Gwangju Uprising

Gwangju Uprising

The Rebellion for Democracy
in South Korea

Recorded by Hwang Sok-yong,

Lee Jae-eui, and Jeon Yong-ho

Compiled by the Gwangju Democratization

Movement Commemoration Committee

(광주민주화운동기념사업회)

Translated by Slin Jung

This book is published with the support of the Literature Translation Institute of Korea (LTI Korea).

This book has been selected to receive financial assistance from English PEN’s “PEN Translates!” programme, supported by Arts Council England. English PEN exists to promote literature and our understanding of it, to uphold writers’ freedoms around the world, to campaign against the persecution and imprisonment of writers for stating their views, and to promote the friendly co-operation of writers and the free exchange of ideas. englishpen.org

This English-language edition first published by Verso 2022

© Hwang Sok-yong, Lee Jae-eui, and Jeon Yong-ho 2017

Translation © Slin Jung 2022

Originally published in Korea as Jugeumeul neomeo, sidaeui eodumeul neomeo by Changbi

All rights reserved

The moral rights of the author have been asserted

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Verso

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ISBN-13: 978-1-78873-714-2

ISBN-13: 978-1-78873-715-9 (UK EBK)

ISBN-13: 978-1-78873-716-6 (US EBK)

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Hwang, Sŏg-yŏng, 1943- author. | Lee, Jai-eui, author. | Jeon, Yong-ho, 1957- author. | Jung, Slin, translator. | Gwangju Democratization Movement Commemoration Committee, compiler.

Title: Gwangju uprising : the rebellion for democracy in South Korea / recorded by Hwang Sok-yong, Lee Jae-eui, and Jeon Yong-ho ; compiled by the Gwangju Democratization Movement Commemoration Committee ; translated by Slin Jung.

Other titles: Chugŭm ŭl nŏmŏ sidae ŭi ŏdum ŭl nŏmŏ. English | Beyond death, beyond the darkness of the age

Description: English-language edition. | London New York : Verso, 2022. | “Originally published in Korea as Chugum ul nomo, sidae ui odum ul nomo by Changbi.” | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2022000530 (print) | LCCN 2022000531 (ebook) | ISBN 9781788737142 (trade paperback) | ISBN 9781788737166 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Kwangju Uprising, Kwangju-si, Korea, 1980. | Kwangju-si (Chŏlla-namdo, Korea)--History. | Democracy--Korea (South)--History.

Classification: LCC DS925.K86 H8413 2022 (print) | LCC DS925.K86 (ebook) | DDC 951.95043--dc23/eng/20220125

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022000530

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022000531

Typeset in Minion Pro by MJ & N Gavan, Truro, Cornwall

Printed in the UK by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents

A Note on Transliteration

Preface: Once More Beyond the Darkness by Hwang Sok-yong

Publication Committee’s Introduction: Breaking the Silence in the Face of Slander

Part I. The Unstoppable Waves of History

1. From October to May

2. Sporadic and Passive Resistance
(Sunday, May 18: Day 1 of the Uprising)

3. Transition to an Active Offensive
(Monday, May 19: Day 2 of the Uprising)

4. Full-Scale Popular Protest
(Tuesday, May 20: Day 3 of the Uprising)

5. Armed Protests and Victory
(Wednesday, May 21: Day 4 of the Uprising)

6. The Uprising Expands

7. The Blockade of Gwangju and Civilian Massacres
(May 21–24)

Part II. Gwangju! Gwangju! Gwangju!

8. Liberation I
(Thursday, May 22: Day 5 of the Uprising)

9. Liberation II
(Friday, May 23: Day 6 of the Uprising)

10. Liberation III
(Saturday, May 24: Day 7 of the Uprising)

11. Liberation IV
(Sunday, May 25: Day 8 of the Uprising)

12. Liberation V
(Monday, May 26: Day 9 of the Uprising)

Part III. The End, and a New Beginning

13. The Uprising’s Completion
(Tuesday, May 27)

14. The Rest of the Story

15. Work Left Undone

Appendix A: Martial Law Troops Deployed to Gwangju

Appendix B: Timeline of Events: The Gwangju Uprising over the Course of 10 days (May 17–27, 1980)

Appendix C: Publishing the Revised Edition: The History of Recording the Uprising

Gwangju Uprising Historical Sites

Notes

Index

Note on Transliteration

When transliterating proper pronouns, for the most part, the translator followed the romanization system (often referred to as the Revised Romanization of Hangeul) established by the National Institute of Korean Language.

Korean names are typically trisyllabic (although they can be disyllabic), in which the surname (or family name) forms the first syllable—unlike in English where the surname would follow the given name(s). In this book, the names have been presented in the Korean way—for example, Bae Eun-jeong. Some names, however, have retained an older variation of spelling to maintain continuity with their appearance in an English-language historical or publishing record (for example, Pusan National University, the Kwangju Christian Hospital, or Shim Jae Hoon).

When transliterating place names, administrative elements like roads, municipalities, and provinces, for example, retained their designations in transliterated form. For example, Geumnam-ro was used instead of Geumnam Street, Geumnam-ro 3-ga instead of Geumnam Street Section 3, and Yang-dong instead of Yang neighborhood.

In contrast, when transliterating human-made, geographical, or cultural entities, the translation was more complete. For example, Dokdo became Dok Island; Seoraksan, Seorak Mountain; Bulguksa, Bulguk Temple; Geungnakgyo, Geungnak Bridge; and Deudeulgang, Deudeul River. If a name contained multiple markers, only the most relevant element was translated to keep the name as close as possible to the original: for example, Mundeungsan Valley was used instead of Mudeung Mountain Valley.

Preface: Once More Beyond the Darkness

When the dust finally settled on the city, the survivors of the Gwangju Uprising in May 1980 were seized by a sense of responsibility to fully record the facts of the uprising for the people of Korea and for posterity.

I was already a writer in the 1970s during the authoritarian Fourth Republic of Korea. I chose then to reside in South Jeolla Province, where Gwangju was located, for the purpose of writing and participating in democratization activism. I spent over a decade in the province, in the cities of Haenam and Gwangju, and befriended countless people. The tragedy at Gwangju transformed those relationships into a destiny to which I would always be bound. Most of those who attempted to record the events of the uprising were young intellectuals outside the established order, and in many cases they were subject to rigorous surveillance, oppression, and incarceration or became wanted criminals forced to compile their information while on the run. It was no easy task to undertake discreet journalistic research and interviews with firsthand witnesses under the oppressive authoritarian regime. But by 1985, facing the fifth anniversary of the uprising, we could no longer deny our calling. As Lee Jae-eui has stated, although only a select few may have participated in the compilation of information, the many citizens who agreed to be interviewed and gave us their testimony must be recognized. It is thanks to them that Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age¹ may truly be called the testimony of the people.

At the request of my friends from Gwangju, I gladly accepted responsibility for the publication of a record of the uprising. Considering the political climate of South Korea at the time, the role came with the risk of imprisonment and persecution—but that, too, was part of my calling as a writer. The title of the compiled book was taken from the anguished poem by Moon Byung-ran titled “The Song of Revival.” It was an encapsulation of the modern history of Korea and its people, from Imperial Japanese occupation to democratization and the path to reunification. It was thanks to the book that the desperate final stand at the South Jeolla Province Hall was transformed into a rallying standard for the democratization movements of the 1980s and the June Struggle.

Humanity and the course of history are unique in their capacity for change. But the latter can only be changed by the actions of the former. The physical limitations of human life mean that new and old will always exist together; the world will not change for the better overnight. The era in South Korean history following the June Struggle was a time of compromise, when we failed to excise the political and cultural remnants of the authoritarian regime and were forced to guarantee freedoms even to the leaders of the old order. Though we were draped in the lavish robes of democracy, Korea remained a divided nation whose security was fundamentally compromised.

Following the elections of two successive right-wing presidents in South Korea in 2008 and 2013, right-wing groups that had supported the dictatorship immediately attempted to eliminate the democratic values of the Gwangju Uprising by resorting to the strategy that vested interests had used many times in the past—the invocation of North Korea and the clash of ideologies it would bring. Empowered by the revival of authoritarian-era public security forces, they asserted that the Gwangju Uprising was a riot against the supposedly legitimate force known as the South Korean military, incited by communist special forces who had crossed the 38th parallel or by conspirators acting on orders from North Korea.

A national military is composed of the sons and daughters of the people, and their primary purpose is to protect the lives and properties of the country’s citizens. But the deployment of the Special Forces to Gwangju in 1980 was for the purpose of defending the authority of Chun Doo-hwan and his cronies, the Singunbu; in the 1990s the courts ruled it to be a coup d’état and an act of treason against the people of South Korea. By this definition, the military forces deployed during the uprising were essentially a private force with no legitimate authority. The actions of Gwangju citizens during the uprising were clearly sanctioned by the constitution, which outlines the people’s right of revolution. The people of Gwangju rose up in the name of democracy to protect their right to live and defend themselves against the indiscriminate killing of South Korean citizens.

As firsthand accounts from Gwangju citizens and press both domestic and foreign will attest, right-wing groups’ claims of North Korean incitement are farcical. Recently declassified documents from the United States confirm that Chun and the Singunbu were fully aware that claims of North Korean involvement were fraudulent. Chun’s reassignment of regular military units from national defense to demonstrator suppression in Gwangju proves that there was no significant North Korean threat against the South at the time, as does the US’s implicit approval of Chun’s actions, which led to longstanding anti-American sentiments in South Korea. Claims of North Korean intervention were always the favored tactic of postdivision authoritarian regimes in South Korea and were attempted in Gwangju as well. Chun attempted to frame Gwangju’s citizen defenders as communists through ploys such as the so-called Poison Pin Incident, which was discovered and disclosed to the masses. The only real conspiracies involved in the uprising were the orders of Chun and the Singunbu, named Operation Loyalty. The citizens of Gwangju acted with no central authority. They simply stepped forward wherever they happened to be, helping, protecting, and fighting for those within reach, becoming comrades in arms and forming a community.

My life was never the same following the publication of Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age. I was compelled to dedicate my life to the truth of the uprising. When the book was published in 1985, Chun’s Department of National Security arrested publisher Na Byeong-sik and me for the minor crime of rumormongering as a form of harassment. Later, Na was arrested and indicted for the publication of the book Hanguk minjungsa (A people’s history of Korea). I was strongly advised by the government to accept a recent invitation to a cultural event in Berlin and handed a temporary passport. The Chun administration did not want the Gwangju Uprising to enter mainstream discourse.

For my part, the Berlin trip was my first time leaving the effective island that was South Korea, my first chance to objectively examine myself and the othered. I traveled to Europe, the Americas, and Japan to speak with foreign literary communities, civic groups, and the Korean diaspora and raised awareness about the Gwangju Uprising. In the United States, photocopied versions of the book were printed by Young Koreans United—an activist group founded by political exile Yoon Han Bong. Yang Gwan-su and fellow Koreans in Osaka translated the book into Japanese and published it under the supervision of the Japan Catholic Council for Justice and Peace. It was only after leaving South Korea that I realized that the limitations of our democracy were rooted in the precarious state of our national security.

In 1989, at the tail end of South Korea’s developmental dictatorship era, I made a highly publicized visit to North Korea alongside Reverend Moon Ik-hwan. It was a show of resistance against the South Korean government, which repeatedly attempted to suppress our democratization activities by accusing us of having connections to North Korea. Our visit was also an attempt to bring the issue of reunification into mainstream discourse among ordinary South Korean citizens. Unable to return to South Korea following the visit, I spent four years in exile and was incarcerated upon my return, spending five years in jail. In the thirteen years following 1985, I had been unable to write and was therefore more of an activist than a writer, but I console myself with the thought that my actions during the period were in and of themselves literature.

The overwhelming developmental superiority of South Korea over its twin in the north has been proven by social and economic metrics in the seventy years since the country’s division. South Korea is likely the only country liberated from colonial rule in the aftermath of World War II to have achieved the two pillars of modernization—industrialization and democracy—simultaneously. The security threat posed by North Korea is no longer sufficient excuse to put off democratic reforms. The 2008 and 2013 conservative administrations in South Korea, however, treated North Korea with open hostility and returned to Cold War–era politics, effectively handing over the reins of national security on the Korean Peninsula to foreign powers. Their actions reversed our efforts to transition into an era of peace, and instead plunged the country into the direct threat of war. This goes against the very spirit of the Gwangju Uprising, which was ultimately a struggle for democracy and a fight for a peninsula where the two Koreas could exist in peace.

In its regression into the ways of the authoritarian Fourth Republic, the 2013 Park Geun-hye administration heaped abuses on Gwangju’s history even more aggressively than her conservative predecessor Lee Myung-bak. The most glaring example was the Park administration’s attempt to cast aspersions on the song “Marching for Our Beloved,” which had been composed in remembrance of those killed in the uprising and sung as a symbol of resistance against government oppression. They accused the song of having been composed on the orders of Kim Il-sung, pointing to my 1989 trip to North Korea, on top of their ludicrous claims that Beyond Death had been copied from a North Korean book. This was, of course, impossible, because the song was composed in 1982 while my visit to North Korea was seven years later. The survivors and witnesses of Gwangju were already supported by the flood of evidence sent overseas in the immediate aftermath of the uprising by religious and secular organizations. At around the same time, articles, photographs, and video materials from foreign press also flooded into South Korea. Any hypothetical North Korean book that accusers claim served as the origin of Beyond Death would have been a copy—a copy of reality based on facts and material evidence. Shamefully, it was the South Korean press that was unable to report a single word about the truth of the Gwangju Uprising because of the Chun regime’s brutal censorship and oppression.

Talks on a revised edition of Beyond Death began in 2010, on the thirtieth anniversary of the Gwangju Uprising. But circumstances prevented us from properly pursuing the project until 2014, when Jeong Sang-yong, Jeong Yong-hwa, Lee Jae-eui, and Jeon Yong-ho came to Na Byeong-sik and me with renewed resolve. We were heartbroken when Na passed away of a chronic illness soon after the discussions, but we pressed on. While the South Korean government continued to make a mockery of the Gwangju Uprising, we grit our teeth and continued our work. It was in the midst of this process that the Candlelight Struggle for the removal of Park Geun-hye from presidential office began.

It was a season of unprecedented hope. Enkindled by the sorrows of Gwangju and the deaths of the many young souls on the Sewol Ferry, the people of South Korea displayed their potential to the fullest and changed their world. It is thanks to their efforts that this book will no longer be a record of blood and tears, but a guidepost for a society that upholds the values of justice and peace.

Hwang Sok-yong

May 2017

Publication Committee’s Introduction:
Breaking the Silence in the Face of Slander

This book is something of an anomaly. It is the first revised edition of Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age, which was first published in 1985. We had been bombarded with requests for a revised edition throughout those years but could never bring ourselves to begin the work. The prospect of facing the realities of the Gwangju Uprising again was simply too painful and distressing.

The election of two consecutive conservative governments in South Korea in the twenty-first century, however, led to the erosion of the integrity of national democracy. It was impossible not to respond. The Park Geun-hye administration in particular, which took power in 2013, attempted to distort the truths of the Gwangju Uprising and drag it down from its place on the moral high ground—and came perilously close to succeeding. Such factions have existed in South Korea since the days immediately after the uprising; when this book was first published as Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age in 1985, they heaped one abusive accusation after another on the book’s contents and the context in which it was written, and showed no reservations about resorting to ad hominem attacks on the authors. It was as if the ghosts of the authoritarian Chun Doo-hwan administration were refusing to die, bent on slandering and covering up the uprising.

Why were these people so fixated on Beyond Death? Part of the reason lies with the book’s place in history as the first structured record of the Gwangju Uprising that spoke on behalf of the people, but the more important reason is the historical stance taken by the book. Opponents claim that the Gwangju Uprising was a treasonous riot stirred up by the citizens of Gwangju against the central government. They claim that the riot was repackaged into a legitimate revolution by Beyond Death. It is their argument that this book, read by countless South Koreans since its publication, implanted the idea in the public’s mind that the Gwangju Uprising was a struggle for democracy by the people.

The full democratization of South Korea in the 1990s silenced them. Former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, who masterminded the uprising, were convicted during the trial for the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising. The uprising was officially declared a democratization movement, and the Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement was legislated to bring justice for those affected by the Chun administration’s retaliation. In 2011, multiple records from the Gwangju Uprising were included in UNESCO’s Memory of the World alongside documents such as England’s Magna Carta (1215), the United States Declaration of Independence (1776), and France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789).

Beyond Death played a small but critical part in the elevation of the uprising’s historical significance. The first edition of the book was one of the catalysts for the June Struggle in 1987, a nationwide democratization movement that led to the establishment of the modern-day democratic government of South Korea. The people of South Korea, who had previously been denied information about the Gwangju Uprising, were stunned by the truth. Word of mouth about Beyond Death spread, turning it into an underground bestseller. People read their copies in secret and quietly shared how they wept over the book. The facts of the terrible massacre and the brutalities perpetrated by the Chun regime had finally reached the public. South Koreans demanded that the government disclose the truth behind the Gwangju Uprising and open up the constitution for revision. Of these demands, the former essentially became the foundation of the country’s democratization.

The South Korean government’s stance on the Gwangju Uprising took an unfavorable turn with the election of the conservative president Lee Myung-bak in 2008. Far-right demagogues, most famously the internet community known as Ilbe, began to present distorted versions of the causes, character, and timeline of the Gwangju Uprising. They argued that the city of Gwangju had been infiltrated by North Korean agents in 1980 and that those among the citizens seen with their faces covered were actually inciting the people on behalf of North Korea. They even claimed that, on the final May 27 attack on Province Hall, government forces did not kill a single Gwangju citizen—that every casualty was actually a North Korean agent or rioters accidentally firing on innocent civilians.

The sudden surge of revisionist sentiment led to renewed attacks on Beyond Death. Opponents first cast doubt on the contents of the book before turning to personal attacks on the writers. When plans for a revised edition were announced to the public in February 2014, these opponents spewed abusive messages through publications and the media and even released illegally filmed footage online in their thorough attempts to discredit the writers and the book.

We could no longer remain silent and watch as historical truths were slandered and destroyed. In January 2014, we formed a publication committee with plans to publish the revised edition of this book in May 2015, on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Gwangju Uprising. It was determined that the project would be funded by civilian donations, and a press conference was held in July 2014. However, the committee was unable to keep its promised release date. There was simply too much information to examine—witness testimonies and hearing records, records for the trials of Chun and Roh, records pertaining to the deployment of the military, declassified documents from the United States, and testimonies from journalists who were present at the city—which totaled hundreds of thousands of pages. Compiling the multitude of voices into a single volume was a titanic task that took more time than initially expected. We apologize sincerely for failing to meet the promised deadline and ask readers for their understanding.

Gwangju Uprising carries on the work of its predecessor in conveying the perspectives and voices of the people of Gwangju. When the first edition was published in 1985, it was a beacon of hope and comfort to the people of the city, who had suffered under accusations of rioting. The authoritarian regime of the time monopolized all discourse and politics relating to the Gwangju Uprising, making the very publication of Beyond Death the subject of great attention. The public recognition came with danger as the book dealt with the Chun administration’s sordid past and its corrupt origins. The writers and publishing team that set out to make the book a reality were ready to put themselves in peril from the outset, but to our infinite gratitude, chairman Jeon Gye-ryang of the South Jeolla Social Activism Association, author Hwang Sok-yong, and the late president Na Byeong-sik of Pulbit Publishing House willingly took it upon themselves to serve as editors in a time of political oppression and authoritarianism. They stepped forward to share in the difficulties that we would have otherwise shouldered alone. I would like to take this opportunity to thank them once again.

We extend our gratitude to the writers of the revised edition of this book: Hwang Sok-yong, Lee Jae-eui, and Jeon Yong-ho. We are also thankful to Jo Yang-hun for filling in our maps and to Ahn Jong-cheol, Ahn Jeong-gil, Jeong Dae-ha, Park Byeong-gi, and Jeong Hyeon-ae for reviewing the manuscript. In addition, we would like to recognize director Jeong Yong-hwa of the Gwangju Democratization Movement Commemoration Committee (광주민주화운동기념사업회) and Choi Pyeong-ji, Cho Bong-hun, Kim Sang-jip, Kim Chang-jung, and the late Jeong Ui-haeng for their work on the executive committee. The May 18th Memorial Foundation (director: Cha Myeong-seok), the May 18 Democratization Movement Archive (director: Na Gan-chae), and the Chonnam National University May 18 Institute (chair: Park Hae-gwang) have our gratitude for their archival assistance. Finally, we thank the publication committee for their tireless work raising funds from across South Korea to make this project possible.

As we wrapped up our work on the revised edition, South Korean society entered a new era in history. The people came together in the Candlelight Struggle of 2016 and 2017 to call for the removal of President Park Geun-hye from office. Change was upon us, and this time without the bloodshed of the Gwangju Uprising. The corruption that had taken root into the country throughout the administrations of Park Chunghee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Park Geun-hye was pulled clean out of the ground by the people. The wreck of the Sewol Ferry was raised to the surface once more to clear up the truths the Park administration had tried to bury under the waves. A new task is now upon South Korea—the task of removing the corruption of the past. At the same time, Koreans must contend with continued opposition, such as the publication of Chun and his wife’s autobiography. This revised edition of Beyond Death will bring the perpetrators’ duplicity and violence into the spotlight and compel readers to ask the fundamental question: “What is a nation?” We hope that the sacrifices of the Gwangju Uprising will be reflected in the entirety of the South Korean Constitution, which may stand as the shining exemplar for all citizens to follow in this democratic republic.

Gwangju Uprising Revision Committee

Chair Jeong Sang-yong

May 2017

Part I

The Unstoppable Waves of History

1

From October to May

The Busan-Masan Democratization Protests and the Assassination of Park Chung-hee

October 26, 1979. At 7:41 p.m., the peaceful weekend evening was shattered by a series of gunshots.

The commotion was traced to a narrow alley in Seoul’s Gungjeong-dong neighborhood, near the Blue House—South Korea’s presidential residence. Director Kim Jae-gyu of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) had opened fire on Park Chung-hee, the president of South Korea, ending Park’s life and the authoritarian regime that had been the Fourth Republic of Korea.

Park’s military regime first came into power in 1961. It proceeded to retain a viselike grip on South Korea for eighteen years by amending the constitution three times, ultimately allowing an individual to remain in office for an indefinite number of terms. In October 1972, the regime declared martial law and illegally passed the Fourth Republic Constitution (also known as the Yusin Constitution), signaling the start of a decade of cruel military dictatorship.¹ Chaebol monopolies were formed under the regime’s protection, leading to worsened economic exploitation and increased pressure on the working class. In the midst of mounting authoritarian oppression, postsecondary students and some intellectuals began to form organized resistance groups. It was in this time of merciless tyranny that the South Korean democratization movement developed and grew.

However, much of the resistance in the 1970s was limited to the students and intellectuals, with little participation from agricultural- and industrial-sector workers. The Yusin regime responded to fledgling attempts at activism by promoting ideologies such as economic development and anti-communism to tighten its control over society. Its plan to spur economic development indeed found quantitative success but led directly to problems such as low incomes, growing urban poverty rates, the dissolution of agricultural communities, widening wealth gaps, and regional development gaps. The social pressures eventually reached a breaking point marked by the Busan-Masan Democratization Protests.

The protests began on October 16, 1979, as a demonstration by students in the city of Busan calling for the end of the Yusin regime. They were quickly joined by blue-collar workers and ordinary citizens from the neighboring city of Masan. The demonstration quickly turned into a full-fledged protest. On October 18, Park Chung-hee declared martial law in the Busan area and court-martialed sixty-six civilians. Two days later, on October 20, Park declared a garrison decree over the Masan and Changwon regions—deploying tanks and the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade to quash the protests—and court-martialed fifty-nine civilians. The Busan-Masan Democratization Protests were thus stopped, but the trigger had already been pulled. Less than a week later, the Yusin regime ended with the assassination of Park Chung-hee.

On October 26, Park attended the opening ceremony of a dam in Sapgyocheon, South Chungcheong Province, and returned to Seoul for dinner in Gungjeong-dong. The meal was well underway and the diners relaxing over a bottle of Chivas Regal when an argument began between Kim Jae-gyu and chief presidential bodyguard Cha Ji-chul over the regime’s response to the protests. Where Cha was in full agreement with the strong military retaliation, Kim argued that displays of forceful oppression would not sustain the regime much longer. Cha went as far as to respond, “Pol Pot of Cambodia stayed in power after killing two million people; we could easily kill one million and retain our authority.” Park sided with Cha in the matter. Kim judged that the Yusin regime had to be ended,² took out a handgun, and shot Park and Cha.

President Park Chung-hee, symbol of the authoritarian Yusin regime, was suddenly removed from the throne. In that instant, South Korean politics was turned upside down. The regime had stood on five pillars of political power—the KCIA, the presidential secretariat, the presidential security service, the military, and the Blue House (South Korea’s executive office and presidential residence), with the latter reigning at the top. The assassination resulted in all but the military losing political authority.³

Emergency Responses by South Korea and the United States

At 2:00 a.m. on October 27, six hours following the assassination of Park Chung-hee, the South Korean government convened an emergency cabinet meeting. Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah assumed the role of acting president and responded to the national crisis. At 4:00 a.m., the government declared emergency martial law over all of South Korea (with the exception of Jeju Island) and named ROK Army Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa the Chief Martial Law Administrator. At 12:40 a.m. on October 27, Jeong summoned Defense Security Commander Chun Doo-hwan to take the arrested Kim Jae-gyu into custody and conduct a thorough investigation.⁴ Chun took on leadership of the Joint Investigation Headquarters and officially led the investigation of the Park assassination.

To minimize the incident’s effect on the public, the government focused its efforts on maintaining order and setting the foundations for the gradual development of the political system.⁵ The foreign press took note of the swift response and commented, “daily life for South Korean citizens is quickly returning to business as usual” and that citizens were “expected to shape a new republic founded on the bedrock of political freedom” in a show of optimism for the country’s future.⁶ On November 8, Acting President Choi delivered a state of affairs address promising the amendment of the Yusin Constitution and a government-led move to democratization. The interim government’s rapid response led to the equally rapid pacification of public sentiment.

The US government also reacted quickly to the assassination.⁷ In the immediate aftermath of the killings, President Jimmy Carter convened the National Security Council and declared DEFCON 3 for United States Forces Korea (USFK). Deeming that intervention by North Korea, the USSR, and China was likely, the US State Department warned them not to take action. As outlined in the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States, the US military responded promptly. On October 28, US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown deployed two state-of-the-art Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) units as a deterrent. Two days later, the USS Blue Ridge, flagship of the United States Seventh Fleet with a displacement of over 12,000 tons, was stationed at the Port of Busan. On November 2, the USS Kitty Hawk, a supercarrier with a displacement of 73,000 tons, as well as two guided missile cruisers, were stationed at the same port, and three pairs of battleships (including frigates) were deployed to the ports of Jinhae and Incheon. The United States Pacific Command (PACOM) firepower was focused on the Korean Peninsula to serve as a powerful bulwark.⁸ The proactive defensive maneuver was powerful enough to raise tensions not only in North Korea but also in China and the USSR. The increased security made the possibility of North Korean invasion or infiltration of South Korea practically impossible.⁹

President Carter continued to keep a close eye on the situation in South Korea, forming a policymaking group in the National Security Council.¹⁰ This team was dubbed “Cherokee”¹¹ and convened to directly discuss South Korea and decide on policies for the country. Members included President Carter and US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, with US Ambassador to South Korea William H. Gleysteen being the only member based in the country. Gleysteen would keep in contact with South Korean officials like Defense Security Commander Chun Doo-hwan, President Choi Kyu-hah, ROK-US Combined Forces Command Deputy Commander Lew Byeong-hyun, Prime Minister Shin Hyun-hwak, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Tongjin. His role was to discreetly represent US interests and negotiate with South Korean officials.

Political Uncertainty

One month later, on November 24, nongovernment political activists in support of democracy gathered at YWCA Seoul under the pretense of a wedding to discuss the changes that would follow the Park assassination. The group, which included former president Yun Posun and human rights activist Ham Seok-heon, concluded that the assassination was the culmination of years of desperate struggling for democracy. It was the end of the Yusin dictatorship, they declared, which necessitated the immediate establishment of a democratic administration. However, the meeting was forcibly terminated. One hundred and forty were indicted without detention and the fourteen leaders of the meeting were taken to the Joint Investigation HQ to be brutally tortured. The gathering had underestimated the force with which the military would retaliate.

On December 6, Acting President Choi was formally elected president by the National Conference for Unification, a 2,549-member electoral college. Politicians across the spectrum suspected that the acting Choi administration intended to carry on an updated version of the Yusin regime. The regime’s supporters remained in positions of absolute national influence and hoped to drag their feet, waiting for public sentiment to settle again before pursuing an advantageous new constitution. The YWCA meeting and Choi’s election to office were signs of turbulent times to come. The future of South Korea was mired in complete political uncertainty.

The December 12 Military Insurrection

The movements of the South Korean military were among the most important political variables in the wake of the Park assassination. In the military, there was a sharp rise in demand for the removal of soldiers from political positions. Open criticism also mounted against the unofficial military organization known as the Hanahoe, which had gained a monopoly over influential military positions under the Park regime.¹² Spooked by the show of hostility, members of the Hanahoe quickly rallied around Chun. Most major military units in the Seoul area were by this time entirely under the authority of Hanahoe members. In full defiance of chain of command, they answered only to the orders of the informal organization. Fear of being caught off-guard spread rapidly among members, and when the Hanahoe’s intelligence caught wind that Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa was plotting to remove Chun, it took preemptive action.¹³

Threatened with removal from positions of political influence, the Hanahoe chose to turn the tables by seizing military command. Its first target was Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa. Chun led the conspiracy, assisted by Defense Security Command advisors including Chief Secretary Heo Hwa-pyeong, Chief of Personnel Heo Sam Soo, and Chief Investigator Lee Hak-bong—all members of the Hanahoe. The group went so far as to draft plans for a military command overhaul and administrative takeover, which would be implemented upon the success of the insurrection.¹⁴

In early December, Chun commanded Lieutenant Colonel Lee Hak-bong to devise a plan for the arrest of Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa, citing Jeong’s dubious actions during the Park assassination.¹⁵ His preparations complete, Chun met with Commander Roh Tae-woo of the 9th Infantry Division on December 7 and set December 12 as the date of the coup.

On the evening of December 12, core members of the Hanahoe—Yu Hak-seong, Hwang Young-si, Cha Gyu-heon, Park Jun Byung, Baek Un-taek, Park Hee-do, Choi Se-chang, Jang Gi-oh, Jang Se-dong, and Kim Jin-young—discreetly convened at the office of the 30th Garrison at Capital Garrison Command. In the meantime, Roh withdrew the 9th Infantry Division from the front lines, deploying them to Seoul in a flagrant violation of the law. Park Hee-do and Choi Se-chang deployed the paratroopers under their command to the capital as well. Heo Sam Soo, chief of personnel at Defense Security Command, launched an assault on the chief of staff’s official residence and, following a shootout with security, took Jeong Seung-hwa into custody. Upon receiving belated news of the arrest, commanders such as Special Warfare Commander Major General Jeong Byeong-ju, Capital Garrison Commander Major General Jang Tae-wan, and ROK Army Provost Marshal General and Martial Law Command Public Security Chief Brigadier General Kim Jin-gi mobilized their forces. However, the insurrectionists had already taken the upper hand.¹⁶

Having taken the ROK Army chief of staff into custody, Chun Doo-hwan went to President Choi Kyu-hah to request his official approval for the arrest. Choi responded with rage. “You’ve made a complete mess. This is a breach of protocol. It is illegal, and I will not give my approval without listening to the circumstances first. I demand to see the Minister of National Defense.” At 3:30 a.m., the insurrectionists emerged victorious in a shootout and took control over the ROK Army HQ and the Ministry of National Defense. Finally, they hauled Minister of National Defense Roh Jae-hyeon to Defense Security Command, and at 5:00 a.m., Chun took him to the Blue House. President Choi put his signature at the bottom of the approval document, adding the time of the signature—5:00 a.m.—to indicate that he had resisted for as long as he could.¹⁷

Because of the speed at which the events unfolded, little about the December 12 military insurrection was known to the public. Although tanks were deployed and soldiers exchanged fire in the streets of Seoul—leaving a significant number of personnel dead—very few outside those directly involved recognized the dramatic change. The fact that the incident took place at night and involved so few people meant that the coup and its immediate ramifications remained nearly imperceptible even to the government and those in the political world who had been keeping a close eye on the political situation.

The December 12 military insurrection involved the unlawful deployment of over 5,000 personnel and thirty-five tanks. A regular combat unit at the frontlines against North Korea had left its post and entered Seoul, and the official chain of command at the ROK Army HQ was left completely paralyzed. The incident was met with strong criticism from the United States, which claimed that the deployment of the 9th Infantry Division from the North Korean border to Seoul without the prior consent of the ROK-US combined forces commander was a violation of the Mutual Defense Treaty.¹⁸ The following day, Chun retrieved public funds from the vault at the Ministry of National Defense and handed out KRW 50 million to each unit that was ordered to participate in the coup as though dividing spoils of war.

On the morning after the coup, the insurrectionists immediately shuffled key military positions, seating Hanahoe members or pro-Chun personnel in places of command. Choo Young-bock was made minister of national defense, Lee Hui-seong the ROK army vice chief of staff, Roh Tae-woo the capital garrison commander, and Chung Ho-yong the special warfare commander. The unofficial organization seized full control over the military, giving rise to the Singunbu regime. Only two days after the coup, Gleysteen met Chun at the US embassy. According to a recent WikiLeaks cable, the Chun-Gleysteen meeting was arranged by CIA station chief in South Korea Robert Brewster, despite opposition by ROK-US Combined Forces Commander John Wickham. The United States’ implicit acceptance added further leverage to Chun’s influence over the South Korean military. It was not until 1997 that the Supreme Court of South Korea officially ruled the December 12 military insurrection a “mutinous military insurrection”¹⁹ and “the beginning of a rebellion to seize political authority.”²⁰

The Singunbu’s Bid for Political Takeover

Galvanized by the success of the December insurrection, Chun and his cronies immediately prepared to quash the public’s calls for democracy, which would hinder their bid for power. They would systematically take control over the media and major intelligence agencies, followed by key national institutions such as the National Assembly, the Blue House, and the courts. Chun’s Defense Security Command advisors played critical roles in the planning and execution of these plans. They revived the defunct Bureau of Information at Defense Security Command and implemented Operation K, a strategy that would give them total control over the press. Training for the military riot suppression tactic, titled “Operation Loyalty Training,” was escalated to full-blown mock trials. In early May 1980, the Singunbu devised a concrete plan of action and set out to swallow the government whole.

Operation K

In mid-February 1980, Chun installed a media taskforce within Defense Security Command. The force would be led by Warrant Officer Lee Sang-jae from the Counter-communism Division and exercise control over the media in order to improve the military’s public image under the pretext of overseeing Martial Law Command’s press censorship duties. Public sentiment was the biggest obstacle to the Singunbu’s rise to power. The people of South Korea had had enough of military dictatorship and were clearly not inclined to accept another such regime.

In response, the media taskforce devised Operation K, a clandestine plan: “as discretion is imperative to this strategy, it shall henceforth only be referred to as ‘Operation K,’ and should any amendments or additions be required in the implementation of this plan, approval must be received from Commander Chun Doo-hwan.”²¹ To accomplish their plan, the taskforce set a concrete goal: change public sentiment regarding the discourse between democratization and stabilization, and overturn the people’s preference for the former. Stage 1 of Operation K was set for March 25 to May 31, stage 2 for the month of June, and stage 3 for July until the completion of the plan. A monthly budget of KRW 9.7 million was allocated to stage 1 and KRW 4 million to stages 2 and 3, with a separate budget for special operations. Operation K’s primary targets were the ninety-four executives, presidents, and editors of the country’s seven major newspapers, five major broadcasters, and two news agencies. Agents would meet with the targets individually and, through persuasion and threats, gradually bring them to the Singunbu’s side. The media taskforce also operated a press censorship desk to scrutinize news articles in the name of public security, dragging off any reporters unfavorable to the Singunbu’s activities to be beaten and their families threatened.²²

Operation Loyalty Training

The Singunbu’s government takeover was no different from a military operation. On February 18, ROK Army HQ conveyed special orders to the First, Second, and Third ROK Army commanders, the special warfare commander, the capital garrison commander, and the public defense security commander to speed up the timeframe for the quarterly Operation Loyalty training so it would begin and end in February. This training scheme was an offensive riot suppression tactic designed at Chun’s orders by Defense Security Command advisors and handed over to ROK Army HQ.

The Singunbu subsequently initiated the rigorous training exercise, which involved units based around the Seoul area. Composed of divisions under the Capital Garrison Command—the 1st, 3rd, 7th, and 9th Airborne Special Forces Brigades and the 17th, 20th, 26th, and 30th Infantry Divisions—these “Loyalty units” specialized in riot suppression and counter-rebellion operations. The Special Warfare units in particular would spearhead such operations. Free from US operational control, these units were historically deployed for riot suppression for incidents that threatened government authority, such as the Busan-Masan Democratization Protests, the December 12 military insurrection, and later the Gwangju Uprising. Although relatively cumbersome to utilize in comparison to regular forces under US operational control, the Airborne Special Forces Brigades were “the most convenient tool at an authoritarian’s disposal.”²³ The Singunbu had learned from the Busan-Masan Democratization Protests that a quick and powerful response was the most effective way to end protests.²⁴

Operation Loyalty training took place from March 4 to 6 that year to coincide with resumption of classes at postsecondary institutions. The training was almost rigorous enough to be real combat. The men were armed with batons measuring 45–75 cm in length and 5–6 cm in diameter, made of ash wood—which meant that they were larger and denser than traditional police batons.²⁵ The paratroopers of the Airborne Special Forces Brigades were trained to charge into groups of rioters to scatter them, spreading fear and brutally beating participants and taking the leaders into custody on the spot in order to discourage regrouping.

At the First Loyalty Conference on March 6, Loyalty unit commanders including Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong labeled student activist groups as “zealous insurgents” and agreed that they must be separated from society at large. By the end of April, the Singunbu had completed preparations for national emergency military operations, from logistics to securing the requisite forces.

Chun Doo-hwan Appointed Acting KCIA Director

On April 14, Defense Security Commander Chun Doo-hwan was appointed to the position of acting KCIA director, which put him in control of two of the most powerful national intelligence organizations. When the new position finally brought Chun into the media spotlight, student council members at Chonnam National University in the city of Gwangju became wary. His name began to appear on posters pasted on campus walls and student gatherings. Although Chun’s role as a key military figure had been mentioned occasionally in news drifting in from Seoul, the majority of Gwangju citizens had never heard of him.

The announcement of Chun’s new position was met with immediate resistance from the opposition and the political community. The US government responded by pushing back the regular ROK-US security consultative meetings to a later date as a stern warning against the consolidation of power.²⁶

Democratization Activist Groups

In contrast to the Singunbu’s proactive preparations for an offensive, democratization activists made slow progress. The democratization activism community at the time was split into approximately four groups:

• postsecondary student activists who were quick to understand social circumstances and were capable of the most powerful responses to political situations;

• nongovernment political activists—a group from disparate backgrounds such as clergy, literati, journalists, scholars, and young adults who had been brought together by shared circumstances such as imprisonment and self-sacrifice during the Yusin regime;

• opposition party politicians such as Kim Young-sam and opposition political activists such as Gwangju-area politician Kim Dae-jung, who directly challenged the Yusin regime and attempted to secure a place in the political community; and

• civil activists from low-income backgrounds such as blue-collar workers, farmers, and the impoverished, who grew in influence through their struggles for the right to dignified life in the 1970s.

By 1980, the pro-democratization camp was characterized by a constant tug-of-war between the groups. The students and the nongovernment political activists took charge of the pushing and pulling for the democratization movement, alternating positions to suit the circumstances. These two groups discovered common perspectives and solidarity and eventually allied with the pro-democracy politicians via the National Union for Democracy and Unification. The student activists, however, were unable to fight on behalf of the extensive demands of the civil activists. The nongovernment political activists were not sufficiently organized to handle the fervor rising from the people and did not have the capacity to support the people’s fight for the right to dignified life.

The nongovernment political activists in Gwangju hailed from a range of backgrounds: religious leaders such as priests and pastors, human rights lawyers, civic groups, and teachers. Of the religious leaders, some were rooted in agricultural activist groups such as the Catholic Farmers’ Association and the Christian Farmers’ Association, and they provided assistance to labor unions through groups like the Young Christian Workers. The opposition activists in Gwangju as a whole, like those in the rest of South Korea, were not prepared for the sweeping changes in the politically fueled student activist camp.

The Springtime of Democracy

With the start of the new school year in March 1980, the South Korean people’s passion for democracy began to break through the frozen wasteland of the eighteen-year Park dictatorship. Democratization was the call of the era, a flood that could no longer be stopped. Young people and students who had been imprisoned for their resistance to the Yusin regime and the suspension of citizens’ rights and freedoms, and those who had been expelled from school due to their involvement in political incidents, were released and allowed back to classes.

On March 28, the Seoul National University Student Council was formally organized. Other postsecondary institutions followed, and by mid-April, every major university had elected a student council for the year. Students voiced overwhelming support for anti-Yusin activists; the majority of student council presidents were activists themselves.

As for labor activism, the number of labor disputes in the year 1980 reached 719 by April 24—almost seven times as many as that in all of 1979 (during which 105 occurred). Blue-collar workers called for the right to organize, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to strike, but they also voiced political demands such as the abolition of the National Security Act. However, labor activists as a whole did not have strong popular backing and did not have the organizational or offensive capabilities to withstand the brutal oppression of the Singunbu.

It was in this social climate that the Sabuk Incident occurred.²⁷ Tensions ran high as the Singunbu readied the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade for deployment, but the incident ended just before the paratroopers could be ordered into the field and the brigade was withdrawn from the nearby city of Wonju.²⁸ Only a month later, the brigade would play a critical role in the bloodbath at Gwangju.

Politicians began to actively debate matters of constitutional reform and democratization. While the Blue House preferred to adopt the dual executive system, the National Assembly was opposed to presidentially led constitutional reform. Popular sentiment mounted against the concentration of Yusin powers. At the same time, there was discreet yet growing competition between the three most likely presidential candidates: Kim Dae-jung—recently returned to politics after incarceration and house arrest—and Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil, the respective leaders of the ruling and opposition parties. Agreeing that the Singunbu must not be permitted any excuse to intervene in politics, they urged for restraint from student and nongovernment political activists. Meanwhile, Gleysteen met with the Singunbu, the South Korean government, politicians, nongovernment activists, and other parties and signaled that “gradual democratization” was the US official stance on the South Korean situation.

The Singunbu took one step after another to political domination. It manipulated the media to cast the competition between Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung as an “ugly factional split,” and as time went on, Gleysteen was dragged along behind the Singunbu’s increasingly forceful momentum.

Democratization Activism in the South Jeolla Region

Managed by Kim Sang-yun, Gwangju’s Nokdu Bookstore hosted multiple book clubs that produced student activists and served as a hub for information about the movements of the military in Seoul and the rest of South Korea. Another group of note in the city was the Modern Cultural Research Center, run by Kim Nam-ju, Yoon Han Bong, and Jeong Yong-hwa. The center sought to consolidate the social activism movements in South Korea and attempted to reach out to blue-collar workers to sow the seeds of activism. Other organizations that fought for democratization included the Yangseo Association, the Credit Union, the Council of Youth for Democracy, the Songbaek Women’s Society, night school groups, and the Gwangdae Theater Company. Progressive Catholics and Protestants educated budding labor unions in Gwangju and assisted farmers’ associations and youth activist groups. The YMCA and YWCA reached out to the citizens of Gwangju, expanding their contact points. In the days leading up to the uprising, the democratization movement swelled exponentially in the city’s mainstream.

Standing at the forefront of the movement were the student activists from Chonnam National University and Chosun University. Chonnam in particular was energized by the return of more than thirty students and faculty who had been wrongly expelled or incarcerated: Jeong Dong-nyeon, who was imprisoned for his opposition to Korea–Japan talks in 1965; those who had been part of the National Youth and Student Alliance for Democracy, which was wrongly accused in 1974 of attempting to overthrow the government; and the faculty who had been dismissed for signing the Standards of Democratic Education declaration in 1978. The start of the school year in March was accompanied by the formation of the Commission for the Liberalization of Educational Institutions, which abolished the Student National Defense Corps and paved the way for the birth of the student council organization. On April 2, third-year law student Park Gwan-hyun was chosen by direct election as Chonnam’s student council president.²⁹ The Chonnam Student Council, in addition to its official administrative team, formed a clandestine planning team.³⁰ The team operated a separate unofficial outreach team called “Voice of the University.”

Unlike faculty at other South Korean postsecondary institutions, professors Myeong Noh-geun and Song Gisuk (and others) were restored to their positions at Chonnam. Their addition to the ranks intensified the school’s preparations to eradicate the remnants of the authoritarian Yusin regime.³¹ As postsecondary students across the country protested against mandatory military training exercises, the younger members of Chonnam’s student body gained an increased awareness of South Korea’s sociopolitical situation and staged repeated overnight sit-ins as well as emergency town hall meetings, becoming the vanguard of protest movements. Conditions at Chonnam in early 1980 were ripe for the integration of disparate activist groups, forming one large force that swelled with popular support.

Also located in the city of Gwangju, Chosun University rallied around reinstated students Kim Un-gi, Lee Gyeong, Yang Hui-seung, and Yu Jae-do, who had been imprisoned for protesting the Yusin regime but recently released, as well as students Lee Wu-jeong, Im Wang-taek, Han Guk-jae, Gwak Jae-gu, Kim Dong-su, and Jang Gap-su. With the Commission for the Liberalization of Educational Institutions and the Union of Student Clubs in the lead, Chosun’s student body demanded the removal of government-appointed faculty and Chancellor Pak Chor-ung, kicking off their protests by bringing issues of corruption in private school foundations to the forefront. In response, Pak hired armed thugs and desperately attempted to break up the student organizations. On May 1, Chosun activists were forced to put off the establishment of a student council, instead answering the call to democracy by forming the Chosun University Council for Democratization, allying with the Chonnam Student Council and other student activists in the area.

Other postsecondary institutions in the city, such as the Gwangju National University of Education, the Seongin College of Management and Commerce (now Honam University), Dongshin College (now Dongshin University), and Chosun University’s College of Engineering (now Chosun College of Science and Technology), also fought to organize democratic student councils, turning out in droves at democratization rallies in front of the South Jeolla Province Hall in early May with school banners in hand. When Gwangju citizens began to hold demonstrations in the downtown core that month, high school students also joined in with their school banners. A significant number of these participants joined the civilian resistance during the uprising and lost their lives.

Conflicting Outlooks

On the Children’s Day holiday on May 5, 1980, about thirty figures from Gwangju’s democratization activist community held a spring outing at Sikyeong Pavilion at the foot of nearby Mudeung Mountain. The event was planned by the Songbaek Society, a gathering of women who formed a community of sorts as they attended to family members imprisoned for political activism. The outing, however, was a front for a situation review. The activists would assess the rapid political developments unfolding in Seoul and explore avenues for future actions.

Yoon Han Bong opened the meeting with a discussion of the ill-fated Seoul YWCA gathering the previous November. He warned, “In spite of the great optimism for democratization, we are under the constant threat of mass government oppression.” He was followed by a member of the Cheonggye Apparel Labor Union from Seoul, who spoke on the authoritarian regime’s show of brute force during the Sabuk Incident. The meeting continued with deliberations on potential scenarios for Chun Doo-hwan or Shin Hyun-hwak’s rise to power, the military’s unusual movements, and the US response.³²

The group concluded from the example of the Busan-Masan Democratization Protests that in the event of social upheaval, the United States was likely to turn a blind eye to the South Korean military’s use of power—even if it violated US operational authority. The United States had an interest in prolonging the division of the Koreas so that the Cold War regime would continue. However, a drawn-out military dictatorship would lead to civilian resistance and alter US priorities so that democratization—and the social stability that followed—would become the more desirable choice. Student protests were mounting to the point where the military was almost certain to respond under the pretext of maintaining social order. How would the United States respond then? Participants at the meeting could not agree. The United States had supported the authoritarian regime in Iran to the end and failed to prevent the rise of Ruhollah Khomeini.³³ Optimistic perspectives at the meeting conjectured that the United States would have learned its lesson and would support the transfer of political power from the military to the people, contingent on pressure from South Korean citizens. The critical variable in this scenario was South Korea’s capacity for independent democratization.³⁴ Others presented bleaker outlooks: pressure for democratization in South Korea might lead to the US bolstering the South Korean military’s authority under the pretext of defending against North Korean invasion.

Amidst intensifying student protests, the meeting participants’ greatest issue of concern was the military’s response. From its actions following the Park assassination, the military seemed to be more inclined to openly take power rather than allow democratization to proceed peacefully. However, most agreed that South Korean civil society did not have the capacity to prevent a military coup, leaving the student activists to be crushed under the military’s boot. What, then, could they do? They had no clear solutions. The participants agreed that should the situation worsen, they should find safety and wait for circumstances to improve. Activist Yoon Sang-won (age 29) returned from the meeting to Deulbul Night School with a heavy heart.

This agreement was the reason most activist leaders fled Gwangju following the nationwide expansion of emergency martial law and the preventative custody-taking measures on May 17. Several were immediately taken in, while many others left the city for their own safety. However, the civilian response in Gwangju on May 18 and beyond exceeded the activists’ wildest expectations. Citizens’ outrage at paratroopers’ excessively brutal suppression reached the boiling point, sparking a full-fledged uprising. Yoon was among the few activist leaders who remained in Gwangju and threw themselves into the currents of resistance.

The Night Before the Storm

By early May, postsecondary student activists had overcome another hurdle. Seoul National University hosted the General Meeting for National Democratization on May 2 with more than 10,000 students in attendance. Students and nonstudent citizens found themselves with renewed confidence. Student leaders declared a period of democracy marches to unify the various postsecondary institutions around South Korea. Nongovernment political activists, too, were spurred into action. On May 7, the National Union for Democracy and Unification presented a national declaration for democratization under the names of its three co-chairs: Yun Posun, Ham Seok-heon, and Kim Dae-jung.³⁵ The National Union demanded an end to the state of martial law and openly applied pressure against the government and the Singunbu. On May 10, Korea University’s student council hosted twenty-three student council presidents from postsecondary institutions around the country. The gathered students agreed to issue a public statement for the immediate lifting of martial law and the resignation of Chun, Shin, and the remnants of the Yusin regime.

The student activist movement took more than ten days to come to a consensus and build the framework for a unified national alliance. Simultaneously, Chun’s Singunbu and the remnants of the Yusin regime organized together in preparation for their coup. Democracy activists in South Korea, spearheaded by student activists, had formed a massive and unavoidable wave, set on a head-on collision course with the military.

The National Crisis Countermeasure

As student activists increasingly turned their focus to ending the state of martial law and demanding the resignation of Chun Doo-hwan, the Singunbu finalized their counterprotest plans. In the first week of May, Chun ordered Defense Security Command Chief of Intelligence Kwon Jung-dal to develop a comprehensive strategy, the National Crisis Countermeasure—clear premeditation and planning for the Singunbu’s takeover of the government later that month.³⁶ The countermeasures were developed by Kwon and Defense Security Command advisors.³⁷

On the afternoon of May 4, Kwon and Defense Security Command advisers Heo Hwa-pyeong, Heo Sam Soo, Jeong Do-yeong, and Lee Hak-bong gathered in the parlor next to the Defense Security Commander’s office to give a page-by-page presentation on their completed draft. Attending the meeting were leading Singunbu figures, including Capital Garrison Commander Roh Tae-woo, 3rd ROK Army Commander Yu Hak-seong, Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Young-si, Korea Military Academy Superintendent Cha Gyu-heon, and Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong. “If the Singunbu was a corporation, these men would be its majority shareholders—the ones responsible for deploying troops” when the coup d’état plans were put into motion.³⁸ The National Crisis Countermeasure consisted of three main pillars—the expansion of emergency martial law to every province of South Korea, the dissolution of the National Assembly, and the installation of a special body to handle the crisis.

Around the same time, ROK Army HQ Operations Command also devised the Student Protest Countermeasure Plan. The plan was divided into four stages: Stage 1 (May 7–10) was the announcement of talks with the Ministry of Culture and Education. Stage 2 (May 11–13) was the declaration of martial law. Stage 3 (May 14–15) was the temporary closure of schools. Finally, Stage 4 (May 17) was the deployment of martial law troops.³⁹ In other words, ROK Army HQ proposed the nationwide state of martial law, including the deployment and stationing of troops, before May 7. The Singunbu’s insistence that the military be deployed to bring order in the face of social upheaval caused by student protests was a lie fabricated to justify the expansion of martial law.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, Chun separately sought to end disorder on university campuses and reached out to Counter-communism Division Chief and Joint Investigation Team Chief Lee Hak-bong, ordering him to develop a plan for the arrest and disposal of opposing politicians, nongovernment political activists, and student activist leaders.

US Assent to Deployment

On May 7, a confidential cable from South Korea reached the Cherokee Team in Washington.⁴¹ Sent by Ambassador Gleysteen, the telegram claimed that the South Korean military was deploying its special forces and informed USFK commanders that the Singunbu was stationing two Airborne Special Forces Brigades at Seoul and the Gimpo Airport area in preparation for social disruption caused by student demonstrations.⁴² The cable signaled that the South Korean military, which had been quiet since the December 12 military insurrection, was finally on the move.⁴³ ROK-US Combined Forces Command and the US embassy had a clear view of South and North Korean military movements.⁴⁴ The confidential cable also stated that “[c]learly ROK military is taking seriously students’ statements that they will rally off campus on May 15 if martial law is not lifted before that date.” Because the 1st Marine Division was under the command of the Combined Forces, any movement of troops would require the prior approval of the US military, and although the South Korean military had yet to request approval for the deployment of marines, the cable noted that USFK Command would approve such a request when it is made.

In a separate cable from May 7, Gleysteen wrote, “In none of our discussions … will we in any way suggest that the [US government] opposes [the Korean government’s] contingency plans to maintain law and order, if absolutely necessary, by reinforcing the police with the army. If I were to suggest any complain of this score I believe we would lose all our friends within the civilian and military leadership.”⁴⁵

On May 8, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent a response: “We agree that we should not oppose ROK contingency plans to maintain law and order …”⁴⁶

On May 9, Gleysteen met with Chun to deliver the US position. Although he spoke in indirect terms as befitting a diplomat, the core of his message was clear: the United States would not be opposed to the deployment of South Korea’s military in putting down public demonstrations.

Falsified Threats of North Korean Invasion

In addition to the alleged danger of student riots, the Singunbu cited the threat of North Korean invasion as another pretext for the nationwide expansion of martial law on May 17. The source of the perceived North Korean threat was intelligence Chun received on May 10 about an impending invasion. The intelligence was said to have come from Japan and delivered to Chun by KCIA’s second deputy director, who was identified only as Kim. Immediately, Chun ordered Defense Security Command advisors to develop a countermeasure and forwarded the intelligence to Prime Minister Shin Hyun-hwak, who ordered that the relevant KCIA bureau director report the intelligence directly to the ministers at the special cabinet meeting on May 12. No measures were taken to confirm the authenticity of the intelligence before it was delivered directly to the cabinet meeting. The threat of North Korean invasion would thus be made official to the public.

On May 10, however, US intelligence agencies claimed that the source of the information was unclear and that the intelligence was not credible. On May 13, Chun spoke directly with the ROK-US Combined Forces Commander John Wickham and asserted that North Korea was “the hidden mastermind behind the student demonstrations” and emphasized that “the decisive moment for an attack on the South might be at hand.” Wickham responded that the United States as always stood ready to defend Korea, but that there was no sign that a North Korean invasion might be imminent. Soon after the meeting, Wickham reported to Washington that “Chun’s pessimistic assessment of the domestic situation and his stress on the North Korean threat seemed only a pretext for a move into the Blue House.”⁴⁷

The South Korean military also immediately questioned the authenticity of the intelligence. On May 10, the ROK Army HQ Intelligence Corps analyzed the KCIA’s information and concluded that there was no possibility of an imminent North Korean invasion of the South.⁴⁸

According to a recently declassified top secret document, the CIA reported to the United States National Security Council on May 9, 1980, that “North Korea does not currently appear to be taking any military steps in response to the deteriorating political situation in the South.” A different top secret document from the US National Intelligence Council dated June 2 stated that North Korea was responding rationally to the situation in South Korea and that Kim Il-sung knew that any hostility toward the South will ultimately benefit Chun. The document also asserted that North Korea would certainly not intervene with the events unfolding in South Korea.⁴⁹

However, Chun ignored the doubts cast on the information by US and Korean military intelligence, making the threat of North Korean invasion one of the main pretexts for the expansion of martial law to the entirety of South Korea on May 17, together with the alleged threat of insurrection by university students and labor unions.

The Singunbu’s Preemptive Strike

The Singunbu decided to fully implement the expansion of martial law on May 17, recognizing the need for a preemptive attack prior to the provisional session of the National Assembly scheduled for May 20—which could derail the Singunbu’s plot by agreeing to end the state of martial law.⁵⁰ At 2:56 p.m. on May 10, Second ROK Army Operational Command issued orders for reinforcement strategies to Combat Arms Command, to be implemented in the event of student rioting.

On May 12, politicians submitted a constitutional amendment proposal to the National Assembly. The same day, Chun signed the National Crisis Countermeasure Plan, which signaled the beginning of Operation Loyalty. The following day, 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade Commander Shin Woo-sik received orders from ROK Army HQ to prepare for deployment to the Gwangju area and went on standby. The plan involved the stationing of one battalion from the brigade at Jeonbuk National University in the city of Jeonju and another at Chungnam National University in the city of Daejeon, the 33rd Battalion at Chonnam National University and Gwangju National University of Education, and the 35th Battalion at Chosun University.

South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense issued an order for the fortification of countermeasures against North Korean agent infiltration from May 14 to May 20 under the excuse of preparing for the imminent threat of active North Korean hostilities and unconventional warfare.⁵¹ With this order, the military was able to move troops prior to the nationwide expansion of martial law.

Common sense would dictate that troops be stationed near the Armistice Line to thwart an impending attack by North Korea. However, rather than deploy troops to the border, the Singunbu used the pretext of rooting out North Korean infiltrators to deploy riot suppression-trained Loyalty units far south of the Armistice Line. The unit’s purpose of riot suppression was later proven in the orders they received, titled “Operation: Air-Ground Forces Cooperative Riot Suppression Strategy.”⁵² The operation in question entailed the deployment of armed helicopters and the suppression of riots as part of counteractivities against North Korean agents. The operation began five days later in the city of Gwangju.

Kim Dae-jung Targeted

In the days leading up to the Gwangju Uprising, politicians agreed to bring forward multiple urgent proposals to the National Assembly. They included a resolution urging for an end to martial law, a resolution for the shortening of political timelines, a resolution for the dissolution of the government’s Constitutional Amendment Review Committee and a national referendum for constitutional amendments, and a proposal for the release of political prisoners. Kim Dae-jung held a press conference and declared, “Should the communists in North Korea take advantage of this transitional period in the South and make an attempt at hostilities, I will personally lead the charge against them, supported by the citizens of South Korea united in spite of our differences.” His commitment to combat communism, however, only made him a greater nuisance for the Singunbu, whose intent was to scapegoat him as a North Korea sympathizer.

On May 13, Kwon Jung-dal delivered a list of persons of note who had been under scrutiny by Defense Security Command to Counter-communism Division Chief and Joint Investigation Team Chief Lee Hak-bong. The individuals were set for incarceration, and categorized as either “threats to state order” or “unscrupulous authority figures,” with student protest masterminds placed in the former and those who engaged in acts of corruption in the latter. The intent was to eliminate prominent figures in the democratization movement alongside the corrupt, dampening public opposition.

Targets in the first category included Kim Dae-jung (co-chair, National Union for Democracy and Unification), Kim Dong-gil (professor, Yonsei University), and Lee Mun-yeong (professor, Korea University). Those in the latter category included Kim Jong-pil (leader, Democratic Republican Party), Lee Hu-rak (former director, KCIA), Park Jong-gyu (former chief presidential bodyguard), and Kim Chi-yeul (minister of justice). Everyone the Singunbu saw as potential threats to Chun’s authority was singled out for removal from politics, together with those with known records of corruption.

The Unstoppable Call for Democratization

Students in Seoul took to the streets in protest on May 13. Galvanized by the news, Chonnam National University’s student council called for a meeting of student representatives of Gwangju-region postsecondary institutions on the same afternoon. Chonnam and Chosun University students rose up in protest one day later, in the afternoon of May 14.

On the evening of May 13, when students in Seoul flooded the streets, more than forty student representatives from twenty-seven Seoul-area postsecondary institutions gathered at the Korea University student council office and deliberated overnight, ultimately agreeing to increase the scale of demonstrations to full force in the morning. At noon on May 14, more than 70,000 students from universities around Seoul spilled out of the campus gates. Including schools from other regions, students from a total of thirty-seven postsecondary institutions took to the streets, demanding the democratization of South Korea.

“End martial law!” “Out with Chun Doo-hwan!” “Down with the Yusin regime!”

The prime minister convened two ministerial meetings on national security on May 14, at 8:00 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. All participants were personally shown the scenes of student demonstration via two helicopters flown over Seoul. Minister of Home Affairs Kim Jong-hwan urged Prime Minister Shin to deploy troops, arguing that the police alone would not be sufficient to respond to the scale of the student demonstrations. Kim also requested that Chief Martial Law Administrator Lee Hui-seong send troops to defend key facilities and infrastructure.

The military, led by Martial Law Command, was one step ahead of Kim. The 9th Airborne Special Forces Brigade had been assigned to the Capital Corps on May 3, the 13th Brigade to the 3rd Brigade’s post on May 8, the 11th to the 1st’s post on May 10, and the 3rd to the National Cemetery on May 14. On May 15 and 16, three regiments from the 20th Division were stationed at key locations in downtown Seoul, including Hyochang Stadium.

Starting in the afternoon of May 14, Combat Arms Commander Yun Heung-jeong stationed martial law troops at key facilities in the city of Gwangju in accordance with orders given by ROK Army HQ at 7:55 a.m. that day. In other words, the command to fortify military watch over these facilities was handed down prior to the start of student demonstrations in the city.

The administrative and intelligence responses had also been solidified prior to the student demonstrations. Governor Jang Hyeong-tae of South Jeolla Province held a meeting in the governor’s office on May 14 from 10:45 a.m. to 11:20 a.m. with local security officials and authorities including Commander Chung Ung of the 31st Division, the police commissioner, the chancellors of Chonnam and Chosun Universities, the director of the Gwangju branch of the KCIA, the chief of the South Jeolla Province branch of the Joint Investigation HQ (Commander of the 505th Security Unit), and the South Jeolla Provincial Police commissioner to discuss countermeasures for the mounting protests.

That afternoon, Yun Heung-jeong—who also served as the Jeolla Province martial law commander—invited Chung Ung and Shin Woo-sik to the Combat Arms Command office in the Sangmudae training facility, home to the Jeolla Province branch of Martial Law Command. At the meeting, Chung and Shin agreed upon logistics routes based on the locations of 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade paratroopers around Gwangju. By this point, the Second ROK Army Operational Command had already proposed plans for support measures in case of student demonstrations four days earlier on May 10.

According to testimony from then assistant chief of staff Lee Sanghan, Airborne Special Forces Brigade leadership traveled to Gwangju between May 8 and 16; Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong, Operations Commander Jang Se-dong, and Lee Sang-han, as well as an unidentified Defense Security Command chief were taken by helicopter to Combat Arms Command at Sangmudae, situated near Gwangju.⁵³

Student demonstrations in Gwangju began in earnest at 2:50 p.m. that day. The crowds were made up of Chonnam and Chosun students, as well as some high school students. Ten thousand people filled the plaza in front of the South Jeolla Province Hall and conducted a rally for democratization around the plaza fountain. Students delivered impassioned speeches for an immediate end to martial law, the shortening of political timelines, and the protection of blue-collar workers’ rights, each one met by thunderous applause from the citizens of Gwangju. The rally ended at 6:00 p.m., at which point students returned to their campuses to hold overnight demonstrations. By contrast, all student demonstrations in Seoul ended at 10:15 p.m.

Withdrawal at Seoul Station

Another student demonstration took place in Gwangju on the following day at 2:30 p.m. This time, participants were joined by Chonnam University faculty. Six students took the lead with a large Korean flag held between them, followed by more than fifty faculty members, who were in turn followed by the rest of the students. It was the first time since the April Revolution in 1960 that faculty and students had stood together for the cause of democratization. Unlike the previous day, the demonstrations were relatively peaceful because the police did not actively try to stop the students from taking to the streets.

Meanwhile, more than 100,000 students from thirty-five postsecondary institutions filled the plaza in front of Seoul Station. It was the third day of demonstrations in the city, and tensions neared the breaking point. Students and police clashed violently on the streets, paralyzing traffic. Police cars were set on fire and the demonstration went on into the night. Street demonstrations took place at twenty-four other postsecondary institutions in cities such as Busan, Daegu, Gwangju, and Incheon.

On the afternoon of the same day, Kim Jong-pil—leader of the Democratic Republican Party—visited Prime Minister Shin and expressed his firm opposition to the violent suppression of the demonstrations. The government called a cabinet-level meeting with Chun in attendance and agreed to have President Choi return to Korea early from a state visit. Shin pleaded with the people to refrain from demonstrating in the streets, promising to shorten political timelines in close cooperation with the National Assembly and other authorities.

That evening, representatives of Seoul-area postsecondary student councils gathered at Korea University once again for an emergency meeting. Deliberations on the timeline and continuation of street demonstrations ended with the conclusion to put a temporary halt to the demonstrations and observe the situation. The students had clearly communicated their position to the government and the possibility of military intervention had increased. They also reasoned that if two days of large-scale protesting had not prompted the government to order school closures, they could easily go back to demonstrating on the streets should the political climate change for the worse. This event came to be known as the “Withdrawal at Seoul Station.”⁵⁴ News of the withdrawal quickly reached other regions. Postsecondary schools in most other cities—including Busan, Daegu, and Jeonju—followed the Seoul region’s decision and suspended demonstrations. Days of mounting tension finally gave way to silence.

At 5:05 p.m. on May 15, thirty-one 2.5-tonne trucks from Combat Arms Command set off to take the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade—which was stationed in Geumma, North Jeolla Province—to Gwangju.⁵⁵ Around the same time, the Third Military Command in Daejeon and the 35th Infantry Division in North Jeolla Province also deployed transport vehicles to 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade Command. By May 15, preparations were complete to transport airborne brigade paratroopers to Gwangju’s postsecondary institutions.

Gwangju’s May 16 Torchlight Demonstration

Friday, May 16, marked the third day of mass student rallies for democratization. More than 30,000 postsecondary students and Gwangju residents gathered in the plaza outside the South Jeolla Province Hall, brimming with determination. The day also marked the 19th anniversary of the May 16 coup that saw Park Chung-hee’s rise to power. Gwangju-area United Student Leadership chose to conduct the demonstration that day with flaming torches symbolizing the light of democracy, calling for an end to the darkness of eighteen years of authoritarian rule.

The same day, Chonnam University Student Council President Park Gwan-hyun sought out South Jeolla Province Police Commissioner Ahn Byeong-ha, explaining that the students would conduct themselves in an orderly manner and requesting that the police cooperate with the demonstrators rather than stop them. Ahn gladly agreed and the demonstration ended peacefully. Gwangju was the only city to rally for democracy that day. Fearing the possibility of violent incidents in the torchlight demonstration, the police provided their full cooperation to the citizens.⁵⁶

At the end of the demonstration, the Chonnam Student Council decided that if schools were ordered to close, they would convene outside the campus gates at 10:00 a.m. the next morning. If they were unable to meet there, they would gather at the fountain in the plaza in front of Province Hall at noon to fight on the streets—May 17 and 18 were the weekend, and students could rest and observe the situation.

The Military Commanders’ Meeting

May 17 marked D-Day for the Singunbu. At 9:30 a.m., Chun sent Defense Security Command Chief of Intelligence Kwon Jung-dal to National Defense Minister Choo Young-bock to explain the National Crisis Countermeasure Plan, whose three main pillars were the nationwide expansion of martial law, the dissolution of the National Assembly, and the installation of an emergency leadership body. Through Kwon, Choo was instructed to order military commanders to support the National Crisis Countermeasure Plan as the military’s official recommendation at the military commanders’ meeting that day. Although the expansion of martial law could have easily been accomplished in a cabinet meeting, Chun had rallied the entire military to openly throw in their support as a form of pressure against President Choi.

At 10:00 a.m., Chun had a one-on-one meeting with Choi at the Blue House to give a report on South Korea’s domestic security status. During the conversation, the former declared his intent to arrest and investigate protest instigators and unscrupulous authority figures and to implement the National Crisis Countermeasure Plan. Choi, who had made a rushed return to Korea the previous night during his tour of the Middle East, received the report and ordered Chun to pursue his initiatives carefully and in accordance with the law.

The military-wide commanders’ meeting took place from 11:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. in Conference Room 1 of the Ministry of National Defense. It was hosted by Choo and attended by forty-three commanders in key posts. The meeting was held at the request of Chun during a phone call to Choo at 1:30 p.m. the previous day. Of the three pillars of the National Crisis Countermeasure Plan, only the nationwide expansion of martial law was approved. The dissolution of the National Assembly and the installation of an emergency leadership body were not mentioned because such actions could be seen as overstepping the military’s jurisdiction and had the potential to spark resistance from the public.⁵⁷

Having secured the joint signatures of the meeting participants, Choo joined Chief Martial Law Administrator Lee Hui-seong and went to Prime Minister Shin at 4:30 p.m. Upon receiving the meeting report, Shin responded that the expansion of martial law was the prerogative of the president and suggested officially proposing its implementation. However, he expressed his clear opposition to the other two items in Chun’s countermeasure plan, emphasizing that they were political matters in which military leaders had no say.⁵⁸

At 5:10 p.m., Choo, Lee, Shin, and Chun went to the Blue House to bring the proposed countermeasure plan to Choi. Choi’s response was that the May 16 coup that saw Park Chung-hee’s rise to power was one coup too many and that the constitution must never again be suspended. He refused to permit the dissolution of the National Assembly and the installation of an emergency leadership body. The proposal for the expansion of martial law, however, was accepted, and at 7:00 p.m., Prime Minister Shin was ordered to declare a cabinet meeting.⁵⁹ Choi had let down his guard because student demonstrators had eased pressure on May 16 to wait for the government response. The Singunbu took the opportunity to pressure him further.

At 8:00 p.m., Martial Law Commander Lee ordered the arrest and investigation of protest instigators and unscrupulous authority figures, as well as the nationwide expansion of martial law, in accordance with the plan designed by Defense Security Command. All of these actions were taken before the proposal to expand martial law had passed the cabinet meeting.

May 17: The Nationwide Expansion of Martial Law

At 9:42 p.m. on the night of May 17, Prime Minister Shin held a special cabinet meeting at the Seoul Capitol, which was surrounded by 595 fully armed martial law soldiers. Earlier that day, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Capital Garrison Commander Roh Tae-woo had also dispatched soldiers to the site, ordering military police (MP) forces into the Seoul Capitol building and a significant number of soldiers from the 30th Garrison to be stationed outside. He had taken these actions independently without informing Martial Law Command.⁶⁰ At 7:35 p.m., 18 officers of the 30th Garrison armed with handguns, 324 soldiers armed with M16 rifles, and four armored vehicles were stationed on the outskirts of the Capitol grounds. The entryway, staircases, and corridors of the building were lined with 17 Capital Garrison MP officers and 236 soldiers, all armed and stationed in intervals of one to two meters. In order to cut off all outside contact, the military police’s communications branch severed all 2,440 telephone lines in the building. Access to the Seoul Capitol was strictly restricted to cabinet members, with any civil servants unfortunate enough not to have left the building for the evening locked on the fifth floor until the building was opened again the next day at 7:00 a.m. At the oppressive cabinet meeting, National Defense Minister Choo proposed the expansion of martial law, bringing up the alleged North Korean threat as the cause. Not a single cabinet member spoke. There was no debate on the matter, and the meeting was adjourned in eight minutes.⁶¹

Twenty minutes past midnight, martial law troops led by eight light armored vehicles and four tanks took over the National Assembly building. At 1:00 a.m., Lee announced the Tenth Declaration of Martial Law, the original draft of which had been devised at Defense Security Command and sent to Martial Law Command. The Declaration included the suspension of political activities and university classes; a ban on gatherings and demonstrations, strikes, and groundless rumors; and the censorship of media and press. This was the Singunbu’s response to the president’s opposition to the dissolution of the National Assembly: abuse martial law in order to take politicians into custody, which ultimately achieved Chun’s goal of dissolving the National Assembly.

Preventive Custody

At noon on May 17, Defense Security Command Counter-communism Division Chief Lee Hak-bong officially contacted security forces units across the country at Chun’s orders. The forces contacted were specifically stationed in areas where those on the Singunbu’s list of protest instigators and unscrupulous authority figures resided. Their orders were to take people on the list into custody simultaneously at 10:00 p.m. National Union for Democracy and Unification co-chair Kim Dae-jung was taken from his Donggyo-dong home at 11:00 p.m. by nineteen MP officers, while Democratic Republican Party leader Kim Jong-pil was taken from his home in Sindang-dong at the same time by Defense Security Command investigators. Jeong Dong-nyeon, a reinstated student at Chonnam National University, was taken into custody at midnight by Gwangju-area Joint Investigation HQ investigators.

Following the declaration of martial law, the Singunbu turned its attention to Gwangju and South Jeolla Province. At 6:00 p.m. on May 17, Lieutenant Colonel Seo Ui-nam, chief of the counter-communism division at the 505th Security Unit, returned to Gwangju from a meeting of national security forces’ counter-communism division chiefs and remarked to the investigators, “Gwangju has been targeted because of Kim Dae-jung.”⁶² Targets were taken into preventative custody starting 11:00 p.m. on May 17. A total of 22 were targeted in Gwangju—12 from Chonnam University and 10 from Chosun University.⁶³ The Joint Investigation HQ in the South Jeolla Region was centered on the 505th Security Unit, with the KCIA and the police playing supporting roles. A total of 30 people, 10 each from the South Jeolla Province police forces, Gwangju Police Station, and West Gwangju Police Station, were temporarily transferred to the Joint Investigation HQ. Every Defense Security Command agent was accompanied by one police investigator. Seo ordered the agents to secure preventive custody targets by 4:00 a.m. on May 18, taking individuals into custody personally rather than entrusting them to the police. In Gwangju, 86 agents and police investigators went out on twenty-two vehicles and took 12 people into custody.⁶⁴ The preventative custody measures implemented at the expansion of martial law resulted in the arrest of 2,699 people. Of them, 404 were indicted and 2,295 were released with warnings.⁶⁵

Martial Law Troops Stationed in Gwangju

At 10:40 a.m. on May 17, Second ROK Army Commander Jin Jong-chae ordered Commander Chung Ung of the 31st Infantry Division to deploy the 31st to eight postsecondary institutions in the Gwangju area. By 5:00 p.m., the military had set up tents at Chonnam National University and Chosun University. The 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade (commanded by Brigadier General Shin Woo-sik), stationed in Geumma, North Jeolla Province, set out at 10:00 p.m. and approached Gwangju in the dead of night. Eighty-four officers and 604 enlisted men from the 33rd and 35th Battalions reached the city at 1:10 a.m. on May 18.⁶⁶ Outside South Jeolla Province, the 31st and the 32nd Battalions occupied Jeonbuk National University and Chungnam National University respectively.

In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Seo Ui-nam sent security forces soldiers under the Gwangju Joint Investigation Team to order already-dispatched security forces agents occupying Chonnam and Chosun Universities with the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade to “send reports about the conditions of the troops to the 505th directly, rather than to the units they usually reported to.”⁶⁷

Upon deployment, the 7th Brigade immediately searched the campuses. With instructions from ROK Army HQ, the Second ROK Army Operational Command gave the following commands to the 7th alongside their deployment orders: First, they were to force all campus residents to leave. Second, they were to arrest any protest inciters on campus. However, members of the 7th stationed at Chonnam and Chosun completely ignored the orders, arresting all students on sight and beating them ruthlessly before taking them into custody.

Prelude to Oppression

At 7:00 p.m. on May 17, economist Park Hyun-chae gave a lecture in the auditorium of the Gwangju YWCA, located on Geumnam-ro in front of the South Jeolla Province Hall. Over 300 postsecondary students and local residents attended the event, filling seats on the first and second levels. After the lecture, participants held a spirited after-party. An air of celebration was in the air thanks to the successful conclusion of the three-day democratization rally, which gave people hope for the imminent arrival of democracy.

The evening news reported that the National Assembly would hold its 104th provisional session on May 20 to discuss a range of pertinent social issues such as the lifting of martial law, the shortening of political timelines, and the Special Constitutional Amendment Committee’s official amendment proposal. The people of Gwangju and of South Korea saw a light at the end of the tunnel. Things seemed to be going well.

However, events were spiraling out of control right under their noses. At 7:00 p.m., a female student in Seoul made a desperate phone call to the Chonnam University Student Council office with news that all postsecondary student council members in the Seoul region had been taken into custody by martial law troops. The news shocked the students, but there was no time to hesitate. Chonnam’s student council evacuated to the Mudeung Lodge in the depths of Mudeung Mountain. When they learned of the expansion of martial law by TV at the lodge, the group split into two. One group, led by president Park Gwan-hyun, remained at the lodge, while the other group, led by the council’s administrative manager Yang Gang-seop, relocated to the Daeji Hotel in the city around 11:00 p.m. to keep an eye on the situation unfolding in Seoul.

Yang’s group was forced to relocate again following a warning from Kim Sang-yun, going back to the Chonnam Student Council office at midnight. At the same time, the Security Forces’ preventative custody team stormed Nokdu Bookstore, and martial law forces marched into Chonnam and Chosun Universities through all entryways. Kim Sang-yun was caught and arrested while closing the bookstore for the night. Yang and seven of the student council members spotted the martial law troops and split up into two groups to escape, but vice president Lee Seung-ryong (age 21) and two others were captured.⁶⁸ The 7th Brigade, having taken control of Chonnam University, turned the campus upside down and took sixty-nine students into custody. Students were tied up and brutally beaten by the 7th, who were armed with bayonet-equipped M16 rifles. At the same time, the 35th Battalion occupying the Chosun University campus arrested forty-three students, including twenty communication team members preparing for a school event.⁶⁹ At Jeonbuk University in North Jeolla Province, second-year agriculture student Lee Se-jong fell from the student center rooftop during the 7th’s raid and died.⁷⁰ Many students were arrested that night: sixty-nine at Chonnam, forty-three at Chosun, thirty-four at Jeonbuk, and twenty-three at Wonkwang University.

Agents of the 505th and the police also raided the homes of reinstated students and student council officers. They marched straight into bedrooms with handguns drawn and shoved crying family members aside as they dragged off their targets. Yu So-yeong—a student at Chosun’s College of Pharmacy—was the only female student to be taken that night, arrested at her home at midnight on May 17.⁷¹ Yoon Han Bong avoided capture because following the Park lecture, he had gone to the home of poet Moon Byung-ran with Jeong Yong-hwa, chief of the Modern Cultural Research Center, and Chairman Choi Seong-ho of the South Jeolla Catholic Farmers’ Association.⁷² Of Chosun University’s democratization committee members, reinstated students Kim Un-gi, Yang Hui-seung, and Yu Jae-do were taken into protective custody on the evening of May 17. Lee Wu-jeong, Han Guk-jae, and Kim Dae-hong fled to Jeonju, and Gwak Jae-gu escaped to Jindo.

On the morning of May 18, Chonnam Student Council President Park went to Deulbul Night School in Gwangju’s Gwangcheon neighborhood and met with Yoon Sang-won. Yoon advised Park to go into hiding where he could still be contacted. Park and his party left to Dolsan in the city of Yeosu that afternoon, at which point all contact with him was lost. Many citizens searched for him on May 22, during the liberation of Gwangju, but he was never able to return.⁷³

Robbed of their leaders, Gwangju-area students were left to their own devices. However, the fires of revolution were lit in their absence by ordinary citizens, whose dedication to democratization grew the tiny flame into a roaring inferno.

2

Sporadic and Passive Resistance
(Sunday, May 18: Day 1 of the Uprising)

The Fuse

The morning of May 18 began with a chill that quickly gave way to warmth. It was a clear spring day; the mood in the city, however, was bleak. Every street and avenue brimmed with silence and tension. Older plainclothes policemen, temporarily transferred to Gwangju from police stations and precincts in other communities in the province, stood guard in pairs at key locations. Distraught locals came out into the side streets and exchanged news under their breaths. The torchlight demonstrations that lit up the city only two nights earlier were still clear in their minds, and the absence of the flames was keenly felt. People gathered in small groups in the downtown area and the main street of Geumnam-ro, sharing rumors. Even passersby stopped to listen. Citizens clashed with stationed police officers on occasion, but there was no sign of unusual activity.

At 7:00 a.m., students attempting to enter Chonnam National University to access the library were beaten by the paratroopers at the main gates. They had been completely oblivious to the political changes sweeping the nation—and the expansion of martial law—and had only focused on studying for employment or civil service examinations. Half a dozen or so injured students were taken to the Noh Jun-chae Clinic for treatment.¹ As time passed, more and more students crowded the main gates. Some had gathered to use the library or meet for group excursions, while others had come for sports. Yet others had come out because of a pact to gather at the main gates at 10:00 a.m. if the school was ordered to close. The students circled the gates, which were defended by the paratroopers, and refused to depart. They had no idea that those who had stayed on campus overnight had been taken into custody.

Lee Gwang-ho (age 21), a third-year student at the College of Social Sciences and Humanities at Chonnam, had learned of the expansion of martial law and headed to school early to put away documents detailing the student council’s activities. He arrived at 8:00 a.m. and encountered Student Council President Park Gwan-hyun and his small party walking out from the vicinity of the College of Agriculture. They exchanged glances warning one another to be careful.

At that time, eleven soldiers from the 7th Company of the 9th Field Battalion of the 33rd Battalion of the 7th Brigade stood guard at the gates to Chonnam University. However, as the number of congregating students increased, Lieutenant Colonel Kwon Seung-man—commander of the 33rd—deployed an additional thirty soldiers to the gates. Kwon was anxious to resolve the situation quickly because Brigadier General Shin Woo-sik, commander of the 7th Brigade, was scheduled to visit at 11:00 a.m.²

Lee Gwang-ho noted that by 9:00 a.m., the number of students had risen to about fifty. They put themselves into a formation and attempted to break through the barricade at the gates with cries of “End martial law now!” However, their attempts were unsuccessful, and they were forced to simply circle the gates from the outside. By 10:00 a.m., their numbers had grown to over a hundred, and the crowd of onlookers also increased in number. An officer picked up a megaphone to demand that students disperse. In response, the students assembled by the bridge in front of the gates for a sit-down demonstration. Their numbers soon rose to over 200. The demonstrators shouted rallying cries of “End martial law now,” “Down with Chun Doo-hwan,” “Down with martial law troops,” and “Open schools again.”

Lieutenant Colonel Kwon, the highest-ranked officer of the special forces troops stationed at Chonnam, sensed that something was amiss and personally stepped forward. He warned demonstrators, “Disperse immediately, or you will be disbanded by force.” The students simply chanted more loudly.

In response, Kwon roared, “Charge!”

Paratroopers rushed into the crowds with menacing yells, clubbing students indiscriminately; unlike the police, they showed no restraint. Soon many bleeding students fell to the ground. The students were rattled by the violence, fleeing into alleyways to regroup and fighting back by throwing rocks.³ The 7th rushed the students again without hesitation. They chased down one of the demonstrators, clubbing them in the head until they were unconscious, and dragged them away. The skirmish went on for about thirty minutes, but unarmed university students ultimately stood no chance of defeating special forces who were trained in riot suppression and guerrilla warfare.

At around 10:30 a.m., Kim Han-jung (age 20) cried, “We should relocate to Province Hall instead of staying here to fight a battle we can’t win.” The students accepted the proposal and headed downtown.⁴ Fellow Chonnam students Park Mong-gu (age 25), Lee Don-gyu (age 22), Cheon Yeong-jin (age 20), and Cho Gil-yeong (age 22) and Chosun students Park Chae-yeong (age 21) and Na Jeong-sik (age 21) were also at the scene.

Paratroopers were engaged in violence at the rear gates of Chonnam as well. However, the situation was completely different. Students did not congregate at the rear gates, but the soldiers stationed there indiscriminately attacked postsecondary-aged passersby and took them into custody for no reason. Paratroopers even charged into buses that had stopped to let off passengers, dragging off young people and beating them.

At 10:00 a.m., Beom Jin-yeom (male, 21)—who was on the cusp of starting his mandated military service—was on his way to pick up pesticides on an errand for his father, when the bus he was on stopped briefly at the rear gates of Chonnam University. The doors opened, and soldiers poured inside and started beating passengers around his age. About twenty of them were taken away to Chonnam University for no reason. A female student who was unable to walk because of a leg injury was dragged off bodily.⁵ Jang Cheon-su (male, 24), who was in the furniture business, disembarked from the bus at Chonnam’s rear gates for personal business around 10:30 a.m. and was immediately taken to the guardhouse by two soldiers who kicked and clubbed him. Arms locked and helpless to defend himself, Jang sustained heavy injuries to his head and back without so much as an explanation.⁶ During the investigation by the Prosecutors’ Office, Lieutenant Colonel Kwon admitted that the 7th had used excessive force at the very beginning of the Gwangju situation:

Captain Ko, commander of the 7th Field Battalion, which was stationed at the rear gates of Chonnam University, said that “there was jeering from the bus, so the sentries dragged out multiple people, struck them, and had them kneel while the field commander re-educated them before sending them away.” Because of the nature of the re-education process, they would have struck those people several times.⁷

Resistance in the Downtown Core

As the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade hunted down small groups of students putting up resistance at the main gates of Chonnam University, one of the students proposed heading downtown to inform people that martial law troops had taken control of the campus. With raised voices, students called to regroup at Gwangju Station. They scattered and made the one-kilometer journey to the plaza outside Gwangju Station in groups of twos and threes. With the plaza outside the South Jeolla Province Hall as their destination, the students ran from the station to the Intercity Bus Terminal to the Catholic Center on Geumnam-ro with cries of “End martial law now,” “Release Kim Dae-jung,” “Open schools again,” “Down with Chun Doo-hwan,” and “Down with martial law troops.” The majority of citizens at the time had no idea that Kim had been taken into custody. It took only two sentences for them to learn that their hopes for democratization had been cruelly dashed by the remnants of the Yusin regime and the Singunbu forces that composed a large portion of the military:

“Chun Doo-hwan has led a coup d’état.”

“Kim Dae-jung has been taken into custody.”

The students were met with little resistance as they reached the Catholic Center downtown at 11:00 a.m. There, they marched to the YMCA in a large group and were met by riot police. The group changed course and headed to the Chungjang-ro post office. Riot police had already been stationed at the entrance to Chungjang-ro 1-ga, forming a blockade with their shields. The demonstrators split into two groups: one headed straight toward Gwangju River, and the other turned into Chungjang-ro 2-ga. The number of students continued to snowball. Around 11:25 a.m., the students threw rocks at Chungjang-ro Police Substation, breaking nine windows.⁸

Pushed toward Gwangju River by the police, the students took a break at the Gwangju Park plaza around 11:30 a.m. before heading to the Catholic Center on Geumnam-ro via Jungang-ro. Two to three hundred staged a sit-down demonstration on Geumnam-ro. Hundreds of locals gathered on sidewalks to watch, but no one stepped up to join them. Some time passed, and the number of demonstrators grew to over 500. Police surrounded the students and fired tear gas canisters over their heads.

Figure 1. The route taken by Chonnam students into downtown Gwangju (May 18, 10:30 a.m.–12:00 p.m.)

Students were shocked to find that the police’s attitude had done a full 180 from the torchlight demonstrations only two days earlier. People watching from either end of the road jeered the police and showered them with profanities. The police forces vastly outnumbered the students and arrested many of them, but the students stubbornly dispersed and regrouped again and again.

Geumnam-ro and the fountain outside Province Hall remain the most symbolic places in Gwangju today, similarly to Gwanghwamun in Seoul and the plaza in front of Seoul City Hall. News of these events in downtown Gwangju quickly spread across the rest of the city.

Helicopters Deployed Against Demonstrators

The students found themselves growing more cornered over time. Although the people of Gwangju were outraged at their treatment, they did not dare to join the demonstrations. Slowly pushed out of Geumnam-ro, the students elected to avoid unnecessary confrontations with the police in favor of collecting stray students in the Geumnam-ro area. By 12:30 p.m., events unfolded similarly in the areas north and south of the street. About 300 of the students who had been scattered from Geumnam-ro regrouped in front of the Municipal Student Hall and made their way to the bridge at Bullo-dong. There, they ran into 300 more demonstrators who had been marching from the Dong-gu district. The two groups had not been aware of one another and raised a cheer at the encounter.

Next, the demonstrators went to the Intercity Bus Terminal in the hopes that news of their open opposition to the military coup d’état would spread across the region. Students raised their voices, some speaking directly to passengers in waiting areas and asking them to spread news about the demonstrations in Gwangju to the countryside. In response, the police surrounded the terminal and shot tear gas canisters into the building. The demonstrators desperately fled in the direction of Daein Market.

Outside, they were chased past the terminal roundabout and toward the Gwangju Citizens’ Center, at which point an unprecedented event took place—a helicopter joined the chase. It was apparent that personnel on the helicopter were delivering the demonstrators’ locations to the riot police. Chonnam student Im Nak-pyeong (age 22), who was among the crowd, testified that the wind from the helicopter threatened to blow away the demonstrators on the ground.⁹ The demonstrators scattered into narrow alleyways but were met by police at every turn and dispersed. The deployment of the helicopter accelerated the riot police’s movements, with police on land and air cooperating to suppress the demonstrations.¹⁰

Violent police tactics pushed the demonstrators all the way to Gyerim Cinema, located about one kilometer from Geumnam-ro. Countless students were taken in the process, and the rest dispersed almost entirely. Only about twenty were left remaining. The helicopter continued to circle overhead in search of the main group behind the demonstrations.

The Second Fuse

The demonstrations weakened considerably when the helicopter joined the pursuit. There was a real possibility that the student demonstrations would simply end there, as with similar incidents during the Yusin regime. The last group of students who remained in the Gyerim Cinema area took shelter in a nearby table tennis hall to avoid the helicopter. Although they only numbered around twenty, these students played a critical role in rekindling the flames of resistance that afternoon, reviving it in much the same way as the initial demonstration at the Chonnam gates. A short discussion later, they agreed to meet in front of the Municipal Student Hall on Chungjang-ro 1-ga at 3:00 p.m., spreading the news to their allies. They would take a break for lunch and then regroup. Starting in the afternoon, businesses in the downtown core shuttered their storefronts and closed down for the day.

Students began to congregate in the city center and the plaza in front of Gwangju Park around 2:00 p.m., their numbers increasing to more than 500 an hour later. At 3:00 p.m., they joined the other demonstrators and headed to the alley by the Student Hall.¹¹ Now numbering over 1,000, the demonstrators slipped in through a gap in the police watch—a group of twenty to thirty officers relaxing by their jeeps and vehicles equipped with tear gas spray. The students launched a surprise attack with a volley of rocks, sending the police scattering. Demonstrators tore down police vehicles and equipment by setting the seats on fire and working together to tip the vehicles over. The crowds cheered as flames and smoke rose into the air.

The success in front of the Municipal Student Hall encouraged the demonstrators to take even bolder action. As they scattered and regrouped again and again over the course of the police pursuit that morning, the students learned to maximize their mobility. The demonstrators marched with one person in the lead, followed by another person carrying the Korean flag, then a dozen or so students in a scrum singing together. The formation made it easy for fellow demonstrators to quickly join the group. This method was employed by demonstrators all afternoon in their protests.

The afternoon was marked by a departure from the morning’s demonstrations, where the crowds had numbered only about 500 and were easily chased down by police. The number of demonstrators swelled in the afternoon, with their marches becoming more organized and proactive. The violence of the police response had enraged the students, who had been expecting the same cordial reception they received at the torchlight demonstrations. However, the protests at this point had not escalated to the point where paratroopers were required.¹² Operation records corroborate that even Martial Law Command and the Second ROK Army Command did not perceive the situation as an emergency.¹³

At 10:00 a.m. that day, Second ROK Army Commander Jin Jong-chae received word of the confrontation at the Chonnam University main gates and immediately departed for Gwangju by helicopter with Operations Officer Kim Jun-bong from their post in the city of Daegu in the country’s southeast. Upon arriving at Combat Arms Command at 11:00 a.m. to reports that student demonstrations were expanding into the downtown core, Jin ordered Jeolla Province’s Martial Law Commander Yun Heung-jeong to personally report on the Gwangju situation to Martial Law Command. An hour later, he returned to Daegu.¹⁴ At the same time, 7th Brigade Commander Shin Woo-sik also headed to Combat Arms Command after briefly visiting Chonnam and Chosun Universities. Following Commander Jin’s instructions, Yun ordered Commander Chung Ung of the 31st Infantry Division to deploy the 7th to suppress the demonstrations.

At 12:45 p.m., Chung issued Operation Order 1, commanding the majority of the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade to prepare to enter the downtown core, leaving only token forces at Chonnam and Chosun Universities to maintain their control over the campuses.¹⁵

Chung did not send in his troops immediately, however, because he judged that the situation had not escalated beyond police capabilities. It was only when Yun pressed him, saying, “Why aren’t you following orders to deploy the men?” that Chung deployed the 7th, unable to disobey his superior officer.¹⁶

At 2:25 p.m., Chung personally headed to Chosun University by MD 500 helicopter. At the campus, he held a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Kwon Seung-man, commander of the 33rd Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Il-ok, commander of the 35th Battalion, and the Gwangju Police’s security division chief.¹⁷ Chung explained the demonstration situation in Gwangju over a map of the city and commanded those in attendance to move out to Geumnam-ro by 4:00 p.m. Because the police had already blocked off Province Hall, the 35th would cut off the street on either side with its intersection with Chungjang-ro as the center. The 33rd would start from Geumnam-ro 5-ga and put pressure toward Province Hall to disperse the demonstrators.¹⁸

Paratroopers in the City

The 33rd Battalion departed Chonnam National University at 3:40 p.m. At 4:00 p.m., they reached the crossroads in front of 180 Geumnam-ro, Buk-dong, about 450 meters from the Yu-dong three-way intersection. The crossroads led to the gates of Gwangju Jeil High School.

“Halt! Line up!”

The 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade came to a halt at their commander’s orders. At that exact moment, a loudspeaker mounted on the commander’s vehicle declared: “Citizens of Gwangju, return to your homes. Any and all persons who partake in illegal demonstrations will be arrested. Return to your homes.”

Civil servant Kim Jeong-seop (age 34), who worked at the Ministry of Education outside the city in Jangseong County, had attended the wedding of a coworker’s sibling at the Gwangju Community Center and was on his way to the Intercity Bus Terminal to take a bus back to Jangseong County. However, the city bus taking him to the terminal stopped near Suchang Elementary School; the driver was unable to continue the route. Kim disembarked and, about a minute later, happened to witness the soldiers charging the demonstrators. In an instant, the demonstrators parted and scattered everywhere. The soldiers hunted down anyone they had locked onto—not only demonstrating students, but also passersby. Their boots and batons fell on anyone they caught. It all happened in the blink of an eye. Kim had thought himself safe because he was older than the students, but he was soon proven wrong:

I turned at the sound of military boots and movements. About forty to fifty paratroopers were coming after me, brandishing their batons. I quickly yelled, “I’m not a student!” but they surrounded me and kicked me. They punched me all over and pummeled me with their batons and the butts of their M16 rifles. Even then, I had no idea why I was being attacked, and I was outraged. But there was nothing I could do in the face of such brute strength.¹⁹

Kim collapsed in the street. All he could hear was the sound of the clicking breechblock each time someone hit him with the butt of a rifle. Eventually, he lost consciousness.

At the same time, two paratroopers charged into the Gwangju branch of the Dong-a Ilbo daily—a national newspaper—on the second floor of the three-story building at 276 Buk-dong. In the office were a female clerk, manager Jeong Eun-cheol (age 22), two or three delivery workers, and more than twenty citizens who had rushed in for shelter. The partitioned room next door also sheltered three young people who had scrambled upstairs. The soldiers stormed into the partitioned room first, brandishing bayonet-equipped M16 rifles. Those in the office heard a cry, followed by pleas for mercy and assertions of innocence. The soldiers had beaten the young men so badly that all three were dragged out unconscious, heads and shirts covered in blood. Some time later, the men returned, grabbing Jeong—who had come out to the office on Sunday to collect bills—by the back of the neck. He fell backwards in his chair, and the soldiers stomped on him and beat him with their rifles. Jeong lay on the office floor, barely able to breathe and on the verge of death. The soldiers each took one of his feet and dragged him outside like a dead animal, letting his head bounce down the stairs to the first floor. They returned yet again to beat delivery worker Park Jun-ha (first-year student at Gwangju Technical High School). Park lost consciousness as they dragged him down the stairs, at which point the soldiers left him and departed.²⁰

As If Given a License to Kill

The 200-odd members of the 35th Battalion, sent to the Chungjang-ro intersection on Geumnam-ro 2-ga, attacked citizens in a similarly aggressive manner. Onlookers were bewildered by the unbelievable scene unfolding before their eyes. The soldiers passed the Kwangju Bank head office and the Catholic Center as they marched toward the Dong-gu District Office and the Gwangju Tourist Hotel, pulling aside any young people they saw on the street or in the buses stopped on the roadside, stripping them down to their underwear and beating them, pushing their heads against the pavement. In the blink of an eye, the demonstration turned to chaos. The soldiers treated both men and women with the same ruthlessness, mobbing individuals in groups of three or four to club and trample them. Paratroopers behaved as though they had been given a license to kill.

A little past 4:00 p.m., YWCA Chairwoman Cho Ah-ra (age 68) witnessed the scene from the Intercity Bus Terminal area.²¹ The soldiers stopped city buses and searched them, dragging out without explanation anyone who looked to be college-aged. Resistance was met with a group beating by seven or eight soldiers, who would shout, “Die, Gwangju rats!” When a female bus conductor tried to stop them, they hurled insults at her and clubbed her as well. She lost consciousness and rolled off the bus. If a flagged bus continued to drive several more meters to find a place to park, the soldiers would immediately climb aboard and club the driver in the back of the head.

One young man disembarked from a city bus and ran into a blocked alleyway, where he was caught by the soldiers. He knelt on the ground and begged for mercy. An elderly man who had been watching from his door rushed in to shield him, and the soldiers struck him down crying, “Out of the way, bastard!” The elderly man fell, bleeding. The young man picked up a rock, but the soldiers brutally beat him down. They dragged him out limp into the street by his legs.

One student demonstrator ran into the last house in a narrow alley next to the Buk-dong Post Office. A moment later, two soldiers followed him in. There was a scream, and the student was hauled out. Once they had gone, the neighbors who had witnessed the scene gathered around the house in an uproar to denounce the soldiers’ actions. The student had hidden in the closet of the master bedroom, and the soldiers in pursuit demanded that the elderly woman who had been watching the house alone confess where the student was. When the woman pretended not to know, they struck her, marched into the room, and pulled the student out of the closet. The neighbors seethed with rage.²²

Violence at the Sports Day Festivities

Things were little different in the Gwangju Jeil High School area. Kim Beom-dong (age 33, cook) who worked at Jeilgwan, a Chinese restaurant at the entrance of Chungjang-ro 1-ga, was repairing a broken stove when he spotted paratroopers hunt down demonstrators. He witnessed a young woman being assaulted by the soldiers on the roadside in front of the barbershop next to the high school.²³ Three or four soldiers grabbed her by the blouse, tearing it off and exposing her. They kicked her from the sidewalk and onto the street. They lunged at her again. There was a loud noise and the woman went silent. About fifty people watched from Chungjang-ro in fear, yelling for the soldiers to stop. In that instant, more than thirty soldiers swarmed the area from Chungjang-ro 4-ga to Chungjang-ro 5-ga one block over, armed with guns, batons, and cage-equipped helmets. The onlookers scattered in every direction. Kim, who had been wearing grease-covered gloves and sandals, did not think to run. The soldiers found him in front of the restaurant. They charged him, one of the soldiers driving the butt of his rifle into his shoulder. Kim lost consciousness on the spot and was carried to the Kim Du-won Neurosurgery Clinic across from Hanil Bank by others at the scene.

The Gwangju Jeil High School athletics field, in the meantime, had been hosting a Sports Day for alumni of Chosun University’s College of Medicine and Medical School. The festivities were nearing a close when the paratroopers charged in, some rushing to the classrooms and others swarming the athletics field. The campus was devastated. Some of the alumni were taken into custody, and the rest were forced to scatter without saying goodbye. Fourth-year medical student Lee Min-oh (age 25), who was in the graduating class, had stepped out of the high school campus briefly to see what was happening on Geumnam-ro and was targeted by the soldiers. He managed to avoid them and took shelter in the Gwangju Jeil High School principal’s residence, but he was discovered when the soldiers stormed the home. They kicked him in the stomach, and as he reeled in pain on the floor, they stomped on him again and again. That night, Lee underwent abdominal surgery at the Korean Armed Forces Hospital. Part of his pancreas was severed, and he lost 2.5 liters of blood due to intestinal hemorrhaging. Lee narrowly survived but lost 80 percent of his pancreas and underwent a splenectomy.²⁴ Second-year Chosun Medical School student Park Byeong-ryul (age 23) was also beaten by paratroopers and was hospitalized with a concussion.

Police Assaulted by Paratroopers

Kim Woo-sik (age 39), who ran a barbershop at the Gwangju Tourist Hotel near Geumnam-ro 1-ga by Province Hall, witnessed police officers being beaten by paratroopers.²⁵ He and his employees went outside upon hearing a commotion and saw more than a hundred students fleeing the paratroopers. The soldiers took about thirty to forty students and citizens into custody, depositing them in front of the hotel. Prisoners were stripped down to their underwear and beaten, and their heads were pushed against the ground. Two of the paratroopers dragged a female student from near the Gwangju branch of the Bank of Korea. When she begged for mercy, the soldiers swore and kicked her even harder. Soon afterward, when the soldiers left to arrest more people, a man freed everyone who had been dragged there. He was the chief of the Security Division at the South Jeolla Province Police. When the soldiers realized what had happened, they brutally assaulted him and dragged him into a back alley by the Dong-gu District Office.

Police Commissioner Ahn Byeong-ha had given orders concerning police response to the demonstration at 11:00 a.m. that day: “Do not unnecessarily chase down those who scatter, avoid causing injuries, take into custody those who resist, and make certain that students are not injured in the process of arrest and detainment.” When the demonstrations escalated, he ordered, “Make certain to take demonstrating students into custody.”²⁶

At 4:00 p.m., Cho Hun-cheol (age 20), who was preparing for university entrance exams, had finished playing a game of billiards with his friends and was about to wash his hands when a pair of paratroopers entered with batons in hand.²⁷ They divided up the billiards hall patrons into those with clean hands and those with dusty hands, and beat the latter under the assumption that their hands were dirty because they had been among the demonstrators throwing rocks. Cho protested, asserting that his hands were covered with chalk, but the soldiers refused to listen. They beat Cho ruthlessly and dragged him before the Gwangju Post Office, where many people had already been brought and forced on their knees. Soon afterward, the soldiers took them away on trucks.

At 4:30 p.m., Lee Geun-jae (age 57) was walking by Geumnam-ro when he witnessed soldiers striking a girl. He tried to stop them but was clubbed in the head and knocked unconscious.²⁸

Demonstrators Sing the National Anthem

Meanwhile, demonstrators in Dongmyeong-dong and Sansu-dong were completely unaware of the deployment of paratroopers. A group of more than 2,000 demonstrators charged toward the Dongmyeong-dong Police Substation. Chonnam student Yu Seung-gyu (age 21) witnessed outraged students tear down the station and remove the portrait of President Choi Kyu-hah from the wall. Some among the crowds yelled, “Choi Kyu-hah is a puppet!” or “Kill the cat’s paw president!” Demonstrators took documents, desks, and chairs from the substation and threw them into a roaring fire.²⁹ A similar scene unfolded at the nearby Jisan-dong Police Substation. Demonstrators stood in a circle around the pyre of office supplies and furniture, singing the national anthem and giving three triumphant cries of “Manse!” before continuing their march in the direction of the five-way intersection at Sansu-dong neighborhood around 4:40 p.m.

On the way to Sansu-dong, demonstrators at the back of the group raised a sudden uproar. Hong Sun-hui (age 20, postsecondary student), who was part of the crowd of demonstrators, looked back and spotted a police bus come up on Nongjang Bridge. Its windows were equipped with protective cages. The bus made its way toward the Gwangju District Court. In the blink of an eye, demonstrators surrounded the bus and threw rocks at it. The protective cages broke, and forty-two terrified police personnel stepped outside. They had been temporarily reassigned to Gwangju from nearby Damyang County to bolster local forces. The demonstrators decided to take the police hostage and request a prisoner exchange for the students taken into custody.³⁰ Marching the police at the center of their formation, the demonstrators made their way to Province Hall. At 5:00 p.m., the procession reached Cheongsan Private School at the entrance of Dongmyeong-ro. At that moment, several military trucks carrying paratroopers emerged. A chill ran through the crowd of demonstrators. They had already seen the soldiers in action at the main gates of Chonnam that morning. The demonstrators released the police personnel. The paratroopers, who had surrounded the demonstrators, took the opportunity to force their way directly into a head-on clash. The demonstrators scattered in a matter of seconds. The soldiers targeted fleeing students one by one and chased them down in the chaos.

Thirty men from the 33rd Battalion of the 7th Brigade were stationed at Gwangju National University of Education at 10:00 a.m. Jeon Gye-ryang (age 45), a career soldier on the cusp of being discharged, had come home to the neighborhood on leave. At 4:00 p.m., he looked out from the second floor of his home across the university and witnessed soldiers from the 7th working in groups of two or three, hunting down all young people on the streets. The soldiers brought them to the empty lot behind Jeon’s house and had them kneel, kicking and stomping on them until they were bloody, and hauling them into military trucks. Although himself a soldier, Jeon trembled at the brutality of the troops.³¹

The nine o’clock news that day did not even mention Gwangju. The media turned a blind eye to the catastrophe unfolding in the city. To make matters worse, there were no newspapers that day because it was a Sunday. Completely cut off from the rest of Korea, Gwangju was plunged into terror.

Figure 2. Clashes between police and student demonstrators (May 18, 11:00–17:00)

The First Victim: Hearing-Impaired Kim Gyeong-cheol

The first recorded loss of life during the Gwangju Uprising was the death of Kim Gyeong-cheol (age 24), who was hearing-impaired and unable to speak. On the morning of May 18, family and relatives gathered at his home to celebrate the 100th day since the birth of his daughter. Kim ran a shoe-shining and crafting business in the Kkachigogae area of Baegun-dong with fellow hearing-impaired friends Hwang Jong-ho (age 22) and Park In-gap (age 25). They would visit cafés and businesses in the city to offer their services. That afternoon, Kim and his friends wandered the downtown core in search of work, when three or four paratroopers appeared out of nowhere at the entrance to the alley by Jeil Cinema on Chungjang-ro and struck Kim in the head. Kim fell on the spot, bleeding. Hwang and Park fled in terror and watched from a hiding place in the alley as Kim was beaten. They too were quickly discovered by soldiers coming from the opposite direction and beaten with rifles and kicked. They gestured desperately to explain that they were unable to hear or speak, until blood ran down their hands. But the more they tried to plead, the more the soldiers assaulted them and accused them of faking disabilities. The soldiers dragged the half-conscious men away and hauled them into their armored vehicles. It was 11:00 p.m. when the soldiers finally realized that the men were indeed hearing-impaired and released them.

Kim, who was taken to the Red Cross Hospital in the afternoon, was moved to the Korean Armed Forces Hospital and was declared dead at 3:00 a.m. on May 19.³² According to the autopsy of Kim’s body, conducted jointly by the Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office and the military, Kim suffered “abrasions and lacerations to the back of the head, lacerations to the superior palpebral region of the left eye, blunt trauma to the upper right forearm, blunt trauma to the left shoulder joint, and blunt trauma to the anterior tibia, buttocks, and femoral region.” In other words, the back of his head was caved in, his left eye was ruptured, his right arm and left shoulder were broken, and his buttocks and thighs were crushed. According to the death certificate, the direct cause of death was cerebral hemorrhaging caused by blunt trauma to the back of the head.³³

By 5:00 p.m., an hour after paratroopers were deployed to the downtown core, the last of the student demonstrations on Geumnam-ro were disbanded in front of Cheongsan Private School. However, the soldiers continued to carry out their violent suppression. They crawled through shops, cafés, barbershops, restaurants, offices, homes, and billiard halls, hunting down students with dogged obstinance. Those still in hiding or who had failed to escape were dragged out like animals.

Signs of Reversal

At 6:00 p.m., about 300 young people clashed with a small number of paratroopers in the Gyerim-dong neighborhood. The demonstrators were armed with pieces of lumber, metal pipes, and kitchen knives. Where other demonstrators scattered helplessly in the face of military might, this group met the soldiers head-on and refused to give in. A fierce struggle ensued with injuries on both sides. Lee Jang-ui (age 30), a blue-collar worker at the Asia Motors factory, had attended the first birthday celebration of a friend’s child in Gwangcheon-dong and was on his way back when he happened to stumble upon the scene. Lee attempted to pass by the paratroopers stationed in front of Gyerim Cinema at 6:00 p.m. when, with a cry of “Get him!” the soldiers swarmed him, beating him with their batons and stabbing him four times.³⁴

Demonstrators responded with horror and indignation. They surrounded the paratroopers without care for their own safety. The soldiers were pushed back little by little until suddenly, they broke ranks and fled in the direction of the Sansu-dong five-way intersection with the demonstrators in hot pursuit. It was not long, however, before military reinforcements arrived to strike back, forcing demonstrators to fall back and scatter, taking shelter in local residences.

The paratroopers surrounded the neighborhoods of Sansu-dong and Punghyang-dong and combed the area late into the night, taking away anyone who seemed to be postsecondary student-aged. Rumors spread that martial law forces would search boarding houses and studio apartments in the Chonnam and Chosun University areas at night to take students into custody.

At 6:00 p.m., Jeolla Province martial law authorities moved up curfew time in Gwangju to 9:00 p.m. with Martial Law Command Branch Announcement 4 and urged citizens to return home early. At 7:00 p.m., Lieutenant Colonel Kim Il-ok, commander of the 35th Battalion, reported to Commander Chung Ung of the 31st Division that the demonstrations had been put down. However, demonstrators continued their activities guerrilla-style late into the night. A group of more than 600 amassed in front of the Catholic Center on Geumnam-ro downtown at 8:00 p.m. and clashed with martial law troops before being driven off. Dozens were taken into custody and over 2,000 young people were pushed toward the Labor Supervision Office and Hanil Bank until they scattered. Pockets of resistance flared up across the city. Demonstrators were taken away until late that night, and screams continued to echo down the streets. The commotion finally grew quiet at 11:00 p.m. The alleyways were rank with the stench of blood.

That night, Chonnam University students Noh Jun-hyeon (age 24) and Im Nak-pyeong made countless telephone calls in the dark to confirm the safety of their friends and to spread word about what they had seen on the streets that day.³⁵ Their hushed voices carried across phone lines and over walls from house to house. Word of the military’s brutal actions spread across the city like wildfire. The people of Gwangju spent the night wide awake, simmering with fear and anger.

Officially, 405 people were taken into custody on May 18: 114 university students, 35 college students, 6 high school students, 66 young people studying for university entrance exams, and 184 ordinary civilians.³⁶ Of them, 68 suffered head injuries, blunt trauma, or puncture wounds, and 12 were in critical condition.³⁷ However, the real number of injuries and arrests was much higher than reported.

That day, the 31st Infantry Division collected 4,717 firearms and 1.16 million rounds of ammunition from storage locations across the city and the armories of workplace reserve units and moved them onto their base, fearing that they might be seized by civilians. An additional 550,000 rounds of ammunition from local armories were collected to be stored on base or at a police station. The 31st also requested permission from the Singunbu to open fire on anyone who attempted to approach any of the armories in the city.³⁸

The Government Response

At 4:30 p.m. on May 18, President Choi Kyu-hah issued a special presidential statement concerning the May 17 expansion of martial law: “The necessary measures have been taken to protect the country and defend the lives of 37 million South Koreans.” The statement was based on an original draft composed by Defense Security Command that morning and edited by the Blue House.³⁹

Earlier that day at 1:45 a.m., martial law troops sealed off the National Assembly. The 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion, the 101st Regiment, the 33rd Division, part of the Capital Corps, took over the building and prevented National Assembly members from entering. The Tenth Declaration of Martial Law paralyzed the legislative branch of South Korean government altogether. At 10:40 a.m. on May 18, the Martial Law Command’s press office summoned the editors-in-chief of twenty-two newspapers and notified them of new censorship regulations.⁴⁰

Starting at 8:30 a.m., Chief Martial Law Administrator Lee Hui-seong hosted a martial law conference with national security decisionmakers from Defense Security Command, the KCIA, Public Defense Security Command, and the Ministry of Home Affairs in attendance to report on and review major issues.⁴¹ At the meeting, Lee ordered those in attendance to publicize the national crisis to the citizens and to assert that military intervention was crucial to restoring social order.

From 11:30 a.m. to 12:55 p.m., Lee met with Ambassador Gleysteen and the ROK-US Combined Forces Command chief of staff. Gleysteen expressed the United States’ implicit approval of the expansion of martial law, saying, “The US is not opposed to the efforts of the South Korean government to maintain law and order.”⁴²

At 5:00 p.m. that day, ROK-US Combined Forces Commander John Wickham—who had gone to the United States on May 14 to discuss the situation around the Korean Peninsula—quickly returned to Korea. He had been scheduled to return on May 27 but cut his visit short when Gleysteen determined that something had gone awry and requested his presence in Seoul.

Reinforcements from the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade

Singunbu leaders had a 2.5-hour lunch meeting at 1:00 p.m. at Martial Law Command. Meeting participants included Singunbu leaders Lee Hui-seong, Hwang Young-si, Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, and Chung Ho-yong, as well as Lew Byeong-hyun—chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and the ROK Navy and Air Force chiefs of staff. The discussions were focused on the status of demonstrations in the country on the morning of May 18 and countermeasures against them. It was reported at the meeting that while other areas were quiet, postsecondary students in Gwangju continued to put up resistance and that there were signs that their demonstrations could snowball. Meeting participants unanimously agreed that the situation had to be contained preemptively, drawing from their experiences with the Busan-Masan Democratization Protests. They immediately decided to send additional paratroopers to Gwangju.⁴³ Before the lunch meeting ended, Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong ordered Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Kim Jae-myeong to immediately dispatch an additional Airborne Special Forces Brigade to Gwangju to bolster forces on the scene. At 2:00 p.m., Kim asked Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong to recommend a brigade for the mission. Chung named the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade (commanded by Choi Ung).⁴⁴ Kim officially handed down ROK Army HQ Operation Order 19-80, which dispatched the 11th to the city.

Meanwhile in Gwangju, Commander Chung Ung of the 31st Infantry Division, who led counterdemonstration efforts in the city, judged that police forces alone would be enough to quell the demonstrators and was reluctant to deploy paratroopers. Defense Security Command, however, judged otherwise. As soon as demonstrations began in the morning, a request was sent to Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Young-si for paratrooper reinforcements to preemptively stamp out the unrest.⁴⁵

The lunch meeting at ROK Army HQ ended at 3:30 p.m. Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong immediately met with Brigadier General Choi Ung at Dongguk University with orders to mobilize to Gwangju: “Two battalions from the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade have been dispatched to the city, but they have been unable to crush the protesters and are struggling to maintain order. Assist them in quelling the unrest.”⁴⁶ Chung’s description of the situation in Gwangju, however, was not correct. The 7th had not been sent into the streets until 4:00 p.m. that day, but Chung intentionally portrayed the situation as such to motivate Choi.

Chung went further, claiming that “Rumors abound in Gwangju that soldiers from the Gyeongsang Provinces are set on exterminating the people of the Jeolla Provinces, enraging the citizens—which is why [Choi], who is not from either of the regions but from Seoul, needs to defuse the situation.”⁴⁷ This story, too, was false. The rumor about the Gyeongsang Province troops did not spread across the city until after the 7th violently descended upon demonstrators at 4:00 p.m. that day. It was the 7th’s shocking display of brutality that created the conditions for the spread of such rumors to begin with.

Two hundred and sixty men from the 61st Battalion of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ahn Bu-ung, as well as Brigadier Choi Ung, would serve as the advance party. At 4:30 p.m., they boarded a military plane bound for Gwangju at Seoul Air Base. The remaining members of the 61st, as well as the 62nd and 63rd Battalions, boarded a train from Cheongnyangni Station in Seoul at 5:00 p.m. Private First Class Lee Gyeong-nam from the 61st Battalion boarded the train with no idea where they were headed. All he had to go on was the vague rumor that he and his fellow soldiers were bound for Jeju Island to combat guerrilla fighters who had gathered en masse. Having grown accustomed to following orders every day, no one asked why they were being deployed or let themselves bother wondering what their specific purpose was.⁴⁸

Having landed at Gwangju Airport at 5:50 p.m., the advance party from the 61st traveled to their camp at Chosun University. They violently cut across downtown Gwangju on the way. It was still light out, but the 7th had already swept across the city by then. Private First Class Lee saw chaos and gloom reign on the streets. Terrified locals gave them icy looks.

At 9:00 p.m., Commander Chung Ung of the 31st Infantry Division held an operations meeting in the situation room. He assembled the 7th’s forces around the South Jeolla Province Hall, stationing them at twenty-six strategic locations such as police stations, police substations, and major intersections in groups composed of one officer, ten enlisted men, and two squads of police officers composed of twenty-four men. When they were joined by the 11th at 11:40 p.m., Commander Chung Ung held another meeting and transferred control of the strategic locations to the 11th, sending the 7th to Chonnam National University and Chosun University for rest.

3

Transition to an Active Offensive
(Monday, May 19: Day 2 of the Uprising)

From Student Demonstration to Popular Revolt

The military’s brutal response to the student demonstrations left the residents of Gwangju trembling in fear through the night. The highly trained counterdemonstration forces used darkness to further prepare their offensive. Seven hundred and ninety-eight members of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade (102 officers, 696 enlisted) arrived at Chosun University at 2:10 a.m. on May 19. The 35th Battalion of the 7th Brigade—which was responsible for the previous day’s carnage—was placed under operational control of the 11th Brigade, and the 31st Division’s troops were reorganized.

At 3:00 a.m., Lieutenant Colonel Ahn Bu-ung of the 61st Battalion received his orders from the operations officer of the 31st Division at the Chosun University Reserve Officers’ Training Corps office. Ahn objected, however, saying, “As the commander, I cannot accept this order. Special forces troops are meant to work as a group in an assembled position to hold a location or act as mobile strike forces. Dispersing them would go against their specialization.”¹

This was the only time during the Gwangju Uprising when the commander of the 61st Battalion was subject to direct operational control by an officer of the 31st Division. According to protocol, all special forces troops deployed to Gwangju were under the command of the 31st Division. However, following the first day of the Gwangju Uprising, the battalion received no further orders from or delivered any status reports to the 31st.²

At 9:00 a.m., Brigade Commander Choi Ung arrived at the Chosun University Reserve Officers’ Training Corps office and gathered all three battalion commanders of the 11th Brigade. Choi assigned each battalion to strategic locations and encouraged the men heading out to quell the demonstrations. Choi himself remained at Combat Arms Command at Sangmudae—west of downtown Gwangju—occasionally flying to Chosun University by helicopter to lead operations.

The meeting also ordered an “investigation on whether part of the 7th Airborne Special Forces would be required in the region.” The meeting ended at 9:40 a.m. Ten minutes later, part of the 7th was transferred to the Mokpo field battalion from Gwangju.³ At 9:50 a.m., the 33rd Battalion of the 7th Brigade (59 officers, 253 enlisted, 15 vehicles), a division reserve corps, was also assigned to Gwangju. A separate field battalion from the 7th was established for the city of Mokpo further south in accordance with the general staff meeting hosted by Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong at 8:20 a.m. that day. Martial Law Command ordered “close surveillance on the Mokpo region,” which was the hometown of Kim Dae-jung, “whom the people of the Jeolla Provinces idolize[d].”

By that point, Martial Law Command had already made the decision to send in another Airborne Special Forces Brigade in addition to the 11th (dispatched on May 18). The decision was handed down at 6:30 a.m. on May 19, even before demonstrations had started in the morning.

Martial Law Command scrutinized every development in the Gwangju area and kept a tight hold over the situation. The minutest of details were handed down to commanders on the field directly from Martial Law Command. The operation orders sent to Combat Arms Command were command orders as opposed to training orders.⁴ Thanks to the operations of Defense Security Command agents, who held a discreet monopoly on information networks around the country, Martial Law Command in Seoul had a clear idea of the events taking place far to the south in Gwangju.

At daybreak, Gwangju residents streamed into the streets to learn what was happening. Households with postsecondary students or similarly aged children were fraught with worry, especially those whose family members failed to return home the previous night. Even unaffected households urged students to flee to the countryside for fear of indiscriminate slaughter by paratroopers. A number of students heeded their advice, and those who remained in the city were practically locked in their houses by worried family members.

Elementary, junior high, and high schools held classes for the morning. Most businesses in the downtown core remined shut, but it was business as usual for public offices and large corporate factories. Soldiers and police kept a strict watch on the streets, and Geumnam-ro was closed off to vehicle traffic. Even areas frequented by pedestrians were guarded by platoon-sized groups of martial law troops who prevented the entrance of young people and vehicles. The industrial area of Gwangcheon-dong fell under particularly intense scrutiny, with soldiers inspecting every vehicle entering the area. In the markets, people discussed what they had witnessed the previous day without even unpacking their merchandise.

Tensions ran high through the city. Fear turned to outrage as residents exchanged all kinds of speculation.

“They’re going to kill Kim Dae-jung and everyone in Gwangju too.”

“They say the special forces are all from the Gyeongsang Provinces.”

“The soldiers want to exterminate the people of the Jeolla Provinces.”

In the alleys, strangers recounted the horrors of the previous day. The stories spread like wildfire. The more the people told the stories, the more solidarity they found in their anger. The people of Gwangju chose to go out into the streets and see what was really happening in their city. Residents from all across town headed for Geumnam-ro.

Police had closed off all traffic on the thoroughfare. Riot police set up a barricade in front of Province Hall, and martial law troops were stationed at strategic locations around the city. The crowds converged on Geumnam-ro at 9:00 a.m. When their numbers swelled past a hundred soldiers and police began to chase them away. One young man pursued by martial law troops into the alley next to Sangmu Hall was released by police rather than captured; the soldiers assaulted the police lieutenant responsible. Onlookers jeered the soldiers and applauded the police for their actions.⁵

By 10:00 a.m., the number of people crowding Geumnam-ro had risen to 3,000–4,000. Bound by camaraderie, they stared silently at the line guarded by the police and the military. Where the previous day’s demonstrators were mainly students and young adults, those gathered on the morning of May 19 were from many walks of life—small business owners, retail employees, local residents, and homemakers. The police and military used megaphones and military helicopters to urge the crowds to disperse. But no one showed signs of leaving, and some people even shook their fists and swore at the helicopters.

The first clash between paratroopers and demonstrators that day began in front of the Chungjang-ro Police Substation on the edge of the 61st Battalion’s security area. At 10:40 a.m., police fired tear gas to disperse the crowds. The people responded by throwing rocks. When the tear gas grew thick, they would hide in residential or commercial buildings in nearby alleyways before rushing back into the streets. Little by little, the crowds became demonstrators and pushed back against the military. They tipped over large planters on the roadside and shattered paving stones to throw at the soldiers. The people of Gwangju began to fight, building makeshift barricades with phone booths and barbed wire used for traffic.

As students and young people among the demonstrators sang the Korean national anthem, “Justice,” and “Our Wish Is Reunification,” the demonstration became progressively hostile. Young people brought in pieces of lumber, iron bars, and pipes from an underground marketplace construction site under Jungang-ro and armed themselves. Demonstrators fought back with more than just stone and wood, however—Molotov cocktails were also among their weapons.

About thirty minutes after the clash between police and the people of Gwangju, paratroopers reached Province Hall and the Gwangnam-ro intersection on a fleet of over thirty military trucks. Ahn Bu-ung, commander of the 61st Battalion of the 11th Brigade, who had just finished placing his men throughout the city, was on his way back to Chosun University to bathe when he received a radio communication from the commander of the 1st Field Battalion: “The field battalion stationed at Chungjang-ro Police Substation has been surrounded by protesters. They are being pelted with rocks and firebombs and require support.” He rushed into a commander’s vehicle with an operations officer and hurried to the scene, siren blaring. The demonstrators were pushing back the paratroopers. Ahn immediately radioed the 11th’s chief of staff for backup. It was not long before the 62nd and 63rd Battalions, fresh from displays of force in other areas of the city (including Yang-dong Market), joined the 61st.

Upon repelling the demonstrators from the police substation area, paratroopers fenced them in from either end of Geumnam-ro, packing them in tighter and tighter. They showed even more belligerence than the previous day and tore into the crowds like starved beasts. The soldiers pushed forward against the shower of rocks—striking, swinging, and stabbing with their batons, rifles, and bayonets. Charging into the center of the crowd, they did not stop until their uniforms were covered in blood. People scattered in every direction and gathered again in smaller groups, leaving many injured and dead on the road. Demonstrators took refuge in residences, cafés, offices, and businesses. The ensuing carnage was identical to the previous day. Soldiers barged through any door they could find and dragged out any college-aged person who happened to be inside, beating them mercilessly with their batons and taking them to the streets.

The soldiers searched nearby buildings in groups of three or four. Prisoners were stripped as an example and punished brutally as though in a military camp. People stripped down to their underwear were made to crawl across the debris- and shrapnel-littered pavement on their stomachs with their hands tied behind their back. Some were hog-tied or forced to put their foreheads against the ground and support their own weight only by their forehead and feet in a brutal punishment known as the “Wonsan Bombing.” Women were stripped naked and kicked and were grabbed by the hair and their heads slammed against walls. Prisoners were loaded into military vehicles like piles of refuse. It was as though the soldiers enjoyed the carnage. Prisoners who were still conscious were forced to sing with their heads still against the pavement or sent into trucks one after another to be beaten. It was a scene that went beyond any act of violent terrorism, but something straight out of hell. According to witnesses, “It was impossible to believe that those soldiers were fellow countrymen.” Even Ahn Bu-ung, the on-site commander, indirectly admitted to the unnecessary cruelty of their actions:

The military leaders are at fault for deploying paratroopers trained for guerilla warfare against civilians without considering the perspective of the people of Gwangju. We attempted to quell the protests in accordance with our training, but in the process of tracking down and securing the instigators, we forced our way through a large number of people and found ourselves using excessive force.⁶

Violence at Midojang Inn

At 10:00 a.m., a young man in black work wear who had been among the demonstrators on Geumnam-ro 3-ga was chased by paratroopers into the Midojang Inn behind the Catholic Center. The inn’s manager, Cho Geon-su (age 27) immediately attempted to roll down the shutters behind him. However, a platoon forced their way into the entrance before the shutters were fully closed. They beat Cho and the bookkeeper Son Byeong-seop (age 23) before hauling them away. Employee Jang Ik-su (age 23), who was in charge of the VIP rooms, brought a fleeing demonstrator to the bathroom of room 201 and they barricaded themselves inside. The soldiers ransacked the rooms one after another until they finally broke down the door to room 201, beat both Jang and the demonstrator bloody, and dragged them off. The soldiers even took away a pair of young honeymooners staying at the inn. A total of seven Midojang employees were taken into custody. Park Pil-ho (age 20), who was repairing the boiler in the basement when he heard the commotion, changed out of his reserve forces pants into old work wear and ragged sandals, and covered his face in soot. He pretended to be busy tinkering with the machines, but half a dozen soldiers barged into the basement and attacked him anyway, bayonets at the ready. Employees Kim Byeong-ryeol (age 16) and Kim Yeong-dae (age 22) attempted to explain that they worked for the inn and were not demonstrators, but their pleas fell on deaf ears.

About seven or eight of us went to an inn called something like “Midojang,” which was behind the Gwangju Tourist Hotel. The gates were barred. … I said, “Somebody needs to teach these bastards a lesson,” and used the double jump kick technique from taekwondo on some of them, and beat the others with my baton. As I explained earlier, the batons are solid and very heavy, so even a small amount of force could break your arm if you tried to block it. In only two or three minutes, four to five employees were rolling on the floor, their tidy white button-down shirts and bow ties unrecognizable.⁷

When the soldiers pulled the fallen employees to their feet and lined them up against the wall, the major in charge of the field battalion entered. He made the employees kneel and kicked each of them once in the face—which was enough to leave them maimed and bleeding profusely. Paratroopers went on to search the rooms and dragged out more than ten people in their twenties and thirties, lining them up in two rows. A man in his thirties pleaded for mercy, explaining that he was on his honeymoon, but the paratroopers did not listen. They brutally assaulted him even as his bride begged for them to stop. The soldiers stripped down all civilians in their custody down to their underwear, humiliating and terrifying them so they would not escape. They tied up the prisoners with their own belts, forced them to carry their clothes with bound hands, and dragged them to the military trucks. Civilians were gathered in groups of thirty to forty people in the middle of Geumnam-ro and forced to do military drills while bound: “Backs on the floor!” “Stomachs on the floor!” “Roll right!” “Roll left!” Once the prisoners’ spirits were sufficiently crushed, they were forced to climb into the backs of the trucks in double file. Because of the difficulty of climbing into a truck with hands bound, the person behind the climber would push them up with their head. The prisoners were loaded in like pieces of cargo.

Figure 3. Clashes between police and demonstrators (May 19, 10:30 a.m.–13:00 p.m.)

Archbishop Youn Kong-hi witnessed the scene from the Diocesan Curia Office on the sixth floor of the Catholic Center, but he could not pluck up the courage to head downstairs and protest. He feared for the lives of the people on the ground and regretted his inaction—particularly considering his position as high-ranking clergy. He saw one young man who had taken off his jacket, which revealed that he was bleeding from the chest and neck.

He was bleeding, staggering towards Geumnam-ro. A few steps later, he collapsed to the ground, and the soldiers were threatening him. He was wounded and bleeding and needed care, but the soldiers wouldn’t take care of him. I myself couldn’t do a thing. In that moment I was starkly reminded of the parable of the Good Samaritan from the Gospels.⁸

The Manhunt

On the first floor of the YWCA building was a Credit Union office occupied by a number of employees including Kim Yeong-cheol (age 32) and Park Yong-jun (age 24). On the second floor was a booksellers’ union, where employees such as Hwang Il-bong (age 23) witnessed the carnage outside the window. Around noon, paratroopers stormed the Credit Union. They inspected Park’s belongings and dragged Hwang to the entrance hall, making to swing their batons at him. However, young people at the Mudeung Civil Service Exam Academy across the street jeered at the soldiers from the windows and demanded that they stop. In response, the paratroopers turned their sights on the academy. Student Jeong Bang-nam (age 19) was caught and beaten with clubs and rifles. About forty paratroopers closed the shutters to the building from the outside, leaving only a small crack through which occupants could crawl. They forced the students to come outside and assaulted them ruthlessly as they made their way out under the shutters. The soldiers loaded the collapsed students onto military trucks and took them to Sangmudae. The violence left Jeong with cerebellar and spinal injuries. He wasted away for years until he was reduced to skin and bones and passed away on January 6, 1994.⁹

Shaking in anger at the brutality of the paratroopers, Park Yong-jun yelled, “Bastards! I would kill you all if only I had a gun!” He immediately joined the demonstrations and indeed took up a rifle in the early morning of May 27 during the final stand against martial law forces. Park would be shot to death during the confrontation at his workplace—the Credit Union in the YWCA building. Kim Yeong-cheol also joined the resistance, taking a post in the Uprising Leadership Team as Planning Director. He fought to the end to defend Province Hall until his arrest early in the morning of May 27.

Reporter Kim Chung-geun, who worked for the Dong-a Ilbo daily, was working near the Jeonil Building on Geumnam-ro 1-ga Street when he saw a young man escape a beating from paratroopers and flee into the Mudeung Civil Service Exam Academy. One of the soldiers followed the young man up the stairs, detached his bayonet, and lobbed it at the young man’s back. Once the military openly began to taunt the civilians of Gwangju, people chose to clash head-on with soldiers. The demonstrations became more violent. Kim witnessed a host of unbelievable scenes across the city. Where counterdemonstration forces would generally attempt to disperse crowds by threatening or using limited displays of force, martial law troops charged directly into the demonstrators, destroying any semblance of boundaries. When the civilians scattered, they followed in every direction after them, attacking men, women, and children alike with reckless abandon. “Manhunt” was the only word Kim could use to describe the horror.¹⁰

In describing the scene, Terry Anderson from the Associated Press also asserted that “this was effectively a military riot.”¹¹ The paratroopers’ use of violence was not a means of dispersing demonstrators; it was a means of taking civilians into custody. Seventeen years later, in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that “martial law troops’ violent suppression of Gwangju civilians’ demonstrations constituted an assault and intimidation under the definition of rioting, which is a prerequisite for the crime of rebellion.”¹²

As the number of injured mounted, taxi drivers stepped forward to take them to hospitals. Those caught loading the wounded into their vehicles or transporting them were dragged out along with the passengers and beaten relentlessly. The soldiers even turned on police officers who assisted the transportation of victims. Ahn Su-taek, operations chief of the South Jeolla Province Police, led the transportation efforts and was threatened by a lieutenant colonel who commanded one of the battalions: “If you smuggle out any of the injured protesters or student demonstrators, you will be considered their collaborators.” A riot police commander who witnessed the brutality of the military begged loitering civilians, “Please go back home—the paratroopers will kill you if they catch you.”¹³

By lunchtime, a somber silence had fallen over the city. Geumnam-ro was closed off completely to traffic and riot police once again set up barricades around the Province Hall premises. Left behind in the wake of the storm were empty streets, occupied only by soldiers at strategic locations, and the odd foreign journalist and TV camera. If the demonstrations on the previous day were led mostly by students, Monday’s demonstrations were conducted by nearly an even mix of students and nonstudent civilians in a testament to the city’s mounting outrage. Those taken into custody on Geumnam-ro between 11:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. that day were recorded in the Martial Law Records as follows:

1 architect, 8 manufacturing-sector workers, 1 blue-collar worker, 1 driver, 10 employees, 1 farmer, 1 merchant, 1 pastor, 9 office workers, 20 students preparing for university entrance exams, 1 Gwangju Health University student, 1 Nongwon Industrial Technical School student, 4 Dongshin College students, 1 Mokpo National University student, 1 Anyang Industrial Technical School student, 1 high school student, 4 Chonnam National University students, 1 electrician, 1 Chosun University College of Engineering student, 26 Chosun University students, 1 Hanyang University student, 11 other. Total: 107.

That morning, plumber Hwang Gang-ju (age 20), who was doing construction work to supply drinking water to the paratroopers who had set up camp on the grounds of Chosun University, saw endless streams of military trucks carry in young people in groups of thirty to forty. The soldiers dragged them off the trucks and forced them to crawl in circles around the athletics field, beat them, and hauled them into the gymnasium. Hwang witnessed more than eight instances of such brutality that day.¹⁴

High School Students Join the Demonstrations

A stir ran through high schools in the city all morning until the students rose up at noon on their own campuses. Gwangju Daedong High School students formed lines and marched in a circle around their athletics field in protest. Kumho Jungang Girls’ High School Student Council President Park Chan-suk led over 600 of her fellow students onto the school grounds chanting, “Democracy has been annihilated. Countless students are dead,” until police arrived and blocked off the gates. At 2:00 p.m., Kim Yeong-ran (age 18), third-year student and student council president at Gwangsan Girls’ High School in Songjeong-ri, met with her counterpart from Jeonggwang High School during the lunch period and made a pact to go out into the streets in protest at 5:00 p.m. She mustered five class representatives to lead the students, but armed police arrived at the gates that afternoon and prevented them from marching.

The on-campus demonstrations led to the closure of most high schools at 3:00 p.m., with students instructed to return home. However, students gathered in groups of twenty to thirty the moment they stepped out the gates and joined the demonstrations. Many teenagers showed uncanny boldness and passion on the streets of Gwangju, throwing themselves at the paratroopers without a care for their own safety. Their deaths broke the hearts of Gwangju’s citizens and galvanized them into action. The following day, the South Jeolla Provincial Education Committee ordered the one-day closure of every high school in the city—the closures, however, were extended all the way to the end of the uprising on May 27.

The Fight for Survival

Over the course of the Gwangju Uprising, several key events led to the intensification of civilian resistance. The first catalyst took place on the afternoon of May 19. In the morning, the demonstration switched hands from students to ordinary citizens, and the unorganized and passive demonstrations (and the violent quashing thereof by paratroopers) gave way to open defiance. At noon, martial law troops cut off movement at every intersection, eliminating all traffic from the downtown core. The people of Gwangju, who had personally witnessed the carnage that morning, seethed in fury. They realized that driving the troops out of the city was their only hope of survival. Their newfound determination shaped the civilian response that afternoon.

The people had been helpless to fight back against the paratroopers’ raw firepower. The fear of death weighed heavily on the city. What could ordinary civilians—armed with nothing but fury and their conscience—do against the military might of the Singunbu? How could they survive? In the name of the nation, Chun and his cronies used terror and power to demand absolute mass subservience on pain of death.

It was in this dark hour, however, that the unthinkable occurred. The overwhelming show of state violence struck a nerve, awakening the people’s innate instinct for survival. The citizens of Gwangju opened their eyes to the potential within them to fight.

At 1:30 p.m., paratroopers stationed on Geumnam-ro vacated the area for lunch, leaving behind a token force with the police forces to man the barricades. Demonstrators saw their chance and swarmed the street. The crowds filled not only Geumnam-ro but the intersecting Chungjang-ro as well; they also clashed with troops who had been deployed to the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) building. The crowds gathered in front of the Catholic Center numbered 4,000–5,000.

A pair of military helicopters flew low over the people, announcing:

Citizens and students of Gwangju, your outbursts will only add to the confusion. Disperse and return to your homes immediately. You are being incited by a small number of unsavory elements and rioters. Any participation in or support for their activities will result in serious consequences for you and your families. We are not responsible for what happens in such a scenario.

The helicopters also scattered flyers over the crowds, who picked them up and responded with outrage. They were simply the written version of the announcement blaring from the helicopters. The people raised their tools, lead pipes, and lumber bludgeons higher into the air and chanted, “Get them first!” “Down the helicopters!” “If you call us rioters, then we will be rioters! Kill us if you can!”

The demonstrators gathered in even greater numbers than the previous morning. Even onlookers stepped forward, pressing the civilians further into action. They threw rocks and firebombs toward the police barricades on either end of Geumnam-ro. Newly joining the ranks of demonstrators were middle-aged people and homemakers. The soldiers and police held their ground, and a hail of rocks, firebombs, and tear gas canisters rained upon the street as the announcement continued from the helicopter in front of the line.

In the heat of the confrontation, one young man brought out four cars from the Catholic Center parking garage, doused them in oil, lit them, and—with the engine still running—pushed them towards the military and police barricade. One of the vehicles belonged to the Christian Broadcasting System. The military and the police fired off tear gas at maximum output. It was a fierce skirmish. When one of the burning cars hit the police barricade and exploded, the crowd cheered.

It was not long before young people brought out two full oil drums from the construction site for the new Jeil Church on Geumnam-ro 2-ga. They lit the drums on fire and rolled them toward the barricades. One of them exploded with a deafening blast, sending flames rising into the air. Multiple news photographers captured the moment, which decorated newspapers when the first articles concerning the Gwangju Uprising were published on May 25.¹⁵ The blasts, clamor, and fire sent a wave of confidence all the way to the back of the crowd of demonstrators, intensifying their resistance. The military and police no longer relied solely on tear gas vehicles. Without warning, they charged at the demonstrators, brandishing batons, the butts of their rifles, and bayonets to send the civilians scattering before going back to their posts. The scattered demonstrators, however, quickly regrouped and resumed their offensive.

The civilians set up barricades with large planters, phone booths, barbed wire, and bus station signs. The women near the center and back of the group broke paving stones to secure rocks for the men to throw. The young men led the offensive and physically clashed with martial law troops. Construction workers who had been working on the nearby underground building site carried in anything that could be used as weapons—pieces of lumber, iron bars, and pipes—and passed them to the demonstrators.

Around 2:00 p.m., having run out of suppression weapons, the military and the police stood their ground with shields raised and batons in hand. A moment later, there was a cry in front of the Catholic Center as more than 200 civilians stormed the building. They had spotted half a dozen soldiers on the seventh floor reporting the demonstrators’ activities via radio. The people charged up to the seventh floor, and after a brief confrontation, captured ten men. Finally, the demonstrators had achieved a small victory. However, the soldiers there were not paratroopers but local men from the Homeland Division, dispatched to the Christian Broadcasting System center on the seventh floor of the Catholic Center by the 96th Regiment of the 31st Division. The hostage situation did not last long. The bulk of the paratroopers returned from their lunch break and encircled the demonstrators, pressing in from Province Hall and the Gwangnam-ro intersection.

Grid-Style Occupation

Following the suppression efforts in the morning, the 11th Brigade returned to Chosun University for lunch around 2:30 p.m. At the end of the lunch break, Brigade Commander Choi Ung arrived at the campus by helicopter and gathered the battalion commanders to give out instructions: “About 2,000 people have gathered near the Hanil Bank on Geumnam-ro and are destroying public property and setting gasoline fires in the street. All battalions must act immediately and disperse them.”¹⁶

Following Choi’s orders, Yang Dae-in, the 11th’s chief of staff, gave specific orders to the soldiers to move onto Geumnam-ro from the vicinity of Gwangju Jeil High School and follow the road toward Province Hall while maintaining counter-riot formation. Battalion commanders sent regular reports from the scene to the brigade headquarters via radio. Their information was used by the headquarters to determine troop placement. The demonstrators’ small victory was soon followed by massive retaliation.

At 2:50 p.m., the 61st, 62nd, and 63rd Battalions of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade and the 35th Battalion of the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade assembled on Geumnam-ro in front of the Hanil Bank in a diamond formation, kicking off a powerful counterdemonstration operation. Generally, counterprotest troops switched between four formations depending on the type of demonstration they faced: the wedge formation, where the sharp end of the wedge would be pointed at demonstrators; the line formation, used when sweeping down wide roadways; the column formation, where forces would be packed into a narrow but solid group; and finally, the diamond formation, where forces would stand their ground in a rectangular formation to repel attackers when surrounded on all sides by demonstrators. By that point in time, the number of demonstrators had snowballed to the point where only the diamond formation was a viable option. Regardless of their choice of tactics, what did not change was the underlying premise that once the demonstrators were scattered, those who incited them were to be taken into custody at all costs.

The 61st began from the Yu-dong three-way intersection and marched toward Province Hall. The 35th started from Province Hall and pushed the demonstrators into Geumnam-ro. According to Gwangju City Hall’s records from that day, “At 3:14 p.m., troops were transported from Chosun University towards the Province Hall on one tank, one armored vehicle, and twenty-two trucks.” Demonstrators put up fierce resistance, to no avail. An armored vehicle equipped with an M60 machine gun charged into the crowd. Hundreds of paratroopers came running from Geumnam-ro 1-ga. They switched from column to line formation and began to swing their batons without a second thought. Demonstrators were terrified.¹⁷

People on the streets cried, “The special forces are here!” as they looked up helplessly at the Catholic Center. Those who had gone up to the rooftop earlier spotted the paratroopers swarm in and rushed back down. Some of those who did not make it to the stairs even opened windows from the second floor and jumped out. Others jumped onto a tarp over the parking garage in the back. Even those fleeing the scene were beaten and stabbed. Those who did not make it out in time were brutally assaulted and taken away. Countless were left injured in the attack.

At 3:40 p.m., even the 280 members of the 7th Brigade’s 33rd Battalion (30 officers, 250 enlisted) were deployed to the scene. With all five battalions stationed around the city, the paratroopers unleashed their full might on the civilians as though battling North Korean soldiers. Demonstrators fought back with close combat. In response, paratroopers divided up areas where demonstrators congregated into grid-shaped sections, partitioning off the groups into small pieces to push them out of Geumnam-ro and connect the 7th and 11th Brigades together by 4:00 p.m. In the span of an hour, demonstrators who had earlier filled Geumnam-ro and the Catholic Center area were completely dispersed.

When looking down Geumnam-ro from the South Jeolla Province Hall, features such as Gwangnam-ro, Yu-dong, Im-dong, and Mudeung Sports Center were ahead in the north. From the same perspective, Chungjang-ro, the Red Cross Hospital, Gwangju Park, Gwangju River, Gwangju Jeil High School, Hyeondae Cinema, and Yang-dong Market were on the left side of the street, and the Intercity Bus Terminal, fire department, Daein Market, Chonnam Girls’ High School, Gwangju Jungang Elementary School, MBC, Nokdu Bookstore, and the Labor Supervision Office were on the right. Even as the demonstrators were pushed into the sides of the road, they put up fierce resistance. The crowds responded to pressure like a balloon, moving toward the left side of the street when pressed to the right and moving toward the right side when pressed to the left. Each time they were driven out of the center of the street, they dispersed to either side before rushing back into the center at the first opportunity. The oil drums, the destruction of the barricade, and the brief victory over the soldiers at the Catholic Center on the afternoon of May 19 provided a critical boost in morale for the people of Gwangju. This was a key turning point that altered the nature of the Gwangju Uprising, moving the people into active resistance against the military.

To Die Fighting

At 3:00 p.m., locals gathered in front of the Intercity Bus Terminal and threw rocks at paratroopers stationed near the fire department. The soldiers retaliated by shooting flamethrowers overhead, spewing gas into the air. The paratroopers who were next to an armored vehicle behind the fire department had been unresponsive to the crowds who had jeered at them, but they suddenly turned hostile. They fired off tear gas and indiscriminately took people into custody. Some fled into nearby residences, but the paratroopers quickly broke inside, beat them, and loaded them onto trucks to be sent to Sangmudae following a stop at Chosun University.¹⁸

Some demonstrators were pushed out of Geumnam-ro by paratroopers all the way to the rear entrance of Gwangju Jungang Elementary School. They lobbed firebombs behind them as they went all the way to the Gwangju MBC building. The demonstrators entered the building, breaking windows and property, and dragged out a total of eight vehicles from the premises (including two broadcast vehicles and a passenger car), setting them on fire. This was the first of three attacks on this building by locals until it was razed completely the following day. It was a symbol of retribution against those who willfully turned a blind eye to their plight and the massacre. When news of the attack on MBC reached the 33rd Battalion, they marched on the building to rescue 10 soldiers (1 officer, 9 enlisted) who had been stationed to guard it. In the process, they once again assaulted civilians with bayonets and batons. Those who escaped the carnage were chased towards Gwangju High School and were treated with the same brutality as demonstrators elsewhere. When paratrooper reinforcements arrived in the afternoon, they took complete control over Geumnam-ro in downtown Gwangju. In response, demonstrators expanded into nearby streets like Gwangnam-ro and Chungjang-ro, as well as adjacent areas such as Gyerim-dong and Yang-dong.

Near Yang-dong Market, paratroopers followed a young man into the second floor of the market district. Locals who witnessed the scene chased the paratroopers upstairs in turn, cornering them. The paratroopers narrowly escaped the reversal. At the market entrance, a group of paratroopers chasing down demonstrators found their way obstructed by bowls and wares from a fruit stall on the street. In retaliation, they kicked the stall owner in the lower belly. When the woman fell with a scream, a group of elderly people went to help her up. The paratroopers struck them with batons, shouting, “We almost had them until you got in our way!”

Park Nam-seon (age 26), who was in the construction materials business, witnessed martial law forces in front of Yang-dong Market harass a high school girl in a white blouse and black skirt, prodding at her breasts with their bayonets. Outraged onlookers demanded that they stop, and an elderly woman cried, “What are you doing to my baby?” Paratroopers kicked the elderly woman, and onlookers threw rocks at the paratroopers, calling them animals. The paratroopers turned on the people and gave chase, brandishing their bayonets. The scene propelled Park into the waves of the uprising. When paratroopers retreated from downtown Gwangju on May 21, Park would enter the South Jeolla Province Hall and take the role of Operations Director for the resistance.

Figure 4. Routes taken by paratroopers (May 19, 14:00–16:30)

A group of seven or eight paratroopers chased down demonstrators as the latter retreated toward Gwangju Park. They spared no one caught in their path, not even homemakers who had stepped out of their doors to see what was happening outside. Elderly people who witnessed their vicious beatings attempted to stop them and were clubbed in the head in response. When demonstrators realized what was happening, they immediately turned. “Just try and kill us all!” they cried, charging head-on. Caught completely off-guard, the paratroopers fled in terror. One of them was separated from the group in front of the Yangnim-dong Red Cross Hospital and fled in the direction of Yangnim Bridge along Gwangju River. Yoon Sang-won, who personally witnessed the scene, immediately made a phone call to Nokdu Bookstore to convey the situation to Kim Sang-jip (age 24). Yoon had fled with the other demonstrators from the Catholic Center all the way to Gwangju Park, where a group of elderly men reprimanded the paratroopers for refusing to let the demonstrators go. When the paratroopers turned on the elderly men, the demonstrators turned back to charge, sending the paratroopers running. One of the paratroopers was separated and desperately jumped from a bridge into the river to flee from the demonstrators. The people threw rocks in the direction of his landing. In his phone call to Kim, Yoon remarked that the paratrooper might have lost his life. Kim could not help his mixed feelings—although the people’s passion was encouraging, the situation was dire and there was no guarantee that demonstrators would make it out of the crisis alive.¹⁹

By 4:15 p.m., the number of people congregating along Jebong-ro from the telecommunications office at Jang-dong roundabout to the four-way intersection in front of the Kim Orthopedic Clinic had swelled to over 3,000. Paratroopers swarmed the area to clear them out. At 4:20, over 1,000 civilians gathered outside the main gates of Chosun University. Ten minutes later, police set up a five-layer barricade at the Yu-dong three-way intersection to prevent entry to Geumnam-ro. More than 300 paratroopers searched residences around the Buk-dong Neighborhood Center, assaulting and arresting young people.²⁰ At 4:30 p.m., a woman stood up with a megaphone at the four-way intersection by the Intercity Bus Terminal and the fire department: “I am neither a communist nor a rioter. I am an ordinary Gwangju citizen. I cannot sit by and watch as our innocent students and fellow citizens are slaughtered. Everyone, we must step forward. Let us protect our students. Let us drive out the martial law troops and protect our city with our own hands.”

The people of Gwangju rallied to her immediately. The number of demonstrators soared to the thousands as the people prepared to make their way downtown once more. It was not long before paratroopers were deployed to the location. According to ROK Army HQ’s operation records and Combat Arms Command’s lesson manual, at 4:40 p.m. on May 19, troops in the city were stationed as follows: the 61st Battalion of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade (27 officers, 172 enlisted) was deployed against more than 2,000 student demonstrators gathered near the Intercity Bus Terminal; and the national defense reserves from the 11th Military Logistics Maintenance Battalion (11 officers, 360 enlisted) from Combat Arms Command were stationed at key locations including the Labor Supervision Office, the South Jeolla Branch of the National Federation of Fisheries Co-op, Daeseong Academy, the local telecommunications office, and the four-lane street in front of Daein Supermarket. The 62nd Battalion of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade was stationed in front of the Hanil Bank, the 63rd in front of Gwangju High School, and the 35th Battalion of the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade were stationed at the Gwangju Fire Department. The Singunbu continued to supplement military presence in the city over the course of the afternoon, temporarily reassigning 1,800 police personnel from eight police departments across South Jeolla Province (with the exception of the Mokpo and Yeosu regions) to Gwangju. However, even the full might of the military was not enough to overpower the demonstrations that swept across the entire city. Martial law forces could do little more than occupy thoroughfares, select locations of strategic importance, and national roads that led into the countryside.

At that time, the 11th Brigade appeared at the fire department by the Intercity Bus Terminal with an armored vehicle. A 1,000-strong crowd of demonstrators gathered at the site, at which point a young man who looked to be a postsecondary student stepped forward and broke down sobbing. He described how his friend had been beaten to death by paratroopers and declared, “We must work together to avenge our friends and our brothers.” The young man led the charge in breaking down phone booths and guardrails. A barricade was erected at the rear entrance of the bus terminal, in the direction of the fire department. Seven or eight young men took cover behind a fallen phone booth and used it as a shield as they advanced forward.

When they were about fifty meters from the paratroopers, the young men simultaneously pelted them with rocks, marking the start of the Intercity Bus Terminal skirmish, the most violent and heated clash since the beginning of the demonstrations the previous day. The armored vehicle, which had been on standby behind the paratroopers’ formation, charged forward through the barricades and into the crowds, splitting the demonstrators down the middle of the street. When the crowd swelled to over 3,000, paratrooper reinforcements arrived on ten military trucks. They assaulted the rear of the demonstrators’ group at the back of the bus terminal. Equipped with gas masks, paratroopers lined up in platoon- and company-sized clusters as they marched forward, firing endless streams of tear gas. Demonstrators scattered into nearby alleyways and climbed up to the third-story rooftop of the bus terminal to throw rocks at the soldiers. About fifteen students and young adults were captured by the paratroopers and were forced to lie face-down against the ground in a line in the middle of the roundabout, when one of them—a high school student—leapt to his feet and made a desperate dash for the alleyway by the produce wholesaler markets in Buk-dong. Demonstrators cheered and applauded. When three paratroopers charged, brandishing batons, the people ran forward and sent the solders fleeing. Meanwhile, citizens who had been chased into the underground pathways were captured by paratroopers in the dark and brutally beaten with batons. Some even suffered stab wounds from bayonets.

Figure 5. Military attempts to quash demonstrations at the Intercity Bus Terminal (May 19, 16:00–18:00)

Kim In-yun (male, age 20) was chased by bayonet-wielding soldiers into the Intercity Bus Terminal. He testified that paratroopers broke the terminal windows and pursued demonstrators into the building. Kim was stabbed in the face with a bayonet and struck in the back of the head with the butt of a rifle, while many others similarly suffered stab wounds.²¹ However, the commander of the 61st Battalion, who led the assault in the area, vehemently denied the use of bayonets by paratroopers during investigations by prosecutors, claiming, “Our battalion had only just been deployed on May 19. We had no reason to be equipped with bayonets so early on in the operation.”²² Flooding into the terminal office, soldiers ransacked rooms and dragged off female conductors by the hair. It took just over twenty minutes for paratroopers to put down all demonstrations in the terminal area. Subsequently, a makeshift bus terminal was established outside Gwangju Station. According to the ROK Army HQ’s operation records, “Over 1,000 civilians amassed at the Intercity Bus Terminal and, following a confrontation with the 61st Battalion of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, scattered at 7:30 p.m.”

One person was injured at the roundabout, their skull and arms broken and the rest of their body covered in blood. A taxi driver scrambled to take them to a nearby hospital, but was ordered by a paratrooper to bring the injured out of the car. The driver replied, “This person is dying. People’s lives come first.” The paratrooper responded by breaking the taxi windshield and dragging out the driver to beat him with his rifle and baton. Similar incidents took place all over the city. Horrified taxi drivers would take action the very next day, directly leading the vehicle protest convoy on May 20. Driver Jeong Yeong-dong (age 26), who had been passing by the Intercity Bus Terminal with three young adult passengers, was stopped by rushing paratroopers. They dragged out the passengers and brutally assaulted them before turning on Jeong, snarling, “You might as well be one of the rioters.” Jeong was struck with a baton and lost consciousness. He opened his eyes at a hospital near the bus terminal. When he went back to the scene, the soldiers had left. Taxi drivers gathered in a corner and vowed to take action against the unspeakable actions of the paratroopers. They agreed to join other drivers at Mudeung Sports Center the next day to stage a vehicle protest.²³

The First Shot

The first shot of the Gwangju Uprising was fired at 4:50 p.m. on the street in front of Gwangju High School. An armored vehicle had set out from Chosun University following a report that a paratrooper lay dead near Sajik Park. The vehicle made multiple threatening displays as it made its way around Gyerim-dong. Locals gathered in the street between Gwangju High School and Gyerim Police Substation and threw rocks at the armored vehicle as it passed by, breaking the periscopes on either side. Unable to navigate, the vehicle drove itself onto the sidewalk with its engine shut off. Dong-a Ilbo daily reporter Kim Chung-geun approached to cover the scene, when Captain Cha Jeong-hwan, operations officer of the 63rd Battalion, peered outside and called to Kim, saying, “We’ve been completely surrounded. We will cover you from the vehicle, so go to the headquarters in front of Province Hall to request immediate backup.” When Kim attempted to make his way through the crowds, demonstrators kicked at the vehicle and jeered, asking, “Why does the Dong-a Ilbo remain silent when people are dying in Gwangju?”²⁴ Wi Seong-sam (age 26, fourth-year student at Chosun University) set fire to a handful of hay and put it on the hatch of the armored vehicle. In that instant, the hatch opened and an M16 emerged, as well as a soldier, who fired two shots into the air. The crowds fled at the noise, but someone cried, “Blanks!” and rallied the people back to the vehicle. Another shot was fired, and a high school student fell where he stood. Demonstrators scattered once more into the alleys, clinging to the walls. A moment later, the armored vehicle’s engine turned back on. With the M16 at the ready, the paratroopers departed the scene. The fallen student was Kim Yeong-chan (age 18, third-year student at Chosun University High School). He was the first recorded case of injury by gunfire during the Gwangju Uprising.²⁵ Nearby demonstrators, including public health doctor Jeong Eun-taek, took Kim to a nearby clinic for an emergency operation. Kim was moved to Chonnam National University Hospital and woke up from a coma two days later on May 21. The bullet had entered through his right abdomen and exited through his left buttock, leaving him with critical injuries and internal bleeding. Over the course of five operations, over two meters of intestines were removed and Kim received transfusions from over twenty people.²⁶ Captain Cha, who had opened fire, was summoned to Defense Security Command the following day for a token investigation before being permitted to return to his unit.²⁷ Cha died on May 24 during the 11th Brigade’s retreat from Junam Village in a case of friendly fire by martial law troops who had been lying in ambush in the hills of Hyocheon Village.²⁸

Gwangju’s Tears

As the sun set on the streets at 7:00 p.m., a light shower fell over Gwangju. The rain washed away the signs of murder and violence that had filled Geumnam-ro that afternoon and the pain of the people along with them. Police and paratroopers kept the street under heavy lockdown. The air was thick with the smell of tear gas, and the sight of smashed phone booths, broken paving stones, and shattered streetlights cast an eerie pall over the city. The people of Gwangju hid away in the darkness and looked out at the desolation that had fallen on their home. They could not understand why such wanton brutality had flooded their streets.

As the night grew dark, demonstrators converged at the Intercity Bus Terminal. Local car mechanics led a group of more than 1,000 in burning down an 8-tonne truck with a South Gyeongsang Province license plate. The truck was loaded with an assortment of plastic products. Rumor began to spread that soldiers from the Gyeongsang Provinces, in the country’s southeast, were out to massacre the people of Gwangju. Having borne witness to so much horror throughout the day, the people did not doubt the rumor. Some among the crowds demanded that they kill the driver of the truck, but others stopped them, saying, “The driver hasn’t done anything wrong. The one who deserves death is Chun Doo-hwan and his paratrooper cronies.” The driver escaped unscathed. Demonstrators drove the burning truck toward the Intercity Bus Terminal and burned down a large arch with pro-government slogans written on it. At 8:20 p.m., paratroopers barged in on half a dozen weightlifters who had been exercising at the Gwangju Indoor Sports Center and took two of them into custody. Demonstrators split into groups of about a hundred and went into the streets, arming themselves with hoes, shovels, and clubs, continuing to protest in the rain well past the 9:00 p.m. curfew and into midnight. The clashes were so heated that 277 people were arrested on the night of May 19 alone; 24 soldiers and police, as well as dozens of civilians were injured. Five of the civilians, including Choi Mi-ja (female, age 19) were confirmed to have suffered puncture wounds inflicted by sharp objects such as bayonets.²⁹

Demonstrators carried out heated guerrilla-style activities late into the night in the area stretching from the South Jeolla Province Hall to northern Yang-dong, Yu-dong, Im-dong, the Intercity Bus Terminal, and Gwangju Station.

Increased Use of Bayonets

The number of critical patients admitted to general hospitals and clinics in Gwangju skyrocketed that afternoon. They were civilians who had been fortunate enough to escape the military trucks despite serious injuries or those who had been assisted by others in escaping the brutality of the soldiers. Many who reached medical care, however, did not survive. Victims included not only postsecondary students and young adults but the elderly, homemakers, junior high students, and even young children. Medical facilities in the city could not possibly hold them all.³⁰ Paratrooper brutality had only increased since the previous day. In addition to the batons that were mainly used on May 18, bayonets were used in greater frequency. It was retaliation by the 11th Brigade after attempts to quell the demonstrations by the 7th Brigade the previous day only resulted in further pushback by the demonstrators. The people’s resistance had injured their pride, and as a result paratroopers targeted not only demonstrators but also onlookers and bystanders. Some of those injured that day never fully recovered. They spent years suffering from the aftereffects of their injuries before finally succumbing to them.

All the civilians returned to their homes by midnight. They shared their experiences from the day with their households and seethed at the horrors perpetrated by the military. Families whose older children had not come home for the night made desperate phone calls to confirm their safety. In contrast, the televisions still played the usual soap operas and entertainment programs. While a mass manhunt unfolded in one corner of the country, broadcasters filled their channels with dancing entertainers and celebrities. The people of Gwangju were betrayed and outraged. It was this fury that led to the razing of the MBC broadcasting station the following day.

Chung Ho-yong Leads Aggressive Suppression Tactics

When the demonstrations in Gwangju intensified, Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong responded with aggressive suppression tactics. Chung claimed that a rapid and powerful military response would quickly put down the demonstrations. At the 1988 National Assembly hearing, it was put forth that Chung’s uncompromising attitude toward the incident made paratroopers on the ground more belligerent and ruthless. One theory posited that Chung was eager to make up for his absence during the December 12 military insurrection.³¹ Whatever the case, Chung took an aggressive approach with the Gwangju crisis from the outset. As a result, he achieved a victory for Chun Doo-hwan in the city and was awarded the Order of Military Merit (Chungmu Cordon).

However, Chung was never officially in a commanding position with regards to the Gwangju Uprising. Because paratroopers under his command had been reassigned to the 31st Division under Combat Arms Command in the Second ROK Army Operational Command, he was unable to take on active roles and was mandated only to serve in advisory and logistical capacities away from the frontline. Despite this, Chung was deemed the third most influential figure in the time between the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising, trailing only behind Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo.³² Considering his lack of involvement in the former, the weight given his influence was almost certainly due to his leading role in the atrocities at Gwangju.

Chung remained in Seoul until May 19, where he gave orders for the additional deployment of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade. He personally made his way to Gwangju on May 20. He had already given orders at 6:30 a.m. on the morning of May 19 to Brigadier General Choi Se-chang, commander of the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade, to remain on standby for his potential arrival in the Gwangju area. On the morning of May 20, Chung arrived in the city via C-54 helicopter. He received detailed briefings concerning the progress of the demonstrations in the Gwangju area from Brigadier Generals Shin Woo-sik and Choi Ung, commanders of the 7th and 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigades respectively, as well as operations officer Colonel Jang Se-dong. Afterward, he met with Commander Yun Heung-jeong of Combat Arms Command and Vice-commander Kim Gi-seok to discuss demonstration countermeasures. As Yun had been Chung’s senior at the Korea Military Academy and a close personal friend, he privately urged more aggressive responses to the demonstrations: “We can’t stand for continued riots against the expansion of martial law, whether here or in the capital. Don’t you think it would be best to clearly demonstrate our commitment and strike fear into the people early on?”³³ Yun, however, declined and gently informed Chung of the meeting between Gwangju-area community leaders that morning, where participants had shown clear resentment against the brutal suppression tactics used by paratroopers.

Gwangju-Area Community Leaders’ Meeting

At 10:00 a.m. that morning, prior to Chung Ho-yong’s arrival at Gwangju, Combat Arms Command at Sangmudae held an emergency meeting of Gwangju-area community leaders, centered on the local military-government-civil defense partnership council. The meeting was attended by civilians such as South Jeolla Province Vice-governor Jeong Si-chae (standing in for Governor Jang Hyeong-tae, briefly on leave due to the death of his mother), Superintendent of Education Lee Dae-sun, Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office director Bae Myeong-in, the chief of the Korean Veterans Association, and KCIA Gwangju branch chief Jeong Seok-hwan, as well as 31st Division Commander Chung Ung, 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade Commander Shin Woo-sik, Combat Arms Command’s Chief of Staff Jang Sa-bok, and 505th Security Unit Commander Lee Jae-woo. During the meeting, Commander Yun was subjected to uncomfortable testimonies from community leaders about the excessive force exercised by paratroopers, “Enough to be ashamed of [his] military uniform.”³⁴ Yun had received a large number of complaint calls from friends and acquaintances who lived in Gwangju on the evening of May 18. Archbishop Youn Kong-hi of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Gwangju had also made a desperate and indignant telephone call.³⁵ Yun immediately ordered Jang to personally assess the situation. Jang reported that “there was some use of excessive force by lowest-ranked enlisted men.”³⁶ This exchange led directly to the leaders’ meeting.

Community leaders heaped criticism upon the military from the outset. Superintendent of Education Lee Dae-sun complained, “Several high schools have reported students refusing to attend classes. At this rate even high school students will join the demonstrations. Your tactics are too aggressive and must be toned down.” Vice-governor Jeong pointed out that “the military is treating this situation just like the Busan-Masan protests. Gwangju is nothing like Busan; you aren’t taking the unique circumstances of this region into consideration.” Brigadier General Shin, who had led the initial blitz against demonstrators on May 18, was silent. Gwangju-area leaders called for the “complete withdrawal of paratroopers from the city.” Some requested that if full withdrawal was impossible, paratroopers should be dressed in traditional camouflage uniforms like regular soldiers to soothe public sentiment.³⁷

At the meeting, Yun gave strict orders to the 31st Division Commander and the brigade commanders to refrain from violent suppression tactics and promised attending leaders that excessive force would not be used again. The meeting was followed by the release of all those who had been captured, with the exception of the instigators. Postsecondary students who had been conscripted into student training exercises by the military were allowed to stop and return home. But in spite of Yun’s orders and the efforts that followed, the 11th Brigade—which was deployed to supplement the 7th—continued to use violent suppression tactics on the streets. Martial law troops’ official chain of command, which went from Combat Arms Command to the 31st Division to the paratroopers, went completely ignored.

Chung Ung’s Deliberation and Decision

At 11:00 p.m. that evening, 31st Division Commander Chung Ung called together the 7th Brigade’s 33rd Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Kwon Seung-man, 35th Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Kim Il-ok, Brigadier General Choi Ung of the 11th Brigade, and South Jeolla Province Police Commander Ahn Byeong-ha, as well as every regimental commander, battalion commander, and staff under his command. At the meeting, Chung ordered an end to all violent suppression tactics and a transition to nonviolent suppression in 31st Division Operation Order 3. The order prohibited arrests, the use of bayonets, and striking demonstrators in the head with batons and instead focused on the dispersal of crowds. A determined Chung gave the orders “fully prepared to be court-martialed and sentenced to death” for his “independent alteration of the orders for aggressive suppression to nonviolent suppression.”³⁸ A battle against enemy forces would generally involve little in the way of moral questioning—Chung could simply fight alongside his men until the enemy had been defeated or he himself died in battle. But in Gwangju, he faced the city’s civilian residents, who were at least nominally under his protection as citizens of South Korea. Gathering the commanders and staff together, he individually asked for their perspectives. Eight out of ten were of the same mind as Chung, while two were ambiguous.³⁹

However, Singunbu leaders’ attitude toward the demonstrations in Gwangju differed from those of commanders in the field like Yun and Chung Ung. They pushed back with even stronger measures. Upon his return to Seoul, Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong met with Minister of National Defense Choo Young-bock, Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong, and Defense Security Commander Chun Doo-hwan and called for even more aggressive measures against the demonstrators, asserting that “the riots in Gwangju show no sign of slowing. Unfounded rumors have turned the people of the city against us, and martial law troops must be mustered immediately to bolster the forces already deployed to the area.” Lee disapproved, saying, “I see no reason to send troops to Gwangju specifically, considering sporadic signs of unrest in Seoul as well.”

Chung retorted, “The riots will not gain momentum in Seoul, but the situation in Gwangju will only worsen if left unchecked. The commander of the 3rd Brigade has already been ordered to prepare for deployment, and it seems the 1st may have to be deployed at the same time.”

The final say belonged to the judgement and command of Chun Doo-hwan. He concluded, “It would be best to deploy the 3rd Brigade along with the 20th Division.”⁴⁰

According to a deputy department chief at the ROK Army HQ Personnel Corps with the family name Park, who attended the general staff meeting at Martial Law Command from 8:20 a.m. to 9:40 a.m., “Chief of Staff Lee Hui-seong said at the general staff meeting on the morning of May 19, ‘North Korea is behind the situation in Gwangju. If rioters pose a threat to the lives of martial law troops, the troops must naturally exercise their right of self-defense.’”⁴¹

The violent suppression tactics adopted by the Singunbu had outraged the people of Gwangju and spurred them to take even more active roles in the demonstrations. The people took it upon themselves to fight back against paratrooper suppression. Although Jeolla Province Martial Law Commander Yun Heung-jeong and 31st Division Commander Chung Ung handed down orders for nonviolent suppression and Combat Arms Command staff showed quiet reluctance to violent tactics, ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Young-si sent down a strongly worded order to Yun via Defense Security Command on May 19: “Martial Law Command Order 80.5.18 (May 18, 1980): Martial Law Command advises the Combat Arms Commander to respond strongly to the riots at Chonnam University in order to demonstrate the commitment and will of Martial Law Command.”⁴²

Piecemeal Deployment of Martial Law Troops

At 3:00 p.m., Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong delivered a Blue House briefing concerning the Gwangju situation and informed President Choi of the deployment of the 3rd Brigade and the reinforcements from the 20th Division. At 6:00 p.m., Martial Law Command sent orders to Combat Arms Command for the additional deployment of 1,392 personnel from five battalions from the 3rd Brigade to the city of Gwangju. It was a unilateral decision handed down by Martial Law Command with no input or request from forces already on the field.

At 11:08 p.m., the 3rd Brigade (led by commander Choi Se-chang) departed from Seoul by train. They disembarked at Gwangju Station at 7:00 a.m. on the morning of May 20. With two battalions from the 7th Brigade, three from the 11th, and five from the 3rd, a total of ten battalions’ worth of paratroopers had been deployed to Gwangju. The 3rd in particular had also been deployed to the Busan-Masan Democratization Protests and were considered an elite force even among paratroopers.

This was how additional units were deployed piecemeal to Gwangju each day from May 18 to May 21.⁴³ A total of 688 personnel (84 officers, 604 enlisted) from two battalions under the 7th Brigade were deployed on May 18, followed by 1,200 (162 officers, 1,038 enlisted) from three battalions from the 7th on May 19, who were again followed by 1,392 (255 offices, 1,137 enlisted) from five battalions from the 3rd the next day. By the morning of May 20, a total of 3,280 paratroopers (501 officer, 2,779 enlisted) had been sent to Gwangju.

At 11:40 p.m. that night, the Operation Loyalty guidelines delivered to Combat Arms Command by Second ROK Army Operational Command outlined a checkerboard strategy, where the focus was on aggressive closure of escape routes and the arrest of demonstrators rather than peaceful dispersal. The orders also described the deployment of plainclothes soldiers who would blend into the crowds to find and arrest instigators.

However, Jeolla Province’s local Martial Law Command delivered significantly relaxed instructions to frontline units:

1. Act in accordance with the purpose of martial law troops.

2. Take strict measures against troops whose actions deviate from instructions.

3. Protect innocent students and civilians.

4. Maintain proper conduct as members of the armed forces.

5. Defend government property.⁴⁴

Deployment of Three Veteran Security Agents

Upon criticism from Chun Doo-hwan concerning Gwangju-area security forces’ response to the crisis, Defense Security Command sent three high-ranking security agents into the city.

Brigadier General Choi Ye-seop of the Bureau of Planning at Defense Security Command arrived at Songjeong-ri Air Base (now Gwangju Airport) at 4:00 p.m. on May 19. From that evening to the retaking of Province Hall by martial law troops on May 27, Choi stayed at the offices of the combat arms vice-commander and a room next to the office of the Gwangju-region defense security commander to deliver constant reports on the situation to Seoul. Choi participated in Combat Arms Command operation meetings and met with civilian negotiators, personally working on the front lines of the Gwangju Uprising. He was Chun’s personal hotline to the situation and he followed Chun’s orders on the scene. Colonel Lee Jae-woo, 505th Security Unit commander, also delivered several reports to Seoul, but “information of critical importance, such as situation reports on the riot suppression operations, was delivered by Brigadier General Choi.”⁴⁵

Upon the nationwide expansion of martial law, Lee Hak-bong of Defense Security Command’s Counter-communism Division gave orders to Colonel Hong Seong-ryul, who had been dispatched to the Joint Investigation Team for the adjustment of investigation duties, to assess the situation in Gwangju. Hong arrived in the city at 8:00 a.m. on May 20. He slipped into the downtown core at 9:30 a.m. to collect information, and from May 21 onwards, concealed himself in the city to confirm the positions of demonstrators, the status of their weapons, their movements and attack preparations, and the locations and statuses of prominent citizens and members of the Settlement Committee. At 2:00 p.m. on May 24, Hong returned to the Gwangju 505th Security Unit, where he stayed until his return to Defense Security Command on June 8. The only known information concerning Hong is that “being from Gwangju, Colonel Hong Seong-ryul collected and conveyed accurate information concerning the city and attempted to create a divide between the citizens and the resistance.”⁴⁶

On May 22, Colonel Choi Gyeong-jo, head of the Defense Security Forces’ audit department and director of investigation at the Joint Investigation HQ, was dispatched to Gwangju as the Joint Investigation Team chief for the region. Choi commanded more than thirty investigation agents dispatched by the Joint Investigation HQ along with ten local agents, taking charge of operations concerning those connected to the demonstrations. Colonel Lee Jae-woo of the 505th Security Unit took on the role of investigation director, with Counter-communism Division Chief Seo Ui-nam executing the operations. Upon taking leadership, Choi completely overhauled the investigation team. Where previously personnel were assigned to groups based on their affiliation—such as the Defense Security Forces, the police, or military police—the overhauls led to their reassignment into groups based on the categories of those who had been taken into custody and would be investigated: the student team, the rioter team, the nongovernment political activist team, and the administrative team. The Gwangju Joint Investigation Team questioned over 3,000 citizens who had been detained over the course of the uprising. Army surgeon Lee Jeong-yung (age 36), a Gwangju native at the Korean Armed Forces Hospital and a close friend of Colonel Choi, testified that Choi stated, “3,000 unarmed rioters rose up during the Sabuk Incident and 80 were arrested. In comparison, 300,000 have armed themselves in revolt in Gwangju, meaning at least 8,000 must be arrested and charged.”⁴⁷

The three high-ranking security agents were dispatched at almost the same time as the martial law troops. They worked in the city as frontline information collectors for the Singunbu throughout the course of the Gwangju Uprising.

Rumors of Infiltration by North Korean Special Forces

More than thirty years after the Gwangju Uprising, a persistent conspiracy theory that continues to plague the city is the suggestion that 600 North Korean soldiers had infiltrated the city during the uprising. According to the theory, the North Korean soldiers were not simple operatives but special forces who mingled with the demonstrators in Gwangju and incited violent riots. Some of these rumors go even further and suggest that South Korean paratroopers were wrongfully blamed for the acts of North Korean special forces, who supposedly opened fire on both soldiers and demonstrators and committed the atrocities that were recorded in the city.

The sheer audacity of the rumors suggests that they were spread intentionally. These conspiracy theories spread further with the intensification of South Korean conservatism. Select North Korean defectors and far-right agitators who take advantage of their claims lead the way today in propagating falsehoods about the Gwangju Uprising through print publications and the internet. However, their arguments are full of logical inconsistencies: if North Korean special forces had indeed committed the atrocities in Gwangju in May 1980, why was South Korea not able to capture a single North Korean agent on the scene, let alone a soldier? Ironically, the far right’s claim serves to only delegitimize the military regime. These conspiracy theories have a great deal in common with the rumors that were spread during the Gwangju Uprising in May 1980.

Even famous conservative commentator Cho Gab-je has openly denied the theory of North Korean infiltration: Gwangju locals and martial law troops bore full witness to the events of the uprising, and journalists from South Korea and abroad spoke with these people and personally observed the incident—and not one such journalist had put forth the idea of North Korean infiltration. Even officers from the martial law troops did not mention so much as a sighting of North Korean soldiers. Previous instances of North Korean infiltration such as the Blue House raid (January 1968) and the Uljin-Samcheok Landings (November 1968), which were undertaken by platoon- and company-scale forces respectively, had resulted in dozens of South Korean military deaths. If a 600-strong North Korean force had been involved in Gwangju, the clash would certainly have left more than twenty-three dead—the number of South Korean troops who lost their lives during the uprising. Even if North Korean authorities had ordered the deployment of special forces to Gwangju at the very beginning of the Gwangju Uprising, their troops could not physically have reached the city before May 20. By then, martial law troops had already begun to close off Gwangju from the outskirts, making it impossible for North Korean troops to enter the city. Furthermore, these conspiracy theories claim that two-thirds of a battalion of North Korean troops were killed. In that case, what happened to their bodies? Not a single corpse belonging to a North Korean soldier has been discovered. Seven investigations have been conducted on the Gwangju Uprising over the years: Martial Law Command’s investigation immediately following the uprising in 1980, the re-examination by the Ministry of National Defense in 1985, the National Assembly’s Gwangju hearing in 1988, the Prosecutors’ Office and National Assembly’s joint investigation in 1995, the Gwangju Uprising trials that lasted from 1996 to 1997, the Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission investigation in 2007, and the classified National Intelligence Service investigation in 2012. Not a single investigation discovered direct or circumstantial evidence of a battalion-level North Korean infiltration.⁴⁸

The far right’s continued assertions of North Korean involvement, however, led to the release of an official statement by Prime Minister Chung Hong-won at a plenary session of the National Assembly in June 2013, and a statement by the Ministry of National Defense in October of the same year officially denying North Korean military involvement in the Gwangju Uprising.⁴⁹

The United States Bolsters Its Forces

On May 19, US Pacific Air Forces Commander in Chief James D. Hughes gave a press conference in Honolulu, Hawaii, where he claimed that should there be a war on the Korean Peninsula due to North Korean invasion, US tactical aircrafts stationed in Okinawa would quickly be deployed to the Korean front and that the US-ROK air forces had the capacity to repel any aerial attack by North Korea.⁵⁰

The US Defense Intelligence Agency also stated in a cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington that more than 30,000 students were running amok in Gwangju, and although the agency could not determine the exact number, it was clear that blue-collar workers were also participating in the riots. The cable explained that the situation was dire, with the South Korean military deploying tear gas, armed transport vehicles, and helicopters equipped with megaphones, to little effect. The cable had been composed by US intelligence officers at the US Air Force base in Songjeong-ri, Gwangju.⁵¹

Officials at the US embassy in South Korea had no information about the events taking place in Gwangju until David Miller—chair of the American Cultural Service in Gwangju—delivered fragmentary updates on the situation via telephone on the morning of May 19. However, contrary to the official statement of the US government, Ambassador Gleysteen stated in an interview with journalist Tim Shorrock that he had received detailed daily reports from a US intelligence agent who had stayed at the Gwangju Tourist Hotel during the uprising.⁵²

Whatever the case, the official position of the United States was that Miller was informed by Gwangju citizens of violent riots in the city, and he was told that some of the homicides that occurred were perpetrated by special forces units. US military officials in Seoul also received phone calls of a similar nature from acquaintances in Gwangju on May 19. Due to government censorship, Korean media did not report on the events that took place in Gwangju on May 18 and 19. What few pieces of information the US embassy had at the time came from Miller, the reports from the US Air Force base twelve miles from Gwangju, and coverage from foreign press. South Korean officials denied that anything unusual had occurred in Gwangju and tried to downplay the gravity of the situation.⁵³

4

Full-Scale Popular Protest
(Tuesday, May 20: Day 3 of the Uprising)

The Additional Deployment of the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade

On May 20, the South Jeolla Provincial Education Committee declared the full suspension of classes for junior high and high schools in the city of Gwangju. At 5:00 a.m., Combat Arms Command sent a request for three additional helicopters to Martial Law Command. Five battalions from the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade that had departed Seoul via train at Cheongnyangni Station at 1:20 a.m. arrived at Gwangju Station at 7:00 a.m. Brigade Commander Choi Se-chang and battalion commanders were met by 31st Division Commander Chung Ung at Gwangju Station and driven to their camp at Chonnam University. The 33rd Battalion of the 7th Brigade, which was originally stationed there, moved to Chosun University to make room for the 3rd. The 3rd was assigned to the Geumnam-ro area during the day, and when the demonstrations intensified after sundown, would be deployed to the northwestern regions of the city (the main gates of Chonnam University, Gwangju Station, and Gwangju City Hall) to suppress demonstrations there.¹ Bolstered by the addition of the 33rd Battalion, the 11th Brigade adjusted its mission in the eastern part of the city. The 61st Battalion would be stationed near the Commercial Bank of Korea on Geumnam-ro 2-ga, the 62nd near the Gwangju Post Office on Chungjang-ro, the 63rd near Kwangju Bank on Geumnam-ro 3-ga, and the 33rd Battalion of the 7th Brigade at Gwangju Station in the morning and then at Gyerim Police Substation in the afternoon.

According to Pokdongjinapjakjeon gyobeom (Fundamentals of riot suppression) by ROK Army HQ, “When facing an ordinary protest where suppression by physical force is required, ordinary infantry units must be deployed to overpower targets with numbers; should riots intensify and armed rioters put up resistance at a base of operations, forces capable of special operations must be deployed.”² The Singunbu ignored these protocols and countered the demonstrators with special forces from the beginning. This, along with the operation schedule set ahead of time for the three Airborne Special Forces Brigades in preparation for demonstrations in Gwangju as a response to the May 17 measures, is the reason the Chun regime was accused of committing premeditated massacre upon the city.³

The Second Victim: Kim An-bu

At 8:00 a.m. that day, Reverend Arnold A. Peterson went to the Kwangju Christian Hospital for service with his outreach team, who had been staying at Yangnim-dong. A US Baptist missionary, Peterson had performed ministry work in Gwangju since 1975. Although he witnessed the events that unfolded in the city on May 18 and 19, he assumed that if the government were to apologize for the actions of the paratroopers and withdrew them from Gwangju, there would be no more bloodshed and the crisis would be resolved. His hopes were cruelly dashed. After singing a hymn, one of the doctors prayed, “Father in heaven, how could these soldiers continue to kill our brothers and sisters and children?” and wept. Most of the other believers wept as well. It was an outpouring of anger and outrage the likes of which Peterson had never seen.⁴

The rain from the previous evening continued until 9:00 a.m. The people of Gwangju roused themselves early in the morning and crowded the downtown core in the drizzle. They knew that their safety was not guaranteed and that paratroopers had blocked off sections of the city, but their fury outweighed their fear. The military and the police continued to keep checkpoints at bridges, roundabouts, and major intersections. On occasion, demonstrators would find women who had fallen to their knees in the streets, tearing out their hair and clothes in sorrow as they wailed at the soldiers to bring their children back. No one could find the words to console them. Demonstrators could do little but wipe their tears.

By 10:00 a.m., the rain had slowed and over 1,000 people had gathered around the Daein Market. Now the crowds included homemakers, high school students, and the elderly, who also testified to the horrors wrought by paratroopers the previous day. Solidarity grew between people from all walks of life. The crowds also quickly learned of the death of Kim An-bu (age 35, day laborer), who was found before dawn on the road in front of Jeonnam Brewery with his face caved in. It was the second confirmed death following the murder of Kim Gyeong-cheol. Kim An-bu’s cause of death was determined to be lacerations to his face and forehead caused by a powerful impact that broke his skull. According to daily situation records compiled by Gwangju City Hall, “At 6:30 p.m. on May 19, paratroopers stripped eight postsecondary students down to their underwear and forced them into the Wonsan Bombing position at the plaza in Gwangju Park.” It was suspected that Kim had joined the demonstrators nearby at that time or had been an onlooker when he was also captured by paratroopers. His wife Kim Mal-ok (age 22), who had been home overnight to comply with curfew, stayed up all night waiting for her husband. She set out early in the morning and overheard liquor deliverymen discuss a commotion at Gwangju Park. Immediately, she rushed to the scene and found her husband lying on the ground in only a gray T-shirt, soaked from the rain. His eyes were wide open, as though protesting the injustice of his death.⁵

Merchants who did business at Daein Market agreed that this was no time for work. They abandoned their stalls and joined the ranks of demonstrators. They marched around Gwangju High School and headed for the Gwangju Citizens’ Center. But before they reached Geumnam-ro at the center of the downtown core, they were scattered by paratroopers who had cut off the roads with armored vehicles in the lead.

Yun Heung-jeong called for a second community leaders’ meeting at Combat Arms Command, which lasted from 10:20 a.m. to 12:50 p.m. The city’s leaders demanded the withdrawal of paratroopers—or at least a change in their uniforms to those matching the rest of the army—citing civilian outrage. Yun responded that he would give their demands serious consideration.⁶ Another meeting was held at 2:00 p.m. and lasted for twenty minutes, this time hosting fifty-six citizen representatives from a variety of backgrounds and eight staff members from Combat Arms Command, including Combat Development Corps Chief Kim Sun-hyeon. Citizen leaders included the chairs of the Gwangju Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Jeollanam-do Medical Association, the Jeollanam-do Pharmaceutical Association, and the Gwangju branch of the Korean Women’s Association, who criticized the paratroopers’ violent suppression methods and the rumors that were circulated throughout the city.⁷

Women Stripped Down to Underclothes

At 10:30 a.m., paratroopers were witnessed yet again stripping their captives and subjecting them to military drills. The 35th Battalion of the 7th Brigade, stationed in front of the Catholic Center across from the Bank of Korea, were seen by the Dong-a Ilbo daily’s Gwangju correspondent Kim Yeong-taek on Geumnam-ro 3-ga with more than thirty young people as their prisoners. The young people had been stripped down to their underpants and brassieres and were forced to do military drills. Paratroopers put them in four lines, which upon closer examination Kim found were composed of six to eight people each. Kim estimated that about ten of the prisoners were women. Most of the young people seemed to be in their twenties, with one or two in their thirties. Many of the women were in high heels. As a dozen or so paratroopers encircled the prisoners, batons in hand, a soldier who appeared to be a noncommissioned officer stood in the middle of the lines giving orders. “Front leaning rest position! Lie back! Lie sideways! Five rolls! Squat! Leapfrogs! Crawls! Single leg balance!” Anyone who failed to follow, or was too slow, was pummeled mercilessly. The humiliating treatment of the women in particular was appalling.⁸

Priest Cho Pius also witnessed the horror from the sixth floor of the Catholic Center, as did nuns and non-clergy employees from the Diocesan Curia Office. Cho went on to testify at the Gwangju court-martial, “I may be a priest, but in that moment, I would have opened fire on them if I had a gun at my side.”⁹ Chonnam University Director of Student Affairs Seo Myeong-won (age 41) also witnessed the scene.¹⁰

At 11:00 a.m., Yoon Sang-won, Jeong Sang-yong (age 30), Lee Yang-hyeon (age 30), Jeong Hyeon-ae (age 28), and Kim Sang-jip gathered at Nokdu Bookstore to discuss future plans. The bookstore specialized in social sciences and the humanities and was a frequent hangout for student activists. It had become a hub of activism when owner Kim Sang-yun was taken into custody on the night of May 17 and the violence in the city escalated. Those gathered at the bookstore concluded that the demonstrators needed leaders and that the Chonnam University Student Council members were the right group for the job. Chonnam Student Council President Park Gwan-hyun had left a powerful impression on the people of Gwangju during the democratization rallies up to May 16. When Yoon saw Park for the last time at Deulbul Night School on May 18, the latter had given him the telephone number of Student Council Administrative Manager Yang Gang-seop. Yoon dialed the number but received no answer. All contact with student council executives, including Park, had been lost from the afternoon of May 18. They had also lost contact with nongovernment political activists who had avoided preventative custody, and with other regions. Those still left in Gwangju had to act independently. The group at the bookstore decided to simply continue their production of firebombs and newsletters.

At 11:30 a.m., the 11th Brigade stationed the 61st Battalion at Gwangju Post Office and the 63rd at Kwangju Bank, and the 7th Brigade stationed the 35th Battalion at Hanil Bank and the 33rd at Gyerim Police Substation. Like the previous day, several skirmishes occurred between demonstrators and paratroopers on Geumnam-ro, with civilians assaulted and taken into custody. The demonstrations briefly subsided around noon.

Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan Meets Chun Doo-hwan

Completely ignored by the media, Gwangju was cut off from the rest of the world and forced to fight a lonely battle against martial law troops. The people desperately attempted to communicate their plight to the outside world by making phone calls to friends and relatives in other areas such as Seoul but could not connect. Others tried to leave the city to deliver news in person, only to be stopped by the military.

On the morning of May 20, Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan in Seoul sought a meeting with Chun Doo-hwan. The previous day, the cardinal had received word of the violent suppression by paratroopers from Archbishop Youn Kong-hi, who had come to Seoul from Gwangju on the afternoon of May 19. Determined to prevent bloodshed, the cardinal went to Chun’s office—the very same location in Gungjeong-dong where Park Chung-hee had been shot—to plead for an end to the carnage in Gwangju. However, their conversations were constantly cut off. Every few sentences, the telephone would ring and Chun would receive yet another report of worsening conditions in the city. Eventually, Chun said, “I’m afraid I cannot continue this conversation because of the rebellion in Gwangju,” and left. Having received no optimistic response, the cardinal concluded that Chun was set on strengthening his hostile stance against the people of Gwangju.¹¹

Meanwhile in Gwangju, the 3rd Brigade—stationed to guard Gwangju Station, the Intercity Bus Terminal, and the Seobang three-way intersection—armed themselves with flamethrowers, which would be used to spray tear gas at an even larger scale.

Tensions ran high between the crowds at Geumnam-ro and the paratroopers. Another clash could easily spark an explosive battle. The people of Gwangju did not hide their determination to fight back even at the cost of their own lives. They railed against the label of “rioters,” an insulting description of their lonely and desperate struggle. The city was their home and community, and the soldiers were laying waste to it without so much as an explanation. The people of Gwangju made use of the weapons at their own disposal to fight for their lives.

High School Students Pass Out Newsletters

By May 20, newspapers stopped being delivered to Gwangju. All information in the city came from a mix of state media and martial law troops’ pacification broadcasts, propaganda flyers, and groundless rumors. Groups of newsletter publishers, mostly composed of postsecondary students, struggled fiercely to combat the flurry of misinformation. They included students from Deulbul Night School and Baekje Night School as well as members of the Gwangdae Theater Company and the production team of “Voice of the University,” an unofficial newsletter run by the Chonnam University Student Council’s clandestine planning team. The newsletters tended to be rushed and haphazard in quality and emotionally charged. They were distributed in the Geumnam-ro area overnight and were so popular that production teams ran out of copies. Those who managed to obtain these newsletters would often fold them up for safekeeping and pass them on to others to read.

High school students also produced and distributed newsletters. Ten high school students, including Cho Gang-il (age 18, Gwangju Jinheung High School), who were friends from the secondary students’ groups at Deoglimsa Temple and Deoglim Church in Wolsan-dong, had witnessed the atrocities on May 18 and resolved to do what they could as minors. They borrowed mimeographs from the temple and the church and began production of newsletters on the evening of May 20, handing them out to the people of Gwangju at Dakjeonmeori in Yang-dong and intersections on the way to Yang-dong Market. On May 21, Cho and three other boys from the group went to Naju on demonstrator vehicles and obtained firearms to help defend the Deoglim Mountain area. However, Cho’s father—the local leader—and the head priest of Deoglim Temple took away their guns out of fear for their safety. On May 26, the boys resumed production and distribution of newsletters.¹²

Threats of Court-Martial

On the afternoon of May 20, 31st Division Commander Chung Ung was deprived of operational command for ordering nonviolent suppression the previous night. Although command over the paratroopers would officially pass to the Combat Arms Commander the following day at 4:00 p.m., the paratroopers of the Airborne Special Forces Brigades were immediately removed from Chung’s authority and did not report to him for a full day before the official transfer of command.¹³ Paratrooper commanders never concerned themselves with Chung to begin with. In official testimony to prosecutors, a battalion commander from the 3rd Brigade testified:

No Airborne Special Forces Brigade commander would have cared what the 31st Division Commander or the Combat Arms Commander ordered. Even battalion commanders like myself looked down on the 31st Division Commander. After all, Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong was the real authority, and he was personally in Gwangju. We had no reason to take orders from a powerless division commander.¹⁴

According to 7th Brigade Commander Shin Woo-sik, Chung Ho-yong spent a total of six days in Gwangju over the course of the uprising: May 20–21, 23–24, and 26–27.¹⁵ It went without question that brigade commanders were to remain at their respective brigade headquarters at Chonnam or Chosun University. However, in a glaring breach of protocol, the commanders largely stayed at and gave orders from Combat Arms Command in Sangmudae, where Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong resided. Battalion commanders on the front lines were incensed by their decision. During examinations at the Prosecutors’ Office, brigade commanders who opened fire on Gwangju Station on the night of May 20 did not hide their vexation about the issue. The commander of the 61st Battalion of the 11th Brigade, which opened fire on demonstrators indiscriminately in front of the South Jeolla Province Hall on May 21, outright cursed into his radio. Because paratrooper units used an independent frequency, Combat Arms Command had no way of knowing the contents of their radio transmissions. Colonel Baek Nam-i, operations officer at Combat Arms Command, testified that the Airborne Special Forces Brigades did not properly report to Combat Arms Command and undertook independent action while communicating only with the special forces situation room.¹⁶ According to Baek, Chung Ho-yong and Colonel Jang Se-dong went to the special forces situation room brandishing handguns, threatening, “If you do not comply, you will be court-martialed.” A colonel by the family name Kim, who had been dispatched to Combat Arms Command from Security Forces, was also met with threats such as “If you value your safety, you will give your full cooperation.”¹⁷

An Elderly Woman Holding a Child’s Hand Joins the Demonstration

The demonstrations were relatively calm on the morning of May 20, as were the paratroopers’ responses. However, the situation rapidly degenerated in the afternoon. The 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade dispatched its 11th Battalion to Hwanggeum-dong, its 12th to Gwangju City Hall, its 13th to Gwangju Jeil High School, its 15th to Wolsan-dong and Numun-dong, and its 16th to the roundabout at Gwangju Station, while the 7th Brigade dispatched its 33rd Battalion to Gyerim Police Substation and Gwangju High School and its 35th Battalion to the Hanil Bank area, and the 11th Brigade dispatched its 61st Battalion to the South Jeolla Province Hall, its 62nd Battalion to the Gwangju Post Office area, and its 63rd to the Daein-dong Police Substation area.¹⁸ All ten battalions from the three brigades were deployed to the city in preparation for a joint suppression operation.

The demonstrations started after lunchtime at the edges of Geumnam-ro. At 2:40 p.m., more than 300 junior high students who had finished classes in the Dongmyeong-dong area threw rocks at the paratroopers stationed along the street, pulling back when they were showered with tear gas and pepper fog. A similar scene played out near Dongmun Bridge in Gyerim-dong, where more than 200 junior high and high school students pelted paratroopers with rocks before fleeing. In front of Gyerim Police Substation, more than 700 civilians were involved in a confrontation with soldiers. Skirmishes occurred sporadically throughout the city.

By 3:00 p.m., the people once again converged around Geumnam-ro. More than 200 gathered outside Chohung Bank at 3:40 p.m., and fifteen minutes later, thousands congregated on Geumnam-ro 4-ga. The demonstrators were a diverse group of people, from elderly women holding the hands of kindergarten-aged children to young women who looked to be from the entertainment districts, to shopkeepers, students, office workers holding paper bags, homemakers, and restaurant employees. Police fired tear gas into the crowds. The people retreated briefly but quickly flooded the streets again. The back-and-forth continued until the number of demonstrators swelled to the tens of thousands. Students and young adults led the charge, stationing themselves at the Geumnam-ro and Jungang-ro intersection and the construction site for the underground marketplace to stage a sit-in protest. The people no longer tried to run or hide. They seated themselves and cried out, “You may as well kill us all!” and waved the Korean flag. The paratroopers’ undisputed supremacy had begun to fail.

Choi Yang-geun (age 23, third-year student at Chonnam University Law School) and a small group of students led the protest. They explained to the crowds why they chose to fight, read out newsletters, and sang songs in between. Choruses of “Arirang,” “Our Wish Is Reunification,” “Justice,” and “A Fighter’s Anthem” resounded through the city, at first with awkward voices but eventually with confidence and determination. By the time they sang “Arirang” again, the demonstrators were in tears. One person stood and suggested pooling money for speakers. They raised KRW 320,000 in less than ten minutes. The student holding the donation box counted the money on the spot and declared the tally to the crowd.

Airborne Special Forces Brigade commanders ordered the demonstrators to go back to their homes, but people only sang louder. Paratroopers responded by rushing into the crowds like a swarm of bees, swinging their batons with reckless abandon. Blood was spilled on the site of the protest, and the crowds scattered in every direction. Although paratroopers did not follow them into the alleys or use their bayonets, they still made use of their batons. When paratroopers split off into smaller groups to chase down the crowds, they were quickly cornered by demonstrators instead. This new trend discouraged—and ultimately prevented—the soldiers from hunting down demonstrators. When paratroopers did follow people into the alleys, the people would turn and face the soldiers head-on. Other demonstrators would cut off their rear, turning the hunters into the hunted. In response, the paratroopers chose to consolidate their numbers to focus on large groups of demonstrators.

“We Die Together”

Once paratrooper pursuit of individual demonstrators subsided, the people of Gwangju found themselves with even greater freedom of movement. They showed no sign of losing ground. Demonstrators fanned into alleys and the gaps between buildings, calling out, “Join us! Join us!” to bring more people into the fold. Groups that had grown numerous enough faced off against large groups of paratroopers, refusing to give an inch. The donations from earlier were used to buy speakers for the demonstrators. One person would carry a speaker, another the battery, and the third a microphone through which they would encourage their fellow civilians. These trios served as mobile broadcasting stations for the people of Gwangju.

“We die together with our friends who have gone ahead!”

Amidst skyrocketing demonstrator morale, the siege against the military continued. Demonstrators surged through six roads that led to the plaza in front of Province Hall in massive waves, using drum canisters and large planters as moving barricades as they pushed forward into paratrooper lines one step at a time. Citizens no longer stood on the sidelines to watch. United in determination, they came out of businesses and residences on the street with large buckets and tubs of water to wash off tear gas, and used wheelbarrows, bicycles, and wooden boxes to carry over gravel, pieces of lumber, and iron bars from construction sites. Tear gas was everywhere, but Gwangju’s civilians refused to surrender. Middle-aged women and young waitresses went through the crowds handing out wet towels and toothpaste to be applied under the nostrils to help people endure the hot, burning sensation caused by the tear gas. The military and the police had set up layers of cordons on the roads in front of Province Hall. Countless soldiers were stationed behind the cordons with the plaza fountain at the center. Demonstrators and martial law troops engaged in fierce clashes before backing down briefly and then resuming their confrontations. At 5:50 p.m., about 5,000 demonstrators formed a scrum at the entrance to Chungjang-ro and made a bodily charge toward Province Hall. Upon clashing with martial law troops, the demonstrators retreated and staged a sit-in protest in front of the Daedo Hotel and the Nammun branch of the Kwangju Bank. Meanwhile, six female high school students held up a large Korean flag and led hundreds of demonstrators from the Intercity Bus Terminal to the Labor Supervision Office. Paratroopers could not comprehend why the people of Gwangju would respond this way.

The Taxi Drivers’ Revolt

At 7:00 p.m., countless vehicles rushed toward Province Hall from the direction of Yu-dong without warning, headlights ablaze and horns screaming. At the head of the charge was a fully laden 12-tonne truck belonging to Daehan Logistics, which was followed by 11 express and intercity buses, behind which were over 200 taxi cabs. More than twenty young people had climbed atop the lead truck, waving the Korean flag. The buses also carried young people holding the Korean flag and even young women carrying wooden bludgeons. The vehicles gave great encouragement to the demonstrators who had been engaged in desperate skirmishes along Geumnam-ro all afternoon.

This was the second catalyst that led to the intensification of civilian resistance. The first was an unplanned and unorganized outpouring of the people’s rage in front of the Catholic Center on Geumnam-ro around lunchtime the previous day. The second—the mass vehicle demonstrations on the evening of May 20—was organized. Although this demonstration too was entirely voluntary and unplanned, the professional drivers acted as one and threw their lives into the forefront of history. Their intensity, solidarity, and dedication would eventually become a symbol of the Gwangju Uprising. The anger that had simmered beneath the surface for the past three days reached a breaking point, erupting onto the city in a wave of conviction that covered the streets until the break of dawn.

The vehicle demonstration had begun at 2:00 p.m. that afternoon near Gwangju Station with about a dozen taxis. “Why are the paratroopers beating and killing innocent drivers? We’re only doing our jobs.” “We can’t keep acting like it’s business as usual while they continue killing us with batons and bayonets. We have to fight.” As the drivers exchanged heated perspectives, their numbers rose to more than twenty. Eventually, their opinions converged on the idea of organized resistance against martial law troops. Because their work took them all over the city, they saw more of the paratroopers’ ruthless actions than anyone, and they themselves had also been the target of brutal violence. Taxi drivers who were caught taking dying civilians to the hospital were stopped, beaten, and threatened with bayonets for assisting supposed rioters. They knew better than anyone that their collective actions would come with great risks.

Figure 6. The demonstrations on Geumnam-ro (May 20, 15:00–18:00)

Once they had agreed to meet at Mudeung Sports Center, the drivers went across the city to get in touch with their fellows. Some had been beaten by paratroopers earlier and still sported bandages around their heads. More than 200 taxi cabs arrived at the Sports Center at 6:00 p.m. that evening. The drivers parked their vehicles in an orderly fashion and exchanged eyewitness accounts and news of injuries sustained by drivers, agreeing to lead the charge on the military cordons. Wrapping towels around their heads, they went back to their vehicles—their very livelihoods—to use them as battering rams at the risk of death.

The vehicles that left Mudeung Sports Center split into two groups and headed for Province Hall. One group headed to Geumnam-ro via Imdong-gil and the Yu-dong three-way intersection, while the other went from the Chonnam University intersection in Sinan-dong to Gwangju Station, turning in the direction of the Intercity Bus Terminal to join demonstrators on Geumnam-ro. With headlights lit and horns howling, the convoy made their charge with a freight truck and buses in the lead and taxis behind them. Young people waved large Korean flags from the truck and the buses. When demonstrators saw the vehicles make their charge, dramatically lit by the searchlights, their enthusiasm snowballed. Someone cried out, “The drivers have risen up for democracy!”

Figure 7. The taxi convoy’s route (May 20, 18:00–18:30)

Paratrooper radios went abuzz with reports of the convoy’s movements. Martial law troops scrambled to devise countermeasures. At that moment, two men in their forties went to Lieutenant Colonel Ahn Bu-ung, the 61st Battalion Commander who had been defending the Province Hall from Geumnam-ro, informing him that a convoy of vehicles had set off from Mudeung Sports Center with Province Hall as their target. If the convoy broke through the lines on Geumnam-ro, nothing would stop the demonstrators from taking control of the Province Hall premises. Ahn immediately reported the situation to the brigade situation room by radio. To his irritation, they seemed to be oblivious to the mounting situation on the street, giving orders that not a single vehicle be allowed through the cordons. The 61st Battalion did not have the manpower to stop the convoy’s charge. He was forced to radio the commander of the 62nd Battalion for reinforcements. Using the median strip of Geumnam-ro as a divider, the 61st would take the right side of the street as seen from Province Hall, and the 62nd would take the left. Riot police would stand behind the paratroopers and prepare to fire tear gas canisters over their heads. Paratroopers were evacuated into the alleyways on either side of the street, as building a barricade in the middle of the road at this stage would only result in casualties. An intelligence officer named Jang and a HQ company commander named Jeong volunteered to stop the convoy. Ahn set up a special attack team with the two men in the lead. All the buildings in the area had been shuttered, leaving the soldiers nothing with which to form a barricade, so all they had at their disposal were the cement planters on the roadsides. The moment paratroopers finished moving three of them onto the middle of the road, the convoy arrived, headlights flashing.¹⁹

Demonstrators Charge into Combat Against Paratroopers

When the convoy reached Geumnam-ro, demonstrators who had been clashing with martial law troops at the cordon cheered and shed tears of joy. They were convinced that the addition of the buses and taxis would break the stalemate. With lead pipes, wooden bludgeons, Molotov cocktails, pickaxes, kitchen knives, and sickles in hand, and with rocks ready to throw, the demonstrators covered the convoy as it made its way down the street.

Ahn Bu-ung estimated that the barricades would be able to stop large vehicles like buses and trucks. As for smaller vehicles like taxis, which could squeeze through the gaps in the planter barricades, he determined that pepper-fog vehicles would have to be used to stop them. As he moved the pepper-fog vehicles into position between the barricades, the buses and trucks advanced ever closer. Paratroopers sprayed tear gas with abandon, and the pepper-fog vehicles worked at full output as if to suffocate the demonstrators. Canisters broke through windshields and vehicle windows, releasing tear gas directly into taxis and buses. The lead vehicle of the convoy, a bus with the serial number South Jeolla 5-Ah 3706, was making its way forward with headlights on, protected by demonstrators, when the driver spotted the planter through the fog of tear gas. He braked and made a hard right turn, and the bus ran into a tree on the roadside. In that moment, a paratrooper captain named Jang leapt forward and struck the windshield with his baton. Four special forces operatives broke the side windows and threw in canister after canister of tear gas. Dozens of paratroopers followed, pummeling the bus and rushing inside. They hauled out the driver and nine young people and beat them with their batons. Most of those who had been pulled out were limp and almost unconscious. But the paratroopers continued to beat and trample them. Those detained were handed off to the police and taken to Province Hall.²⁰

Kim Yeong-nam (age 23) had been near the construction site of the underground marketplace when he joined a group of others who boarded the bus at the head of the convoy. From the bus, he witnessed the paratroopers stationed in front of Province Hall draw closer, firing tear gas canisters. The following convoy vehicles made it impossible to retreat or even escape the bus. The paratroopers broke the windows with their batons and threw tear gas canisters inside. Reeling from the effects, demonstrators jumped out to escape. Kim also climbed out a window, face smeared in tears and mucus, and was immediately trampled upon without mercy. The last thing he remembered before losing consciousness was being dragged in front of the Korea First Bank on Geumnam-ro 2-ga.²¹

The assault on the bus slowed down the rest of the convoy, preventing them from continuing forward. More than 500 citizens launched themselves at the soldiers with a battle cry to rescue the drivers and the demonstrators on the vehicles. Paratroopers assaulted them mercilessly, scaring off the demonstrators. One middle-aged woman shook off the paratroopers and went to treat the injured with medicine and wet towels. Upon the sight of blood pooled all over the streets, she cried, “Look at all this blood! And you still call yourselves South Korean soldiers?” as she fainted. One of the drivers following the bus succumbed to the tear gas and stopped his vehicle only twenty meters or so from the martial law troops. Those who disembarked from the vehicles wandered in the haze with no sense of direction. Troops struck the half-conscious driver in the head with a baton, and he collapsed without resistance. Drivers following behind them leapt out of their vehicles and escaped, but more than twenty people were captured by the police and the military.

During the demonstrations, some paratroopers attempted to stop their comrades from using excessive force. Lee Sang-hyeon, who ran the Wolsan-dong neighborhood branch of the Chosun Ilbo, had taken a taxi to reach the company office on the third floor of the Dong-gu District Office on Geumnam-ro 2-ga when the taxi was caught in the vehicle convoy on Geumnam-ro. Three paratroopers broke the rear windows and dragged him out, striking him on the arms, back, and knees. The paratroopers’ commander, who had been passing by, ordered them to stop and approached the fallen Lee, encouraging him to escape.

Mounting Casualties at the Cordons

The demonstrators who had defended the convoy fled the open street, taking cover in the alleys to throw rocks at the soldiers. However, the paratroopers threw themselves forward without hesitation. The convoy had turned to chaos, with vehicles bumping into one another. Paratroopers broke the windshields, windows, and lights on every one of more than 200 vehicles on the street. Demonstrators who continued to resist were pushed to the very end of the convoy by troops, forced into physical combat. The street shook with the sound of screams. Dozens of civilians were dragged into Province Hall. Im Jae-gu (age 16, high school student) had watched from in front of the Jeonil Building as hundreds of vehicles rushed toward the cordons. When the tear gas grew too thick to see, he and his friend climbed into a passing taxi. Less than five minutes later, the paratroopers charged. Im hid under the seat but was captured when the soldiers broke the windows. They dragged him to the front of the YMCA building, where he joined over thirty prisoners who had been brought there earlier. They were forced to assume the Wonsan Bombing position before being taken to Province Hall and beaten almost to death. His face was so swollen and bloodied that he could scarcely recognize himself. On the afternoon of the following day, when paratroopers and police pulled out of the downtown core after the shooting in front of Province Hall, Im made a narrow and desperate escape by climbing over the back fence, cradling his broken arm.²²

The confusion and mayhem lasted over twenty minutes. A significant number of vehicles were left running. Countless injured lay bleeding between the vehicles, with their head smashed in or shoulders dislocated, moaning in pain. Paratroopers removed the keys from the vehicles, handing them to the riot police commander. Two women in their twenties, both dressed as bus conductors, wailed over the body of a bus driver in his thirties whose head has been smashed in. As demonstrators carried away the wounded, voices called desperately for ambulances. The attempted frontal assault on Geumnam-ro ultimately failed to break paratrooper lines. Ahn Bu-ung later testified to prosecutors that following rumors of four paratroopers being crushed to death by demonstrator buses, “the fear of being run over by the vehicles ran through the men.” The convoy’s valiant attempt marked a turning point in the Gwangju Uprising, when paratroopers began to fight for their own lives as well. They spent the rest of the night paralyzed with fear.²³

“We Demand Truthful Coverage of These Atrocities”

A brief lull fell over the section of Geumnam-ro in front of Province Hall for about fifty minutes from 7:40 p.m. onward. Demonstrators were pushed back all the way to the Kookmin Bank on Geumnam-ro 4-ga. Those who escaped Geumnam-ro flooded the adjacent streets of Jebong-ro and Chungjang-ro. The powerful defense put up by martial law troops taught demonstrators that a frontal assault would be to their disadvantage. They changed course and headed to the MBC broadcasting station on Jebong-ro. At 7:45 p.m., more than 5,000 people surrounded the building and demanded that the broadcaster “deliver full coverage of the atrocities taking place outside on the 8 o’clock news.” When their demands were not met by 8:30 p.m., demonstrators tossed firebombs at the building. Employees and members of the 1st Battalion of the 96th Regiment from the 31st Division—who had been stationed for security—put out the flames with fire extinguishers. The fire did not spread any further. At the same time, the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) station near Gwangju Station was similarly surrounded and taken over by demonstrators. Angry crowds destroyed their equipment, cutting off the broadcasts altogether.

Gwangju-area journalists, who were unable to publish even a single line pertaining to the uprising due to government censorship despite the demonstrators’ demands and their personal experiences on the scene, fell into despair. Their only means of resistance was the declaration to stop writing altogether. On May 20, reporters at the Jeonnam Meil daily turned in a joint letter of resignation. The letter was short but powerfully conveyed the hopelessness of the reporters: “We saw it all. We saw with our own two eyes how people were dragged away like dogs and killed. But we were unable to write a single line describing these scenes in our newspaper. We hereby lay down our brush in shame.”²⁴

Those who attacked the broadcasters soon rejoined the rest of the demonstrators in the area of the Labor Supervision Office, Hak-dong, and the entrance of Chungjang-ro. Having completely filled the roads, demonstrators attempted once again to make their way to the Province Hall plaza. Police assisted martial law troops in shooting pepper fog and countless canisters of tear gas, attempting to hold the demonstrators at bay. When troops advanced in a flurry of tear gas canisters, civilians briefly scattered into the side streets. Once the tear gas had abated, coughing demonstrators returned in the tens of thousands. The back-and-forth went on in the darkness.

Even people from the outlying neighborhoods of Hak-dong, Bangnim-dong, Sansu-dong, Jisan-dong, Yudeok-dong, Gwangcheon-dong, and Hwajeong-dong joined the demonstrations downtown, armed with pickaxes, shovels, sickles, cudgels, coal briquette tongs, and washing paddles. Word about the battle on Geumnam-ro Street spread across the city like wildfire. In the Yu-dong area, demonstrators spread into the alleys and side streets rolling drum canisters to encourage locals to join them outside. More than fifty farmers from the rural neighborhood of Yudeok-dong made their way to the downtown core, dressed in white hanbok and wielding pitchforks, hoes, and bamboo spears. Onlookers cheered at the unusual sight. The Sansu-dong five-way intersection was packed with local residents who had just finished dinner and wanted to know more about the situation downtown. Chonnam University students Kim Han-jung, Yu Seung-gyu, and Kim Hyeon-cheol (age 21) canvassed the neighborhood, shouting, “Residents of Sansu-dong! Tonight we destroy the martial law troops. Pick up a weapon and come outside!” The small scrum composed of several dozen people made its way from the Sansu-dong five-way intersection to the Jang-dong roundabout, past the MBC broadcasting building, and finally to Jebong-ro, over time swelling to a crowd of over 1,000—mostly adult men. The group shattered phone booths and the windows of government offices along the way. When they reached the Intercity Bus Terminal and met a group of 1,000 from a different neighborhood, the teams cheered and joined together. These suburban groups converged on the downtown core, filling the streets like little streams to form an unstoppable river. Tens of thousands of people packed every road that led to the fountain in front of Province Hall. Although most were complete strangers, they became natural comrades in arms as they joined together in readiness for the battles to come that night at the Province Hall, Chosun University, and Gwangju Station.

At 8:30 p.m., upon being pushed back from Geumnam-ro, demonstrators obtained four fire trucks from the Gwangju Fire Department and headed back to Geumnam-ro. As many as 20,000 citizens roared in triumph as the trucks made their way from the direction of Hanil Bank, sirens wailing. People pushed aside the abandoned vehicles on the street to make way. Once they drew close to Province Hall and were showered with tear gas, the demonstrators sprayed water from the fire trucks to wash the gas away. As the battle escalated that night, the number of casualties increased. Blood drenched the ground and the entire city was swallowed up by darkness, a chaotic furnace of fury and emotion, screams and cheers, and life and death.

Park Gi-hyeon (age 14, third-year student at Gwangju Dongsung Middle School) had left his house by bicycle late in the afternoon that day to buy books. He was seized by paratroopers at Dongmun Bridge in Gyerim-dong and was beaten. The next day, he was found dead at Chonnam University Hospital with his forehead caved in, body covered in bruises, and eyes popping out of their sockets.²⁵

Figure 8. The second demonstration at Geumnam-ro (May 20, 18:00–21:00)

The Deaths of Four Police Officers at the Labor Supervision Office

In the desperate battles on the streets, demonstrators were forced to make use of unconventional weapons: vehicles. Taxi drivers put their lives on the line and drove their vehicles—representing either their livelihoods or property entrusted by others—toward martial law troops. Other citizens climbed into whatever vehicles they could find and joined the demonstrators or explained the situation in the city to drivers of buses, trucks, and cars coming in from other regions to convince them to join the demonstrations. Vehicles from Seoul generally passed Jangseong, Unam-dong, and the Mudeung Sports Center to reach the Intercity Bus Terminal near Gwangju Station, but because of the crowds, they were forced to stop at the Mudeung Sports Center. Demonstrators near Unam-dong and the Sports Center diverted vehicles in the area to the downtown core.

In the afternoon of May 20, Park Nam-seon and several other young people took charge of the gas station at Dongun-dong, where they produced firebombs, directed traffic, and attempted to convince drivers to join their cause downtown. Meanwhile, demonstrators took over the police substation in front of Gwangju Station and broke its windows. Other police substations in Yang-dong and Hak-dong were also taken by demonstrators. Vehicles making their way from the highway to the road to Unam-dong and the sports center headed to Geumnam-ro in droves. Streetlights had been extinguished, leaving only the endless line of headlights to illuminate the city.

At 9:20 p.m., a Gwangju Buslines bus at the five-way intersection in front of the Labor Supervision Office killed four police officers. The driver, Bae Yong-ju (age 34), worked for the bus company on the intercity route between Gwangju and Namwon and had departed Namwon at 7:00 p.m. that day. Upon reaching the Intercity Bus Terminal two hours later, one of the managers instructed him to follow the buses leaving via the company entrance. Bae did as he was ordered without understanding the situation. Others boarded his bus, including fellow driver Kim Gap-su (age 30) and several demonstrators. They made their way from the Labor Supervision Office to Province Hall but were stopped at Sangmu Hall by pepper fog. Bae could not open his eyes because of the pain. He let go of the steering wheel and shrank into the space under the dashboard. The bus slid toward the curb and hit something, coming to a stop. He heard screams everywhere. Once the bus had stopped moving, Bae leaped off and took cover.²⁶ He had no idea that four police officers had been crushed and killed by the bus.

The situation was witnessed by Nam Dong-seong from the 2nd Riot Squad of the South Jeolla Provincial Police, who had been ordered to suppress the demonstrators. Riot police had been stationed in four lines to hold back hundreds of people. A gas station about a hundred meters from the Labor Supervision Office was taken by demonstrators, who used the gasoline from the pumps to set vehicles on fire and push them toward police lines. Around 9:00 p.m., Nam spotted a bus drive toward the police. It weaved between the burning vehicles effortlessly and barreled towards the line. Nam shouted, “Get out of the way!” and threw rocks at the bus. The police split to either side, and the bus slowed as it swerved to the right, finally stopping from the friction against the wall by the road. When Nam made his way to the scene, he found multiple police officers crushed between the bus and the wall, moaning and wailing. Those unharmed pulled on their arms and legs to drag them out but found them already limp.²⁷

Figure 9. Demonstrations led by convoy of vehicles (May 20, 20:30–21:30)

Bae Yong-ju arrived at work the next morning and was shocked to hear from a colleague that four police officers had been crushed by his bus. Following the Gwangju Uprising, he was arrested and sentenced to death but was pardoned on Christmas 1982. Fellow bus driver Kim Gap-jin, who had been on his bus, was mistaken for the driver. He was arrested and subsequently tortured and beaten. He was finally released when Bae was arrested, but he died of the aftereffects of the torture in 1986. The deceased officers—Jeong Chun-gil, Kang Jeong-ung, Lee Se-hong, and Park Gi-ung—were originally from Hampyeong Police Station. Five other police personnel were injured.

The demonstrations that night were centered around Province Hall and Gwangju Station because martial law troops had abandoned all other areas in favor of defending these two locations.

Crowds marched on Province Hall from every direction, assaulting military cordons in waves from the Chungjang-ro entrance, the Labor Supervision Office, and west Geumnam-ro. The downtown core almost seemed to be on fire. A large assortment of vehicles had also joined the demonstrators, from small and large buses to jeeps, taxis, and trucks of all sizes. The intense clash between the civilians and martial law troops went on until the gap between the cordons and the demonstrators—filled with burning vehicles—was only about fifty meters wide. On occasion, there would be a loud noise as a pillar of fire rose from one of the cars. A seemingly endless stream of tear gas canisters rained down on the demonstrators, who fought back by lobbing rocks at the martial law troops.

The five-way intersection in front of the Labor Supervision Office was packed with more than twenty burning vehicles. Following the capture of the gas station, demonstrators targeted the Province Hall parking garage across from the Labor Supervision Office. They hauled out vehicles and set the seats on fire, with drivers pointing them toward the cordons before jumping out and running to safety. Those who failed to escape found themselves deep within military lines and were taken out by force: beaten and dragged away half-conscious. The exchange continued late into the night. As civilians continued to make their way into the downtown core from the outskirts, they began to take over for those who were exhausted from the struggle and had to go home to rest. According to the daily records kept by Martial Law Command, the number of demonstrators who clashed against the 11th Battalion of the 3rd Brigade on Geumnam-ro at 9:13 p.m. was estimated to be more than 70,000.

At 9:20 p.m., the commander of the 11th Brigade ordered the 33rd Battalion of the 7th Brigade to retreat from the Gyerim-dong five-way intersection to defend Chosun University. As the 33rd pulled back, civilians chanted, “Leave Gwangju now!” Thousands of demonstrators—people of all ages—marched forward with shovels, sickles, pickaxes, and pieces of lumber in hand. They demanded to know if only soldiers from the Gyeongsang Provinces had been deployed to the city and if they intended to exterminate the people of Gwangju. It was not until a captain named Lee, who was from Gwangju, showed his national ID card to confirm his hometown that the citizens’ anger was partially pacified.

Figure 10. Demonstrations near the Labor Supervision Office and the MBC building (May 20, 19:30–24:00)

Arson at the MBC Building

At 10:00 p.m., there was an explosive noise as flames billowed from the MBC broadcasting station. They spread from the back of the building and engulfed the entire structure in the blink of an eye, casting a blinding light across the city. Local residents evacuated sleeping children and escaped with their belongings. Young men among the demonstrators worked together to protect residences from the fire. This was the third attack on the MBC, which drew massive crowds from across Gwangju.

Even until that point, the MBC had not sent out any news coverage concerning the situation in the city. Rather, it had simply parroted Martial Law Command’s official statements and played entertainment programs. MBC immediately sent its employees home after the fire. The dozen or so martial law troops from the 31st Division, who had been assigned security duty, also withdrew. The flames weakened around 1:00 a.m. and died down completely three hours later.²⁸

Television broadcasts from the Gwangju MBC station ended that day at 8:25 p.m., with broadcasts from KBS Gwangju ending at 10:05 p.m. As for radio, the Gwangju Christian Broadcasting System ended at 8:30 p.m., MBC Radio at 9:25 p.m., and Jeonil Broadcasting at 11:09 p.m. KBS Radio, however, continued broadcasting. It was interrupted at 5:40 a.m. on May 21 by a fire set by demonstrators, but it resumed at 7:28 a.m. from a transmitter station. It was the only radio station to continue broadcasting through the course of the Gwangju Uprising, but it only played propaganda and messages from the government and Martial Law Command.

At 10:30 p.m., demonstrators clashed with paratroopers on the streets of Dongmyeong-dong, both sides refusing to cede ground. A man in his thirties in yellow workwear was found dead, having been knocked unconscious by the tear gas, captured, and beaten by a large group of soldiers.²⁹ As the night went on, Province Hall was flooded with a chaotic mix of police, soldiers, and captured civilians. Multiple police officers collapsed from overwork.

At 8:50 p.m., Gwangju City Hall was taken by the people. Demonstrators took Gwangju Police Station and West Gwangju Police Station at 10:00 p.m., and by midnight, the Gwangju Tax Office was ablaze.

Figure 11. Paratroopers’ final line of defense and arson cases at the Gwangju Tax Office and MBC building (May 20, 24:00)

Battle in Pitch-Black Darkness

By 11:00 p.m., demonstrators had taken control of all but the South Jeolla Province Hall. At the plaza outside the premises, 11th Brigade commander Choi Ung assembled all forces under his command. They had been stationed at key locations in the area such as Geumnam-ro, Jebong-ro, and Chungjang-ro, but Choi determined that it would no longer be possible to defend such a large area. More than 1,200 paratroopers belonging to the 61st, 62nd, and 63rd Battalions of the 11th Brigade and the 35th Battalion of the 7th Brigade gathered at Province Hall.³⁰

That night, shots were heard at Gwangju Station. In response, several battalion commanders from the 11th Brigade distributed live ammunition.³¹ In the case of the 11th Brigade, each company commander was given one magazine containing fifteen rounds to be used as warning shots—the 61st at 10:00 p.m., the 62nd at midnight, and the 63rd at 10:30 a.m. on May 21.³² According to the ROK Army HQ’s Pokdongjinapjakjeon gyobeom (Fundamentals of riot suppression), live rounds may not be distributed to individuals in riot suppression situations. However, as fear spread among the troops amidst injuries and the sounds of gunfire, the 11th Brigade went against protocol and distributed the ammunition to soldiers to provide “peace of mind” with the warning that the rounds “must not be used recklessly.” The distribution of live rounds was generally heavily regulated by military commanders because it led to an astronomical increase in the likelihood of gunfire. The battalion commanders acted of their own accord without reporting to their commanders. Although members of the 11th Brigade claim that they did not open fire that night, several civilians witnessed tracer rounds and heard gunfire in the Province Hall area around midnight.³³

By midnight, paratroopers had long since run out of tear gas and were forced to rely only on their batons. Division headquarters at Chosun University was surrounded by demonstrators and could not send additional supplies to Province Hall. The fighting had been reduced to late-night street brawls between a small number of paratroopers and tens of thousands of demonstrators. It was close to the new moon, making the night even darker, and even the streetlamps and the lights of the buildings had been shut off. Chaos reigned in the darkness. The paratroopers had scarcely eaten or rested, let alone slept, and could barely stop for a sip of water. Because the roads were blocked, field kitchens could not approach, forcing the troops to subsist on rations, and military ambulances could not easily take the injured away. Out of the 300-odd members of the 61st Battalion, about 70 had been injured by stones thrown by demonstrators. Paratroopers responded with rage and vengeance at the injury of their comrades in arms, making it difficult for their direct commanders to keep them under control.³⁴

To boost morale, the commander of the 61st Battalion obtained a megaphone from the commander of the 2nd Field Battalion and ordered his men to attack: “Today we lay down our lives. We will not return home alive.” Encouraging the troops, he led a charge on the demonstrators who had converged on Geumnam-ro, scattering them and chasing down individuals. In one push, the paratroopers drove away the crowds while cutting off the side streets and alleys all the way to the Intercity Bus Terminal. Along with the 62nd, they managed a successive retreat to choruses of the “Special Forces Anthem.” The paratroopers were galvanized by the successful attack in which four men were taken away by ambulance with blunt trauma.

Nam Dong-seong, a member of the riot police, had gone out to Chungjang-ro past midnight with fellow officers when several of them were left stranded on the way back. A group of demonstrators threw rocks and brandished clubs, and one of Nam’s fellows screamed, “We’re going to die!” and ran off in fear. At that moment, a platoon of paratroopers came to the rescue with an armored vehicle in the lead. In their assault, the paratroopers left two uniformed junior high students lying on the road. Nam went to them and found one had already died, his chest caved in as if run over. The other faintly moaned for his mother before going silent. Nam carried them away from the road and put them next to a nearby store before returning to his unit. As he watched several civilian deaths over the course of the evening, he blamed God and wept to himself—not out of anger, but because of the pointlessness of the violence.³⁵

Voices of Female Street Broadcasters

One of the most psychologically damaging blows levied against martial law troops holding down Province Hall that day were the sharp, desperate voices of women encouraging their fellow protesters. Amplified via speakers mounted on trucks, their words were passionate and determined:

Martial law soldiers, do you have no pity? Don’t you remember which country you are sworn to defend? And to the police: we ask for your help. Please open up the Province Hall plaza for us briefly so we can protest peacefully and depart. Please don’t fire more tear gas. We are unarmed. But we guarantee that we will emerge victorious nonetheless. Fellow citizens of Gwangju, let’s work together to defend our city to the end.

One paratrooper who had been assigned to hold the line against demonstrators in front of the Gwangju Tax Office testified that the voices of the impromptu broadcasters carried the grief, anger, and fury of the citizens. They touched the hearts of the soldiers, prompting commanders to send out snipers to kill them. However, the snipers were foiled because the broadcasters were surrounded by too many people.³⁶

The voices from the speakers belonged to Jeon Ok-ju (age 31) and Cha Myeong-suk (age 19).³⁷ Their heartfelt appeals roused people’s outrage, striking terror into the hearts of martial law forces. Jeon and Cha first began their broadcasts when the donations collected on Geumnam-ro were used to buy audio equipment installed on vehicles that ended up leading the demonstrators. Their higher pitched voices stood out more in the clamor than the men’s, making them ideal for the role. Others involved in the broadcasts would write up scripts, which Jeon and Cha would fill with their own grief and outrage. From the afternoon of May 20 to the morning of the following day, they continued their broadcasts without rest and encouraged demonstrators at key locations in the city such as Geumnam-ro, Gwangnam-ro, Yu-dong, Im-dong, and Gwangju Station. The equipment was purchased at Gyerim Radio and broke down at 9:30 p.m. on May 20, at which point the speakers and amplifiers from the rooftop of the Hagun-dong Neighborhood Center were repurposed for the broadcasts.³⁸

At 2:00 a.m. on May 21, the broadcast truck led more than 2,000 demonstrators through Yang-dong Market, along the banks of Gwangju River, and past Ilshin Textile, Chonbang Textile, and the Mudeung Sports Center before stopping at Gwangju Station. As tensions rose, and even live rounds were fired at demonstrators, Jeon continued her broadcast over the station and encouraged the people while demoralizing the 3rd Brigade.

The Battle at Gwangju Station

Alongside the battle on Geumnam-ro, the battle at Gwangju Station on the night of May 20 was one of the most powerful moments of the Gwangju Uprising. It marked the first time during the uprising that shots were fired indiscriminately, causing at least five civilian deaths and multiple injuries.³⁹ Although the 3rd Brigade was the top special forces team in the country and equipped with firearms, they found it difficult to hold back the civilians’ assault. Between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. on May 21, they finally chose to abandon the defense of Gwangju Station and were forced to flee to Chonnam University.

The rout of the 3rd at Gwangju Station came as a shock to Singunbu leaders, plunging them into confusion and fundamentally altering their operating paradigm. It would lead directly to the withdrawal of soldiers from the downtown core the following day and the subsequent blockade.⁴⁰ However, the significance of the battle did not become apparent to the public until much later in history.⁴¹

Because of its position as a center of transport in the city, Gwangju Station played a symbolic role in much the same manner as Province Hall. When expressways were left paralyzed, trains became one of the only reliable means of logistical military transport from Seoul to Gwangju.⁴² By the evening of May 20, the large-scale convoy led by the taxi drivers had turned the situation on its head, with demonstrators taking the offensive against paratroopers.

At 6:30 p.m., headquarters personnel from the 3rd Brigade took two 2.5-tonne military trucks from Chonnam University to provide meals to the units downtown. However, upon reaching the underpass at Sinan-dong about 500 meters from the campus, they were attacked by more than 2,000 demonstrators who cut off food supplies to the paratroopers in the city. The 16th Battalion, which had remained on standby at the university, retaliated violently with tear gas and batons.

When more than 200 taxi cabs gathered for the convoy at Mudeung Sports Center at 7:00 p.m., the 3rd Brigade stationed its 16th Battalion in the vicinity of Gwangju Station. About three hours later, some of the convoy passed the KBS building and the Intercity Bus Terminal, heading for the station. Gunfire resounded through the streets at that point, but they were likely blanks shot as a warning by martial law troops to deter demonstrators from approaching.⁴³

The 3rd Brigade’s 12th and 15th Battalions set up barricades in the plaza in front of Gwangju Station and clashed with demonstrators at 8:00 p.m. Some troops from the 16th Battalion cut off the Sinan intersection near the station. At that point, the 11th Battalion had been surrounded by demonstrators gathering around the Province Hall. The 13th was attacked by the demonstrator convoy at the Intercity Bus Terminal and pushed back to Gwangju City Hall.⁴⁴

The distance between Mudeung Sports Center and Gwangju Station was only two and a half kilometers in a straight line down Mudeung-ro, with the Sinan intersection in between. Demonstrators who had gathered at the Sports Center clashed with the paratrooper line at the intersection, only 800 meters away from the station. Demonstrators who had been heading to Geumnam-ro from the Sports Center split again at the Im-dong five-way intersection, with some changing targets to Gwangju Station and clashing with soldiers who had been defending the KBS broadcasting building about 100 meters from the station plaza. The crowds of demonstrators only grew more numerous as time passed.

Around 9:00 p.m., demonstrators mainly congregated in front of the KBS building and the Sinan intersection with vehicles that had been rerouted from the Sports Center to the downtown core. More than a hundred vehicles flashed their headlights menacingly and sounded their horns from the expressway exit toward the 16th Battalion at the intersection, making their way forward in a close convoy. The 16th set up a barricade to block the vehicles. Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Kim Gil-su stepped forward, at which point those at the head of the crowd of demonstrators stood on top of the vehicles with wooden clubs and lead pipes to protest the military’s actions. Some among the crowds even dared the vehicles to “run him over.” The following exchange occurred:

“If you kill me, my troops will kill you. Let’s solve this with words instead of violence. What are your demands?”

“We want to go to Gwangju Station. Move aside.”

“I have to consult my commander. Give me five minutes.”

During the five minutes given, paratroopers called for the demonstrators to disperse from their broadcasting vehicles. But the people refused. Once five minutes had passed, paratroopers fired more than ten tear gas canisters and charged with batons in hand with a cry of, “March forward!” Some of those attempting to flee the soldiers and the suffocating gas were captured. Paratroopers seized the opportunity to take away the keys from the vehicles in the front and slash their tires. The vehicles ended up adding to their barricade and prevented any more from the expressway from reaching Gwangju Station. Once the situation had subsided, Lieutenant Colonel Kim left one team at the intersection and diverted the rest to the station to support the field battalion clashing with demonstrators there.⁴⁵

By 10:00 p.m., the demonstrators’ attacks had escalated in intensity and three NCOs were critically injured by a demonstrator truck barreling toward the station. News spread quickly among the paratroopers. Furious, the commanders of the 12th and 15th Battalions took out their handguns and opened fire on the tires of demonstrator vehicles.⁴⁶

Assaults with Unmanned Vehicles

Demonstrator attacks on the 3rd Brigade at Gwangju Station involved the use of primitive unmanned vehicle tactics, where a driver would weigh down the gas pedal with a stone or a lump of metal, guide the vehicle as close to paratrooper lines as possible, and jump out of the moving vehicle. Oftentimes, vehicles aimed at the military would instead run into fountains, curbsides, or walls. Vehicles following behind would crash into them and cause explosions.

Approximately twenty to fifty such attacks were carried out by demonstrators against the paratroopers, and these attacks struck fear into the hearts of paratroopers. A shout of “Incoming!” would send them scrambling from the road to the sidewalks; they could not let down their guard for even a moment. But although they were an effective psychological threat, these assaults did not cause significant physical damage to paratroopers. Often the vehicles would stop partway, forcing some drivers to remain in their seats to the end to make sure their attacks connected, knowing they would be captured or killed. Young people ranging in age from eighteen to twenty-four wrapped tire tubes around their chests for cushioning and rammed paratrooper lines at speeds of 100 kmph. Now it was the demonstrators who were on the offensive.⁴⁷

Four or so vehicles barreled into the roundabout in front of Gwangju Station. Demonstrators on the beds of about fifteen freight trucks lobbed firebombs at the paratroopers, who realized that the most dangerous situations were when two or three cars charged in unison. The injured were taken to Chonnam University Hospital before being transferred to the Korean Armed Forces Hospital.⁴⁸

Raging Pillars of Gasoline Fire

High school student Kim Yong-wan (age 16) was arrested while charging toward Gwangju Station on a 2-tonne truck. He had been throwing rocks at paratroopers before setting a drum canister on fire and rolling it toward the military line. When all his attacks failed, he had climbed atop the 2-tonne truck with two other young people and the driver. The rocks on the street, however, prevented them from speeding up. Half a dozen paratroopers seized the opportunity to jump into the truck and capture Kim. He took a flurry of batons to the stomach and fell to the pavement, then was stabbed in the left leg by a bayonet. Paratroopers dug their heels into his face and dragged him around. Kim lost chunks of flesh and his face was covered in blood.⁴⁹

A group of young people loaded two drum canisters filled with gasoline onto a truck and set them alight. One young man drove the truck toward the station, jumping out when the truck was about twenty meters from military lines. The blazing truck barreled forward, crashing through the barricade and into the fountain in the plaza. The drum canisters exploded and flames rose into the air.

The First Paratrooper Death at 10:00 p.m.

At 10:00 p.m., brigade commander Choi Se-chang, who had been at Sangmudae, received desperate reports from battalion commanders about the situation in Gwangju and the mounting injuries. In response, he commanded that all troops under the 3rd Brigade assemble at Gwangju Station. Most of the downtown core was under demonstrator control, making it difficult for paratroopers to reach the station. At the same time, more than 10,000 demonstrators launched an attack on Gwangju City Hall. Those from the 12th Battalion who had been stationed to defend the building radioed headquarters for emergency rescue. The 13th, which had been stationed at the Intercity Bus Terminal a kilometer away, broke through the crowds and narrowly saved the troops at City Hall.

Meanwhile, just past 10:00 p.m., a paratrooper was crushed to death by a freight truck launched by demonstrators at the Sinan intersection, defended by the 16th Battalion. This was the first death on the military side since the beginning of the Gwangju Uprising. The 8-tonne truck had charged from the direction of Gwangju Station, swerving suddenly to the right at the intersection toward Chonnam University. Troops on the Gwangju Station side heard the horn and managed to avoid the truck, but the truck lost control and crashed into the gas station on the corner of the intersection. Sergeant First Class Jeong Gwan-cheol, a military driver who served under the battalion commander, had been stationed to watch the opposite direction and had his back turned to the scene. He was crushed and killed instantly.⁵⁰ Two civilians were also struck. The 16th Battalion’s headquarters company immediately leapt on the truck and took the teenager in the passenger seat into custody. The driver fled the scene, and the teenager was identified as Lee Geum-yeong (age 17, freight truck passenger). That night paratroopers tied up captured civilians in groups of half a dozen people with nylon rope, stripped them, and wrote “rioter” or “driver” on their backs with red permanent marker for identification. When Lee was taken to Chonnam University, paratroopers scored his head with their bayonets, accusing him of killing their comrade. Lee was beaten almost to death even after being moved to prison.⁵¹

Figure 12. The Battle at Gwangju Station, where guns were first fired en masse (May 20, 21:00–May 21, 04:00)

Who Gave the First Order to Open Fire?

News that a paratrooper from the 16th Battalion had been killed by a demonstrator vehicle quickly spread via radio to the rest of the 3rd Brigade and even to the leaders of the 11th and 7th Brigades, who were in charge of the defense of the Province Hall and Chosun University. When they learned that one of their own had been killed by the demonstrators, paratroopers responded with further violence. Battalion commanders requested live ammunition over the radio. At 10:30 p.m., Commander Choi Se-chang of the 3rd Brigade commanded, “Live rounds are only to be used as warning shots. If they must be used for any other purposes, report to me ahead of time,” and ordered the distribution of the ammunition.⁵²

Immediately, a support unit was formed out of some twenty-odd troops who had been on standby at brigade headquarters at Chonnam University to deliver the rounds to forces on the ground. The rounds were all stored at the university, and Private Lee from the headquarters, under the guidance of the operations officer, supplied more than a hundred rounds to the 16th Battalion at Sinan intersection about 900 meters from the campus main gates.⁵³ Lee and his support team returned to Chonnam University to bring back yet more supplies for the troops at Gwangju Station but were stopped by hundreds of demonstrators. They broadcast warnings by megaphone and fired tear gas, but the people refused to back down. Lee and his unit were forced to take a 2.5-kilometer detour behind Gwangju Station via the Security Office intersection.

Once he had delivered the rounds from Chonnam University to the troops at Gwangju Station, Private Lee received an additional 120 rounds wrapped in white cloth from a logistics officer and set off once again for the station. His support team flanked the supply truck carrying the rounds on either side, firing warning shots at the pavement and at nearby buildings. The gunner of the M60 mounted on the truck covered the men on the flanks. Lee testified that he remembered the gunner being a master sergeant with the family name Cho. Because it was dark, they had no idea how many people they had injured or killed on the way to Gwangju Station. A major who served as operations officer for the 3rd Brigade pulled out his handgun in the process and threatened, “I will shoot you if you retreat!” The unit made their way to the destination in terror. At the station, they found soldiers in a line with the building to their backs, opening fire. Buses and trucks driven by civilians were charging toward the station from across the plaza, many of them crashing into the fountain. Private Lee spotted about twenty civilians laying in pools of blood around the fountain area.⁵⁴

Although Brigade Commander Choi Se-chang supposedly ordered for soldiers to show restraint in gunfire, the distribution of live rounds in itself implicitly approved the use of firearms. Demonstrators at the very head of the crowds realized that they were facing death but did not try to run or escape. They closed in on the paratroopers. Once the ammunition was delivered to the soldiers, tracer rounds began to arc overhead. Gunshots resounded across the plaza. A chill fell upon the area as everyone went silent. Only the flames rising from the tangle of vehicles lit up the darkness and the fog of tear gas. The silence of the crowd was soon broken by a shout of “They’re blanks!” The people raised their voices once more and leapt forward, swallowing tears of anger as they heard the screams of fellow demonstrators around them.

Gunshots from an M16 automatic rifle punctuated the air, marking the first instance of indiscriminate fire. Those at the head of the demonstrators collapsed one by one. There was another burst, and the roiling crowds froze. In the blink of an eye, they scattered, bent forward and taking cover behind the buildings. Those left on the ground writhed in pain before they finally stopped moving. Once the demonstrators had scattered, the paratroopers ceased fire.

Kim Jae-hwa (age 26, office worker), Lee Buk-il (age 29, motorcycle repair and sales), Kim Man-du (age 45, blue-collar worker), Kim Jae-su (age 25, plasterer), and Heo Bong (age 26, barber) lost their lives to gunfire at the Battle at Gwangju Station that night, with eleven more left injured.

The identity of those who gave the order to fire and those who opened fire on the demonstrators remains officially unknown. Even military records contain no clue as to who they were.⁵⁵ When Combat Arms Commander Yun Heung-jeong heard the gunfire from Sangmudae, he demanded a status report, to which the paratrooper commander on the scene replied that the shots were blanks. However, the 31st Division and Combat Arms Command had dispatched an independent intelligence team to downtown Gwangju separate from the paratroopers and at that point had already learned that live rounds were fired at the station.⁵⁶

Combat Arms Command Proposes Withdrawal of Paratroopers

At 11:00 p.m., Yun Heung-jeong made a call to Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong to propose the withdrawal of paratroopers to the outskirts of Gwangju, explaining, “Otherwise there will be violent clashes between civilians and the troops, leading to numerous casualties. Please approve the withdrawal.” The movement of troops generally had to be reported to the Martial Law Commander via the Second ROK Army Commander, but the situation on the ground was so dire that Lee was compelled to give approval immediately. Minister of National Defense Choo Young-bock was also present and gave his silent agreement.

At 11:20 p.m., Second ROK Army Command handed down instructions to Combat Arms Command to “cease fire, lock down live ammunition, prepare to transfer the three Airborne Special Forces Brigades’ duties to the 20th Division, disperse and regroup in battalions, and strengthen tactics for the pacification of locals.”⁵⁷ The first two instructions were carried out immediately following the 3rd Brigade opening fire on demonstrators at Gwangju Station.⁵⁸ Authorities scrambled to bring troops under control.

The desperation of the soldiers and the self-reproach of the paratroopers are apparent in a testimony from a commander who was on the scene:

We chose to forget everything and withdrew to Chonnam University. Our breaths all smelled of shit. It felt like a miracle for the 12th and 13th Battalions to come back alive. Only then did we learn that a driver from the 16th was killed by a truck, turning the scene into complete chaos. We swallowed our tears at his death. […] In any event, the situation was beyond our wildest imaginations. Not even the Marines had defeated us paratroopers. We prided ourselves on our camaraderie—if someone hurt one of our men, the rest of us would take up our guns to retaliate—but that pride and our tradition had been dragged through the mud. It was humiliating. Just discussing what had happened was shameful and degrading.⁵⁹

Following a two-hour struggle, all troops under the 3rd Brigade regrouped at Gwangju Station around 1:00 a.m. on May 21 to prepare for withdrawal. The 11th Battalion cleared the path as the advance party in an operation that began at 2:00 a.m. and ended at 4:30 a.m. when the brigade reached Chonnam University. The two-hour withdrawal was a difficult one and paratroopers beat the demonstrators who attempted to stop them. One civilian died, three were critically injured, and one suffered minor injuries.

A military report titled Jeontusangbo (Special Forces combat report) describes the results of the operation as follows:

Rescued 5 KBS technicians and infantry (5 officers, 35 enlisted) and returned to Chonnam University under the protection of the 16th Battalion with firearms from the armory. Operation results: 1 friendly death, 5 injured, 2 civilian deaths, 5 injured (self-inflicted by rioters’ vehicles). Spent equipment: 409 tear gas canisters, 3 containers of CS [grenades], 3 E-8 launchers.

The Gwangju Tax Office in Flames

As the clock ticked past midnight, demonstrators converged on the three locations where paratroopers chose to concentrate their defenses: the South Jeolla Province Hall, Gwangju Station, and Chosun University. The streetlamps were out and homes had gone dark, plunging the city into darkness. The people’s anger rolled in the streets like waves in the sea, following the lights of the vehicles. In those moments, the city seemed to be defined by the sounds of gunfire, tracer rounds, screams, and horns.

The demonstrations around Province Hall continued past midnight, with the crowds following the broadcast vehicles as they went back and forth between the Labor Supervision Office and Gwangju Station. Jeon Ok-ju was at the microphone, with an assistant holding up the speaker and another assistant carrying the amplifier. The demonstrators were mostly people in their twenties armed with pieces of lumber or lead pipes. Female high school students in uniform dotted the streets and gave first aid to the injured. Flames continued to burn in the city, including the MBC building and in front of the Labor Supervision Office.

At 12:30 a.m. on May 21, some of the demonstrators changed course to Chosun University, crying out, “Let’s rescue the people they took away!” Over 3,000 people led by three buses attempted to lay siege to the school. The 33rd Battalion of the 7th Brigade responded by installing vehicle gates. One of the buses drove into the wall around the campus premises. Paratroopers threw tear gas canisters at the following bus, which crashed into a nearby residence and came to a stop. The soldiers dragged away three demonstrators and took them into custody as they beat them.⁶⁰

At 12:35 a.m., more than 20,000 people congregated at the Labor Supervision Office and pushed into the military and police line, attempting to break through the cordons. Jeon Ok-ju and Cha Myeong-suk cried out into their microphones, “We ask the police to help us. We are your allies. Please move aside and help us.” Their pleas became more emotional and direct as time went on.

At 12:45 a.m., Moon Jang-woo (age 27, reserve force company commander) joined hundreds of demonstrators in the march to the Gwangju Tax Office. Two paratroopers who had been stationed at either side of the main entrance saw the wave of demonstrators raising their voices and fled into the building to open fire. Moon spotted three people fall. The crowds responded, “We pay our taxes so those guns will protect us at the 38th parallel, not turn on our own people! Burn down the Tax Office!” Moon immediately gathered a group of young people to bring gasoline from a nearby gas station. They doused a military truck and set it on fire. Another young man reversed the truck into the building, jumping out of the driver’s seat before it made contact. The tax office burned as the demonstrators cheered and applauded. A sudden burst of gunfire and screams, however, plunged the site into chaos.⁶¹ When the gunfire ceased, demonstrators kicked down the doors, smashed everything in sight, and set the interior on fire. They cried out in triumph and sang the national anthem. Flames rose from the reserve force armory at the Tax Office as well. At 3:00 a.m., some demonstrators removed seventeen carbine rifles from the workplace reserve force armory in the building—the first firearms to reach the hands of demonstrators—but the military had already taken away the ammunition, leaving the guns empty.⁶²

Rallying cries of “End martial law!” and “Down with Chun!” resounded across the city through the night. All of Gwangju was swept in a wave of rage against the military, which went on into the morning. The fire at the MBC building was followed by the razing of the Gwangju Tax Office, the Labor Supervision Office, and the KBS building. Demonstrators took control of Gwangju Station and destroyed the Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office, the courts of law, and eight police substations that night.

Earlier that day at 9:00 a.m., Kim Young-sam, leader of the New Democratic Party of Korea, delivered a statement from his home in Sangdo-dong denouncing the May 17 expansion of martial law. One hour later, 300 people—including National Assembly members Hwang Nak-ju and Son Ju-hang and their staff, as well as the press—were stopped at the entrance to the National Assembly building by the military. By physically preventing the entry of legislators, the Singunbu prevented a provisional session where lawmakers could adopt a resolution to lift the state of martial law.

That day, the government named Pak Choong-hoon to the post of acting prime minister in place of Shin Hyun-hwak. The media still had not reported on the grim situation unfolding in Gwangju.

5

Armed Protests and Victory
(Wednesday, May 21: Day 4 of the Uprising)

Additional Deployment of the 20th Division

From 2:40 a.m. to 8:50 a.m. on May 21, the 61st Regiment of the 20th Division, 20th Division Command, and the 62nd Regiment arrived in succession at Songjeongni Station in Gwangju. The 60th Regiment would reach the city that evening.¹ As the 20th Division made its way to the city, the situation in Gwangju changed rapidly. Trains carrying troops were supposed to pass through Songjeongni Station and stop at Gwangju Station, but the latter had been taken over by the demonstrators after a fierce overnight battle and was unapproachable. The 20th Division was deployed to the scene with no idea of the citizens’ rage. Five additional MD 500 helicopters also touched down at Combat Arms Command at 6:25 a.m. that day.

Dead Carried in Wheelbarrows

Around 4:00 a.m. on May 21, flames enveloped the KBS building across the street from Gwangju Station. As dawn broke, the sun brought to light the skeletal remains of burnt-out vehicles in the station plaza. Black smoke still rose from many of them. Demonstrators who remained until that point belatedly realized that the paratroopers had surrendered the station and withdrawn. Waving the Korean flag, they stampeded toward the station waiting room.

“We’ve won! We’ve driven out the paratroopers!”

Cheering, the demonstrators made their way to the station—only to freeze about fifty meters from the entrance, when they spotted two bodies on the ground with faces caved in and mutilated. The paratroopers had left in such a hurry that they had not been able to take away the bodies of the demonstrators they killed.²

With the bodies placed on a wheelbarrow and covered with the Korean flag, Jeon Ok-ju—who had been at the microphone overnight—led more than 1,000 demonstrators in a march to the main branch of the Kwangju Bank on Geumnam-ro. Jeon and the people of Gwangju held a moment of silence for the dead. The city had been rife with rumors about civilians murdered by paratroopers, but the vast majority of demonstrators had not personally seen such evidence until that point. The bodies proved the rumors true. Jeon went up to a battalion commander from the 11th Brigade who had been on watch in front of the South Jeolla Province Hall and pointed at the bodies, demanding an explanation. The commander, a lieutenant colonel, replied, “They were not killed by martial law forces but North Korean agents.”³ The military’s mindless parroting of the Singunbu’s ridiculous excuses only fueled the flames of outrage in the city.

Tragedy on Buddha’s Birthday

May 21 was Buddha’s Birthday, a national holiday, but the carnage in the city was far from the peace and mercy of Buddha. Major civic buildings had burned overnight, including the Gwangju Tax Office, the Province Hall parking garage, sixteen police substations around the city, the Labor Supervision Office, and buildings of broadcasters such as MBC and KBS. Urban thoroughfares were littered with burnt-out cars, crushed barricades, paving stones scattered like hail, shrapnel from firebombs, and bloodstains congealing on the ground. Black smoke still spewed from some of the buildings.

All long-distance calls between Gwangju and the rest of South Korea were cut off at 2:00 a.m. that morning. Intercity buses and trains could not enter the city. Branch offices of Seoul-based newspapers used the security phone network installed in the South Jeolla Province Police Headquarters to relay the situation in Gwangju to Seoul via the press room in the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency. The foreign press concealed film of the photographs they had taken and escaped through the outskirts of the city by motorcycle and bicycle, away from the military’s eyes, to relay their reports to head offices in cities like Suncheon, Mokpo, and Jeonju, which remained open to communications.

The city of Gwangju was cut off from the media. Left with only radio broadcasts, the people turned to self-publishing newsletters to spread information. KBS and MBC had burned overnight, and daily newspapers like the Jeonnam Ilbo and the Jeonnam Meil had stopped publishing. Completely cut off from outside information, Gwangju was essentially an island. The entire city wondered how the media was depicting their situation.

Martial law troops had lost their hold on most locations in the city, narrowly retaining control over Province Hall, Chonnam University, and Chosun University. Police stations and substations too were left empty. Now civilians had the military surrounded. The way between Chosun University and Province Hall was blocked, preventing field kitchens at the university from reaching the 11th Brigade—who had subsisted on rations at Province Hall since the afternoon of May 20.

When the sun rose, the people of Gwangju drove suburban residents into the downtown core. By 9:00 a.m., the number of demonstrators on Geumnam-ro had swelled to more than 10,000. The crowds were so large that there was scarcely any room to stand from the Gwangju Tourist Hotel to the Bank of Korea intersection, with the back of the crowds, at the Yu-dong three-way intersection, growing even tighter.

Women made rice balls and put them on the vehicles of passing demonstrators. These drivers received boxes of beverages from streetside businesses and even received free fuel at gas stations. Logistics companies and logistics vehicle owners volunteered their vehicles for use in the demonstrations. Even the rare forceful appropriation of vehicles was met with little resistance. The people’s rage had surpassed their fear, unifying them in the struggle for survival.

Fourteen Command Vehicles from the 20th Division Snatched

The moment the 20th Division arrived in Gwangju, it was met with fierce resistance. Eighty-two officers and 1,413 enlisted personnel from the 61st Regiment of the 20th Division disembarked at Songjeongni Station at 8:00 a.m. with forty military vehicles. They were ordered to make their way to the Gwangju National University of Education. But by the time they had gone from Sangmudae, passed the Korean Armed Forces Hospital, and reached the Nongseong-dong intersection, the demonstrators had barricaded the road. Lieutenant Colonel Kim Hyeong-gon, commander of the 61st’s 2nd Battalion, realized that “the people of Gwangju were in a state of extreme agitation.” Onlookers tried to stop him, saying, “It would be best if martial law forces didn’t enter the city.” Kim communicated the situation to the regiment commander via radio and returned to Sangmudae with his men. The civilians who saw his actions “applauded and cheered” for the 2nd Battalion.⁴

Over the preceding days, the city’s community leaders had made use of multiple channels to repeatedly demand the withdrawal of paratroopers from the city—or if such an action was not possible, for the replacement of paratroopers with ordinary soldiers due to rising civilian resentment. The arrival of the 20th Division was Combat Arms Command’s attempt to replace the paratroopers, but the situation had changed even faster than they had expected. By the morning of May 20, tensions had risen in the city to the point where even nonparatrooper soldiers could no longer set foot in the streets.

At 8:45 a.m., part of the 20th Division and their equipment reached Gwangju by expressway, led by a commander of a chemicals unit. They included fourteen command vehicles, among them the division commander’s personal jeep. The moment they entered the city, about 300 demonstrators who had blocked the road at the city’s industrial area launched a surprise attack on the convoy with firebombs, taking possession of the fourteen jeeps in the blink of an eye. The vehicles contained no weapons such as rifles or grenades. One soldier from the 20th Division was captured alive and released around noon to safely return to his unit. The victory and the spoils of battle boosted the demonstrators’ morale. Some took the vehicles into the city, while others headed for the local Asia Motors factory (now a KIA Motors factory) for more vehicles.

These two incidents involving the 20th Division were the results of the military leaders’ failure to comprehend the situation in the city. Defense Security Command’s Colonel Hong Seong-ryul, who had been dispatched to Gwangju, testified to prosecutors as follows in a 1995 investigation:

When I went to Gwangju to determine the reason the protests intensified, I learned that the paratroopers who had been assigned to quell the protests at the very beginning ignored local sentiment in the city, where everyone considered fellow citizens as brothers. The paratroopers, rather than focus on dispersing the crowds, chose to hunt down the instigators and responded violently to the protests, angering the people of Gwangju and escalating the situation. As such, I determined that rather than an aggressive suppression tactic involving paratroopers, the best way to bring the situation under control was to take local sentiment into account and use pacification measures, even if they would be more time-consuming. This judgment was echoed by the 505th Security Unit and delivered to Defense Security Command, who proceeded to ignore our advice and stubbornly pursue violent suppression tactics, which worsened the situation in the city.⁵

Defense Security Command intelligence chief Han Yong-won also testified that “command ignored the realities of the situation on the ground and only thought of the precedent of the Busan-Masan Democratization Protests” and that “they thoughtlessly assumed that dispatching paratroopers would automatically solve the situation and sent off their troops without any preparation.”⁶

The Resistance’s Armored Vehicles

The situation in Gwangju changed rapidly throughout the course of the uprising. The shooting deaths of civilians during the clash at Gwangju Station against the 3rd Brigade enraged the demonstrators who streamed out of the city on the morning of May 21 to tell the outside world what was happening in Gwangju. Meanwhile, demonstrators blocked off the main roads into the city in the industrial area and the Dolgogae area with old tires, lumber, and wire fencing to prevent the military from entering the city from the direction of Sangmudae or Seoul.

That morning, Kim Jeon-gi (age 19), who worked at Asia Motors, boarded a demonstrator bus passing by the Catholic Center. He had stayed up all night and was exhausted. Someone on the vehicle suggested going to the Asia Motors factory to bring out vehicles for use. More than twenty security guards put up fierce resistance at the factory entrance. Kim remained in the vehicle, worried that the guards might recognize him. The demonstrators soon pushed through and entered the factory, but those who went into the premises came out empty-handed, claiming that they found no vehicles. Familiar with the layout of the facilities, Kim stepped forward. “I work here. That area is the parts assembly line, so you won’t find any cars there.” He led the people toward the third factory and opened the door, revealing rows upon rows of new vehicles. Someone asked if the factory had any armored cars. Kim remembered visiting the drive testing facilities several days earlier, where he had indeed spotted armored vehicles and vehicles capable of spraying tear gas. Demonstrators brought out the armored vehicles, and Kim walked out of the factory alone, hiding from the security guards. As the demonstrators in his group came out the gates, he spotted four to five more demonstrator vehicles roll into the factory to obtain more armored vehicles. From that point on, factory security guards put up no resistance to citizens entering the premises.⁷

Many others followed the demonstrators into the Asia Motors factory that day to bring out military trucks and armored vehicles—Kim Tae-heon (age 19, student preparing for university entrance exams), Lee Yong-il (age 18, tailor trainee), Jeong Won-hun (age 17, high school student), Kang Gu-yeong (age 18, high school student), Noh Dong-gyu (age 22, store employee), Heo Oh-je (age 17), and Kim Baek-cheon (age 33, Yang-dong Market greengrocer).⁸ The company management stored batteries and other key components separately to prevent the vehicles from being stolen, but mechanics and professional drivers from among the demonstrators attached the batteries and outfitted the necessary parts to make the vehicles usable.

Wave upon wave of demonstrators went to the Asia Motors factory until that afternoon, bringing out a total of 56 military-grade trucks as well as 414 armored vehicles, buses, gas-spraying vehicles, and jeeps. Vehicles from other sources were also brought into the demonstrations—intercity and local buses, freight trucks, and cars—totaling 529 personal vehicles and 83 mass transport vehicles. The demonstrators used a total of 1,026 vehicles over the course of the Gwangju Uprising, some which led the charge against martial law troops, with the rest used to travel to other areas to seek assistance.

Negotiations Between Civilian Representatives and the Provincial Governor

The number of demonstrators who had congregated in front of Province Hall on Geumnam-ro swelled that morning, with the crowds going all the way back to Geumnam-ro 3-ga by 9:00 a.m. By 10:00 a.m., their numbers had grown to 50,000, which was enough to completely fill the six-lane street.

That morning, martial law troops ceased all aggressive activities against citizens on orders from their commanders, who determined that violent suppression tactics would no longer be effective but rather serve to aggravate the people further. Paratroopers stationed in front of Province Hall were terrified first by the vehicle convoy from the previous day and then by the seemingly endless waves of people pushing into their lines. The military was rooted to Province Hall and the Labor Supervision Office all night. When day broke, they reassembled the troops and narrowed their point of defense to just the Province Hall in order to strengthen their lines. The 11th Brigade’s 61st and 62nd Battalions stood at the front, backed by riot police and flanked on either side by riot police, the 63rd Battalion, and the 7th Brigade’s 35th Battalion, who stood ready to provide immediate support. A first lieutenant with the family name Chun, a Gwangju native who was part of the 3rd Field Battalion, was stationed at the scene when he spotted his own younger brother among the demonstrators, waving the Korean flag from one of the buses. The conflict had even driven family members against one another.

Since the evening of May 20, Jeon Ok-ju’s traveling broadcasts had led the demonstrators. On the morning of May 21, she went to a battalion commander in front of Province Hall to ask for the withdrawal of paratroopers from the city. Ahn Bu-ung of the 61st Battalion stepped forward to negotiate. On behalf of the demonstrators, Jeon demanded the “withdrawal of martial law troops, the immediate release of the detained, and a stop to the use of violent tactics.” Ahn passed on the demands to the 11th Brigade’s Brigadier General Choi Ung, who was at Combat Arms Command, and waited for further instructions. Soon, Choi responded, “Withdrawal is not an option at this time as our orders are to defend Province Hall. The detained have all been transferred to police custody and are no longer under the authority of martial law troops. Violent tactics will not be used so long as demonstrators do not turn to violent rioting.” Realizing that the military had no intention of negotiating, the demonstrators demanded to meet with the governor of South Jeolla Province. Paratrooper battalion leaders considered the proposal and agreed to connect the demonstrators with the governor in order to prevent further escalation. Jeon Ok-ju, Kim Beom-tae (age 26, Chosun University, civil servant), Kim Sang-ho (age 21, Chonnam University), and another citizen formed a negotiation team. Lieutenant Colonel Kim Il-ok, commander of the 7th Brigade’s 35th Battalion, led them into Province Hall.⁹

Once inside the building, the citizen representatives confirmed their identities with their national ID cards and met with Mayor Gu Yong-sang. When Governor Jang Hyeong-tae finally arrived, the citizen representatives went over the demonstrators’ requests one by one. Jang replied that he himself was “as outraged at the situation as the citizens of Gwangju.” He explained that “in principle, martial law troops are mandated to report to the local governor when stationing themselves in the region, but that they did not present any reports to [him].” He agreed to the demands for “a public apology, a promise to prevent such incidents from occurring in the future, and the arrangement of meetings with the martial law authorities in charge.” However, he only responded that he would “do his best” regarding demands for “the withdrawal of martial law troops and the confirmation of the statuses of detained citizens.” These items were beyond his authority as governor. However, Jang did not deny those requests outright either. He was determined to do his best to prevent tragedy. The citizen representatives requested that the governor officially declare the agreed-upon items to the demonstrators outside. Jang accepted. Jeon would later recall the situation:

I explained how anxious the people of Gwangju were and outlined our demands for “the withdrawal of martial law troops, the confirmation of the statuses of detained citizens, fair and impartial media coverage of the situation in the city, and a meeting with the Martial Law Commander.” The governor replied, “I will let you meet with the Martial Law Commander by noon, so go outside and calm down the people. I will be out in five minutes to deliver my official apology to the citizens.” Believing his promises, we left Province Hall and explained the outcome of the negotiations to the demonstrators, then awaited the governor with choruses of “Arirang” and “Trailblazer.”¹⁰

The governor waited in Province Hall while crews prepared a microphone outside. Mayor Gu Yong-sang went outside first to placate the crowd. He took the podium and asked the citizens for restraint and order. The people of Gwangju responded with shouts of “Shut up!” He was quickly driven off the podium by the demonstrators. Province Hall employees determined that it was too dangerous for the governor to step forward in person. As time passed with the governor nowhere in sight, tensions ran high among the demonstrators. Little by little, they made their way forward toward the paratroopers.

At 10:45 a.m., Governor Jang chose not to appear publicly before the people. Instead, he flew in a police helicopter and addressed the demonstrators on Geumnam-ro from the air. “Citizens of Gwangju, I will agree to all your demands. The martial law troops will be withdrawn by noon. Please disperse. The detained will be released, so please disperse. I am the Governor of South Jeolla Province.”¹¹ Jang’s voice resounded from the speakers into the downtown core. The helicopter circled the sky above the Province Hall premises several times and headed straight for Combat Arms Command. The Jungang Church and the demonstrators’ speakers responded with the people’s calls to “fight to the bitter end.”

The Meeting at Nokdu Bookstore

That morning, women in residential districts brought out their pots and started to make rice. When homemaker Kim Gyeong-ae (age 51) from Juwol-dong first witnessed martial law troops viciously beat students in the streets, she rushed home, locked the door, and refused to come outside. But over the following days, she realized that a mother should not be cowering at home. She spoke with other women in the neighborhood, gathered rice, and began to cook. They lined instant noodle boxes with plastic and filled them with rice balls, taking them to the road outside Chonnam University Medical School and handing them out to passing demonstrator vehicles with words of encouragement.¹² The young people who put their lives on the line to fight the paratroopers were like their own children. Efforts like Kim’s slowly transformed the city into a community, where each member was part of one large family.

The Gwangju Tax Office building continued to burn into the morning. In front of neighboring Gwangju Technical High School, a bus was also on fire. Fumes rose from tires in the buffer zone between the demonstrators and the paratroopers. Posters were pasted haphazardly onto the Catholic Center, reading “Destroy Chun Doo-hwan,” “Choi Kyu-hah must resign,” “Out with Shin Hyun-hwak,” “End martial law,” “No more violence on our streets,” and “South Jeolla Province, rise up.”

Around 11:00 a.m., Nokdu Bookstore hosted another meeting with the group from the previous day—Yoon Sang-won, Jeong Sang-yong, Lee Yang-hyeon, Jeong Hyeon-ae, and Kim Sang-jip. They agreed on a need for a powerful and trustworthy group of leaders and resolved to continue printing newsletters at any cost. Yoon’s team from Deulbul Night School was put in charge of the newsletters. The group also agreed that they needed a new meeting venue, as the bookstore was too exposed. Yoon went out into the downtown core and told the disorderly vehicles on the streets to “let people know to meet in front of the Catholic Center at 1:00 p.m.” Kim Sang-jip also went out by truck, conveying the same message to every vehicle he came across. However, at that point in time, there was no suitable means by which the people could channel their indignation and resistance. After the meeting, Deulbul Night School instructor Jeon Yong-ho (age 23) arrived at the bookstore. Yoon informed him that Deulbul Night School would be in charge of the newsletters and went to the night school with him on a passing truck. There, they recruited ten instructors and students to begin their work. Yoon named the newsletter The Fighters’ Bulletin.

Cardinal Kim Meets Gleysteen

At 11:00 a.m. on May 21, as tensions rose on Geumnam-ro, Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan met with US Ambassador Gleysteen in Seoul. Having confirmed the Singunbu’s staunch commitment to violent suppression following his meeting with Chun Doo-hwan the previous day, the cardinal realized that the United States was the only power capable of stopping the Singunbu. However, he had been unable to reach Gleysteen by telephone all night. The Martial Law Commander had already sent out a broadcast threatening violent suppression. The situation was dire, and Kim found himself back to his old habit of smoking. The moment he met Gleysteen, the cardinal said, “I’d been wanting to speak to you since last evening concerning the Gwangju situation. We must prevent a violent clash at any cost.” Gleysteen replied that he met with Commander Wickham for that very reason the previous day and that they were doing their best. The cardinal finally begged him, “You must prevent bloodshed at all costs,” and left. It was later revealed that Gleysteen was in discussions with US Department of State authorities concerning the possible use of violent suppression tactics for the Gwangju situation. By that point, the 20th Division had already arrived in Gwangju with permission from the United States.

Cardinal Kim, meanwhile, contacted Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong through a chaplain, as he judged that the final orders would be handed down by the commander. They met at Myeongdong Cathedral.¹³ The cardinal pleaded with Lee to “find as peaceful a solution as possible.” Lee replied that if the situation in Gwangju spread only into the south, there would be no need for violent suppression—but if it spread into the direction of Seoul in the north, they would have to resort to violent tactics.¹⁴

A Volatile Situation

On the morning of May 21, military helicopters were spotted busily landing and taking off from the Province Hall rooftop and the plaza. Demonstrators clashing with the military and police on Geumnam-ro guessed that martial law troops were preparing for a withdrawal. As with the previous day, newsletters were scattered all across the street and the rest of Gwangju, decrying the massacre perpetrated by the paratroopers and calling on the country to rise up. This time, however, the newsletters called for the organization of the people. They called for students to gather in select locations: Chonnam students at the Intercity Bus Terminal, Chosun students at the Gyerim Police Substation, vocational and nursing students at the MBC building, and high school students at the Sansu-dong five-way intersection. From these locations, they would march on Province Hall together. From that point onwards, “To Province Hall!” became a unified rallying cry among the people of Gwangju.

At 10:08 a.m., a military helicopter landed in the plaza in front of Province Hall. At 10:10, as many as ten live rounds were distributed to each officer and NCO from the 11th Brigade’s 63rd Battalion.¹⁵ Dong-a Ilbo reporter Kim Yeong-taek witnessed the scene from the hallway outside the Governor’s office on the third floor of Province Hall. He rushed into the office and informed Governor Jang of the situation, adding, “If they are supplying ammunition now, it likely means that the military has sanctioned the use of firearms.” Jang immediately called Jeolla Province Martial Law Commander Yun Heung-jeong and begged, “Please, don’t allow your men to open fire.”¹⁶

At 11:00 a.m., ROK Army HQ Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Kim Jae-myeong arrived at Combat Arms Command via helicopter from Seoul. Following a meeting with on-site commanders, he formed the foundations of Operation Sangmu Loyalty.¹⁷

Not long afterward, Governor Jang broadcast pacification messages from a helicopter over Province Hall. He called on the demonstrators for restraint and promised to propose the withdrawal of paratroopers. Ahn Bu-ung radioed Chief of Staff Yang Dae-in at the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade headquarters at Chosun University to ask if they really would be withdrawing by noon. Ten minutes later, Yang replied that he had checked with Commander Choi Ung of the 11th Brigade, confirming that there were no plans for a withdrawal at the time, which meant the paratroopers would continue to defend Province Hall and continue efforts for pacification. Ahn ordered his men not to open fire without orders. However, the rounds had already been distributed and the demonstrators encroached menacingly on military lines. At this point in time, Choi, the commander of the 11th Brigade, was at Sangmudae and had given full command over the situation in front of Province Hall to Lieutenant Colonel Ahn Bu-ung. The four battalion commanders on the scene often gathered by the fountain in the Province Hall plaza to discuss the impending crisis. The commander of the 61st argued for the defense of the site even at the cost of their own lives.

When the clock tower in front of the fountain struck noon, tensions rose even further. The demonstrators had demanded the withdrawal of troops by that time, and the governor had promised to try—but noon had come and gone, with still no sign of the soldiers’ departure. The crowds stirred. Betrayed, the people prepared to charge into the occupied zone using vehicles as battering rams. The demonstrators had by now advanced to the YMCA building, just twenty meters from the troops stationed in front of the fountain in the plaza.

The 11th Brigade gave no response to mounting civilian protests. Instead, they put on gas masks and took up offensive positions, prepared to throw tear gas canisters at a moment’s notice. The people at the head of the demonstrators demanded that the soldiers not throw tear gas. They were accompanied by several buses and trucks, and the crowds had packed the street and even the roofs of the buses, waving their arms and shouting rallying cries.

The commander of the 61st continued to deliver reports via radio and awaited orders from his commanders. The situation was careening toward a confrontation, and he determined that a significant number of his men would be in danger. However, the brigade commander at Combat Arms Command only ever responded that they were still in discussion. Angrily, the battalion commander yelled into the radio, “Does Command even realize what is happening here?” and “We need orders! Either to open fire or to withdraw!”

The situation was volatile, but the commanders at Sangmudae simply ordered the soldiers on the ground to “continue pacification attempts.” In contrast, the commanders of the 3rd, 7th, and 11th Brigades, who were at Combat Arms Command, had a grasp of the intensifying situation in front of Province Hall thanks to reports from the paratroopers’ independent frequency.

It was not long before the demonstrators and martial law troops were close enough to hear one another draw breath. At 12:30 p.m., Jeonnam Meil reporter Na Gyeong-taek, who had been photographing the scene from the rooftop of the nearby Daedo Hotel, overheard a paratrooper captain’s conversation with a signaler:¹⁸

“What about orders to fire?”

“We haven’t received them yet.”

About ten minutes later, Na heard the signaler say in a tense voice, “We have orders to open fire.”

The paratroopers were organized with the 61st and 62nd Battalions at the front, facing Geumnam-ro, the 63rd about fifteen meters behind to provide support at a moment’s notice, and the 35th around the walls surrounding Province Hall premises.

A Soldier Is Crushed to Death by a Paratrooper Armored Vehicle

Around 1:00 p.m., demonstrator representatives issued an ultimatum to paratroopers to withdraw within five minutes. While the commander of the 61st Battalion attempted to negotiate and waited for orders from above, a firebomb was thrown and set an armored vehicle on fire. As the soldiers rushed to reverse the armored vehicle, angry demonstrators surged into the cordons like a wave.

Two of the soldiers tripped as the troops fell back in a panic and were crushed by the reversing vehicle. Private Kwon Yong-un from the 63rd Battalion died instantly, while another was severely injured. Private Lee Gyeong-nam from the same battalion was right next to Kwon when the latter’s lower body was crushed under the armored vehicle’s caterpillar tracks. His upper body was lifted upward and blood spilled from his mouth.¹⁹

The demonstrators’ attack was led by two buses and several armored vehicles, and it took more than 1,000 paratroopers by surprise. The soldiers fell back momentarily but quickly reformed their lines and took over the plaza once more. At 12:58 p.m., demonstrators charged at the paratroopers again, reaching the center of the fountain plaza. One of the buses returned to the demonstrators, while the other came to a halt next to the fountain. There was a gunshot and the driver was killed instantly.²⁰

Kim Yong-dae (age 28) witnessed the scene from the front of the demonstrator lines. A bus packed with young people accelerated in front of the YMCA building and made a wide turn around the fountain before driving off into the direction of Sangmu Hall. Paratroopers opened fire on the bus, sending sparks flying. Kim did not see a single person leave the bus but spotted two fallen paratroopers pull their backpacks onto their shoulders. One of them was limping and needed the other’s support, and they went off to the side of the road.²¹

At 12:59 p.m., one of the demonstrators’ armored vehicles sped past the crowd and into the plaza, driving to the left of the fountain and swerving right to disappear in the direction of the Chonnam University Medical School. It was driven by a man in his forties, who was part of the armored vehicle assembly team at Asia Motors. This vehicle charged into a hail of gunfire three times that day until the paratroopers withdrew from Geumnam-ro later in the afternoon. Nine people were aboard, including Yang Dong-yeong (age 18, third-year student at Gwangju Seoseok High School).²²

The Korean National Anthem Followed by Gunfire

At exactly 1:00 p.m., the speakers on the Province Hall rooftop played the Korean national anthem, and the soldiers opened fire. All previous instances of gunfire had been spontaneous, but this time the soldiers opened fire en masse on their commanders’ orders. Mayhem broke out on Geumnam-ro, which emptied out in the blink of an eye, and silence quickly fell over the city.

Gwak Hyeong-ryeol (age 21, riot police) witnessed the gunfire from among the riot police unit lined up outside the civil affairs office. He saw demonstrator vehicles charge toward the martial law troops when the anthem began to play. Initially, he assumed that the anthem was played to momentarily pacify the demonstrators. But before the song ended, he heard multiple simultaneous gunshots. Casings rattled against the pavement and smoke rose over the fountain. Parked about ten meters from Gwak was an armored vehicle pointed in the direction of the Labor Supervision Office. A paratrooper was inside, tossing loaded bandoliers to others and bringing down boxes of ammunition. Paratroopers attached the magazines from the boxes to their guns. A man who seemed to be an officer yelled, “Take aim, you bastards!”

From that point forward, the paratroopers fired directly at the citizens. They assumed kneeling and standing positions and opened fire. At that point during the Gwangju Uprising, the people did not have usable firearms of their own. Gwak testified that if that had been the case, paratroopers would not have been able to assume proper firing positions.²³

Geumnam-ro was plunged into chaos. People fell to the pavement, bleeding. About ten minutes later, a crowd of about 1,000 crept back onto the sidewalks on Geumnam-ro 3-ga and near the Bank of Korea. Young people gathered around the underground marketplace construction site and waved a large Korean flag, chanting rallying cries and singing the national anthem in a display of solemn determination. Half a dozen young people ran out into the middle of the street, one of them waving the flag and calling, “Down with Chun Doo-hwan!” and “End martial law!” The people watched anxiously as the group broke the 300-meter mark to the Province Hall plaza. There was a round of gunfire, and the young man with the flag fell, bleeding from his head, chest, and legs. The flag was drenched in his blood. The bullets had come from the rooftops of nearby buildings, where snipers were directly taking aim at the people. Paratroopers had been sent out in groups of three of four to the rooftops of high-rises in the area, including the National Federation of Fisheries Co-op building, the Jeonil Building, and the Gwangju Tourist Hotel. They took aim and fired on demonstrators who took the lead to rally the people.²⁴

The gunfire stopped. Several young people rushed out into the street to drag away the bodies and the injured. A moment later, to the shock of the people, yet more young people ran out into the street with the Korean flag, rallying the demonstrators. There was another round of gunfire as these people, too, were shot down. Another group of people came to the street to take them away, and then yet another group came out into the street, waving the flag. This time, too, the bullets did not spare them. This shocking display went on five or six times.²⁵

“We Must Arm Ourselves”

Kim Yong-dae witnessed the unfolding events as he stuck close to the wall of the Jeonil Building for shelter. Turning away from the gunfire, he made a run for the Dong-gu District Office. He didn’t see a single paratrooper on the way and wondered where the shots were coming from. That was when he spotted three paratroopers on the rooftop of the National Federation of Fisheries Co-op building, opening fire from standing and kneeling positions. Kim himself was gunned down immediately afterward in front of the district office.²⁶ Hwang Yeong-ju (age 17) witnessed someone next to him collapse to the ground, blood foaming at the mouth. Hwang sprinted all the way to the Gwangju Post Office in shock, when a friend named Bae Jun-cheol noticed blood on Hwang’s shirt—he had been shot in the chest.²⁷ Lee Seong-ja (female, age 15) was passing in front of the Hong Ophthalmology Clinic with four friends when she was shot in the chest by a paratrooper sniper on a nearby rooftop and killed.²⁸ Indiscriminate fire came not only from Geumnam-ro, but also from the direction of the Labor Supervision Office. Lee Dae-seong (age 26) also witnessed a young man in a student camouflage uniform fall to the ground, clutching his stomach. Lee hit the ground in terror, crawling toward a nearby alleyway. He was shot in the buttocks, and three other people around him also fell to gunfire.²⁹

Following the first round of fire, paratroopers were stationed on the rooftops of the Jeonil Building, Sangmu Hall, Province Hall, and the South Jeolla branch of the National Federation of Fisheries Co-op building. A private by the family name Han from the 11th Brigade’s 62nd Battalion testified that “a team of four went up to the rooftop of the Gwangju Tourist Hotel, and on instructions from marksmen, used scope-equipped rifles to gun down those inciting demonstrators or those carrying firearms.”³⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Ahn Bu-ung also testified to prosecutors in 1995 that out of desperation, he sent men up to the rooftops of nearby buildings to act as sentries and open fire on charging vehicles or those inciting the demonstrators. Each brigade was supplied with M16 scopes: 100 for the 3rd Brigade, 102 for the 7th, and 81 for the 11th.³¹

Riot police officer Gwak Hyeong-ryeol witnessed machine guns mounted on armored vehicles firing .50 Browning machine gun (BMG) rounds. The vehicles were less than a hundred meters from the demonstrators, who made their way forward fully prepared to lose their lives.³² Baekje Night School instructors Son Nam-seung (age 22, student at Chonnam University) and Kim Hong-gon (age 23, student at Chonnam University) were walking from the Chosun University entrance to the Chonnam Medical School roundabout when they spotted an armored vehicle speed down the street, opening fire to the left and right. The rounds from the gun grazed both of Son’s shoulders.³³

At 1:30 p.m., as paratrooper snipers continued to open fire, an armored vehicle carrying a shirtless young man with a white headband waving the Korean flag sped toward the Province Hall plaza. Snipers concentrated fire on the young man. His head slumped forward.³⁴ With the young man limply nodding from the roof, the armored vehicle swerved in front of the plaza and disappeared. Countless demonstrators witnessed the scene.³⁵ The image was burned into the minds of the people. Around the same time, Hwang Ho-jeong (age 62), who lived on the fifth floor of a building on Chungjang-ro, was shot and killed while attempting to close a window. Even after the death of the young man, more vehicles made the charge on Province Hall. Most of the brave demonstrators who led the way were also gunned down.³⁶

As the carnage continued, the civilians refused to stand for further bloodshed. Young people rose up in anger and set out in search of firearms of their own.

Orders to Fire

To this day, it is not known who gave the orders to fire at the Province Hall plaza on May 21. Lieutenant Colonel Ahn Bu-ung testified that though he was at the center of the scene, “the men opened fire in an uncontrollable situation,” claiming, “no one gave or received orders to fire” and that they “clearly witnessed demonstrators armed with carbine rifles and other firearms, and there was gunfire from their side when the demonstrator vehicles charged toward [paratroopers].”³⁷ Ahn also claimed that “the indiscriminate gunfire was not reported to [his] commanders.”³⁸ Combat reports for the 11th and 7th Brigades have no records of the martial law troops’ opening fire, when by all rights the incident should have been recorded.³⁹

Even if the first rounds of gunfire in the chaos of the situation had not been premeditated, the same cannot be said for the snipers who gunned down unarmed civilians from the rooftop. If they had not received orders to fire, their actions would have been a breach of protocol and cause for court-martial. However, no soldier was punished for such actions in the wake of the Gwangju Uprising. This proves that they had been given orders to open fire.

Military authorities were not oblivious to the gunfire in front of Province Hall. Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong testified in the May 1989 edition of a monthly magazine: “When the situation worsened, I received an urgent message asking if the men had permission to fire. Although I was not part of the chain of command, I gave orders to ‘hold fire at all costs.’”⁴⁰

Whether or not Chung was telling the truth about the orders he gave, he had indeed given orders of some sort to paratroopers under his authority.⁴¹

During the trials for the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising, judges made clear that martial law troops opening fire on the demonstrators on the afternoon of May 21 could not in any way be justified. The High Court ruled in 1996 that the citizens of Gwangju were a constituent power. In 1997, the Supreme Court declared that “the demonstrations conducted by the people of Gwangju were a justified act of protecting the constitutional order” and that the Singunbu’s “deployment of paratroopers for the violent dissolution [of the demonstrations]” was a subversion of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea.⁴²

Invocation of the Right of Self-Defense

In the military, the order to open fire and the right of self-defense are two sides of the same coin.⁴³ If the former is a specific order on the use of firearms, the latter is an action that encompasses the former and creates a situation in which orders to fire may be delivered. Those who opened fire and killed innocent Gwangju civilians used the right of self-defense as a shield for their actions.

On May 20 at 10:30 p.m., 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade Commander Choi Se-chang ordered the distribution of ammunition to paratroopers stationed outside Gwangju Station. Paratroopers opened fire at 11:00 p.m., killing Kim Jae-hwa and other citizens.

Although Combat Arms Commander Yun Heung-jeong sought confirmation that the men had opened fire, Choi and other commanders attempted to cover up their actions. At 11:20 p.m., the Second ROK Army Operational Command gave orders to Combat Arms Command and the paratroopers forbidding the use of firearms and the distribution of ammunition.⁴⁴

On May 21 at 4:30 a.m., an emergency meeting was held at the Martial Law Commander’s office to discuss the invocation of the right of self-defense for the first time.⁴⁵ The contents of the meeting were once more discussed at the Martial Law Command countermeasures meeting at 9:00 a.m. on the same day.⁴⁶ At 10:49 a.m., Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong reaffirmed martial law troops’ right of self-defense.⁴⁷

That morning, Second ROK Army Commander Jin Jong-chae and Second ROK Army operations officer Kim Jun-bong went to Gwangju’s Martial Law Command branch via helicopter and proposed the invocation of the right of self-defense (listed as “sweep-out operation” in the files). Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong replied that “the invocation of the right of self-defense is a serious matter” and went to the office of the Minister of National Defense, explaining, “this must be reported directly to the Minister.”⁴⁸

At 2:00 p.m., Minister of National Defense Choo Young-bock hosted a meeting at his office with ROK-US Combined Forces Deputy Commander Lew Byeong-hyun, Chun Doo-hwan, Capital Garrison Commander Roh Tae-woo, Korea Military Academy Superintendent Cha Gyu-heon, and Chung Ho-yong. After Second ROK Army Commander Jin Jong-chae reported on the situation in Gwangju, Chun brought up the basic premises behind the right of self-defense and proposed its invocation. Items confirmed at the meeting included the invocation of the right of self-defense and the military sweep of the city, the orders for which would be handed down after May 23.⁴⁹

Another meeting was held at the same venue at 4:30 p.m., where it was agreed that a statement sanctioning the military’s right of self-defense would be issued.⁵⁰ Lee Hui-seong ordered Martial Law Command to make adjustments to the proposed draft submitted by Defense Security Command and issued the statement via television and radio at 7:30 p.m.⁵¹ He specifically elected to broadcast the statement live as a warning to the people of Gwangju and a declaration of the Singunbu’s determination to put down the uprising in the city at any cost.⁵² Commanders deployed to Gwangju interpreted the invocation of the right of self-defense as permission to open fire. Once the Singunbu had labeled the armed demonstrators as rioters, it was inevitable that many would be shot to death.⁵³

Martial Law Directive 11, which marked the invocation of the right of self-defense, was sent to each unit at different times. Yang Dae-in, the 11th Brigade’s chief of staff, received permission to open fire—official invocation of the right of self-defense—from Brigade Commander Choi Ung at 6:00 p.m. However, his superior in the chain of command at the Second ROK Army Operational Command only issued the orders two and a half hours later at 8:30 p.m. to the commander of the 31st Division.

A Split in the Chain of Command

Part of the confusion regarding the permission to open fire stemmed from a split in the chain of command. In theory, the chain went in this order: Martial Law Command—Second ROK Army Operational Command—Combat Arms Command—the 31st Division—the 3rd, 7th, and 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigades. But in reality, a separate chain of command was in effect, where Defense Security Commander Chun Doo-hwan directly gave orders to Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong, leading to criticism that Chun had split the chain of command.

If the regular chain of command had been in effect, the orders to fire would have come from the 31st Division and the Combat Arms Command operations officer. However, this was not the case with the gunfire at Gwangju Station on the night of May 20 and at Province Hall in the afternoon of May 21.

Although 3rd Brigade Commander Choi Se-chang distributed ammunition to his men at 10:30 p.m. on May 20, which led to the gunfire one hour later, he did not report this fact to his superiors Chung Ung and Yun Heung-jeong. Likewise, 11th Brigade Commander Choi Ung did not report the gunfire at 1:00 p.m. on May 21 to Chung Ung or Yun Heung-jeong. Colonel Baek Nam-i, operations officer at Combat Arms Command, testified:

Because there were no reports whatsoever about violent suppression of demonstrators by paratroopers, I only learned of the situation when I personally sent men in plainclothes into the city to report back to me. The same went for the gunfire in front of Province Hall on May 21.⁵⁴

In 1997, at the trial for the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising, the courts confirmed that Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong did not simply advise or receive advice from the Combat Arms Commander—who nominally held operational control—but personally involved himself in important decisions such as the deployment of additional paratroopers and the replacement of the Combat Arms Commander. Chung also traveled frequently to Gwangju and contacted the commanders of the three Airborne Special Forces Brigades deployed there, discussing suppression tactics and intervening in operational command, and played a leading role in the procurement of key supplies and the selection of units to be deployed to each location during the implementation of Operation Sangmu Loyalty.⁵⁵

When the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade opened fire in front of Gwangju Station on May 20 at 11:00 p.m., Second ROK Army Operational Command responded by halting the distribution of ammunition at 11:20 p.m. However, this order was not properly conveyed to the paratrooper units, and even at midnight, the 11th Brigade continued to distribute rounds to company commander–level officers.⁵⁶ The split in the chain of command also led to a case of mistaken identity on May 24 at Songam-dong near the Honam Expressway tollgate that led to a skirmish between fellow martial law troops, which resulted in the deaths of several soldiers.

Indignation Overcomes Fear

Chosun University student Kim Jong-bae (age 26) was among the demonstrators in front of Province Hall when he witnessed the shooting of a girl in a high school uniform top and white gym bottoms. It was a long time after the gunfire ended that the girl was finally taken to the Hong Ophthalmology Clinic, where she was pronounced dead. Kim was overcome by anger and burst into tears. The innocent girl had died in front of his eyes, covered in blood. That afternoon, he cast away his fears to take an active part in the demonstrations.⁵⁷

Around the same time, Koryeo Cement employee Kim Jun-bong (age 21) was on the rooftop of his company building, which was behind the South Jeolla Province Hall. As he looked out at the situation unfolding in the city, he heard someone shriek for help. Kim spotted someone grab a child who seemed to be in the third grade, covered in blood. He rushed downstairs and took the child to the Gwangju Red Cross Hospital. This incident took him from his ordinary office job to participation in the demonstrations in the city.⁵⁸

Military Helicopters Open Fire on the City

Multiple witnesses have testified that around the time martial law forces opened fire on demonstrators in front of Province Hall, soldiers strafed civilians from helicopters. Lee Gwang-yeong (age 27), a Buddhist monk who had been giving medical assistance to the wounded, saw a helicopter open fire around 2:00 p.m. at the Wolsan-dong roundabout. Lee had been in a car traveling from the roundabout in the direction of Baegun-dong when a helicopter flew in from the direction of Province Hall and opened fire. A female student suddenly dropped to the ground next to one of the trees on the sidewalk. Lee disembarked immediately, stanched her bleeding, and drove her to the Gwangju Red Cross Hospital.⁵⁹ The girl was identified as Park Geum-hui (third-year student at Jeonnam Girls’ Commercial High School). She had been returning from donating blood at the Kwangju Christian Hospital when she was shot to death by the helicopter.⁶⁰

Priest Cho Pius heard the deafening roar of gunfire and saw flashing lights from a helicopter flying from Province Hall toward Sajik Park. The helicopter was about 130 meters above the ground. Cho and the other priests at the church in Honam-dong all heard the machine gun and gave up their plans to mediate peaceful negotiations between martial law troops and the people, scattering.⁶¹ Arnold A. Peterson also witnessed a helicopter open fire that day. Following lunch on May 21, he returned home from Kwangju Christian Hospital and went up to the rooftop balcony when he saw and photographed flashes of light coming from the bottom of a helicopter flying over the city.⁶²

These clergymen were far from the only ones to testify to prosecutors about helicopters opening fire that day.⁶³ Their testimonies were supported by large clusters of bullet holes found on the 10th floor of the Jeonil Building near Province Hall. A 2016 investigation by the National Forensic Service revealed that the rounds had come from a helicopter-mounted gun, drawing public attention to the case. Confirmation that their helicopters opened fire would completely discredit martial law forces’ claims that troops only the exercised of the right of self-defense, because such an intentional act could not in any way be defined as an “act of desperation” that would justify the invocation of the right of self-defense.⁶⁴

Snipers Hunt for Prey

At 1:40 p.m., a military helicopter landed in the plaza outside Province Hall and departed with nine soldiers from the 31st Division. Additional military and police helicopters landed and took off in quick succession, carrying away injured paratroopers and important documents.

At 2:00 p.m., the helicopters scattered flyers into the crowds at the orders of the Jeolla Province Martial Law Commander. They read, “The actions of rioters last night resulted in the deaths of ten soldiers and police, and the destructive arson of several civic buildings and three broadcasting stations” and urged demonstrators to “return home immediately” to restore order to the city. To the public’s fury, the flyers did not mention measures for reparations or what would happen to the detained.

At 2:35 p.m., paratroopers built a makeshift barricade of buses and small trucks on Geumnam-ro, about 70 meters from the fountain in the plaza. Demonstrators watched from about 300 to 400 meters away and eventually advanced all the way to the Catholic Center. They set fire to a military truck brought from the Asia Motors factory.

At 2:55 p.m., paratrooper snipers positioned on the rooftops of high-rises such as the Province Hall annex and the National Federation of Fisheries Co-op building peered into the alleyways like hunters chasing down prey. They opened fire on any passersby they spotted, including third-year Gwangju Daedong High School student Jeon Yeong-jin (age 18), who was shot in the head by an M16 near the Labor Supervision Office and killed.⁶⁵ Half a dozen young people had also been gunned down at the old city hall intersection and lay in pain on the ground. Paratroopers even opened fire on those who tried to approach and rescue the wounded. When Lee Gwang-yeong approached an injured person by jeep and reached out, a bullet shot through his lower back. Two of the five people in the jeep died on the scene, with Lee and another passenger injured. Only the driver escaped harm.⁶⁶ Kim Gwang-yeong, a caretaker at the Dong-gu District Office, witnessed two people being gunned down. One died instantly and the other was taken to a hospital.⁶⁷

Democratization Activists Seek Shelter

Around 1:00 p.m., the sound of repeated gunfire reached Nokdu Bookstore, 300 meters from Province Hall. The democratization activists in the store froze. The worst had come to pass. Because the bookstore was known to intelligence agencies, the people gathered there agreed to move their headquarters to the Bosung Construction office in Bullo-dong, next to the Gwangju River.⁶⁸ At 3:00 p.m., about twenty young people gathered at the office to discuss their response to the violence but did not reach any conclusive agreement. That was when the telephone rang, and Jeong Sang-yong’s wife quickly relayed the message that more than twenty military trucks had just passed Jaetdeung in Hwajeong-dong and were making their way into downtown Gwangju. Those at the office realized that a large-scale suppression operation was underway and agreed to scatter and seek temporary shelter. Because of their past democratization activities, the activists knew they would be the first targets. With grave determination, they hugged each other and promised to meet again alive.

Lee Yang-hyeon and Jeong Sang-yong fled to their hometown of Hampyeong.⁶⁹ Nokdu Bookstore owner Jeong Hyeon-ae escaped the downtown core with her brother-in-law Kim Sang-jip to shelter at a relative’s home. At 3:30 p.m., while crossing Yangnim Bridge to head for the suburbs, they witnessed a truck belonging to the civilians’ newly formed armed resistance head toward the downtown area from Naju. In only half an hour, more than a hundred vehicles gathered in the Gwangju Park area with weapons aboard. Kim Won-gap (age 20, student preparing for university exams), Kim Hwa-seong (age 21), Moon Jang-woo, Park Nam-seon, and other young people distributed the weapons to demonstrators. When Jeong, Kim and the others saw the people arm themselves, they turned around and returned to Nokdu Bookstore, determined to follow their fellow citizens to death if necessary.⁷⁰

The Distribution of Weapons

Filled with grim determination, demonstrators distributed weapons to the people of Gwangju. At 3:30 p.m., they drove in weapons from Hwasun and handed out M1 rifles and live ammunition near Jiwon-dong Bridge and Seokcheon Bridge in Hak-dong. Around the same time, weapons from the nearby cities of Naju and Damyang were distributed to civilians at the Yu-dong three-way intersection, the Chunggeum Underground Marketplace, the Hanil Bank, and Gwangju Park. People clamored for firearms, and soon the trucks ran out of weapons.

Moon Jang-woo made certain to train the people on the proper use of firearms in order to prevent any accidents. He explained, “When the safety catch is engaged on an M1, impacts to the butt of the rifle won’t knock the safety loose. But avoid doing the same with the carbine rifles because they will fire”; he alerted them that “Even when you remove the clip, one round will remain inside, so make sure to remove the last round after the clip has been removed.” He also instructed the civilians to not linger in the same spot when in a shootout at night, because the flash of the muzzle would alert enemies to their location. Finally, Moon told people to put a piece of reflective paper (found on the inside of cigarette packs) on the crosshairs to mark the direction of the muzzle in order to prevent friendly casualties. He also taught people to use grenades as an extra precaution, warning that once the pin was pulled and the grenade was tossed, it would explode within seconds. Following the impromptu lesson, he told people to assemble at Gwangju Park. (Most grenades would later be collected from ordinary citizens because of the danger they posed.)⁷¹

Park Nam-seon obtained firearms from the Naju Police Station armory and distributed them to citizens at the Yu-dong three-way intersection in Gwangju. The area was packed with trucks that demonstrators had brought from the Asia Motors factory, two armored personnel carriers, and other vehicles filled with weapons and demonstrators from other areas. Park suggested to the newly armed resistance that they split off in two directions—Chonnam Girls’ High School and the Gwangju River—and attack Province Hall from the sides, because charging head-on via Geumnam-ro would expose them to gunfire. Park went from the intersection to Hyeondae Cinema and Gwangju Park before stopping at the Gwangju Red Cross Hospital to set up a temporary base of operations.⁷²

Organizing a Special Force

By 3:00 p.m., the demonstrators were equipped with firearms, completely changing the dynamics in the city. It was now a battle between the armed resistance and the martial law troops. The latter were composed of elite paratroopers armed with cutting-edge weaponry such as M16 rifles. The former—the ordinary citizens of Gwangju—were armed only with carbine rifles and conventional M1 rifles that could not hope to match the military’s arms. But even a bullet from an older rifle was just as lethal as one fired by the latest in firearms technology.⁷³

The demonstrators secured even more weapons for their resistance efforts. Jeong Yeong-dong was handed a rifle at Gwangju Park, after which he drove around the city in a jeep and announced, “From this point on, the city will be protected not by soldiers but by the civilian resistance.”⁷⁴ Im Chun-sik (age 28) took cover in an alley by the intersection behind the Catholic Center on Geumnam-ro. He kept a tally on the ground to keep track of the number of times he spotted someone fall to gunfire. He reached thirty-seven before he quit in frustration.⁷⁵

More than 300 young people gathered in Gwangju Park for marksmanship drills. The drills were structured identically to those administered to reserve forces: a gun was loaded and then fired a total of five times toward a target. The young people were divided into small groups, where they learned to use firearms and grenades. Those with military leadership experience—whether reserve force officers or reserve forces with NCO backgrounds—served as the instructors. The newly trained resistance also formed its own special forces and found no shortage of volunteers. Someone suggested criteria for the special forces. Ultimately, the top 100 marksmen from the practice range were chosen, from which men with families to support and men with no brothers to carry on the family line were excluded. The remaining 60 were placed in six groups of 10, each group supplied with communal vehicles, the Korean flag, a radio, and one or two grenades. Members were supplied with one carbine rifle, thirty-six rounds, and two clips per person.

The groups were then assigned to separate roles—Group 1 to reconnaissance, Group 2 to observing the South Jeolla Province Hall, Group 3 to watching the roads on the city outskirts, and Group 4 to public security. Most members of the resistance special force were young reservists, but some among them were teenagers who had lied about their age.

At 3:30 p.m., the armed resistance converged on Province Hall. Kim Tae-heon, who had brought in weapons from Hwasun Police Station, reached the area around 4:00 p.m. As he stepped in between the buildings from Chungjang-ro 3-ga to head for Geumnam-ro, he heard a scream. People lay on the pavement ahead of him with gunshot wounds. Kim took cover in the building, got down low, and opened fire at Province Hall. Bullets from paratroopers struck the building wall near him, sending sparks flying.⁷⁶

Light Machine Guns Installed on the Rooftop of Chonnam University Medical School

South Jeolla Province Hall, occupied by paratroopers, was only about 300 meters away from Chonnam University Medical School. When the resistance obtained arms from the reserve forces’ armory, they also secured several light machine guns, two of which were installed on the rooftop of Chonnam University Medical School.⁷⁷ Cho In-ho (age 20, tea house cook), who was among the demonstrators near the school on the afternoon of May 21, spotted the machine guns in question when a group of forty to fifty demonstrators arrived at the roundabout in front of the school with weapons from the Jiwon-dong armory, handing them out to the people. Cho saw two light machine guns in the demonstrators’ possession. A short young man who claimed to be 27 years old stepped forward to say that he had been a light machine gun gunner when he served as a conscript. He set up one of the guns on the pavement and fired three deafening shots into the air. The sound of gunfire silenced the city. That was when three military helicopters approached at a low altitude and began to circle the sky above Province Hall. The gunner said, “We’ll shoot down the military and their allies,” and opened fire on the helicopters. One of them flew off in the direction of Songjeong-ri, seemingly hit, and the remaining two quickly ascended and disappeared from sight.⁷⁸

Once the helicopters had been driven off, demonstrators debated what to do with the light machine guns. Proposals to install them on top of the hospital building were met with reluctance because of the patients still inside. Building owners objected to installing them on their own rooftops.⁷⁹ Journalist Kim Yeong-taek of the Dong-a Ilbo, who had been at Province Hall at the time, spotted three of four young people moving busily on the 12th floor rooftop of Chonnam University Medical School at 4:43 p.m. The young people seemed to be postsecondary school-aged, and between them, Kim spotted a light machine gun barrel—and then another. The demonstrators had ultimately agreed to put the guns on the rooftop of the medical school, but the light machine guns mounted there were not fired again, as martial law troops withdrew from the city at that moment. The guns on the rooftop simply served as a threat to the military until the end of the Gwangju Uprising.⁸⁰

The Battle at Chonnam National University

That morning, tens of thousands of demonstrators also congregated in front of Chonnam University, where the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade was stationed. Word had spread across the city that the detained had been imprisoned at the school, spurring many people to mount a rescue attempt. The crowds began to gather at 10:00 a.m., and by noon they had swelled to more than 40,000 at the main gates and 10,000 at the rear gates. Led by vehicles brought from the Asia Motors factory, demonstrators laid siege to the campus from three directions: the main gates, the rear gates, and the rear gates of the College of Agriculture.

With buses, trucks, fire trucks, and military jeeps at the head, the demonstrators faced down the military at the gates. Although martial law forces had installed a machine gun on the roof of the security office at the gate, citizens petitioned strongly for its removal, and the soldiers took it down. Discussions opened at 11:00 a.m. Representatives from each side would meet together to outline their demands. The military’s microphone was used for the process. Demonstrators demanded the unconditional withdrawal of martial law troops. Martial law troops responded that they would withdraw if the people returned the stolen vehicles, which the people did not accept.

At noon, gunfire sounded and tear gas canisters rained down upon the protesters. The same E-8 launcher from the clash at Gwangju Station the previous evening had been used again. It could shoot multiple canisters at once and was informally known as the “jiraltan,” or “crazy-canisters.” With the noise of harmless fireworks, tear gas blanketed the area. Paratroopers equipped with gas masks rushed in to arrest confused demonstrators.

A Pregnant Woman Shot

Martial law troops opened fire around noon in front of Chonnam University, injuring over five people and killing two⁸¹—including Choi Mi-ae (age 23), a homemaker who was eight months pregnant. She had moved into the home next door to her parents immediately upon her marriage to a high school teacher. When he went out in the morning out of concern for his students and did not come back until noon as he promised, Choi went out into the alleys to wait for him and stood alone on a manhole cover in the alley that connected the Chonnam University main gates to Pyeonghwa Market. When the shooting broke out, a paratrooper chasing down the demonstrators opened fire, and Choi fell to the ground. Her family rushed to her side only to find her already dead. Even when they took her body home, the baby in her womb continued to move vigorously. They contacted a local hospital to at least save the child, but the hospital would not pick up the phone—by the time Choi’s husband returned home at 4:00 p.m., even the baby had stopped moving.⁸²

Martial law troops continued to fire upon demonstrators from 1:30 p.m. to the withdrawal from the Chonnam campus at 3:00 p.m., injuring and killing many in the residences and streets nearby. Several demonstrators leapt into the Gwangseong Transport garage near the main gates of the school, at which point over twenty paratroopers barged inside. They beat the eight employees, who had been eating instant noodles, and took seven of them into custody—the remaining one had fallen unconscious—even though they had nothing to do with the demonstrations.

When paratroopers charged out of the school’s gates, national defense reserve force member Choi Byeong-ok (age 21) rushed into the outhouse of a nearby residence and found three people already hiding there. Suddenly, flames roared in through a small window in the wall. Choi thought he would suffocate in the heat. Suffering burns across his entire face, he was taken to Chonnam University. Later, Choi testified that the paratroopers following after him must have fired a flamethrower into the outhouse.⁸³

Children’s Last Memories of Their Fathers

At 3:00 p.m., Kim Yeon-tae (age 33) pelted paratroopers with rocks alongside his fellow demonstrators when several soldiers chased him down. Kim and a dozen other demonstrators hid near the bridge in front of the main gates of Chonnam University, and when the paratroopers began to cross, leapt on them. Kim and six others dragged away the paratroopers and beat them, and the paratroopers retaliated with gunfire. Kim let the soldiers go and ran, when a man in his mid-fifties running in front of him was shot in the ankle and fell. Helping the man to his feet, Kim half-dragged him along. Three paratroopers caught up with him and pulled him away by the back of the neck. Kim was taken to the Chonnam campus’s main building, where he found countless citizens who had been taken away earlier. He counted well over a hundred people who were covered in blood and moaning or whose heads had been bashed in. One man who seemed to be around 30 years of age was left with his skull gaping open, which Kim could hardly stand to look at.⁸⁴

Jang Bang-hwan (age 58, self-employed) and Ahn Du-hwan (age 45, boiler technician) were ordinary family men who lived near Chonnam’s main gates and did not take part in the demonstrations. Jang’s wife Park Yeon-sun (age 51) kept a boarding house outside the campus, from where she watched the skirmish between demonstrators and martial law troops on the afternoon of May 21. When soldiers tried to drag away two young men, the people clapped their hands in anger and demanded, “Let them go!” That was when one of the paratroopers whirled around and opened fire indiscriminately. Park’s husband Jang, who worked in distribution outside the city, was home that day and set out to see what the commotion outside the school was about. He did not return home that night. Park searched for her husband for days until she finally found his pants—covered in blood and dirt—in one of the Chonnam University buildings. Ten days later on May 31, she confirmed the identity of her husband, who was found among eight bodies hastily buried at Gwangju Prison. An autopsy revealed his cause of death as blunt trauma to the stomach and head—he had been beaten to death.⁸⁵

Boiler technician Ahn Du-hwan also lived in front of the Chonnam University gates and was taken on the afternoon of May 21 on his way out of the outhouse in the yard of his home. His daughters witnessed the scene and described the situation between sobs when their mother returned home after a brief outing: “Three soldiers knocked down the door and beat Father as he came out of the outhouse! They hit him until his head was bleeding. They kept beating him and dragged him away.” Even as he was taken, Ahn continued to gesture to his daughters to get back in the house. That was the last time his family saw him alive. Ahn’s wife, Kim Ok-ja, waited all night with the hope that even paratroopers wouldn’t be so heartless to kill a man nearing age 50. The next day, she went to Chonnam University to find her husband and, upon discovering his bloodied clothes, lost consciousness. From that point on, Kim searched like a woman possessed through Province Hall, the hospitals, the 31st Division, and Sangmudae. Ten days later on May 31, her husband was found among the eight bodies in the temporary grave at Gwangju Prison. His head was found leaning to the right, so she reached out to straighten it, only to find her hands collapsing into his head. The back of his skull had been bashed in.⁸⁶

Commanders on the Scene Refuse Violent Suppression

On May 21 at 4:00 p.m., ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Yeong-si ordered Brigadier General Lee Gu-ho, superintendent of the ROK Army Armor School at Combat Arms Command, to “immediately deploy the 32nd Tank Battalion.” Lee refused to uphold the command.⁸⁷ Hwang also gave orders by telephone to Major General Kim Gi-seok, Combat Arms Deputy Commander, to deploy armed AH-1J Cobra helicopters and tanks to quickly suppress the demonstration. Kim also refused his orders, saying, “If this is absolutely necessary, I would like to request an official order handed down via the chains of command and not through the phone.”⁸⁸ Hwang then gave orders via his subordinate Kim Jae-myeong, ROK Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, to Kim Sun-hyeon, head of the Combat Development Corps at Combat Arms Command, to send out armed Cobra helicopters to fire warning shots at the mountains behind the Chosun University campus to disperse the demonstrators. The 31st Aviation Group had sent two AH-1J Cobra helicopters and five MD 500 helicopters from the 103rd Squadron to Combat Arms Command at 10:45 a.m. for support. However, this order was also met with objections from the 31st Aviation Group and was not carried out.⁸⁹ In addition, 31st Division Commander Chung Ung was ordered and urged by Kim Jae-myeong to “thwart the protesters with tanks and armed helicopters,” but Chung replied, “We cannot use heavily armed military personnel for the purposes of quelling a demonstration” and refused to obey.⁹⁰ In short, every commander on the scene refused Hwang Young-si’s orders for the violent suppression of the demonstrations at Gwangju.⁹¹

Withdrawal of Martial Law Troops

Following reports on the afternoon of May 21 that demonstrators had begun to arm themselves, martial law leadership elected to change their approach, relocating troops to the outskirts of the city to seal off the city and invoke the right of self-defense to justify the suppression of the demonstration.⁹² At 4:00 p.m., Combat Arms Commander Yun Heung-jeong received the Martial Law Commander’s approval for the relocation of paratroopers to the city outskirts and ordered the withdrawal of the 7th and 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigades from Province Hall. At the same time, he also ordered the military to secure all reserve forces arms and ammunition and to close completely all roads leading out of Gwangju.⁹³ With armored vehicles in the lead, paratroopers walked past the Labor Supervision Office and Jeonnam Technical High School and completed their retreat to Chosun University. Fearing attack by demonstrators, paratroopers opened fire on the rooftops of buildings that lined the streets through which they traveled.

With the withdrawal of martial law troops at 5:15 p.m., the South Jeolla Province Police’s situation room was sealed off. Ten minutes later, Province Hall employees and journalists escaped over the rear wall of the Province Hall premises. Afterwards, riot police and non-riot police officers also left the same way without fanfare. South Jeolla Province Police Commissioner Ahn Byeong-ha ordered, “Due to the urgency of the situation, commanders are hereby ordered to secure their units’ own avenues of withdrawal and regroup at the Jisan Recreation Area, or as a secondary rendezvous point, Songjeong-ri Air Base,” and then he himself fled to Combat Arms Command.⁹⁴ Riot police threw off their combat uniforms and changed into tracksuits to escape. Some fled to the residential area behind Province Hall and changed into plainclothes, devising a number of ways to avoid being targeted by the resistance.

At 7:30 p.m., Martial Law Commander Lee made an announcement live from the ROK Army HQ war room announcing the military’s invocation of the right of self-defense.

A Retreat with Machine Gun Fire

Although paratroopers from Province Hall had reached Chosun University, headquarters of the 11th Brigade, they had no time to lose. Leaving behind tents and other supplies, they left the campus immediately to escape the civilian resistance and headed for their rendezvous point: Junam Village, only four kilometers from Chosun University and on the road to Hwasun.

Martial law troops split up their numbers for the withdrawal, with logistical support units and those withdrawing by vehicle taking the roads leading from Hak-dong to Jiwon-dong to Sotae-dong, and the rest fleeing by foot via the mountains at the back of Chosun University.⁹⁵

Upon reaching the campus, paratroopers rushed up the mountainside with nothing but their personal equipment, making their way to the flagpole at the peak. Headquarters provided field battalion commanders with a single map each, marked with the location of Junam Village. The 11th and 7th made their way into the mountains and took account of their numbers under cover. At midnight, about a hundred paratroopers made their way over the mountains using the cover of night and descended quietly to Suksil Village on the other side. Local defense forces had closed off Baegopeun Bridge at the entrance of the village and stationed guards, making it difficult for paratroopers to make further progress. Some of the 11th’s forces were stuck all night in the valley near Jeungsim Buddhist Temple at the entrance of Mudeung Mountain, only making their way over the mountains in the early morning when the resistance had turned in for the night. The next day, resistance forces defending the entrance to Jeungsim Temple in Hak-dong captured a paratrooper and sent him to the situation room at Province Hall.⁹⁶

Having climbed over the mountains behind Chosun University, the 61st and 63rd Battalions of the 11th Brigade elected to remain on the ridge at 2:40 a.m. on the morning of May 22, finally reaching Junam Village at 8:30 a.m. The 62nd, however, remained trapped in the valley near Jeungsim Temple and only reached the rendezvous point at 4:00 p.m. The commander of the 62nd was chastised by Choi Ung for the delay.⁹⁷

Lieutenant Colonel Kwon Seung-man, commander of the 7th Brigade’s 33rd Battalion, ordered the distribution of sixty rounds for each of the seventy members of the 7th Field Battalion—in charge of supplies, catering, and vehicles—and their withdrawal by motorway. It was 7:00 p.m. on May 21 when the logistical support units finished gathering a mess of communal equipment, loading them onto vehicles, and set off for Junam Village. For the first two kilometers from the main gates, the military convoy was frequently fired upon by the resistance, who had hidden in the buildings along the road in Hak-dong and Sotae-dong. These civilians had been supplied with weapons at Gwangju Park that afternoon.⁹⁸ Several paratroopers were injured, and several civilians were hurt or killed on the roads.

When the 11th’s convoy passed Namgwangju Station on its way to Sungui Technical High School, it was attacked by the resistance, who overturned three military vehicles. One enlisted soldier was killed and six were injured.⁹⁹ In response to the attack, an armored vehicle belonging to the 11th made two laps around Hak-dong and Jiwon-dong, firing machine guns and M16 rifles indiscriminately on streetside residences. Machine gun rounds penetrated all the way to the master bedrooms of the homes.

Wi Seong-sam was a member of the civilian resistance. He was armed and placed into a unit at Gwangju Park and stationed at the photography studio next to Hak-dong Market. At 7:00 p.m., a retreating armored vehicle belonging to martial law forces sped past with guns ablaze. When the resistance returned fire, the vehicle stopped briefly, withdrew, and then raced on again in the direction of Hwasun, firing indiscriminately at either side of the street.

Song Seung-seok (age 24, haberdashery store employee) heard gunfire at 7:00 p.m. and stepped outside the store with a coworker when an armored vehicle belonging to paratroopers opened fire. Song rushed back into the store but was shot in the left thigh.¹⁰⁰ The armored vehicle raced back and forth between Jiwon-dong and Hak-dong as it fired away. Im Su-chun (age 38, grocery store owner) was struck on the road in front of his own store by a retreating armored vehicle. He was sent flying and landed on the doorstep of a neighboring home, head smashed by the impact.¹⁰¹ Taxi company employee Jeon Jeong-ho (age 55) was shot and killed by an armored vehicle near Jiwon-dong on his way home. Park Chan-uk (age 25, furniture maker) was shot in the left shoulder.

Tear Gas Set Off in a Sealed Truck

At 4:00 p.m., the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade at Chonnam University was also given withdrawal orders, their rendezvous point set to Gwangju Prison. About 130 citizens who had been detained were held in the campus auditorium at the time. Most had been captured during the battle of Gwangju Station the previous night, and some were taken from the skirmish outside the main gates of the campus that morning. Kang Gil-jo (age 38, Chonbang Textile labor section chief) had attempted to mediate when the 3rd Brigade blocked demonstrators traveling via Gwangju Station toward Province Hall at the Lotte Confectionary in Sinan-dong. He was captured at 6:00 p.m. on May 20 and was detained at Chonnam University, where he was subjected to beatings and military drills that broke his left arm.

As it prepared for withdrawal in the afternoon of May 21, the 3rd Brigade strung together the detained, put them into the backs of sealed trucks, and set off tear gas inside. Kang looked outside through the small windows on either side of the truck and spotted two dead female students on the slope by the tennis courts. Both wore large bands over their chests that read, “Tear Chun Doo-hwan to pieces,” and both were covered from head to toe in blood. Because of the tear gas, the people in the backs of the trucks had nosebleeds and urinated on themselves. It was a living hell. Unable to endure the pain, Kang butted the window with his head. Glass shards drove themselves into his skin. By the time they reached Gwangju Prison, the sun had already set. He counted three or four dead in his truck alone, and many were left with faces red and peeling from tear gas–induced burns.¹⁰²

6

The Uprising Expands

On the morning of May 21, demonstrators in Gwangju made their way to the cities and counties across South Jeolla Province with the vehicles they obtained at the Asia Motors factory and at various bus companies in the city. Their goal was to spread the word about the Gwangju situation to nearby rural areas and secure reinforcements. The acquisition of vehicles immediately expanded the scope of the demonstrators’ activities.

Initially, they attempted to head for Jeonju (capital of North Jeolla Province) and the national capital Seoul via the expressway. However, martial law troops had already cut off the Sanam Tunnel, which stood between Jangseong¹ and Jeongeup and was the only way through by motor vehicle.² Gwangju Prison, situated next to the entrance to the Honam Expressway—which connects Gwangju to Daegu (capital of North Gyeongsang Province) via Damyang and Suncheon via Gokseong—was defended by the 31st Division.³ When travel to the north and east became difficult, demonstrators made a beeline for other regions in the south and west, taking routes such as Naju-Hampyeong-Muan-Mokpo, Naju-Yeongam-Gangjin-Jangheung-Haenam-Wando, and Hwasun-Songgwang-Boseong-Beolgyo-Goheung.

Demonstrators first appeared in Naju County on May 21 at 10:43 a.m. A crowd of more than a hundred gathered in front of Geumseong-dong Police Substation in Naju with a Gwangju Buslines vehicle at the lead. According to military records, the bus in question was the first demonstrator vehicle to leave the city of Gwangju that day.

At 10:45 a.m., another bus carrying demonstrators from Gwangju stopped in front of Nampyeong Police Substation. Sitting inside or on top of the buses and trucks with smashed windows, the passengers drummed on the vehicles and recited rallying cries, drawing large crowds. The young people on the vehicles zealously described the situation in Gwangju to the onlookers. These demonstrators went around the downtown areas and eventually traveled to Yeongam or Mokpo further in the south. The demonstrator vehicles intended to deliver news about the situation in Gwangju to nearby cities and towns and recruit those who might be willing to help.⁴ At 11:23 a.m., six vehicles finished their work and returned to Gwangju, carrying more than 200 people.⁵

Figure 13. The expansion of demonstrations across South Jeolla Province and military blockades of Gwangju (May 21)

A similar situation unfolded at Hwasun that morning. Around 11:00 a.m., buses and trucks from Gwangju with their windows smashed entered the town’s main street via the Neoritjae Tunnel. More than 200 young people chanted rallying cries and banged on the vehicles, calling for Chun’s resignation, the end of martial law, and the release of Kim Dae-jung.

When news of the demonstrators from Gwangju spread across the town of Hwasun, locals flocked to the main street—although news about paratroopers and a large commotion had reached them before, no details had been released. Parents with children living alone in Gwangju were terrified for their sons and daughters, and others worried for their relatives and friends. The arrival of the demonstrators from Gwangju, accordingly, was met with great enthusiasm as locals waved the Korean flag. At the same time, rumors began to spread that the paratroopers deployed to Gwangju would also storm Hwasun.

Around noon, locals and even those from the outlying rural areas gathered in the main street, their numbers swelling to more than 2,000. It was a large enough number in the town for the crowds to fill the downtown area all the way from the local bus terminal to the street in front of the county hall. It was an unprecedented crowd that dwarfed the numbers that gathered on market day. The people of Hwasun drew water for the demonstrators and bought bread and beverages from stores for them, listening to the stories from Gwangju and joining in their outrage.

Demonstrators from Gwangju who drove to the nearby areas of Naju, Hwasun, and Damyang to spread news about the city were not initially armed. News of the indiscriminate gunfire in front of Province Hall that afternoon, however, completely changed the situation. Like a bundle of kindling roaring into flames, the people of Gwangju quickly obtained weapons and organized a resistance.

“We Must Arm Ourselves!”

Paratroopers opened fire indiscriminately on demonstrators in front of Province Hall at 1:00 p.m. that day. Half an hour later, a young man near the Jin Internal Medicine Clinic cried, “Everyone! My name is Moon Jang-woo, a company commander in the Hagun-dong reserve forces. Paratroopers are firing on us, but we can’t expect to put up a fight with rocks and pieces of lumber. We must arm ourselves!” Twenty to thirty young people gathered around him. Demonstrators divided into groups and slipped away toward places that might have reservist armories, such as Chonbang Textile and the nearby communities of Naju and Hwasun. They agreed to meet at Gwangju Station as soon as they had secured their weapons.⁶

News of the gunfire at Province Hall spread rapidly, even to the demonstrators who had left the city by motor vehicle early in the morning to recruit reinforcements. As soon as they received word of the incident, demonstrators in Naju and Hwasun immediately headed for nearby police stations and reserve forces armories.

Naju

At 2:00 p.m., demonstrators from Gwangju delivered an impassioned testimony on martial law troops’ indiscriminate shooting of civilians to the people of Naju, emphasizing that weapons would be needed to protect the people of Gwangju from the martial law troops. Young locals set off for nearby police stations and regional substations to secure firearms.

Upon witnessing the gunfire in front of Province Hall, Choi In-yeong (age 17, welder) had boarded a vehicle equipped with tear gas spray previously used by police that had been left in front of the Hwani Department Store. Carrying Choi and about fifteen other young people, the vehicle sped toward the town of Nampyeong. Around 2:20 p.m., a little past lunchtime, they reached the Nampyeong Police Substation and found it empty. Behind the building was a storehouse with a sign labeled “Armory.” When locals saw Choi and the demonstrators, they handed them axes to break down the armory door. They secured more than twenty carbine rifles and seven or eight boxes of ammunition. Having obtained weapons with ease, the demonstrators returned to Gwangju as they chanted rallying cries.⁷

Kim Bong-su (age 27, mechanic) was one of thirty-odd demonstrators who boarded a city bus bound for Naju.⁸ Onlookers Park Yun-seon (age 23), Yu Jae-hong (age 24), and Choi Jae-sik (age 24) joined Kim on the bus.⁹ The crowds at Naju swelled past 500. With guidance from the locals, the demonstrators from Gwangju headed to nearby police station and reserve forces’ armories for firearms. With more than twenty vehicles and 500 Naju residents behind him, Kim went to Naju Police Station in Seongbuk-dong in the town of Naju. They used a military tow truck to pull open the armory door and took out carbine rifles, handguns, and air guns to take back to Gwangju.¹⁰ Demonstrator vehicles continued on to the town of Yeongsanpo and stormed the Yeonggang-dong Police Substation, where they obtained two boxes of ammunition.¹¹

High school student Kim Seong-su (age 17) backed a military truck into the door of the Geumseong-dong Police Substation armory in Naju. When the door broke down, demonstrators brought out handguns and air guns. The twenty men and five women aboard the truck returned to Gwangju via the Nampyeong Police Substation and headed for the Ilshin Textile armory in the city.

National defense force reservist Choi Seong-mu (age 23), who lived in Naju and commuted to work at the Air Force base in Songjeong-ri, visited the local temple Gabo, for Buddha’s Birthday with his friends Lee Jae-gwon (age 21, national defense force reservist), Park Chang-nam (age 23), and Im Chae-ho (age 23). As they returned home around lunchtime, they heard news of a commotion and rushed to downtown Naju, where they saw two Titan trucks and a bus packed with people, as well as a dead body aboard. One young man called to the onlookers and cried, “Look, everyone! Paratroopers have come to Gwangju and are ruthlessly killing civilians. Look! This is one of their victims. Let’s combine our strength to protect our families!” When he saw the body with his own two eyes, Choi felt his blood boil. He immediately boarded one of the demonstrator vehicles, determined to take up a gun and fight against the paratroopers.¹²

The demonstrators went around the Noan-myeon and Sanpo-myeon areas, some taking weapons back to Gwangju immediately and others remaining to spread the news about the crisis to rural areas. Those who returned to Gwangju from Naju converged with the Gwangju resistance near the roundabout outside the Chonnam University Medical School. Some of these demonstrators volunteered for the defense of Gwangju’s outskirts, while others returned to Naju. Lee Jae-gwon and his friend Im Chae-ho were assigned to the defense of Nongseong-dong.¹³

Administrative officials in Naju attempted to independently counter the unprecedented situation, but most of their police personnel had been taken to Gwangju to suppress the protests on May 18, leaving only one to three officers per station and substation—not nearly enough to prevent the demonstrators from breaking into the armories. When Naju County Office employees learned that demonstrators were securing weapons, they hid the office’s administrative vehicles and some of the weapons in their armory in the Hankook Chemical fertilizer factory in Naju. The employees also concealed sixty-eight carbine rifles in the wall cabinets of the official residence of the chief of financial affairs and buried 360 rounds of ammunition on the county office property. The Naju Police Station also moved to collect ammunition from its substations, but demonstrators had already emptied some of their armories by that point.¹⁴

Meanwhile, demonstrators who had arrived in Naju split up at intersections and swept through police station and substation armories across the towns and villages in South Jeolla Province. This was made possible by Naju’s location as a transportation hub for southwestern communities in the province such as Mokpo, Wando, and Jindo, among a dozen other cities and counties. One group of demonstrators went from Naju to the Hampyeong intersection to Muan, followed by Mokpo, while another group went to Yeongam, Haenam, Wando, and Jindo, with yet another group splitting off to go to Yeongam, Gangjin, Jangheung, and Boseong. Demonstrator activity subsided in Naju after May 23.¹⁵

According to records from the South Jeolla Province Police, the first attack by demonstrators on a police armory was at 8:00 a.m. on May 21, when three carbine rifles and 270 rounds of ammunition were taken from the Bannam Police Substation in Naju County.¹⁶ Considering the circumstances, however, this record is suspect¹⁷ and is contradicted by the investigation report of the Naju Police Station, written on June 3, 1980, at Naju Police Station and submitted to the South Jeolla Province Police, which records the attack on the Bannam Police Substation as occurring at 5:30 p.m.¹⁸ Taking the circumstances and testimonies into account, it is clear that civilians did not begin to secure weapons from the Naju area until after martial law troops opened fire indiscriminately on Geumnam-ro at 1:00 p.m. on May 21.

Table 1. Investigation report on the May 21 theft of firearms and ammunition from offices under the jurisdiction of the Naju Police Station

Location

Time of Theft

Date and Time of Report

Nampyeong Police Substation

14:20

May 21, 14:30

Geumseong-dong Police Substation

14:30

May 21, 16:00

Sanpo Police Substation

14:00

May 21, 16:00

Yeonggang Police Substation

14:30

May 21, 14:35

Bannam Police Substation

17:30

May 22, 09:00

Dasi Police Substation

13:20

May 23, 12:10

Source: South Jeolla Province Police, June 1980.

Hwasun

At 2:00 p.m., demonstrators from Gwangju rushed over Neoritjae Pass to Hwasun with news that soldiers had opened fire.

A girl in a high school uniform cried from atop one of the vehicles, “Martial law forces in Gwangju are killing innocent citizens. All able-bodied young men, come with us and fight on our side!” Many young men answered the call, boarding the demonstrator vehicles one after another. The first call was followed by dozens more vehicles from the city arriving at Hwasun, carrying demonstrators who delivered reports on the situation in the city and asked for the locations of nearby armories. Some headed for the Hwasun Mining Station for ammunition, while others set off in the direction of Boseong.

Kim Tae-heon reached the town of Hwasun at 2:00 p.m. to find the local police station empty. He broke open the armory and returned to Gwangju with more than eighty carbine rifles.

Ahn Seong-ok (age 17) boarded a demonstrator vehicle bound for the Hwasun Mining Station to procure dynamite. However, the employees refused to hand over explosives, forcing the demonstrators back to the city, where the group was given six to seven carbine and M1 rifles at the bridge in Jiwon-dong. They left the city once more and reached the Dong-myeon Police Substation in Hwasun, where they shot the armory lock open and acquired dozens of carbine and M1 rifles, one light machine gun, one machine gun, and two boxes of grenades. Loading their new cargo on their vehicles, the group returned to Gwangju.¹⁹

Hwasun natives Park Nae-pung (age 23, blue-collar worker) and Kang Seong-nam (age 20, in the furniture industry) obtained more than a hundred guns from the armories at the police substation in front of the station and the Nam-myeon Police Substation and brought them to Gwangju. Another group of twenty to thirty young people secured a significant number of firearms, ammunition, and blanks from the Hwasun reserve forces company headquarters. They transported the weapons to the South Jeolla Province Hall. Some demonstrators reached the bridge in Jiwon-dong and handed out dynamite while also receiving a small quantity of ammunition.

At 3:00 p.m., demonstrators took their vehicles to the police substation in front of Hwasun Station, broke the lock on the armory door, and took more than 500 carbine and M1 rifles and more than 1,600 rounds of ammunition to take back to Gwangju. Kim Chang-oh (age 24, businessman), Cho Byeong-guk (age 22, plumber), and Kim Yong-gyun (age 21, welder), who were in Hwasun to visit their hometowns, joined a group of demonstrators headed for Dong-myeon on three military trucks and a jeep. Amidst the people’s cheers, the group of thirty to forty rammed the armory with their truck and armed themselves with the carbine rifles and ammunition they obtained.

At 3:30 p.m., Shin Man-sik (age 24, national defense force reservist) arrived at the Hwasun Mining Station, driving the lead vehicle in a convoy of four trucks, and found seven or eight employees loading crates of TNT into an 8-tonne truck to transport to another location. When Shin and the other demonstrators held up their guns and demanded the TNT, the employees handed them over, advising, “Please don’t set anything alight.” The demonstrators divided the crates across the trucks and joined other demonstrator vehicles on their way to Province Hall, where the TNT was moved to the basement.²⁰

In the Hwasun region, reserve force company commanders and police worked with community leaders to prevent demonstrators from obtaining firearms. They recruited reservists and more than a hundred young locals and distributed firearms to them ahead of time in order to proactively defend themselves before the Gwangju demonstrators took them away. However, criticism that the distribution of guns might lead to injury or death led the leaders to collect them again and bury them in the mountains near the Donggu-ri Reservoir at the entrance to Mannyeon Mountain on the outskirts of Hwasun. Some of the young men, including Kim Yeong-bong (Hwasun Mining Station employee), Bae Bong-hyeon, Lee Seong-jeon, Kim Jeong-gon, Park Tae-jo, Oh Dong-chan, Kim Seong-jin, Lee Seon (age 23), Cha Yeong-cheol (age 28), Park Hong-cheol, and Cheon Ju-il adamantly refused to turn in their weapons, even going into the mountains that night to dig up the hidden firearms and distribute them to the villagers.²¹ (They did not obtain any ammunition.) A dozen or so young men including Lee Seong-jin, Kim Yeong-bong, Lee Seon, and Oh Dong-chan went around to the Neungju, Dong-myeon, Nam-myeon, and Songgwang Police Substations late into the night (the latter in Suncheon) to find ammunition but turned up nothing. On the way, however, they encountered a group of young men coming out of the Hwasun Mining Station, who shared with them more than 200 dynamite detonators and thirty meters of fuse. At 11:00 p.m., they obtained additional weapons at the Hwasun Buk-myeon Police Substation.²² Demonstrations in the Hwasun region continued until the afternoon of May 22, when the Neoritjae Tunnel was sealed off.²³

Yeongam

Around lunchtime on May 21, an express bus carrying demonstrators armed with wooden bludgeons and a jeep mounted with a speaker arrived at the Sinbuk three-way intersection in Yeongam County. The vehicles had come from Gwangju via Naju. A female high school student sat in the front passenger seat of the jeep, tearfully describing the situation in Gwangju and spurring the locals to action. Yeongam residents offered their full support, bringing demonstrators bread and beverages. At that point, the demonstrators had not yet secured firearms.

Around 2:00 p.m., Kang Deok-jin (age 23, driver) heard the pleas of the student in the jeep and gathered together more than thirty others of his age to go to Gwangju via Naju.²⁴ On the way to Naju, however, they heard news about the gunfire outside Province Hall from a vehicle coming out of the city. In response, the group headed back to Yeongam to arm themselves. On their way between Yeongam and Yeongsanpo, two buses and a car joined their group. At 6:00 p.m., the group broke the lock at the armory in the Dasi-myeon Police Substation in Naju and acquired carbine rifles, M1 rifles, a .50 BMG, and ammunition. Kang’s vehicle joined more than twenty vehicles and hundreds of demonstrators at the Naju three-way intersection who went to Gwangju together. Once in the city, they distributed the weapons they secured; they were assigned to the defense of the Baegun neighborhood with the citizens’ resistance and stationed at the second-floor office of a taxi company near the overpass.

On the same afternoon, more than a hundred young people also gathered in the town of Yeongam and boarded two buses to make their way to Gwangju. Yeongam’s Cooperative Leader Kim Hui-gyu (age 37, artist) met at a tea house in front of the Yeongam County Office with the leaders of five community groups and collected money to support the demonstrators. Once they had gathered a substantial amount, some of the group, including Lee Gang-ha (age 27, artist) bought cotton canvas at a linens store to paint rallying chants such as “Down with Chun Doo-hwan,” “Release Kim Dae-jung,” and “End Martial Law”; “Yeongam County” was written at the bottom.²⁵ The young people heading to Gwangju hung up the makeshift signs by Kim on the sides of the buses.

At 4:00 p.m., a group of more than twenty people from Gwangju reached Yeongam via truck and took more than twenty firearms from the Yeongam Police Station. When they arrived, they found the building empty. The police had heard ahead of time that demonstrators were making their way to Yeongam and took the ammunition in the armory to the riot police in Seongjeon, Gangjin County.

The demonstration in Yeongam spread throughout the county. Sinbuk-myeon residents Lee Dal-yeon, Yu Eun-yeol (age 27), and Lee Yeong-il (age 23) set out at 4:00 p.m. by car, joining the demonstrations with their friends Im Jong-mun (age 26), Han Gyu-yeong (age 21), Jeon Su-ryong (age 27).²⁶

Gangjin, Haenam, Wando

At 4:00 p.m. on May 21, demonstrators on three buses from Gwangju arrived at the town of Gangjin and marched through the streets with rallying chants. Countless residents came outside to cheer them on. At 5:00 p.m., the demonstrators secured more than a hundred firearms from the Gangjin Police Station armory and left the town on five vehicles, returning to Gwangju at 7:00 p.m.²⁷ At 8:55 p.m. the same day, another group of demonstrators obtained firearms at the Seongjeon-myeon Police Substation armory.²⁸

At noon on the same day, a group of demonstrators from Gwangju arrived at the town of Haenam. A female high school student at the front of their vehicle held up the Korean flag and described the desperate situation, calling for support from the people of the county. County residents congregated around the demonstrators, applauding and encouraging the group. As news about the crisis in Gwangju spread, locals swarmed the town. Chairman Gwang Yong-taek and eleven leaders of the Haenam Youth Club were holding a bazaar at Daeheung Temple in Samsan-myeon, Haenam County, when they heard about the arrival of the demonstrators at 12:30 p.m. They held an emergency meeting, agreed on five demands, and decided to start local demonstrations in solidarity.²⁹

At 3:00 p.m., demonstrators from Gwangju and a crowd of more than 3,000 gathered at the plaza outside the Education Office in Seongnae-ri in the town of Haenam to openly denounce the acts of the Singunbu and march through the streets. Pastors in the town led their churches in supporting the demonstrators, with older women preparing food that could be eaten on the streets, while the men and young people joined in the marches for democratization. Pharmacies and businesses handed out beverages, and stores that dealt in glass gave away spray bottles for washing off tear gas.

At 5:00 p.m., another wave of demonstrator vehicles reached Haenam. The convoy, which included one jeep, two military trucks, two buses, and a truck, also carried more than 500 young locals to Gwangju. The Haenam Police Station was completely empty, leaving local residents to take the security of public offices into their own hands. At 6:30 p.m., about 200 Haenam residents boarded four buses and headed to the local army base, where the 2nd Battalion of the 93rd Regiment of the 31st Division was stationed. The demonstrators covered their faces and fired blanks in warning as they approached the guard station. A battalion commander by the name of Jang met with three demonstrator representatives and explained, “We are here to protect the Haenam area, and have nothing to fight over with you.” Being well-known to local residents and the representatives, the commander convinced the demonstrators to leave the base alone.

At 7:00 p.m., members of the Haenam Youth Club discovered a Gwangju Buslines vehicle that had been hidden in Yong-dong in Okcheon, Haenam. They brought out the bus and a Daehan Logistics Truck for the demonstrators. An hour later, a group of postsecondary school–aged youths led marches in town, followed by high school and junior high school students. They went from the bus terminal to the Education Office to the Haenam Secondary School and Godo-ri, with those in the lead firing blanks to embolden the demonstrators. They smashed the windows of every police substation on the way while plainclothes officers stood back and watched. Led by a convoy of more than twenty-five vehicles, the group numbered more than 200 when it departed Haenam at 8:50 p.m. for Hyeonsan-myeon and Songji-myeon, and then to the town of Wando, where they marched through the streets.³⁰ Some among the demonstrators made their way back to Haenam at 1:50 a.m. on May 22 to lodge at the Anheung Inn or Daeheung Temple’s Yuseon Hall, where they rested and made plans for the morning. At 6:00 a.m., the demonstrators marched through the town of Haenam, Masan-myeon, Hwangsan-myeon, Munnae-myeon, and Hwawon-myeon.³¹

Jangheung, Boseong

Demonstrators first arrived at Jangheung on the morning of May 22, having spent the night of May 21 at Gangjin. They marched through the town of Jangheung, made their way to Boseong, and returned to the town before heading back to Gangjin. Locals welcomed the demonstrators with open arms, some even joining the demonstrators.³² On May 23, a group of more than 100 attacked the Jangdong-myeon Police Substation, and 200 demonstrators departed Jangheung for Boseong before making their way to Suncheon.³³ A group of more than 400 demonstrators—largely composed of Jangheung High School students—welcomed them. Another group of demonstrators and a bus joined them in Gwansan-myeon.

Demonstrators first arrived in the Boseong area at 8:00 p.m. on May 21. A group armed with pieces of lumber had taken two taxis and ten trucks, with 80 people heading for Jangheung and 30 for Boseong. The latter marched through Boseong until a smaller group departed in the direction of Beolgyo with three trucks and two taxis.³⁴ At noon on May 23, more than 100 armed demonstrators arrived in Mundeok-myeon, situated on the boundary of Hwasun and Boseong, carrying 69 firearms and 560 rounds of ammunition. Local police and military planned to eliminate the group, but the incident ended without bloodshed when the demonstrators gave back the weapons and turned themselves in.³⁵

Hampyeong, Yeonggwang, Muan

At 1:00 p.m. on May 21, Gwangju demonstrators arrived at the town of Hampyeong on a convoy of more than ten vehicles including express buses and trucks. Locals welcomed them and held demonstrations in the town as well. Hampyeong had led the way in agricultural activism under the Yusin regime with the Hampyeong Sweet Potato Incident in 1978, where sweet potato farmers in the area led a successful protest against the agricultural co-op when the latter refused to make promised purchases of the harvest. The town was a powerful base of the Catholic Farmers’ Association, which stood with the farmers in the struggle. Still invigorated by their victory, locals gladly took up the cause for Gwangju and sent three vehicles along to Mokpo. At 5:00 p.m., demonstrators broke into the Hampyeong Police Station armory. Three of the demonstrator vehicles subsequently headed back to Hampyeong, and five buses departed for Yeonggwang.³⁶

Although demonstrators also reached Yeonggwang, no significant activity was recorded in the area save for military reports stating, “About twenty to thirty demonstrators have gathered at the town of Yeonggwang at 11:15 p.m. on May 21, approaching the military base,” and “Twenty-five demonstrators from Songjeong-ri have gathered at the bus terminal to protest at 11:34 p.m. on May 21.”³⁷

At 2:00 p.m. the same day, about thirty demonstrators on three buses headed to the town of Muan. Locals joined the demonstrators and marched through the area, repeating Gwangju’s rallying cries. Some of them departed for Mokpo, while the rest searched the county for weapons and attempted to re-enter Gwangju. Having failed, they headed for Yeonggwang via Songjeong-ri before heading for Yeongam. This group conducted vehicle demonstrations as they traveled through Naju, Yeonggwang, Yeongam, Hampyeong, and Mokpo.³⁸

Mokpo

At 1:00 p.m. on May 21, Ahn Cheol (age 34)³⁹ headed to Jukdong Church and met with Yu Gi-mun, Kim Hyeon-sik, Jeong Gwon-mo, and Reverend Kang Sin-seok of Gwangju Mujin Church.⁴⁰ The latter had fled the wave of preventative custody in Gwangju and taken shelter in Mokpo. The moment he saw Ahn, Kang chastised him, saying, “What are the people of Mokpo doing when the people of Gwangju are dying on the streets?”⁴¹

At 2:15 p.m., a group of more than 200 demonstrators from Gwangju armed with makeshift weapons reached Mokpo, having traveled through Naju, Hampyeong, and Muan on four buses and a taxi. As was the case in Gwangju, they drove through the streets and gave impromptu street broadcasts to convey the plight of the Gwangju citizens and the atrocities perpetrated by martial law forces. They called for the support of Mokpo, chanting rallying cries such as “End martial law,” “Down with Chun Doo-hwan the murderer,” “Release Kim Dae-jung,” and “Release the detained citizens and students.” When news of the situation in Gwangju spread, the people of Mokpo welcomed the demonstrators and a crowd of more than 10,000 gathered at the plaza outside Mokpo Station.⁴² Some locals crafted large banners for the demonstrator vehicles that read, “End martial law” or “Release Kim Dae-jung,” while others brought bread and beverages for the demonstrators. At 4:00 p.m., Mokpo residents acquired three Taewon Passenger Corp. buses, delivery vans, and cars to hold demonstrations of their own. Police fired tear gas to disperse the crowds but were quickly scared away by the mounting anger of the people and changed into plainclothes to flee the police stations and local substations.

Ahn Cheol instructed Choi Mun (age 24), an Amnesty International staff member, to deliver instructions to demonstrators at the plaza outside Mokpo Station. Choi went to the station broadcasting room but was interrupted partway through the announcement when Park Sang-gyu (age 22), a student at Mokpo Vocational College, entered the room. Park received the microphone and instructed postsecondary students to gather separately. Another group of students worked separately from Park: Yang Ji-mun (age 23), who had been attending night school in Seoul before returning home to Mokpo in preparation for his mandated military service, met with about fifteen other young people from Yeondong Church’s youth group and night classes to discuss potential contributions to the Gwangju demonstrators.

The crowds made their way to the KBS broadcasting station on nearby Yudal Mountain and attempted to reach the public but left the building when their attempts failed. The vehicles from Gwangju soon headed back to the city with a significant number of Mokpo youth onboard. Around 7:20 p.m., a military helicopter flew over Mokpo and took account of the demonstration situation for about ten minutes. Afterward, demonstrators attacked civic offices and smashed windows. They broke into the Yeon-dong and Hang-dong Police Substations and acquired weapons, then burned a police truck and a prisoner transport vehicle. From 9:20 p.m. onwards, demonstrators attacked the KBS and MBC buildings in three waves and smashed equipment and windows. More than twenty vehicles joined the demonstrators, fueling their enthusiasm and adding to the numbers until late into the night.

At 8:00 p.m., soldiers in front of the Jisan military base at the boundary between Mokpo and Muan fired on two buses bound for Gwangju for approximately fifteen minutes. Taewon Passenger Corp. bus driver Kim Dong-mun (age 47) and Kim Ho-seong (age 25) were injured in the attack, which had come from the hills in front of the base without warning. Kim Ho-seong suffered three gunshot wounds to his right hand and abdomen.⁴³

When the clock struck midnight on May 21, women, children, and the elderly returned to their homes, while postsecondary students and adult men continued the demonstrations through the night. At 2:00 a.m. on May 22, the demonstrators destroyed the KCIA’s Mokpo office, the Hang-dong Police Substation, the local tax office, and the coast guard office—then they obtained weapons, and armed themselves. By 3:00 a.m., the Namyang fishing net factory had also been destroyed.⁴⁴

Gwangju, Damyang

Damyang Police Station was also attacked by demonstrators on the afternoon of May 21.⁴⁵ Kang Ju-won (age 20, postsecondary student) and a group of more than fifty demonstrators in ten vehicles smashed the police station windows with lead pipes to collect radio equipment and weapons.⁴⁶ At 4:00 p.m., Yu Seok (age 17, second-year student at Gwangju Daedong High School), who had heard rumors that Seoul National University and Korea University students who had traveled south to help Gwangju had been detained at Damyang Police Station, joined a convoy of more than thirty to forty buses, trucks, and three-wheeled cars to rescue them. Demonstrators loaded their vehicles with broken bricks and tires when they set out; they met with no resistance from martial law forces who had been defending Gwangju Prison. By the time the convoy reached its destination, however, the police station was unmanned and emptied of firearms.⁴⁷

Even within the city of Gwangju, some firearms had been left behind in reserve forces armories and corporate buildings because the military had not gotten to them in time. On the afternoon of May 21, six young men took hammers to the armory lock at Hyodeok Police Substation in Gwangju and acquired carbine rifles. Park Ah-rang (age 17, high school student) used heavy equipment to break open the Baegun-dong Police Substation armory and obtained ten carbine rifles. Hong Sun-hui brought out an M1 rifle from the Daechon Police Substation in Gwangju, and Kim Gwang-ho (age 21, taxi driver) broke open the lock on the police substation to the right of Gwangju Open College to obtain carbine rifles. Demonstrators broke into other armories around the city, such as the workplace reserve unit armories in Chonbang Textile, Ilshin Textile, and the tobacco factory in Im-dong, and secured TNT from the Seoksan Explosives Warehouse in Jiwon-dong, which they brought to the South Jeolla Province Hall.⁴⁸

7

The Blockade of Gwangju and
Civilian Massacres (May 21–24)

Having withdrawn from downtown Gwangju on May 21 at 5:00 p.m., paratroopers immediately blocked off key roads on the outskirts of the city.¹ The 31st Division stationed one company at Ochi to block off the road to Damyang, and the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade—stationed at Gwangju Prison—blocked off the roads to the Honam Expressway bound for Suncheon, which served as the eastern gateway of the city. The 11th Brigade and the 7th Brigade’s 33rd and 35th Battalions, stationed at Junam Village in Sotae-dong, cut off the roads leading to Hwasun in the south. The 20th Division stationed three battalions at strategic locations leading west and north: Geungnak Bridge (connecting Gwangju and Songjeong-ri), the Baegun-dong area (connecting Gwangju and Mokpo), and the Gwangju tollgate, which led to the Honam Expressway and to Seoul.² The Singunbu’s highest priority was preventing the spread of demonstrations to the national capital.³ This was because news of the mass uprising in Gwangju might incite the public in Seoul and other regions of the country to act in unpredictable ways. As such, upon the failure of initial suppression attempts, they resorted to a full blockade of the city. The areas blocked off by martial law forces were essentially the gateways of Gwangju—cutting them off cut off the city from the outside world.

At 4:00 p.m. on May 21, Martial Law Command transferred command of ten battalions in the 7th, 11th, and 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigades from the 31st Division to Combat Arms Command.⁴ Three hours later, Martial Law Command warned that martial law troops would be permitted to take whatever measures they deemed necessary for self-defense. In doing so, they covered up the indiscriminate gunfire in front of Province Hall and retroactively justified any gunfire on the military’s part.

Where locations of strategic importance overlapped with blockade areas, security was doubled: the Korean Armed Forces Hospital, the 505th Security Unit base, Combat Arms Command, the Songjeong-ri Air Base, and Gwangju Prison.⁵

Table 2. Blockade locations by unit, as recorded in Combat Arms Command operation records

Unit

Personnel

Notes

3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade

265 officers, 1,261 enlisted

Defense of Gwangju Prison, blockade of entrance to Namhae Expressway

7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade

82 officers, 604 enlisted

Blockade of roads between Gwangju and Hwasun

11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade

163 officers, 1,056 enlisted

Blockade of roads between Gwangju and Hwasun

20th Division

308 officers, 4,778 enlisted

Additional deployment of 60th Regiment, blockade of roads between Gwangju and Mokpo

31st Division

22 officers, 294 enlisted

Stationed on base

Combat Arms Command

42 officers, 746 enlisted

Stationed on base

Total

882 officers, 8,739 enlisted

Six blockades on five roadways out of Gwangju

“They Really Are Commies”

At 9:00 p.m. on May 21, Martial Law Command deployed the 20th Division’s 60th Regiment to Gwangju. In accordance with ROK Army Operation Order 80-25, as many as 1,649 personnel from the 60th Regiment (87 officers, 1,562 enlisted) departed Seoul Air Base and landed at Songjeong-ri Air Base in Gwangju at 7:00 a.m. the following morning. A captain identified by the family name Kim (age 28), a reconnaissance company commander in the 20th Division, was among the men deployed to Gwangju with this group. Without being informed of their destination, Kim and thirty-three reconnaissance troops boarded an airplane at Seoul Air Base. Initially, they speculated among themselves that war had broken out with North Korea and that they were to be sent to Pyeongyang—even collecting hair and nail clippings to send back to their families in case they did not return home alive. Only when the pilot announced their landing in Gwangju did Kim finally realize where they were headed. Born in Yeonggwang, South Jeolla Province, he had attended Gwangju Commercial High School. The city was akin to a hometown to him, and he could scarcely believe that something terrible enough to warrant the deployment of special forces had occurred there. When day broke, Kim spotted demonstrators carrying firearms around the airfield. His education in the military led him to believe that armed troops from North Korea had infiltrated the South or that North Korean agents stationed in the area had incited a riot. He thought, “They really are rebels. They really are commies.”⁶

A 3rd Brigade military administrator with the family name Kim, who was deployed to Gwangju on the morning of May 20, gave a similar testimony. He and his fellow soldiers had been assigned to riot suppression with no prior briefing concerning the situation in Gwangju. At 9:00 a.m. on May 20, just prior to deployment, Brigade Commander Choi Se-chang had given a stern speech stating that the situation in Gwangju was worse than that of the Busan-Masan Democratization Protests and that the involvement of communist sympathizers had intensified the crisis. Signboards hung around the Chonnam University grounds read, “Release Kim Dae-jung,” “Down with Chun Doo-hwan,” and “End the Exploitation of Farmers” in red writing. The color immediately convinced him that Choi’s claims of communist activity were true. Kim was driven solely by the thought of “protecting [his] homeland from any and all communist activity.”⁷

By manipulating information in a tightly controlled environment, martial law authorities successfully injected troops with outrage. Taken in by the black-and-white narrative of the military, the soldiers saw the resistance put up by Gwangju citizens as the work of communist sympathizers and the people of Gwangju as targets to be eliminated. As a result, in the eyes of the troops deployed to the city, the citizens were no longer citizens of South Korea to be protected, but rather enemies to be killed without mercy.⁸

Unannounced Road Blockades

Late in the afternoon of May 21, more than seventy demonstrator vehicles that had gone out to nearby areas such as Haenam, Gangjin, Yeongam, and Mokpo converged in Naju to return to Gwangju. Gwangju-bound vehicles soon packed the area around Naju County Office, the three-way intersection outside the police station, and the plaza outside Naju’s South Gate. Locals provided the demonstrators with rice balls, bread, and milk—the rice balls were originally intended for Naju-area police officers who had been dispatched to Gwangju, but the arming of the demonstrators in the afternoon had prevented police helicopters from delivering supplies to the police in downtown Gwangju. Restaurant owners and women who worked in the entertainment districts volunteered to make meals and rice balls for the civilian guard. As the day grew late, rumors that paratroopers would raze Naju ran rampant. Young men from the area took up arms and stood watch at key locations to prevent martial law forces from entering the town. That night, two fire trucks from the Naju Fire Department were also secured for the demonstrators’ use.

Gwangju resident Park Haeng-sam (age 43, teacher at Gwangju Daedong High School), who joined the demonstrators all the way to Haenam and returned to Naju that afternoon, counted a total of seventy-three demonstrator vehicles. The demonstrators agreed to make their way to Gwangju after they had eaten their gimbap dinner and the sun had set. Fearing that martial law troops might be lying in wait in the mountains surrounding the way into the city, several demonstrators volunteered to serve as an advance guard and headed to Gwangju with three vehicles. About thirty minutes later, the bus that had been at the rear of the advance guard returned to Naju, its windows completely shattered. Five people were inside, but one was hanging dead from one of the windows. According to the survivors, the advance guard was met with a hail of bullets by soldiers hiding at Nampyeong Bridge. The young men who returned explained in anguish, “The people in the first two vehicles must have all died.”⁹

Until around 5:00 p.m. that afternoon, demonstrator vehicles were able to enter Gwangju safely. The situation changed once the 20th Division had been assigned to their posts. The 2nd Battalion (Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Kim Hyeong-gon) of the 61st Regiment of the 20th Division (Commander: Major General Park Jun Byung) was stationed near Hyocheon Station in Baegun-dong in Gwangju’s Seo District to block off the road connecting the city to Mokpo. The emergency runway in Nampyeong was cut off by a company from the 61st Regiment’s 1st Battalion to undertake operations under the command of the 2nd Battalion.¹⁰ The company set up ambushes on Jungnyeong Mountain, in the valley next to Maebong Mountain, and at Hyocheon Station, and opened fire on any vehicles passing on the road. With no prior warning about the blockade of Gwangju, demonstrator vehicles passing through these areas crashed, even flipping over, while attempting to swerve or rush through the gunfire. Many were left dead or injured as a result.

Hyocheon Station

Lee Deok-jun (age 17, third-year student at Gwangju Daedong High School) was on a demonstrator vehicle traveling in the direction of Hyocheon Station when it was ambushed. He had departed Gwangju that morning and gone all the way to Haenam via Naju, and then departed Haenam with three vehicles at 5:00 p.m. before reaching the emergency airstrip at Nampyeong. It was already dark, and more than forty demonstrator vehicles had congregated there to make their way into the city. Helicopters circled the skies, and the vehicles had their headlights turned off. Someone climbed atop the truck at the head of the convoy and shouted, “Paratroopers have occupied Hyocheon, which leads into Gwangju. But even at this moment, the people of the city are dying. Let’s break through and rescue them.” Vehicles with more male passengers went to the front of the convoy while those carrying more female passengers went to the back.

When the bus Lee was on passed Nampyeong, he witnessed a 2.5-tonne Namseon Coal truck with seven covered bodies in the back. The bed of the truck was soaked with blood, and a middle-aged woman outside clung to a foot sticking out of the bed, crying out, “My baby, oh my baby,” as if she had lost her mind with grief. About fourteen or fifteen men and ten women were on Lee’s bus. As they made their way forward, the men held their rifles at the ready by the windows, and the women who witnessed the bodies sat in the aisle in terror. Soon, the women began to cry and sang hymns in the crawling bus pleading for courage on the path of death. The quiet voices grew louder over time, and Lee listened to the singing as he looked outside. He felt his terror lessen and his heart grow light. He realized that he was at death’s door. But even that fear eventually vanished, giving way to calm.

As they crossed the bridge over the Deudeul River, they heard a cacophonous noise ahead. The vehicle ahead of the bus stopped, and someone shouted, “Pull back!” The bus immediately turned and sped straight back to Naju. They were quickly followed by several other vehicles that had been ahead in the convoy. Once they reached Naju, the people from the vehicles ahead explained that everyone in the jeep at the head of the convoy had been shot and that only the driver of the truck behind it survived, managing to escape at the curve.¹¹ Helicopters still circled the skies. Lee spent the night on the second floor of the Naju Wedding Hall.¹²

Upon receiving news about skirmishes with demonstrators near Hyocheon Station, the commander of the 61st Regiment deployed 130 members of the 1st Battalion’s 1st Company and 70 members of the reconnaissance company for a total of 200 men (8 officers, 192 enlisted) to the scene at 12:15 a.m. on May 22. Less than an hour later, at 1:00 a.m., there was another skirmish with demonstrators in a convoy of six buses making their way from the direction of Gwangju.

Upon receiving word that many people were killed in a skirmish near Hyocheon Station, resistance members at Baegun-dong in downtown Gwangju set out to retrieve the dead. Kang Deok-jin was standing guard on the outskirts of Baegun-dong at midnight when he heard that the resistance needed backup in a shootout with martial law troops in Hyocheon. He boarded a bus headed there.¹³ A total of five buses left the neighborhood. Kang’s bus contained fifty people and was so packed that some passengers had to stand. When they reached the battle site and scanned the area in the darkness, they noted rice paddies on either side of the road, a mountain a slight distance away, and a village nearby. There they found three buses and a military truck. One of the buses had been driven into the rice paddy. The wounded lay moaning on the bloodied pavement. Those who arrived ahead on the scene carried the injured into the buses and set off for the city. When Kang’s bus turned to return to Gwangju, he heard gunfire and spotted a shower of tracer rounds from the mountain. Bullets made deafening impacts with the bus, and people began to scream. The gunfire soon subsided, and the road went quiet. The bus would not start, with its engine presumably damaged by bullets. When people tried to climb out the windows to move onto the truck parked behind the bus, the gunfire started again. Several waves later, the noise stopped and people climbed out of the windows and made their way to the truck. They narrowly made it back to Baegun-dong with three people injured. The ambush in the dark had forced them to flee, gaining nothing but more injuries. Helicopters continued to buzz overhead and cast searchlights on the ground.

The two skirmishes that occurred near Hyocheon Station that night resulted in the deaths or injuries of more than ten demonstrators. Two paratroopers were injured with gunshot woulnds, but martial law troops collected sixteen firearms and more than 500 rounds of ammunition from demonstrators.¹⁴

As a result of the blockade, more than 300 demonstrators across forty-five vehicles were locked out of Gwangju. They spent the night at Naju County Office or local schools, and most of them made their way to Songjeongni Station at 7:50 a.m. the next day.¹⁵

When the sun rose on May 22, the 61st Regiment of the 20th Division fanned out from Hyocheon Station, putting up barricades on the road in front of the Songam Industrial Complex that led to Gwangju and at the entrance to Nampyeong Bridge in Naju, which led to Mokpo. The barricades cut off almost ten kilometers including the road in front of the coal factory in Songam-dong, which was blocked with stones. It was at this location that tragedy struck early in the morning.

At 5:40 a.m., Hwang Nam-yeol (age 43, teacher), his wife, and their son Hwang Jae-yeong boarded a vehicle driven by Park Jae-yeong to make their way from Gwangju to Mokpo. They passed the Hyocheon Station area and were granted martial law troops’ permission to pass at the guard station in front of the Namseon Coal factory in Songam-dong. About five minutes later, just before reaching Nampyeong Bridge, the driver slowed when he saw drum canisters blocking the road. At that moment, more than thirty members of a reconnaissance company from the 20th Division’s 61st Regiment opened fire on the vehicle. When Hwang Nam-yeol waved his national ID card in the air, imploring them to stop, the gunfire ceased, and soldiers ordered the passengers to put their hands in the air and step out of the car. Park Jae-yeong, who was in the driver’s seat, hesitated. Martial law troops shot him, killing him instantly. Hwang and his family were covered with shrapnel wounds.

As they waited for a helicopter to take them to the Korean Armed Forces Hospital, Hwang and his family spotted another car make its way from the direction of Gwangju with a white flag flying from the front. The soldiers opened fire on this car as well until the occupants were left motionless. The captain next to Hwang remarked, “Look, everyone in that car is dead. Your family is lucky.”¹⁶ The car that the Hwang family witnessed is conjectured to be the one containing Wang Tae-gyeong (age 27) of Gwangwon Transport, Hae Jeong-gu (age 39), factory manager Jang Jae-chun (age 44), and employee Im Dong-jae (age 20). At 8:20 a.m. on May 22, Wang had set out from Gwangju by car to protect company vehicles outside the city. Jang was at the wheel with Wang next to him, and Hae and Im were in the back. Wang died instantly when a bullet shattered his jaw. Jang suffered gunshot wounds to his right shoulder, and Hae to his left ankle and side.¹⁷

At 3:00 p.m. on May 22, Go Jae-seong (age 18, third-year student at Gwangju Seoksan High School) boarded a mobile crane at Hyocheon with his classmate Jeong Guk-seong (age 18) and Kim Jae-hong (age 19, third-year student at Gwangju Soongil High School) and followed a jeep to Naju. Just before they reached Nampyeong, however, the jeep at the head of the convoy and the mobile crane flipped over amidst gunfire from martial law troops when the drivers where shot. Thirteen people were on the crane at the time. Go was left with a broken sternum, a severed nerve in his right thumb, and a broken jaw. Jeong was pierced under his right underarm with a lead pipe that had come loose from the vehicle. Go and Jeong were taken to Kwangju Christian Hospital to be treated, while Kim suffered severe injuries to his right leg that forced doctors to amputate his leg at the knee.¹⁸

Many like Go were injured or killed not knowing that the roads they were attempting to pass were blocked by martial law troops. Martial law authorities had not made warning broadcasts or publicized the blockade to citizens. Although some of the casualties were armed demonstrators, others were friends and relatives heading into the city out of concern for their loved ones, or nondemonstrators attempting to flee the chaos. Residents of villages near the blockades were also harmed by the soldiers.

Gwangju Prison

The 2nd Battalion of the 96th Regiment of the 31st Division started guarding the Gwangju Prison on May 18 and was replaced by the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade at 5:30 p.m. on May 21 following the latter’s retreat from Chonnam National University. Most civilian casualties at the prison occurred during the 3rd’s occupation of the facility. The 3rd was stationed there from May 21 to the morning of May 24, until it was replaced by the 20th Division’s 62nd Regiment to prepare for Operation Sangmu Loyalty. The moment the 3rd reached the prison, they blocked off the entrances to national roads and expressways that led toward Damyang and Gokseong and opened fire on both demonstrator vehicles and unarmed civilian vehicles.

At 8:00 p.m. on the afternoon of May 21, four people from a village in Daedeok-myeon were on their way home from Gwangju on a pickup truck when they were fired upon by martial law troops on the expressway behind Gwangju Prison. Two were killed and the two were injured. Martial law troops buried the dead—village chief and local Saemaeul Movement leader Go Gyu-seok (age 39) and livestock farmer Im Eun-taek (age 35)—in the ditch in front of the prison.¹⁹ The injured were Park Man-cheon (age 21) and Lee Seung-eul (age 40).²⁰ Survivor Lee Seung-eul testified, “We were all from Damyang and had gone to Gwangju to get tractor parts and wallpaper on the pickup truck. We spotted barricades on the road by the prison and moved them out of our way, when paratroopers opened fire on us.²¹

Kim Seong-su (age 46), a traveling vegetable merchant, was making his way home to Jindo by truck at 10:00 a.m. on May 22 with his wife Kim Chun-hwa (age 43) and youngest daughter Kim Nae-hyang (age 5). They attempted to enter the Honam Expressway near Gwangju Prison when the truck was stopped by martial law troops at the guard station. When the soldiers blocked his way, Kim turned back to return to Gwangju, when they were assaulted by gunfire. The couple’s daughter was left paralyzed below the waist and his wife’s injuries required three separate brain surgeries.²² Kim testified:

I spotted a barricade of buses and trucks outside Gwangju Prison. They told me to stop, and I did. My wife pleaded with them. One of the martial law troops made a phone call, then kicked my wife and told us to turn back. They said, “Go back or we’ll shoot you!” and pointed their guns at us. I had no choice but to turn. Then I heard gunfire and the sound of bullets striking my truck all over. By the time I sped up, realizing I had to get out of there, the seats were covered in blood. Blood spewed from my five-year-old daughter Nae-hyang’s waist. My wife was bleeding everywhere. I bled from my side, soaking the seat. I drove for about 300 meters before losing consciousness.²³

At 9:30 a.m. on May 22, Chae Jong-il (age 19, office worker), armed with a carbine rifle, reached the Seobang three-way intersection by car with his friends when locals stopped them, warning that martial law troops had set up an ambush near Gwangju Prison. When the car passed Gwangju Dongshin High School and reached Malbawoo Market, martial law troops on the hill ahead opened fire. Chae was shot in the chest and taken to the hospital.²⁴

At 10:00 a.m. the same day, Kim Hyeon-chae (age 19), a member of the resistance’s mobile patrol squad, was at Province Hall when he heard news of a skirmish on the hill across from Gwangju Dongshin High School. He reached the brick factory in front of the school and exchanged fire with the soldiers hiding on the hill. When several of the resistance members attempted to approach the barley field on the hill, the soldiers opened fire on them and prevented further progress. Unable to make inroads, Kim retreated to Province Hall quickly.²⁵ That same morning, Jeong Yeong-dong drove a jeep around the city in search of weapons. He was passing the Seobang area of Gwangju when he heard gunfire from the prison. Jeong drove past Dongshin College and turned the jeep around near Mudeung Library. Bullets rained down upon him. When the gunfire stopped, he sped toward Seobang and found someone bleeding of gunshot wounds. Jeong took the injured to a hospital in Gyerim-dong, but the victim succumbed to the wounds.²⁶

According to the military, martial law forces had opened fire from the prison to prevent the resistance from causing a prisoner escape.²⁷ However, no civilians who were injured in the vicinity testified to attempting to attack Gwangju Prison. Most accounts come from those wounded while attempting to return home to other areas such as Damyang or Jindo, to notify other regions of the crisis in Gwangju, or to enter the Honam Expressway to gather weapons and recruit volunteers.²⁸

Martial law authorities falsely claimed that there was an attempted assault on Gwangju Prison in order to package the Gwangju Uprising as a riot incited by unsavory elements.²⁹ The South Jeolla Joint Investigation Team, which investigated those connected to the Gwangju Uprising, asserted that during the uprising, Shin Ae-deok and Yu Yeong-seon joined the demonstrations, attacked the prison, and stirred up the crowds to rescue long-term inmate Yu Nak-jin—a political prisoner who was Shin’s husband and Yu Yeong-seon’s older brother. The Investigation Team claimed that Yu and a group of demonstrators attempted to attack Gwangju Prison during the uprising.³⁰

However, the lies perpetrated by the Defense Security Command were exposed by the Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission in 2007. Although it was true that Yu was incarcerated at Gwangju Prison and that Yu Yeong-seon had been shot to death, Shin Ae-deok had only been searching for her daughter Yu So-yeong—a Chosun University student who had been taken into preventative custody—and never incited people to attack the prison. Yu Yeong-seon joined the demonstrators in response to the violent suppression tactics used by martial law troops but was shot in the head during the gunfire in front of Province Hall at 1:00 p.m. on May 21. He was unconscious when he was taken to Kwangju Christian Hospital, where he soon died.³¹ However, shots were not fired at civilians from the prison until the arrival of the 3rd Brigade at 5:00 p.m. on May 21—after Yu had been shot and killed. Defense Security Command had tampered with the records to make it seem as though Yu Yeong-seon, who was dying of a gunshot wound in a hospital, had led an attack on the prison in order to rescue his brother.³²

Junam Village

Having withdrawn from Province Hall on the afternoon of May 21, the 7th and 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigades set up camp on the mountain behind Junam Village in Jiwon-dong. On May 22, they fully blocked off the roads between Gwangju and Hwasun. At 6:00 a.m. on May 22, the 11th stationed the 61st, 62nd, and 63rd Battalions along the national road leading to Hwasun from Sotae-dong (near Sotae Bridge, which today intersects with the Gwangju Loop 2 expressway that circles the city) to Junam Village. The 11th Field Battalion of the 35th Battalion of the 7th Brigade was stationed at Neoritjae Tunnel. At 6:30 p.m., the 7th cut off road traffic between Hwasun and Gwangju when it fired on a 2.5-tonne truck making its way to Gwangju from Hwasun, stopped it, pushed it into the tunnel, and set it on fire.³³

Bangnim-dong resident Choi Byeong-ho (age 30) went hiking up the nearby hill in Jiwon-dong at 6:00 a.m. on May 23, close to the blockade line, when he was shot in the leg by martial law troops. Homemaker Kang Hae-jung (age 45) was walking from Jiwon-dong to send off her two sons to safety in Hwasun with her daughter. She had intended to see them off at Neoritjae, when a resistance bus passed them by in front of them. A moment later, martial law troops lying in wait on either side of the road opened fire on the bus. Kang was shot in the process and lost her eyesight. She testified that she had no idea what happened to the people in the bus. At 2:00 p.m., farmer Jeon Jeong-il (age 39) from Junam Village was returning home from Yongsan-dong, near the blockade line, when he was ambushed by men from the 11th Brigade, who had been hiding on the slopes of Barang Mountain. He was shot in the lower abdomen. At 4:00 p.m., Kim Sam-jung (age 25), who was walking along the road near Mudeung Middle School, was shot and injured by martial law forces hiding about 300 meters away on Barang Mountain.³⁴

According to a Prosecutors’ Office report from 1995, the fatal attack on the bus near Junam Village unfolded as follows:

At 10 a.m. on May 23, a minibus traveled from the direction of Gwangju down the national road towards Hwasun, reaching the ambush point of the 4th Field Battalion of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade’s 62nd Battalion at the foot of Bueong Mountain at Junam Village. The minibus ignored orders to stop and sped towards Hwasun. In response, members of the 5th Company of the 5th Field Battalion, who were on patrol nearby, opened fire on the bus. Passengers Park Hyeon-suk (female, age 18, third-year student at Sinui Girls’ Commercial High School), Go Yeong-ja (female, age 22, employee at Ilshin Textile), Hwang Ho-geol (male, age 20, third-year student at Open High School), Baek Dae-hwan (male, age 19, first-year student at Songwon College), Kim Yun-su (male, age 27, driver), and Kim Chun-rye (female, age 18, employee at Ilshin Textile) were among the ten killed in the attack. Of the three passengers carried to the regiment base, Hong Geum-suk (female, age 17, first-year student at Chuntae Girls’ High School) was airlifted away, and two severely wounded men whose identities are unknown died of gunshot wounds inflicted by paratroopers.³⁵

Prosecutors concluded that only one such incident occurred on May 23. However, other witnesses testified that on May 23, there were at least two separate instances where soldiers opened fire on a vehicle on the road between Jiwon-dong and Neoritjae and caused multiple deaths. One of these incidents is the well-known Junam Village minibus shooting incident, where Hong Geum-suk was the only survivor out of the eighteen occupants. The other was the attack on Van 103 of the resistance, where all eleven occupants are believed to have been killed. Victim testimony allows the reconstruction of the two incidents.

The first attack on the road took place sometime between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. on May 23. A twelve-seater van with the number 103 painted in white on the side was carrying demonstrators toward Hwasun from Jiwon-dong. It was a demonstrator vehicle, numbered by the resistance to avoid confusion on the road. Songwon College student Baek Dae-hwan, alongside former high school classmates Kim Nam-seok (age 19, vocational college student) and Hwang Ho-geol, wrapped towels around their heads, slung guns on their backs, and boarded the van.³⁶ On the way, they also picked up Ilshin Textile employees Kim Chun-rye and Go Yeong-ja, who told the resistance they were on their way to Hwasun for a jesa (an ancestral memorial rite). The resistance let the women onboard because Hwasun was too far away to reach on foot and even travel by vehicle was not easy. When the van reached Jiwon-dong, the local barber stopped them and said, “It’s dangerous to go any further.” According to the barber, about eleven people were in the van.³⁷ However, the van ignored him and continued toward Hwasun. Just past the last stop of Jiwon-dong Bus 1, in front of the brick factory in the direction of Hwasun, a paratrooper commander stopped the van. As the barber watched from a distance, he heard the commander say, “You’re all disgusting.” There was a sudden burst of gunfire, and the van was practically shredded. The people inside were killed. Soldiers quickly took the van away, and multiple bodies were left covered on the roadside for three or four days before they were finally taken away after May 28.³⁸ Of the victims, Kim Chun-rye and Go Yeong-ja’s bodies were later identified by relatives.³⁹

The second incident took place between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. that day.⁴⁰ This was the Junam Village minibus shooting incident, which was better reported to the public thanks to the testimony of Hong Geum-suk, the only surviving occupant. On the morning of May 23, Hong had searched the city with her mother for her older brothers—high school and Chonnam University students—until lunchtime, when they split up. Because city traffic had been paralyzed, she boarded a twenty-five-seater demonstrator minibus near Gwangju Park, which was headed in the direction of her home—near Okcheon Girls’ High School in Juwol-dong, on the way to Naju. However, the bus suddenly changed directions near Daechang Gas Station, heading for Jiwon-dong instead. When Hong asked why, the others told her that they would only make a brief detour before going back in the direction of Naju. Hong remained in the bus where she sat in the very back and exchanged greetings with a third-year high school student named Park Hyeon-suk. There were four women in the bus and more than fourteen men, who seemed to be school-aged or in early adulthood. Five of the men were armed with carbine rifles and had radios, and they all seemed to be close. They explained that they were gathering coffins for the dead.

When the minibus was about 650 meters from Junam Village, a soldier on the road signaled it to stop. However, the driver accelerated because it was clear that they would be detained. There was a sudden burst of gunfire as bullets rained upon the vehicle. Someone cried, “Turn around!” But at that moment, the driver was shot and fell limp. The young men who had rifles began to return fire out the windows. The soldiers responded with even more bullets. Soon, seeing no other way, one of the young men proposed that they hold up their guns above their hands in surrender. The men waved their rifles and the women waved handkerchiefs, shouting for mercy. However, the soldiers did not stop. Their bullets were concentrated on the front and back of the vehicle. Hong Geum-suk, who had been sitting at the back, crept to the middle and took cover under a seat. The bus was quickly filled with gunfire, screams, moans, and the clanging of bullets against the exterior. The man across from Hong cried out for help as his ruptured intestines spilled out of his stomach. Hong shut her eyes tightly and clung to the floor. When the gunfire finally ceased, the others around her had stopped moaning. Hong looked up, aching everywhere, and saw that she was bleeding from her right arm, back, side, buttocks, and calves. The bullets had all missed her, but she had been riddled with shrapnel. Voices approached the bus.

Figure 14. Massacre of demonstrators on vehicles near Junam Village (May 23)

“Check the bodies!”

Three or four soldiers stepped into the bus, kicking at each person with their boots to check if anyone was still alive. Someone in the back pleaded for help in a terrified voice. The paratroopers pulled him outside and then stepped back into the bus.

“If anyone else is alive, get up. We won’t hurt you.”

Another moan came from the front of the bus.

“Pull him out. And check again to make sure!”

Hong remained on the floor, watching the men out of the corner of her eye. Suddenly, someone kicked her hard in the side. She screamed and was dragged outside to join two heavily injured men who had been her fellow passengers. She clearly heard the paratrooper next to her declare that fifteen were dead. An ambulance arrived soon after and the survivors were given first aid.⁴¹ Hong and the two male passengers were taken into the mountains via tractor. When she asked where they were going, a paratrooper pointed his bayonet at her and threatened to cut off her breasts. One of the survivors, a young man in camouflage print, had one hand over a presumably injured eye and begged for mercy.

When the path up the mountain by the village narrowed, the paratroopers tied up the injured men, put them on a cart, and made Hong walk. They were taken to the base. Hong noted a large military presence on the mountain. When the soldiers searched the young men, they found their ID cards and ten carbine rifle rounds. A moment later, Hong heard a high-ranking man say, “What did you even bring them for? Get rid of them.” Hong noted that one of her fellow survivors was critically wounded, but the one in camouflage print would probably survive if he was taken to the hospital immediately. The wagon carrying the pleading men was taken away somewhere. Some time later, Hong heard gunshots from the direction in which the survivors were taken. The soldier assigned to watch her said, “If anyone asks, you don’t know anything. I’m telling you this because I have a little sister around your age. Eleven people died just this morning.” Much later, Hong was airlifted to Songjeong-ri Air Base, from where she was taken to the hospital for treatment.⁴²

In 1995, prosecutors stated, “the two male survivors were shot and killed by paratroopers.”⁴³ Two bodies presumed to be these men were found on June 3, approximately ten days after the Gwangju Uprising had ended, by Junam Village high school student Im Hui-ju.⁴⁴ The bodies of those killed in the minibus were either left exposed in watery ditches or buried in shallow mass graves in the barley fields and mountainsides by the road. Even locals could not approach these areas until May 24, as the 7th and 11th Brigades remained stationed there. The bodies were recovered on May 25 and 28, when the paratroopers finally left Junam Village.⁴⁵

These accounts show that two separate shooting incidents had occurred between Junam Village and Jiwon-dong on the morning and afternoon of May 23. Hong testified that her vehicle was attacked by martial law troops at 3:00 p.m. The 9:00 a.m. shooting of the van was witnessed by local resident Yu Chun-hak (age 16, carpenter). Yu even drew a map of the scene for prosecutors and gave a detailed account of the event.⁴⁶ It is conjectured that at least twenty-eight were killed in these two incidents.⁴⁷ However, only ten of the bodies were identified. The fates of the remaining victims are unknown. According to special forces combat reports written after the uprising was quashed, no civilians were killed in the Junam Village area. In addition, Hong’s first witness testimony, composed during the South Jeolla Province joint investigation in 1980, is officially missing—even though testimonies from other people still remain.⁴⁸ The absence of this key evidence shows the degree to which the military tampered with records in order to cover up their actions.

The Gwangju Armed Forces Hospital

At 4:00 p.m. on May 22, the 2nd Battalion of the 62nd Regiment of the 20th Division received orders to secure the Armed Forces Hospital in Gwangju by 5:00 p.m. The battalion made its way to the hospital with three armored vehicles in the lead, opening fire on nearby residences and causing multiple casualties. By 5:50 p.m., martial law troops had control of the hospital.⁴⁹

Ham Jang-nam was a builder working on a house with his son Ham Gwang-su (age 17). They returned to their unit in a community housing building in Ssangchon-dong that afternoon, when a number of troops made their way into the local business district—some had concealed themselves in the foliage near Honam Theological University and Seminary in Ssangchon-dong, while others marched down the street with a tank in the lead. Locals, including Ham’s family, opened their windows to watch the curious sight. That was when the soldiers hiding near the seminary opened fire on the onlookers. Ham Gwang-su, who assisted his father in the construction business, was shot and killed as he watched from the rooftop.⁵⁰

Im Jeong-sik (age 18), who was preparing for his university entrance exams, had gone out to get his uncle, who had a leg injury from a piece of shrapnel. He was shot on the left side of his chest as he helped his uncle home. Another victim, Kim Jae-pyeong (age 29), was an employee at the Wando National Federation of Fisheries Co-op who had come to Gwangju to meet his newborn daughter. Cho Gyu-yeong (age 38), who worked at a brick factory near the Armed Forces Hospital, was shot when he went out to see the military’s approach. Lee Mae-sil (age 68) was killed in her bedroom in Ssangchon-dong when a bullet pierced the door and hit the right side of her jaw. Kim Yeong-seon (age 26) was shot in the chest while standing in the alleyway in front of his home, and Yang Hoe-nam (age 30), who was in the oil delivery business, was shot when he left his house to rescue the injured. Soldiers collected the bodies and buried them in unmarked graves in the Baegil Shooting Range. It was only about two weeks later that family members managed to track down the locations of their loved ones.

Many people were injured by the gunshots as well. Choi Bok-deok (female, age 61), who ran a corner store near the hospital, received injuries to the face when bullets flew into her home as she walked into the living room.⁵¹ The bullets shattered her windows and even drove into the blankets in her dresser. Homemaker Son Je-seon (female, age 30) and her 5-year-old son Kim Cheol-su were both injured. Son lost one side of her jaw, and Cheol-su was shot in the wrist. Choi Bok-sun (female, age 39) had opened a door on the second floor and was about to go downstairs when a bullet smashed through the window and hit her shoulder.⁵² Vocational student Choi Sang-eon (age 25) was exercising on the rooftop when he received a spinal injury.⁵³ Laborer Yu Bok-dong (age 35) was shot in the mouth by a bullet that had broken through the frame of his front door.⁵⁴ His daughter next to him was hit by shrapnel, leaving her face covered in blood. The soldiers had come to a stop on the street and threatened, “Onlookers will be shot!” and opened fire recklessly. Lee Chu-ja (female, age 23), who was three months pregnant, had opened her door in surprise at the gunfire, when a bullet grazed her face by her right eye and ear.⁵⁵

When martial law forces continued to fire on the neighborhood, the resistance’s Hwajeong-dong unit retaliated. The shootout continued for some time and left one soldier dead.

Military records state, “Protesters opened fire from high-rises such as condos, forcing soldiers to return fire. Three civilians were killed.” The official tally states that three were killed, ten injured, and twenty-five were taken into custody; on the military side, one was killed and four were injured.⁵⁶ The Prosecutors’ Office investigation, however, found that a total of eight, not three, civilians had been killed during this incident.⁵⁷

Useuljae and Bokpyeong-ri in Haenam County

At 9:00 p.m. on May 22, the 2nd Battalion of the 93rd Regiment stationed forty and ten armed personnel respectively at Useuljae and Bokpyeong-ri—both situated in Haenam County. At 5:30 a.m. on May 23, shots were fired in Useuljae.⁵⁸ Soldiers had opened fire on a jeep carrying seven or eight civilians, sending the jeep careening into a ditch. The passengers were all taken to the nearby military base. Bae Sang-seon (age 21) had been on his way to Haenam from Busan when he missed the last bus, forcing him to walk from Gangjin onward with three others. A truck bound for Haenam stopped next to them, and they boarded it together. When they reached Useuljae Pass, they found that armed soldiers had set up a barricade there. Three of the nine passengers disembarked and shouted, “Don’t shoot! We’re Haenam residents!” The soldiers ignored them and opened fire, even throwing a grenade. One person was killed on the scene. Bae was shot through the femoral region, and another passenger was covered in shrapnel. The truck turned around and fled toward Okcheon. Kang Seok-sin (age 17, high school student), who was aboard the other truck, was shot through the toe.⁵⁹

Martial law troops caused civilian casualties in Haenam County again later that day. At 10:00 a.m., two demonstrator buses making their way from Hwawon-myeon approached a military barricade at Bokpyeong-ri, when ten national defense reservists opened fire at the buses. One person was killed, another was shot through the stomach, and all of the fifty-plus passengers were taken into custody.

The following day, demonstrators on seven buses making their way to Haenam also ran into soldiers in front of a military base. The tense situation, however, was defused by the base commander and the mayor of Haenam Village.

The implementation of the blockade on May 21, the invocation of the right of self-defense, and Martial Law Directive 11 were followed immediately by open and widespread killings of civilians by martial law troops.⁶⁰ Where previously soldiers had at least made an attempt to hold fire outside of extreme situations, the invocation of the right of self-defense led to indiscriminate fire on civilians and shots fired without warning in plain sight of the public.⁶¹

What martial law troops feared most was not riots, but the exposure of their killings of civilians to the rest of the country, which could lead to nationwide protests. The people of Gwangju made a valiant attempt to break through the barricades and convey the truth of the situation to other regions but were only able to reach the southwestern areas of South Jeolla Province.

Having completely cut off the province from the rest of South Korea, martial law troops systematically took control of cities and counties, stationing personnel at locations of strategic importance such as Haenam, Nampyeong, and Yeonggwang in order to put down armed demonstrators outside Gwangju. Helicopters followed groups from overhead, and when the demonstrators drew close to soldiers lying in ambush, the helicopters instructed the troops to attack.

Gwangju was all but blocked to entry by vehicles on May 22. The following day, concerned citizens in other areas began to recall distributed weapons for safety purposes. By May 24, demonstrator vehicles were a rare sight on the roads of South Jeolla Province.

Part II

Gwangju! Gwangju! Gwangju!

8

Liberation I
(Thursday, May 22: Day 5 of the Uprising)

The Joy of Victory and Liberation

On the fifth day of the Gwangju Uprising, the joy of victory and liberation spread across the city like morning sunshine. The people were finally free. Those who accused them of rioting had been driven out of the city. Those who had taken innocent lives had disappeared from their sights.

“To Province Hall!”

People flocked to Geumnam-ro from every road and alley in the surrounding neighborhoods, flooding the downtown core. Where paratroopers had used strategy and careful planning (May 18–21), the civilians had been reactive and spontaneous. But the series of spontaneous responses had proved a powerful force that allowed the leaderless but self-driven group to overthrow their oppressors and create a new order in the city.¹

The unprecedented violence of the paratroopers had initially terrified the people, but the fear quickly gave way to anger, which compelled the citizens of Gwangju to jump into the fray. The people were united by the understanding that joining hands was the only way to survive. This formed a foundation for solidarity among the citizens of Gwangju.²

The paratroopers, too, were faced with an unprecedented situation. They had been overwhelmed by an unstoppable, unknowable force. Initially, they had assumed that the demonstrators would scatter in a matter of minutes as they had during the Busan-Masan Democratization Protests. But the situation had spun wildly out of their control. The more aggressively they hunted down the demonstrators, the more the demonstrators fought back. Finally, the soldiers were driven to a point of terror, where they came to fear for their own lives—making them more susceptible to the belief that there was a mastermind orchestrating the actions of the people. Having been indoctrinated by martial law training, the sight of demonstrators fighting back against military authority came across to them as the actions of communist sympathizers, spies, or those under the influence of such individuals. The soldiers were trained to believe implicitly that democratization would cause societal chaos, which would leave the country open to North Korean invasion. At the outset of each operation, their commanders emphasized the presence of communist agents among the demonstrators and the necessity of constant vigilance. To martial law troops, the outraged demonstrators did not come across as citizens of South Korea under their protection, but enemies to be destroyed.

Enlisted men likely had different impressions of the demonstrations depending on their deployment date. The 7th and 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigades, deployed on May 18 and 19, took aggressive suppression measures in accordance with their training. Their violent methods, however, terrified and angered the citizens, which escalated the situation. To the 3rd Brigade and the 20th Division—deployed on the 20th and 22nd respectively with little to no such context—the outraged response of the people of Gwangju likely came across as unwarranted.³

Washing Away the Bloodstains

Gwangju’s popular uprising was a spontaneous act of self-defense caused by a powerful threat to the lives of citizens, but its historical ramifications cannot be understated. The withdrawal of the paratroopers left the people with an unprecedented power vacuum, where there was no state authority to oversee them. Violations of social order did not result in arrest by police. The people chose to fill the vacuum with an order and structure of their own. While the withdrawal of the paratroopers was still fresh enough to feel like a dream, Gwangju citizens gathered together to discuss the triumphs and tragedies of the past several days, the work that lay ahead, and the fate of the city.

Without prompting, the people began to clean up Geumnam-ro. Military trucks were repurposed into cleaning vehicles. Damaged vehicles were hauled away by crane, and the bloodstains from the victims—still red and not yet congealed—were also washed away.

Masked young people drove through the streets with signs like “End Martial Law” and “Remove Chun Doo-hwan,” singing and chanting rallying cries. They marched with pride and triumph like war heroes, and the people responded with equal exuberance. The young people who had fought for the city were informally called militia members. Women flagged down demonstrator vehicles and loaded them with rice balls and gimbap. Corner stores and supermarkets loaded sacks of cigarettes onto their vehicles. Some brought out water to wipe dust off the faces of the young people or simply gave them proud pats on the shoulder. The entire city saw the militia members as their children or siblings. When they passed by a pharmacy, the pharmacist would load a box of energy drinks into their cars, and even when the militia members declined, saying they already had enough, they were given extra food and beverages to share with the others.

The Organization of the Resistance

The demonstrators who had fought to defend the city the previous night gathered at the Gwangju Park plaza to establish an organized force to fight off martial law troops and maintain peace and order in the city. Four or five young men, including Kim Won-gap and Kim Hwa-seong, went around to number and register vehicles and assign them missions.⁴ They borrowed white paint and brushes from nearby florists and painted each vehicle with a registration number in large font on both the front and back, and registered the vehicle in notepads by using the driver’s ID as a reference. Smaller vehicles were assigned to patient transport and communications, and large vehicles to the transport of resistance members and citizens, logistics, and communications. Military jeeps would be used for command, reconnaissance, and situation control and military trucks for combat. Registered drivers were asked to drive out into the city and call for all other vehicles to be brought to the park for registration.

The park was soon crowded with vehicles of all kinds. Labeled with registration numbers, they were given more specific jurisdictions and missions. Of the seventy-eight vehicles registered at the time, vehicles 1 through 10 would cover the area from Province Hall to Baegun-dong, 11 through 20 the area from Province Hall to Jiwon-dong, 21 through 30 the area from Seobang to Province Hall, 31 through 40 the area from Dongun-dong to Province Hall, 41 through 50 the area from Hwajeong-dong to Province Hall, and the remaining smaller vehicles were given patient transport and communications roles. A significant number of vehicles in the city had been destroyed and abandoned during the demonstrations, and many that appeared whole had burned out engines due to reckless driving. Gas stations in the city were also running low, making the control of vehicles imperative to the resistance’s activities.

Though initially scattered throughout Gwangju, members of the resistance were contacted and sent to Gwangju Park; some were assigned to guard major buildings in the downtown core.

Using tanks and armored vehicles, martial law troops blocked off six roads that led into Gwangju with barbed-wire barricades. Soldiers were stationed in hiding places in the mountains to open fire on anyone who drew near. The resistance responded by building barricades of their own about 200 meters down the road from the military’s. They made use of burnt-out vehicles and tires, wire fences used for traffic, lumber, cement structures, and planters to build two or three layers and prepare for a military assault of the city.

The resistance was exhausted from five days of demonstrations and skirmishes. But the triumph of having driven out the paratroopers had boosted their morale to an all-time high. The resistance refrained from actions that might alarm the citizens. Their faces were blackened from days of going without a wash, and their eyes and cheeks were sunken from lack of food and sleep. Most were from socially marginalized backgrounds, while many of the others were students. Some of the resistance members had joined the struggle to avenge friends or family who had been hurt or killed by martial law troops.

The Mobile Patrol Squad

Having taken the South Jeolla Province Hall to use as a base of operations, the resistance transformed the General Affairs Division on the first floor into a situation room. Kim Won-gap and Kim Hwa-seong, who had finished assigning missions to vehicles at Gwangju Park, entered the building at this time.⁵ More than twenty armed trucks were placed on standby outside Province Hall so the resistance could respond quickly to an attack by martial law troops. The resistance first formed a security team to protect Province Hall. This team would defend the building, guard the main entrance, and transport and manage the dead. They were also supplied with weapons.

The next group to be formed was the mobile patrol squad. The vehicles that had been registered and assigned roles at the park were reassigned to this group. Members were supplied with weapons and would drive around the city and maintain security in areas of conflict with martial law troops. This squad also took charge of patient transport and policing work such as the arrest of hostiles or thieves reported by citizens. They were supplied with military jeeps, trucks, armored vehicles, and vehicles with tear gas–spraying capabilities.

The mobile patrol squad patrolled the outskirts of the city where citizens were still engaged in standoffs with martial law troops, such as the entrance to the Gwangcheon industrial complex, the Gwangju Prison area, and Jiwon-dong. They sent regular status reports to Province Hall by radio and were dispatched to crisis situations. This squad also took charge of the weapon recall initiative that took place May 22–25. They went around the city to inform residents about the initiative and transported collected weapons to Province Hall. Over time, a number of mobile patrol squad and security team members abandoned their posts. Because all members were volunteers who had stepped forward to protect Gwangju, no one could force them to stay. Empty positions were quickly filled by other volunteers. The resistance received no pay, were not given assistance for refueling, were not guaranteed standard working hours or relief, and were not given consistent meals. They subsisted on the gimbap rolls, bread, and milk handed out by citizens on the road, and the best they could hope for was a meal at the Province Hall cafeteria. Members of the resistance could not even dream of showering, getting fresh clothes, or washing their hair. They dressed in the uniforms and helmets left behind by martial law troops and police during the withdrawal, with high school students wearing military camouflage gear. The resistance’s tense eyes glinted from their unwashed faces. Most of them had been ordinary citizens prior to the uprising—servers, furniture makers, factory workers, and postsecondary students or those studying for postsecondary school. A significant number had come from nearby areas like Hwasun, Naju, Damyang, Yeongam, Haenam, and Hampyeong on May 21, spurred by the pleas of the demonstrators who had gone out to those regions for help. Many high school students had also volunteered. They would briefly go home for showers and changes of clothes; some were detained by their concerned parents and unable to return to their positions.

The situation room recruited volunteers daily to fill gaps in personnel. Volunteers’ identities were verified, but the resistance could not risk leaving behind records of the individuals because the future of the movement was still unclear. If martial law troops happened to take the city and find a roster, anyone who was involved would be in danger. Some members of the mobile patrol squad would later be absorbed into the mobile strike force, formed on May 26.

Most of these efforts were led by citizen volunteers. There was no organized leadership, but as they had done earlier during the demonstrations, the people of Gwangju took matters into their own hands and took the initiative to defend one another and their city.

The Province Hall Situation Room

The citizens and the resistance members who entered Province Hall early in the morning of May 22 were not yet organized, but their confusion quickly gave way to structure. The building was still littered with firearms, gas masks, grenades, radios, and operation blueprints, which were quickly collected and organized for citizen use. The students in particular quickly brought order to the mess left behind by the soldiers.

University students including Lee Jae-eui (age 24) and Ahn Gil-jeong (age 23), who had been active participants in the demonstrations, also entered Province Hall in the morning to join the others.⁶ They watched the meeting that gave birth to the Citizen Settlement Committee and set out to find something that students could do. First, they established a communications system with resistance members assigned to the city outskirts using the phones in the Province Hall situation room. Two postsecondary students who knew how to contact the situation room would be assigned to each patrol vehicle on the perimeter. If there were any changes in the military’s movements, the students would immediately give local residents the Province Hall phone number to deliver the news. They would also contact Province Hall every hour for regular reports. The reports began to trickle in from all around the city as the vehicles went out for their morning patrol. Now Province Hall had something akin to a real-time grasp of the city defenses. Countless phone calls from other administrative offices across the province poured in beginning at 10:00 a.m., and the callers were informed of the situation in Gwangju.

The resistance also collected the grenades, rifles, and gas masks left scattered in the building and organized them into armory cabinets. Martial law troops had also left behind five radios of varying sizes, which allowed the resistance to listen in on the withdrawal operation that continued into the morning of May 22. The radio communications exchanged by members of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, who had attempted to go from Chosun University to their rendezvous point at Junam Village and were lost in the Mudeungsan valley, was heard by the resistance. This insight into military communications reassured the resistance that martial law troops would not immediately try to advance back into the city.

Some of the resistance members climbed up the pillar in front of Province Hall to deliver lists of confirmed casualties, the movements of martial law troops on the city outskirts, and other important reports to the people. Because Province Hall was flooded with so much pertinent information, the people naturally looked to its situation room for updates. However, there was no central organization to tackle these jobs in a structured manner at this point.

A significant number of female high school and university students joined the efforts at Province Hall. They went to the kitchens, the situation room, the Settlement Committee office, and the broadcasting room to take on cooking and clerical duties. Following the negotiation report announcement at the Province Hall plaza on the afternoon of May 22, Lee Gyeong-hui (age 20, student at Mokpo Vocational College), Kim Seon-ok (age 21, student at Chonnam University), and Ju So-yeon (age 18, third-year student at Gwangju Girls’ High School) heard the call for postsecondary students to gather separately and took on roles at Province Hall.⁷

Park Yeong-sun (age 21, female, second-year student at Songwon College) helped promote the resistance’s activities from a broadcasting car from May 24 onward.⁸ Female high school students from the Red Cross Youth volunteer club also assisted the efforts at Province Hall. The volunteers did not introduce themselves unless absolutely necessary. This meant that most remained strangers, but they were all united by a common purpose. The female students assigned to the situation room and the Settlement Committee conference room made entry permits, kept a list of the deceased, and managed the donations from the people of Gwangju. The broadcasting room next to the situation room, equipped with a high-quality speaker, was used to make announcements at the plaza concerning the dead such as details about unidentified bodies that could lead to verification. The system was also used to seek out families of identified casualties or deliver general announcements from the Settlement Committee.

Meanwhile, notifications from citizens had begun to pile up at Province Hall, but it took time to respond to them. Multiple reports of suspicious individuals led to arrests by the mobile patrol squad. Most of those reported were those who had discreetly filmed the movements of the resistance or carried around walkie-talkies or handheld radios. The captured were handed over to a makeshift investigation team to be questioned.

At 11:00 a.m., resistance members assigned to Hagun-dong dragged a captured paratrooper into the situation room at Province Hall. The paratrooper had hidden in the mountains during the retreat, only to be separated from the rest of his unit when he fell asleep. Trembling and pale, he begged for mercy—the ferocity with which he and his fellows chased down and stabbed the demonstrators nowhere to be found. Following a brief investigation, he was returned to his unit.⁹

Suspicious Individuals

As time passed, the offices of Province Hall—including the situation room on the first floor—were frequented by more and more people. By the afternoon of May 22, the building was crowded to the point of chaos. While some individuals may have been there out of curiosity, the sheer number of people made it likely that intelligence agents or saboteurs working for Martial Law Command would infiltrate the building. Self-proclaimed “investigation” or “intelligence” teams took charge of offices in the building for their use, but some of the individuals in these groups were of dubious backgrounds. Student Settlement Committee vice-chair Hwang Geum-seon (age 28) met a man from Suncheon on the second floor of Province Hall. After being arrested and taken to Sangmudae following the uprising, Hwang realized that the man was actually a colonel working for the Joint Investigation Team.¹⁰

Kim Yang-oh, a civilian in his mid-thirties, established the investigation team in the Rural Division office on the first floor of Province Hall. More than twenty people were part of this team, and they were divided into three sections: violent crime, nonviolent crime, and communist activity. The “violent crime” section was headed by a student preparing for university entrance exams, the “nonviolent crime” section by a Busan native who had served on the National Security Forces, and the “communist activity” section by someone who had been nominated by a member of the Settlement Committee for having brought a note of recommendation from the KCIA. There was a good chance that the activities of the resistance in Province Hall would be leaked to martial law forces. Investigation team leader Kim Yang-oh served until May 25 and fled Province Hall when it became clear that martial law troops would march on Gwangju.¹¹

Chonnam University students in the situation room, including Lee Jae-eui and Ahn Gil-jeong, had suspicions about two men who claimed to be members of the investigation team. They were both in their forties with cropped hair, strong builds, and sharp gazes. The students suspected them of being from a government investigation team because the men indiscriminately levied accusations against others of being communist spies. Concerned that this behavior would lead to accusations of North Korean affiliation against them, the students determined that it would be safest to drive these men out of the situation room. One student rose up, stood on a desk, and announced: “People of Gwangju, I am a university student. At this time, we are on constant alert for an invasion by martial law troops, and the people in this room must strive continuously for the safety of the people. However, there are so many of us here that even people who may be military spies are getting inside. We will henceforth restrict entry to the situation room and ask for your understanding and cooperation. Only people with specific business here will be given entry permits. If you have any matter that must come to our attention, please notify us so that we may issue you an entry permit.”¹²

All eyes in the situation room fell on the student. He had a loaded rifle in one hand and a grenade in the other. Most nodded and left the room, but the two suspicious men stubbornly remained seated. When the student held out the grenade before them and asked why they refused to leave, the men finally walked away, visibly upset. From that point onward, only those with entry permits were allowed into the situation room. The sentries gladly abided by the new system.

At 3:00 p.m., a foreign journalist from the Asian Wall Street Journal entered the situation room with an interpreter. The journalist, Norman Thorpe, asked about the scale of the damage and casualties and about the reasons behind the escalation of the situation. Thorpe spent the period of the Gwangju Uprising going back and forth between Gwangju and Mokpo to cover the unfolding story.¹³

Around 4:00 p.m., Gwangju Jeil High School’s Finance Alumni Club offered their assistance. They were quickly asked to tally the number of deaths from the local hospitals. Another citizen came to the situation room in tears, saying that his younger sibling had been murdered by paratroopers and suggesting that a funeral be held to appease the dead.

Open Testimonies

Countless citizens gathered on Geumnam-ro and around the fountain in front of Province Hall. They seated themselves on pieces of newspaper or flyers on the ground, waiting for some satisfactory announcement from the Settlement Committee. At 10:30 a.m., a military helicopter circled the area and dropped flyers addressed “to the rioters.” The people immediately tore the flyers into pieces or shook their fists at the helicopter. At 11:20 a.m., a Red Cross Hospital blood drive truck and several resistance jeeps drove around asking for blood donations. People boarded the vehicles in droves and went to the hospital to give blood.

Each time Province Hall listed the names of those newly identified as deceased, the people held their breath, afraid that their loved ones might be named next. A young man would come out of the building, climb up the pillar at the entrance, and read out the list in a loud voice or chant a rallying message before holding a moment of silence, allowing the people to pour out their frustrations. The broadcasting room next to the situation room also announced the names of the dead as soon as their list was updated. Each time, people from the crowds would break down sobbing. Resistance vehicles busily carried the injured to hospitals. The resistance also collected bodies from the hospitals, put them into makeshift coffins, and moved them to Province Hall. Those whose identities were confirmed were brought outside to the fountain plaza.

YWCA employees Jeong Yu-ah (age 26), Lee Yun-jeong (age 25), and Jeong Hyeon-ae, as well as the members of the Songbaek Women’s Society, made more than 3,000 black ribbons to hand out to the people. The remainder of the black cloth was turned into a flag and flown at half-mast on the flagpole on the Province Hall rooftop at noon.

That afternoon, reservists among the resistance set up defenses around the Jeonil Building, the post offices, and the telecom companies. The people of Gwangju did not want to harm facilities that provided public services. The broadcasting buildings, the Tax Office, and the police stations had been burned, but only in retaliation for the lack of news coverage and the violent suppression tactics; most other public offices remained untouched for the duration of the Gwangju Uprising.

As the people sat in a daze in the Province Hall plaza, someone went up to the dry fountain and delivered a testimony of everything they had seen. Next, a woman in her fifties went up to explain that her child had yet to come home and asked for any information concerning them. Because there were no microphones and the crowd numbered in the tens of thousands, those seated in the back could not hear the people at the fountain properly. But the stream of appeals continued. The next person climbed up to the fountain, denouncing the actions of the paratroopers and describing the death of their family. An impromptu rally had begun. Some people chanted rallying cries until their voices grew hoarse. Others described detailed, organized plans for future clashes with martial law troops. There was no set format or restriction, but each presentation moved the hearts of the people. Gwangju was outraged, and the people had a clear understanding of their predicament. The fountain was now a place of sharing and empathy where anyone could give their testimony. Women selling goods in the marketplace, elementary school teachers, clergy, homemakers, young adults, high school students, and farmers alike were given a chance. Although the experiences they shared were deeply personal, the people applauded and showed their support, uniting the city. The defense of the right to live was at the center of every speaker’s testimony.

Following the transportation of eighteen bodies from local hospitals during the rally at 4:00 p.m., an additional twenty-three bodies were brought to Province Hall at 5:40 p.m. Each time an ambulance arrived with sirens wailing and a coffin was brought in front of the fountain, the crowds gathered around and wailed in sorrow. When the lids were opened, their terrible states were revealed to the public. Some were headless, others with faces caved in, hands and feet chopped off, insides spilling open, or burned. The people at the plaza trembled and wept. Most of the victims’ faces were left unrecognizable. Some of the bloodstained bodies stuck out from the coffins. The coffins had been so hastily constructed that they had not been properly filed down or nailed shut.

The Formation of the Settlement Committees

At 8:10 a.m. on May 22, a group of Province Hall employees and leaders, including South Jeolla Province Vice-governor Jeong Si-chae, Planning and Management Director Moon Chang-su, Internal Affairs Director Kim Dong-hwan, and Emergency Planning Manager Kim Gyeong-su, gathered in the vice-governor’s office for an emergency meeting. Governor Jang Hyeong-tae had fled the building by helicopter for Combat Arms Command just before noon the previous day, leaving his subordinates behind. Vice-governor Jeong pleaded for the assistance of lawyer Lee Jong-gi (age 63), businessman Jang Hyu-dong, Reverends Jang Se-gyun and Park Jae-il, Archbishop Youn Kong-hi, and Father Cho Pius for help in bringing the situation under control. Jeong called Combat Arms Command to convey his plans for order to the governor, who instructed him to include two of three more symbolic figures in the effort, such as independence fighter Choi Han-yeong.

By 12:30 p.m., the Gwangju Uprising Settlement Committee, composed of fifteen local authority figures, including reverends, priests, lawyers, bureaucrats, and businessmen, was formed, with independence fighter Choi Han-yeong as its chair. (However, this committee was destined to be limited because of its government origins. The people of Gwangju had no faith in the government and the military, meaning that this makeshift committee’s members would inevitably be replaced by new representatives who stood for the interests of the citizens.) The Settlement Committee held discussions all morning and agreed upon seven terms to be proposed to martial law authorities.

Acknowledgment of the unnecessarily violent methods employed in the suppression of demonstrations

The release of detained students and democratization activists

Reparations for deaths, injuries, and damages incurred by citizens

Punishment of those who issued orders to fire and an apology from the head of state

Citizens’ funerals for the victims

The promise that citizens will be safe from retaliation

The agreement that if the above demands are met, citizens would turn in their weapons and disarm themselves

These terms, however, did not mention fundamental issues that the demonstrators wished to address: the departure of the military regime and the establishment of a democratic government.

In the afternoon, Chonnam National University professors Myeong Noh-geun and Song Gisuk gathered dozens of students in the plaza outside Province Hall with a megaphone. Following discussions with those who arrived, they agreed to form a Student Settlement Committee, composed of five members each from Chonnam and Chosun Universities and five members representing the remaining postsecondary institutions in the city. At 6:00 p.m., Song led the committee of fifteen into the General Affairs Division on the first floor of Province Hall. They then reassembled in the situation room on the first floor of the building and had a two-hour meeting facilitated by Jeong Hae-min (age 23, fourth-year student at Chonnam University), where they agreed upon the name “Temporary Student Settlement Committee.” The word “temporary” was added in case existing student leaders elected directly by students, such as Chonnam Student Council President Park Gwan-hyun, emerged at some point and took up leadership once more.

Roles were decided for the new committee: Kim Chang-gil (Chonnam University) for chair, Kim Jong-bae (Chosun University) for vice-chair and funeral management, Jeong Hae-min (Chonnam University) for general affairs, Yang Won-sik (Chosun University) for spokesperson, and Heo Gyu-jeong (age 26, Chosun University) for weapons management. Other members were selected to oversee areas such as weapons recall, vehicle management, repairs and maintenance, public order, and medical treatment. This was how the two settlement committees were formed. The Citizen Settlement Committee focused on negotiations with martial law authorities and appealing to the general public, while its student counterpart took care of civil services such as cleaning and maintaining order.¹⁴

Unfortunately, both committees were flawed from the outset. Neither had been formed with significant input from the people who led the demonstrations and armed themselves, the resistance representatives, or those speaking on their behalf. The committees also failed to understand the nature of the changes wrought by the public’s desperate, explosive response to oppression. The committees’ founders set out with a humble sense of justice, with their only goal the prevention of further bloodshed. Their overnight discussions led to agreements for the formation of student resistances in district-level units and education schemes to ease the anxieties of the people. From the beginning, they assumed that a battle between martial law forces and the unorganized resistance would result in defeat for the city.

The First Negotiation with Martial Law Authorities

At 1:30 p.m., eight members of the Citizen Settlement Committee made their way to the Jeolla Province branch of Martial Law Command to negotiate with authorities. Their arrival coincided with the sudden replacement of General Yun Heung-jeong as Combat Arms Commander by Major General Soh Jun-yeol. Soh said to the Settlement Committee representatives, “I was only just assigned to this post, so I would prefer that you discuss the matter with the vice-commander.” Combat Arms Vice-commander Kim Gi-seok took over as the negotiation representative for martial law troops. He met the Settlement Committee representatives alongside three brigadier generals, a security commander (colonel), and an MP commander (lieutenant colonel).

The Settlement Committee outlined the seven terms they had agreed upon at Province Hall that morning. They first demanded that martial law forces admit to having employed unnecessarily violent methods in the suppression of the demonstrations. Martial law troops claimed that they had been forced to resort to violent measures because the demonstrators opted for violent methods first. Committee members retorted that unarmed citizens would have no reason to attack armed paratroopers and that the people of Gwangju only resorted to violence as a response to the methods employed by martial law forces. Vice-commander Kim and his fellow commanders remained obstinate. Their arguments concerning the first term went nowhere, prompting the participants to move on to the second. When the Settlement Committee demanded the immediate release of detained students and democratization activists, martial law forces responded that they would only release a select number. The demand for reparations was also met with a similar response, with the military unable to promise reparations to more than a select percentage of cases.

Cho Pius proposed that an audio recording or a transcript of the negotiations be made and a signed mutual agreement be exchanged, but the proposal was denied. When the committee demanded the punishment of commanders responsible and a public apology from the president, martial law forces only responded that they would pass on the proposal to the authorities. The demand for a citizens’ funeral was turned down because it “created the potential to incite the citizens,” and although the martial law forces agreed in principle to the return of the weapons taken by protesters and the promise of peace and an end to violent suppression, they demanded that the return of the weapons be unconditional. Both sides agreed to the term that there should be no retaliation.

For the duration of the negotiations, the military side made frequent phone calls to Martial Law Command for instructions on each of the Settlement Committee’s terms. After the first round of negotiations, General Kim Gi-seok pulled open the doors of the Quonset hut where the meeting took place, bringing dozens of helicopters and tanks on the grounds below into view. The tanks had revved up their engines, and the roar of the helicopters was deafening. He said to the Settlement Committee, “Look. We have tanks, helicopters, and cutting-edge military technology at our disposal. Why do you think that downtown Gwangju still remains in your control? It’s because we do not want to harm citizens. If they want a peaceful conclusion to this crisis, they will have to return our weapons and disperse. The military’s patience is not infinite.” It was a clear threat of immediate military retaliation. Martial law forces emphasized that their withdrawal was a strategic retreat and that if the people of Gwangju chose to dig in their heels, tanks and heavy weaponry would be deployed against them. It was essentially a demand for unconditional surrender. Settlement Committee representatives were exasperated by the aggressive attitude of the martial law forces. Cho Pius later remarked, “Not one of our seven terms were met during the Gwangju Uprising. The demands that the Settlement Committee outlined crumbled, and the only reward we had to show for it was the promise of release for some of the detained.”¹⁵

The Settlement Committee’s negotiators returned to Province Hall with heavy hearts. They conveyed martial law forces’ response to the remaining members, then agreed to communicate the outcome of the meeting to the people. Afterward, they rushed to recall police and military weapons from citizens to prevent further bloodshed.

Announcement of the Negotiation Results

The Settlement Committee negotiators departed for Sangmudae at 1:30 p.m. and returned to downtown Gwangju at 5:18 p.m. As people watched with bated breath, the committee held a public gathering to announce the results of their attempted talks with the Jeolla Province branch of Martial Law Command. Acting Prime Minister Pak Choong-hoon had been scheduled to visit the city that day, and the people had debated taking him straight to the hospitals to show him the dying and the dead. Archbishop Youn and priest Kim Seong-yong had also awaited Pak at Nam-dong Catholic Church. However, Pak did not set foot in the downtown core that day. Instead, he listened only to reports from the Jeolla Province Martial Law Commander at Sangmudae and declared, “Do not be swayed or convinced by the words of the rioters, who are a small minority of the people in Gwangju.” When word of Pak’s actions reached the crowds at the plaza outside Province Hall, the people of Gwangju denounced him, crying, “He’s even worse than Shin Hyun-hwak. They all deserve to die.” Having seen the government’s stalwart opposition to their movement, the people lost hopes for the negotiations.

With Vice-governor Jeong Si-chae leading the proceedings, eight members of the negotiation team took turns speaking at the fountain. They shared that the Jeolla Province Martial Law Commander had privately acknowledged that the aggressive suppression tactics had gotten out of hand, and that he would discuss the other terms with his superiors before giving an answer. When the remaining committee members followed, emphasizing peace and order, the people applauded in agreement. However, when committee member Jang Hyu-dong commented, “At this rate, we really will become rioters. We must return our weapons to Martial Law Command and hand over peacekeeping duties in the city to the military,” a stir ran through the crowds. One young man leapt onto the fountain and snatched the microphone from his hands. He said to the people, “Jang is a politician who ran for the National Assembly during the Yusin regime. He isn’t speaking on our behalf—he’s speaking against us. Too many people have been killed for us to discuss unconditional peace. We can’t surrender until they propose a detailed and specific plan to make reparations and make things right again.” The crowds applauded the young man and cheered. The young man was Kim Jong-bae, a Chosun University student who would take on the role of chair for the new resistance leadership that would be established on May 25. Kim denounced the Settlement Committee further: “You’re just trying to get ahead on the backs of the people! Get out of our sight; we don’t need you.” The committee members rushed off the fountain. The announcement reporting on the results of the negotiations quickly turned to an open testimony rally where the citizens of Gwangju declared their grievances with the committee. Not long afterwards, more than fifty bodies that had been kept at the hospitals in the city were brought to the plaza. The sight of the coffins only angered the people further, and turned the gathering into a memorial.

The Activists Gather

As the Settlement Committee announced the results of the negotiations, Yoon Sang-won, Kim Yeong-cheol, Park Hyo-seon (age 26), Kim Tae-jong, Jeong Hyeon-ae, Jeong Yu-ah, and Lee Yun-jeong realized that the committee’s priorities were not aligned with those of the people. The Settlement Committee was composed of government and community leaders, which limited them to the pursuit of order at all costs. However, the people of Gwangju were not yet equipped to independently develop and sustain a free city. They needed a group that would democratically consider the demands of the citizens, develop a vision for the future, set a course, and make rapid progress toward their chosen ideals. The city also had a desperate need for an administrative structure to replace the old one, which had been paralyzed with the withdrawal of martial law troops. The people wanted leaders to whom they could entrust their future and safety in this state of emergency.

Those who shaped public opinion in the area, such as businessmen, conservative clergy, high-ranking civil servants, journalists, and academics were not suited to taking on leadership in this situation. It seemed impossible to bring an end to the situation unless the Singunbu gave up its political ambitions or the people of Gwangju surrendered to martial law troops. The only group that might feasibly take on this challenge were the democratization activists and nongovernment political activists who had emerged during the resistance to military authoritarianism in the 1970s.

Unfortunately, student activists and democratization groups had been pushed into a corner. Reinstated postsecondary students who were known to the government, such as Jeong Dong-nyeon and Kim Sang-yun, had been taken into preventative custody on the night of May 17, and the student council members of major postsecondary institutions such as Chonnam and Chosun had been forced to flee the city and were unable to return to Gwangju. Key nongovernment political activists such as Yoon Han Bong, leaders of social activist groups, and progressive clergy had been driven to hiding out of the fear of impending arrest. The majority of opposition politicians who supported Kim Dae-jung had also disappeared to avoid being detained by the Singunbu. And it was impossible to combine forces with democratization activists in other regions such as Seoul because martial law troops had completely sealed off the city. Whoever stepped up to take on leadership would have to somehow harness the demand for democratization in the city and organize the people without help from the outside.

Nevertheless, a significant number of democratization activists—executives and leaders of community groups such as the YWCA and YMCA, human rights lawyers, professors, priests, and reverends—remained in the city. Young people from communities such as the Nokdu Bookstore, the Yangseo Association, the Credit Union, the Deulbul Night School, the Baekje Night School, the Gwangdae Theater Company, the Songbaek Women’s Society, the Council of Youth for Democracy, the Catholic Farmers’ Association, the Young Christian Workers, the YMCA, the YWCA, and the Modern Cultural Research Center, as well as postsecondary student activists who had not yet been arrested, waited for the right moment to act.

These people had joined the demonstrations independently or gone into hiding but they gathered at Nokdu Bookstore every day following May 18. By the morning of May 21, they had grown in number to more than twenty.

When martial law troops opened fire indiscriminately in front of Province Hall in the afternoon of May 21, the activists wrongly assumed that the military had launched a full-scale invasion of the city and scattered. Yoon Sang-won and Kim Yeong-cheol were exceptions. The former remained at the forefront of the Gwangju Uprising, fighting alongside the people of the city. Kim assisted Yoon in the city by publishing The Fighters’ Bulletin with Deulbul Night School students.

Meanwhile, at 11:00 a.m., Gwangju’s clergy, academics, and veteran nongovernment political activists who had championed the cause since the 1970s gathered separately from the Settlement Committee at Nam-dong Catholic Church, which was situated behind Province Hall. The group included lawyer Hong Nam-sun, elder Lee Seng-hak, priest Kim Seong-yong, YWCA chair Cho Ah-ra, YWCA general affairs director Lee Ae-sin, lawyer Lee Gi-hong, professors Myeong Noh-geun and Song Gisuk, and teacher Yun Yeong-gyu. Some of these members would join the new Settlement Committee formed after the original group lost the trust of the people.

Signs of Internal Strife Over the Weapons Recall Initiative

Despite opposition from a number of people, upon its return from Sangmudae, the Settlement Committee elected to recall the firearms taken from armories by the demonstrators, believing that returning the weapons to martial law forces as soon as possible would be the best way to avoid further bloodshed.

The committee set up collection desks at Province Hall and Gwangju Park and called for the return of the firearms. Some of the resistance members complied, asserting that the formation of the Settlement Committee signaled the return of order to the city—order that should be respected. A significant number of the resistance, however, did not agree. They could not see why the Settlement Committee was so eager to collect the firearms when the negotiation with martial law troops had yielded no real results, and so they did not turn in their weapons. Most of these members were in charge of the city perimeter. The seeds of internal division began to sprout over the issue of the weapons recall initiative, threatening to undermine the momentum for democracy that had been built up over the past several days. Kim Jong-bae and Heo Gyu-jeong from the Student Settlement Committee were opposed to the recall from the beginning.

On the first day of the initiative, the Settlement Committee left armed citizens alone and only picked up weapons that had been abandoned in the streets or those that had been voluntarily brought to the desks at Province Hall or Gwangju Park. About 1,500 firearms were collected by that evening, but they were simply placed in a haphazard pile near the security office at Province Hall.¹⁶

Unmarked Graves

Early in the morning of May 22, Seo Myeong-won, director of Chonnam National University’s Student Affairs Department, went to the campus with other school employees to examine the state of the premises. More than 500 belts and more than 100 pairs of shoes were found in lecture halls in the sciences department and the family studies building, which had been used as the martial law troops’ command center. The lecture hall floors were caked in blood. Seo spotted an unusually large mound of pine brushes on a small hill behind the campus. When he stuck his foot in the mound, it fell straight in. There, he discovered the body of a high school student whose upper body had been covered by a flour sack before being buried in the ground. The body showed signs of having been stabbed and beaten; it was later identified as Lee Seong-gwi (age 16) from Gwangju Commercial High School. Mobile patrol squad member Kim Tae-chan (age 19) also discovered a body on the Chonnam campus when his team went to the school on patrol. He spotted dogs from local residences digging at the paving stones near the school publishing building and pulled up the stones, where he found the body of a female high school student. She had been stabbed twice in the thigh with a bayonet; her eyes were wide open, and her mouth was filled with soil. He brought the body to Province Hall.¹⁷ Other bodies were discovered throughout the city, especially in the hills near the perimeter. One hill behind the 31st Division in Ochi contained bodies as well as half-dug pits, which suggested that martial law troops may have attempted to bury other bodies before running out of time.

The Regional Defense Squads

The plaza at Gwangju Park was the headquarters for the resistance, which created regional defense squads: groups of armed young men in company-sized units dispatched to key locations such as the Baegun-dong railroad tracks, the entrance to the Hwajeong-dong industrial complex, the expressway ramp at Dongun-dong, the Seobang three-way intersection, Sansu-dong, and Baegopeun Bridge in Hagun-dong.

The latter was the first location to which a squad was deployed. Moon Jang-woo, a platoon commander in the reserve forces assigned to the Hagun-dong neighborhood, organized other reservists and young men from the Hagun-dong and Sotae-dong areas into twelve groups.

Those later arrested for their activities in the Hagun-dong regional defense squad include Moon Jang-woo, Kim Yong-seon (age 19), Kim Bok-su (age 21), Kim Chun-seok (age 25), Yu Hong-ryeol (age 19), Heo Chun-seop (age 23), Park Byeong-gi (age 21), Park Dong-seop (age 33), and Yun Da-hyeon (age 29).¹⁸

The Emergence of Military Hardliners

A cabinet shuffle led to the appointment of Lieutenant General Yun Heung-jeong to the post of Minister of Information and Communication. Major General Soh Jun-yeol replaced him as the Combat Arms Commander at 10:00 a.m. on May 22. Chun Doo-hwan had ordered Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong to make this personnel transfer upon requests to replace the dovish commander with someone who would take a firmer position against the demonstrators in Gwangju.¹⁹ Upon consultation with Chun, ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Young-si nominated Soh Jun-yeol, superintendent of the ROK Army Administrative School. At 6:00 p.m. on May 20, Hwang informed Soh of his upcoming appointment and promised that he would be promoted to lieutenant general when the Gwangju situation was resolved. Soh had been passed over for promotion because he had stood against the Singunbu during the December 12 military insurrection. The post of Combat Arms Commander was usually held by a lieutenant general. Hwang, however, made the unprecedented decision to appoint Soh—a former classmate from the Korea Military Academy and a native of Gurye in South Jeolla Province—to the post in order to secure a hardline response to the Gwangju Uprising.²⁰ Immediately following the December 12 military insurrection, Hwang had also appointed Major General Kim Jae-myeong—yet another former Korea Military Academy classmate and a native of Gangjin, South Jeolla Province—to the post of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at ROK Army HQ, a position that supported the vice chief of staff in the operation planning.²¹

The government formed a Gwangju Situation Countermeasure Committee on May 22, which was largely composed of Prime Minister Pak Choong-hoon’s new cabinet. The first cabinet meeting included a report on the Gwangju situation from Martial Law Command, followed by the allocation of relevant duties. It was determined that the military would primarily take charge of resolving the situation, and other branches of government would take on civilian relief responsibilities. At 9:30 p.m., Acting Prime Minister Pak Choong-hoon delivered an address on the government’s stance to the Gwangju situation via television and radio:

The city of Gwangju is a security vacuum with no military or police to keep the peace. Unsavory elements from outside attacked civic centers, committed arson, and stole firearms with which they attacked the military, killing multiple personnel. However, the military is currently unable to open fire on civilians due to orders from the government. The situation in the city seems to be improving, judging from the fact that City Hall employees are still going about their duties, utilities are being provided, and banks have been left unmolested.²²

In his position as acting KCIA Director, Chun Doo-hwan held a press conference at the Shilla Hotel with the heads of major press on May 22, where he expressed his opinion on the situation. According to a two-page document covering Chun’s statements, Chun began by explaining that “the military has surrounded the perimeter of Gwangju, cutting off the city to prevent entry from areas such as Mokpo, and has set up a radio communications center at Gwangju Airfield to deliver real-time reports on the situation.”²³

Chun also mentioned unfounded rumors such as “hardware stores in the city are the main targets of looting,” or “rioters are going door-to-door to browbeat civilians into joining and threaten local leaders,” and that rallying cries such as “wipe out the rich” had become popular in the city. He went further to say that “unknown persons dressed as paratroopers had gone up Mudeung Mountain on ten trucks and claimed that ‘Soldiers of the Jeolla Provinces have risen up against the soldiers of the Gyeongsang Provinces’ and may attempt to cross to North Korea by sea, forcing a navy blockade of the coast.” Chun emphasized that “armed rioters have launched a siege on Gwangju Prison” and that “radio monitoring has revealed that the Unification Revolutionary Party has sent orders for explosives to be detonated at the prison.” He also claimed that “four crime syndicates serving Kim Dae-jung have joined the rioters.”

Asserting that “the military is preparing a citywide operation that may involve battles in the city,” he boasted his confidence that “the suppression operation will take less than two hours” and that “the military will not back down on its commitments.” He made comments that strongly implied a large-scale, violent suppression operation in Gwangju on May 24. Finally, Chun threatened the press chiefs and management gathered at the conference that “any sympathy or permissive stance taken [toward the Gwangju situation] will be met with unprecedented countermeasures.”

US Assent to Military Suppression

On May 22, US Defense Department spokesperson Thomas Ross stated that “UN Command and ROK-US Combined Forces Commander John Wickham has given his approval to a request from the South Korean government to deploy troops under his operational command for the purposes of protester suppression.” Ross added, “We have yet to discover evidence that North Korean troops are planning to capitalize on this situation taking place in the south.” In other words, Wickham had agreed to the deployment of the military for the purposes of domestic protest suppression despite the absence of a North Korean threat. It was a victory for the Singunbu as they secured official US assistance and justification for the violent suppression of the Gwangju demonstrations. US Defense Department spokesperson Hodding Carter III expressed his “deep concern for the riots taking place in Gwangju” and warned of the “potential for misunderstanding by outside forces should the violent situation continue,” emphasizing that in such an event, “the US government would respond strongly in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America.”²⁴

That day, the US government decided to make an emergency deployment of two airborne early warning aircrafts from Okinawa, Japan, and the USS Coral Sea aircraft carrier, which was anchored in the Subic Bay in the Philippines, to South Korean waters. US authorities announced that they would first prepare for a North Korean invasion of the South and secure the latter’s safety before moving on to internal political issues, essentially making a public declaration that national stability was a higher priority than human rights. When word spread that a US aircraft carrier would be docking in Busan, the people of Gwangju began to hope the United States was there to keep Chun in check.

However, Wickham had already approved the Korean Minister of National Defense and ROK Army Chief of Staff’s request for transfer of wartime operational control of the 20th Division on May 16. When the Korean government once again requested permission to alter the 20th’s role from the suppression of riots in the Seoul region to the suppression of riots in Gwangju, Ambassador Gleysteen and Commander Wickham consulted with Washington before approving the requests.²⁵

Diplomat David Miller—chair of the American Cultural Service in Gwangju—stayed at the Gwangju Tourist Hotel on Geumnam-ro on May 19–21 to deliver daily reports to Gleysteen.²⁶ The same hotel was also used as a clandestine base by members of Defense Security Command’s 505th Security Unit.²⁷

Premonitions of Lasting Anti-US Sentiment

Pointing out to Washington authorities that a military solution to the Gwangju situation seemed to be at hand, Gleysteen stated in his May 21 report that the military’s involvement might cause difficulties for the United States in the future. His first report of the day predicted that the approval of the deployment of the 20th Division—then under US operational command—would raise issues of US culpability.

Gleysteen’s second report from May 21 went further into detail:

While [the] military will probably restore order using considerable force, sufficient damage has been done to create scars which will last for years … Why has this southern city fallen into serious rioting and a very great loss of the government’s ability to maintain public order? It is probably that regionalism is playing significant role in the intensity of the riot … Police and troops responded with special degree of severity, partly because of the spirit of the challenge, but possible because that was how they felt they should treat [Jeolla] people … Reportedly the rioters are linking the US to support of the ROK military and thus, in some way, to responsibility for events now taking place. The propensity to seek an outside villain may well cause us further trouble in the future.

The third and final report sent on May 21 claimed that “at least 150,000 people are involved … The December 12 [military insurrection] generals obviously feel threatened by the whole affair.” Gleysteen also reported that “General Wickham has agreed to a high internal alert status against infiltration and he has informally taken some measures associated with DEFCON 3.”²⁸

The following day, Gleysteen explained to Pak Tongjin, Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, that

US forces were cooperating with the Korean Army’s “efforts to restore order in Gwangju and deter trouble elsewhere,” but made clear that the United States “had not and did not intend to publicize [their] actions because [they] feared [they] would be charged with colluding with the martial law authorities and risk fanning anti-American sentiment in the Gwangju area.”

Gleysteen feared that US cooperation with military insurrectionists could lead to the growth of anti-US sentiment.²⁹

By May 23, Gleysteen had judged that the Gwangju situation had passed the point of no return. According to the report he sent Washington at 10:00 p.m. “the Gwangju ‘rioters’ had increased to 150,000 and were seizing hundreds of vehicles and thousands of firearms.”

According to secret meeting minutes from a US National Security Council meeting, high-ranking administration members gathered at the White House on May 23 to discuss the situation in South Korea. The minutes state that “there was general agreement that the first priority was the restoration of order in Gwangju by the Korean authorities with the minimum use of force necessary without laying the seeds for wide disorders later.” The White House’s plan was to first restore order to Gwangju, then pressure the Singunbu to permit greater political freedom. Zbigniew Brzezinski summarized the US position as follows: “in the short term support, in the longer term pressure for political evolution.” Several hours later, Gleysteen informed Pak Tongjin that the United States was “doing all we can to contribute to the restoration of order.”³⁰

However, the perspective of Reverend Arnold Peterson, who remained in Gwangju throughout the course of the uprising and personally witnessed the actions of the paratroopers, was strikingly different from that of diplomat David Miller.³¹ According to Peterson, clergy from multiple denominations gathered at Gwangju Baptist Church at 10:30 a.m. on May 22 and agreed to send three Baptist ministers—including Reverend Jang Se-gyun—to the South Jeolla Province Hall in order to convince the students to negotiate with martial law authorities. The students were convinced to strike up negotiations, and Jang and his companions joined the Citizen Settlement Committee. It was through this connection that Peterson found himself serving as an interpreter for foreign journalists who came to Province Hall. He remained in the city to the bitter end, even as his friends pushed for him to escape the dangers, and later testified to the violent suppression tactics used by martial law troops and use of helicopter-mounted firearms.

At 5:00 p.m. on May 22, United States Air Force Technical Sergeant Dave Hill made a phone call to Peterson to inform him that martial law troops were planning an assault of the Province Hall area and that there were plans for the deployment of US Air Force helicopters to rescue American citizens in Yangnim-dong. Peterson replied that such an effort would not be necessary and guessed that the rescue plan had been made due to the unfounded fear built up by diplomat David Miller, who had fled the city to the air base in Songjeong-ri. At the request of the US embassy on May 23, Peterson tracked down eight Americans and non-American foreign nationals located in Gwangju and found all of them safe. Peterson testified in his book that although he had gone out into downtown Gwangju almost every day by bicycle alone, he had not been threatened for being American and that in fact the majority of people he met in Gwangju welcomed him even more for being a foreigner and offered assistance.

Peterson’s testimony, as well as analysis of Shorrock’s reports to Washington, show that David Miller—who delivered real-time reports to Gleysteen—supported the perspective of the Singunbu. Consequently, Washington officials, who relied solely on Gleysteen’s reports, had been given a description of the Gwangju situation from David Miller’s pro-military perspective.

9

Liberation II
(Friday, May 23: Day 6 of the Uprising)

To Province Hall!

The sound of gunfire continued overnight across the city perimeter. Martial law troops had completely sealed off the city and secured their hold through the night.¹ However, on the morning of May 23, the city was still in high spirits from its victory and newfound freedom. Although vehicles raced down the roads in the morning, order slowly returned to the streets by the afternoon. Debates began to rage as the weapons recall initiative became a contentious issue among citizens. People gathered in groups by neighborhoods of residence and marched to Province Hall. More than 700 high school students took to cleaning the streets beginning at 6:00 a.m., and neighborhoods took it upon themselves to sweep local roads and alleyways. Women brought out pots to the roads by the marketplaces early in the morning to make rice. Resistance members who had stood guard all night drove into town and sat down anywhere they could find for breakfast, exchanging news about the battles that had taken place overnight. Shops also began to open for the day.

Countless bodies lay covered in cloth in the auditorium of Sangmu Hall across from the Province Hall plaza. Dozens had yet to be placed into coffins, and their blood left dark stains on the cloths. An incense altar had been set up for the dead at the entrance to the studio, and preservatives were applied to the bodies to prevent further decay. A long, winding line of mourners formed at the studio entrance, leading all the way across to the plaza across the street. Those who reached the studio were shocked by the sheer number of victims. They offered incense and slowly made their way through the auditorium, viewing the horrifically injured bodies as they trembled in rage and swallowed their tears.

Families of the missing also lined up at Province Hall to confirm the whereabouts of their loved ones. Those in charge of administration would compare lists of the missing submitted by families with hospital documents listing the hospitalized and dead. Most of those seeking their loved ones were women and the elderly. Young people wearing banners marked “Settlement Committee” stood at the main entrance, checking the IDs of individuals seeking to identify loved ones before allowing them to view the deceased. Most of the bodies had been so badly damaged that it was nearly impossible to identify them. Those that had been shot or clubbed to death had their faces and heads caved in, and those that had been stabbed had become swollen or started decaying. The bereaved went through one coffin after another—some containing stray limbs or decapitated corpses or faces gone dark with decay or eyeballs popped out of skulls—and held handkerchiefs to their mouths to prevent themselves from crying, or wept with their arms around the coffins until they collapsed in exhaustion. Bodies whose identities were confirmed were moved to Sangmu Hall.

Kim Jong-bae, who was in charge of funerals, noted a distressing shortage of coffins and went to funeral homes around the city with a statement of authority from the Student Settlement Committee. His intention was to secure about a hundred coffins for immediate use and pay back the funeral homes later with money collected through donations, but most of the establishments he visited had also run out. No one had expected so many deaths in such a short time, leaving the city with no coffins to spare. Kim made a special request to relevant authorities and was promised assistance by the head of the province’s Department of Health and Human Services. One young woman brought dozens of pairs of white socks to the studio and put them on the feet of the deceased. She did not disclose her identity but was supposedly an entertainment district hostess. She also drew water and washed the faces of the deceased.

Following overnight discussions, the Student Settlement Committee agreed to take on the roles of public peacekeeping, public relations, funerals, and weapons recall. The Citizen Settlement Committee, composed of local leaders, mostly returned home in the evenings, and came out to Province Hall after sunrise due to the fear of paratrooper invasion in the night.

At 10:00 a.m. on May 23, following the resignation of several members of the Citizen Settlement Committee the previous day, the remaining members gathered at the Governor’s office to reorganize their ranks. New members inducted into the Committee were Father Cho Pius, Reverend Shin Seung-gyun, Reverend Park Yeong-bong, South Jeolla Red Cross President Park Yun-bong, independence fighter Choi Han-yeong, lawyer Lee Jong-gi, Taepyeong Cinema president Jang Hyu-dong, and teacher Shin Yeong-sun. Afterward, the new Citizen Settlement Committee began to work alongside the Student Settlement Committee as a larger leadership group.

The Second Round of Negotiations

On May 23, the newly expanded Settlement Committee agreed upon eight demands to bring before Martial Law Command:

1. Acknowledgement of the unnecessarily violent methods employed by martial law troops and paratroopers in the suppression of demonstrations

2. The release of the detained

3. The promise that martial law troops will not be deployed into the city

4. The promise that citizens will be safe from retaliation or punishment

5. Government reparations for deaths, injuries, and damages incurred by citizens

6. Resumption of media broadcasts and the public disclosure of the facts

7. The promise that inflammatory words will not be used

8. The opening of roads leading out of the city.

Internal discussions among the Student Settlement Committee resulted in near-unanimous agreement on most of the issues concerning the situation in the city, but opinions were starkly divided on the issue of weapons recall. Chair Kim Chang-gil and several other members believed that collecting and returning the firearms would be the best way to prevent further bloodshed, while vice-chair Kim Jong-bae and Heo Gyu-jeong argued that the weapons should not be returned to authorities until the barest minimum of terms that the people could accept had been met by martial law forces and the government.

Cho Pius, Myeong Noh-geun, Reverend Han Wan-seok, Jang Hyu-dong, and Kim Chang-gil served as the Settlement Committee representatives for the second negotiation with Martial Law Command. Kim petitioned strongly to bring 150 of the retrieved carbine rifles to Sangmudae. Although opinions remained divided on the issue, the return of the 150 rifles was intended to be a symbolic gesture showcasing the committee’s dedication to their terms.

The Settlement Committee made clear to martial law authorities that although they had no authority or power to lead and control the people, they would put their lives on the line to recall and return all firearms on the condition that Martial Law Command uphold the terms set out by the Committee. Martial Law Command, however, was willing to accept no less than an unconditional return of the taken weapons. The committee sensed that it would be difficult to sway martial law troops and were seized by frustration and desperation. The sheer obstinacy displayed by martial law authorities even seemed to suggest that they only agreed to negotiate with the Settlement Committee to create a justification for an invasion of Gwangju. The committee judged that it would be easier to sway the people of Gwangju than martial law troops if they wanted to avoid further violence.

The negotiations went on at length, prompting Myeong to remain at Jeolla Province Martial Law Command while the remaining committee members returned to Province Hall with thirty-four people whom the military had chosen to release. Myeong continued to speak with Combat Arms Vice-commander Kim Gi-seok and managed to reach a consensus on six of the demands. They reached an impasse, however, with the demand for the release of all detained and those taken into preventative custody. Those in the latter category differed from those captured indiscriminately during the demonstrations—they were activists and nongovernment democratization supporters who had been selected ahead of time by Defense Security Command for their potential to hinder the Singunbu’s rise to power. Kim Gi-seok stated that he did not have the authority to agree to this demand—that the release of those taken into preventative custody would only be possible by orders from the central government. Myeong pleaded for Kim to change his mind, as there was no other way to convince the demonstrators to lay down their arms. Kim asked, “If I were to release those taken into preventative custody at Sangmudae, would you be able to guarantee a full resolution to this situation?” Myeong replied, “I cannot answer, but Chonnam students such as Jeong Dong-nyeon and Kim Sang-yun may be able to convince the demonstrators. Please let me meet Jeong and Kim so I can persuade them.” Kim answered, “Then we will meet again tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. to discuss the matter in further detail.” Having agreed to another meeting, Myeong went to the MP guardhouse to at least see the faces of the detained. He confirmed that those in custody were still alive but could only see them from afar and could not speak with them. Instead of heading back to downtown Gwangju, he spent the night at an inn near Sangmudae so he could return directly to negotiations the following morning.

To Return or Not to Return the Firearms

When Cho Pius and the other Committee members returned to Gwangju with the thirty-four released prisoners, the conflict concerning the recall of firearms rose to the surface. Those in support of the unconditional return of the weapons, such as Kim Chang-gil, argued, “Martial Law Command has released some of the detained. If we recall and return all the firearms, they will accept the rest of our terms. Continuing to struggle against them will only result in more violence. We must send back the weapons at once.” Kim Jong-bae and those in support of a conditional return retorted, “Giving back the firearms unconditionally at this point is no different from bleeding the people of Gwangju—not to mention that the members of the resistance will not agree to return the weapons. If we want to persuade the people, we need nothing less than a full change in the government’s stance toward us. The detained students and citizens must be released immediately, full reparations must be made for the damages and deaths, and the dead must be given a citizens’ funeral.” However, the voices of religious leaders, who fundamentally supported nonviolent resistance, added weight to those in the committee who argued for the unconditional return of the firearms. This made it difficult for those who opposed the unconditional return to strongly assert their position.

Meanwhile in Seoul, Ambassador Gleysteen met with eight assembly members from the Democratic Republican Party, the Yusin Political Society, and the New Democratic Party of Korea at the Lotte Hotel for a luncheon. The assembly members expressed their thanks for US assistance in Korean national security and discussed the Gwangju situation with apprehension. Gleysteen responded that the situation in Korea had recently become a greater priority to the Carter administration than Iran or Afghanistan and that the United States’ firm commitment to the defense of South Korea had been conveyed to North Korea.²

The First Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy

As the Settlement Committee went about its business, several young people working in the Province Hall situation room focused on the task of organizing the resistance. They felt that a stronger defensive stance would give Gwangju greater bargaining power against martial law authorities and saw that if order was not restored to the city and its defenses not bolstered soon, the isolated city would fall quickly and easily to an assault by martial law troops. In order to increase their chances of successful negotiations with the military, they had to display the solidarity of the people of Gwangju.

During the organization process, they recognized the disadvantages of fighting as an isolated city. In order to maintain a solid defense, they needed to thoroughly manage combat equipment, secure ammunition, prevent wasteful fuel use, build anti-tank defensive lines, secure a supply of food, and revamp their organization.

Early in the morning of May 23, civic groups and student activists including Kim Yeong-cheol, Yoon Sang-won, Park Hyo-seon, Kim Tae-jong, Jeong Yu-ah, Lee Yun-jeong, Im Yeong-hui (age 24), and Yun Gi-hyeon gathered one by one at the Nokdu Bookstore. The disastrous announcement of the negotiation results the previous day had made clear the people’s fury and their commitment. The majority of citizens were opposed to the unconditional return of firearms and distrusted the first Settlement Committee because it was composed partly of government officials. Leaving the fate of the city in their hands would clearly lead to further chaos. Activist leaders agreed that a citizens’ rally should be held to unify the people and form a solid leadership in order to gain more bargaining power against martial law authorities. The need for an organized group to promote the rally was also made clear. Activist leaders were finally ready to join the fray.

The first Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy would be held at 3:00 p.m. that day. Yoon Sang-won volunteered to go to Province Hall to meet with Student Settlement Committee chair Kim Chang-gil and take on the role of promoter, leading street broadcasts and the production of flyers and newsletters. Park Hyo-seon and Kim Tae-jong, both from the Gwangdae Theater Company, began to seek out fellow performers who had scattered. Jeong Hyeon-ae, Jeong Yu-ah, Lee Yun-jeong, and Im Yeong-hui called on members of the Songbaek Society to gather at the bookstore. A full-scale rally at the fountain plaza outside Province Hall would take a great deal of preparation. They needed microphones, amplifiers, and other audio equipment and had to invite speakers and compose speeches. Banners for the plaza and flyers promoting the event also needed to go into production immediately.

The most urgent matter was the promotion of the event to the people of Gwangju. Yoon Sang-won proposed that they drive a Chonnam National University bus around the city with a microphone and speakers to raise awareness about the event and gain the people’s trust. The university bus was important because there was a great deal of public trust in postsecondary students. Kim Sang-jip, who was a skilled driver, took a van to the campus alongside Kim Yeong-cheol, Jeon Yong-ho, Seo Dae-seok (age 20), Lee Yun-jeong, Jeong Yu-ah, Kim Yun-gi (age 23), Park Jeong-yeol (age 21), and Kim Gwang-seop (age 24, student at Seoul National University). Although they could not find the key to the bus, Kim started the engine with the skills he learned during his military service and brought the bus out of the garage. The activists installed audio equipment from the Gwangju High School broadcasting room into the bus and drove around the city to inform the people about the upcoming rally.

Meanwhile, Gwangdae Theater Company members Kim Jeong-hui (age 22), Lee Hyeon-ju (age 21), Yun Man-sik (age 28), and Choi In-seon (age 21), as well as Songbaek Society members Im Yeong-hui and Jeong Hyeon-ae and the artist Hong Seong-dam (age 25), made placards in front of the National Tax Service building to hang on the walls of Province Hall, Sangmu Hall, and police station garages. Banners reading, “Cheers for Citizens of Democracy,” “Tear the Murderer Chun Doo-hwan to Pieces,” “End Martial Law,” “Out with Yusin Remnants,” “Release Kim Dae-jung,” “We Fight to the Death,” and “Until the Day of Victory” in red, black, and blue paint were hung around the plaza outside Province Hall. It was a massive boost to flagging morale. The outer walls of the Namdo Art Hall and the YWCA on the Chungjang-ro side were plastered with lists of the deceased and gruesome photos of the dead, the injured, and those dying in hospitals. Most were hastily printed monochrome photos, but they still moved the people to tears.

After lunchtime, the crowds outside Province Hall swelled. The Settlement Committee inside had yet to reach a consensus. Some of the members were uncomfortable with the idea of a rally. Although they agreed to provide amps and speakers, the equipment was not yet ready. Park Hyo-seon, Kim Tae-jong, Park Mong-gu, Yun Gi-hyeon, and other members of the rally preparation team took the broadcasting amplifier from the Chonnam University bus and installed it on the fountain. They floundered because they did not know how to operate the equipment, but after a short delay, two radio store owners emerged from the crowds to assist the team.

By 3:00 p.m., a crowd of nearly 150,000 had gathered downtown. The megaphone sounded and the crowds circled the fountain. When Kim Tae-jong and Lee Hyeon-ju stepped onto the podium on the fountain to serve as the emcees, 150,000 pairs of eyes fell on them. When Kim took the mic and said, “I am a student at Chonnam National University,” silence fell over the plaza. His simple declaration won the trust and faith of the people. In contrast to the messy announcement at the same location the previous day, the rally on May 23 was structured and organized. It began with a moment of silence for the fallen and the Korean anthem. The stage was then taken by people representing blue-collar workers, farmers, ordinary citizens, students, teachers, and homemakers. Most of the speakers introduced themselves before expressing their perspectives on the situation or giving voice to their personal frustrations. YWCA Credit Union employee Kim Yeong-cheol spoke as a blue-collar worker representative, and Yun Gi-hyeon, a Haenam resident who had come to Gwangju on May 19 for the Catholic Farmers’ Conference before joining the demonstrations, spoke on behalf of those in the agricultural industry. Citizen representative Hong Hui-yun (age 34, homemaker) gave a calm and collected account of the atrocities committed by martial law troops, to great applause and empathy from the audience.

Organizers gave frequent updates on evolving situations over the course of the rally. They reported that including over thirty identified bodies at general hospitals around the city, as well as unidentified bodies, the number of deaths was in the dozens, and injuries in the hundreds. They also reported that it was impossible to know how many dead and wounded the paratroopers had taken away, and where they might be. The people wept with each update from the organizers and gave thunderous applause to each speaker. Some brought boxes of beverages and placed them by the podium. Someone suggested a donation drive to cover funeral costs for the dead, and in the span of thirty minutes, more than 1 million won were collected and delivered to the Settlement Committee at Province Hall. Donation drives continued afterwards, not only at the plaza but also at major intersections, where local residents and female high school students stood by boxes labeled “Donations for the injured.” People of all ages, from young children to the elderly, gave away 100-won coins and 1,000-won bills that, when totaled, rose to 80,000, 200,000, and even 500,000 won, which was immediately sent to the Settlement Committee. These efforts continued throughout the Gwangju Uprising, expanding into different organizations.

Choi Chi-su (age 19, high school student) took the podium as the chair of the High School Student Settlement Committee and said: “Fellow high school students! I am not here to tell you to become demonstrators or destroy something or someone. That job is for the adults. We must do what we can as high school students, taking on work like cleaning up the streets. If you are in agreement, please gather in front of the civil affairs building at Province Hall.” After the rally, 200 to 300 high school students congregated in front of the building. Choi led them on a walk around the city before returning to Province Hall to divide up their numbers. Some were assigned to assist the women providing catering at Province Hall, and other were assigned to knocking on doors asking for donations of rice for the resistance. Choi and his group of students slept at Province Hall from that day onward.³

At the end of the rally, Park Hyo-seon took the podium again to deliver announcements from the Settlement Committee and notify the people of the second rally the following day. The proceedings ended with three cries of “Hurrah for democracy!” The semblance of structure and organization that had emerged following the confusion of the previous day seemed to satisfy the people. Even after the rally ended, the majority of people remained seated in the streets, singing together. More than ten high school students carried the coffins of their deceased classmates, draped with the Korean flag, and sang “Our Wish Is Reunification” alongside the teary-eyed crowds.

As the people began to disperse, a helicopter scattered flyers from Martial Law Command across the city. The word “Warning” was printed in red, followed by the message “North Korean agents, unsavory elements, and criminal organizations are behind the riots, and Martial Law Command is committed to eliminating rioters whose actions continue to escalate with their theft of firearms, ammunition, and explosives.” Those who read the flyers tore them to pieces and stamped them under their heels for good measure. “Who are they accusing of being North Korean spies and unsavory elements?” they cried. Even after the crowds had gone home for the evening, the resistance stayed up until morning to defend key locations and the city perimeter. The blackout effort meant that the entire city except for Province Hall went dark for the night. Gunfire could be heard from the city outskirts on occasion.

The Necessity of a Powerful Leadership Team

After the rally, the activists gathered at the YWCA for a review. Jeong Sang-yong, Lee Yang-hyeon, and Kim Seong-ae (age 24) were also present, having broken through the blockade and reached the Nokdu Bookstore at 3:00 p.m. that day. They had fled the city on May 21 to find shelter in their hometown of Hampyeong but set out for Gwangju on foot on the morning of May 23. The return of Jeong and Lee greatly encouraged Yoon Sang-won. Yun Gang-ok (age 29) of the National Youth and Student Alliance for Democracy, who had avoided preventative custody on the night of May 17, had not left the city but instead participated in the demonstrations before joining Yoon Sang-won on May 22. Jeong Hae-jik (age 29), a teacher at an elementary school in Boseong hailing from Young Korea Academy, had reached Hwasun by train at 4:00 a.m. before taking a taxi to Neoritjae, where he walked to Jiwon-dong and received a ride from a resistance vehicle that took him into the city.

More than forty people gathered at Sosimdang Hall in the YWCA building for the review at 6:00 p.m. They included young adults, students, members of the Gwangdae Theater Company, members of the Songbaek Society, and students and faculty from Deulbul Night School. It was the first meeting of this scale since May 18. Participants discussed the afternoon rally and their future direction. They agreed that while the people’s enthusiasm was encouraging, there was need for more structure and organization, as well as a clearer division of roles. Lee Jae-eui pointed out the problems they faced, which had been identified at the situation room in Province Hall: the Settlement Committee would not be able to overcome the challenges ahead. To avoid further loss of life, Gwangju needed to have solidarity and alliance with other regions and a stronger resistance force, for which reservists would need to be deployed. The food, fuel, electricity, and water supply in the city would have to be managed efficiently. In addition, funeral rites would have to be held before the bodies decayed any further. A powerful leadership force was required to fill the shortcomings of the Settlement Committee, which had thus far been unable even to hold a citizens’ funeral. This would also give the people greater bargaining power against martial law authorities, which would facilitate the negotiation of a peaceful and satisfactory solution. Participants agreed that young adults and students would be recruited after the next rally to serve as volunteer resistance fighters to be deployed into Province Hall. The volunteers would relieve the regional defense squads, which had been working tirelessly around the clock for days. The formation of this new group would also support those in the Settlement Committee who opposed the unconditional return of firearms.

Activists in the religious and nongovernment political categories also jumped into action. Following the meeting on May 22, as many as sixteen activist leaders gathered at Nam-dong Catholic Church at 10:00 a.m. on May 23—Hong Nam-sun, Cho Ah-ra, Lee Song-hak, Kim Bong-hwan, Lee Gi-hong, Lee Yeong-saeng, Kim Cheon-bae, Song Gisuk, Myeong Noh-geun, Lee Ae-sin, Kim Seong-ryong, Cho Pius, Jang Ji-gwon, Jang Gi-eon, Wi In-baek, and Kim Gap-je. The people’s displeasure and distrust of the Settlement Committee following their of support for an unconditional return of firearms made clear to the gathered activists that the Settlement Committee would have to be completely revamped. Although they were not among those gathered, Ahn Cheol of Mokpo, Kim Yeong-jin of Gangjin, Lee Gi-bong, chair of the YWCA, and General Affairs Manager Kim Gyeong-cheon—all members of Amnesty—were counted among the members of the new Settlement Committee. The committee would also include the governor of South Jeolla Province, the mayor of Gwangju, the police commissioner, and leaders from the media and labor activist movements. The group also agreed upon eight statements to be made to martial law troops.⁴ The nongovernment activists who attended this meeting would go on to play leading roles in the reform of the Settlement Committee, along with the emergence of the Uprising Leadership Team on May 25.

“End the Crisis Even at the Cost of Lives”

At 9:00 a.m. on May 23, Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong; ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Young-si; the deputy chiefs of staff for intelligence, operations, logistics, and strategy; Martial Law Command’s chief of staff; and Second ROK Army Commander Jin Jong-chae attended a meeting at the ROK Army Chief of Staff’s office to discuss the return of martial law troops to Gwangju.⁵ The shock of the indiscriminate fire at Province Hall and the full withdrawal of martial law troops from the city on May 21 had finally worn off, and martial law authorities were now ready to regroup and take a different approach to suppressing the demonstrations. Chun Doo-hwan and other Singunbu leaders had ordered that “citizens and students putting up resistance with the South Jeolla Province Hall as their base must be put down as soon as possible,” and Commander Lee had called for the meeting to discuss concrete strategies for the troops’ re-entry to the city. Second ROK Army Commander Jin asserted that the troops must be deployed back into the city as quickly as possible in order to avoid a long-term standoff. Commander Lee agreed and decided that the precise details of the operation and its timing should be left to the commander on site—the Combat Arms Commander—subject to the earlier order for the operation to take place sometime after 2:00 a.m. on May 25, taking into account the time required for the return of firearms by the citizens, the separation of innocent citizens from rioters, and the preparation of the commanders of the units to be deployed.

In the afternoon of May 23, Chun passed on a handwritten note to Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong via Combat Arms Commander Soh Jun-yeol ordering an “end to the crisis even at the cost of lives.” The message also requested that the operation “not heavily impact the morale of the paratroopers.” ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Young-si also made a telephone call to Soh, requesting that the situation in Gwangju be resolved quickly even if it resulted in deaths. Chun’s course was set: rather than negotiate with the people to find a peaceful solution, he would pursue violent suppression tactics predicated on civilian deaths. The Singunbu took a particularly aggressive stance to the Gwangju situation because the spread of the demonstrations in the city to other regions such as Seoul would undermine their final goal of taking the presidency.⁶

Soh was in a rush to implement plans for the assault of Province Hall from the moment he took up his position at Combat Arms Command. Upon receiving the handwritten message and the words of encouragement from Singunbu leaders on May 23, he ordered Combat Development Corps Commander Kim Sun-hyeon to establish Operation Sangmu Loyalty.⁷

At 3:00 p.m. on May 23, ROK Army HQ Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Kim Jae-myeong reprimanded Soh in the latter’s office with the same arguments as Hwang: “Why has the response so far been lukewarm? Why have tanks and armed helicopters not yet been deployed to end the Gwangju situation?” Vice-commander Kim Gi-seok expressed his opposition: “This isn’t even a state of war—how could we use such weapons for the suppression of civilian demonstrations?” Kim Jae-myeong left the office with a look of displeasure.⁸

10

Liberation III
(Saturday, May 24: Day 7 of the Uprising)

Gunpoint Threats Between Generals

At 9:00 a.m. on May 24, Professor Myeong Noh-geun entered the Combat Arms Vice-commander’s office to continue negotiations with Major General Kim Gi-seok. He was soon joined by three or four brigadier generals in combat uniform. Myeong stood off to the side and listened to the discussions until the generals suddenly raised their voices. A general who seemed to have come to Gwangju from Seoul pulled a handgun on Kim and lunged as if to shoot him, and in response Kim also pulled out his handgun. The tense situation was defused by their respective subordinates, and the generals stormed out of the room, red-faced. Myeong supposed that while commanders from the Gwangju regions were inclined to a peaceful resolution that involved accepting the demands of the people of Gwangju, commanders from Seoul were set on hostile resolution—which led to conflicts such as the one he witnessed in the office.¹

The atmosphere of open hostility prevented Myeong from even proposing further negotiations to Kim Gi-seok. He walked out the front gates of Combat Arms Command knowing that Kim was committed to a peaceful resolution—to the point of drawing a gun on his fellow general—after witnessing Kim’s limits and how much pressure Martial Law Command applied on him.²

Despondent, Myeong Noh-geun walked back to Province Hall. The military had set its sights on a full takeover of the government, and its interests were diametrically opposed to the people of Gwangju’s demand for democratization. The Singunbu’s commitment to a violent suppression had been made clear to Myeong. He sensed that martial law authorities would move forward with hostilities even in the face of Kim Gi-seok’s efforts for a peaceful solution. By the time Myeong reached Province Hall, the atmosphere around the Student Settlement Committee was completely different. The members were divided into two camps: one for pursuing a nonviolent solution at any cost, and the other for fighting to the bitter end without surrendering their weapons.

The Regional Defense Squads’ Opposition to the Weapons Recall Initiative

Even by May 24, the Student Settlement Committee had yet to agree on the matter of recalling and returning their firearms. Those who sought resolution via the return of firearms to Martial Law Command remained starkly opposed against those who sought official apologies, the restoration of honor, and the prevention of retaliation as a condition to weapons return. In the meantime, weapons recall efforts continued for the third consecutive day. Safety concerns raised by the fact that firearms had fallen into the hands of minors led most to agree that weapons should be collected and managed safely, but the rally showed that although the people of Gwangju were in favor of collecting the firearms, the vast majority were against returning them to Martial Law Command unconditionally. They would need to negotiate further before returning the collected weapons to the military and police.

Settlement Committee members committed to nonviolent resistance called for the weapons recall not because they wished to surrender, but because they were dedicated to continuing their struggle in a peaceful manner, similarly to Gandhi. These members included mostly nongovernment political activists—Cho Pius, Nam Jae-hui, Lee Jong-gi, and Cho Ah-ra. The Settlement Committee made weapons recall a priority, leading to the establishment of return desks across the city. Mobile patrol squads went around to the city perimeter—defended by regional defense squads—to collect weapons. Even the defense squad at Baegopeun Bridge in Hak-dong, which had formed a strong, structured local organization to build up a solid defense, was eventually persuaded to hand back their firearms and disband.

At 1:30 p.m. on May 23, mobile patrol squads went to the resistance at Hagun-dong and demanded the return of their firearms, stating, “The weapons are spread too thin to be used effectively, so they will be collected and handed out again once a clearly-structured system has been established.” The Hagun-dong defense squad fell into a dilemma. No one had any way of knowing what would happen if they handed back their weapons unconditionally. They could not refuse, but a significant number of regional defense squad members strongly opposed the return of their weapons. The squad was so divided that their captain, Moon Jang-woo, asked the mobile patrol squad to return at a later time and held a meeting with his men. One by one, Moon persuaded those opposed to the weapons recall to adhere to the new orders, and when the mobile patrol squad came back several hours later, he returned his squad’s weapons. At that point, the Hagun-dong regional defense squad was dissolved.³

Unlike the Hagun-dong defense squad, resistance members in charge of the Baegun-dong railway tracks, the Hwajeong-dong industrial complex entrance, the expressway ramp at Dongun-dong, the Seobang three-way intersection, the Sansu five-way intersection, and Jiwon-dong vehemently refused to turn in their weapons, asserting that they had to fight to the bitter end on behalf of the dead and injured. The Baegun-dong defense squad was particularly opposed to returning their weapons because there had been a massive shootout in nearby Songam-dong and Hyodeok-dong in the afternoon of May 24, when martial law troops mistakenly opened fire on one another. In the aftermath, young people from the local community had been dragged away and killed in retaliation by the soldiers.

From May 23 to 24, Cho Pius, Jang Se-gyun, Lee Jong-gi, and Nam Jae-hui of the Settlement Committee also visited the city perimeter defended by the resistance to call for the return of firearms. Cho, who was beloved not only by local Catholics but also student activists and nongovernment leaders, especially emphasized the necessity of the weapons recall initiative. The resistance members retorted, “If we return our weapons, can you guarantee that reparations will be made for the blood that has been shed in Gwangju?” The Settlement Committee members could only respond, “We don’t know.” The resistance replied, “Then we refuse to hand over our weapons.”⁴

On May 25, the Settlement Committee went into the streets again, this time to areas where firearms had not been returned. The Hak-dong Bridge area on the road to Hwasun was a particularly dangerous location, as martial law troops were stationed on the hill by Junam Village nearby. When the Settlement Committee reached the area, they found the regional defense squad exhausted and hungry from having missed breakfast. The defense squad had earlier received reports of bodies near Junam Village and gone out on a jeep with a white flag and even Red Cross armbands to recover them, when martial law troops opened fire. Consequently, they were strongly opposed to returning their weapons. The Settlement Committee refused to back down and desperately attempted to persuade the resistance until the latter finally returned their weapons and the squad of more than fifty men left the Hak-dong area.

A group of a hundred resistance members were stationed at the entrance to the industrial complex, using an empty bus for cover. Beyond the barricades, in the direction of the Gwangju Armed Forces Hospital, were martial law troops poised to strike at any time with tanks in the lead. The commanders of this group were reservists, and the members were largely young blue-collar workers. They staunchly refused to return their weapons, stating, “Either way, we are going to die. We refuse to give back our weapons. ‘Resolving’ this situation will mean we get arrested and killed.” Cho Pius pleaded with them, “If we die, we die together, and if we live, we will live together.” Eventually, the resistance at the industrial complex entrance made a compromise to return to Province Hall without surrendering their firearms. Exhausted, they slept as soon as they arrived, but never once let their weapons out of their hands. Lee Seong-hak of the Settlement Committee proposed collecting donations to buy thermals for the resistance members serving in the chilly weather, and Yun Yeong-gyu immediately collected donations in a hat and passed the funds to the resistance members who had just retreated from the industrial complex. These resistance members filled their stomachs on fresh rice made by female volunteers in the Province Hall kitchens, and then returned their firearms.⁵ Of those who handed in their weapons, some left Province Hall, while about eighty or so remained to contribute to its defense.

Prior to the collection of the weapons, the number of resistance members defending the city perimeter were as follows: 150–200 at Gwangju Park, 50 at Seobang, more than 100 at the Baegun-dong railway tracks, over 100 at the Nongseong-dong intersection, more than 100 at Baegopeun Bridge in Hagun-dong, more than 50 at the Hak-dong Bridge, and more than 100 on the expressway to Gwangju Prison. Approximately 1,000 people took on the task of cooking meals and delivering them to the forces stationed in these areas.

By May 25, about 4,500 firearms were collected from the people of Gwangju, comprising about 90 percent of the 5,000 taken from various armories. The remaining 500 stayed in the hands of those who chose to put up resistance to the end and the resistance members who supported their cause. This was the end of the weapons recall initiative.

Weapon Returns: A Double-Edged Sword

The return of the weapons, however, proved to be a double-edged sword for the people of Gwangju. Safety concerns arising from teenagers and even elementary school students carrying around firearms and grenades (hung over their shoulders by a string through the safety pin) were addressed by the recall, but the majority of Gwangju citizens were opposed to the unconditional and indiscriminate return of their weapons, which they saw as an act of surrender to martial law forces. The people generally supported the idea of collecting the weapons to prevent accidental fire and other problems to keep them under safe management, but recalling the weapons and returning them to martial law forces were completely different matters.

The collection efforts had been rushed into implementation while the Settlement Committee had deferred the decision of whether to return the weapons to martial law troops. Student Settlement Committee chair Kim Chang-gil and his faction (who saw the return of the weapons as the solution to the crisis) along with the religious leaders (who called for nonviolent resistance and an end to bloodshed) were united in their support for collecting the weapons, which meant that the decision was made quickly. The return of the weapons, on the other hand, was a matter to be decided following negotiations with martial law forces. Unfortunately, the military refused to compromise and demanded an unconditional return of the firearms. From the perspective of Gwangju citizens, who wanted a guarantee of their safety following the return and a peaceful solution to the situation, the answer was far from satisfactory.

Although nonviolent resistance is a valid form of resistance, there are two prerequisites for the success of this sort of demonstration: the demonstrators must be able to openly reveal the barbarism of the oppressors to the world at large, and there must be a third party capable of passing some sort of judgment on the oppressors when their atrocious actions are revealed. The situation in Gwangju was different. The Singunbu had complete control over the media, making it impossible for those in other regions to know what had happened in Gwangju. The absence of an audience to see the military’s violent actions on the stage of Gwangju meant that there was no tactical advantage to nonviolent resistance. This absence of outside perspectives was painful and difficult for the people of Gwangju to endure. The Singunbu’s media blackout not only prevented outside assistance to Gwangju, it also erased the option of nonviolent resistance.⁶

In addition to the media, the Singunbu had also completely cut off road traffic leading outside the city. Taking these circumstances into account, the return of firearms to martial law forces was as good as an unconditional surrender. Giving back the weapons without any plan of action would rob Gwangju of all bargaining power. This issue essentially led to the dissolution of the regional defense squads and the breakdown of the resistance, which ultimately cost Gwangju a great deal of influence at the bargaining table. The return of weapons by regional defense squads who faced down martial law forces at the city perimeter essentially meant that the resistance had disarmed itself.

One of the greatest points of concern for martial law forces at this time was the large quantity of TNT stored in the Province Hall basement. Resistance forces had 382.5 kilograms of explosives, 6,800 detonators, and 6,100 meters of fuses—powerful weapons that posed a significant threat to the military. In response, martial law authorities discreetly deployed a technician to the city to get rid of the detonators. The Settlement Committee’s negotiations with martial law authorities was, from that point onward, an uphill battle. It was the contesting perspectives on the return of firearms that eventually led to the division and reconstitution of the Settlement Committee.

During the 8:00 a.m. KBS Radio broadcast that day, Martial Law Command announced, “Those in possession of firearms who return their weapons to the Armed Forces Hospital or a police station by the morning of May 24 will not be held responsible for their actions.” The declaration signaled an impending storm of violence in the city. The people feared government retribution. They had no way of knowing whether people in other cities such as Seoul would support their lonely struggle or turn a blind eye in their direction.

Resistance members who refused to return their weapons and defended their posts on the city perimeter, too, were afraid. A significant number of weapons had been collected and many teams dissolved, making it unlikely that the remaining resistance members could hold back an invasion by martial law troops. If the resistance lost ground, it was guaranteed complete defeat—even those who managed to survive would not find shelter in the city and would have to flee into the wilderness for safety.

Only those who insisted on revenge for the dead remained in the resistance and held on to their weapons. As the joy of victory and liberation subsided, fervor for the resistance also began to flag.

Military Friendly Fire in Songam-dong

At 1:30 a.m. on May 24, the 7th and 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigades, stationed at Junam Village, were ordered to transfer command of the area to the 20th Division’s 61st Regiment and move to Gwangju Airfield to take on mobile strike force duties. The 61st Regiment handed over the Hyocheon Station blockade to forces from Combat Arms Command’s Infantry and Armor schools and made its way to Junam Village. At 9:00 a.m., the 7th Brigade moved to Gwangju Airfield by helicopter, and the 11th Brigade traded places with the 61st and set off on land. Their plan was to travel with armored vehicles in the lead and the rest of the personnel following on fifty-six military trucks, driving through Jiwon-dong and Yongsan-dong, past Jinwol-dong and Songam-dong. They would then reach Gwangju Airfield via the loop expressway leading to Nampyeong in Naju.

At 1:30 p.m., those at the head of the 11th Brigade discovered more than ten armed resistance members near the Hyodeok Elementary School three-way intersection, who had come to the area by truck. A shootout began.⁷ When the rest of the 11th Brigade—following about 500 meters behind—heard the shots, they opened fire indiscriminately on their surroundings. They even fired at children bathing at the Wonje Reservoir in front of Wonje Village in Jinwol-dong, killing first-year junior high school student Bang Gwang-beom (age 13). They also fired on children playing at the entrance of the village near the elementary school, sending them scattering into the hills. Fourth-grader Jeon Jae-su (age 10) lost his black rubber shoe as he fled; when he turned back to grab it, he was caught in the hail of bullets and killed. Jeon’s mother went into shock upon seeing her son’s body and died of grief in 1984. Fifth-grader Kim Mun-su (age 11), who had been playing on the elementary school grounds, was also shot and injured.

The armed demonstrators discovered at the intersection near the elementary school included resistance members Choi Yeong-cheol (age 20, shoemaker), Choi Jin-su (age 17), and Lee Gang-gap, who had all been dispatched as regional defense squad members. A resistance vehicle had dropped them off in front of the school at 1:00 p.m., handing each man a helmet and a gun. Choi Yeong-cheol was given a carbine rifle and an M1 rifle—with fifteen rounds of ammunition for the former and three for the latter, which he kept in his pants pockets. The vehicle immediately returned to the city upon dropping them off. Not long afterward, around 2:00 p.m., they heard students on the school grounds shout, “Soldiers!” Paratroopers entered the narrow road leading to Jiwon-dong on an armored vehicle and opened fire indiscriminately. Choi Yeong-cheol quickly took shelter in a residence by the road, bullets flying past his ears. He took two shots to the head but was saved by his helmet. The first round grazed the top of his head, only rattling the helmet, but the second round hit the back of his helmet directly and pushed him to the ground. Choi dropped his M1 rifle and hid in the outhouse of a residence at the end of the road with only his carbine rifle. Two of his fellow resistance members hid in the house itself. In the ten-odd minutes Choi stayed in the outhouse, the paratroopers showered the area with so many bullets that he did not dare to move.⁸

Figure 15. Massacre at Jinwol-dong and Songam-dong, and misfire between martial law forces (May 24, 13:00–15:00)

Later, upon being captured and taken to Sangmudae, Choi learned that the gunfire he heard was from an accidental shootout that had taken place between military forces. While he was in hiding, soldiers fired three times toward the entrance of Gwangju Open College, each time hitting a rice paddy and sending mud flying into the air. When the commander ordered his men to search the area, four soldiers entered the residence where Choi was in hiding. Choi took aim and even undid the safety but could not bring himself to pull the trigger. He had lost all strength and could barely stand. Eventually, the soldiers found Choi and his fellow resistance members and ordered them to surrender. He walked out with his hands in the air and was immediately beaten with clubs and rifles, then trampled and kicked until he lost consciousness. All five resistance members who had been dropped off at the site were taken alive.

It was 1:55 p.m. when the 11th Brigade passed the Hyodeok three-way intersection (now called the Hyodeok Underpass) and reached the road in front of the Songam industrial complex. When the 63rd Battalion, at the van of the brigade, was about 500 meters from Hyocheon Station, traveling in the direction of Naju, it was ambushed by the reserve training unit from the Infantry School, which had taken up the post in place of the 20th Division’s 61st Regiment early that morning. When they spotted the entirety of the 11th moving with armored vehicles in the lead, the 61st mistook them for resistance members making their way out of the city. Immediately, they blew up the armored vehicles in the lead and the trucks that followed with four 90 mm recoilless rifle rounds. They then fired M16 rifles and anti-personnel Claymore mines and threw grenades at the group. When the armored vehicle in the lead exploded without warning, the 11th Brigade assumed that the resistance had buried mines in the ground and immediately launched a counteroffensive, leading to an intense thirty-minute battle between fellow martial law troops.

Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Jo Chang-gu, operations chief Captain Cha Jeong-hwan, and a sergeant identified by the family name Kim were among the six soldiers in the lead vehicle. The 11th disembarked as soon as the gunfire began, charging into the direction of fire. Following a fierce skirmish, they took over their ambushers’ hiding place in the mountain and killed one and captured seven. Upon investigating the captured men, they realized that their attackers were a reserve training unit from Combat Arms Command’s Infantry School. At the same time, the reserve training unit radioed Sangmudae and reported that they “launched a preemptive offensive on rioters on dozens of vehicles and overpowered them.” Commanders at Combat Arms Command realized that the 11th and the reserve training unit had mistaken one another for the enemy and belatedly gave orders to cease attack. Nine soldiers from the 11th’s 63rd Battalion were killed instantly in the ambush, and thirty-three soldiers—including Lieutenant Colonel Jo Chang-gu—were injured. Four armored vehicles and trucks were also destroyed in the battle.⁹

Retaliation and Massacre

Because of the initial difficulty of determining the direction of their assailants, the 11th Brigade even opened fire on residences in a nearby village. They injured Noh Deuk-gi (age 33), napping in his bedroom; Kim Yeong-muk (age 64), planting rice in the paddy next door to his house; Choi Cheol-jin (age 37), working at the nearby brick factory; Kim Haeng-nam (age 46), running a farm about 150 meters from the main road; and Yun Yeong-hwa, a barber. Dozens of bullets were found in the walls of Kim Haeng-nam’s house and in his clothes, and over 250 turkeys kept at a local farm were killed.

The 11th Brigade rushed into nearby communities and retaliated against the residents. They marched into homes and dragged out Kim Seung-hu (age 19, lathe worker) and tenants Kwon Geun-rip (age 25, blue-collar worker) and Im Byeong-cheol (age 24, Namseon Coal employee) who lived next door, took them to the railway, and executed them immediately. According to family, Kwon and Im had been playing Korean chess at home when the gunfire and explosions outside went silent, and soldiers charged into the house. The soldiers brandished their guns and raised their voices. Kim Seung-hu’s father, Kim Gil-su, responded calmly and explained, “only my family is here,” fearing that his household might be mistaken for resistance members. The soldiers, still furious, replied, “traitorous rebels buried mines in the road and destroyed our vehicles” and declared that they would search the home for the rebels. They pointed their guns at the three young men in the house and ordered them outside. Not long afterwards, the family heard gunshots. Their hearts sank. When the streets outside went quiet, Kim Gil-su and his family cautiously ventured outside and spotted a destroyed truck burning a slight distance away. There was no one around it. When Kim drew closer, he found people lying inside. It was raining, and streams of water darkened with blood ran along the pavement. He stepped even closer and found his son Kim Seung-hu, already dead and limp. Kim Gil-su fell into despair. The other young men dragged away by the soldiers were also found murdered in the gutters in front of the house.¹⁰

Local resident Park Yeon-ok (female, age 50), who had a farm in Songam-dong, set out to find her youngest son—a junior high school student—when she heard gunfire and explosions from the road and quickly took shelter in a nearby gutter. When paratroopers found her and ordered her to come out, pointing their guns, she was paralyzed with fear. In anger, the paratroopers opened fire and left her dead in the gutter.

Upon receiving reports of the mistaken battle between troops, Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong rushed to the scene by helicopter. When he witnessed the carnage, he showed concern only for his troops; he did not pay any attention to the murder of the local residents. Later he claimed: “I don’t believe such a thing ever happened. I do not want to picture soldiers stabbing innocent people to death—even women and children—and I do not believe such a thing happened. There are some rumors claiming otherwise, but we must find concrete proof against them. I will never believe their claims.”¹¹

In-depth investigations by prosecutors in 1995, however, showed that “an unidentified resistance member, as well as local residents Kwon Geun-rip, Kim Seung-hu, Im Byeong-cheol—who were detained—and Park Yeon-ok—who was hiding in the gutter—were shot and killed by paratroopers.” This was later confirmed by courts.¹²

A similar event occurred on the same day at 9:55 a.m. when 31 soldiers (2 officers, 29 enlisted) from the 31st Division’s 96th Regiment made their way down the expressway to return to Yeonggwang. One hundred and twenty (3 officers, 117 enlisted) soldiers from the Combat Arms Command Armor School mistook them for resistance members and opened fire, killing three enlisted men from the 31st and injuring 2 civilians and 10 soldiers.¹³

The deaths of soldiers caused by cases of mistaken identity became a point of debate during the National Assembly’s Gwangju hearing when it was presented as evidence of a split in the chain of command.¹⁴ The Infantry School reserve training unit’s ambush, which used heavy weaponry such as recoilless rifles and Claymore mines, was an act of indiscriminate murder that went far beyond the scope of self-defense.¹⁵ When the Gwangju Uprising ended, martial law authorities tampered with records to claim that those killed in these battles were shot to death by rioters and awarded them posthumous medals.¹⁶

The Settlement Committee Flounders

At 1:00 p.m. on May 24, Kim Chang-gil held a Student Settlement Committee meeting at the Province Hall situation room, where four demands to be made to martial law authorities were determined:

1. The government must apologize for its depiction of the Gwangju situation as a riot caused by unsavory elements, when it is in reality an uprising led by the city’s own people.

2. Citizens’ funerals must be held for those killed by the military.

3. All detained students and citizens must be released.

4. Reparations must be made at a standard deemed acceptable by the people of Gwangju.

These demands were officially announced by vice-chair Kim Jong-bae at 3:00 p.m. with the agreement that they would be submitted to martial law authorities in the name of the Student Settlement Committee. Vice-governor Jeong Si-chae and several members of the Citizen Settlement Committee, however, expressed their reluctance. Resistance to student chair Kim Chang-gil’s proposal to collect the firearms prior to ending the situation had begun to solidify.

Kim Chang-gil and Kim Jong-bae were fundamentally divided on the matter of returning their weapons to authorities. The former essentially supported surrender, while the latter supported continued resistance. Whatever the Settlement Committee’s demands, it was clear that Martial Law Command would order the immediate return of firearms and the dispersal of the demonstrators. However, the majority of people in Gwangju would not agree to such orders when more than a hundred innocent people were dead and thousands more injured, and the government had not given so much as an apology. In the end, they had only two options: surrender or fight to the death. It was then that Yoon Sang-won and Jeong Sang-yong went to Kim Jong-bae at Province Hall to offer assistance. “We agree with your argument, as do the majority of the people. We can rally postsecondary students to your faction.” Having waged a lonely struggle alone in the Settlement Committee, Kim accepted Yoon and Jeong’s proposal gladly. Kim Jong-bae, Yoon, and Jeong were now in an alliance.

The nongovernment political activists who gathered regularly at Nam-dong Catholic Church, too, did not place their faith in the Settlement Committee led by Vice-governor Jeong. At one point, Father Kim Seong-yong happened to visit the situation room at Province Hall and heard two members of the Settlement Committee speaking with martial law authorities over the phone. He was shocked to hear the committee members asking for the military to quickly enter the city and bring the situation under control.

Gathering a number of fellow priests, Father Kim returned to Province Hall for discussions with the Settlement Committee. He argued that the situation in Gwangju could not truly be resolved without the shedding of blood, but the government-affiliated members stubbornly insisted on the continued recall of weapons. Realizing that he could no longer stand with them, Kim and his fellow nongovernment activists left the building.¹⁷

It was at this time that students and younger nongovernment political activists, using the Nokdu Bookstore and the YWCA as their bases of operation, held the citizens’ rally and applied public pressure to the original Settlement Committee formed by Vice-governor Jeong, pushing them out of Province Hall one by one.

The Second Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy

On May 24, the walls near the plaza outside Province Hall were plastered with criticism of the Settlement Committee’s resigned stance to the uprising. Someone even put up an issue of the Japanese newspaper Mainichi Shimbun, which had published a photograph of the citizens’ rally in Gwangju. Foreign journalists were relatively free to cover the events unfolding in the city. Rather than treat them with displeasure, the citizens welcomed them. This was because stories written by domestic reporters were either twisted to cast the demonstrators in Gwangju as rioters or not published at all, whereas foreign journalists were able to cross the military blockade—going all the way to Japan to submit their stories—and came back to Gwangju with copies of their articles in print. Foreign journalists were also free to go in and out of Province Hall, whereas their domestic counterparts were strictly forbidden from entry.

In the morning, the Settlement Committee printed a list of eight terms negotiated with Martial Law Command and handed them out across the city. The situation initially looked optimistic, with the list declaring the release of all but 79 of the 927 detained persons. However, the people quickly learned that the negotiations had not gone as smoothly as the Settlement Committee had made it seem.

When the second citizens’ rally began at 2:30 p.m., the people poured out their complaints concerning the half-hearted attitude of the Settlement Committee. More than 100,000 gathered in the downtown core, and countless sticks of incense burned around Sangmu Hall. Although the hall was thick with the pungent smell of formaldehyde and decaying bodies mixed with burning incense, the mourners’ line went on without end. Rally organizers struggled to set up their audio equipment on the fountain, but the Settlement Committee did not show any hint of interest, let alone offer assistance. They judged that the rally would only make it more difficult to resolve the situation. To make matters worse, as solidarity grew between the people through the rallies—which allowed them to express their grief and anger—martial law forces sabotaged the proceedings. Operatives went into Province Hall and tampered with the broadcasting equipment, turning off the microphones and making audio systems installed in large churches unusable, and quietly made off with most of the amplifiers and speakers left in city radio stores.

The Settlement Committee, too, repeatedly cut off power from Province Hall to disable the audio system in the building. Young people responded by taking one of the vehicles left by the riot police, which was equipped with a loudspeaker, and furiously criticized the Settlement Committee. They accused the committee of attempting to compromise the ideals of the people against their wishes by conspiring with martial law authorities to end the uprising unconditionally. The young people in the police vehicle called on their fellow citizens to prevent the conspiracy and demand payment for the blood that was shed in Gwangju. The citizens gathered at the plaza responded with thunderous applause and cheers. They took batteries from cars and hooked them up to amplifiers so they would not have to rely on Province Hall for power. The rally continued as people took the podium at the fountain one after another to call for the punishment of those responsible and reparations for the dead and injured. Some also demanded the full disclosure of records from negotiation attempts with Martial Law Command. It was much later that lawyer Lee Jong-gi stepped forward to present the Settlement Committee’s eight negotiation terms. The people jeered at the extent to which the committee had compromised their demands. Suddenly, showers fell over the city, scattering the crowd. The emcee remarked, “These raindrops are the tears of those who died fighting for democracy and cannot move on until their souls have been granted peace.” Citizens folded their umbrellas and solemnly gathered together in the rain. Their silence soon turned to rousing clamor when an effigy of Chun Doo-hwan was brought forward and burned. The rally ended at 6:00 p.m. with a march through the streets. The American NBC and Jürgen Hinzpeter of Germany’s Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR) both captured the entirety of the proceedings on video.

When the rain started, a significant number of resistance members facing down martial law troops on the city perimeter left their posts. They had gone too long without encouraging news, the Settlement Committee continued to demand that they return their weapons, and the rain only made their situation more miserable. The following day, their numbers were visibly lower. KBS television broadcasts made a temporary return that afternoon but continued to describe the crowds gathered at Province Hall as rioters.

Rise of the Uprising Leadership Team

Despite many difficulties, the second Citizens’ Rally ended with more than 100,000 people in attendance. Student Settlement Committee chair Kim Chang-gil and Citizen Settlement Committee member Jang Se-gyun, however, asked Jeong Sang-yong to refrain from rousing the people further, as the Settlement Committee representatives had already promised the collection of weapons and the self-contained resolution of the Gwangju situation to martial law authorities.

Jeong responded, “The citizens of Gwangju do not want the same terms as the Settlement Committee. We must show the people’s commitment to their ideals through the rallies and gain greater bargaining power against the government. If you don’t have the confidence to make that a reality, step down from your posts.”

At the review meeting concerning the second rally, the organizers set four guidelines for future action.

1. Nongovernment political activists would be contacted and included in resistance activities.

2. To bolster rally participation, audio equipment would be secured and flyers, placards, and ribbons promoting the events would be made.

3. The people must be put on the track to resistance rather than surrender as the Settlement Committee prefers, for which the organizers would work with the resistance faction at Province Hall.

4. The Fighters’ Bulletin, vehicle broadcasts, and the rallies must be used to recruit young people and students willing to participate in the resistance, who can be assembled at Province Hall and organized into a new team.

The group further divided up their roles in order to continue the rallies into the future.¹⁸

The group also discussed the most pertinent issues facing the uprising and agreed to write messages directed toward the government, the people of Korea, the military, the people of Seoul, the media, and the people of Gwangju. These messages would be read aloud at rallies and call for national solidarity against martial law authorities. Another matter of discussion was the start of a nationwide blood drive via the Red Cross to raise awareness about the violence that had taken place in the city. They would also receive the Red Cross’s assistance in dealing with the dead and injured and in receiving food and supplies. Finally, the group agreed to organize young people and students, who would enter Province Hall and form a new leadership team. In preparation for this plan, they agreed to muster postsecondary students at the YWCA the following day.

Fierce Debates on the Return of Firearms

The Student Settlement Committee held another meeting at 9:00 p.m. in the Province Hall situation room, where tensions flared between the factions on the matter of returning their weapons to the military. Kim Chang-gil asserted, “Martial law troops have officially notified us that they will launch an assault on the city if we do not return our weapons. A full-scale military invasion will lead to massacre and blood in the streets. The weapons must be returned immediately.” Kim Jong-bae, equally agitated, replied, “Returning the firearms at a point when none of our demands have been met is as good as selling out the people. I refuse to compromise.” A majority of the Student Committee members expressed their agreement with Kim Chang-gil, but Park Nam-seon rose from his seat and threw his chair. “I would rather blow up Province Hall and myself with it than surrender the weapons on the military’s terms.” The discussions continued into the night, until a number of members left the room at 1:00 a.m. in disagreement with the rest. The students decided that the task ahead was too large and significant for them to take responsibility for alone, and they agreed to reinforce and reorganize the existing Student Settlement Committee:

Chair: Kim Chang-gil

Vice-chair/chief of internal affairs/general affairs: Hwang Geum-seon

Vice-chair/funeral management/spokesperson: Kim Jong-bae

Operations director: Park Nam-seon

Security management: Kim Hwa-seong

Planning director: Kim Jong-pil

Weapons management: Lee Gyeong-sik

Publicity management: Heo Gyu-jeong

“Why Must We Fight?”

Meanwhile, the young people organizing a more powerful leadership team, the Uprising Leadership Team (U), held a debate with the Student Settlement Committee (S) to decide the future of their resistance efforts:

U: What is [the Student Settlement Committee’s] outlook on the current situation?

S: We must prevent bloodshed at all costs.

U: On that, we agree. But what will happen if we return our weapons to martial law troops and surrender in our current situation?

S: We will have to trust in the martial law troops. They agreed to negotiate and make compromises with the government concerning the future of Gwangju.

U: Do you not remember who they are? Was it our fault that martial law troops slaughtered fellow citizens in the streets just a few days ago? Not one of our demands—the demands made by the people who bled on the streets—were met. Surrendering now would be an insult to the people who died fighting. If we return the firearms, we lose our only weapons, our own people, and our justification—and create a justification for martial law troops to commit massacre and violence in our streets.

S: We also do not believe that our demands have been met. But we refuse to let any further violence occur. Even if we hold on to our weapons, we will not win. We would not advocate for returning our weapons if we had a fighting chance to begin with.

U: Victory can be defined in many ways—and the resistance fighters who went before us knew that better than anyone. The only way to guarantee victory is for everyone to work together and fight back against the martial law troops. There are six arguments in favor of this tactic.

First, the eyes of the world are on Gwangju. According to those who came to Gwangju from Seoul, public opinion around the globe is against the current South Korean government—even America is on Gwangju’s side. Because they believe Korea’s democratization aligns with US interests, they will not offer unconditional support to the military regime’s hardline stance.

Second, the Choi Kyu-hah interim government is faced with a dilemma. Democratization supporters domestically are launching resistance movements and attacks, while even some in the military support our cause and are constantly on the lookout for a chance to lend their support, like the 31st Division. When word of our resistance reaches the rest of the country, other military units will falter as well. If nothing else, we must prevent the perpetrators of the massacre from taking power.

Third, other countries will cut off economic ties with South Korea in the event that the military takes control over the government. Our domestic economy is heavily dependent on international trade and will not survive such sanctions. An economic collapse will also heavily impact blue-collar workers, who will stand with us and rebel as the miners did during the Sabuk Incident.

Fourth, if we can keep martial law troops occupied this way for just one more week, the uprising will spread across not only South Jeolla Province but the rest of the country. The media blackout prevents the people from learning about our situation, but once information gets through, they will not stand by and watch. When other cities rise up as we have, martial law forces will be toppled in one swift blow.

Fifth, mass uprisings across Korea will make it impossible for the United States to turn a blind eye to the actions of the Singunbu. The Korean Peninsula is a keystone of America’s operations in the Pacific, and abandoning South Korea to its own devices would be akin to giving up the Pacific region itself. Rather than allow South Korea to fall to chaos and permit North Korean threats to become a reality, the United States will choose to back democratization in South Korea.

Sixth, even if none of the above comes to pass, the more time we manage to buy, the greater our advantage will be. The Singunbu intends to rule the country as Park Chung-hee did in the past, meaning that they will avoid mass murder wherever possible. As such, we will be able to make more demands in future negotiations and make certain that our demands are realized. If we give up our weapons now and surrender, we gain nothing and lose even more lives. We must organize the people to form a solid defense that can withstand the assault of the martial law troops.

The Clandestine Removal of Detonators

The large quantity of explosives stored in the basement of Province Hall was a matter of great concern for both the resistance and the martial law troops. The former saw the explosives as their last resort in resisting the military, usable as leverage in negotiations. So many weapons had been collected that the defense of the city perimeter had essentially collapsed, leaving only the explosives as a possible deterrent against invasion. Even martial law troops could not risk the destruction of half the city for control over Gwangju.

An armory management team grew out of the group in charge of collecting firearms. They numbered more than ten initially but were down to nine by the following day. Although strangers at first, they learned one another’s names over the course of multiple meetings. The management team members included Moon Yong-dong (age 29, killed on May 27), Kim Yeong-bok (age 27), Park Seon-jae (age 22), Yang Hong-beom (age 20, boxer), Lee Gyeong-sik (age 23, student at Chosun University), Jeong Nam-gyun (age 21, student at Incheon National University of Education), and Lee Hyeok (age 20). The three oldest members—Moon Yong-dong, Lee Gyeong-sik, and Park Seon-jae—took turns attending Settlement Committee meetings as armory management team representatives.¹⁹

Moon was a fourth-year student at Honam Theological University and Seminary and a pastor at Gwangju Jeil Church. He had also been serving as a chaplain at Sangmudae since the previous year. Reverend Han Wan-seok, the lead pastor at the same church, served as a member of the Province Hall Settlement Committee. Moon had joined the demonstrators on the afternoon of May 18, when on his way home from Sunday service at Sangmudae, he discovered an elderly man who had been beaten by paratroopers on Geumnam-ro and took him to a hospital. From that point onward, he assisted the injured and participated in blood drives. An associate pastor at Gwangju Jeil Church who also served as a Sangmudae chaplain, according to testimony by Lee Gyeong-sik, proposed that Moon negotiate with martial law troops’ commanders, using the firearms collected in Gwangju as leverage. Moon had asked Lee for his opinion on the matter. Lee had initially disagreed but eventually changed his mind following multiple attempts at persuasion by Moon.

At 5:00 p.m. on May 23, Moon and Kim Yeong-bok took 600 to 700 dynamite detonators from the armory and headed to Sangmudae, where the Gwangju Jeil Church associate pastor waited—as well as Combat Arms Command’s chief of staff, Brigadier General Jang Sa-bok. Unfortunately, the armory management team did not have separate terms of their own prepared, as their only mission was the safe management of the resistance’s weapons. They simply reiterated the eight demands set out by the Settlement Committee on May 23, which had already been rejected. Negotiation had been impossible from the beginning. As Moon and Kim made to leave, Combat Arms Vice-commander Kim Gi-seok appeared with a new proposal, suggesting that for the safety of countless lives, the grenades stored in the armory be disarmed. It was an acceptable offer, as the explosion hazard had kept the management team on constant alert. Moon asked how the procedure would be conducted. Major General Kim offered to send a military explosives expert to remove the detonators, asking that his safety be assured. With no input from the Province Hall Settlement Committee, martial law authorities and armory management team members came to an agreement on the removal of the detonators from the explosives in the Province Hall basement.

On the afternoon of May 24, Moon and three other members of the armory management team went to Sangmudae at 5:00 p.m. for another meeting with Major General Kim. Moon and his team brought 2,288 detonators from the armory and handed them over to Combat Arms Command for safekeeping. A soldier responsible for the military armory was also in attendance at the meeting. At 8:00 p.m., Moon and the team returned to Province Hall with Bae Seung-il, a civilian technician serving in an ordnance company, who would take on the role of removing the detonators from the grenades stored in the basement. Bae worked through the night and disarmed all 279 grenades, 170 tear gas canisters, and 2,100 dynamite cylinders.²⁰

Kim Jong-bae, Park Nam-seon, Jeon Sang-yong, and Yoon Sang-won never realized that the explosives in the armory were being disarmed under their noses. The situation may have unfolded differently otherwise. Student Settlement Committee chair Kim Chang-gil, however, was aware of Bae’s work in the armory. Kim and vice-chair Hwang Geum-seon had gone to the armory at 11:00 p.m. on May 24, in the middle of the disarming efforts, and watched Bae work for a long time before leaving with a word of encouragement.²¹ Bae finished his work at 1:00 p.m. on May 25 and slipped out of Province Hall without the Uprising Leadership Team’s notice.²² The armory management team stored the removed detonators in burlap sacks. Following the Gwangju Uprising, Bae Seung-il was awarded the Order of National Security Merit, Gwangbok Medal, for his efforts in defusing the explosives.²³

The Domestic Media Turn a Blind Eye to the Truth

On May 24, martial law authorities flew in society section editors from major newspapers and broadcasters from the Seoul area to show them the “realities” of the Gwangju incident. The press was given a briefing at Sangmudae and a look at the city from the Hwajeong-dong pass where the resistance had set up a barricade, and then taken back to Seoul. The first public mention of the Gwangju crisis by the military was at the Public Defense Security Command announcement at 10:00 a.m. on May 20. The following morning, they partially lifted the embargo on coverage of Gwangju and published an official statement claiming, “the riots in Gwangju have spiraled out of control.” The situation had escalated to the point where Martial Law Command could no longer conceal the uprising; instead, they released scraps of information in their own favor.

They went on to announce that 150,000 people had stolen weapons, ammunition, and armored vehicles from armories and attacked martial law forces, resulting in “the deaths of five soldiers and police and one civilian.” On May 21, major newspapers described Gwangju as “a city of rioters.” They claimed that “unfounded rumors and regional resentment” had worsened the situation and emphasized that “public offices and vehicles were vandalized,” making it seem as though martial law troops were the victims.

In a May 25 editorial, the Chosun Ilbo daily parroted Martial Law Command’s statement that “North Korean agents [have] spread unfounded rumors to fuel regional resentment.” The Dong-a Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo followed suit, describing Gwangju as a lawless city that had been taken over by rioters.

As the mainstream press ignored the plight of Gwangju, the people of the city fought to raise awareness about the truth. On May 23, flyers titled “Chun Doo-hwan’s Massacre Plot” were scattered in parts of Seoul. The flyer began with the words, “How could the heavens be so uncaring?” and was the first recorded instance of news from Gwangju spread outside the province.²⁴

Witnesses from Around the World

While domestic media remained silent or twisted the facts of the Gwangju Uprising, foreign journalists made the truth known to countries around the world. The tragedy in Gwangju rode the airwaves to Europe, the United States, and Japan, causing a storm of international criticism against the Singunbu.

Vivid footage of the tragedy in Gwangju, taken on May 22, was broadcast not only in Germany but also to the rest of Europe and the United States, marking the first time that video of the Gwangju Uprising reached the world.

On the morning of May 19, Jürgen Hinzpeter, NDR’s Asia correspondent, first saw the brief headline “Civilians in Gwangju Clash with Troops under State of Martial Law” in Tokyo. He immediately flew to South Korea and reached Gwangju in the morning of May 20, an entire day earlier than most other foreign journalists. At the time, foreign press were mandated to report to the Ministry of Public Information prior to covering stories in South Korea, but Hinzpeter sensed that receiving permission for coverage of Gwangju would be impossible and chose to slip into the city unannounced. On May 20, as the uprising reached a climax, the people of Gwangju welcomed Hinzpeter with open arms for breaking through the heavily guarded blockade. He visited hospitals and the sites of massacres, capturing what he saw on video. Even with his experience covering the Vietnam War, Hinzpeter was astonished by the carnage in the city. At times, he was so outraged or blinded by tears that he was forced to stop shooting briefly. He also captured on camera the indiscriminate gunfire at Province Hall on May 21. In order to send the footage to NDR headquarters in Hamburg, he departed Gwangju in the afternoon of May 21 and took the film to Tokyo via Seoul. Following twenty-two hours of security procedures, he finally reached the airport in Tokyo, where he handed off the film to be sent to Germany and flew straight back to Gwangju. On May 23, he recorded footage of resistance activity during Gwangju’s liberation and the Citizens’ Rallies. Hinzpeter was responsible for most of the video footage of the Gwangju Uprising available today.²⁵

Starting May 21, foreign journalists stationed in Seoul risked their lives to sneak into Gwangju. Philippe Pons of Le Monde and the New York Times Seoul correspondent Shim Jae Hoon departed Seoul by rental car at 5:00 a.m. that day and reached the Seogwangju (West Gwangju) tollgate at 9:00 a.m. They were given a hero’s welcome and found that the city was not a site of violence, rioting and anarchy, but a city of rebels and resistance, where women, the elderly, and the young gladly loaded demonstrator vehicles with gimbap, fruit, and other foods.²⁶ Pons and Shim were guided around the Province Hall premises and hospital morgues. Afterward, they left Gwangju and headed to Suncheon, where they sent their manuscripts to their respective Seoul offices. Pons and Shim’s articles were published on May 23 in Le Monde and the New York Times respectively. Coverage of the Gwangju crisis in two of the Western world’s most influential newspapers caused a massive stir in the international community, which was followed by a wave of foreign press from television, radio, newspapers, and magazines making their way to Gwangju.

At sunset on May 21, Terry Anderson from the Associated Press and Time photographer Robin Moyer found themselves only ten kilometers from Gwangju. They walked into the downtown core amidst the procession of refugees. Anderson described the situation in Gwangju as a riot perpetrated by the military.²⁷

According to Sam Jameson of the Associated Press, who covered US Ambassador Gleysteen’s foreign press briefing of the Gwangju situation on May 21, Gleysteen claimed that the demonstrations in Gwangju had given way to full-scale rioting and that Chun’s decision to expand the scope of martial law was a deeply flawed choice. However, Gleysteen also remarked that the United States supported Korea’s deployment of the military for the purposes of restoring order.²⁸ Norman Thorpe of the Asian Wall Street Journal also entered the city on May 21 and went to the hospitals, counting the dead and taking photographs. Even as the Korean government continued to claim that there had been no civilian casualties, Thorpe personally counted dozens of deaths. He remarked that the government had gone against the primary purpose of protecting its citizens and that these killings were a massacre worsened by the government’s attempt at covering up its actions.²⁹ Other journalists who entered the city included correspondent Bradley Martin of the Baltimore Sun, correspondent Gebhard Hielscher of Süddeutsche Zeitung, New York Times Tokyo bureau chief Henry Scott-Stokes, and reporters for the Asahi Shimbun, the Yomiuri Shimbun, NBC, and ABC. The stories conveyed by foreign press took an entirely different perspective from those by Korean media. One article by Hielscher noted that the Singunbu’s attempts to frame North Korean agents or a small group of communist sympathizers were not only distortions of the truth, they also revealed the Singunbu’s narrow-minded view of the purpose of politics as the maintenance of law and order at all costs.³⁰

Foreign journalists served as objective observers of the Gwangju Uprising and became witnesses to history, making them the third main players in the crisis in Gwangju alongside the martial law troops and the people of the city. Without their efforts and their coverage, the sacrifices and the resistance of the people of Gwangju may have been lost forever, covered up and assumed to have never happened. Thanks to these journalists, the Gwangju Uprising is not remembered today as a riot stirred up by communist sympathizers acting on North Korean orders. Each of the accounts of the Gwangju crisis offered by the nearly unbiased foreign press was shocking and horrifying to behold.

11

Liberation IV
(Sunday, May 25: Day 8 of the Uprising)

The Poison Pin Incident

At 8:00 a.m. on May 25, Jang Gye-beom (age 23, bar manager), head of the resistance intelligence team, staggered into the office of the Director of Agriculture and Forestry at Province Hall, cradling his shoulder. “I’ve been pricked with a poison pin!” he cried.

When Shin Man-sik of the investigation department went over for a closer look, Jang refused his assistance and asked Jeong Hyang-gyu (age 32, driver, real name Jeong Hyeong-gyu) for help. Jeong pulled off Jang’s shirt, motioned as if sucking on the wound, and collapsed. Other members of the investigation department rushed them to Chonnam University Hospital. An air of distrust began to run through Province Hall. The conflicts within the two Settlement Committees had put everyone on edge overnight, and the prospect of a drawn-out battle with martial law troops had already drained morale. The poisoning incident further deflated enthusiasm at Province Hall. In a matter of minutes, rumors of North Korean infiltrators in the building spread like wildfire. People began to leave the premises one by one.

Resistance leaders guessed that the commotion was caused by intelligence agents working for martial law authorities or by those under the orders of agents. Student Settlement Committee vice-chair Kim Jong-bae calmed the resistance members and immediately instructed Kim Jun-bong of the investigation department to observe Jang Gye-beom. Kim went back and forth from the hospital to Province Hall, keeping a close eye on Jang, and stationed six armed resistance members in the hallways and just outside Jang’s hospital room. Jang’s family had already arrived, and the hospital was packed with reporters. Jang quietly called Kim over to tell him, “Kim Jong-bae of the leadership team and some of the women in the broadcasting office are commies—investigate them.” Kim warned Jang not to make wild accusations and returned to Province Hall to report the situation to the leaders.

Kim investigated the alleged poison pin used to attack Jang and found that it was a simple pin attached to an ordinary ballpoint pen. The owner of the pen was a student preparing for university entrance exams who had joined the resistance. When Kim took the circumstances into account, he concluded that Jang was the most suspicious person involved in the case. He went to the hospital and showed the pen to Jang’s doctor, explaining the situation. The doctor responded that Jang’s condition was likely caused by a temporary paralyzing substance rather than a poison pin.¹ By the time Kim Jun-bong returned to the hospital room at 6:00 p.m., both Jang and Jeong were nowhere to be found. Reporters from KBS, the Chosun Ilbo, and other media had crowded the hospital to cover the incident. Resistance leaders at Province Hall immediately deployed Yun Seok-ru (age 22) and the mobile patrol squad to track them down. Although Jang had disappeared completely, they took Jeong Hyang-gyu into custody and brought him to the investigation department at Province Hall. The Settlement Committee officially announced that Jang Gye-beom was a spy planted by the government. The “Poison Pin Incident” made the airwaves that evening, further dampening morale at Province Hall.

Several days later, Jang Gye-beom’s true identity was discovered. After the military’s capture of Province Hall on May 27, resistance leaders were arrested by MP from Combat Arms Command for investigation. Jang appeared at the investigations, his face completely covered, and explained to the investigators exactly what roles each person had played at Province Hall. When the detained were handed over to the National Security Forces following the preliminary investigations, many of them spotted Jang Gye-beom walking around freely and smoking cigarettes. Jang confessed to the National Security Forces Joint Investigation Team that he had not been poisoned—it had all been an act. He had entered Province Hall on May 23 and organized an intelligence team under his command. He testified that on the morning of May 25, he “happened to pick up something resembling a poison pin and put on a performance in order to escape Province Hall.”²

Jang’s diagnosis from his hospitalization declared that a red spot measuring three centimeters in diameter was found on his person. Although Jang claimed that the spot was caused by poisoning (via pin), he remained completely lucid while hospitalized (8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.), and psychochemical and clinical testing revealed no sign of poisoning.³

Fearing pursuit by the resistance, Jang hid at hospitals and inns in the city rather than return home. The following morning, he went from places he described as “[his] uncle’s house” and “old man Song’s home” until finally, in the afternoon of May 26, he went to the 505th Security Unit with his father and turned himself in. Lieutenant Colonel Seo Ui-nam of the National Security Forces ordered his subordinate Master Sergeant Heo Jang-hwan to keep a close eye on Jang. Heo guessed that Jang must have been an agent for the military.⁴ During his investigation, Jang told the security forces investigator what he had learned about the movements of the resistance and handed over information concerning the leaders of the uprising.⁵

Meanwhile, Colonel Hong Seong-ryul, dispatched on special orders from Defense Security Command, set up a secret headquarters in Gwangju’s Sa-dong for his clandestine activities. With support from a South Jeolla Province Police 2nd Intelligence Section chief identified only as Inspector Kim and a 505th Security Unit Intelligence Department agent identified only as Master Sergeant Park, Hong led the information-gathering efforts of three groups active in downtown Gwangju.⁶ Details concerning Hong’s special mission remain unknown, but his stay in Gwangju overlapped with the indiscriminate firing outside Province Hall and the Poison Pin Incident. Although there is no concrete evidence of Jang Gye-beom contacting Hong or one of Hong’s men, it is significant that one of the locations Jang visited prior to turning himself in was an uncle’s home in Sa-dong.

Martial law forces undertook a number of other clandestine missions to create divisions within Gwangju and destroy people’s morale. Around this time, the Dong-a Ilbo published an article titled “North Korean Agent Attempting to Incite Gwangju Riots Captured at City Perimeter.” On May 24, Seoul Metropolitan Police announced that North Korean agent Lee Chang-ryong, charged with turning the citizen demonstrations in Gwangju into armed riots, had landed on Korea’s southern coast and attempted to enter the city but was foiled by the military blockade. He then traveled to Seoul by express train before he was arrested while wandering Seoul Station. However, the Ministry of National Defense’s 2007 Truth Commission officially ruled that “the North Korean agent Lee Chang-ryong had been dispatched to South Korea for reasons unrelated to the Gwangju Uprising,” confirming that the Singunbu had released falsified information in order to make the Gwangju Uprising appear to be connected to North Korea.⁷

The Dignity of the People

By May 25, the fourth day since the city’s liberation, order had returned to the streets of Gwangju. Markets and businesses opened doors, and vegetables were carried in on tractors for distribution. Merchants and customers alike worked together to prevent hoarding. Smokers could only purchase one pack of cigarettes at a time. Hospitals, initially crippled by a shortage of blood due to the sheer number of injured patients, were quickly flooded with blood donors and left with a surplus. One Catholic group from the North Jeolla Province conducted a blood drive and made their way to Gwangju, only to be turned back at the perimeter by martial law troops. Electricity, water, and phone services remained intact. Financial incidents were few. The forty-two commercial banks in downtown Gwangju held cash reserves totaling approximately 150 billion KRW as of May 20, which remained untouched. Cash reserves held by 325 businesses and companies at their offices, as well as cash held in the Province Hall accounting department vault for employee wages, were left alone. The theft of currency from financial institutions could have caused untold chaos and confusion, but even in their desperation, the people of Gwangju neither attacked financial institutions nor stole from others, in a clear show of their commitment to the cause of democratization.

Crime rates in the city during the Gwangju Uprising were significantly lower than during the time of government control. Mobile patrol squads stationed at Province Hall would respond immediately to even the smallest of incidents and hand over the perpetrators to the investigation department. The dignity of the people would not allow their hard-won freedom and independence—bought with the blood of their loved ones—to be sullied by criminal actions at a time when administrative and law enforcement authorities were unable to act. Foreign journalists marveled at the orderly conduct of Gwangju’s people. A continuous stream of donations from religious groups and local communities made their way to the Settlement Committee and a group of young people at the YWCA. Locals also delivered food for more than 300 resistance members and leaders at Province Hall, as well as more than 400 regional defense squad members, and when the prospect of a long-term siege became apparent, each neighborhood collected food and sent banchan.

At 3:00 p.m. on May 25, residents at the Seongha Mansion apartment complex north of Sajik Park contacted Province Hall with an offer of handmade masks for those working at Sangmu Hall. The masks had been sewn by residents at the home of Song Hui-seong (female, age 43), leader of the apartment complex women’s committee. They were made with medical gauze and slightly larger than standard size, to be used for those who worked with the bodies lying in the hall.⁸ Mobile patrol squad members Lee Jae-chun (age 21, national defense reserve forces), Yang Gi-nam (age 18), and Oh Jeong-ho (age 32) went to Seongha Mansion and picked up a hundred masks, fifty pairs of gloves, fifty loaves of bread, and a sack of rice balls for those serving at Province Hall. Most of the masks were sent to Sangmu Hall, with some sent to the resistance.⁹

Following the end of the Gwangju Uprising, martial law investigators distorted the voluntary donation of food and beverages to the resistance by citizens into acts of looting perpetrated by rioters. Those who gave provisions to the resistance were detained and investigated, with some—including Song Hui-seong—tortured by investigators.

The YWCA and the Youth and Student Resistance Headquarters

The YWCA, located behind the Jeonil Building, served as a base of operations for students and young adults taking part in resistance efforts. They had initially gathered at the Nokdu Bookstore with nongovernment political activists, but the sheer number of people flooding the store starting May 22 forced the group to find a larger venue for the production of posters and banners. The YWCA’s location near Province Hall made it the perfect place for their efforts.

On May 23, Park Hyo-seon, Kim Tae-jong, and fellow members of the Gwangdae Theater Company, as well as Hong Hui-yun, Im Yeong-hui, and fellow members of the Songbaek Society went to Nokdu Bookstore and the YWCA to make posters, produce and distribute black ribbons, collect donations, and write scripts for rallies.¹⁰ Postsecondary students including Park Jeong-yeol and Lee Yeon also used the YWCA as a base of operations for their street broadcasts, which were conducted on a school bus they had brought out from Chonnam University. Yangseo Association member and high school student Kim Hyang-deuk was among several students who assisted the efforts at Nokdu Bookstore, the YWCA, and Province Hall.¹¹

On May 25, the publication team for The Fighters’ Bulletin moved production of their newsletters from the Deulbul Night School classroom at the Citizens’ Apartments complex in Gwangcheon-dong to the YWCA. The team had worked with two manual mimeographs until that point, but following the move, they were able to use a text-specific and high-speed mimeograph brought from author Hwang Sok-yong’s home. The new additions made it possible to print tens of thousands of copies per day. Yoon Sang-won would write drafts of the text at Province Hall, and the text would be transcribed by Park Yong-jun and Dong Geun-sik. Night school teachers and students printed the newsletters and gathered paper, ink, and other supplies.¹² The manuscripts read out during the rallies were immediately printed on The Fighters’ Bulletin and distributed across the city. With the rally organizers, poster makers, street broadcasters, and the publishers of The Fighters’ Bulletin all gathered under one roof, the YWCA was a de facto public relations headquarters for Gwangju’s resistance fighters.

The young people preparing the new leadership team reached out to nongovernment political activists from Gwangju with whom they had worked in the past and held a meeting at 10:00 a.m. on May 25 to assess general sentiment among the activists. Until that point, the nongovernment political activists had either participated in the resistance as part of the Province Hall Settlement Committee or as bystanders on the sidelines. Everyone agreed that a general meeting involving all the activists was needed to set a direction for the future of the Gwangju Uprising. The meeting took place in the general manager’s office on the second floor of the YWCA building and was attended by Constituent Assembly legislator Lee Seong-hak; lawyers Hong Nam-sun and Lee Gi-hong; Chonnam University professors Song Gisuk and Myeong Noh-geun; Credit Union director Jang Du-seok; YWCA chair Cho Ah-ra; YWCA general affairs director Lee Ae-sin; teachers Yun Yeong-gyu, Park Seok-mu, Yun Gwang-jang; and young leaders Jeong Sang-yong and Yoon Sang-won. Attendees criticized the Settlement Committee’s resigned approach to negotiations and agreed that the crisis had to be resolved in a different manner.

Some brought up the seven terms declared by the Settlement Committee [page 208] and asserted that the weapons used by the citizens first had to be collected in order to prevent further bloodshed. Jeong Sang-yong and the other young people argued against the proposal: “The Settlement Committee is trying to surrender the weapons so it will be easier for martial law troops to accept the seven terms, but that won’t properly solve this crisis. The Settlement Committee is ignoring the will of the people, even showing reluctance to the rallies outside Province Hall. We young people disagree with their direction. We have made up our minds to continue the rallies to unify the people of Gwangju and make our commitment known to the military, which will give us greater bargaining power at the negotiating table. Please give us your trust and join us.” The young people also pointed out that government-appointed leaders and reverends of conservative denominations who were part of the Settlement Committee did not have the trust of the people—these members were neither democratization activists nor civic activists and were not known to the public. Following further discussions, Lee Seong-hak, Jang Du-seok, Lee Gi-hong, Park Seok-mu, Wi In-baek, and several other nongovernment political activists declared support for the young people, with others either opposed or neutral.

Even the most progressive activists, however, found it difficult to agree to Jeong Sang-yong and Yoon Sang-won’s call to halt the weapons recall initiative and continue the uprising. It was clear how a clash between untrained young people and trained soldiers armed with tanks and heavy weaponry would end. Hundreds—even thousands—of lives could be lost in the blink of an eye. No one wished to bow to Chun and his military cronies, but the activists could not agree to a plan that put the lives of countless young people on the line. Their discussions became heated and no clear compromise was reached, but the meeting still led to the participation of nongovernment political activists in the Settlement Committee and the rearming of the city. The Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial prosecution later issued a written arraignment describing the situation as follows:

When Myeong Noh-geun explained the seven terms officially adopted by the Citizen Settlement Committee and argued that the weapons must be recalled even if the terms were not met, Park Seok-mu responded, “That is nothing short of humiliation for the people of Gwangju,” and “We cannot begin negotiations until they release Kim Dae-jung and other detained persons and retract their accusations of rioting.”

Lee Gi-hong proposed, “Hardline students must go to Province Hall and take control over the Student Settlement Committee and their security forces, and continue the struggle until Kim Dae-jung is released. We activists will also take over the Citizen Settlement Committee in order to support you.” … Hong Nam-sun showed strong support for Lee Gi-hong’s remark, repeating and re-emphasizing his points.

Jang Du-seok claimed, “We will also take control over the citizen leaders,” thereby persuading Jeong Sang-yong to reorganize the rioters at Province Hall into hardline fighter forces set against martial law troops …¹³

Park Seok-mu (teacher at Gwangju Daedong High School), formerly a student activist at Chonnam University, met separately with fellow Chonnam student Jeong Sang-yong outside the YWCA doors and encouraged him: “You must take care of the situation inside Province Hall. I will take responsibility for the older activists. Whatever you do, you must not let our weapons be surrendered.” Both Jeong and Yoon were encouraged by his support.

Following the YWCA meeting, some of the nongovernment political activists met again at Nam-dong Catholic Church at 2:00 p.m. Priests Kim Seong-yong and Cho Pius, Chonnam University professor Song Gisuk, and others held an in-depth discussion on the issue of their participation in the Province Hall Settlement Committee. Cho Pius, who was part of the committee from the beginning, pleaded for the activists’ full involvement in the Settlement Committee, arguing that clergy who had led previous democratization activities or had the respect of the community should lead the way in bringing about a peaceful conclusion to the crisis. Cho was among the only ones in the Settlement Committee in putting into action the issues he proposed and taking responsibility for them. The agreement to recall the weapons, for instance, was followed by action only from Cho and the lawyer Lee Jong-gi, with the rest simply standing on the sidelines self-consciously.¹⁴

Having confirmed that the Settlement Committee did not have the people’s support, the activists at the church discussed whether they should merge with the existing group to change it from the inside or create a new, separate committee that had the backing of the people from the outset. Two of the activists were sent to Province Hall to assess the situation. When they returned, it was decided that the first option was the better choice. Wi In-baek typed out an official document that included government leaders in the proposed new committee, which would in theory protect the other Settlement Committee members from accusations of inciting riots. At 5:00 p.m., the activists at Nam-dong Catholic Church made their way to Province Hall and joined the Settlement Committee.

Although conducted with little fanfare, the addition of the activists brought about transformative change. Of the eleven members of the original Settlement Committee, only Lee Jong-gi, Myeong Noh-geun, and Cho Pius remained. A significant number of members affiliated with the government or those recommended by administrative leaders left the group. The reorganization of the Settlement Committee changed the direction of the leadership. With the activists now at the helm, they immediately held a meeting in the vice-governor’s office, where Kim Seong-yong proposed four terms for the settlement of the Gwangju crisis that were adopted with unanimous approval. The four terms were put into a document titled “An Appeal to President Choi Kyu-hah”:

1. The government must accept its role as the perpetrator of the Gwangju incident,

2. The government must deliver an official apology and beg forgiveness from the people of Gwangju,

3. The government must provide all reparations for damages, injuries, and deaths, and

4. The government must not take any retaliatory measures. With Kim Seong-yong as the spokesperson, the twenty-five Settlement Committee members put their signatures on the appeal.¹⁵

This new document distinguished itself from previous petitions by the Settlement Committee in its call for the government’s acknowledgment of its responsibilities and the demand for reparations.

Kindred Spirits

At dawn that day, Kim Chang-gil and his faction of the Student Settlement Committee unilaterally decided to collect all the firearms taken for use by the people of Gwangju and return them to martial law forces. The plan was to gather all the weapons at Province Hall and then vacate the building. Vice-chair Kim Jong-bae and situation room director Park Nam-seon both strongly opposed the plan. At the time, Province Hall was on high alert for assassination attempts on Kim Jong-bae—essentially a leader of the resistance—by martial law agents. The friction between those for surrender and those for resistance had grown to the point that members of the resistance had to be assigned to Kim Jong-bae as security detail.

Park Nam-seon had begun to take a leadership role on May 22, when he helped to organize the resistance and carry bodies from the Red Cross Hospital via ambulances and military trucks to have them identified by their families. His fervor and dedication to his work put him in the director’s seat at the Province Hall situation room on May 24. Rugged, loud, and bold, Park quickly became one of the leaders of the resistance at Province Hall. He had a dozen or so resistance members on rotation for guard duty at the main entrance, and he went around the armory and explosives storage rooms to order fortified defenses. The mobile patrol squad also fell under his command.

Yoon Sang-won, who believed that Gwangju would have greater bargaining power against martial law authorities if the resistance was rearmed, took notice of Park Nam-seon’s attitude and shared his perspective on the situation: the resistance had to be reorganized immediately to bolster the defenses of the city. Park expressed his agreement, and Yoon asked for his cooperation, criticizing the resigned attitude of the Student Settlement Committee and revealing his plan to bring in a new leadership team consisting of university students and young activists. Park was asked to take full control of the resistance so as to avoid physical altercations of any kind during the transition. Yoon also spoke separately to Kim Jong-bae and Heo Gyu-jeong, explaining that he was helping to organize a group of like-minded students and young people at the YWCA. He proposed the formation of a new leadership team. Kim and Heo, who had been at odds with Student Settlement Committee chair Kim Chang-gil over the issue of the weapons recall initiative, agreed wholeheartedly with Yoon’s proposal.

The Third Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy

The third rally took place at 3:00 p.m. that day. The number of participants had fallen to about 50,000, but the crowds were no less passionate than before. Entire neighborhoods arrived together under the same picket signs and placards. Participants read out statements and manifestos, and lists of casualties, injuries, and damages were recited in public. Resistance member Lee Gwan-taek (age 32) took the podium and read a statement titled “Why Do We Have No Choice but to Take up Arms?”

According to tallies from Province Hall, approximately 520 people were left in critical condition, 2,170 suffered noncritical injuries, and 70 people were dead. Identified bodies were brought to Sangmu Hall, and the unidentified were laid out in the Province Hall courtyard to be seen by families of the missing.

During the rally, city perimeter residents requested that Province Hall dispatch one or two students per neighborhood in order to represent their concerns. Independent communities and neighborhoods cut off by or bordering the blockade were in a particularly difficult state because of the proximity to martial law troops. They explained that a significant number of loved ones had moved downtown to take shelter with relatives out of fear and asked after the people who had come into the city earlier.

Birth of the Uprising Leadership Team

At 7:00 p.m., Yoon Sang-won led Jeong Sang-yong, Lee Yang-hyeon, Kim Yeong-cheol, Jeong Hae-jik, Yun Gang-ok, and Park Hyo-seon into Province Hall for their first meeting with Student Settlement Committee vice-chair Kim Jong-bae and Heo Gyu-jeong. They brought along more than fifty postsecondary students they had organized at the YWCA and, upon entering the building, stationed them in the conference room next to the office of the director of food and production. Yoon had already explained the situation ahead of time, so it did not take long for the group to quickly agree to the formation of a new leadership group. Immediately, they concluded that the weapons recall initiative had to be stopped and that the leadership had to focus on gaining greater bargaining power. A moment later, Student Settlement Committee chair Kim Chang-gil entered the conference room and raised his voice: “What are you people trying to do? Are you planning to bring bloodshed to the city again?”

Cho Pius, who was at the scene, later testified, “It was an ultimatum. Lee Yang-hyeon, Heo Gyu-jeong, and Yoon Sang-won—who would later be killed by soldiers—supported continued resistance. Yoon was a smart man, and he communicated with those arguing for resistance and those arguing for surrender like he was negotiating a ceasefire.” Kim Chang-gil argued that they should leave all their weapons at Province Hall and vacate the premises, but Yoon retorted, “We would rather die than give up our weapons. We haven’t been guaranteed reparations for the friends and bystanders who were killed. Even if we surrender your way, we are guaranteed death. And if we are going to die either way, we would rather go down fighting.”¹⁶ The heated debate went on into the evening. At 9:00 p.m., realizing that Yoon and his faction would never accept his arguments, Kim Chang-gil finally volunteered to resign from his post. (KBS TV had already reported at 7:00 p.m. that night that hardliners had taken over Province Hall, but the announcement was made before Kim Chang-gil’s concession.)

Student and Youth Resistance

Efforts to recruit postsecondary students for deployment into Province Hall began on the morning of May 25. More than seventy young people inspired by the rallies lined up outside the YWCA and were accepted upon showing their ID. In order to gain the trust of the people, only postsecondary students whose ages could be confirmed were initially accepted. Multiple minors, some as young as junior high school age, had previously gotten access to firearms and caused great concern among the public.

The majority of previously recruited resistance members were from blue-collar backgrounds or the service industry or were high school students or recent graduates preparing to retake university entrance exams. Leaders at the YWCA found it easier to quickly organize their own resistance because of public trust in postsecondary students. At midnight, the student recruits made their way to Province Hall in the rain. The air in the vice-governor’s office on the second floor was tense. Completely oblivious to the situation with the Settlement Committee, the students listened to a speech by Father Kim Seong-yong and spent the night in the office. The next morning, equipped with carbine rifles and ammunition, they were assigned their roles. Most students were assigned to guard duty at the front gates of the Province Hall premises and the armory and to the transportation of the dead.¹⁷ Chosun student Wi Seong-sam also went to Province Hall and served as a security guard.¹⁸ High school students like Kim Hyang-deuk and Kim Hyo-seok, who were from the Yangseo Association book club on the second floor of the YWCA, also gathered at the building.

While the Uprising Leadership Team at Province Hall reorganized into the Resistance Council, planning director Kim Yeong-cheol explained the situation in the building to the students and young people on standby. Kim Seong-yong gave a brief speech on behalf of the Settlement Committee concerning the roles of the students and young people, and Wi Seong-sam and Kim Sang-jip—both of whom had previously served in the military—instructed the recruits on the use of firearms. Most of the recruits were assigned to the youth and student security team, a majority of which took on administrative work at Province Hall such as the registration of the dead, assistance for identification of the dead, and the tidying of the incense altar area.

It was soon announced that the recruited student resistance would replace the armed security forces in Province Hall. To prevent friction, students were instructed to show courtesy to the security team and persuade them to get some rest after days of sleepless work. Student resistance members were then given instructions by leaders and each equipped with 15-round magazines and carbine rifles, then split up into shifts so that some would be on the night watch rotation.

There was a small amount of animosity toward the students from the existing civilian militia, who assumed that the students had kicked off the demonstrations and then pulled back during the thick of the struggle. They also disagreed with the Student Settlement Committee’s unilateral decision to recall their weapons with no regard for future consequences. This issue remained a persistent problem for the Uprising Leadership Team.

The Leadership Team was in desperate need of long-term siege countermeasures. In order to both comply with the safety demands made by the people and to keep the civilian militia under control, they would have to merge the militia and the new student resistance units. Team unity was an important factor to consider.

The student resistance members who gathered at the YWCA had already been placed into units ahead of time and given short briefings concerning the use and dismantling of firearms and the basics of combat and battle. About ten of the recruits had previously served in the military before returning to their studies, but the rest had, at best, touched a gun once or twice during student training exercises. There were over 70 post-secondary student and young adult volunteers on May 25 and more than 150 the following day. May 26 also saw a marked increase in the number of high school students, reservists, and nonstudent adult volunteers.

A significant number of women were also active at the YWCA on May 25—members of the Songbaek Society, female blue-collar workers, female members of the Gwangdae Theater Company, and postsecondary- and high school-aged women who had been inspired by the street broadcasts. The female blue-collar workers were members of the Korean Young Christian Workers (also known as the JOC), who worked at companies such as Honam Electric, Ilshin Textile, Jeonnam Textile, and the Namhae Fishing Net Factory. Some of the women were deployed to the Province Hall kitchens, while others produced posters and worked with the public at the citizens’ rallies.

Launch of the Resistance Council for Democracy

The Uprising Leadership Team was formed at 10:00 p.m. on May 25, its members unified by their commitment to resistance against martial law troops. Newly christened the “Resistance Council for Democracy” in the office of the internal affairs director at Province Hall, the new team was much more structured than the Student Settlement Committee and included the following members:

Chair: Kim Jong-bae¹⁹ (age 26), director of operations

Vice-chair in charge of internal affairs: Heo Gyu-jeong (age 26), Province Hall internal affairs, public affairs, funeral management

Vice-chair in charge of external affairs: Jeong Sang-yong²⁰ (age 30), negotiations with Martial Law Command

Spokesperson: Yoon Sang-won²¹ (age 29), press conferences and official public announcements

Operations director: Park Nam-seon²² (age 26), resistance operations

Planning director: Kim Yeong-cheol²³ (age 32), general operations and planning for the leadership team

Planning member: Lee Yang-hyeon²⁴ (age 30), planning duties

Planning member: Yun Gang-ok²⁵ (age 29), planning duties

Chief of publicity: Park Hyo-seon²⁶ (age 26), rally planning and general public relations

Chief of civil affairs: Jeong Hae-jik²⁷ (age 29), general civil affairs, funeral management

Chief of investigation: Kim Jun-bong²⁸ (age 21), public security and order, investigation of traitorous elements

Chief of provisions: Gu Seong-ju²⁹ (age 25), food provision and distribution

The Leadership Team’s Plans

The leadership team discussed preparations for a drawn-out siege through the night. Members agreed that the formation of the new council may have been too late, as a significant number of weapons had already been collected and the regional defense squads had been all but dissolved. The city was helpless. Weapons had to be redistributed immediately. First, the team decided to issue a conscription order for reservists in each neighborhood to form a self-defense force that would hold the city perimeter. The mobilization of reservists had been proposed multiple times during the rallies. The proposed citizens’ funeral for all the dead would also be upgraded to a provincial funeral, which would take place on May 28.

Multiple factors had delayed the joint citizens’ funeral. First, martial law authorities insisted that autopsies of victims be conducted by relevant authorities in order to prevent objections concerning the cause of death in the future. Outraged families, who could not wait for the government to act, took it upon themselves to bury their dead. Summer was approaching and the bodies were decomposing quickly. Without biers or hearses, the families personally took away the coffins covered in white cotton cloth. Cries of anguish filled the plaza outside Province Hall, and the sight of the wailing families broke the hearts of all those who laid eyes on them.

The leadership team also discussed plans to use the explosives in the basement armory as leverage in negotiations, unaware that martial law forces had already disarmed them on May 24–25.

Another topic of discussion was a return to daily life for the people of Gwangju, which would involve the resumption of public bus operations, the return of civil servants and unarmed police, the reopening of businesses and marketplaces, a survey of damages incurred by each neighborhood, the distribution of rationed rice from City Hall, the resumption of local media such as Jeonil Broadcasting, the restriction of fuel use, the reopening of intercity phone lines, the preservation of public order, the reorganization of patrol squads, and the formation of mobile strike forces. Once measures for normalization were agreed upon, the leadership team agreed to hold an international press conference the following day to assert their commitment to resistance and to raise awareness about their dedication to democratization.

Plans for the Sweep of Gwangju Finalized

On the same day, martial law forces finalized Operation Sangmu Loyalty, a plan for the military sweep of the city of Gwangju. Martial law authorities including Chun Doo-hwan. Roh Tae-woo, Choo Young-bock and Hwang Young-si convened at the ROK army hall for a luncheon, where they reviewed the proposed plans for Operation Sangmu Loyalty and agreed to put it into motion on May 27 at 12:01 a.m.

Although martial law authorities claimed that Operation Sangmu Loyalty was only established after the resistance forces pushed out those disposed to peaceful surrender, their claims do not match the time frame. The new resistance leadership took control at 10:00 p.m. on May 25. Martial law troops had already scheduled Operation Sangmu Loyalty for May 23 during their retreat from Gwangju on May 21, later delaying it by two days due to issues concerning US military cooperation. At that time, the resistance forces had yet to form a consensus, and the daily negotiations between citizen representatives and Combat Arms Command leaders had been halted due to the sudden hardline shift by martial law authorities on the morning of May 24. Operation Sangmu Loyalty was planned and executed by Martial Law Command with no connection to the emergence of the resistance faction at Province Hall.

Following the meeting, ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Young-si and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Kim Jae-myeong traveled to Gwangju to hand over instructions concerning the mission to Combat Arms Commander Soh Jun-yeol. The documents were handed over in person for security purposes. At the same time, Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong handpicked special attack squads to deploy to key locations such as Province Hall, the Jeonil Building, and Gwangju Park, and he handed over that list of personnel and locations to Soh.

Meanwhile, Minister of National Defense Choo Young-bock and Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong made their way to the Blue House at 4:20 p.m. to report to the president. On orders from Chun, who wanted to use the president as justification for Operation Sangmu Loyalty, they proposed to President Choi that he personally travel to Gwangju. Choi accepted.

At 6:00 p.m., Choi made his way to the Jeolla Province branch of Martial Law Command at Sangmudae by helicopter with four ministers, the martial law commander, and other government leaders. Soh Jun-yeol and South Jeolla Province Governor Jang Hyeong-tae delivered a briefing on the Gwangju situation to the president. Soh reported, “Negotiations with civilian leaders have ground to a halt, and a group of 200–300 armed demonstrators have instituted a reign of terror over 800,000 Gwangju citizens. We have no choice but to send in troops to Gwangju.” Governor Jang requested that the military “restore order, but with discretion.”³⁰ When the president asked, “How many casualties are expected [from the sweep of Gwangju]?” Kim Sun-hyeon, head of the Combat Development Corps at Combat Arms Command, replied, “We will keep casualties to a minimum.” The president asked once again, “How many is considered the minimum?” When Kim answered, “Supposing that there are 4,000 armed demonstrators, we expect about 200 casualties,” the president replied, “I will go to Province Hall and personally speak with the demonstrator leadership.”³¹ Even the smallest estimate given by martial law authorities was too much for Choi. Everyone was taken by surprise at his demand, pleading, “If you go to Province Hall now, you may be kidnapped and taken hostage, leaving the country open to attack by North Korea.” Choi finally relented and personally made edits to statements written by staff before recording them for broadcast. The recordings were played three times across Gwangju via KBS radio and TV at 9:00, 10:00, and 10:30 p.m.

Choi thanked the military for their restraint and patience in dealing with the Gwangju incident and entreated them to avoid the loss of life wherever possible because even those who disrupted the public order were still people of the same nation. The fact that Choi made such an entreaty meant that a military sweep of the city was by that point already in the cards.

12

Liberation V
(Monday, May 26: Day 9 of the Uprising)

The March of Death

At 4:00 a.m. on May 26, crisis fell on Province Hall upon reports of martial law troops marching on three sections of the city perimeter with tanks at the helm. They had already pushed the perimeter an entire kilometer into the city from the direction of Nongseong-dong, where the Gwangju Armed Forces Hospital was located. Troops from the direction of Baegun-dong had pushed past Songam-dong to Gwangju Daedong High School, and the troops from the direction of Unam-dong had made it past the expressway and all the way to the Mudeung Sports Center. Martial law authorities had not announced their plans or actions to the Settlement Committee. This move was meant to preemptively seize the roads that went through the industrial complex so that the military could transport the personnel and equipment they needed for the planned attack on Province Hall for the morning of May 27. On May 26, the troops made plans to attack the building from the rear entrance while moving in preparations for a head-on assault.

A state of emergency was declared at Province Hall in response to the movement of martial law troops. Operations director Park Nam-seon and the mobile patrol squad were dispatched in armed jeeps to the Korea Electric Power Corporation building in Nongseong-dong, where they discovered armored vehicles belonging to martial law forces and fired warning shots.

The Settlement Committee, which had been in discussions through the night, also immediately convened to address the situation. There were seventeen members, including elder Lee Seong-hak, lawyer Hong Nam-sun, priest Kim Seong-yong, lawyer Lee Gi-hong, priest Cho Pius, YMCA general affairs director Lee Yeong-saeng, YMCA director Kim Cheon-bae, teachers Yun Yeong-gyu and Jang Sa-nam, and activist leader Wi In-baek. Kim Seong-yong proposed, “Let us be human shields. We will walk to the tanks and stand in their way. They will have to run us down before they murder yet more of Gwangju’s people.” They set off on a grim, determined march toward death, making their way from Province Hall shoulder-to-shoulder. Foreign journalists crowded around them, but the Settlement Committee was silent save for brief explanations of the situation in English by Kim Cheon-bae. One by one, the people of Gwangju joined the march until their numbers swelled to hundreds. Their four-kilometer-long route took them from Province Hall down Geumnam-ro, past Dolgogae and to the Rural Development Center. An hour later, the marchers came to a stop in front of martial law forces’ tanks.

The Settlement Committee members called to the officers on the scene to ask for the troops to be sent back to their original positions and petitioned for a discussion with their leader. It was not long before Major General Kim Gi-seok, Combat Arms Vice-commander, arrived in a black sedan. Kim Gi-seok proposed to the Settlement Committee that they discuss the matter at Sangmudae, but the Settlement Committee demanded that Kim first withdraw his troops from the site. Kim acquiesced, to the cheers and applause of countless Gwangju residents.

Earlier that day, at 4:00 a.m., Kim Chang-gil had made a phone call to Kim Gi-seok to complain about the sudden movement of the troops. Kim Gi-seok apologized and responded that even he had not been made aware of the deployment, adding that whether or not the issue was solved through discussions, he would go to Province Hall himself to bring about a resolution. Kim Chang-gil proposed that they meet somewhere between Sangmudae and Province Hall, as he could not guarantee Kim Gi-seok’s safety. Kim Gi-seok had already made up his mind the previous day, when Hwang Young-si delivered the orders for Operation Sangmu Loyalty. He had done his best to resolve the situation over the course of four negotiations, but Martial Law Command’s obstinate insistence on violence had made it impossible for him to take action for a peaceful conclusion.

Eleven Settlement Committee members, including Hong Nam-sun, Kim Seong-yong, Lee Seong-hak, Lee Gi-hong, Kim Cheon-bae, Lee Yeong-saeng, and Kim Chang-gil, made their way to Combat Arms Command at Sangmudae. The negotiations began at 7:00 a.m. and went on for four and a half hours. Two brigadier generals and a lieutenant colonel speaking on behalf of martial law forces were seated on the sides of the conference table. Major General Kim Gi-seok stated, “I am a soldier who knows little about political matters. If you collect the weapons currently in the hands of the people and return them to the military, I would have the police restore order to the city. We don’t have much time, so I would like to finish these discussions in half an hour. Collect the firearms within the day and bring public order back to Gwangju, or you will not be allowed to meet me or negotiate with me.”

Kim Seong-yong, spokesperson for the Settlement Committee, was the one generally speaking on the committee’s behalf. “Thirty minutes is not nearly enough time when your forces have caused such devastation in the city. How could you call the people of Gwangju ‘rioters’ in your broadcasts? Why have we been labeled as such? Stop using that word, and do not let your forces into our city. If there must be an intervention, have the police take up the task. How could you do this with the weapons that have been bought with the people’s tax money?”

One of the brigadier generals rose from his seat and strode forward. “I’ve had enough of this drivel!” he roared, slamming the door behind him as he left the conference room. An icy silence fell over the room. Kim Gi-seok pleaded once more for the demonstrators to turn in their weapons and return to their homes, explaining that this would be the final negotiation attempt.

The Settlement Committee finally realized that martial law troops would launch an attack on Province Hall within twenty-four hours. Major General Kim delivered an ultimatum, stating that if the situation in Gwangju was not resolved by midnight, he would have no choice but to send in his troops. The Settlement Committee submitted the five demands they had agreed upon, but not one was accepted. Kim Seong-yong could see no hope in the situation.¹

Singunbu leaders had already held an operation meeting at Combat Arms Command on the morning of May 26 for the implementation of Operation Sangmu Loyalty at 12:01 a.m. on May 27. By that point, specific operation orders for the movement of troops and armored vehicles and helicopter support were being handed down.² The operation had already begun, making negotiations meaningless. Kim Seong-yong wrote a memorandum on his negotiations with Martial Law Command:

1. More time is required. The military has broken its promises after we worked hard to bring the situation under control, and so we asked for time—and were immediately rebuffed for the supposed reason that it would negatively affect military morale after days of patience and even a retreat. It is no different from claiming that the military must always be victorious. I see their logic. It is true that for the sake of morale, our military must always win. But this is only against enemy troops, not our own people—against over 800,000 Gwangju citizens. I was not able to ask again for lack of time.

2. The military must clearly state its reasons for breaking its promise and dispatching tanks to the perimeter, and apologize. They claim that the explanation and apology have already been delivered via broadcasts.

3. The military must not enter the downtown core. As we all felt this morning, the people of Gwangju will not see a military that fires on its own people as defenders of South Korea. The people of Gwangju will never forgive the soldiers who suddenly and indiscriminately murdered the people of the city. I am a priest and I did not personally witness any murders, and yet I still felt a sense of loathing when I first met Major General Kim. How much more for those who saw the killings with their own eyes and lost their loved ones? How could they ever forgive the military? I have been told that some of the young soldiers, too, are outraged at the deaths of their comrades in arms and have been told that they have been thoroughly educated to hold back in spite of their emotions. The military is impossible to reason with. Students asserting their rights as democratic citizens were gunned down and stabbed before the people’s eyes, and yet the military turns a blind eye to the people’s righteous fury.

4. The maintenance of public order must be left to the police. This is the condition we added to the scenario in which the weapons are collected and returned to the military.

5. The military must refrain from calling for reconciliation via broadcasts and must refrain from agitating the people further. These proposals were noted and handed to a messenger with a promise that they would be looked into.³

The Settlement Committee members’ footsteps were heavy as they made their way back from Sangmudae. They could say nothing more. Agreeing to meet again at Province Hall in the afternoon, they went their separate ways. Kim Seong-yong visited the Nongseong-dong Catholic Church to notify Archbishop Youn Kong-hi of the outcome of the negotiation by telephone and later headed to the YWCA, where he was met by Lee Seong-hak and Hong Nam-sun. Lee instructed Hong and Kim to head to Seoul immediately to meet with President Choi, expose the truth of the situation in Gwangju, and prevent further casualties. Hong and Kim would ask former president Yun Posun and Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan to secure a presidential audience for them. At 3:00 p.m., Kim Seong-yong and Kim Gap-je (age 25, member of the Alliance for Democratic and Constitutional Governance) left for Seoul. Hong also left the city at 4:00 p.m. with his wife and son, taking a taxi to Songjeong-ri, where he hoped to find transportation to the capital. However, Hong and his family were caught in a spot check by soldiers on Geungnak Bridge and arrested. Kim Seong-yong, though questioned five or six times on his way through Yeonggwang and Jeonju, narrowly managed to reach Seoul the next morning thanks to Kim Gap-je’s journalist ID.⁴ By that point, however, the South Jeolla Province Hall had already fallen to martial law troops.

Masked Resistance Members

When news of martial law troops’ approach on the city center broke in the morning of May 26, mobile strike force members Yang Gi-nam, Im Seong-taek, and Gu Seong-hui set out to Nongseong-dong by military jeep. They were equipped with uniforms and helmets left behind by riot police during the May 21 retreat and with masks supplied at Province Hall on May 25. During their stand-off with martial law forces in front of the Korea Electric Power Corporation, a German journalist approached them and asked in faltering Korean, “May I take your picture?” The men gave their permission. The journalist asked them to remove their masks, but they refused for fear their identities might be revealed. The developed photograph from the exchange depicts the resistance member on the right with a curled left hand. This was Im Seong-taek, who lost his left pinky in a childhood accident. He had a habit of curling his left hand to hide his missing appendage. This photograph, where two resistance members in dark green uniforms and riot police-issue helmets, carbine rifles in hand, became a symbol of the Gwangju Uprising. Some far-right agitators today claim that the photo features North Korean special forces, but Im Seong-taek remains committed to fighting such distortions of history.⁵

The Fourth Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy

When news of martial law troops’ movement into the city spread early in the morning, the Uprising Leadership Team decided to reschedule the afternoon rally to the morning. The public relations team put up posters all over the city, and broadcasting vehicles were sent out to notify the people that the fourth rally would take place at 11:00 a.m. By the time the people of Gwangju crowded the Province Hall plaza, they numbered more than 30,000. The atmosphere was tense. Eom Tae-ju (age 24) and Park Mong-gu served as the emcees for the event. They notified the people that martial law troops had broken their promise and made their way further into the city in the early hours of the morning. They called for the media to cover the events unfolding in the city without bias and read out a statement addressed to the military, demanding that they step out of their role as Chun and the Singunbu’s loyal dogs in their bid for power and instead go back to the Armistice Line to protect the country as they were originally meant to do. A statement titled “The Commitment of 800,000 Citizens for Democracy,” composed of seven demands, was adopted at the rally. This new statement was a faithful reflection of the direction chosen by the Resistance Council formed on May 25 and asserted the following:

1. All responsibility for this crisis is with the interim government. The interim government must make reparations for all deaths, injuries, and damages, and immediately step down from power.

2. The unjustified state of martial law that only serves as an umbrella for violent suppression of citizen demonstrations must be ended immediately.

3. In the name of the Korean people, we demand the public punishment of the murderer Chun Doo-hwan.

4. Democratization activists who have been taken into custody must be released immediately, and a new interim government composed of activists must be formed in order to reform the nation.

5. The government and media must cover the events in Gwangju without fabrication.

6. Our demands go beyond reparations and the release of the detained; we demand the establishment of a true democratic government.

7. We hereby declare before the Korean people that until these demands are met, the 800,000 citizens of Gwangju will continue to resist to the final hour and the last man.⁶

Unlike previous demands and statements made by the Settlement Committee, this new declaration made clear that the driving force behind the Gwangju Uprising was the demand for democratization, rather than simple reparations or resolutions. The demands for a new interim government and the establishment of a democratic government were unlikely to be met, but these terms helped to define the movement as something beyond resistance to violent suppression—it was a democratization movement standing in defiance of the military coup d’état.

Following the rally, countless citizens marched through the streets with school buses leading the way. So many people filled the downtown core that when those in the lead turned at the Gwangnam-ro intersection a kilometer away from Geumnam-ro, those at the back had yet to start marching down the six-lane road. The people chanted, “We refuse to surrender,” “We refuse to hand over our weapons,” and “Tear the murderer Chun Doo-hwan to pieces” as they traveled from Geumnam-ro past Gwangnam-ro, Gwangju Park, Yangnim Bridge, Chonnam University Hospital, Cheongsan Private School, Gyerim Police Substation, Gwangju Station, and Hanil Bank and returned to Province Hall again. The ninth issue of the Citizens for Democracy Bulletin, first distributed on the morning of May 26, included a copy of “The Commitment of 800,000 Citizens for Democracy.”

At 2:00 p.m., the Uprising Leadership Team and the mayor of Gwangju had a meeting at the office of the director of internal affairs at Province Hall. Kim Jong-bae, Jeong Sang-yong, and Jeong Hae-jik made nine demands of the mayor and director-level provincial civil servants at the meeting:

1. The provision of seventy-two kilograms of white rice to Gwangju per day

2. The provision of other foods and fuel

3. The provision of forty coffins

4. The provision of one ambulance

5. The unhindered provision of daily necessities

6. The deployment of police for peacekeeping duties

7. The resumption of public bus services

8. Provincial funerals for the dead

9. The subsidization of all funeral costs

The Resistance Council, accompanied by eight representatives of the bereaved, discussed funeral procedures with Vice-governor Jeong Si-chae and the director of social services at the office of the vice-governor. When the Resistance Council pointed out that the bodies were decaying and needed to be buried soon, the vice-governor proposed that the dead be buried at the cemetery at Mangwol-dong Municipal Park and that the dead be given a citizens’ funeral.⁷ The bereaved agreed to the proposal, and May 28 was decided as the funeral date. The Resistance Council chose the later date on purpose in order to stall the entry of martial law troops into the city, hoping that the military would at least wait until the funerals were finished. Their hopes, however, were cruelly dashed.

Women Working in the Kitchens

On May 22, Ju So-yeon and other women—including high school students, postsecondary students, and homemakers—took over the kitchens at Province Hall to cook for the demonstrators. Despite the sheer number of women who rose to the challenge, it proved a difficult task to provide three meals per day for hundreds of people. There was a shortage of industrial-size rice cookers, stoves, utensils, spoons, and chopsticks and a lack of space for people to eat. They first made use of the cafeteria in the basement of the civil affairs office, which was quickly packed with people who were physically unable to go home during the uprising. Eventually, the cafeteria was repurposed as a kitchen and the auditorium on the second floor became a makeshift dining hall. The sheer quantity of rice that had to be cooked at once meant that the rice was often too watery. A middle-aged man advised the cooks that adding salt to the rice before cooking would help with the issue. The advice not only solved their problem, it also made the rice perfectly seasoned for rice balls. The kitchens had to be active all day, necessitating that the women take shifts. The first shift was from dawn to 5:00 p.m., and the second shift was from 5:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. The shortage of utensils made rice balls the menu of choice. Women from the Yang-dong and Seobang Markets regularly brought kimchi and gimbap rolls to Province Hall on pushcarts. The Hyeongje Bakery at the Yu-dong three-way intersection, run by a pair of brothers, brought in boxes of fresh-baked goods almost daily.

On May 22 and 23, rice balls were also sent to regional defense squads at Hak-dong, Baegun-dong, Sansu-dong, and Hwajeong-dong. On May 24, as many citizens went back to ordinary life, general administrative offices were flooded with people. The passion from the beginning of the liberation period began to drain as time went on, and the kitchens, the situation room, and the armory all needed additional personnel. Kim Seong-yong heard the news and asked Nam-dong Catholic Church parishioner Jeong Suk-gyeong (age 25, nurse) to help recruit more people for the kitchens. Jeong, who had previously organized nurses to treat the injured at hospitals, reached out to Kim Seong-ae of the Korean Young Christian Workers to recruit over twenty women. Blue-collar workers from the book club at the Gyoyukmunhwasa publishing company run by Lee Hwang (age 26) also stepped forward. The Korean Young Christian Workers had already come together on May 23 for initiatives such as blood donations, fundraising, poster production, and the production and distribution of black ribbons for solidarity. They went to Province Hall on May 25 and split into three groups to fill gaps in personnel.⁸

Kim Yang-ae, a pollock merchant at Yang-dong Market, collected rice from her neighbors, made gimbap, and hauled it to Province Hall on a pushcart. Kim was the chair of a neighborhood women’s association and had gone to Province Hall to find her son when she heard that students and young people there were going hungry. When she explained the situation, she received so many rice donations that she had to cook the rice at a restaurant and get the help of other women from the market to make gimbap rolls. All the ingredients they needed were there in the marketplace, and the people not only offered food but also their assistance. In another corner of the market, people made the Korean flag, and others boiled eggs and drew water to hand out to resistance members who drove around the city. The hungry resistance members at Province Hall finished off the entire delivery of gimbap in the blink of an eye. As for Kim, she was reunited with her son Park Byeong-gyu (age 19, first-year student at Dongguk University), who wore a sash labeled “Student Settlement Committee Member” and helped oversee the bodies brought to the building. Kim took his hand and pleaded, “I’m terrified of what might happen to you here. Come home with me.” Her son, however, shook her off and remained at Province Hall. He would be shot to death with an M16 rifle when martial law troops took back the building early in the morning of May 27.

The Street Broadcasting Team

A significant number of people participated in the street broadcasts that took place during the Gwangju Uprising. Demonstrators started an impromptu donation drive for broadcasting equipment on May 19. Proper audio equipment was imperative to organizing crowds to counter the paratroopers. On May 20 and 21, when the demonstrations reached their peak, street broadcasters acquired equipment from civic offices such as neighborhood centers. The number of amplifiers, speakers, microphones, and megaphones listed as lost in later surveys of damages sustained by these offices shows the sheer number of people who took it upon themselves to reach out to the public.

Even on May 22, following the retreat of martial law troops and the liberation of Gwangju, many broadcast vehicles drove through the streets. The youth and student public relations teams working out of the YWCA led street broadcasts from a Chonnam University school bus on May 23 to deliver announcements from the Uprising Leadership Team to the people. Copies of The Fighters’ Bulletin were scattered from the bus on the way. Resistance member Kim Jong-nam (age 19) was part of the public relations team at Province Hall that utilized a 4.5-tonne pepper-fog vehicle, a 2.5-tonne riot police vehicle, and several cars belonging to Province Hall.⁹

Some broadcasts were sent out directly from Province Hall. The high-quality equipment in the situation room allowed the leadership to notify the public of the identities of the deceased, rally and event schedules, and regulations to be followed from May 22 to May 26. Women like Lee Gyeong-hui and Kim Seon-ok read out the messages written by the Settlement Committee. Park Yeong-sun, who remained at Province Hall following the street broadcast on May 26, notified the public of the invasion of martial law forces early in the morning of May 27.

The Mobile Strike Forces

The mobile strike forces were organized by the Uprising Leadership Team at 2:00 p.m. on May 26 at the office of the director of food and production. The majority of resistance members who had served on the mobile patrol squad signed up for the new organization. The mobile patrol squad, which had been the first of the armed resistance, had no real structure or hierarchy. Members simply went home for the day when they became tired, and missions were not followed up on. However, when the Uprising Leadership Team took control of Province Hall and changed the direction of the uprising from surrender to resistance, Yun Seok-ru and Lee Jae-ho (age 33) stepped forward to reorganize the resistance into a mobile strike force.

Yun would serve as the captain of the new team, and Lee the lieutenant. The force was a structured paramilitary organization with a chain of command. Their main duty was the patrol of the city perimeter, surveillance of martial law troops’ movements, and public safety in the city. Six squads were initially organized, then expanded to seven to accommodate additional recruits. The seventh squad served a support and logistics role backing up the remaining six squads.¹⁰

Recruits recited a pledge and were given specific missions to heighten their sense of duty as members of the new organization. Respected figures such as Kim Seong-yong were present at the launch of the strike force to explain the responsibilities of the group and the importance of their mission. The launch was given an official ceremony that gave the new members a sense of pride in their work. The pledge was written by lieutenant Lee Jae-ho, the eldest of the members and a university graduate who had led the efforts for the organization of the group and had set down the rules and regulations they abided by. Lee had worked as an architect in Gwangju before circumstances brought him to the lieutenant’s seat.

Each squad was supplied with one military jeep and one radio, and the members were equipped with grenades and the best of the weapons collected at Province Hall. They were also given uniform helmets left behind by riot police and the military. At Lee’s suggestion, each person was given a nickname—for instance, Polar Bear from Squad 1—that was written on a white piece of cloth and tied to the helmet. Most of the nicknames were animals. Not knowing each other’s names would make it easier to protect one another’s identities in the event someone was captured by martial law troops.

It was not long after the launch ceremony that the mobile strike forces received reports of martial law troops in Gwangcheon-dong. Squad 6 was dispatched to the area and returned with one captured soldier in tow. When they learned that the soldier was not a paratrooper but part of the Combat Arms Command forces at Sangmudae, the soldier was given back his gun and driven back to his unit.¹¹

In a similar fashion, most soldiers captured during the Gwangju Uprising were sent back to their units. Paratroopers who were injured while fleeing along Gwangju river on May 19 were taken to the Red Cross Hospital by civilians and then handed over to the Armed Forces Hospital under martial law troops’ control. Even when outraged citizens seized fourteen vehicles from the 20th Division on the morning of May 21 in front of the Gwangju industrial complex, all captured troops were sent back to Sangmudae. Military records show that one soldier reported missing at the time was safely returned to his unit the same afternoon. Members of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade who were separated from their unit during the retreat from Chosun University to Junam Village and arrested at Hagun-dong were brought to Province Hall but were handed over to martial law troops following cursory questioning. On May 23, Kim Jun-bong, a resistance member in the public safety unit, questioned a paratrooper who had fallen behind and been brought to Province Hall. He reassured the trembling paratrooper, “Don’t be afraid. I couldn’t kill a fellow Korean citizen. A soldier’s duty is simply to follow orders. Don’t worry, because we know that you’ve only been doing your job.”¹² Afterward, the soldier was transferred to the Armed Forces Hospital.

Despite the heated battles that took place between the people and martial law troops, captured soldiers were not tortured or killed; instead, they were returned to their units. This was in stark contrast to the way paratroopers retreating from Chonnam University mercilessly beat or suffocated the helpless prisoners in tear gas and the way they killed the two injured resistance members captured alongside Hong Geum-suk on the minibus outside Junam Village and buried them in secret.

Each squad of the mobile strike force was assigned to a patrol district: Squad 1 to the Geumnam-ro—Hak-dong—Bangnim-dong area, Squad 2 to the Punghyang-dong—Gyerim-dong—Chungjang-ro—Geumnam-ro area, Squad 3 to the Baegun-dong roundabout and Chonnam University Hospital, Squad 4 to Punghyang-dong—Sansu-dong—Jisan-dong—Dongmyeong-dong, Squad 5 to Geumnam-ro—Gwangcheon-dong—Yang-dong Market District, Squad 6 to Province Hall—Geumnam-ro—Yang-dong Elementary School—Wolsan-dong—Gwangju River, and Squad 7 to the Jiwon-dong area as a support unit. Each squad was composed of six to nine members for a total of forty to seventy members. Thirty-one people were identified as members following the Gwangju Uprising. The identities of those who died or fled the scene during the attack on Province Hall on the morning of May 27 remain unknown, because members only referred to each other by nicknames to protect their identities.

The Fifth Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy

The fifth Citizens’ Rally took place at 3:00 p.m. on the same day, following the negotiations at Sangmudae and the confirmation that martial law troops would be marching on the city. Unlike previous rallies, where the proceedings were largely centered on the public declarations of statements, people were given action guidelines. As with the previous events, however, citizens once more went up to the podium to denounce the atrocities committed by martial law troops. One middle-aged woman described how her entire family was massacred near Gwangju Prison by paratroopers and broke down wailing, unable to complete her story. A teacher went up to the podium asking what she could do for the city. Another middle-aged woman, who confessed that this was her first time at a rally, explained that she had believed the TV broadcasts about rioters and looters in the city and stayed home in fear, only to learn upon coming outside that the reality was completely different. She called for the demonstrators to visit the suburbs and the city perimeter to raise awareness about the truth of the situation in the city. Other citizens expounded on the political and economic issues that had plagued the country since its liberation from Japanese rule. “The Commitment of 800,000 Citizens for Democracy,” first read at the morning rally, was read out once more to the city.

At the end of the rally, the Uprising Leadership Team officially announced that martial law troops were likely to march on the city that night. The city was rife with rumors that defense reserve forces members at Sangmudae claimed that martial law troops would attack that night and that family members in the military described an influx of reinforcements and the provision of pork for dinner for morale. Another rumor claimed that the wife of an officer stationed at Sangmudae called Province Hall, claiming that her husband warned that he would not be coming home for several days and that she should under no circumstances venture outside. After the rally, 5,000 people cried out, “We fight to the end!” and marched down Geumnam-ro to Yang-dong Market and Hwajeong-dong, all the way to the perimeter where martial law forces faced them down. The people continued to chant before the soldiers and eventually returned to Province Hall. That night, approximately 150 young people and students remained at the YMCA auditorium to protect Province Hall.

The International Press Conference

Uprising Leadership Team spokesperson Yoon Sang-won held a press conference for foreign journalists at 5:00 p.m. on May 26 at the spokesperson’s office on the second floor of Province Hall. The press conference was the first of its kind since the Settlement Committee had given way to the Resistance Council, and with martial law troops’ invasion all but confirmed, there was great interest in the event. More than twenty press badges were handed to foreign journalists, drawing the eyes of the world to the city of Gwangju. The office doors were guarded by Chonnam University students Kim Yun-gi, Ahn Gil-jeong, and Park Jong-seop (age 19), who were armed with carbine rifles.¹³ This event, which was the first and last of its kind during the uprising, was attended by about a dozen journalists including the New York Times Tokyo bureau chief Henry Scott-Stokes, New York Times Seoul correspondent Shim Jae Hoon, Terry Anderson of the Associated Press, Matsunaga Seitarō of the Yomiuri Shimbun, Jürgen Hinzpeter of NDR, Bradley Martin of the Baltimore Sun, and Gebhard Hielscher of Süddeutsche Zeitung. John Linton (age 22, first-year student at Yonsei University College of Medicine), an American born to a missionary family in Suncheon, served as the interpreter.¹⁴ Linton had snuck into the city out of personal curiosity by claiming to be an employee at the US embassy; he became the interpreter for the press conference by chance.

Scott-Stokes described the atmosphere in the building as follows:

The student leaders looked very tired and very young, and did not know how to properly wield their weapons. When we went to the office to meet the spokesperson, we found that they had left their carbine rifles leaning against the walls as if they were toys. Had they properly armed the safety?¹⁵

Yoon gave a short briefing on the position of the Resistance Council, the results of the negotiations with the South Jeolla branch of Martial Law Command, the number of casualties, and the damages incurred by the citizens of Gwangju. He made a particularly emphatic plea for the journalists to request two things on behalf of the city: communications with US Ambassador Gleysteen and aid from the Red Cross. Yoon ended the press conference with the statement, “Even if we fall today, we will never be defeated.” Linton, who had interpreted for Yoon throughout the three-hour conference, found himself in tears. The city was not a den of rioters, but a community in mourning. According to Linton, Yoon said: “I don’t understand why those guns are pointed southward instead of at the Armistice Line. We are in a desperate situation. We are running out of food and water… We are not ‘commies.’ We begin each day with rallying cries denouncing communism. The injustice of being labeled as agents of North Korea brings us to tears.”

Following the press conference, Yoon asked to speak separately to Scott-Stokes and Shim, both from the New York Times, to ask them to arrange a meeting with the US ambassador to Korea. He made clear that he would not negotiate with Chun Doo-hwan. Shim and Scott-Stokes were torn at the request to serve as messengers for the resistance. They discussed the issue privately after the interview. Both felt that if they were not journalists, they would indeed plead on behalf of the city, but ultimately judged against it because they considered the role of the journalist to be that of an impartial observer. They deemed that the best they could do was write articles for the New York Times, through which Gleysteen might understand the situation in Gwangju and independently come to the decision to meet with the Resistance Council’s spokesperson. Unfortunately, Province Hall fell early the following morning, before their articles could even be printed.

After the press conference, posters were pasted outside Province Hall: “People of Gwangju, rest assured. The leadership has spoken with journalists from the New York Times and has received information that suggests the United States is about to intervene for the peaceful resolution of the crisis in our city.”

The posters even had Scott-Stokes and Shim’s names on them. Shim later recounted that the leadership must have been desperate to keep the people calm. The claim on the poster was not true. In early July, over a month after the Gwangju Uprising, Shim was suddenly taken into custody by Martial Law Command’s Joint Investigation HQ, illegally detained, and investigated. Investigators were especially focused on the contents of the posters. The New York Times and Gleysteen petitioned strongly for Shim’s release, and Shim was freed several days later.

On May 26, Gleysteen received a telephone call from someone in Gwangju requesting that he mediate between the rebel forces and Martial Law Command. Gleysteen, however, ignored the request for two reasons. The first reason was that he assumed that Martial Law Command would not agree to the mediation because the 20th Division had already been deployed to the city. He did not feel that such a role was appropriate for a US ambassador.¹⁶ The second reason was that he had no way of knowing who it was that requested the mediation. However, the Washington Post quoted a State Department spokesperson who claimed that the United States had no intention of negotiating with the resistance in the first place: “The request for mediation was ignored, the spokesperson said, because it was ‘not a human rights issue… It [was] a question of the national interest of the US in achieving and maintaining stability in Northeast Asia.’”¹⁷

The foreign journalists who attended the press conference were left with striking memories of spokesperson Yoon Sang-won. Scott-Stokes later recalled that Yoon was “a pure Jeffersonian supporter of democracy.” Anderson remembered him as “a resistance member who delivered a passionate and genuine plea.” Bradley Martin’s May 28 article on the front page of the Baltimore Sun began with the title “Korean Rebel’s Gaze Was Even but It Foretold His Death.” Martin later wrote about his encounter with Yoon in a 1994 issue of the monthly magazine Saemi gipeun mul:

I suspected by that point that [Yoon] was going to die. He seemed to know as well. There was a gentleness and kindness in his expression, but the shadow of death seemed to be approaching nearer by the second. I remember his insightful eyes and his prominent cheekbones in the moment he said, “We will fight to the last man.”¹⁸

At 9:30 a.m. that day, a reporter from CBS interviewed Arnold Peterson, who remained in the city. When the reporter asked, “What do you think of the government’s claim that this incident was caused by communists or communist sympathizers?” Peterson replied, “The people who caused this crisis were not communists, but the South Korean military.”¹⁹ Martial Law Command’s assertion that the Gwangju Uprising was sparked by North Korean agents or incited by communists continues to be repeated today by deniers.

The Final Conference

The Settlement Committee met for the final time at the vice-governor’s office at Province Hall, with Lee Jong-gi, Oh Byeong-mun (professor), Kim Jae-il, Jang Se-gyun, Cho Pius, Cho Ah-ra, Lee Ae-sin, Hwang Geum-seon, Gu Seong-ju, Kim Hwa-seong, Jeong Sang-yong, Kim Jong-bae, and Kim Chang-gil in attendance. Kim Chang-gil said, “We went to Martial Law Command earlier today and were informed that midnight tonight was the deadline to hand over our weapons. We must send back the firearms immediately.” Jeong Sang-yong argued against the proposal: “We humiliate ourselves by suing for peace at this point. Surrendering would be little different from betraying the people of the city. We heard their cries for justice at each rally. How many of our demands have Martial Law Command met? Not one! We can’t surrender now. Remember that the US has deployed its aircraft carriers. We only need to hold out for a few more days until we have our victory.” Kim Jong-bae agreed, adding, “Returning our weapons now is tantamount to suicide. And I choose to continue acting in accordance with the people’s will.”

When Kim Chang-gil continued to press for the return of their weapons, operations director Park Nam-seon and mobile strike force captain Yun Seok-ru pulled out their handguns and stated, “Those who will fight may remain, but those who intend to surrender must leave.” Kim Chang-gil, Hwang Geum-seon, and others in favor of returning the weapons left the conference room. On their way out of Province Hall, they went to the women in the kitchens and the people standing guard on the perimeter to inform them that martial law troops were on the way and persuaded many to go home.

YWCA chair Cho Ah-ra later recounted:

The Student Settlement Council split into factions. Jeong Sang-yong and Kim Jong-bae refused to leave Province Hall for the sake of the people who were so cruelly murdered, but Kim Chang-gil argued that he was going to leave after 5:00 p.m. It was so frustrating to watch them bicker that way that I scolded them, “You are only making the tragedy worse by arguing amongst yourselves. We need all the help we can get at this point, but you’re doing nothing but stirring up division. If you insist on continuing to argue, I am going to walk out of this building before any of you.” In the end, Kim Chang-gil left Province Hall. His followers went with him. A few people stayed behind, like Father Cho Pius, Professor Oh Byeong-mun, Reverend Jang Se-gyun, and the lawyer Lee Jong-gi. Jeong Sang-yong and Kim Jong-bae broke down crying, telling us, “No matter what happens, we are going to stay here to the last man. Please support us to the end.” That was around 7:00 p.m. I decided to go home about an hour later, so Father Cho and Professor Oh walked me back to the YWCA. From there, I went home with general affairs director Lee Ae-sin that night.²⁰

At 9:00 p.m., Kim Chang-gil returned home for the first time since he joined the Settlement Committee five days earlier. Earlier that evening at 7:00 p.m., 207 foreign citizens residing in the city (134 American, 9 Japanese, 3 British, 61 other) made their way out of the city.²¹ No foreigner was injured in any way during the city’s liberation period. That afternoon, Peterson once again contacted Technical Sergeant Dave Hill at the United States Air Force base in the city. Hill implored Peterson to leave the city quickly, but his pleas fell on deaf ears. Peterson remained in Gwangju to the end, spending the night alone at his residence in Yangnim-dong. He was awakened early the next morning by the sounds of gunfire coming from the direction of Province Hall. Peterson would recount that Hill later informed him that Korean forces were planning to bomb the city as part of their attack.²²

Indescribable Grief

Many of the bodies at Sangmu Hall had been carried in from nearby general hospitals like Chonnam University Hospital, the Red Cross Hospital, and Kwangju Christian Hospital. When a body was first brought in, it was initially examined by the investigation team at Province Hall before being moved to the empty courtyard between the main Province Hall building and the civil affairs office on the side of the premises. A cadaver treatment team would block the facial orifices with cotton to prevent the leakage of fluids and wrapped up bodies that were decaying rapidly. Many of the bodies had been shot and were missing limbs or were swollen due to beatings. When family members arrived and claimed a body, the body would be embalmed, placed in a coffin wrapped in white cloth, and carried to Sangmu Hall. More than sixty bodies had been brought to Sangmu Hall by May 26, and more than ten unidentified bodies were left at Province Hall. Two of the unconfirmed bodies were female, and they were not claimed until May 26. Because their faces were no longer recognizable, families had to confirm their identities through their attire and belongings.

Although morticians near Yang-dong Market supplied some coffins, there was such a shortage that construction-use plywood from Chosun University Hospital had to be brought in for makeshift coffins. Following a tip-off about a body in the field near Gwangju Daedong High School, the cadaver treatment team and the mobile patrol squad went to the scene and collected a body that had been buried without a coffin. However, no one came to collect it until the evening of May 26. If an injured person was brought to Province Hall, they were given first aid and, depending on the severity of the injury, carried to a nearby hospital.

Jeong Tae-ho (age 19, university student) and several female students volunteered to guard the bodies at Sangmu Hall. Although he was scared at first, Jeong eventually found comfort in the knowledge that the bodies he guarded belonged to his comrades in arms. Catholic parishioner Hong Sun-gwon (age 20, baptismal name Pius) took on work that others found off-putting, such as washing the bodies and embalming them at Province Hall. Hong was a member of the youth group at Buk-dong Catholic Church and had been studying for university entrance exams but he would be shot and killed by martial law troops on May 27 while standing guard at Province Hall.

Martial Law Forces’ Attempts at Sowing Division

The retreat of martial law forces from downtown Gwangju on May 21 was the culmination of the people’s desperate acts of resistance. Upon retreating, the military immediately set up a blockade around the city and determined that an operation to put down the “rioters” would be implemented after May 23.²³

Part of their plan to take back the city entailed psychological warfare, which involved inciting dissent and mutual distrust among the resistance. Despite these efforts, however, Gwangju remained standing for five days in the siege. The failure of these attempts was one of the factors that led to Martial Law Command shortening their invasion timeline.

Operation Sangmu Loyalty

On May 23, the South Jeolla Province branch of Martial Law Command distributed flyers stating the following:

We now march on downtown Gwangju in order to restore peace to the occupied city and protect innocent civilians. If you have been enticed by unsavory elements into rioting, surrender your weapons and turn yourself in. Civilians, remain in your homes. Resistance will be met with lethal force. Parents must keep their children in check. The operation will take place today.

The flyers had originally been distributed on May 23 with the intent to implement Operation Sangmu Loyalty that day, but the schedule had been pushed back due to orders.

This was not the only time that the operation to sweep Gwangju was altered.²⁴ When Operation Loyalty was proposed to Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong at 3:00 p.m. on May 23 by Second ROK Army Operations Officer Brigadier General Kim Jun-bong, Lee ordered that the operation be pushed back to the following day to secure agreement from the United States prior to the attack. Minister of National Defense Choo Young-bock then gave orders to push back the operation to 2:00 a.m. on May 25 with the excuse that a violent suppression operation would worsen regional resentment and make it difficult to counter hostage situations involving civilians. However, the real reason was that they needed extra time to secure US cooperation, which would entail the deployment of US fleets. It was 4:00 p.m. on May 24 when ROK Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Kim Jae-myeong reached an agreement with US military authorities. Subsequently, Martial Law Command ordered Combat Arms Commander Soh Jun-yeol to “put the operation on hold until we have reinforcements from the US Navy and Air Force.” The independent recall of weapons by the people of Gwangju also played a part in the delay of Operation Sangmu Loyalty.²⁵

On May 24, the 3rd, 7th, and 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigades transferred control of key locations on the Gwangju perimeter such as Gwangju Prison and Junam Village to the 20th Division and assembled at Gwangju Airfield to prepare for deployment. Second ROK Army HQ ordered Combat Arms Command to open supply lines between Gwangju and Jangseong County, north of Gwangju. Martial Law Command subsequently “reported to ROK-US Combined Forces Commander John Wickham that Martial Law Command had completed preparations for re-entry into and the capture of Gwangju.”²⁶

Earlier, martial law authorities had “confirmed that in accordance with the efforts of the minister of national defense and the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, it has become apparent that the US stance is an actively cooperative one.”²⁷ On May 22 in the US (May 23 in Korea), the US Defense Department announced that it had approved of the deployment of the 20th Division to Gwangju. The senior steering committee also declared that early warning aircrafts and aircraft carriers would be swiftly deployed to South Korea.

At 12:15 p.m. on May 25, Chun Doo-hwan, Choo Young-bock, Lee Hui-seong, Hwang Young-si, Roh Tae-woo, and other martial law authorities gathered at ROK Army Hall. Lee handed out documents by ROK Army HQ outlining Operation Sangmu Loyalty. Lee had ordered Kim Jae-myeong to prepare these files at 4:00 a.m. that day. Now with the full support of the United States, the group went through the documents and agreed to set the deployment time to sometime after 12:01 a.m. on May 27. Combat Arms Command would be placed in charge of the implementation of the plan.²⁸

The process leading up to the implementation of Operation Sangmu Loyalty went as follows: Kim made a personal visit to Gwangju on May 21 from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. as ROK Army HQ’s special team commander. Simultaneously, the 11th Brigade’s 61st and 62nd Battalions opened fire indiscriminately on tens of thousands of civilians gathered on Geumnam-ro. Following meetings with the Combat Arms Commander, the Special Warfare Commander, the commanders of the three brigades, the commander of the 20th Division, and the chief of the Bureau of Planning at Martial Law Command, Kim published a report titled “Conclusions on the Matter of Operation Implementation.” The on-site commanders he met emphasized the importance of preemptive suppression. In his report, Kim proposed that martial law forces be deployed to the downtown core at 4:00 a.m. on May 25. Later, a report on Kim’s report was published under the name of Lee Sang-hun, deputy director of operations at ROK Army HQ Operations Command. According to Lee’s report, there were three potential methods by which to end the Gwangju crisis: 1. Provision of support to civilian-led resolution, 2. Long-term blockade of Gwangju, or 3. Preemptive suppression. Following consideration of the three options, Lee’s report suggested that the third method be implemented for the following reasons: the first option, while the most peaceful, did not guarantee success and could lead to the massacre of civilians and long-term rioting. The second option, which would lead to comparatively fewer casualties and guarantee success, would give rioters more time to organize and use civilians as human shields, bolster defenses, spread the protests to other regions, cause civilian complaints, and use civilians and the families of soldiers to hinder military operations. The third option had the advantages of demoralizing the rioters, preventing the spread of the protests, and reducing damages which might be caused by a lengthy siege. However, this option would also lead to significant military, civilian, and rioter casualties, leave room for malicious media coverage, and cause negative aftereffects in the future.²⁹ It was this final option that was ultimately adopted.

To boost their wiretapping capacity, Martial Law Command’s 505th Security Unit was dispatched to Gwangju at 7:00 p.m. on May 26. Enlisted men on standby at Songjeong-ri Air Base and Combat Arms Command were also provided a total of KRW 63 million in incentives and seven cattle for a special luncheon.³⁰

Part III

The End, and a New Beginning

13

The Uprising’s Completion
(Tuesday, May 27)

Preparations for Battle

A light rain fell on the darkened city. Province Hall, the fountain plaza, and Geumnam-ro went silent. The fervor and excitement of liberation from the past five days grew cold as people went into their homes, locked their doors, and turned out the lights. The deserted streets and neighborhoods were dreary and dim. Only Province Hall, the YMCA, and the YWCA remained defiantly bright, and only the occasional mobile strike force or resistance vehicle drove down the empty roads. The fate of Gwangju would be decided before dawn.

Although the impending invasion had been made known to the public at the afternoon rally, a significant number of people remained at Province Hall. Just over twenty people had left the premises alongside Kim Chang-gil after a heated debate that evening between those for surrender and those for resistance. No one, however, criticized those who departed. A despondent Kim had gone around the building before his departure, informing people that the invasion was near and trying to persuade them to leave.¹ Mobile strike force captain Yun Seok-ru did not try to stop him, later explaining, “He was just trying to save as many people as he could. We may have had different perspectives, but we weren’t absolutely sure that we were the only ones in the right. Our intent was that only people who were willing to stay and defend Province Hall to the end should remain.”²

Early in the evening of May 26, a high-ranking National Security Forces official made a phone call to Yun with the demand, “Clear out Province Hall by midnight or face the consequences.” The official warned that if the building was not cleared, the military would march in. Yun threatened back, claiming, “If paratroopers come to the building, we will set off the TNT in the basement.”

Operations director Park Nam-seon, Yang Si-yeong, Lee Yong-suk, Son Nam-seung, Lee Gyeong-hui, Cho Si-hyeong, and Kim Hyeong-gon remained in the situation room on the first floor. Kim Jun-bong, Wi Seong-sam, Yang Seung-hui, Shin Man-sik, and Park Mi-suk remained in the investigation department room next door. Public relations team members Lee Heung-cheol and Park Yeong-sun, who had returned to Province Hall after making street broadcasts, were unable to return home and also remained in the situation room. More than 200 people, including the Uprising Leadership Team and mobile strike forces members Yun Seok-ru, Lee Jae-ho, and Kim Tae-chan, stationed themselves on the second floor in preparation for the final battle.

Moon Yong-dong, Kim Yeong-bok, Park Seon-jae, Yang Hong-beom, Jeong Nam-gyun, Jeong Gon-seok, and Lee Hyeok were among those who remained in the armory in the basement of the civil affairs office. Lee Gyeong-sik, who had been among the security team since May 23, was persuaded by his mother to return home in the evening of May 26, and everyone from the team stayed in the armory, except for Lee Hyeok, who had moved to the guardhouse near the main gates. Chief of Provisions Gu Seong-ju was busy running to marketplaces and City Hall to secure supplies, so he could not attend meetings on time. More than twenty women remained in the kitchens, including high school student Ju So-yeon and Catholic parishioners Jeong Suk-gyeong, Yun Cheong-ja, and Kim Sun-yi, who had joined the team on May 25.

Uprising Leadership Team chair Kim Jong-bae, spokesperson Yoon Sang-won, external affairs vice-chair Jeong Sang-yong, vice-chair Heo Gyu-jeong, planning director Kim Yeong-cheol, planning members Lee Yang-hyeon and Yun Gang-ok, chief of civil affairs Jeong Hae-jik, chief of investigation Kim Jun-bong, and general affairs manager Jeong Hae-min defended the offices on the second and third floors. Operations director Park Nam-seon and mobile strike force captain Yun Seok-ru, lieutenant Lee Jae-ho, and patrol squad leader Kim Hwa-seong busily responded to information delivered via radio.

As the sky grew dark, Lee Jong-gi appeared at Province Hall and was greeted with warm surprise. He was the only one of the older leaders to return to the building that night, having first taken a bath before joining the others. Commenting, “As chair of the Settlement Committee, I must take responsibility for failing to settle this situation,” he stationed himself in an office on the second floor. Lee Yang-hyeon later recalled, “Mr. Lee’s return was a great encouragement to us young people.”³ By that point, the resistance was only driven by the sacrifices of the people over the past nine days, their commitment to democracy, and their firm belief in the righteousness of their cause.

More than fifty members of the mobile strike forces patrolled the city. Resistance members not assigned to the strike forces kept watch over Province Hall and local neighborhoods. At 7:00 p.m., a group of more than seventy students, directed by posters and the Citizens for Democracy Bulletin, gathered at the YMCA to enlist for the defense. Kim Sang-jip and Kim Yun-gi led them to the conference room on the third floor of Province Hall, where the former briefly instructed them on the use of firearms.

“The guns we have are older models and may not load properly. When the trigger is pulled, there is a chance that the bullet might go off in the firing chamber, burning the shooter. Make certain to hit the breech block after each shot to prevent this from happening. After shooting, roll to the left to avoid being struck by return fire.”

Yoon Sang-won soon appeared to the new recruits and delivered a speech: “I have just given a press conference to foreign journalists. I would like to make clear that we are committed to the cause. The murderer Chun Doo-hwan continues to indiscriminately slaughter our family and friends. Even today, we discovered yet more bodies buried in unmarked graves. Hundreds remain missing. We must continue to fight so that the efforts of the martyrs who died in the name of freedom and democracy are not wasted. We welcome the new members of the resistance who stepped forward to protect the people of Gwangju and their property. We will continue to fight until the murderer Chun ends the state of martial law and proper political timelines are followed for the establishment of a democratic government in Korea. The foreign journalists I spoke with held up three fingers, assuring me that if we hold out for just three more days, Chun will retreat. We must continue to fight until democracy has been realized.”

Kim Sang-jip and Son Nam-seung were moved by Yoon’s speech. When Yoon concluded with the question, “Will you fight to the end?” every new recruit raised their voice to respond, “We will!”⁴

In the evening, the leadership team persuaded all students gathered for the final battle to call their families to let them know that they were at Province Hall. First-year Dongguk University student Park Byeong-gyu called his parents’ home, where his younger sister Park Gyeong-sun picked up the phone. “Gyeong-sun, is that you? Do you know where I am? I’m in some director’s office at Province Hall, sitting in the director’s chair. Let me talk to Mom,” he said to her, voice playful. When his mother took the phone, she told him, “Come home for breakfast tomorrow,” and hung up. Park did not tell her that he was preparing for the final battle.⁵

Other students were persuaded to return home by tearful parents. Telephones rang off the hook at Province Hall as families attempted to call back their loved ones. Although the battle would be for the city as a whole, individuals would not escape death. And because the rebels saw no value in death without conviction, each person made their own choice and did not enforce their decisions on others.

At 10:00 p.m., Lee Yeong-hyeon of the Uprising Leadership Team sent his wife back home to be with their children and said his goodbyes: “If tonight passes without incident, come out to Province Hall at nine in the morning and help at the kitchens like before. And if the children want to see their father, have them come visit. Pray that our family will be reunited alive.” Too conscious of the other resistance members to openly embrace her husband or let herself cry loudly, Lee’s wife put her head against his arm and wept. Lee gave her a gentle push in the back and walked back into the building with utter calm. The end was upon them.

With full knowledge of the impending assault, the resistance members collapsed into chairs with guns in their arms or put their heads on desks and fell asleep. Few had gotten enough sleep in the past several days, and the palpable tension had drained them of energy.

“Defend Province Hall!”

More than 5,000 citizens participated in the march following the afternoon rally on May 26. Afterward, more than 200 young people from the march volunteered to defend Province Hall to the end. They would serve as the final line of defense in the last battle against martial law troops and were mostly high school students, postsecondary students, and young blue-collar workers. It was clear even to them that they had no chance against the highly trained, well-equipped soldiers who would march on the city. However, surrender was not an option.

Because of their numbers, the Uprising Leadership Team had the volunteers gather at the YMCA rather than the crowded YWCA. The women from the YWCA served the volunteers rice with curry. After 8:00 p.m., operations director Park Nam-seon and spokesperson Yoon Sang-won entered the YMCA. With the gravitas of a man prepared for death, Park gave the volunteers an outline of the situation, describing the movements of martial law troops and the tasks before the resistance. Yoon strongly recommended that women and high school students return home: “We understand that high school students are no less committed to the cause than their elders. But this is not a fight for minors. We want you to survive and pass on your accounts of the day to others. You must become witnesses to history and tell the world how we fought and died.”

People could not be forced to remain, because those who stayed at Province Hall were likely to lose their lives. The Uprising Leadership Team was especially concerned about avoiding casualties among minors. However, most of the high school students who joined the volunteers at the YMCA chose to stay.

Im Yeong-sang (third-year student at Gwangju Seoseok High School) had been visiting the downtown core with his classmate and fellow boarding house resident Choi Jae-nam when he decided to join the group at the YMCA. He joined the rally outside Province Hall on the afternoon of May 26 and viewed the bodies at Sangmu Hall. Driven to outrage, he joined the volunteers with the determination to protect Province Hall and bring justice for the innocents who were killed. The volunteers were placed into squads of nine to ten people who put down their names and addresses on a roster to make sure that in the case of death, their bodies could be identified. Although Im was scared when the possibility of death was brought up, he also found greater resolve.⁶

Once Park and Yoon had given their speeches, reservist captain Song Jin-gwang (age 28, office worker) came forward to instruct the volunteers on the use of firearms, which included basic techniques such as loading, aiming, and opening fire. The Leadership Team gathered those with military experience from among the volunteers—those who knew how to operate firearms—and recruited volunteers from this group to join the mobile strike forces. The rest of those gathered at the YMCA remained there until the emergency alarm was sounded past midnight, at which point they went to Province Hall to receive firearms and ammunition. They were then stationed at key locations in the city including Province Hall, Gyelim Elementary School, and Hanil Bank.

The Night Before Deployment

A meeting for commanders who would be personally implementing Operation Sangmu Loyalty was held at the combat arms commander’s office at 10:30 a.m. on May 26.⁷ The commanders of the 20th Division; the 31st Division; and the 3rd, 7th, and 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigades, as well as the deans of the Infantry School under Combat Arms Command received specific orders on the sweep of Gwangju. The paratroopers would lead the attack as special forces teams, penetrating the perimeter and taking key locations in the city to bring the so-called rioters under control. The locations would then be handed over to the attack units, composed of soldiers from the 20th and 31st Division. Troops from the Infantry, Artillery, and Armor Schools would take control of the perimeter as blockade units.⁸

ROK Army HQ sent a set of instructions to Combat Arms Command ahead of time.⁹ Martial law troops would approach the city from five directions and take the final objective (Province Hall) and three other key locations—Gwangju Park, the Gwangju Tourist Hotel, and the Jeonil Building.

Specific orders were relayed to individual units. The 3rd Brigade, the pride of the military, was assigned to Province Hall, with the 11th assigned to the Gwangju Tourist Hotel, the Jeonil Building, and the YWCA; the 7th was assigned to Gwangju Park. These assignments were made in accordance with the recommendations made by Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong to Combat Arms Commander Soh Jun-yeol.

Seventy-seven soldiers (11 officers, 66 enlisted) from the 1st Field Battalion (Commander: Captain Pyeon) of the 11th Battalion (Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Im Su-won) of the 3rd Brigade (Commander: Brigadier General Choi Se-chang) were chosen for the attack on Province Hall. The capture of the Jeonil Building and the Gwangju Tourist Hotel was assigned to 37 soldiers (4 officers, 33 enlisted) from the 4th Company (Commander: Captain Choi) of the 2nd Field Battalion of the 61st Battalion (Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Ahn Bu-ung) of the 11th Brigade (Commander: Brigadier General Choi Ung). The capture of Gwangju Park was assigned to 262 soldiers (38 officers, 224 enlisted) from the 8th and 9th Field Battalions of the 33rd Battalion (Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Kwon Seung-man) of the 7th Brigade (Commander: Brigadier General Shin Woo-sik).

Having received deployment orders, the units each moved to different hangars at Gwangju Airfield from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., where they were given instructions on their missions. Maps of the city and blueprints of target buildings were laid out for the soldiers to examine and analyze for the best possible routes into their locations and potential situations they might encounter.

Four companies from the 3rd Brigade were assigned to specific missions and locations within the Province Hall grounds. Specific units would be assigned to each floor of the main building, the police building, the armory, and the civil affairs building. Agents from Defense Security Command and agents who were assigned to Province Hall joined the meeting, where they explained the layout and structures in detail. They even delivered recent information such as the split in the Settlement Committee and the fact that the resistance faction had elected to make one last stand. Brigade commanders emphasized that casualties be kept to a minimum and that soldiers were to follow guidelines they were given to the letter.

A total of eighteen specific guidelines were given to the soldiers to be memorized prior to deployment and adhered to during their mission. They included instructions to aim gunshots at the lower abdomen where possible, to utilize two police escorts per company, to protect foreigners and key figures, to refrain from the use of radios for security purposes, to work in close cooperation with other units assigned to the operation, and to avoid accidental fire at uninvolved parties; they also included countermeasures for a scenario where rioters used civilians as hostages.¹⁰

At 4:00 p.m., Soh Jun-yeol visited Gwangju Airfield to inform the commanders that the operation would begin at 12:01 a.m. on May 27. Soh conveyed the instructions in person in order to prevent information from being leaked.

Each special forces member was provided with one M16 rifle and 140 rounds of ammunition. Each company was provided with three grenades, two tear gas canisters, and two gas masks. Equipment was kept to a minimum to guarantee maximum mobility. Because public sentiment toward paratroopers was extremely hostile, strike team members were dressed in ordinary infantry uniforms rather than the striped paratrooper uniforms. They wore bulletproof vests over their jackets and put white bands around their helmets to prevent accidental fire among fellow soldiers.

The 3rd Brigade’s 11th Battalion and four companies from the 11th Brigade’s 61st Battalion’s 2nd Field Battalion, all of whom would be deployed to Province Hall and nearby areas, were flown to Junam Village by helicopter at 6:30 p.m. The 61st Regiment of the 20th Division had been holding the perimeter at the village since May 24, which necessitated discussions on the transfer of control over the Province Hall area to the 61st Regiment following the operation. The paratroopers’ plan was to assault the key locations quickly in the night and make their way out of the city discreetly before dawn. The discretion was part of the Singunbu’s meticulous plan to ease potential political pressure caused by criticism of their unnecessarily violent suppression methods.

Even as the 3rd and 11th Brigades waited on standby at Junam Village, more intelligence was brought in from headquarters. The locations of the resistance personnel around the key sites in the city were relayed through martial law forces’ intelligence channels and reached the paratroopers. The field battalion leaders, who would personally command the special forces, assigned each company to specific missions at target locations: Province Hall’s rear entrance, which was to be sealed off; the police building; the rooftop; the first floor of the main building; the second floor of the main building; the cafeteria and the civil affairs office in the basement with the armory; and the main gates. Once a company had completed its mission, it would send up a signal flare. Two police officers who knew the city well were assigned to the head of each unit to accompany them until they reached their target locations. Gwangju-region police had been officially summoned by martial law authorities on May 25 in preparation for this operation. The 3rd Brigade was guided by Bae Seung-il, the ordnance company’s civilian technician who had entered the basement armory to disarm the explosives in storage.¹¹

Chung Ho-yong arrived at Gwangju Airfield at 9:00 p.m. that night to encourage the special forces teams. He had met with Chun Doo-hwan in Seoul that morning and was supplied with wigs, plainclothes, and gunny sacks for the operation. At 2:00 p.m., he had also spoken with Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong, from whom he received stun grenades and aerial photos of the city for the troops.¹²

Just as the 3rd Brigade prepared to depart Junam Village at 10:30 p.m., ten stun grenades were delivered to them by a member of the Intelligence Corps. Each company assigned to interior locations such as the Province Hall building and the civil affairs office were given two grenades. The 11th Brigade unit assigned to the Jeonil Building was also supplied with stun grenades. Grenades were supplied separately to the company in charge of the main gates of Province Hall due to intelligence that suggested resistance fighters had erected a solid defense there.¹³ Preparations were complete.

The 3rd Brigade’s special forces teams departed Junam Village at 11:00 p.m. and reached the mission support site on the hill behind Chosun University two and a half hours later at 1:30 a.m. on May 27. The 11th Brigade departed Junam Village at 11:15 p.m. and reached the same location at 1:50 a.m.¹⁴ Travel time was initially projected at two hours, but the paratroopers were delayed due to an obstacle along the way. The 3rd Brigade’s special forces remained at the site for approximately ninety minutes to make final preparations and, at 3:00 a.m., set out for their destination: Province Hall. The 11th Brigade’s special forces set off for the Jeonil Building at 3:30 a.m.

“Emergency! Emergency!”

The odor of decay at Sangmu Hall mingled with the scent of burning incense and then rode the gentle night breeze into the offices at Province Hall across the street. The smell of death permeated the plaza outside the building. Earlier, the resistance might have been too exhausted to notice the smell—but to their surprise, they found themselves keenly aware of it as they looked out into the empty streets in silence. At 11:50 p.m., operations director Park Nam-seon made a phone call to the Seoul Capitol via the exclusive phone line at Province Hall: “This is the South Jeolla Province Hall. Have martial law troops been deployed to downtown Gwangju? If they enter the premises, we will set off the dynamite and kill ourselves and our attackers.”

A moment later, all phone lines leading outside the city went dead. Martial law forces had cut the lines between Gwangju and surrounding regions in the province, as well as lines within the city. Any skepticism left with the resistance evaporated, and those at Province Hall were now certain that martial law troops would make their move. Tensions ran even higher when a mobile strike force squad that had gone to patrol the perimeter at midnight returned to Province Hall one by one, reporting movements by martial law troops.¹⁵

Na Il-seong (age 19), a member of the mobile strike force’s 6th squad, made a beeline all the way to Province Hall through Yangnim Market to report that troops were marching from the direction of Wolsan-dong. He later testified, “Seeing the soldiers with my own eyes scared me. A part of me considered running away. My maternal aunt’s house was actually on the way back, and I thought if I got off the jeep here, I wouldn’t die. But then I realized that running would be cowardly and went back to Province Hall.”¹⁶

At 2:00 a.m., a state of emergency was declared at Province Hall.¹⁷ Resistance fighters at Province Hall had been nodding off, exhausted snores from days of patrols filling the offices. When the sirens shrieked, every person on the premises rose to their feet and went to their assigned locations and teams.

The resistance first evacuated the women, who had gone to the vice-governor’s office on the second floor to sleep after handing out bread and milk to the young people at midnight and completing preparations for breakfast. Jeong Suk-gyeong and Yun Cheong-ja were escorted by the resistance out of the premises and into Nam-dong Catholic Church behind the building. Park Byeong-gyu, first-year student at Dongguk University, woke up the remaining seven or eight women and took them to safety at Dongmyeong Church, one kilometer east of Province Hall. He returned to the building alone.

High school student Im Yeong-sang, who had been curled up asleep on a mattress in the YMCA auditorium, opened his eyes and checked his watch. It was a little past 2:00 a.m. The air was filled with the wail of sirens, the roar of engines, and a desperate female voice on the broadcasting system. About 200 volunteers were on standby in the auditorium in squads of ten people each. Each squad had been assigned to different locations such as Province Hall, Chonnam National University Medical School, Sansu-dong, and Gyerim-dong. The volunteers lined up with their squads, and the commander who had instructed them in the use of firearms earlier in the evening raised his voice: “Here we once again steel our resolve. If we defend Province Hall today, we will be victorious. We will give our lives for the defense!”

Every word out of the commander’s mouth filled Im with a sense of duty and purpose. Lining up with his fellow volunteers, they ran 200 meters from the YMCA to Province Hall. Foreign journalists trailed after them with cameras flashing. Wi Seong-sam, assigned to Province Hall security, handed out carbine rifles to the volunteers. Once he was armed outside the basement armory, Im was supplied with a magazine loaded with three rounds. The person who handed him the magazine advised him to be frugal with his ammunition, as they did not have much left over. Im briefly wondered if they expected him to simply die after he had spent his three rounds but knew that he could not ask for more. Once the young people from the YMCA were fully equipped, Wi dispatched them to security posts around the outer perimeter facing Geumnam-ro and sent the rest into the hallways of Province Hall and the civil affairs office.

Im and Choi Jae-nam were dispatched to the second security post on the right side of the main gates, about forty meters away. The tiny cement security post was stuffed full when two men in their twenties joined them. Through the murder hole in the wall, they could see a great deal in the darkness. Even the National Federation of Fisheries building across the plaza and the entrance to Chungjang-ro 1-ga were faintly in view. Each security post was about one and a half meters in height and had four brick-sized murder holes in the wall. Im and the others positioned their guns in the holes and took turns scanning their surroundings. By the time everyone had taken their positions, it was 3:00 a.m., and silence fell on Province Hall once more. The stillness continued, and Im found himself nodding off.¹⁸

When the emergency alert sounded at 2:00 a.m., more than fifty people on standby at the YWCA were also awoken. They included the Gwangdae Theater Company members, Deulbul Night School students and instructors, the Songbaek Society members, postsecondary students, and Yangseo Association high school students who had organized the rallies and published The Fighters’ Bulletin. When they learned that martial law troops were marching on the city, the group first evacuated Kim Tae-jong and Um Tae-ju, whose faces were widely known from the rallies, over the back fence. Thirty-odd women were also evacuated from the scene after them. About thirty men remained—among them Deulbul Night School associates Park Yong-jun, Na Myeong-gwan (age 18), Yun Sun-ho, Kim Seong-seop, Shin Byeong-gwan, and Jeon Yong-ho, high school students Kim Hyang-deuk, Lee Deok-jun, and Kim Hyo-seok, and postsecondary students Lee Gyu-hyeon, Lee Yeon, Jeong Yeon-hyo, Seo Han-seong, and Kim Sang-jip. Jeong, who had served in the military, took up the mantle of security chief and dispatched the men to their posts.

Unfortunately, as Deulbul Night School members had focused on publication work, the YWCA group only had ten guns. Na Myeong-gwan and ten others from the night school, led by Park Yong-jun, went to Province Hall to request additional weapons. Yoon Sang-won was shocked to see his night school students come to him at the armory. “Do you even know how to use these?” he asked worriedly. “I’m not sure you have what it takes,” he muttered to himself, hesitating. He finally made his decision, briefly drilling his students with squats.¹⁹ This was the last Na saw of Yoon Sang-won. The tension in the air made it difficult even to hear one another’s breaths. By the time the night school members felt sweat on their foreheads, Yoon relented and put rifles and ammunition in their hands. They then returned to the YWCA.

Operations director Park Nam-seon was fully occupied commanding the resistance. Due to the ammunition shortage, he ordered that resistance members were not to fire until fired at, to only fire on orders from the operations director, and to hold fire until enemies were well in range. Park personally went to the sites where resistance members were positioned to check the state of their defenses. He stationed more than ten men under the fence by the rear entrance and more than fifty members of the mobile strike forces around the planters near the fountain in the plaza. He also confirmed the locations and situations of the resistance members stationed near the perimeter.

The mobile strike force, commanded by captain Yun Seok-ru and lieutenant Lee Jae-ho, was also busy. When martial law forces were detected entering the city from 2:00 to 3:00 a.m., making patrols of the perimeter impossible, Yun recalled all the members back to Province Hall and reassigned them to security posts on the premises and to areas around the fountain plaza. Squad 1 leader Lee Jae-chun and Squad 3 used the cement planters around the fountain in the plaza as barricades from where they stood guard. Squad 2 was ordered to patrol the vicinity of the Intercity Bus Terminal. Squad 5 was assigned to security in Jungheung-dong, Daein-dong, Buk-dong, Gwangju Station, and the Intercity Bus Terminal. When the emergency alert was sounded, Squad 6 was stationed in the alley outside Province Hall next to Sangmu Hall. Kim Tae-chan, leader of the 7th Squad, was stationed in the second-floor hallway of Province Hall.

Reservist captain Song Jin-gwang proposed to Park Nam-seon that fifty reservists with firearms experience be selected from the group and gathered at the YMCA. The selected men were divided into four squads to be stationed at roads near the perimeter through which martial law forces were expected to enter the city. When the state of emergency was declared, Song led the men to the conference room on the first floor of Province Hall, where he supplied each member with a carbine rifle and thirty rounds of ammunition. Song took about twenty of the men under his command and set out for Gyerim-dong. Squad 7 leader Kim Tae-chan dropped them off by military truck on the footbridge in front of Gyelim Elementary School at 3:00 a.m. and retuned to Province Hall. Song divided up the men into two squads of ten, with one squad watching the west from the footbridge and the rest stationed in the school.²⁰

The regional defense squads stationed at Gwangju Park and the city perimeter had already dissolved. The weapons recall initiative on May 23 and 24, followed by a full night of rain on May 25, had scattered most of the members. The Uprising Leadership Team had instructed the few who remained at their posts to return to Province Hall earlier in the evening. The erosion of the outer defenses allowed martial law forces to march into downtown Gwangju with ease. When the state of emergency was declared in the early hours of May 27, however, the Uprising Leadership Team sent out some of their volunteers from the YMCA to unoccupied locations such as Wolsan-dong, Sajik Park, Sansu-dong, Chonnam University Hospital, and Gyelim Elementary School.

By 3:30 a.m., all personnel at Province Hall and the volunteers from the YMCA and the YWCA were equipped with firearms and ammunition and stationed at their posts. The total number of resistance members in the moments prior to the attack by martial law troops in the early morning of May 27 is estimated to be more than 340:²¹

Province Hall premises: 200+²²

YWCA: 30+²³

YMCA: 10+²⁴

Jeonil Building: 10+²⁵

Intercity Bus Terminal: 30+²⁶

Gyelim Elementary School: 20+²⁷

Wolsan-dong: 10+²⁸

Sajik Park: 10+²⁹

Namgwangju Station: 10+³⁰

Geumnam-ro Hanil Bank: 10+³¹

Gwangju Seobu Police Station: 30+³²

Once the resistance members were all in place, Jeong Sang-yong shook hands with Yoon Sang-won—his fellow Chonnam University alumnus—and briefly exchanged words.

“This might be the end, Sang-won. Do you not regret your choice?”

“I don’t know what you’re talking about. It’s an honor to lay down my life at this historic turning point.”

Lee Yang-hyeon said to Yoon, “We’ll all meet in the afterlife. And fight for democracy there, too.”

Kim Yeong-cheol, Lee Yang-hyeon, and Yoon Sang-won each took up a carbine rifle and made their way to the auditorium on the second floor of the civil affairs office—the armory—hands clasped tightly together.³³

The Final Broadcast

At 3:50 a.m., a desperate female voice broke the silence through the speakers mounted atop the roof of Province Hall. Park Yeong-sun sat in the situation room with the microphone in hand, choking back sobs as she read the final manuscript.

“Fellow citizens of Gwangju, martial law troops are making their way into the city. Our beloved brothers and sisters are falling to their bayonets and bullets as we speak. Let us all fight back to the end. We will defend Gwangju. Please remember us. We will fight to the end. Citizens of Gwangju, martial law troops are making their way into the city.”

Although the people were awakened by Park’s voice, they could not rush out their doors. No one was free from the fear of death. Park’s desperate pleas that night drove into the hearts of Gwangju’s citizens like a knife. The knife seemed to twist in their wounds, leaving behind an everlasting scar.

The message was handed to Park by Uprising Leadership Team chair Kim Jong-bae, who had rushed in with the manuscript crammed into a small piece of paper. The moment she received the note, Park trembled and burst into tears. She sensed that the end was near.³⁴ New York Times reporter Henry Scott-Stokes heard her voice at an inn about 200 meters from Province Hall. Although he did not understand what she said, her voice resonated deeply with him.³⁵

Park had read out the manuscript four or five times when the lights in the building went off—along with the audio system. Lee Yang-hyeon, who was at the auditorium on the second floor of the civil affairs building, had cut the power to the premises upon receiving confirmation of martial law troops infiltrating Province Hall at 4:00 a.m.

Paratroopers Launch a Surprise Attack on the Rear Entrance

Just before 4:00 a.m., the vanguard of the 1st Field Battalion from the 3rd Brigade’s 11th Battalion reached the rear entrance of Province Hall.³⁶ They crossed the Chosun University athletics field and discreetly passed through the Donaegi Market, the expressway, the railroad, South Jeolla Machine Engineering High School, and the Labor Supervision Office. As Park Yeong-sun’s voice echoed from the speakers overhead, the men infiltrated Province Hall from the rear entrance and either flank, expecting the resistance to have fortified the defenses around the main entrance. However, the rear guard—the 4th Company, led by a Captain Yuk, which was assigned to climbing over the rear fence to take over the South Jeolla Province Police building—had yet to arrive.³⁷

At 4:10 a.m., paratroopers discreetly surrounded the premises with the exception of the main gates, poised to attack. The alley directly behind Province Hall was barely wide enough for one handcart. As the 4th Company approached the alley, they heard hushed resistance voices from beyond the fence. The company commander gestured for caution, but one of the paratroopers in the back dropped his gun, setting it off.³⁸ It was too dark to aim at one another. One of the bullets bounced off a nearby wall and hit the leg of a sergeant first class just behind the commander. When the gunshots went silent, Captain Yuk had the injured sergeant moved to the back and peered into the premises through a murder hole. Seeing no one inside, he made to climb over the fence when he heard gunshots again and saw bullets right before his eyes. Yuk put his own gun to the murder hole and shot back with burst fire. His men quickly climbed over the fence and spotted half a dozen resistance fighters scatter to the left and right. They captured one of the people who ran for the first floor of the police building.

Resistance member and Chonnam student Kim In-hwan (age 21) also testified about the incident.³⁹ He had been stationed behind the fence at the back of the Province Hall premises, with his carbine rifle in the murder hole and eyes on the residential alleyway. The murder hole was about the size of a brick and was positioned at eye-height. In the dark, Kim managed to make out martial law troops stir in the alleyway. One of the resistance fighters with him opened fire, deterring the soldiers from making their way in.⁴⁰ A moment later, martial law troops fired back. Dozens of resistance members on guard at the back of the premises, including Seo Ho-bin and Kim In-hwan, were instantly overcome as the paratroopers made their way over the fence. Kim In-hwan and Seo Ho-bin retreated and fled into the police building. A moment before they passed through the doors, Seo yelled, “I’ve been shot in the leg!” They narrowly managed to conceal themselves in the building. Seo, however, was unable to endure the pain of the wound and ran outside, breaking a window. That was the last Kim saw of Seo.⁴¹ As the resistance fell back toward the building, the paratroopers made their way over the fence in one push. Kim In-hwan was captured alive on the scene.

Captain Yuk of the 4th Company captured one man alive and made his way into the police building halls, where he met a paratrooper staff sergeant from another company.⁴² On his way out of the building, he was shot and received a neck injury. The bullet had come from one of the rooms on the first floor of the police building. Yuk approached the room, fired two or three shots at the doorknob, and warned loudly, “I’m giving you to the count of ten. Come outside or I kill you all.”

Figure 16. Troop movements during Operation Sangmu Loyalty (May 26, 22:00–May 27, 06:00)

When Yuk began his countdown, someone inside yelled, “We’re coming out!” A moment later, about five people in their twenties walked out of the room—including Kim Jun-bong of the investigation department. Kim had gone to the police building when someone on the radio cried, “The rear defenses are weak!” He had opened a small door in the building next to the tennis court when he found four or five resistance members hiding inside. At that moment, a soldier came up behind him with his gun pointed, demanding, “Surrender, and we let you live!” Kim did not have the chance to fight back. He yelled, “We’re coming out!” and the soldier replied, “throw away your weapons and crawl outside!” As he was taken to the main entrance after his arrest, Kim spotted two resistance members lying on the ground. Another critically injured resistance member was quickly dragged over. A man who seemed to be a captain barked at the paratrooper who brought in the injured man, asking, “What happened?” The injured man, his head covered in blood, weakly called for his mother again and again before he finally went limp.

Park Byeong-jun (age 17, seamster) was a volunteer who enlisted at the YMCA before being sent to Province Hall at 2:00 a.m. to receive his carbine rifle and ammunition. He was later assigned to the police building with twelve others. When martial law troops were within thirty meters, he could not bring himself to open fire. Terrified, Park escaped to the police building basement, where he was shot in the leg and detained.⁴³ The defense of the Province Hall rear collapsed completely.

At 4:00 a.m., the 11th Brigade’s special forces team bound for the Gwangju Tourist Hotel and the Jeonil Building passed by Province Hall. They made their way from the direction of Chungjang-ro toward the fountain in the plaza. Lee Jae-chun, leader of Squad 1 of the mobile strike force, was on standby behind one of the concrete planters in front of the fountain. A high school student next to him accidentally shot his gun into the air. Martial law troops fired back, focusing their aim at the direction of the sound.⁴⁴

“I kept hearing gunshots from somewhere. Two of the resistance members who had joined us from Province Hall for support suddenly fell limp. I had told them to keep their heads down, but they didn’t listen and were shot in the head.”⁴⁵

The 11th Brigade’s special forces team made their way to the direction of the gunshots. Under the cover of obstacles, they shot one resistance member to death with an M16 before they left the scene and headed to the Gwangju Tourist Hotel.⁴⁶

When the gunfire stopped, Lee Jae-chun spotted martial law troops with white bands around their helmets on the move near Sangmu Hall. Yu Seok and his friend Jeong Geum-dong (age 17, first-year student at Gwangju Jeil High School) were also behind the planters around the fountain at the time.⁴⁷ The realization that they were completely surrounded terrified Lee Jae-chun. It occurred to him that staying by the fountain would put him in more danger. Lying flat on his stomach, he crawled back into Province Hall. The rest of the resistance stationed around the fountain all rushed back to the building after the first exchange of fire.⁴⁸

Na Il-seong from Squad 6 of the mobile strike forces, stationed in the alley to the side of Sangmu Hall, heard the M16 shots grow louder and louder from the back of Province Hall. He led a group of men toward the gunshots, parking their vehicle in front of the studio and making their way down the road from Chungjang-ro 1-ga to Province Hall. The strike force member nicknamed “Samurai” took the lead, followed by Kim Yeo-su (age 19) and Park In-su in single file. When Park In-su, leader of the 6th Squad, was about halfway past the crossing at the entrance to Chungjang-ro 1-ga, they heard gunshots from next to the Dosim Supermarket building and spotted flashes of gunfire. Park fell to the ground. Kim Yeo-su and Samurai carried Park to Province Hall. Na Il-seong jumped over the Province Hall fence with Kim Hyeon-chae and took shelter in the premises. Kim Hyeon-chae hid under a vehicle next to the guardhouse. When the gunfire slowed, Na rushed to the Province Hall rear entrance, where he spotted movement. He asked, “Who are you?” but received no answer. “Hands in the air!” someone yelled from behind, jumping on him. “Commie scum!” Na was brutally beaten to unconsciousness as he was arrested by martial law troops.⁴⁹

Kim Yeo-su and Samurai carried Park In-su, who was bleeding from his neck, into a restaurant in an alleyway by Province Hall and yelled, “We have an injured man here!” A soldier outside ordered them to abandon their weapons and step outside. Kim Yeo-su carried Park In-su out of the restaurant.⁵⁰ Kim Hyeon-chae was also quickly arrested. Samurai was nowhere to be seen.⁵¹

Once they had completed their sweep of the police building, paratroopers went up to the rooftop of the three-story building. This was witnessed by Terry Anderson of AP, who was at Daedo Hotel, only fifteen meters from the police building.⁵² He wrote:

Before dawn, I witnessed paratroopers creep around Province Hall and charge at the building where the Uprising Leadership Team stayed. In a textbook example of urban warfare tactics, the paratroopers went up to the top floor and made their way down one story at a time, sweeping the building. They threw stun grenades into each room and opened fire on anything that moved.⁵³

Paratroopers also opened fire on Daedo Hotel, where many foreign journalists stayed. When Terry Anderson spotted two paratroopers on the rooftop of the police building only fifteen meters away at dawn, he crept toward his window to take pictures.⁵⁴ The paratroopers noticed him and opened fire. The first round landed only centimeters from Anderson’s ear. He leapt into the corner where the other journalists were huddled, but the bullets broke through the wood-and-mud walls and reached the interior. The journalists scrambled out into the hallway. According to Anderson, the paratroopers had opened fire on them even though martial law authorities clearly knew that the foreign journalists were staying at that hotel.

The 20th Division’s operation records describe the circumstances as follows:

The moment our forces climbed over the wall, they were fired upon indiscriminately by machine guns mounted to the rooftop and rear entrance of the South Jeolla Province Hall (caliber unknown), and were fired upon by armed protesters stationed on each floor of Province Hall, the rooftop of the Jeonil Building, Sangmu Hall, and the Province Hall rooftop. Two soldiers sustained serious injures (one neck injury, one perforating leg injury). However, 20th Division forces blocked off the rear entrance and attacked the second floor of the main building, securing the demonstrators’ armory and ammunitions supplies.⁵⁵

The Main Building at Province Hall

At 4:00 a.m., a Captain Kim from the 2nd Company of the 11th Field Battalion of the 3rd Brigade’s 11th Battalion approached the southern fence of Province Hall in the direction of Chungjang-ro, preparing to attack the premises. He heard hushed voices from across the alley.⁵⁶ Because it was too dark to make them out, he waited for them to draw close and said, “Six.” The people responded, “Three.” The paratroopers had determined a signal where one side would call out a number and the other side would call out a number that would bring the sum of their numbers to nine. Kim realized that he had encountered another company that had reached Province Hall earlier. A moment later, they heard gunshots.⁵⁷ Forced to wait for the gunshots to stop before he could move again, Kim was late to reach his destination—the wall by Daedo Hotel on the south side of Province Hall. The field battalion commander censured him for being late.

Because we had taken so much time, and because the commander pressed us into immediate attack upon arrival at the fence, we promptly climbed over to the Province Hall premises. The courtyard was empty, likely because we were late. Because Province Hall’s main building had no rear entrance, we smashed a window and made our way inside. The room we entered happened to be empty. We quickly went up the stairs to the second floor.⁵⁸

Province Hall’s main building consisted of three stories: the first was home to administrative offices including the General Affairs Division; the second housed the executives’ offices; the third was occupied by division offices and conference rooms.⁵⁹ Lee Jong-gi, Kim Jong-bae, Heo Gyu-jeong, Jeong Sang-yong, Park Nam-seon, Jeong Hae-min, Yun Gang-ok, Jeong Hae-jik, and other leaders, situation room and investigation team members, YMCA reinforcements, and the mobile strike force members from the fountain including Kim Tae-chan had by this point entered the main building at Province Hall and the civil affairs building next door.

Park Nam-seon went up to the second floor and ordered, “Break the windows!” The attack from the rear entrance had taken the Uprising Leadership Team by surprise, leaving them with no countermeasure. He attempted to order the resistance stationed outside to fall back into the building, but his voice was drowned out by gunfire.

Captain Kim of the 3rd Brigade’s 2nd Company climbed up to the second floor of the main building, where he spotted half a dozen resistance members by the hallway windows with guns pointed outside. When he opened fire, the people in the hallway quickly took shelter in the offices. The 2nd Company, which entered the stairway of the new wing to the south of the main building, quickly took control of the rooftop and swept their way downstairs.

Chonnam students Kim Yun-gi and Ahn Gil-jeong were stationed in the spokesperson’s office, where Yoon Sang-won had been. Kim Jong-bae initially stayed with them in the vice-governor’s office on the second floor, only to rush up to the fourth floor of the new wing upon hearing gunfire and news that the first floor had been taken. Some time passed and the gunfire died down, at which point Kim Jong-bae and his companions peered out the door. They spotted paratroopers in the fourth-floor hallways and opened fire, then quickly shut the door for cover. The paratroopers ordered via handheld microphone, “We have taken control of this building. Abandon your weapons and surrender yourselves.” They wondered if they should fight to the death or give up. Someone said, “It looks like it’s all over anyway. Let’s turn ourselves in.” It was not long before they put down their guns and walked out the door, yelling, “We surrender.”⁶⁰

Jeong Hae-jik and Yun Gang-ok were on the second floor of the main building when they fled the hallway and leapt into the office of the director of food and production. “Everyone scattered in the dark. We had no idea where the bullets were coming from, so all we could do was run around, not knowing which way to shoot.”⁶¹

They pushed filing cabinets against the doors and pulled out bundles of documents to use as barricades. Paratroopers seemed to be sweeping the second story, setting off grenades alongside burst fire from their M16 rifles as they commanded the resistance members to surrender. Someone desperately knocked on the door, asking to enter. Jeong and Yun opened it and a high school student scrambled inside. A moment later, paratroopers opened fire on the office door. Bullets drove themselves into the cabinets with percussive impacts. A nearby high school student, terrified, pleaded that he had to defecate. He did so in a corner of the office as the paratroopers continued to attack the door.

“Rioters, put down your weapons! Step outside by the count of seven, or we will throw grenades into the office.”

They could already hear yelling outside, which suggested that those who had already been captured were forced into military drills. The noise was dizzying. “I think they’ll spare us if we surrender,” someone said. They pushed their guns out the door to signify surrender and turned themselves in.

Jeong Sang-yong took shelter in the office of the planning director on the second floor of the building. His eardrums rattled at the sound of grenades and M16 rifles. He lay flat on his stomach on the office floor, resigned to death, and found a sense of peace and serenity.

M16 burst fire roared from the rear entrance. Glass shattered in the distance, and mobile strike force members stationed outside came running into the building, at which point the gunfire and screaming resounded from every direction. Choi Chi-su, leader of the high school volunteers, left the situation room to assess the status of the front gates. He heard glass shatter and saw paratroopers open fire in his direction from about twenty to thirty meters to the left. Park Nam-seon burst out of the office at the noise and yelled, “To the second floor!” Choi scrambled after him up the stairs.⁶²

Kim Tae-chan, leader of the mobile strike forces’ 7th Squad, had driven the reservists to Gyelim Elementary School at 3:00 a.m. and returned to Province Hall. When martial law forces invaded at 4:00 a.m., Kim was in the second-floor hallway of the main building alongside fellow strike force members Jang Seung-hui and Park Myeong-guk. They had been fooling around with rifles propped up against the walls when they heard gunfire. It was only at that point they truly understood that their lives were in danger. Kim was so tense that his rifle wouldn’t fire. His friend found that Kim had stuffed two rounds into the chamber. But the moment he took the rifle and made to shoot, Kim’s friend collapsed. Kim shook him, assuming he was playing a prank, until he realized that his friend was bleeding. Kim opened fire indiscriminately in the direction of the gunshots. A moment later, Lee Jong-gi pulled him into one of the offices. They were completely surrounded by martial law troops.⁶³

A cacophony of gunfire rattled the building. Outside the second-story window, Kim saw martial law troops run amok with guns ablaze. Lee stopped Kim from opening fire. Kim put his rifle aside and found himself in tears. Some time passed before the door burst open with a round of burst fire. Martial law troops ordered, “Come out!” Lee responded, “We surrender, so don’t shoot us.” The gunfire stopped. “Crawl out on your stomachs, you bastards!” the soldiers commanded. Kim and Lee did as they were told. The soldiers tied their hands behind their backs with their own belts and took them to the other prisoners in the second-floor hallway. Over a hundred people who were captured earlier were in the front courtyard, forced to assume the Wonsan Bombing position.

Jeong Hae-min of the Leadership Team took shelter in an office on the second floor with a dozen or so other resistance members. They were quickly joined by Park Nam-seon, who had a carbine rifle slung across his back. All they could do was stay put. An impatient Jeong, however, opened the door and stepped out into the hallway and was immediately shot at from the end of the hall. Jeong quickly stepped back inside and shut the door, asking Park to help him assess the situation outside. They went into the hallway together. It was too dark to see anything, so they yelled toward the end of the hallway, “Don’t shoot! This is the director of operations and the general affairs manager,” guessing that fellow resistance fighters might be at the end of the hall. They took several steps down the hallway when without warning, Park dropped to the floor and crept on his stomach. A confused Jeong heard someone shout from the end of the hall, “On the floor, damn you!” Martial law troops had made it to the second floor.

Wi Seong-sam had fallen asleep in the investigation department room on the first floor overnight and was awakened by the commotion outside. A resistance member scrambled into the room, appearing to have been shot in the face. As Wi and the women from the broadcasting room treated the injured man, they heard gunshots. Soldiers rushed inside and opened fire indiscriminately. Wi attempted to fire back with his carbine rifle, but the female high school student hiding next to him begged, “Please don’t shoot!” out of fear that they would be discovered. Wi took out the ammunition from his pocket and dropped them on the floor. He tried to encourage the girl, “Don’t worry. As long as we make it to dawn, we’ll be fine. All of Gwangju will rise up with us.” The gunfire seemed to subside, and the soldiers outside roared, “Surrender now!” Wi and his companions stood up in a line, waving their jackets as they cried, “We surrender.” They walked out of the room, and two of the soldiers ordered, “On the floor!” One of those soldiers said to someone in the distance, “Just like in the movies, eh, Staff Sergeant Kim?” as he opened a window and shot at another direction.

Once martial law troops had made it into the main building, the resistance forces were trapped in their offices and did not come face-to-face with the soldiers until the moment of their capture. They were in no position to open fire on the paratroopers who systematically searched each office, making their way down the halls.⁶⁴ The few who attempted to rush out the doors were quickly gunned down.

Shin Man-sik of the investigation team clashed against soldiers in Province Hall until he was forced into a retreat. He fled to a pile of resistance corpses under a tree by the outer fence, lying down and pulling another body on top of his own. He heard a soldier say, “Hey! Don’t let anyone escape alive. Confirm all kills.”

Immediately, a soldier approached the pile of bodies and pierced them with his bayonet one by one. When the corpse above Shin’s was stabbed, the bayonet also pierced his right calf. He endured the agony and remained as still as possible. A moment later, once the soldiers had relaxed their guard, he pushed away the bodies, climbed over the chest-height fence near the main entrance, opened a gutter cover at the intersection in front of the Labor Supervision Office, and took shelter there. His calf continued to bleed, so he tore off part of his undershirt and wrapped it around the wound. Shin remained hidden in the gutter for several hours.⁶⁵

The Basement Armory

When the emergency alert was sounded at 3:00 a.m., Moon Yong-dong, Kim Yeong-bok, Park Seon-jae, and Yang Hong-beom, who stood guard over the armory in the basement of the civil affairs office, distributed one carbine rifle and magazines loaded with three rounds to each of the forty-nine reservists and students brought in from the YMCA on the orders of Park Nam-seon. Time passed, and although they heard that martial law troops were making their move on Province Hall, never in their wildest dreams did they expect that soldiers would charge onto the premises firing at practically unarmed civilians.⁶⁶

Just before the alert, Yang was on guard alone for the night, with his companions fast asleep. A little past 4:00 a.m., they heard screams and the sound of M16 rifles from the first floor of the main building. A moment later, the doors to the basement—where they were stationed—flew open and paratroopers opened fire. Yang and the others bolted past the back of the armory and the makeshift kitchen, rushing out the back door. Moon and Kim ran for the building ahead but Park and Yang stumbled at the sound of gunfire nearby. They separated into pairs, with Moon and Kim heading to the police building, then the small storehouse in front of the police building. Park and Yang waited for the gunfire to die down and followed their friends into the police building. The premises were bombarded with the sound of gunfire, the roar of helicopters, and the message, “You are surrounded. Surrender yourselves” blasting from the helicopters. Yang proposed suicide by mutual shooting to Park but did not go through with the idea. When the calls for surrender continued, Moon relented and suggested to Kim that they abandon their weapons and turn themselves in. Kim agreed. Moon yelled, “We surrender!” and emerged, hands in the air. Kim followed close behind. Instantly, soldiers opened fire on Moon, who fell screaming. Kim quickly took shelter in the building again, bleeding from what he guessed was a stray gunshot. Martial law forces continued to broadcast the message to surrender, and Kim eventually complied. He walked out of the building and was arrested. On the way, he spotted Moon, who lay in a pool of blood. Moon had contacted martial law authorities at great risk to defuse the explosives at Province Hall, only to fall at the hands of the military.⁶⁷ With the exception of Moon, the men who had served as armory guards were all captured on the scene.

The Civil Affairs Office

When the emergency alert was sounded, Yoon Sang-won, Kim Yeong-cheol, and Lee Yang-hyeon armed themselves at the guardhouse next to the main gates and went up to the auditorium on the second floor of the civil affairs office on the north side of the premises, which had been used as a makeshift cafeteria. The importance of the armory in the basement made the building one of the most critical locations to defend, even at the cost of the main building. Martial law troops also knew of the armory, which was why they had deployed the best of the 3rd Brigade’s 11th Battalion’s 1st Field Battalion to the site.

At the same time, mobile strike force members stationed around the fountain in the plaza were forced back toward the civil affairs office.⁶⁸ This group included captain Yun Seok-ru and lieutenant Lee Jae-ho of the resistance’s mobile strike forces.

As he steadied his guns against the windowsill in preparation for his last stand, Lee Yang-hyeon found himself unafraid but tense. He turned to Yoon Sang-won and Kim Yeong-cheol next to him to say what could be his final goodbyes. “If we die here, we’ll meet again in the afterlife, won’t we? Let’s proudly remember the sacrifices made by the people who went before us.”

The men on the second floor of the civil affairs office all waited in the hallway outside the auditorium, guns trained on the main entrance to the premises. Gunfire roared from the direction of the rear entrance. It was still 4:20 a.m., which meant it was too dark to even make out the foliage outside the windows. Someone rushed into the auditorium from the direction of the police building to warn, “The rear entrance has been breached.” Lee Yang-hyeon, Kim Yeong-cheol, and Yoon Sang-won crossed the auditorium and made their way to the walkway to the police building near the rear entrance, where the three-story building loomed. The police building, connected to the civil affairs building via the second-story walkway, was very close. Lee and the others positioned their guns on the windowsills in the direction of the police building, when they saw flashes of light. Yoon collapsed with a groan. Kim Yeong-cheol and Lee Yang-hyeon moved Yoon to the back of the auditorium and laid him out on the tiled floor. By the time Lee wrapped a blanket around him, Yoon had already stopped moving, seemingly unconscious.⁶⁹

The gunfire drew closer. Leaving Yoon behind, Lee and the others were chased to the front of the auditorium and took shelter at the stairwell entrance on the first floor. Outside the window they could dimly see the main entrance to the premises—and martial law troops making their way inside, armored vehicles and tanks in the lead. Park Nae-pung and some of the other rebels on the second floor opened fire in the direction of the soldiers.⁷⁰ Lee Yang-hyeon, who had been a distinguished rifleman during his time in the military, could not muster the courage to pull the trigger against paratroopers. Captain Yun Seok-ru berated hesitant resistance members to open fire.⁷¹

Soldiers who had entered the police building to reach the civil affairs office crossed the walkway, passed through the hallway in the back, and entered the auditorium. The resistance members who remained in the auditorium had, by that time, crowded the hallway on the opposite side and the ends of the stairs. Martial law troops opened fire indiscriminately on the auditorium, where Yoon Sang-won lay, but the gunfire soon subsided. Windows shattered and people screamed. The military speakers demanded surrender. The resistance members gathered near the stairwell took shelter in the restrooms at the entrance of each floor and the stairwells themselves, but they could not last much longer. Park Nae-pung saw paratroopers make their way up the stairs and hid in a restroom with two or three friends. They soon heard gunshots pepper their surroundings.

Bullets struck the walls, sending shrapnel flying into Lee Yang-hyeon’s head and arms. Lee barely noticed the pain even as he bled. More time passed, and he heard voices around him cry, “We surrender! We surrender!” The soldiers ordered, “Put down your guns and step outside.” Kim Yeong-cheol, preferring to die than be captured, put the barrel of his gun into his mouth and pulled the trigger—but the gun never went off. The first soldier Kim saw had no nametag, only a badge of rank identifying him as a sergeant first class. Instinctively, he felt that this soldier was the one who shot Yoon Sang-won and was overwhelmed with rage. The sergeant first class fired into their hiding spot, ordering them to surrender. It was not long before the younger resistance members pushed their guns across the hallway floors and revealed themselves. Everyone captured on the second floor was made to kneel in the narrow balcony hallway. More than twenty were taken prisoner. The soldiers spotted two large pine trees about a meter from the balcony and instructed their prisoners to climb down the trees to the ground. The captured resistance members clambered down the trees one by one and were met by soldiers on the ground who kicked them in the back of the neck before they could reach the ground. The prisoners’ lips and faces tore when they were thrown to the pavement. Even when they lay on their stomachs with their hands behind their backs, the soldiers continued to abuse them. When the sun finally rose, the prisoners were dragged into the plaza outside. A foreign journalist brought a TV camera up to Kim Yeong-cheol’s face. The words “violent element” and “firearms possession” were scrawled on his back with permanent marker. A soldier struck him in the head with the butt of his M16, but Kim was so tense that he felt no pain.

The 3rd Brigade’s sweep of Province Hall, which began at 4:10 a.m., ended about an hour later at 5:15 a.m. Only two soldiers from martial law forces were injured at the site, with no deaths recorded.⁷² In contrast, a total of sixteen members of the resistance were killed on the scene, mostly struck down by M16 bullets fired by martial law troops.⁷³

The Fountain Plaza and Sangmu Hall

Members of the resistance were stationed not only inside the buildings on Province Hall premises, but also around the fountain in the plaza, the guardhouse by the main gates, the Jeonil Building, the YWCA, and the YMCA. Those stationed at the Jeonil Building, the YWCA, and exterior positions such as the fountain and the guardhouse, however, quickly took shelter in the Province Hall buildings when martial law troops opened fire. The majority of resistance members were unable to shoot at martial law troops. Part of the reason was the sheer difference in power between the carbine and M16 rifles, but the biggest reason was that resistance members feared giving away their own positions and opening themselves up to concentrated fire.

Lee Jae-chun, leader of Squad 1 of the mobile strike force, was behind a planter by the fountain in the plaza.⁷⁴ When the hail of gunfire from martial law troops seemed to lapse, Lee crawled to the main gates and took cover under a bus parked in the front courtyard. He hid there until dawn with three others, including mobile strike force captain Yun Seok-ru, but was caught and taken into custody.

When the emergency alert was sounded, Yang In-hwa (age 24, cook) was assigned to the police bus parked in front of Sangmu Hall with seven or eight fellow resistance members. They spotted two martial law soldiers with white bands on their helmets make their way into the fountain plaza, hugging the outer fence of the Province Hall premises. Metal netting had been installed around the police bus windows Yang was on, but they were not strong enough to withstand bullets. There was a burst of gunfire in the plaza and sparks flew against the ground. Martial law troops took aim and raised their voices, and Yang threw his gun outside, having never pulled the trigger, and exited the bus. The hail of bullets terrified him, but when he heard the soldiers roar, “Move, you bastard!” he willed his feet to move and ran to Province Hall, eyes shut tightly.⁷⁵

Around 4:00 a.m., Im Yeong-sang, Choi Jae-nam, and their two companions, stationed in a guardhouse on the outer fence, spotted a helmet with a white band about thirty to forty meters away. Im tried to pull the trigger, but he was too terrified to move. The soldier drew closer and closer until he was only about ten meters away, at which point he finally noticed Im and his companions and froze. “Put down your weapons, please, and come outside quickly,” the soldier said, also sounding terrified. Im leapt out and climbed over the fence next to the Province Hall barbershop in one go, fleeing into the residential district.⁷⁶ Yun Yeong-cheol (third-year student at Gwangju Dongshin High School), who was also at the YMCA before being sent to Province Hall in response to the alert to arm, was stationed in a similar role on the third floor of the National Federation of Fisheries Co-op building across from Province Hall with two slightly older strangers. Like Im, Yun also did not open fire, instead hiding in the cafeteria in the basement of the building before heading home around 11:00 a.m., only to be caught at a checkpoint outside Chungjang-ro Police Substation by martial law troops and detained.⁷⁷

The Jeonil Building and the YWCA

Thirty-seven members of the 4th Company under the 11th Brigade’s 61st Battalion were deployed to the Jeonil Building. The building was defended by thirteen members of the resistance who had volunteered at the YMCA, including Hwang Ui-su (age 28, jobseeker).⁷⁸ As most of the recruits were young people with no firearms experience, Hwang—relatively older and with military experience—was made leader of Squad 1, which was charged with the defense of the Jeonil Building. When the emergency alert was sounded, they headed to Province Hall for their equipment and made their way to the Jeonil Building. Because the street-facing shutters were closed tightly, Hwang and his men had to enter through the west-side passageway and climb up to the third floor via a pitch-dark stairway. Hwang had his men remain on standby and went back downstairs with high school student Kim Seung-ryeol to assess their surroundings. But the moment they set foot outside, they spotted human figures and heard a quiet but firm voice say, “Hands in the air!” Half a dozen soldiers in helmets with white bands had discovered them. The soldiers kicked down Hwang and Kim, tied their hands behind their backs, and dragged them in front of Province Hall. At the time, Hwang and Kim did not know what became of the eleven who remained on the third floor of the Jeonil Building.

A Captain Choi entered the building and learned that, in contrast to provided intelligence, the premises were guarded only by a token force. Meeting no opposition, he captured the resistance inside alive without firing a single shot. Events unfolded similarly at the YMCA and the Gwangju Tourist Hotel. Martial law troops found the buildings nearly empty and secured them with ease. The 11th Brigade thus took both their primary targets—the Jeonil Building and the Gwangju Tourist Hotel—at 4:10 a.m.⁷⁹

Having completed their objectives much earlier than expected, the 11th was ordered via radio to provide support to the 3rd Brigade, whose mission at Province Hall was still in progress. The 11th Brigade’s special forces team left one company at the hotel and the Jeonil Building respectively and deployed the rest to Province Hall.

At 5:15 a.m., the 11th Brigade—having completed its mission—made its way to Province Hall to provide support to the 3rd when it made a left turn at the Jeonil Building, which was across from the YWCA through a small alleyway.⁸⁰ Yun Sun-ho and Na Myeong-gwan, on watch behind a table on the first floor of the YWCA, saw the men march past in front of their noses. Na exclaimed to Yun, “Soldiers!” The soldiers were less than a meter from the window where they were hidden, and until that point, Na had been silent for fear of giving away his location.⁸¹

At that moment, they heard gunfire from the second floor of the building. Kim Gil-sik (age 19, Credit Union employee) had spotted martial law troops in the street and opened fire with his carbine rifle without thinking. He had never used a gun before and trembled in fear after making his shot. A resistance member nearby remarked, “You’re no good. You have to escape!”

The 11th Brigade had not been expecting resistance at the YWCA building. They returned fire immediately, and many resistance members also opened fire. Two soldiers were injured, one shot through the shoulder and the other through the leg. Because the driveway into the YWCA was narrow, and the fences encircled the premises, it was a difficult building for martial law troops to attack. They fired a grenade launcher at the second floor, and two field battalions went around to the left and used hooks to climb upstairs.

After the initial exchange of fire, Kim crawled out to the hallway to make his way downstairs when he spotted Park Yong-jun at the corner of the building on the second floor, gun trained at three or four soldiers giving orders in front of Gwangju Police Station. Kim cried, “Yong-jun, be careful. Don’t shoot at them—we have to run.” Park was an orphan who had made a living as a shoeshiner and dedicated himself to the better treatment of the marginalized. He had shown particular kindness to Kim. Park looked back at Kim, gun still pointed outside, and gave a confident grin. There was a gunshot, and Park crumpled. He slowly fell forward against the window and did not rise again. Kim called out his name and crawled to his side. Blood ran down Park’s face and his eyes were open and unblinking. His blood pooled on the floor of the Yangseo Association office, where bullets were driven into the books in the shelves. Kim was seized by terror. Gunshots and screams resounded through the building in a moment of chaos. He went upstairs to find a hiding place, kicking down the door to a nursing assistant training classroom and climbing up a two-meter shelf, lying flat on the top.⁸²

It was not long before martial law troops barged into the second floor. They dragged Park’s body back to the first floor, staining the YWCA stairs with his blood.⁸³

Lee Deok-jun was in the first-floor conference room with a postsecondary student. When soldiers opened fire on the YWCA from the Jeonil Building, he crawled to the kitchens. He saw two paratroopers on the rooftop of the Jeonil Building shoot at the YWCA. Windows shattered and bullets drove themselves into the walls with terrifying metallic screeches. That was when Kim Yun-hui (age 19, student at Chonnam University) was shot in the chest and fell with a scream. Shoulders trembling violently, she begged for help. Her companions Lee Nam-sun (age 31) and Kang Im-ah (age 22) yelled to the soldiers, “Our friend’s been shot! Don’t shoot anymore!” With hands in the air, they walked out of the building and were arrested. The soldiers swore when they saw Kim Yun-hui, saying, “What is a woman doing out of her house? You deserve to die,” and dragged her away. The three women had taken shelter at the next building over at 4:30 a.m. but had returned just before the shootout. Kim had just started to cook a pot of rice for the resistance when she was shot.⁸⁴

Everyone who remained at the YWCA was arrested. The sweep of the building by the 11th Brigade began at 5:15 a.m. and ended just over an hour later at 6:20 a.m.⁸⁵

Gwangju Park

The 7th special forces team was composed of 20 officers and 181 enlisted men from six companies from the 8th and 9th Field Battalions under the 33rd Battalion. They took control of Gwangju Park at 5:06 a.m. The park was completely empty, but the 7th had engaged in a shootout near Wolsan-dong on the way to its destination.⁸⁶

The 7th Brigade set off from Gwangju Airfield in military trucks, disembarking near the Armed Forces Hospital in Hwajeong-dong and walking the rest of the way to Gwangju Park. Officers from Gwangju Seobu Police Station, who knew the local geography, guided the team. They happened upon two resistance members at a three-way alleyway intersection in Wolsan-dong but heard gunfire while arresting them. The troops engaged a group of about fifteen resistance fighters. Because it was difficult to tell where the bullets came from, they could not easily return fire. About ten minutes later, the gunshots died down.

Kim Jong-nam (age 19), a member of the mobile strike force’s Squad 7, had been ordered to patrol Wolsan-dong that night by leaders at Province Hall because he was a local who knew the area well.⁸⁷ Seven other resistance members were placed in his squad. At 2:00 a.m., he sat down at a community safety guardhouse in front of the Wolsan-dong Catholic Church, situated 200 meters from the gates to Gwangju Mujin Middle School. He heard gunshots from the direction of Deongnim Mountain, where Yang-dong Market was, and from the direction of Antenna Mountain across from the middle school. Bullets hit the school gates, sending sparks flying. Kim and his men climbed over fences and took cover in the residential area, spooked by the gunfire. Kim hid in an outhouse in the courtyard of a house on the main street. About thirty minutes later, the gunfire died down and silence returned to the area. Kim threw away his gun and belongings in the outhouse and walked outside with only his curfew exception pass in his possession. But sometime between 2:30 to 3:00 a.m., as he stepped into an alley, a soldier grabbed him by the hair and dragged him about fifty meters to where four other resistance members had been taken and bound.

In Wolsan-dong, a second lieutenant from the 7th lost his life, a field battalion commander was hit in the leg by shrapnel, and four or five soldiers were injured. According to the 7th Brigade’s combat records, one resistance member was killed and one was captured alive.⁸⁸

At 5:42 a.m., the 7th Brigade’s special forces team transferred the missions of weapons collection and public pacification to the 1st Battalion of the 20th Division’s 61st Regiment. They returned to their first rendezvous point—the K-57 airfield—at 7:25 a.m.

Gyelim Elementary School

While paratroopers carried out coordinated strikes on three key sites in the city, the 20th Division (284 officers, 4482 enlisted) cast a wide net on Gwangju from the perimeter and pushed closer and closer into the downtown core. They began their part of Operation Loyalty at 2:00 a.m.⁸⁹

Of the 62nd Regiment, the 2nd Battalion’s 6th and 8th Companies set off from Gwangju Prison at 3:20 a.m. with police guides in the lead. They reached the area of Gyelim Elementary School at 4:30 a.m. A skirmish broke out between the soldiers and more than twenty resistance members who had prepared an ambush on the footbridge in front of the elementary school, lying on their stomachs in the direction of Duam-dong. Prevented from advancing, the troops took a detour through Gyerim-dong and hit the resistance from behind. The battle only lasted about ten minutes because of the sheer number of martial law troops and their superior firepower. The resistance fled toward Gwangju High School and nearby residences. Those who made it to the high school joined a group of about five who had been in hiding there, going up to the second floor to continue their fight. The commander of the 2nd Battalion had the 8th Company keep an eye ahead and ordered the 6th Company to attack from the flank, using the stone fence surrounding the elementary school as a barricade. The resistance escaped into the residential area and concealed themselves. Martial law troops searched the homes thoroughly, arresting a total of fifteen resistance members who had been in hiding.⁹⁰ Gwangju High School security guard Yang Dong-seon (age 45) was shot and killed on the school rooftop in the process.

The leader of the resistance at Gyelim Elementary school was Song Jin-gwang, a reservist officer.⁹¹ He had gone to the YMCA on the night of May 26 upon hearing news of the impending attack on the city to educate recruits on the use of firearms and make a request to Park Nam-seon to gather forty-nine reservists who knew how to use weapons and split them into four squads to take into Province Hall.⁹² Song was on standby in a conference room on the first floor when the emergency alert sounded. At 3:00 a.m., he sent two squads to Namgwangju Market (near Chonnam National University Medical School) and Sansu-dong and drove the remaining twenty members to Gyelim Elementary School. Setting the footbridge in front of the gates as a defensive line, he stationed men on top of and on either end of the footbridge and sent several to the school in order to cut off martial law troops’ expected route. Song ordered his men to hold fire until specifically ordered to shoot.

By the time he had stationed the men, it was 4:00 a.m. The sound of gunfire resounded all the way from Province Hall. Around 4:30 a.m., martial law troops appeared behind Song’s squad. He had expected that the military would strike from the west, but the 20th Division had noticed the ambush on the footbridge and taken a detour to attack the resistance from behind.⁹³

Song was shot in the right femoral region. He dragged himself onto the roof of a house next to a nearby alleyway. However, the roof collapsed, and Song fell into the home. The elderly couple who lived there were shocked, but quickly and calmly concealed him in their attic. Song guessed that troops would descend on the house soon. He left through the back door, climbed over the next house on the street, and climbed over the house behind it. Soldiers barged into the old couple’s home as soon as Song departed and opened fire on the roof. Limping badly and his pants soaked with blood, Song managed to escape the scene.⁹⁴

Lee Chung-yeong (age 20, student at Kyung Hee University School of Korean Medicine, son of lawyer Lee Jong-gi) was on the footbridge at Gyerim-dong when he heard gunfire. He turned around and discovered three soldiers approach in a low position with guns trained ahead. Lee and fellow resistance member Cho Jae-man crawled away in the direction of Gyelim Elementary School. Two other resistance members were shot beside them. Lee and his companions took shelter in the gutters. About an hour later, they heard tanks and armored vehicles drive past, and a conversation: “You think there are rioters in the gutters?” “Let’s throw in a grenade and see what happens.” Immediately, Lee and his companions cried, “We surrender!” and turned themselves in, hands in the air. Half a dozen soldiers stamped on the face of Shin Gwang-seok (age 20, unemployed), who had been shot in the thigh, until he lost consciousness. Shin eventually lost his eyesight due to his injuries.

At 5:20 a.m., the 20th Division attempted to contact the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade at Province Hall. However, Province Hall had not yet fallen. The 20th Division went around the main entrance, climbed over the fence from the flank in order to join the 3rd, and tracked down the resistance members who fled into the Province Hall building. Those who resisted arrest were killed, and by 6:30 a.m., Province Hall was under complete military control.⁹⁵

The Human Slaughterhouse

At 5:00 a.m. on May 27, the Jeolla Province Martial Law Commander made an announcement via KBS: “Rioters are hereby ordered to surrender. Province Hall and Gwangju Park are under military control. You are surrounded. Put down your weapons and surrender, and your lives will be spared.”

An hour later at 6:00 a.m., tanks and armored vehicles rolled down Geumnam-ro, and dozens of helicopters hummed in the air. Speakers mounted to the helicopters broadcast warnings to the public:

Early this morning, martial law forces conducted an operation against the rioters who resisted to the end at the South Jeolla Province Hall. The rioters have been quelled. Citizens, remain in your homes until the danger has passed. Two rioters were killed on the scene, and 207 have been taken into custody. Although the majority of rioters have been accounted for, remnants continue to attempt to infiltrate residences. Rioters, put down your weapons and surrender if you wish to live. Refusal to do so will be met with lethal force.⁹⁶

Triumphant military songs such as “The Returning Soldier” and “Bridge on the River Kwai” played in the background of the broadcast. But other than the sounds from the speakers, the air in Gwangju following the gunfire was oppressively silent. Flyers rained down from the helicopters like snowflakes. Soldiers stood next to still-warm corpses singing songs of victory, and special forces teams lined up around the fountain to join the triumphant chorus with a swing in their step.

“Special forces must make the impossible a reality,” they sang, their rifles still stinking of gunpowder. The murders perpetrated against their own people had been packaged as a triumphant victory for martial law forces.⁹⁷ The KBS broadcast messages to civil servants encouraging them to return to work.

“Citizens of Gwangju, rest assured that the rioters have been eliminated. Police and civil servants may now go back to their workplaces. Return to your designated offices by 9:00 a.m.”

Meanwhile, resistance members taken into custody were strung together in front of the YWCA building, forced to lie on their stomachs. Cheon Yeong-jin, captured by the soldiers, overheard paratroopers who had just emerged from a search of the building in the alley across the way:

“Staff Sergeant Kim! Come over here and have a drink.” The soldier who made the offer drank beer with one hand and opened fire with the other, a crate of beer next to him. The other soldier replied, “I already had drinks.”

“Where?”

“I found a ton in the Tourist Hotel basement.”

Cheon continued to listen to their conversation as he and the other prisoners were dragged into the plaza outside Province Hall.⁹⁸

The soldiers stripped the prisoners of their shirts and wrote phrases like “violent element,” “weapon possession,” and “vehicle passenger” on their undershirts with red permanent marker. The prisoners were tied together, and anyone who so much as twitched was kicked in the head and stomped upon. The prisoners could not even moan in pain despite their injuries.

Around 6:00 a.m., as the operation drew to a close, 505th Security Unit investigator Heo Jang-hwan slipped into the Province Hall building and, with permission from Security Forces members in charge of the 20th Division, went around the offices to collect all documents left behind by the resistance while the building was still closed off to press.⁹⁹ The documents would be needed for the forthcoming investigation. As soon as Heo and his entourage left the scene, the 20th Division took control of the building.

When the sun rose on the city once more, Province Hall resembled a human slaughterhouse. Terry Anderson, Norman Thorpe, and other foreign journalists who had watched the operation from Daedo Hotel just ten meters from the southern fence of Province walked out onto the streets at daybreak. At 6:00 a.m., soldiers with white bands around their helmets hid behind utility poles and kept wary eyes on their surroundings or stood around on rooftops with guns trained on the street. Anderson and Thorpe cautiously made their way to the fountain plaza. All they saw there were soldiers busily going about but no civilians. A colonel drove up to them on a jeep, and Anderson asked how many people had been killed.

“Two rioters and one soldier,” the colonel replied.

Anderson quickly learned that the colonel had lied. At 7:30 a.m., foreign journalists were permitted to enter the premises, at which point Anderson personally confirmed at least seventeen deaths.¹⁰⁰ Norman Thorpe took photographs of the site as soon as he was able.¹⁰¹ The things he saw testified to the events that had taken place in the darkness. When he entered the vice-governor’s office on the second floor, the clock pointed to 7:50. Thorpe photographed three dead resistance members on the second floor. Two of them were hauled onto a ping pong table to be carted down to the first floor via the central staircase by four to six soldiers. The corpses were dressed in school-issue camouflage, suggesting that they were students. The third was in a corner of an office filled with desks and chairs, hunched forward in a folding chair. The first- and second-floor stairways were stained with blood, as though having been painted—signs that those injured by gunfire were dragged down the stairs. The body of a young man in camouflage lay face down atop a juniper tree on one end of a planter. Seven or eight bodies lay tangled together in a corner of the stairway in the building connecting the civil affairs office and the police building. Because they were not yet placed into coffins, it was likely that these bodies likely belonged to those who lost their lives earlier that very morning.

Although guideline #4 of Operation Sangmu Loyalty ordered that paratroopers “aim for the lower abdomen when engaging hostile rioters,”¹⁰² troops did not adhere to it.¹⁰³

“When we entered Province Hall, we opened fire on sight. Surrender was impossible for the people there to begin with. We couldn’t tell the people coming out with their hands in the air to just stay there.”¹⁰⁴

Reporter Cho Seong-ho of the Hankook Ilbo daily recorded the death of university student resistance member Park Byeong-gyu as follows:

In the morning of May 27, 1980, behind the South Jeolla Province Police Headquarters situation room at Province Hall, a young man lay by a planter whose flowers had fallen, face pointed at the sky and blood staining his abdomen. He wore a military-style jacket and brown pants, and a small notepad was tucked in his back pocket. A pair of white running shoes and shell casings were scattered at his feet, and in front of his head lay a helmet and a round platter that had been shot clear through. The young man, identified as Park Byeong-gyu (age 20), a first-year student at Dongguk University’s Computer Science Institute, must have run outside at the noise and attempted to shield himself with a platter made to carry fruit. What drove this student to come all this way to his death?¹⁰⁵

A helicopter carrying Minister of National Defense Choo Young-bock, accompanied by ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Young-si and the Joint Chief of Staff intelligence chief landed in the plaza outside Province Hall and was met by more than fifty provincial police and Province Hall executives standing in orderly lines. It was not long before South Jeolla Province Police Chief Ahn Byeong-ha was seen being taken into custody and driven away in an MP jeep.¹⁰⁶ Newspapers in the capital that day published headlines titled “Former South Jeolla Police Chief Ahn Arrested for Desertion of Command” and “Former South Jeolla Police Chief Ahn Arrested for Dereliction of Duty.”¹⁰⁷

Defense Security Command dispatched Joint Investigation Team Chief Lee Hak-bong to the city, where Lee was given a briefing of the situation and discussed future measures. He was also instructed to deliver guidelines for the future measures to Colonel Choi Gyeong-jo. Colonel Hong Seong-ryul returned to Defense Security Command on June 8 from his clandestine mission in Gwangju and delivered a report and analysis of the Gwangju incident to Chun Doo-hwan.¹⁰⁸

Their operation completed with the taking of the YWCA at 6:20 a.m., paratroopers handed over command of the Province Hall area to the 20th Division’s 61st Regiment at 7:20 a.m. and returned to Gwangju Airfield. From 7:30 to 9:30 a.m., following the withdrawal of paratroopers, fourteen Armor School tanks and armored vehicles drove between Geumnam-ro, Province Hall, Hak-dong, and the community center in a display of force.¹⁰⁹ It was at this time that local phone services that had been cut during the attack on Province Hall were restored.

Before noon on May 27, soldiers searched residences and detained anyone whose identities could not be confirmed or were deemed suspicious. Setting up a firm blockade around the city perimeter, martial law troops closed in on the downtown core as they performed concentrated searches, then spread out again to search alleys and residences in the city thoroughly. Hundreds of young people were dragged into the streets. Anyone who showed signs of disapproval was beaten or taken away. Not even the elderly were spared. Lee Geum-jae (age 29) was an employee at a traditional Korean medicine clinic who had been married for three years to his wife, who was pregnant. Upon hearing the announcement in the morning stating, “Citizens may now come outside and return to their daily activities,” he walked out the doors of his residence near Chonnam Girls’ High School and was shot fatally in the waist by martial law troops.¹¹⁰ At 7:40 p.m., Kim Myeong-suk (age 15), a third-year student at Gwangju Seogwang Middle School who lived near Chonnam University, went to a nearby friend’s home to borrow a book. She was shot by a soldier wielding an M16 rifle near the university, dying of a “penetrating gunshot wound to the left pelvis.”¹¹¹ On May 28, the 20th Division also searched the foot of Mudeung Mountain in Jisan-dong to root out resistance members who might have taken shelter in the mountains to prepare for a drawn-out conflict. However, their fears proved unfounded.

14

The Rest of the Story

Unmarked Burials and the Recovery of Bodies

When the Gwangju Uprising ended on May 27, the bodies at Province Hall were moved to Sangmu Hall, where about sixty bodies had been housed until that point. As for the thirty bodies collected in the rear courtyard of Province Hall that afternoon as many as fourteen had died on May 26 or earlier but had not been identified, and sixteen had died earlier that morning.¹ However, the bodies of those who died outside the Gwangju Armed Forces Hospital, in the minibuses in Jiwon-dong and on the road in front of Junam Village, near Gwangju Prison, and near Hyocheon Station were not fully accounted for. Some were collected by the resistance and taken to Sangmu Hall, but those left in areas occupied by the military were either left on the roadsides to rot or buried in unmarked or temporary graves.² Bodies brought to the Gwangju Armed Forces Hospital were buried in the Baegil Shooting Range at Sangmudae. Martial Law Command, the federal government, and even Gwangju’s municipal government showed little enthusiasm for locating and collecting bodies from areas other than the Province Hall premises. Although such an incident would generally warrant the formation of a specialized team at City Hall, the task was simply assigned to the preexisting welfare department.

Cho Seong-gap, an employee at Gwangju City Hall’s civil affairs department, set out independently to help collect the bodies. From May 27 to the end of June, he searched the city and personally collected forty-one bodies. At first he operated on tips and intelligence from neighborhood centers and locals, but he later went on to actively seek out information on potential unmarked burial sites.

On May 27 alone he discovered five bodies, including one wrapped in a military rain poncho on the grounds of Gwangju Prison, one found covered in a white cloth in the Gwangju High School guardhouse,³ one found with gunshot wounds under the east-side windows of the school gymnasium, one at the YWCA, and one male body by the river behind the Chonnam Girls’ High School fence. Cho had the five bodies sent to Chonnam University Hospital. His work continued into May 29, when he found (in a bathtub at the Intercity Bus Terminal) a man about 20 years of age who had been shot to death. At Gwangju Prison, he spotted what seemed to be a haphazardly planted young tree. He dug up the ground and discovered eight bodies that had been wrapped up in pairs. Two male bodies were also unearthed from the hill in front of the prison gates and sent to Chosun University Hospital. That day, seven bodies—including that of one woman—were found in the ditch by the road that led from Jiwon-dong to Hwasun-dong, and eleven male bodies were found at Baegil Shooting Range in Sangmudae. Near Junam Village, Cho discovered a wrist bone sticking out of the ground in the gravel and discovered two badly decayed male bodies. In the hills in front of Gwangju Inseong High School, he discovered the body of what seemed to be a boy about 7 years of age. Cho also found the body of a man about 20 years of age with gunshot wounds in the rice paddies by a residential area in Hyodeok-dong, a male body (Kim Sang-tae) wrapped up in a rain poncho next to the Cheonil bus terminus near the 31st Division headquarters, a male body with gunshot wounds in the mountains near Ilgok Village, and the body of Chosun University Middle School student Kim Bu-yeol, which had been buried in an unmarked grave at the peak of Bueong Mountain. Cho also searched other areas discussed in rumors, such as the excrement tank in Songam-dong, the hills behind Junam Village where paratroopers camped, the mountains behind Chosun University, and Saengyong Reservoir in Yongjeon-dong, Gwangju, but did not find any bodies there. Other areas he searched included the Gwangju Airfield guardhouse, the banks of the Hwangnyong River, and Jaetdeung in Hwajeong-dong.⁴

Some families took it upon themselves to find their loved ones. On May 22, Seo Man-oh (age 25, logistics industry) had set out for Changpyeong in Damyang via demonstrator vehicle in order to find a deaf younger sibling and was shot to death on the road in front of Gwangju Prison. Seo’s family was contacted by the Munhwa-dong Neighborhood Center on May 24 and was informed that an elderly woman turned in Seo’s national ID card. The old woman ran a small eatery on the road to Damyang in Munhwa-dong and explained to the Seo family what she had seen. Around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. on May 22, three trucks on their way to Damyang were fired upon by martial law troops who had set up an ambush on the roadside. A bloodied man crawled to the old woman and desperately held out his ID card, begging her to contact his family. Soldiers quickly stormed the eatery, dragged the man into a vehicle, and took him to the prison. Seo’s family hired ten men to scour the hills in the area. They finally found his body, buried with half a dozen others on the slope where the mountain met a rice paddy. Seo had lost the tip of his right index finger in a previous accident and was easily identified. The body was taken to Chosun University Hospital, where autopsy results revealed that Seo had been shot five times in the lower abdomen.⁵

Table 3. Records of collected bodies compiled by Cho Seong-gap (civil affairs, Gwangju City Hall)

Status

Date

Location

No. of bodies

Identity (name)

Notes

Collected

May 27

Gwangju Prison

1

Unknown, male, age 25

Collected

May 27

Gwangju High School

2

Yang Dong-seon (born 1935, Gwangju High School security guard)

1 unknown, male, 30s

Collected

May 27

YWCA

1

Park Yong-jun (born 1956)

Collected

May 27

Next to Chonnam Girls’ High School

1

Lee Geum-jae (born 1951)

Collected

May 29

Intercity Bus Terminal bathtub

1

Unknown, male, 20s

Gunshot wound(s)

Buried, unearthed

May 29

Gwangju Prison ditch

8

Ahn Du-hwan (born 1935)

Jang Bang-hwan (born 1922)

Im Eun-taek (born 1945)

Go Gwi-seok (born 1960)

Min Byeong-yeol (born 1949)

3 bodies, identities not recorded

Blunt trauma

Blunt trauma

Gunshot wound(s)

Gunshot wound(s)

Stab wound(s)

Buried, unearthed

May 29

Hills in front of Gwangju Prison

2

Choi Yeol-rak (born 1953)

1 unknown

Gunshot wound(s)

Reported, collected

May 29

Roadside ditch, Jiwon-dong

7

7 unknown

Includes 1 female

Collected, unearthed

May 29

Baegil Shooting Range, Sangmudae (disinfectant odor)

11

Kim Jae-pyeong (born 1951, collected May 22)

Police precinct

14 bodies were buried, but 3 were either collected by family or remain missing

Cho Gyu-yeong (born 1942, collected May 22)

Ham Gwang-su (born 1963, collected May 22)

Im Jeong-sik (born 1962, collected May 26)

Park Jong-gil (born 1956, collected May 26)

Yang Hoe-nam (born 1950, collected May 26)

Kim Pyeong-yong (born 1963, collected May 26)

Song Jeong-gyo (born 1929, collected May 26)

Kim Hyeong-ryeol (police, collected May 26)

Jeon Jae-seo (born 1954, unknown)

1 unknown

Police precinct

Police precinct

Armed Forces Hospital

Armed Forces Hospital

Armed Forces Hospital

Armed Forces Hospital

Armed Forces Hospital

Armed Forces Hospital

Reported, unearthed

June 3

Hills behind Junam Village

2

Chae Su-gil (born 1959)

Yang Min-seok (born 1960)

Identities confirmed through DNA analysis (2002)

Reported, unearthed

Unknown

Hills in front of Gwangju Inseong High School

1

Jeon Jae-su (male, born 1969)

Gunshot wound(s)

Reported, unearthed

Unknown

Hyodeok-dong rice paddies

1

Male, 20s

Gunshot wound(s)

Reported, unearthed

Unknown

Cheonil bus terminus

1

Kim Sang-tae (born 1950)

Reported, unearthed

Unknown

Ilgok Village mountains

1

Unknown (male, 40s, mental disorder)

Mental disorder(?)

Reported, unearthed

Unknown

Hills behind Junam Village (May 24, Bueong Mountain)

1

Kim Bu-yeol (born 1963, third year at Chosun University Middle School)

June 7 (autopsy)

Note. As there are no written records of the dates of collection, this table is based entirely on Cho’s memories and may contain errors.

When the Gwangju Uprising ended, martial law authorities moved the bodies to hospital morgues, confirmed their identities, notified the families, conducted autopsies, and undertook funeral procedures. The majority of bodies had been exposed to the elements in early-summer weather or buried and severely damaged, which made it difficult to identify them. Fingerprints, belongings, and physical features were used to match some of the bodies with names of the missing, but some could not be identified. Eleven bodies whose identities remained unknown were buried in a cemetery in Mangwol-dong.

In 2001, the Gwangju Uprising Missing Persons Truth Commission was formed and the eleven unidentified bodies were exhumed for identification. A comparison of their DNA to ninety-three family members of the missing identified six of the bodies. The following year, the two men who had been dragged from Junam Village by the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade on May 23 to be executed and buried were identified as Yang Min-seok (age 20, blue-collar worker) and Chae Su-gil (age 21, restaurant employee).

More than 300 people were registered as missing during and after the Gwangju Uprising, but when narrowed down with strict criteria, only 81 were acknowledged as missing in direct connection with the uprising. Of the 81, 6 have been identified by DNA analysis, leaving 75 whose whereabouts remain unknown. Five of them are buried in the graves of the unknown dead, and the remaining 70 have yet to be found.

Forty-seven sites were reported thus far as potential sites of unmarked burials. In-depth explorations of the ground near the Hwangnyong River embankments, Sochon-dong, Samdo-dong, and two other locations turned up no bodies. The identification and recovery of the missing will remain a difficult task without the cooperation of the soldiers who personally buried the bodies during the Gwangju Uprising.

Table 4. Bodies identified by DNA test (2002)

No.

Name

Year of birth

Occupation

Date of death

Location of death

Cause of death

Date of autopsy

Relevant incident

1

Kwon Ho-yeong

1963

Student preparing for university entrance exams

Unknown

Unknown

Gunshot wound(s)

May 28

2

Kim Gi-un

1962

Songwon High School (second year)

May 21

Unknown

Gunshot wound(s)

May 28

3

Kim Nam-seok

1959

Jobseeker

May 23

Jiwon-dong

Gunshot wound(s)

May 29

Jiwon-dong minibus shooting incident

4

Kim Jun-dong

1963

Carpenter

Unknown

Unknown

Gunshot wound(s)

May 28

5

Yang Min-seok

1960

Blue-collar worker

May 23

Junam Village

Gunshot wound(s)

June 3

Junam Village minibus shooting incident

6

Chae Su-gil

1959

Restaurant employee

May 23

Junam Village

Gunshot wound(s)

June 3

Autopsies and the Manipulation of Autopsy Results

Autopsy reports for deceased civilians were published after the bodies were recovered. The reports were collected in Defense Security Command’s “Results of autopsies concerning the Gwangju Uprising” and the Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office’s “5.18-gwallyeon samangja geomsi naeyong” (Autopsy reports of Gwangju Uprising casualties). The Cadaver Examination Committee was formed by Defense Security Command, and in early June, a cadaver examiner, a reverend, journalists, citizen representatives, a judge advocate, a police officer, and a Security Forces officer gathered at the 505th Security Unit base to categorize the dead with the examination reports published by National Security Forces. The dead were placed into one of two categories—“rioter” or “non-rioter”—depending on the circumstances and information concerning the body. The criteria are listed in Table 5.

Table 5. Judgement criteria (observations)

Law-abiding civilians (Compensation KRW 4 million per person)

Rioters (No compensation provided)

• Those under the age of 14

• Those over the age of 50

• Civil servants

• Women

• Those killed in traffic accidents in areas without skirmishes

• Those whose deaths were caused by blunt force trauma

• Those killed resisting during the May 27 operation by the military to take Province Hall

• Those killed resisting against forces guarding Gwangju Prison

• Those killed resisting in Jiwon-dong, Gwangju (8:30 a.m. May 22 to 12:00 May 24), which was under the control of the 7th and 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigades

• Those killed resisting during the withdrawal of the 11th Airborne Special Forces’ Brigade from Junam Village to their base

• Residents of other regions (Seoul, Mokpo, etc.) who participated in the riots in Gwangju

Source: Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection, the May 17 military insurrection, and the Gwangju Uprising] (2007), 126. All terminology used has been taken directly from the National Security Forces.

The dead were categorized by the weapons that caused their death—M16 rifles or carbine rifles. In cases where no bullets remained in the body, it was difficult to tell the difference. M16 rifles and carbine rifles differed greatly in destructive force, and wounds caused by these weapons could generally be distinguished with the naked eye. However, with the exception of those taken to the hospital immediately after being wounded, most of the bodies had been left exposed on the roadsides or buried, which advanced their decay and made it difficult to identify their wounds.

Because the families of those who fell into the category of “rioter” would not be compensated, the two doctors and the reverend who attended the examinations attempted to have as many of the dead categorized as “law-abiding civilians” as possible.⁶ National Security Forces policy stated that those killed by M16 rounds would be seen as those who attempted to resist the military and categorized as rioters. This policy led to a total of only twenty people falling into the “rioter” category. National Security Forces protested, claiming that more people should be placed into this category.⁷ However, martial law authorities judged that minimizing the number of casualties would alleviate any political backdraft that might be caused by their impending takeover and did not actively oppose the civilian side’s attempts to categorize as many people as possible as law-abiding civilians.⁸ The final total reflected concessions and compromises from both the military and the citizens: thirty-eight categorized as rioters, with the rest categorized as law-abiding civilians. This process was the reason that the recorded number of M1- and carbine-caused deaths was greater than the number of M16-caused deaths. Table 6 lists the causes of death and the numbers associated with them.⁹

Table 6. Causes of death

Cause of death

Number

M1, carbine rifle (conflicts between hardline and dovish rioters, mistaken fire)

94

M16 (killed in battle against martial law troops)

24

Other firearms (misfires between rioters caused by inexperience and mistakes)

14

Blunt trauma (traffic accidents caused by stolen vehicles)

12

Stab wounds (caused by rioters)

  9

Motor vehicle

  5

Additional discovered deaths

  6

Total

164

Source. Defense Security Command, “Samangja silsabogo” [Report on casualties] (1980), quoted in Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 127.

Those whose cause of death could not be definitively identified as gunshot wounds from M16 rifles were automatically deemed to have been killed by carbine rifles, M1 rifles, or other firearms. The story that “conflicts between hardliners and those who wished to surrender led to gunfire” was created in order to explain the deaths of the ninety-four who fell into the “death by carbine rifle” category. Those killed by stray bullets, machine guns, grenades, and other weapons also did not qualify for the “death by M16” category and were given the label of “killed by misfire due to lack of experience.” The causes of death for those clubbed to death and those who were likely stabbed with bayonets were altered to “traffic accident caused by stolen vehicle” and “killed by rioters” respectively.

The victims’ recorded causes of death changed several times over the course of decades, with each wave of change lowering the number of carbine and M1-inflicted deaths and raising the number of M16-inflicted deaths. The documents submitted by the prime minister to the National Assembly on October 16, 1985, differed from the earlier tally, listing a total of 166 civilian deaths (29 killed by M16 rifles, 37 by carbine rifles, 67 by other firearms or explosives, 15 by blunt force trauma, 8 by traffic accidents, 8 by stabbing, and 2 unknown).¹⁰ In comparison to the 1980 autopsy reports by National Security Forces, the number of those killed by M1 or carbine rifles had decreased by 57 to 37. The number of deaths caused by other firearms rose to 67, and the number of those killed by M16 rifles rose to 29. As efforts to uncover the truth gained momentum, additional hospital examination records from the period and other documents were brought to light. Witnesses also came forward with detailed testimonies and clarified the causes of many deaths. Following two further rounds of autopsies and an investigation by the Prosecutors’ Office in 1995, the counts were tallied again: more than 100 had been killed by M16 rifles or other firearms and more than 30 by blunt trauma, traffic accidents, stabbings, or other injures. However, 27 victims were still classified as having been killed by carbine or M1 rifles. Although the possibility of fatal misfire incidents by resistance members cannot be discounted, this scenario still differs from the assertion made by martial law authorities at the time: that the resistance fired on fellow members due to factional conflicts. As such, the official causes of death for these individuals remain uncorrected.

Twenty Thousand Troops Deployed to Gwangju

From May 18 to 27, martial law authorities deployed approximately 20,000 trained soldiers to Gwangju to suppress the demonstrations. The population of the city at the time was approximately 800,000, meaning that one soldier was deployed for every 40 citizens. The units deployed to the city were as follows: three Airborne Special Forces Brigades, encompassing ten battalions (3,121 personnel; 496 officers; 2,625 enlisted), nine battalions from the 20th Division (4,791 personnel; 276 officers; 4,515 enlisted), and twenty-eight battalions from Combat Arms Command (11,998 personnel; 3,976 officers; 8,022 enlisted) for a total of 19,910 soldiers (4,748 officers; 15,162 enlisted) from forty-seven battalions.¹¹

A total of 23 soldiers lost their lives during the Gwangju Uprising; 8 were killed by gunfire or other hostile actions taken by Gwangju citizens (3 traffic accidents, 2 on May 22, 1 on May 23, 2 on May 27), and the remaining 15 were killed by fellow troops in cases of mistaken identity (14) and misfire (1).¹²

Martial law troops were involved in three skirmishes with fellow troops caused by mistaken identity, each producing military casualties. The first instance was at 9:55 a.m. on May 24, when 31 men (2 officers, 29 enlisted) from the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Division’s 96th Regiment reached the Gwangju interchange on the Honam Expressway on their way back to Yeonggwang. As many as 120 soldiers (3 officers, 117 enlisted) under Combat Arms Command’s Armor School had set up an ambush in the area and opened fire on the 3rd Battalion, killing 3 enlisted men and injuring 2 civilians and 10 soldiers.¹³ The second such incident occurred at 2:00 p.m. on the same day between members of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, headed from Songam-dong to Gwangju Airfield, and the reserve training unit from the infantry school that had also set up an ambush. The skirmish ended with 9 paratroopers and 1 member of the reserve training unit dead. The third took place early in the morning of May 27, when the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade bound for Gwangju Park accidentally engaged friendly forces, starting a skirmish that left 1 soldier dead. With the addition of 1 death caused by a misfire, the total number of soldiers killed by fellow troops comes to 15—nearly twice the number of soldiers killed in battle against demonstrators and the resistance.¹⁴

The Sangmudae Holding Cells

The fall of Province Hall was far from the end. Unimaginable suffering awaited those who continued to resist. Those arrested on the scene were made to lay face-down on the floor as soldiers trampled over them. Those captured on the second or third floor of Province Hall had their hands tied behind their backs and were forced to belly crawl down the stairs. Anyone whose pockets turned up ammunition was threatened with immediate death. Those who raised their heads were struck with the handles of pickaxes. Almost as painful as the beatings were the bindings around the prisoners’ wrists, which were generally any ropelike objects soldiers could find—telephone cables, shoelaces, belts—tied so tightly as to obstruct blood flow. Prisoners’ hands turned blue and swelled. Even after the bindings had been cut or removed, the scars and the pain persisted over three months later. When hauling the prisoners onto buses, the soldiers treated them like chunks of meat at a slaughterhouse. Those captured at Province Hall, the YWCA, the Jeonil Building, Gwangju High School, and other skirmish sites on the morning of May 27 were strung together to be taken away. Anyone who tried to look up was clubbed, so the prisoners could not tell where they were headed. When they reached their destination, the prisoners were forced to move forward with their heads against the ground. They were provided with no food on the day of their arrest. For some time, the prisoners did not know where they had been taken. It was only when they encountered those detained during the preventative custody sweep on May 17 that they learned that they were in the holding cells at Sangmudae.

The holding cell area was a large semicircular space divided into six slices around a central area, with only the smallest side of each section open—albeit barred. This layout made it possible for MPs in the central area to keep an eye on all prisoners without having to turn. Each section had raised wooden floors and was barely large enough for 30 people, but because soldiers had already detained over 300 people previously and had an additional 590 prisoners from May 27, approximately 150 people were stuffed into each section. Kim Sang-yun, who had been taken into preventative custody days earlier, glimpsed his wife Jeong Hyeon-ae as well as his sister-in-law and his younger brother Kim Sang-jip on the grounds outside through the windows. He had been completely unaware of the events that had unfolded in the outside world. The detained citizens finally found Jang Gye-beom, who had disappeared following the Poison Pin Incident. He had covered his face with sunglasses and a handkerchief, but Kim Jun-bong and Yun Seok-ru recognized him instantly. Jang personally pointed out the Uprising Leadership Team leaders to MPs. Pieces of paper labeled with titles from the Leadership Team were stuck on the chests of Kim Jong-bae, Park Nam-seon, Jeong Sang-yong, Yun Gang-ok, Yun Seok-ru, Jeong Hae-jik, and Kim Jun-bong. They were photographed and immediately driven away to the National Security Forces.

When the Uprising Leadership Team leaders entered the National Security Forces office, they were greeted by tall soldiers built like wrestlers who gave them pats on the back and sarcastic remarks such as, “Welcome, comrades from the Republic of South Jeolla.” The soldiers stood in a circle in the middle of the office, called in each prisoner one by one, and beat them—first dazing them with a slap and a punch to the solar plexus, then dragging them to their feet when they fell to beat them more. This torture went on for five days and four nights.

Waves of Mass Arrests

Between May 17 and late July, 2,699 were arrested in connection with the Gwangju Uprising. Five hundred and ninety were captured on May 27 alone following the attack on Province Hall, and more than 100 more were detained by the end of the month. By May 31, a total of 1,039 people—including those detained during the uprising—were under investigation in custody.

Defense Security Command initiated a crackdown, arresting anyone who had wielded a gun during the Gwangju Uprising, members of the Settlement Committees, and executives of postsecondary student councils. While the special forces teams marched on Province Hall on May 27, the rest of the military surrounded the city perimeter and rooted out any potential suspects who attempted to leave Gwangju. Police were offered rewards of KRW 1 million and a one-rank promotion per collected firearm. Former regional defense squad members were no exceptions to the crackdown. Every resident of Taebong Village and Suksil Village who assisted in the defense of Baegopeun Bridge from May 21 to 23 under the command of Moon Jang-woo was arrested. When no firearms were found, police dragged away and beat the village’s young people, elders, and the women who cooked for the demonstrators. They thoroughly searched each home, even breaking down closet doors. Between seventy and eighty residents of Suksil Village were detained and tortured during this period.¹⁵

Torture

The resistance’s operations director Park Nam-seon was labeled a “riot ringleader” and placed in solitary confinement in a white room in the basement. He was stripped naked and beaten mercilessly over the course of three days. Park was struck about the head, shoulders, and the rest of his body. His molars and incisors broke, and he lost consciousness numerous times. The National Security Forces investigators drove needle-thin picks about five centimeters in length under Park’s fingernails and demanded that he confess to being a North Korean agent. Several days later, the members of the Resistance Council—haggard from days of torture and beatings—were moved to the holding cells at Sangmudae, where investigators who had already prepared the scenario for their investigation waited.

At 4:00 a.m. on May 28, Kim Yeong-cheol, planning director for the Uprising Leadership Team, went to the restroom attached to the back of the holding cells and attempted suicide. The shock of watching coworker Yoon Sang-won die before his eyes in the conference room at Province Hall and the news of the death of his close friend Park Yong-jun at the YWCA had rattled him. The ensuing arrest, torture, beatings, and humiliation drove him to his suicide attempt. He slit an artery in his left wrist with a sharp object and smashed his head against the corner of the concrete wall multiple times. MPs heard the noise, dragged him out of the restroom, beat him with pickax handles and trampled on him, and transferred him to the Armed Forces Hospital. Two months later, Kim began to show signs of mental illness. Fellow prisoners requested an in-depth psychiatric examination for Kim but were denied. Kim’s symptoms worsened day by day, even after he was released on December 1981 thanks to the suspension of his sentence. He underwent an operation at Chonnam University Hospital and went from one medical institution to another, including Naju National Hospital, until he died in August 1998.

Unable to bear the beatings and torture, mobile strike force member Na Il-seong collected painkillers, antipyretics, and antidiarrheals from weekly visits by the military medic. He consumed them all at once to end his own life but survived. The attempt caused severe damage to his digestive system, which continues to cause Na pain to this day.¹⁶

The phrase “human rights” was essentially off-limits to anyone labeled a rioter. All sorts of unusual tortures were inflicted on the prisoners, but they were made to feel as though they were lucky to be spared their lives. Those who were tortured or beaten suffered from lasting aftereffects even after their release, which prevented them from leading normal lives. A significant number were left with mental conditions that led to their deaths. They were victimized and terrorized even after they were finally freed from detention.¹⁷

“Agent Peony”

Jeon Ok-ju and Cha Myeong-suk, the women who led the street broadcasts on May 20 and 21 as the street demonstrations intensified, were captured at 4:00 p.m. on May 22 by a group that had come out of the crowds in Hwajeong-dong. Martial Law Command had a plainclothes unit operating in Gwangju at the time to undermine the demonstrations. Accused of being North Korean agents, they were dragged to the National Security Forces base. Jeon later testified that the one who arrested her was a man in his thirties with cropped hair and a dark blue jacket, who looked more like an intelligence agent than an ordinary civilian. When Jeon stepped into the office, more than fifty men turned in her direction and yelled, “Here comes the agent!” Jeon and Cha were separated and investigated individually. They were subjected to sexual degradation and torture, and investigators held them at gunpoint to demand written confessions of being North Korean agents. Reporters were called to take photographs of Jeon and Cha, with the investigators claiming they were working for North Korea. When Jeon covered her face and denied the accusation, she was struck in the back of the head with the butt of a rifle. National Security Forces announced that Jeon was “Agent Peony,” who had received two years of espionage training at Moranbong (“Peony Peak”) Mountain in North Korea. Domestic media reported, “Jeon Ok-ju and two other women captured and handed over to the military by civilian demonstrators confirmed as spies.”¹⁸ Ultimately, doubts could not be cast on Jeon’s identity as her father was a police officer. Unable to frame her for espionage, the military attempted to frame her for the burning of the MBC building—when that attempt also failed, they accused her of colluding with Kim Dae-jung’s alleged attempt at rebellion.¹⁹

In early June, investigators discovered that Cha had lied about her status as a Chonnam National University student when they dispatched an investigator to the address on her student card and learned that it belonged to a different individual. Cha had picked up the card during the demonstrations and pretended to be a university student. When news broke of her falsified identity, investigators celebrated “catching a real North Korean agent.” Upon repeated torture, they learned Cha’s real name and hometown. A visit to Changpyeong in Damyang, where Cha’s family was from, revealed that she had relatives there but that her family had moved to Seoul in search of a better life. However, the investigators demanded that Cha confess what part of North Korea she had come from. When Cha refused to confess to being a North Korean agent, she was tortured mercilessly. On September 19 that year, martial law authorities officially accused Jeon Ok-ju and Cha Myeong-suk not of espionage for North Korea, but violation of martial law and conspiracy to incite rebellion. Jeon was sentenced to ten years in prison, while Cha was sentenced to seven to ten years in prison. The former was released on April 3, 1981, and the latter was given a Christmas pardon in December 1981.

Connections to a Falsified Kim Dae-jung Conspiracy

The Joint Investigation Team began the investigation into the Gwangju Uprising by drafting one overarching scenario into which arrested persons of note would be slotted. Kim Dae-jung would be framed as the leader of this falsified conspiracy, with Hong Nam-sun cast as the ringleader of the Gwangju-area nongovernment activists. In this scenario, Jeong Dong-nyeon was the ringleader of the postsecondary students, Kim Jong-bae the ringleader of the rioters, and Park Nam-seon and Yun Seok-ru would be ruffians bent on extremist activities.

Jeong Dong-nyeon, Kim Sang-yun, Kim Un-gi, and Yu Jae-do, who were detained during the preventative custody blitz on May 17, guessed that they would be released soon because they were not involved in the uprising. However, their expectations were betrayed on the night of May 27 as Jeong Dong-nyeon and Kim Un-gi—students at Chonnam and Chosun University respectively who had been detained in the past and later released—were called into MP investigation offices around midnight. Jeong found himself surrounded by a dozen men armed with batons and whips, who forced him to his knees and beat him mercilessly for hours. The investigators held out a photocopied page from a guestbook from Kim Dae-jung’s residence in Donggyo-dong, Seoul, where the signature “Jeong Dong-nyeon, Chonnam National University” was written. “You visited his house, didn’t you?” they accused, and Jeong admitted to visiting the home. However, that was not the end of that line of investigation. Closer to dawn, the men beat Jeong again and accused him of taking money from Kim Dae-jung. Jeong, unable to endure the repeated beatings, was forced into confessing that he had received KRW 5 million from Kim. In reality, although Jeong had visited the Kim residence in April that year, he had not even met Kim Dae-jung—nor had he received any money.

Upon returning to his holding cell, Jeong took a sharpened spoon into the restroom and attempted to disembowel himself out of despair at being beaten into given false confessions. However, a fellow prisoner happened to enter the restroom at the same time and alerted the soldiers, who quickly dragged Jeong away. Following emergency treatment at a hospital, Jeong was taken to the National Security Forces yet again and was interrogated as to the whereabouts of the money he supposedly received from Kim Dae-jung. Jeong testified to handing over KRW 3 million and KRW 2 million to former Chonnam Student Council President Park Gwan-hyun and Yoon Han Bong respectively—both of whom were still at large. Following the investigation, Jeong was treated at the Armed Forces Hospital for a month before being transferred to a holding cell in Sangmudae once more. During this period, records of Jeong’s testimony where he claimed to have handed over KRW 2 million to Yoon Han Bong were altered to state that the sum had gone instead to Kim Un-gi, a student at Chosun University. At the end of the investigation, the official story was as follows: of the KRW 5 million Jeong supposedly received from Kim Dae-jung at the latter’s residence in Donggyo-dong, KRW 3 million went to Park Gwan-hyun, and KRW 2 million passed through Yoon Han Bong’s hands before being handed off to Kim Un-gi of Chosun University to fund the student demonstrations led by Chonnam and Chosun University.

In 1988, just before the National Assembly hearing on the Gwangju Uprising, Heo Jang-hwan—formerly an investigator on the 505th Security Unit—spoke at a press conference to explain the manipulation that occurred behind the scenes concerning the investigation of the Gwangju Uprising. He claimed that “in order to connect Kim Dae-jung to criminal actions, investigators forced prisoners to give false confessions stating that they had been paid off by Kim. In the process, the prisoners were subjected to indescribable, humiliating, and inhumane violence—torture, beatings, and even being forced to beat their fellows in their holding cells.”²⁰

Heo went on to describe typical cases of investigation manipulation. In one case, investigators shredded the guest list at an inn in the town of Wando in order to eliminate Jeong’s alibi of having stayed at the establishment. In another case, the lawyer Hong Nam-sun was tortured, persuaded, and placated into cooperation before being handed over to prosecutors—but when Hong went back on his testimony, military prosecutors notified the investigators that the accusations against Hong would be difficult to uphold. As a result, Hong was handed back to the National Security Forces to be brutally tortured into copying out a testimony written out by the investigators—which was used to indict him by military prosecutors. A third case involved Jeon Ok-ju, who had been captured at 4:30 p.m. on May 22 near the Gwangju Armed Forces Hospital and accused of being a North Korean agent. Lieutenant Colonel Seo Ui-nam commanded Heo to somehow devise as much of a connection between Jeon and Kim Dae-jung as possible. Yet another case involved Jang Gye-beom, the culprit behind the Poison Pin Incident at Province Hall. Following the uprising, National Security Forces took him into protection, with Lieutenant Colonel Seo ordering Heo to ensure Jang’s safety. Fifth, Heo confessed that the 505th Security Unit, Combat Arms Command, military prosecutors, and military courts determined the sentences of prisoners before the court-martials took place, and that on the day of the court-martial, all investigators remained on standby around the court to take all necessary measures to ensure that the defendant admitted to the acts that they were accused of. Finally, the investigation team picked out Chonnam University professors and framed them of indirectly assisting Kim Dae-jung’s rebellion conspiracy, demanding the resignation of dozens including president Min Jun-sik and faculty members Kim Dong-won, Lee Bang-gi, and Myeong Noh-geun.²¹

On July 15, Martial Law Command dispatched two additional prosecutors and two KCIA investigators to Gwangju to examine the investigation thus far, adjust justifications and severity levels of sentences, and decide on future measures. Following discussions, the South Jeolla Province Joint Investigation Team concluded, “whether to apply the crimes of rioting or rebellion is a matter of policy; the people of Gwangju will only accept the story if Kim Dae-jung is cast as the ringleader of the rebellion attempt,” and proposed that approximately 500 people be punished for their actions, with 30 to 40 leading actors given especially severe sentences. In accordance with these guidelines, even prisoners detained during the preventative custody blitz were forced to rewrite their testimonies to match the charge of conspiracy to incite rebellion in mid-July.

On July 31, the Joint Investigation Team in Seoul commanded that their South Jeolla Province counterpart include the following in Jeong Dong-nyeon’s transcript of suspect examination: (1) the goal of the Chonnam University student movement was to incite a large-scale violent incident and a nationwide popular protest to overthrow the current government and place Kim Dae-jung in the seat of power to form a new political order, (2) that Jeong had explained the above plan to Kim during a visit to the latter’s home on May 5, 1980, and (3) that he had received KRW 5 million from Kim and ordered Park Gwan-hyun to kick off a demonstration at Chonnam University.²² In accordance with this command, the Gwangju Uprising was officially packaged as key evidence of Kim Dae-jung’s supposed plot to incite rebellion. Jeong Dong-nyeon, Hong Nam-sun, Cho Ah-ra, Myeong Noh-geun, Song Gisuk, and other democratization activists were tortured in the investigation rooms and basements of Sangmudae and the National Security Forces base until they signed the testimonies written by investigators.

Court-Martial

A total of 2,522 people were taken into custody in connection with the Gwangju Uprising. Of these, 1,906 were dismissed with warnings and the remaining 616 were sent to military courts. Two hundred and twelve were not indicted, but the remaining 404 were court-martialed.²³ The court-martial process went smoothly. The defendants were not even permitted the right of legal counsel. No one locked in the Sangmudae holding cells or their families were informed of the procedures or of the matter of consulting legal services. The only exceptions were lawyers Hong Nam-sun and Lee Gi-hong, who were jointly defended by attorneys from the Gwangju Lawyers’ Association, and priests Kim Seong-yong and Cho Pius, as well as one professor, who were provided lawyers upon request from Archbishop Youn Kong-hi. Families and religious leaders also pleaded for lawyers for Jeong Dong-nyeon—framed as the ringleader of an attempt to incite rebellion—Kim Jong-bae and Park Nam-seon of the Uprising Leadership Team, and other accused who were expected to be condemned to severe sentences. However, lawyers were not given proper access to their clients, and were not even permitted to examine the records of statement given by the accused.

The farcical trials took place at the Combat Arms Command military court at Sangmudae. An additional building was erected because the existing courthouse could not house all involved personnel. Twenty to thirty handcuffed defendants at a time were stuffed into a space only slightly wider than a classroom, with armed MPs standing guard between the defendants and their families. During the court-martial process, it was found that when Jeong Dong-nyeon supposedly received the KRW 5 million from Kim Dae-jung, he had been in reality teaching at a private academy. When the court moved on to the matter of the KRW 5 million, and how it supposedly passed from Yoon Han Bong to Kim Un-gi of Chosun University, Kim Un-gi demanded (for the pride of his school) that the courts record his funds as having come straight from Kim Dae-jung. However, the investigator in charge replied that such a change was not possible because it was not part of the script passed down from Seoul, filling the courthouse with laughter. When military prosecutors asserted that Cho Pius’s attempt to recall the firearms from the people was for the goal of consolidating the city’s weapons in order to better fight back against martial law troops, Cho’s lawyer summoned South Jeolla Province Vice-governor Jeong Si-chae as a witness. Jeong had previously reported to authorities that Cho deserved official commendation for his efforts to recall the weapons. When Jeong took the stand, however, he refused to give a straight answer and claimed that he had no memory of making such a claim.²⁴

Jeong Dong-nyeon’s final testimony went on for approximately an hour. Turning from the defendant’s seat, he looked straight at the gallery and declared, “Ask anyone on the streets of Gwangju today if there truly was a ‘ringleader’ behind our actions. Not a single person would tell you that the Gwangju incident was caused by some mastermind.” He said to the those in audience, “Today, we are physically locked in these dark, hopeless cells. But someday, the bells of liberty will ring on a democratic society. We will be victorious. Truth and justice will be victorious. My friends, let us have faith and overcome this hardship together!” Sobs could be heard from those in the gallery, and one of the judges was spotted quietly wiping a tear. Though weakened by the torture inflicted during the investigation, Jeong’s spirit was far from broken.²⁵

The first public trial for the Gwangju Uprising concluded at 10:00 a.m. on October 24, 1980. One hundred and forty-nine out of 404 were released on suspended sentences, and 255 were pronounced guilty.²⁶ During the second round of trials at the High Military Court on December 29 that year, 80 of the 163 previously pronounced guilty were released on exemption or probation. On March 31 the following year, the Supreme Court struck down the defendants’ appeals and affirmed the High Military Court’s sentences concerning the 83 defendants, who were charged with violation of martial law, taking on leadership roles in conspiracies to incite rebellion, and murder. With this, the scripted scenario for the Gwangju Uprising trials were carried out to perfect completion.

On April 3, three days after the Supreme Court upheld the defendants’ original sentences, all 83 defendants were given commuted sentences or special pardons or were reinstated to previous positions. The 3 persons sentenced to death (including Jeong Dong-nyeon) had their sentences reduced to life in prison; the 7 sentenced to life in prison (including Park Nam-seon) had their terms reduced to twenty years; the 13 sentenced to time under fifteen years (including Hong Nam-sun) had their terms cut in half. As a result, those whose remaining sentences were less than five years (including Jeon Ok-ju) were given exemptions or their sentences were invalidated, allowing them to go free. On December 24, 1981, Jeong Dong-nyeon and the remaining 11 others who had their sentences suspended were given special Christmas pardons. This marked the release of all those imprisoned in connection with the Gwangju Uprising.

15

Work Left Undone

The military’s capture of the South Jeolla Province Hall early in the morning of May 27 put an end to the Gwangju Uprising. Chun Doo-hwan, who took control of the military through the December 12 insurrection and took political power following the May 17 insurrection and the Gwangju massacre, was named President of the Republic of Korea by the National Conference for Unification on August 27 that year. In response, the families of those who lost their lives during the Gwangju Uprising, the families of the detained, and the injured survivors organized themselves in solidarity and resistance.

Association of Families of the Fallen

On May 29, 1980, cleaning trucks carried the 129 bodies that had been placed in Sangmu Hall to section 3 of the municipal cemetery in Mangwol-dong. A joint funeral was held for the deceased, and more than a hundred family members met for the first time at the samuje ceremony on May 31. It was at this time that the Association of the Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Martyrs was formed. The following year, the group became formally organized and was renamed the Association of the Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Activists.

In 1981, association chair Park bowed to pressure from authorities and was prevented from holding a commemoration event marking the first anniversary of the uprising. Outraged family members held a smaller makeshift ceremony, but intelligence agents latched onto anti-American sentiments in general affairs manager Jeong Su-man’s eulogy and arrested him for violation of the National Security Act. For the second anniversary of the Gwangju Uprising, the South Jeolla Development Council forcibly conscripted countless citizens to the city’s public stadium for a Citizens’ Solidarity Rally, preventing participation in the commemoration events. For the third anniversary, intelligence agents and police outright put families under house arrest and cut off roads leading to the cemetery. Even after the uprising, victims and their families were forced into hardship, and more than fifty people died of their injuries and aftereffects. No matter how much the bereaved asserted that the official number of deaths had been reduced or manipulated, the government refused to conduct a proper investigation into the matter, instead accusing the families of propagating false information.

Many people were arrested and imprisoned for brazenly challenging the Chun regime by holding memorial ceremonies in Mangwol-dong. Intelligence agencies continued to investigate, place under house arrest, tail, detain, and isolate these families until the mid-1980s. The families of the fallen went on to fight for the right to testify at the National Assembly hearing and to protest at Myeongdong Cathedral for the legislation of the Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement.

Association of Wounded Victims

Because those wounded during the Gwangju Uprising were scattered across hospitals for treatment and unable to move easily, they were later to organize than the families of the deceased. To make matters worse, attempts to form an association to represent their interests in the immediate aftermath of the Gwangju Uprising were foiled by the authorities. As concerns about the treatment and livelihood of the wounded mounted, eighteen of the wounded who learned of the launch of associations for the bereaved and the families of the imprisoned gathered together on August 1, 1982, without the notice of the police to establish the Association of Wounded 5.18 Democratization Activists. The group was reorganized into the Association of Wounded 5.18 Gwangju Uprising Democratization Activists in 1995 and then relaunched as the Association of Wounded 5.18 Gwangju Democratization Movement Activists Inc. in May 1998.

Many of the wounded were left with life-altering conditions and aftereffects that made even daily life a constant struggle for survival. But as their injuries healed, the wounded grew more stalwart and unyielding. They led the way at protests at the Blue House, the Saturday protests for the legislation of the Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement, and the protest at Myeongdong Cathedral, and they participated in rallies.

Association of the Detained and the Families of the Detained

In the immediate aftermath of the Gwangju Uprising, families of the detained shared the common concern of caring for their imprisoned loved ones and providing assistance during their upcoming trials. These families exchanged information and supported one another until they formed the Association of Those Detained Concerning the Gwangju Uprising on September 20, 1980, during the first trial of the detained. This group provided a means of communication and solidarity to those preparing for the trial of their imprisoned husbands and children. The association fought for the release of their family members, protested at the sentencing, submitted a blood-written petition, protested Chun Doo-hwan’s scheduled visit to Gwangju, and protested at Myeongdong Cathedral.

Following the release of the last of the detained in December 1982, a number of disparate associations of families of the detained attempted a merger and succeeded in forming the Council of Gwangju Uprising Detainees in 1984. Even after their release, the detained suffered from the aftereffects of torture and were prevented from pursuing careers and livelihoods by the Chun regime’s slander, which labeled them as rioters. They were also subjected to continued surveillance and oppression.

In 1990, the Act on Reparations for Persons in Connection with the Gwangju Democratization Movement was legislated, with the sixth round of reparations made in 2006. Reparations were made to a total of 4,634 people: 155 dead, 81 missing, 110 dead of injuries, and 4,288 injured or detained. The act was amended on December 30, 2014, and a seventh round of reparations was made in 2017.

From the Gwangju Uprising to the June Struggle¹

On May 28, 1980, the National Union for Democracy and Unification released a statement concerning the Gwangju incident. On May 29, students from Korea University and Ewha Womans University were arrested distributing flyers that publicized the events that took place in Gwangju. On May 30, Kim Ui-gi, a student at Sogang University, left a will denouncing the government and demanding the disclosure of the facts behind the Gwangju Uprising before jumping from the sixth floor of the National Council of Churches in Korea, located at Jongno 5-ga, Seoul. Distribution of flyers related to the Gwangju Uprising continued into June, as did arrests of those responsible. On June 9, Samjin Special Steel blue-collar worker Kim Jong-tae left behind a manifesto titled “In Memory of Gwangju’s Fallen” and immolated himself. Even into July and August, people continued to publicize the events that took place in Gwangju and were detained or arrested. When summer break ended and postsecondary students returned to classes in September, student activism intensified considerably. Flyers were discovered at Yonsei University and distributed at a dozen schools, including Hanshin University, and demonstrations were held at several postsecondary campuses. On December 9, 1980, members of the Catholic Farmers’ Association and students from Chonnam National University set fire to the American Cultural Service building in Gwangju, demanding the disclosure of the truth of the Gwangju Uprising. The public pushed for justice almost immediately after Chun’s suppression of the uprising.

In 1981, the Chun regime dispatched countless plainclothes officers to postsecondary campuses in Korea and appointed academic advisors to keep tabs on and control students. Despite his efforts, postsecondary students rose up in May 1981 to commemorate the first anniversary of the Gwangju Uprising and to protest against the fascist government. On May 27, Kim Tae-hun, a fourth-year economics student at Seoul National University, cried out, “Out with Chun Doo-hwan!” and jumped from the sixth floor of the school library.

In March 1982, postsecondary students Moon Bu-sik and Kim Eun-suk were arrested and accused of arson that damaged the American Cultural Service building in Busan. Kim Hyeon-jang, who had been wanted on suspicion of being a ringleader of the Gwangju Uprising, was also captured, alongside priest Choi Gi-sik, who had given him shelter. In October, Park Gwan-hyun—former president of the Chonnam National University Student Council—died while staging a hunger strike at Gwangju Prison. Chonnam and more than twenty other postsecondary schools across the country rose up to commemorate Park and denounce the government.

Student resistance intensified in May 1983; more than thirty demonstrations took place at a dozen schools, including Korea University. More than sixty-five people were imprisoned and thirteen were conscripted. When the second term of the school year began that autumn, student demonstrations spread across the country to Kangwon National University, Pusan National University, and Incheon National University.

On December 21 that year, the government finally conceded to students and dissolved the Student National Defense Corps, a quasi-military organization that had been instituted at postsecondary institutions. Students who had been expelled due to their participation in activism were reinstated, 172 prisoners were released, and 142 had their previous statuses restored. Plainclothes officers on campuses were withdrawn and student councils were re-established. Student activism had been restored after three years of oppression.

The flames of resistance continued to spread in 1984 as students from fifty-five postsecondary schools fought to demand the liberalization of educational institutions—separation of state from universities—and nongovernment political activists and politicians joined the movement.

Finally, in May 1984, the police blockade of the cemetery at Mangwol-dong was removed. The number of visitors to the graves of those killed in the uprising increased dramatically as university students and democratization activists flocked to pay their respects. This marked the rise of Mangwol-dong as a symbolic place in Korean democratization. Commemoration events grew into new resistance movements, and more and more voices began to demand full disclosure of the events that took place during the Gwangju Uprising. The cry for democracy spread across South Korea with Gwangju as an origin point.

The commemoration ceremony in May 1985 included more than 500 guests, including families of the fallen, postsecondary students, National Assembly members, and nongovernment political activists. The ceremony took place in Mangwol-dong and ended with a march to Province Hall. An estimated 2,500 postsecondary students from twelve schools around the country took part in overnight sit-in demonstrations and pelted police substations with rocks.

The resistance efforts gained further momentum in the years that followed. The 1987 anniversary was especially remarkable and involved more than 5,000 participants. The end of Chun’s presidential term drew near and tensions ran high as the country was shaken by the death by torture of democratization activist Bak Jong-cheol, the issue of constitutional amendment, and the presidential statement for the preservation of the existing constitution. The necessity of constitutional amendment was officially raised at the commemoration ceremony in Mangwol-dong, which gave rise to the South Jeolla Office for the Reclamation of Democracy and the Constitution. The organization eventually expanded nationwide as the people moved as one to create the great wave known as the June Struggle that very year.

The National Assembly’s Gwangju Hearing

The June Struggle in 1987 made it possible to request the investigation of the Gwangju Uprising at Korea’s legislative body, the National Assembly. Chun Doo-hwan’s successor Roh Tae-woo, also a member of the Singunbu, formed the Commission for the Harmonious Pursuit of Democratization on January 16, 1988, in what appeared to be a move toward justice. However, Roh’s proposed measures for reconciliation lacked any reference whatsoever to a thorough investigation and disclosure of the truth.

A federal election took place in April the following year to elect the members of the 13th National Assembly. The election ended with the opposition party taking a majority of the seats. This allowed for the National Assembly to take unprecedented action and hold a hearing on the Gwangju Uprising. In accordance with the Act on the Inspection and Investigation of State Administration (Act no. 4011), the 9th main conference of the 142nd Provisional Session of the National Assembly on June 27, 1988, passed the proposal for the formation of a special commission for the investigation of the Gwangju Uprising. This marked the beginning of the National Assembly’s hearing on the Gwangju Uprising. It was through this hearing that the people of South Korea learned the (albeit limited) truth of the Gwangju Uprising. The presented evidence and testimonies plunged the country into shock. In response to the people’s outrage, the Roh administration formed a three-party coalition with other conservative political parties to regain a majority in the National Assembly. This made it impossible for the National Assembly to further investigate those responsible for actions taken during the Gwangju Uprising such as giving the order to fire.

The National Assembly’s Gwangju hearing took place from 1988 to 1989 but was hampered by political circumstances and fell short of thoroughly examining the uprising. It ultimately confirmed that the Hanahoe (Singunbu) led a military coup on December 12, 1979, that riot suppression training took place in the beginning of 1980, that martial law was expanded nationwide on May 17, 1980, and that political power went to Chun and his military cronies. However, the truth behind the Gwangju Uprising, the suppression tactics used by martial law troops and the resulting atrocities, the indiscriminate gunfire by martial law troops and the massacre of civilians, and the connection between the uprising and the United States were simply discussed, not investigated. Politicians concluded the National Assembly hearing on Gwangju on the condition that Chun Doo-hwan, the mastermind behind the killings that took place in Gwangju, deliver his testimony at the National Assembly.

The Struggle Taken to Courts

In October 1988, the Gwangju Uprising Allies Association, dissatisfied with the results of the hearing, formally accused Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, and seven other high-ranking military officials as perpetrators of the Gwangju Uprising. However, the case was dismissed by prosecutors—who had not even summoned the accused for investigation.

When the Kim Yeong-sam administration came into power in December 1992, the faltering fight for justice found its footing once more. Victims’ organizations and civil groups led widespread movements for the investigation of the uprising and the accusation of the perpetrators. On July 19, 1993, military victims of the December 12 military insurrection formally accused former Martial Law Commander Jeong Seung-hwa and his fellow insurrectionists. On May 13, 1994, civil groups from across the country banded together to form the Citizens’ Committee for the Investigation and Legacy of the Gwangju Uprising, which filed accusations against thirty-five people (including former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo) with the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office. Simultaneously, a group of 322 victims and families of victims filed a written accusation against the perpetrators. From May 13, 1994, to April 3, 1995, a total of seventy accusations were filed against fifty-eight persons, including the former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo.

The accused were military commanders ranked at battalion commander or higher during the Gwangju Uprising. Their names and positions at the time are listed in Table 7.

Table 7. Accused military commanders

Name

Unit commanded

Chun Doo-hwan

Defense Security

Roh Tae-woo

Capital Garrison

Chung Ho-yong

Special Warfare

Lee Hui-seong

Martial Law

Jin Jong-chae

Second ROK Army

Soh Jun-yeol

Combat Arms

Park Jun Byung

20th Division

Shin Woo-sik

7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade

Choi Ung

11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade

Choi Se-chang

3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade

Jeong Su-hwa

20th Division, 60th Regiment

Kim Dong-jin

20th Division, 61st Regiment

Lee Byeong-nyeon

20th Division, 62nd Regiment

Kwon Seung-man

7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 33rd Battalion

Kim Il-ok

7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 35th Battalion

Ahn Bu-ung

11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 61st Battalion

Lee Je-won

11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 62nd Battalion

Cho Chang-gu

11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 63rd Battalion

Im Su-won

3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 11th Battalion

Kim Wan-bae

3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 12th Battalion

Byeon Gil-nam

3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 13th Battalion

Park Jong-gyu

3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 15th Battalion

Kim Gil-su

3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 16th Battalion

Lee Byeong-woo

20th Division, 60th Regiment, 1st Battalion

Yun Jae-man

20th Division, 60th Regiment, 2nd Battalion

Gil Yeong-cheol

20th Division, 60th Regiment, 3rd Battalion

Cha Dal-suk

20th Division, 60th Regiment, 4th Battalion

Jeong Yeong-jin

20th Division, 61st Regiment, 1st Battalion

Kim Hyeong-gon

20th Division, 61st Regiment, 2nd Battalion

Park Jae-cheol

20th Division, 61st Regiment, 3rd Battalion

Kang Yeong-uk

20th Division, 61st Regiment, 4th Battalion

Oh Seong-yun

20th Division, 62nd Regiment, 1st Battalion

Lee Jong-gyu

20th Division, 62nd Regiment, 2nd Battalion

Yu Hyo-il

20th Division, 62nd Regiment, 3rd Battalion

Kim In-hwan

20th Division, 62nd Regiment, 4th Battalion

However, prosecutors claimed that “a successful coup d’état cannot be punished” and declared on July 18, 1995, that the accused would not be indicted. Their reasoning was that the coup had given rise to a new constitutional order that prevented the perpetrators from judicial scrutiny in matters relating to the coup.

The decision by the Prosecutors’ Office outraged the people. On the day of the statement, the Joint Committee for the Indictment of the Perpetrators of the Gwangju Massacre, composed of 136 organizations from Gwangju and South Jeolla Province, held an emergency meeting and staged a protest at Myeongdong Cathedral. One hundred and thirty-one faculty members from Korea University published a statement denouncing the prosecutors’ decision on July 31, and in a matter of days, 6,963 additional faculty from 54 postsecondary institutions around the country added their signatures. On August 25, 3,560 faculty from 78 postsecondary institutions petitioned for the legislation of a special law concerning the Gwangju Uprising. The Korean Bar Association also launched a petition for the legislation of a special law that would make it possible to punish those who perpetrated the Gwangju Massacre, and the lawyers’ group Minbyun (Lawyers for a Democratic Society) marched through the streets in protest. The Citizens’ Committee for the Investigation and Legacy of the Gwangju Uprising and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy also petitioned the National Assembly for the legislation of the special law. Demand for the punishment of those responsible mounted across the country, swelling into an unstoppable torrent battering against the walls of the National Assembly.

In response to the public outcry, the opposition party—the National Congress for New Politics—submitted three proposals concerning the Gwangju Uprising to the National Assembly on September 22: the Special Act on Investigating the Truth of the May 18 Democratization Movement, the Act on the Appointment etc. of Independent Prosecutor, and the Act on the Statute of Limitations on the Violation of the Constitution. The Democratic Party also submitted a proposal for the Special Act on the Handling of the December 12 Military Insurrection and the May 18 Democratization Movement.

The Legislation of the Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement

As the battle for the legislation of a special act on the Gwangju Uprising intensified, the Joint Committee for the Indictment of the Perpetrators of the Gwangju Massacre was formed in Gwangju on July 14, 1995. This committee worked with the Seoul-based Citizens’ Settlement Committee for Justice, Resolution, and Hope for the Gwangju Uprising in seeking out legal and physical ways to overturn the Prosecutors’ Office’s declaration. Gwangju Uprising survivors gathered at Myeongdong Cathedral in the heart of Seoul, under the blazing summer sun to protest for more than 180 days. Postsecondary school faculty members continued to release statements of denunciation, lawyers marched through the city, the well-educated committed themselves to participation, and organizations held rallies and demonstrations in support of the Gwangju victims and visited the Blue House and the Prosecutors’ Office in protest.

Finally, President Kim Young-sam ordered the legislation of the Special Act on Gwangju. The Special Investigation Headquarters for the December 12 Military Insurrection and Gwangju Uprising was established, and two days later, former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo were officially taken into custody. This was how the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Prescription for Public Prosecution etc. Against Crimes Disrupting Constitutional Order and the Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement were legislated.

Punishment of the Perpetrators

The legislation of the Special Act led to the indictment of every perpetrator of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Massacre who had been until that point outside the bounds of the law. On April 18, 1997, following a lengthy battle, the Supreme Court determined that these perpetrators would stand trial for their crimes.

The Supreme Court determined that the December 12 military insurrection was legally an act of military insurrection, that the Gwangju Uprising was a democratization movement, and that the Singunbu’s violent response to the uprising was an act of rebellion. The Supreme Court also declared that “under [the South Korean] constitution, non-democratically grounded acts of violence which prevent constitutional institutions from performing their functions, and nondemocratically grounded acts of violence with which the power of national governance is taken are not acceptable under any circumstance.” The Supreme Court examined the acts perpetrated by Defense Security Command advisors under the orders of Chun Doo-hwan and found that the National Crisis Countermeasure Plan fell under the crime of participation in conspiracy to incite rebellion, and the series of actions following the plan—the nationwide expansion of martial law on May 17, the arrests of politicians, and the blockade of the National Assembly—counted as participation in critical roles in a rebellion against the state. The starting date of the statute of limitations, which was one of the key points of debate in the case, was determined to be January 24, 1981. The final verdicts are presented in Table 8.

Table 8. Sentences for the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju incident by defendant

Name

Position at time of incident

Determinate sentence

Sentence

First trial

Appeal

Chun Doo-hwan

Defense Security Commander

Life imprisonment, forfeiture of KRW 220.5 billion

Death penalty, forfeiture of KRW 225.9 billion

Life imprisonment, forfeiture of KRW 220.5 billion

Roh Tae-woo

9th Division Commander

17 years imprisonment, forfeiture of KRW 262.8 billion

22 years, 6 months imprisonment, forfeiture of KRW 283.8 billion

17 years imprisonment, forfeiture of KRW 262.8 billion

Hwang Young-si

I Corps Commander

8 years imprisonment

10 years imprisonment

8 years imprisonment

Chung Ho-yong

Special Warfare Commander

7 years imprisonment

10 years imprisonment

7 years imprisonment

Heo Hwa-pyeong

Defense Security Command Chief Secretary

8 years imprisonment

10 years imprisonment

8 years imprisonment

Lee Hak-bong

Defense Security Command Investigation Director

8 years imprisonment

10 years imprisonment

8 years imprisonment

Heo Sam Soo

Defense Security Command Chief of Personnel

6 years imprisonment

8 years imprisonment

6 years imprisonment

Lee Hui-seong

Martial Law Commander

7 years imprisonment

8 years imprisonment

7 years imprisonment

Yu Hak-seong

Ministry of National Defense Assistant Secretary of Logistics

Indictment dismissed

8 years imprisonment

6 years imprisonment

Choi Se-chang

3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade Commander

7 years imprisonment

8 years imprisonment

5 years imprisonment

Choo Young-bock

Minister of National Defense

7 years imprisonment

7 years imprisonment

7 years imprisonment

Cha Gyu-heon

Capital Corps Commander

3 years, 6 months imprisonment

7 years imprisonment

3 years, 6 months imprisonment

Jang Se-dong

30th Garrison Commander

3 years, 6 months imprisonment

7 years imprisonment

3 years, 6 months imprisonment

Shin Yun-hui

Capital Garrison Command Military Police Commander

3 years, 6 months imprisonment

4 years imprisonment

3 years, 6 months imprisonment

Park Jong-kyu

3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade, 15th Battalion Commander

3 years, 6 months imprisonment

4 years imprisonment

3 years, 6 months imprisonment

Park Jun Byung

20th Division Commander

Not guilty

Not guilty

Not guilty

Note. JoongAng Ilbo, April 18, 1997. The Supreme Court’s final sentences are identical to the sentences pronounced by the appellate court (with the exception of Yu Hak-seong, whose indictment was dismissed due to Yu’s death).

The seventeen-year struggle for legal justice that gave rise to heated contention and debate across the country finally came to a close. A clear legal line had been drawn on one of the most significant issues in modern Korean history, which had nearly been left unsolved. The affirmation that the values of democracy, human rights, and justice would ultimately emerge victorious drew international attention to the Gwangju Uprising trials.

The trials, however, were limited in that on-site commanders who bore personal responsibility for the killings at Gwangju were not punished. They were never impeached for their many false testimonies on the stand—only the minority who had political responsibility for the massacre were punished.

Following their sentencing, former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo became ordinary prisoners. In accordance with the Act on the Respectful Treatment of Former Presidents, due to their sentences of imprisonment or higher, they were stripped of all honors and privileges that came with their former presidential positions. Immediately, the issues of pardon and the reinstatement of their privileges rose to the surface. On National Liberation Day (August 15)—a date on which prisoners were traditionally pardoned—the former presidents became the subject of intense political debate. Kim Dae-jung, leader of the National Congress for New Politics, who had worked toward the presidential seat for years, asserted that “the fastest way to resolve the regional resentment that has festered between the Yeongnam and Honam regions in southeastern and southwestern Korea is to put a conclusive end to the issue of the Gwangju Uprising by pardoning Chun and Roh.”

Gwangju Uprising organizations and civil groups railed against Kim’s remark. They argued that “pardons must be predicated on true remorse and repentance,” and that they would “oppose the granting of pardons that ignore the perspectives of the victims.” Eighty percent of the Korean population was opposed to the unconditional pardoning of Chun and Roh. However, popular opposition did not stop Kim from granting special pardons to the former presidents on December 22, 1997, soon after inauguration. Neither Chun nor Roh showed any sign of remorse upon their release.

The Necessity of Reinvestigation

The failure to thoroughly hold all those responsible to account led to the eventual attempts to distort the truth of the Gwangju Uprising. Some far-right agitators claim that the 1980 court-martial trials supersede the 1997 Supreme Court rulings and assert that not a single member of the citizen resistance was killed during the sweep of downtown Gwangju by martial law troops on May 27, 1980, and that all deaths at Province Hall were caused by mistaken fire between resistance members.

These claims, however, go against the official stance of South Korean constitutional institutions. The Supreme Court ruled that Operation Sangmu Loyalty, which took place on May 27, 1980, was not an “act of rebellion,” but “murder with the intent to incite rebellion.”² The latter is a crime in which people are murdered as a direct means to undermine the national constitution. This is distinguished from the former, in which rioting is used as a means to undermining the constitution.³

Concerning the attack on Province Hall on May 27, the Supreme Court ruled that “the act of ordering an operation in which troops would inevitably clash with resisting demonstrators and cause deaths is equivalent to directly or implicitly ordering the act of murder.” The court also made clear that orders to fire were explicitly included in Operation Sangmu Loyalty. The killing of Gwangju citizens who resisted Chun’s government takeover would result in the quick suppression of the demonstration in Gwangju, which in turn would prevent the demonstrations from spreading further—as such, the deaths caused by troops during Operation Sangmu Loyalty early in the morning of May 27 was ruled “murder with intent to incite rebellion,” as the operation was necessary for the success of Chun’s rebellion.

Although martial law authorities ruled in 1980 that Gwangju’s resistance was an act of rebellion that undermined the constitution, the Supreme Court overturned the ruling and acknowledged that the demonstrations were a justified act of defense for the constitutional order. It was determined that when constitutionally installed institutions such as the president and the cabinet were endangered and prevented from taking action, collective resistance by ordinary citizens was the last line of defense for the constitution.

Nevertheless, the court charged former Defense Security Commander Chun Doo-hwan, former ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Young-si, former Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong, former Minister of National Defense Choo Young-bock, and former Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong only with the crime of murder with intent to incite rebellion. The commanders who personally carried out the orders to kill in Gwangju in May 1980 were not held accountable for their actions. This was because the acts of murder had taken place under official orders, which were absolute and could not be disobeyed due to the structure and nature of the military.

Some legal scholars, however, argue that a blanket pardon for all commanders who were at Gwangju at the time is unacceptable.⁴ Although the people of Gwangju had armed themselves in desperation, in terms of numbers, training, and firepower, they were simply no match for the military personnel on the scene. The merciless murders and maiming of citizens, and the scenes of troops triumphantly singing military anthems in front of Province Hall, showed no hint of guilt or even hesitation on the part of the soldiers on the site.

A report submitted to the 48th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights clearly states that in cases of severe human rights violations, the fact that an act was perpetrated on the orders of the government or a higher ranking person does not exempt the perpetrator from criminal responsibility or constitute a mitigating circumstance and may only serve as a mitigating factor in the matter of sentencing.⁵ In a similar case, in 1994, Germany’s Federal Court of Justice convicted the soldiers who shot a man who crossed the Berlin Wall.⁶

The continued insistence of far-right agitators that martial law troops did not kill a single person during the attack on Province Hall makes a thorough reinvestigation of the events inevitable. Closer examination of the events and the evidence left behind will bring to light the facts of the crimes against humanity that took place in Gwangju and will protect the bereaved from further harassment and abuse by these agitators.

UNESCO Memory of the World Programme

Records and the analysis of records are the means by which lessons from history are passed on to the future. In 1994, the Gwangju Metropolitan City established the 5.18 Archives to collect records and items concerning the Gwangju Uprising. In 1997, the archives began publication of the May 18 Gwangju Uprising Archival Collection.

In September 2000, the Korea Society of Archival Studies announced that the records concerning the Gwangju Uprising were valuable enough to warrant being listed on the UNESCO Memory of the World Register. Discussions began in earnest in June 2009, with Chonnam National University, Gwangju Metropolitan City, South Jeolla Province, and the May 18 Memorial Foundation forming a public-private partnership for the initiative.

The Commission for the Listing of Gwangju Uprising Records to the UNESCO Memory of the World Register was officially launched in January the following year.⁷ The nomination documents were submitted to UNESCO in March, and on May 20, 2011, the Prime Minister officially remarked to the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to UNESCO that the Gwangju Uprising was a democratization movement officially recognized by the government. Three days later on May 23, at the 10th meeting of the International Advisory Committee of the Memory of the World Programme in Manchester, UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova put her signature on the papers that put the Gwangju Uprising documents on the Memory of the World Register.

The records of the May 18th Democratic Uprising listed by UNESCO contain a vast number of documents concerning the beginning and suppression of the Gwangju Uprising and the investigation and reparation processes that followed, produced by the Korean government, the National Assembly, individual citizens, organizations, and the United States government. The Gwangju Uprising had a massive impact on not only the democratization of South Korea but on democratization movements in the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and other Asian countries. The investigations and the reparation measures that followed the uprising were also lauded for creating positive precedence for other nations to follow. Scholars around the world defined the Gwangju Uprising as an act of transitional justice and an exemplar of making amends for past atrocities.

The records of the Gwangju Uprising have now joined the ranks of the Magna Carta⁸ and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,⁹ cementing the Gwangju Uprising’s place in international history as an event that must never be allowed to fade from memory.¹⁰

Appendix A

Martial Law Troops Deployed to Gwangju

Appendix A: Martial Law Troops Deployed to Gwangju

Unit

Numbers (officers/ enlisted)

Time and day of deployment

Arrival at Gwangju

Posted location

Previous post

Notes

7th Special Forces Brigade

33rd Battalion

45/321

22:37, May 17

01:10, May 18

Chonnam University, Gwangju Teachers College

Geumma

May 18, 01:00: 119/873 members of Bupyeong 9th Special Forces Brigade deployed to Seoul National University, Soongjeon University, and Chung-Ang University.

35th Battalion

39/283

Chonnam University, Chosun University

Geumma

11th Special Forces Brigade

Base

45/213

16:30, May 18

17:50, May 18

Chosun University, 18:30

Dongguk University

16:00–16:30: 42/195 members of 5th Special Forces Brigade, 22nd Battalion stationed at Korea University deployed to Dongguk University.

61st, 62nd, 63rd Regiment

102/596

19:00, May 18

00:50, May 19

Chosun University, 07:50

3rd Special Forces Brigade

11th Battalion, 12th Battalion, 15th Battalion, 16th Battalion

First wave: 131/589

01:00, May 20

06:50, May 20

Chonnam University, 07:03

National Cemetery

May 19, 20:40: Ordered to return to base. 23:15: Artillery Unit C of 2nd Field Artillery Corps (63rd Artillery Corps) takes control of National Cemetery.

Second wave: 134/623

01:10, May 20

07:00, May 20

Chonnam University, 07:35

20th Infantry Division: 61st Regiment

Division troops

18/145 2nd Battalion: 21/377

22:40, May 20

04:40, May 21

Sogang University, Dankook University, Hongik University

Army Command forbids gunfire, restriction of ammunition distribution. May 20, 23:00: 1st Special Forces Brigade advance guard deployed to Hongik University, Sogang University. May 21, 09:00: 390th Regiment, 30th Division deployed to Dankook University, Industrial College, Hanyang University, Konkuk University (91/1181). Remaining 20th Division personnel deployed to Dongguk University. May 21 01:00: Capital Garrison reassignment lifted.

1st, 2nd, 3rd Battalion

1st Battalion: 24/511 3rd Battalion: 19/380

22:50, May 20

04:50, May 21

20th Infantry Division: 62nd Regiment

3rd Battalion, regiment command

53/738

02:30, May 21

08:30, May 21 (Songjeongni Station)

Sangmudae, 10:00

Hanyang University, Seoul Industrial College, Dongguk University, Dankook University, Konkuk University

1st, 2nd Battalion, Division Command

54/802

02:40, May 21

08:58, May 21 (Songjeongni Station)

20th Infantry Division: 60th Regiment

69th Artillery Battalion Regiment troops

87/1,562

17:40, May 21

21:00, May 22

Combat Arms Command, 04:55

Kookmin University, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Kyung Hee University

May 21, 21:00: Order to deploy. Permission to fire granted by Combat Arms Command.

16:30: Withdrawal from South Jeolla Province Hall.

May 22, 05:40: 102/1454 members of 26th Division, 75th Regiment deployed to institutions listed in previous column.

Combat Arms Command

3 battalions, 31st Division

87/1,367

Infantry School

1,923/864

Artillery School

357/1,775

Armor School

1,165/1,700

Chemical School

75/253

Division troops

369/2,063

Total

47 battalions

4,727/15,590

Note. Numbers vary depending on the document used. Source: Park Man-gyu, “Singunbu-ui Gwangju-jinapgwa migungmunje” [The Singunbu’s suppression of the Gwangju Uprising and the United States problem], Journal of Democracy and Human Rights 3, no. 1 (2003): 230–1.

Appendix B

Timeline of Events: The Gwangju Uprising over
the Course of Ten Days (May 17–27, 1980)

1. Sporadic and Passive Resistance

May 17 (Saturday, weather clear): Nationwide expansion of martial law

11:00 – Military-wide commanders’ meeting; agreement to the nationwide expansion of martial law

20:25 – Martial Law Command orders commencement of Operation Loyalty

21:42 – Minister Lee Gyu-hyeon, spokesperson for the government, announces that nationwide expansion of martial law will start at 24:00

May 18 (Sunday, weather clear): Deployment of paratroopers to Geumnam-ro

01:00 – Tenth Declaration of Martial Law (Martial Law Command)

01:00 – 688 personnel (84 officers, 604 enlisted) from the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade’s 33rd and 35th Battalion deployed to Chonnam National University, Chosun University, Gwangju National University of Education; 1,146 personnel (14 officers, 1,132 enlisted) from the 31st Division’s 96th Regiment deployed to 16 postsecondary institutions and key locations around South Jeolla Province; 12 taken into preventative custody

10:00 – 200+ students gather at Chonnam University main gates, clash with the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade

11:00 – 500+ postsecondary students protest outside the Catholic Center on Geumnam-ro

14:00 – ROK Army Command confirms deployment of 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade to Gwangju

15:40 – 64 officers, 490 enlisted men from the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade’s 33rd Battalion deployed to the Yu-dong three-way intersection and Chungjang-ro; beginning of violent suppression

16:30 – President Choi Kyu-hah issues special statement (concerning the necessity of the expansion of martial law)

19:00 – End of the 7th Brigade’s suppression operation on Geumnam-ro (173 arrested)

21:00 – Curfew imposed on the Gwangju area; reservist weapons in Gwangju transferred to military units (First wave: 4,717 firearms, 1.16 million rounds of ammunition)

2. Transition to an Active Offensive

May 19 (Monday, weather clear to rainy): Citizen participation and resistance

03:00 – Death of Kim Gyeong-cheol (first civilian death)

04:00 – 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade dispatched to key locations in the city (61st Battalion: Intercity Bus Terminal; 62nd Battalion: Jang-dong; 63rd Battalion: Gyerim-dong; 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade: Express Bus Terminal)

10:00 – Citizens congregate on Geumnam-ro; military and police call for dispersal via helicopter; campus demonstrations at Gwangju Daedong High School, Kumho Jungang Girls’ High School; classes canceled at four elementary schools (classes suspended from May 22)

10:50 – Four armored vehicles surround 3,000+ demonstrators near Province Hall on Geumnam-ro

11:00 – 200+ demonstrating students arrested in front of the Catholic Center; additional 108 arrested by 13:00

14:00 – 5,000+ citizens gather outside the Catholic Center, set fire to five vehicles; paratroopers gather on Geumnam-ro for suppression operation; demonstrator demographics shift from students to working adults; stones and firebombs thrown; martial law troops call for dispersal via helicopter

15:00 – Combat Arms Command holds leaders’ meeting: Gwangju community leaders protest indiscriminate beatings of civilians

16:00 – Defense Security Command dispatches Brigadier General Choi Ye-seop to Gwangju

16:50 – First shot fired, injures third-year Chosun University High School student Kim Yeong-chan; demonstrators attack armored vehicle in Gyerim-dong

22:00 – Outraged demonstrators attack Buk-gu District Office, police substations at Yang-dong, Im-dong, Gwangju Station, take control of KBS broadcasting facilities

23:00 – 31st Division Commander Chung Ung orders paratrooper commanders to use nonviolent suppression methods

23:08 – Decision made for the additional deployment of the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade to Gwangju

23:40 – Second ROK Army Command orders violent suppression tactics as part of Operation Loyalty (suppression of urban guerrillas, grid-form takeover of the city, proactive strike tactics, protection of firearm supplies, deployment of plainclothes soldiers/officers)

3. Full-scale Popular Protest

May 20 (Tuesday, weather rainy to clear): Flames of resistance spread, indiscriminate gunfire at Gwangju Station

04:00 – Calls for popular uprising spread across Gwangju

06:00 – 7th and 11th Brigades reassigned (to Geumnam-ro, Chungjang-ro, Gyerim-dong area)

07.30 – 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade (255 officers, 1,137 enlisted) arrive at Gwangju Station, move to camp at Chonnam University

08:00 – Colonel Hong Seong-ryul of Defense Security Command arrives at Gwangju, begins special undercover mission

09:00 – 31st Division collects firearms and ammunition from the city (second wave: 6,508 firearms, 420,000 rounds of ammunition)

10:00 – Combat Arms Command holds community leaders’ meeting (community leaders demand withdrawal of paratroopers, or a switch to regular army uniforms); lull in demonstrations due to rain

10:20 – Martial law forces strip 30+ captured men and women down to underwear in front of the Catholic Center, subject them to military drills and severe beatings

12:00 – Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong meets Combat Arms Commander, demands violent suppression and returns to Seoul

12:30 – 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade deployed to locations in the city (11th Battalion: Hwanggeum-dong; 12th Battalion: City Hall; 13th Battalion: Intercity Bus Terminal; 15th Battalion: Yang-dong three-way intersection; 16th Battalion: Chonnam National University)

12:55 – Prime Minister Shin Hyun-hwak and the entire Cabinet resign

15:00 – 5,000+ demonstrators protest at the Geumnam-ro intersection

18:00 – Convoy of 100+ taxis lead 2,000 demonstrators in march from Mudeung Sports Center to Geumnam-ro; Second ROK Army hands down operation guidelines (analysis of rumors, prevention of weapon theft, treatment of prisoners, etc.); Combat Arms Commander replacement declared (Lieutenant General Yun Heung-jeong replaced by Major General Soh Jun-yeol)

19:00 – Vehicle convoy clashes with 11th Brigade on Geumnam-ro

19:30 – 10,000+ demonstrators join Geumnam-ro demonstrators at Intercity Bus Terminal

20:00 – Demonstrators seize City Hall, police substations at Yang-dong, Gwangju Station, and Hak-dong

21:05 – Four police officers killed by demonstrator bus in front of Labor Supervision Office

21:25 – Decision made for the additional deployment of the 20th Division to Gwangju

21:30 – Demonstrators surround 3rd Brigade at Gwangju Station; three buses burned down in front of Labor Supervision Office

21:45 – Arson of the Gwangju MBC building

22:00 – 3rd Brigade paratrooper run over and killed by demonstrator vehicle at Sinan intersection; 3rd Brigade’s 12th and 15th Battalions open fire on tires of demonstrator vehicles with handguns at Gwangju Station

22:30 – 3rd Brigade Commander (Choi Se-chang) orders distribution of live rounds for warning shots (100+ rounds supplied to 16th Battalion); Combat Arms Commander Yun Heung-jeong demands replacement of paratroopers, approved by Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong

23:00 – 3rd Brigade’s 11th Battalion opens fire indiscriminately in front of Gwangju Station, killing five civilians; 100,000+ demonstrators continue overnight battle on Geumnam-ro and Gwangju Station; more than fifty vehicles burned down on Geumnam-ro

23:20 – Second ROK Army hands down additional guidelines (prohibition of gunfire, cessation of ammunition distribution, preparations for replacement of paratroopers with 20th Division); orders for the blockade of roads leading out of Gwangju (to prevent the spread of demonstrations)

24:00 – 11th Brigade’s 61st and 62nd Battalions distribute fifteen live rounds to each company commander in front of Province Hall

4. Armed Protests and Victory

May 21 (Wednesday, weather clear): Indiscriminate fire at Province Hall, withdrawal of martial law troops

00:35 – Skirmish between 20,000+ demonstrators and martial law troops at Labor Supervision Office; skirmish involving three buses and 3,000+ demonstrators at main gates of Chosun University (ended 04:40)

01:30 – Arson of the KBS building, Gwangju Tax Office; newspaper publications halted

02:00 – 3rd Brigade withdraws from Gwangju Station, returns to Chonnam University; phone service to Gwangju cut

04:00 – Demonstrators march from Gwangju Station plaza to Geumnam-ro with two bodies on a pushcart

04:30 – Martial Law Command holds emergency meeting, considers invocation of right of self-defense

08:00 – Demonstrators seize fourteen command vehicles belonging to the 20th Division from the entrance to the Gwangju industrial area

09:00 – 20th Division (284 officers, 4,482 enlisted) arrives at Combat Arms Command at Sangmudae; demonstrators at Asia Motors factory seize four armored vehicles, fifty-six other vehicles (first wave)

09:50 – Citizen representatives (Jeon Ok-ju, Kim Beom-tae, etc.) attempt negotiations with Governor Jang Hyeong-tae (for withdrawal of paratroopers)

10:00 – Crowds of 40,000+ demonstrators gather outside Chonnam University main gates

10:30 – Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong delivers statement

11:00 – 11th Brigade’s 63rd Battalion provided live rounds outside Province Hall

12:00 – 3rd Brigade’s 13th Battalion opens fire on demonstrator vehicle at Sinan-dong Underpass

13:00 – Martial law troops open fire indiscriminately on crowds outside Province Hall (gunfire upon the playing of the national anthem; targeted fire continued until 17:00); demonstrators and onlookers fall to gunfire

13:20 – Demonstrators secure firearms for first time at Dasi, in Naju (weapons obtained from 14:00 onward at Naju, Bia, Yeonggwang, Yeongsanpo, Muan, Yeongam, Hwasun, Jangseong, etc.)

14:00 – Chun Doo-hwan, Chung Ho-yong, Hwang Young-si, Lee Hui-seong, Choo Young-bock and other leaders agree to station martial law forces around Gwangju perimeter, invocation of right of self-defense

14:15 – South Jeolla Province Governor attempts to persuade demonstrators to disband from police helicopter

14:40 – Demonstrators obtain dynamite from Jiwon-dong armory; obtain 1,108 carbine rifles and 17,760 rounds of ammunition at Hwasun Mining Station

15:15 – Martial Law Commander hands down orders (prevention of spread of demonstrations, consolidation of chain of command, separation of civilians from unsavory elements, defense of Gwangju Prison)

15:30 – Demonstrators transport weapons obtained at Naju, Hwasun, and other regions to Gwangju to fight in the streets

16:00 – Paratroopers ordered to withdraw from Province Hall, transfer of operational control (31st Division to Combat Arms Command)

16:35 – Minister of National Defense calls meeting, agrees to withdrawal of martial law troops to city perimeter and the invocation of the right of self-defense

17:00 – 7th and 11th Brigades withdraw from Province Hall to Chosun University; 3rd Brigade withdraws to Gwangju Prison

19:00 – Blockade of roads out of Gwangju complete (31st Division at Ochi; 3rd Brigade at Gwangju Prison; 7th and 11th Brigade at Junam Village; 20th Division at Geunglag Bridge, Baegun-dong, Gwangju tollgate, Gwangju Armed Forces Hospital)

19:30 – Martial Law Commander gives broadcast confirming invocation of right of self-defense for military (permission to fire at lower abdomen if approached)

20:00 – Demonstrators seize South Jeolla Province Hall

22:10 – Martial law troops clash with armed demonstrators near Hyocheon Station (more than two clashes until 04:00, more than ten presumed dead)

5. Liberation

May 22 (Thursday, weather clear): Blockade of Gwangju, formation of Settlement Committee

00:05 – Demonstrators expand to southwestern South Jeolla Province (Naju, Mokpo, Yeongam, Gangjin, Wando, Hampyeong, Yeonggwang, Muan); daily rallies at Mokpo Station, May 22–27

04:40 – Shootout between demonstrators and martial law troops near Gwangju Prison

08:00 – South Jeolla Province Vice-governor Jeong Si-chae and other Province Hall authorities discuss formation of Settlement Committee

10:20 – Newly incumbent Prime Minister Pak Choong-hoon visits Combat Arms Command

10:30 – Message from Martial Law Commander (addressed “to rioters”) scattered from helicopters over Gwangju

11:00 – Complete blockade of roads leading out of Gwangju; bolstered coastal security; blockade of expressways

11:25 – Red Cross blood donation truck drives around Gwangju to request donations

12:00 – Korean flag on Province Hall rooftop flown at half-mast alongside black ribbon

13:30 – Eight representatives of Citizen Settlement Committee (fifteen members) visit Jeolla Province branch of Martial Law Command at Sangmudae, deliver seven terms for negotiation

17:00 – Citizens’ Rally held outside Province Hall; Settlement Committee representatives present results of Sangmudae negotiations (citizens outraged, 56 bodies recovered); 20th Division 62nd Regiment 2nd Battalion conducts operation to seize Gwangju Armed Forces Hospital (8 civilians dead, 10 injured, 25 detained); 848 detained students released

18:00 – Student Settlement Committee formed (to maintain order, collect weapons, lead blood drives)

21:30 – Prime Minister Pak statement: “Gwangju in state of lawlessness, unsavory elements have opened fire on soldiers”

May 23 (Friday, weather clear with cloudy periods): Massacre of civilians, weapon collection, the Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy

08:00 – Student volunteers step forward to clean Geumnam-ro and area; businesses open doors

09:00 – Martial Law Commander considers Operation Sangmu Loyalty

10:00 – 50,000+ citizens gather at Province Hall plaza; 11th Brigade at Junam Village opens fire on van (first attack), 11 innocent civilians killed; Student Settlement Committee begins weapon collection efforts

11:48 – Guidelines for blockade defense handed down to 20th Division (absolute prevention of the escape of armed rioters, use of lethal force against resistance)

13:00 – Paratroopers stationed at Junam Village open fire on minibus (second attack), killing fifteen of eighteen passengers with two critically injured, one survivor; paratroopers kill injured in the hills behind Junam Village and bury them in unmarked graves

15:00 – The first Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy (150,000+ in attendance); warning messages from Martial Law Command scattered across Gwangju

16:00 – Martial law blockade units rotate stations (blockade of roads, troops on standby)

19:00 – 3rd Brigade stationed at Gwangju Prison opens fire on approaching resistance members (5+ times)

May 24 (Saturday, weather clear to rainy): Negotiations with Martial Law Command come to impasse

09:00 – Martial law forces reorganize unit stations (paratroopers moved to Gwangju Airfield in preparation for Operation Sangmu Loyalty)

09:20 – South Jeolla Province Martial Law Commander broadcasts order to “return weapons to the Gwangju Armed Forces Hospital or a nearby police station”

09:55 – Case of mistaken identity leads to skirmish between 31st Division (96th Regiment, 3rd Battalion) and Combat Arms Command Armor School on the expressway between Unam-dong and Duam-dong (three dead)

13:30 – 11th Brigade opens fire indiscriminately at reservoir by Wonje Village (two dead, including junior high school student Bang Gwang-beom)

13:55 – Case of mistaken identity leads to skirmish between 11th Brigade traveling to Gwangju Airfield and Combat Arms Command reserve training unit near Hyocheon Station (nine paratroopers dead, thirty-three critically injured, five vehicles including armored vehicles damaged); Songam Village residents murdered in retaliation (four dead, five critically injured)

14:50 – The second Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy (Province Hall plaza)

16:00 – Second ROK Army hands down command (mutual cooperation and prior notice for troop movement, prevention of nighttime movement)

20:30 – Explosives expert disarms detonators in Province Hall basement (May 24, 20:00–May 25, 13:00)

May 25 (Sunday, weather rainy): Establishment of the Uprising Leadership Team

04:00 – Martial Law Commander orders for preparations to begin Operation Sangmu Loyalty (plan for re-entry of troops into Gwangju)

08:00 – Poison Pin Incident at Province Hall; agents sent by martial law authorities attempt to undermine resistance

11:00 – Message from Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan and relief funds of KRW 10 million delivered to Gwangju

12:15 – Chun Doo-hwan and Singunbu determine timing for Operation Sangmu Loyalty (to be determined by commander on scene following 00:01, May 27)

15:00 – ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Young-si personally delivers orders for Operation Sangmu Loyalty at Combat Arms Command; the third Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy (50,000+ in attendance)

17:00 – First round of recruitment for young adult and student resistance members (70+ recruited)

18:10 – President Choi Kyu-hah visits Sangmudae, issues special statement

22:00 – Uprising Leadership Team forms Democratization Committee (chair: Kim Jong-bae; spokesperson: Yoon Sang-won; operations director: Park Nam-seon; vice-chair in charge of external affairs: Jeong Sang-yong; vice-chair in charge of internal affairs: Heo Gyu-jeong)

May 26 (Monday, weather rainy to clear): The ultimatum and the beginning of Operation Sangmu Loyalty

04:00 – Tanks deployed to city perimeter and Rural Development Center to pressure resistance

08:00 – March of Death (seventeen Settlement Committee members march from Province Hall to Hwajeong-dong in bid to stop martial law forces)

09:00 – Fourth and final round of negotiations between citizen representatives and martial law troops ends in failure (4.5 hours of negotiations involving Father Kim Seong-yong and ten others)

10:00 – The fourth Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy (30,000+ in attendance, statement titled “The Commitment of 800,000 Citizens for Democracy” adopted)

10:30 – Final meeting for the sweep of Gwangju at Combat Arms Command (including commanders of 20th Division; 31st Division; 3rd, 7th, and 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade; and superintendent of Combat Arms Command Infantry School)

12:00 – Archbishop Youn Kong-hi visits Jeolla Province branch of Martial Law Command, demands release of all detained persons

14:00 – Formation of Mobile Strike Force (Captain Yun Seok-ru, 70+ members)

15:00 – The fifth Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy (citizen action guidelines delivered, open denunciation of martial law troops); second round of recruitment for young adult and student resistance members (150+ recruited)

16:00 – Combat Arms Commander Soh Jun-yeol delivers official time of operation to paratrooper special forces teams at Gwangju Airfield

17:00 – Democratization Committee spokesperson Yoon Sang-won gives briefing on Gwangju situation to foreign press (requests meeting with US Ambassador to South Korea)

18:00 – Uprising Leadership Team holds final general meeting (Province Hall)

19:00 – Uprising Leadership Team announces impending attack by martial law troops (women and minors sent home)

19:00 – 270 foreigners residing in Gwangju assembled at Gwangju Airport and flown to Seoul

21:00 – Paratroopers deploy plainclothes soldiers into city for reconnaissance

24:00 – Democratization Committee makes phone call to Seoul Capitol (threatening self-destruction by explosives if martial law troops march on Province Hall); phone services in Gwangju cut directly after phone call

5. The Final Battle

May 27 (Tuesday, weather clear): Province Hall falls

01:30 – Paratrooper special forces teams deployed (3rd Brigade: Province Hall; 11th Brigade: Jeonil Building and YWCA; 7th Brigade: Gwangju Park)

02:00 – 20th Division deployed (102 officers, 3,030 enlisted)

03:50 – Final broadcast from Province Hall speakers by Park Yeong-sun “Fellow citizens of Gwangju, martial law troops are making their way into the city … Please remember us. We will fight to the end.”

04:00 – 3rd Brigade special forces team (thirteen officers, sixty-six enlisted; Battalion Commander Im Su-won, team leader Captain Pyeon) surrounds Province Hall, enters premises and opens fire indiscriminately

05:00 – Jeolla Province Martial Law Commander message delivered via KBS: “Rioters are hereby ordered to surrender. Province Hall and Gwangju Park are under military control. You are surrounded. Put down your weapons and surrender, and your lives will be spared.”

05:10 – 3rd Brigade seizure of Province Hall complete (armed helicopters flown overhead in display of force)

06:00 – Warning message is broadcast to citizens to remain indoors

07:00 – 3rd, 7th, and 11th Brigades hand over control of Province Hall to 20th Division and withdraw to Gwangju Airfield

07:30 – Fourteen tanks and armored vehicles from Combat Arms Command Armor School drive through streets in displays of force

08:50 – Phone services restored in Gwangju

09:00 – Police and civil servants ordered to return to posts via KBS broadcast

09:30 – 500+ civil servants return to work at South Jeolla Province Hall

10:00 – Minister of National Defense Choo Young-bock, ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Young-si visit Province Hall

*May 27 casualties: 27 citizens dead, 295 citizens detained, 2 soldiers dead, 12 soldiers injured

Appendix C

Publishing the Revised Edition:
The History of Recording the Uprising

First published in May 1985, Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age was the first of many books chronicling the Gwangju Uprising and the most widely known publication of its kind. The publication process was tumultuous; at several points it was nearly halted outright. However, the efforts and sacrifices of those involved finally led to the release of Beyond Death, which was first brought to the public in the format of a booklet.

The Gwangju White Papers: The First Underground Handouts to Discuss the Gwangju Uprising

Efforts to bring the truth of the Gwangju Uprising to light began in late 1980, before the aftershocks of the resistance had faded. One of those who led the charge was former Gwangju City Council member Cho Bong-hun, who was caught up in the Standards of Democratic Education incident and imprisoned. Immediately following his release in November 1980, he returned to his hometown and began to collect documents concerning the uprising and recorded the facts of the incident. In December, Cho called on an acquaintance from his imprisonment at Seongdong Prison in Seoul—Soh Jun-seop, a doctor of international relations, started his bachelor’s degree in 1978 at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)—to join his endeavor in Gwangju. At the time, Soh was wanted for his involvement in the 1980 student protests known as the “Springtime of Seoul.”

The May uprising had left the city in a state of fear. Cho and Soh’s work took place in secret at the former’s apartment in Sinan-dong, Gwangju. They undertook extensive research over the first seven months from November 1980 to May 1981, reaching out to witnesses through the clergy, churchgoers, and the families of the detained to gather as much information as possible. Their work gained momentum when the state of emergency martial law was lifted in March 1981 and a significant number of those detained for their involvement in the uprising were given special pardons in early April. The oral testimonies of those who fought on the frontlines proved invaluable to Cho and Soh’s work. With the assistance of Cho, a dozen resistance participants, including Shin Yeong-il, Noh Jun-hyeon, Kim Sang-jip, Park Mong-gu, Lee Hyeon-cheol, and Jeon Yong-ho gave eyewitness testimonies and firsthand accounts to Soh. Although Soh had not been in the city during the uprising, he used the collected testimony as a foundation to piece together the events that took place in Gwangju. He accessed court records and news articles to create a timeline of events, making sure to exclude testimonies that were too exaggerated or were not true to the facts.

The Gwangju White Papers was completed in early May 1981. The first draft spanned approximately 500 pages with 200 characters per page. The contents were as follows:

Chapter 1: The Beginning (May 18: Student Demonstrations)

Chapter 2: Transition to Popular Revolt (May 19: Citizen Participation)

Chapter 3: Transition to Armed Revolt (May 21)

Chapter 4: Provincial Expansion of Resistance (May 21: Province-Wide Expansion)

Chapter 5: City Takeover and Independent Organization (May 22–26)

Chapter 6: Violent Sweep by Martial Law Troops (May 27)

An excerpt from the article “The Torn Flag” was added to the back of the publication as an appendix. This was because Soh judged the work to be a vivid depiction of the events, but one that was too exaggerated to be part of the main book. Having finished the compilation, Soh traveled to Seoul with the timeline of the Gwangju Uprising and photocopies of some of the most critical documents.

The collection of information in Gwangju was put on hold in early July that year because of the Adeul Community incident. Jeong Cheol (Jeong Ui-haeng), chair of the Adeul Community (an activist group with roots in a high school literary club), had produced handouts calling for democratization and the publicization of the truth of the Gwangju Uprising since October 1980. On May 10, 1981, he produced thousands of handouts titled “The Truth Behind the Gwangju Uprising” and handed them out in residential areas across the city with fellow members with the hopes of starting a rally to commemorate the first anniversary of the uprising. Ten members were caught by intelligence agents and taken into custody, with Cho Bong-hun among them.

At the end of the year, Soh and his companions in Seoul set out to publicize the uprising to the rest of South Korea. In January 1982, he rented an apartment unit with Park Wu-seop (later chief of Nam-gu, Incheon) and worked with other wanted men like Min Jong-deok (later director of the Jeon Tae-il Commemoration Committee) and Lee Beom-yeong (later chair of the National Democracy Federation) to type out the Gwangju White Papers. They used a mimeograph to print approximately 120 copies of the resulting 42-page booklet on paper from a paper company based in Jung-gu, Seoul. To make it seem as though the pamphlets were produced in Gwangju, Soh took them to the city and posted them by registered mail to over twenty recipients (including Lee Chang-bok of Wonju [later National Assembly member]) under an assumed name. Other copies were left at locations that were unlikely to be discovered by authorities (National Council of Churches in Korea, other democratization organizations in Seoul, and humanities study group rooms at Seoul National University) but likely to be distributed to citizens. Soh subsequently burned his handwritten manuscript of the Gwangju White Papers to erase evidence of his involvement.

The booklet was the first structured record of the Gwangju Uprising, distributed at a time when many citizens doubted the facts presented by participants and were subjected to distortions of the truth. As such, it caused no small uproar among the people of Korea and played a key role in the intensification of democratization movements across the country in the 1980s. The pamphlet also provided the foundations of anti-US movements in Korea by presenting proof of the US role in the Gwangju massacre.

The Collection of Information for the Investigation of the Gwangju Uprising

Parallel to Cho and Soh’s efforts, Jeong Yong-hwa (later director of the Gwangju Democratization Movement Commemoration Committee) also worked to collect information concerning the Gwangju Uprising. He was arrested in 1978 for his involvement in the Standards of Democratic Education incident at Chonnam, which violated Emergency Measure 9. He was again arrested on suspicion of involvement in the Gwangju Uprising and was released on October 31 the same year with a stayed sentence. Immediately, Jeong tasked himself with the collection of information concerning the uprising. Prior to May, he had been the chief of the Modern Cultural Research Center (founded by Yoon Han Bong) and was also the president of the South Jeolla branch of the Council of Youth for Democracy. The Modern Cultural Research Center was a hub of local activism for young people, postsecondary students, blue-collar workers, and nongovernment political activists.

Kim Sang-yun’s Nokdu Bookstore also served as a similar hub. It was at this location that Kim Sang-jip kept a daily record of events during the Gwangju Uprising before he joined the resistance and fought at the YWCA. Kim’s original intent was to personally publish a collection of records based on his observations, but following his release, he learned that Jeong and Cho had already begun similar work and chose to join their efforts.

The documents collected by Jeong included personal written testimonies, journal entries, and memoirs, public statements, medical records, arraignments, verdicts, court records, and photographs. Approximately six apple crates’ worth of information had been compiled. Partial lists of the dead and detained were included, as well as “The Chun Doo-hwan Massacre Operation” by Kim Hyeon-jang and “The Torn Flag” by Kim Geon-nam (pen name Kim Mun). Kim Geon-nam was a Christian literary hopeful born in Muan, South Jeolla Province in 1946. His work, an emotionally charged firsthand account of the atrocities that took place in Gwangju, was published in booklet form by Nampung Publications in April 1989. Kim gave a reading of the work on June 3 at Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul, but recordings of second-hand readings distributed by nuns were found by authorities. The incident made headlines across the country on June 13.

Many played major roles in the information collection efforts. Clergy and religious contributors included Reverends Kang Sin-seok and Jeong Deung-ryong, Na Sang-gi (Christian Farmers’ Association), and Choi Cheol (YMCA). Information concerning the wounded and dead were provided by medical professionals including Jeong Hong-jun (doctor of internal medicine) and Yoon Jang-hyeon (doctor of optometry, later mayor of Gwangju). Kim Yang-rae (Catholic Council for Justice and Peace) collected information concerning the Catholic Church, Lee Seung-yong (vice-president of the Chonnam Student Council at the time of the uprising) information concerning the student council, and Hwang Il-bong (later chief of Nam-gu, Gwangju) information concerning the Yangseo Association book club members. Information about Deulbul Night School members who produced The Fighters’ Bulletin during the uprising was collected by Kim Seong-seop (blue-collar worker), as well as Yun Sun-ho, Jeon So-yeon, and Oh Gyeong-min. Members of the Songbaek Women’s Society, who provided assistance to the detained, also contributed to the efforts. Funds for photocopying, printing, and documentation were acquired personally by Cho Bong-hun through acquaintances and religious communities. Cho also received financial assistance for the photocopy and printing process from his friend Moon Guk-ju, a Gwangju native who worked at the Catholic Council for Justice and Peace in Seoul.

Work on Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age Begins

The release of Jeong Yong-hwa in late December 1982 led to the resumption of compilation work. When the Adeul Community incident was discovered by authorities in July 1981, he had taken all six boxes of documents he had collected and hidden them at the home of Park Yeong-gyu (then employed at the Gwangju branch of the National Tax Service), a classmate of Jeong Sang-yong who had been Jeong Yong-hwa’s senior at a high school club. Jeong Yong-hwa’s involvement in the aforementioned incident and Yoon Han Bong’s escape to the United States made him a wanted man. He spent a year and a half eluding authorities before he finally turned himself in at the end of December 1982, at which point he was released due to suspension of indictment. Jeong immediately confirmed that the documents he entrusted to Park were safe and began the publication process. By this point (December 25, 1992), Jeong Sang-yong and all the others imprisoned for their involvement in the Gwangju Uprising had been released.

The South Jeolla Council of Youth Activism for Democracy was launched on November 18, 1984. Jeong Sang-yong was named the chair, with Jeong Yong-hwa serving as vice-chair. The priority of the new council was the public disclosure of the truth behind the Gwangju Uprising. The documents collected and hidden by Jeong Yong-hwa would be used to secretly compile a record of the events that took place in May 1980. At the beginning of October 1984, Jeong Sang-yong asked Lee Jae-eui (later policy advisor for the Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Energy) to take on the task of bringing together the information in prose format. There were three reasons Jeong chose Lee, who was a returning third-year student at Chonnam National University’s Department of Economics. First, Lee had not been involved in any political incidents after his arrest and ten-month imprisonment in the direct aftermath of the Gwangju Uprising. Second, Lee had been in downtown Gwangju during the uprising and had personally witnessed the massacres perpetrated by martial law forces. Not only that, Lee had entered Province Hall immediately after the military pulled out of the city on May 21, which meant that he had a relatively clear grasp of the way events unfolded at Province Hall during the uprising. Third, Lee had gotten to know others imprisoned during the uprising during his term at Gwangju Prison and would have an easier time contacting them for research and information. The earlier failure of the Adeul Community incident taught Jeong, Jeong, and Lee to begin the project in utter secrecy.

Lee agreed to personally take charge of all aspects of the project related to writing. He organized a writing team and determined the content and direction of the book. The cost of research, business trips, printing and photocopying materials, and other activities necessary for the books would be covered by Jeong Yong-hwa. Lee, Jeong, and Jeong would confer together on the matter of publication once the writing process had been completed. Their goal was to release the books by May 1985, on the fifth anniversary of the uprising. The manuscript would have to be completed by the end of March, giving them a very limited timeline.

Seeking a writing partner, Lee reached out to his friend and high school classmate Cho Yang-hun (later president of Uri Plant Research Center), who had been caught up in the same incident as he had and imprisoned. They had been fellow members of RUSA book club at Chonnam University and could also call on junior members to contribute. Jeong Yong-hwa gathered all the documents he had hidden at Park Yeong-gyu’s home and handed them to Lee.

Clandestine Research

Over the course of several days, Lee and Cho sorted the documents and began the research process. The Gwangju White Papers, as the most structured record concerning the Gwangju Uprising, became their starting point. Circumstances had changed since 1981, when the Gwangju White Papers was written. By the end of 1984, all those incarcerated for their involvement in the uprising had been released, making it easier to draft a comprehensive picture of the events that had taken place in May 1980. Lee and Cho identified and reached out to more than forty major players, sorted by individual incidents. They also selected key figures from other areas, categorizing them by location of activity (Mokpo, Haenam, etc.) to interview them in secret.

The following people were interviewed: resistance leaders such as Uprising Leadership Team chair Kim Jong-bae (student at Chosun University), vice-chair Jeong Sang-yong (office worker), Heo Gyu-jeong (student at Chosun University), planning member Lee Yang-hyeon (labor activist), Yun Gang-ok (student at Chonnam University), general civil affairs chief Jeong Hae-jik (teacher), and Ahn Gil-jeong (student at Chonnam University) for information concerning the Uprising Leadership Team and the last stand at Province Hall; Jeong Dong-nyeon (student at Chonnam University) and Kim Sang-yun (Nokdu Bookstore), who were tried for their involvement in the uprising and the falsified Kim Dae-jung plot, for detailed information concerning the ways by which martial law authorities distorted the facts in order to connect the two incidents; chief of public relations Park Hyo-seon (teacher) and Chonnam students Kim Tae-jong and Kim Seon-chul, who served as emcees at the plaza rallies, for information about the Citizens’ Rallies; Jeon Yong-ho (student at Chonnam University) and Kim Seong-seop (blue-collar worker) for information concerning The Fighters’ Bulletin; and Uprising Leadership Team operations director Park Nam-seon (driver), mobile strike force captain Yun Seok-ru, mobile strike force member Kim Tae-chan, Kim Won-gap (vehicle scheduling, student preparing for university entrance exams), Wi Seong-sam (student at Chosun University), Na Myeong-gwan (blue-collar worker), and Kim Sang-jip (student at Chonnam University) for information concerning the resistance fighters. Lee and Cho also categorized each of the skirmishes by site: locations in Gwangju such as Hwajeong-dong, the Gwangju Prison area in Duam-dong, Jiwon-dong, Unam-dong, and Baegun-dong, and locations on the city outskirts that led out in the direction of Hampyeong, Damyang, Hwasun, Jangseong, and Naju. Because most of the content in the book that dealt with martial law troops’ earlier suppression tactics and the situation at Province Hall came almost entirely from Lee’s personal accounts, and because most of the objective facts had already been recorded in the Gwangju White Papers in clear order, the interviews were generally conducted for confirmation of known information. They split into teams for different regions: Mokpo (Go An-cheol, Choi Mun, Yang Ji-mun, Myeong Jae-yong), Yeosu and Suncheon (Kim Yeong-woo, Kim Chu-gwang), Naju (Yang Cheon-taek, Kim Gyu-sik, Choi Gwang-ryeol), Hwasun (Jang Du-seok, Jeong Gyu-cheol, Lee Seon, Shin Man-sik), Boseong (Yang Hae-su), Muan (Yun Geum-seok, Lee Beom-nam), Yeongam (Kim Jun-tae, Yu Ji-gwang), Haenam (Kim Deok-su, Min Chung-gi, Kim Seong-jong, Park Haeng-sam, Cho Gye-seok), Wando (Park Chung-ryeol, Kim Un-gi), Jeonju (Lee Sang-ho, Noh Dong-gil, Kim Jong-hun), Seoul (Kim Yeong-mo, Kim Pan-geum, Kim Hong-myeong, Im Sang-taek), and Chosun University (Kim Su-nam, Kwon Gwang-sik, Im Yeong-cheon). Women were also interviewed: Jeong Hyeon-ae (Nokdu Bookstore, teacher), Im Yeong-hui (Song-baek Women’s Society), Kim Jeong-hui (Gwangdae Theater Company), Jeong Hyang-ja, and Yun Cheong-ja (Young Christian Workers). They also spoke with a number of others connected to the Gwangju Uprising, including the injured, families of the dead, and clergy.

Government surveillance made it difficult to reach many of these individuals. Of those whom Lee and Cho were able to reach, many broke down sobbing partway through their testimony. Although there were some concerns about secrecy, no such issues arose from those who were interviewed. Both the interviewers and interview subjects shared the fervent desire to make the truth known to the world. In January 1985—following two months of interviews—Lee and Cho began work on the manuscript. Both newly married, they mostly took turns writing out of one of their homes in utter secrecy. Lee and Cho’s team slept during daylight hours and wrote overnight, hanging blankets from the windows to prevent people from noticing the lights turned on at night. Lee wrote the manuscript with pencil in a notebook while Cho drew maps of the conflicts between citizens and the military, sorted by date, and made a record of Gwangju Uprising-related organizations and their activities following May 1980. Choi Dong-sul and Sohn Hyeon typed out the manuscripts as soon as Lee handed it to them. They also organized the list of the dead and missing, which were scattered throughout their files, and added them to the appendices. Ten junior members of RUSA visited their workspaces often to do odd jobs, conduct quick interviews, and type out completed manuscripts. Choi Hyang-dong was in charge of revision and fact-checking in instances where contents of documents did not match the contents of relevant interviews. The exaggerated sections of “The Torn Flag” were fact-checked and removed entirely from the manuscript.

At the end of March, as the first draft neared completion, more than ten leaders from the uprising—including Jeong Sang-yong, Jeong Yong-hwa, Lee Yang-hyeon, Jeong Hae-jik, and Yun Gang-ok—discreetly gathered at an inn room to check and correct the manuscript. The manuscript was completed in early April, narrowly meeting their timeline for a fifth-anniversary publication.

Jeong Yong-hwa was given partial financial support for the information collection efforts by Reverend Kang Sin-seok of Gwangju Mujin Church. Several senior activists also provided funding for the book. Im Sang-taek (Seoul National University School of Commerce, Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development) gave half of the royalties from his book to support the publication team.

The Selection of a Publisher and an Author

Once the manuscript was ready, the team searched for someone to take on the nominal title of “author” and a publisher—knowing full well that the author and the publishing house’s leaders would likely be arrested. The team sought out several well-known individuals for their assistance but were met with reluctance. Finally, Jeon Gye-ryang—chair of the Association of the Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Activists—volunteered to take nominal responsibility for editing the publication. Jeon was the president of the South Jeolla Social Activism Association, a coalition of more than ten activist organizations based in the province including the South Jeolla Council of Youth Activism for Democracy, the Association of the Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Activists, the Association of Wounded 5.18 Democratization Activists, the Young Christian Workers, the Catholic Farmers’ Association, the Christian Farmers’ Association, the South Jeolla Coalition of the Gijang Youth League, the Ecumenical Youth Council in Gwangju, the Gwangju Christian Alliance of Laborers, and the Folk Culture Research Center. The book would be released by the publishing house Pulbit, which was headed by Na Byeong-sik—a graduate of Gwangju Jeil High School who was caught up in the National Youth and Student Alliance for Democracy Conspiracy in 1974 during his studies at Seoul National University and sentenced to death.

Finally, the team had to find a writer to take responsibility for the book. Democratization activists convened multiple times in Seoul and Gwangju to discuss the issue. The Seoul meetings were attended by Jeong Sang-yong, Moon Guk-ju, and Na Byeong-sik, and the Gwangju meetings by Jeong Yong-hwa, Lee Jae-eui, and Jeon Yong-ho. Participants suggested the novelist Hwang Sok-yong for the role. His name on the cover would have multiple positive implications: first, his status as an established writer would draw a significant number of readers, which would lead to the widespread proliferation of the truth concerning the Gwangju Uprising; second, Hwang was well-known internationally and could not be so easily taken by authorities. Third, Hwang could contribute to the book as an editor and polish the manuscript further.

The final meeting took place in mid-April 1985. It was attended by Kim Geun-tae (chair of the Youth Alliance for Democratization Activism, later minister of health and welfare), Shin Dong-su (Folk Culture Activism Alliance, later establishing member of Pulmuone), Chae Gwang-seok (Korean Democratic Unification Activism Union, literary critic), Na Byeong-sik (president of Pulbit), Jeong Sang-yong (chair of South Jeolla Council of Youth Activism for Democracy), and Hwang Sok-yong. At the meeting, Hwang agreed to take nominal responsibility for the book, joining Na Byeong-sik as the face of Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age.

In mid-April, Jeong Yong-hwa, Jeon Yong-ho, Lee Jae-eui, and Cho Yang-hun took a photocopy of the typed first-draft manuscript to Hwang’s home in Unam-dong, Gwangju. Lee and Cho requested polishing and revisions, but also requested that the content remain as untouched as possible (because the content had been meticulously checked against testimonies and documents) and that Hwang personally copy out the text onto manuscript paper himself so that in the case of investigation by authorities, the writers could point to Hwang as the author of the book. Hwang gave his immediate agreement and locked himself in a small inn next to the Pulbit office in Seoul for six weeks to complete his work. During this process, Hwang added an introduction to the book and added subheadings for ease of reading. The title Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age was taken from a line in the poet Moon Byung-ran’s “The Song of Revival.” Finally, the manuscript was published in booklet form on May 20, 1985, labeled, “Edited by the South Jeolla Social Activism Association, Written by Hwang Sok-yong.”

Confiscation and Arrest

Predictably, authorities immediately confiscated 20,000 copies of Beyond Death and took Hwang and Na into custody. At the same time, the first edition of the book—released in such a rush that the cover page was devoid of design work—entered circulation and was devoured by hungry readers. Although the book was sold in secret at bookstores near postsecondary schools and only publicized by word of mouth, it became an immediate bestseller. In the process, many bookstore owners were arrested by authorities and those who were caught in possession of the book during spot checks were taken to police stations to be interrogated.

Following his arrest, Na was put on trial and Hwang was released immediately following an investigation. Authorities had learned their lesson from the similar case of poet Kim Chi-ha that putting Hwang on trial would only serve to publicize the truth of the Gwangju Uprising further. Hwang was released on the condition that he leave South Korea. He was immediately flown to Berlin, where he attended a third-world writers’ event. Hwang went on to tour Europe, the United States, and Japan to meet overseas democratization activists and speak about the Gwangju Uprising. In 1989, Hwang visited North Korea on invitation from a literary group and, unable to return to South Korea, moved to Berlin as an invited author at the Berlin Academy of Arts. Upon his homecoming in April 1993, he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for his visit to North Korea, which was a violation of the National Security Act. He was given a special pardon and released in March 1998. His association with Beyond Death made him the target of many unwarranted accusations and slander from conservative media.

Translation into Japanese and English

In October 1985, Beyond Death was translated into Japanese and published under the title 光州5月民衆抗争の記録 (A record of the May Gwangju popular uprising), with a Japanese translation of the Korean title added as a subtitle. The translator was listed as the “Association for the Commemoration of Gwangju Martyrs,” and the publishing company was listed as the Japan Catholic Council for Justice and Peace, located in Tokyo. The English translation was published in the United States in 1999 under the title Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age by UCLA. The translators were Kap Su Seol and Nick Mamatas, with Lee Jae-eui listed as the author. As US copyright laws mandated that the book could only be published under the name of the original writer, a detailed explanation of the circumstances behind the initial publication was included in the introduction of the book. Essays concerning the incident were contributed by Bruce Cumings of the University of Chicago, one of the foremost international scholars of Korean studies, as well as journalist Tim Shorrock, who acquired and analyzed declassified US documents concerning US involvement in Gwangju. The English-language version was also well received by readers.

Beyond Death’s publication in 1985 was only the beginning of a turbulent journey. It was cited as strong circumstantial evidence during the National Assembly hearing on Gwangju and the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising trials. It was also one of the main sources cited on the Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission’s report on the Gwangju Uprising.

The election of a conservative president in 2008 signaled a change for the negative. Far-right agitators and the far-right internet community Ilbe, under the silent protection of the government, set out to distort and slander the truths of the Gwangju Uprising. They claimed that North Korean soldiers had made their way to Gwangju in May 1980 and accused masked resistance members of being North Korean special forces. The song “Marching for Our Beloved,” sung to commemorate the Gwangju Uprising, was forbidden at official ceremonies. Agitators accused Beyond Death of being ungrounded and copied from North Korean sources, even resorting to ad hominem attacks on the writers by accusing them of being North Korean agents. Even courts gave lukewarm responses to lawsuits against these agitators. The people of Gwangju were outraged. By the end of 2013, many were calling for a new edition of Beyond Death to teach new generations about the truth of the Gwangju Uprising and fight back against the conservative administration’s attempted distortion of history.

The Launch of the Publication Committee

In response to this call from Gwangju, a new publication committee for a revised edition of Beyond Death was formed in 2014 composed largely of those who participated in the publication of the first edition. A separate executive committee was formed for the hands-on work, with director Jeong Yong-hwa of the Gwangju Democratization Movement Commemoration Committee taking the leading role in the publication. The publication committee held a press conference in July 2014 to raise national awareness concerning the attempted distortions of history made by agitators and began a national fundraiser to cover the publication costs.

The revised edition was written by Hwang Sok-yong, Lee Jae-eui, and Jeon Yong-ho. Lee, who had written the first draft of the first edition, had entered journalism after the initial publication. Jeon had been on the production team for The Fighters’ Bulletin with Yoon Sang-won during the Gwangju Uprising. Many others contributed to the publication process. Cho Yang-hun, who drew the maps for the first edition, appended the original diagrams and added new maps for ease of understanding. Dr. Ahn Jong-cheol, who spearheaded the publication of the May 18 Gwangju Uprising Archival Collection and the UNESCO initiative, contributed to the “Work Left Undone” section of the revised book. As a former research chief at the May 18 Memorial Foundation, Dr. Ahn Gil-jeong offered invaluable advice and feedback on areas of contention that agitators targeted most. May 18 Democratization Movement Archive chief Kim Tae-jong, Dr. Park Byeong-gi, Jeong Hyeon-ae, and journalist Jeong Dae-ha of Hankyoreh also provided feedback on early drafts. Most of all, the book would not have been possible without the eager contributions of the May 18 Memorial Foundation (director: Cha Myeong-seok), the May 18 Democratization Movement Archive (director: Na Gan-chae), the Chonnam University May 18 Institute (director: Park Hae-gwang), and former Jonnam Meil daily photographer Na Gyeong-taek.

Where the first edition of Beyond Death was based entirely on the accounts and records of the victims—the people of Gwangju—the revised edition clarifies the historical and legal aspects of the uprising by including information concerning martial law forces’ military movements and the results of the Gwangju Uprising trials. The new edition also includes third-party observations from foreign journalists who personally bore witness to the uprising. These inclusions serve to bolster areas of the first edition that had been limited by the perspectives and information available to the original publication team. Another notable difference is that witnesses have been named, except in the cases of certain military witnesses: those who were lower ranked commanders (company commander/captain or lower) or enlisted men at the time. Battalion commanders whose culpability on the site was clear—even if they were not held legally responsible—have been named. Most of the documents collected for the first edition of Beyond Death were donated to the Chonnam University May 18 Institute. The first draft of Beyond Death, written by Lee Jae-eui in his notebooks, are held at the May 18 Democratization Movement archives.

The publication of Beyond Death thirty-two years ago represented the single-minded determination of its writers and the people of Gwangju to bring the truth of the uprising to the forefront. We, the publication committee, wholeheartedly reject any and all attempts to disparage the deaths and sacrifices of the people of Gwangju. There is no place for the glorification of individuals in this collective endeavor.

May 2017

Publication Committee Editorial Team

Kim Sang-jip, Kim Chang-jung, Park Si-yeong, Lee Jae-eui, Jeon Yong-ho, Jeong Sang-yong, Jeong Yong-hwa, Jeong Cheol (Jeong Ui-haeng), Cho Bong-hun, Cho Yang-hun, Choi Pyeong-ji

Figure 17.

Figure 18.

Notes

Preface

1. Editor’s note: In this book, Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age refers to the original Korean edition (Jugeumeul neomeo, sidaeui eodumeul neomeo), abridged and published in 1985. It was translated into English as Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age, published by UCLA in 1999.

1 From October to May

1. Seo Jung-seok, Jibaejaui gukga, minjungui nara: hangukgeunhyeondaesa 100-nyeonui jaejomyeong [The dictator’s nation, the people’s country: Re-examining 100 years of modern and contemporary Korean history] (Dolbege, 2010). The Yusin Constitution was a denial of democracy and democratic values, taking national sovereignty from the citizens and focusing power exclusively on the executive branch of the government. Under this constitution, the legislature (the National Assembly) and the judiciary were made largely subject to the presidential office.

2. Kim Jae-gyu, 1-shim beopjeong choehujinsul [Final testimony of first trial] (Republic of Korea Army Headquarters State of Emergency Martial Law Court-Martial, December 19, 1979); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 1, 393.

3. Lee Yun-seop, 1980-nyeon daehanminguk [The Republic of Korea in 1980] (ebookspub, 2012).

4. Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, s.v. “Kim Jae-gyu,” https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=553283&cid=46626&categoryId=46626. Kim Jae-gyu was tried by court-martial in 1980. Charged with “murder with intent to incite rebellion,” he was executed on May 24, 1980, at the Seoul Detention Center.

5. Gyeeompogoryeong je 3-ho [Third declaration of martial law] (October 30, 1979).

6. AFP, Tokyo Shimbun, November 4, 1979; Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (1997), 23.

7. Cho Dong-jun, “Migungmubu bimiloegyomunseo 1979–1980 cheoljeobunseok” [In-depth analysis of US Department of State’s 1979–1980 secret diplomacy documents], Monthly Chosun Magazine (August 1996). Even until the assassination of Park Chung-hee, US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea William Gleysteen judged that the Yusin regime still had the strength to sustain itself.

8. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 22.

9. Pak Tongjin, in Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995). “Following President Park’s Assassination, the US immediately deployed an aircraft carrier, positioned warning systems, and mobilized its forces. I don’t believe it would have been possible for North Korea to invade the South at the time because the US had given eight to nine stern warnings to ensure North Korea wouldn’t get any ideas. Another factor that would have deterred the North was the actions taken by the government in the immediate aftermath of the assassination, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested for the US to personally take necessary measures in Korea. US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea William Gleysteen visited President Choi Kyu-hah in the morning of the twenty-seventh, after all possibilities had been accounted for, in order to reassure him.”

10. In 1979, the United States had been rocked by three shocking anti-American incidents: the Iranian Revolution, the Nicaraguan Revolution, and the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan. The rapid US response to the Park assassination was due to the country’s justified fears of social unrest in South Korea. See Cho Dong-jun, “Migungmubu bimiloegyomunseo 1979–1980 cheoljeobunseok” [In-depth analysis], 340. According to a Carter-era State Department document recently released by WikiLeaks, the policymaking group was organized at the end of the Carter administration—before the Park assassination—to respond to potential three-party talks between South Korea, North Korea, and the United States. The sudden shift in the South Korean situation following the assassination led to the group being reassigned to the monitoring of the political situation in South Korea and the formulation of US responses to any changes in the former.

11. Sisa Press (March 7, 1996), 23. The name “Cherokee” originally refers to an indigenous people group in North America. The Cherokee Team exchanged confidential cables (Cherokee Files) labeled “NODIS” (no distribution outside of approved channels) with the US embassy in Seoul in real time and monitored the political and military situation in South Korea from the Park assassination to the start of the Chun Doo-hwan regime. The Cherokee Team consisted of ten key members of the US government: President Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie (succeeding Vance in early May 1980), Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Assistant Secretary of State of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, US National Security Council Asia Policy and Intelligence Matters Specialist Donald Gregg, and the US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea William Gleysteen. All policies related to South Korea were determined by this group and the information available to its members. Gleysteen gave detailed real-time reports on the South Korean situation as it unfolded, with the White House referencing his reports to share its assessment of the political circumstances in South Korea.

12. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 29. Park Chung-hee understood full well the threat of a military coup d’état, having taken power through one himself. For his own protection, he formed a group of loyalists in the military called the Hanahoe—an informal organization akin to a private army—and lavished members with great privileges. New members were chosen from cadets in excellent academic standing at the Korea Military Academy who were from the Yeongnam (Gyeongsang Provinces) region in the southeast with a demonstrated record of duty and loyalty. Three to ten members were chosen from each graduating class. By the time the thirty-sixth class had graduated, the Hanahoe boasted nearly 240 members. Yun Pil-Yong, Cha Gyu-heon, and Yu Hak-seong, all Yeongnam natives from the eighth graduating class, as well as Hwang Young-si from the tenth graduating class, were among those named political advisors who served as the bridge between the executive and legislative branches of the government. Defense Security Commander Chun Doo-hwan was the de facto leader of this organization.

13. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection, the May 17 military insurrection, and the Gwangju Uprising] (2007), 5. Jeong intended to reassign Chun to the seat of East Coast Security Commander alongside a reshuffling of the cabinet on December 13. The information was leaked to Chun’s cronies via Vice Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyu, leading Chun to plan his coup for the day before the planned reassignment—December 12.

14. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 41. Chun’s appointment to leadership at the Joint Investigation HQ on October 27 allowed him to seize political authority in the unexpected power vacuum.

15. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 19. Chun accused Jeong of implicitly inciting internal rebellion for his failure to take appropriate measures at the scene of Park’s assassination and of taking illicit funds from Kim Jae-gyu.

16. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 73.

17. Korean Veterans Association, 83.

18. Kim Yeong-jin, Chungjeongjakjeongwa Gwangju-hangjaeng [Operation Loyalty and the Gwangju Uprising] (Donggwangsa, 1989), 1:93. The deployment of the 9th Infantry Division, 30th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Armored Division during the December 12 military insurrection was not carried out with prior transfer of wartime operational control and was a violation of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States.

19. Banballanjoee daehan jeongui [Definition of “insurrection”], Military Criminal Act Article 5. According to the Military Criminal Act, insurrectionists are defined as “persons who rise up and take up arms.”

20. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 222. The court ruled that those complicit in the coup d’état, because they knew they would be punished for their military insurrection if they did not take seize full political control following their takeover of the military, intended from the start to take over the Blue House and that the December 12 military insurrection was the premeditated first step to the full coup d’état, which occurred on May 17 of the following year.

21. Chosun Ilbo, April 23, 1996. Operation K was hand-documented on eleven A4-sized papers (cover included). The “K” stood for “King,” alluding to the plot to make Chun Doo-hwan president.

22. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 222.

23. Cho Gab-je, “Gongsubudaeui Gwangju-satae” [The Airborne Special Forces Brigades’ Gwangju Uprising], Monthly Chosun Magazine (July 1988), 179. From the testimony of former Special Warfare Commander Jeong Byeong-ju.

24. Kim Jae-myeong, in Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995).

25. Hwang Young-si, in Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1996). Just before the Gwangju Uprising, Martial Law Command held a meeting where three sample batons were compared. One was chosen for mass production.

26. Associated Press, April 14, 1980.

27. Hankyoreh, February 12, 2015. The Sabuk Incident was a labor dispute that started on April 21, 1980, and lasted for four days. It began when 3,500 miners and 2,500 family members at the Sabuk Mining Station of the Dongwon consolidated coal mine in the town of Sabuk, Jeongseon County, Gangwon Province, demanded the resignation of the company-appointed labor union leader. The incident was treated as a riot for thirty-five years until courts declared the participants not guilty in a retrial, officially defining the incident as a democratization movement.

28. Yukjangmyeong 10-80-ho [ROK Army headquarters order 10-80], April 22, 1980. 1st ROK Army Commander Yun Seong-min reported the strategies and movements of one battalion under the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, as well as their firearms training, to ROK-US Combined Forces Commander John Wickham.

29. Park Gwan-hyun studied social sciences at Nokdu Bookstore and taught laborers at Deulbul Night School in Gwangju’s Gwangcheon-dong neighborhood alongside Park Gi-sun, Yoon Sang-won, and Kim Yeong-cheol.

30. The Chonnam Student Council’s clandestine planning team kept a record of their activities in a note with “自由” (freedom) written on the cover. During the Chun regime’s investigation of the Gwangju Uprising, the record was presented as evidence to argue that the uprising was a student-led coup.

31. Maeng Dae-hwan, “Yusinjeonggwon jeongmyeon bipanhan gyoyukjipyo sageoneun?” [What was the “Standards of Democratic Education” Incident that Directly Criticized the Yusin Regime?], Joongang Ilbo, February 5, 2013. On June 27, 1978, Professor Song Gisuk of the Department of Korean Literature at Chonnam National University was among eleven faculty members who publicly proclaimed the Standards of Democratic Education, a call for the democratization of education. Two days later on June 29, students rose up in a demonstration supporting the participating faculty.

32. Jeong Yong-hwa and Kim Sang-jip, in discussion with Lee Jae-eui, May 2015.

33. Ayatollah Khomeini led Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, toppling the US-backed absolutist regime of the Pahlavi dynasty. Anti-US sentiments spread like wildfire in Iran, leading to the Iran hostage crisis in November of the same year.

34. This perception of the United States was tested during the Gwangju Uprising by Gwangju representative Yoon Sang-won. On May 26, Yoon attempted to contact US Ambassador Gleysteen, hoping that the United States would clearly understand that the uprising was fighting not against the United States but the military dictatorship at the foreign press conference. He persistently attempted to reach US authorities, who were Gwangju’s only hope in its blockaded state. However, the US responded with disinterest. Yoon did not get the chance to speak with Gleysteen and was killed at Province Hall by paratroopers, who were acting outside US operational control.

35. The National Union for Democracy and Unification was launched on March 1, 1979, by nongovernment political activists. Kim Dae-jung—who had been given a stay of execution and released—Yun Posun, and Ham Seok-heon served as co-chairs. The organization was a successor and improvement upon the National Union for Democracy, which had survived as part of the Citizens’ Association for the Recovery of Democracy.

36. Supreme Court of South Korea, 12·12, 5·18-sanggosim seongo pangyeolmun [Supreme Court ruling on the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], April 17, 1997. South Korean courts ruled that the Singunbu’s National Crisis Countermeasure was clear proof of the premeditated nature of the military’s response to the Gwangju crisis, which was ruled a rebellion conducted by the Singunbu.

37. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 19. The original document detailing the National Crisis Countermeasure, composed by Kwon Jung-dal and the Defense Security Command advisors, has not been found.

38. Kwon Jung-dal, in Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1996).

39. Martial Law Command, “May 8, 1980,” Gyeeomilji [Martial law records]; Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 42.

40. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 43.

41. Tim Shorrock, “Migugui ‘Chun Doo-hwan gwollyeok chantal’ hyeopjo jeonmo 1” [The truth behind US cooperation in Chun’s insurrection], Sisa Journal (March 7, 1996).

42. Cho Dong-jun, “Migukmubu bimiloegyomunseo 1979–1980 cheoljeobunseok” [In-depth analysis], 373.

43. According to ROK-US Combined Forces Command’s chain of command, any movement of South Korean troops required prior approval or notification of approval from the ROK-US Combined Forces Commander. However, the Singunbu rallied soldiers without approval for the December 12 military insurrection, angering Commander John Wickham. Wickham later sent an official notice to the ROK Army outlining the latter’s violations of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea. After the incident, the Singunbu made sure to notify US forces of all South Korean military deployment plans in advance.

44. “Gwangju-satae dangsi juhanmigukdaesa ‘William Gleysteen’-ui jeungeon” [The testimony of William Gleysteen, US ambassador to South Korea during the Gwangju Uprising], Shindonga (July 1985), 318–22.

45. Tim Shorrock, “Kwangju Diary: The View from Washington,” in Lee Jae-eui, Kwangju Diary (UCLA, 1999), 160.

46. Shorrock, “Kwangju Diary,” 160–3.

47. “Article 26, United States Government Statement on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980,” quoted in Hae-chan Lee, Rhyu Si-min, et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember] (Dolbege, 2010), 185. This statement is the US administration’s official response to the questions sent by the South Korean National Assembly’s Special Truth Commission for the Gwangju Democratization Movement.

48. ROK Army Headquarters Intelligence Corps, “Bukgoenamchimseol bunseok” [Analysis of theory of North Korean invasion of South Korea] (May 10, 1980); Monthly Chosun Magazine supplement (January 1999), 339–42. If North Korea had intended to invade South Korea at the time, there would have been specific signs of battle preparation—which were not observed in early May 1980. Signs of preparation include the placement of ground forces at key access points, the movement of strategic forces such as tanks and mechanized units to the front lines, an increase in logistical support activities and communications, the deployment of submarines and guided missile patrol boats, and the operation of emergency landing strips.

49. Central Intelligence Agency, “Growing Unrest in South Korea and Prospects for Takeover by Military Strongman Chon Doo Hwan” (May 9, 1980), cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020024-8.pdf. On January 18, 2017, the CIA released over 12 million pages’ worth of declassified documents on its online reading room. The CIA judged at the time that it was the US Air Force and Navy that served as deterrents to North Korea rather than the US Army.

50. Seoul High Court, “12·12, 5·18-hangsosim seongo pangyeolmun” [Court ruling on December 12 military insurrection, Gwangju Uprising appeal case], December 16, 1996.

51. Ministry of National Defense, “Daeganjeon je 49-ho” [Counter–North Korean agent infiltration measure no. 46].

52. ROK Army Headquarters Strategy Education Corps, “Soyojinap gongjungjiwonbangbeopyeongu” [Research on riot suppression air support methods] (April 19, 1980); Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 44.

53. Lee Sang-han (Special Warfare Command Assistant Chief of Staff and colonel at the time of Gwangju Uprising), YouTube video, June 21, 2013, https://youtube.com/watch?v=cDoOX83Ixs8.

54. The withdrawal at Seoul Station led to the complete isolation of Gwangju from other regions when martial law was expanded nationwide on May 17.

55. ROK Army Special Warfare Command, “May 15,” Chungjeongbyeongnyeok chuldong mit Gwangju-satae sanghwangilji [Status record: Loyalty forces deployment and the Gwangju situation]; Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 61.

56. Lee Jae-eui, “5·18 dangsi balpo geobu jeonnamdogyeong gukjangui Gwangju-bimangnok” [The South Jeolla Province police commissioner who refused to open fire during the Gwangju Uprising: Memories of Gwangju], Mal (May 1994).

57. Defense Security Command, “Jeongun juyojihwigwan hoeuirok” [Meeting records of prominent military commanders]; Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 52, 103. Of the participants, only Logistics Base Commander Ahn Jong-hun voiced concerns about military intervention in the government. As a result, he was forcibly discharged on August 20, 1980.

58. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 229.

59. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok 229–30.

60. Lee Hui-seong and Kim Jae-myeong, in Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995).

61. Supreme Court of South Korea, 12·12, 5·18-sanggosim seongo pangyeolmun [Supreme Court ruling on the December 12 military insurrection]. The Supreme Court of South Korea ruled that the Singunbu’s decision to expand martial law at the cabinet meeting on May 17 was an act of rioting, as “armed military personnel” were illegally mustered to drive “cabinet members, who are a constitutionally installed national body, into fear and coercion.”

62. Heo Jang-hwan, “Naega Chung Ung jangguneul chepo·susahaetda—jeon Gwangju 505-boanbudae susagwanui pongno sugi” [I arrested and investigated General Chung Ung—Records of a former Gwangju 505th Security Unit investigator’s disclosures], Shindonga (January 1989). While being questioned as a witness by prosecutors in 1995, Seo Ui-nam denied most of Heo’s accusations. As the investigation at the time was focused on Chun and key members of the Singunbu, the investigation on those who carried out their orders, such as Seo, ended without being pursued further, leaving many unanswered questions.

63. Twelve people from Chonnam University, including Student Council President Park Gwan-hyun, and ten people from Chosun University, including Yu So-yeong, were targeted for preventative custody.

64. Defense Security Command, “Gwangju-satae hapdongsusa” [Joint investigation on the Gwangju Uprising] (1980), 546–55; Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 61. Those taken into preventative custody were Jeong Dong-nyeon, Park Seon-jeong, Yun Mok-hyeon, Kim Sang-yun, Park Hyeong-seon, Moon Deok-hui, Ha Tae-su, Kim Un-gi, Yu So-yeong, Yu Jae-do, Lee Gwon-seop, and Yang Hui-seung.

65. Seoul High Court, “12·12, 5·18-hangsosim seongo pangyeolmun” [Court ruling on December 12 military insurrection], December 16, 1996.

66. Kim Yeong-jin, Chungjeongjakjeongwa Gwangju-hangjaeng [Operation Loyalty], 1:201.

67. Heo Jang-hwan, “505-boanbudae Gwangju-satae cheori teungmyeongban susagwanui jeungeon” [Testimony from 505th Security Unit Gwangju Uprising team’s investigator], Hankyoreh Community, December 6, 1988, https://c.hani.co.kr/hantoma/1434931.

68. Lee Seung-ryong (male, born 1959), “Testimony 3004,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

69. Jin Ho-rim (male, born 1961), “Testimony 3017,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical].

70. Chonbuk National University Press (newspaper), September 7, 2013.

71. Shin Ae-deok (female, mother of Yu So-yeong), “Testimony 3111,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

72. Following the Gwangju Uprising, Yoon Han-bong became a wanted man. He stowed away to the United States in April 1981 on a cargo ship and only returned to Gwangju twelve years later on May 19, 1993.

73. Following the Gwangju Uprising, Park Gwan-hyun was arrested while on the run and incarcerated at Gwangju Penitentiary. He went on a hunger strike demanding improved conditions for prisoners and died behind bars in October 1982.

2 Sporadic and Passive Resistance

1. Gwangju Medical Association Gwangju Uprising Medical White Paper Publication Committee, ed., 5·18 uiryohwaldong [Medical activities during the Gwangju Uprising] (Gwangju Medical Association, 1996), 198.

2. Kwon Seung-man, in Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995), quoted in Cho Gab-je, Cho Gab-Jae-eui Gwangju-satae [Cho Gab-je’s Gwangju Incident] (Chogabjedotcom, 2013), 280.

3. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection, the May 17 military insurrection, and the Gwangju Uprising] (2007), 62. According to ROK Army HQ’s 1982 archive Gyeeomsa [History of martial law], the students involved in the first clash outside Chonnam University that sparked the Gwangju Uprising had “brought rocks in their bags.” Combat Arms Command’s 1981 document “Soyojinapgwa geu gyohun” [Riot suppression and lessons thereof] claims that the students “concealed rocks on their persons ahead of time and threw them at the soldiers.” Lieutenant Kwon of the 33rd Battalion of the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, who was stationed at Chonnam National University at the time, gave a similar testimony at the National Assembly’s Gwangju Hearing in 1988. Until 1995–1996, martial law authorities continued to insist that students had prepared rocks ahead of time to use in a violent clash. However, the Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission’s 2007 report clarified that no record of students bringing rocks ahead of time could be found in military reports from 1980, including operation records and situation reports. Military documents published after the Gwangju Uprising, including Gyeeomsa and “Soyojinapgwa geu gyohun,” were altered or embellished after the fact by the Chun regime and the Singunbu to suit their purposes.

4. Kim Han-jung (male, born 1960), “Testimony 1041,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

5. Beom Jin-yeom (male, born 1959), “Testimony 3035,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

6. Jang Cheon-su (male, born 1956), “Testimony 7063,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

7. Kwon Seung-man, in Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995); Cho Gab-je, Cho Gab-Jae-eui Gwangju-satae [Cho Gab-je’s Gwangju Incident], 281.

8. Combat Arms Command, “Jeongyosa Jakjeonsanghwangilji” [Combat Arms Command operation records] (1980).

9. Im Nak-pyeong (male, born 1958), “Testimony 3028,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

10. Song (commander, ROK Army 1st Aviation Brigade), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995). According to the Ministry of National Defense’s orders for fortification of counter–North Korean agent infiltration measures, Operation Loyalty—a riot suppression tactic—involved the deployment of aerial scouts who would report on the activities of rioters to ground forces, proactively neutralizing armed protesters for maximum efficiency.

11. Lee Gwang-ho (male, born 1959), “Testimony 1024,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

12. Kim Yeong-taek, 5-wol 18-il Gwangju [Gwangju, May 18] (Yeoksagonggan, 2010), 253.

13. Martial Law Command, “May 18, 1980,” Gyeeomilji [Martial law records]; ROK Army HQ Second ROK Army Martial Law Command, “May 18, 1980,” Gyeeomsanghwangilji [Martial law status records].

14. Kim Jun-bong (Second ROK Army Operations Officer), “Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo” [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995).

15. Defense Security Command, “May 18, 1980,” Gwangju-soyosatae jinhaengsanghwang [Gwangju riot situation report]; Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 63.

16. Chung Ung, “Testimony,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 5·18 Gwangju-minjuhwaundongjinsangjosateukbyeolwiwonhoe hoeuirok [May 18 Gwangju democratization movement truth investigation commission meeting records], vol. 21 (December 21, 1988).

17. Kim Il-ok, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo [Transcript of suspect examination at Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office] (1995).

18. Defense Security Command, “May 18, 1980,” Gwangju-satae irilsokbocheol [Gwangju situation daily news bulletin archive].

19. Kim Jeong-seop (male, born 1946), “Testimony 7061,”, in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip, [Complete collection of historical records], 199.

20. Kim Yeong-taek, “Testimony,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 5·18 Gwangju-minjuhwaundongjinsangjosateukbyeolwiwonhoe hoeuirok [May 18 Gwangju democratization movement], vol. 25 (January 26, 1989).

21. Cho Ah-ra (female, born 1912), “Testimony 1003,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

22. Gwangju City Hall, “5·18-satae sanghwang mit jochisahang” [Gwangju Uprising situation and responses] (1980). See Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 18, 1988.

23. Kim Beom-dong (male, born 1947, cook), “Testimony 3004,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

24. Lee Min-oh (male, born 1955), “Archive 1-326,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research], ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (1999).

25. Kim Hu-sik (male, born 1941, cook), “Testimony 3065,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

26. South Jeolla Province Police, “Jipdansatae balsaeng mit jochisanghwang” [Outbreak of and measures against large-scale unrest] (May 18, 1980); Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 66.

27. Cho Hun-cheol (born 1960), “Testimony 7077,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

28. Lee Geun-jae (born 1923), “Testimony 7087,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

29. Yu Seung-gyu (born 1959), “Testimony 1035,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

30. Hong Sun-hui (male, born 1960, postsecondary student), “Testimony 2008,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

31. Jeon Gye-ryang (born 1935), “Testimony 3072,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. Jeon Gye-ryang was the father of Jeon Yeong-jin (age 18), a third-year student at Gwangju Daedong High School. The younger Jeon was near the Labor Supervision Office on May 21 when martial law troops opened fire outside the South Jeolla Province Hall, where he was shot in the head with an M16 rifle and killed.

32. Defense Security Command 505th Security Unit, “Gwangju-satae samangja geomsigyeolgwa bogo” [Report on autopsy results of Gwangju incident fatalities] (1980); Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 70.

33. Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., “Gwangju-jigeom geomsijoseo” [Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office autopsy report], 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 20 (1999), 492–3.

34. Lee Jang-ui (male, born 1950), “Testimony 7056,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

35. Im Nak-pyeong (male, born 1958), “Testimony 3028,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

36. Combat Arms Command, “May 19, 1980,” Jeongyosa Jakjeonsaryeongilji [Combat Arms Command operation records]; Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 78.

37. South Jeolla Province Joint Investigation Team, “May 18, 1980,” Gwangju-sataesi jeongyosa jeongbocheo ilji [Combat Arms Command Bureau of Information operation records concerning the Gwangju incident]; Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 69.

38. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research, ed., “31-sadan jakjeonjisi-80-1” [31st Division Operation Order 80-1], Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records], 28.

39. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (1997), 505.

40. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 57–8.

41. Kim Yong-sam, “Gyeeomsaryeonggwan dongjeongilji” [Daily logs of the martial law commander], Monthly Chosun Magazine (September 1995), 629–31.

42. Cho Dong-jun, “Migungmubu bimiloegyomunseo 1979–1980 cheoljeobunseok” [In-depth analysis of US Department of State’s 1979–1980 secret diplomacy documents], Monthly Chosun Magazine, 378.

43. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 255.

44. Korean Veterans Association, 257–8.

45. Seoul District Court, 12·12, 5·18 1-sim seongo pangyeolmun [Court ruling on the first trial of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], August 26, 1996.

46. Chung Ung, “Testimony,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 5·18 Gwangju-minjuhwaundongjinsangjosateukbyeolwiwonhoe hoeuirok [May 18 Gwangju democratization movement], vol. 21.

47. Chung Ung, vol. 21.

48. Lee Gyeong-nam (Private First Class, 9th Field Battalion, 63rd Battalion, 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade), “Han teukjeonsa byeongsaga gyeokkeun Gwangju—20-nyeon manui gobaek” [One Special Forces soldier’s experiences at Gwangju—a 20-year belated confession], Dangdaebipyeong [Criticism of the times], Winter 1999.

3 Transition to an Active Offensive

1. Ahn Bu-ung, “Gukbangbugodeunggeomchalgwansil piuijasinmunjoseo (1-hoe)” [Transcript of suspect examination at Ministry of National Defense High Prosecutors Office (examination 1)] (1995), quoted in Monthly Chosun Magazine supplement (January 1999), 360.

2. Ahn Bu-ung, “Gukbangbugodeunggeomchalgwansil piuijasinmunjoseo (3-hoe)” [Transcript of suspect examination 3] (1995).

3. Combat Arms Command, “Soyojinapgwa geu gyohun” [Riot suppression and lessons thereof] (1981), 58, quoted in Lee Hae-chan et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember] (Dolbege, 2010), 263.

4. Yun Heung-jeong, “Testimony,” in National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 5·18 Gwangju-minjuhwaundongjinsangjosateukbyeolwiwonhoe hoeuirok [May 18 Gwangju democratization movement truth investigation commission meeting records], vol. 16 (December 7, 1988).

5. Kim Gyeol (male, born 1937, self-employed), “Testimony 4015,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

6. Ahn Bu-ung, “Gukbangbugodeunggeomchalgwansil piuijasinmunjoseo (4-hoe)” [Transcript of suspect examination 4] (1995), quoted in Monthly Chosun Magazine supplement (January 1999), 360.

7. The Recollections of Na (paratrooper, identified by family name only), “Naega bonaen ‘hwaryeohan hyuga’” [My “fascinating vacations”], in Jakjeonmyeongnyeong—hwaryeohan hyuga [Operation: Fascinating vacations], ed. Yun Jae-gol (Silcheon, 1987), 35.

8. Youn Kong-hi, “Gyohoega apeumeul hamkkehaeseo tteusi itjyo” [There is meaning in the church when it shares in the suffering], in Gusulsaengaesaro bon 5·18-ui gieokgwa yeoksa: cheonjugyo pyeon [The memories of the Gwangju Uprising, through the lens of oral accounts: The Catholic church], vol. 5, ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2013), 48.

9. Jeong Bang-nam (male, born 1961), “Testimony 7104,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

10. Kim Chung-geun, “Geumnam-ro Arirang” [The “Arirang” on Geumnam-ro], in Journalists Association of Korea, Mudeung Ilbo, and Citizens’ Solidarity Association, eds., 5·18 taeukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report] (Pulbit, 1997), 212.

11. Terry Anderson, “Naraoneun chongareul pihamyeo” [Ducking between flying bullets], in Journalists Association of Korea et al., eds., 5·18 taeukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], 24.

12. Supreme Court of South Korea, 12·12, 5·18-sanggosim seongo pangyeolmun [Supreme Court ruling on the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], April 17, 1997.

13. Kim Yeong-taek, 5-wol 18-il Gwangju [Gwangju, May 18] (Yeoksagonggan, 2010), 302. This police commander was stripped of his duties two months later on July 19, 1980.

14. Hwang Gang-ju (male, born 1960), “Testimony 7153,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

15. Kim Yeong-taek, 5-wol 18-il Gwangju [Gwangju, May 18], 295.

16. Ahn Bu-ung, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo (4-hoe) [Transcript of suspect examination 4].

17. Gwangju City Dong-gu District Office, “Sanghwangilji” [Situation record]. See 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, “Teukjeonsa jeontusangbo” [Special Forces combat report] (May 19, 1980).

18. Choi Chung-yong (male, born 1951), “Testimony 5040,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

19. Kim Sang-jip (male, born 1956), “Testimony 4011,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

20. Gwangju City Hall, “5·18-satae sanghwang mit jochisahang” [Gwangju Uprising situation and responses] (1980). See Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 18, 1988.

21. Kim In-yun (male, born 1960), “Peace Democratic Party Victim Statement no. 39,” Lee Hae-chan et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember], 250.

22. Ahn Bu-ung, “Gukbangbugodeunggeomchalgwansil piuijasinmunjoseo (1-hoe)” [Transcript of suspect examination 1], 360.

23. Jeong Yeong-dong (male, born 1954, driver), “Testimony 1022,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

24. (Censored section,) Dong-a Ilbo, May 22, 1980.

25. Due to multiple extenuating circumstances that made it difficult to confirm all accounts, the first edition of Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age (1985) erroneously reported that Kim Yeong-chan had died. According to Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records], which compiled the eyewitness accounts of over 500 people who participated in the Gwangju Uprising, Kim was immediately taken to a hospital and survived the gunshot wound.

26. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection, the May 17 military insurrection, and the Gwangju Uprising] (2007), 79. Martial Law Command published a report titled “Gogyosaeng chongsangja hwagin gyeolgwa” [Results of investigation into gunfire wounds sustained by high school students], in Chungjeongeommu iril juyosahang [Daily points of note in loyalty operations], which described Kim Yeong-chan’s injuries as “difficult to confirm as having been caused by firearms, as the exit wound is smaller than entry wound and a number of shrapnel fragments were found in Kim’s body.”

27. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 115. There are no records of gunfire on the May 19 records of the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade’s combat reports or the operations records of the 31st Division and Combat Arms Command. It is conjectured that the 11th chose to cover up the incident rather than report it to authorities. According to the May 20, 1980, 1:00 p.m. report on the instigators of the Gwangju Uprising that was submitted to Defense Security Command by the 505th Security Unit (Defense Security Command, “May 20, 1980,” Gwangju-satae irilsokbocheol [Gwangju situation daily news bulletin archive]), “Considering the complete absence of gunfire on May 19, the high school student in question was likely shot with a muffled handgun by certain rebellious elements among the rioters in an intelligent plot to incite the crowds into assuming that martial law troops had shot the student.”

28. Cho Chang-gu, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo [Transcript of suspect examination at Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office] (1995).

29. According to “5·18 gwallyeon sageon susagyeolgwa bogo” (Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office, Ministry of National Defense Prosecutors’ Office, July 18, 1995), “Although the majority of military personnel deny the use of bayonets in counterdemonstration operations, it has been confirmed that paratroopers were equipped with bayonet-affixed rifles and, while putting on shows of force during transport via truck, they were attacked by demonstrators who hurled rocks at them, to which they responded by disembarking to pursue and arrest demonstrators. There is a possibility that some demonstrators were injured by the bayonets during the process. Ha Heon-nam, Choi Seung-gi, Kim In-yun, Lee In-seon, and Choi Mi-ja were confirmed to have suffered puncture wounds during the incident. Puncture wounds were also found on the bodies of those killed during the Gwangju Uprising, including Son Ok-rye, Kwon Geun-rip, Yun Gye-won, Kim Pyeong-yong, Park Jong-gil, Min Byeong-ryeol, Heo Bong, and Kim Gyeong-hwan. Taking these facts into consideration, it can be acknowledged that regardless of the wishes of the commanders, paratroopers made use of bayonets during the process of putting down the demonstrations.”

30. “Gwangju-demosatae datsaejjae” [The fifth day of the Gwangju protests], Dong-a Ilbo, May 22, 1980.

31. Kim Chung-rip (Special Warfare Command Security Bureau Chief), “Chung Ho-yong teukjeonsaryeonggwaneun jihwigwon haengsa motaetda” [Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong could not exercise command], Ohmynews, May 17, 2010. Chung Ho-yong, who had at the time been the 50th Division Commander, heard about the December 12 military insurrection and rushed north to Seoul from Daegu on the morning of December 13. By then, the situation had already been resolved. Surprisingly, Chun Doo-hwan named him Special Warfare Commander that day. Because Chung was a close friend of both Chun and Roh Tae-woo, no one publicly voiced opposition. However, some members of the Singunbu who had risked their lives for the coup—especially Defense Security Command staff—viewed him as a freeloader. It is conjectured that Chung saw the incident in Gwangju as the perfect opportunity to regain his political foothold.

32. “12·12 mit 5·18 gwallyeon seohunja myeongdan” [List of persons awarded distinctions for involvement in the December 12 military insurrection and/or the Gwangju Uprising] (June 20, 1980), quoted in Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (1997), 543.

33. Mal (May 1988).

34. Yun Heung-jeong, “Testimony,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 5·18 Gwangju-minjuhwaundongjinsangjosateukbyeolwiwonhoe hoeuirok [May 18 Gwangju democratization movement], vol. 16.

35. Combat Arms Commander Yun Heung-jeong was a member of the Papyeong Yun clan, making him a relative of Archbishop Youn (Yun). Both had come from what is now North Korea and had enjoyed a close friendship following Yun’s assignment to Gwangju.

36. Jang Sa-bok (Combat Arms Command Chief of Staff), “Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo” [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995).

37. Chung Ung, “Testimony,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 5·18 Gwangju-minjuhwaundongjinsangjosateukbyeolwiwonhoe hoeuirok [May 18 Gwangju democratization movement], vol. 21 (December 21, 1988).

38. Chung Ung, “Chung Ung-ui ‘Gwangju-reul sson saramdeul’” [Chung Ung: The people who shot Gwangju] (transcript of the 16th main conference of the 142nd provisional session of the National Assembly), Kyunghyang Monthly (August 1988), 146–63.

39. Park Chan-hui, “Gwangju-sataewa Chung Ung sadanjang” [The Gwangju incident and Division Commander Chung Ung], Monthly Chosun Magazine (October 1987), 290–301.

40. Lee Hui-seong, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo (7-hoe) [Transcript of suspect examination 7] (1996).

41. Park (ROK Army HQ Personnel Corps Deputy Director, identified by family name only), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo [Transcript of suspect examination at Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office] (1995).

42. Defense Security Command, “May 19, 1980,” Gwangju-satae irilsokbocheol [Gwangju situation daily news bulletin archive], 11, quoted in Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 65.

43. In piecemeal deployment, units are deployed in smaller groups, starting with those that are prepared for deployment first. Successive units are sent out as soon as they are ready.

44. Combat Arms Command, Jeongyosa jakjeonsanghwangilji [Combat Arms Command operation records].

45. Lee Jae-woo (South Jeolla Province 505th Security Unit Commander), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo (2-hoe) [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement (examination 2)] (1995).

46. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, Ministry of National Defense Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation into Gwangju Uprising–related incidents] (July 18, 1995).

47. Lee Jeong-yung (male, born 1944, MD at Korean Armed Forces Hospital), “Testimony,” in 5·18-hangjaeng jeungeonjaryojip [Gwangju Uprising Testimony Collection], vol. 4, ed. Chonnam University May 18 Institute (Chonnam University, 2005).

48. Cho Gab-je, Cho Gab-Jae-eui Gwangju-satae [Cho Gab-je’s Gwangju Incident] (chogabjedotcom, 2013), 43–5.

49. Ministry of National Defense Bureau of Legal Affairs, “5·18-e bukangun teuksubudaega gaeipaetdaneun mo bangsongsaui bangsong naeyonggwa talbukja dance jujange daehan gunui ipjang” [The military’s position on the assertion by a broadcaster’s broadcast and North Korean defectors’ group that North Korean Special Forces were involved in the Gwangju Uprising] (October 2013).

50. Ahn Jong-ik, “Hanbando yusasi migi jeukgak chuldong—Hughes saryeonggwan balkyeo” [Commander Hughes: In case of war on Korean Peninsula, US aircrafts to be deployed immediately], Chosun Ilbo, May 19, 1980.

51. Tim Shorrock, “Migugui ‘Chun Doo-hwan gwollyeok chantal’ hyeopjo jeonmo 3” [The truth behind US cooperation in Chun Doo-hwan’s insurrection 3], Sisa Journal, March 21, 1996, 30.

52. Tim Shorrock, “Kwangju Diary: The View from Washington,” in Lee Jae-eui, Kwangju Diary (UCLA, 1999), 151–72.

53. “Article 26, United States Government Statement on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980,” quoted in “10.26-buteo Chun-ssi chwiimkkaji” [From the assassination of Park Chung-hee to Chun’s inauguration], Yonhap News Agency, February 28, 1996.

4 Full-Scale Popular Protest

1. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (1997), 266.

2. ROK Army HQ, Pokdongjinapjakjeon gyobeom [Fundamentals of riot suppression], quoted in Kim Yeong-taek, 5-wol 18-il Gwangju [Gwangju, May 18] (Yeoksagonggan, 2010), 319.

3. Chung Ung, “Testimony,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 5·18 Gwangju-minjuhwaundongjinsangjosateukbyeolwiwonhoe hoeuirok [May 18 Gwangju democratization movement truth investigation commission meeting records], vol. 21 (December 21, 1988).

4. Arnold A. Peterson, 5·18, Gwangju-satae, tr. Jeong Dong-seop (Pulbit, 1995). Originally published in English as 5·18, the Kwangju Incident (A. A. Peterson, 1990).

5. Kim Mal-ok (female, born 1958, wife of Kim An-bu), “Testimony 0040,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

6. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 267.

7. Defense Security Command, “Gwangju-soyosatae sanghwangilji jeonmun” [Full text of Gwangju riot situation records], 152, quoted in Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military Insurrection, the May 17 military insurrection, and the Gwangju Uprising] (2007), 78.

8. Kim Yeong-taek, 5-wol 18-il Gwangju [Gwangju, May 18] (Yeoksagonggan, 2010), 311–12.

9. Cho Pius, Sajeui jeungeon [A priest’s testimony] (Bitgoeul, 1994).

10. Seo Myeong-won (male, born 1939, Chonnam University Director of Student Affairs), “Testimony 3035,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

11. Kim Sou-hwan, “Testimony,” in Gusulsaengaesaro bon 5·18-ui gieokgwa yeoksa: cheonjugyo pyeon [The memories of the Gwangju Uprising, through the lens of oral accounts: The Catholic church], vol. 5, ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2013), 21.

12. Cho Sam-nam (father of the late Cho Gang-il), “Testimony 4018,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]; Im Ho-sang (male, born 1962, third-year student at Gwangju Soongil High School), “Testimony 4019,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. Cho Gang-il produced and distributed the newsletters alongside Lee Hong-jae (third-year student at Gwangju Jeil High School), Park Gyu-sang (third-year student at Gwangju Technical High School), Im Ho-sang (third-year student at Gwangju Soongil High School), and four students from Kumho Jungang Girls’ High School. Following the Gwangju Uprising, the military learned of the group’s activities during a search for firearms and took four of the students into custody. Those detained were subjected to brutal torture. Cho, who was the student council president at Gwangju Jinheung High School, was branded as the ringleader and tortured severely. He died of the aftereffects in 1986.

13. Chung Ung, “Chung Ung-ui ‘Gwangju-reul sson saramdeul’” [Chung Ung: The people who shot Gwangju] (transcript of the 16th main conference of the 142nd provisional session of the National Assembly), Kyunghyang Monthly (August 1988), 146–63.

14. Park Jong-gyu (Commander of 15th Battalion, 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo (3-hoe) [Transcript of suspect examination at Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office (examination 3)] (1995).

15. Shin Woo-sik (Commander of 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo (3-hoe) [Transcript of suspect examination 3]. From the May 21 (8:45 a.m.) Martial Law Command record (Kim Yong-sam, “Gyeeomsaryeonggwan dongjeongilji” [Daily logs of the martial law commander], Monthly Chosun Magazine (September 1995)) and his attendance at the Ministry of National Defense meeting at 2:00 p.m. that day (2nd ROK Army, “Gwangju-gwon chungjeongjakjeongan gun jisi mit jochisahang” [Military orders and measures for Operation Loyalty in the Gwangju region]), Chung Ho-yong is surmised to have been at Seoul on May 21.

16. Combat Arms Commander Yun Heung-jeong, Vice-commander Kim Gi-seok, and Combat Development Corps Commander Kim Sun-hyeon testified to the same at the National Assembly’s 1988 Gwangju hearing and at Prosecutors’ Office investigations.

17. Testimony of Baek Nam-i (Combat Arms Command operations officer), “5·18 jinsangeul kaenda” [Unearthing the truths behind the Gwangju Uprising], JoongAng Ilbo, May 15, 1993.

18. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 268.

19. Ahn Bu-ung (Commander of 61st Battalion, 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade), “Testimony,” in Gwangju-satae cheeomsugi [Firsthand accounts of the Gwangju Uprising], ROK Army Office of Military History Studies, ed. (1988).

20. Ahn Bu-ung, “Gukbangbugodeunggeomchalgwansil piuijasinmunjoseo (1-hoe)” [Transcript of suspect examination at Ministry of National Defense High Prosecutors Office (examination 1)] (1995), quoted in Monthly Chosun Magazine supplement (January 1999), 360, quoted in Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection] vol. 18 (1999), 67–8.

21. Kim Yeong-nam (born 1957, cook), “Testimony 3055,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

22. Im Jae-gu (born 1964, first-year student at Chosun University High School), “Testimony 3053,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

23. Ahn Bu-ung, “Gukbangbugodeunggeomchalgwansil piuijasinmunjoseo (1-hoe)” [Transcript of suspect examination 1], quoted in Monthly Chosun Magazine supplement, 370. Ahn’s testimony did not corroborate the events that took place on the evening of May 20. Four police officers were killed by a bus at Geumnam-ro, but at 9:20 p.m.—more than thirty to sixty minutes after the clash between the convoy and the paratroopers. Ahn may have not fully understood the circumstances, or he may have knowingly given such testimony in order to emphasize the desperation of the paratroopers.

24. Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 2 (1997), 25.

25. Park Dong-yeong and Lee Jeong-ae (parents of the late Park Gi-hyeon), “Testimony 7021,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

26. Bae Yong-ju (born 1964, bus driver), “Testimony 3056,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

27. Nam Dong-seong (South Jeolla Province Police 2nd Riot squad, second-year student at Daegu Kyungpook National University Department of Political Science and Diplomacy), “Testimony,” Cho Gab-je, Cho Gab-Jae-eui Gwangju-satae [Cho Gab-je’s Gwangju Incident] (chogabjedotcom, 2013), 94.

28. The arsonist and the cause of the fire remain unknown to this day, with opinions sharply divided on whether it was caused by demonstrators or by martial law troops.

29. (Censored section,) Dong-a Ilbo, May 22, 1980.

30. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 277.

31. The shots fired at Gwangju Station led to live rounds being distributed not only to the 3rd Brigade but also the 11th, which was stationed at Province Hall. The gunshots heard from the station led to “a wave of fear, out of which the company commanders of the 61st and 62nd Battalions requested the distribution of live rounds.” Battalion commanders “independently made the decision” to acquiesce. The rounds distributed by the 11th Brigade were the catalysts of the shootout that would take place at 1 p.m. on May 21 outside Province Hall.

32. Ahn Bu-ung, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo (4-hoe) [Transcript of suspect examination 4]; Cho Chang-gu (Commander of the 63rd Battalion, 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo (2-hoe) [Transcript of suspect examination 2].

33. For testimonies regarding the gunfire near the Gwangju Tax Office on the night of May 20 and early morning of May 21, see the testimony of Lee Ji-hyeong (Testimony 3066, “Testimony 3066,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]); the testimony of Moon Jang-woo (“Testimony 2025,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]); and the July 1985 edition of Monthly Chosun Magazine.

34. Ahn Bu-ung, “Testimony,” Gab-je Cho, Cho Gab-Jae-eui Gwangju-satae [Cho Gab-je’s Gwangju Incident], 98–100.

35. Nam Dong-seong (South Jeolla Province Police 2nd Riot squad, second-year student at Daegu Kyungpook National University Department of Political Science and Diplomacy), “Testimony,” Cho Gab-je, Cho Gab-Jae-eui Gwangju-satae [Cho Gab-je’s Gwangju Incident], 94.

36. The Recollections of Na (paratrooper, identified by family name only), “Naega bonaen ‘hwaryeohan hyuga’” [My “fascinating vacations”], in Jakjeonmyeongnyeong—hwaryeohan hyuga [Operation: Fascinating vacations], ed. Yun Jae-gol (Silcheon, 1987).

37. Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. Jeon Ok-ju (age 31, real name: Jeon Chun-sim) was born in Boseong. Her father was a police officer and town councilman during the Korean War. During the demonstrations in Gwangju, she met Cha Myeong-suk (age 19) and Kim Beom-tae, with whom she led the street broadcasts. Cha was originally from Changpyeong, Damyang County, and had been attending Yangjae Academy in Gwangju at the time. Kim (age 26) was a civil servant at the Goseo Town Office in Damyang County and a night school student at Chosun University’s College of Political Science and Law.

38. Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., “Haengjeonggigwan sojangmunseo jung Gwangju-satae pihaehyeonhwang gwallyeon munseo” [Administrative service documents pertaining to damage incurred during Gwangju Uprising], 5·18 gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochong seo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 11 (2000), 359. Official records state the following: “May 20, 21:30—1 amp, 2 microphones, 3 speakers stolen from Hagun-dong Neighborhood Center in Dong-gu, Gwangju.”

39. Kim Yeong-jin, Chungjeongjakjeongwa Gwangju-hangjaeng [Operation Loyalty and the Gwangju Uprising] (Donggwangsa, 1989), 1:219.

40. When the 3rd Brigade was routed at the Battle of Gwangju Station on the night of May 20, Martial Law Command called an emergency countermeasure meeting for 4:40 a.m. on May 21. Leaders agreed to switch from a strategy that focused on violent and proactive suppression measures to one that involved the invocation of the right of self-defense and the reassignment of troops to the city outskirts, and after May 23, the start of an operation to put down the “rioters” in the city.

41. The scale and intensity of the battle at Gwangju Station remained relatively unknown for some time because it took place at night. In 1995, prosecutors investigating the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising discovered Gwangju-satae cheeomsugi [Firsthand Accounts of the Gwangju Uprising], an educational text published by the ROK Army Office of Military History Studies and written by commanders who served during the uprising. This text shed new light on the battle and allowed for a clearer look at the events that took place.

42. At 7:00 a.m. on May 20, the 3rd Brigade disembarked at Gwangju Station rather than Songjeongni Station, which was also in the city, from where they headed to their camp at Chonnam University.

43. Korean Veterans Association, ed., “Jawigwon baldong ijeonui balpohaengwi naeyong” [Records of gunfire prior to invocation of right of self-defense], in 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 291.

44. Korean Veterans Association, “Jawigwon baldong ijeonui balpohaengwi naeyong” [Records of gunfire], 277.

45. Kim Gil-su (Commander of 16th Battalion, 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade), “Testimony,” in Gwangju-satae cheeomsugi [Firsthand accounts of the Gwangju Uprising].

46. Korean Veterans Association, “Jawigwon baldong ijeonui balpohaengwi naeyong” [Records of gunfire], 291.

47. Park Jong-gyu, “Testimony,” in Gwangju-satae cheeomsugi [Firsthand accounts of the Gwangju Uprising].

48. Kim Wan-bae (Commander of 12th Battalion, 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade), “Testimony,” in Gwangju-satae cheeomsugi [Firsthand accounts of the Gwangju Uprising].

49. Kim Yong-wan (born 1964, high school student), “Testimony 7062,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

50. Cho Ho-yeon, “’Gwangju-haksal’ hunjanggwa gongjeokseo” [Records of medals and distinctions from the Gwangju massacre], Kyunghyang Monthly (January 1989), 184. Sergeant First Class Jeong Gwan-cheol (age 26, 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade) was the first military casualty during the Gwangju Uprising. His cause of death was identified as trauma caused by femoral fracture.

51. Gukmin Sinmun, January 10, 1989. Immediately following the Gwangju Uprising, Lee Geum-yeong’s parents thought him dead and even put up a headstone with his name in a gravesite for the victims. However, Lee was later found to have survived.

52. Defense Security Command, “May 20, 1980, 22:27,” Gwangju-satae irilsokbocheol [Gwangju situation daily news bulletin archive], quoted in Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 80.

53. Private Lee (identified by family name only, stationed at 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade HQ), “Testimony,” in Kim Yeong-jin, Chungjeongjakjeongwa Gwangju-hangjaeng [Operation Loyalty and the Gwangju Uprising], 1:222.

54. Private Lee, “Testimony,” in Yeong-jin Kim, Chungjeongjakjeongwa Gwangju-hangjaeng [Operation Loyalty and the Gwangju Uprising], 1:222.

55. Seoul High Court, 12·12, 5·18-hangsosim seongo pangyeolmun [Court ruling on December 12 military insurrection, Gwangju Uprising appeal case], December 16, 1996. Courts officially recognized that shots were fired at Gwangju Station on the night of May 20, stating, “On the night of May 20, officers from the 12th and 15th Battalions of the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade responded to demonstrators’ vehicle assaults by opening fire, injuring numerous Gwangju citizens.”

56. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 81.

57. Tactical Report 444.

58. Kim Yeong-jin, “Jeongyosa jeontusangbo” [Combat Arms Command combat report], in Chungjeongjakjeongwa Gwangju-hangjaeng [Operation Loyalty and the Gwangju Uprising], 1:222.

59. Park Jong-gyu, “Testimony,” in Gwangju-satae cheeomsugi [Firsthand accounts of the Gwangju Uprising].

60. Defense Security Command, Gwangju-satae irilsokbocheol [Gwangju situation daily news bulletin archive], 170; Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 80.

61. Moon Jang-woo (born 1953), “Testimony 2025,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

62. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 90.

5 Armed Protests and Victory

1. “20-sadan chungjeongjakjeonsangbo” [The 20th Division’s Operation Loyalty], Shindonga (December 1988), 717.

2. Defense Security Command 505th Security Unit, “Gwangju-satae geomsi chamyeo gyeolgwa bogo” [Participation report on autopsy of Gwangju incident fatalities] (1980), 452; Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection, the May 17 military insurrection, and the Gwangju Uprising] (2007), 80. The victims discovered at Gwangju Station are assumed to be Kim Jae-hwa and Heo Bong. The cause of death for Kim (age 26, barber) was recorded as “penetration of left and right thorax by rifle.” KBS reporter Gu Yang-sul spotted someone bleed to death in front of Gwangju Station between 2:00–3:00 a.m. on May 21, who is conjectured to have been Heo. According to the autopsy observation report published by Defense Security Command’s 505th Security Unit, Heo’s cause of death was “laceration(s) to the right parietal bone with blunt weapon and puncture(s) to the left forehead with sharp object such as a bayonet.”

3. Jeon Ok-ju (born 1949), “Testimony 4014,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

4. Kim Hyeong-gon (commander of 2nd Battalion, 61st Regiment, 20th Division), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo [Transcript of suspect examination at Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office] (1995).

5. Kim Il-ok, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo (4-hoe) [Transcript of suspect examination at Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office (examination 4)] (1995).

6. Han Yong-won, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995).

7. Kim Jeong-gi (born 1961), “Testimony 2001,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

8. Testimonies of Kim Tae-heon, Lee Yong-il, Jeong Won-hun, Kang Gu-yeong, Noh Dong-gyu, Heo Oh-je, and Kim Baek-cheon, “Testimony 2001,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

9. Ahn Bu-ung, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo (4-hoe) [Transcript of suspect examination 4].

10. Jeon Ok-ju (born 1949), “Testimony 4014,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

11. Jang Hyeong-tae, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo (3-hoe) [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement (examination 3)] (1995). Governor Jang Hyeong-tae testified that although he had promised to convey the demonstrators’ demands for the withdrawal of troops by noon to the military, the withdrawal itself was beyond his authority, for which reason he did not make the promise for withdrawal.

12. Kim Gyeong-ae (female, born 1929, homemaker), “Testimony 3117,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

13. According to the “Gyeeomsaryeonggwan dongjeongilji” [Daily logs of the martial law commander], Monthly Chosun Magazine (September 1995), Lee is recorded to have visited Myeongdong Cathedral at 2:00 p.m. on May 22, departing fifty minutes later. Cardinal Kim, however, remembers the meeting as having taken place on the afternoon of May 21.

14. Kim Sou-hwan, “Testimony,” in Gusulsaengaesaro bon 5·18-ui gieokgwa yeoksa: cheonjugyo pyeon [The memories of the Gwangju Uprising, through the lens of oral accounts: The Catholic church], vol. 5, ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2013), 22–4.

15. Cho Chang-gu (commander of 63rd Battalion, 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo (2-hoe) [Transcript of suspect examination 2)].

16. Kim Yeong-taek, “Testimony,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 5·18 Gwangju-minjuhwaundongjinsangjosateukbyeolwiwonhoe hoeuirok [May 18 Gwangju democratization movement truth investigation commission meeting records], vol. 9 (January 26, 1989).

17. Kim Jae-myeong (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, ROK Army HQ), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995).

18. Na Gyeong-taek (Jeonnam Meil reporter), “Testimony,” Journalists Association of Korea Magazine, May 12, 2010. In March 2017, Na reconfirmed the situation in an interview with this writer at the May 18 Democratization Movement Archive.

19. Lee Gyeong-nam (Private First Class, 9th Field Battalion, 63rd Battalion, 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade), “Han teukjeonsa byeongsaga gyeokkeun Gwangju—20-nyeon manui gobaek” [One Special Forces soldier’s experiences at Gwangju—a 20-year belated confession], Dangdaebipyeong [Criticism of the times], Winter 1999. “The armored vehicle that crushed one of the paratroopers belonged to the military. Our battalion used it to open fire. I witnessed the scene clearly. When the people attempted to negotiate for the safety of their demonstration again and again only to be met with rejection, they charged on us with their vehicles. The armored vehicle was in such a rush to pull back that it ran over a fallen soldier and killed him on the spot. I still clearly remember how the soldier’s lower body was crushed under the caterpillar tracks. His upper body sprang upward and blood spewed from his mouth. He was a new enlistee who had not been in the special forces for very long.” Lee Hae-chan et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember] (Dolbege, 2010), 288. Some military records and martial law authorities claimed that Private Kwon was crushed to death by a civilian-driven armored vehicle. According to the Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission’s 2007 investigation, different sources have conflicting records of Kwon’s time of death, ranging from 12:55 p.m. to 2:05 p.m. Where records by groups near the incident such as the city of Gwangju, the Dong-gu District Office, and the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade’s 35th Battalion simply record Kwon’s death with no cause given, records by the ROK Army and Special Warfare Command intentionally distorted the truth by recording the cause of death as “crushed by protester-driven armored vehicle” and “shot to death by rioter handgun.” The armored vehicles brought from the Asia Motors factory by demonstrators were different from the models used by paratroopers. The former was intended mostly for personnel transport and had a pointed front bumper for use in the city with standard rubber tires similar to those used by civilian vehicles. This was the only model of armored vehicle produced at the factory at the time. The paratroopers’ model, however, was built for battlefields and ran on caterpillar tracks wrapped with chains, similar to tractors.

20. Kim Yeong-taek, 5-wol 18-il Gwangju [Gwangju, May 18] (Yeoksagonggan, 2010), 364.

21. Kim Yong-dae (male, born 1952, office worker), “Archive 1-248,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research], ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (1999).

22. Yang spoke to the writers of this book on October 14, 2017, and delivered a detailed account of the events that unfolded that day. He was the first to give firsthand testimony of being in one of the armored vehicles. At 11:00 a.m. on May 21, Yang happened to board an armored vehicle parked outside Gwangju Station out of curiosity. His vehicle charged toward the fountain outside the South Jeolla Province Hall three times that day. A total of nine people were aboard. The driver was a man in his early forties who personally put together armored vehicles at the Asia Motors factory. Because he was a veteran of the Vietnam War who knew the armored vehicle inside and out, and was an excellent driver, the other passengers followed his orders to the letter. Yang testified that his fellow passengers included a man from Busan who seemed to be in his late twenties, a second-year student at Chosun University’s College of Physical Education, three high school students from Gwangju Daedong and Gwangju Seoksan High Schools, including himself, and three other young adults whom he did not remember clearly. The man with the strong Busan accent agreed to take the driver’s seat in case the driver died in battle and was given the nickname of “Assistant Driver.” During the second charge on Province Hall, they were equipped with a light machine gun and carbine rifles that had been given to them by demonstrators at the Yu-dong three-way intersection. The Chosun University student took up the machine gun, with the rest of the passengers arming themselves with the rifles. Although they were showered with gunfire and the vehicle took some damage, the passengers and driver remained unharmed until they went their separate ways that night.

23. Gwak Hyeong-ryeol (born 1959, riot police), “Testimony 3013,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

24. Paratrooper commanders who attended the National Assembly’s Gwangju Hearing in 1988 firmly denied that snipers shot to kill or injure civilians, but most went back on their testimonies and admitted as such during prosecutor investigations in 1995.

25. Kim Yeong-taek, 5-wol 18-il Gwangju [Gwangju, May 18], 369.

26. Kim Yong-dae (male, born 1952, office worker), “Archive 1-248,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research].

27. Hwang Yeong-ju (male, born 1963, textile worker), “Archive 1-288,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ rral testimony research].

28. Jeong Seok-sim (female, mother of the late Lee Seong-ja), “Testimony 7024,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

29. Lee Dae-seong, “Testimony,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records], 63.

30. Han (Private, 62nd Battalion, 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, identified by family name only), “Testimony,” Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 89.

31. Special Warfare Command, Teukjeonbudaesa [Special warfare history] (1980), 343–63, quoted in Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 89.

32. Gwak Hyeong-ryeol (born 1959, riot police), “Testimony 3013,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

33. Son Nam-seung (born 1958), “Testimony 1046,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

34. Kim Yeong-taek, 5-wol 18-il Gwangju [Gwangju, May 18], 371.

35. Cha Yong-bong (born 1955, architect), “Testimony 2020,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

36. Jeong Hae-min (born 1958), “Testimony 1016,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

37. Ahn Bu-ung, “Testimony,” Cho Gab-je, Cho Gab-Jae-eui Gwangju-satae [Cho Gab-je’s Gwangju incident] (Chogabjedotcom, 2013), 114. Following an investigation of officers from the 61st and 62nd Battalions in 1995, prosecutors learned that a significant number of officers had not witnessed demonstrators equipped with firearms. Lieutenant Colonel Ahn Bu-ung went back on his previous testimony and claimed that in the confusion of the situation, where guns went off and vehicles were charging at the paratroopers, he had assumed without a second thought that the demonstrators had opened fire, which was the reason for his earlier testimony. He acknowledged that his testimony may not line up with the facts.

38. Ahn Bu-ung, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo (3-hoe) [Transcript of suspect examination 3].

39. Although the situation was clearly recorded by administrative institutions such as the Gwangju City Hall and the Dong-gu District Office, no such records can be found on the side of the military about who was responsible for opening fire. This absence raises doubts about the veracity of military records. The 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade had opened fire at Gwangju Station on the night of May 20 and the 11th Brigade had opened fire at 1:00 p.m. on the afternoon of May 21, killing dozens of Gwangju citizens and injuring many more. Yet there are practically no relevant records on the military side, showing the extent to which the Singunbu went to cover up the truth. During the 5th Republic of Korea (1981–1988), the Singunbu systematically erased and covered up all military records of paratroopers opening fire on civilians. Those who distort the truths of the Gwangju Uprising operate on the assumption that the tampered records are to be taken at face value.

40. Chung Ho-yong (Special Warfare commander), “Chung Ho-yong, Gwangju-satae chaegimeul balkida” [Chung Ho-yong discusses who is responsible for the Gwangju Incident], by Lee Tae-won, Kyunghyang Monthly, May 1989.

41. Kim Gi-seok, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement]. When discussing the orders to fire at the National Assembly’s Gwangju Hearing, Combat Arms Command Vice-commander Kim Gi-seok testified that “that commander” (referring to Chung Ho-yong) had come to Gwangju for the purpose of riot suppression and that authority to give orders to fire would naturally belong to the commander of the units that had been deployed, effectively pointing at Chung. Kim also testified that he “gave strict orders not to fire” and that this order remained in effect until the martial law commander invoked the right of self-defense at 23:30 on May 21.

42. Seoul High Court, 12·12, 5·18-hangsosim seongo pangyeolmun [Court ruling on December 12 military insurrection, Gwangju Uprising appeal case], December 16, 1996. The verdict of the December 16, 1996, appeal outlines two offenses: 1. military insurrection and 2. rebellion. Specifically, on the crime of rebellion, the court ruled that in the use of force against constituent powers, “the act of deploying Airborne Special Forces Brigades to violently dissolve protests by the people of Gwangju—who demonstrated firmly against the nationwide expansion of martial law, the sealing off of the National Assembly, the prevention of political activity, and the detention of popular politicians—constitutes a subversion of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea.” The Supreme Court declared in its final verdict (12·12, 5·18-sanggosim seongo pangyeolmun [Supreme Court ruling on the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], April 17, 1997) that “Although the actions taken by the people of Gwangju were, rather than subversive to the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, wholly justified in the interests of protecting the constitutional order against the defendants’ nationwide expansion of martial law at 24:00, May 17, 1980, and the defendants’ abuse of power against constitutionally instituted positions such as the president and members of the National Assembly, the defendants suppressed the people of Gwangju with violence and force, and if in the process the defendants terrorized the people of Gwangju by threatening even greater harm than to the president and members of the National Assembly, the suppression of the demonstrations in Gwangju as dealt with in this case is a subversion of the National Constitution of the Republic of Korea and a direct method by which the defendants sought to subvert the constitution.”

43. Gyeeomhullyeong je 11-ho [Martial law directive 11] (May 22, 1980). The right of self-defense is defined as “the right to exercise force in a case where the use of force is absolutely necessary to the urgent elimination of threatening element(s) that threaten(s) national security or the lives and property of citizens.”

44. Second ROK Army Operational Command “Gwangju-gwon chungjeongjakjeongan gun jisi mit jochisahang” [Military orders and measures for Operation Loyalty in the Gwangju region] (1980). According to testimony by Yun Heung-jeong, commanders on the ground including Choi Se-chang attempted to cover up the shots fired at Gwangju Station, claiming that they were blanks. For this reason, Yun did not know the truth of what happened on the scene or the scale of gunfire. The orders forbidding gunfire that night were not from Combat Arms Command but Second ROK Army Operational Command.

45. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, Ministry of National Defense Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation into Gwangju Uprising–related incidents] (July 18, 1995), 36; “Jawigwon baldong boansa judo … ‘12·12’ ‘5·18’ 7-cha gongpan” [Defense security command ordered invocation of right of self-defense … 7th trial of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], Hankook Ilbo, May 7, 1996. Meeting participants included ROK Army Chief of Staff Lee Hui-seong, ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Yeong-si, Martial Law Command Vice Chief of Staff Na Dong-won, ROK Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Kim Jae-myeong, and Martial Law Bureau Chief Kim Eul-gon (Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 83). ROK Army Vice Chief of Staff Hwang Yeong-si brought up the right of self-defense at the meeting. Defense Security Commander Chun Doo-hwan had demanded Hwang invoke the right of self-defense at the meeting to justify the gunfire outside Gwangju Station after the fact and suppress the demonstrations urgently.

46. Combat Arms Command, “Soyojinapgwa geu gyohun” [Riot suppression and lessons thereof] (1981), 61–2, quoted in Kim Yeong-jin, Chungjeongjakjeongwa Gwangju-hangjaeng [Operation Loyalty and the Gwangju Uprising] (Donggwangsa, 1989), 1:224. At noon on May 21, the Martial Law Command countermeasures meeting came to an agreement on four items: the relocation of martial law troops from downtown Gwangju to the outskirts of the city, the invocation of the right of self-defense, the deployment of an additional regiment, and the implementation of the operation to sweep the city and crush the rioters, the orders for which would be handed down after May 23.

47. Lee Hui-seong’s response to prosecutorial examination during the 7th trial of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising at Criminal Settlement Court 30 at the Seoul District Court, “Jawigwon baldong boansa judo… ’12·12’ ‘5·18’7-cha gongpan” [Defense security command ordered invocation]. When asked by prosecutors, “Is it true that following the decisions to relocate martial law troops from downtown Gwangju to the outskirts of the city, deploy an additional regiment to the area, and implement the counter-riot operation upon orders after May 23, and the invocation of the right of self-defense at the Martial Law Command countermeasures meeting at 9 a.m. on May 21 that you hosted, you, as the martial law commander, clarified at 10:49 a.m. that martial law troops indeed possessed the right of self-defense?” Lee replied, “Yes.”

48. Second ROK Army Operational Command, “Gwangju-gwon chungjeongjakjeongan gun jisi mit jochisahang” [Military orders and measures], quoted in Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 83. While Second ROK Army Commander Jin Jong-chae proposed the invocation of the right of self-defense, 31st Division Commander Chung Ung had proposed to Martial Law Command via Combat Arms Command that a political solution be employed, as the demonstrations were political in nature. Chung’s proposal, however, was not accepted. (Seoul District Court, 12·12, 5·18 1-sim seongo pangyeolmun [Court ruling on the first trial of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], August 26, 1996.)

49. Second ROK Army Operational Command “Gwangju-gwon chungjeongjakjeongan gun jisi mit jochisahang” [Military orders and measures]. (The entire record can be found in Defense Security Command. ed., Je 5-gonghwaguk jeonsa [History of the 5th Republic of Korea], (1982), 4:1653–54.) A handwritten note was added to this record: “His Excellency Chun: Emphasis on the invocation of the right of self-defense in accordance with Military Service Regulations, where it may be invoked by sentries facing displays of unrest.” The meeting was attended by Minister of National Defense Choo Young-bock, ROK Army Chief of Staff Lee Hui-seong, Second ROK Army Commander Jin Jong-chae, Joint Investigation Chief Chun Doo-hwan, Capital Garrison Commander Roh Tae-woo, Special Warfare Commander Chung Ho-yong, and Korea Military Academy Superintendent Cha Gyu-heon. The meeting took place in the office of the Minister of National Defense. Although the specific time was not recorded, that the note was written next to “Additional operation instructions on May 20, 23:20” (Tactical Report 444) and before the records concerning the activities of Second ROK Army Commander Jin Jong-chae for May 21 seems to imply that it was written in the morning of May 21 (or earlier). This record does not state the time when Jin invoked the right of self-defense and makes it seem as though the decision was made after 2:30 p.m. that day at the office of the Minister of National Defense. The time may have been intentionally removed from the record in order to cover up the military’s culpability for the shootings at Gwangju Station and the Province Hall or altered after the fact to seem as though the right was invoked after 2:30 p.m. as a response to the demonstrators arming themselves. At the first trial for the Gwangju Uprising, the court judged that the agreement to invoke the right of self-defense at the 4:30 a.m. meeting on May 21 had been forced by Chun through his proxy Hwang Young-si (“Jawigwon baldong boansa judo … ’12·12’ ‘5·18’ 7-cha gongpan” [Defense security command ordered invocation]). That the decision to invoke the right of self-defense was made in the morning is confirmed by the testimony of Lee Hui-seong.

50. Seoul District Court, 12·12, 5·18 1-sim seongo pangyeolmun [Court ruling on the first trial]. For the 4:35 p.m. meeting, Defense Security Bureau Chief Jeong Do-yeong attended in place of Defense Security Commander Chun.

51. “Gyeeomsaryeonggwan gyeonggomun” [Martial law commander’s warning], in Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (1997), 286.

52. Seoul District Court, 12·12, 5·18 1-sim seongo pangyeolmun [Court ruling on the first trial].

53. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 289.

54. Testimony of Baek Nam-i (Combat Arms Command operations officer), “5·18 jinsangeul kaenda” [Unearthing the truths behind the Gwangju Uprising], JoongAng Ilbo, May 15, 1993.

55. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 272–74.

56. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 101.

57. Kim Jong-bae (male, born 1954), “Testimony 1014,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. Following the withdrawal of martial law troops, Kim Jong-bae went to the South Jeolla Province Hall and served as a representative of the democratization committee, becoming one of the faces of the resistance forces alongside Yoon Sang-won. Kim and Yoon did not know each other prior to the Gwangju Uprising. Kim remained in the Province Hall building until the final stand on May 27 and was arrested while resisting the martial law troops. He was court-martialed and sentenced to death.

58. Kim Jun-bong (male, born 1959), “Testimony 1020,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. Following the withdrawal of martial law troops, Kim Jun-bong went to the South Jeolla Province Hall and served as head of the investigation department, becoming one of the resistance leaders alongside Kim Jong-bae. Kim Jun-bong, too, did not know any of the resistance leaders prior to the Gwangju Uprising. He remained at Province Hall on the morning of May 27 and was arrested during the final stand.

59. Lee Gwang-yeong (male, born 1953, Buddhist monk), “Testimony 5043,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

60. Association of Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Democratization Activists, ed., “Yeol yeodeol sal kkotdaun Geum-hui-ui jugeum” [The untimely death of 18-year-old Geum-hui], Geuhae owol naneun salgo sipeotda [That May, I wanted to live], vol. 1 (2005), 147.

61. Cho Pius, “Jugeumui pineun heotdoeji aneul geosida” [The blood of the dead will not be for naught], in Gusulsaengaesaro bon 5·18-ui gieokgwa yeoksa: Cheonjugyo pyeon [The memories of the Gwangju Uprising, through the lens of oral accounts: The Catholic church], vol. 5, ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2013), 105. At the 1988 National Assembly Gwangju Hearing, Cho Pius openly testified to witnessing the military helicopter open fire. Following his testimony, he received threats and attempts at intimidation. ROK Army HQ and the Democratic Justice Party (headed by Chun’s successor Roh Tae-woo) accused him of perjury. Cho responded that his accusers refused to acknowledge the facts because the use of cutting-edge helicopter-mounted weaponry on unarmed civilians was a dishonorable act.

62. Arnold A. Peterson, 5·18, Gwangju-satae [5·18, the Kwangju Incident], tr. Jeong Dong-seop (Pulbit, 1995). Reverend Peterson testified that of all the incidents he witnessed over the course of the ten-day uprising, nothing could match the cruelty of soldiers opening fire on civilians from the helicopter. Military experts claimed that the lights on the bottom on the helicopter in Peterson’s picture was not the flash of gunfire, but rather the anti-collision lights installed in the same position.

63. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, Ministry of National Defense Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation]. In June 1995, the Catholic Archdiocese of Gwangju’s Justice and Peace Council submitted to the Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office the accounts of eleven people who testified to witnessing a helicopter open fire on civilians that day. Earlier public testimonies about the helicopter from four people, including Heo Chun-seop (age 23, witnessed on Geumnam-ro), who either saw the helicopter open fire or heard the sound of gunshots, can be found in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

64. Kukmin Ilbo, January 13, 2017. In 2016, traces of more than fifty gunshots were found in the walls, pillars, and floors of the 10th floor of the Jeonil Building, which stands in front of the former South Jeolla Province Hall. The National Forensic Service stated, “Over 180 gunshot marks were found in the outer walls and interior of the Jeonil Building on Geumnam-ro, strongly suggesting that a helicopter had opened fire on the building while hovering, only changing altitude” in an official report; Jeong Dae-ha, “5·18 jinapgun ‘helgi gichongsosa chujeong tanpi’ cheot balgyeon” [First discovery of casing potentially fired from helicopter used by the military during Gwangju Uprising], Hankyoreh, February 16, 2017. Three 20-milimeter casings estimated to be from an M61 Vulcan or an M197 cannon were found at Handujae, past Hyocheon Station and toward Naju on the outskirts of Gwangju. This discovery roused suspicions of helicopter strafing with a machine gun.

65. Association of Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Democratization Activists, ed., “Malgeun owol, pureun sipdaeui jugeum” [The death of a teenager on a clear May day], in Geuhae owol naneun salgo sipeotda [That May, I wanted to live]. Jeon’s cause of death was officially identified as a gunshot wound to the right side of the head.

66. Lee Gwang-yeong (male, born 1953, Buddhist monk), “Testimony 5043,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. The gunshot wound Lee received left him paraplegic and in constant pain that led to several suicide attempts.

67. Kim Gwang-yeong (male, born 1951, Dong-gu District Office caretaker), “Testimony 3083,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

68. Bosung Construction was the workplace of Jeong Sang-yong, who would become the Uprising Leadership Team’s vice chief of external affairs.

69. Lee Yang-hyeon and Jeong Sang-yong stayed in hiding in Hampyeong until they received word the following day that the paratroopers had pulled out of Gwangju. They immediately snuck through the heavily guarded military blockade around the city and reunited with Yoon Sang-won and other activists, working to establish the uprising leadership council.

70. From that point forward, Jeong Hyeon-ae worked with the families of the detained, laborers who studied at Deulbul Night School and women’s rights activists at the YWCA to prepare for a citizens’ rally, publish newsletters, and provide catering to demonstrators, among other important supportive initiatives. She was taken into custody on the morning of May 27 at Nokdu Bookstore.

71. Moon Jang-woo (born 1953), “Testimony 2025,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

72. Park Nam-seon, Owol geunal [That day in May] (Saemmul, 1988), 154.

73. More than fifty-four civilians were killed when the military opened fire indiscriminately in front of Province Hall at 1:00 p.m. on May 21. In contrast, not a single paratrooper was killed on Geumnam-ro by resistance gunfire.

74. Jeong Yeong-dong (male, born 1954, driver), “Testimony 1022,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

75. Im Chun-sik (born 1952), “Testimony 3082,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

76. Kim Tae-hon (born 1961), “Testimony 3035,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

77. The first edition of Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age (1985) states that after being installed on the twelfth-floor rooftop of Chonnam University Medical School by the resistance, the light machine guns were fired at Province Hall. However, following the publication of the book, Dong-a Ilbo reporter Kim Yeong-taek cast doubt on the record that the light machine guns were fired. Kim had been inside Province Hall from the morning of May 21 to cover the situation until the withdrawal of martial law troops and claims that “the Province Hall building was not assaulted by machine gun fire.” He is supported by the testimonies of other journalists who were on the scene at the time, including Lee Sang-mun of the Hankook Ilbo, Hwang Yeong-cheol of the JoongAng Ilbo, and President Ma Sam-yeol of Jeonil Broadcasting, which claim that although the light machine guns were installed, they were not fired.

78. Jeong Yeong-jin, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo [Transcript of suspect examination] (1995); Kim Sun-hyeon (combat development corps chief, Combat Arms Command), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement]. A similar situation was described in testimonies given during the 1995 investigation of the Gwangju Uprising by the Prosecutors’ Office. At 3:00 p.m., Combat Arms Command Headquarters had made plans to pull paratroopers out of the downtown core to the outskirts of the city, replacing them with the 1st Battalion of the 61st Regiment of the 61st Division. This was to pacify the citizens, who showed extreme hostility to paratroopers. However, the crowds gathered around Province Hall made it impossible for the 61st Regiment to reach the building from Sangmudae by ground; a helicopter was sent out for reconnaissance in preparation for flying troops to the scene. When the reconnaissance helicopter—carrying the 61st Regiment commander, a colonel from Combat Arms Command, the commander of the 1st Battalion, a colonel from the ROK Army Air Force, and an operations chief—reached the plaza in front of Province Hall, demonstrators had been cleared off Geumnam-ro by gunfire. It was 3:30 p.m. The helicopter had circled low around Province Hall about five times when there was a burst of gunfire. The helicopter shot upward and rushed back to Sangmudae. The pilot claimed that the helicopter had been shot. When they landed, Lieutenant Colonel Jeong Yeong-jin, commander of the 61st Regiment’s 1st Battalion, checked the helicopter and found five bullet marks in the hull. The reconnaissance flight was after 3:00 p.m., but those onboard—the commanders of the 20th Division’s 61st Regiment—claimed to have no idea that soldiers opened fire indiscriminately at Province Hall at 1:00 p.m., implying that if they had known, they would not have flown so low. Plans to deploy the 20th Regiment to Province Hall by helicopter were subsequently scrapped.

79. Cho In-ho (born 1960), “Testimony 2002,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

80. Kim Yeong-taek, 10-il ganui chwijaesucheop [Observational notes from those 10 days] (Sakyejul, 1988). Journalist Kim Yeong-taek, who covered the situation from Province Hall on May 21, left the building with the police when paratroopers withdrew. He testified that even until that point, the resistance did not shoot machine guns at Province Hall.

81. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, Ministry of National Defense Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation], 96.

82. Choi Jeong-gu, Kim Hyeon-nyeo, “Testimony 7029,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

83. Choi Byeong-ok (male, born 1959), “Testimony 2002,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

84. Kim Yeon-tae (male, born 1947), “Testimony 3119,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

85. Park Yeon-sun (wife of the late Jang Bang-hwan), “Archive 1-144,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju uprising victims’ oral testimony research].

86. Kim Ok-ja (wife of the late Ahn Du-hwan), “Testimony 7046,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

87. One year later, on July 31, 1981, Brigadier General Lee Gu-ho was transferred to the reserve forces against his will.

88. Hwang Young-si, Kim Gi-seok, “Cross-Examination,” Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo [Transcript of suspect examination] (1996).

89. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 289, 290.

90. Chung Ung, “Chung Ung-ui ‘Gwangju-reul sson saramdeul’” [Chung Ung: The people who shot Gwangju] (Transcript of the 16th main conference of the 142nd provisional session of the National Assembly), Kyunghyang Monthly (August 1988).

91. Hwang Young-si, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo [Transcript of suspect examination] (1996).

92. Seoul High Court, 12·12, 5·18-hangsosim seongo pangyeolmun [Court ruling on December 12 military insurrection].

93. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 287.

94. On the morning of May 27, Martial Law Command charged Commissioner Ahn with dereliction of duty and placed him under emergency arrest.

95. Logistical support units included those charged with cooking and the provision and management of arms and equipment.

96. The captured paratroopers were subjected to a cursory investigation and were sent back unharmed to Combat Arms Command following the start of negotiations between civilian representatives and Martial Law Command not long afterward.

97. Lee Jae-won, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo [Transcript of suspect examination] (1995).

98. Wi Seong-sam (born 1954, student at Chosun University), “Testimony 1038,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

99. The deceased soldier was Corporal Lee Gwan-hyeong, a driver from the 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade Headquarters.

100. Song Seung-seok, “Peace Democratic Party Victim Statement no.93,” Hae-chan Lee et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember], 185.

101. Yun Sam-rye (wife of the late Im Su-cheon), “Testimony 7003,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

102. Kang Gil-jo (born 1942), “Testimony 7134,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

6 The Uprising Expands

1. Combat Arms Command, Jeongyosa jakjeonsanghwangilji [Combat Arms Command operation records]. The military also noted the appearance of demonstrators at Jangseong: “May 21, 19:25: protesters armed with carbine rifles gathered at Nammyeon Junior High School,” “May 22, 13:30: protesters appeared at the Hwanam three-way intersection in front of Singi Village in the town of Hwangryong,” and “May 23, afternoon: martial law troops faced down approximately 300 protesters.”

2. Defense Security Command, Bulletins 16, 20, and 21 of “May 21, 1980,” Gwangju-satae irilsokbocheol [Gwangju situation daily news bulletin archive], 199. Sanam Tunnel was closed off by 68 members (6 officers, 62 enlisted) of Jeonju’s 35th Division at 11:50 p.m. on May 21. At 12:40 p.m. on May 21, an additional 120 personnel (20 officers, 100 enlisted) from the same division, equipped with four rocket launchers, three armored personnel carriers, four 2.5-tonne trucks, and two 0.25-tonne trucks were deployed to the emergency airstrip at Jeongeup. An MD 500 helicopter provided air patrol support. At 7:00 p.m. on May 21, Second ROK Army HQ ordered the additional deployment of 100 soldiers from the 35th Division to Sanam Tunnel and also commanded that should protesters from South Jeolla Province be confirmed as rioters, the soldiers should open fire immediately.

3. Defense Security Command, Bulletin 29 of “May 21, 1980,” Gwangju-satae irilsokbocheol [Gwangju situation daily news bulletin archive], 214. Until 5:00 p.m. on May 21, Gwangju Prison was guarded not by paratroopers but by the 31st Division. At 11:30 a.m. on May 21, demonstrators went to Damyang via the Seobang intersection on one military vehicle, one small bus, one taxi, and one large bus. At 2:22 p.m., demonstrators on two express buses, one military truck, one sedan, and one Daehan Logistics truck were spotted by martial law troops heading to Damyang via the expressway entrance by Gwangju Prison. Some demonstrators also left the city at 2:30 p.m. and headed to the Changpyeong reserve forces training center to obtain weapons. Until that point, demonstrator vehicles were relatively free to travel onto and off the expressway. Following the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade’s withdrawal from Chonnam University and regrouping at Gwangju Prison, martial law troops began to open fire on civilians in the area with little warning or hesitation.

4. ROK Army HQ Second ROK Army Martial Law Command, Gyeeomsanghwangilji [Martial law status records]; Defense Security Command, Bulletin 14 of “May 21, 1980,” Gwangju-satae irilsokbocheol [Gwangju situation daily news bulletin archive], 197. At 10:45 a.m., more than a hundred demonstrators gathered in front of the Naju Police Substation and smashed the windows of twenty buses, circled the town, and called for recruits. Another group of about forty demonstrators set off for Mokpo on a Gwangju Buslines vehicle. At 11:20 a.m., more than twenty demonstrators went between Naju and Yeongsanpo on a Titan truck to promote the resistance to the people there.

5. ROK Army Headquarters Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sanghwangbogocheol [Situation Report Archive] (1980); Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon, Gwangju·Jeonnam-jiyeok sahoeundong yeongu: 5·18 minjunghangjaeng [The 100-year journey of democracy, research on social activism in Gwangju and South Jeolla Province: The Gwangju Uprising] (Gwangju Metropolitan City, South Jeolla Province, 2015), 369.

6. Moon Jang-woo (born 1953), “Testimony 2025,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

7. Choi In-yeong (born 1963), “Testimony 2025,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

8. Kim Bong-su (born 1953), “Testimony 6043,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

9. Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeophoeui pangyeolmun [Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial verdict] (for Park Yun-seon, Yu Jae-hong, Choi Jae-sik, etc.) (October 24, 1980); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 45 (2007), 182.

10. Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeophoeui pangyeolmun [Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial verdict] (for Kim Bong-su and three others); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], 180.

11. ROK Army Headquarters Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sanghwangbogocheol [Situation report archive] (1980). On May 21, demonstrators took 94 carbine rifles, 25 handguns, and 151 air guns from Naju Police Station and 780 carbine rifles, 235 M1 rifles, 46,400 rounds of ammunition, 12 .38-mm handguns, and 16 4.5-mm handguns from the Geumseong-dong Police Substation.

12. Choi Seong-mu (born 1958), “Testimony 6043,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

13. Lee Jae-gwon (born 1959), “Testimony 6044,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. A national defense reservist, Lee Jae-gwon participated in the defense of Gwangju as part of the resistance from May 21 to May 26. When news of martial law troops’ planned sweep of Gwangju reached the city, Lee visited Province Hall to assess the situation and encountered his mother, who had come to find him; she convinced him to return to Naju with her.

14. The Kwangju Daily, Jeongsa 5·18 [The real history of the Gwangju Uprising] (Sahoepyeongron, 1995), 360–2. Lee Jae-gwon, as well as a large number of young men from Naju—including Choi Seong-mu and Park Chung-ho—participated in the demonstrations at Gwangju. After May 27, martial law authorities identified fourteen of them and arrested them on charges of weapons theft.

15. When news of martial law troops’ plan to seal off Gwangju and open fire on civilians spread, Naju demonstrators found it difficult to enter the city. They made their way to other counties and mostly blended into the population by May 23.

16. South Jeolla Province Police, Sanghwangilji [Situation records] (1990).

17. The May 18 Memorial Foundation places significant weight on the possibility that official records concerning the time of the demonstrators’ procurement of arms may have been tampered. Records submitted by the Ministry of National Defense’s 511 Committee and the Defense Security Command 511 Analysis Team for the 1988 National Assembly’s Gwangju Hearing altered the time of the arming of the civilians to the morning of May 21 rather than the afternoon in order to argue that paratroopers only opened fire in response to civilians shooting first with carbine rifles obtained from police armories. However, these records are considered to be unreliable and tampered with after the fact.

18. South Jeolla Province Police, Najugyeongchalseo gwannae chonggi mit tanyangnyu pital josabogo [Investigation report on the theft of firearms and ammunition from offices under the jurisdiction of the Naju Police Station] (June 1980).

19. Kim Yong-gyun (born 1959), “Testimony 2021,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

20. Shin Man-sik (born 1956), “Testimony 1044,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

21. Cha Yeong-cheol (born 1952), “Testimony 6027,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

22. Lee Seon (born 1957), “Testimony 6026,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

23. The demonstrations in Hwasun continued until the afternoon of May 22, when the Neoritjae Tunnel connecting the region to Gwangju was sealed off, preventing unimpeded travel to and from the city. Following the end of the Gwangju Uprising, a wave of arrests swept the Hwasun area, and the majority of young locals who stood with the demonstrators and obtained weapons were taken into custody.

24. Kang Deok-jin (born 1957, driver), “Testimony 6015,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. According to Kang, the group that headed to Gwangju with him included Kim Yong-yeol, Yang Il-bong, Noh Chi-un (shot to death in Gwangju), Choi Han-gi, Choi Ok-gi, Ryu Chung-yeol, and Jang Gap-dong, as well as several high school students.

25. Kim Hui-gyu (born 1943, artist, chief of the Yeongam Prosperity Association), “Testimony 6020,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. Because of this incident, Kim Sang-nam (born 1941, animal husbandry), Lee Gang-ha (1953, artist), and Kim Hui-gyu were arrested after May 27.

26. On May 22, students from Sinbuk High School in Yeongam and their friends dug up firearms and ammunition that had been buried by officers at the Sijong Police Substation, handing them out to passing demonstrator vehicles until the afternoon of May 23. The demonstrations in the region continued until May 23 and 24, when local co-op leaders and veterans’ associations began to collect the weapons from the people. When a wave of arrests swept the region after the end of the Gwangju Uprising, the number of Yeongam residents detained was second only to the city of Gwangju. High school students in particular saw high rates of participation and death.

27. Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office, “Gwangju-satae dangsi hagwondonghyang” [Records concerning schools during the Gwangju incident] (1980); Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey of democracy], 379.

28. ROK Army HQ Second ROK Army Martial Law Command, Gyeeomsanghwangilji [Martial law status records]; Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey of democracy].

29. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research, ed., Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. The five demands were the release of democratization activists and the restoration of democracy, the expulsion of the dictator Chun Doo-hwan, the implementation of legislation protecting workers in the agriculture and fishery industries, the payment of reparations to victims of the crisis in Gwangju, and the lifting of martial law.

30. Wando Police Station was destroyed at midnight on May 21. However, the demonstrators returned to Haenam soon afterward, and no more demonstrations took place in Wando.

31. The demonstrators in Haenam dispersed on the night of May 22, when the 31st Division cut off Useuljae and Bokpyeong-ri.

32. ROK Army Headquarters Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sanghwangbogocheol [Situation report archive]; Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey of democracy].

33. ROK Army HQ Second ROK Army Martial Law Command, Gyeeomsanghwangilji [Martial law status records]; Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey of democracy].

34. ROK Army Headquarters Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sanghwangbogocheol [Situation report archive]; Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey of democracy].

35. Gwangju district Prosecutors’ Office, “Gwangju-satae dangsi hagwondonghyang” [Records concerning schools]; Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey of democracy].

36. Defense Security Command, “May 21, 1980,” Gwangju-satae irilsokbocheol [Gwangju situation daily news bulletin archive]; Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey of democracy].

37. ROK Army HQ Second ROK Army Martial Law Command, Gyeeomsanghwangilji [Martial law status records]; Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey of democracy].

38. ROK Army Headquarters Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sanghwangbogocheol [Situation report archive]; Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey of democracy]. Following a report dated 1:30 p.m., May 23, stating “demonstrators turned in a portion of stolen firearms and have become peaceful,” the demonstrations in the Muan region came to an end.

39. Ahn Cheol (age 34) was a Christian activist and pharmacist who had served as the head of the National Youth Coalition of the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea. In August 1977, during his tenure at the National Youth Coalition, Ahn was detained as part of the regime’s Emergency Measure 9 and sentenced to one year of imprisonment. Following his release, he formed the Mokpo branch of Amnesty International in October 1979 and served as the chief of general affairs, taking a leading role in the release of prisoners of conscience and becoming a pillar of social activism in the region.

40. Kang had been ministering at Yeondong Church in Mokpo when he was detained during the August 10 Incident in 1976, where 10 people were taken into custody and Reverends Jo Hong-rae, Kang Sin-seok, Im Gi-jun, and Yun Gi-seok were arrested when a provisional session of the General Assembly of Chonnam Presbyterian Church in Korea at Yangnim Church in Gwangju passed a resolution supporting the March 1st Democracy Defense Declaration (known as the “Myeongdong Incident”) and calling for the abolishment of the Yusin Constitution. Following his release one year later, Kang founded Mujin Church in Gwangju on March 3, 1978, and became a leading figure in Christian social activism in the Gwangju area.

41. The Kwangju Daily, Jeongsa 5·18 [The real history], 368; Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey], 357.

42. Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey], 357.

43. Kim Ho-seong, “Testimony,” Kwangju Ilbo, March 17, 1989. The gunfire outside the Jisan military base on the evening of May 27 was not disclosed to the public until several years later.

44. During the Gwangju Uprising, Mokpo’s nongovernment political activists, the Christian community, and students took it upon themselves to independently establish a democratization council. The group held rallies for democratization daily until Gwangju was forcibly taken by martial law forces on May 27.

45. Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office, “Gwangju-satae dangsi hagwondonghyang” [Records concerning schools]; Choi Jeong-gi and Yu Gyeong-nam, Minjujangjeong 100-nyeon [The 100-year journey of democracy].

46. Kim Ju-won (born 1960), “Testimony 2007,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

47. Yu Seok (born 1963), “Testimony 3115,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

48. Park Byeong-jun (born 1963), “Testimony 3107,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

7 The Blockade of Gwangju and Civilian Massacres

1. Second ROK Army Operational Command “Gwangju-gwon chungjeongjakjeongan gun jisi mit jochisahang” [Military orders and measures for Operation Loyalty in the Gwangju region] (1980). Preparations for the blockade of Gwangju began on May 20. At 11:25 p.m. on May 20, immediately following the indiscriminate fire by the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade at Gwangju Station, Second ROK Army Operational Command handed down Order 445; it decreed that the roads leading out of Gwangju be blocked to prevent the spread of the demonstrations: “Armed rioters must be prevented at all costs from breaking through the blockade. Rioters who put up no resistance are to be detained, and those who resist shall be killed. Those who attempt an assault with armored personnel carriers or other motor vehicles shall be killed. The blockade will extend beyond major thoroughfares to cover all side streets, and rioters must not be permitted to escape”; Combat Arms Command, “Soyojinapgwa geu gyohun” [Riot suppression and lessons thereof] (1981), 61. When early attempts at forceful suppression failed, Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong held an emergency meeting at 4:30 a.m. on May 21 to alter the direction of Operation Loyalty, transitioning to a blockade of the city of Gwangju. Those at the emergency meeting agreed to the following six measures: 1. The relocation of martial law troops from the downtown core to the city outskirts, 2. The invocation of the right of self-defense, 3. The additional deployment of one regiment, 4. Additional drafting at two combat training centers to make up for any gaps that may be created by the deployment of existing forces, 5. The implementation of the counter-riot operation on May 23 or later, and 6. The fortification of the national state of alert. (All of South Korea was placed under the Jindogae II Alert at 4:00 p.m. on May 21.)

2. Combat Arms Command, Jeongyosa jakjeonsanghwangilji [Combat Arms Command operation records] (1980).

3. Kim Sou-hwan, “Testimony,” in Gusulsaengaesaro bon 5·18-ui gieokgwa yeoksa: cheonjugyo pyeon [The memories of the Gwangju Uprising, through the lens of oral accounts: The Catholic church], vol. 5, May 18 Memorial Foundation ed. (2013), 24. Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan met with Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-seong at Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul at 2:00 p.m. on May 21. During the meeting, Lee remarked, “if the situation in Gwangju spreads into the south, there will be no need for violent suppression—but if it spreads into the direction of Seoul in the north, we will have to resort to violent tactics.”

4. Lee Hae-chan et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember] (Dolbege, 2010), 330. On the surface, the reason for the transfer of command was the increased magnitude of the operation resulting from the additional deployment of the 20th Division. However, the real reason was to remove commanders in opposition to violent suppression or those who showed subdued responses to the demonstrations—including Combat Arms Commander Lieutenant General Yun Heung-jeong and 31st Division commander Major General Chung Ung—from the line of command and replace them with hardliners.

5. Combat Arms Command, Jeongyosa jakjeonsanghwangilji [Combat Arms Command operation records].; Ahn Gil-jeong, “Gyeeomgunui Gwangju-bongswae” [Martial law troops’ blockade of Gwangju], Soosun Historical Association, Sarim (vol. 60, 2017). Combat Arms Command instructed martial law troops at locations of strategic importance that if armed demonstrators approached the locations, they should give warnings, which if unheeded, would be followed with gunshots to the lower abdomen.

6. Kim (captain, commander of 20th Division reconnaissance company, identified by family name only), “20-sadan gwangyeja jeungeon—ppalgaengi pokdoin julloman algo” [Testimony from the 20th Division: Mistaken suspicion of communist riots], May 18 Memorial Foundation (December 1997).

7. Kim (military administration, 12th Battalion, 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade, identified by family name only), “Jeontuneun isseotjiman haksareun eopseotda” [There were skirmishes, but no massacres], Monthly Chosun Magazine, April 1996, 422.

8. Kim (captain, commander of 20th Division reconnaissance company), “20-sadan gwangyeja jeungeon” [Testimony from the 20th Division]. Captain Kim, commander of the 20th Division’s reconnaissance company, only realized that what he knew to be the truth had all been lies when he saw the National Assembly’s Gwangju Hearing televised live in 1989.

9. Park Haeng-sam (born 1937), “Testimony 5037,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

10. Jeong Yeong-jin, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo [Transcript of suspect examination at Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office] (1995).

11. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (1997), 294. Military records detail a similar situation to Lee Deok-jun’s testimony. At 10:10 p.m. on May 21, the 2nd Battalion of the 61st Regiment of the 20th Division—stationed near Hyocheon Station in Baegun-dong to block off the road between Gwangju and Mokpo—encountered a demonstrator convoy of trucks and six buses, headed by a 0.25-tonne jeep, making its way to the city from the direction of Mokpo. Following a skirmish, the battalion overturned two of the demonstrator buses.

12. Lee Deok-jun (born 1963, high school student), “Testimony 6045,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. The next day, Lee Deok-jun left the convoy at Songjeong-ri and walked across the Geungnak River with nothing but a weapon. He made it all the way to Yudeok-dong before he buried his guns and ammunition in a rice paddy and entered the city proper. He was arrested by martial law troops at the YWCA early in the morning of May 27.

13. Kang Deok-jin (born 1957, driver), “Testimony 6015,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. Kang Deok-jin had gathered together a group of thirty young men from their village in Sinbuk, Yeongam, and joined the resistance at Baegun-dong, Gwangju.

14. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, Ministry of National Defense Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation into Gwangju Uprising–related incidents] (July 18, 1995). Following a thorough examination of this incident for the Truth Commission, the Prosecutors’ Office found that Combat Arms Command’s Jeongyosa jakjeonsanghwangilji [Combat Arms Command operation records], written in the immediate aftermath of the Gwangju Uprising, only recorded the killings of three demonstrators. This led to criticism that martial law forces had tried to downplay the number of civilian deaths. In addition, three cartridges were collected from Handujae, near Hyocheon Station between Gwangju and Nampyeong on May 24 or May 25, 1980. These cartridges were discovered and kept by a Naju civil servant with the family name Kim before he donated them to the May 18 Memorial Foundation. On February 15, 2017, a foundation associate “sent photos of the casings to the National Forensic Service to confirm the origins of the cartridges, and was given an unofficial verbal response that they seemed to have come from 20mm M61 Vulcan [rounds]” (Hankyoreh, February 16, 2017).

15. Combat Arms Command, Jeongyosa jakjeonsanghwangilji [Combat Arms Command operation records].

16. Hwang Nam-yeol (born 1937), “Testimony 5035,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

17. Hae Jeong-gu (male, born 1941, transportation business), “Testimony 5032,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. Wang Tae-gyeong’s body was buried in an unmarked grave at the nearby Baegil Shooting Range on May 31 and was found and dug up by his family. According to prosecutor investigations, two civilian vehicles on the road connecting Nampyeong and Hyocheon were mistaken for demonstrators and fired upon on the morning of May 22—one vehicle at 5:40 a.m. and the other at 9:00 a.m. Two civilians—Wang Tae-gyeong and Park Jae-yeong—were killed, and five were injured. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation].

18. Go Jae-seong (male, born 1962, high school student), “Archive 4-003,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research], ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (1999). Kim Jae-hong died in 1981, and Jeong Guk-seong in 1992, both from aftereffects of the injuries they suffered in this incident.

19. Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office, “Autopsy Report 98” and “Autopsy Report 96,” 5·18 gwallyeon samangja geomsi naeyong [Autopsy reports of Gwangju Uprising casualties] (1989). Go Gyu-seok’s cause of death was “gunshots wounds to the chest,” while Im Eun-taek’s cause of death was “gunshot wounds to the left femoral region, right shoulder, and right calf.”

20. According to special forces combat reports, an incident reported as “Casualty: 1 pickup truck” occurred at 0:40 a.m. on May 22.

21. Lee Seung-eul, “Testimony,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 5·18 Gwangju-minjuhwaundongjinsangjosateukbyeolwiwonhoe hyeonjanggeomjeungsowiwonhoe hoeuirok [May 18 Gwangju democratization movement truth investigation commission on-site confirmation committee meeting records], vol. 5 (March 14, 1989), 8–10.

22. Kim Seong-su’s wife, Kim Chun-hwa, was killed by a motorcycle in 1985 while pushing her daughter Kim Nae-hyang’s wheelchair at the hospital. Some documents record her name as “Kim Chun-ah.”

23. Kim Seong-su (male, born 1934, transport industry, Jindo), “Archive 1-099,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research].

24. Chae Jong-il (born 1961), “Testimony 5039,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

25. Kim Hyeon-chae (born 1961), “Testimony 2041,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

26. Jeong Yeong-dong (born 1954), “Testimony 1022,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

27. Ministry of National Defense, “Gwangju-sataeui silsang” [The truth of the Gwangju incident] (July 30, 1985). A Ministry of National Defense report submitted to the National Assembly claimed that Gwangju Prison came under the attack of rioters from 12:20 on May 21, with “the majority of rioters former inmates, families of inmates, or hardline protesters attempting to set the incarcerated loose.” The report also claimed that the rioters attacked again at 3:00 p.m., and that at 7:30 p.m., the rioters made use of nine vehicles—two of them armored—and a significant number of firearms and met martial law troops in a head-on clash. The report went on to claim that a total of five attacks occurred until the early morning of May 22, leaving eight dead and more than seventy injured before the rioters retreated—a claim that makes it seem as though the resistance had led organized assaults on Gwangju Prison.

28. According to citizens injured near Gwangju Prison, most had neither attacked nor intended to attack the prison—they had only attempted to use the Honam Expressway to leave the city when the 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade opened fire and caused casualties. This led to the assertion that the actions of the 3rd were not part of a justified defense of the prison, but rather the use of excessive force against civilians in the process of carrying out the operation of cutting off Gwangju from the outside world. According to the statement of grounds of the final appeal on the ruling on the first trial for the Gwangju Uprising (August 26, 1996), the skirmish against six demonstrators who had approached Gwangju Prison was an act of murder to incite a rebellion, perpetrated by martial law troops. However, the verdict by the appellate court (December 16, 1996) overturned the ruling, stating that an armed assault against the prison by demonstrators was in violation of the law and that martial law troops were justified in defending a location of national import such as a prison. The Supreme Court’s ruling upheld the appeal verdict. Although the demonstrations by the people of Gwangju could be seen as the exercise of the people’s constituent power, an attack on a prison went beyond the defensive nature of the use of constituent power. However, this verdict does not justify martial law troops’ indiscriminate attack on unarmed civilians and armed civilians who had no intention of attacking. Only if a premeditated assault on the prison by armed demonstrators can be proven can martial law troops’ use of gunfire be justified. During the second trial for the Gwangju Uprising, the court accepted the arguments of martial law troops’ on-site commanders without even listening to the people of Gwangju, who were the victims of the incident.

29. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 118.

30. Defense Security Command, “Gwangju-gyodoso seupgyeokgido sageon” [The attempted attack on Gwangju Prison] (1980), 89; Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 118.

31. South Jeolla Province, Gwangju-satae busangja jiwonhyeonhwang (July 1982); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 23 (2000), 359. According to hospitalization records, Yu Yeong-seon was shot in the head and hospitalized at Kwangju Christian Hospital on May 21. Medical records from the hospital record his condition as a “semicoma.” “Kwangju Christian Hospital Medical Records,” Hosp. No. 80-14034, 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 24 (2000), 642. However, the Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office’s autopsy reports from May 28 (Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office, 5·18 gwallyeon samangja geomsi naeyong (1989), quoted in 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 20 [1999], 421) claim that Yu had died near the YWCA on May 27 of a gunshot wound from an M16 rifle to the face. There are claims that this autopsy report was falsified to make it seem as though Yu had been involved with an attack on Gwangju Prison.

32. The attempted attack on Gwangju Prison is one of the most famous cases falsified by Defense Security Command to cast the Gwangju Uprising as a riot incited by North Korean spies or communists.

33. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation], 42. The truck driver went missing at this time. However, according to the report on the Gwangju Uprising by the Gwangju Crisis Truth Investigation Team (headed by National Security Emergency Measures Committee division of internal affairs commissioner Brigadier General Lee Gwang-no), “civilians were killed while setting up a vehicle barricade for the operation to block off the entrance to Hwasun Tunnel on May 22.” Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 95.

34. Kang Hae-jung (female, born 1935), “Testimony 5027”; Jeon Jeong-il (male, born 1941), “Testimony 5025”; and Kim Sam-jung (male, born 1935), “Testimony 5026,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

35. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation].

36. Park Sun-rye (age 47, mother of the late Baek Dae-hwan), “Testimony 7002,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

37. Park Sun-rye, “Testimony 7002,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

38. Park Sun-rye, “Testimony 7002,”; Hwang Gil-hyeon (father of the late Hwang Ho-geol), “Archive 1-008,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research].

39. Kim Gwi-nam, “Archive 1-039,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research]. Kim Gwi-nam (male, age 28, brother-in-law of Kim Chun-rye) personally confirmed the bodies of Kim Chun-rye and Go Yeong-ja on the scene several days after the Gwangju Uprising. Having heard rumors that two female Ilshin Textile employees had been shot and killed in a van en route to Hwasun and their bodies left on the roadside, Kim Gwi-nam headed to Junam Village by motorcycle with Lee Byeong-min. He spotted a pit in the middle of a barley field by the road and several bodies in the ditch to the side. The people had been dead for days and their bodies gave off a terrible stench. Kim Gwi-nam approached the people in white lab coats (assumed to be coroners) and asked if one of the bodies belonged to Kim Chun-rye. The coroners showed Kim an Ilshin Textile-branded notebook from one of the bodies to confirm the name of the dead. Kim Chun-rye’s abdomen was riddled with bullet holes, which had gone dark with decay and was crawling with maggots. Go Yeong-ja’s notebook was similarly used to confirm her identity.

40. Jeongyosa jakjeonsanghwangilji [Combat Arms Command operation records], published by Combat Arms Command, records the following: “May 23, 3:30 p.m. situation: 50 rioters (1 bus) attempt to attack military base in Sotae-dong, Gwangju. Military base (11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade) returns fire and eliminates rioters. Three captured alive (2 injured), 17 killed.”

41. The person who gave the survivors first aid was Kim Sun-hui (female, age 19), who was a medical volunteer for Province Hall.

42. Hong Geum-suk, in discussion with Lee Jae-eui and Jeon Yong-ho, May 2016. Hong turned down this writer’s proposal to visit the site of the killings near Junam Village, stating that even thirty-six years after the fact, the horrific memories of that day still prevent her from going to the village.

43. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation], 45.

44. Im Hui-ju visited the reservoir behind Junam Village to go swimming and was led by a sickening odor about 500 meters from the shore, where two bodies were buried. Im reported the discovery to the Neighborhood Center. One of the bodies was wearing camouflage-print pants and canvas boots, matching Hong’s description of one of her fellow survivors. The bodies were so badly decomposed that they were buried unidentified in Mangwol-dong. In 2002, DNA analysis of families of the missing identified the men as Chae Su-gil (age 21, chef) and Yang Min-seok (age 20, laborer).

45. Documents pertaining to the treatment of the deceased in this case remain at Gwangju City Hall and the Dong-gu District Office. According to City Hall records (Gwangju City Hall, “5·18-satae sanghwang mit jochisanghwang” [Gwangju Uprising situation and responses] [1980], quoted in Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 18, 1988), two young men in white lab coats, a driver, and a neighborhood leader approached the military base at 11:00 a.m. on May 25 and attempted discussions. The young men collected the twelve bodies in front of the explosives warehouse in Nok-dong at 2:00 p.m. that day. According to records for May 28 from the Dong-gu District Office (Gwangju Dong-gu District Office, “Sanghwangilji” [Situation records]), Lee Sang-cheol demanded to receive the bodies under the explosives warehouse in Jiwon-dong, and on the same day, the Jiwon-dong Neighborhood Center’s general affairs manager also demanded to receive the seven bodies that had been left on the left side of the road about 300 meters from Nok-dong. Documents from the Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office for May 28 (Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office, “Gwangju-satae dangsi hagwondonghyang” [Records concerning schools]) state that eleven bodies were buried in unmarked graves in Jiwon-dong and that all were scheduled to undergo autopsy. Twelve bodies were found in the neighborhood on May 25, and an additional eleven were found on May 28 for a total of twenty-three. Gwangju City Hall labor and policy division employee Cho Seong-gap also collected seven bodies and wrapped them up in plastic bags on May 29 near Jiwon-dong. Fingerprinting identified one of the bodies he collected as that of Park Hyeon-suk (age 18, third-year high school student), who had exchanged greetings with Hong Geum-suk on the minibus (testimonies of Cho Seong-gap and Park Hyeon-suk’s mother, Gu Gil-seong).

46. Yu Chun-hak (male, born 1964, carpenter), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995); Yu Chun-hak (male, born 1964, carpenter), “Testimony 5028,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

47. Witnesses unanimously assert that the prosecutors’ investigation merged together two completely separate incidents. The prosecutors’ investigation was based on the testimony of Hong Geum-suk—the sole survivor of the minibus—as well as the accounts of a sister and the mother of one of the deceased, those of Junam Village residents, and those who collected the bodies in the area. However, other accounts point to the shooting of a van at a different time. According to the Prosecutors’ Office investigation, only one witness account matched that of Hong, while multiple witnesses claimed to have seen a shooting in the morning, which led them to conclude that Hong was mistaken and that there was only one vehicle shooting on May 23, which took place at 9:00 a.m. Even today, Hong continues to assert that the attack on her minibus took place sometime between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m.

48. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 18.

49. ROK Army HQ 20th Division, “Chungjeongjakjeonsangbo” [Operation Loyalty report] (1980). The operation to secure the Gwangju Armed Forces Hospital was launched following a string of military casualties and the resistance’s takeover of the area surrounding the hospital.

50. Ham Jang-nam (father of the late Ham Gwang-su), “Testimony 5012,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

51. Choi Bok-deok (female, born 1919, injured), “Testimony 5017,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

52. Choi Bok-sun (female, born 1941, injured), “Testimony 5018,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

53. Choi Sang-eon (male, born 195, injured), “Testimony 5020,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

54. Yu Bok-dong (male, born 1945, injured), “Testimony 5019,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

55. Lee Chu-ja (female, born 1957, injured), “Testimony 5013,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

56. ROK Army HQ 20th Division, “Chungjeongjakjeonsangbo” [Operation Loyalty report]. Military records state that this operation led to an understanding of the “rioters’ capacity for resistance” and “served as a stern warning for what would happen in the event the military was fully deployed.”

57. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation]. The victims were mostly residents of Hwajeong-dong, Ssangchon-dong, and Naebang-dong. The eight civilians killed were Lee Mae-sil (female, age 68), Kim Yeong-seon (male, age 26), Yang Hoe-nam (male, age 30), Im Jeong-sik (male, age 18), Cho Gyu-yeong (male, age 38), Ham Gwang-su (male, age 17), Kim Jae-pyeong (male, age 29), and Son Gwang-sik (male, age 20, national defense reservist). One soldier was also killed in the gunfire.

58. The first edition of Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age (1985) erroneously claimed that “at least twenty people were killed” in Useuljae. However, many eyewitness accounts and the 1995 Prosecutors’ Office investigation clarified the facts surrounding the incident, and it was confirmed that one or two civilians were killed in Useuljae and not twenty as had been reported earlier.

59. Bae Sang-seon (born 1959), “Archive 1-212,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research]; Seok-sin Kang (born 1963), “Testimony 6043,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

60. Martial Law Directive 11 includes items such as the definition of the right of self-defense, the subjects against whom the right may be invoked, the timing of the invocation, the means, and the precautionary measures involved in the invocation.

61. Supreme Court of South Korea, 12·12, 5·18-sanggosim seongo pangyeolmun [Supreme Court ruling on the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], April 17, 1997. During the trial for the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising, the Supreme Court ruled that because Martial Law Directive 11 did not specifically spell out orders to fire on Gwangju civilians, the killings of civilians prior to the operation on Province Hall could not be ruled as murder with intent to incite rebellion. However, this verdict assumes that the Martial Law Directive itself was legally without issue. Commanders on the scene who ordered the soldiers to fire did not adhere to these directives, opening fire on innocent civilians indiscriminately as if the right of self-defense was an order to open fire. As such, critics continue to argue that regardless of the content of Martial Law Directive 11, on-site commanders must be held liable for the crime of murder with intent to incite rebellion for situations where they ordered gunfire even when the circumstances did not call for self-defense. Min Byeong-ro et al., “12·12, 5·18 sageon daebeobwon pangyeol bunseok bogoseo” [Analysis of Supreme Court verdict on December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (2015).

8 Liberation I

1. George Katsiaficas, Asia’s Unknown Uprisings: South Korean Social Movements in the 20th Century, tr. Won Yeong-su (PM Press, 2012).

2. Choi Jeong-un, “Pongnyeokgwa sarangui byeonjeungbeop: 5·18 minjunghangjaenggwa jeoldaegongdongcheui deungjang” [The dialectics of violence and love: The Gwangju Uprising and the emergence of an absolute community], in 5·18 minjunghangjaenggwa jeongchi·yeoksa·sahoe [The Gwangju Uprising and politics, history, and society], vol. 3, ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2007), 231–85.

3. Testimonies given to the Prosecutors’ Office and personal accounts by soldiers involved in the counterdemonstrator missions in Gwangju reveal that soldiers deployed at different stages of the uprising have different impressions of the incident.

4. Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeophoeui pangyeolmun [Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial verdict] (for Kim Won-gap and others) (October 24, 1980); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 44 (2004), 147–51.

5. Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeophoeui pangyeolmun [Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial verdict] (for Kim Hwa-seong) (October 25, 1980); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 44, 126; “Appellate Brief” (for Kim Hwa-seong); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 44, 311.

6. Lee Jae-eui (born 1956, third-year student at Chonnam University), “Testimony 1045,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

7. Gwangju Police Station, “Pogoryeong wibansabeom cheoribu” [Treatment of declaration violators] (June 27, 1980) (for Lee Gyeong-hui); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection] vol. 28 (2002), 720; South Jeolla Province Joint Investigation Team, “Susabogo” [Investigation report] (July 4, 1980) (concerning Kim Seon-ok); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection] vol. 30 (2003), 603–9.

8. Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeophoeui pangyeolmun [Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial verdict] (for Park Yeong-sun) (October 25, 1980); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection] vol. 46, 201–2.

9. The paratrooper who had been captured at Hagun-dong was briefly investigated and returned to his unit the following day, after negotiations between the Jeolla Province branch of Martial Law Command and the Citizen Settlement Committee.

10. Hwang Geum-seon (born 1952), “Testimony 1021,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

11. Kim Yang-oh, Gwangju-bogoseo [The Gwangju report] (Cheongeum, 1988), 154.

12. Lee Jae-eui, “Testimony 1045,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

13. Lee Jae-eui, “Nae chingu Norman Thorpe, 5·18-I maejeojun teukpawongwaui inyeon” [My friend Norman Thorpe: A friendship with a foreign correspondent sparked by the Gwangju Uprising], Siminui sori [Voices of the people], October 9, 2008.

14. Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeophoeui pangyeolmun [Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial verdict]; Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection] vol. 44 (2004), 147.

15. Cho Pius, “Testimony 1011,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]; Cho Pius, “Jugeumui pineun heotdoeji aneul geosida” [The blood of the dead will not be for naught], in Gusulsaengaesaro bon 5·18-ui gieokgwa yeoksa: cheonjugyo pyeon [The memories of the Gwangju Uprising through the lens of oral accounts: The Catholic church], vol. 5, ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2013), 105.

16. The first edition of Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age (1985) stated that about 300 firearms had been collected on the first day. Testimony released following the publication revealed that the number collected that day was approximately 1,500.

17. Kim Tae-chan (born 1961), “Testimony 2032,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

18. Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeophoeui pangyeolmun [Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial verdict]; Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 44, 461.

19. Seoul District Court, 12·12, 5·18 1-sim seongo pangyeolmun [Court ruling on the first trial of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], August 26, 1996.

20. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (1997), 271.

21. Kim Jae-myeong, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995). Kim Jae-myeong was part of the tenth graduating class of the Korea Military Academy. He served as commander of the 31st Division (1977) and the vice-commander of the ROK-US I Corps and was named deputy chief of staff for operations at ROK Army Headquarters following the December 12 military insurrection. On June 9, in the immediate aftermath of the Gwangju Uprising, he was transferred yet again to the post of head of the Ministry of National Defense Special Investigation Team.

22. Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 23, 1980.

23. Association of Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Democratization Activists, ed., “Chun Doo-hwan CIA-bujang seoriui bareon” [The remarks of acting KCIA director Chun Doo-hwan], 5·18 seongmyeongseo [The Gwangju Uprising manifesto], vol. 1, ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2012), 601–2. This typewritten document outlines the statements made by Chun Doo-hwan at the press conference with the heads of major press on May 22. In this outline, Chun discusses three major topics: “the Gwangju situation” (twenty points), “the issue of political development” (two points), and “the media” (six points), the allocation of which reflects the acting KCIA director’s priorities at the time.

24. Kang In-seop, “Yeonhapsa sosok hangukgun byeongnyeok, Wickham demo jinapdongwon dongui” [Wickham approves deployment of combined forces to protest suppression] and “Gwangju-satae pyeonghwajeok haegyeoreul” [A peaceful resolution to the Gwangju incident], Dong-a Ilbo, May 23, 1980.

25. Following the approval for the deployment of the 20th Division, at noon on May 23, ROK-US Combined Forces Command gave immediate approval for the transfer of wartime operational control of one battalion from the 33rd Division. The 33rd Division, although placed on standby for deployment to Gwangju at Seoul Air Base at 12:25 p.m., was called back to base without being deployed.

26. Tim Shorrock, “Kwangju Diary: The View from Washington,” in Jae-eui Lee, Kwangju Diary (UCLA, 1999), 165.

27. Heo Jang-hwan, “Naega Chung Ung jangguneul chepo.susahaetda—jeon Gwangju 505-boanbudae susagwanui pongno sugi” [I arrested and investigated General Chung Ung—Records of a former Gwangju 505th Security Unit investigator’s disclosures], Shindonga (January 1989), 370.

28. Shorrock, “Kwangju Diary,” 164.

29. Shorrock, “Kwangju Diary,” 165.

30. Shorrock, “Kwangju Diary,” 166.

31. Arnold A. Peterson, 5·18, Gwangju-satae [5·18, the Kwangju Incident], tr. Jeong Dong-seop (Pulbit, 1995).

9 Liberation II

1. Three facts outlined in the first edition of Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age (1985) concerning the events of May 23 have either been proven false or remain unconfirmed. First, the discovery of the body of a female high school student in the basement of the burned-down Gwangju Tax Office on the morning of May 23 (155–6) has not been verified. Second, the claim that the Baegun-dong regional defense squad shot down a helicopter at 2:00 p.m. (156) was found to have been false. Although there are several accounts of resistance opening fire on helicopters, no aircrafts crashed or were shot down during the Gwangju Uprising. The three military deaths described in connection with the crash from the first edition, subsequently, are also false. Third, the claim that a military jeep carrying four resistance members headed for Hwasun on the night of May 23 met with machine gun fire from a helicopter that left no survivors has not been verified.

2. “Gleysteen Daesa, anbojungyoseong bara” [Ambassador Gleysteen emphasizes national security], Chosun Ilbo, May 24, 1980.

3. Choi Chi-su (born 1961), “Testimony 1017,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

4. Wi In-baek, Yeoksaui noreul jeoumyeo [Rowing through the currents of history] (Simmian, 2004), 81–3. Wi In-baek, who worked for Amnesty International, used the typewriter in Father Kim Seong-ryong’s rectory to print out the list of eight statements, which would be delivered to Combat Arms Commander Soh Jun-yeol and the police commissioner. The inclusion of administrative authorities such as the governor was a safety measure to prevent martial law authorities from framing them as the leaders of a treasonous riot following the conclusion of the situation. However, martial law authorities ultimately charged the nongovernment activists with playing key role(s) in treasonous activities while leaving out most of the administrative authorities who were included in the committee. The statements outlined at the meeting are as follows: 1. The uprising in Gwangju was an act of self-defense; 2. Paratroopers and commanders responsible for the deaths of innocent civilians must be held to account; 3. The government must take responsibility for all deaths caused and damages incurred in Gwangju; 4. Martial law troops must be forbidden from being deployed into the city; 5. Citizens and students must not be held responsible in any way; 6. Detained students must be released and a public apology must be issued by martial law troops in regards to their arrest; 7. The situation must be resolved by the Settlement Committee, which includes representatives from different organizations, the governor of South Jeolla Province, the mayor of Gwangju, and the police commissioner; 8. Firearms will be returned on a voluntary basis.

5. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (1997), 299.

6. Supreme Court of South Korea, 12·12, 5·18-sanggosim seongo pangyeolmun [Supreme Court ruling on the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], April 17, 1997.

7. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 300.

8. Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 452. At the seventh trial of the court of first instance of the December 12 military insurrection and the May 18 Gwangju Uprising case, defendant Hwang Young-si asserted that “although Command (ROK Army Headquarters) may give orders on what to do, the methods by which the orders are carried out are the responsibility of subordinate units,” foisting responsibility onto Combat Arms Command and the 31st Division. However, former Combat Arms Vice-commander Kim Gi-seok submitted a note from the period of the uprising as evidence to the contrary. “During the Gwangju Uprising, defendant Hwang Young-si ordered the hostile suppression of the protesters by the use of tanks and armed helicopters,” and even outlined specific methods: “Cobra helicopters will attack armored personnel carriers, MD 500 helicopters will attack vehicles, and infantry will attack protesters.” Kim’s testimony essentially stated that “the defendant Hwang Young-si personally took the lead in the operation for the suppression of the Gwangju Uprising.”

10 Liberation III

1. Myeong Noh-geun (born 1933, professor at Chonnam University), “Testimony 1012-1,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

2. Kim Gi-seok (Combat Arms vice-commander), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995); Young-si Hwang (ROK Army vice chief of staff), Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong piuijasinmunjoseo [Transcript of suspect examination at Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office] (1996).

3. Moon Jang-woo (born 1953), “Testimony 2015,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

4. Cho Pius, “Jugeumui pineun heotdoeji aneul geosida” [The blood of the dead will not be for naught], in Gusulsaengaesaro bon 5·18-ui gieokgwa yeoksa: cheonjugyo pyeon [The memories of the Gwangju Uprising, through the lens of oral accounts: The Catholic church], vol. 5, ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2013), 112.

5. Cho Pius, “Jugeumui pineun heotdoeji aneul geosida,” 113.

6. Choi Jeong-un, “Pongnyeokgwa sarangui byeonjeungbeop: 5·18 minjunghangjaenggwa jeoldaegongdongcheui deungjang” [The dialectics of violence and love: The Gwangju Uprising and the emergence of an absolute community], in 5·18 minjunghangjaenggwa jeongchi·yeoksa·sahoe [The Gwangju Uprising and politics, history, and society], vol. 3, ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2007), 278.

7. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, Ministry of National Defense Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation into Gwangju Uprising–related incidents] (July 18, 1995).

8. Choi Yeong-cheol (born 1960, shoemaker), “Testimony 5010,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]; Choi Jin-su, “Testimony,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 5·18 Gwangju-minjuhwaundongjinsangjosateukbyeolwiwonhoe hoeuirok [May 18 Gwangju democratization movement truth investigation commission meeting records], vol. 28 (February 22, 1989).

9. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (1997), 295.

10. Kim Gil-su (born 1930, father of the late Kim Seung-hu), “Archive 1-178,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research], ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (1999).

11. Lee Hae-chan et al., “Chung Ho-yong-ui bareon” [The words of Chung Ho-yong], Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember] (Dolbege, 2010), 361.

12. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation], 126–7.

13. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo,” 125.

14. It was argued that the failure to organize proper communication chains between troops on the ground and command, and the paratroopers’ failure to clearly report their movements and operation statuses was the result of a split in the chain of command.

15. Lee Hae-chan et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember], 361.

16. Cho Ho-yeon, “’Gwangju-haksal’ hunjanggwa gongjeokseo” [Records of medals and distinctions from the Gwangju massacre], Kyunghyang Monthly (January 1989), 448.

17. Father Kim Seong-yong (born 1934), “Testimony 1008,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

18. The roles for future activities as determined at the review meeting were as follows: emcee (Kim Tae-jong, Lee Hyeon-ju, Eom Tae-ju), copy writing (Park Hyo-seon, Kim Tae-jong, Hong Hui-yun, Yun Gi-hyeon, Lee Yun-jeong, Jeong Hyeon-ae, Jeong Yu-ah, Choi In-seon, Park Monggu, Kim Seon-chul), donation collection (Jeong Hyeon-ae, Im Yeong-hui, and other Songbaek Society members), postrally march leader (Lee Hyeon-cheol), production of The Fighters’ Bulletin (Jeon Yong-ho of Deulbul Night School, Park Yong-jun, Kim Seong-seop, Na Myeong-gwan, and others), preparation of tools and poster production (Kim Jeong-hui, Im Yeong-hui), lead singer (Im Hui-suk), and recruitment of nongovernment political activists (Jeong Sang-yong, Jeong Hae-jik).

19. Yang Hong-beom (born 1960, boxer), “Testimony 1047,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. The security situation surrounding the Province Hall armory can be found in the protocols of suspect examination for Park Seon-jae, Yang Hong-beom, and Jeong Gon-seok that was conducted by military prosecutors in 1980.

20. Cho Ho-yeon, “’Gwangju-haksal’ hunjanggwa gongjeokseo” [Records of medals and distinctions], 458. Detonator removal time: 8:30 p.m., May 24, to 1:00 p.m., May 25.

21. Hwang Geum-seon (born 1952), “Testimony 1021,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

22. Lee Gyeong-sik, “Testimony,” in 5·18-hangjaeng jeungeonjaryojip [Gwangju Uprising testimony collection], vol. 4, ed. Chonnam University May 18 Institute (Chonnam University, 2005).

23. Yonhap News Agency, February 16, 2007. In March 2006, further investigation into the Gwangju Uprising led to the cancellation of 176 medals and honors awarded to those who participated in the suppression efforts, including that awarded to Bae. Bae filed a suit for the retraction of the cancellation and had his distinctions restored.

24. Kim Hyeon-jang, Vincentius, saraseo jeungeonhara—Busan mimunhwawon banghwasageonui sahyeongsu Kim Hyeon-jang yukpilsugi [Vincentius, you must survive in order to testify: The handwritten accounts of death row prisoner Kim Hyeon-jang, accused of the arson of the American Cultural Service building in Busan] (SahoePyoungnon, 1994). These flyers, written in a tone of outraged accusation, were produced by Chosun University alumnus Kim Hyeon-jang (age 29), a journalist who had witnessed the events in Gwangju on May 20 and 21. Kim went on the run from police for his actions and was later apprehended and imprisoned upon being accused of masterminding the 1982 arson of the American Cultural Service building in Busan.

25. Jürgen Hinzpeter, “Camera-e dameun 5·18 Gwangju hyeonjang” [Images of the Gwangju Uprising captured on camera] in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], ed. Journalists Association of Korea, Mudeung Ilbo, Citizens’ Solidarity Association (Pulbit, 1997), 119–30. After the uprising, Hinzpeter independently produced a forty-five-minute documentary on the events. The film was given the Korean title Gwangjuminjunghangjaengui jinsil [The truth of the Gwangju popular uprising] and screened in secret at Catholic churches and neighborhoods around postsecondary schools in the 1980s; it served a key role in sparking the June Struggle in 1987. Hinzpeter was finally made a household name in Korea when the film was screened on the KBS program Sunday Special in 2003 as part of a series on the Gwangju Uprising. He died at the age of 79 in Germany on January 2016. The Gwangju Metropolitan City awarded him honorary citizenship.

26. Shim Jae Hoon, “Gwangju-sageonun pokdongi anira bonggiyeotda” [The Gwangju incident was an uprising, not a riot] in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], 59–80.

27. Terry Anderson “Naraoneun chongareul pihamyeo” [Ducking between flying bullets], in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], 107–18.

28. Sam Jameson, “Hangjaengjidobu byeoge saegyeojeotdeon ‘segyepyeonghwa’” [The words ‘world peace’ etched on the wall of the Uprising Leadership Team office], in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], 107–18.

29. Norman Thorpe (Asian Wall Street Journal), “Let’s Live and Meet Again,” The Kwangju Uprising, ed. Henry Scott-Stokes and Lee Jai Eui (M. E. Sharpe, 2000), 117–27.

30. Gebhard Hielscher, “Gwangju-ui bulgiran jingjo” [Ominous clouds over Gwangju], in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], 91–3.

11 Liberation IV

1. Chonnam University Hospital, “Jang Gye-beom Hospitalization Record (Registration no. 137772)” (May 25, 1980); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 23 (2000), 603. The diagnosis line filled out by Jang’s doctor reads in English, “Drug poisoning, possible & questionable.” (Translator’s note: The Korean text implies that drug poisoning is possible but questionable.)

2. Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeophoeui pangyeolmun [Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial verdict] (for Jang Gye-beom, case number 80-GYEEOMBOGUN HYEONGGWANG 32) (October 24, 1980); “Military Prosecutor Testimony” (June 8, 1980); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection] vol. 44 (2004), 225–9.

3. Chonnam University Hospital, “Jang Gye-beom Hospitalization Record.”

4. Heo Jang-hwan, Bigeopan abeojineun doel su eopseotda [But I could not be a cowardly father] (Green Design, 1998), 94.

5. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection, the May 17 military insurrection, and the Gwangju Uprising] (2007), 114. Military investigators arrested Jang on charges of rumormongering. Jang was court-martialed and sentenced to two years of imprisonment. The arrest and sentencing drew suspicion that martial law authorities attempted to erase evidence of their covert activities by removing Jang from media attention (National Assembly Gwangju hearing). In the Gwangju-naeran mit soyosageon susagyeolgwa bogo [Report on the results of the investigation into the Gwangju insurrection and riots] published by the South Jeolla Province Joint Investigation Team, Jang Gye-beom was labeled “head of the civilian resistance intelligence team” and described as “the perpetrator of the May 25 8:00 p.m. Poison Pin Incident who escaped and turned himself in to authorities.”

6. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 113.

7. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo, 116–17.

8. “Simingundeul sseun bongmyeon naega mandeureotda” [I made the masks worn by the resistance], Kwangju Ilbo, May 15, 2015.

9. “Bobok duryeoweo bongmyeon beotji anko dogil gijae sajin jjikyeo” [Photographed by a German journalist while masked for fear of retribution], Kwangju Ilbo, May 15, 2015.

10. The Gwangdae Theater Company members gathered at the YWCA were Park Hyo-seon, Kim Tae-jong, Lee Hyeon-ju, Yun Man-sin, Kim Seon-chul, Kim Yun-gi, Choi In-seon, Kim Yeong-hui, Im Hui-suk, and Lee Hyeon-cheol. The members of the Songbaek Society were Hong Hui-yun, Jeong Hyeon-ae, Jeong Yu-ah, Lee Yun-jeong, and Im Yeong-hui.

11. The high school student members of the Yangseo Association included Kim Hyo-seok, Kim Hyang-deuk, Yu Seok, and Lee Deok-jun.

12. Deulbul Night School associates Yoon Sang-won, Park Yong-jun, Jeon Yong-ho, Dong Geun-sik, Kim Seong-seop, Na Myeong-gwan, Yun Sun-ho, Kim Gyeong-guk, Jeong Jae-ho, Lee Yeong-ju, Park Yong-an, Oh Gyeong-min, Noh Yeong-ran, and Cho Sun-im were among those responsible for the production and distribution of The Fighters’ Bulletin.

13. Combat Arms Command Prosecution Division, “80 GEOMJE 40” (August 22, 1980).

14. Cho Pius, “Jugeumui pineun heotdoeji aneul geosida” [The blood of the dead will not be for naught], in Gusulsaengaesaro bon 5·18-ui gieokgwa yeoksa: cheonjugyo pyeon [The memories of the Gwangju Uprising, through the lens of oral accounts: The Catholic church], vol. 5, ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2013), 108.

15. The members of the Settlement Committee on May 25 were as follows: Chair Lee Jong-gi (age 63, lawyer), spokesperson Kim Seong-yong (age 46, priest at Nam-dong Catholic Church), Lee Seong-hak (age 74, head of the South Jeolla Province branch of Amnesty), Cho Ah-ra (age 68, YWCA chair), Hong Nam-sun (age 66, lawyer), Lee Yeong-saeng (age 65, YMCA general affairs director), Kim Cheon-bae (age 65, YMCA director), Cho Cheol-hyeon/Cho Pius (age 44, priest at Gyerim-dong Catholic Church), Myeong Noh-geun (age 47, Chonnam National University professor), Song Gisuk (age 45, Chonnam National University professor), Lee Gi-hong (age 47, head of the Gwangju Lawyers’ Association), Jang Du-seok (age 40, Catholic Farmers’ Association), Jeong Tae-seong (age 36, political party member), “Kim” (Baptist minister), Wi In-baek (age 32, law office), “Jang” (Baptist minister), Jeong Gyu-wan (age 41, priest at Buk-dong Catholic Church), Lee Yang-hyeon (age 30), Oh Je-il (age 28), Jang Sa-nam (teacher at Gwangju Seoseok High School), “Shin” (Chosun University professor), and Kim Gap-je (Liberation Association). (Twenty-two signatories of the May 25, 1980, document “An Appeal to President Choi Kyu-hah.”)

16. Cho Pius, “Jugeumui pineun heotdoeji aneul geosida” [The blood of the dead will not be for naught], 114.

17. Kim Han-jung (male, born 1960), “Testimony 1041,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

18. Wi Seong-sam (born 1954, student at Chosun University), “Testimony 1038,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

19. Born in Gangjin, South Jeolla Province, Kim was a third-year student in the Department of Trade at Chosun University. He was galvanized into action after the demonstrations on Geumnam-ro. Following the retreat of martial law forces, he went to Province Hall and became the vice-chair of the Student Settlement Committee. His opposition to Kim Chang-gil’s efforts for the unconditional return of firearms caught Yoon Sang-won’s eye and eventually put him in the chairman seat of the Resistance Council. Kim was arrested at Province Hall on May 27 and sentenced to death. At the elections for the 15th National Assembly in 1996, he became a proportional representative for the National Congress for New Politics Party.

20. Jeong Sang-yong participated in a student demonstration protesting student training exercises in March 1971 and was suspended indefinitely from Chonnam National University. After the Gwangju Uprising, he became the chair of the South Jeolla Council of Youth Activism for Democracy and chair of the Gwangju Uprising Allies Association. Jeong was also elected to the 13th and 14th National Assembly of Korea.

21. Yoon’s real name was Yoon Gae-won. Born in Sinnyong-ri, Imgok-myeon, Gwangsan County, South Jeolla Province, he graduated from the Department of Political Science and International Relations. During his studies, he worked as an instructor at Deulbul Night School to educate the public. Upon the assassination of Park Chung-hee, Yoon joined the preparation committee for the National Alliance of Laborers for Democracy led by Yi Tae-bok (later minister of health and welfare). During the Gwangju Uprising, Yoon published The Fighters’ Bulletin and the Citizens for Democracy Bulletin. After his death at Province Hall on May 27, he was posthumously wed to former fellow Deulbul Night School instructor and activist Park Gi-sun, who died in 1978. The famous song “Marching for Our Beloved” was dedicated to their memory.

22. Park Nam-seon worked in the aggregate quarrying business in Gwangju until his younger brother was beaten and left with a broken leg by martial law troops during the Gwangju Uprising. He joined armed demonstrators in an outrage, and following the retreat of martial law troops from Province Hall, became the operations director for the resistance. He opposed the Settlement Committee’s plan to return their weapons to martial law troops and led the defense of Province Hall on May 27.

23. Born in Suncheon, South Jeolla Province, Kim Yeong-cheol was raised in orphanages in Mokpo and Gwangju. He attended school with Nokdu Bookstore manager Kim Sang-yun (later chair of the Yoon Sang-won Commemoration Committee). After a brief stint as a civil servant, Kim dove into activism in 1976, meeting Yoon Sang-won, Park Gwan-hyun, Park Hyo-seon, and Park Gi-sun while fighting alongside the credit union activists and the community activists at the Citizens’ Apartments complex in Gwangcheon-dong and at Deulbul Night School. In the early hours of May 27, Kim was arrested on the second floor of the civil affairs office at Province Hall with Yoon Sang-won. He attempted suicide in a Sangmudae MP cell. He was released in December 1981 with a mental disorder that put him in a psychiatric ward for sixteen years. Kim died in August 1998.

24. Lee Yang-hyeon participated in the Chonnam National University demonstration protesting student training exercises in March 1971 alongside Jeong Sang-yong and was suspended indefinitely. He first became aware of social injustices as a member of the Homeland Club at Gwangju Jeil High School. Dropping out of school in 1975, Lee joined the Alliance of Cheonggyecheon Labor Unions and undertook labor activism work at small factories in Gwangju before the uprising. Lee went on to head the Gwangju office of the Hankyoreh daily.

25. Yun Gang-ok was a student at Chonnam National University’s Department of History when he was accused of taking part in the National Youth and Student Alliance for Democracy Conspiracy in 1974 and expelled. He went on to become the secretary general of the Gwangju Uprising Allies Association and led the founding of the Gwangju branch of the National Movement for the Reclamation of Democracy and the Constitution, taking a leading role in the June Democracy Movement.

26. A member of the Gwangdae Theater Company who studied at Chonnam National University’s Department of Korean Language and Literature, Park Hyo-seon took part in the performance of Hampyeong Sweet Potatoes at the National Farmers’ Rally in 1978 and co-directed Dwejipuri Madanggut by the Gwangdae Theater Company the following year. Park initially led publicity efforts in the Uprising Leadership Team. He founded the Tobagi Theater Company in 1983 and fell ill during production of the film RED BRICK in 1998, and died in September that year.

27. Jeong Hae-jik was a teacher at the Gwanggok branch school of Nodong Elementary School who joined the Gwangju Uprising and served as the chief of civil affairs at Province Hall. He was captured by martial law forces in the early morning of May 27 and stripped of his teaching credentials. Jeong went on to dedicate himself to the democratization of education and became one of the founders of the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union. He served as the head of the National Elementary School Council for the union and was removed from his post twice. In 2002, he took up a post as the chair of the Gwangju Uprising Allies Association.

28. A graduate of Gwangju Suchang Elementary School and Jeonnam High School, Kim Jun-bong found employment at Koryo Cement in 1978 and was studying for an equivalency diploma when the Gwangju Uprising began. He joined the investigation department at Province Hall and joined the Uprising Leadership Team. He went on to become an active member of the Gwangju Uprising Allies Association.

29. Gu Seong-ju was a member of the regional defense squads before he joined the team at Province Hall and took over the management of the kitchens.

30. Defense Security Command, “May 25, 1980,” Gwangju-satae sanghwangbogo [Gwangju incident situation report], 257–8, quoted in Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 122.

31. Kim Sun-hyeon, Seoul-jibanggeomchalcheong jinsuljoseo [Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office record of statement] (1995).

12 Liberation V

1. Kim Seong-yong, “Testimony,” in Gusulsaengaesaro bon 5·18-ui gieokgwa yeoksa: cheonjugyo pyeon [The memories of the Gwangju Uprising, through the lens of oral accounts: The Catholic church], vol. 5, ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2013), 159.

2. “20-sadan Gwangju-jakjeonilji” [The 20th Division’s Gwangju Operation Records], Monthly Chosun Magazine, December 1988, 466–80.

3. Kim Seong-yong, “Testimony,” in Yoon Kong-hi et al., Jeohanggwa myeongsang: Youn Kong-hi daejugyowa sajedeure owolhangjaeng cheeomdam (Owolminjunghangjaengjaryojip 6) [Resistance and meditation: Firsthand accounts of the Gwangju Uprising from Archbishop Youn Kong-hi and the priests] (Bitgoeul, 1989).

4. Gusulsaengaesaro bon 5·18-ui gieokgwa yeoksa: cheonjugyo pyeon [The memories of the Gwangju Uprising], 159. After his arrival in Seoul, Father Kim Seong-yong took refuge at Myeongdong Cathedral and published a thirty-one-page account of his experiences in the Gwangju Uprising, titled “Bunnobodaneun seulpeumi” [Anger overshadowed by grief].

5. Jeong Dae-ha, “’35-nyeon mane eolgul deureonaen’ bongmyeon simingun … ‘5·18 waegok matseo ssaul geot’” [Masked resistance member reveals face after 25 years, vows to fight malicious revisionism of Gwangju Uprising], Hankyoreh, May 18, 2015.

6. Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., “80-man minjusiminui gyeorui” [The commitment of 800,000 citizens for democracy], 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 2 (1997), 73.

7. The matter of whether to give the dead a citizens’ funeral or a provincial funeral was debated with raised voices by Vice-governor Jeong Si-chae and Mayor Gu Yong-sang, both of whom attempted to foist the responsibility to the other. The issue was ultimately left undecided until the agreement made between the Resistance Council and the vice-governor.

8. The Korean Young Christian Workers members who participated in these efforts include Jeong Suk-gyeong, Kim Seong-ae, Yun Cheong-ja (age 22, Honam Electric employee), Shin Yang-hui (age 22), Choi Jeong-nim (age 21), Kim Sun-yi (age 20, Catholic Center employee), and Im Mi-ryeong (age 23, Namhae Fishing Net Factory employee).

9. Kim Jong-nam (male, born 1961, freight truck assistant), “Archive 1-382,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research], ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (1999). Kim Jong-nam was arrested by martial law troops at Wolsan-dong early in the morning of May 27. He was subsequently beaten and tortured by investigators and left with schizophrenia-like symptoms.

10. Yun Seok-ru (resistance mobile strike force captain), “Choehu hangjaeng uimiwa jeungeonui somyeong” [The meaning of the final stand and the call to testimony], August 28, 2011, audio recording, May 18 Memorial Foundation.

11. Lee Jae-chun (born 1959), “Testimony 2038,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990).

12. Kim Jun-bong (born 1959), “Testimony 1020,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

13. Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeophoeui pangyeolmun [Combat Arms Command martial law court-rartial verdict] (for Ahn Gil-jeong and Kim Yun-gi) (October 24, 1980); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 44 (2004), 194–9; Park Jong-seop, “Jeonnnamhapdongsusadan joseo” [South Jeolla Joint Investigation Team Report] (May 31, 1980); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising Archival Collection] vol. 31 (2003), 14–62.

14. John Linton (currently professor at Yonsei University College of Medicine, director at Yonsei University Severance Hospital International Health Care Center), May 26, 2013, Gwangju MBC. Linton’s family served as missionaries in the Suncheon area for four generations. Following the Gwangju Uprising, he was threatened with deportation by the Singunbu for his role as the interpreter for the resistance spokesperson.

15. Henry Scott-Stokes, “Gija samyeonggwa oegyo yocheongui galdeung sogeseo” [Amid the conflict between the journalist’s duty and the request for diplomatic assistance], in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], ed. Journalists Association of Korea, Mudeung Ilbo, and Citizens’ Solidarity Association (Pulbit, 1997), 40.

16. “Article 61, United States Government Statement on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980.”

17. Tim Shorrock, “Kwangju Diary: The View from Washington,” in Jae-ui Lee, Kwangju Diary (UCLA, 1999), 167.

18. Bradley Martin “Yoon Sang-won geuui nungire damgin chenyeomgwa jugeumui gyeoldan” [Yoon Sang-won: His resignation and determination to fight to the death], in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], 131.

19. Arnold A. Peterson, 5·18, Gwangju-satae [5·18, the Kwangju Incident], tr. Jeong Dong-seop (Pulbit, 1995), 152.

20. Cho Ah-ra (female, born 1912), “Testimony 1003,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

21. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (1997), 288.

22. For more information concerning Operation Sangmu Loyalty, refer to Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection, the May 17 military insurrection, and the Gwangju Uprising] (2007), 120–3.

23. Peterson, 5·18, Gwangju-satae, 152.

24. Combat Arms Command, “Soyojinapgwa geu gyohun” [Riot suppression and lessons thereof] (1981), 63, quoted in Lee Hae-chan, et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember] (Dolbege, 2010), 386.

25. Combat Arms Command, “Soyojinapgwa geu gyohun” [Riot suppression and lessons thereof], 64–5, quoted in Hae-chan Lee et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember], 387.

26. “Article 57, United States Government Statement on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980,” quoted in Lee Hae-chan et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember], 389.

27. Combat Arms Command, “Soyojinapgwa geu gyohun” [Riot suppression and lessons thereof], 63, quoted in Lee Hae-chan et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember], 388.

28. Seoul District Court, 12·12, 5·18 1-sim seongo pangyeolmun [Court ruling on the first trial of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], August 26, 1996.

29. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 122.

30. Defense Security Command, “Gwangju-soyosatae gwallyeoncheol” [Files concerning the Gwangju rioting crisis], 60, quoted in Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo, [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 122.

13 The Uprising’s Completion

1. Ultimately, it is pointless to divide the uprising leadership into supporters of surrender and supporters of resistance, as even the former had worked toward settlement with the best interest and the safety of the people at heart. Once martial law troops had rejected the citizen representatives’ demands and decided to march on the city, there was nothing more this faction could do.

2. Yun Seok-ru (resistance mobile strike force captain), “Choehu hangjaeng uimiwa jeungeonui somyeong” [The meaning of the final stand and the call to testimony], August 28, 2011, audio recording, May 18 Memorial Foundation.

3. Lee Jong-gi was stripped of his status as a lawyer and imprisoned in 1973 for his opposition to the Yusin regime. He was part of the Settlement Committee from its inception on May 22 and took on the role of chair when the Settlement Committee was reorganized with nongovernment political activists on May 25. Hong Nam-sun, “Testimony 1012,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990). His courageous act on the night of May 26 galvanized the resistance forces. Lee remained at Province Hall with Kim Tae-chan of the mobile strike forces and was arrested early in the morning of May 27. His son Lee Chung-yeong (age 20, student at Kyung Hee University School of Korean Medicine) enlisted with the resistance at the YMCA earlier that night and was stationed at Gwangju Gyelim Elementary School, where he was captured by martial law troops early in the morning of May 27.

4. Son Nam-seung (born 1958), “Testimony 1046,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

5. Association of Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Democratization Activists, ed., “5·18-ui jeongukwa” [The nationwide spread of the Gwangju Uprising], Geuhae owol naneun salgo sipeotda [That May, I wanted to live], vol. 2 (2005), 338.

6. Im Yeong-sang, Bukkeureoun talchul—gogyosaeng simingunui 5·18 hoesanggi [A shameful escape—a high school resistance fighter’s recollections of the Gwangju Uprising] (Pureun Media, 2009). Im Yeong-sang’s book, which describes his experiences from the Gwangju Uprising, is a faithful reflection of high school students’ shifts in perspective and their participation in the demonstrations. Im had boarded a demonstrator vehicle by chance on May 21 and gone all the way to Yeongam. However, the blockade of Gwangju that afternoon left him wandering Naju, Yeonggwang, Hampyeong, and Mokpo before he was finally able to return to his boarding house in the city on May 25.

7. At the same time, only several dozen meters away, Combat Arms Vice-Commander Kim Gi-seok was negotiating with Father Kim Seong-yong and the citizen representatives on behalf of martial law forces. It was a ruse to give the citizens the impression that the military was still open to negotiations when, in reality, the final operation was already underway.

8. Combat Arms Command, “Soyojinapgwa geu gyohun” [Riot suppression and lessons thereof] (1981), 75.

9. The instructions included: 1. Infiltration and ambush of the city at the same time as the sweep of the final target; 2. The blockade of motorways leading out of the city; 3. The infiltration and takeover of special targets such as Province Hall, Gwangju Park, the Gwangju Tourist Hotel, and the Jeonil Building; 4. The simultaneous attack of the city, followed by contact with the special forces team and the deployment of key points, where rebels would be suppressed; and 5. The collection of weapons and the implementation of public pacification strategies.

10. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising] (1997), 302.

11. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection, the May 17 military insurrection, and the Gwangju Uprising] (2007).

12. Stun grenades are used for hostage rescue situations and were first used by Israeli special forces in 1976 during Operation Entebbe. Their first use in South Korea was during the attack on the South Jeolla Province Hall in Gwangju on May 27, 1980. These grenades cause a bright flash upon exploding, temporarily blinding those within range. Because the grenade exterior is made of plastic, it is used for suppression rather than the killing of hostage-takers (3rd Brigade combat report).

13. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 521. At 9:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on May 26, as they prepared for the attack on Province Hall, martial law troops dressed paratrooper NCOs in plainclothes and dispatched them to downtown Gwangju to collect information.

14. 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade Combat Report.

15. Yang Dong-nam and Na Il-seong, “Testimony,” in 5·18-hangjaeng jeungeonjaryojip [Gwangju Uprising testimony collection], vol. 1, ed. Chonnam University May 18 Institute (Chonnam University, 2003).

16. Na Il-seong, “Testimony,” in 5·18-hangjaeng jeungeonjaryojip [Gwangju Uprising testimony collection], 116.

17. By 2:00 a.m., martial law troops had been spotted closing in from Hwajeong-dong, Seobang, and Jiwon-dong.

18. Im Yeong-sang, Bukkeureoun talchul [A shameful escape], 218.

19. Na Myeong-gwan (born 1962, welder), “Testimony 4003,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

20. “Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeopoeui pangyeol iyuseo” [Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial verdict brief] for Song Jin-gwang (December 30, 1980); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 47 (2004), 37.

21. The number of resistance members arrested following the martial law troops’ sweep of Province Hall in the morning of May 27 is estimated to be more than 200. The number of resistance members who fought to the end and their final positions have been estimated from testimonies from 143 of the arrested who could still be reached and from calculations based on available Prosecutors’ Office investigation records. The numbers listed per location were based on approximate numbers given in the testimonies of those captured at those sites. As such, areas from which all resistance members fled and escaped arrest have not been counted. Although it is guessed that resistance fighters were dispatched to Sansu-dong, no records exist to support this theory.

22. During the 1989 National Assembly hearing, Uprising Leadership Team members captured at Province Hall on May 27 claimed that approximately 300 to 500 people remained at the building when martial law troops stormed the city. A significant number of people are believed to have escaped Province Hall just before the attack or during the gunfight that occurred. Approximately 200 were captured alive by martial law forces.

23. There were originally twenty men at the YWCA, but an additional ten were sent to the building from among the YMCA volunteers early in the morning of May 27. Martial law troops killed two resistance fighters at the YWCA and arrested twenty-nine. One of the deceased was Park Yong-jun, and the other’s identity remains unknown.

24. Yun Gi-gwon, Im Jun-seop, and Jeong Sam-gi were arrested at the YMCA on the morning of May 27. Journalist Norman Thorpe took a photograph of Geumnam-ro in front of the YMCA at 8:30 a.m. that day, depicting one fallen resistance member on the ground.

25. Hwang Ui-su (age 28) was the leader of Squad 1 (thirteen members) of the resistance reinforcement team, which was formed on the night of May 26 at the YMCA. According to operation records from the 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, three people were arrested at the Jeonil Building, with the rest presumed to have escaped.

26. Lee Hak-jong and Oh Jong-su were among more than twenty resistance members who took shelter at an inn near the Intercity Bus Terminal and were arrested on the morning of May 27.

27. This estimate came from Song Jin-gwang, who led the men to Gyelim Elementary School and stationed them on the footbridge in front of the grounds. Kim Tae-chan testified that he drove to the school by truck with between twenty and thirty resistance members.

28. The Wolsan-dong area is guessed to be the area around Deongnim Mountain, where the present-day Gwangju MBC is located. There was a skirmish in this area when the 7th Brigade’s special forces team attempted to pass through on their way to Gwangju Park. A second lieutenant Choi was killed in the battle. Kim Jong-nam was one of seven resistance members dispatched to Wolsan-dong. Two of them were arrested on the scene and resistance member Kim Seong-geun lost his life.

29. Six men, including Han Gang-un, were arrested at Sajik Park.

30. Namgwangju Station is located across the street from Chonnam University Hospital. The 10th Division’s 61st regiment records that at 4:20 a.m. on May 27, troops engaged a group of resistance fighters near Chonnam University Hospital, killing two. There are no known records of testimony from resistance members captured at this site.

31. Chief of Provisions Gu Seong-ju and five of his companions were arrested near Hanil Bank on Geumnam-ro on the morning of May 27.

32. A captain identified by the family name Kim, commander of a reconnaissance squad from the 20th Division’s 60th Battalion, captured Gwangju Seobu Police Station early in the morning of May 27. According to Kim, his men met fierce pushback from the resistance from the Cheonggiwa Gas Station in Nongseong-dong to the police station.

33. Jeong Sang-yong and Lee Yang-hyeon, in discussion with Lee Jae-eui and Jeon Yong-ho, May 2016. The first edition of Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age claims, “Some in the situation room proposed a suicide attack by grenade, but one young man argued against it, wiping his tears with clenched fists … The room became silent and the high school students holding the grenades wept” (241). However, this was not true. No one proposed a suicide attack, and grenades were kept under tight control and were not distributed.

34. The first edition of Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age claims, “Young people ran out of their homes upon hearing the broadcast and rushed to Province Hall, only to find themselves surrounded by soldiers as they wandered the Province Hall area. Hundred were detained, and those who fled were gunned down mercilessly” (241). However, multiple accounts have shown that very few young people made their way to Province Hall at this time. The claim that the final broadcast was delivered “throughout the city via a broadcast vehicle” (Hae-chan Lee, Si-min Rhyu, et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember] [Dolbege, 2010], 404; Korean Veterans Association, 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 305) have also been proven false. Park Yeong-sun testified, “It was pitch-black outside and soldiers armed with rifles were attacking; driving around in a vehicle for the broadcast was out of the question”: Park Yeong-sun, “Testimony” (testimony, May 18 Democratization Movement Archive Conference, March 2016). Four speakers were on the Province Hall rooftop at the time, each pointed in one of the cardinal directions. The speakers were of high quality and generally used for civilian air raid drills.

35. Henry Scott-Stokes, “Gija samyeonggwa oegyo yocheongui galdeung sogeseo” [Amid the conflict between the journalist’s duty and the request for diplomatic assistance], in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], ed. Journalists Association of Korea, Mudeung Ilbo, and Citizens’ Solidarity Association (Pulbit, 1997), 44. “Picture Munch’s The Scream, with the distorted face and the hollow mouth—and imagine the picture screaming without warning in a darkened studio. Then you will understand the power behind the voice I heard.”

36. According to the first edition of Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age (1985), martial law troops first attacked Province Hall via the main gates. However, military records released during the 1997 trial for the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising revealed that the operation actually began when the special forces team from the 3rd Brigade climbed over the rear fence and launched a surprise attack on the building. The resistance had not expected an attack on their rear. (Testimony of Yun Seok-ru, Park Nam-seon, and others).

37. Captain Yuk (identified by family name only, 1st Field Battalion, 11th Battalion, 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade), Gukbangbubotonggeumchalbu jinsuljoseo [Ministry of National Defense General Prosecutors’ Office record of statement], 1995.

38. “20-sadan Gwangju-jakjeonilji” [The 20th Division’s Gwangju Operation Records], Monthly Chosun Magazine, December 1988, 477–80. According to this report, eleven shots were heard at Province Hall at 4:10 a.m.

39. Kim In-hwan (born 1959), “Testimony,” in 5·18 minjuhwaundong beopjeong· yeongchang storytelling gusulbogoseo [Gwangju Uprising court and court-martial narrative testimony reports], ed. Gwangju Democratization Movement Commemoration Committee (2015).

40. Together with Seo Ho-bin, Kim In-hwan testified that while stationed at the rear fence of Province Hall for guard duty, he spotted a helicopter above Province Hall dropping off paratroopers in the city. “The moment martial law troops made to enter, a helicopter appeared over Province Hall, turned on searchlights, and dropped off many paratroopers who rappelled down to the ground. Like a scene out of a movie, they opened fire as they dropped, spinning due to the recoil and sending their bullets curving in the air” (Kim In-hwan 2015). Operations director Park Nam-seon also testified at the 1988 National Assembly hearing that paratroopers attacked the building “while firing machine guns from helicopters overhead.” Kim and Park’s testimonies do not match official military records. The 20th Division’s operation records state that no helicopters were deployed until 5:16 a.m., an hour after the infiltration of the 3rd. Kim and Park claim that helicopters appeared earlier than reported and that they witnessed paratroopers rappelling down from overhead. Although there may be some doubt as to the accuracy of their memories, more research into their claims is required because the military is known to have removed or altered sensitive information after the fact.

41. It was only after his release from Sangmudae that Kim In-hwan learned from Seo Ho-bin’s parents that Seo was killed.

42. Captain Yuk, Gukbangbubotonggeumchalbu jinsuljoseo [Ministry of National Defense General Prosecutors’ Office record of statement], 1995.

43. Park Byeong-jun (born 1963), “Testimony 3107,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

44. Lee Jae-chun, in discussion with Jeon Yong-ho, July 2016. Lee Jae-chun was armed with an M16 but could not return fire because he had no ammunition.

45. Lee Jae-chun (born 1959), “Testimony 2038,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

46. According to Kim Dae-ryeong, in Imeul wihan haengjingok [Marching for our beloved] (BBBooks, 2015), “not one person was shot to death by martial law troops” by the fountain. However, this claim is refuted even by the paratrooper special forces commanders who were on the scene. A Captain Choi from the 11th Brigade testified to prosecutors that “the operation began at 04:00, and on the way to the destination via Province Hall, someone at the fountain in front of Province Hall opened fire on the men. The attacker was killed and the unit resumed making its way to the destination.” Captain Choi (identified by family name only, 2nd Field Battalion, 61st Battalion, 11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade), Gukbangbubotonggeumchalbu jinsuljoseo [Ministry of National Defense General Prosecutors’ Office record of statement], 1994.

47. Yu Seok (born 1963), “Testimony 3115,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. Yu Seok and his friend Jeong Geum-dong were on standby at the YMCA when the emergency alert was sounded. They received their rifles and ammunition at Province Hall and were stationed at the fountain. The plaza was silent for about an hour after the alert, but around 4:00 a.m., they heard gunfire behind Sangmu Hall and spotted signal flares shot by martial law troops. The area was already crawling with soldiers, who surrounded the fountain from both sides.

48. Documents that spread false claims about the Gwangju Uprising, such as Kim Dae-ryeong’s Imeul wihan haengjingok [Marching for our beloved], emphasize that the 3rd Brigade’s special forces team entered Province Hall by climbing over the rear fence in order to claim that there were no martial law troops in the plaza outside Province Hall at 4:00 a.m. However, the testimonies of Captain Choi of the 2nd Field Battalion from the 11th’s 61st Battalion, as well as the accounts of Lee Jae-chun and Yu Seok, make clear that martial law troops were indeed at the fountain at the time.

49. Na Il-seong (born 1961), “Testimony 2035,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

50. Kim Yeo-su (born 1961), “Testimony 2040,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

51. Kim Hyeon-chae (born 1961), “Testimony 2041,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

52. Daedo Hotel was a small, three-story establishment situated in the alley bordering the south side of Province Hall. The building was demolished and the Asia Culture Center now stands on the site. Foreign journalists including Terry Anderson and Norman Thorpe stayed at the hotel on the night of May 26, and they personally observed the paratrooper attack on Province Hall. Their witness accounts are recorded in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report].

53. Terry Anderson, “Naraoneun chongareul pihamyeo” [Ducking between flying bullets], in Journalists Association of Korea et al., eds., 5·18 taeukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], 30.

54. The two paratroopers are guessed to have stood near the southern edge of the South Jeolla Province Police building on the Province Hall premises. Norman Thorpe, who stayed at Daedo Hotel with Terry Anderson, returned to Gwangju in May of 2016 at the invitation of the city, at which time he went up to the rooftop of the old Province Hall building and pointed out the precise locations of the hotel at which the foreign press stayed on the night of May 26 and the location from which they witnessed the assault to Lee Jae-eui, one of the writers of this book.

55. “20-sadan Gwangju-jakjeonilji,” [The 20th Division’s Gwangju operation records], Monthly Chosun Magazine, December 1988, 477–80.

56. Captain Kim (identified by family name only, commander of 2nd Company, 1st Field Battalion, 11th Battalion, 3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade), in Gukbangbubotonggeumchalbu jinsuljoseo [Ministry of National Defense General Prosecutors’ Office record of statement], 1994.

57. The gunshots are guessed to be from the exchange of fire between troops who had approached Province Hall from the rear at 4:10 a.m. and resistance members who were on guard, or to be the shots fired by the 11th Brigade as they passed by the fountain in the plaza and fired upon the resistance members hiding behind the planters.

58. Captain Kim, in Gukbangbubotonggeumchalbu jinsuljoseo [Ministry of National Defense General Prosecutors’ Office record of statement], 1994.

59. The Province Hall buildings—including the South Jeolla Province Police building—were all interconnected with one another, with a courtyard in the center. Each floor of the main building could be accessed via the central staircase in front of the main entrance. Long hallways spanned each floor, with cubicle-style offices used for administrative work. The Uprising Leadership Team used the first-floor offices as the situation and investigation offices and the governor’s office, vice-governor’s office, and the directors’ offices as the Settlement Committee office, Uprising Leadership chair office, Uprising Leadership vice-chair office, public relations office, spokesperson’s office, and planning director’s office. The second floor was also spanned by long hallways, and behind each office door was a smaller room that led into the office proper. A separate four-story building was erected south of the main building following Korea’s independence to connect the main building and the police building, both of which were built during Japanese rule.

60. Kim Yun-gi (born 1957), “Testimony 4012,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

61. Yun Gang-ok (born 1951, planning committee member), “Archive 7-24,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research], ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (1999).

62. Choi Chi-su (born 1961), “Testimony 1017,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

63. Kim Tae-chan (born 1961), “Testimony 2032,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

64. Jeong Sang-yong, in discussion with Lee Jae-eui and Jeon Yong-ho, May 2016. The majority of resistance members who were arrested in the main building of Province Hall, including Jeong Sang-yong, Jeong Hae-jik, and Yun Gang-ok, had been locked in their offices and were thus unable to see the martial law troops until they had opened the doors and thrown their guns into the hallways in surrender. It had been physically impossible for them to fire back or put up any resistance.

65. Shin Man-sik (born 1956), “Testimony 1044,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

66. Yang Hong-beom (born 1960, boxer), “Testimony 1047,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records]. When they first received news of the impending attack by martial law troops the previous day, the men had discussed the matter and vowed to keep the armory secure to the end.

67. According to the autopsy report published by the Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office, the cause of death for Moon Yong-dong (born 1953, seminarian) was “penetrating gunshot wound to the right thorax, penetrating gunshot wound to the upper left thorax, and perforating wound to the right hand” left by M16 rifle(s). The autopsy report published by Defense Security Command, however, lists Moon’s cause of death as “Two penetrating wounds and one perforating wound to the right middle finger (measuring at 1.5 x 0.5 cm)” left by carbine rifle(s).

68. When seen from the main gates, the civil affairs office was to the left of the main building and was composed of a basement and two stories above the ground. The basement housed a cafeteria and a barbershop for Province Hall employees, the first floor was the civil affairs center, and the second floor was an auditorium. When the resistance took control of the premises during the Gwangju Uprising, the basement was turned into an armory housing TNT, grenades, and firearms; the first floor a cafeteria and kitchen; and the second floor an additional cafeteria and a rest area. Although the civil affairs office was separate from the main building, it was connected to the main building at the auditorium on the second floor via a walkway. The south side of the auditorium also led to a different walkway that led into the police building.

69. Ahn Gil-jeong, “Yoon Sang-won-ui saine daehayeo” [On Yoon Sang-won’s cause of death], Historical Studies Research, vol. 63 (August 2016), 95–134. In 1980, martial law authorities repeatedly put forth that Yoon had committed suicide by disembowelment or immolation. These allegations were succeeded in recent years by suggestions of suicide by grenade, which were used to suggest that the song “Marching for Our Beloved” was not appropriate to serve as the official representative song of the Gwangju Uprising, as the song was originally written in Yoon’s memory (Kim Dae-ryeong, Imeul wihan haengjingok [Marching for our beloved]). These allegations, however, are a gross distortion of Yoon’s real cause of death. HIs death has a symbolic place in the debates surrounding the definition of the Gwangju Uprising as a democratization movement, a popular uprising, or a riot. As such, martial law authorities, from the outset, attempted to forge Yoon’s cause of death and continued to put forth variations on the same assertion over the years to distort the truth.

70. Park Nae-pung (born 1957), “Testimony 1036,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

71. Yun Seok-ru, “Testimony,” in 2011-nyeon 5·18 minjuhwaundong gusuljaryo sujip yeonguyongyeok gyeolgwabogoseo [Report on the results of the Gwangju Uprising oral testimony collection research (2011)], ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (2011).

72. “Gwangju-soyosatae jinapjakjeon” [Operation for the suppression of the Gwangju riots], 3-gongsuyeodan teukjeonsajeontusangbo [3rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade combat report] (1980).

73. Supreme Court of South Korea, 12·12, 5·18-sanggosim seongo pangyeolmun [Supreme Court ruling on the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], April 17, 1997. At the trial for the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising, the Supreme Court declared, “the operation for the re-entry of military personnel to downtown Gwangju and the retaking of Province Hall necessitated the suppression of the armed demonstrators at the site, which would inevitably lead to battle against the resisting forces and subsequently the injury and death of those involved. The accused, Chun Doo-hwan, was aware of these facts when he chose to pursue the operation for the re-entry of troops into the city. The commands he delivered to this end, then, clearly carried intent to order or implicitly approve of such acts of murder.” The court also found that Chun committed these acts of murder because he was “in a critical situation where failing to prevent the spread of the Gwangju demonstrations in a timely manner would prevent him from accomplishing the goal of his insurrection—taking political power,” and ruled that he be held responsible for “murder with intent to incite rebellion.”

74. Imeul wihan haengjingok [Marching for our beloved] by Kim Dae-ryeong claims that the two victims Lee Jae-chun witnessed near the fountain in the plaza on the morning of May 27 were Moon Jae-hak and Ahn Jong-pil, first-year students at Gwangju Commercial High School. However, Lee’s testimony shows that there is no evidence that the two victims were indeed Moon and Ahn, as Kim claims (2011-nyeon 5·18 minjuhwaundong gusuljaryo sujip yeonguyongyeok gyeolgwabogoseo [Report on the results of the Gwangju Uprising oral testimony collection research]). Kim’s book also claims that Park Nam-seon and Shin Man-sik were the only ones who were armed with M16s and opened fire, but Park and Shin testify to having no ammunition for M16 rifles. The majority of resistance members testified that the lack of M16-appropriate ammunition made the rifles useless for them. As for the deaths of students Moon and Ahn, their autopsies were performed in the afternoon of May 27 in the rear courtyard of Province Hall by the Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office under the supervision of military prosecutors. The cause of death for Moon Jae-hak (age 16) was determined to be “perforating gunshot wound to the left abdomen (penetrating gunshot wound to the left abdomen and left frontal cervical region, comminuted fracture of the mandible), with the entry wound measuring at 1.0 x 0.5 cm in the rear cervical region and the exit wound measuring at 6.0 x 4.0 cm in the left frontal cervical region.” Ahn Jong-pil’s (age 16) cause of death was determined to be “perforating gunshot wound to the right thorax (penetrating wounds to the left posterior and thorax, right frontal thorax, and lower back). Both of their wounds were recorded to have been inflicted by M16 rifles. Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 20 (1999), 476–9.

75. Yang In-hwa (male, born 1956), “Testimony 2026,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

76. Im Yeong-sang, Bukkeureoun talchul [A shameful escape].

77. Im Yeong-sang, Bukkeureoun talchul.

78. Hwang Ui-su (born 1952), “Testimony,” in 5·18 minjuhwaundong beopjeong· yeongchang storytelling gusulbogoseo [Gwangju Uprising court and court-martial narrative testimony reports].

79. “Gwangju-soyosatae jinapjakjeon” [Operation for the suppression of the Gwangju riots], 11-gongsuyeodan teukjeonsajeontusangbo [11th Airborne Special Forces Brigade Combat Report] (1980).

80. The YWCA was home to The Fighters’ Bulletin publishing team, and it was where postsecondary students were recruited for the replacement of the Settlement Committee with the Uprising Leadership Team. In the morning of May 27, the female members of the Gwangdae Theater Company and the Songbaek Society were evacuated, leaving about thirty men on the premises. Seo Han-seong, who had completed his military service, instructed the others on the use of firearms before they dispersed to stand watch. Kim Seong-seop, Shin Eun-ju, and Park Yong-jun were stationed on the second floor, and Na Myeong-gwan and Yun Sun-ho were stationed at the Sosimdang Hall on the first floor. They were accompanied by a dozen recruits from the YMCA, as well as Chae Yeong-seon (age 23), Kim Han-jung (age 20), Kim Hyeon-cheol (age 21), Cheon Yeong-jin (age 20), and Han Jeong-man (age 19).

81. Na Myeong-gwan (male, born 1962, welder), “Archive 1-036,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research].

82. Kim Gil-sik (born 1961), “Testimony 1039,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

83. Association of Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Democratization Activists, ed., “Seumulse sal oeroun nimui saengae [Your lonely 23-year life], Geuhae owol naneun salgo sipeotda [That May, I wanted to live], vol. 1 (2005), 355. According to autopsy reports from the Gwangju Prosecutors’ Office, Park Yong-jun’s cause of death was a “perforating gunshot wound to the face” (an M16 round through the face). Paratroopers had opened fire indiscriminately at the resistance, shooting at the head and the chest despite guidelines to aim for the lower abdomen.

84. Jeong Dae-ha, “80-nyeon Gwangju choehu jikida chongsang ibeun yeodaesaeng ‘owol ilgi’ cheot gonggae” [Never-before-seen account of Gwangju Uprising by postsecondary student shot during final stand], Hankyoreh, May 26, 2016. Following her release in July of 1980, Kim Yun-hui wrote a journal chronicling her experiences during the Gwangju Uprising. The contents of her journal were recently published anonymously on the Hankyoreh.

85. The 11th Brigade’s combat reports outline the outcome of the mission: “3 killed, 29 prisoners; obtained 500 carbine rifles, 1 light machine gun, 1 M203 grenade, 1 M16 rifle, 1 P-77 radio, 4 cases of machine gun ammunition, etc.; 2 men injured (Staff Sergeants Jeong and Lee from the 61st Battalions’ 3rd Field Battalion) with gunshot wounds.”

86. Combat Arms Command, “Gwangju-soyosataebunseok—gyohunjip” [Analysis of the Gwangju riots—lessons] (September 1980), quoted in JoongAng Monthly (February 1989).

87. Kim Jong-nam (born 1961, freight truck assistance), “Archive 1-382,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research].

88. ROK Army HQ 7th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, “Jeontusangbo” [Combat report].

89. ROK Army HQ 20th Division, “Jeontusangbo” [Combat report].

90. “20-sadan Gwangju-satae jakjeonilji” [The 20th Division’s Gwangju operation records], Monthly Chosun Magazine (December 1988), 466–80.

91. Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeophoeui pangyeolmun [Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial verdict] (1980); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryo chongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 47 (2004), 37.

92. Operations director Park Nam-seon referred to Song Jin-gwang by the pseudonym “Hwang Du-il” (Shindonga, May 1988). Those who attempt to distort the facts of the Gwangju Uprising assert that “Hwang Du-il” is a North Korean officer who infiltrated South Korea (such as Imeul wihan haengjingok by Kim Dae-ryeong).

93. ROK Army HQ 20th Division, “Chungjeongjakjeonsangbo” [Operation Loyalty report], 1980.

94. Song Jin-tae (male, brother of Song Jin-gwang), “Archive 1-091,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research]. Song Jin-gwang (age 28) finished high school in Gwangju and entered Korea Army Academy at Yeongcheon. He did his military service as an officer in a chemical support unit in the Third ROK Army in Chuncheon, and completed his service with the rank of captain in 1979. Song went into downtown Gwangju on May 20 and bore witness to the atrocities committed by martial law troops, which spurred him to go to the YMCA following the May 26 rally. He commanded the resistance in Gyerim-dong on the morning of May 27 and escaped the scene in spite of his injury. Several months later, he visited the elderly couple to give his thanks. However, in October of that year, he was arrested on a tip and tortured severely. Jeongyosagyeeombotonggunbeophoeui pangyeolmun [Combat Arms Command martial law court-martial verdict]; Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwau ndongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 47 (2004), 37. Song’s daring escape became a myth among the people of Gwangju, spreading across the city. He was released from prison in 1981, married, and operated a rice mill at Yongyeon Village at the foot of Mudeung Mountain, in front of the 2nd Reservoir. On September 5, 1985, autumn downpours caused a river to overflow and swept away a child who worked at Song’s rice mill. He jumped in after the child, but both were killed by the floodwaters.

95. “20-sadan Gwangju-jakjeonilji” [The 20th Division’s Gwangju operation records], Monthly Chosun Magazine, 477–80.

96. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 308–10.

97. Kim Yang-woo, “Ajikdo Gwangju-neun kkeutnaji anatda” [The Gwangju Uprising is not yet over], in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], 237.

98. Cheon Yeong-jin (born 1960), “Testimony 3109,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

99. Heo Jang-hwan, “505-boanbudae Gwangju-satae cheori teungmyeongban susagwanui jeungeon” [Testimony from 505th Security Unit Gwangju Uprising team’s investigator], Hankyoreh Community, December 6, 1988, http://c.hani.co.kr/hantoma/1434931.

100. Terry Anderson “Naraoneun chongareul pihamyeo” [Ducking between flying bullets], in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], 31. When he entered Province Hall from 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. on May 27, he wrote down precisely the number of dead he saw and their locations: 2 in the second-floor conference room, 1 self-immolation, 7 in the rear courtyard, 3 in the Province Hall stairway, and 2 dismembered bodies for a total of 15.

101. Norman Thorpe was confirmed to be the first journalist to set foot in Province Hall on the morning of May 27.

102. ROK Army HQ 20th Division, “Chungjeongjakjeonsangbo” [Operation Loyalty report], 1980 (Records from May 21, 21:00). During the Gwangju Uprising, martial law troops were instructed in specific firearms use guidelines concerning the invocation of the right of self-defense. They were ordered to “begin by warning foes to hold approach, and open fire on the lower abdomen if foes ignored the warning.” Combat Arms Command guidelines also state that “shots toward hostile rioters must be aimed at the lower abdomen where possible.”

103. According to autopsy reports published by the Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office and by Defense Security Command, the majority of those killed at Province Hall had been shot multiple times in the head and chest. An analysis of the 87 autopsy reports from the Gwangju Uprising where the victims had been shot in the upper body with M16 rifles shows that 33 were killed by shots to the head and 54 to other parts of the upper body.

104. Lee Hae-chan et al., Gieokaneun jaui Gwangju [The Gwangju of those who remember], 411.

105. Cho Seong-ho, “Owol Gwangju-ui hoesang” [Reminiscences of Gwangju in May] in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report], 204. Autopsy results showed that Park was killed by “penetrating gunshot wound to the left thorax (5 x 12 cm), abrasive gunshot wound to the upper femoral region, and perforating gunshot wound to the right knee” inflicted by M16 rifles. Association of Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Democratization Activists, ed., “5·18-ui jeongukwa” [The nationwide spread of the Gwangju Uprising], in Geuhae owol naneun salgo sipeotda [That May, I wanted to live], 304.

106. Kim Yang-woo, “Ajikdo Gwangju-neun kkeutnaji anatda” [The Gwangju Uprising is not yet over], in 5·18 teukpawon report [Gwangju Uprising special correspondent report].

107. “Ahn (Byeong-ha) jeon Jeollanamdo-gyeonggukjang jingmuyugihyeomui yeonhaeng” [Former South Jeolla Province Police Chief Ahn (Byeong-ha) arrested for dereliction of duty], Chosun Ilbo, May 27, 1980.

108. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, Ministry of National Defense Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation into Gwangju Uprising–related incidents] (July 18, 1995).

109. Korean Veterans Association, ed., 12·12. 5·18 sillok [Annals of the December 12 military insurrection], 310.

110. Association of Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Democratization Activists, ed., “Geudeuri saengeobe jongsaharago haenneundae” [They told us to return to daily activities], in Geuhae owol naneun salgo sipeotda [That May, I wanted to live], vol. 2 (2005), 408; Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryocho ngseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 20 (1999), 584–5.

111. Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office, 5·18 gwallyeon samangja geomsi naeyong [Autopsy reports of Gwangju Uprising casualties] (1989); Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjumi njuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 20 (1999), 484–5.

14 The Rest of the Story

1. Seo In-seop (born 1928, South Jeolla Province Civil Affairs Chief), “Archive 7-20,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research], ed. May 18 Memorial Foundation (1999). Seo In-seop testified that sixty bodies were at Sangmu Hall on May 26, and thirty were collected at Province Hall on May 27.

2. Burial in a temporary grave entailed the burial of unidentified victims in temporary marked graves to be identified and returned to families at a later time. Burial in unmarked graves was undertaken with the intent to conceal the death itself, with the burial in deserted locations such as densely wooded hills.

3. Presumed to be Yang Dong-seon (age 45), security guard at Gwangju High School.

4. Cho Seong-gap (welfare department, civil affairs, Gwangju City Hall), “Archive 7-25,” in 5·18 pihaeja gusuljaryo josa [Gwangju Uprising victims’ oral testimony research].

5. Seo Man-bok (younger brother of the late Seo Man-oh), “Testimony 7030,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records pertaining to the Gwangju Uprising], ed. Center for Contemporary Korean Historical Records Research (Pulbit, 1990). According to the autopsy report from prosecutors (June 2, 1980), the cause of death was “gunshot wounds inflicted by carbine rifles” (Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office, “Autopsy Report 38,” 5·18 gwallyeon samangja geomsi naeyong [Autopsy reports of Gwangju Uprising casualties] [1989]). However, examinations at Chosun University Hospitals found that the entry wounds were measured at 0.5 x 0.5 cm and the exit wounds were 2 x 2 cm, making M16 rifles wielded by martial law troops the likely cause of death (Gwangju Metropolitan City Historical Record Compilation Committee, ed., 5·18 Gwangjuminjuhwaundongjaryochongseo [Gwangju Uprising archival collection], vol. 20 [1999], 410–11).

6. The testimony of examining doctor Moon Hyeong-bae (then doctor of pathology at Chonnam University Hospital, currently professor of pathology at Wonkwang University School of Medicine). Interview with Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission (November 29, 2006).

7. The last of those whose categorizations were debated was a high school student from Gyeonggi Province who died at the YWCA on May 27. The military insisted that the student fell into the “rioter” category or resisting the military at the YWCA, but the civilian panelists argued that a high school student was too young to qualify and ultimately had him put in the category of “law-abiding civilian.”

8. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection, the May 17 military insurrection, and the Gwangju Uprising] (2007), 126. Following the completion of the operation in Gwangju on May 27, Martial Law Command took measures to justify their actions in Gwangju.

9. Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 127. All terminology used has been taken directly from the National Security Forces.

10. ROK Army HQ, “Gwangju-satae jaryojeongni gyeolgwa” [Results of the organization of documents concerning the Gwangju incident], quoted in Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 127.

11. For the numbers of deployed forces and their times of deployment, refer to the appendix. Different sources contain minute differences in the number of troops deployed to the city.

12. Defense Security Command, “Sunjigilja mit jangso” [Dates and locations of death in the line of duty] (1980), quoted in Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 125.

13. Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, Ministry of National Defense Prosecutors’ Office, “5·18 gwallyeon susagyeolgwa bogo” [Report on the results of the investigation into Gwangju Uprising–related incidents] (July 18, 1995).

14. Of the eight soldiers killed during battle with demonstrators and the resistance, three were killed in traffic accidents. Only five were shot to death.

15. Jang Myeong-hui (born 1946, Taebong Village resident), “Testimony,” in Areumdaun oworui maeul gongdongche mandeulgi jipdamhoe [Conference for the formation of a beautiful May community], ed. Story Farmers Co-op (May 18 Memorial Foundation, February 17, 2016).

16. Na Il-seong (born 1961), “Testimony 2035,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

17. Yonhap News, May 17, 2004. According to the Korean Rehabilitation Center for Torture Victims (Co-director: Park Yeong-sun), victims who were arrested or imprisoned during and after the Gwangju Uprising were tortured 9.5 times on average during their imprisonment. Of the techniques used, 62 percent were physical (water torture, hanging, beating, forced into unnatural positions, force-feeding, starvation, denial of medical service) and 38 percent were mental (sleep deprivation, forced obedience, sensory deprivation, imprisonment in total darkness).

18. Busan Ilbo, May 24, 1980.

19. Jeon Ok-ju (born 1949), “Testimony 4014,” in Gwangju-owolminjunghangjaengsaryojeonjip [Complete collection of historical records].

20. Heo Jang-hwan, “505-boanbudae Gwangju-satae cheori teungmyeongban susagwanui jeungeon” [Testimony from 505th Security Unit Gwangju Uprising team’s investigator], Hankyoreh Community, December 6, 1988, https://c.hani.co.kr/hantoma/1434931.

21. Heo Jang-hwan, “505-boanbudae Gwangju-satae cheori teungmyeongban susagwanui jeungeon.”

22. Defense Security Command, “Hapsu jochi naeyong” [Joint investigation measures], quoted in Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 12·12, 5·17, 5·18 sageon josagyeolgwabogoseo [Investigation report on the December 12 military insurrection], 119.

23. Yun Seong-min, “Gwangju-sataebogo” [Report on the Gwangju incident] (June 7, 1985).

24. Na Gan-chae, Hangugui 5-wolundong [The May movement in Korea] (Hanul Academy, 2012), 65.

25. Lee Jae-eui, “5·18-gunsajaepangwa byeonhoindeul” [The lawyers of the Gwangju Uprising courts-martial], in Yehyang (June 1989).

26. Those sentenced to death were Jeong Dong-nyeon for leading a rebellion; Kim Jong-bae and Park Nam-seon for partaking in rebellion and violation of martial law; Bae Yong-ju for murder for the traffic death of a police officer during the demonstrations on the night of May 20; and Park No-jeong for murder, rioting, and violation of martial law. Settlement Council members Hong Nam-sun, Jeong Sang-yong, Heo Gyu-jeong, Yun Seok-ru, and 3 others were sentenced to life in prison for the charge of conspiracy to incite rebellion. Kim Sang-yun and 162 others were given sentences ranging from five to twenty years in prison, and the remaining 80 were given suspended sentences or put on probation.

15 Work Left Undone

1. Na Gan-chae, Hangugui 5-wolundong [The May movement in Korea] (Hanul Academy, 2012), 47–121.

2. Supreme Court of South Korea, 12·12, 5·18-sanggosim seongo pangyeolmun [Supreme Court ruling on the December 12 military insurrection and the Gwangju Uprising], April 17, 1997.

3. Undermining of the constitution entails the destruction of the constitutional order by means of a coup d’état or the violent abuse of the constitution and liberal democracy.

4. Han In-seop, “Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo 1-sim jaepan ipchebunseok” [In-depth analysis of the first trial of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo], in Shindonga (October 1996), 610.

5. Louis Joinet’s final report on impunity, submitted to the 48th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, outlines a set of principles on the protection and promotion of human rights through resistance against impunity.

6. Yi Chae-sang, “Jeongbeombaehu jeongbeomiron” [The perpetrator behind the perpetrator], in Ewha Womans University Journal of Legal Studies 7, no. 2 (2003): 25–33.

7. Commission members included leaders of Gwangju Uprising–related organizations, presidents of major universities, and religious leaders. Former National Assembly member Kim Yeong-jin served as the chair of the commission and Ahn Jong-cheol as the head.

8. The Magna Carta (1225, listed on the UNESCO Memory of the World Register in 2009) is one of the most important documents in the history of England, being the first document to impose limits on the monarch’s powers over matters of taxation, the rights of the lords, and over judicial matters. The document set forth the overarching principle that royal authority could only be exercised under the law rather than over it and today stands as a symbol of democracy across the globe.

9. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789–1791, listed on the UNESCO Memory of the World Register in 2003) originated in the French Revolution and includes the first copy of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, related documents, and the 1791 declaration. These documents form the foundations of the development of democracy and human rights worldwide.

10. Other records from modern history in the category of human rights that have been listed in the UNESCO Memory of the World Register include the radio recording announcing the success of Castro and Che Guevara’s Cuban Revolution (1956), the arrest warrant for Nelson Mandela (1963), the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum Archives from the massacre of 15,000 (1975–1979) by Cambodia’s Pol Pot regime, and radio recordings from the People Power Revolution in the Philippines (1986).

Index

Act on Reparations for Persons in Connection with the Gwangju Democratization Movement, 359

Adeul Community, 389, 392, 393

Afghanistan, 226

Agent Peony, 350

Ahn Bu-ung, 53, 55, 58, 59, 100, 101, 132, 136, 137, 141, 142, 304, 364,

Ahn Byeong-ha, 27, 46, 81, 156, 334

Ahn Cheol, 172, 232

Ahn Du-hwan, 154–5, 338

Ahn Gil-jeong, 202, 205, 288, 318, 394, 400

Ahn Jeong-gil, xvi

Ahn Jong-cheol, xvi, 400

Ahn Seong-ok, 166

Ahn Su-taek, 63

Air Base, Seoul, 53, 176

Air Base, Songjeong-ri, 83, 87, 156, 164, 176, 189, 221, 296

Air Force, ROK, 52, 164

Air Force, US, 87, 221, 292, 294

Airborne Special Forces Brigades, 20, 24, 56, 79, 89, 94–6, 122, 144–5, 152, 161f, 185, 198, 240, 294, 304, 314f, 343, 346, 364, 386

1st Brigade, 11

3rd Brigade, 4, 11, 79, 88, 95, 119f, 143, 144–5, 152, 159, 161f, 175, 176, 182, 294, 304, 314f, 331, 364, 368, 369, 379, 386

7th Brigade, 11, 22, 25, 27, 31, 37, 41, 42, 53, 56, 68, 73, 79, 95, 144, 152, 161f, 175, 176, 185, 188f, 198, 240, 294, 304, 314f, 343, 346, 364, 377–8, 386

9th Brigade, 11, 24

11th Brigade, 14, 52–3, 55, 72, 74, 79, 95, 136, 144–5, 152, 161f, 175, 176, 185, 186, 188f, 198, 203, 240, 241f, 286, 294, 304, 314f, 341, 343, 346, 364, 378, 386

Airborne Warning and Control System, 5

Alliance for Democratic and Constitutional Governance, 279

American Cultural Service, 87, 219, 360

Amnesty International, 172

Anderson, Terry, 63, 256, 288, 290, 316–7, 333

Anheung Inn, 170

Antenna Mountain, 329

Anyang Industrial Technical School, 64

AP (Associated Press), 63, 256, 288, 316

April Revolution, 26

Archdiocese of Gwangju, Roman Catholic, 80

“Arirang,” 96, 133

Armed Forces Hospital, 45, 49, 85, 118, 129, 176, 181, 190, 237, 239, 275, 285, 286, 328, 336, 339, 349, 352, 353, 382–4

Armistice Line, 22, 280, 289

Armor School, 155, 240, 244, 334, 346, 376, 384, 387

Army, ROK, 5, 8–11, 19–22, 24, 25, 31, 41, 52, 53, 72, 74, 78, 82–4, 89, 90, 112, 122, 136, 143–5, 155, 157, 176, 216, 217, 219, 220, 232–3, 273, 294–5, 304, 334, 364, 370, 375, 378–80, 385, 387

Artillery School, 376

Asahi Shimbun, 256

Asia Motors, 50, 129–31, 139, 147, 149, 150, 152, 160, 314f, 381

Asian Wall Street Journal, 205, 256

Associated Press (AP), 63, 256, 288, 316

Association for the Commemoration of Gwangju Martyrs, 398

Association of the Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Activists, 357, 396

Association of Those Detained Concerning the Gwangju Uprising, 359

Association of Wounded 5.18 Democratization Activists, 358, 396

Aviation Group, 31st, 155

Bae Bong-hyeon, 167

Bae Jun-cheol, 140

Bae Myeong-in, 79

Bae Sang-seon, 192

Bae Seung-il, 253–4, 306

Bae Yong-ju, 107–9

Baegil Shooting Range, 191, 336, 337, 339

Baegopeun Bridge, 157, 216, 235, 237, 348

Baek Dae-hwan, 186

Baek Nam-i, 95, 145

Baek Un-taek, 7

Baekje Night School, 93, 141, 213

Bak Jong-cheol, 361

Baltimore Sun, 256, 288, 290

Bang Gwang-beom, 240, 241f, 384

Bangnim-dong, 105, 185, 286

Bank of Korea, 46, 88, 91, 128, 140

Bannam Police Substation, 165

Baptist Church, Gwangju, 220

Bar Association, Korean, 365

Barang Mountain, 185

Battle at Gwangju Station, 115–18, 122, 159

Beolgyo, 160, 161f, 171

Beom Jin-yeom, 36

Berlin Academy of Arts, 398

Berlin Wall, 371

Bia, 382

Blue House, 3, 4, 8, 9, 14, 21, 28, 29, 51, 82, 86, 273, 359, 366

Bokova, Irina 372

Bokpyeong-ri, 191–2

Boseong, 160, 161f, 165, 166, 170–1, 231, 395

Bosung Construction, 148

Brewster, Robert, 9

“Bridge on the River Kwai,” 332

Brown, Harold, 5

Brzezinski, Zbigniew 220

Buddha, 127, 164

Bueong Mountain, 186, 337, 340

Buk-dong, 42, 43, 73, 310

Buk-dong Catholic Church, 293

Buk-dong Neighborhood Center, 72

Buk-gu District Office, 379

Buk-myeon, 161f

Bullo-dong, 39, 148

Bupyeong, 374

Bureau of Information, 9

Bureau of Planning, 83, 295

Busan, 4, 5, 26, 27, 80, 192, 204, 219, 360

Busan-Masan Democratization Protests, 3–4, 11, 17, 52, 80, 83, 130, 177, 197

Buslines, Gwangju, 107, 160, 170

Byeon Gil-nam, 364

Cadaver Examination Committee, 343

Cambodia, 4

Candlelight Struggle, xii, xvi

Capital Corps, 24, 51, 369

Capital Garrison, 8, 11, 19, 29, 144, 364, 369, 375

Capitol (Seoul), 29, 307, 386

Carter, Hodding, III, 218

Carter, Jimmy, 5, 6, 226

Cathedral, Myeongdong, 135, 358, 359, 365, 366, 391

Catholic Archdiocese of Gwangju, 80

Catholic Center, 37, 43, 50, 59, 61, 65–9, 71, 91, 98, 130, 134, 147, 150, 377, 378, 379

Catholic Church, 392

Buk-dong, 293

Nam-dong, 211, 214, 232, 245, 265, 283, 308

Nongseong-dong, 278

Wolsan-dong, 329

Catholic Council for Justice and Peace, x, 391–2, 398

Catholic Farmers’ Association, 13, 33, 171, 213, 229, 360, 396

CBS (US), 290

Central Intelligence Agency, Korean (KCIA), 3, 4, 11, 21, 23, 25, 31, 51, 79, 173, 204, 217, 353

Central Intelligence Agency, US (CIA), 9, 21

Cha Dal-suk, 364

Cha Gyu-heon, 7, 19, 144, 369

Cha Jeong-hwan, 75, 76, 242

Cha Ji-chul, 4

Cha Myeong-seok, xvi, 400

Cha Myeong-suk, 114–15, 124, 350–1

Cha Yeong-cheol, 167

Chae Gwang-seok, 397

Chae Jong-il, 183

Chae Su-gil, 339, 341, 342

Chamber of Commerce, Gwangju, 90

Changpyeong, 161f, 337, 351

Changwon, 4

Chemical School, 376

Cheon Ju-il, 167

Cheon Yeong-jin, 36, 332

Cheonggye Apparel Labor Union, 16

Cheongnyangni Station, 53, 88

Cheongsan Private School, 47, 48f, 49, 281

Cheonil bus terminus, 340, 337

Cherokee Team, 6, 20

Cho (master sergeant), 121

Cho Ah-ra, 44, 214, 232, 235, 263, 290, 291, 354

Cho Bong-hun, xvi, 388–9, 390–1, 392, 401

Cho Byeong-guk, 166

Cho Chang-gu, 364

Cho Gab-je, 85

Cho Gang-il, 93

Cho Geon-su, 59

Cho Gil-yeong, 36

Cho Gye-seok, 395

Cho Gyu-yeong, 190, 339

Cho Hun-cheol, 46

Cho In-ho, 151

Cho Jae-man, 331

Cho Pius, 91, 147, 208, 210, 211, 224, 226, 232, 235–7, 265–6, 268, 276, 290, 291, 354, 355

Cho Seong-gap, 336–40

Cho Seong-ho, 334

Cho Si-hyeong, 300

Cho Yang-hun, 393–4, 397, 400, 401

Chohung Bank, 96

Choi (captain), 304, 326

Choi Bok-deok, 191

Choi Bok-sun, 191

Choi Byeong-ho, 185

Choi Byeong-ok, 153–4

Choi Cheol, 391

Choi Cheol-jin, 243

Choi Chi-su, 230, 319

Choi Dong-sul, 395

Choi Gi-sik, 360

Choi Gwang-ryeol, 395

Choi Gyeong-jo, 84–5, 334

Choi Han-yeong, 208, 224

Choi Hyang-dong, 395

Choi In-seon, 228

Choi In-yeong, 163

Choi Jae-nam, 303, 309, 325

Choi Jae-sik, 163

Choi Jin-su, 240

Choi Kyu-hah, 5, 6, 8, 26, 28–9, 46, 51, 82, 134, 251, 266, 273–4, 279, 378, 385

Choi Mi-ae, 153

Choi Mi-ja, 77

Choi Mun, 172, 395

Choi Pyeong-ji, xvi, 401

Choi Sang-eon, 191

Choi Se-chang, 7, 8, 79, 82, 88, 119, 120, 121, 143, 145, 177, 304, 364, 368, 380

Choi Seung-ho, 33

Choi Seong-mu, 164

Choi Ung, 52, 53, 56, 67, 79, 81, 112, 132, 136–7, 144, 145, 157, 304, 364

Choi Yang-geun, 96

Choi Yeol-rak, 338

Choi Yeong-cheol, 240, 241–2

Choi Ye-seop, 83–4, 378

Chonbang Textile, 115, 159, 162, 174

Chonnam Girls’ High School, 69, 150, 335, 337, 338

Chonnam National University, 12, 15, 22, 25, 26, 30–7, 40–2, 46–7, 50, 54, 64, 82, 88, 91, 94, 96, 99, 105, 115, 116, 119, 120–3, 128, 132, 136, 141, 152–5, 159, 177, 182, 187, 203, 205, 208–9, 213, 215, 225, 228–9, 262, 263, 265, 284, 286, 288, 311, 313, 318, 328, 335, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 360, 371, 374, 377, 379, 380, 381, 391, 393, 394, 400

Department of Economics, 393

Hospital, 76, 106, 118, 258, 281, 286, 292, 311, 337, 349

May 18 Institute, xvi, 400, 401

Medical School, 134, 139, 141, 151–2, 164, 308, 330

Student Council, 15, 16, 24, 27, 32, 33, 91, 93, 209, 352, 360, 392

Choo Young-bock, 9, 28–30, 81, 122, 144, 273, 294, 334, 368, 370, 382, 387

Chosun Ilbo, 103, 254, 259

Chosun University, 15–16, 22, 24, 25, 30–33, 36, 41, 45, 50, 54, 55–6, 58, 64, 67–9, 72, 75, 76, 88, 94, 102, 105, 110, 113, 120, 123, 124, 128, 132, 136, 141, 146, 155–7, 184, 203, 208, 209, 212, 213, 252, 269, 286, 292, 307, 312, 337, 351, 352, 355, 374, 377, 381, 382, 394, 395

College of Agriculture, 35, 152

College of Engineering (Science and Technology), 16, 64

College of Medicine and Medical School, 45

College of Pharmacy, 33

College of Social Sciences and Humanities, 35

Council for Democratization, 16

High School, 76, 379

Hospital, 292, 337, 341

Middle School, 337, 340

Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, 55–6

Christian Alliance of Laborers, Gwangju, 396

Christian Broadcasting System, 66, 67, 111

Gwangju, 111

Christian Farmers’ Association, 13, 391, 396

Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development, 396

Christopher, Warren 20

Chun (lieutenant), 132

Chun Doo-hwan, ix–x, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, 5–12, 17–22, 24, 26, 28–9. 35, 37, 52, 65, 77, 78, 81–2, 83, 89, 92, 125, 134, 135, 140, 144–5, 159, 168, 172, 177, 199, 216–19, 228, 232, 233, 248, 254, 264, 273, 280, 281, 289, 294, 301, 306, 335, 357–60, 362–3, 364, 366–7, 368–70, 382, 385, 391

Chung Hong-won, 86

Chung Ho-yong, 9, 11, 19, 25, 52–3, 78–9, 81, 94–5, 142, 144–5, 233, 244, 273, 304, 306, 364, 368, 370, 379, 382

Chung Ung, 25, 31, 41, 50, 53, 54, 79, 81, 82, 88, 94, 145, 156, 379

Chung-Ang University, 374

Chunggeum Underground Marketplace, 99f, 149

Chungjang-ro, 37, 40, 42–45, 49, 65, 69, 70, 88, 97, 104–5, 109, 112, 114, 141, 151, 228, 286, 309, 315–317, 378, 379

Police Substation, 37, 58, 326

Chungmu Cordon (Order of Military Merit), 78

Chungnam National University, 22, 31

Chuntae Girls’ High School, 186

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), US, 9, 21

Citizens’ Center, Gwangju, 39, 48f, 90

Citizens’ Committee for the Investigation and Legacy of the Gwangju Uprising, 365

Citizen Settlement Committee, 202–3, 209, 221, 223–4, 248, 264, 383

Citizens for Democracy Bulletin, 281, 301

Citizens’ Rally for the Defense of Democracy, 227, 246, 267, 280, 287, 383–6

City Council, Gwangju, 388

City Hall, Gwangju, 45, 68, 88, 90, 95, 111, 116, 119, 217, 272, 300, 336, 338–340, 379, 380

City Hall, Seoul, 39

Cold War, xi, 17

Combat Arms Command, 22, 24, 25, 27, 41, 56, 72, 78–80, 82–3, 88, 90, 94–5, 122, 126, 129, 132, 134, 136, 137, 143, 144–5, 155, 156, 175–6, 207–8, 209, 216, 225, 233, 234, 240, 242, 253, 259, 264, 273, 274, 276–7, 285, 294–6, 304, 346, 353, 355, 364, 376, 378–87

Armor School, 244, 346, 384, 387

Combat Development Corps, 90, 155, 233, 274

Infantry School, 242, 244, 304, 346, 376, 386

Combat Development Corps, 90, 155, 233, 274

Combined Forces, ROK-US, 6, 9, 20, 21, 52, 144, 218, 294

Commercial Bank of Korea, 88

Commercial High School, Gwangju, 177, 215

Commission for the Harmonious Pursuit of Democratization, 362

Commission for the Liberalization of Educational Institutions, 15, 16

Commission for the Listing of Gwangju Uprising Records, 371

Commission on Human Rights, United Nations, 371

“The Commitment of 800,000 Citizens for Democracy,” 280, 281, 287, 386

Community Center, Gwangju, 42, 335

Constitutional Amendment Review Committee, 23, 32, 361, 362

Council of Gwangju Uprising Detainees, 359

Council of Youth Activism for Democracy, South Jeolla, 392, 396

Council of Youth for Democracy, 14, 213

South Jeolla, 391, 397

Credit Union, YWCA, 14, 62, 213, 229, 263, 327

Cumings, Bruce, 399

Daechang Gas Station, 187

Daechon Police Substation, 174

Daedeok-myeon, 182

Daedo Hotel, 97, 137, 138, 316, 317, 333

Daedong High School, 64, 148, 173, 178, 179, 265, 275, 292, 378

Daegu, 26, 27, 41, 160

Daehan Logistics, 98, 170

Daeheung Temple, 169, 170, 402f

Daein Market, 39, 69, 90

Daein Supermarket, 72

Daein-dong Police Substation, 95

Daejeon, 22, 27

Daeji Hotel, 32

Daeseong Academy, 72

Dakjeonmeori, 93

Damyang, 47, 149, 160, 161f, 162, 173, 175, 182–4, 201, 314f, 337, 341, 351, 394

Damyang County, 47

Damyang Police Station, 173

Dankook University, 375

Dasi-myeon, 165, 168, 381

Dase-myeon Police Substation, 165

Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, xiv, 372

Defense Security Command, 5–11, 19, 21, 23, 25, 28–31, 51, 53, 56, 76, 81–4, 129–30, 144, 184–5, 219, 225, 254, 260, 305, 334, 343, 348, 364, 367, 368, 370, 378, 379

Defense Security Forces, 84

Democratic Party, 365

Democratic Republican Party, 23, 26, 30, 226

Democratization Committee, 385, 386

Democratization Movement Commemoration Committee, Gwangju, xvi, 390, 399–400

Deoglim Church, 93

Deoglim Mountain, 94

Deoglim Temple, 94

Deongnim Mountain, 329

Department of Health and Human Services, 223

Department of National Security, x

Deudeul River, 179

Diocesan Curia Office, 61, 91

District Court, Gwangju, 47, 314f

District Prosecutors’ Office, Gwangju, 49, 79, 125, 343

District Prosecutors’ Office, Seoul, 363

Dolgogae, 130, 276

Dolsan, 33

Donaegi Market, 312

Dong Geun-sik, 263

Dong-a Ilbo, 43, 62, 75, 91, 136, 152, 254, 260

Dong-gu, 39

Dong-gu District Office, 43, 46, 103, 140, 148

Donggu-ri Reservoir, 167

Dongguk University, 53, 283, 301, 308, 374, 375

Computer Science Institute, 334

Donggyo-dong, 30, 351, 352

Dongmun Bridge, 95, 106

Dong-myeon, 166, 167, 308

Dong-myeon Police Substation, 166

Dongmyeong Church, 308

Dongmyeong-dong, 46, 95, 111, 286

Dongmyeong-dong Police Substation, 46

Dongmyeong-ro, 47

Dongshin College (Dongshin University), 16, 64, 184

Dongshin High School, 183, 184, 325, 326

Dongun-dong, 107, 199, 216, 236

Dongsung Middle School, Gwangju, 106

Dosim Supermarket, 316

Duam-dong, 330, 384, 394

Ecumenical Youth Council, 396

Education Office, 169, 170

Elementary Schools

Gwangju Jungang, 69, 70

Gye-lim, 303, 310, 311, 319, 329–31

Hyodeok, 240

Suchang, 42

Yang-dong, 286

Eom Tae-ju, 280

Ewha Womans University, 359

Express Bus Terminal, 378

Families of Fallen Gwangju Uprising Activists, Association of the, 357, 396

Federal Court of Justice (Germany), 371

Field Battalion, 35, 36, 56, 58, 60, 113, 117, 132, 157, 158, 185, 186, 304, 305, 312, 317, 322, 328

“A Fighter’s Anthem,” 96

The Fighters’ Bulletin, 135, 214, 249, 263, 284, 309, 392, 394, 400

Fire Department, Gwangju, 73, 106

First Loyalty Conference, 11

1st Marine Division, 20

505th Security Unit, 25, 30–1, 80, 84, 130, 176, 219, 260, 296, 333, 343, 352, 353

Folk Culture Activism Alliance, 397

Folk Culture Research Center, 396

Fourth Republic of Korea, viii, 3. See also Yusin regime

“Fundamentals of riot suppression” (Pokdongjinapjakjeon gyobeom), 89, 112–13

Gabo Temple, 164

Gandhi, 235

Gangjin, 160, 161f, 165, 169–70, 177, 192, 217, 232, 383, 402f

Gangjin County, 168

Gangjin Police Station, 169

General Affairs Division, 200, 208, 318

Geumma, 27, 31, 374

Geumnam-ro, 32, 34, 37–9, 41–3, 45–6, 49, 50, 57–9, 61–3, 65–70, 72, 76, 88, 90–93, 95–6, 98–107, 109–10, 112–16, 127, 128, 131, 133, 135, 136, 138–41, 147, 150–1, 165, 197, 198, 206, 219, 252, 276, 281, 286, 287, 295, 299, 309, 311, 331, 335, 377–81, 383

Geumseong-dong Police Substation, 160, 163, 165

Geunglag Bridge, 382

Geungnak Bridge, 175, 279

Gijang Youth League, 396

Gil Yeong-cheol, 364

Gimpo Airport, 20

Gleysteen, William H., 6, 9, 14, 20, 52, 87, 135, 219–21, 226, 256, 288, 289

Go An-cheol, 395

Go Gwi-seok, 338

Go Gyu-seok, 183

Go Jae-seong, 182

Go Yeong-ja, 186–7

Godo-ri, 170

Goheung, 160, 161f

Gokseong, 160, 161f, 182

Good Samaritan, 61

Gu Seong-hui, 279

Gu Seong-ju, 271, 290, 300

Gu Yong-sang, 132, 133

Gungjeong-dong, 3, 4, 92

Gurye, 216

Gwak Hyeong-ryeol, 139, 141

Gwak Jae-gu, 16, 33

Gwang Yong-taek, 169

Gwangbok Medal (Order of National Security Merit), 254

Gwangcheon-dong, 33, 50, 57, 105, 201, 263, 285, 286

Gwangcheon-dong industrial complex, 201

Gwangdae Theater Company, 15, 93, 213, 227, 228, 231, 262, 270, 309, 395

Gwanghwamun, 38

Gwangju Airport, 53, 54, 83, 386

Gwangju Baptist Church, 220

Gwangju Buslines, 107, 160, 170

Gwangju Chamber of Commerce, 90

Gwangju Christian Alliance of Laborers, 396

Gwangju Christian Broadcasting System, 111

Gwangju Citizens’ Center, 39, 48f, 90

Gwangju City Council, 388

Gwangju City Hall, 45, 68, 88, 90, 95, 111, 116, 119, 217, 272, 300, 335, 336, 338–40, 379, 380

Gwangju Commercial High School, 177, 215

Gwangju Community Center, 42, 335

Gwangju Daedong High School, 64, 148, 173, 178, 179, 265, 275, 292, 378

Gwangju Democratization Movement Commemoration Committee, xvi, 390, 399–400

Gwangju District Court, 47, 314f

Gwangju District Prosecutors’ Office, 49, 79, 125, 343

Gwangju Dongshin High School, 183, 184, 325, 326

Gwangju Dongsung Middle School, 106

Gwangju Fire Department, 73, 106

Gwangju Girls’ High School, 203

Gwangju Health University, 63

Gwangju High School, 70, 72–3, 75, 90, 95, 228, 330, 337, 338, 347

Gwangju Indoor Sports Center, 77

Gwangju Inseong High School, 337, 339

Gwangju Jeil Church, 66, 252, 253

Gwangju Jeil High School, 42, 44, 45, 67, 69, 95, 205, 315, 396

Gwangju Jeil High School Finance Alumni Club, 205

Gwangju Jinheung High School, 93

Gwangju Joint Investigation Team, 31, 84. See also Joint Investigation Team

Gwangju Jungang Elementary School, 69, 70

Gwangju Lawyers’ Association, 354

Gwangju Loop 2, 185

Gwangju Mujin Church, 172, 396

Gwangju Mujin Middle School, 329

Gwangju National University of Education, 16, 22, 47, 128, 377

Gwangju Open College (Gwangju University), 174, 241

Gwangju Police Station, 31, 111, 327

Gwangju Post Office, 46, 88, 92, 95, 140

Gwangju River, 37, 69, 71, 115, 148, 150, 285, 286

Gwangju Seobu Police Station, 311, 328

Gwangju Seogwang Middle School, 335

Gwangju Seoksan High School, 182

Gwangju Seoseok High School, 139, 303

Gwangju Situation Countermeasure Committee, 217

Gwangju Soongil High School, 182

Gwangju Tax Office, 111, 114, 123–5, 127, 134, 173, 206, 381

Gwangju Teachers College, 374

Gwangju Technical High School, 43, 134

Gwangju University (Gwangju Open College), 174, 241

Gwangju Uprising Allies Association, 363

Gwangju Uprising Missing Persons Truth Commission, 341

Gwangju Uprising Revision Committee, xvi

Gwangju Uprising Settlement Committee, 208

Gwangju White Papers, 388–90, 393–5

Gwangnam-ro, 58, 67, 69, 70, 115, 281

Gwangsan Girls’ High School, 64

Gwangseong Transport, 153

Gwangwon Transport, 181

Gyelim Elementary School, 303, 310, 311, 319, 329–31

Gyeongsang Province, North, 160

Gyeongsang Province, South, 76

Gyeongsang Provinces, 53, 57, 77, 110, 217

Gyerim Cinema, 39, 40, 50

Gyerim Police Substation, 75, 88, 92, 95, 136, 281

Gyerim Radio, 115

Gyerim-dong, 70, 75, 95, 106, 110, 184, 286, 308, 310, 330, 331, 378–9

Gyoyukmunhwasa publishing company, 283

Hae Jeong-gu, 181

Haenam, viii, 160, 161f, 165, 169–70, 177–9, 191–2, 201, 229, 394, 395, 402f

Police Station, 169

Secondary School, 170

Village, 192

Youth Club, 169, 170

Hagun-dong, 162, 204, 216, 235–6, 237, 286

Hagun-dong Neighborhood Center, 115

Hak-dong, 105, 107, 149, 157–8, 235, 237, 282, 286, 335, 380

Hak-dong Bridge, 236, 237

Hak-dong Market, 158

Ham Gwang-su, 190, 339

Ham Jang-nam, 190

Ham Seok-heon, 6, 18

Hamburg, 255

Hampyeong, 148, 160, 161f, 165, 171–2, 201, 231, 383, 394, 402f

Hampyeong Police Station, 109, 171

Hampyeong Sweet Potato Incident, 171

Han (private), 141

Han Guk-jae, 16, 33

Han Gyu-yeong, 168

Han Wan-seok, 224, 252

Han Yong-won, 130

Hanahoe, 7–8, 9, 363

Hang-dong, 173

Hang-dong Police Substation, 173

Hanguk mingjungsa (A people’s history of Korea), x

Hanil Bank, 45, 50, 67, 68, 72, 92, 95, 106, 149, 281, 303, 311

Hankook Chemical, 164

Hankook Ilbo, 334

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 376, 388

Hankyoreh, 400

Hanshin University, 360

Hanyang University, 64, 375

Harmonious Pursuit of Democratization, Commission for the, 362

Hawaii, 86

Heo Bong, 122

Heo Chun-seop, 216

Heo Gyu-jeong, 209, 215, 224, 250, 267, 268, 271, 300, 318, 385, 394

Heo Hwa-pyeong, 7, 19, 368

Heo Jang-hwan, 260, 333, 352–3

Heo Oh-je, 131

Heo Sam Soo, 7, 8, 19, 368

Hielscher, Gebhard, 256–7, 288

High Court, 143

High Military Court, 356

High Schools, 64, 93

Chonnam Girls’ High School, 69, 150, 335, 337, 338

Chosun University High School, 76, 379

Chuntae Girls’ High School, 186

Gwangju Commercial High School, 177, 215

Gwangju Daedong High School, 64, 148, 173, 178, 179, 265, 275, 292, 378

Gwangju Dongshin High School, 183–4, 326

Gwangju Girls’ High School, 203

Gwangju High School, 70, 75, 90, 95, 228, 330, 337, 338, 347

Gwangju Inseong High School, 337, 339

Gwangju Jeil High School, 42, 44, 45, 67, 69, 95, 315, 396

Gwangju Jinheung High School, 93

Gwangju Seoksan High School, 182

Gwangju Seoseok High School, 139, 303

Gwangju Soongil High School, 182

Gwangju Technical High School, 43, 134

Gwangsan Girls’ High School, 64

Jangheung High School, 170

Jeonggwang High School, 64

Jeonnam Girls’ Commercial High School, 146

Jeonnam Technical High School, 156

Kumho Jungang Girls’ High School, 64, 378

Okcheon Girls’ High School, 187

Open High School, 186

Sinui Girls’ Commercial High School, 186

Songwon High School, 342

South Jeolla Machine Engineering High School, 312

Sungui Technical High School, 158

High School Student Settlement Committee, 230

Hill, Dave, 221, 292

Hinzpeter, Jürgen, 248, 255, 288

Homeland Division, 67

Honam (region), 367

Honam Electric, 270

Honam Expressway, 145, 160, 175, 183, 184, 346

Honam Theological University, 190, 252

Honam University (Seongin College of Management and Commerce), 16

Honam-dong, 147

Hong Geum-suk, 186, 187–9, 286

Hong Hui-yun, 229, 262

Hong Nam-sun, 214, 232, 263, 265, 276, 279, 351, 353, 354, 356

Hong Ophthalmology Clinic, 141, 146

Hong Seong-dam, 228

Hong Seong-ryul, 84, 129, 260, 334, 379

Hong Sun-gwon, 293

Hong Sun-hui, 47, 174

Hongik University, 375

Hospitals

Armed Forces, 45, 49, 84, 85, 118, 128, 129, 176, 181, 190, 237, 239, 275, 285, 286, 328, 336, 339, 349, 352, 353, 382–4

Chonnam National University, 76, 106, 118, 258, 281, 286, 292, 311, 337, 349

Chosun University, 292, 337, 341

Kwangju Christian, 89, 146–7, 182, 184, 185, 292

Naju National, 349

Red Cross, 49, 69, 71, 146, 150, 206, 267, 285, 292

Hughes, James D., 86

Health and Human Services, Department of, 223

Hwang Gang-ju, 64

Hwang Geum-seon, 204, 250, 253–4, 290, 291

Hwang Ho-geol, 186

Hwang Ho-jeong, 141

Hwang Il-bong, 62, 392

Hwang Jae-yeong, 181

Hwang Jong-ho, 48–9

Hwang Nak-ju, 125

Hwang Nam-yeol, 181

Hwang Sok-yong, x, xv–xvi, 263, 397–8, 400

Hwang Ui-su, 326

Hwang Yeong-ju, 140

Hwang Young-si, 7, 19, 52, 53, 82, 155, 156, 216–17, 232, 233, 273, 276, 294, 334, 368, 370, 382, 385, 387

Hwanggeum-dong, 95, 379

Hwangnyong River, 337, 341

Hwangsan-myeon, 170

Hwani Department Store, 163

Hwasun (region), 149, 157, 158, 160–3, 165–7, 171, 175, 176, 185–7, 201, 231, 236, 382, 394, 395, 402f

Buk-myeon Police Substation, 167

Dong-myeon Police Substation, 166

Mining Station, 166, 167, 382

Police Station, 151

Station, 166

Hwasun-dong, 337

Hwawon-myeon, 170, 192

Hyeondae Cinema, 69, 110f, 150

Hyeongje Bakery, 282

Hyeonsan-myeon, 170

Hyochang Stadium, 24

Hyocheon Station, 178–82, 240, 241f, 242, 336, 382, 384

Hyocheon Village, 76

Hyodeok Elementary School, 240, 241f, 403f

Hyodeok Police Substation, 174

Hyodeok Underpass, 242

Hyodeok-dong, 236, 337, 340

Ilbe, xiv, 399

Ilgok Village, 337, 340

Ilshin Textile, 115, 164, 174, 186, 270

Im Byeong-cheol, 241f, 243, 244

Im Chae-ho, 164

Im Chun-sik, 150

Im Dong-jae, 181

Im Eun-taek, 183, 338

Im Hui-ju, 189

Im Jae-gu, 103

Im Jeong-sik, 190, 339

Im Jong-mun, 168

Im Nak-pyeong, 39, 50

Im Sang-taek, 395, 396

Im Seong-taek, 279

Im Su-chun, 158

Im Su-won, 304, 364, 387

Im Wang-taek, 15

Im Yeong-cheon, 395

Im Yeong-hui, 227, 228, 262, 395

Im Yeong-sang, 303, 308, 325

Imdong-gil, 99

“In Memory of Gwangju’s Fallen,” 360

Incheon, 6, 26, 390

Incheon National University, 361

Incheon National University of Education, 252

Indoor Sports Center, Gwangju, 77

Infantry Division, 11

9th, 7–8, 9

20th, 375–6

31st, 31, 41, 51, 53, 54

35th, 27

Infantry School, 241f, 242, 244, 304, 346, 376, 386

Inseong High School, Gwangju, 337, 339

Intelligence Corps, Army HQ, 21, 306

International Advisory Committee of the Memory of the World Programme, 372

Iran, 17, 226

Jaetdeung, 148, 337

Jameson, Sam, 256

Jang (battalion commander), 169

Jang (intelligence officer), 101

Jang (paratrooper captain), 102

Jang Bang-hwan, 154, 338

Jang Cheon-su, 36

Jang Du-seok, 263, 264, 265, 395

Jang Gap-su, 16

Jang Gi-eon, 232

Jang Gi-oh, 7

Jang Gye-beom, 258–60, 347–8, 353

Jang Hyeong-tae, 25, 79, 132–3, 136, 207, 273–4, 381

Jang Hyu-dong, 207, 212, 224

Jang Ik-su, 60

Jang Jae-chun, 181–2

Jang Ji-gwon, 232

Jang Sa-bok, 80, 253

Jang Sa-nam, 276

Jang Se-dong, 7, 25, 79, 95, 369

Jang Se-gyun, 208, 236, 248, 290–1

Jang Seung-hui, 319

Jang Tae-wan, 8

Jang-dong, 378

Jang-dong roundabout 72, 105

Jangdong-myeon Police Substation, 170

Jangheung, 160, 161f, 165, 170

Jangheung High School, 170

Jangseong, 107, 161f, 382, 394

Jangseong County, 42, 294

Japan Catholic Council for Justice and Peace, x, 398

Jebong-ro, 72, 104, 105, 112

Jeil Church, Gwangju, 66, 252, 253

Jeil Cinema, 49

Jeil High School, Gwangju, 42, 44, 45, 67, 69, 95, 205, 315, 396

Jeilgwan (restaurant), 44

Jeju Island, 5, 53

Jeolla Province Martial Law Command, 25, 41, 50, 82, 83, 136, 147, 209, 211–12, 225, 273, 288, 293, 331, 383, 384, 386, 387. See also Martial Law Command

Jeolla Provinces, 53, 56, 57, 217

Jeollanam-do Medical Association, 90

Jeollanam-do Pharmaceutical Association, 90

Jeon Gye-ryang, xv, 47, 396

Jeon Jae-seo, 339

Jeon Jae-su, 240, 241f, 339

Jeon Jeong-ho, 158

Jeon Jeong-il, 185

Jeon Ok-ju, 114–15, 124, 127, 132–3, 350–1, 353, 356, 381

Jeon Sang-yong, 253

Jeon So-yeon, 392

Jeon Su-ryong, 168

Jeon Tae-il Commemoration Committee, 390

Jeon Yeong-jin, 148

Jeon Yong-ho, xii, xvi, 135, 148, 228, 309, 389, 394, 397, 400, 401

Jeonbuk, 22, 31, 33

Jeonbuk National University, 22, 31, 33

Jeong (company commander), 101

Jeong Bang-nam, 62

Jeong Byeong-ju, 8

Jeong Cheol (Jeong Ui-haeng), xvi, 389, 401

Jeong Chun-gil, 109

Jeong Dae-ha, xvi, 400

Jeong Deung-ryong, 391

Jeong Do-yeong, 19

Jeong Dong-nyeon, 15, 30, 213, 225, 351–2, 354–6, 394

Jeong Eun-cheol, 43

Jeong Eun-taek, 76

Jeong Geum-dong, 315

Jeong Gon-seok, 300

Jeong Guk-seong, 182

Jeong Gwan-cheol, 120

Jeong Gwon-mo, 172

Jeong Gyu-cheol, 395

Jeong Hae-jik, 231, 268, 271, 281, 300, 318–19, 348, 394, 396

Jeong Hae-min, 208, 209, 300, 318, 320

Jeong Hong-jun, 391

Jeong Hyang-gyu (Jeong Hyeong-gyu), 258, 259

Jeong Hyang-ja, 395

Jeong Hyeon-ae, xvi, 91, 134, 148, 206, 212, 227, 228, 347, 395, 400

Jeong Hyeong-gyu (Jeong Hyang-gyu), 258

Jeong Nam-gyun, 252, 300

Jeong Sang-yong, xii, xvi, 91, 134, 148, 231, 245, 246, 263–5, 268, 271, 281, 290–1, 300, 311, 318, 319, 348, 385, 392–3, 394, 396, 397, 401

Jeong Seok-hwan, 79

Jeong Seung-hwa, 5, 7–8, 363

Jeong Si-chae, 79, 80, 207–8, 212, 245–6, 281, 355, 383

Jeong Su-hwa, 364

Jeong Suk-gyeong, 283, 300, 308

Jeong Su-man, 357

Jeong Tae-ho, 293

Jeong Ui-haeng (Jeong Cheol), xvi

Jeong Won-hun, 131

Jeong Yeong-dong, 75, 150, 184

Jeong Yeong-jin, 364

Jeong Yeon-hyo, 309

Jeong Yong-hwa, xii, xvi, 14, 33, 390–1, 392, 393, 396, 397, 401

Jeong Yu-ah, 206, 212, 227, 228

Jeongeup, 160

Jeonggwang High School, 64

Jeonil Broadcasting, 62, 103, 111, 140, 141, 147, 206, 262, 272, 273, 304, 306, 307, 311, 315, 317, 325, 326–8, 347, 387

Jeonju, 22, 27, 33, 128, 160, 279, 395

Jeonnam Brewery, 90

Jeonnam Girls’ Commercial High School, 146

Jeonnam Ilbo, 128

Jeonnam Meil, 104, 128, 137

Jeonnam Technical High School, 156

Jeonnam Textile, 270

Jeungsim Buddhist Temple, 157

Jin Internal Medicine Clinic, 162

Jin Jong-chae, 31, 41, 143, 144, 232–3, 364

Jindo, 33, 165, 183, 184

Jinhae, 6

Jinheung High School, Gwangju, 93

Jinwol-dong, 240, 241f

Jisan military base, 173

Jisan Recreation Area, 156,

Jisan-dong, 105, 286, 335

Jisan-dong Police Substation, 47

Jo Chang-gu, 242–3

Jo Yang-hun, xvi

Joint Committee for the Indictment of the Perpetrators of the Gwangju Massacre, 366

Joint Investigation Headquarters, 5, 6, 25, 30, 31, 84, 289

Joint Investigation Team, 19, 23, 31, 84, 184, 204, 334, 351, 353, 354

Gwangju, 31, 84

South Jeolla, 25, 184, 353, 354

Jongno, 360

Jonnam Meil, 400

JoongAng Ilbo, 254, 369

Ju So-yeon, 203, 282, 300

Jukdong Church, 172

Junam Village, 76, 157–8, 175, 185–90, 203, 236–7, 240, 286, 294, 305–7, 336, 337, 339–43, 382, 384

June Struggle, ix, xiv, 362

Jungang Church, 61f, 134

Jungang Elementary School, Gwangju, 69, 70

Jungang-ro, 37, 58, 96

Jung-gu, 390

Jungheung-dong, 310

Jungnyeong Mountain, 178

Juwol-dong, 134, 187

Kang Deok-jin, 168, 180

Kang Gil-jo, 159

Kang Gu-yeong, 131

Kang Hae-jung, 184

Kang Im-ah, 328

Kang Jeong-ung, 109

Kang Ju-won, 173

Kang Seok-sin, 192

Kang Seong-nam, 166

Kang Sin-seok, 172, 391, 396

Kang Yeong-uk, 364

Kangwon National University, 361

Kap Su Seol, 398

KBS (Korean Broadcasting System), 104, 111, 116, 123, 125–128, 173, 239, 248, 259, 269, 274, 331, 332, 379, 381, 387

KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency), 3, 4, 11, 21, 23, 25, 31, 51, 79, 173, 204, 217, 353

Khomeini, 17

KIA Motors, 129

Kim (captain), 176–7

Kim (captain, 3rd Brigade, 11th Battalion), 317, 318

Kim (colonel), 95

Kim (inspector), 260

Kim (KCIA), 21

Kim (sergeant), 242

Kim (3rd Brigade military administrator), 177

Kim An-bu, 89–90

Kim Baek-cheon, 131

Kim Beom-dong, 44

Kim Beom-tae, 132, 381

Kim Bok-su, 216

Kim Bong-hwan, 232

Kim Bong-su, 163

Kim Bu-yeol, 337, 340

Kim Byeong-ryeol, 60

Kim Chang-gil, 209, 224, 226, 227, 238, 245, 248, 249–50, 253, 266, 267, 268–9, 276, 290–2, 299

Kim Chang-jung, xvi, 401

Kim Chang-oh, 166

Kim Cheol-su, 191

Kim Cheon-bae, 232, 276

Kim Chi-ha, 398

Kim Chi-yeul, 23

Kim Chu-gwang, 395

Kim Chun-hwa, 183

Kim Chun-rye, 186–7

Kim Chun-seok, 216

Kim Chung-geun, 62, 75

Kim Dae-hong, 33

Kim Dae-jung, 12, 14, 18, 23, 30, 33, 37, 56–7, 161, 168, 172, 177, 213, 218, 228, 264, 350, 351–5, 367, 369, 394

Kim Deok-su, 395

Kim Dong-gil, 23

Kim Dong-hwan, 207

Kim Dong-jin, 364

Kim Dong-mun, 173

Kim Dong-su, 16

Kim Dong-won, 353

Kim Du-won Neurosurgery Clinic, 45

Kim Eun-suk, 360

Kim Gap-je, 232, 279

Kim Gap-jin, 109

Kim Gap-su, 107

Kim Geon-nam (Kim Mun), 391

Kim Geun-tae, 397

Kim Gil-sik, 327–8

Kim Gil-su, 117, 243, 364

Kim Gi-seok, 79, 155, 210, 225, 233, 234–5, 253, 276–7

Kim Gi-un, 342

Kim Gwang-ho, 174

Kim Gwang-seop, 228

Kim Gwang-yeong, 148

Kim Gyeong-ae, 134

Kim Gyeong-cheol, 48–9, 90, 378

Kim Gyeong-cheon, 232

Kim Gyeong-su, 207

Kim Gyu-sik, 395

Kim Haeng-nam, 243

Kim Han-jung, 36, 105

Kim Ho-seong, 173

Kim Hong-gon, 141

Kim Hong-myeong, 395

Kim Hui-gyu, 168

Kim Hwa-seong, 149, 199, 200, 250, 290, 300

Kim Hyang-deuk, 262, 269, 309

Kim Hyeon-chae, 183–4, 316

Kim Hyeon-cheol, 105

Kim Hyeon-jang, 360, 391

Kim Hyeon-sik, 172

Kim Hyeong-gon, 129, 178, 300, 364

Kim Hyeong-ryeol, 339

Kim Hyo-seok, 269, 309

Kim Il-ok, 41, 50, 81, 132, 364

Kim Il-sung, xi, 21

Kim In, 49, 352

Kim In-hwan, 313, 364

Kim In-yun, 74

Kim Jae-gyu, 3, 4, 5

Kim Jae-hong, 182

Kim Jae-hwa, 121, 143

Kim Jae-il, 290

Kim Jae-myeong, 52, 136, 155, 156, 217, 233, 273, 294, 295

Kim Jae-pyeong, 190, 339

Kim Jae-su, 121

Kim Jeon-gi, 130–1

Kim Jeong-gon, 167

Kim Jeong-hui, 228, 395

Kim Jeong-seop, 42

Kim Jin-gi, 8

Kim Jin-yong, 8

Kim Jin-young, 8

Kim Jong-bae, 146, 209, 212, 215, 223, 224, 226, 245, 249, 250, 253, 258, 259, 266, 267, 268, 271, 281, 290, 291, 300, 312, 318, 348, 351, 354, 385, 394

Kim Jong-hun, 395

Kim Jong-hwan, 24

Kim Jong-nam, 284, 329

Kim Jong-pil, 14, 23, 26, 30, 250

Kim Jong-tae, 360

Kim Jun-bong, 41, 143, 146, 258, 259, 271, 286, 294, 300, 314, 348

Kim Jun-dong, 342

Kim Jun-tae, 395

Kim Mal-ok, 90

Kim Man-du, 121

Kim Mun (Kim Geon-nam), 391

Kim Mun-su, 240, 241f

Kim Myeong-suk, 335

Kim Nae-hyang, 183

Kim Nam-ju, 14

Kim Nam-seok, 186, 342

Kim Ok-ja, 155

Kim Orthopedic Clinic, 72

Kim Pan-geum, 395

Kim Pyeong-yong, 339

Kim Sam-jung, 185

Kim Sang-ho, 132

Kim Sang-jip, xvi, 71–2, 91, 134, 148, 228, 269, 301, 309, 347, 389, 391, 394, 401

Kim Sang-tae, 337, 340

Kim Sang-yun, 14, 32, 91, 213, 225, 347, 351, 391, 394

Kim Seon-chul, 394

Kim Seon-ok, 203, 284

Kim Seong-ae, 231, 283

Kim Seong-jin, 167

Kim Seong-jong, 395

Kim Seong-ryong, 232

Kim Seong-seop, 309, 392, 394

Kim Seong-su, 163, 183

Kim Seong-yong, 211, 214, 246, 265, 266, 269, 276, 277–9, 283, 285, 354, 386

Kim Seung-hu, 241f, 243, 244

Kim Seung-ryeol, 326

Kim Sou-hwan, 92, 135, 279, 385

Kim Su-nam, 395

Kim Sun-hyeon, 90, 155, 233, 274

Kim Sun-yi, 300

Kim Tae-chan, 215, 300, 310, 318, 319–21, 394

Kim Tae-heon, 131, 151, 164

Kim Tae-hun, 360

Kim Tae-jong, 212, 227, 228–9, 262, 309, 394, 400

Kim Ui-gi, 360, 395

Kim Un-gi, 15, 33, 351, 352, 355

Kim Wan-bae, 364

Kim Won-gap, 149, 199, 200, 394

Kim Woo-sik, 45

Kim Yang-ae, 283

Kim Yang-rae, 391

Kim Yang-oh, 204–5

Kim Yeon-tae, 154

Kim Yeong-bok, 252, 253, 300, 321–2

Kim Yeong-bong, 167

Kim Yeong-chan, 76, 379

Kim Yeong-cheol, 62, 212, 214, 227, 228, 229, 269, 271, 300, 311, 322, 323–4, 349

Kim Yeong-dae, 60

Kim Yeong-jin, 232

Kim Yeong-mo, 395

Kim Yeong-muk, 243

Kim Yeong-nam, 102

Kim Yeong-ran, 64

Kim Yeong-sam, 363

Kim Yeong-seon, 190

Kim Yeong-taek, 91, 136, 152

Kim Yeong-woo, 395

Kim Yeo-su, 316

Kim Yong-dae, 138, 140

Kim Yong-gyun, 166

Kim Yong-seon, 216

Kim Yong-wan, 118

Kim Young-sam, 12, 14, 125, 366

Kim Yun-gi, 228, 288, 301, 318

Kim Yun-hui, 328

Kim Yun-su, 186

Kkachigogae, 48

Ko (captain), 36

Konkuk University, 375

Kookmin Bank, 104

Kookmin University, 376

Korea, Fourth Republic of, viii, 3. See also Yusin regime

Korea Electric Power Corporation, 275, 279

Korea First Bank, 102, 110f

Korea Military Academy, 19, 79, 144, 216, 217

Korea Society of Archival Studies, 371

Korea University, 18, 23, 24, 26, 173, 359, 361, 365, 374

Korean Armed Forces Hospital, 45, 49, 84, 85, 118, 128, 129, 176, 181, 190, 237, 239, 275, 285, 286, 328, 336, 339, 349, 352, 353, 382–4

Korean Bar Association, 365

Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), 104, 111, 116, 123, 125–128, 173, 239, 248, 259, 269, 274, 331, 332, 379, 381, 387

Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), 3, 4, 11, 21, 23, 25, 31, 51, 79, 173, 204, 217, 353

Korean Democratic Unification Activism Union, 397

Korean Women’s Association, 90

Korean Young Christian Workers (JOC), 270, 283

Koryeo Cement, 146

Kumho Jungang Girls’ High School, 64, 378

Kumho Jungang Girls’ High School Student Council, 64

Kwangju Bank, 43, 88, 92, 97, 127

Kwangju Christian Hospital, 89, 146–7, 182, 184, 185, 292

Kwon Geun-rip, 241f, 243, 244

Kwon Gwang-sik, 395

Kwon Ho-yeong, 342

Kwon Jung-dal, 19, 23, 28

Kwon Seung-man, 35, 36, 41, 81, 158, 304, 364

Kwon Yong-un, 138

Kyung Hee University, 331, 376

School of Korean Medicine, 331

Lawyers’ Association, Gwangju, 354

Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Minbyun), 365

Le Monde, 256

Leadership Team. See Uprising Leadership Team

Lee (captain), 111–12

Lee (private), 120–1

Lee Ae-sin, 214, 232, 263, 290

Lee Bang-gi, 353

Lee Beom-nam, 395

Lee Beom-yeong, 390

Lee Buk-il, 121

Lee Byeong-nyeon, 364

Lee Byeong-woo, 364

Lee Chang-ryong, 260

Lee Chang-bok, 390

Lee Chu-ja, 191

Lee Chung-yeong, 331

Lee Dae-seong, 141

Lee Dae-sun, 79–80

Lee Dal-yeon, 168

Lee Deok-jun, 179–80, 309, 328

Lee Don-gyu, 36

Lee Gang-gap, 240

Lee Gang-ha, 168

Lee Geum-jae, 335, 338

Lee Geum-yeong, 120

Lee Geun-jae, 46

Lee Gi-bong, 232

Lee Gi-hong, 214, 232, 263, 264–5, 266, 276, 354

Lee Gu-ho, 155

Lee Gwan-taek, 267

Lee Gwang-ho, 35

Lee Gwang-yeong, 146, 148

Lee Gyeong, 15

Lee Gyeong-hui, 202, 284, 300

Lee Gyeong-nam, 53–4, 138

Lee Gyeong-sik, 250, 252–3, 300

Lee Gyu-hyeon, 309, 377

Lee Hak-bong, 7, 19, 23, 30, 84, 334, 368

Lee Heung-cheol, 300

Lee Hui-seong, 9, 24, 28–30, 51–2, 56, 81–2, 122, 135, 143, 144, 157, 216, 232–3, 273, 294–5, 306, 364, 368, 370, 380–2

Lee Hu-rak, 23

Lee Hwang, 283

Lee Hyeok, 252, 300

Lee Hyeon-cheol, 389

Lee Hyeon-ju, 228, 229

Lee Jae-chun, 262, 310, 315, 325

Lee Jae-eui, viii, xii, xvi, 202, 205, 231, 393–4, 395, 397, 399, 400, 401

Lee Jae-gwon, 164

Lee Jae-ho, 285, 300, 310, 323

Lee Jae-woo, 80, 84

Lee Jang-ui, 50

Lee Je-won, 364

Lee Jeong, 393

Lee Jeong-woo, 84

Lee Jeong-yung, 84

Lee Jong-gi, 207, 224, 235, 236, 247, 265–6, 290, 291, 300, 318, 320, 331

Lee Jong-gyu, 364

Lee Mae-sil, 190

Lee Min-oh, 45

Lee Mun-yeong, 23

Lee Myung-bak, xi, xiii

Lee Nam-sun, 328

Lee Sang-han, 25

Lee Sang-ho, 395

Lee Sang-hun, 295

Lee Sang-hyeon, 102–3

Lee Sang-jae, 10

Lee Se-hong, 109

Lee Se-jong, 33

Lee Seng-hak, 214, 237, 262

Lee Seon, 167, 395

Lee Seong-gwi, 215

Lee Seong-hak, 264, 276, 279

Lee Seong-ja, 140

Lee Seong-jeon, 167

Lee Seong-jin, 167

Lee Seung-eul, 183

Lee Seung-ryong, 33

Lee Seung-yong, 392

Lee Song-hak, 232

Lee Wu-jeong, 15, 33

Lee Yang-hyeon, 91, 134, 231, 268, 271, 300, 301, 311, 312, 322, 323–4, 394, 396

Lee Yeon, 262, 309

Lee Yeong-hyeon, 302

Lee Yeong-il, 168

Lee Yeong-saeng, 232, 276

Lee Yong-il, 131

Lee Yong-suk, 300

Lee Yun-jeong, 206, 212, 227–8

Lew Byeong-hyun, 6, 52, 144

Liberalization of Educational Institutions, Commission for the, 15, 16, 361

Linton, John, 288–9

Listing of Gwangju Uprising Records, Commission for the, 371

Loop 2, Gwangju, 185

Lotte Confectionary, 159

Lotte Hotel, 226

Maebong Mountain, 179

Magna Carta, xiv

Mainichi Shimbun, 246

Malbawoo Market, 183

Mamatas, Nick, 398–9

Mangwol-dong, 282, 341, 357, 358, 361–2, 403f

Mannyeon Mountain, 167

“Marching for Our Beloved,” xi, 399

Marine Division, 1st, 20

Martial Law Command, 8, 10, 24, 25, 29, 30, 41, 50–52, 56, 82–3, 86, 88, 110, 111, 143–4, 175–6, 204, 209–12, 217, 224–6, 230, 232, 234–5, 239, 245–7, 254, 271, 273, 276, 277, 288–91, 293–6, 336, 350, 353, 377, 381, 383–4, 386

Martial Law Directive 11, 144, 192

Martin, Bradley, 256, 288, 290

Masan-myeon, 4, 170

Matsunaga Seitarō, 288

May 18 Democratization Movement Archive, xvi, 400

May 18 Gwangju Uprising Archival Collection, 371, 400

MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation), 65, 69, 70, 78, 104, 105, 110, 111, 124, 125, 127–8, 136, 173, 350, 380

Memory of the World Programme, UNESCO, 372

Middle Schools

Chosun University, 337, 340

Gwangju Dongsung, 106

Gwangju Mujin, 329

Gwangju Seogwang, 335

Mudeung, 185

Midojang Inn, 59–60

Military Logistics Maintenance Battalion, 72

Miller, David 87, 219–21

Min Byeong-yeol, 338

Min Chung-gi, 395

Min Jong-deok, 390

Min Jun-sik, 353

Minbyun (Lawyers for a Democratic Society), 365

Ministry of Culture and Education, 19, 42

Ministry of Home Affairs, 51

Ministry of National Defense, 8–9, 22, 28, 86, 184, 260, 343, 345, 368, 399

Ministry of National Defense Truth Commission, 86, 184, 260, 399

Ministry of Public Information, 255

Modern Cultural Research Center, 14, 33, 214, 391

Mokpo, 56, 73, 128, 160–1, 165, 171–3, 175, 176, 178, 181, 205, 217, 232, 343, 383, 394, 395, 402f

Mokpo National University, 64

Mokpo Station, 172, 383

Mokpo Vocational College, 172, 203

Moon Bu-sik, 360

Moon Byung-ran, ix, 33, 397

Moon Chang-su, 207

Moon Guk-ju, 392, 397

Moon Ik-hwan, xi

Moon Jang-woo, 124, 149, 162, 216, 236, 348

Moon Yong-dong, 252–3, 300, 321–2

Moranbong, 350

Moyer, Robin, 256

Muan, 160, 161f, 165, 171–3, 382, 383, 391, 395, 402f

Mudeung Civil Service Exam Academy, 62

Mudeung Library, 184

Mudeung Lodge, 32

Mudeung Middle School, 185

Mudeung Mountain, 16, 32, 157, 217, 335

Mudeung Sports Center, 69, 75, 99–100, 107, 115, 116, 275, 380

Mudeung-ro, 116

Mujin Church, Gwangju, 172, 396

Mujin Middle School, Gwangju, 329

Mundeok-myeon, 171

Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), 65, 69, 70, 78, 104, 105, 110, 111, 124, 125, 127–8, 136, 173, 350, 380

Munhwa-dong, 341

Munhwa-dong Neighborhood Center, 337

Municipal Park, Mangwol-dong, 282

Municipal Student Hall, 39, 40

Munnae-myeon, 170

Mutual Defense Treaty, 5, 9, 218

Myeong Jae-yong, 395

Myeong Noh-geun, 15, 208, 214, 224–5, 232, 234–5, 263, 264, 266, 353, 354

Myeongdong Cathedral, 135, 358, 359, 365, 366, 391

Na Byeong-sik, x, xii, xv, 396, 397–8

Na Gan-chae, xvi, 400

Na Gyeong-taek, 137–8

Na Il-seong, 307, 315–16, 349

Na Jeong-sik, 36

Na Myeong-gwan, 309, 327, 394

Na Sang-gi, 391

Naju, 93, 149, 160, 161f, 162–5, 167–8, 171–2, 178–82, 187, 201, 240, 242, 381–3, 394–5, 402f

Naju County, 160, 164, 165

Naju County Office, 164, 178, 181

Naju Fire Department, 178

Naju National Hospital, 349

Naju Police Station, 149, 163–5

Naju Wedding Hall, 180

Nam Dong-seong, 108–9, 113–14

Nam-gu, Gwangju, 392

Nam-gu, Incheon, 390

Nam Jae-hui, 235, 236

Namdo Art Hall, 228

Nam-dong Catholic Church, 211, 214, 232, 265, 283, 308

Namgwangju Market, 330

Namgwangju Station, 158, 311

Namhae Expressway, 176

Namhae Fishing Net Factory, 271

Nammun, 97

Nam-myeon, 167

Nam-myeon Police Substation, 166

Nampung Publications, 391

Nampyeong, 163, 178–79, 182, 192, 240

Nampyeong Bridge, 178, 181

Nampyeong Police Substation, 160, 163–5

Namseon Coal, 179, 181, 243

Namwon, 107

Namyang, 173

National Assembly, 9, 14, 19, 22, 23, 26, 28–9, 30, 32, 51, 78, 86, 125, 212, 244, 345, 352, 358, 361, 362–3, 365, 367, 372, 390, 399

National Cemetery, 24, 374

National Conference for Unification, 6, 357

National Congress for New Politics, 365, 367

National Council of Churches, 360, 390

National Crisis Countermeasure Plan, 19, 22, 28, 367

National Democracy Federation, 390

National Federation of Fisheries Co-op, 72, 140, 141, 148, 190, 309, 326

National Forensic Service, 147

National Intelligence Council, US, 21

National Intelligence Service, 86

National Liberation Day, 367

National Security Act, 13, 358, 398

National Security Council, US, 5–6, 21, 220

National Security Forces, 204, 259, 260, 299, 343, 344, 345, 348, 349, 350, 352, 353, 354

National Tax Service, 228, 392

National Union for Democracy and Unification, 13, 18, 23, 30, 359

National Youth and Student Alliance for Democracy, 15, 231

National Youth and Student Alliance for Democracy Conspiracy, 396

Navy, ROK, 52, 218

Navy, US, 294

NBC (US), 248, 256

NCO (noncomissioned officer), 117, 136, 150

NDR (Norddeutscher Rundfunk), 248, 255, 288

Neoritjae, 185, 186, 231, 402f

Neoritjae Pass, 165

Neoritjae Tunnel, 161, 167, 185

Neungju, 167

Neurosurgery Clinic, Kim Du-won, 45

New Democratic Party of Korea, 125, 226

New York Times, 256, 288, 289, 312

Noan-myeon, 164

Noh, 34, 50, 131, 243, 389, 395

Noh Deuk-gi, 243

Noh Dong-gil, 395

Noh Dong-gyu, 131

Noh Jun-chae Clinic, 34

Noh Jun-hyeon, 50, 389

Nongjang Bridge, 47, 48f

Nongseong-dong, 129, 164, 237, 275, 279

Nongseong-dong Catholic Church, 278

Nongwon Industrial Technical School, 63

Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR), 248, 255, 288

North Gyeongsang Province, 160

North Jeolla Province, 27, 31, 33, 160, 261

Numun-dong, 95

Ochi, 161f, 175, 215, 382

Office for the Reclamation of Democracy and the Constitution, 362

Oh Byeong-mun, 290–1

Oh Dong-chan, 167

Oh Gyeong-min, 392

Oh Jeong-ho, 262

Oh Seong-yun, 364

Okcheon, 170, 192

Okcheon Girls’ High School, 187

Okinawa, 87, 218

Open High School, 186

Operation K, 9, 10

Operation Loyalty, x, 9–11, 22, 83, 294, 329, 377, 379

Operation Sangmu Loyalty, 136, 145, 182, 233, 272–3, 276, 277, 293–5, 304, 334, 369, 370, 384–5

Order of Military Merit, Chungmu Cordon, 78

Order of National Security Merit, Gwangbok Medal, 254

Orthopedic Clinic, Kim, 72

Osaka, x

“Our Wish Is Reunification,” 58, 96, 230

PACOM (US Pacific Command), 6

Pak Choong-hoon, 125, 211, 217, 383

Pak Chor-ung, 16

Pak Tongjin, 6, 220

Park (deputy department chief), 82

Park (master sergeant), 260

Park Ah-rang, 174

Park Byeong-gi, xvi, 216, 400

Park Byeong-gyu, 283, 301, 308, 334

Park Byeong-jun, 315

Park Byeong-ryul, 45

Park Chae-yeong, 36

Park Chan-suk, 64

Park Chan-uk, 158

Park Chang-nam, 164

Park Chung-hee, xvi, 3–7, 13, 17, 27, 29, 92, 252

Park Chung-ryeol, 395

Park Dong-seop, 216

Park Geum-hui, 146

Park Geun-hye, xi, xii, xiii, xvi

Park Gi-hyeon, 106

Park Gi-ung, 109

Park Gwan-hyun, 15, 27, 32–3, 35, 91–2, 209, 352, 354, 360

Park Gyeong-sun, 302

Park Hae-gwang, xvi, 400

Park Haeng-sam, 178, 395

Park Hee-do, 7–8

Park Hong, 260

Park Hong-cheol, 167

Park Hyeon-suk, 186, 187

Park Hyo-seon, 212, 227, 228, 230, 262, 268, 271, 394

Park Hyun-chae, 32, 33

Park In-gap, 48–9

Park In-su, 316

Park Jae-cheol, 364

Park Jae-il, 208

Park Jae-yeong, 181

Park Jeong-yeol, 228, 262

Park Jong-gil, 339

Park Jong-gyu, 23, 364

Park Jong-kyu, 369

Park Jong-seop, 288

Park Jun Byung, 7, 178, 364, 369

Park Jun-ha, 43

Park Man-cheon, 183

Park Mi-suk, 300

Park Mong-gu, 36, 228, 280, 389

Park Myeong-guk, 319

Park Nae-pung, 166, 323–4

Park Nam-seon, 70, 107, 149–50, 249, 250, 253, 266–7, 271, 275, 291, 300, 303, 307, 310, 318–22, 330, 348, 349, 351, 354, 356, 385, 394

Park Pil-ho, 60

Park Sang-gyu, 172

Park Seok-mu, 263, 264–5

Park Seon-jae, 252, 300, 321

Park Si-yeong, 401

Park Tae-jo, 167

Park Wu-seop, 390

Park Yeon-ok, 241f, 244

Park Yeon-sun, 154

Park Yeong-bong, 224

Park Yeong-gyu, 392–3

Park Yeong-sun, 203, 284, 300, 312, 387

Park Yong-jun, 62, 263, 309, 327, 338, 349

Park Yun-bong, 224

Park Yun-seon, 163

Peony Peak, 350

“A people’s history of Korea” (Hanguk mingjungsa), x

People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, 365

Peterson, Arnold A., 89, 147, 220–1, 290, 292

Philippines, 218, 372

Pius Cho. See Cho Pius

Poison Pin Incident, x, 258–60, 347, 348, 353, 385

Pokdongjinapjakjeon gyobeom (Fundamentals of riot suppression), 89, 112–13

Pol Pot, 4

Police stations, 34, 54, 163, 172, 206, 398

Damyang, 173

Gangjin, 169

Gwangju, 31, 111, 327

Gwangju Seobu, 311, 328

Haenam, 169

Hampyeong, 109, 171

Hwasun, 151

Naju, 149, 163, 164, 165

West Gwangju, 31, 111

Yeongam, 168

Police substations, 54, 107, 125, 127, 165, 361, 379, 380

Baegun-dong, 174

Bannam, 165

Buk-myeon, 167

Chungjang-ro, 58, 326

Daechon, 174

Daein-dong, 95

Dasi-myeon, 165, 168

Dongmyeong-dong, 46, 166

Geumseong-dong, 160, 163, 165

Gyerim, 75, 92, 95, 136, 281

Hang-dong, 173

Hyodeok, 174

Jangdong-myeon, 170

Jisan-dong, 47

Nam-myeong, 166

Nampyeong, 160, 163, 164, 165

Sanpo, 165

Seongjeon-myeong, 169

Yeonggang-dong, 163, 165

Pons, Philippe, 256

Port of Busan, 5

Post Office, Gwangju, 46, 88, 92, 95, 140

Presidential Security Service, 4

Prosecutors’ Office, Gwangju District, 49, 79, 125, 343

Prosecutors’ Office, Seoul District, 363

Province Hall, South Jeolla, ix, xiv, 16, 25, 27, 32, 36–8, 42, 45, 47, 54, 57, 58, 62, 63, 67–70, 75, 77, 83, 94, 95, 97–116, 120, 123, 127, 128, 131–4, 136–42, 145–8, 150–2, 155–7, 159, 162–3, 166–8, 174, 176, 183–5, 197, 199–208, 210–11, 214–15, 221, 222–3, 225, 227–37, 239, 245–9, 252–6, 258–74, 275–93, 299–319, 321–2, 324–7, 329–35, 336, 343, 347–9, 353, 357, 361, 369–71, 376, 378, 381–7, 393, 394

Province Hall Settlement Committee, 252, 253, 263, 265

Public Defense Security Command, 51, 254

Pulbit Publishing House, xv, 396, 397

Pulmuone, 397

Punghyang-dong, 50, 286

Pusan National University, 361

Pyeon (captain), 304, 387

Pyeonghwa Market, 153

Pyeongyang, 177

Red Cross, 49, 69, 71, 146, 150, 203, 206, 224, 237, 249, 267, 285, 288, 292, 383

Red Cross Hospital, 49, 69, 71, 146, 150, 206, 267, 285, 292

Red Cross Youth, 203

Republic of Korea, Fourth, viii, 3. See also Yusin regime

Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, Chosun University, 55, 56

Reservoir

Donggu-ri Reservoir, 167

Saengyong Reservoir, 337

Wonje Reservoir, 240, 384

Resistance Council for Democracy, 269, 271, 280–282, 288, 289, 349

“The Returning Soldier,” 332

Riot Squad, 2nd, 108

Roh Jae-hyeon, 8

Roh Tae-woo, xiv, xv, 7–9, 19, 29, 52, 78, 144, 273, 294, 362–3, 364, 366–9

ROK Air Force, 52, 164

ROK Army, 5, 8–11, 19–22, 24, 25, 31, 41, 52, 53, 72, 74, 78, 82–4, 89, 90, 112, 122, 136, 143–5, 155, 157, 176, 216, 217, 219, 220, 232–3, 273, 294–5, 304, 334, 364, 370, 375, 378–80, 385, 387

ROK Army Administrative School, 216

ROK Army Armor School, 155

ROK Army Command, 41, 122, 378, 379

ROK Army Hall, 273, 294, 295

ROK Army HQ, 8, 10, 11, 19, 21, 22, 24, 31, 52, 53, 72, 74, 82, 89, 112, 136, 157, 217, 233, 294, 295, 304

ROK Army HQ Intelligence Corps, 21

ROK Army HQ Operations Command, 19, 295

ROK Army HQ Personnel Corps, 82

ROK Army Operation Command, 25

ROK-US Combined Forces, 6, 9, 20, 21, 52, 144, 218, 294

Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Gwangju, 80

Ross, Thomas, 218

Rural Development Center, 276, 385

RUSA, 393, 395

Sa-dong, 260

Sabuk Incident, 14, 17, 85, 251

Saemaeul Movement, 183

Saemi gipeun mul (magazine), 290

Saengyong Reservoir, 337

Sajik Park, 75, 147, 262, 311

Samdo-dong, 341

Samjin Special Steel, 360

Samsan-myeon, 169

“Samurai,” 316

Sanam Tunnel, 160

Sangdo-dong, 125

Sangmudae, 25, 56, 62, 69, 79, 94, 119, 122, 128–30, 137, 155, 204, 211, 214, 225–6, 241, 242, 252–4, 273, 276–8, 285–7, 336–7, 339, 346, 347, 349, 352, 354–5, 375, 381, 383, 385

Sangmudae holding cells, 347, 354

Sanpo-myeon, 164

Sanpo Police Substation, 165

Sansu-dong, 46, 47, 50, 105, 136, 216, 236, 282, 286, 308, 311, 330

Sapgyocheon, 4

Scott-Stokes, Henry, 256, 288–90, 312

2nd Field Artillery Corps, 374

Second ROK Army, 22, 25, 31, 41, 78, 83, 122, 143–5, 232, 233, 294, 364, 379, 379, 380, 385

Security Unit, 505th, 25, 30–1, 80, 84, 130, 176, 219, 260, 296, 333, 343, 352, 353

Seo Dae-sok, 228

Seo Han-seong, 309

Seo Ho-bin, 313

Seo Man-oh, 337, 341

Seo Myeong-won, 91, 215

Seo Ui-nam, 30–1, 84, 260, 353

Seo-dong (district), 178

Seobang, 93, 183, 184, 199, 216, 236, 237

Seobang Market, 282

Seobu Police Station, Gwangju, 311, 328

Seogwangju (West Gwangju), 256

Seogwang Middle School, Gwangju, 335

Seokcheon Bridge, 149

Seoksan High School, Gwangju, 182

Seoksan Explosives Warehouse, 174

Seongbuk-dong, 163

Seongdong Prison, 388

Seongha Mansion, 262

Seongin College of Management and Commerce (Honam University), 16

Seongjeon-myeon, 161f, 168, 169

Seongjeon-myeon Police Substation, 169

Seongnae-ri, 169

Seoseok High School, Gwangju, 139, 303

Seoul Air Base, 53, 176

Seoul Capitol, 29, 307, 386

Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office, 363

Seoul City Hall, 39

Seoul Industrial College, 375

Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency, 127, 260

Seoul National University, 13, 18, 173, 228, 360, 374, 390, 396

School of Commerce, 396

Student Council, 13

Seoul Station, 26, 260

Seoul YWCA, 6–7, 16

Settlement Committee, 84, 202–4, 206, 207, 208–12, 214, 215, 221, 223–5, 227–32, 235–9, 245–50, 252, 253, 258, 259, 261, 263–9, 271, 275–8, 281, 283, 284, 288, 290, 292, 300, 305, 348, 366, 383–5

Citizen Settlement Committee, 202–3, 209, 221, 223–4, 245, 248, 264, 383

Citizens’ Settlement Committee for Justice, Resolution, and Hope for the Gwangju Uprising, 366

Gwangju Uprising Settlement Committee, 208

High School Student Settlement Committee, 230

Province Hall Settlement Committee, 252, 253, 263, 265

Student Settlement Committee, 204, 208–9, 215, 221, 223–4, 227, 235, 238, 245, 248, 249–50, 253, 258, 264, 266–8, 271, 283, 291, 383–4

Sewol Ferry, xii, xvi

Shilla Hotel, 217

Shim Jae Hoon, 256, 288–9

Shin Ae-deok, 184

Shin Byeong-gwan, 309

Shin Dong-su, 397

Shin Gwang-seok, 331

Shin Hyun-hwak, 6, 17–18, 21, 24, 26, 28–9, 125, 134, 211, 380

Shin Man-sik, 166–7, 258, 300, 321, 395

Shin Seung-gyun, 224

Shin Woo-sik, 22, 25, 31, 35, 41, 79–80, 94, 304, 364

Shin Yeong-il, 389

Shin Yeong-sun, 224

Shin Yun-hui, 369

Shorrock, Tim, 87, 399

Sikyeong Pavilion, 16

Sinan-dong, 99, 116, 119, 120, 159, 380, 389

Sinan-dong Underpass, 381

Sinbuk-myeon, 161f, 167, 168, 402f

Sindang-dong, 30

Singunbu, ix, x, 9–14, 18–20, 22, 23, 28–30, 37, 51, 52, 65, 73, 81, 82, 85, 89, 115, 125, 127, 135, 143, 144, 169, 175, 213, 216, 218, 220, 221, 225, 232, 233, 235, 238, 239, 251, 255, 257, 261, 277, 280, 306, 362, 366, 376, 385

Sinui Girls’ Commercial High School, 186

Sochon-dong, 341

Sogang University, 360, 375

Soh Jun-seop, 388–90

Soh Jun-yeol, 209, 216, 233, 273, 294, 304, 305, 364, 380, 386

Sohn Hyeon, 395

Son Byeong-seop, 60

Son Je-seon, 191

Son Ju-hang, 125

Son Nam-seung, 141, 300, 301

Song Gisuk, 15, 208, 214, 232, 263, 265, 354

Song Hui-seong, 262

Song Jeong-gyo, 339

Song Jin-gwang, 303, 310, 330–1

“The Song of Revival,” ix, 397

Song Seung-seok, 158

Songam industrial complex, 181, 242

Songam Village, 384

Songam-dong, 145, 161f, 236, 240, 244, 275, 337, 346

Songbaek Women’s Society, 14, 16, 206, 213, 227, 228, 231, 262, 270, 309, 392, 395

Songgwang, 160, 167

Songjeong-ri, 64, 87, 151, 161f, 164, 171, 175, 221, 279, 314f

Songjeong-ri Air Base, 83, 87, 156, 164, 176, 189, 221, 296

Songjeongni Station, 126, 128, 181, 375

Songji-myeon, 170

Songwon College, 186, 203

Songwon High School, 342

Soongil High School, Gwangju, 182

Soongjeon University, 374

Sosimdang Hall, 231

Sotae Bridge, 185

Sotae-dong, 157, 158, 175, 185, 216

South Chungcheong Province, 4

South Gate (Naju), 178

South Gyeongsang Province, 76

South Jeolla Catholic Farmers’ Association, 33

South Jeolla Coalition of the Gijang Youth League, 396

South Jeolla Council of Youth Activism for Democracy, 392, 396, 397

South Jeolla Development Council, 358

South Jeolla Joint Investigation Team, 25, 184, 353, 354. See also Joint Investigation Team

South Jeolla Machine Engineering High School, 312

South Jeolla Office for the Reclamation of Democracy and the Constitution, 362

South Jeolla Province, viii, 14, 25, 30, 31, 73, 79, 81, 132, 134, 160, 165, 177, 190, 192, 193, 207, 216, 217, 232, 251, 348, 355, 365, 371, 377, 382, 383, 391, 402f, 403f

South Jeolla Province Hall. See Province Hall

South Jeolla Province Police, 25, 27, 31, 46, 63, 108, 127, 156, 165, 260, 313, 334

South Jeolla Provincial Education Committee, 64, 88

South Jeolla Social Activism Association, xiv, 396, 397

Special Act on the Handling of the December 12

Military Insurrection and the May 18 Democratization Movement, 365

Special Constitutional Amendment Committee, 32

Special Forces, ROK, ix, 4, 11, 14, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 31, 35–7, 41, 42, 52, 53, 55–7, 67, 68, 72–4, 79, 85–9, 94–6, 102, 113, 115, 122, 123, 136, 143–5, 150, 152, 156, 159, 175–7, 182, 185, 186, 190, 198, 203, 240, 279, 286, 294, 304–7, 315, 327–9, 331, 332, 341, 343, 346, 348, 364, 368, 369, 374, 375, 377–9, 386, 387, 399. See also Airborne Special Forces Brigades

“Special Forces Anthem,” 113

Special Investigation Headquarters for the December 12 Military Insurrection and the May 18 Democratization Movement, 366

Special Warfare Command, 8, 11, 19, 25, 52, 53, 78, 81, 94, 142, 144, 145, 233, 244, 273, 295, 304, 364, 368, 370, 379

Sports Center, Gwangju Indoor, 77

Sports Center, Mudeung, 69, 75, 99–100, 107, 115, 116, 275, 380

“Springtime of Seoul,” 388

Ssangchon-dong, 190

Standards of Democratic Education, 15, 388, 391

State Department, US, 290

Student Hall, Municipal, 39, 40

Student National Defense Corps, 15, 361

Student Protest Countermeasure Plan, 19

Student Settlement Committee, 204, 208–9, 215, 221, 223–4, 227, 235, 238, 245, 248, 249–50, 253, 258, 264, 266–8, 271, 283, 291, 383–4

Subic Bay, 218

Suchang Elementary School, Gwangju, 42

Süddeutsche Zeitung, 256, 288

Suksil Village, 157, 348, 349

Suncheon, 128, 160, 167, 170, 175, 204, 256, 288, 395

Sungui Technical High School, 158

Supreme Court of South Korea, 9, 63, 143, 356–7, 369–70

Sweet Potato Incident, Hampyeong, 171

Taebong Village, 348

Taepyeong Cinema, 48f, 224

Taewon Passenger Corp, 172, 173

Tank Battalion, 32nd, 155

Tax Office, Gwangju, 111, 114, 123–5, 127, 134, 173, 206, 381

Teachers College, Gwangju, 374

Technical High School

Gwangju, 43, 134

Jeonnam, 156

Sungui, 158

Tenth Declaration of Martial Law, 30, 51, 377

Thorpe, Norman, 205, 256, 333

Tokyo, 255, 256, 288, 398

“The Torn Flag,” 389, 391, 396

Tourist Hotel, Gwangju, 43, 45, 60, 87, 128, 140, 141, 219, 304, 315, 326, 332

“The Truth Behind the Gwangju Uprising,” 390

Truth Commission, Ministry of National Defense, 86, 184, 260

Truth Commission, Gwangju Uprising Missing Persons, 341

20th Division Command, 126, 375

Uljin-Samcheok Landings, 86

Um Tae-ju, 309

Unam-dong, 107, 275, 384, 394, 397

UNESCO, xiv, 371–2, 400

UNESCO Memory of the World Programme, xiv, 371

Unification Revolutionary Party, 218

Union of Student Clubs, 16

United Nations Command, 218

United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 371

United States Forces Korea (USFK), 5, 20

United States Pacific Command (PACOM), 6

United Student Leadership, 27

Uprising Leadership Team, 62, 232, 248, 250, 254, 268–71, 280, 281, 284, 287, 288, 300, 302–3, 311, 312, 316, 318, 320, 348, 349, 354, 385, 386, 394

Uri Plant Research Center, 393

US Air Force, 87, 221, 292, 294

US Declaration of Independence, xiv

US Defense Department, 218, 284

US Defense Intelligence Agency, 87

US embassy, 9, 20, 87, 221, 288

Useuljae, 161f, 191–2, 402f

Useuljae Pass, 192

USFK (United States Forces Korea), 5, 20

US National Intelligence Council, 21

US National Security Council, 5–6, 21, 220

US Navy, 294

US Seventh Fleet, 5

US State Department, 5, 135, 290

USS Blue Ridge, 5

USS Coral Sea, 218

USS Kitty Hawk, 5

USSR, 5, 6

Vance, Cyrus, 6

Vietnam, 372

Vietnam War, 255

Wando, 160, 161f, 165, 169, 170, 190, 353, 383, 395

Wang Tae-gyeong, 181–2

Washington Post, 290

West Gwangju (Seogwangju), 31, 111, 256

West Gwangju Police Station, 31, 111

White House, 220

White Papers, Gwangju, 388–90, 393–5

Wi In-baek, 232, 264, 265, 276

Wi Seong-sam, 75, 158, 269, 300, 308, 320–1, 394

Wickham, John, 9, 21, 52, 135, 218–20, 294

WikiLeaks, 9

Wolsan-dong, 13, 95, 103, 146, 286, 307, 311, 328–9

Wolsan-dong Catholic Church, 329

Wonje Reservoir, 240, 241f

Wonje Village, 240, 384

Wonju, 14, 390

Wonkwang University, 33

Wonsan Bombing position, 59, 90, 103, 320

World War II, xi

Yang Cheon-taek, 395

Yang Dae-in, 67, 136, 144

Yang Dong-seon, 330, 338

Yang Dong-yeong, 139

Yang Gang-seop, 32–3, 92

Yang Gi-nam, 262, 279

Yang Gi-un, 342

Yang Gwan-su, x

Yang Hae-su, 395

Yang Hoe-nam, 190–1, 339

Yang Hong-beom, 252, 300, 321–2

Yang Hui-seung, 15, 33

Yang In-hwa, 325

Yang Ji-mun, 172, 395

Yang Min-seok, 339, 341, 342

Yang Seung-hui, 300

Yang Si-yeong, 300

Yang Won-sik, 209

Yang-dong, 70, 77, 93, 107, 282, 286, 379, 380

Yang-dong Elementary School, 286

Yang-dong Market, 58, 69, 70, 93, 115, 131, 283, 286, 287, 292, 329

Yangnim Bridge, 71, 148, 281

Yangnim Market, 307

Yangnim-dong, 71, 89, 221, 292

Yangseo Association, 14, 213, 262, 269, 309, 327, 392

Yeon-dong, 173

Yeondong Church, 172

Yeongam, 160, 161, 165, 167–8, 171, 177, 201, 382, 383, 395, 402f

Yeongam County Office, 168

Yeongam Police Station, 168

Yeonggang-dong, 163, 165

Yeonggang-dong Police Substation, 163, 165

Yeonggwang, 161f, 171, 177, 192, 244, 279, 346, 382

Yeongnam, 102, 367

Yeongsanpo, 161f, 163, 168, 382, 402f

Yeosu, 33, 73, 316, 395

Yomiuri Shimbun, 256, 288

Yong-dong, 170

Yongjeon-dong, 337

Yongsan-dong, 185

Yonsei University, 23, 360

College of Medicine, 288

Yoon Han Bong, x, 14, 16, 33, 213, 352, 355, 391, 392

Yoon Jang-hyeon, 391

Yoon Sang-won, 17, 33, 71, 91, 134, 212, 214, 227–8, 231, 253, 288, 290, 300, 301, 303, 309, 311, 318, 322–4, 349, 385, 386, 400

Youn Kong-hi, 61, 80, 92, 208, 211, 278, 354, 386

Young Christian Workers, 13, 213, 270, 283, 395, 396

Young Korea Academy, 231

Young Koreans United, x

Youth Alliance for Democratization Activism, 397

Yu Bok-dong, 191

Yu Chun-hak, 189

Yu Eun-yeol, 168

Yu Gi-mun, 172

Yu Hak-seong, 7, 19, 368

Yu Hong-ryeol, 216

Yu Hyo-il, 364

Yu Jae-do, 15, 351

Yu Jae-hong, 163

Yu Ji-gwang, 395

Yu Nak-jin, 184

Yu Seok, 173, 315

Yu Seung-gyu, 46, 105

Yu So-yeong, 33, 184

Yu Yeong-seon, 184–5

Yu-dong, 42, 68, 69, 72, 77, 98, 99, 105, 115, 128, 149, 282, 378

Yudal Mountain, 173

Yudeok-dong, 105

Yuk (captain), 313–14

Yun Cheong-ja, 300, 308, 395

Yun Da-hyeon, 216

Yun Gang-ok, 231, 268, 271, 300, 318–19, 348, 394, 396

Yun Geum-seok, 395

Yun Gi-hyeon, 227, 228, 229

Yun Gwang-jang, 263

Yun Heung-jeong, 24, 25, 41, 79–82, 90, 122, 136, 143, 145, 156, 209, 216, 380

Yun Jae-man, 364

Yun Man-sik, 228

Yun Posun, 6, 18, 279

Yun Seok-ru, 259, 284–5, 291, 299–300, 310, 323, 325, 348, 351

Yun Sun-ho, 309, 327, 392

Yun Yeong-cheol, 325–6

Yun Yeong-gyu, 214, 237

Yun Yeong-hwa, 243

Yuseon Hall, 170

Yusin regime, 3–6, 12–15, 18, 24, 37, 40, 171, 212, 226, 228. See also Fourth Republic of Korea

Yusin Constitution (Fourth Republic Constitution), 3, 5

Yusin Political Society, 226

YWCA (Gwangju), 15, 32, 44, 62, 206, 213–14, 228, 229, 231–2, 246, 249, 261–3, 265, 267, 268, 269–70, 279, 284, 291, 299, 303–4, 309–11, 325–8, 332, 335, 337, 338, 347, 349, 387, 389

YWCA Credit Union, 14, 62, 213, 229, 263, 327

YWCA Seoul, 6–7, 16