LENINISM

Volume Two

Joseph Stalin

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:
VLADIMIR LENIN

LENINISM

Volume Two

Joseph Stalin

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:
VLADIMIR LENIN

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: VLADIMIR LENIN

Volume 5

LENINISM

LENINISM

Volume Two

JOSEPH STALIN

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in Russian in 1926. First published in English in 1933 by
George Allen & Unwin Ltd
Translated from the Russian by Eden & Cedar Paul

This edition first published in 2017
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 1928 English Translation George Allen & Unwin Ltd

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-0-415-79274-5 (Set)
ISBN: 978-1-315-20438-3 (Set) (ebk)
ISBN: 978-1-138-70385-8 (Volume 5) (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-20002-6 (Volume 5) (ebk)

Publisher's Note
The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent.

Disclaimer
The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.

LENINISM

by
JOSEPH STALIN

VOLUME TWO

LONDON
GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
MUSEUM STREET

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1933

All rights reserved

CONTENTS

REGARDING THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT

Reply to Comrade Dmitriev

THE THREE BASIC SLOGANS OF THE PARTY ON THE PEASANT QUESTION

Reply to Comrade Yan-sky

THE SLOGAN OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY IN THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Reply to S. Pokrovsky

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION IN RUSSIA (September 9, 1927)

1. Questions Put by the Delegation and Stalin's Replies
2. Stalin's Questions to the Delegation and its Replies

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS' DELEGATIONS ON NOVEMBER 5, 1927

ON THE GRAIN FRONT

Extract from a Talk to Students of the Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy, and the Sverdlov University on May 28, 1928

LENIN ON THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANTS

Reply to Comrade S.

THE JULY PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U.

Speech Delivered to a Meeting of the Active Members of the Leningrad Organisation of the C.P.S.U. on July 13, 1928

I. Comintern Questions

1. The Fundamental Problems of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern
2. The Programme of the Comintern

II. Questions of Socialist Construction in the Soviet Union

1. The Grain Collection Policy
2. The Problem of Cadres for Industrial Construction

III. Conclusion

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.

Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and the Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U. on October 19, 1928

THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.

Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., November 19, 1928

1. The Rate of Industrial Development
2. The Grain Problem
3. Deviations and the Conciliatory Attitude Towards Deviations

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

From a Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in April, 1929

1. The Shifting of Classes and Our Differences

2. Differences on Comintern Questions
3. Differences on Internal Policy
(*a*) The Class Struggle
(*b*) The Intensification of the Class Struggle
(*c*) The Peasantry
(*d*) N.E.P. and Market Relations
(*e*) The Rate of Development of Industry and the New Forms of *Smychka*
(*f*) Comrade Bukharin as a Theoretician
(*g*) A Five-Year Plan or a Two-Year Plan
(*h*) The Question of the Sowing Area
(*i*) The Grain Collections
4. The Fight Against the Right Deviation

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE

ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWELFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

1. In the Sphere of Productivity of Labour
2. In the Sphere of Industrial Development
3. In the Sphere of Agricultural Development

Conclusion

QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE CONFERENCE OF MARXIST-AGRARIANS ON DECEMBER 27, 1929

1. The Theory of "Equilibrium"
2. The Theory of "Automatic Development" in the Building Up of Socialism
3. The Theory of the "Stability" of Individual Small-Peasant Farming
4. The Town and the Village
5. The Nature of the Collective Farms

6. The Class Shiftings and the Turn in the Policy of the Party
7. Conclusions

ON THE POLICY OF LIQUIDATING THE KULAKS AS A CLASS

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS

REPLY TO COMRADES ON THE COLLECTIVE FARMS

POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

REPORT DELIVERED JUNE 27, 1930, AND SPEECH IN REPLY TO DEBATE DELIVERED JULY 2, 1930

I. THE GROWING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION OF THE U.S.S.R.
1. The World Economic Crisis
2. The Sharpening of the Contradictions of Capitalism
3. Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and the Capitalist State

II. THE RISING TIDE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R.
1. The Growth of National Economy as a Whole
2. The Successes of Industrialisation
3. The Predominant Position of Socialist Industry and the Rate of its Growth
4. Agriculture and the Grain Problem
5. The Turn of the Peasantry Toward Socialism and the Rate of Development of the Soviet and Collective Farm Movement
6. The Improvement of the Material and Cultural Position of the Workers and Peasants

7. The Difficulties of Growth, the Struggle of Classes, and the Socialist Offensive Along the Whole Front
8. The Capitalist or the Socialist Economic System
9. Our Next Tasks
(*a*) General
(*b*) Industry
(*c*) Agriculture
(*d*) Transport

III. The Party
1. The Direction of Socialist Construction
2. The Leadership of Internal Party Affairs

IV. Speech in Reply to the Debate

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS MANAGERS
Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Conference of Managers of Soviet Industry, February 4, 1931

NEW CONDITIONS, NEW TASKS
Speech Delivered at the Conference of Leaders of Industry, June 23, 1931
1. Labour Power
2. Wages
3. Labour Organisation
4. A Working-Class Industrial and Technical Intelligentsia
5. Symptoms of the Change of Attitude of the Old Industrial and Technical Intelligentsia
6. Business Accounting
7. New Methods of Work, New Methods of Leadership

SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM
To the Editors of *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia*

INDEX

LENINISM

REGARDING THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT

(*Reply to Comrade Dmitriev*)

COMRADE DMITRIEV,

Your letter of January 14, 1927, to the *Bolshevik*, on the subject of the workers' and peasants' government was sent to me at the Central Committee for reply. I am answering after some delay owing to the fact that I have been very busy, for which I beg you to forgive me.

1. This question cannot be put as some comrades put it: is the workers' and peasants' government a fact, or is it only an agitational slogan? We cannot say that, although in reality there is no such thing as a workers' and peasants' government, nevertheless, we may talk about a workers' and peasants' government as an agitational slogan. This would suggest that our Party is capable of issuing intrinsically false slogans, slogans that are actually unsubstantial, in which the Party itself does not believe, but which the Party, nevertheless, puts into circulation in order to deceive the masses. Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and bourgeois-democrats may act like that, since contradiction between word and deed and deceit of the masses constitute one of the chief weapons of these moribund Parties. But never and under no circumstances can our Party put the question in this way; for our Party is a Marxist Party, a Leninist Party, a Party that is on the ascendant, a Party which draws its strength from the fact that its words do not contradict its deeds, that it does not deceive the masses, that it tells the masses only the truth and bases its policy not on demagogy, but on a scientific analysis of class forces. The question must be put in this way: *either* we have no such thing as a workers' and peasants' government, in which case the slogan workers' and peasants' government must be discarded as a superfluous and false slogan, *or* we have a workers' and peasants' government in fact, and the existence of that government corresponds with the state of class forces, in which case the slogan of a

workers' and peasants' government is a genuine and revolutionary slogan. Either one or the other. We have to choose, Comrade Dmitriev.

2. You say that the slogan workers' and peasants' government is "Comrade Stalin's formula." That is absolutely untrue. The fact is that this slogan, or, if you will, this "formula," is none other than Lenin's slogan. I merely repeated it in my *Questions and Answers*.[1] Take Vol. XV of Lenin's Works, pp. 12, 14, 16, 38, 52, 79, and 348; Vol. XVI, pp. 28, 29, and 315; Vol. XVIII, Part 1, p. 96, where Lenin speaks of the Soviet Government as *a Workers' and Peasants' Government*. Take Vol. XV, pp. 228, 322, 340, 341, and 345; Vol. XVI, pp. 95, 164, 301, 303, 307, 378, and 379; Vol. XVII, pp. 56, 105, 320, 340, 403, 419, and 420; Vol. XVIII, Part I, pp. 94, 111, and 223, in which Lenin speaks of the Soviet Power as a *Workers' and Peasants' Power*. Take all these and certain other of the works of Lenin and you will find that the slogan, or "formula," workers' and peasants' government is the slogan, or "formula," of Lenin and of nobody else.

3. The fundamental error you commit is that you confuse (*a*) the question of our Government with the question of our State and (*b*) the question of the class nature of our State and of our Government with the question of the day-to-day policy of our Government.

Our State must not be confused, *i.e*. identified, with our Government. Our State is the organisation of the *class* of proletarians as a State power the purpose of which is to crush the resistance of the exploiters, organise Socialist economy, put an end to classes, and so on. Our Government, on the other hand, is the *peak* of that State organisation, the ruling peak. The Government may make mistakes, it may commit blunders that may involve the danger of a temporary collapse of the dictatorship of the proletariat; but that would not mean that the proletarian dictatorship as a principle of structure of the State in the transition period is wrong or mistaken. It would only mean that the ruling peak is a bad one, that the policy of the ruling peak, the policy of the Government, is not consistent with the dictatorship of the proletariat and that that policy must be altered to *correspond with* the demands of the dictatorship of the proletariat. State and Government are homogeneous as to their class nature, but the Government is narrower in scope and does not embrace the State. They are organically connected and dependent one on the other, but that does not mean that they are the same thing.

You see, therefore, that the question of our State must not be confused with the question of our Government, just as the question of the class of proletarians must not be confused with the question of the ruling peak of the class of proletarians.

But still more impermissible is it to confuse the question of the class nature of our State and of our Government with the question of the day-to-day policy of our Government. The class nature of our State and of our Government is obvious—it is proletarian. The aims of our State and of our Government are also obvious, namely, to crush the resistance of the exploiters, to organise Socialist economy, to abolish classes, and so forth. All that is perfectly clear. In what, then, does the question of the day-to-day policy of our Government consist? It consists in the *ways* and *means* by which the class aims of the proletarian dictatorship may be realised in our peasant country. The proletarian State is required to crush the resistance of the exploiters, organise Socialist economy, abolish classes, and so forth. Our Government, in addition to all this, is required in order to point out the *ways* and the *means* (the day-to-day policy), without which the realisation of these aims would be impossible in our country, where the proletariat constitutes the minority and the peasantry the vast majority. What are these ways and means; what do they consist in? Fundamentally, they consist in measures directed towards maintaining and strengthening the *alliance* between the workers and the basic masses of the peasants and to maintaining and strengthening the *leadership* exercised in that alliance by the proletariat which is in power. It need hardly be shown that without, or apart from, *such* an alliance our Government would be impotent and that it would be impossible to realise the aims of the dictatorship of the proletariat to which I have just referred. How long will this alliance, this *smychka*, exist and how long will the Soviet Government's policy of strengthening this alliance, this *smychka*, continue? Obviously, as long as classes and as long as a government which is the expression of a class society and of the dictatorship of the proletariat exist. In this connection it should be borne in mind (*a*) that we need an alliance of the workers and the peasants not in order to preserve the peasantry as a class, but in order to transform it and remould it in a way that will assist the triumph of Socialist construction; and (*b*) that the Soviet Government's policy of strengthening that alliance is intended not to perpetuate classes, but to abolish them and to hasten their abolition. Lenin, therefore, was absolutely right when he said that:

> The supreme principle of the dictatorship is to preserve the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry, so that the proletariat may retain the leading position and the State power (Vol. XXVI, p. 460).

There is no need to show that it is this principle of Lenin's, and no other, that is the guiding spirit of the day-to-day policy of the Soviet Government and that the policy of the Soviet Government at the present stage of development is essentially a policy of preserving and strengthening this alliance between the workers and the basic masses of the peasants. It is *in this sense*, and in this sense alone, and not in the sense of its class nature, that the Soviet Government is *a workers' and peasants'* government. Not to recognise this is to deviate from the path of Leninism and to reject the idea of the bond, the idea of an alliance between the proletariat and the toiling masses of the peasantry. Not to recognise this is to regard the bond as a mere manœuvre, and not as a genuine revolutionary act, and to believe that we introduced N.E.P. merely for "agitational purposes," and not for the purpose of Socialist construction in association with the basic masses of the peasantry. Not to recognise this is to believe that the *fundamental* interests of the basic masses of the peasantry cannot be satisfied by our Revolution, that those interests are irreconcilably hostile to the interests of the proletariat, that we cannot and should not build up Socialism in association with the basic masses of the peasantry, that Lenin's co-operative plan is futile, and that the Mensheviks and their supporters are right. The questions have only to be put in this way and it becomes clear how hollow and worthless is the "agitational" conception of this cardinal question of the *bond*. That is why in my *Questions and Answers* I declared that the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government was not "demagogy" and not an "agitational" manœuvre, but that it was an undoubtedly genuine and revolutionary slogan.

Briefly: the question of the class nature of the State and of the Government, which determines the fundamental aims of the development of our Revolution, is one thing; and the question of the day-to-day policy of the Government, of the *ways* and *means* of carrying out that policy in order to achieve those aims, is another thing. These questions are, of course, interrelated. But that does not mean that they are identical, thrown into one heap as it were.

You see, therefore, that the question of the class nature of the State and of the Government must not be confused with the question of the day-to-day

policy of the Government.

You may say that there is a contradiction here: How can a Government that is proletarian in its class nature be called a workers' and peasants' government? But the contradiction is only an apparent one. Indeed, it is the same sort of "contradiction" as some of our wiseacres profess to see between Lenin's two formulas regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat, the first of which states that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the power of *one* class" (Vol. XVI, p. 282), while the second states that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is *a special form of class alliance* between the proletariat, the vanguard of the toilers, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of toilers (petty-bourgeoisie, small owners, peasantry, intellectuals, etc.)" (Vol. XVI, p. 241). Is there any contradiction between these two formulas? Of course not. How then is the power of *one* class (the proletariat) to be achieved in a class alliance, let us say, with the basic masses of the peasantry? By the proletariat ("the vanguard of the toilers"), which is in power, assuming the leadership in this alliance. The fundamental idea of these two formulas is that the power of one class, the class of proletarians, is exercised, with the aid of an alliance of that class with the basic mass of the peasantry, by assuming the *State* leadership over the latter. Where is the contradiction? What is meant by the *State* leadership of the proletariat in relation to the basic mass of the peasantry? Is that the same sort of leadership as existed, for instance, in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution when we demanded the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry? No, it is not. The *State* leadership of the proletariat in respect of the peasantry is a leadership exercised under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The *State* leadership of the proletariat means (*a*) that the bourgeoisie is already overthrown; (*b*) that the proletariat is in power; (*c*) that the proletariat does not share its power with other classes; and (*d*) that the proletariat is building Socialism and in this is leading the basic masses of the peasantry. On the other hand, the leadership of the proletariat in a bourgeois-democratic revolution under a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry means (*a*) that capitalism fundamentally remains; (*b*) that a revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie is in power, and constitutes the dominating force in the Government; (*c*) that the democratic bourgeoisie shares power with the proletariat; and (*d*) that the proletariat is emancipating the peasantry from the influence of the bourgeois parties, leads the peasantry intellectually and politically, and is preparing for the

struggle to overthrow capitalism. The difference, you will see, is a fundamental one.

The same is true of the question of the workers' and peasants' government. What is there contradictory in the fact that the proletarian nature of our Government and the Socialist tasks that follow therefrom not only do not prevent it from pursuing, but, on the contrary, compel it, necessarily compel it, to pursue a policy of maintaining and strengthening the alliance of the workers and peasants as one of the most important means of achieving the Socialist class aims of the proletarian dictatorship in our peasant country, and that our Government is consequently called a workers' and peasants' government? Is it not obvious that Lenin was right when he issued the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government and when he qualified our Government as a workers' and peasants' government?

Generally speaking, "the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat," with the aid of which the power of one class, the proletariat, is exercised in our country, is a rather complicated thing. I know that this does not please certain comrades, they do not like it. I know that on "the principle of the least expenditure of energy" some of them would have preferred a simpler and easier system. But what can one do? Firstly, you have got to accept Leninism as it is (Leninism must not be simplified and vulgarised), and, secondly, history teaches us that the simplest and easiest "theories" are not always correct ones.

4. In your letter you complain that:

> The fault of all the comrades who have dealt with this question is that they either speak only of the Government, or only of the State, and, consequently, do not give a final answer and entirely fail to explain what relation should exist between these concepts.

I admit that certain of our leading comrades are indeed guilty of this fault, especially when we remember that certain not very diligent "readers" will not themselves make a careful study of the works of Lenin, but demand that every phrase be thoroughly digested for them beforehand. But what can one do? Firstly, our leading comrades are too busy, too overburdened with current work, and therefore cannot find time to make an exposition of Leninism point by point, and, secondly, something must be left for the "readers," who, after all, ought to cease merely *perusing* the Works of Lenin and begin to make a serious *study* of Leninism. And it should be stated that,

unless the "readers" really make a serious study of Leninism, complaints like yours and "misunderstandings" are always bound to arise.

Take, for instance, the question of our State. It is obvious that our State, from the point of view of its class nature, its programme, its fundamental aims, its actions and deed, is a proletarian State—a workers' State, it is true, with certain "bureaucratic distortions." You will remember the definition given by Lenin:

> A workers' State is an abstraction. In actual fact we have a workers' State, firstly, with the peculiarity that it is not the working-class population but the peasant population that is predominant in the country, and that, secondly, it is a workers' State with bureaucratic distortions (Vol. XXVI, p. 91).

Only Mensheviks, S.R.S, and certain of our oppositionists can doubt this. Lenin repeatedly explained that our State is the State of the proletarian dictatorship, and the proletarian dictatorship is the power of one class, the power of the proletariat. All this has long been known. Nevertheless, not a few "readers" have complained, and still complain, that Lenin sometimes called our State a "workers' and peasants '" State, although it is not difficult to understand that Lenin was not referring to the specific class nature of our State, nor still less was he denying the proletarian nature of that State, but was pointing out that the proletarian nature of the Soviet State inevitably leads to the necessity for a *smychka* between the proletariat and the basic masses of the peasantry, and that consequently the policy of the Soviet Government must be directed towards strengthening that bond. Take, for instance, Vol. XV, p. 55; Vol. XVII, pp. 26, 54, and 420; and Vol. XVIII, Part 1, pp. 12, 111, 119, and 380. In these, as well as in other of his works, Lenin describes our State as being a "*workers*' and *peasants*'" State. But it would be strange indeed not to understand that in all such cases Lenin did not intend to describe the class nature of our State, but to define the policy of strengthening the alliance that follows from the proletarian nature and Socialist aims of a State existing under the conditions prevailing in our peasant country. Only in this conditional and limited sense, and *only in that sense*, can one speak of a "workers' and peasants'" State, as Lenin speaks of it in the passages quoted from his Works. Regarding the class nature of our State, Lenin, as I have already mentioned, gives a most precise formula, permitting of no misinterpretations, namely, a workers' State with bureaucratic distortions in a country with a predominantly peasant

population. That is clear, I think. Nevertheless, certain "readers," who are able to "read," but are not anxious to understand what they read, continue to complain that Lenin has "confused" them regarding the nature of our State, and that his "disciples" refuse to unravel the "confusion." That is rather ridiculous, Comrade Dmitriev.

You ask, What is the way out of this "misunderstanding"? In my opinion there is only one way out, namely, to study Lenin not from isolated quotations, but to study the whole subject, to study him deliberately, seriously, and diligently. I see no other way out.

The Bolshevik, No. 6, March 15, 1927.

[1] Cf. Vol. I.-Ed.

THE THREE BASIC SLOGANS OF THE PARTY ON THE PEASANT QUESTION

(*Reply to Comrade Yan-sky*)

COMRADE YAN-SKY,

I, of course, duly received your letter. I am replying after some delay, for which please forgive me.

1. Lenin says that "*the most important question of every revolution is the question of State power*" (Vol. XIV, Part 2, p. 192). In the hands of which class, or which classes, is power concentrated; which class, or which classes, must be overthrown; which class, or which classes, must take power? Such is "the most important question of every revolution."

The basic strategic slogans of the Party, that retain their validity during the whole period of any particular stage of the revolution, cannot be regarded as basic slogans if they are not fully and completely founded on this cardinal thesis of Lenin. Basic slogans are correct slogans only if they are built on a Marxian analysis of class forces, only if they indicate a correct plan of disposition of the revolutionary forces along the battle-front of the class struggle, only if they assist in bringing the masses up to the battle-front of the struggle for the triumph of the revolution and for the seizure of power by the new class, and only if they assist the Party in forming a large and powerful political army from among the broad masses of the people, which is essential for the fulfilment of this task.

Defeats and retreats, failures and tactical errors, may occur in any given stage of the revolution; but that does not mean that the fundamental strategical slogan is a wrong one. For instance, the basic slogan during the *first* stage of our Revolution, namely, "together with the whole peasantry, against the Tsar and the landlords, with the bourgeoisie neutralised, for the triumph of the bourgeois-democratic revolution" was an absolutely correct slogan, in spite of the fact that the Revolution of 1905 was unsuccessful.

In other words, we must not confuse the question of the basic slogan of the Party with the question of the defeat or failure of the revolution at any particular stage of its development.

It may happen that in the course of the revolution the basic slogan of the Party may have already led to the overthrow of the power of the old classes,

or of the old class, but that a number of essential demands of the revolution, following from that slogan, have not been realised, or that their realisation has been delayed for a long period of time, or that their realisation may require a new revolution. Nevertheless, that would not mean that the basic slogan is a wrong one. For instance, the February Revolution of 1917 overthrew tsarism and the landlords, but it did not lead to the confiscation of the estates of the landlords, and so on. That, however, does not mean that our basic slogan in the first stage of the Revolution was a wrong one. Or, further, the October Revolution brought about the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the transfer of power to the proletariat, but did not immediately result (*a*) in the final completion of the bourgeois revolution in general, and (*b*) in the isolation of the kulaks in the rural districts in particular; these were delayed for a certain period of time. That, however, does not mean that our basic slogan during the *second* stage of the Revolution, namely, "together with the poor peasantry, against capitalism in town and country, with the middle peasantry neutralised, for the power of the proletariat," was a wrong slogan.

In other words, the question of the basic slogan of the Party must not be confused with the time and forms of realising any particular demand arising out of that slogan.

Consequently, the strategic slogans of our Party cannot be judged from the point of view of episodical successes or defeats of the revolutionary movement in any particular period, nor, still more, from the point of view of the times or forms of realising any particular demands that arise out of those slogans. The strategic slogan of the Party can be judged only from the point of view of a Marxian analysis of the class forces and of the correct disposition of the forces of revolution on the battle-front of the struggle for the triumph of the revolution and the concentration of power in the hands of the new class.

Your error, Comrade Yan-sky, is that you overlooked, or did not understand, this important methodological question.

2. In your letter you write:

> Is it correct to assert that we were in alliance with the whole peasantry *only* up to October? No, it is not. The slogan of an "alliance with the whole peasantry" was in effect before October, *during October*, *and in the first period after October*, inasmuch as the whole peasantry was interested in completing the bourgeois revolution.

From this quotation it follows that the strategic slogan of the Party in the *first* stage of the Revolution (1905 to February, 1917), when it was a matter of overthrowing the power of the Tsar and the landlords and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, *did not differ* from the strategical slogan of the *second* stage of the Revolution (February, 1917, to October, 1917), when it was a matter of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. In other words, you deny the fundamental difference between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian Socialist revolution. This error you commit because, apparently, you will not understand so simple a matter as that the basic theme of a strategical slogan is the question of power in the particular stage of the revolution, the question as to *which* class is being overthrown and into the hands of *which* class the power is being transferred. It need hardly be shown that on this point you are grievously mistaken.

You state that we carried out the slogan of an "alliance with the *whole* peasantry" during October as well as in the first period after October, inasmuch as the whole peasantry was interested in completing the bourgeois revolution. But who told you that the October upheaval and the October Revolution were confined to, or made it their basic task to complete, the bourgeois revolution? Where did you get that from? Do you really believe that the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat may be effected within the framework of the bourgeois revolution? Does not the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat mean breaking out of the framework of the bourgeois revolution? How can you assert that the kulaks (who, of course, are also peasants) have supported the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the transfer of power to the proletariat? How can it be denied that the decree on the nationalisation of the land, the abolition of private property in land, the prohibition of the purchase and the sale of land, etc., in spite of the fact that it cannot be regarded as a Socialist decree, was carried out by us in a *struggle against* the kulaks, and not in alliance with them? How can it be asserted that the kulaks (who are also peasants) could support the decrees of the Soviet Power regarding the expropriation of mills and factories, railways, banks, etc., or the slogan of the proletariat regarding the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war? How can it be asserted that it was not these and similar acts, not the overthrow of the

bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat that constituted the *fundamental* feature of October, but the completion of the bourgeois revolution?

No one denies that one of the chief aims of the October Revolution was to complete the bourgeois revolution, that it could not have been completed without the October Revolution, just as the October Revolution itself could not have been consolidated without the bourgeois revolution having been completed; and that, inasmuch as the October Revolution completed the bourgeois revolution, it could not but meet with the sympathy of all the peasants. All that is undeniable. But can it for this reason be asserted that the completion of the bourgeois revolution was not a by-product of the October Revolution, but its essential feature, its chief aim? What then becomes of the chief aim of the October Revolution, namely, the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, the expropriation of the capitalists, etc.? And if the basic theme of a strategic slogan is the basic question of every revolution, *i.e*. the question of transfer of power from one class to another class, is it not obvious that the question of the completion of the bourgeois revolution by the proletarian power must not be confused with the question of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the conquest of that proletarian power, *i.e*. with the question that constituted the main theme of the strategic slogan of the second stage of the revolution?

One of the greatest merits of the dictatorship of the proletariat lies in the fact that it completed the bourgeois revolution and entirely swept away the debris of medievalism. This was of supreme and, indeed, decisive importance to the rural districts; without it that association of peasant wars with the proletarian revolution of which Marx spoke in the second half of the last century could not have been achieved. Without it the proletarian revolution itself could not have been consolidated. Moreover, the following important circumstance should be borne in mind. The completion of the bourgeois revolution was not a single act. It was spread over a whole period embracing not only parts of 1918, as you assert in your letter, but also parts of 1919 (the Volga provinces and the Ural) and of 1919 and 1920 (the Ukraine). I am referring to the advance of Kolchak and Denikin, when the peasantry as a whole was faced with the danger of the restoration of the power of the landlords and when the peasantry as a *whole* was obliged to rally around the Soviet Power in order to ensure the completion of the

bourgeois revolution and to preserve the fruits of that revolution. We must always bear in mind the complexity and variety of the processes of actual experience, the "fantastic" interweaving of the immediate Socialist tasks of the dictatorship with the task of completing the bourgeois revolution, if we are to understand correctly both the quotations from Lenin cited above and the mechanism of the realisation of the Party slogan. Can it be asserted that this interweaving proves that the slogan of the Party in the *second* stage of the Revolution was a wrong one and that this slogan does not differ from the slogan of the *first* stage of the Revolution? Not at all. On the contrary, this interweaving merely confirms the correctness of the slogan of the Party in the second stage of the Revolution, namely, together with *poor* peasantry, against the capitalist bourgeoisie in town and country, for the power of the proletariat, etc. Why? Because in order to complete the bourgeois revolution it was *first* necessary, in October, to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and to set up the power of the proletariat, for only this power is capable of completing the bourgeois revolution. And in order to set up the power of the proletariat in October it was necessary to prepare and organise, for October, the *requisite* political army, which would be capable of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and of setting up the power of the proletariat. And there is no need to prove that *such* a political army could be prepared and organised *only* with the help of the slogan: an alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry, against the bourgeoisie, for the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is obvious that without *this* strategic slogan, which we issued from April, 1917, until October, 1917, we would never have had such a political army; in other words, we would not have triumphed in October, we would not have overthrown the power of the bourgeoisie, and, consequently, we would not have completed the bourgeois revolution.

That is why the completion of the bourgeois revolution cannot be set up against the strategic slogan of the second stage of the revolution, the purpose of which was to guarantee the seizure of power by the proletariat.

There is only one way to avoid all these "contradictions," namely, to admit the fundamental difference between the strategic slogan of the first stage of the Revolution (the bourgeois-democratic revolution) and the strategic slogan of the second stage of the Revolution (the proletarian revolution), and to admit that in the first stage of the Revolution we allied ourselves with the *whole* peasantry for the bourgeois-democratic revolution, while in the second stage of the Revolution we allied ourselves with the

poor peasantry against the power of capitalism and for the proletarian revolution. It is essential to admit this, because an analysis of the class forces in the first and second stages of the Revolution obliges us to do so. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain the fact that until February, 1917, we carried on our work under the slogan of a revolutionary-*democratic* dictatorship of the proletariat and the *peasantry*, while after February, 1917, this slogan was replaced by the slogan of the *Socialist* dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poor* peasantry. Confess, Comrade Yan-sky, that the substitution of one slogan by another in March and April, 1917, cannot be explained by your scheme.

This fundamental difference between the two strategic slogans of the Party was pointed out by Lenin in his pamphlet *Two Tactics*. He formulated the slogan of the Party during the period of preparation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution as follows:

> The proletariat must complete the democratic revolution and secure the adhesion of the mass of the peasantry in order to crush the resistance of the autocracy by force and paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie (Vol. VIII, p. 96).

In other words: together with the whole peasantry against the autocracy, with the bourgeoisie neutralised, for a democratic revolution.

The slogan of the Party in the period of preparation of the Socialist revolution he formulated as follows:

> The proletariat must bring about the Socialist revolution and secure the adhesion of the mass of semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie by force and paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty-bourgeoisie (Vol. VIII, p. 96).

In other words: together with the poor peasantry and the semi-proletarian sections of the population in general, against the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie in town and country being neutralised, for the Socialist revolution.

That was in 1905.

In April, 1917, Lenin, describing the then existing political situation as an interweaving of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry with the actual power of the bourgeoisie, said:

> The peculiar feature of the present moment in Russia is that it is a transition from the *first* stage of the Revolution, which, owing to the fact that the proletariat was not sufficiently class conscious and organised, gave power to the bourgeoisie, to the *second* stage, which should transfer power to the proletariat and the *poor* sections of the peasantry (*The April Theses*, Vol. XX, p. 88).

Towards the end of August, 1917, when the preparations for the October Revolution were in full swing, Lenin, in an article entitled "The Peasants and the Workers," wrote as follows:

> Only the proletariat and the *peasantry* can overthrow the monarchy—such at that time [*i.e.*, 1905, *J.S.*] was the fundamental definition of our class policy. And that definition was correct. Its correctness was confirmed again in February and March, 1917. Only the proletariat, leading the *poor peasantry* (the semi-proletarians, as our programme calls them), can end the war by a democratic peace, heal its wounds, and begin to take steps towards Socialism which have undoubtedly become essential and urgent—such is the definition of our class policy now (Vol. XXI, p. 111).

That should not be understood to mean that we have a dictatorship of the proletariat *and* the poor peasantry *now*. That, of course, is not so. We prepared for October under the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry and in October realised it formally, inasmuch as we had formed a *bloc* with the Left S.R.S and shared the government with them, although in point of fact the dictatorship of the proletariat already existed, since we Bolsheviks constituted the majority. However, the dictatorship of the proletariat *and* the poor peasantry ceased to exist formally after the Left S.R. *putsch*, after the rupture of the *bloc* with the Left S.R.S, when the government passed *completely and entirely* into the hands of *one* Party, our Party, which does not share, and must not share, the rule of the State with any other Party. This is what we mean by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Finally, in November, 1918, Lenin, casting a retrospective glance along the path the Revolution had followed, wrote:

> Yes, our Revolution is a bourgeois revolution *as long as* we ally ourselves *with* the peasantry as a whole. That we realised absolutely clearly; we stated it a hundred and thousand times in 1905; we never attempted to skip this essential phase of the historical process and never attempted to abolish it by decrees…. But in 1917, in the month of *April*, *long before the October Revolution and*

> *before we assumed power*, we openly declared, and explained to the people, that now the Revolution could not stop there; for the country has gone ahead, capitalism has moved on, has reached an unparalleled stage of ruin, which will *demand* (whether they like it or not), will demand that steps be taken towards Socialism. For there was *no* other way of moving forward, no other way of saving the country racked by war, and no other way of relieving the sufferings of the toilers and exploited. And it turned out just as we had foretold. The course of revolution confirmed our arguments. *At first*, together with *all* the peasantry against the monarchy, against the landlords, against medievalism (and to that extent the Revolution remained bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic). *Then*, together with the poor peasantry, together with the semi-proletariat, together with all the exploited, *against capitalism*, including the *rural rich*, *the kulaks*, *and the speculators*, and to that extent the Revolution becomes a *Socialist* revolution (Vol. XXIII, pp. 390–391).

As you see, Lenin repeatedly pointed out how profound was the difference between the first strategical slogan of the period of preparation for the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the second strategic slogan of the period of preparation for the October Revolution. The first slogan was: *together with the whole peasantry* against the autocracy; the second slogan: *together with the poor peasantry* against the bourgeoisie.

The fact that the completion of the bourgeois revolution dragged on for a whole period after October and that since we were completing the bourgeois revolution the "whole" peasantry could not but sympathise with us, does not, as I said above, in the least disturb the fundamental postulate, that we moved towards October and triumphed in October together with the *poor peasantry*, that we overthrew the power of the bourgeoisie and set up the dictatorship of the proletariat (one of the tasks of which was to complete the bourgeois revolution) together with the *poor peasantry* and against the resistance of the kulaks (also peasants) and the vacillations of the middle peasantry.

That is clear, I think.

3. In your letter you further write:

> Is the assertion true that "*we reached the threshold of October* under the slogan of an *alliance with the rural poor and the neutralisation of the middle peasant*? No, it is not true. For the reasons mentioned above, and from the quotations from Lenin, it will be seen that this slogan could arise only when "the class

> division within the peasantry had matured" (Lenin), *i.e*. "in the summer and autumn of 1918."

It follows from this quotation that the Party adopted the policy of neutralising the middle peasant not in the period of preparation for October and during October, but after October, and particularly after 1918, after the setting up of the Committees of Poor Peasants. That is *absolutely untrue*, Comrade Yan-sky. On the contrary, the policy of neutralising the middle peasant did not begin, but *ended* after the setting up of the Committees of Poor Peasants, after 1918. The policy of neutralising the middle peasant was *abolished* (and not introduced) after 1918. It was after 1918, in March, 1919, that Lenin, opening the Eighth Congress of our Party, stated:

> The best representatives of Socialism of the old days—when they still believed in revolution and served it as theoreticians—spoke of the neutralisation of the peasantry, *i.e*. of transforming this middle peasant into a social stratum, which, if it did not actively aid the revolution of the proletariat, at least would not hinder our work. This abstract, theoretical statement of the task is perfectly clear to us. *But it is not enough*. We have entered *a phase of Socialist construction* in which we must draw up concrete and detailed basic rules and instructions drawn from the experience of our work in the rural districts, by which we must guide ourselves in order to achieve a *stable alliance* with the middle peasantry (Vol. XXIV, p. 114).

As you see, this is something directly contrary to what you say in your letter. You turn our *actual* Party practice upside down by confusing the *beginning* of neutralisation with its *end*.

The middle peasant whined and vacillated between revolution and counter-revolution as long as the bourgeoisie was being overthrown and as long as the power of the Soviets was not consolidated; therefore it was necessary to neutralise him. The middle peasant began to turn towards us when he began to convince himself that the bourgeoisie had been overthrown "for good," that the power of the Soviets was being consolidated, that the kulak was being overcome, and that the Red Army was beginning to triumph on the fronts of the civil war. And it was after such a change that the third strategic slogan of the Party, announced by Lenin at the Eighth Congress, became possible, namely, with the support of the poor peasants and by establishing a stable alliance with the middle peasants, to march forward towards Socialist construction.

How could you have forgotten this well-known fact?

It further follows from your letter that the policy of neutralising the middle peasant during the *transition* toward the proletarian revolution and in the *early period* after the triumph of that revolution is incorrect, worthless, and, therefore, inacceptable. That is *absolutely untrue*, Comrade Yan-sky. Just the contrary is the case. It is while the power of the bourgeoisie is being overthrown and until the power of the proletariat is consolidated that the middle peasant vacillates and resists most of all. And it is at this period that alliance with the poor peasant and neutralisation of the middle peasant are essential.

Persisting in your error, you assert that the question of the peasantry is of great importance not only for our country, but also for other countries "which more or less resemble the economic system of pre-October Russia." The latter statement is, of course, true. But this is what Lenin said in his *Theses on the Agrarian Question* at the Second Congress of Comintern regarding the policy of proletarian Parties towards the middle peasant in the period when power is assumed by the proletariat. Having defined the poor peasantry, or, more precisely, "the toiling and exploited masses of the countryside," as a separate group consisting of agricultural labourers, semi-proletarians, or dwarf peasants, and small peasants, and proceeding to deal with the question of the middle peasantry as a separate group in the village, Lenin said:

> In the economic sense the term "middle peasantry" applies to small husbandmen, who also possess, either by right of ownership or by lease, only small parcels of land, but of such a nature that, under capitalism, as a rule provide not only modest support for the family and the farm, but also the possibility of obtaining a certain surplus, which, at least in good years, is capable of being transformed into capital, and who fairly frequently resort to the hire of the labour power of others…. The revolutionary proletariat cannot hope —at least *in the immediate future* and in *the early period of the dictatorship of the proletariat*—to win the adhesion of this section. *It must confine itself to the task of neutralising it*, *i.e*. inducing it not to offer active support to the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the proletariat (Stenographic Report of the Second Congress of Comintern, pp. 610–611).

How, after this, can it be asserted that the policy of neutralising the middle peasant arose only "in the summer and autumn of 1918," *i.e. after* the

decisive successes achieved in the consolidation of the power of the Soviets, the power of the proletariat?

As you see, the question of the strategic slogan of proletarian parties at the moment of transition to the Socialist revolution and the consolidation of the power of the proletariat, as well as the question of the neutralisation of the poor peasant, are not so simple as you imagine.

4. From all that has been said above it is clear that the quotations from the works of Lenin cited by you cannot be regarded as being contradictory to the basic slogan of our Party in the second stage of the Revolution, since these quotations (*a*) deal, not with the basic slogan of the Party *prior* to October, but with the completion of the bourgeois revolution *after* October, and (*b*) they do not refute, but confirm the correctness of that slogan. I have already mentioned above, and am obliged to repeat, that the strategic slogan of the Party in the second stage of the Revolution, in the period *prior to* the assumption of power by the proletariat, the chief theme of which is the question of power, cannot be set up in opposition to the task of completing the bourgeois revolution, which is effected in the period *following* the assumption of power by the proletariat.

5. You speak of a certain article by Comrade Molotov in *Pravda*, entitled "The Bourgeois Revolution in our Country" (March 12, 1927), which it appears "induced" you to apply to me for an explanation. I do not know how you read articles, Comrade Yan-sky. I have also read Comrade Molotov's article and do not think it in any way contradicts what I said in my report to the Fourteenth Congress of our Party on the slogans of our Party regarding the peasantry. In his article Comrade Molotov does not deal with the basic slogan of the Party in the period of October, but with the fact that, inasmuch as the Party, after October, completed the bourgeois revolution, it enjoyed the sympathy of the peasants. But I have already stated that the recognition of this fact does not refute, but on the contrary confirms, the correctness of the fundamental postulate that we overthrew the power of the bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the proletariat together with the poor peasantry, the middle peasant being neutralised, and against the bourgeoisie of town and country, and that but for that we would not have completed the bourgeois revolution.

The Bolshevik, Nos. 7–8, April 15, 1927.

THE SLOGAN OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY IN THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

(*Reply to S. Pokrovsky*)

COMRADE POKROVSKY,

I think that your letter of May 2 provides neither pretext nor foundation for a reply in detail, point by point, so to speak. Indeed, it offers nothing particularly new as compared with Comrade Yan-sky's letter. I am replying to your letter only because it contains certain elements directly restoring the Kamenevist views of the period April and May, 1917. It is only for the purpose of exposing these elements of restoration of Kamenevism that I consider it necessary to make a brief reply to your letter.

1. In your letter you state that "in fact, during the period from February to October we had the slogan of an alliance with the *whole of* the peasantry" and that "during the period from February to October the Party supported and defended its *old* slogan in relation to the peasantry: an alliance with the *whole* of the peasantry."

It follows from this, firstly, that during the period of preparation for the October Revolution (April to October) the Bolsheviks did not consider it their task to drive a furrow between the poor peasants and the rich peasants, but accepted the peasants as a whole.

Secondly, it follows that during the period of preparation for the October Revolution the Bolsheviks did not replace the old slogan of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry by a new slogan, namely, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, but retained the old positions laid down in Lenin's pamphlet, *Two Tactics*, in 1905.

Thirdly, it follows that the policy of the Bolsheviks of combating the vacillations and conciliationism of the Soviets during the period of preparation for the October Revolution (March to October, 1917), the vacillations of the middle peasants within the Soviets and on the battle-fronts, the vacillations between revolution and counter-revolution and the vacillations and compromise that became particularly acute in the July days,

when the Soviets, headed by the S.R. and Menshevik conciliators, allied themselves with the counter-revolutionary generals in order to isolate the Bolsheviks—it follows that the fight waged by the Bolsheviks against these vacillations and this compromise among certain strata of the peasantry was purposeless and absolutely unnecessary.

And, finally, it follows that Kamenev was right when, in April and May, 1917, he defended the old slogan of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, while Lenin, who regarded this slogan as already out of date and who proclaimed the new slogan of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, was wrong.

These questions have only to be formulated and the absurdity of the whole of your letter becomes apparent.

But since you happen to be a great lover of isolated quotations from the Works of Lenin, let us turn to the quotations.

It does not require much effort to prove that what Lenin regarded as the *new* factor in the agrarian relations in Russia after the February Revolution from the point of view of the further development of the Revolution was not the community of interests of the proletariat and the peasantry as a whole, but the *split* that had taken place between the poor peasants and the rich peasants, as a result of which the former, *i.e*. the poor peasants, gravitated toward the proletariat, whereas the latter, *i.e*. the rich peasants, supported the Provisional Government.

This is what Lenin said on the subject in his argument against Kamenev and Kamenevism in *April*, 1917:

> It is impossible for the proletarian Party *now* to base its hopes on the community of interests with the peasantry (Speech delivered at the Party Conference in April, 1917, Vol. XX, p. 245).

And further:

> We already discern, in the decisions of a number of peasant congresses, a tendency to put off the decision of the agrarian question until the Constituent Assembly meets. That is a victory for the *rich peasants*,[1] who tend towards the Cadets[2] (Speech delivered at the Petrograd City Conference in April, 1917, Vol. XX, p. 107).

And again:

> It is possible that the peasantry will seize the whole of the land and all power. I not only do not overlook that possibility, not only do not limit my outlook to the present day, but directly and precisely formulate the agrarian programme bearing this *new phenomenon* in mind, namely, the profound *split* between the agricultural labourers and poor peasants, on the one hand, and the peasant owners, on the other (*Letters on Tactics*, written in April, 1917, Vol. XX, p. 103).

That is the *new* and *important* factor that Lenin discerned in the new situation that had arisen in the village *after* the February Revolution.

That is what Lenin based himself on when deciding the policy of the Party after February, 1917.

That was the position that Lenin adopted when at the Petrograd City Conference in April, 1917, he said:

> We learned only here that the Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies has handed power over to the Provisional Government. The Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies is the embodiment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the soldiers; the majority of the latter consists of peasants. This is the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants. But this "dictatorship" has compromised with the bourgeoisie. We have to *re-examine the* "*old Bolshevism*"[1] (Vol. XX, p. 176).

Lenin started out from this postulate when, in April, 1917, he wrote:

> Whoever *now* speaks only of a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" is lagging behind the times and for that reason has, in actual fact, *gone over* to the side of the petty bourgeoisie against the proletarian class struggle and must be put in the archives of "Bolshevist" pre-revolutionary rarities (one might call it the archive of "Old Bolsheviks") (Vol. XX, p. 101).

It was on this foundation that the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poor* peasantry arose, *replacing* the old slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

You might say, as you do in your letter, that this is a Trotskyist way of skipping the uncompleted peasant revolution; but that is just as convincing as the objections that were levelled by Kamenev against Lenin in April, 1917. Lenin had these objections in mind when he said:

Trotskyism—"No Tsar and a Government of workers." That is false. The petty bourgeoisie exists, it cannot be discarded. But it consists of two parts. The *poor*[1] part is marching with the working class (Vol. XX, p. 182).

Comrade Kamenev's error, and yours now, Comrade Pokrovsky, consists in his inability to note the difference between the two sections of the petty bourgeoisie, in this case the peasantry, in his inability to *distinguish* the poor section of the peasantry from the general mass of peasants, and to *make that the basis* for the Party policy in the conditions of the transition from the first stage of the Revolution in 1917 to the second stage, and in his inability to deduce from this the second slogan, the second strategical slogan of the Party, viz. the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry.

We will trace the subsequent history of the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry from April to October, 1917, in the Works of Lenin.

April, 1917.

The peculiar feature of the present situation in Russia is that it is a *transition* from the *first*[1] stage of the Revolution, which, owing to the fact that the proletariat was not sufficiently class conscious and organised, gave power to the bourgeoisie, to the *second* stage, which should transfer power to the proletariat and the *poor sections of the peasantry*" (*The April Theses*, Vol. XX, p. 88).

July, 1917.

The revolutionary workers alone, provided they are supported by the *poor peasantry*,[1] are capable of smashing the resistance of the capitalists, lead the people to the seizure of the land without compensation, to complete freedom, to triumph over famine, to triumph over the war, and to a just and durable peace" (Vol. XXI, p. 77).

August, 1917.

The proletariat alone, leading the *poor peasantry* (the semi-proletarians, as our programme calls them) can put a stop to the war and achieve a democratic peace, heal the wounds caused by the war, and take the steps toward Socialism which have become absolutely necessary and *unpostponable*—this defines our class policy at the present time (Vol. XXI, p. 111).

September, 1917.

> Only the dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poor peasants*[1] is capable of smashing the resistance of the capitalists, of displaying really sublime daring and decision in the exercise of power, and of securing the enthusiastic, self-sacrificing, and truly heroic support of the masses both in the army and among the peasantry" (Vol. XXI, p. 147).

From *September to October*, 1917, Lenin, in his pamphlet *Can the Bolsheviks Retain Power?* attacking the *Novaya Zhizn*, wrote:

> *Either*[1]—all power to the bourgeoisie—and you yourselves have long since ceased to defend this, and the bourgeoisie itself dares not even think of suggesting it, knowing that in April 20 and 21 the people with one heave of the shoulder overthrew that power and would do so now thrice as energetically and ruthlessly. *Or*[1]—power to the petty bourgeoisie, *i.e.* in a coalition (alliance or agreement) with the bourgeoisie, for the petty bourgeoisie is undesirous and, indeed, incapable of assuming power independently, as has been proven by the experience of all revolutions and is demonstrated by economic science, which shows that in a capitalist country one can be in favour of capital, or in favour of labour, but that it is impossible to defend any middle course. In Russia such a coalition for half a year has tried scores of methods and failed. *Or***[1]**—finally, all power to the proletarians and the *poor peasants***[1]** against the bourgeoisie, in order to smash its resistance. That has not yet been tried, and from that you, gentlemen of the *Novaya Zhizn*, are trying to dissuade the people and are frightening them with your own fear of the bourgeoisie. A fourth course cannot even be conceived (Vol. XXI, p. 275).

Those are the facts.

You, however, "successfully" evade all these facts and incidents in the history of the preparation for the October Revolution; you "successfully" *expunge* from the history of Bolshevism the *struggle* waged by the Bolsheviks during the period of preparation for October against the *vacillations* and the *conciliationism* of the "peasant owners" represented at that time on the Soviets; you "successfully" *bury* Lenin's slogan of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry and at the same time imagine that this is not committing violence against history and against Leninism.

From these citations, which can be multiplied, you will see, Comrade Pokrovsky, that after February, 1917, the Bolsheviks took as their starting-point not the peasantry as a whole, but the poor section of the peasantry,

and moved forward toward October, not under the *old* slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but under the *new* slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry.

It will be seen from this that the Bolsheviks carried out this slogan in a fight against the vacillations and conciliationism of the Soviets, against the vacillations and conciliationism of a certain section of the peasantry represented in the Soviets, and against the vacillations and conciliationism of certain petty-bourgeois democratic parties known as Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

It will be seen from this that without the new slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry we would have been unable to assemble a sufficiently powerful political army capable of overcoming the conciliationism of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, of neutralising the vacillations of a certain section of the peasantry, of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie, and of thus making it possible to complete the bourgeois revolution.

It will be seen from this that "we moved toward October and triumphed in October together with the poor peasantry and against the resistance of the kulaks (also peasants) and the vacillations of the middle peasantry (cf. my Reply to Comrade Yan-sky).

It follows, therefore, that in April, 1917, and during the whole period of preparation for October, Lenin was right, and not Kamenev, and that you, Comrade Pokrovsky, by now restoring Kamenevism, are falling into not very good company.

2. As against all that which has been said above, you quote Lenin to the effect that in October, 1917, we assumed power with the help of the peasantry *as a whole*. That we assumed power with a *certain amount* of support from the peasantry as a whole is absolutely true. But you forgot to add a small "trifle," namely, that the peasantry *as a whole* supported us in October, and after October, only in so far as we brought the bourgeois revolution to completion. That is a very important trifle, a trifle that in the present instance is all-decisive. It does not befit a Bolshevik, Comrade Pokrovsky, to "forget" so important a "trifle" and thus confuse so important an issue.

From your letter it appears that you *contrast* the words of Lenin regarding the support given by the peasantry *as a whole* to the Party slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poor* peasantry, which was also

issued by Lenin. But in order to prove that there is a contradiction between these words of Lenin and the quotations from the works of Lenin we have cited, and in order to refute the quotations from Lenin regarding the slogan of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry by the words of Lenin himself regarding the peasantry as a whole, two things at least must be proved.

Firstly, it must be proved that the completion of the bourgeois revolution was the essential feature of the October Revolution. Lenin considers that the completion of the bourgeois revolution was a "by-product" of the October Revolution, which solved this task "in passing." You must first refute this thesis of Lenin and prove that the *main thing* in the October Revolution was not the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the transfer of power to the proletariat, but the completion of the bourgeois revolution. Try to prove that, Comrade Pokrovsky, and then I shall be ready to admit that from April to October, 1917, the Party's slogan was not dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, but dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. It appears from your letter that you did not think it possible to assume this rather more than risky duty, but tried, however, to prove "in passing" that on one of the most important questions of the October Revolution, the question of peace, we presumably were supported by the peasantry as a whole. That, of course, is untrue. It is absolutely untrue, Comrade Pokrovsky. On this question of peace you adopt the viewpoint of the philistine. The fact is that for us at that time the question of peace was a question of power, for only with the transfer of power to the proletariat could we expect to extricate ourselves from the imperialist war. You, apparently, have forgotten what Lenin said, that "the war can be ended only by the transfer of power to another class," and that "Down with War!—does not mean discarding bayonets, it means transferring power to another class" (cf. Lenin's Speech at the Petrograd City Conference in April, 1917, Vol. XX, pp. 181–178).

One of two things, therefore: you must either prove that the *most important thing* in the October Revolution was the completion of the bourgeois revolution, or you do not prove it, in which case it follows that the peasantry *as a whole* supported us in the October Revolution only *to the extent that* we carried the bourgeois revolution to completion.

Secondly, you must prove that the Bolsheviks could have secured the support of the peasantry as a whole both during October and after October

by completing the bourgeois revolution *without* systematically carrying out the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat with the *poor* peasantry during the whole period of preparation for October, *without* conducting the systematic fight against the conciliationism of the petty-bourgeois parties which follows from this slogan, and *without* the systematic exposure of the vacillations of certain sections of the peasantry and of their representatives in the Soviets, which also follows from this slogan. Try to prove that, Comrade Pokrovsky. Indeed, why did we succeed in securing the support of the peasantry as a whole in October and after October? Because we had the opportunity of completing the bourgeois revolution. Why did we have this opportunity? Because we were able to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and replace it by the power of the proletariat, which alone is able to complete the bourgeois revolution. Why were we able to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and set up the power of the proletariat? Because we prepared for the October Revolution under the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poor* peasantry, because on the basis of this slogan we waged a systematic struggle against the conciliationist petty-bourgeois parties, because on the basis of this slogan we waged a systematic struggle against the vacillations of the middle peasants in the Soviets, and because *only with the aid of this slogan* were we able to overcome the vacillations of the middle peasant, defeat the conciliationism of the petty-bourgeois parties, and assemble a political army capable of fighting for the transfer of power to the proletariat. It need hardly be shown that without these preliminary conditions, which determined the fate of the October Revolution, we should not have obtained the support of the peasantry as a *whole* either before or after October.

It is in this way that the combination of peasant wars with the proletarian revolution is to be understood, Comrade Pokrovsky.

That is why the attempt to draw a contrast between the support given by the peasantry as a whole during October and after October and the fact that the preparations for October were made under the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poor* peasantry implies a complete *failure to understand Leninism*.

Your chief error, Comrade Pokrovsky, lies in the fact that you failed to understand either the interweaving of *Socialist* tasks during the October Revolution with the task of completing the *bourgeois* revolution, or the mechanism of practically realising the various demands of the October

Revolution that followed from the second strategic slogan of the Party regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry.

Reading your letter one might think that it was not we who used the peasantry in the service of the proletarian revolution, but that on the contrary it was "the peasantry as a whole," including the kulaks, who used the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks would be in deplorable condition indeed if they so easily entered the service of non-proletarian classes.

Kamenevism of April, 1917—that is what is dragging at your feet, Comrade Pokrovsky.

3. You assert that Stalin can see no difference between the conditions prevailing in 1905 and those prevailing in February, 1917. That, of course, is absurd. I did not say that, and could not have said it. All I said in my letter was that the slogan issued by the Party in 1905 regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry was confirmed in the February Revolution of 1917. That, of course, is true. That is exactly how Lenin described the situation in August, 1917, in his article "Peasants and Workers":

> Only the proletariat and the peasantry can overthrow the monarchy—such at that time [*i.e*. 1905, *J.S*.] was the fundamental definition of our class policy. And that definition was correct. *Its correctness was confirmed again in February and March*, 1917[1] (Vol. XXI, p. 111).

You are simply trying to find fault—my too "dialectical" comrade.

4. Furthermore, you try to trip up Stalin and to show that he is contradicting himself by contrasting his thesis on the conciliationism of the middle peasant *prior to October* to a quotation, from his pamphlet *Leninism*, which speaks of the possibility of building up Socialism together with the middle peasantry *after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been consolidated*. It does not require much effort to prove that to make these two different phenomena identical is absolutely unscientific. The middle peasant before October, when the bourgeoisie was in power, and the middle peasant after the dictatorship of the proletariat had been consolidated, when the co-operative movement had become developed and the basic means of production were in the hands of the proletariat, are two different things. To make these two different kinds of middle peasant identical and to treat them on an equal footing is to regard phenomena abstracted from historical conditions and to lose all sense of perspective. It is something like the

Zinoviev manner of mixing up dates or periods. If this is what is called "revolutionary dialectics," it must be admitted that you, Comrade Pokrovsky, have beaten all records for "dialectical" hairsplitting.

5. I shall not deal with the remaining questions, since I regard them as having been exhaustively dealt with in the correspondence with Comrade Yan-sky.

May 20, 1929.

[1] Stalin's italics.—Ed.
[2] Constitutional Democrats, *i.e*. bourgeois-Liberals.—Ed.
[1] Stalin's italics.—Ed.
[1] Stalin's italics.—Ed.
[1] Stalin's italics.—Ed.
[1] Stalin's italics.—Ed.

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION IN RUSSIA[1]

(September 9, 1927)

I. QUESTIONS PUT BY THE DELEGATION AND STALIN'S REPLIES

QUESTION I: *What new principles have Lenin and the Communist Party added to Marxism in practice? Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in "Creative Revolutions" whereas Marx was more inclined to wait for the culmination of economic forces?*

REPLY: I think that Lenin "added" no "new principles" to Marxism nor did Lenin abolish any of the "old" principles of Marxism. Lenin always was and remained a loyal and consistent pupil of Marx and Engels, and wholly and entirely based himself on the principles of Marxism. But Lenin did not merely carry out the doctrines of Marx and Engels. He developed these doctrines further. What does that mean? It means that he developed the doctrines of Marx and Engels in accordance with the new conditions of development, with the new phase of capitalism, and with imperialism. This means that in developing further the doctrines of Marx in the new conditions of the class struggle, Lenin contributed to the general treasure of Marxism something new as compared with what was created by Marx and Engels and with what they could create in the pre-imperialist period of capitalism. Moreover, the contribution made by Lenin to Marxism is based wholly and entirely on the principles laid down by Marx and Engels. In that sense we speak of Leninism as Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Here, for example, are a number of questions in the sphere of which Lenin contributed something new in developing further the doctrines of Marx:

First: the question of monopolistic capitalism—of imperialism as the new phase of capitalism. In *Capital* Marx and Engels analysed the basis of capitalism. But Marx and Engels lived in the pre-monopolistic period of capitalism, in the period of the smooth evolution of capitalism and its "peaceful" expansion throughout the whole world. This old phase of capitalism came to a close towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, when Marx and Engels had already

passed away. Clearly Marx and Engels could only guess at the new conditions of the development of capitalism which arose out of the new phase of capitalism which succeeded the older phase. In the imperialistic monopolistic phase of development the smooth evolution of capitalism gave way to sporadic cataclysmic development; the unevenness of development and the contradictions of capitalism emerged with particular force; the struggle for markets and spheres for the investment of capital conducted amidst conditions of extreme unevenness of development made periodical imperialist wars for a periodical redistribution of the world and of spheres of influence inevitable. The service Lenin rendered, and consequently his new contribution, consisted in that, on the basis of the main postulates enumerated in *Capital*, he made a fundamental Marxian analysis of imperialism as the final phase of capitalism: he exposed its ulcers and the conditions of its inevitable doom. On the basis of this analysis arose Lenin's well-known postulate that the conditions of imperialism made possible the victory of Socialism in separate capitalist countries.

Second: the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The fundamental idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the political domination of the proletariat and as a method of overthrowing the reign of capital by violence was created by Marx and Engels. Lenin's new contribution in this field consists in that (*a*) utilising the experience of the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolution, he discovered the Soviet form of government as the State form of the dictatorship of the proletariat; (*b*) he deciphered the formula of dictatorship of the proletariat from the point of view of the problem of the proletariat and its allies and defined the dictatorship of the proletariat as a special form of class alliance between the proletariat, who is the leader, and the exploited masses of the non-proletarian classes (the peasantry, etc.), who are led; (*c*) he stressed with particular emphasis the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat is a higher type of democracy in class society, the form *of proletarian* democracy, expressing the interests of the majority (the exploited), as against capitalist democracy, which expresses the interests of the minority (the exploiters).

Third: the question of the forms and methods of the successful building up of Socialism in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism in a country encircled by capitalist States. Marx and Engels regarded the period of the dictatorship of

the proletariat as a more or less prolonged period replete with revolutionary conflicts and civil wars in the course of which the proletariat in power would take the economic, political, cultural, and organisational measures necessary for the purpose of establishing a new Socialist society, a society without classes and without a State, in place of the old capitalist society. Lenin wholly and entirely based himself on these fundamental postulates of Marx and Engels. Lenin's new contribution in this field was (*a*) he established the possibility of constructing a complete Socialist society in a land of the dictatorship of the proletariat encircled by imperialist States provided the country is not crushed by the military intervention of the surrounding capitalist States; (*b*) he outlined the concrete path of economic policy ("the New Economic Policy") by which the proletariat, being in command of the economic key positions (industry, land, transport, the banks, etc.), links up socialised industry with agriculture ("linking up industry with peasant agriculture"), and thus leads the whole of national economy towards Socialism; (*c*) he outlined the concrete channels by which the bulk of the peasantry is gradually brought into the line of Socialist construction through the medium of the co-operative societies, which, in the hands of the proletarian dictatorship, represent a powerful instrument for the transformation of petty-peasant economy and for the re-education of the main masses of the peasantry in the spirit of Socialism.

Fourth: the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in revolution, in all popular revolutions—in the revolution against tsarism as well as in the revolution against capitalism. Marx and Engels presented the main outlines of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat. Lenin's new contribution in this field consists in that he further developed and expanded these outlines into a symmetrical system of the hegemony of the proletariat, into a symmetrical system of proletarian leadership of the masses of the toilers in town and country not only in the fight for the overthrow of tsarism and capitalism, but also in the work of building up Socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is well known that, thanks to Lenin and his Party, the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat was skilfully applied in Russia. This, in passing, explains the fact that the revolution in Russia brought the proletariat to power. In previous revolutions it usually happened that the workers did all the fighting at the barricades, shed their blood, and overthrew the old order, but power passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie, which later oppressed and exploited the workers. That was the case in

England and in France. That was the case in Germany. In Russia, however, things took a different turn. In Russia, the workers did not merely represent the shock troops of the Revolution. While serving as the shock troops of the Revolution, the Russian proletariat at the same time strove for hegemony, for the political leadership of all the exploited masses of town and country, rallying them around itself, detaching them from the bourgeoisie and politically isolating the bourgeoisie. Being the leader of the exploited masses, the Russian proletariat all the time waged a fight to seize power in its own hands and utilise it in its own interests against the bourgeoisie and against capitalism. This explains why every powerful outbreak of the Revolution in Russia, as in October, 1905, and in February, 1917, gave rise to Councils of Workers' Deputies as the embryo of the new apparatus of power—the function of which would be to crush the bourgeoisie—as against the bourgeois parliament, the old apparatus of power—the function of which was to crush the proletariat. On two occasions the bourgeoisie in Russia tried to restore the bourgeois parliament and put an end to the Soviets: in August, 1917, at the time of the "Preliminary Parliament" prior to the capture of power by the Bolsheviks, and in January, 1918, at the time of the "Constituent Assembly" after power had been seized by the proletariat. On both occasions these efforts failed. Why? Because the bourgeoisie was already politically isolated. The vast masses of the toilers regarded the proletariat as the sole leader of the Revolution and the Soviets had been already tried and tested by the masses as their own workers' Government. For the proletariat to have substituted these Soviets by a bourgeois parliament would be tantamount to committing suicide. It is not surprising, therefore, that bourgeois parliamentarism did not take root in Russia. That is why the revolution in Russia led to the establishment of the rule of the proletariat. These were the results of the application of the Leninist system of the hegemony of the proletariat in revolution.

Fifth: the national and colonial question. In analysing the events in Ireland, India, China, and the Central European countries like Poland and Hungary, in their time, Marx and Engels developed the basic, initial ideas of the national and colonial question. In his Works, Lenin based himself on these ideas. Lenin's new contribution in this field consists in (*a*) that he gathered these ideas into one symmetrical system of views on national and colonial revolutions in the epoch of imperialism; (*b*) that he connected the national and colonial question with the question of overthrowing

imperialism; and (*c*) that he declared the national and colonial question to be a component part of the general question of international proletarian revolution.

Finally: the question of the Party of the proletariat. Marx and Engels gave the main outlines of the idea of the Party as being the vanguard of the proletariat, without which (the Party) the proletariat could not achieve its emancipation, *i.e.* could not capture power or reconstruct capitalist society. Lenin's new contribution to this theory consists in that he developed these outlines further and applied them to the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in the period of imperialism and showed (*a*) that the Party is a higher form of the class organisation of the proletariat as compared with the other forms of proletarian organisation (labour unions, co-operative societies, State organisation), and, moreover, its function was to generalise and direct the work of these organisations; (*b*) that the dictatorship of the proletariat may be realised only through the Party as its directing force; (*c*) that the dictatorship of the proletariat can be complete only if it is led by a single Party, the Communist Party, which does not and must not share leadership with any other Parties; and (*d*) that without iron discipline in the Party the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat to crush the exploiters and to transform class society into Socialist society cannot be fulfilled.

This, in the main, is the new contribution which Lenin made in his Works; he developed and made more concrete the doctrines of Marx in a manner applicable to the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in the period of imperialism.

That is why we say that Leninism is Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

From this it is clear that Leninism cannot be separated from Marxism, still less can it be contrasted to Marxism.

The question submitted by the delegation goes on to ask:

"Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in 'constructive revolution' whereas Marx was more inclined to await the culmination of the development of economic forces?" I think it would be absolutely incorrect to say that. I think that every popular revolution, if it is really a popular revolution, is a constructive revolution; for it breaks up the old system and creates a new one. Of course, there is nothing constructive in such revolutions (if we can call them that) as take place, let us say, in Albania in the form of toy "rebellions" of one tribe against another. But Marxists never

regarded such toy "rebellions" as revolutions. Apparently, it is not such "rebellions" that we are discussing, but mass, popular revolutions, the rising of oppressed classes against oppressing classes. Such a revolution cannot but be constructive. Marx and Lenin stood for such a revolution, and only for such a revolution. It must be added, of course, that such a revolution cannot arise under all conditions, but can unfold itself only under certain favourable economic and political conditions.

QUESTION II: *Is it correct to say that the Communist Party controls the Russian Government?*

REPLY: It all depends upon what is meant by control. In capitalist countries they have a rather curious conception of control. I know that a number of capitalist Governments are controlled by big banks, notwithstanding the existence of "democratic" parliaments. The parliaments assert that they alone control the Government. As a matter of fact, the composition of the Governments is predetermined, and their actions are controlled by great financial consortiums. Who does not know that there is not a single capitalist "Power" in which the Cabinet can be formed in opposition to the will of the big financial magnates? It is sufficient to exert financial pressure to cause Cabinet Ministers to fall from their posts as if they were stunned. This is real control exercised by banks over governments in spite of the alleged control by parliament. If such control is meant, then I must declare that control of the Government by money-bags is inconceivable and absolutely excluded in the U.S.S.R., if only for the reason that the banks have been nationalised long ago and the money-bags have been ousted. Perhaps the delegation did not mean control, but the guidance exercised by the Party in relation to the Government. If that is what the delegation meant by its question, then my reply is: Yes, our Party does guide the Government. And the Party is able to guide the Government because it enjoys the confidence of the majority of the workers and the toilers generally, and it has the right to guide the organs of the Government in the name of this majority.

In what is the guidance of the Government by the workers' Party in the U.S.S.R., by the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., expressed?

First of all it is expressed in that the Communist Party strives, through the Soviets and their Congresses, to secure the election to the principal posts in the Government of its own candidates, its best workers, who are

loyal to the cause of the proletariat and prepared truly and faithfully to serve the proletariat. This it succeeds in doing in the overwhelming majority of cases because the workers and peasants have confidence in the Party. It is not an accident that the chiefs of Government departments in our country are Communists and that these chiefs enjoy enormous respect and authority.

Secondly, the Party supervises the work of the administration, the work of the organs of power; it rectifies their errors and defects, which are unavoidable; it helps them to carry out the decisions of the Government and strives to secure for them the support of the masses. It should be added that not a single important decision is taken by them without the direction of the Party.

Thirdly, when the plan of work is being drawn up by the various Government organs, in industry or agriculture, in trade or in cultural work, the Party gives general leading instructions defining the character and direction of the work of these organs in the course of carrying out these plans.

The bourgeois Press usually expresses "astonishment" at this "interference" by the Party in the affairs of the Government. But this "astonishment" is absolutely hypocritical. It is well known that the bourgeois Parties in capitalist countries "interfere" in the affairs of the Government and guide the Government, and, moreover, that in these countries this guidance is concentrated in the hands of a narrow circle of individuals connected in one way or another with the big banks, and because of that they strive to conceal the part they play in this from the people. Who does not know that every bourgeois Party in England, or in other capitalist countries, has its secret Cabinet consisting of a close circle of persons who concentrate the guidance in their hands?

Recall, for example, Lloyd George's celebrated reference to the "shadow Cabinet" in the Liberal Party. The differences between the land of the Soviets and the capitalist countries in this respect are (*a*) in capitalist countries the bourgeois Parties guide the Government in the interest of the bourgeoisie and against the proletariat, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the Communist Party guides the Government in the interests of the proletariat and against the bourgeoisie; (*b*) the bourgeois Parties conceal from the people the role they play in guiding the State, and resort to suspicious, secret Cabinets, whereas the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. does not stand in need of such secret Cabinets. It condemns the policy and practice of

secret Cabinets and openly declares to the whole country that it takes upon itself the responsibility for the guidance of the State.

ONE OF THE DELEGATES: On the same principles the Party guides the trade unions?

STALIN: In the main, yes. Formally, the Party cannot give instructions to the trade unions, but the Party gives instructions to the Communists who work in the trade unions. It is known that in the trade unions there are Communist fractions as there are also in the Soviets, co-operative societies, etc. It is the duty of these Communist fractions to secure by argument the adoption of decisions in the trade unions, in the Soviets, co-operative societies, etc., which correspond to the Party's instructions. This they are able to achieve in the overwhelming majority of cases because the Party exercises enormous influence among the masses and enjoys their great confidence. By these means is secured unity of action of the most varied proletarian organisations. If this were not done there would be confusion and clashing in the work of these working-class organisations.

QUESTION III: *Since there is legality for one political party only in Russia, how do you know that the masses favour Communism?*

REPLY: It is true that in the U.S.S.R. there are no legal bourgeois Parties, that only one Party, the Party of the workers, the Communist Party, enjoys legality. Have we the ways and means, however, of convincing ourselves that the majority of the workers, the majority of the masses of the toilers, sympathise with the Communists? We speak, of course, of the masses of the workers and peasants, and not of the new bourgeoisie or of the remnants of the old exploiting classes which have been already crushed by the proletariat. Yes, it is possible. We have the ways and means of knowing whether the masses of the workers and peasants sympathise with the Communists or not. Take the most important moments in the life of our country and see whether there are any grounds for the assertion that the masses really sympathise with the Communists.

Take, first of all, so important a moment as the period of the October Revolution in 1917, when the Communist Party, precisely as a Party, openly called upon the workers and peasants to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie and when this Party obtained the support of the overwhelming majority of the workers, soldiers, and peasants. What was the situation at the time? The Socialist-Revolutionaries (S.R.S) and the Social-Democrats

(Mensheviks) allied with the bourgeoisie were in power then. The governmental apparatus, both in the centre and locally, as well as the command of the twelve-million army, was in the hands of these Parties, in the hands of the Government. The Communist Party was in a state of semi-legality. The bourgeoisie of all countries prophesied the inevitable collapse of the Bolshevik Party. The Entente wholly and entirely supported the Kerensky Government. Nevertheless, the Communist Party, the Bolshevik Party, never ceased to call upon the proletariat to overthrow this Government and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. What happened? The overwhelming majority of the masses of the toilers, in the rear as well as at the front, most emphatically supported the Bolshevik Party —the Kerensky Government was overthrown and the rule of the proletariat was established. How is it that the Bolsheviks were able to emerge victorious at that time in spite of the malicious forecasts of the bourgeoisie of all countries of the doom of the Bolshevik Party? Does it not prove that the broad masses of the toilers sympathised with the Bolshevik Party? I think it does. This is the first test of the authority and influence of the Communist Party among the broad masses of the population.

Take the second period, the period of intervention and civil war, when the British capitalists occupied the North of Russia, the districts of Archangel and Murmansk; when the American, British, Japanese, and French capitalists occupied Siberia and pushed Kolchak to the forefront; when the French and British capitalists took steps to occupy "South Russia," and raised on their shields Denikin and Wrangel. This was a war conducted by the Entente and the counter-revolutionary generals in Russia against the Communist Government in Moscow, against the achievements of the October Revolution. In this period the strength and stability of the Communist Party among the broad masses of the workers and peasants were put to the greatest test. And what happened? It is generally known that as a result of the civil war the occupationary troops were driven from Russia and the counter-revolutionary generals were defeated by the Red Army. Here it was proved that the outcome of war is decided in the last analysis, not by technique, with which Kolchak and Denikin were plentifully furnished by the enemies of the U.S.S.R., but by proper policy, the sympathy and support of the millions of the masses of the population. Was it an accident that the Bolshevik Party proved victorious then? Of course not. Does not this fact prove that the Communist Party in Russia enjoys the

sympathy of the wide masses of the toilers? I think it does. This is the second test of the strength and stability of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R.

We will now take up the present period, the post-war period, when questions of peaceful construction are the order of the day. The period of economic ruin gave way to the period of the restoration of industry, and finally to the period of the reconstruction of the whole of our national economy on a new technical basis. Have we now ways and means of testing the strength and stability of the Communist Party, of determining the degree of sympathy enjoyed by the Party among the broad masses of the toilers? I think we have.

Take first of all the trade unions, which combine nearly ten million proletarians. Let us examine the composition of the leading organs of these trade unions. Is it an accident that Communists are at the head of these organs? Of course not. It would be absurd to think that the workers in the U.S.S.R. are indifferent to the composition of the leading organs of their trade unions.

The workers in the U.S.S.R. grew up and received their training in the storms of three revolutions. They learned, as no other workers learned, to try their leaders and to expel them if they do not satisfy the interests of the proletariat. At one time the most popular man in our Party was Plekhanov. However, the workers did not hesitate to isolate him completely when they became convinced that he had abandoned the proletarian position. And if these workers express their complete confidence in the Communists, elect them to responsible posts in the trade unions, it is direct evidence that the strength and stability of the Communist Party among the workers in the U.S.S.R. is enormous. This is one test of the undoubted sympathy of the broad masses of the workers for the Communist Party.

Take the last Soviet elections. In the U.S.S.R. the whole of the adult population from the age of eighteen, irrespective of sex and nationality—except the bourgeois elements who exploit the labour of others and those who have been deprived of their rights by the courts—enjoy the right to vote. The people enjoying the right to vote number sixty millions. The overwhelming majority of these, of course, are peasants. Of these sixty million voters, about 51 per cent, *i.e.* over thirty millions, exercise their right. Now examine the composition of the leading organs of our Soviets both in the centre and locally. Is it an accident that the overwhelming

majority of the elected leading elements are Communists? Clearly, it is not an accident. Does not this fact prove that the Communist Party enjoys the confidence of millions of the masses of the peasantry? I think it does. This is another test of the strength and stability of the Communist Party.

Take the Komsomol (Young Communist League), which combines nearly two million young workers and peasants. Is it an accident that the overwhelming majority of the elected leading elements in the Young Communist League are Communists? I think that it cannot be said to be an accident. Thus you have another test of the strength and authority of the Communist Party.

Finally, take the innumerable conferences, consultations, delegate meetings, etc., which embrace millions of the masses of the toilers, both working men and working women, peasants and peasant women, among all the nationalities forming the U.S.S.R. In Western countries, people wax ironical over these conferences and consultations and assert that the Russians like to talk very much. For us, however, these conferences and consultations are of enormous significance in that they serve as a test of the mood of the masses and also as a means of exposing our mistakes and indicating the methods by which these mistakes may be rectified; for we make not a few mistakes and we do not conceal them, because we think that to expose these errors and honestly to rectify them is one of the best means of improving the management of the country. Take the speeches delivered at these conferences and consultations. Note the businesslike and straightforward remarks uttered by these "simple people," these workers and peasants; note the decisions taken, and you will see how enormous is the influence and authority of the Communist Party, an influence and authority that any Party in the world might envy. Thus you have still another test of the stability of the Communist Party.

These are the ways and means enabling us to test the strength and influence of the Communist Party among the masses of the people.

That is how I know that the broad masses of the workers and peasants in the U.S.S.R. sympathise with the Communist Party.

QUESTION IV: *If a non-Party group should organise a fraction and nominate candidates for office on a platform which supported the Soviet Government, but at the same time demanded the abolition of the foreign*

trade monopoly, could they have their own funds and conduct an active political campaign?

REPLY: I think there is an irreconcilable contradiction in this question. We cannot conceive of a group basing itself on a platform supporting the Soviet Government and at the same time demanding the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. Why? Because the monopoly of foreign trade is one of the unshakable foundations of the "platform" of the Soviet Government; because a group demanding the abolition of the foreign trade monopoly could not support the Soviet Government; because such a group would be profoundly hostile to the whole Soviet system.

There are, of course, elements in the U.S.S.R. who demand the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. These are the Nepmen, the Kulaks, and the remnants of the already defeated exploiting classes, etc. But these elements represent an insignificant minority of the population. I do not think that the delegation has these elements in mind. If, however, the delegation refers to workers and peasant toilers, then I must say that the demand for the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade would merely call forth ridicule and hostility among them.

Indeed, what would the abolition of monopoly of foreign trade mean for the workers? For them it would mean abandonment of the industrialisation of the country, cessation of the construction of new works and factories and of the expansion of the old works and factories. To them it would mean that the U.S.S.R. would be flooded with goods from capitalist countries, the destruction of our industry, because of its relative weakness; increase in unemployment, deterioration of the material conditions of the working class, and the weakening of their economic and political conditions. In the last analysis it would mean the strengthening of the Nepmen and the new bourgeoisie generally. Can the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. agree to committing suicide like this? Clearly it cannot.

And what would the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade mean for the toiling masses of the peasantry? It would mean the transformation of our country from an independent country into a semi-colonial country and the impoverishment of the masses of the peasantry. It would mean a return to the system of "free trade" which prevailed under Kolchak and Denikin when the combined forces of the counter-revolutionary generals and the "Allies" freely plundered the many millions of the peasantry. In the last analysis it would mean the strengthening of the Kulaks and other exploiting

elements in the rural districts. The peasants have sufficiently experienced the charms of this system in the Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, on the Volga, and in Siberia. What grounds are there for believing that they desire to put their heads into this noose again? Is it not clear that the toiling masses of the peasantry cannot support a demand for the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade?

A DELEGATE: The delegation put forward the point concerning the monopoly of foreign trade and of its abolition as a point around which a whole group of the population might organise if there was not the monopoly of a single Party, the monopoly of legality in the U.S.S.R.

STALIN: The delegation consequently is returning to the question of the monopoly of the Communist Party as the sole legal Party in the U.S.S.R. I replied briefly to this question when I spoke about the ways and means of testing the sympathy of the millions of the masses of the workers and peasants towards the Communist Party. As for the other strata of the population, the Kulaks, the Nepmen, the remnants of the old, defeated, exploiting classes, they are deprived of the right to have their political organisations just as they are deprived of the right to vote. The proletariat deprived the bourgeoisie not only of the factories, workshops, banks, railroads, lands, and mines, but they also deprived them of the right to have their political organisations, because the proletariat does not desire the restoration of the rule of the bourgeoisie. The delegation apparently does not object to the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. depriving the bourgeoisie and the landlords of their factories and workshops, of their land and railroads, banks and mines (laughter), but it seems to me that the delegation is somewhat surprised that the proletariat did not limit itself to this, but went further and deprived the bourgeoisie of political rights. This, to my mind, is not altogether logical or, to speak more correctly, is quite illogical. Why should the proletariat be called upon to show magnanimity towards the bourgeoisie? Does the bourgeoisie in Western countries, where they are in power, show the slightest magnanimity towards the working class? Do they not drive genuine revolutionary Parties of the working class underground? Why should the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. be called upon to show magnanimity towards their class enemy? You must be logical. Those who think that political rights can be restored to the bourgeoisie must, if they are to be logical, go further and raise the question of restoring to the bourgeoisie the factories and workshops, railroads and banks.

A DELEGATE: It is the task of the delegation to investigate how the opinion of the working class and the peasantry, as distinct from the opinion of the Communist Party, can find legal expression. It would be incorrect to believe that the delegation is interested in the question of granting political rights to the bourgeoisie, or in the manner in which the bourgeoisie may find legal expression of their opinions. The question is, in what manner can the opinions of the working class and of the peasantry, as distinct from the opinion of the Communist Party, find legal expression?

ANOTHER DELEGATE: These distinctive opinions could find expression in the mass organisations of the working class, in the trade unions, etc.

STALIN: All right. Consequently, the question is not one of the restoration of the political rights of the bourgeoisie, but of the conflict of opinion within the working class and among the peasantry. Is there any conflict of opinion among the workers and the toiling masses of the peasantry at the present time? Undoubtedly there is. It is impossible for millions of workers and peasants to think all alike. This never happens. First of all, there is a great difference between the workers and peasants relative to their economic position and in their views concerning various questions. Secondly, there is some difference in outlook among various sections of the working class, difference in training, different ages, temperament, a difference between the old-standing industrial workers and those who have migrated from the rural districts, etc. All this leads to a conflict of opinion among the workers and the toiling masses of the peasantry which finds legal expression at meetings, in trade unions, in co-operative societies, during elections to the Soviets, etc.

But there is a radical difference between the conflict of opinion now, under the proletarian dictatorship, and conflict of opinion in the past, prior to the October Revolution. In the past, the conflict of opinion among the workers and the toiling peasantry was concentrated mainly on questions concerning the overthrow of the landlords, of tsarism, of the bourgeoisie, and of the break-up of the whole capitalist system. Now, however, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, conflict of opinion does not revolve around questions concerning the overthrow of the Soviet Government, of the break-up of the Soviet system, but around questions concerning the improvement of the organs of the Soviet Government and improvement of their work. This makes a radical difference.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that the conflict of opinion in the past around questions concerning the revolutionary destruction of a prevailing system gave grounds for the appearance of several rival Parties in the working class and toiling masses of the peasantry. These Parties were the Bolshevik Party, the Menshevik Party, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. On the other hand, it is not difficult to understand that conflict of opinion under the dictatorship of the proletariat, which has for its aim not the break-up of the existing Soviet system, but its improvement and consolidation, provides no nourishment for the existence of several Parties among the workers and the toiling masses in the rural districts. That is why the legality of a single Party, the Communist Party, the monopoly enjoyed by that Party, not only raises no objection among the workers and toiling peasants but, on the contrary, is accepted by them as something necessary and desirable.

The position of our Party as the only legal Party in the country (the monopoly of the Communist Party) is not something artificial and deliberately invented. Such a position cannot be created artificially by administrative machinations, etc. The monopoly of our Party grew up out of life, it developed historically as a result of the fact that the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Menshevik Party became absolutely bankrupt and departed from the stage of our social life. What were the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Menshevik Party in the past? They were channels for conducting bourgeois influence into the ranks of the proletariat. By what were these Parties cultivated and sustained prior to October, 1917? By the existence of the bourgeois class and in the last analysis by the existence of bourgeois rule. Is it not clear, then, that when the bourgeoisie was overthrown the basis for the existence of these parties should disappear? What became of these Parties after October, 1917? They became Parties for the restoration of capitalism and for the overthrow of the rule of the proletariat. Clearly, these Parties had to lose all support and all influence among the workers and the toiling strata of the peasantry.

The fight between the Communist Party and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and Menshevik Party for influence among the workers did not commence only yesterday. It commenced when the first symptoms of a mass revolutionary movement manifested themselves in Russia, even before 1905. The period between 1903 and October, 1917, is the period of severe conflicts of opinion within the working class of our country, a period

of struggle between the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries for influence in the working class. During this period the working class of the U.S.S.R. passed through three revolutions. In the fires of these revolutions it tried and tested the proletarian revolutionary character of these Parties and their fitness for the cause of the proletarian revolution. In October, 1917, when history had summed up the whole of the past revolutionary struggle, and had weighed in the balance the various Parties fighting within the working class, the working class of the U.S.S.R. made its final selection and accepted the Communist Party as the only proletarian Party. How is the fact that the working class selected the Communist Party to be explained? In April, 1917, for example, the Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet represented an inconsiderable minority. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks at that time had an overwhelming majority. In the October days the whole apparatus of the Government and all means of coercion were in the hands of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Parties, who had allied themselves with the bourgeoisie. It is explained by the fact that the Communist Party stood for the termination of the war, for an immediate democratic peace, while the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Parties insisted upon "War to Complete Victory," the continuation of the imperialist war. It is explained by the fact that the Communist Party stood for the overthrow of the Kerensky Government, for the overthrow of the rule of the bourgeoisie, for the nationalisation of the factories and workshops, of the banks and railroads, whereas the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Parties fought in defence of the Kerensky Government and defended the right of the bourgeoisie to the factories and the workshops, the banks and the railroads. It is to be explained by the fact that the Communist Party stood for the immediate confiscation of the estates of the big landlords for the benefit of the peasantry, whereas the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Parties postponed this question until the Constituent Assembly should be convened, which in its turn was postponed for an indefinite time. What is there surprising, therefore, in the fact that the workers and the poor peasants made their final selection in favour of the Communist Party? What is there surprising in the fact that the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Parties went to the bottom so quickly? That is why the Communist Party came to power.

The subsequent period, the period following October, 1917, the period of civil war, was the period in which the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries finally met their doom; it was the period of the final triumph of the Bolshevik Party. In that period the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves facilitated the triumph of the Communist Party. Broken up and sent to the bottom during the October Revolution, remnants of the Menshevik Party and Socialist-Revolutionary Party began to link themselves up with counter-revolutionary kulak rebellions, allied themselves with Kolchak and Denikin, went into the service of the Entente, and finally and utterly discredited themselves in the eyes of the workers and peasants. The situation then created was that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, having changed from bourgeois revolutionaries into bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, helped the Entente to strangle the new Soviet Russia, whereas the Bolshevik Party, rallying around itself all that was vital and revolutionary, roused fresh ranks of workers and peasants in increasing numbers for the fight in defence of the Socialist fatherland and against the Entente. It was quite natural that the victory of the Communists in that period should, and in fact did, lead to the utter defeat of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. What is there surprising, therefore, in the fact that after all this the Communist Party became the sole Party of the working class and the poor peasantry?

That is how the monopoly of the Communist Party as the only legal Party in the country arose.

You speak of a conflict of opinion among the workers and peasants at the present time, under the proletarian dictatorship. I have said already that conflict of opinion exists and will exist in the future, that no progress is possible without this; but conflict of opinion among the workers under present conditions centres not around the question of principle of the overthrow of the Soviet system, but around practical questions like the improvement of the Soviets, the rectification of errors committed by the Soviet organs, and, consequently, of consolidating the Soviet rule. Such a conflict of opinion can only serve to strengthen and perfect the Communist Party. Such conflict of opinion can only serve to strengthen the monopoly of the Communist Party. Such a conflict of opinion cannot provide nourishment for other Parties within the working class and among the toiling peasantry.

QUESTION V: *Will you summarise briefly the outstanding differences between yourself and Trotsky?*

REPLY: I must say first of all that the differences with Trotsky are not personal differences. If these differences bore a personal character, the Party would not concern itself with them for a single hour, for it does not like individual persons to stick themselves forward. Apparently, you mean the differences in the Party. That is how I understand the question. Yes, such differences do exist in the Party. The character of these differences was described rather in detail by Comrade Rykov in a speech he delivered recently in Moscow and by Comrade Bukharin in Leningrad. These speeches have been published. I have nothing to add to what is stated in them concerning these differences. If you have not obtained these documents, I can get them for you. (The delegation states that it is in possession of the documents.)

A DELEGATE: On our return we shall be questioned concerning these differences, but we have not all the documents. For example, we have not the platform of the "83."

STALIN: I did not sign that platform. I have no right to dispose of other peoples' documents. (Laughter.)

QUESTION VI: *In capitalist countries the chief incentive to production is furnished by the hope of private profit. This incentive is, of course, relatively absent in the U.S.S.R. What alternative displaces it and, in your opinion, how effective is it? Can it be maintained indefinitely?*

REPLY: It is true that the principal motive power of capitalist economy is profit. It is true also that obtaining profit is neither the aim nor the motive power of our Socialist industry. What, then, is the motive power of our industry?

First of all, the fact that the factories and workshops in the U.S.S.R. belong to the whole people and not to capitalists, that the factories and workshops are managed not by the appointees of capitalists, but by representatives of the working class; the consciousness that the workers work, not for the capitalists, but for their own State, for their own class, represents an enormous driving-force in the development and perfection of our industry. It must be observed that the overwhelming majority of the factory and works managers in Russia are working men, appointed by the Supreme Economic Council in agreement with the trade unions, and that not a single

factory manager can remain at his post contrary to the will of the workers of the particular trade union. It must be observed also that in every factory and workshop there is a factory council, elected by the workers, which controls the activities of the management of the particular enterprise. Finally, it must be observed that in every industrial enterprise regular production conferences of workers are held in which all the workers employed in the given enterprise take part and at which the work of the manager of the enterprise is discussed and criticised; the plan of work in the factory administration is discussed, errors and defects are noted and rectified through the trade unions, through the Party, and through the organs of the Soviet administration. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, that all these circumstances radically alter the position of the workers as well as the state of affairs in the various enterprises. While, under capitalism, the workers regard their factory as a prison, under the Soviet system the workers no longer regard the factory as a prison, but as something near and dear to them and in the development and improvement of which they are vitally interested. It is hardly necessary to prove that this new attitude of the workers towards the enterprise in which they are employed, this understanding of the close ties that link the workers with the enterprise, represents a powerful driving-force for the whole of our industry. This circumstance explains the fact that the number of worker inventors in the field of technique of production and worker organisers of industry increases from day to day.

Secondly, the revenues from industry in Russia are employed not for the enrichment of individuals, but for the further expansion of industry, for the improvement of the material and cultural conditions of the working class, for reducing the price of industrial commodities necessary both for the workers and for the peasants, which again is the improvement of the material conditions of the toiling masses. A capitalist cannot employ his revenues for improving the welfare of the working class. He lives for profit; otherwise he would not be a capitalist. He obtains profit in order to invest it as surplus capital in less developed countries suffering from a shortage of capital in order again to obtain fresh and increased profit. That is how capital flows from the United States to China, to Indonesia, to South America and Europe, and from France to the French colonies, and from England to the British colonies. In the U.S.S.R. things are altogether different, for we neither conduct nor recognise colonial policy. In Russia, the

revenues from industry remain in the country and are employed for the further expansion of industry, for improving the conditions of the workers, for enlarging the capacity of the home market, including also the peasant market, by reducing the price of industrial commodities. Ten per cent of the profits from industry in our country goes to a fund for improving the social conditions of the workers. A sum equal to 13 per cent of the wages paid is contributed to a sick insurance fund for the insurance of workers. (This represents 800 million rubles per annum.) A certain part of the revenues (I cannot just now say exactly how much) is employed for cultural requirements, vocational training, and vacations for the workers. A fairly considerable part of these revenues (again I cannot now say exactly how much) is employed for the annual increase in the money wages of the workers. The rest of the revenues from industry are employed for the further expansion of industry, for the repair of old workshops, for the construction of new workshops, and finally for the reduction of prices of industrial commodities. The enormous significance of these circumstances for our industry consists in (*a*) that they facilitate the linking up of agriculture with industry and the smoothing out of the antithesis between town and country; (*b*) that they facilitate the increase of the capacity of the home market—urban and rural—and by that create a constantly expanding base for the further development of industry.

Finally, the nationalisation of industry facilitates the conduct of industry as a whole according to plan.

Will these stimuli and motive forces of our industry be permanent factors? Can they be permanently operative factors? Yes, undoubtedly they are permanently operative stimuli and motive forces, and the more our industry develops, the more the strength and significance of these factors will grow.

QUESTION VII: *How far can Soviet Russia co-operate with the capitalist industry of other countries? Is there a definite limit to such co-operation, or is it simply an experiment to discover in which field such co-operation is possible and in which it is not?*

REPLY: Apparently this is a reference to temporary agreements with capitalist States in the field of industry, in the field of commerce, and perhaps of diplomatic relations. I think that the existence of two opposite systems, the capitalist system and the Socialist system, does not exclude the

possibility of such agreement. I think that such agreements are possible and expedient in conditions of peaceful development. Exports and imports are the most suitable ground for such agreements. We require equipment, raw material (raw cotton, for example), semi-manufactures (metals, etc.), while the capitalists require a market for their goods. This provides a basis for agreement. The capitalists require oil, timber, grain products, and we require a market for these goods. Here is another basis for agreement. We require credits, the capitalists require good interest for their credits. Here is still another basis for agreements in the field of credit. It is well known that the Soviet organs are most punctual in their payments.

The same thing may be said in regard to the diplomatic field. We are pursuing a policy of peace and we are prepared to sign a pact of non-aggression with bourgeois States. We are pursuing a policy of peace and we are prepared to come to an agreement concerning disarmament right up to the complete abolition of standing armies, which we declared to the whole world as far back as the time of the Genoa Conference. Here is a basis for agreement in the diplomatic field.

The limits to these agreements? The limits are set by the opposite characters of the two systems between which there is rivalry and conflict. Within the limits permitted by these two systems, but only within these limits, agreement is quite possible. This is proved by the experience of the agreements concluded with Germany, Italy, Japan, etc.

Are these agreements merely experiments? Or can they be of a more or less prolonged character? That does not altogether depend upon us. It depends also upon the other parties. It depends upon the general situation. A war may upset any and every agreement. Finally, it depends upon the terms of the agreement. We can never accept conditions of bondage. We have an agreement with Harriman, who is exploiting the Manganese mines in Georgia. That agreement extends for twenty years. As you see, not a brief period. We have also an agreement with the Lena Goldfields Company, which is extracting gold in Siberia. That agreement has been signed for thirty years—a still longer period. Finally, we have an agreement with Japan concerning the exploitation of the oil-and coal-fields in Sakhalin. We would like these agreements to have a more or less solid character. But that depends, of course, not only upon us, but upon the other parties.

QUESTION VIII: *What are the chief ways in which Russia differs from capitalist states in her treatment of national minorities?*

REPLY: Apparently, this refers to the nationalities in the U.S.S.R. who were formerly oppressed by tsarism and the Russian exploiting classes and who did not enjoy State sovereignty. The principal distinction is that, while in capitalist States national oppression and national enslavement prevail, in the U.S.S.R. both the one and the other have been radically abolished. In capitalist States, side by side with nations of the first rank, privileged nations, "sovereign" nations, there are second-rank nations, "non-sovereign" nations, nations which do not enjoy equality, which are deprived of various rights, principally of sovereign rights. In the U.S.S.R., however, all the attributes of national inequality and national oppression have been abolished. In the U.S.S.R. all nations are equal and sovereign, for the national and State privileges which previously were enjoyed by the Great Russian people have been abolished. We do not, of course, speak of declarations of national equality. All bourgeois and Social-Democratic Parties have made not a few declarations concerning national equality. What is the value of such declarations if they are not carried out? The thing to do is to abolish those classes which are the bearers, the creators, and the conduits of national oppression. In Russia these classes were the landlords and capitalists. We overthrew these classes and by that abolished the possibility of national oppression. And precisely for the reason that we abolished these classes, real national equality became possible in the U.S.S.R. This is what we call the application of the idea of self-determination of nations including the right of complete separation. Precisely for the reason that we carried out the self-determination of nations, we managed to eliminate mutual suspicion between the toiling masses of the various nationalities in the U.S.S.R. and to unite these nationalities on a voluntary basis into one Federal State. The present Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the result of our national policy and expression of the voluntary federation of the nationalities in the U.S.S.R. into one Federal State.

It is hardly necessary to prove that such a policy in the national question is inconceivable in capitalist countries, for there the capitalists, who are the creators and conduits of national oppression, are still in power. For example, we cannot fail to observe that the supreme organ of the U.S.S.R., the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, is headed not necessarily by one Russian chairman, but by six chairmen, representing each of the federal

republics forming the U.S.S.R., of whom one is a Russian (Kalinin), the second a Ukrainian (Petrovsky), the third a White Russian (Cheriakov), the fourth an Azerbaidjanian (Musabekov), the fifth a Turkoman (Aitakov), and the sixth an Uzbek (Faizulla Hodjaev). This fact is a striking expression of our national policy. Needless to say, there is not a single burgeois republic, however democratic it may be, that would do this. And yet with us it is taken as a matter of course, as following directly from our policy of national equality.

QUESTION IX: *American labour leaders justify their struggle against the Communists on two grounds:* (1) *The Communists are disrupting and destroying the labour movement by their factional fights inside the unions and their attacks on all union officials who are not radicals, and* (2) *American Communists take their orders from Moscow and hence cannot be good trade unionists, since their loyalty to an outside foreign body is placed above their loyalty to the union. How can this difficulty be adjusted so that American Communists can work jointly with other sections of the American labour movement?*

REPLY: I think that the attempts of the American labour leaders to justify their struggle against the Communists do not stand examination. No one has yet proved, nor can it be proved, that the Communists disrupt the labour movement. But it can be taken as fully proved that the Communists are the most loyal and boldest champions of the labour movement all over the world, including America. Is it not a fact that during strikes and demonstrations the Communist working men take their place in the front ranks of the working class and receive the first blows of the capitalists, whereas the reformist labour leaders take shelter in the backyards of the capitalists?

How can Communists refrain from criticising the cowardice and the reactionary policies of the reformist labour leaders? Is it not clear that such criticism can serve only to stimulate and strengthen the labour movement? True, such criticism destroys the authority of the reactionary labour leaders, but what about that? Let the reactionary labour leaders answer the criticism, not expel the Communists from the unions. I think that if the labour movement in America desires to live on and develop, it cannot avoid a conflict of opinion and of tendencies within the trade unions. I think that the conflict of opinion and of tendencies within the trade unions, criticism of

the reactionary labour leaders, etc., will continue to grow notwithstanding the efforts of the reformist labour leaders to prevent it. The working class of America stands in absolute need of such conflict of opinion and of such criticisms in order that it may be able to choose between the various tendencies and finally to take up its stand as an independent organised force within American society. The complaints made by American reformist leaders against the Communists merely indicate that they are not sure of the correctness of their case and do not feel strong in their position. That is why they fear criticism like the plague. It is a remarkable fact that the American labour leaders are more determined opponents of elementary democracy than many capitalists in America.

The assertion that the American Communists work under "orders from Moscow" is absolutely untrue. There are no such Communists in the world who would agree to work "under orders" from outside against their own convictions and will and contrary to the requirements of the situation. Even if there were such Communists, they would not be worth a cent. Communists are bold and courageous, they are fighting against a host of enemies. The value of a Communist, among other things, lies in that he is able to defend his convictions. Therefore, it is strange to speak of American Communists as not having their own convictions and capable only of working according to "orders" from outside. The only part of the labour leaders' assertion that has any truth in it at all is that the American Communists are affiliated to an international Communist organisation and from time to time consult with the central body of this organisation on one question or another.

But what is there bad in this? Are the American labour leaders opposed to an international workers' centre? It is true they are not affiliated to Amsterdam, not because they are opposed to an international workers' centre as such, however, but because they regard Amsterdam as being too radical. (Laughter.) Why may the capitalists organise internationally and the working class, or part of it, not have its international organisation? Is it not clear that Green and his friends in the American Federation of Labour slander the American Communists when they slavishly repeat the capitalist legends about "orders from Moscow"? Some people believe that the members of the Communist International in Moscow do nothing else but sit and write instructions to all countries. As there are more than sixty countries affiliated to the Comintern, one can imagine the position of the members of

the Comintern who never sleep or eat, in fact do nothing but sit day and night and write instructions to all countries. (Laughter.) And the American labour leaders believe that with this ridiculous legend they can cover up their fear of the Communists and conceal the fact that Communists are the bravest and most loyal workers in the labour movement in America.

The delegation asks for a way out of this situation. I think there is only one way out: leave room for conflict of opinion and of tendencies within the American trade unions, give up the reactionary policy of expelling the Communists from the trade unions, and give the working class of America an opportunity of making a free choice of these tendencies; for America has not yet had its November Revolution, and the workers there have not yet had the opportunity of making their final selection from among the various tendencies in the trade unions.

QUESTION X: *Is any money now being sent to America to aid either the American Communist Party or the Communist paper, the* Daily Worker? *If not*, *how much do American Communists remit to the Third International in annual membership dues?*

REPLY: If this has reference to the relations between the Communist Party of America and the Third International, I must say that the Communist Party of America, as part of the Communist International, most likely pays affiliation dues to the Comintern. On the other hand, the Comintern, being the central body of the International Communist movement, we assume, renders assistance to the Communist Party of America whenever it thinks it necessary. I do not think there is anything surprising or exceptional in this. If, however, the question refers to the relations between the Communist Party of America and the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., I must say that I do not know of a single occasion on which the representatives of the American Communist Party appealed for aid to the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. You may think this strange, but it is a fact, which indicates that the American Communists are rather independent. What would happen if the Communist Party of America did appeal for aid to the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.? I think the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. would render it whatever assistance it could Indeed, what would be the worth of the Communist Party, a Party that is in power, if it refused to do what it could to aid the Communist Party of another country labouring under the yoke of capitalism? I would say that such a Communist Party would not be worth a

cent. Let us assume that the American working class had come into power after overthrowing its bourgeoisie. Let us assume that the working class of another country appealed to the working class of America, which had emerged victorious in a great struggle against capitalism, for material aid: would the American working class refuse it? I think it would disgrace itself if it hesitated to give the assistance asked for.

QUESTION XI: *We understand that some good Communists are not in entire sympathy with the Communist Party's demand that all new members be atheists*, *now that the reactionary clergy are suppressed. Could the Communist Party in the future take a neutral attitude towards a religious faith which supported all the teachings of science and did not oppose Communism? Could you in the future permit some Party members to hold religious opinions if they did not conflict with Party loyalty?*

REPLY: In this question there are several inexactitudes. In the first place, I do not know of any such "good Communists" that the delegates talk about. It is hardly likely that such Communists exist at all. Secondly, I must declare that, speaking formally, we have no conditions of Party membership which demand that a candidate for Party membership shall be an atheist.

The conditions of membership of our Party are: acceptance of the programme and rules of the Party; absolute subordination to the decisions of the Party and its organs; payment of membership dues; and membership in one of the Party locals.

A DELEGATE: I often read of expulsions from the Party because of belief in God.

STALIN: I can only repeat the conditions of membership in our Party that I have just mentioned. We have no other condition.

Does that mean the Party is neutral towards religion? No, it does not. We carry on and will continue to carry on propaganda against religious prejudices. Our legislation guaranteed to citizens the right to adhere to any religion. This is a matter for the conscience of each individual. That is precisely why we carried out the separation of the Church from the State. But in separating the Church from the State and proclaiming religious liberty, we at the same time guaranteed the right of every citizen to combat by argument, by propaganda, and agitation any and all religion. The Party cannot be neutral towards religion, and it does conduct anti-religious propaganda against all and every religious prejudice because it stands for

science while religious prejudices run counter to science, because all religion is something opposite to science. Cases such as recently occurred in America, in which Darwinists were prosecuted in court, cannot occur here because the Party carries out a policy of the general defence of science. The Party cannot be neutral towards religious prejudices, and it will continue to carry on propaganda against these prejudices because this is one of the best means of undermining the influence of the reactionary clergy who support the exploiting classes and who preach submission to these classes. The Party cannot be neutral towards the bearers of religious prejudices, towards the reactionary clergy who poison the minds of the toiling masses. Have we suppressed the reactionary clergy? Yes, we have. The unfortunate thing is that it has not been completely liquidated. Anti-religious propaganda is a means by which the complete liquidation of the reactionary clergy must be brought about. Cases occur when certain members of the Party hamper the complete development of anti-religious propaganda. If such members are expelled, it is a good thing, because there is no room for such "Communists" in the ranks of the Party.

QUESTION XII: *Can you outline briefly the characteristics of the society of the future which Communism is trying to create?*

REPLY: The general characteristics of Communist society are given in the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Briefly, the anatomy of Communist society may be described as follows: It is a society in which (*a*) there will be no private ownership of the means of production, but social, collective ownership; (*b*) there will be no classes or State, but workers in industry and agriculture managing their economic affairs as a free association of toilers; (*c*) national economy, organised according to plan, will be based on the highest technique in both industry and agriculture; (*d*) there will be no antithesis between town and country, between industry and agriculture; (*e*) the products will be distributed according to the principle of the old French Communists: "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs"; (*f*) science and art will enjoy conditions conducive to their highest development; (*g*) the individual, freed from bread-and-butter cares, and of necessity of cringing to the "powerful of the earth," will become really free, etc., etc. Clearly, we are still remote from such a society.

With regard to the international conditions necessary for the complete triumph of Communist society, these will develop and grow in proportion

as revolutionary crises and revolutionary outbreaks of the working class in capitalist countries grow.

It must not be imagined that the working class in one country or in several countries will march towards Socialism, and still more to Communism, and that the capitalists of other countries will sit still with folded arms and look on with indifference. Nor must it be imagined that the working class in capitalist countries will agree to be mere spectators of the victorious development of Socialism in one or another country. As a matter of fact, the capitalists will do all in their power to crush such countries. As a matter of fact, every important step taken towards Socialism, and still more towards Communism, in any country will be inevitably accompanied by the unrestrained efforts of the working class in capitalist countries directed towards achieving the dictatorship and Socialism in those countries. Thus, in the further progress of development of the international revolution, two world centres will be formed: the Socialist centre, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards Socialism, and the Capitalist centre, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards capitalism. The fight between these two centres for the conquest of world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and Communism throughout the whole world, for the final defeat of world capitalism means the victory of Socialism in the arena of world economy.

2. Stalin's Questions to the Delegation and its Replies

Stalin: If the delegation is not too tired, I would ask it to permit me to put several questions. (Delegation agrees.)

Question I: *How do you account for the small percentage of American workers organised in trade unions? I think there are about* 17 *million industrial workers in America. (The delegates explain that there are from* 18 *to* 19 *million industrial workers.) I think that about* 3 *millions are organised. (Delegates explain that the American Federation of Labour has a membership approximately of* 3 *millions*, *and that besides these about a half-million workers are organised in other unions, so that taken together* 3½ *million workers are organised.) Personally, I think that the proportion of American workers organised in trade unions is very small. In the* U.S.S.R. 90 *per cent of all the proletarians in the country are organised in trade unions*.

I would like to ask the delegation whether it regards this small percentage of organised workers as a good thing. Does not the delegation think that this small percentage is an indication of the weakness of the American proletariat and of the weakness of its weapon in the struggle against the capitalists in the economic field?

BROPHY: The small membership of trade unions is to be explained not by the bad tactics applied in the labour organisations, but by the general economic conditions prevailing in the country, which do not stimulate the whole mass of the workers to organise. These favourable economic conditions restrict the necessity of the working class to fight against the capitalists. Of course, these conditions will change. And simultaneously with the change in these conditions, the trade unions will grow and the whole of the trade union movement will proceed along a different path.

DOUGLAS: I agree with the explanation given by the previous speaker. To that I add, however, that first of all it is necessary to bear in mind that wages in the United States have been recently increased considerably by the capitalists themselves. This process of rising wages was observed in 1917, 1919, and later. If we compare the real wages prevailing at the present time with the wages prevailing in 1911, we will find that they are considerably higher. In the process of its development the trade union movement at first based itself and still bases itself on the craft principle, according to trade, and the trade unions were formed mainly for skilled workers. At the head of these unions there were definite leaders who represented a close organisation and strove to obtain good conditions for their members. They had no stimuli to widen the labour organisation or to organise the unskilled workers. Moreover, the American trade unions come up against well-organised capitalism, which has at its disposal all means to prevent the organisation of all the workers in trade unions. If, for example, a trust encounters the too strong resistance of the trade unions in one of its enterprises, it will close down that enterprise and transfer its work to another. In this way the resistance of the trade unions is broken. The American capitalists voluntarily raise the wages of the workers, but give them no economic power or the possibility of fighting for the economic improvement of their conditions of life. Another very important fact in America is that the capitalists sow dissension among the workers of various nationalities. In the majority of cases the unskilled workers are immigrants from Europe or, as the case has become recently, Negroes. The capitalists

try to sow dissension between workers of different nationalities. This national strife is fostered among both skilled workers and unskilled workers.

The capitalists systematically sow antagonism among the workers of various nationalities irrespective of their degree of skill. During the last ten years American capitalism has been conducting a more enlightened policy in that they are forming their own trade unions, the so-called company unions. They strive to develop the workers' interest in the enterprise and in the increase of profits. American capitalism shows a tendency to substitute horizontal division by vertical division, *i.e*. to split up the working class and to give it an interest in capitalism.

COYLE: I approach the question not from the theoretical point of view, but from the practical point of view. It is true that it is easier to organise the workers in good times, but the statistics of the membership of the American Federation of Labour show that the A.F. of L. is gradually losing the unskilled workers and is increasing its membership of skilled workers. Thus the American Federation of Labour desires to become, and is gradually becoming, an organisation principally of the skilled workers. The trade union movement in America barely touches the unskilled workers. The big branches of industry are hardly touched by the trade unions. Of these big branches of industry only the mining and railroad industries are organised to any extent, and even in the coal industry 65 per cent of the workers are unorganised. The workers in such industries as steel, rubber, and automobiles are hardly organised at all. It may be said that the trade unions do not touch the unskilled workers. There are a number of trade unions outside the American Federation of Labour which strive to organise the unskilled and semi-skilled workers. As for the position taken up by the leaders of the American Federation of Labour, for example, the President of the Machinists Union quite frankly stated that he does not wish to attract the unskilled workers to his union. The position in regard to the trade union leaders is this: that a leader caste has grown up consisting of a few score of individuals who receive enormous salaries up to $10,000 per annum and even more, and into which it is extremely difficult to penetrate.

DUNN: The question put by Stalin is not fair because if in this country 90 per cent of the workers are organised it must be borne in mind that here power is in the hands of the working class, whereas in capitalist countries the workers are an oppressed class and the bourgeoisie does everything to

prevent the workers from organising. Moreover, there are reactionary trade unions led by reactionary leaders in those countries. In the conditions prevailing in America it is very difficult to get into the heads of the workers the very idea of trade unionism. This explains why trade unionism in America is not so widespread.

STALIN: Does the speaker agree with the previous speaker that certain leaders of the labour movement in America strive to restrict the trade union movement?

DUNN: I agree.

STALIN: I did not wish to offend anybody. I merely wanted to clear up for myself the difference in the situation that exists in America as compared with the U.S.S.R. If I have offended anybody, I hope you will forgive me. (Laughter.)

DUNN: I am not offended in the least.

STALIN: Is there a system of State insurance of workers in America?

A DELEGATE: There is no system of State insurance of workers in America.

COYLE: In the majority of States compensation is paid for accidents during employment, and the maximum of 30 per cent of the loss of earning capacity is paid. This is in the majority of States. The compensation is paid by the private firms in whose enterprises the accident occurred. But the law demands that compensation shall be paid.

STALIN: Is there State insurance against unemployment in America?

A DELEGATE: No. The funds for insurance against unemployment might satisfy from 80–100,000 unemployed in all States.

COYLE: There is insurance (not Government insurance) against accidents during employment, but there is no insurance against sickness or old age. The insurance fund is made up of contributions from the workers. As a matter of fact, the fund is provided by the workers themselves, because if the workers did not organise these funds they would receive higher wages, and as these funds are established in agreement with the employers the workers receive a smaller wage. As a matter of fact, the employers contribute only a very small proportion of the fund, about 10 per cent. Almost the whole of it is made up by the workers.

STALIN: I think the comrades will be interested to learn that in the U.S.S.R. more than 800 million rubles per annum are appropriated for workers' insurance. It will not be superfluous to add also that our workers in all

branches of industry, in addition to their ordinary money wages, receive a supplementary grant of about one-third of the wages paid for insurance, social improvements, cultural requirements and so on.

QUESTION II: *How do you explain the absence of a special mass workers' Party in the United States? The bourgeoisie in America have two Parties, the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. But the American workers have no mass Party of their own. Do not the comrades think that the absence of such a mass workers' Party, even if it were like the British Labour Party, weakens the working class in its political fight against the capitalists? Then again, why do the leaders of the labour movement in America, Green and the others, so strongly oppose the establishment of a Labour Party in America*?

BROPHY: Yes, the leaders did decide that there was no necessity for forming such a Party. However, there is a minority which considers that such a Party is necessary.

Conditions in America at the present time are such, as has been pointed out already, that the trade union movement is extremely weak. The weakness of the trade union movement is to be explained in its turn by the fact that the working class at present does not have to fight against the capitalists because the capitalists themselves increase wages and guarantee to them satisfactory material conditions.

STALIN: But it is the skilled workers mainly whose material conditions are guaranteed. There is a contradiction here. On the one hand, it would appear that there is no necessity for organisation because the workers are provided for. On the other hand, it is said that the more secure workers, the skilled workers, are organised in the trade unions. Thirdly, it would appear that the unorganised workers are those least provided for, namely, the unskilled workers who most of all stand in need of organisation. I cannot understand this at all.

BROPHY: Yes, there is a contradiction. But so are American political and economic conditions contradictory.

BREBNER: Although the unskilled workers are not organised, they have the political right to vote, so that if there is any discontent the unskilled workers can express this discontent by exercising their political right to vote. On the other hand, the organised workers who belong to trade unions, when particularly bad times come, do not turn to their union but exercise

their vote. Thus the political right to vote compensates for the lack of trade union organisation.

ISRAELS: One of the principal difficulties is the very system of election in the United States. It is not the man for whom the majority of the votes of the whole country is cast, or even the majority of the votes of any particular class is cast, that is elected as President. In every State there is an electoral college; every State has a certain number of electors who participate in the election of the President. To be elected, the candidate must obtain 51 per cent of the votes. If there were three or four Parties, no one candidate would be elected, and the election of the President would have to be transferred to the Congress. This is an argument against forming a third Party.

The opponents of the third Party argued in this way: Don't put forward a third candidate because you will split the Liberal vote and you will prevent the Liberal candidate from being elected.

STALIN: But Senator La Follette at one time created a third bourgeois Party. It follows, then, that the third Party will not split votes if it is a bourgeois Party, but it may split votes if it is a Labour Party.

DAVIS: I do not regard the fact mentioned by the previous speaker as a fundamental one. I think the most important point is the following. I will quote the example of the city in which I live. During the election campaign the representative of a certain Party gives the trade union leader an important job in connection with the campaign and places certain funds at his disposal, which he uses for his own purpose. In this way he obtains a certain prestige connected with his job. It turns out, therefore, that the leaders of the trade union support one or the other of the bourgeois Parties. Naturally, when there is any talk of forming a third Party a Labour Party, these labour leaders refuse to do anything in the matter. They argue that if a third Party were formed there would be a split in the trade union movement.

DOUGLAS: The fact that only skilled workers are organised in trade unions is due principally to the fact that in order to be able to join a union a man must have money and be well off, because the entrance fees and dues are high and the unskilled worker cannot afford to pay. Moreover, the unskilled worker is under the constant danger of being thrown out of work if he attempts to organise. The unskilled workers can be organised only with the active aid of the skilled workers.

In the majority of cases this aid is not forthcoming, and this is one of the principal obstacles to the organisation of the unskilled workers. The

principal means by which the workers can defend their rights are political means. This, in my opinion, is the principal reason why the unskilled workers are unorganised. I consider the economic condition the principal factor in the unorganised state of the unskilled workers in the political and industrial fields. I must point to a special feature of the American electoral system, the direct primary election, in which any man may get to the election booth, declare himself a Democrat or a Republican, and cast his vote. I am convinced that Gompers could not keep the workers on a non-partisan political programme if he did not have the argument of the direct primary. He always told the workers that if they wished to act politically they could join either of the existing two political parties, get the responsible position in them, and command influence. With this argument Gompers managed to keep the workers away from the idea of organising the working class and of forming a Labour Party.

QUESTION III: *How do you explain that on the question of recognising the U.S.S.R. the leaders of the American Federation of Labour are more reactionary than many bourgeois? How do you explain that bourgeois like Mr. Borah and others are in favour of recognising the* U.S.S.R., *while American labour leaders like Gompers and Green have conducted and still conduct reactionary propaganda against the recognition of the first workers' republic, against the recognition of the* U.S.S.R.*? How do you explain that even a reactionary like the late President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, was able to "greet" Soviet Russia, while Green and other leaders of the American Federation of Labour wish to be more reactionary than the capitalists? Here is the text of the "greeting" Woodrow Wilson sent to the Soviet Congress in Russia in March*, 1918, *at the time that the troops of the German Kaiser were marching against Soviet Leningrad:*

> Taking advantage of the Congress of the Soviets I would like, in the name of the people of the United States, to express sincere sympathy with the Russian people, particularly at the present time, when Germany has moved her armed forces far into your country in order to hinder the struggle for liberty, to destroy all its achievements, to carry out the designs of Germany, and to enslave the Russian people.
>
> Although the Government of the United States is, unhappily, not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through this Congress that the Government of the

United States will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her internal affairs and full restoration to her great role in the life of Europe and modern humanity.

The people of the United States are wholeheartedly sympathetic with the Russian people in their effort to free themselves for ever from autocracy and become the masters of their own destiny (*Pravda*, No. 50, March 16, 1918).

Can we regard it as normal when the leaders of the American Federation of Labour desire to be more reactionary than reactionary Wilson?

BROPHY: I cannot precisely explain the reason, but I think that the leaders of the American Federation of Labour are opposed to the recognition of Soviet Russia for the very same reason that the American Federation of Labour is not affiliated to the Amsterdam International. I think it is due to the peculiar philosophy of the American workers and to the difference in the economic conditions of the American workers as compared with the European workers.

STALIN: But as far as I know, the American Federation of Labour does not object to the recognition of Italy or Poland where Fascism reigns.

BROPHY: By quoting the example of Poland and Italy, where there are Fascist Governments, you explain the reason for the non-recognition of the U.S.S.R. by America. The hostile attitude towards the U.S.S.R. is explained by the unpleasantness which the Communists at home cause the American labour leaders.

DUNN: The argument used by the last speaker—that the labour leaders cannot recognise the U.S.S.R. because they cannot get on with the Communists at home—is not convincing because they preached the non-recognition of the U.S.S.R. before the American Communist Party was organised. The principal reason is that the leaders of the American Federation of Labour are opposed to everything in the nature of Socialism. They are put up to this by the capitalists who have an organisation, called the National Civic Federation, which does its utmost to rouse American society against Socialism in any form. This organisation opposed the position taken by Ivy Lee, who advocated the development of commercial relations between America and the U.S.S.R. The leaders of this organisation say: “How can we maintain order among our own working class when Liberals begin to talk like this?” The National Civic Federation is an organisation of a group of capitalists who have invested a large sum of money in it and who control it. It should be mentioned that the vice-

president of this reactionary organisation is Matthew Woll, the vice-president of the American Federation of Labour.

BROPHY: The explanation regarding the reactionary character of the labour leaders that have been made here are inadequate. We must look deeper. The presence of the American delegation in the U.S.S.R. is the best reply, and is evidence of the sympathy of a section of the American workers to the workers of the Soviet Union. I think that the opinion of the leaders of the American Federation of Labour in regard to the U.S.S.R. does not differ from the opinion of the majority of the working class in America. The position of the majority of the working class in regard to the U.S.S.R. is to be explained by the remoteness from the U.S.S.R. The working class of America is not interested in international affairs, and the influence of the bourgeoisie on the working class of America makes itself felt very strongly in regard to its attitude towards the U.S.S.R.

[1] In view of the fact that the English stenographic report of this interview was not available to the publishers, the report was translated from the Russian, which appeared in *Pravda* of September 15, 1927. Consequently, while the speeches of the American delegates as given in this report are correct in substance, they are not presented as a verbatim report.—ED.

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS' DELEGATIONS ON NOVEMBER 5, 1927

(*There were eighty delegates present from Germany, France, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, South America, Mexico, China, Belgium, Finland, Denmark, and Esthonia. The interview lasted six hours.)*

STALIN: Comrades, a list of questions was handed over to me yesterday in the German language without any signature. This morning I received two other lists, one from the French delegation and another from the Danish delegation. Let us begin with the first list of questions, although I do not know from which delegation it emanates, and then we will be able to take up the other two lists. If you do not mind, we shall begin. (The delegates consented.)

QUESTION I: *Why does the* U.S.S.R. *not participate in the League of Nations?*

ANSWER: Much has already been said on the reasons why we do not participate in the League of Nations. I can point out some of these reasons.

The Soviet Union is not a member of the League of Nations and does not take part in it because, first of all, it does not want to take the responsibility for the imperialist policy of the League of Nations, for the "mandates" which are handed out by the League of Nations for the exploitation and oppression of colonial countries. The Soviet Union does not participate in the League of Nations because it is completely opposed to imperialism, and to the oppression of colonial and subjugated countries.

The Soviet Union does not participate in the League of Nations, secondly, because it does not want to take responsibility for military preparations, for growing armaments, for new military alliances, etc., which are covered and sanctioned by the League of Nations and which cannot but lead to new imperialist wars. The Soviet Union does not participate in the League of Nations because it is utterly opposed to imperialist wars.

Finally, the Soviet Union does not participate in the League of Nations because it does not want to be a component part of that screen of imperialist machinations which the League of Nations represents and which are concealed by the honeyed phrases of its members. The League of Nations is

a rendezvous for imperialist chiefs, who do their business behind the scenes. What the League of Nations *says* officially is empty twaddle, intended to deceive the workers. But what the imperialist chiefs *do* unofficially behind the scenes is real imperialist business, which is pharisaically concealed by the eloquent orators of the League of Nations. What can there be surprising over the fact that the Soviet Union does not want to become a member and participant of this anti-nation comedy?

QUESTION II: *Why does the Soviet Union not tolerate the existence of a Social-Democratic Party?*

ANSWER: A Social-Democratic Party (*i.e.* a Menshevik Party) is not suffered in the Soviet Union for the same reason that counter-revolutionaries are not tolerated here. This, perhaps, may surprise you, but there is nothing extraordinary about it. The conditions of development of our country, the history of its development, are such that the Social-Democrats, who constituted under tsarism a more or less revolutionary Party, have, after the overthrow of tsarism, under Kerensky, become a Government Party, a bourgeois Party, a Party of imperialist war, and after the October Revolution an avowedly counter-revolutionary Party against the proletarian dictatorship. You surely know that the Social-Democrats in our country have participated in the civil war on Kolchak's and Denikin's side against the Soviet Government. At the present time this Party is a Party of capitalist restoration, a Party which stands for the liquidation of the proletarian dictatorship. I think that this development of Social-Democracy is typical not only of the U.S.S.R. but also of the other countries. In our country Social-Democracy was more or less revolutionary so long as tsarism existed. This, as a matter of fact, explains the circumstance that we Bolsheviks were then together with the Mensheviks, with the Social-Democrats in one Party. Social-Democracy becomes an opposition, or Government and bourgeois Party, when the so-called democratic bourgeoisie comes into power. It becomes a Party of avowed counter-revolution when the revolutionary proletariat seizes power.

INTERJECTION BY A DELEGATE: Does this mean that Social-Democracy is a counter-revolutionary force only here in the Soviet Union, or can it be classified as a counter-revolutionary force also in other countries?

STALIN: I have already stated that in this respect there is a certain difference. In the country of proletarian dictatorship Social-Democracy is a

counter-revolutionary force fighting for the restoration of capitalism and the liquidation of the proletarian dictatorship in the name of "bourgeois" democracy. In the capitalist countries, where the proletariat is not yet in power, the Social-Democrats constitute either an opposition Party to the capitalist State or a semi-governmental Party in coalition with the Liberal-bourgeoisie against the most reactionary forces of capitalism, or a thoroughly governmental Party openly and avowedly defending capitalism and "bourgeois" democracy, against the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. Social-Democracy becomes utterly counter-revolutionary, and its counter-revolutionary action is directed against proletarian governmental power only when proletarian governmental power becomes an actual fact.

QUESTION III: *Why is there no freedom of the Press in the* U.S.S.R.*?*

ANSWER: What freedom of Press have you in mind? Freedom of the Press? For which class—the bourgeoisie or the proletariat? If it is a question of freedom of the Press for the bourgeoisie, then it does not and will not exist here as long as the proletarian dictatorship is in power. But if it is a question of freedom of the Press for the proletariat, then I must say that you will not find another country in the world where such broad and complete freedom of the Press exists as in the U.S.S.R. Freedom of the Press for the proletariat is not an empty phrase. And without the best printing works, the best Press clubs, free organisations of the working class, from the most exclusive to the broadest organisations, embracing millions of workers, without the evident freedom of assembly, there can be no freedom of the Press. Examine the conditions in the U.S.S.R., go into the workers' districts, and you will find that the best printing works, the best Press clubs, entire paper mills, entire ink factories, producing the necessary material for the Press, huge assembly halls—these and many other things which are so necessary for the freedom of the Press of the working class are entirely and fully at the disposal of the working class and the toiling masses. This is what we call freedom of the Press for the working class. We have no freedom of the Press for the bourgeoisie. We have no freedom of the Press for the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who represent the interests of the beaten and overthrown bourgeoisie. But what is there surprising in that? We have never pledged ourselves to grant freedom of the Press to all classes, and to make all classes happy. Taking power in October, 1917, the Bolsheviks openly declared that this Government is a

Government of one class, a Government of the proletariat, which will subdue the bourgeoisie in the interests of the toiling masses of town and country who represent the overwhelming majority of the population of the U.S.S.R. How can one, after this, demand from the proletarian dictatorship that it grant freedom of the Press for the bourgeoisie?

QUESTION IV: *Why are not the imprisoned Mensheviks released?*

ANSWER: Evidently this refers to the active Mensheviks. Yes, it is true the active Mensheviks in our country are not released from prison until their sentence expires. But why wonder at this? Why, for example, were not the Bolsheviks released from prison in July, August, September, and October, 1917, when the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were in power? Why was Lenin compelled to keep in hiding underground from July to October, 1917, when the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were in power? How can you explain the fact that the great Lenin, whose name is a symbol for the proletarians of all countries, was compelled to keep in hiding from July to October, 1917, in Finland, far away from the "democratic republic" of Kerensky and Tsereteli, Chernov and Dan, and that the *Pravda*, the organ of Lenin's Party, was smashed by the bourgeois junkers in spite of the fact that prominent and active leaders of the Second International were then in power. Obviously, this is to be explained by the fact that the struggle between bourgeois counter-revolution and proletarian revolution cannot but lead to a certain amount of repression. I have already stated that the Social-Democrats in our country are a counter-revolutionary Party, but from this it follows that the proletarian revolution cannot help arresting the active members of this counter-revolutionary Party.

But this is not all. From this it further follows that the imprisonment of Mensheviks in our country is a continuation of the policy begun with the October Revolution. After all, what is the October Revolution? The October Revolution means first of all the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie. All more or less conscious workers of all countries now admit that the Bolsheviks were right in overthrowing bourgeois power in 1917. I have no doubt that you are of the same opinion. But the question arises, whom did the proletariat actually overthrow in 1917? History tells us, and facts go to prove, that in October, 1917, the proletariat overthrew the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, as it was precisely the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, Kerensky and Chernov, Gotz and Lieber, Dan and

Tsereteli, Abramovitch and Avksentiev, who were then in power. And what are the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Parties? They are Parties of the Second International.

It therefore follows that in accomplishing the October Revolution the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. overthrew the Parties of the Second International. This, perhaps, is not very pleasing to some Social-Democrats, but it is an undeniable fact, comrades, over which it would be absurd to argue.

Consequently, it follows that at the moment of proletarian revolution it is possible and necessary to overthrow the power of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries so that the power of the proletariat may triumph. But if they may be overthrown, why cannot they be arrested if they go over openly and determinedly to the camp of bourgeois counter-revolution? Do you think that the overthrow of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries is a milder act than their imprisonment? One cannot consider the policy of the October Revolution correct unless he also considers the inevitable results of that policy correct. One of two things: either the October Revolution was wrong, in which case the imprisonment of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries is also wrong, or the October Revolution was right, in which case one cannot regard the imprisonment of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries wrong. Logic must take its course.

QUESTION V: *Why was not the correspondent of the Social-Democratic Press Bureau permitted to enter the* U.S.S.R.*?*

ANSWER: *Because the Social-Democratic Press* abroad, particularly the *Vorwärts*, excels even a number of bourgeois papers in its monstrous slander of the U.S.S.R. and its representatives. Because many bourgeois newspapers, such as the *Vossische Zeitung*, for instance, behave far more "impartially" and "decently" in their struggle against the U.S.S.R. than the *Vorwärts*. This may seem "queer," but it is a fact which cannot be ignored. If the Vorwärts could behave no worse than some of the bourgeois papers, then its representatives would surely find their place in the U.S.S.R. together with the representatives of the bourgeois papers. A few days ago a *Vorwärts* representative asked one of the employees of our Embassy in Berlin what conditions had to be complied with for a *Vorwärts* representative to be permitted to enter the U.S.S.R. In reply, he was told: "If the *Vorwärts* will prove, in deed, that it is prepared to behave towards the U.S.S.R. and its

representatives at least as well as the ‘respectable’ Liberal Press, like the *Vossische Zeitung*, the Soviet Government will have no objection to permitting a *Vorwärts* representative in the U.S.S.R.” I think that the answer was quite reasonable.

QUESTION VI: *Is it possible to unite the Second and Third Internationals?*

ANSWER: I think it is impossible. It is impossible because the Second and Third Internationals have two entirely different viewpoints and have two different objects in view. The Third International looks forward to the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship. The Second International, on the contrary, looks forward to the safeguarding of capitalism and the annihilation of everything which is essential for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The struggle between these two Internationals is the ideological expression of the struggle between the adherents of capitalism and the adherents of Socialism. In this struggle, either the Second or the Third International must be victorious. There are no reasons for doubting that the Third International will be victorious in the labour movement. I do not think that they can be united.

QUESTION VII: *How do you regard the European situation? Is there reason for expecting revolutionary events in the next few years?*

ANSWER: I think that elements of a profound capitalist crisis are growing and will continue to grow in Europe. Capitalism can be partly stabilised, it can rationalise its production, it can temporarily stifle the working class. Capitalism is still able to do these things, but it will never return to that stability and that equilibrium which existed prior to the war and before the October Revolution. It will never again return to that stability and equilibrium. And that this is so can be seen from the fact that in the European countries, as well as in the colonial countries, which are the source of life of European capitalism, we see one revolutionary outburst after another. To-day we see a revolutionary outburst in Austria, to-morrow in England, and the day after somewhere in France or Germany, and then in China, Indonesia, India, etc. And what is Europe and its colonies? It is the centre of capitalism and its periphery. There is “unrest” in the centres of European capitalism. There is still greater “unrest” in its periphery. Conditions are ripening for new revolutionary events. I think that the clearest sign of the growing capitalist crisis, the clearest example of

accumulated discontent and dissatisfaction among the working class, are the events connected with the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti. What did the murder of two workers mean to the capitalist butchers? Have they not been murdering workers up to now in tens and hundreds, day in and day out? However, it sufficed to kill two workers, Sacco and Vanzetti, to set the working class all over the world in motion. What does that show? It indicates that the ground is getting too hot for capitalism. It indicates that conditions for new revolutionary events are ripening. The fact that the capitalists could succeed in sweeping back the first revolutionary wave cannot by any means serve as a consolation for capitalism. The revolution against capitalism cannot rise in one continuous wave. It always develops in the form of ebbs and flows. Such was the case in Russia. Such will also be the case in Europe. We are on the eve of new revolutionary events.

QUESTION VIII: *Is the opposition of the Russian Party strong, and on what circles does it rest?*

ANSWER: I think that it is very weak. Moreover, its strength is rather insignificant in our Party. I have before me to-day's newspaper. It contains a survey of the last few days' discussions. The figures show that over 135,000 members of the Party voted for the Central Committee and its theses, and only 1,200 voted for the opposition. This is even less than 1 per cent. I think that the future votes will be even more disastrous for the opposition. Our discussion will last up to the Congress. We will try to question the whole Party during that period if possible. I do not know how discussions are conducted in the Social-Democratic Parties in your countries. I do not know whether discussions are carried on at all in the Social-Democratic Parties. But we regard a discussion as a serious matter. We will question the whole Party and you will see that the relative strength of the opposition in our Party will even be more insignificant than the figures I have just given. It is quite possible that at our Fifteenth Party Congress the opposition will not have a single representative, a single delegate. Let us take, for instance, such huge works as the "Treugolnik" or "Putilov" in Leningrad. The number of workers employed in "Treugolnik" is about 15,000. The number of Party members is 2,122. The opposition received thirty-nine votes. The number of workers in the "Putilov" works is about 11,000. The number of Party members is 1,718. The opposition received twenty-nine votes.

On what circles does the opposition rest? I think that the opposition is supported primarily by non-proletarian circles. If you ask the non-proletarian sections of the population, those which are discontented with the proletarian dictatorship, with whom they side, they will unhesitatingly reply that they sympathise with the opposition. Why? Because the struggle which the opposition is carrying on is essentially a struggle against the Party, a struggle against the regime of the proletarian dictatorship, with which certain non-proletarian sections cannot but be dissatisfied. The opposition reflects the dissatisfaction of the non-proletarian sections of the population with the proletarian dictatorship and their pressure exerted upon it.

QUESTION IX: *Is Ruth Fischer's and Maslow's Contention, now circulated in Germany, that the present leaders of the Comintern and the Russian Party are betraying the workers to the counter-revolution correct?*

ANSWER: We must assume that it is correct. There is also reason to think that the Comintern and the C.P.S.U. are betraying the working classes of the U.S.S.R. to the counter-revolutionaries of the world. Moreover, I can inform you that the Comintern and the C.P.S.U. recently decided to bring back all landlords and capitalists, who have been driven out of the country, to restore their factories to them. And that is not all. The Comintern and the C.P.S.U. have gone even further than that, and decided that the time has come for Bolsheviks to become cannibals. Finally, we have decided to nationalise all women and to make it a practice to violate our own sisters. (General laughter. Voices from the crowd: "Who could have asked such a question?") I can see that you are all laughing. Perhaps some of you will think that I am not serious on the question. Of course, comrades, a question like this cannot be treated seriously. I think that such questions can be answered only by ridicule. (Loud applause.)

QUESTION X: *What is your attitude to the opposition and to the Fischer—Maslow tendency in Germany?*

ANSWER: My attitude to the opposition and its German agency is similar to the attitude of the famous French novelist, Alphonse Daudet, to his *Tartarin of Tarascon*. (Laughter.) You have probably read this novel? Tartarin, the hero of the book, was just an ordinary, "good-natured" petty bourgeois. But he had such an extravagant imagination and such a capacity for good-natured "lying" that eventually he fell victim to these unusual

abilities. Tartarin boastingly assured everybody that he killed an innumerable number of lions and tigers on the Atlas Mountains. His credulous friends bestowed on him the order of the greatest lion-hunter in the world. And yet Alphonse Daudet knew perfectly well, just as Tartarin knew perfectly well, that he had never in his life seen either lions or tigers. Tartarin boasted of having climbed to the peak of Mont Blanc. His credulous friends therefore bestowed on him the order of the greatest mountain-climber in the world. However, Alphonse Daudet surely knew that Tartarin never even saw the peak of Mont Blanc, because he was only at the foot of it. Tartarin boasted that he had founded a great colony in a country a long distance from France. His credulous friends, therefore, bestowed on him the order of the greatest coloniser in the world. However, Alphonse Daudet surely knew, as Tartarin himself had to admit, that nothing but disgrace could result from Tartarin's fantastic imaginations.

You know what scandal and disgrace Tartarin's fantastic boastings caused the Tartarinists.

I think that the noisy boastfulness of the leaders of the opposition and the clamour they raised in Moscow and Berlin will end in similar scandal and disgrace for the opposition. (Laughter.)

We have now exhausted the first list of questions, let us now deal with the questions of the French delegation.

QUESTION I: *How does the* U.S.S.R. *Government propose to combat the foreign oil concerns?*

ANSWER: I do not think that this is the right way to put this question. One might think that the Soviet oil industry intends to make an attack on the oil concerns of other countries and aims at their overthrow and liquidation. But is this really the case? Certainly not. The fact is that certain oil concerns in capitalist countries are striving to throttle the oil industry of Soviet Russia, whereas the latter has to defend itself in order to be able to exist and develop. The Soviet oil industry is weaker than the oil industry of the capitalist countries in regard to production—we produce less than they—and also in regard to markets—they are better connected with the world market than we. How does the Soviet oil industry defend itself? It defends itself by improving the quality of its products, and, above all, by lowering oil prices, by throwing cheap oil on the market, cheaper than the oil of the capitalist concerns. You will probably ask me: Are the Soviets really so well

off that they can afford to sell cheaper than the wealthiest capitalist firms? It goes without saying that the Soviet industry is not wealthier than the capitalist firms. On the contrary, the latter are considerably wealthier than the Soviet industry. But it is not a question of wealth here. The point is that the Soviet oil industry is not a capitalist industry, and therefore does not require enormous super-profits, whereas capitalist oil concerns cannot do without such profits. And because the Soviet oil industry does not require super-profits it can sell its products cheaper than the capitalist firms. The same can be said about Soviet grain, timber, etc. It should be pointed out that Soviet goods, particularly Soviet oil, are a factor on the international market, which reduces prices and improves thereby the position of the mass of consumers. This constitutes the strength and at the same time the means of defence of the Soviet oil industry against the attacks of the capitalist oil concerns. This also explains the noisy campaign the oil concerns of all countries, and particularly of Deterding, are waging against the Soviets and the Soviet oil industry; they disguise their policy of high prices and robbing the consumers by the now fashionable phraseology about "Communist propaganda."

QUESTION II: *How do you think you will achieve collectivism in the peasant question?*

ANSWER: We think of achieving collectivism in the peasant question gradually, by economic, financial, and cultural-political measures. I think that the most interesting question is that of economic measures. In regard to this we adopt measures which follow three lines. We organise individual peasant holdings on a co-operative basis, we organise peasant holdings, mainly of the poorest type, into producers' societies, and finally, the fact that peasant farming is brought within the sphere of operations of our State-planning bodies in regard to marketing of farm produce and to supplying the peasants with the necessary articles produced by our industry.

A few years ago there were numerous middlemen between our industry and the peasant farms, private traders who supplied the peasantry with the necessary manufactured goods and sold the peasants' produce to the workers. It goes without saying that these middlemen did not "work" for nothing, but got tens of millions out of the peasantry, and also out of the urban population. This was the period when there was no proper union between town and countryside, between Socialist industry and individual

peasant holdings. At that time co-operatives and State distributive organs played a comparatively insignificant role. A radical change has taken place since then. At present the role of co-operatives and State-trading organisations not only predominate in, but dominates, if it does not monopolise, trade between town and country, the exchange of goods between industry and the peasant economy. Co-operatives and State organs supply over 70 per cent of the textile goods absorbed by the countryside. In regard to agricultural machinery, co-operative and State organs are responsible almost for 100 per cent of the total supply. The share of co-operatives and State organs in the buying up of peasant grain is over 80 per cent, and in regard to the buying up of raw material for industry, such as cotton, sugar-beet, etc., the share of co-operatives and State organs is almost 100 per cent.

What does this mean?

It means, firstly, that the capitalists are being squeezed out of the sphere of trade, industry is in direct contact with the peasant economy, the high profits of speculating middlemen remain in industry and agriculture, the peasants can buy manufactured goods cheaper, and urban workers in their turn are able to buy agricultural produce cheaper.

It means, secondly, that by eliminating the capitalist middlemen from the sphere of trade, industry is enabled to give a lead to the peasant economy, to influence it, to raise its productivity, to rationalise and industrialise it.

It means, thirdly, that by linking up agriculture with industry the State is in a position to develop agriculture according to plan, to supply it with improved seed and fertilisers, to determine the volume of its production, to influence it in regard to price, policy, etc.

It means, finally, that favourable conditions are created in the countryside for the liquidation of the capitalist elements, for a further restoration and overcoming of the kulaks, for the organisation of the non-kulak peasant farms into producers' societies, for financing these societies out of State funds.

Let us take, for instance, the production of sugar-beet for the sugar industry and the production of cotton for the textile industry. The volume of production of this kind of raw material and prices for them, as well as their quality, are determined, not by the elemental play of forces on an unorganised market, through profiteering middlemen, marts, and other capitalist trade organisations, etc., but according to a definite plan, by

definite preliminary agreements between the sugar and textile syndicates on the one hand, and tens of thousands of peasant farms represented by beet- and cotton-growing co-operatives on the other hand. Here we have no more marts, exchanges, commercial offices, and price speculation, etc. All these adjuncts of capitalist economy no longer exist with us in this sphere. Here, two parties meet without any marts and middlemen—State syndicates on the one hand, co-operative peasants on the other hand. The State syndicates sign contracts with corresponding co-operative organisations for the production of a certain quantity of sugar-beet or cotton, for supplying the peasantry with seeds, loans, etc. At the end of the financial year the total production is placed at the disposal of the syndicates, and the peasants receive for it the amounts agreed upon in the contracts. This is what we call the contract system. The advantage of this system is that it is profitable to both sides, and links up the peasant economy with industry directly without middlemen. This system is the surest way to the collectivisation of peasant economy.

We cannot say that other branches of agriculture have already reached this stage of development. But we can safely say that all branches of agriculture, including grain production, will gradually take this form of development. And this is the direct road to the collectivisation of agriculture.

All-embracing collectivisation will come when peasant farms are reorganised on a new technical basis—mechanisation and electrification, when most of the working peasants will be coordinated in co-operative organisations, when most of the villages will have a network of agricultural associations of a collectivist type. We are developing towards this, but we have not yet reached this goal and are not likely to reach it soon. Why? Because, among other things, large sums of money are needed for this which our State has not yet at its disposal, but which will no doubt be accumulated in the course of time. Marx said that not a single new social order in the history of mankind established itself firmly without being generously financed, without absorbing hundreds and hundreds of millions. I think that we are already entering upon the stage in the development of agriculture when the State is beginning to be able to give increased financial support to the new social order. The fact that socialised industry has already acquired the leading role in our national economy and that it is

carrying agriculture with it is the surest guarantee that peasant economy will pursue the road of further collectivisation.

QUESTION III: *What were the main difficulties under war Communism, when efforts were made to abolish money?*

ANSWER: There were many difficulties, internal and external. In internal economic relationships there were three main internal difficulties, as follows:

Firstly, our industry was ruined and paralysed, except for the war industry, which supplied our civil war fronts with ammunition and arms during the intervention. Two-thirds of our works and factories were at a standstill, transport was disorganised, there were no, or hardly any, manufactured goods.

Secondly, agriculture was in a very bad state, working peasants were at the fronts, there was lack of raw material, of bread for the urban population and particularly for the workers. In those days the bread ration for workers was half a pound and sometimes only an eighth of a pound a day.

Thirdly, there was no, or hardly any, Soviet distributive apparatus between town and country capable of supplying the latter with manufactured articles and the former with agricultural produce. Co-operatives and State trade organs were in an embryonic state.

However, at the end of the civil war and when the New Economic Policy was introduced the economic position of the country underwent a radical change.

Industry developed and consolidated itself. It took up a commanding position in the whole national economy. The most characteristic fact in respect to this is, that during the last two years we have been able to invest in industry over two billion rubles from our own savings, without help from outside, without any foreign loans whatever. Now it can no longer be said that there are no goods for the peasantry.

Agriculture has developed, its production has reached the pre-war level. Now it can no longer be said that there is no grain and other agricultural produce for the workers.

Co-operative and State trade organs have developed to such an extent that occupy a commanding place in the trade of the country. Now it can no longer be said that we have no distributive apparatus between town and country, between industry and peasant economy.

Of course, all this is not enough to build up Socialist economy here and now. But it is quite enough to be able to proceed along the road of successful Socialist construction.

We must now re-equip our industry and must build new works and factories on a new technical basis. We must develop agriculture, supply the peasantry with a maximum of agricultural machinery; we must organise the majority of the working peasantry in co-operative societies and reorganise the individual peasant farms into a big network of agricultural associations. We must organise a distributive apparatus between town and country capable of ascertaining and satisfying the requirements of the urban and rural districts of the whole country, in the same way as every individual draws up his budget, his revenue and expenditure. When we will have achieved all this, then, I should say, the time will have come when money will no longer be required. But this time is still remote.

QUESTION IV: *What about the "Scissors"?*

ANSWER: If by "scissors" we are to understand that discrepancy between the prices of agricultural produce and the prices of manufactured goods from the viewpoint of cost of production, the question of the "scissors" presents itself somewhat as follows: there is no doubt whatever that our manufactured goods are still sold at a somwhat higher price than they could be sold under different circumstances. This is because our industry is very young, because it is necessary to protect it from competition from outside, because it is essential to create for it conditions which will accelerate its development. Its rapid development is needed for our urban as well as our rural districts. Otherwise, we would be unable to supply the peasant homesteads with the necessary textile goods and agricultural machinery. This creates a discrepancy between prices for manufactured articles and prices for agricultural produce which is to some extent detrimental to the peasantry.

In order to relieve peasant economy of this drawback the Government and the Party have decided to follow the policy of a gradual but steady reduction of prices for manufactured goods. Can this be called a practical policy? I think so. It is a well-known fact, for instance, that during the last year we have been able to reduce retail prices for manufactured articles by 8 to 10 per cent. It is also a well-known fact that our industrial organisations are systematically reducing the cost of production and wholesale prices for

manufactured articles. There is every reason to believe that this policy will be continued. Even more than that, I must say that the policy of a steady reduction of prices for manufactured articles is the corner-stone of our economic policy without which the improvement and rationalisation of our industry and the consolidation of the union between the working class and the peasantry are impossible.

A different policy is adhered to in this respect in bourgeois countries. Enterprises are usually organised there into trusts and syndicates to raise prices for manufactured articles within the country to make them monopoly prices, to make on this basis as big profits as possible, and to create a fund for the export of goods abroad where the capitalists sell these goods at low prices in order to secure new markets. The same policy was pursued here in Russia under the bourgeois regime, when, for instance, sugar was sold in the country at exorbitant prices; for instance, in England this sugar was sold at such low prices that it was used as food for pigs. The Soviet Government works on diametrically opposite lines. It holds that industry must be at the service of the population, and not *vice versa*. It holds that a steady reduction of prices for manufactured articles is the fundamental means, without which the normal growth of industry is impossible, apart from the fact that the policy of reducing prices for manufactured articles contributes to increased consumption by the population, increases the demand of the urban and rural home markets, and creates in this manner an ever-growing source of funds for the further development of the industry.

QUESTION V: *What are the proposals of the Soviet Government to the French small holders of the Russian bonds? How are they to be brought to the notice of the French rentiers?*

ANSWER: Our proposals on the pre-war debts are published in Comrade Rakovsky's well-known interview. I think you must be familiar with them. The condition is: simultaneous credits for the U.S.S.R. We follow in this respect the well-known principle of give and take. If you give us credit you will receive something from us on account of the pre-war debts; if you do not give anything you will not receive anything. Does this mean that we have thereby recognised in principle the pre-war debts? Certainly not. It means only that while leaving in force the well-known decree about the annulment of old tsarist debts, we are prepared at the same time, in the form of a practical agreement, to pay a part of the pre-war debts if we get in

return the credits which we need, and which will be at the same time useful to French industry. We look upon payments on account of the pre-war debts as additional interest on the credits which we will receive for the development of our industry.

People talk about the war debts of tsarist Russia, of all sorts of claims on the U.S.S.R. arising out of the October Revolution. But people forget that our Revolution is, in principle, the negation of imperialist wars and tsarist debts connected with them. People forget that the U.S.S.R. cannot and will not pay war debts. People also forget that the U.S.S.R. cannot leave out of account the plunder and violence to which the country was subjected for a number of years, during the intervention of foreign States with which certain counter-claims on the part of the U.S.S.R. are connected. Who is responsible for this plunder and the violence? Who must be called to account for it? Who must pay compensation for it? The imperialist rulers of affairs are inclined to allow these unpleasant things to be forgotten, but they must know that such things are not forgotten.

QUESTION VI: *How do you reconcile the vodka monopoly with the struggle against alcoholism?*

ANSWER: Generally speaking, I think that it is difficult to reconcile them; one certainly runs counter to the other. The Party is aware of this, and it took up this policy deliberately, knowing full well that at present such a seeming contradiction is the lesser evil. When we introduced the vodka monopoly we were confronted with the alternative: *either* to accept the capitalist yoke by ceding to capitalists a whole number of our most important works and factories, receiving from them in return the necessary means enabling us to extricate ourselves from our temporary difficulty, *or* introduce the vodka monopoly in order to get the necessary revenue for the development of our industry with our own resources. The members of the Central Committee, including myself, had a talk with Lenin, who admitted that in the event of not getting the necessary credits from outside the vodka monopoly was inevitable as a provisional means of an extraordinary kind. This is how matters stood when we introduced the vodka monopoly.

Of course, generally speaking, it would be better to abolish vodka, for vodka is an evil. But in that would mean accepting the yoke of capitalism, which is a still greater evil. Therefore we preferred the lesser evil. At present the revenue from vodka is over 500 million rubles. To give up the

vodka monopoly now would mean to give up this revenue. Moreover, there are no grounds for asserting that this would lessen alcoholism, for the peasants will begin to distil their own vodka and to poison themselves with this inferior home-distilled stuff. In this respect the great cultural backwardness of our countryside obviously plays a certain role, apart from the fact that the immediate abandonment of the vodka monopoly is tantamount to depriving our industry of over half a billion rubles which cannot be derived from any other source.

Does this mean that the vodka monopoly will always exist? Certainly not; we introduced it as a provisional measure. Therefore it must be abolished as soon as we discover in our national economy new sources of revenue for the further development of our industry. That such sources will be discovered is certain.

Were we right to transfer the production and distribution of vodka to the hands of the State? I think so. If vodka were handed over into private hands this would, firstly, lead to strengthening private capital; secondly, the Government would not have been able to adequately regulate the production and consumption of vodka; and thirdly, this would have made it more difficult for the Government to repeal the production and consumption of vodka in the near future. At present our policy is gradually to reduce the production of vodka. I think that in the near future we will be able to abolish the vodka monopoly, to reduce the production of spirits to the minimum required for technical purposes, and subsequently to abolish the sale of vodka.

I think that we could do away with vodka and many other unpleasant things if the Western European proletarians took power into their hands and gave us the necessary help. But what are we to do? Our Western European brothers do not as yet want to seize power, and we are obliged to do the best we can with our own means. But it is not our fault; it is destiny. As you will admit, our Western European friends are also partly responsible for the vodka monopoly. (Laughter and applause.)

QUESTION VII: *Judicial powers of the* G.P.U., *trial without witnesses, without counsel, secret arrests. Considering that these measures are not approved of by French public opinion, it would be interesting to hear their justification. Is it intended to substitute or abolish them*?

ANSWER: The G.P.U., or the Cheka, is a punitive organ of the Soviet Government. It is more or less similar to the Committee of Public Safety which existed during the great French Revolution. It punishes primarily spies, plotters, terrorists, bandits, speculators, and forgers. It is something in the nature of a military political tribunal set up for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Revolution from attacks on the part of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and their agents.

This organ was created on the day after the October Revolution, after all kinds of plots, terrorist and spying organisations, financed by Russian and foreign capitalists were discovered. This organ developed and became consolidated after a series of terrorist acts had been perpetrated against the leaders of the Soviet Government: after the murder of Comrade Uritsky, member of the Revolutionary Committee of Leningrad (he was killed by a Socialist-Revolutionary); after the murder of Comrade Volodarsky, member of the Revolutionary Committee of Leningrad (he was also killed by a Socialist-Revolutionary), after the attempt on the life of Lenin (he was wounded by a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party). It must be admitted that the G.P.U. aimed at the enemies of the Revolution without missing. By the way, this quality of the G.P.U. still holds good. It has been, ever since, the terror of the bourgeoisie, the indefatigable guard of the Revolution, the unsheathed sword of the proletariat.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the bourgeoisie of all countries hate the G.P.U. All sorts of legends have been invented about the G.P.U. The slander which has been circulated about the G.P.U. knows no bounds. And what does that mean? It means that the G.P.U. is properly defending the interests of the Revolution. The sworn enemies of the Revolution curse the G.P.U. Hence it follows that the G.P.U. is doing the right thing.

But this is not how the workers regard the G.P.U. You go to the workers' districts and ask the workers what they think of it. You will find that they regard it with great respect. Why? Because they see in it a loyal defender of the Revolution.

I understand the hatred and distrust of the bourgeoisie for the G.P.U. I understand the various bourgeois tourists who, on coming to the U.S.S.R., inquire before anything else as to whether the G.P.U. still exists and whether the time has not yet come for its liquidation. This is comprehensible and not out of the ordinary. But I cannot understand some workers' delegates who, on coming to the U.S.S.R., ask with alarm as to whether many counter-

revolutionaries have been punished by the G.P.U. and whether terrorists and plotters against the proletarian Government will still be punished by it and is it not time yet for its dissolution. Where does this concern of some workers' delegates for the enemies of the proletarian revolution come from? How can it be explained? How can it be justified?

They advocate a maximum of lenience, they advise the dissolution of the G.P.U.… But can anyone guarantee that the capitalists of all countries will abandon the idea of organising and financing counter-revolutionary plotters, terrorists, incendiaries, and bomb-throwers after the liquidation of the G.P.U.? To disarm the Revolution without having any guarantees that the enemies of the Revolution will be disarmed—would not that be folly, would not that be a crime against the working class? No, comrades, we do not want to repeat the errors of the Paris Communards. The Communards of Paris were too lenient in dealing with Versailles, for which Marx rightly reproved them at the time. They had to pay for their leniency, and, when Thiers came to Paris, tens of thousands of workers were shot by the Versailles forces. Do the comrades think that the Russian bourgeoisie and nobility are less bloodthirsty than those of Versailles in France? We know, at any rate, how they behaved towards the workers when they occupied Siberia, the Ukraine, and North Caucasia in alliance with the French and British, Japanese and American interventionists.

I do not mean to say by this that the internal situation of the country is such as makes it necessary to have a punitive organ of the Revolution. From the point of view of the internal situation, the Revolution is so firm and unshakable that we could do without the G.P.U. But the trouble is that the enemies at home are not isolated individuals. They are connected in a thousand ways with the capitalists of all countries who support them by every means and in every way. We are a country surrounded by capitalist States. The internal enemies of our Revolution are the agents of the capitalists of all countries. The capitalist States are the background and basis for the internal enemies of our Revolution. Fighting against the enemies at home we therefore fight the counter-revolutionary elements of all countries. Judge for yourselves whether under such conditions we can do without such punitive organs as the G.P.U.

No, comrades, we do not want to repeat the mistakes of the Paris Communards. The G.P.U. is necessary for the Revolution and it will continue

to live and strike terror into the heart of the enemies of the proletariat. (Loud applause.)

ONE OF THE DELEGATES: Allow me, Comrade Stalin, to thank you on behalf of the delegates present for your explanations and refutations of the falsehoods circulated about the U.S.S.R. abroad. You can rest assured that we will be able to tell our workers at home the truth about the U.S.S.R.

STALIN: You are welcome, comrades. I consider it my duty to answer your questions and to report to you. We Soviet leaders hold ourselves duty-bound to report to our class brothers on all questions of interest to them. Our State is the child of the world proletariat. The leaders in our State merely do their duty to the international proletariat in reporting to its representatives. (Applause.)

ON THE GRAIN FRONT

(*Extract from a Talk to Students of the Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy, and the Sverdlov University on May 28, 1928*)

QUESTION: What are our main difficulties in the grain problem? What is the solution of these difficulties? What, in connection with these difficulties, are the conclusions to be drawn as regards rates of development of our industry, particularly from the point of view of the relation between the light and heavy industries?

ANSWER: At the first glance it might appear that our grain difficulties are of a fortuitous nature, the result merely of faulty planning, merely of a number of errors committed in the matter of economic adjustment. But that might appear so only at the first glance. As a matter of fact, the cause of the difficulties lies much deeper. That faulty planning and errors of economic adjustment have played a considerable part, of that there cannot be the slightest doubt; but it would be the grossest error to attribute everything to faulty planning and chance mistakes. It would be wrong to minimise the role and importance of planning; but, on the other hand, it would be still more wrong to exaggerate the part played by the planning principle, in the belief that we have already reached a stage of development when it is possible to plan and regulate everything. It must not be forgotten that, in addition to elements which lend themselves to planning, there are elements in our national economy which so far do not lend themselves to planning; and that, after all, there are hostile classes which cannot be overcome simply by State planning. That is why I think that we must not reduce everything to mere chance, errors of planning, etc.

Well, then, what is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front?

The basis of our grain difficulties lies in the fact that the increase in the production of marketable grain in our country is proceeding at a slower pace than the increase in the demand for grain. Industry is growing; the number of workers is increasing; towns are spreading; and, finally, the regions producing industrial crops (cotton, flax, sugar-beet, etc.), and which create a demand for marketable grain, are expanding. All these factors lead to a rapid increase in the demand for grain, for marketable grain, whereas

the production of marketable grain is increasing at a tragically slow rate. It cannot be said that the amount of grain at the disposal of the State is less this year than last year, or than the year before. On the contrary, there is far more grain in the hands of the State this year than in previous years. Yet, in spite of that, we are faced with grain difficulties. Here are a few figures. In the year 1925–26 we managed by April 1 to collect 434 million poods of grain, of which 123 million poods were exported abroad. There remained, therefore, in the country 311 million poods of collected grain. In 1926–27 there were 596 million poods of collected grain by April 1, of which 153 million poods were exported, while 443 million poods remained in the country. In 1927–28 there were 576 million poods of collected grain by April 1, of which 27 million poods were exported and 549 million poods remained in the country. In other words, this year, by April 1, we had 100 million poods more of collected grain to satisfy the requirements of the country than last year, and 230 million poods more than the year before. Yet, in spite of that, we are experiencing difficulties on the grain front this year.

I have already declared in one of my speeches that these difficulties were exploited by the capitalist elements in the countryside, and primarily by the kulaks, in order to disrupt the Soviet economic policy. You know that the Soviet Government adopted a number of measures with the object of putting a stop to the anti-Soviet activities of the kulaks. I need not therefore dwell on this matter here. It is another question which interests me at present, namely, the question of the causes of the slow increase of the production of marketable grain and of why the increase of the production of marketable grain in our country is proceeding more slowly than the increase of the demand for grain, in spite of the fact that we have reached the pre-war level in respect of the area cultivated with grain and of the gross production of grain.

Is it not a fact that we have reached the pre-war level in respect of the area under cultivation? Yes, it is a fact. Is it not a fact that last year the gross production of grain reached pre-war production, *i.e*. five billion poods? Yes, it is a fact. Why, then, in spite of these facts, are we producing only one-half and exporting abroad only one-twentieth of the amount of marketable grain produced and exported in pre-war times? The reason is, primarily and chiefly, the change in the structure of our agriculture brought about by the October Revolution, namely, the transition from large-scale landlord and

large-scale kulak farming, which provided the greatest proportion of marketable grain, to small- and middle-peasant farming, which provides the least proportion of marketable grain. The very fact that before the war there were 15 to 16 million individual peasant farms, whereas now there are 24 to 25 million individual peasant farms, amply proves that the fundamental basis of our agriculture consists of small-peasant farms, yielding a minimum amount of marketable grain. The strength of large-scale production in agriculture, no matter whether it is landlord, kulak, or collective farming, lies in the fact that large-scale farming is able to apply machinery, scientific knowledge, and fertilisers, and to increase the productivity of labour, and thereby provide the maximum of marketable grain. On the other hand, the weakness of small-peasant farming lies in the fact that it is deprived of these opportunities, or almost deprived of them, and accordingly is a semi-consuming[1] and poor market-yielding farming. Take, for instance, the collective farms and the Soviet farms. Their marketable grain yield amounts to 47·2 per cent of their gross production. In other words, they yield more marketable grain than landlord farming of pre-war days. And what of the small- and middle-peasant farms? They yield marketable grain only to the extent of 11·2 per cent of their output. The difference, as you see, is striking.

Here are a few figures illustrating the structure of grain production in the past, in the pre-war period, and at present, *i.e*. since the October Revolution. These figures have been furnished by Comrade Nemchinov, a member of the Collegium of the Central Statistical Board. They do not pretend to be exact, as Comrade Nemchinov explains in his accompanying note; they afford the opportunity only for approximate calculations. But these figures are quite adequate for the purpose of understanding the difference between the pre-war period and the period succeeding the October Revolution, from the point of view of the structure of grain production in general, and of the production of marketable grain in particular.

	Gross Grain Production		Marketable Grain (*i.e.* not consumed in the Village)		Percentage of Marketable Grain to Gross Production
	Millions of Poods	Per cent	Millions of Poods	Per cent	
PRE-WAR					
1. Landlords' estates	600	12·0	281·6	21·6	47·0
2. Kulaks	1,900	38·0	650·0	50·0	34·0
3. Middle and Poor Peasants	2,500	50·0	369·0	28·4	14·7
Total ..	5,000	100·0	1,300·6	100·0	26·0
1926–27					
1. Soviet and collective farms	80·0	1·7	37·8	6·0	47·2
2. Kulaks	617·0	13·0	126·0	20·0	20·0
3. Middle and Poor Peasants	4,052·0	85·3	466·2	74·0	11·2
Total ..	4,749·0	100·0	630·0	100·0	13·3

What does this table show?

It shows, first of all, that the production of the overwhelming proportion of grain products has passed from the hands of the landlords and kulaks into the hands of the small and middle peasants. That means that the small and middle peasants, having completely emancipated themselves from the yoke of the landlords, and having, in the main, broken the strength of the kulaks, thereby obtained the opportunity of considerably improving their material well-being. That was the result of the October Revolution. It is an expression of the important gains which accrued to the greater mass of the peasantry as a result of the October Revolution.

It shows, secondly, that the chief holders of marketable grain are the small and, primarily, the middle peasants. That means that as a result of the October Revolution the Soviet Union has become a country of small-peasant farming not only from the point of view of the gross output of grain, but also from the point of view of the production of marketable grain, and that the middle peasant has become the "central figure" in agriculture.

It shows, thirdly, that the abolition of landlord (large-scale) production, the reduction of kulak (large-scale) production to less than one-third, and the transition to small-peasant production, with a marketable output of only

11 per cent, accompanied by the absence of any degree of developed large-scale social production of grain (collective and Soviet farms), must lead, and in fact has led, to a drastic reduction in the output of marketable grain as compared with pre-war days. It is a fact that although we have reached the pre-war level in respect of the gross production of grain the output of marketable grain has been reduced to one-half.

Therein lies the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

And that is why our difficulties on the grain front cannot be regarded as merely fortuitous.

No doubt the fact that our trading organisations took upon themselves the unnecessary task of supplying a number of small and middle-sized towns with grain, which could not but result in a certain reduction of the grain reserves of the State, also affected the situation to some extent. But there is absolutely no reason to doubt that the basis of our difficulties on the grain front does not lie in this particular circumstance, but in the slow development of the marketable output of our agriculture, whereas the demand for marketable grain is rapidly expanding.

What is the solution to the problem?

Some people believe that the solution of the problem lies in a return to kulak farming, in the development and extension of kulak farming. These people dare not advocate a return to landlordism, realising, apparently, that it is dangerous in our times to talk about such matters. All the more eagerly, therefore, do they advocate the necessity of the maximum development of kulak farming, which, they claim, is in the interest of … the Soviet Government. They think that the Soviet Government can simultaneously rely on two diametrically opposed classes—the class of the kulaks, the economic principle of which is the exploitation of the working class, and the class of the workers, the economic principle of which is the abolition of all exploitation. A trick worthy of reactionaries. There is no need to show that these reactionary "plans" have nothing in common with the interests of the working class, and with the principles of Marxism and the tasks of Leninism. All talk about the kulak being "no worse" than the capitalist of the town, that the kulak is not more dangerous than the town Nepman, and that therefore there is no reason now to fear the kulak—all such talk is sheer Liberal chatter which lulls the vigilance of the working class and of the great mass of the peasants. It must not be forgotten that while in industry we can oppose the small urban capitalist by large-scale Socialist industry,

which produces nine-tenths of the whole output of industrial commodities, in agriculture large-scale kulak farming can be opposed only by the still weak collective farms and Soviet farms, which produce one-eighth of the amount of grain produced by the kulak farms. To fail to understand the significance of large-scale kulak farming in the countryside, to fail to understand that the specific gravity of the kulaks in the rural districts is one hundred times greater than the specific gravity of the capitalists in urban industry, is to have lost one's senses, to have broken with Leninism and deserted to the side of the enemies of the working class.

Where, then, is the solution to the situation?

The solution consists, firstly, in a transition from small, backward, and scattered peasant farming to concentrated, large-scale social farms, equipped with machinery, armed with the knowledge of science, and capable of producing the maximum quantity of marketable grain. The solution lies in the transition in agriculture from individual peasant farming to collective, to communal farming.

Lenin, in the very first days of the October Revolution, called on the Party to organise collective farms. From that time forth the propaganda of the idea of collective farming has not ceased within the ranks of our Party. However, it is only very recently that the call for collective farms has met with mass response. That is to be explained by the fact that the widespread development of co-operative organisation in the rural districts prepared the way for a complete and favourable change in the attitude of the peasant toward the collective farms, and that the existence of a number of collective farms already yielding from 150 to 200 poods per dessiatin, of which from 30 to 40 per cent represents a marketable surplus, is strongly attracting the poor peasants and the lower strata of the middle peasants toward the collective farms. Of no little importance in this connection is the fact that the State has been only recently in a position to lend serious financial assistance to the collective farm movement. It is known that this year the State granted twice the amount of money in aid of the collective farms that it did last year (more than 60 million rubles). The Fifteenth Party Congress was quite right in recording that the conditions have already ripened for a collective farm movement on a mass scale and that the intensification of the collective farm movement is one of the most important means of increasing the marketable output of grain of the country.

According to the Central Statistical Board, the gross production of grain by the collective farms in 1927 amounted to no less than 55 million poods, with an average marketable output of 30 per cent. The widespread movement that began this year for the creation of new collective farms and for the extension of the old collective farms should considerably increase the grain output of the collective farms by the end of the year. Our task is to maintain the present rate of development of the collective farm movement, to combine the collective farms into larger units, to get rid of sham collective farms, replacing them by genuine ones, and to create a system whereby the collective farms will deliver to the State and co-operative organisations the whole of their marketable grain, or be deprived of State subsidies and credits. I believe that if these conditions are observed we will, in three or four years, be able to obtain from the collective farms about 40 or 50 million poods of marketable grain.

The collective farm movement is sometimes contrasted with the co-operative movement, on the assumption, presumably, that collective farming is one thing and co-operation another. That, of course, is a mistake. Some even go the length of contrasting the collective farms with the co-operative plan of Lenin. It need hardly be said that such a contrast is a long way from the truth. As a matter of fact, the collective farms are a form of co-operation, a very striking form of producers' co-operation. There are sellers' co-operatives, supply co-operatives, and producers' co-operatives. The collective farms represent an inseparable and integral part of the co-operative movement, in general, and of Lenin's co-operative plan, in particular. Carrying out Lenin's co-operative plan means lifting the peasantry from the level of the sellers' and supply co-operatives to the level of the producers' co-operatives—to the collective farm co-operatives, so to speak. That, by the way, explains why the collective farms began to arise and develop only as a result of the development and consolidation of the sellers' and supply co-operatives.

The solution consists, secondly, in developing and strengthening the old collective farms and in organising and developing new large-scale collective farms. According to the figures of the Central Statistical Board, in 1927 the gross output of grain in the existing collective farms amounted to no less than 45 million poods, with a marketable surplus of 65 per cent. There is no doubt that, given a certain amount of support on the part of the State, the collective farms could considerably increase the production of

grain. But that does not exhaust the problem. There is a decision of the Soviet Government according to which new large-scale Soviet farms (from 10,000 to 30,000 dessiatins each) are to be organised in regions that have not been divided up into peasant lands, and these new Soviet farms in five or six years should yield about 100 million poods of marketable grain. The organisation of these Soviet farms has already begun. The task is to carry this decision of the Soviet Government into effect at all costs. It appears to me that, if these tasks are fulfilled, in three or four years we should be able to obtain from the old and new Soviet farms about 80 to 100 million poods of marketable grain.

And the solution finally consists in systematically increasing the yield of the small and middle individual peasant farms. We must not and should not support the individual large-scale kulak farms. But we must and should support the individual small- and middle-peasant farms, increasing their yield and drawing them into the channel of co-operative organisation. This task is an old one, proclaimed by us with great emphasis as early as 1921, at the time of the substitution of the food requisitions by the food tax. This task was reiterated by our Party at the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses. The importance of the task is now emphasised by the difficulties on the grain front. Accordingly, this task must be carried out with no less determination than that with which the first two tasks will be carried out, namely, the organisation of collective farms and the organisation of Soviet farms.

All the signs point to the fact that the yield of peasant farming can be increased by about 15 to 20 per cent in the course of a few years. At present there are no less than five million *sokhas*[1] in use. The substitution of these *sokhas* by ploughs should alone lead to a considerable increase in the grain production of the country, not to mention such measures as supplying the peasant farms with a certain minimum of fertilisers, sorted seeds, simple machines, etc. The contract system—*i.e.* the system of concluding contracts with whole villages for supplying them with seed, etc., on the rigid condition that they in return deliver a corresponding quantity of grain products—this system is the best method of raising the yield of peasant farms and drawing the peasants into the co-operative system. It seems to me that if we work seriously in this direction we can obtain from the small and middle individual peasant farms in three or four years not less than 100 million additional poods of marketable grain.

Thus, provided all these tasks are fulfilled, in three or four years the State will have in its hands about 200 to 250 million additional poods of marketable grain, a supply more or less sufficient to enable us to manœuvre as required both within the country and abroad.

Such, in the main, are the measures which must be taken in order to solve the difficulties on the grain front.

The task at present is to combine these basic measures with the current measures for improving the planning of the supply of the rural districts with goods and releasing our trading organisations from the duty of supplying grain to a number of small and middle-sized towns.

Would it not be wise, in conjunction with these measures, to adopt a number of others, such as, for instance, diminishing the speed of development of our industry, the expansion of which is creating a considerable increase in the demand for grain, a demand which at present is outstripping the increase of production of marketable grain? No, it would not be wise, not by any means. To diminish the speed of development of industry would mean weakening the working class, since every advance in the development of industry, every new factory and workshop, is, as Lenin puts it, "a new stronghold" of the working class, strengthening its position in the fight against the elemental forces of the petty bourgeoisie and in the fight against the capitalist elements in our economy. On the contrary, we must maintain the present rate of development of industry and, at the first opportunity, still more accelerate it, in order to pour cheap goods into the rural districts and obtain from them the maximum amount of grain; in order to supply machines to agriculture, particularly to the collective and Soviet farms, and in order to industrialise agriculture and to increase its marketable surplus.

Perhaps it would be wise, as a measure of greater "caution," to retard the development of heavy industry, with the object of making light industry, which produces chiefly for the peasant market, the basis of our industry. Not by any means. That would be suicidal. It would mean undermining our whole industry, including light industry. It would mean abandoning the slogan of the industrialisation of our country and transforming it into an appendage of the capitalist system of production. In this respect we follow the well-known guiding maxims of Lenin, laid down by him at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, and which are imperatively binding on the

whole of our Party. This is what Lenin said on the subject at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern:

> We know that the salvation of Russia lies not only in the yield of a good harvest by peasant farming—that is not enough; not only in the healthy condition of our light industry, which supplies the peasantry with articles of consumption—that also is not enough. We also need heavy industry (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVII, p. 349).

And further:

> We are economising on everything, even on our schools. Why? Because we know that, except by saving heavy industry, except by restoring it, we cannot build up industry of any kind. Without it we shall perish altogether as an independent country.

These admonitions of Lenin must never be forgotten.

How will the measures proposed affect the alliance between the workers and peasants? I believe that these measures can only help to strengthen the alliance between the workers and peasants. And indeed, if the collective and Soviet farms develop at an increased rate; if, as a result of the direct aid given to the small and middle peasants, the yield of their farms increases and co-operation embraces ever wider masses of the peasantry; if the State obtains hundreds of millions of poods of additional marketable grain, required for the purposes of manœuvring: if, as a result of these and similar measures, the kulaks are bridled and gradually overwhelmed—is it not clear that the antagonisms between the working class and the peasantry within the alliance of workers and peasants will diminish more and more; that the need for extraordinary measures in the collection of grain will disappear; that wider and wider masses of the peasantry will turn to collective forms of production and that the fight for mastery over the capitalist elements of the rural districts will increasingly assume a mass and organised character? Is it not obvious that the alliance between the workers and peasants can only benefit by these measures?

It must be borne in mind, however, that the alliance of the workers and peasants under the dictatorship of the proletariat is not just an alliance. It is a specific form of class alliance between the working class and the toiling masses of the peasantry, which sets itself the aim *(a)* of consolidating the position of the working class, *(b)* of insuring the leadership of the working

class within the alliance, and *(c)* of abolishing classes and class society. Any other conception of the alliance of workers and peasants is opportunism, Menshevism, Social-Revolutionism—anything you like, but not Marxism and not Leninism.

How are we to reconcile the idea of the alliance of the workers and peasants with Lenin's well-known postulate that the peasantry is "the last capitalist class"? Is there not a contradiction here? The contradiction is only an apparent one. As a matter of fact, there is no contradiction at all. In the very speech at the Third Congress of the Comintern in which Lenin characterised the peasantry as "the last capitalist class," in that same speech Lenin over and over again justifies the necessity of an alliance between the workers and the peasants, declaring that "the highest principle of the dictatorship is to support the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry so that it can maintain its position of leadership and the power of the State." It is obvious that Lenin, at any rate, sees no contradiction in this.

What does Lenin's postulate regarding the peasantry being "the last capitalist class" mean? Does it not mean that the peasantry consists of capitalists? No, it does not. It means, firstly, that the peasantry is a special class, basing its production on private ownership in the implements and means of production and therefore distinguished from the class of proletarians, who base their production on collective ownership in the implements and means of production. Secondly, it means that the peasantry is a class which throws up from its midst, engenders and nourishes capitalists, kulaks, and all manner of exploiters.

Does not this represent an insuperable obstacle to the organisation of an alliance of the workers and peasants? No, it does not. An alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat is not an alliance with the whole of the peasantry. The alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry is an alliance of the working class with the toiling masses of the peasantry. Such an alliance cannot be effected without a struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry, against the kulaks. Such an alliance cannot be a firm one without organising the poor peasants to be the support of the working class in the rural districts. Consequently the alliance between the workers and the peasants, under the present conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, can be realised only in accordance with Lenin's well-known slogan: rely upon the poor peasant, establish a firm alliance with the middle peasant, and do not for a moment

relax the fight against the kulak. For only by applying this slogan can the cause of bringing the bulk of the peasantry into the channels of Socialist construction be secured.

You see, therefore, that the contradiction between Lenin's two formulas is only an apparent contradiction. As a matter of fact there is no contradiction at all.

[1] *i.e*. producing largely for the peasant's own needs.—ED.

[1] *Sokha*, a primitive wooden plough used by the Russian peasants.—ED.

LENIN ON THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANTS

(Reply to Comrade S.)

COMRADE S.:

It is not true that Lenin's slogan, "To know how to come to an agreement with the middle peasantry, without for a moment abandoning the fight against the kulak, but relying firmly only on the poor peasantry," which he advanced in his well-known article on Pitirim Sorokin, is, as is alleged, a slogan of the "Period of the Committee of Poor Peasants," a slogan of "the end of the period of the so-called neutralisation of the middle peasantry." *That is absolutely untrue*. The Committees of Poor Peasants were formed in June, 1918. By the end of October, 1918, our forces had already gained the upper hand over the kulak in the countryside, and the middle peasant had already definitely swung over to the side of the Soviet Power. It was on the basis of this swing-over that the decision of the Central Committee was taken to abolish the dual power of the Soviets and the Committees of Poor Peasants, to re-elect the volost and village Soviets, merge the Committees of Poor Peasants with the newly elected Soviets, and consequently to dissolve the Committees of Poor Peasants. This decision of the Soviet Government was formally enacted, as is well known, on November 9, 1918, at the Sixth Congress of Soviets. I refer to the Order of the Sixth Congress of Soviets of November 9, 1918, regarding the re-election of the village and volost Soviets and the merging of the Committees of Poor Peasants into the Soviets. But when did Lenin's article, "A Valuable Admission by Pitirim Sorokin," in which he substituted the slogan of neutralising of the middle peasant by the slogan of agreement with the middle peasant appear? It appeared on November 21, 1918, *i.e*. almost two weeks later than the Order of the Sixth Congress of Soviets. In this article Lenin plainly states that the policy of agreement with the middle peasant is dictated by the *swing-over* of the middle peasant to our side. This is what Lenin says:

> In the village our task is to annihilate the landowner, to shatter the resistance of the exploiter and the kulak speculator; for this purpose we can rely *only* on the semi-proletariat, the "poor peasantry." But the middle peasant is not our enemy. He wavered, is wavering, and will continue to waver; the task of influencing the

> waverers *is not* identical with the task of overthrowing the exploiter and of triumphing over the active enemy. To know how to come to an agreement with the middle peasantry—without for a moment abandoning the fight against the kulak—to rely firmly only on the poor peasantry—such is the task of the moment; for now, for the reasons mentioned above, a *swing-over on the part of the middle peasantry to our side is inevitable*[1] (*Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIII, p. 294).

What follows?

It follows that Lenin's slogan refers, not to the past period, the period of the Committees of Poor Peasants and the neutralisation of the middle peasant, but to the *new* period, the period of agreement with the middle peasant. Hence it reflects, not the *end* of a past period, but the *beginning* of a new period.

But your assertion regarding Lenin's slogan is not only incorrect from the formal point of view, not merely, so to speak, chronologically; it is incorrect in substance. It is known that Lenin's slogan regarding agreement with the middle peasant was proclaimed by the whole Party as a new slogan at the Eighth Party Congress (March, 1919). It is known that the Eighth Party Congress was the very Congress which laid the foundation of our policy of a firm alliance with the middle peasant. It is known that our programme, the programme of the C.P.S.U., was adopted also at the Eighth Party Congress. It is known that the programme contains special points dealing with the attitude of the Party towards the various groupings in the village: the poor peasants, the middle peasantry, and the kulaks. What have these points in the programme of the C.P.S.U. to say regarding the social groupings in the village and regarding our Party's attitude toward them?

Listen:

> In all its work in the village the Russian C.P. continues *to rely for support upon the proletarian and semi-proletarian forces of the village*, first of all, organising them into an independent force, creating Party nuclei in the village, organisations of poor peasants, a specific type of trade union of proletarians and semi-proletarians of the village, etc., striving in every way to bring them into close contact with the town proletariat and to wrest them from the influence of the bourgeoisie and small property interests of the village.
>
> As to the kulaks, the village bourgeoisie, the policy of the R.C.P. is to wage a *determined struggle against their exploiting proclivities and to crush their resistance to the Soviet policy*.

> As to the middle peasants, the policy of the R.C.P. is to draw them gradually and systematically into the work of Socialist construction. The Party sets itself the task of isolating them from the kulaks, of winning them over to the side of the working class by a solicitous interest in their needs, and of combating their backwardness by methods of moral persuasion; not by methods of oppression, but by striving, wherever their vital interests are concerned, *to reach practical agreement with them*, making concessions to them in determining the methods of carrying through Socialist changes[1] (Stenographic Report of the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Russian edition, p. 351).

Try and find the slightest, even verbal, difference between these points of the programme and Lenin's slogan! You will not find it, for there is no difference. What is more, there cannot be the slightest doubt that Lenin's slogan not only does not contradict the decisions of the Eighth Congress on the subject of the middle peasant but, on the contrary, is a most apt and exact formulation of these decisions. And it is a fact that the programme of the R.C.P. was adopted in March, 1919, at the Eighth Party Congress, which specially discussed the question of the middle peasant, while Lenin's article against Pitirim Sorokin, containing the slogan regarding agreement with the middle peasant, appeared in the Press in November, 1918, four months prior to the Eighth Party Congress.

Is it not clear that the Eighth Party Congress *fully and completely confirmed* the slogan which Lenin advanced in his article against Pitirim Sorokin as a slogan by which the Party must be *guided* in its work in the countryside *during the whole of the present period of Socialist construction*?

What is the essence of Lenin's slogan?

The essence of Lenin's slogan consists in the fact that it groups with remarkable precision the *triune* task of the Party in the village and expresses it in a single condensed formula: (*a*) *rely* on the poor peasant; (*b*) come to *agreement* with the middle peasant; and (*c*) do not for a minute cease to *fight* the kulak. Try to extract from this formula any one of its parts as a basis for work in the village at the present moment and ignore the remaining parts, and you will inevitably find yourself in a blind alley. Is it possible in the present phase of Socialist construction to reach a real and stable agreement with the middle peasant without leaning for support on the poor peasant and without fighting the kulak? It is impossible. Is it possible, under the present conditions of development, to carry on a successful fight

against the kulak without leaning for support on the poor peasant, and without having reached agreement with the middle peasant? It is impossible. How can this *triune* task of Party work in the village be most aptly expressed in one all-embracing slogan? I think that Lenin's slogan is the most apt expression of this task. It must be admitted that it cannot be expressed more aptly than Lenin expresses it….

Why is it necessary *particularly at the present time*, particularly *under the present conditions* of work in the village, to emphasise the expediency of Lenin's slogan?

Because, particularly, at this very time a tendency is observed on the part of certain comrades to break up this *triune* task of Party work in the village into parts and to sever these parts one from another. This is fully corroborated by the experience of our grain collection campaign in January and February of the present year. That agreement must be reached with the middle peasant—every Bolshevik knows. But not everybody understands how this agreement is to be reached. Some think that agreement must be reached with the middle peasant by abandoning the fight against the kulak, or by moderating this fight; because, they say, the fight against the kulak may frighten away a section of the middle peasantry, its more well-to-do section. Others think that agreement with the middle peasant must be reached by rejecting the work of organising the poor peasants, or by moderating this work; because, they say, the organisation of the poor peasant means singling out the poor peasant, and this may frighten off the middle peasant. The result of these deviations from the correct line is forgetfulness of the Marxist postulate that the middle peasant is a wavering class, that agreement with the middle peasant can be a firm one only if a determined fight is carried on against the kulak and if the work among the poor peasants is intensified, and that unless these provisions are observed the middle peasant may waver to the side of the kulak as a force. Remember what Lenin said at the Eighth Party Congress:

> We must determine our attitude to a class which *has no definite and stable position*.[1] The proletariat, in the mass, is for Socialism, the bourgeoisie, in the mass, is opposed to Socialism: to determine our attitude as between these two classes is simple. But when we pass to a stratum like the middle peasantry we find that *it is a class that wavers*. The middle peasant is partly a property owner, partly a toiler. He does not exploit other representatives of the toilers. For decades he had to defend his position under the greatest difficulties; he has

> suffered the exploitation of the landlords and the capitalists, he has borne all; yet at the same time he is a property owner. For that reason our attitude toward that wavering class is confronted with enormous difficulties[1] (Stenographic Report of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P., p. 300).

But there are other deviations from the correct line, no less dangerous than the aforesaid. In some cases, the fight against the kulak is indeed carried on, but it is carried on in such a clumsy and senseless manner that the blows fall on the middle and poor peasants. As a result, the kulak escapes unscathed, a rift is made in the alliance with the middle peasant, and a section of the poor peasants for the time being falls into the clutches of the kulak who is working to undermine the Soviet policy. In other cases attempts are made to transform the fight against the kulaks into de-kulakisation, and grain collection into grain requisition, forgetting that de-kulakisation under present conditions is folly, and that food requisition means, not an alliance with, but a fight against, the middle peasant.

What is the reason for such deviations from the Party line?

The reason is failure to understand that the triune task of Party work in the village is *one single and indivisible task*; failure to understand that the task of fighting the kulak *cannot be severed* from the task of coming to agreement with the middle peasant, and that these two tasks cannot be severed from the task of converting the poor peasant into a bulwark of the Party in the countryside.[2]

What must be done in order that these tasks shall not be severed from each other during the course of our work in the village?

We must, at least, issue such a guiding slogan as will combine all these tasks in one general formula and which, consequently, will not permit these tasks to be severed from each other.

Is there such a formula, such a slogan in our Party arsenal?

There is. That formula is contained in Lenin's slogan: "To know how to come to an agreement with the middle peasantry, without for a moment abandoning the fight against the kulak, relying firmly only on the poor peasantry."

That is why I think that this slogan is most expedient and all-embracing and that it must be brought to the forefront *particularly at the present time*, *particularly under the present conditions of our work in the village*.

You regard Lenin's slogan as an "*oppositionist*" slogan, and in your letter you ask: "*How did it come about that … this oppositionist slogan was*

printed in Pravda *on the occasion of May first*, 1928…. *How is it to be explained that this slogan appeared in the pages of* Pravda, *the organ of the Central Committee of the* C.P.S.U.? *Is it only a technical misprint*, *or does it represent a compromise with the opposition on the question of the middle peasant*?" This sounds very threatening, no doubt. But slow up "at the turns," Comrade S.; otherwise, in your zeal you may come to the conclusion that we must *prohibit* the printing of our programme, which fully confirms Lenin's slogan (this is a fact!), which in the main was drawn up by Lenin (who was not an oppositionist), and was adopted by the Eighth Party Congress (also not oppositionist!). A little more respect for the known points in our programme dealing with the social groupings in the village! A little more respect for the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress on the subject of the middle peasantry! As to the phrase "a compromise with the opposition on the question of the middle peasant," it is not worth, I think, troubling to refute it; it was no doubt written by you in the heat of the moment.

You seem to be troubled by the fact that both Lenin's slogan and the programme of the C.P.S.U., adopted by the Eighth Party Congress, speak of an *agreement* with the peasant, whereas, in his speech inaugurating the Eighth Congress, Lenin spoke of *a firm alliance* with the middle peasant. Evidently you think there is something in the nature of a contradiction in this. Perhaps you are inclined to believe that the policy of *agreement* with the middle peasant is something in the nature of a departure from the policy of an *alliance* with the middle peasant. That is not correct, Comrade S. You are greatly mistaken. Only those who are able to read the letter of a slogan but are incapable of penetrating its meaning can talk like that. Only those who do not know the history of the slogan of alliance, of agreement with the middle peasant, can think like that. Only those who are capable of believing that Lenin, who in his opening speech at the Eighth Congress declared for the policy of a "firm alliance" with the middle peasant, departed from his own position by declaring in another speech *at the same Congress*, and in the Party programme, which was adopted by the Eighth Congress, that what we now need is a policy of "agreement" with the middle peasant, can think like that.

What is the point, then? The fact of the matter is that both Lenin and the Party, as represented by the Eighth Congress, make no distinction *whatever* between the concept "agreement" and the concept "alliance." The fact of

the matter is that Lenin everywhere, in all his speeches at the Eighth Congress, places the *sign of equality* between the conception "alliance" and the conception "agreement." The same applies to the resolution of the Eighth Congress on "The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry," in which *a sign of equality* is drawn between the conception "agreement" and the conception "alliance." And since both Lenin and the Party regard the policy of agreement with the middle peasant, not as a casual and short-lived one, but as a policy *for a long time to come*, they had, and have, every reason to call the policy of agreement with the middle peasant a policy of firm alliance with him, and contrariwise, the policy of firm alliance with the middle peasant a policy of agreement with him. To be convinced of this, one has only to acquaint oneself with the stenographic report of the Eighth Party Congress and the resolution of that Congress dealing with the middle peasant.

Here is a quotation from Lenin's speech at the Eighth Congress:

> Very frequently, owing to lack of experience on the part of Soviet functionaries and to the difficulties of the problem, the blows that were intended for the kulaks fell on the middle peasants. In this we have sinned grievously. The experience we have gained in that respect should help us in doing everything to avoid this in the future. Such is the task that confronts us, not theoretically, but practically. You know well that the task is a difficult one. We have not got the things to give to the middle peasant at the present time, but he is a materialist, a practical man, and demands concrete material things, which we are at present not able to give, and which the country will have to do without perhaps for several months more of hard struggle, which struggle, however, now promises complete victory. But a lot can be done in our administrative practice: we can improve our administrative machinery and remove many abuses. We can and must straighten out and correct the line of our Party, which did not sufficiently proceed in the direction of *an alliance, an agreement*[1] with the middle peasant (Stenographic Report of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P., Russian edition, p. 20).

As you see, Lenin makes no distinction between "agreement" and "alliance."

And here is an extract from the resolution of the Eighth Congress on "The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry":

> To confuse the middle peasants with the kulaks, to extend to them in any degree, any of the measures directed against the kulaks, would be the most gross

> infraction, not only of all the decrees of the Soviet Government and of its whole policy, but also of all the fundamental principles of Communism, which is to bring about an *agreement* between the proletariat and the middle peasantry during the period of the determined struggle of the proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, as one of the conditions for the painless transition to the abolition of all forms of exploitation.
>
> The middle peasantry, which possesses comparatively strong economic roots, owing to the backwardness of agricultural technique as compared with industry even in the most advanced capitalist countries, let alone Russia, will continue to exist for a fairly long time after the advent of the proletarian revolution. Consequently the tactics of the Soviet workers in the villages, as of all active Party workers, must be calculated on a *protracted period of collaboration* with the middle peasantry….
>
> … An absolutely correct policy conducted by the Soviet Government in the countryside would, therefore, ensure *an alliance and agreement* between the triumphant proletariat and the middle peasant….
>
> … The policy of the workers' and peasants' government and of the Communist Party must therefore continue to be conducted in the *spirit of agreement* between the proletariat together with the poor peasantry and the middle peasantry[1] (Stenographic Report of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P., pp. 370–372).

As you see, the resolution also makes no distinction between "agreement" and "alliance."

It would not be superfluous to observe that no mention is made in the resolution of the Eighth Congress of "a firm alliance" with the middle peasantry. Does that mean that the resolution thereby *departs* from the policy of "a firm alliance" with the middle peasantry? No, it does not. It only means that the resolution draws the sign of equality between the concept "agreement collaborative" and the concept "a firm alliance." And that is obvious: there cannot be "alliance" with the middle peasant without there being an "agreement" with him; and the alliance with the middle peasant cannot be "firm" unless there is "protracted" agreement and collaboration with him.

Such are the facts.

Either one thing or other: either Lenin and the Eighth Congress *departed* from Lenin's declaration of a "firm alliance" with the middle peasant or this baseless assumption must be abandoned and it must be admitted that Lenin

and the Eighth Congress of the Party made no distinction between the concept "agreement" and the concept "a firm alliance."

Thus, he who does not want to be guilty of sheer pedantry, but desires to comprehend the essence of Lenin's slogan, which speaks of leaning for support on the poor peasantry, of coming to agreement with the middle peasantry, and of fighting the kulak, cannot fail to understand that the policy of *agreement* with the middle peasantry is a policy of *firm alliance* with him.

The mistake you make is that you failed to understand the fraudulent tricks of the opposition and fell a prey to their provocation; you fell into the trap the enemy set for you. The oppositionist frauds noisily assure us that they are in favour of Lenin's slogan of agreement with the middle peasant; but, at the same time, they let fall a provocatory hint to the effect that "agreement" with the middle peasant is one thing, but a "firm alliance" with him is something different. They, thereby, want to kill two birds with one stone: firstly, to conceal their real attitude to the middle peasant, which is not in agreement with him, but "disagreement with the middle peasant" (cf. the speech of the oppositionist, Smirnov, quoted by me at the Sixteenth Moscow Provincial Party Conference); and, secondly, to hook the simple fellows among the Bolsheviks over the *alleged* difference between "agreement" and "alliance," to get them thoroughly muddled and push them away from Lenin.

And how do certain of our comrades react to this? Instead of tearing the mask from the oppositionist frauds, instead of exposing their deception as to their true position, they nibble at the bait, crawl into the trap, and allow themselves to be pushed away from Lenin. The opposition is making a lot of noise about Lenin's slogan: the oppositionists pretend to be adherents of Lenin's slogan: therefore I must dissociate myself from this slogan, otherwise I may be confused with the opposition; I may be accused of "compromising with the opposition"—such is the logic of these comrades.

And this is not the only instance of the fraudulent tricks of the opposition. Take, for instance, the slogan of self-criticism. Bolsheviks cannot fail to understand that the slogan of self-criticism is the foundation of our Party work, it is a means of strengthening the proletarian dictatorship and is the soul of the Bolshevik method of educating "cadres." The opposition raises a howl, protesting that they, the oppositionists, invented the slogan of self-criticism, that the Party stole this slogan from them and

thereby capitulated to the opposition. In acting in this way, the opposition is trying to gain at least two ends: firstly, to fool the working class and to conceal from them the fact that an abyss divides the self-criticism of the opposition, the purpose of which is to *destroy* the Party spirit, from Bolshevik self-criticism, the purpose of which is to *strengthen* the Party spirit; and, secondly, to hook any simple fellow they can and to induce him to dissociate himself from the Party slogan of self-criticism.

And how do some of our comrades react to that? Instead of tearing the mask from the opposition frauds and fighting to retain the Bolshevik slogan of self-criticism, they crawl into the trap, dissociate themselves from the slogan of self-criticism, dance to the tune of the opposition and capitulate to it, fondly believing that they are dissociating themselves from the opposition.

A whole host of such instances might be quoted.

But in our work we cannot dance to anybody's tune. Still less can we allow ourselves to be guided in our work by what the oppositionists say about us. We must pursue our own path, brushing aside both the fraudulent attempts of the opposition and the errors of certain of our Bolsheviks, who have fallen victims to the provocation of the oppositionists. Remember the words of Marx: "Follow your own path, and let people say what they like!"

With Communist greetings,

J. STALIN.

June 12, 1928.

Published in *Pravda*, No. 152, July 3, 1928.

[1] My italics.—J. STALIN.

[1] My italics.—J. STALIN.

[1] My italics.—J. STALIN.

[2] From this it follows that the deviations from the correct line create a twofold menace to the alliance of the workers and peasants: a menace from the side of those who want, for instance, to transform the temporary extreme measures of grain collection into the permanent or protracted policy of the Party; and the menace from the side of those who want to take advantage of the discontinuance of emergency measures in order to give the kulak a free hand and to declare complete freedom of trade, without regulation by the State trading organisations. Hence, in order to secure the correct line, a fight on two fronts is necessary.

I want to take this opportunity to observe that our Press does not always follow this rule, and sometimes betrays a certain one-sidedness. It happens, for instance,

that the Press exposes those who want to transform the emergency measures of grain collection, which are of a temporary character, into a permanent line of our policy, thus threatening the *smychka* [link between the workers and peasants.—ED.]. That is very good. But it is bad and incorrect if at the same time insufficient attention is paid to, and not sufficient exposure is made of, those who threaten the *smychka* from the other side; if not sufficient exposure is made of those who surrender to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, who demand a moderation of the fight against the capitalist elements of the village and the establishment of complete freedom of trade without regulation by the State; and thus undermine the *smychka* from the other end. That is bad. That is one-sided.

It also happens that the Press exposes those who, for instance, deny the possibility and expediency of improving individual small- and middle-peasant farming, which at the present stage represent the basis of agriculture. That is very good. But it is bad and incorrect if at the same time the Press does not expose those who minimise the importance of the collective and Soviet farms, and who fail to see that the task of improving individual small- and middle-peasant farming must be supplemented by the practical task of increasing collective and Soviet farm construction. That is one-sided.

In order to guarantee the correct line the fight must be conducted *on two fronts*, and all one-sidedness must be abandoned.

[1] My italics.—J. STALIN.

[1] My italics.—J. STALIN.

THE JULY PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U.

(*Speech delivered to a Meeting of the Active Members of the Leningrad Organisation of the* C.P.S.U. *on July* 13, 1928)

COMRADES:
The Plenum of the Central Committee, which has just ended, concentrated its labours on two groups of questions. The first group consists of questions related to the fundamental problems of the Communist International in connection with the forthcoming Sixth Congress. The second group consists of questions related to our work of construction within the Soviet Union: to agriculture—the grain problem and grain collections—and to providing our industry with a technical "intelligentsia," with cadres of technical intellectuals drawn from the working class.

We will begin with the first group of questions.

I. COMINTERN QUESTIONS

1. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN

What are the fundamental problems facing the Sixth Congress of the Comintern at the present time?

If we examine the stage we passed through in the period between the Fifth and Sixth Congresses, our attention is drawn first of all to the antagonisms which have matured within the camp of the imperialists. What are these antagonisms? At the time of the Fifth Congress little was said about Anglo-American antagonisms as the basic antagonism. At that time it was even the fashion to speak of an Anglo-American alliance. On the other hand, talk was freely indulged in about antagonisms between England and France, between America and Japan, and between the victorious and defeated nations. The difference between that period and the present period is that, of the several antagonisms existing within the camp of the capitalists, the basic antagonism has become that between American capitalism and English capitalism. Whether you take the question of oil,

which is of decisive importance both for the development of capitalist production and for the purpose of war; or whether you take the question of markets for the sale of goods, which are of prime importance for the life and development of world capitalism, for goods cannot be produced unless markets are secured for the sale of these goods; or whether you take the question of markets for the export of capital, which is the most characteristic feature of the stage of imperialism; or whether, finally, you take the question of routes leading to the markets for the sale of commodities and the markets for the supply of raw materials—all these fundamental problems drive toward the one fundamental problem, the struggle for world hegemony between England and America—America, that country of gigantic capitalist growth, wherever it turns, be it in China or the colonial countries, in South America or Africa, everywhere it encounters tremendous obstacles in the shape of the strongholds already held by England.

That, of course, does not remove the other antagonisms existing within the capitalist camp: between America and Japan, between England and France, between France and Italy, between Germany and France, etc. But it does mean that these antagonisms, in one way or another, rest upon the fundamental antagonism existing between England, whose star is setting, and America, whose star is in the ascendant.

What does this fundamental antagonism augur? It most undoubtedly augurs war. When two giants come into collision, when the world becomes too restricted for them, they strive to measure their forces in order to settle the disputed question of world hegemony by the method of war.

That is the first thing that must be borne in mind.

The second antagonism is that existing between imperialism and the colonial countries. This antagonism also existed at the time of the Fifth Congress, but it has only now assumed an exceptionally acute character. At that time we did not yet have the powerful development of the Chinese revolutionary movement, that upsurge of the vast masses of the workers and peasants of China which occurred a year ago and which is again occurring now. But that is not all. At that time, at the time of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, there had also not yet occurred the powerful invigoration of the working-class movement and the struggle for national emancipation in India, such as we have now. These two fundamental facts bring us squarely face to face with the question of the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

What does the growth of these antagonisms augur? It augurs nationalist wars in the colonial countries and intervention on the part of imperialism.

This fact must also be borne in mind.

And, finally, the third antagonism, the antagonism between the capitalist world and the Soviet Union, an antagonism which is not abating but, on the contrary, is becoming more acute. If at the time of the Fifth Congress it could be said that a certain—it is true unstable, but more or less protracted—equilibrium had been established between the two worlds, between the two antipodes, between the world of the Soviets and the world of capitalism, there is now every reason for asserting that the period of this equilibrium is coming to a close.

It need hardly be said that the intensification of this antagonism cannot but bode the danger of intervention.

It must be presumed that the Sixth Congress will also take this antagonism into account.

Thus all these antagonisms inevitably lead to one fundamental danger—the danger of new imperialist wars and of intervention.

Hence the fundamental problem of the present day is the danger of new imperialist wars and of intervention.

The most popular method of lulling the working class and diverting it from the struggle against the danger of war is present-day pacifism, with its League of Nations, the gospel of "peace," the "outlawry" of war, the nonsense about "disarmament," and so forth.

There are many who think that imperialist pacifism is an instrument of peace. That is a profound mistake. Imperialist pacifism is an instrument for the preparation of war and for the masking of these preparations by pharisaical talk about peace. Without this pacifism and its instrument, the League of Nations, the preparations for war under present conditions would be impossible.

There are simpletons who believe that since there is such a thing as imperialist pacifism there will be no war. That is absolutely wrong. On the contrary, he who would have the truth should reverse the proposition and say: since imperialist pacifism, with its League of Nations, is flourishing, there will most certainly be new imperialist wars and intervention.

And the most important thing in all this is the fact that Social-Democracy is the principal conveyor of imperialist pacifism among the working class,

and is, therefore, the principal support of capitalism within the working class in the matter of preparation for new wars and for intervention.

But for the purpose of preparing for new wars pacifism is not enough, even though it be supported by so serious a force as Social-Democracy. Several other means of suppressing the masses in the imperialist centres are required. It is impossible to fight for imperialism unless the imperialist rear is strengthened. The imperialist rear cannot be strengthened without suppressing the workers. That is what Fascism is for.

The result is an aggravation of internal antagonisms within the capitalist countries, the antagonisms between labour and capital.

On the one hand, pacifism is preached through the mouths of the Social-Democrats in order the more successfully to prepare for new wars; on the other hand, in the rear the working class, the Communist Parties, are being crushed by the application of Fascist methods in order then the more successfully to conduct war and intervention—such is the path of preparation for new wars.

From this follow the duties of the Communist Parties:

Firstly, to carry on an incessant struggle against Social-Democracy along every line, both economic and political, including the exposure of every form of pacifism, with the object of winning over the majority of the working class.

Secondly, to create a united front between the workers of the advanced countries and the toiling masses of the colonial countries in order to ward off the danger of war, or in order, when war breaks out, to transform the imperialist war into civil war, to smash Fascism, to overthrow capitalism, to set up the Soviet State, to emancipate the colonial countries from servitude, and to organise the world-wide defence of the first workers' republic in the world.

Such are the fundamental problems and tasks confronting the Sixth Congress.

The Executive Committee of the Comintern is alive to these problems and tasks, as an examination of the agenda of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern easily shows.

2. The Programme of the Comintern

Closely bound up with the question of the fundamental problems of the international working-class movement is the question of the programme of

the Comintern.

The cardinal significance of the programme of the Comintern is that it gives a scientific formulation of the fundamental problems of the Communist movement, indicates the main paths of solution of these problems, and thus gives the sections of the Comintern that clarity of aim and method without which a confident forward movement is impossible.

A few words regarding the specific features of the draft programme of the Comintern as presented by the Programme Commission of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. At least seven such features may be indicated.

1. The draft provides a programme not for any one or other of the national Communist Parties, but for all the Communist Parties together, embracing what is general and basic for all of them. Hence its character as a programme of principles and theory.

2. Formerly it was the practice to provide a programme for the "civilised" nations. Unlike this, the draft programme takes in all the nations of the world, white and black, the home countries, and the colonial countries. Hence the all-embracing profoundly international character of the draft programme.

3. The draft takes as its starting-point not the capitalism of one or another country, or part of the world, but the whole world system of capitalism, and contrasts it with a world system of Communist economy. For this reason it differs from all previous programmes.

4. The draft programme bases itself on the uneven development of world capitalism and deduces therefrom the possibility of the victory of Socialism in separate countries, thence leading to the prospect of the creation of two parallel centres of gravity—a world centre of capitalism and a world centre of Socialism—struggling between themselves for the conquest of the world.

5. In place of the slogan of a United States of Europe, the draft puts forward the slogan of a Federation of Soviet Republics of advanced countries and colonies which have broken away, or are breaking away, from the imperialist economic system, and which in their struggle for world-Socialism confront the world capitalist system.

6. The draft lays stress on Social-Democracy forming the main support of capitalism within the working class and the chief enemy of Communism, considering that all other tendencies within the working class (anarchism,

anarchist syndicalism, guild Socialism, etc.) are, in actual fact, merely varieties of Social-Democracy.

7. The draft attaches prime importance to the consolidation of the Communist Parties, both in the West and in the East, as a primary condition for securing the hegemony of the proletariat, and subsequently the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Plenum of the Central Committee approved the draft of the programme of the Comintern in its main lines, and called upon comrades who had amendments to offer to the draft to submit them to the Programme Commission of the Sixth Congress.

That is how matters stand regarding Comintern questions.

Let us now pass to the questions of our internal construction.

II. QUESTIONS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IN THE SOVIET UNION

1. The Grain Collection Policy

Allow me to make a brief historical comment. What was the situation on January 1 of this year? You know from Party documents that on January 1 of this year there was a deficit of 128 million poods of grain as compared with last year. I shall not dwell on the causes of this: they are set forth in certain Party documents which were published in the Press. What is important to us now is that there was a deficit of 128 million poods. And only two or three months remained before the roads became impassable owing to the spring thaws. We were, therefore, faced with the choice: either to make up lost ground and secure a normal rate of grain collection for the future or to face the inevitability of a profound crisis in the whole of our national economy. What had to be done in order to make up lost ground? It was necessary, first of all, to strike hard at the kulaks and the speculators who were screwing up the price of grain and creating the danger of famine in the country. Secondly, it was necessary to pour the maximum amount of goods into the grain-purchasing regions. Finally, it was necessary to rouse all our Party organisations and bring about a decisive turn in the whole of our work on grain collection, by rooting out the practice of waiting for grain to come automatically. We were consequently obliged to resort to emergency measures. The measures adopted were effective, and by the end of March we had collected 275 million poods of grain. We not only made

up lost ground, we not only prevented a general economic crisis, we not only caught up with the rate of grain collection of the previous year, but the possibility was created for us to emerge painlessly from the grain collection crisis, provided a normal rate of grain collection was maintained in the succeeding months (April, May, and June).

However, as a result of the failure of the winter crop in the South Ukraine and partly in the North Caucasus, the Ukraine entirely, and the Northern Caucasus partly, dropped out as grain-supplying regions; whereby the Republic was deprived of 20 to 30 million poods of grain. This circumstance, combined with the fact that we had permitted an over-expenditure of grain, imposed on us the necessity of pressing more heavily on the remaining regions, thereby breaking in on the emergency reserves of the peasantry, which could not but make the situation still worse.

While from January to March we were able to collect nearly 300 million poods out of the manœuvring reserves of the peasantry, from April to June we were unable to collect even 100 million, because we were compelled to break in on the emergency reserves of the peasantry, at a time, too, when the prospects for the harvest were not yet clear. But we had to get the grain. Hence the second relapse to emergency measures, administrative arbitrariness, violation of revolutionary law, raids on peasant houses, illegal searches, and so forth, which affected the political condition of the country and created a menace to the *smychka* [link.—ED.] between the workers and the peasants.

Did it mean breaking the *smychka*? No, it did not. Perhaps it was only a trifling matter not worth troubling about? No, it was not. It was a real meance to the *smychka* between the working class and the peasantry. That, in fact, explains why certain of our Party functionaries lacked the calmness and firmness to estimate the situation soberly and without exaggeration.

Subsequently, the prospects for the harvest improved and the emergency measures were partly abandoned, and this served to calm things down and the situation improved.

What is the essence of our difficulties on the grain front? What is the basis of these difficulties? Is it not a fact that the area now being cultivated for grain is almost the same as it was before the war (only 5 per cent less)? Is it not a fact that we are now producing almost as much grain as in pre-war days (about five billion poods), only 200 to 300 million poods less? Why is it that, in spite of this fact, we produce only half the amount of

marketable grain produced before the war? The reason is that our agriculture is broken up into small units. While before the war there were 16 million peasant households, to-day there are no less than 24 million, and the tendency for the peasant farms to break up into small units continues. And what does petty-peasant production imply? It is the least commodity-producing, the least profitable, and the most natural self-sufficing form of production, with a marketable output of only about 12 to 15 per cent.[1] On the other hand, our towns and industry are growing rapidly, construction is developing, and the demand for marketable grain is increasing with incredible rapidity. And that is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

This is what Lenin says on the subject in his pamphlet, *The Food Tax*:

> If peasant production is to develop further, we must definitely secure a further transition, and this transition must inevitably consist in the extremely unprofitable and extremely backward petty, individualised peasant production gradually combining and organising into public, large-scale agricultural production. This is how all Socialists always pictured it. And that is also the view of our Communist Party (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVI, p. 299).

This, then, is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

What is the solution?

The solution lies, firstly, in raising the level of small-and middle-peasant farming, lending it every assistance in developing its fertility and productivity. The task must be to replace the *sokha* [wooden plough.—ED.] by the plough, to provide sorted seed, to supply fertilisers and simple machines, to cover the individual peasant farms with a wide network of co-operative organisations, and to conclude contracts with whole villages (the contract system). There is a method of making contracts between the agricultural co-operative organisations and whole villages for the purpose of supplying the peasants with seed, and thus obtaining better crops and a higher yield, and secure that the peasants deliver their grain to the State in good time; for this purpose the peasants obtain a bonus in the shape of a certain addition to the regulation price, and in this way firm relationships are established between the State and the peasantry. Experience has shown that this method gives tangible results.

There are people who think that individual production is at the end of its tether and is not worth supporting. That is not true, comrades. Such people have nothing in common with the line of our Party. There are, on the other hand, those who think that individual peasant production is the *alpha* and *omega* of agriculture. That also in not true. What is more, those who think so have nothing in common with Leninism. We need neither decriers nor boosters of individual peasant production. We need sober statesmen capable of getting the best out of individual peasant economy, but who, at the same time, will be capable of gradually transferring individual economy to the lines of collectivism.

Secondly, the solution lies in gradually amalgamating individual small- and middle-peasant production into large-scale collective and co-operative, entirely voluntary associations, working on the basis of a modern technique, on the basis of tractors and other agricultural machinery. What are the advantages of collective farms? The advantages are that they are in a position to apply the achievements of science and technique, they are more profitable and sound, they have a greater productivity and a greater marketable output. It should not be forgotten that they have a marketable output of from 30 to 35 per cent and that the yield per dessiatin at times reaches 200 poods[1] and more.

And, finally, the solution lies in improving the old Soviet farms and creating new large-scale Soviet farms.[2] It should be remembered that the Soviet farms are productive units with a very high marketable output. There are Soviet farms with a marketable output of not less than 60 per cent.

Our task should be to properly combine these three tasks and to work intensely along all three channels. The peculiar feature of the period we are now passing through is the fact that the fulfilment of the first task, namely, of raising the level of individual small- and middle-peasant production, which is still the chief aim of our work in the sphere of agriculture, is already inadequate for the solution of the general problem as a whole. The peculiar feature of the period we are passing through is the fact that the first task must be supplemented by the two new practical tasks of raising the level of the collective farms and of improving the Soviet farms.

But, apart from the basic causes, there are also specific causes of a temporary nature, which transformed our grain collection difficulties into a grain collection crisis. What are these causes? Among them the resolution of the Plenum enumerates:

(*a*) The breakdown of the equilibrium of the market, aggravated by the fact that the effective demand of the peasantry for manufactured goods is growing more rapidly than the supply; this is caused by the increased income of the rural population, thanks to a series of good harvests, and in particular to the increased income of the well-to-do and kulak strata of the rural population.

(*b*) The unfavourable relation between the price of grain and the prices of other agricultural products, which has weakened the stimulus to sell grain surpluses, a situation which the Party was unable to alter this spring without damaging the interests of the poorer sections of the rural population.

(*c*) Errors of planned control, chiefly in the timely supply of goods, and in taxation (a low rate of taxation on the wealthier sections of the rural population), and also in the erroneous expenditure of grain.

(*d*) The shortcomings of the grain-collecting and Party and Soviet organisations (the absence of a united front, lack of activity, reliance on grain coming in automatically).

(*e*) Violation of revolutionary law, arbitrary administrative methods, raids on peasant farms, the partial closure of local markets, etc.

(f) The fact that capitalist elements in town and country (kulaks and speculators) took advantage of all these adverse factors in order to undermine the grain collections and to aggravate the political situation in the country.

While it will take a number of years to remove the general causes, the specific and temporary causes can be removed immediately, and thus the likelihood of a recurrence of the grain collection crisis prevented.

What is required for the removal of the specific causes?

It is necessary:

(*a*) Immediately to discontinue the practice of house to house inspection of peasant farms, of illegal search, and of all similar violations of revolutionary law.

(*b*) The immediate discontinuance of every kind of reversion to food requisitions and of all attempts to close down the bazaars, accompanied by more elastic forms of State trade regulation.

(*c*) A certain increase of prices for grain, varied as to region and kind of grain.

(*d*) The organisation of the proper supply of goods to the grain-producing regions.

(*e*) The proper organisation of the supply of grain, with the object of preventing over-expenditure of grain.

(*f*) The unconditional creation of a State grain reserve.

Given the present favourable harvest, the honest and systematic execution of these measures should create a situation in which the application of emergency measures of any kind in the forthcoming grain collection campaign will be entirely unnecessary.

The immediate task of the Party is to see that these measures are scrupulously carried into effect.

In connection with the grain difficulties we were faced with the question of the *smychka*, of the fate of the alliance between the workers and peasants, and of the means of consolidating that alliance. It is said that the *smychka* no longer exists, that it has been replaced by *unlinking*.[1] That, of course, is nonsense that can be expected from panic-mongerers. When there is no *smychka* the peasant loses faith in the morrow, he retires into himself, he ceases to believe in the stability of the Soviet State, which is the principal purchaser of peasant grain, he begins to reduce his area of cultivation or, at any rate, does not risk extending it, fearing that there will again be raids, searches, and so forth, and his grain will be taken from him. But what do we find in actual fact? There is an increase of the spring-sowing area in all regions. It is a fact that in the principal grain-producing regions the peasant has increased the area of spring sowing from 2 to 15, and even 20, per cent. Is it not obvious that the peasant does not believe that the emergency measures will continue for ever and that he has every reason to count on an increase in grain prices? Can this be called *unlinking?* Of course, this does not mean that there is not, or was not, any danger to the *smychka*. But to conclude from that that a rupture has taken place indicates that one has lost one's head and become a prey of elemental forces.

Certain comrades think that in order to strengthen the *smychka* the centre of gravity must be shifted from heavy industry to light industry (textiles), on the assumption that the textile industry is the basic and exclusive industry of the *smychka*. That is wrong, comrades, absolutely wrong. The textile industry, of course, is of tremendous importance in the matter of establishing commodity exchange between Socialist industry and peasant production. But it would be the grossest error to believe that for this reason the textile industry is the exclusive basis for the *smychka*. As a matter of fact, the *smychka* between industry and peasant production proceeds not

only along the line of calico, required for the personal consumption of the peasant, but also along the line of metal, seeds, fertilisers, and machines of all kinds, which are required by the peasant as a producer of grain. I need not add that the textile industry itself cannot develop and exist without the development of heavy industry.

We do not need the *smychka* for the purpose of maintaining and perpetuating classes. We need the *smychka* in order to bring the peasant nearer to the working class, to re-educate the peasant, to transform his individualist psychology, to remould him in the spirit of collectivism, and thus prepare for the liquidation, the elimination of classes on the basis of Socialist society. Those who fail to understand that, or who refuse to admit it, are not Marxists or Leninists, but peasant philosophers, looking backward instead of forward.

How is the peasant to be transformed and remoulded? He can be remoulded primarily and chiefly on the basis of a new technique, on the basis of collective labour.

This is what Lenin says on the subject:

> The task of transforming the small husbandman, of remoulding his whole psychology and habits, is the task of a generation. Only the material basis, technique, the application of tractors and machines to agriculture on a mass scale, electrification on a mass scale, can settle this question in relation to the small husbandman, and, so to speak, sanitise his whole psychology. That is what would radically and with great rapidity transform the small husbandman (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVI, p. 239).

It is obvious: those who would ensure the *smychka* exclusively along the line of textiles, forgetting metals and machinery, which transform peasant production on the basis of collective labour, perpetuate classes, and are not proletarian revolutionaries but peasant philosophers.

And this is what Lenin says in another place:

> Only if we succeed in practice in *demonstrating* to the peasants the advantages of communal, collective, joint, and artel[1] cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasants, with the aid of joint, artel farms, only then will the working class, which holds the power of the State in its hands, really prove to the peasants that it is right will indeed, really and durably, win over to its side the vast millions of the peasant masses (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

That is how the winning over of the millions of the peasant masses to the side of the working class, to the side of Socialism, can be really and securely achieved.

It is sometimes said that we have only one reserve for securing the *smychka*, namely, concessions to the peasants. On that assumption a theory of perpetual concessions is sometimes conceived in the belief that the working class can consolidate itself by continually making concessions. That is untrue, comrades, absolutely untrue. Such a theory can only ruin the whole cause. It is a theory of despair. In order to strengthen the *smychka* we must have a number of other reserves at our disposal, in addition to the reserve of concessions, such as economic strongholds in the villages (developed co-operative organisations, collective farms, Soviet farms), as well as political points of vantage (intensified work among the poor peasants and the secured support of the poor peasants). The middle peasant is a wavering class. Without the support of the poor peasants, and if the Soviet State is weak in the countryside, the middle peasant may waver to the side of the kulak. And, *vice versa*, if the support of the poor peasants is secured, we may say with certainty that the middle peasant will waver to the side of the Soviet State. Hence, the immediate task of the Party is to carry on systematic work among the poor peasants and to provide them with both seed and cheap grain.

2. The Problem of Cadres for Industrial Construction

Let us now pass to the question of providing our industry with new cadres of technical intelligentsia.

The question is associated with our difficulties in industry, difficulties which came to light during the Shakhti trial.[1]

What is the essence of the Shakhti case from the point of view of the improvement of industry? The essence and significance of the Shakhti case consists in the fact that we proved to be almost unarmed and entirely backward, monstrously backward, in the matter of providing our industry with a certain minimum of experts loyal to the cause of the working class. The lesson of the Shakhti case is that we must accelerate the pace of educating and creating a new technical intelligentsia from among members of the working class devoted to the cause of Socialism and capable of technically guiding our Socialist industry.

That does not mean that we intend to discard the experts who do not think in a Soviet way, or who are not Communists, but who are prepared to co-operate with the Soviet State. No, we shall continue in every way to invite the services of non-Party experts, non-Party engineers, who are prepared to work hand in hand with the Soviet State in the construction of our industry. We by no means demand that they should here and now abandon their views or modify them. We demand only one thing, namely, that since they have voluntarily agreed to co-operate with the Soviet State they should do so honestly.

But the fact of the matter is that the number of such old experts who are prepared to work hand in hand with the Soviet State is becoming comparatively fewer and fewer. A supply of new experts to replace the old ones has become absolutely essential. And, therefore, the Party thinks that this new supply must be created very quickly if we are to avoid being faced with new and unexpected difficulties, and that it must be created from members of the working class. That means creating a new technical intelligentsia capable of satisfying the requirements of industry.

The facts have shown that the Commissariat for Education is not equal to this important task. There is no reason to believe that the Commissariat for Education, left to itself, and having little contact with industry, and with its inertia and conservatism, will be able to cope with the task in the immediate future. The Party, accordingly, decided that the job of creating a new technical intelligentsia as early as possible must be divided among three People's Commissariats; the Commissariat for Education, the Supreme Council of National Economy, and the Commissariat for Transport. The Party considers that this would be the most effective way of ensuring that this important work should be carried on with the necessary dispatch. Hence, the transfer of several technical high schools to the Supreme Council of National Economy and the Commissariat for Transport.

That, of course, does not mean that the transfer of technical schools exhausts the task of rapidly creating new cadres of technical intellectuals. It is undoubtedly very important to provide for the students materially. The Soviet State therefore agreed that the expenditure for the formation of new cadres be considered equally as important as expenditure on capital construction in industry, and decided to assign an additional 40 million rubles annually for this purpose.

III. CONCLUSION

It must be admitted, comrades, that we have always learnt from our difficulties and mistakes. Hitherto, at any rate, history has taught and tempered our Party by its difficulties and by the crises it has undergone. Such was the case in 1918 when, as a result of our difficulties on the Eastern Front, and our defeats in the struggle against Kolchak, we at last understood the necessity of creating a regular infantry, and created it. Such was the case in 1919 when, as a result of our difficulties on the Denikin Front, and Mamontov's raid in the rear of our armies, we at last understood the necessity for a strong cavalry force, and, in fact, created that force to become the terror of the enemies of the working class. I believe that such more or less is the case at the present time. The grain difficulties will not have been in vain. They will stir up the Bolsheviks and induce them to seriously tackle the task of developing agriculture, particularly grain production. But for these difficulties it is doubtful whether the Bolsheviks would have seriously tackled the grain problem. The same may be said of the Shakhti case and the difficulties associated therewith. The lessons of the Shakhti case will not, and cannot, have been in vain for our Party. I think these lessons will induce us to face boldly the question of creating a new technical intelligentsia, capable of serving the needs of our Socialist industry. In fact, as you see, we have already taken the first important step in the matter of solving the problem of a technical intelligentsia. Let us hope that this step will not be the last. (Loud and prolonged applause.)

[1] Natural self-sufficing economy means producing to supply own requirements and not for the market. Only about 12 to 15 per cent of the output of the peasant farms was available for the market, *i.e*. to supply towns.—Ed.

[1] Dessiatin = 2½ acres; pood = 36 pounds.—Ed.

[2] Soviet farms are State farms.—Ed.

[1] In Russian, *razmychka*.—Ed.

[1] Co-operative.—Ed.

[1] The trial of wreckers in the Donets coalfield.—Ed.

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.

(*Speech delivered at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and the Moscow Control Commission of the* C.P.S.U. *on October* 19, 1928)

I THINK, comrades, that in order to find a solution to the question of the Right deviation which interests us to-day, we must first rid our minds of trifling matters, personal matters, and suchlike. Is there a Right opportunist danger in our Party? Are there objective conditions which favour the development of such a danger? How are we to fight that danger? Such are the questions we have to answer. But we shall never solve the question unless we abstract it from the trifling and fortuitous elements which now encumber it, and which prevent us from understanding its essence.

Comrade Zapolsky is wrong in thinking that the question of the Right deviation has arisen by chance. He declares that the question is not one of a Right deviation, but of personal bickering, intrigue, etc. Let us assume for a moment that personal bickering and intrigue do play some part in this, as they do in all struggles. But to attribute everything to mere bickering, and fail to see the essence of the dispute behind the bickering, is to depart from the true Marxian method. A large and consolidated organisation of long standing, as the Moscow organisation undoubtedly is, could not be agitated from top to bottom and excited by the efforts of a few scandalmongers or intriguers. No, comrades, such miracles do not happen. This is quite apart from the fact that the strength and power of the Moscow organisation cannot be estimated so lightly. Obviously, more profound causes have been at work here, causes which have nothing to do with scandalmongering and intrigue.

Comrade Fruntov is also wrong for, although he admits the existence of a Right danger, he does not think it worth while for serious businesslike men to concern themselves with it. In his opinion, the question of the Right deviation is a subject for noisy tub-thumpers, not for seriousminded men. I quite understand Comrade Fruntov: he is so absorbed in the day-to-day practical work that he has no time to think of the perspectives of our development. But that does not mean that we must convert the narrow, purely businesslike, and practical attitude taken up by certain of our Party

workers into a dogma of our work of construction. A healthy, purely businesslike attitude is a good thing, but if it loses the perspective in its work, and if the work is not subordinated to the basic line of the Party, it becomes the opposite of a good thing. And yet it should not be difficult to understand that the question of the Right deviation is a question of the basic line of our Party, the question as to whether the plan of development outlined by our Party at the Fifteenth Congress is right or wrong.

The comrades who, in discussing the problem of the Right deviation, make the main issue a question of the individuals who represent the Right danger are also wrong. Show us who are the Rights and the conciliators, they say, name them, so that we can deal with them accordingly. That is a wrong attitude. Individuals are, of course, of some importance. Nevertheless, the question is not one of individuals, but rather of the conditions, the environment that gives rise to the Right danger in the Party. Individuals can be removed, but that does not mean that by doing it we remove the roots of the Right danger from the Party. Therefore the question of individuals does not solve the problem, although it is undoubtedly of interest. In this connection I must recall an incident which took place in Odessa at the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920, when our forces, having driven Denikin out of the Ukraine, were crushing the last remnants of his armies in the region of Odessa. A number of our Red Army soldiers at that time searched high and low for the Entente in Odessa, convinced that if they could only capture the Entente the war would be over. (Loud laughter.) Well, our Red Army soldiers might have captured some representatives of the Entente in Odessa. But that would not have settled the question of the Entente, for the roots of the Entente did not lie in Odessa, although Odessa at that time was Denikin's last stronghold, but in world capitalism. The same can be said of certain of our comrades who, in the question of the Right deviation, concentrate on the individuals representing that deviation, and forget about the conditions that give rise to it.

Therefore, we must make clear first of all what are the conditions that give rise to the Right, and also to the Left (Trotskyist) deviations from the Leninist line.

Under capitalist conditions, the Right deviation in Communism represents a tendency, an inclination, not yet formulated it is true and perhaps not even consciously realised, but nevertheless a tendency, on the part of a section of Communists to depart from the revolutionary line of

Marxism in the direction of Social-Democracy. When certain groups of Communists deny the expediency of the slogan "class against class" in election campaigns (France), or are opposed to the Communist Party putting up independent candidates (Great Britain), or are disinclined to make a sharp issue of the fight against "Left" Social-Democracy (Germany), etc., etc., it means that there are individuals in the Communist Party who are striving to adapt Communism to Social-Democracy. The triumph of the Right deviation within the Communist Parties in capitalist countries would mean the ideological collapse of the Communist Parties, and a tremendous accession of strength to Social-Democracy. And what does an accession of strength to Social-Democracy mean? It means the consolidation and strengthening of capitalism, for Social-Democracy is the main bulwark of capitalism among the working class. Hence, the triumph of the Right deviation in the Communist Parties in capitalist countries favours the conditions necessary for the *preservation* of capitalism.

Under conditions of Soviet development, when capitalism has already been overthrown, but has not yet been torn out by the roots, the Right deviation in Communism represents an inclination, a tendency, not yet formulated it is true and perhaps not even consciously realised, but nevertheless a tendency, on the part of a section of Communists to depart from the general line of our Party toward the ideology of the bourgeoisie. When certain groups of our Communists strive to drag the Party back from the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress and deny the necessity for an offensive against the capitalist elements in the villages; or demand a contraction of our industry, in the belief that the present rate of development is ruinous for the country; or deny the expediency of subsidising the collective and Soviet farms, in the belief that it is throwing money to the winds; or deny the expediency of fighting against bureaucracy on the basis of self-criticism, in the belief that self-criticism shatters our organisation; or demand a slackening of the monopoly of foreign trade, etc., etc., it means that there are people in the ranks of our Party who are striving, perhaps without themselves realising it, to adapt our Socialist development to the tastes and demands of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie. The triumph of the Right deviation in our Party would mean that the capitalist elements in our country would be tremendously strengthened. And what would be the result of the strengthening of the capitalist elements in the country? The result would be that the proletarian dictatorship would be weakened and the

chances of the restoration of capitalism would be increased. Hence, the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party would give rise to the conditions which are necessary for the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Do the conditions exist in our Soviet country that make the restoration of capitalism *possible?* Yes, they do exist. That, comrades, may appear strange, but is a fact. We have overthrown capitalism, we have established the dictatorship of the proletariat, we are intensely developing our Socialist industry, and are closely linking it up with peasant economy; but we have not yet torn out the roots of capitalism. Where are these roots implanted? They are implanted in the system of commodity production, in small production in the towns, and particularly in the villages. As Lenin said, the strength of capitalism lies "in the strength of *small production*, for, unfortunately, small production still survives in a very, very large degree, and small production *gives birth* to capitalism and to a bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale" (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXV, p. 173). Hence, since small production is a mass phenomenon, and even a predominant feature of our country, and since it gives birth to capitalism and to a bourgeoisie constantly and on a mass scale, particularly under the conditions of N.E.P., it is obvious that the conditions do exist which make the restoration of capitalism *possible*.

Do the necessary forces and means exist in our Soviet country for the complete elimination of the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism? Yes, they do exist; and on this very fact is based the correctness of Lenin's thesis regarding the *possibility* of the construction of a complete Socialist society in the U.S.S.R. For this purpose it is necessary to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, to strenghten the union between the working class and the peasantry, to extend our key positions from the point of view of industrialising the country, to develop industry at a rapid rate, to electrify the country, to reconstruct our whole economic life on a new technical basis, to develop mass co-operation among the peasants, to increase the yield of their harvests, to gradually amalgamate the individual peasant enterprises into social enterprises, to develop Soviet farms, to restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in the towns and the villages, etc., etc.

Listen to what Lenin has to say in this respect:

> As long as we live in a small-peasant country there will be a more solid basis in Russia for capitalism than for Communism. That must not be forgotten. Those

> who closely observe the life of the village, in comparison with that of the town, know that we have not eradicated the roots of capitalism and that we have not undermined the base and support of the internal enemy. The latter is supported by petty economy, and there is only one way of undermining him, to transfer the economic life of the country, including agriculture, to a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. The only basis for this is electricity. Communism is the Soviet Government *plus* the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise the country will remain a small-peasant country, and we have got to realise that clearly. We are weaker than capitalism, not only world capitalism, but even our own domestic capitalism. That we all know. We realised this, and we shall see to it that the basis of small-peasant economy is replaced by the basis of large-scale industry. Only when the country is electrified, only when industry, agriculture, and transport are placed on the technical basis of modern large-scale production—only then will our victory be complete (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVII, pp. 46–47).

It follows, therefore, firstly, that as long as we live in a small-peasant country, as long as we have not eradicated the roots of capitalism, there will be a sounder economic basis for capitalism than for Communism. You may have cut down the tree, but the roots may still remain because your strength has not sufficed. Hence, the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Secondly, it follows that, in addition to the possibility of the restoration of capitalism, there is also the *possibility of the triumph of Socialism*, because we can remove the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism. We can dig up the roots of capitalism and secure the final victory over capitalism *only if* we intensify the work of electrifying the country and if we place our industry, agriculture, and transport on the technical basis of modern large-scale industry. Hence the *possibility* of the triumph of Socialism in our country.

And finally, it follows that it is impossible to develop Socialism in industry alone, and leave agriculture to the mercy of spontaneous development, on the theory that the country will "automatically follow" the town. The existence of Socialist industry in the towns is an essential factor for the Socialist transformation of the countryside. But that does not mean that that factor is quite sufficient. In order that the Socialist town may completely draw the peasant village after it, it is essential, as Lenin says, "to transfer the economic life of the countryside, *including agriculture*, to a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production."

Does this quotation from Lenin contradict another of his statements, to the effect that "N.E.P. completely guarantees the *possibility* of building the foundations of Socialist economy"? No, it does not. On the contrary, they are fully consistent one with the other. Lenin does not say that N.E.P. provides us with Socialism ready-made. What he says is that N.E.P. guarantees the *possibility* of building the foundations of Socialist economy. Between the *possibility* of building Socialism and the *actual* building of Socialism there is a vast difference. Possibility and actuality must not be confused. In order to transform the possibility into actuality, Lenin, in this long passage, proposes the electrification of the country and placing our industry, agriculture, and transport on the technical basis of modern large-scale production, as an essential condition for the ultimate triumph of Socialism.

But this condition for the construction of Socialism cannot be fulfilled in one or two years. It is impossible in one year or two to industrialise the country, build up a powerful industry, organise the millions of peasants into co-operatives, place agriculture on a new technical base, amalgamate the individual peasant holdings into vast collective farms, organise Soviet farms, and restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country. Years and years of intensive constructive work on the part of the proletarian dictatorship will be required. And until that is accomplished—and it cannot be accomplished all at once—we shall remain a small-peasant country, where small production gives birth to capitalism and a bourgeoisie constantly and in mass proportions, and where the danger of the restoration of capitalism will always exist. And since the proletariat does not live in a vacuum, but in the midst of real life with all its variety of forms, the bourgeois elements arising on the basis of small production "surrounds the proletariat on all sides by a petty-bourgeois atmosphere, with which it permeates and poisons it, producing among the proletariat reversions to petty-bourgeois spinelessness, disintegration, individualism, and fluctuations between enthusiasm and discouragement" (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXV, p. 436), thereby giving rise to some hesitation and inconstancy among the proletariat and its Party.

Therein lies the root of all vacillations and deviations from the Leninist line within the ranks of the Party.

And that is why the Right and Left deviations within our Party cannot be regarded as trifling matters.

Where does the danger of the *Right*, frankly opportunist, deviation within the Party lie? In the fact that it *underestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism; that it fails to realise the existence of the danger of restoration of capitalism; that it does not understand the mechanism of the class war under the dictatorship of the proletariat; and therefore it is so ready to make concessions to capitalism by demanding a slowing down of the rate of development of our industry, that concessions be made to the capitalist elements in town and country, that the question of collective and Soviet farms be kept in the background, that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party would release the forces of capitalism, would undermine the revolutionary position of the proletariat, and increase the chances for the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Where does the danger of the "Left" (Trotskyist) deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it *overestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism; that it can see only the possibility of the restoration of capitalism, but cannot see the possibility of constructing Socialism with the resources of our country; that it gives way to despair and is obliged to console itself with nonsensical talk about Thermidorism[1] in our Party. From the words of Lenin, "as long as we live in a petty-peasant country there will be a more solid basis in Russia for capitalism than for Communism," the "Left" deviation draws the false conclusion that it is impossible to construct Socialism in the U.S.S.R. at all; that nothing can be done with the peasantry; that the idea of a union between the working class and the peasantry is antiquated; that, unless aid is forthcoming in the shape of the triumph of the revolution in the West, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. is doomed to failure or degenerate, and that unless we adopt the fantastic plan of super-industrialisation, even at the cost of a rupture with the peasantry, the cause of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. must be regarded as lost. Hence, the political adventurism of the "Left" deviation. Hence, its super-human political somersaults. There can be no doubt that the triumph of the Left deviation in the Party would result in the working class being sundered from its peasant base, and the vanguard of the working class from the more backward working-class masses, and consequently in the defeat of the proletariat and the improvement of the conditions for the restoration of capitalism.

We therefore see that both the dangers, the "Left" and the Right, both the deviations from the Leninist line, the Right and the "Left," lead to the same results, although from different directions.

Which danger is the worst? In my opinion, they are equally bad. From the point of view of successfully combating these dangers, the difference between them lies in that the "Left" deviation is more obvious to the Party at the present moment than the Right deviation. The intense struggle against the "Left" wing that has been going on for several years has not been wasted on the Party. It is obvious that in the long fight against the "Left," Trotskyist, deviation the Party has learned a lot, and now cannot be easily led astray by "Left" phrases. As to the Right deviation, which existed before, but which has cropped up more vigorously as a result of the strengthening of the petty-bourgeois elements in connection with the grain collection crisis last year, I think it is not quite so obvious to certain sections of the Party. Hence, our task must be, while not abating the fight against the "Left," Trotskyist, danger one iota, to lay the emphasis on the fight against the Right deviation and to exert every effort to make the danger of this deviation as obvious to the Party as the Trotskyist danger.

The question of the Right danger might not have become so acute were it not for the fact that it is associated with the *difficulties* accompanying our development. But the fact of the matter is that the existence of the Right deviation complicates the difficulties of our development and hinders the work of overcoming these difficulties. And for the very reason that the Right danger complicates the work of overcoming these difficulties, the question of overcoming the Right deviation has assumed supreme importance.

A few words as to the nature of our difficulties. It should be borne in mind that they are not difficulties of stagnation or decline. There are difficulties which result from economic decline, or economic stagnation, when efforts are made to render the stagnation less painful, or the decline less profound. Our difficulties are of an entirely different nature. The peculiar feature about them is that they are difficulties of *expansion* and growth. When we refer to our difficulties we usually mean what per cent must industry be *expanded*, to what extent must the area of cultivated land be *enlarged*, to what extent must the field of the harvest be *increased*, etc. And because our difficulties are those of expansion, and not of decline or stagnation, they should not represent any particular danger to the Party. But

difficulties are difficulties; and since, in order to overcome them, the exertion of every effort is required, and firmness and endurance are demanded, and since not everybody can command sufficient firmness and endurance—perhaps as a result of fatigue and jaded spirits, or because of a preference for a quiet life, free from struggle and agitation—we get those vacillations and hesitations, a tendency to adopt the line of least resistance, talk of retarding the speed of industrial development, of granting concessions to the capitalist elements, of rejecting collective and Soviet farms, and, in general, a shrinking from anything that goes beyond the bounds of the calm and familiar conditions of day-to-day work. But unless we remove the difficulties from our path we shall never make progress; and in order to remove them we must first remove the Right danger and overcome the Right deviation, since it hinders the fight against the difficulties and seeks to undermine the will of the Party in the struggle with these difficulties. We mean, of course, a real fight against the Right deviation, not a verbal or a paper fight. There are people in our Party who are prepared, in order to soothe their conscience, to subscribe to the fight against the Right danger, just in the same way as the priests cry Halleluja! Halleluja! But they will not do a thing, not one practical thing, to fight the Right deviation as it should be fought, and overcome it. That sort of tendency we call a *conciliationist* tendency toward the Right, frankly opportunist, deviation. Obviously, the fight against conciliationism is an integral part of the general fight against the Right deviation and the Right danger. For it is impossible to overcome the Right, opportunist, danger without at the same time conducting a systematic fight against conciliationism which takes the opportunists under its wing.

The question as to who, personally, are the representatives of the Right deviation is undoubtedly of interest, although it does not solve the problem. We had cases of conflict with the representatives of the Right deviation in the lower Party organisations last year during the grain collection crisis, when a number of Communists in the districts and villages opposed the policy of the Party and *pursued a line towards a smychka with the kulak elements*. As you know, these types were cleaned out of the Party last spring, which matter was specially referred to in a document of the Central Committee of our Party in February. But it would be a mistake to think that there are no more types of that kind left in the Party. If we go somewhat higher up, to the county and provincial Party organisations, or if we dig

deeper into our Soviet and co-operative organisations we should doubtless soon run across representatives of the Right deviation and conciliationism there. We know of "letters," and "declarations," and similar documents written by a number of workers in the Party and Soviet apparatus in which the drift to the Right deviation is distinctly expressed. You know that these letters and documents were referred to in the stenogram of the July Plenum of the Central Committee. If we go higher still, to the Central Committee, we must admit that there are certain, it is true, very insignificant elements of a conciliatory attitude towards the Right danger even there. The stenogram of the July Plenum of the Central Committee gives proof of this. Well, and what about the Political Bureau? Are there any deviations there? In the Political Bureau there are neither Right nor Left deviations, nor a conciliatory attitude towards those deviations. This can be declared categorically. It is time to put a stop to the gossip spread by the enemies of the Party and by the opportunists of all kinds to the effect that there is a Right deviation, or a conciliatory attitude towards the Right deviation, within the Political Bureau of our Central Committee.

Were there hesitations or vacillations in the Moscow organisation, or among its leadership, the Moscow Committee? Yes, there were. It would be stupid to assert that there was none. The frank speech of Comrade Penkov is a direct proof. Comrade Penkov is by no means the least important man in the Moscow organisation and in the Moscow Committee. You heard how he openly and directly confessed to errors on a number of important points of our Party policy. This does not mean that the Moscow Committee as a whole was infected by a spirit of vacillation. The appeal of the Moscow Committee to the members of the Moscow organisation made in October of this year proves that the Moscow Committee has succeeded in overcoming the vacillations of certain of its members. I do not doubt that the leading group in the Moscow Committee will be able finally to straighten out the situation.

Certain comrades are dissatisfied with the fact that the district organisations interfered in this matter and raised the question of liquidating the errors and vacillations of certain leaders in the Moscow organisation. I do not see what grounds there can be for this dissatisfaction. What is there wrong in the district active members in the Moscow organisation demanding the elimination of errors and vacillations? Is not our work governed by the slogan—self-criticism from below? Is it not a fact that self-

criticism increases the activity of the Party rank-and-file, and of the proletarian rank-and-file in general? What is there wrong, or dangerous, in the fact that the district *actives* proved to be alive to the situation?

Was it right for the Central Committee to interfere? I think it was right for the Central Committee to interfere. Comrade Berzin is of the opinion that the Central Committee acted too rigorously in demanding the removal of one of the district leaders to whom the district organisation was opposed. That is absolutely wrong. Let me remind Comrade Berzin of certain incidents in 1919 and 1920, when several members of the Central Committee who were guilty of certain, in my opinion not very serious, errors in respect of the Party line were, at the suggestion of Lenin, subjected to exemplary punishment, one of them being sent to Turkestan, and the other almost paying for his sins by expulsion from the Central Committee. Was Lenin right or wrong? I consider he was absolutely right. The situation in the Central Committee was then not what it is now. Half of the Central Committee were followers of Trotsky, and the situation within the Central Committee was far from stable. The Central Committee to-day is acting much more mildly. Why? Is it because we want to prove ourselves gentler than Lenin? Not for that reason. The reason is that the situation within the Central Committee is much more stable than it was then, and the Central Committee can afford to act more mildly. Comrade Sakharov is also wrong in declaring that the interference of the Central Committee was belated. He apparently does not know that the Central Committee began to interfere last February. Comrade Sakharov can convince himself of that if he desires. It is true that the interference of the Central Committee did not immediately secure the required results; but it would be a strange thing to blame the Central Committee for that.

Conclusions: (1) The Right danger is a serious danger in our Party, since it is rooted in the social and economic conditions of the country. (2) The danger of the Right deviation is rendered more profound by the existence of difficulties which cannot be overcome unless the Right deviation and the conciliatory attitude toward the Right deviation are overcome. (3) There have been elements of hesitation and vacillation in the Moscow organisation, there have been elements of instability. (4) The core of the Moscow Committee, with the help of the Central Committee and the district actives, took all measures to liquidate these vacillations. (5) There can be no doubt that the Moscow Committee will succeed in overcoming their former

erroneous tendencies. (6) Our task is to liquidate the internal struggle, to consolidate the Moscow organisation, and to carry through the re-elections of the nuclei successfully on the basis of widely-developed self-criticism. (Applause.)

[1] Thermidor, July, 1793, of the overthrow of Robespierre, leader of Jacobin Party during the great French Revolution. The Trotskyists argued that the October Revolution was heading towards a similar stage.—ED.

THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.

(*Speech delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the* C.P.S.U., *November* 19, 1928)

I SHALL deal, comrades, with the three main questions contained in the theses of the Political Bureau. Firstly, the question of the industrialisation of the country and of the development of the output of means of production at the greatest possible speed being the predominant factor in the problem of industrialisation. The second question concerns the fact that the rate of development of agriculture lags extremely behind the rate of development of industry, and that therefore the burning problem of our internal policy to-day is the problem of agriculture, particularly of grain production, and particularly the problem of how to improve and reconstruct our agriculture on a new technical basis. And, the third question is the question of deviations, of the fight on two fronts, and of the fact that the chief danger at the present time is the danger from the Right.

1. THE RATE OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

The starting-point of our thesis is the postulate that a rapid rate of development of industry in general, and of the production of means of production in particular, is the fundamental principle of and the key to the industrialisation of our country, and the fundamental principle and the key to the transformation of our whole national economy on the basis of Socialist development. What do we mean by a rapid rate of industrial development? It means the maximum amount of capital investment in industry; and that means putting a great strain upon all our plans, both budgetary and non-budgetary. And, indeed, the feature of our Control Figures[1] during the past three years, *i.e.* during the period of reconstruction, is that both their compilation and execution bear the mark of a high degree of tension. Take our Control Figures, examine our budget estimates, speak to our Party comrades, both those engaged in Party work and those engaged in guiding our Soviet, economic, and co-operative development—and everywhere you will find the same characteristic tenseness of our plans. The

question arises, Is it really necessary to work at such a high degree of tension? Can we not get along without tension? Is it not possible to work at a slower rate and in a "calmer" atmosphere? Is not the high rate of industrial development we have adopted due to the restless character of the members of the Political Bureau and the Council of People's Commissars? No, of course not. The members of our Political Bureau and the Council of People's Commissars are calm and sober men. Speaking abstractly, if we abstract ourselves from the internal and external situation, we could, of course, proceed at a slower rate of speed. But the fact of the matter is that, firstly, we cannot ignore the internal and external situation, and that, secondly, if we take into account the circumstances which surround us, we must admit that these circumstances dictate a rapid rate of development of our industry.

Permit me to examine the internal and external situation and the circumstances that dictate a rapid rate of development of our industry.

External conditions.—We have assumed the power of government in a country which technically is frightfully backward. Apart from a few large industrial units, more or less based on modern technique, we have hundreds of thousands of factories and mills which from the point of view of modern technical achievement are beneath all criticism. At the same time, we are surrounded by capitalist countries with a far more developed and perfect industrial technique than ours. In capitalist countries technical development is proceeding by leaps and bounds, rendering all the old forms of industrial technique dead. And so, on the one hand, we have in our country the most advanced Government in the world, the Soviet Government, while, on the other, our industry, which is the basis for Socialism and the Soviet Government, is extremely backward. Do you think that as long as this contradiction persists the final victory of Socialism is possible? What must be done to put an end to this contradiction? We must do everything in our power to overtake and surpass the technical development of the more advanced capitalist countries. We have overtaken and surpassed the most advanced capitalist countries in establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. That is all very good, but it is not enough. In order to secure the final triumph of Socialism, we must overtake and surpass these countries also in technique and economic structure. We have got to do that, or be wiped out. And that applies not only to the building up of Socialism; it applies also to the preservation of the independence of our country,

surrounded as it is by a capitalist environment. It is impossible to preserve the independence of our country without an adequate industrial base for the purpose of defence. And such an industrial base cannot be created without the highest technical development of our industry. That is what dictates a rapid rate of development of our industry.

The technical and economic backwardness of our country was not invented by us. It is an agelong backwardness which we inherited from the whole history of our country. That backwardness made its noxious influence felt both before the Revolution and since the Revolution. When Peter the Great, having to deal with the more advanced countries of the West, began feverishly to build factories and workshops in order to supply his armies and to strengthen the defences of the country, it was a peculiar attempt on his part to escape from the grip of backwardness. Obviously, none of the old classes, neither the feudal aristocracy nor the bourgeoisie, could successfully solve the problem of overcoming the backwardness of the country. They were not only unable to solve the problem, they were even unable to formulate the problem satisfactorily. The agelong backwardness of our country can be overcome only by the successful development of Socialism. And it can be overcome only by the proletariat, which has established its dictatorship and holds the guidance of the country in its hands.

It would be foolish to console ourselves with the thought that, since we did not invent the backwardness of our country, but received it as a heritage from history, we cannot be held responsible for it. That is wrong, comrades. Since we have assumed power, and have taken upon ourselves the task of transforming the country on a Socialist basis, we are responsible and must be held responsible for everything, both the good and the bad. And since we are responsible, we have to overcome our technical and economic backwardness. That is essential if we really mean to overtake and surpass the most advanced capitalist countries. We alone, the Bolsheviks, can do it, nobody else can. And as we really mean to carry out that task, we must systematically achieve a rapid rate of development of our industry. That we are actually achieving a rapid rate of development of our industry is obvious to all.

The question of overtaking and surpassing the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically is for us Bolsheviks neither a new nor an unexpected question. It was raised even in 1917, before the October

Revolution. It was raised by Lenin in September, 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution and during the period of the imperialist war, in his pamphlet, *The Impending Catastrophe and How it is to be Combated*.

Here is what Lenin said on this head:

> The effect of the Revolution is that in a few months Russia, in respect of her *political* structure, has overtaken the most advanced of countries. But that is not enough. The war is merciless, it poses the dilemma with pitiless insistence: either perish or overtake and surpass the most advanced countries also *economically*.[1] … Either perish or press forward at full speed. That is the way history puts the question (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXI, p. 191).

In such a blunt fashion does Lenin put the question of overcoming our technical and economic backwardness.

This was written by Lenin on the eve of the October Revolution, before the proletariat had seized power, when the Bolsheviks were not yet in power, were not yet in command of a socialised industry, nor of a widespread network of co-operatives embracing millions of peasants, nor collective farms, nor Soviet farms. Now, when we have something solid in our possession which enables us completely to abolish our backwardness, we can paraphrase the words of Lenin: "We have overtaken and surpassed the advanced capitalist countries *politically* by establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. But that is not enough. We must use the dictatorship of the proletariat, our socialised industry, transport, credit system, etc., our co-operatives, our collective farms, our Soviet farms, etc., in order to overtake and surpass the advanced capitalist countries also *economically*."

The question of the rapid rate of development of our industry would not have been as acute as it is now if our industry and technique were developed, say, to the German level, and if the relative importance of industry in the economic life of the country were as great as it is, for instance, in Germany. Under such conditions we could afford to develop industry at a less rapid rate without being afraid of lagging behind capitalist countries, for we would know that we could surpass them at one leap. But then our technical and economic backwardness would not be as great as it is now. The whole point of the matter is that we are a long way behind Germany, and have not yet caught up with her technically and economically.

Nor would the question of the rapid development of our industry not be so acute if we were not the *only* country with a proletarian dictatorship, *but one of several countries with a proletarian dictatorship*; if the dictatorship of the proletariat were established not in our country alone, but also in other more advanced countries, say Germany and France. *Under such conditions* the capitalist encirclement would not be as dangerous as it is at present; the question of the economic independence of our country would naturally retire into the background; we would form part of a system of more advanced proletarian States; we could receive from them the machiney for the fructification of our industry and agriculture, and supply them in turn with raw materials and food products; and we could, therefore, afford to develop our industry at a slower rate of speed. But you know very well that these conditions do not exist and that we still remain the *only* country with a proletarian dictatorship, surrounded by capitalist countries, many of which are far in advance of us technically and economically.

That is why Lenin regarded the question of economically overtaking and surpassing the advanced capitalist countries as one of life and death for our future development.

Such are the *external conditions* which dictate a rapid rate of development of our industry.

Internal conditions.—But besides external conditions there are also internal conditions which dictate a rapid rate of development of our industry as the guiding principle of our whole economic life. I refer to the extreme backwardness of our agriculture, its technical and cultural level. I refer to the predominance in our country of small commodity producers, with their fragmentary and utterly backward methods of production, in comparison with which our large-scale socialised industry is like an island in the midst of the ocean, an island the base of which is expanding daily, but which, nevertheless, remains merely an island in the midst of an ocean. It is customary among us to say that industry is the guiding principle of our economic life, including agriculture, that industry is the instrument with which we can reconstruct our backward and fragmentary agriculture on the basis of collectivism. That is perfectly true, and we must never for a moment retreat from that position. But we must also remember that while industry is the guiding principle, agriculture is the base of industrial development, both as the market for the products of industry and as the source of raw materials and food, and also as the source of the export

reserves required to pay for the imports of machinery necessary to satisfy the needs of our national economy. Can industry advance while agriculture remains in a state of complete technical backwardness, while the agricultural base of industry is not guaranteed, and while agriculture itself is not reconstructed and brought up to the level of industry? No, it cannot be done. Hence, our duty is to supply agriculture with the maximum amount of implements and means of production necessary for hastening its reconstruction on a new technical basis. But the fulfilment of this task demands a rapid rate of development of our industry. Of course, the task of reconstructing our fragmentary agriculture is immeasurably harder than the task of reconstructing a united and centralised Socialist industry. But the problem faces us, and we have got to solve it. And it cannot be solved except on the basis of a rapid rate of industrial development. It is impossible endlessly, *i.e*., for a considerable length of time, to base the Soviet system and Socialist construction on *two different* foundations, on the foundation of large-scale and highly concentrated Socialist industry, and on the foundation of very fragmentary and extremely backward small commodity peasant production. Gradually, but systematically and persistently, we must place our agriculture on a new technical basis, the basis of large-scale production, and raise it to the level of socialised industry. Either we succeed in this task, in which case final victory is certain, or we fail in the task, in which case the return to capitalism may become inevitable.

This is what Lenin says on the matter:

> As long as we live in a petty-peasant country there will be a more solid economic basis for capitalism than for Communism. That must not be forgotten. Those who clearly observe the life of the countryside in comparison with that of the town know that we have not eradicated the roots of capitalism and that we have not undermined the foundation, the basis of our internal enemy. The latter is supported by petty-economy, and there is only one way of undermining him, to transform the economic life of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. That basis can only be electricity. Communism is the Soviet Government plus the electrification of the whole country (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVI, p. 46).

As you see, when Lenin speaks of the electrification of the country, he means not the construction of isolated power stations, but the gradual "transformation of the economic life of the country, *including agriculture*,[1] on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production," which one way or another, directly or indirectly, is bound up with electrification.

Lenin delivered this speech in December, 1920, at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, on the very eve of the introduction of N.E.P., when he argued the case for the so-called plan of electrification, the plan of the State Electrification Board. Some comrades, therefore, say that the views expressed by Lenin in this passage are not applicable to the realities of to-day. Why? Because, they say, much water has flowed under the bridges since then. That is true of course. We now have a developed Socialist industry, we have collective farms on a mass scale, we have a widespread network of co-operative organisations, we have machine depots to serve the needs of peasant economy, we have adopted the contract system[2] as a new form of *smychka*. We can pull all these and a number of other levers to gradually transform agriculture on a new technical basis. All that is true. Nevertheless, it is also true that we are still a small-peasant country, where small production predominates. That is the fundamental thing, and as long as that is so, Lenin's thesis that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country there is a more solid economic basis for capitalism than for Communism" retains its force, and that therefore the menace of the restoration of capitalism is not an empty one.

Lenin says the same thing, but more bluntly, in his draft for the pamphlet on *The Food Tax*, written after the introduction of N.E.P. (April—May, 1921):

> If we get electrification in ten or twenty years, the individualism of the small agriculturist and the freedom of trade exercised by *him* locally are not dangerous in the least.
>
> *If we do not* get electrification, the return to capitalism *is in any case* inevitable.

And further on he says:

> Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions now developing are

delayed); otherwise, twenty or forty years of the horrors of White Guard terrorism (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVI, p. 313).

You see how bluntly Lenin puts the question: either electrification, *i.e*. "the transformation of the economic life of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production," or, return to capitalism.

That is what Lenin means by "correct relations with the peasantry." He does not mean pampering the peasant and believing that that is maintaining correct relations with him. Pampering will not carry us very far. The point is to help the peasant to transform his economic life on "a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production," for that is the principal way of extricating the peasant from his poverty.

And it is impossible to transform the economic life of the country on a new technical basis without a rapid rate of development of industry, and primarily of the output of means of production.

That is the position in regard to the internal conditions which dictate a rapid rate of industrial development.

Such then are the internal and external conditions which explain the tension revealed in the Control Figures of our national economy.

That, too, is the explanation why our economic plans, both budgetary and non-budgetary, are so tense and strained, providing as they do for vast investments of capital in construction work for the purpose of guaranteeing a rapid rate of industrial development.

It may be asked, Where is all this mentioned in the theses, where is it referred to? (Voice: Yes, where is it mentioned?) The theses refer to it in the amount of capital to be invested in industry in 1928–29. The theses are called, Theses on the Control Figures. That is right, is it not, comrades? (Voice: That is right.) Well, the theses say that in 1928–29 we shall invest 1,650 million rubles in capital construction work in industry. In other words, this year we shall invest 330 million rubles more in industry than last year. Hence, we are not only maintaining the previous rate of development of industry; we go a step further and invest more than last year, *i.e*. we are increasing the amount of capital construction work in industry, both relatively and absolutely. That is the main feature of the theses on the Control Figures of national economy. And certain comrades

failed to see this main feature. They criticised every detail of the Control Figures, but the most important thing of all they failed to see.

2. The Grain Problem

I have so far spoken of the first main question in the theses, the rate of industrial development. Let us now pass to the second question—the problem of grain. The feature of the theses is that they lay great emphasis on the problem of developing agriculture in general, and grain production in particular. Is that position right or wrong? I think it is right. Even at the July Plenum it was pointed out that the weakest point in the development of our national economy was the *excessive* backwardness of agriculture in general, and of grain production in particular. Of course, when people say that our agriculture is backward in comparison with our industry, and complain of this fact, they must not be taken too seriously. Agriculture always has and always will lag behind industry. That is particularly true in our country, where industry is concentrated to the maximum degree while agriculture is diffused to the maximum degree. It is obvious that concentrated industry will develop much faster than diffused agriculture. That, by the way, is the reason why industry takes the leadership over agriculture. Therefore, the usual backwardness of agriculture in comparison with industry is not a sufficient reason for the grain question becoming a problem. Agriculture, and particularly grain production, becomes a problem when the normal backwardness of agriculture in comparison with industry assumes the form of an excessive lag in the rate of development. The feature of our national economy to-day is the fact that the rate of development of grain production is *excessively* backward compared with the rate of development of industry, while at the same time the demand for commodity grain on the part of the growing towns and industrial centres is increasing by leaps and bounds. Under such conditions, our task is not to *reduce* the rate of development of industry to the level of development of grain production (which would upset all our plans and turn back the hands of the clock), but to accelerate the development of grain production up to the level of industrial development, to *raise* the development of grain production to a level sufficient to guarantee the rapid progress of national economy, both industry and agriculture. Either we find a solution to that problem, and thereby at the same time solve the grain problem, or we fail to find a solution, in which case a rupture between the Socialist city and the small-

peasant countryside is inevitable. That is the question; and that is the essence of the grain problem.

Does that mean that there is "stagnation" in the development of grain production or even "degradation"? That is what Comrade Frumkin actually asserts in his second letter, which, at his demand, we distributed to-day among the members of the Central Committee and of the Central Control Commission. In that letter he plainly states that we are faced with "stagnation" in agriculture: "We cannot," he says, "and must not write of degradation in our Press, but within the Party we must not conceal the fact that this backwardness is equivalent to degradation." Is Comrade Frumkin's assertion correct? Of course not. We members of the Political Bureau entirely disagree with this statement; the theses of the Political Bureau fundamentally diverge from this conception of the condition of grain production.

And, indeed, what does degradation mean, and how is it expressed in our agriculture? It should express itself in a backward, a downward movement of agriculture, a movement away from the new methods to the old medieval methods of agriculture. It should express itself, for instance, in the return from the three-field system to the open-field system; from the iron plough and the machine to the wooden plough; from sorted and graded seed to unsorted and ungraded seed; from modern agricultural methods to antiquated methods. But is that what is taking place? Is it not generally known that hundreds and thousands of peasant farms are already abandoning the three-field system for the four-field and multiple-field systems; ungraded seed for high-grade seed; the wooden plough for the iron plough and machinery; lower forms of agriculture for higher forms? In what way can this be said to be degradation?

Comrade Frumkin has a habit of dragging in members of the Political Bureau in order to show that he is right. It is not unlikely that in this instance, too, he will try to seize upon what Comrade Bukharin has said and try to prove that the latter says "the same thing" in his article "Notes of an Economist." But Comrade Bukharin does not say "the same thing," by a long way. In his article Comrade Bukharin discussed the abstract theoretical question of the possibility, or danger, of degeneration. Abstractly speaking, it is possible and legitimate to present the question in this way. But what does Comrade Frumkin do? He transforms the abstract question of the possibility of degradation in agriculture into an actual fact of degradation.

That is ridiculous, comrades, is it not? It would be a fine Soviet Government indeed if, in the eleventh year of its existence, it had brought agriculture to a state of degradation. A Government like that should be overthrown, not supported. And the workers would have overthrown that Government long ago if it had actually brought agriculture to a state of degradation. That is the tune that is sung by every bourgeois specialist who even in his sleep dreams of the degradation of agriculture. It was the tune which Trotsky sung at one time. I did not expect that Comrade Frumkin would follow in the same dubious path.

On what does Comrade Frumkin base his assertions? First of all, on the fact that the area under grain this year is less than last year? What is that due to? Is it due to the policy of the Soviet Government? Nothing of the kind. It is due to the failure of the winter crop in the steppe region of the Ukraine and partly in the North Caucasus, and to the drought which followed in the same region of the Ukraine. Had it not been for these unfavourable weather conditions, on which agriculture is entirely dependent, the area under grain this year would have been at least one million dessiatins[1] more than last year. Further, he says that the gross production of grain this year is only slightly more than last year, about 70,000,000 poods,[2] whereas wheat and rye are 200,000,000 poods less. And what is this due to? The same drought and the same destruction of the winter crop by heavy frosts. Had it not been for these unfavourable weather conditions, the gross output of grain this year would have been 300,000,000 poods more than last year. How can we ignore such factors as drought, frost, etc., which decide the fate of the crop in any particular region? We have set ourselves the task of extending the sowing area by 7 per cent, of raising the yield per dessiatin by 3 per cent, and increasing the gross output of grain by 10 per cent. There need be no doubt that we shall make every effort to fulfil this programme. But it is not impossible that, in spite of every effort, we may again be faced by a partial failure of the crop, by drought and heavy frost in certain regions, with the result that there may be a definite reduction of the grain output as compared with our plans and even with the gross output of the present year. Would that mean that agriculture is in a state of “degradation” and that the Soviet Government is responsible for such “degradation,” that we have “robbed” the peasant of his economic stimulus and that we have deprived him of all economic prospect for the future?

Several years ago Trotsky fell into this error and asserted that "a little rain" was of no importance in agriculture. Comrade Rykov gave him his answer with the support of the overwhelming majority of the Central Committee. To-day Comrade Frumkin falls into the same error; he ignores the influence of weather conditions, which is of such decisive importance in agriculture, and attempts to fasten the whole blame on the policy of the Party.

What measures and methods are necessary to increase the rate of development of agriculture in general, and of grain production in particular? There are three such methods: (*a*) by increasing the crop yield and extending the sowing area of the individual poor and middle peasants; (*b*) by further developing collective farming; and (*c*) by the extension of the old and the development of new Soviet farms. This was dealt with in the resolution of the July Plenum. The theses repeat what was said at the July Plenum, but in a more concrete form, and express it in figures of the amount of capital investment required. Here, too, Comrade Frumkin finds something to quarrel with. He thinks that if first place is given to individual enterprises and second and third places to the collective and Soviet farms this means a victory for his point of view. That is ridiculous, comrades. Obviously, if we approach the problem from the point of view of the relative proportion of each form of agriculture in our agriculture as a whole, we are bound to assign first place to the individual enterprises, since they produce almost six times as much marketable grain as the collective and Soviet farms. If, however, we approach the question from the point of view of the relative importance of the various forms of agriculture, we must assign first place to the collective and Soviet farms, since they represent a higher form than the individual peasant enterprises. Is it really necessary to show that both methods of approach are equally acceptable for us.

What must be done to secure that the work shall proceed along all three directions and to obtain a practical acceleration of the rate of development of agriculture, and primarily of grain production?

First of all, we must direct the attention of our Party members toward agriculture and concentrate it on the concrete aspects of the grain problem. It is time to drop vague phrases and empty talk about agriculture *in general* and to take *practical* measures for developing grain production adapted to the diverse conditions prevailing in the various regions. It is time to stop talking and proceed to business. We must tackle the concrete problems of

how to increase the yield and extend the sowing area of the individual poor- and middle-peasant enterprises; *how* to improve and further develop the collective and Soviet farms; *how* to organise assistance to be rendered to the peasants by the collective and Soviet farms in the way of supplying them with better seed and better breeds of cattle; *how* to help them with machinery and implements by organising machine-hiring stations; *how* to extend and improve the contract system, agricultural co-operatives, etc. (A voice: That is mere practicism.[1]) Such practicism is absolutely essential, otherwise we run the risk of so serious a matter as the grain problem being submerged in empty talk about agriculture in general. The Central Committee has decided that the leading workers in the principal grain-bearing regions must submit concrete reports to the Council of People's Commissars and the Political Bureau on the problems of agricultural development. At this Plenum you will hear the report of Comrade Andreyev on the way to tackle the grain problem in the North Caucasus. I think we ought later on to receive reports in turn from the Ukraine, the Central Black Earth Region, the Volga Region, Siberia, etc. That is absolutely essential in order to direct the attention of the Party towards the grain problem and to get our leading Party workers to face the concrete tasks associated with the grain problem.

Secondly, we must see to it that our Party workers in the villages in the course of their practical work make a sharp distinction between the middle peasants and the kulaks, not to put them all into one heap and not to hit the middle peasant when it is necessary to hit the kulak. It is time to put a stop to these mistakes, to put it mildly. Take, for instance, the question of individual tax assessment. There is a decision of the Political Bureau and a corresponding law which lay it down that individual assessment for taxation purposes shall not be imposed on more than two or three per cent of the total number of households, *i. e.* only the very richest section of the kulaks. But what do we find in practice? We find that in a number of regions ten, twelve, and even a larger percentage have been assessed under this provision, and as a result the middle peasants are made to suffer. Is it not time to put a stop to this crime? And our dear "critics," instead of making concrete proposals for putting a stop to these outrages, indulge in word-play, and propose that the phrase "the richest section of the kulaks" be substituted by the phrase "the more powerful section of the kulaks," or "the upper section of the kulaks." As though it were not one and the same thing.

It has been proved that the kulaks amount to about 5 per cent. It has been shown that the law proposes to tax by individual assessment only about two to three per cent of the farms, *i.e.* the richest section of the kulaks. It has been proved that in a number of regions the law is being broken. And our "critics," instead of proposing concrete measures for the removal of these outrages, indulge in wordy harangues and refuse to realise that the matter is not changed one iota thereby. Sheer pedants.

(A voice: They propose to subject all kulaks to individual assessment.) Well, if that is so you must demand the rescindment of the law providing for the individual assessment of two to three per cent. Nobody has yet proposed the rescindment of the law, at least I have not heard about it. It is said that the purpose of extending individual assessment is to supplement the local revenues. But you must not increase local revenues by breaking the law and going against the directions of the Party. Our Party still exists; it has not yet been liquidated. The Soviet Government still exists; it has not yet been liquidated. And if local revenues are not sufficient, you must raise the question of local revenues, and not break the law, or ignore the instructions of the Party.

Next, we must give greater stimulus to the individual poor and middle peasants. There is no doubt that the increase that has already been made in the price of grain bought from the peasant, the observance of revolutionary laws, the practical aid given to the poor and middle peasants in the form of the contract system, etc., have given a powerful economic stimulus to the peasantry. Comrade Frumkin thinks we have killed, or nearly killed, that stimulus by robbing the peasant of all economic prospects for the future. That, of course, is sheer nonsense. If it were true, it would be difficult to understand on what the *smychka*, the union between the working class and the bulk of the peasant masses, rests. We cannot believe that that union is merely a moral union. It must, after all, be understood that the union between the working class and the peasantry is one of calculation of advantages, it is a union of the interests of two classes, it is a class union between the workers and the main mass of the peasants for their mutual advantage. It is obvious that if we had killed, or nearly killed, the economic stimulus of the peasants and deprived them of all economic prospects for the future, there would be no bond, no union, between the working class and the peasantry. It is clear that it is not a matter here of "creating" or of "releasing" the economic stimulus of the poor- and middle-peasant masses,

but of increasing and developing that stimulus to the mutual advantage of the working class and the main mass of the peasants. And that is the aim pursued by the theses on the Control Figures of national economy.

Finally, it is necessary to increase the supply of goods to the villages. I mean not only articles of consumption, but also, and particularly, means of production (machinery, fertilisers, etc.), which are necessary in order to increase the output of agricultural products. It cannot be said that everything in this respect is as well as could be desired. You all know that the shortage of goods has not yet been overcome, and probably will not be overcome for a long time. There is an illusion among certain sections of the Party that we can overcome the shortage of goods all at once. Unfortunately, this is not the case. It must be remembered that the phenomenon of the shortage of goods is a result, firstly, of the improved conditions of the workers and peasants and the colossal increase of the effective demand for goods, the production of which increases from year to year, but which is not enough to satisfy the demand; and, secondly, to the present period of industrial reconstruction. Industrial production means the transfer of resources from the field of production of articles of consumption to the field of production of means of production. Without that there is not, and cannot be, any serious reconstruction of industry, especially under Soviet conditions. But what does that mean? It means that money is being invested in the construction of new enterprises, that the number of new towns and new consumers is increasing, while, on the other hand, the new enterprises will begin to put out additional masses of commodities only in three or four years' time. It is obvious that this does not help to overcome the shortage of goods. Does it mean that we have got to fold our arms and admit our impotence in the face of this shortage of goods? Of course not. We must take energetic measures to mitigate the goods famine. That can be done, and should be done, immediately. For this purpose we must accelerate the expansion of those branches of industry which are directly associated with the development of agriculture: the Stalingrad tractor works, the Rostov agricultural machinery works, the Voronezh seed-sorter works, etc., etc.). Further, we must as far as possible strengthen the branches of industry which can increase the output of deficient goods (cloth, glass, nails, etc.). And so on, and so forth.

Comrade Kubiak says that, according to the Control Figures for national economy, it is proposed to give less to the individual peasant farms than last

year. I think that is untrue. Comrade Kubiak apparently does not take into account the fact that we are assigning about 300 million rubles for credits this year under the contract system (about 100,000,000 rubles more than last year). If this is taken into account—as it should be—it will be seen that we are assigning more this year for the development of the individual peasant enterprises than last year. As regards the old and new Soviet and collective farms, we are investing in them this year more than 180,000,000 rubles (75,000,000 rubles more than last year).

Special attention must be drawn to the collective farms, the Soviet farms, and the contract system. These measures must not be regarded merely as an effort to increase the supply of marketable grain. They also represent *a new form of "smychka"* between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry. Enough has been said about the contract system and I shall not expand on it here. Everybody realises that the mass-contract system facilitates the uniting of the forces of the individual peasant enterprises, introduces an element of permanence into the relations between the State and the peasantry, and thereby strengthens the bond between town and country. I should like to draw your attention to the collective farms, and especially the Soviet farms, as levers which facilitate the transformation of agriculture on the basis of a new technique, causing a revolution in the minds of the peasants and shaking them out of their inertia and routine. The appearance of tractors and of large agricultural machinery and tractor brigades in our grain-bearing regions cannot but produce a tremendous effect on the agricultural methods of the surrounding peasantry. The assistance given to the neighbouring peasants in the form of seed, machinery, and tractors will undoubtedly be appreciated by the peasant and be taken as a sign of the power and strength of the workers' state which is trying to lead him on to the broad path of agricultural development on a large scale. Hitherto, we have not appreciated this factor, and perhaps still do not appreciate it sufficiently. But in my opinion it is the most important thing that collective and Soviet farms can, and should, contribute at the present moment to the task of solving the grain problem.

Such, in general, are the main means and methods to be adopted for the solution of the grain problem and of strengthening the *smychka* in the new form.

3. Deviations and the Conciliatory Attitude Towards Deviations

Let us pass now to the third main question of our theses, the question of the deviations from the Leninist line.

The social basis of deviations is the predominance of small production in our country; in the fact that out of small production arise the elements of capitalism; the fact that our Party is surrounded by a petty-bourgeois environment; and, finally, the fact that certain sections of our Party have become infected by that environment. That, fundamentally, is the social basis for deviations. All deviations bear a petty-bourgeois character.

Where does the Right deviation, which in the main point we are discussing now, lead? Where is it heading? It is heading along the road of adaptation to bourgeois ideology, along the road of adaptation of our policy to the tastes and requirements of our "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

What danger does the Right deviation, should it triumph in our Party, present? It would mean the ideological destruction of our Party, the release of the elements of capitalism, and the increase of the chances of the restoration of capitalism, or, as Lenin says, of "the return to capitalism."

Where does the tendency towards the Right deviation mainly breed? It breeds among our Soviet, economic, co-operative, and trade union staffs, as well as in the Party offices, particularly in the lower organisations in the villages.

Are there representatives of the Right deviation among our Party members? Certainly there are. Comrade Rykov referred to the case of Comrade Shatunovsky, who expressed opposition to the construction of the Dnieper Hydro-electric Station (Dnieprostroy). There can be no question but that Comrade Shatunovsky was guilty of a Right deviation, a deviation toward open opportunism. Nevertheless, I believe that Comrade Shatunovsky is not typical, not properly characteristic of the Right deviation and its physiognomy. I think that in this respect the palm must go to Comrade Frumkin. (Laughter.) I refer to his first letter (June, 1928) and to his second letter, which has been distributed here to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (November, 1928).

Let us analyse these two letters. Let us examine the "fundamental postulates" of the first letter.

1. "*The countryside, with the exception of a small section of the poor peasants, is opposed to us*." Is that true? Obviously not. If it were true there would not be even a trace left of the *smychka* between the working class and the peasantry. Yet since June (the letter was written in that month)

almost a half-year has elapsed and one must be blind not to see that the bond between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry not only continues, but is growing stronger. Why does Comrade Frumkin write such absurdities? In order to scare the Party and thereby have it adopt a more conceding attitude towards the Right deviation.

2. *"The policy pursued lately has brought the main mass of the peasantry into a state of gloom and despair."* Is that true? Absolutely untrue. It is obvious that if the main mass of the middle peasants had been in a state of economic despair this spring they would not have extended the spring crop area in all the main grain-bearing regions as they did. Spring sowing takes place in April and May. Well, Comrade Frumkin's letter was written in June. Who is the chief purchaser of grain products under the Soviet Government? The State in conjunction with the co-operatives. Obviously, if the middle-peasant masses were suffering from a state of economic despair, if they were in a state of "disunion" with the Soviet Government, they would not have extended the area under spring crops to please the Government, which is the chief purchaser of grain. Comrade Frumkin is talking patent nonsense. And Comrade Frumkin is thereby trying to scare the Party with the bugbear of the hopelessness of the middle peasants in order to make it adopt a more conceding attitude toward his (Comrade Frunkin's) views.

3. *"We must turn back to the Fourteenth and Fifteen Congresses."* That the Fifteenth Congress had nothing to do with the matter, of that there can be no doubt. The point is not the Fifteenth Congress, but the slogan, "Back to the Fourteenth Congress." And what does that mean? It means rejecting "the intensification of the drive against the kulaks" (see the resolution of the Fifteenth Congress). By this I do not want to say anything derogatory of the Fourteenth Congress. Nothing is further from my thought. I say it because Comrade Frumkin, in advocating the return to the Fourteenth Congress, rejects that forward step made by the Party between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses, and by so doing is trying to pull the Party back. The July Plenum of the Central Committee had this matter under discussion, and in its resolution plainly stated that those who tried "to evade the decision of the Fifteenth Congress," namely, "to extend the drive against the kulaks," were "expressing the bourgeois tendencies within our country." Let me tell Comrade Frumkin frankly that when they formulated this point of the

resolution of the July Plenum the Political Bureau had him and his first letter in mind.

4. *"The utmost assistance to the poor peasants joining the collective farms."* To the extent of our strength and ability we have always given the utmost assistance to the poor peasants who join the collective farms and even to those who do not join the collective farms. There is nothing new in that. The new thing in the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress as compared with the Fourteenth Congress does not lie there; it lies in the fact that the Fifteenth Congress defined the development of the collective farm movement to the utmost, as the most important task of the present day. When he speaks of giving the utmost assistance to the poor peasant who joins the collective farms, Comrade Frumkin is, in fact, evading the task of the Party to develop the collective farm movement to the utmost, which was laid down by the Fifteenth Congress. In actual fact, Comrade Frumkin is opposed to extending the work of strengthening the Socialist sector in the countryside in the shape of the collective farms.

5. *"Not to carry on the development of the Soviet farms in shock or super-shock order."* Comrade Frumkin ought to know that *we have only just begun* to work seriously on the development of the old Soviet farms and the creation of new ones. Comrade Frumkin must know that we are assigning much less resources for this work than we should if we had any reserves for the purpose. The words "in shock, or super-shock, order" have been introduced here in order to horrify people and thereby conceal one's own disinclination in any way seriously to develop the Soviet farms. In these words, Comrade Frumkin expresses his opposition to the strengthening of the Socialist sector in the countryside along the line of the Soviet farms.

Assemble all Comrade Frumkin's postulates and you obtain a bouquet which is characteristic of the Right deviation.

Let us now pass to Comrade Frumkin's second letter. In what does the second letter differ from the first? It differs only in the fact that it magnifies the errors of the first. The first letter speaks of the despair of the middle peasant. But the second speaks of the "deterioration" of agriculture. The first letter speaks of the necessity of returning to the Fourteenth Congress in the sense of diminishing the drive against the kulaks. The second letter says, "we must not hinder the work of the kulak farms." The first letter says nothing about industry. But the second letter develops a "new" theory to the effect that we should assign less money to industrial construction.

Incidentally, there are two points on which both letters are identical, namely, the collective farms and the Soviet farms. In both letters Comrade Frumkin expresses opposition to their development. It is clear that the second letter magnifies the errors of the first. I have already spoken of the theory of "degradation." There cannot be the slightest doubt that this theory is the invention of the bourgeois experts, who are always ready to proclaim the doom of the Soviet Government. Comrade Frumkin has allowed himself to be dismayed by the bourgeois experts who find shelter near the People's Commissariat of Finance, and in turn is trying to scare the Party and make it take a more conceding attitude towards the Right deviation. Enough has been said regarding the collective and Soviet farms and there is no need to repeat it. Let us examine the remaining two points, namely, the question of the kulak farms and the question of capital investments in industry.

Regarding the *kulak farms*, Comrade Frumkin says that *"We must not hinder the work of the kulak farms."* What does that mean? It means that we must not hinder the kulak in the extension of his exploiting enterprise. But what does it mean not to hinder the kulak in the extension of his exploiting enterprise? It means giving free scope and full opportunity to the development of capitalism in the countryside. It is the old slogan of the French Liberals, "*laissez-faire*, *laissez-passer*," *i.e.* do not hamper the bourgeoisie in its affairs and do not hinder its movements. This slogan was advanced by the old French Liberals at the time of the French Revolution, during the struggle against the power of feudalism which hampered the bourgeoisie and prevented it developing. It follows, therefore, that we must abandon our *Socialist* slogan, "increase the restrictions on the capitalist elements" (see the theses on the Control Figures) in favour of the *bourgeois-Liberal slogan* of not hampering the development of capitalism in the countryside. Are we really going to change from Bolsheviks into Liberals? What is there in common between Comrade Frumkin's Liberal slogan and the line of our Party? (Frumkin: Comrade Stalin, read the other points.) I shall read the whole point: "We must not hamper the work of the kulak farms, *while at the same time we must fight their bondage forms of exploitation*." I ask you, Comrade Frumkin, do you really believe that the second part of the sentence improves matters, and does not make them worse? What do you mean by fighting bondage forms of exploitation? Why, the slogan of fighting bondage forms of exploitation was the slogan of the bourgeois revolution against feudal, or semi-feudal, methods of

exploitation. It is true we put forward this slogan when we were moving towards the bourgeois revolution, thereby differentiating between the bondage forms of exploitation, which we were striving to abolish, and the non-bondage, so-called "progressive," forms of exploitation, which at that time we were unable to restrict, or destroy, in so far as the bourgeois system continued to exist. At that time we were moving toward a bourgeois-democratic republic. But now, if I am not mistaken, the revolution is a Socialist one, which is striving, and must strive, to destroy all forms of exploitation, both bondage and non-bondage. Do you want us, Comrade Frumkin, to turn back from the Socialist revolution, which we are developing and advancing, and return to the slogans of the bourgeois revolution? How can you bring yourself to talk such nonsense, Comrade Frumkin? Furthermore, what is meant by not hindering kulak activities? It means giving the kulak full scope. And what does that mean? It means giving him political power. When the French bourgeois-Liberals demanded that the feudal power should not hinder the bourgeoisie from developing they expressed it in the definite demand that political power should be given to the bourgeoisie. And they were right. To develop as they wanted, the bourgeoisie needed political power. Therefore, in order to be logical you must say: admit the kulaks to power. For, after all, it must be understood that it is impossible not to hamper the development of the kulaks once you have deprived them of political power and placed it in the hands of the working class. Such are the conclusions one is forced to arrive at on reading Comrade Frumkin's second letter.

Regarding *capitalist construction in industry*. When we discussed the Control Figures we had three variants before us: The Supreme Council of National Economy demanded 825 million rubles; Gosplan[1] gave 750 million rubles, while the People's Commissariat for Finance agreed to only 650 million rubles. What decision did the Central Committee of the Party take in the matter? It decided on 800 million rubles, *i.e*. exactly 150 million rubles more than the People's Commissariat of Finance proposed. That the People's Commissariat of Finance gave less is not surprising. The niggardliness of that Commissariat is not surprising of course; it has to be niggardly. But that is not the point. The point is that Comrade Frumkin defends the figure of 650 million rubles not from niggardliness, but on the grounds of the newly coined theory of "the possible," asserting in his second letter and in an article printed in the organ of the People's

Commissariat of Finance that *we shall certainly do injury to our national economy if we assign more than* 650 *million rubles to the Supreme Council of National Economy for capital construction*. And what does that mean? It means that Comrade Frumkin is opposed to maintaining the present rate of industrial development, failing to see, presumably, that to reduce that rate would most certainly injure the whole of our national economy.

Now, assemble these two points in Comrade Frumkin's second letter, the point regarding the kulak farms and the point regarding capital construction in industry, and add to that the theory of "deterioration," and you get the physiognomy of the Right deviation.

Do you want to know what the Right deviation is and what it looks like? Read Comrade Frumkin's two letters, study them, and you will understand.

Such is the physiognomy of the Right deviation.

But the theses do not speak only of the Right deviation, they also refer to the so-called "Left" deviation. What is the "Left" deviation? Is there really such a thing as a "Left" deviation in the Party? Is there in the Party an anti-middle peasant tendency, as the theses say, or a tendency toward super-industrialisation, etc.? Yes, there is. What does it amount to? It amounts to a deviation toward Trotskyism. That was said by the July Plenum. I refer to the resolution of the July Plenum on the grain collection policy, where the fight on two fronts is mentioned: the fight against those who want to retreat from the Fifteenth Congress—the Rights—and the fight against those who want to transform the emergency measures into the permanent policy of the Party—the "Lefts," the tendency toward Trotskyism. It is clear that elements of Trotskyism and a tendency toward the Trotskyist ideology exist in our Party. I believe about six thousand individuals voted against our platform at the time of the discussion that took place prior to the Fifteenth Party Congress. (A voice: ten thousand.) Well, if ten thousand voted against, twice ten thousand Party members sympathetic to Trotskyism did not vote at all, since they did not attend the meetings. Those are the Trotskyist elements who have not left the Party but who, it must be assumed, have not rid themselves of the Trotskyist ideology. Moreover, I think that a number of Trotskyists who later broke away from the Trotskyist organisations and returned to the Party have not yet abandoned the Trotskyist ideology and also, presumably, are not averse from spreading their views among the members of the Party. Finally, there is the fact of a recrudescence of the Trotskyist ideology in certain organisations of the Party. Combine all these

facts and you get all the necessary elements comprising a tendency toward Trotskyism in our Party.

And that is easily understood; it cannot be otherwise, in view of the petty-bourgeois environment and the pressure of this environment on our Party, than that Trotskyist tendencies should exist in our Party. It is one thing to arrest and exile the Trotskyist cadres; it is another thing to put an end to the Trotskyist ideology. That will be more difficult. And we say that wherever there is a Right deviation there must be a "Left" deviation. The "Left" deviation is the shadow of the Right deviation. Lenin said, with regard to the Otsovists,[1] that the "Lefts" are Mensheviks turned inside-out. That is absolutely true. The same thing can be said of the present-day "Lefts." Those who incline toward Trotskyism are, in fact, Rights turned inside-out, they are Rights concealing themselves behind "Left" phrases.

Hence the fight on two fronts—against the Right deviation and against the "Left" deviation.

It may be asked: If the "Left" deviation is in essence the same as the Right, opportunist, deviation, then where is the difference between them and where do you get the fight on two fronts? And, indeed, if the victory of the Rights would mean increasing the chances of the restoration of capitalism, and the victory of the "Lefts" would lead to exactly the same result, what is the difference between them and why is one called Right and the other "Left"? And if there is a difference, what does it consist in? Is it not true that both deviations spring from the same social root and that both are petty-bourgeois deviations? Is it not true that the victory of either of these deviations would lead to the same results? Then what is the difference between them?

The difference consists in the fact that their platforms are different, their demands are different, and their approach and methods are different. If, for instance, the Rights say, "*It is a mistake to build Dnieprostroy*," while the "Lefts," on the contrary, say, "*What is the good of one Dnieprostroy? Give us a Dnieprostroy every year*" (laughter), it must be admitted that there is some difference between them. If the Rights say, "*Do not interfere with the kulak*, *give him freedom to develop*," while the "Lefts," on the contrary, say, "*Strike not only at the kulak*, *but also at the middle peasant*, *since he is just as much a private-property owner as the kulak*," it must be admitted that there is some difference between them. If the Rights say, "*The difficulties have set in*, *is it not time to quit?"* while the "Lefts," on the contrary, say,

"*What are difficulties to us: a fig for difficulties*, *let us dash ahead*" (laughter), it must be admitted that apparently there is some difference between them.

And so you get a picture of the specific platform and the specific methods of the "Lefts." And that explains why the "Lefts" sometimes succeed in winning over a part of the workers by their high-sounding "Left" phrases and by depicting themselves as the most determined opponents of the Rights, although all the world knows that the social roots of the "Lefts" are the same as those of the Rights, and that they not infrequently arrive at an understanding, and form a *bloc* with the Rights in order to fight the Leninist line.

That is why it is essential for us Leninists to conduct a fight on two fronts, against the Right deviation and against the "Left" deviation.

But if the Trotskyist deviation is a "Left" deviation, does that not mean that the "Lefts" are more Left than the Leninists? No, it does not. Leninism is the most Left (without quotation marks) tendency in the world working-class movement. In the Second International we Leninists, up to the outbreak of the imperialist war, were the extreme Left faction among the Social-Democrats. We left the Second International and advocated a split of that body because, as the extreme Left faction, we refused to live in one Party with the petty-bourgeois betrayers of Marxism, with the social-pacifists and the social-chauvinists. These tactics and this ideology subsequently became the basis for the Bolshevist Parties of the whole world. In our own Party we Leninists are the *only* Lefts (without quotation marks). Therefore, in our Party we Leninists are neither "Lefts" nor Rights. We are a Marxist-Leninist Party. And in our Party we fight not only those whom we call open opportunist deviationists, but also those who want to be more "Left" than Marxism, more "Left" than Leninism, and conceal their Right opportunist nature behind high-sounding Left phrases. Everybody understands that when people who have not yet rid themselves of Trotskyist tendencies are called "Left" it is meant ironically. Lenin referred to the "Left Communists" as Lefts, sometimes with, and sometimes without, quotation marks. But everybody knows that Lenin referred to them as Lefts ironically and thereby emphasised that they were Left only in words, in appearance, but that in actual fact they represented petty-bourgeois Right tendencies. What can be the Leftism (without quotation marks) of the Trotskyist elements, when only yesterday they formed a united anti-Leninist

bloc with the open opportunist elements and identified themselves directly and indirectly with the anti-Soviet sections of the population? Is it not a fact that only yesterday there was an open *bloc* between the "Lefts" and the Rights against the Leninist Party, and that the *bloc* had the undeniable support of the bourgeois elements? Does that not show that the "Lefts" and the Rights could not join together in a single *bloc* if they did not have common social roots and were not of a common opportunist nature? The Trotskyist *bloc* fell to pieces a year ago. A part of the Rights, like Comrade Shatunovsky, left the *bloc*. Accordingly, the Right members of the *bloc* will henceforth appear as Rights, while the "Lefts" will conceal their Rightism behind Left phrases. But what guarantee is there that the "Lefts" and the Rights will not find each other again? (Laughter.) Obviously, there is no such guarantee, and there cannot be.

But does not our slogan of war on two fronts mean that we are thereby advocating the necessity for *centrism* within the Party? What does the fight on two fronts mean? Does it mean centrism? You know that is exactly what the Trotskyists declare: there are the "Lefts," they say, namely, ourselves, the Trotskyists, the "genuine Leninists"; then there are the Rights, namely, the rest; and, finally, there are the "Centrists," those who wobble between the "Lefts" and the Rights. Is such a view of the Party correct? Obviously not. Only those whose ideas are all muddled can talk like that, those who have long since broken with Marxism. Only those can talk like that who cannot see and fail to understand the *difference in principle* between the Social-Democratic Party of pre-war days, which was a *bloc* made up of proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests, and the Communist Party, which is a *monolithic* Party of the revolutionary proletariat. Centrism is not a concept of space; on the one side, for instance, sit the Rights, on the other the "Lefts," and in between sit the Centrists. Centrism is a political concept. Its ideology is one of adaption, of subordination of the interests of the proletariat to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie in the *same* Party. This ideology is alien and contrary to Leninism. Centrism is a phenomenon natural to the Second International of the pre-war period. There were the Rights (the majority), the Lefts (without quotation marks), and there were the Centrists, whose whole policy consisted in embellishing the opportunism of the Rights with Left phrases and subordinating the Lefts to the Rights. What was, then, the policy of the Lefts, of which the Bolsheviks were the core? Their policy was one of determined struggle against the

Centrists, for a rupture with the Rights (particularly after the outbreak of the imperialist war), and for the organisation of a revolutionary International out of the genuine Lefts and the genuine proletarian elements.

Why was there such a distribution of forces within the Second International, and why was such a policy pursued by the Bolsheviks within that body? Because at that time the Second International was a Party made up of a *bloc* of proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests, to the advantage of petty-bourgeois social-pacifism and social-chauvinism. Because the Bolsheviks then could not but concentrate their fire against the Centrists, who endeavoured to subordinate the interests of the proletariat to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. Because the Bolsheviks at that time were obliged to advocate a split, because without a split the proletariat could not organise its own revolutionary Marxian Party.

Can it be claimed that the same distribution of forces exists in our Party and that we must practise the same policy as was pursued by the Bolsheviks in the Parties of the Second International in the pre-war period? Obviously that is impossible. It is impossible because it would be failing to understand the *difference in principle* between a Party which is a *bloc* of the proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements and a *monolithic* Party of the revolutionary proletariat. The Social-Democrats had one class basis for their Party, the Communists have an entirely different one. Among the Social-Democrats, Centrism was a natural phenomenon, for a Party which is a *bloc* of diverse interests cannot dispense with Centrists, and the Bolsheviks were obliged to pursue a splitting policy. Among the Communists, Centrism has no purpose and is incompatible with Leninist Party principles, since the Communist Party is a *monolithic* Party of the proletariat, and not a *bloc* Party made up of various class elements. And since the ruling power in our Party is the most Left current in the working-class movement (the Leninists), a splitting policy in our Party has no justification, and can have no justification from the point of view of Leninism. (A voice: Is a split possible in our Party, or not?) It is not a question of a split being possible, but of the fact that a splitting policy in our monolithic, Leninist Party cannot be justified from the point of view of Leninism. Whoever does not understand that difference of principle is going against Leninism and making for a rupture with Leninism.

That is why I think that only those who have lost their senses and have abandoned the last shreds of Marxism can seriously assert that the policy of

our Party, the policy of a fight on two fronts, is a Centrist policy.

Lenin always fought a fight on two fronts in our Party, both against the "Lefts" and against the obviously Menshevik deviations. Read Lenin's pamphlet, *Left Wing Communism*, study the history of our Party, and you will see how it grew and became strong in the fight against both deviations —the Rights and the "Lefts." On the one hand, the fight against the Otsovists and the "Left" Communists, and, on the other, the fight against the open opportunist deviations up to the October Revolution, during the Revolution, and since the Revolution—such were the phases our Party passed through in the course of its development. Everybody remembers the words of Lenin to the effect that we must fight both the opportunists and the "Left" doctrinaires.

Does that mean that Lenin was a Centrist, that he conducted a Centrist policy. Obviously not.

What, then, do our Right and "Left" deviationists represent? The Right deviation is, of course, not the same thing as the opportunism of the Social-Democrats of the pre-war period. A deviation towards opportunism is not yet opportunism itself. We know how Lenin explained the meaning of a deviation. A Right deviation is something which has not yet taken the form of opportunism and is still liable to correction, and therefore a deviation toward the Right must not be identified with definite opportunism. The "Left" deviation represents something directly contrary to what the extreme Lefts of the Second International, namely, the Bolsheviks, were before the war. They not only are not Lefts (without quotation marks), they are essentially Right deviationists, with the difference that they unconsciously conceal their real nature behind Left phrases. It would be a crime against the Party to fail to appreciate the full profundity of the difference between the "Left" deviationists and the real Leninists, the *only* Lefts (without quotation marks) in our Party. (A voice: And what about the legalisation of deviations?) If conducting an open war against deviations means legalising them, then it must be confessed that Lenin "legalised" them long ago.

These deviations, the Rights and the "Lefts," are recruited from among the most diverse elements of the non-proletarian sections of the population, elements which reflect the pressure of the surrounding petty-bourgeois environment of the Party, and the degeneration of certain links in the Party. Partly they consist of former members of other Parties; people with Trotskyist tendencies; relics of former Party factions; Party members in the

State, economic, co-operative, and trade union office staffs, who are becoming bureaucratic, or who have already become bureaucratic, and have joined forces with the open bourgeois elements among these staffs; well-to-do Party members in our village organisations who have become merged with the kulaks, etc., etc. This is the environment that fosters deviations from the Leninist line. It is obvious that such elements are incapable of comprehending what is really Left and what is really Leninist. All they can do is to nourish the open opportunist deviation or the so-called "Left" deviation, which masks its opportunism by Left phrases.

Therefore, the fight on two fronts can be the only correct policy for the Party.

Further, is it correct, as the theses state, that the *chief method* of fighting the Right deviation must be an extensive ideological struggle? I think it is correct. It would be well to remember the experience gained in the fight against Trotskyism. How did we begin the fight against Trotskyism? Was it with organisational penalties? Of course not. We began with an ideological struggle which lasted from 1918 to 1925. As far back as 1924 our Party, and in 1925 the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, passed resolutions against Trotskyism, describing it as a petty-bourgeois deviation. Nevertheless, Trotsky was a member both of the Central Committee and of the Political Bureau. Is that true or not? It is true. And so we "tolerated" Trotsky and the Trotskyists as members of the Central Committee. Why did we permit them to continue as members of the leading organs of the Party? Because Trotsky at that time, in spite of his differences with the Party, submitted to the decisions of the Central Committee and remained loyal. When did we begin to apply organisational penalties at all extensively? Only after the Trotskyists had organised themselves into a faction, created a factional centre, transformed their faction into a new Party, and began to call on people to take part in anti-Soviet demonstrations. I think we must follow the same course in the fight against the Right deviation. The Right deviation is not yet something definitely formed and crystallised, although it is gaining strength in the Party. It is just beginning to become crystallised and to assume definite form. Have the Right deviationists a faction? I think not. Can it be said that they do not submit to the decisions of the Party? I do not think there are grounds for such an accusation as yet. Can it be declared that the Right deviation will inevitably organise a faction? I doubt it. Hence, the conclusion: the chief method of fighting the Right deviation *at the present*

stage must be an extensive ideological struggle. That is all the more correct since there is a contrary tendency among certain members of the Party, a tendency to begin not with ideological struggle but with organisational penalties. They frankly declare: give us ten or twenty of these Rights, we will soon smash them up and put an end to the Right deviation. I think, comrades, such a frame of mind is mistaken and dangerous. And for the very reason that we must not pander to such moods, but must put the fight against the Right deviation on right lines, we must state clearly and resolutely that the chief method of fighting the Right deviation *at the present stage* is an ideological struggle.

Does that mean that we disclaim all organisational penalties? No! What it obviously means is that organisational penalties must play a secondary part, and as long as there are no cases of the Right deviationists violating Party decisions, we must not remove them from leading organisations and institutions. (A voice: What about Moscow?) I do not think there were any Rights among the leading Moscow comrades. There was a wrong attitude toward the Right tendencies. It should rather be said that this was a case of a conciliationist tendency. I cannot say there was a Right deviation in the Moscow Committee. (A voice: But was there not an organisational fight?) There was an organisational fight, but it played a subordinate role. The fight occurred inasmuch as the elections in Moscow are taking place on the basis of self-criticism and the regional active members have the right to change their secretaries. (Laughter.) (A voice: Was the re-election of secretaries announced?) Nobody forbade the re-election of secretaries. There is the June appeal of the Central Committee, in which it is plainly stated that extensive self-criticism may become a hollow word if the lower organisations are not given the right to change any secretary or any committee they think fit. What objection can there be to this appeal? (A voice: What, before the Party Conference?) Yes, even before the Party Conference. I see the augur's smile on the lips of certain comrades. That is bad, comrades. I see that some of you have an uncontrollable desire to remove the representatives of the Right deviation from their posts as soon as possible. But, my dear comrades, that is not a solution of the question. It is, of course, much easier to remove people from their posts than to conduct a wide and deliberate campaign of enlightenment on the Right deviation, the Right danger, and how to fight it. But what is the most easy thing is not always the best thing. Please take the trouble to organise a wide campaign

of enlightenment against the Right danger, do not grudge any time for it, and you will see that the wider and deeper the campaign will be, the worse it will be for the Right deviation. That is why I think that the central point of our fight against the Right deviation must be an ideological struggle.

As regards the Moscow Committee, I do not think there is anything to add to what Comrade Uglanov said in his concluding speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. He frankly said: "Going back a little in history, recalling how in Leningrad in 1921 I fought with Comrade Zinoviev, the 'massacre' at that time was certainly on a much larger scale. At that time we were the victors, because we were in the right. This time we were beaten, because we were in the wrong. Well, it is all for the good." It follows, then, that Comrade Uglanov has been fighting this time in the same way as he fought against Comrade Zinoviev. But against whom did he conduct his recent fight? Apparently, against the policy of the Central Committee. Against whom else? on what basis could that struggle be fought? Apparently on the basis of conciliation with the Right deviation.

For that reason the theses are absolutely right in emphasising the necessity for fighting the conciliatory attitude toward the deviations from the Leninist line, especially the conciliatory attitude toward the Right deviation, as being one of the immediate tasks of the Party.

Now, the last question. The theses say that we must particularly emphasise the necessity for the fight against the Right deviation at the present time. What does that mean? It means that at the present time the Right danger is the chief danger in the Party. The fight against the Trotskyist tendencies, a very stubborn fight, has been going on for about ten years. It has resulted in the utter defeat of the leading cadres of the Trotskyists. It cannot be said that the present fight against the open opportunist deviation has been carried on with similar intensity. The reason is that the Right deviation is still in a period of formation and crystallisation; it grows and becomes strong as a result of the growing strength of the surrounding bourgeois environment, as a result of our grain collection difficulties. Therefore, the main blow must be directed against the Right deviation.

In conclusion, comrades, I should like to point out one more factor which has not been referred to here, but which in my opinion is of no little importance. We members of the Political Bureau have submitted to you our

theses on the Control Figures. In my speech I supported these theses because they are absolutely right. Of course, certain corrections may be introduced into these theses; but that fundamentally they are right and give us an opportunity of conducting a correct Leninist line, of that there cannot be the slightest doubt. Well, I want to tell you that these theses were adopted by the Political Bureau unanimously. I believe that fact is of some significance in view of the rumours which are now and again spread in our ranks by malicious opponents and enemies of our Party. I am referring to the rumours to the effect that within the Political Bureau there is a Right deviation, a "Left" deviation, a conciliatory attitude towards them, and the devil knows what. Let these theses serve as one more proof, perhaps for the hundredth-and-first time, that we in the Political Bureau are united, and shall remain united to the end. I would like the present Plenum to adopt these theses, in principle, with equal unanimity. (Applause.)

[1] Estimates.—ED.

[1] Italics mine.—J. STALIN.

[1] Stalin's italics.

[2] The Government enters into a contract with the peasants by which the latter undertake to sow a given quantity of a given crop to sell to the Government at a given price. The Government undertakes to provide credits, seed, etc.—ED.

[1] Dessiatin = 2·7 acres.—ED.

[2] 60 poods = 1 ton.—ED.

[1] *i.e.* too much regard for the practical side and no regard for theory.—ED.

[1] State Planning Committee.—ED.

[1] At the time of the black reaction that reigned after the suppression of the 1905 Revolution, a group of Bolsheviks demanded the "recall" of the Social-Democratic deputies from the Duma. The Russian word for "recall" is "otsovat," hence the word "Otsovists."—ED.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

(*From a Speech delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the* C.P.S.U. *in April*, 1929)

1. The Shifting of Classes and Our Differences

WHAT are our differences? What are they associated with?

They are associated, first of all, with the shifting of classes that have been taking place of late in our country and in capitalist countries. Some comrades think that the differences in our Party are of a fortuitous nature. That is not true, comrades. That is absolutely not true. The differences within our Party have arisen on the basis of the shifting of classes, of the intensification of the class struggle, which has been taking place of late and which is creating a turning-point in development. The principal error the Bukharin group commit is that they fail to see this shifting and this turning-point; they do not see them and neither do they want to see them. That, in fact, explains the failure to appreciate the new tasks of the Party and of the Comintern which is characteristic of the new opposition.

Have you observed, comrades, that in their speeches at the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission the leaders of the new opposition completely evaded the question of the shifting of classes in our country? They did not say a single word about the intensification of the class struggle and did not even remotely hint at the fact that our differences are associated precisely with this very intensification of the class struggle. They talked of everything, of philosophy and theory, but not a word did they say about the shifting of classes that determines the orientation and the practice of our Party at the present moment. How is this strange fact to be explained? Forgetfulness, perhaps? Of course not. Politicians cannot forget essentials. The explanation is that they neither see nor understand the new revolutionary processes now going on both here, in our country, and in capitalist countries. The explanation is that they have overlooked the essential thing, they have overlooked the shifting of classes, which no politician has the right to overlook. That, in fact, explains the confusion and

unpreparedness displayed by the new opposition in face of the new tasks of our Party.

Recall the recent events in our Party. Recall the slogans which our Party issued lately in connection with the new class shiftings in our country. I refer to such slogans as *self-criticism*; the slogan on the intensification of *the fight against bureaucracy and the purging of the Soviet apparatus*; the slogan on *the organisation of new economic cadres and Red specialists*; the slogan *on the strengthening of the collective and Soviet farm movement*; the slogan on *the offensive against the kulaks*; the slogan on *the reduction of the cost of production* and the radical *improvement of the practice of trade union work;* the slogan on *the purging of the Party, etc*. Some comrades thought these slogans were astounding and overwhelming, but it is obvious that they are most essential and timely slogans of the Party at the present moment.

The whole thing began when, as a result of the Shakhti trial, we once again raised the question of new economic cadres, of training Red specialists from members of the working class to replace the old specialists in a new way. What did the Shakhti trial reveal? It revealed that the bourgeoisie is still far from being crushed; that it is organising and will continue to organise its wrecking activities in our economic construction; that our economic, trade union, and, to a certain extent, our Party organisations failed to observe the undermining operations of our class enemies, and that it is essential, therefore, to reinforce and improve our organisations by every means and method in our power and to develop and strengthen their class vigilance.

It was in this connection that the slogan of *self-criticism* assumed acute importance. Why? Because it is impossible to improve our economic, trade union, and Party organisations, it is impossible to advance the cause of Socialist construction and check the wrecking activities of the bourgeoisie, without giving full scope to criticism and self-criticism, without placing the work of our organisations under the control of the masses. It is a fact, is it not, that wrecking has been and is going on, not only in the coal-fields, but also in the metallurgical industries, in the war industries, also in the Commissariat of Ways and Communications, in the gold and platinum industries, etc., etc. Hence the slogan of self-criticism.

Further, in connection with the difficulties experienced during the grain collections, in connection with the active opposition of the kulaks to the

Soviet price policy, we emphasised the question of developing the collective and Soviet farms to the utmost, of launching an offensive against the kulaks, of organising grain collections by bringing pressure on the kulak and well-to-do elements. What was revealed by the grain collection difficulties? It was revealed that the kulak is not asleep, that the kulak is growing, that he is working to undermine the policy of the Soviet Government, while our Party, Soviet, and co-operative organisations, at any rate a section of them, either fail to see the enemy or adapt themselves to him instead of fighting him.

Hence the new emphasis placed on the slogan of self-criticism, on the slogan of testing and improving our Party, co-operative, and our grain-collecting organisations generally.

Further, in connection with the new tasks of reconstructing industry and agriculture on the basis of Socialism, the slogan arose of systematic reduction of the cost of production, of enforcing labour discipline, of developing Socialist competition, etc. These tasks called for a revision of the whole practice of the trade unions and the Soviet apparatus, a complete reinvigoration of these organisations and their cleansing of bureaucratic elements.

Hence, the emphasis on the slogan of the fight against bureaucracy in the trade unions and the Soviet apparatus.

Finally, the slogan of purging the Party. It would be absurd to think that it is possible to strengthen our Soviet and economic, trade union, and co-operative organisations, that it is possible to purge them of the evil of bureaucracy, without putting a fine edge on the Party itself. There can be no doubt that bureaucratic elements flourish not only in the economic, co-operative, trade union, and Soviet organisations, but in the organisations of the Party itself. Since the Party is the controlling force of all these organisations, it is obvious that to purge the Party of undesirable elements is an essential condition for the reinvigoration and improvement of all the other working-class organisations. Hence the slogan of purging the Party.

Are these slogans of a casual nature? No, they are not. You see yourselves that they are not casual. *They are the essential links in the single continuous chain which is called the Socialist offensive against capitalist elements*.

They are connected, primarily, with the period of the reconstruction of our industry and agriculture on the basis of Socialism. What is meant by the

reconstruction of national economy on the basis of Socialism? It means that Socialism launches an offensive against the capitalist elements along the whole front of national economy. That represents an important swing on the part of the working class in our country toward the building up of Socialism. But in order to effect that reconstruction we must first of all improve and strengthen the cadres of Socialist construction, economic and Soviet, trade union, Party, and co-operative; we must put an edge on all our organisations, purge them of evils; we must increase the activity of the great mass of the working class and the peasantry.

Further, these slogans are connected with the resistance offered by the capitalist elements of our national economy to advancing Socialism. What is known as the Shakhti trial cannot be regarded as a chance incident. "Shakhtists" are at present entrenched in every branch of our industry. Many of them have been caught, but by no means all of them. Wrecking activities on the part of the bourgeois intellectuals constitutes one of the most dangerous forms of resistance to developing Socialism. These wrecking activities are all the more dangerous because they are associated with international capitalism. Bourgeois wrecking is undoubtedly an indication of the fact that the capitalist elements have by no means laid down their arms, and that they are gathering strength for fresh attacks on the Soviet Government. And as far as the capitalist elements in the rural districts are concerned, there is still less reason to regard the attack of the kulaks on the Soviet price policy, which has been proceeding for over a year, as being of a chance nature. Many people are still unable to understand why it is that until 1927 the kulak gave his grain automatically, but that since 1927 he no longer gives his grain automatically. But there is nothing surprising in that. Formerly the kulak was still comparatively feeble, he was unable to organise his business on a firm footing, and did not possess sufficient capital to improve his enterprise; consequently, he was obliged to bring all, or nearly all, his surplus grain products to the market; now, on the contrary, following a series of good harvests, he has been able to place his enterprise on a solid footing, and has succeeded in accumulating the necessary capital—now he is in a position to manœuvre on the market, he is able to set aside grain, that currency of currencies, as a reserve for himself, and prefers to bring to the market meat, oats, barley, and other secondary products. It would be ridiculous to hope now that the kulak can be made to part with his grain voluntarily. That is the root of the

resistance which the kulak is offering to the policy of the Soviet Government.

And what does the resistance offered by the capitalist elements of town and country to the Socialist offensive represent? It represents a regrouping of forces of the class enemies of the proletariat for the purpose of defending the old against the new. It is not difficult to understand that such circumstances cannot but lead to an intensification of the class struggle. But in order to break the resistance of the class enemies and to clear the way for the advance of Socialism, we must above all things sharpen up all our organisations, cleanse them of bureaucracy, improve their cadres, and mobilise the millions of the working class and the toiling sections of the countryside against the capitalist elements of town and country.

Such is the shifting of classes that has served as the basis upon which the present slogans of the Party arose.

The same must be said of the shifting of classes in capitalist countries. It would be absurd to think that the stabilisation of capitalism has remained unchanged. Still more absurd would it be to assert that the stabilisation is becoming stronger and firmer. As a matter of fact, capitalist stabilisation is being undermined and shattered every month, every day. The intensification of the struggle for markets and raw materials, the increase of armaments, the growing antagonism between America and England, the growth of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., the radicalisation of the working class in the capitalist countries, the wave of strikes and class conflicts in the European countries, the growing revolutionary movement in the colonies, including India, the growth of Communism in every country of the world—all these are facts that indicate beyond a doubt that the elements of a new revolutionary upsurge are accumulating in the capitalist countries.

Hence, the task of intensifying the fight against Social-Democracy, and particularly against its "Left" wing, which is the social bulwark of capitalism. Hence, the task of intensifying the fight against the Right elements in the Communist Parties, the agents of Social-Democratic influence. Hence, the duty of intensifying the fight against conciliationism with the Right wing, the refuge of opportunism in the Communist Parties. Hence, the slogan of ridding the Communist Parties of Social-Democratic traditions. Hence, what is called the new tactics of Communism in the trade unions. Certain comrades fail to understand the meaning and significance of these slogans. But a Marxist will always understand that unless these

slogans are carried into effect, the preparation of the proletarian masses for new class struggles is out of the question, the victory over Social-Democracy is out of the question, and there can be no selection of real leaders of the Communist movement capable of leading the working class into the fight for the overthrow of capitalism.

Such, comrades, are the shifting of classes in our country and in the capitalist countries, from which the present slogans of our Party in respect to its internal policy and to the Comintern spring.

Our Party sees these class shiftings. It understands the significance of the new tasks and is mobilising its forces for their fulfilment. Accordingly, it is facing events forearmed. Accordingly, it does not fear the difficulties confronting it, for it is prepared to overcome them.

The misfortune of the new opposition, the misfortune of Comrade Bukharin's group, is, that it fails to see these class shiftings and fails to understand the new tasks of the Party. And because it does not understand them it is in a state of utter confusion, it is ready to fly from difficulties, to retire in the face of them and surrender the position.

Have you ever seen sailors when a storm is brewing on a great river—say the Enisei? I have seen them often. There are sailors who in the face of a storm will muster all their forces, encourage their fellows, and boldly sail their boat to meet the storm: "Cheer up, lads, hold tight to the tiller, cut through that wave, she'll make it!" But there are other sailors who lose heart as soon as they smell a storm, begin to whine and demoralise their own ranks: "What bad luck, here comes the storm; lie down, boys, in the bottom of the boat, shut your eyes; let's hope she'll make the shore somehow." (Loud laughter.) Is any more proof needed that the line and conduct of Comrade Bukharin are exactly like the line and conduct of the second group of sailors, who retreat in panic in the face of difficulties?

We say that conditions are maturing in Europe for a new revolutionary upsurge, that these circumstances dictate the new tasks of intensifying the fight against the Right deviation in the Communist Parties and driving the Right deviationists out of the Party; of intensifying the fight against conciliationism, which screens the Right deviation; of intensifying the fight against Social-Democracy traditions in the Communist Parties, etc., etc. But Comrade Bukharin answers that all this is piffle, that no new tasks confront us, and that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority of the Central Committee want to "pick" him (*i.e*. Comrade Bukharin) "to pieces."

We say that the class shiftings in our country dictate new tasks, which call for the systematic reduction of the cost of production and the improvement of labour discipline in industry, and that these tasks cannot be carried out without a radical change in the whole practice and work of the trade unions. But Comrade Tomsky answers that all this is piffle, that no such new tasks confront us, and that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the C.C. want to "pick" him (Comrade Tomsky) "to pieces."

We say that the reconstruction of national economy dictates to us the new tasks of intensifying the fight against bureaucracy in the Soviet and economic apparatus, of ridding the apparatus of rotten and alien elements, of wreckers, etc., etc. But Comrade Rykov replies that all this is piffle, that no such new tasks confront us, and that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the C.C. want to "pick" him (Comrade Rykov) "to pieces."

Is that not absurd, comrades; is it not clear that Comrades Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky cannot see beyond their own noses?

The misfortune of Comrade Bukharin's group is that it fails to see the new class shiftings and fails to understand the new tasks of the Party. And because it fails to understand them it is obliged to follow in the tail of events and to retreat in the face of difficulties.

Therein lies the root of our differences.

2. Differences on Comintern Questions

I have already said that Comrade Bukharin neither sees nor understands the new duties of the Comintern in respect of driving the Rights out of the Communist Parties, of putting a check on conciliationism, and ridding the Communist Parties of Social-Democratic traditions, which are dictated by the growing conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge. This assertion is fully corroborated by our difference on Comintern questions.

How did our differences in this sphere begin?

They began with Comrade Bukharin's theses at the Sixth Congress on the international situation. As a rule, such theses are first examined by the delegation of the C.P.S.U. In this instance, however, that condition was not observed. As it happened, the theses signed by Comrade Bukharin were sent to the delegation of the C.P.S.U. at the same time that they were distributed to the foreign delegations at the Sixth Congress. But the theses proved to be unsatisfactory on a number of points. The delegation of the C.P.S.U. was obliged to introduce about twenty amendments to the theses.

This created rather an awkward situation for Comrade Bukharin. But who was responsible for that? Why did Comrade Bukharin distribute the theses to the foreign delegations before they were examined by the delegation of the C.P.S.U.? Could the delegation of the C.P.S.U. refrain from introducing amendments when the theses proved to be unsatisfactory? And so it came about that from the delegation of the C.P.S.U. there issued what were, in fact, new theses on the international situation to which the foreign delegations opposed the old theses signed by Comrade Bukharin. It is obvious that this awkward situation would not have arisen had not Comrade Bukharin been in a hurry to distribute his theses to the foreign delegations.

I should like to draw attention to four fundamental amendments which the delegation of the C.P.S.U. introduced into Comrade Bukharin's theses. I should like to draw attention to these principal amendments in order to illustrate clearly the character of the differences on Comintern questions.

The first question is the question of the nature of the stabilisation of capitalism. According to Comrade Bukharin's theses it appears that nothing new is taking place at the present moment to unsettle capitalist stabilisation, but that, on the contrary, capitalism is *reconstructing itself* and that, on the whole, it is maintaining itself more or less *securely*. It is obvious that the delegation of the C.P.S.U. could not agree with such a characterisation of what is called the Third Period, *i.e*. the period we are now passing through. It could not agree, because such a characterisation of the Third Period might give our critics the opportunity to say that we have adopted the point of view of so-called capitalist "recuperation," *i.e*. the view of Hilferding, a view which we Communists cannot adopt. Accordingly, the delegation of the C.P.S.U. introduced an amendment, which pointed out that capitalist stabilisation is not secure and could not be secure, that it is being shattered, and will be shattered, by the march of events owing to the aggravation of the crisis of world capitalism. This question, comrades, is of decisive importance for the sections of the Comintern. Is capitalist stabilisation being shaken or is it becoming more secure? On the answer to that question the line of the Communist Parties in their day-to-day political work wholly depends. Are we in a period of decline of the revolutionary movement, a period simply of gathering strength, or are we in a period when the conditions are maturing for a new revolutionary upsurge, a period in which the working class is preparing for impending class struggles? On the answer to that question the tactical line of the Communist Parties depends. The

amendment of the delegation of the C.P.S.U., which was subsequently adopted by the Congress, was a good one for the very reason that it took a clear stand on the latter prospect, the prospect of maturing conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge.

The *second question* is the question of the fight against Social-Democracy. In Comrade Bukharin's theses it was stated that the fight against Social-Democracy is one of the fundamental tasks of the sections of the Comintern. That, of course, is true. But it is not enough. In order that the fight against Social-Democracy may be carried on successfully, attention must be sharply directed to the question of fighting the so-called "Left" wing of Social-Democracy, that "Left" wing which, by playing with "Left" phrases and thus adroitly fooling the workers, is retarding the desertion of the workers from Social-Democracy. It is obvious that unless the "Left" Social-Democrats are smashed, Social-Democracy cannot be overcome at all. But in Comrade Bukharin's theses the question of Left" Social-Democracy was entirely ignored. That, of course, was a great defect. The delegation of the C.P.S.U. was therefore obliged to introduce the necessary correction to Comrade Bukharin's theses which was subsequently adopted by the Congress.

The *third question* is the question of conciliationism within the sections of the Comintern. Comrade Bukharin's theses spoke of the necessity of fighting the Right deviation, but not a word was said about the fight against conciliation with the Right deviation. That, of course, is a great defect. The point is that when war is declared on the Right deviation, the Right deviationists usually assume the colours of conciliators and place the Party in a difficult position. In order to forestall this manœuvre of the Right deviationists we must insist on a determined fight against conciliationism. Therefore the delegation of the C.P.S.U. considered it necessary to introduce the corresponding amendment into Comrade Bukharin's theses which was subsequently adopted by the Congress.

The *fourth question* is the question of discipline. In Comrade Bukharin's theses no mention was made of the necessity of maintaining iron discipline in the Communist Parties. That also is a defect of no little importance. Why? Because in a period when the fight against the Right deviation is being intensified, in a period when the slogan of purging the Communist Parties of opportunist elements is being carried into effect, the Right deviationists usually organise themselves into a faction, set up their own

factional discipline, and disrupt and destroy the discipline of the Party. In order to protect the Party from the factional sorties of the Rights, we must raise the question of iron discipline within the Party and of the unconditional subordination of the Party members to that discipline. Without that, an earnest fight against the Right deviation is out of the question. Accordingly, the delegation of the C.P.S.U. introduced the corresponding amendment into Comrade Bukharin's theses which was subsequently adopted by the Sixth Congress.

Could we refrain from making these amendments to Comrade Bukharin's theses? Of course we could not. In olden times it was said of the philosopher Plato: We love Plato, but we love truth more. The same might be said of Comrade Bukharin: We love Bukharin, but we love truth, the Party, the Comintern still more. Therefore, the delegation of the C.P.S.U. found itself obliged to introduce these amendments into Comrade Bukharin's theses.

That, so to speak, is *the first stage of our differences* on Comintern questions.

The second stage of our differences is connected with what is known as the Wittorf and Thälmann affair. Wittorf was formerly the secretary of the Hamburg organisation, and was accused of embezzling Party funds. For this he was expelled from the Party. The conciliators in the Central Committee of the German Communist Party, taking advantage of the intimacy between Wittorf and Comrade Thälmann, although Comrade Thälmann was in no way involved in Wittorf's guilt, turned the Wittorf case in a Thälmann's case, and set out to overthrow the leadership of the German Communist Party. No doubt you know from the Press that the conciliators, Ebert and Gerhardt, succeeded for a time in winning over a majority of the C.C. of the German Communist Party against Comrade Thälmann. And what then? They removed Thälmann from the leadership, began to accuse him of corruption, and published a "corresponding" resolution, without the knowledge and sanction of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Thus, instead of carrying out the directions of the Sixth Congress of the C.I. to fight against conciliationism, instead of fighting against the Right deviation and conciliationism, they, in practice, grossly violated these directions; they fought against the revolutionary leadership of the German Communist Party, against Comrade Thälmann, in order to *cover up* the

Right deviation and to *consolidate the position* of conciliationism in the ranks of the German Communists.

Yet, instead of swinging the tiller over and straightening out the course, instead of restoring the violated directions of the Sixth Congress and calling the conciliators to order, Comrade Bukharin proposes, in his letter that you know of, *to sanction* the conciliators' *coup d'état*, to hand over the German Communist Party to the conciliators, and again revile Comrade Thälmann in the Press by once more declaring him guilty. And that is called being a "leader" of the Comintern! Do such "leaders" really exist?

The Central Committee discussed Comrade Bukharin's proposal and rejected it. Comrade Bukharin, of course, did not like that. But who is to blame? The decisions of the Sixth Congress were adopted not in order to be violated, but in order that they be carried into effect. If the Sixth Congress decided to declare war on the Right deviation and conciliationism and to keep the leadership in the hands of the main core of the German Communist Party headed by Comrade Thälmann, and if it occurred to the conciliators, Ebert and Gerhardt, to nullify that decision, it was Comrade Bukharin's duty to call the conciliators to order and not to allow them to retain the leadership in the German Communist Party. It is Comrade Bukharin, who "forgot" the decisions of the Sixth Congress, who is to blame.

The third stage in our differences is connected with the question of the fight against the Rights in the German Communist Party, with the question of smashing the Brandler and Thalheimer faction and the expulsion of the leaders of this faction from the German Communist Party. The "position" taken up by Comrade Bukharin and his friends on this cardinal question was that they persistently evaded taking part in its solution. As a matter of fact, it was the fate of the German Communist Party that was being decided. Yet Comrade Bukharin and his friends, knowing this, nevertheless persistently hindered matters by systematically refusing to attend the meetings of the bodies which had the question under consideration. With what purpose? In order, presumably, to remain "clean" both in the eyes of the Comintern and in the eyes of the Rights in the German Communist Party. In order to be able subsequently to say: "Not we, the Bukharinites, secured the expulsion of Brandler and Thalheimer from the Communist Party, but they, the majority of the C.C." And that is what is called fighting the Right danger!

Finally, as to *the fourth stage in our differences*. This stage is associated with the demand made by Comrade Bukharin at the November Plenum of the C.C. that Comrade Neumann should be recalled from Germany and that Comrade Thälmann, who, it was alleged, criticised the report Comrade Bukharin made at the Sixth Congress in one of his speeches, should be called to account. We, of course, could not agree with Comrade Bukharin, since there was not a single document in our possession supporting his demand. Comrade Bukharin promised to present documents against Neumann and Thälmann, but not a single document did he produce. Instead of documents, he distributed to the members of the delegation of the C.P.S.U. copies of a speech delivered by Comrade Humbert-Droz at the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I., the very speech which was subsequently qualified by the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. as an opportunist speech. By distributing Humbert-Droz's speech to the members of the delegation of the C.P.S.U., and by recommending it as material against Thälmann, Comrade Bukharin wanted to prove the justice of his demand for the recall of Comrade Neumann and for calling Comrade Thälmann to account. As a matter of fact, he thereby showed that he identified himself with the position taken up by Comrade Humbert-Droz, a position which the E.C.C.I. regard as an opportunist one.

Those, comrades, are the main points of our differences on Comintern questions.

Comrade Bukharin believes that by conducting a war against the Right deviation and conciliation towards the Right deviation within the sections of the Comintern, by cleaning the German and Czecho-Slovakian Communist Parties of Social-Democratic elements and traditions, and by casting the Brandlers and the Thalheimers out of the Communist Parties, we are "disintegrating" the Comintern, "ruining" the Comintern. We, on the contrary, think that by carrying out such a policy and by concentrating attention on the fight against the Right deviation and conciliationism, we are strengthening the Comintern, cleansing it of opportunists, Bolshevising its sections, and helping the Communist Parties to prepare the working class for the coming revolutionary conflicts.

You see that these are not merely shades of opinion within the ranks of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., but rather serious differences on fundamental questions of Comintern policy.

3. Differences on Internal Policy

I have already spoken of the class shiftings and the class struggle in our country. I have said that Comrade Bukharin's group is infected by blindness and fails to see these shiftings, fails to understand the new tasks of the Party. I have said that for this reason the new opposition has fallen into confusion, has become fearful of difficulties, and is ready to give up in the face of them. It cannot be said that the errors of the new opposition have dropped from the skies. On the contrary, they are associated with the phase of development which we have already passed through, and which is known as the period of *restoration* of national economy, during which construction proceeded peacefully, so to speak, of its own accord, during which the class shiftings now taking place did not exist and during which there was not that intensification of the class struggle which we now observe. But we are now in a new phase of development, distinct from the old period, which was the period of restoration. We are now in a new period of reconstruction, the period of the *reconstruction* of the whole national economy on the basis of Socialism. The new period gives rise to new class shiftings, to an intensification of the class struggle. It demands new methods of struggle, a regrouping of our forces, the improvement and strengthening of all our organisations. The misfortune of Comrade Bukharin's group is that it is living in the past, that it fails to see the characteristic features of the new period and does not understand the necessity for new methods of struggle. Hence its blindness, its confusion, its panic in the face of difficulties.

(*a*) *The Class Struggle*

What is the theoretical basis for the blindness and confusion of Comrade Bukharin's group?

I consider that the theoretical foundation for this blindness and confusion is Comrade Bukharin's incorrect non-Marxian approach to the question of the class struggle in our country. I have in mind Comrade Bukharin's non-Marxian theory that the kulaks will grow into Socialism, the failure to understand the mechanism of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The well-known passage from Comrade Bukharin's book, *The Path to Socialism*, regarding the kulak growing into Socialism has been quoted several times here. But it has been quoted here with a number of omissions. Permit me to quote it in full. That is necessary, comrades, in order to

demonstrate how widely Comrade Bukharin diverges from the Marxian theory of the class struggle. Listen:

> The main network of our co-operative peasant organisations will consist of co-operative nuclei, not of a kulak, but of a "labouring" type, nuclei which will grow into the system of our general State organs and in that way become *links in the single chain of Socialist economy*. On the other hand, *the kulak co-operative nests will, in exactly the same way*, through the banks, etc., *grow into the same system*, but they will be *to a certain extent alien bodies*, similar, for instance, to the *concession enterprises*[1] (N. Bukharin, *The Path to Socialism and the Workers' and Peasants' Alliance*, p. 49).

In quoting this passage from Comrade Bukharin's pamphlet, certain comrades, for some reason or other, omitted the last phrase regarding concessionaires. Comrade Rosit, apparently desiring to help Comrade Bukharin, took advantage of this and shouted from the body of the hall that Bukharin was being distorted. As a matter of fact, the whole point of this quotation lies in the last phrase regarding the concessionaires. For, if concessionaires are placed on the same footing as the kulaks, and the kulaks are growing into Socialism, what follows? Only one thing can follow, namely, that the concessionaires are also growing into Socialism; that not only the kulaks, but the concessionaires also, are growing into Socialism. (General laughter.)

That is what follows, Comrade Rosit.

ROSIT: Comrade Bukharin says, "alien bodies."

STALIN: Comrade Rosit, Bukharin says not "alien bodies," but "to a certain extent alien bodies." Hence, the kulaks and concessionaries are "to a certain extent" alien bodies in the system of Socialism. But that is the very point of the error Comrade Bukharin makes, namely, that kulaks and concessionaires, who are "to a certain extent" alien bodies, nevertheless grow into Socialism. This is the absurdity to which Comrade Bukharin's theory leads. The capitalists in towns and country, kulaks and concessionaires, grow into Socialism—such is the nonsense Comrade Bukharin sank to. No, comrades, such "Socialism" is not for us. Let Comrade Bukharin have it.

Hitherto, we Marxist-Leninists thought that between the capitalists of town and country, on the one hand, and the working class, on the other, there is an *irreconcilable* antagonism of interest. It is on this very belief that

the Marxian theory of the class struggle is based. But now, according to Bukharin's theory that the capitalists will peacefully grow into Socialism, all this is turned topsy-turvy; the irreconcilable antagonism of class interests between the exploiters and the exploited disappears, the exploiters grow into Socialism.

ROSIT: That is not true, the dictatorship of the proletariat is presumed.

STALIN: But the dictatorship of the proletariat is the sharpest form of the class struggle.

ROSIT: Yes, and that is exactly the point.

STALIN: And according to Bukharin the capitalists grew into this very dictatorship of the proletariat. Why is it you cannot understand that, Comrade Rosit? If the capitalists of town and country grow into the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, against whom must the fight be conducted, against whom must the most bitter form of the class struggle be directed? The dictatorship of the proletariat is essential in order to conduct an irreconcilable fight against the capitalist elements, in order to suppress the bourgeoisie and to tear out capitalism by the roots. But if the capitalists of town and country, if the kulak and the concessionaire, are growing into Socialism, is the dictatorship of the proletariat needed at all, and if so, for the suppression of which class?

ROSIT: That is the whole point. According to Bukharin, the growing presumes the class struggle.

STALIN: I see that Comrade Rosit has sworn to serve Comrade Bukharin. But his services are like those of the bear, for, instead of embracing Bukharin, he is hugging him to death. As the proverb says, "An obliging bear is more dangerous than an enemy." (Loud laughter.)

One thing or the other: either there is an irreconcilable antagonism of interest between the capitalist class and the working class which has assumed power and has organised its dictatorship, or there is no such antagonism of interests, in which case only one thing remains: to proclaim the harmony of class interests.

Either Marx's theory of the class struggle, *or* the theory of the capitalists growing into Socialism. *Either* an irreconcilable antagonism of class interests, *or* the theory of harmony of class interests. One or the other.

We can understand "Socialists" of the type of Brentano or Sidney Webb preaching about Socialism growing into capitalism and capitalism into Socialism, for such "Socialists" are in fact anti-Socialists, bourgeois-

Liberals. But it is impossible to understand a man who wishes to be a Marxist preaching the theory that the capitalists will grow into Socialism.

In his speech, Comrade Bukharin tried to strengthen the theory of the kulaks growing into Socialism by referring to the well-known quotation from Lenin and declares that Lenin says *the same thing* as Bukharin. That is not true, comrades. That is a gross and unpardonable slander on Lenin. Here is the text of this quotation from Lenin:

> Of course, in our Soviet Republic the social order is founded on the collaboration of two classes: the workers and the peasants, in which at present, under certain conditions, the "Nepmen," *i.e*. the bourgeosie, are permitted to participate ("How to Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection," *Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVII, p. 405).

You see that not a word is said here regarding the capitalists growing into Socialism. All that is said is that we have "permitted" the Nepman, *i.e*. the bourgeoisie, "under certain conditions" to participate in this collaboration between the workers and peasants. What does that mean? Does that mean that we have thereby admitted the possibility of the Nepman growing into Socialism? Of course not. Only people who have lost all sense of shame can interpret this quotation from Lenin in that way. All that it means is that *at present* we do not annihilate the bourgeoisie, that *at present* we do not confiscate their property, but permit them to exist under certain conditions, *i.e*. provided they unconditionally submit to the laws of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *i.e*. increasingly restricting the capitalists, for the purpose of gradually forcing them out of national economic life. Can the capitalists be forced out, and the roots of capitalism be annihilated without a bitter class struggle? No, it is impossible. Can classes be abolished according to the theory and practice of capitalists growing into Socialism? No, they cannot. Such a theory and practice can only cultivate and perpetuate classes, for this theory is contrary to the theory of the class struggle. But the quotation from Lenin is completely and entirely based on the Marxian theory of the class struggle under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. What can there be in common between Bukharin's theory of the kulak growing into Socialism and Lenin's theory of the dictatorship as a bitter class struggle? It is obvious that there is not and cannot be anything in common between them. Comrade Bukharin thinks that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the class struggle must *die down* and *cease*, in order that classes may be

abolished. Lenin, on the contrary, teaches us that classes can be abolished only by a stubborn class struggle, which under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes *still more bitter* than it was before the dictatorship of the proletariat was established.

> The abolition of classes [says Lenin] requires a long, difficult, and stubborn *class struggle*, which, *after* the overthrow of the power of the capitalists, *after* the destruction of the bourgeois State, *after* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, does not *disappear* (as the peurile believers in the old Socialism and the old Social-Democracy imagine), but merely changes its forms and becomes in many respects still more bitter (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 315, "Greetings to the Hungarian Workers").

That is what Lenin says regarding the abolition of classes.

The abolition of classes *by means of the bitter class struggle of the proletariat*—such is Lenin's formula.

The abolition of classes *by means of the dying down of the class struggle and the capitalists growing into Socialism*—such is Comrade Bukharin's formula.

What can there be in common between these two formulas? It is obvious that there is not and cannot be anything in common between them.

Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into Socialism is therefore a departure from the Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle. It comes close to the theory propounded by Katheder Sozialismus.[1]

And that is the basis of all the errors committed by Comrade Bukharin and his friends.

It might be said that it is not worth dwelling too much on Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into Socialism, since it itself speaks, and not only speaks, but cries out against Comrade Bukharin. That is not correct, comrades. As long as that theory was hidden under a bushel, it was not worth paying attention to. Are there not enough stupidities in the writings of various comrades? Such has been our attitude until quite lately. But recently conditions have somewhat changed. The petty-bourgeois elements that have become more active in recent years began to put breath into this anti-Marxist theory and to cause it to assume a character of immediate significance. It cannot now be said that it lies under a bushel. Now, Comrade Bukharin's queer theory is claiming to become the banner of the Right deviation in our Party, the banner of opportunism. We therefore

cannot now ignore this theory. We are therefore obliged to smash it, as an incorrect and noxious theory, in order to make it easier for our Party comrades to fight the Right deviation.

(*b*) *The Intensification of the Class Struggle*

Comrade Bukharin's second error, which follows from his first error, is that he adopts an incorrect, non-Marxian attitude towards the question of the intensification of the class struggle, of the increasing resistance of the capitalist elements to the Socialist policy of the Soviet Government. What do we mean by that? Do we mean that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the Socialist sector of our economy, and that, because of that, they are strengthening their resistance and undermining Socialist construction? No, not that. Moreover, it is not even true that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the Socialist sector. If that were true, Socialist construction would already be on the verge of ruin. We mean that Socialism is conducting a successful attack against the capitalist elements, Socialism is growing *faster* than the capitalist elements, and as a result the relative importance of the capitalist elements is *declining*, and for the very reason that the relative importance of the capitalist elements is *declining*, the capitalist elements realise their mortal danger and are intensifying their resistance. And they are still able to intensify their resistance, not only because world capitalism is lending them support, but also because, in spite of the decline in their relative importance, in spite of the decline of their relative growth in comparison with the growth of Socialism, there is still an absolute growth of capitalist elements, and this, to a certain extent, enables them to accumulate strength to resist the growth of Socialism. This is the basis on which, *at the present stage of development, and with the present relation of forces*, the intensification of the class struggle and the intensification of the resistance of the capitalist elements of town and country is taking place. The error Comrade Bukharin and his friends make is that they fail to understand this simple and obvious truth. The error they make is that they approach the matter not as Marxists, but as philistines, and try to explain the intensification of the class struggle by all kinds of fortuitous causes, as for instance the "worthlessness" of the Soviet apparatus, the "incautious" policy of local comrades, the "absence" of flexibility, "excesses," etc., etc.

Here, for instance, is a quotation from Comrade Bukharin's pamphlet, *The Path to Socialism*, which demonstrates an absolutely non-Marxian approach to the question of the intensification of the class struggle:

> Here and there the class struggle in the countryside breaks out in all its former manifestations, and, as a rule, the outbreak is provoked by the kulak elements. When, for instance, the kulaks, or people who have grown rich at the expense of others and have crept into the organs of the Soviet Government, begin to shoot down village correspondents, it is a manifestation of the class struggle in its most acute form. [That is not true, since the most acute form of the class struggle is rebellion.—J. Stalin.] However, such incidents, as a rule, occur in those places where the local Soviet apparatus is weak. *As this apparatus improves*, as all the lower units of the Soviet Government become stronger, as the local, village Party and Young Communist organisations become better and stronger, *such phenomena*, it is perfectly obvious, will become more and more rare and will finally disappear leaving no trace[1] (Bukharin, *The Path to Socialism and the Workers' and Peasants' Union*, Russian edition, pp. 53–54).

Thus it follows that the sharpening of the class struggle is to be explained by causes arising out of the character of the Soviet apparatus, the worth or worthlessness, the strength or weakness of our local organisations. It follows, for example, that the wrecking performed by the bourgeois intellectuals in Shakhti, which is a form of resistance of the bourgeois elements to the Soviet Government and a form of intensification of the class struggle, is to be explained, not by the relation of class forces, not by the growth of Socialism, but by the worthlessness of our apparatus. It follows that before the appearance of wholesale wrecking in the Shakhti district, our apparatus was a good one, but that later, when wholesale wrecking activity manifested itself, the apparatus, for some reason or other, became utterly worthless. It follows that until last year, when grain collections proceeded automatically and the class struggle had not assumed a particularly acute form, our local organs were good, even ideal; but that beginning from last year, when the resistance of the kulaks assumed exceptionally acute forms, our organisations suddenly became bad and utterly worthless. That is not an explanation, but a mockery of an explanation. That is not science, but Sorcery.

What is the sharpening of the class struggle due to?

It is due to two causes.

Firstly, to our advance, to our offensive, to the growth of Socialist forms of economy both in industry and in agriculture, a growth which is accompanied by a corresponding squeezing out of corresponding sections of capitalists of town and country. The fact is that we are living according to the Leninist formula of "Who will defeat whom?": shall we put them, the capitalists, on their backs and engage them, as Lenin put it, in the last decisive fight, or will they put us on our backs?

Secondly, it is due to the fact that the capitalist elements will not depart from the scene voluntarily; they resist, and will continue to resist, Socialism, for they see that the last days of their existence are approaching. And they are still in a position to resist, since, in spite of their relative decrease, absolutely, they still continue to increase; the petty bourgeoisie of town and country, as Lenin said, daily and hourly throw up from their ranks capitalists and small capitalists, and these capitalist elements go to any length to preserve their existence.

There have yet been no cases in history when dying classes have voluntarily departed from the scene. There have been no cases in history when the dying bourgeoisie has not exerted all its remaining strength to preserve its existence. Whether our lower apparatus is good or bad, our advance, our offensive, will reduce the numbers of the capitalist elements and force them out of existence, and they, the dying classes, will resist at all costs.

This is the social basis for the sharpening of the class struggle.

The error Comrade Bukharin and his friends make is that they identify the growth of the resistance of the capitalist with the growth of their relative economic importance. But there is absolutely no foundation for such an identification. There is no such foundation, for although the capitalists resist, it by no means follows that they have become stronger than we are. In fact, the contrary is the case. The dying classes resist, not because they have become stronger than we are, but because Socialism is growing faster than they are, and they are becoming weaker than we. And because they are becoming weaker, they feel that their last days are approaching and are obliged to resist with every means and method in their power.

Such is the mechanism of the sharpening of the class struggle and the resistance of the capitalists at the present historical moment.

In view of such a state of affairs, what should be the policy of the Party?

The policy should be to arouse the working class and the exploited masses of the countryside, to increase their fighting capacity and develop their ability to mobilise for the fight against the capitalist elements of town and country, for the fight against the resisting class enemies. The Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle is valuable, among other reasons, for the very fact that it facilitates the mobilisation of the working class against the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Wherein lies the harm of the Bukharin theory of the capitalists growing into Socialism and of the Bukharin conception of the intensification of the class struggle?

In the fact that it lulls the working class to sleep, undermines the preparedness of the revolutionary forces of our country; it demobilises the working class and facilitates the attack of the capitalist elements against the Soviet Government.

(*c*) *The Peasantry*

Comrade Bukharin's third error is on the question of the peasantry. As you know, the peasant question is one of the most important questions in our politics. In the conditions prevailing in our country, the peasantry consists of various social groups, namely, the poor peasants, the middle peasants, and the kulaks. It is obvious that our attitude to these various groups cannot be identical. The poor peasant is the *support* of the working class, the middle peasant is the *ally*, the kulak is the *class enemy*—such is our attitude to these respective social groups. All that is obvious and generally understood. Comrade Bukharin, however, regards the matter somewhat differently. In his description of the peasantry the differentiation is lacking, the existence of social groups disappears, and there remains only a drab patch known as the "village." According to him the kulak is not a kulak, the middle peasant is not a middle peasant, and the village presents a picture of uniform destitution. That is exactly what he said in his speech here: can our kulak really be called a kulak? he said. Why, he is a beggar! And our middle peasant, is he really like a middle peasant? Comrade Bukharin declared here: why he is a beggar, living a half-starved existence. Obviously such a conception of the peasantry is radically wrong and irreconcilable with Leninism.

Lenin said that the peasantry is *the last capitalist class*. Is that postulate correct? Yes, it is absolutely correct. Why is the peasantry described as the

last capitalist class? Because of the two main classes of which our society is composed, the peasantry is a class whose economy is based on private property and small commodity production. Because the peasantry, as long as it remains a peasantry, living by small commodity production, will throw up capitalists from its ranks, and cannot help throwing them up, constantly and continuously. This fact is of decisive importance in relation to our Marxian attitude to the problem of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. That means that we want, not *any kind* of alliance with the peasantry, but only *such an alliance* as is based on the struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry. Thus you see that Lenin's thesis that the peasantry represents the last capitalist class, not only does not contradict the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, but on the contrary supplies the basis for such an alliance, as an alliance between the working class and the peasantry directed against the capitalist elements in our economy. Lenin advanced that thesis in order to show that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry can be a firm one only provided it is based on a struggle against those very capitalist elements which the peasantry throws up from its midst.

Comrade Bukharin's error consists in the fact that he does not understand and does not approve of this simple matter; he forgets the social groupings in the countryside; he loses sight of the kulaks and the poor peasants, and all he sees is one uniform mass of middle peasants. That is undoubtedly a deviation to the Right on the part of Comrade Bukharin, in contradistinction to the "Left," Trotskyist, deviation, which sees no other social groupings in the countryside except the poor peasants and the kulaks, and which entirely loses sight of the middle peasant.

What is the difference between Trotskyism and Comrade Bukharin's group on the question of the alliance with the peasantry? The fact that Trotskyism is *opposed* to a policy of *firm* alliance with the middle masses of the peasantry, while the Bukharin group is in favour of *any kind* of alliance with the peasantry. There is no need to show that both these positions are incorrect and that they are worthy of each other.

Leninism is undoubtedly in favour of a stable alliance with the basic masses of the peasantry, of an alliance with the middle peasants; not any kind of alliance, however, but such an alliance with the middle peasants as will guarantee the *leadership* of the working class, will *consolidate* the dictatorship of the proletariat and *facilitate the abolition of classes*.

Lenin *says*:

> An agreement between the working class and the peasantry may be understood to mean anything and everything. If it is not borne in mind that from the point of view of the working class an agreement can be permissible, correct, and possible in principle only when it supports the dictatorship of the working class and serves as one of the measures directed toward the abolition of classes, the formula—agreement between the working class and peasantry—of course, remains a formula which all enemies of the Soviet Government, all enemies of the dictatorship carry out according to their own views (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVI, p. 387).

And further, Lenin says:

> Now the proletariat holds the power of government in its hands and guides the Government. It leads the peasantry. What is meant by leading the peasantry? It means, firstly, to pursue a policy towards the abolition of classes, and not a policy in favour of the small producer. If we departed from this radical and fundamental policy, we should cease to be Socialists and would find ourselves in the camp of the petty bourgeois, in the camp of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who are at present the most vicious enemies of the proletariat (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVI, pp. 399–400).

This, then, is Lenin's point of view on the question of the alliance with the basic masses of the peasantry, of an alliance with the middle peasants.

The error committed by Comrade Bukharin's group on the question of the middle peasant is that it fails to perceive the dual nature, the dual position, of the middle peasant between the working class and the capitalists. "The middle peasant is a wavering class," said Lenin. Why? Because, from one point of view, the middle peasant is a toiler, which relates him to the working class, and from another point of view he is a property owner, which relates him to the kulak. Hence the wavering of the middle peasant. And that is true not only theoretically. These waverings are evident in practice, daily and hourly.

Lenin says:

> The peasant as a toiler gravitates towards Socialism, and prefers the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The peasant as a seller of grain gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, to freedom of trade, *i.e*. back to the

"habitual" old capitalism "of former days" (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 314).

Therefore, the alliance with the middle peasant can be stable only if it is directed against the capitalist elements, against capitalism in general; only if it guarantees the leadership of the working class in that alliance, if it facilitates the cause of the abolition of classes.

It is strange that Comrade Bukharin's group should forget these simple and obvious facts.

(*d*) N.E.P. *and Market Relations*

The fourth error Comrade Bukharin commits is on the question of N.E.P. Comrade Bukharin's error consists in the fact that he fails to see the dual nature of N.E.P.,[1] he sees only one side of N.E.P. When we introduced N.E.P. in 1921, we directed its edge against war Communism, against the regime and system *which excluded any and every form of freedom of trade*. We considered, and still consider, that N.E.P. implies *a certain measure* of freedom of trade. Comrade Bukharin remembered this side of the matter. And that is very good. But Comrade Bukharin is mistaken if he thinks that this is the only side of N.E.P. Comrade Bukharin forgets that N.E.P. has another side. The fact is that N.E.P. by no means implies *complete* freedom of trade, the *free* play of prices in the market. N.E.P. is freedom of trade within *certain* limits, within *certain* confines, *with the regulating control of the State and its place in the market guaranteed*. That is precisely the second side of N.E.P. And, indeed, this side of N.E.P. is not less, if not more, important than the first side. There is no free play of prices in this country as is usually the case in capitalist countries. We fix the prices of grain basically. We fix the prices for manufactured goods. We endeavour to carry out a policy of reducing cost of production and of the price of manufactured goods, and strive to maintain stable prices for agricultural products. Is it not obvious that such special and specific market conditions do not exist at all in capitalist countries?

Hence it follows that as long as N.E.P. exists, both sides must be retained: the first side, which is directed against the regime of war Communism, and the purpose of which is to guarantee a *certain* amount of freedom of trade; and the second side, which is directed against *complete* freedom of trade, and the purpose of which is to guarantee the position of the State as the regulator of the market. Destroy one of these sides, and N.E.P. disappears.

Comrade Bukharin thinks that danger can threaten N.E.P. only from the "Left," from people who want to liquidate *all forms* of free trade. That is not true. That is a gross error. Moreover, such a danger is the least urgent at the present moment, since there is nobody or hardly anybody in our local and central organisations now who does not understand the full necessity and expediency of maintaining a *certain degree* of freedom of trade. The most urgent danger is from the Right, from those who want to remove the regulating control of the State from the market, who want to "free" the market and thereby open up an era of complete freedom of trade. There can be no doubt that the danger of destroying N.E.P. which threatens from the Right is at the present time much more real. It should not be forgotten that the petty-bourgeois elements are working in this very direction, towards the destruction of N.E.P. from the Right. It should also be remembered that the outcries of the kulaks and the well-to-do elements, the outcries of the speculators and the profiteers, by which many of our comrades are frequently influenced, bombard N.E.P. from this very quarter. The fact that Comrade Bukharin does not see this second, and very real, menace to N.E.P. shows without doubt that he has allowed himself to be affected by the pressure exerted by the petty-bourgeois elements.

Comrade Bukharin proposes to "normalise" the market and to "manœuvre" grain collecting prices according to regions, *i.e*. to increase the price of grain. What does that mean? It means that he is not satisfied with Soviet market conditions, he wants to gradually destroy the role of the State as the regulator of the market and proposes to make concessions to the petty-bourgeois elements, which is destroying N.E.P. from the Right.

Let us for a moment assume that we followed Comrade Bukharin's advice. What would be the result? We raise the price of grain, let us say, in the autumn, at the beginning of the grain collecting period. But since there are always people on the market, speculators and profiteers, who can pay three times as much for grain, and since we cannot keep up with speculators, for they buy in all about ten or twenty million poods while we have to buy hundreds of millions of poods, the result is that those who hold grain will continue to hold it all the same in expectation of a further rise in prices. Consequently toward the spring, when, in the main, the real need of the State for grain begins, we should again have to raise the price of grain. But what is the result of raising the price of grain in the spring? It means ruining the poor and weaker sections of the rural population who are

themselves obliged to buy grain in the spring, partly for seed and partly for food, the very grain which they sold in the autumn for lower prices. Can we obtain serious results by these operations, in the sense of securing a sufficient quantity of grain? Most probably not, since there will always be speculators and profiteers who are able to pay twice and three times as much for the same grain. Consequently, we should have to be prepared for a fresh increase in the price of grain, in a vain endeavour to catch up with the speculators and profiteers.

But from that it follows that, once we have started on the path of increasing grain prices, we have to go further and further without any guarantee of securing sufficient quantities of grain.

But the matter does not end there. Firstly, having raised grain *collection* prices, we should next have to raise prices for raw materials, in order to maintain a certain proportion in the prices of the products of agriculture. Secondly, by raising the grain collection prices we shall be unable to maintain a low price for bread in the towns, and consequently shall be obliged to raise the *selling* price for bread. And since we cannot, and must not, injure the workers, we must rapidly increase wages. But that cannot but lead to an increase in the prices for manufactured goods, for, otherwise, there may be a transfer of funds from the town to the country to the detriment of industrialisation. In the end we should have to equalise the prices for manufactured goods and agricultural products, not on the basis of *falling*, or at any rate stabilised, prices, but on the basis of *rising* prices, both for grain and for manufactured goods. In other words, we must pursue a policy of *dearer* manufactured goods and agricultural products. It is not difficult to understand that such "manœuvring" of prices can only lead to the complete nullification of the Soviet price policy, to the nullification of the regulating role of the State in the market, and to complete freedom of action for the petty-bourgeois elements. Who will profit by this? Only the well-to-do sections in town and country, for dear manufactured goods and agricultural products cannot but put them beyond the reach of the working class and the poor and weaker sections of the rural population. It will be the kulaks and the well-to-do sections, the Nepmen and the other wealthy classes who will benefit.

This, too, will be a *smychka*, but a *smychka* of a peculiar kind, a *smychka* with the wealthy sections of the rural and urban population. The workers and the weaker sections of the rural population will have every right to ask

us: Whose Government are you: a workers' and peasants', or a kulak and Nepmen's Government?

A rupture with the working class and the weaker sections of the rural population and a *smychka* with the well-to-do sections in town and country —that is what Bukharin's "normalisation" of the market and "manœuvring" of grain prices according to regions must lead to.

It is obvious that the Party cannot enter on this fatal path.

How far Comrade Bukharin has muddled all conceptions of N.E.P. and how firmly he has become a captive of elemental petty-bourgeois forces is shown, among other things, by the more than negative attitude he displays to the question of the new forms of commodity exchange between town and country, between the State and the peasantry. He is outraged and cries out in indignation against the fact that the State has become the supplier of goods to the peasantry and that the peasantry has become the supplier of grain to the State. He regards that as a violation of all the rules of N.E.P., almost as a breakdown of N.E.P. Why, one asks; on what grounds? What can there be objectionable in the fact that the State, State industry, is the supplier of goods to the peasantry, and that the peasantry is the supplier of grain to industry, to the State? What can there be objectionable, from the point of view of Marxism and a Marxist N.E.P. policy, in the fact that the peasantry has *already become* the supplier of cotton, beets, and flax for the needs of State industry, and that State industry has become the supplier of city goods, seed, and implements of production for these branches of agriculture? The contract system is here the basic method of establishing these new forms of commodity exchange between town and country. Is the contract system contrary to the requirements of N.E.P.*?* What can there be objectionable in the fact that, thanks to the same contract system, the peasantry *is becoming* the supplier of the State not only in respect of cotton, beets, and flax, but also in respect of grain? Why is it that trade in small quantities, petty trade, may be termed commodity exchange, whereas trade in large lots, by means of preliminarily concluded agreements as to prices and quality of goods (the contract system), cannot be regarded as commodity exchange? This is absurd. Is it so difficult to understand that these new mass forms of commodity exchange between town and country on the basis of the contract system arose on the very basis of N.E.P.*?* That they represent a big step forward on the part of our organisations in respect of strengthening the planned Socialist control of national economy?

Is it not strange that Comrade Bukharin has lost the capacity to understand these simple and obvious things?

(*e*) *The Rate of Development of Industry and the New Forms of "Smychka"*

Finally, as to the question of the rate of development of industry and the new forms of *smychka* between town and country. This is one of our cardinal points of difference. The importance of this question lies in the fact that it concentrates within itself all the threads of our *practical* differences on the economic policy of the Party.

What are the new forms of *smychka*, what do they mean from the point of view of our economic policy?

They mean, firstly, that beside the old forms of *smychka* between town and country, whereby industry chiefly satisfied the *personal* wants of the peasantry (calico, footwear, manufactured goods generally, etc.), we now need new forms of *smychka*, whereby industry will satisfy the *productive* requirements of peasant economy (agricultural machinery, tractors, improved seed, fertilisers, etc.). Whereas formerly we satisfied *mainly* the personal wants of the peasantry, hardly touching the productive needs of their economy, now, while continuing to satisfy the personal requirements of the peasantry, we must exert ourselves to the utmost to supply agricultural machinery, tractors, fertilisers, etc., which are directly associated with the reconstruction of agricultural production on a new technical basis. As long as it was a question of the *restoration* of agriculture and of the peasants acquiring the landlords' estates and the land of the kulaks, we could be content with the old forms of *smychka*. But now, when it is a question of *reconstructing* agriculture, that is not enough. Now we have to go further and help the peasantry to reconstruct agricultural *production* on the basis of a new technique and collectivised labour.

Secondly, they mean that side by side with the re-equipment of our industry we must seriously begin to re-equip agriculture also. We are re-equipping, and have already partly re-equipped, our industry, we are placing it on a new technical basis and supplying it with new and improved machinery and new and improved cadres. We are building new factories and plants and are reconstructing and extending the old ones; we are developing the iron and steel industry, the chemical industry, and the engineering industry. On this basis, new towns are springing up, new

industrial centres are multiplying and old ones are spreading. On this basis the demand for food products and for raw materials for industry is growing. But agriculture remains backward, with old equipment, with the old methods of tillage practised by our forefathers, with the old, primitive, now useless, or nearly useless, technique, with the old, small-peasant, individual forms of economy and labour. Think of it! Before the Revolution there were 16 million peasant households, and now there are no less than 25 million! What does that mean, if not that agriculture is assuming a more and more dispersed and fragmentary character. And the characteristic feature of fragmentary and small farms is that they are unable in the required degree to utilise technique, machines, tractors, and the facts of agronomical science, and that they are enterprises with a small marketable output. Hence, the insufficient output of marketable agricultural products. Hence, the danger of a rupture between town and country, between industry and agriculture. Hence, the necessity for speeding up, for accelerating the rate of development of agriculture to bring it up to that of industry. And so, in order to avoid the danger of this rupture, we must begin to thoroughly re-equip agriculture on the basis of the new technique. But in order to re-equip it we must gradually unite the minute, fragmentary peasant farms into huge farms, into collective farms; we must build up agriculture on the basis of collective labour, we must enlarge the collectives, we must develop the old and new State farms, we must systematically apply the contract system on a mass scale to all the basic branches of agriculture; we must develop the system of machine and tractor stations which assist the peasantry in acquiring the new technique and in collectivising labour—in a word, we must gradually place the small peasant farms on the basis of large-scale collective production, for only large-scale production of a socialised type is able to take full advantage of the benefits of science and of new technique and to advance in seven-league strides the development of our agriculture.

That, of course, does not mean that we must neglect the individual poor and middle-peasant farm. Nothing of the kind. The individual poor and middle-peasant farm plays a predominant part in supplying industry with food and raw materials, and will continue to do so for some little time. That is precisely why we must continue to assist the poor and middle-peasant farms. But it does mean that the individual peasant farm alone is *already* inadequate. That is shown by our grain collection difficulties. Hence, the development of the individual poor and middle-peasant farm must be

supplemented by the fullest possible development of collective farms and Soviet farms. Hence, we must throw a bridge between the poor and middle-peasant farms and the collective and socialised forms of farming, in the shape of the contract system on a mass scale, in the shape of machine and tractor stations, and in the shape of the fullest development of the co-operative movement in order to help the peasants to transfer their small individual enterprises to the lines of collective labour. Without these conditions serious development of agriculture is impossible. Without these conditions, it will be impossible to solve the grain problem. Without these conditions, the poorer sections of the peasantry cannot be saved from poverty and distress.

And, finally, they imply that we must develop our industry to the utmost as the basic source from which agricultural production will be supplied with the means required for its reconstruction; we must develop our iron and steel, chemical and engineering industries; we must build tractor works, agriculture machinery works, etc. There is no need to show that it is impossible to develop collective farms, it is impossible to develop machine and tractor stations, without inducing the basic masses of the peasantry to adopt collective forms of economy with the help of the contract system on a mass scale, without supplying agriculture with a fairly large quantity of tractors, agricultural machinery, etc. But it is impossible to supply the country with machines and tractors without accelerating the rate of development of our industry. Hence, a rapid rate of development of our industry is the key to the reconstruction of agriculture on the basis of collectivism.

Such is the meaning and significance of the new forms of *smychka*.

Comrade Bukharin's group was obliged to admit, in words, the necessity of the new forms of *smychka*. But it was an admission only *in words*, calculated, under the flag of a verbal recognition of the new forms of *smychka*, to smuggle in something directly *contrary*. In actual fact, Comrade Bukharin is opposed to the new forms of *smychka*. According to Comrade Bukharin, the starting-point is not a rapid rate of development of industry as the stimulus for the reconstruction of agricultural production, but the development of the individual peasant farms. His chief aim is the "normalisation" of the market and allowing the free play of prices on the agricultural produce market, which in fact means, allowing complete freedom of trade. Hence, the distrustful attitude to the collective farms

which manifested itself in his speech at the July Plenum of the Central Committee and in his theses prior to the July Plenum of the C.C. Hence, his negative attitude to all and every form of emergency measures against the kulaks during the grain collections. We know that Comrade Bukharin shrinks from emergency measures as the devil shrinks from holy water. We know that Comrade Bukharin still fails to understand that under present conditions the kulak will not give up enough grain voluntarily, automatically. That has been proved by our two years' experience of grain collections.

But what is to be done if, nevertheless, there will not be enough marketable grain? To this Bukharin replies: do not worry the kulaks with emergency measures; import grain from abroad. It was not so long ago that he proposed that we import about 50 million poods of grain, *i.e*. to the value of about 100 million rubles in foreign currency. But what if valuta is required to import equipment for industry? To this Bukharin replies that preference must be given to imports of grain—thus, apparently, giving second place to imports of equipment for industry.

It follows, therefore, that the fundamental solution of the grain problem and the reconstruction of agriculture is not the rapid rate of development of industry, but the development of the individual peasant farms, including also the kulak farms, on the basis of a free market and the free play of prices.

We are thus confronted by two different plans of economic policy.

The plan of the Party.

1. We are re-equipping (reconstructing) industry.
2. We are beginning seriously to re-equip agriculture (reconstruction).
3. This requires the extensive construction of collective and Soviet farms, the mass application of the contract system, and machine and tractor stations as a means of establishing a *productive smychka* between industry and agriculture.
4. As regards the present grain collection difficulties, the necessity for temporary emergency measures, reinforced by the social support of the middle and poor peasant masses, must be recognised as one of the means of breaking down the resistance of the kulaks and securing from them the maximum grain surplus necessary in order to get along without importing grain and in order to save foreign currency for the development of industry.

5. The individual poor and middle-peasant farms play, and will continue to play, a predominant part in supplying the country with food and raw materials. But alone they are already inadequate; therefore, the development of individual poor and middle-peasant farms must be *supplemented* by the development of collective and Soviet farms, by mass contracting, by accelerating the development of machine and tractor stations, in order to facilitate the squeezing out of the capitalist elements from agriculture and the gradual transfer of the individual peasant farms to the lines of large-scale collective farms, to the lines of collective labour.

6. But in order to secure all this, it is necessary first of all to accelerate the development of industry, of metals, chemicals, engineering, of tractor works, agricultural machinery works, etc. Without that the solution of the grain problem and the reconstruction of agriculture are impossible.

Conclusion: *The key to the reconstruction of agriculture is the rapid rate of development of our industry*.

Comrade Bukharin's Plan.

1. The "normalisation" of the market; allowing the free play of prices on the market, and a rise in the price of grain, not deterred by the fact that this may lead to an increase in the price of manufactured goods, raw materials, and bread.

2. The fullest possible development of the individual peasant farm, accompanied by a certain retardation of the speed of development of the collective and Soviet farms (Comrade Bukharin's thesis of July and his speech at the July Plenum).

3. Collections on the automatic principle; under no circumstances to apply, even partially, emergency measures against the kulaks, even though such measures are supported by the poor and middle-peasant masses.

4. In the event of grain not sufficing, to import grain to the value of about 100 million rubles.

5. And if there is not enough currency for importing grain and equipment for industry, to cut down imports of equipment, which means cutting down the rate of development of our industry—otherwise our agriculture will simply "mark time," or will even "directly decline" (Bukharin's *Notes of an Economist*).

Conclusion: *The key to the development of agriculture is the development of the individual peasant farm*.

That is how it works out, comrades.

Comrade Bukharin's plan is a plan for *reducing* the rate of development of industry and for the *breakdown* of the new forms of *smychka*.

Such are our differences.

Have we not begun too late to develop the new forms of *smychka*, to develop the collective and Soviet farms, etc.?

There are some who assert that the Party began this almost two years too late. That is not true, comrades. That is absolutely untrue. Only noisy "Lefts" who have not understood the economics of the U.S.S.R. can talk like that. What does being too late in this matter mean? If it means that we should have foreseen the necessity for collective and Soviet farms, then we can say that we began this at the time of the October Revolution. That the Party then—at the time of the October Revolution—foresaw the necessity for collective and Soviet farms, of that there cannot be the slightest doubt. Take our programme adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Party (March, 1919). The necessity for collective and Soviet farms is recognised therein absolutely clearly. But the mere fact that the leaders of our Party foresaw the necessity for collective and Soviet farms is not enough to carry into effect and organise a *mass movement* for collective and Soviet farms. Therefore, the question is not of foreseeing, but of *carrying into effect* the plan for collective and Soviet farm construction. But in order to carry such a plan into effect a number of conditions are required, such as have not existed hitherto and which came into existence only very recently. That is the point, comrades.

In order to carry out the plan for a mass movement in favour of collective and Soviet farms, it was necessary, first of all, that the Party leadership should be supported in this course by *the mass* of the Party. And, as you know, our Party has over a million members. It was, therefore, necessary to convince the broad masses of the Party of the correctness of the policy of the leaders. That is the first point.

Further, it was necessary that a mass movement should arise among the peasants in favour of the collective farms, that the peasantry should cease to fear the collective farms and should itself join the collective farms, after being convinced by experience of the advantage of collective farming over individual farming. And that was a serious matter, requiring a certain period of time. That is the second point.

Further, it was necessary that the State should possess the material resources required for financing the movement, for financing the collective and Soviet farms. And that, dear comrades, requires hundreds and hundreds of millions. That is the third point.

And, finally, it was necessary that industry should be developed sufficiently to be able to supply agriculture with machinery, tractors, fertilisers, etc. That is the fourth point.

Can it be said that all these conditions existed two or three years ago? No, it cannot.

It must not be forgotten that we are a *ruling* Party, and not an *opposition* Party. An opposition Party can issue slogans—I mean fundamental practical slogans of the movement—in order to carry them into effect after it comes to power. Nobody can accuse an opposition Party for not carrying its fundamental slogans into effect immediately, since everybody knows that not it, the opposition Party, is at the helm, but other Parties. But in the case of a ruling Party, such as our Bolshevik Party is, the matter is entirely different. The slogans of such a Party are not merely agitational slogans, but something much more, since they have the force of a practical *decision*, the force of *law*, which must be carried into effect immediately. Our Party cannot issue practical slogans and then defer carrying them into effect. That would be deceiving the masses. Before issuing a slogan, especially so serious a slogan as placing the millions of the peasantry on the lines of collectivism, the conditions must exist that will enable the slogan to be carried into effect; it is necessary, in a word, to create, to organise these conditions. That is why it was not enough merely that the Party leadership should foresee the necessity for collective and Soviet farms. That is why we also required the conditions, essential for *realising, for carrying our slogans into effect*.

Was the *mass* of the Party ready for the fullest development of collective and Soviet farms, say, two or three years ago? No, it was not ready. The serious swing-over of the Party masses towards the new forms of *smychka* began only with the first serious grain collection difficulties. It required these difficulties to make the Party, as a mass, realise the full necessity for accelerating the adoption of the new forms of *smychka*, and particularly of the collective and Soviet farms, and give decisive support to its Central Committee in this matter. That is one condition which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

Was there any serious movement on the part of the millions of the peasant masses in favour of the collective or the Soviet farms two or three years ago? No, there was not. Everybody knows that two and three years ago the peasants were hostile to the Soviet farms and regarded the collective farm as a "communia"[1] which no one required. And now? Now, the situation is entirely different. Now there are whole sections of the peasantry who regard the collective and Soviet farms as a source of aid to peasant farming in the matter of supplying seed, improved cattle, machines, and tractors. Now we have only to give machines and tractors, and the cause of collective farming will advance rapidly.

How did this fundamental change of attitude on the part of certain fairly considerable sections of the peasantry take place? What helped to bring it about? Firstly, the development of the co-operative movement and co-operative public opinion. There can be no doubt that without the powerful development of co-operation, particularly of agricultural co-operation, which changed the mental attitude of the peasantry in favour of the collective farms, there would not have been that urge toward the collective farms which is now being manifested among whole sections of the peasantry. An important part was played by the existence of well-organised collective farms, which set the peasants good examples of how agriculture can be improved by uniting small-peasant farms into large collective farms. An important part was also played by the existence of well-organised Soviet farms, which assisted the peasants to improve their methods of farming. I will not refer to other factors with which you are well acquainted. This, then, is another condition, which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

Further, can it be said that two or three years ago we were in a position seriously to finance the collective and Soviet farms, to assign hundreds of millions of rubles for this purpose? No, it cannot. You know very well that we did not even have sufficient funds with which to develop that minimum of industry without which industrialisation in general is impossible, let alone the reconstruction of agriculture. Could we take these resources from industry, which was the basis for the industrialisation of the country, and give them to the collective and Soviet farms? Obviously we could not. But now? Now we have the means for developing the collective and Soviet farms.

And, finally, can it be asserted that two or three years ago our industry offered a sufficient basis for increasing the supply of machines, tractors, etc.? No, it cannot. At that time our task was to create the *minimum industrial basis* required for supplying machines and tractors to agriculture *in the future*. Our scanty financial resources were spent in the creation of such a basis. But now? Now we have the industrial basis for agriculture. At any rate, that industrial basis is being created at a very rapid rate.

It follows that the conditions required for the mass development of the collective and Soviet farms have ripened only very recently.

That is how matters stand, comrades.

That is why it cannot be said that we were belated in developing the new forms of *smychka*.

(*f*) *Comrade Bukharin as a Theoretician*

Such, fundamentally, are the main errors of the theoretician of the Right opposition, Comrade Bukharin, on the fundamental questions of our policy.

It is said that Comrade Bukharin is the theoretician of our Party. He is a theoretician, of course, and a theoretician of no mean calibre. But, the fact is that all is not well with his theorising. That is evident if only from the fact that he has piled up a whole heap of errors on questions of Party policy, such as I have just described. All these errors—errors with regard to the Comintern; errors on questions of class struggle, of the intensification of the class struggle; questions of the peasantry, of N.E.P., of the new forms of *smychka*—all these errors cannot be of a chance character. No, these errors are not of a chance character. These errors of Comrade Bukharin's arose out of his false position, out of the gaps in his theories. Yes, Comrade Bukharin is a theoretician, but he is not altogether a Marxian theoretician; he is a theoretician who has much to learn in order to become a complete Marxian theoretician.

Reference is usually made to Comrade Lenin's well-known letter regarding Bukharin as a theoretician. Let us read that letter. Lenin says:

> Of the younger members of the C.C., I should like to say a few words regarding Bukharin and Piatakov. In my opinion, these are the most outstanding forces (of the younger forces), and regarding them the following should be borne in mind: Bukharin is not only the most valuable and important theoretician in our Party, he is also legitimately regarded as the favourite of the whole Party, *but his theoretical outlook can with very grave doubts be classed as fully Marxist, for*

there is something scholastic in him (*he has never learnt, and, I think, he has never fully understood, dialectics*).[1]

Thus, he is a theoretician without dialectics. A scholastic theoretician. A theoretician whose "theoretical outlook can with very grave doubts be classed as fully Marxist." Such is the description of the theoretical complexion of Comrade Bukharin given by Lenin.

You understand, comrades, that such a theoretician has still much to learn. And, if Comrade Bukharin understood that he is not yet a full-fledged theoretician, that he still has to learn, that he is a theoretician who has not yet fully acquired dialectics—and dialectics is the soul of Marxism—if he understood that he would be more modest, and the Party would only benefit thereby. But the trouble is, not only does he not suffer from the complaint of modesty, but he even undertakes to teach our teacher, Lenin, on a number of questions, and, above all, on the question of the State. That is the trouble, comrades.

Allow me in this respect to recall the well-known theoretical dispute between Lenin and Bukharin on the question of the State, which developed in 1916. That is important in order to reveal both the inordinate claims of Comrade Bukharin to teach Lenin and the roots of his theoretical unsoundness on such important questions as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the class struggle, etc. As you know, in 1916 an article appeared by Comrade Bukharin in the magazine *Youth International*,[1] signed *Nota Bene*, which, as a matter of fact, was directed against Comrade Lenin. In his article Comrade Bukharin writes:

> … It is absolutely wrong to seek the differences between the Socialists and the anarchists in the fact that the former are advocates and the latter opponents of the State. As a matter of fact, the real difference between them is that revolutionary Social-Democracy wants to organise social production on new centralised lines, *i.e.* technically the most progressive, whereas decentralised anarchist production would mean a step backward to the old technique, to the old form of enterprise….
>
> Social-Democracy, which is, or which, at any rate, should be, the teacher of the masses, now more than ever must emphasise its hostility in principle to the State…. The present war has shown how deeply the roots of the State have penetrated the soul of the workers.

Comrade Lenin replied in a special article published in 1916, criticising the views of Comrade Bukharin. He said:

> That is wrong. The author raises the question as to what is the difference between the attitude of the Socialists and the anarchists towards the State, but he replies not to *this question*, but to *another*, namely, what is the difference in their attitude towards the economic basis of the future society. That, of course, is a very important and necessary question. But it does not follow from that that the *main point* of the difference in the attitude of the Socialists and anarchists towards the State can be overlooked. Socialists are in favour of utilising the modern State and its institutions in the struggle for the emancipation of the working class, and are equally in favour of utilising the State for the peculiar form of transition from capitalism to Socialism. This transitional form, which is *also* a state, is the dictatorship of the proletariat. The anarchists want to "abolish" the State, to "blow it up" (*sprengen*), as Comrade *Nota Bene* expresses it in one place, erroneously attributing this view to the Socialists. The Socialists —unfortunately the author quotes the words of Engels relevant to this subject far too inadequately—recognise that the State will "gradually" die out, will "fall asleep," after the bourgeoisie has been expropriated….
>
> In order to "emphasise" "hostility" to the State "on principle," it is necessary to understand it "clearly," and it is just this clarity which the author lacks. The phrase regarding "the roots of the State" is absolutely muddled, non-Marxian, non-Socialist. It is not that "State" has clashed with the negation of State, but that the opportunist policy (*i.e*. an opportunist, reformist, bourgeois attitude to the State) has clashed with revolutionary Social-Democratic policy (*i.e*. the revolutionary Social-Democratic attitude to the bourgeois State and towards the utilising of the State against the bourgeoisie in order to overthrow it). These are absolutely and entirely different things (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XIX, p. 296).

I think the point of issue is clear, and I think the semi-anarchistic mess Comrade Bukharin has got himself into is also clear.

STEN: At that time Lenin had not yet fully formulated the necessity for "blowing up" the State. Bukharin, while committing anarchist errors, was approaching a formulation of the question.

STALIN: No, Comrade Sten, that is not the point at present. The point is the attitude towards the State in general. The point is that, according to Comrade Bukharin, the working class should be hostile *in principle* to the State *as such*, including the working-class State.

STEN: Lenin then referred to the utilising of the State; he said nothing in his criticism of Comrade Bukharin regarding the "blowing up" of the State.

STALIN: You are mistaken, Comrade *Sten*. Let me assure you that the point here is that, in the opinion of Comrade Bukharin (and of the anarchists), the workers should emphasise their hostility in principle to the State as such, and, hence, to the State of the transition period, to the working-class State. Try to explain to our workers that the working class must become imbued with hostility in principle to the proletarian dictatorship, which, of course, is also a State. Comrade Bukharin's position as set forth in his article in *Youth International* is that he repudiates the State in the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism. Comrade Bukharin here overlooked a "trifle," namely, the whole transition period, during which the working class cannot get along without its own State, if it really wants to crush the bourgeoisie and build Socialism. That is the first point. The second point is that it is not true that Comrade Lenin at that time did not deal in his criticism with the theory of the "blowing up," or the "abolition" of the State in general. Lenin not only dealt with that theory, as is obvious from the passages I have cited, but he criticised it to bits, as an anarchist theory, and opposed it by the theory of the *creation* of a new State after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, namely, the State of the proletarian dictatorship. Finally, the anarchist theory of "blowing up" the State must not be confused with the Marxist theory of the "breaking up," the "smashing" of the *bourgeois* State machine. Certain comrades are inclined to confuse these two distinct conceptions in the belief that they are an expression of one and the same idea. But that is wrong, comrades, absolutely wrong. Lenin proceeded only from the Marxist theory of the "smashing" of the *bourgeois* State machine when he criticised the anarchist theory of "blowing up" and "abolishing" the State in general.

Perhaps it would not be superfluous if, in order to introduce greater clarity in the subject, I cited a passage from a manuscript written by Comrade Lenin on the subject of the State, written, apparently, at the end of 1916, or the beginning of 1917 (before the February Revolution of 1917). From this manuscript it is easily seen that (*a*) in criticising the semi-anarchistic errors of Comrade Bukharin on the question of the State, Lenin proceeded from the Marxist theory of the "smashing" of the bourgeois State machine; and (*b*) that although Bukharin, as Lenin expressed it, "is nearer

to the truth than Kautsky," nevertheless, he "instead of unmasking the Kautskyists, helps them in their errors." Here is the text of the manuscript:

> Of *extremely* great importance on the question of the State is the letter of *Engels* to *Bebel* dated March 18–28, 1875.

Here is the most important passage in full:

> … The free people's State was transformed into a free State. According to the grammatical meaning of these words, a free State is one in which the State is free in relation to its citizens, *i.e*. a State with a despotic government. *It would be well to stop all this nonsensical talk regarding the State, especially after the Commune, which was no longer a State in the real meaning of the word*. The anarchists have been throwing the "people's State" in our teeth far too long, although Marx's work against Proudhon, followed by the *Communist Manifesto*, plainly states that *with the introduction of the Socialist social order the State dissolves of itself* (sich auflöst) *and disappears*. Since the State is only a transitional institution, which must be utilised in the struggle, in the revolution, in order to crush our enemies by force, it is pure nonsense to speak of a free people's State: as long as the proletariat *needs* the State, it needs it *not in the interests of freedom, but in order to crush its enemies, and when it becomes possible to speak of freedom, the State, as such, will cease to exist*. We would therefore propose everywhere in place of the word *State* to use the word "community" (*Gemeinwesen*), a fine old German word, equivalent to the French word "commune." (Italicised by Engels.)
>
> That, perhaps, is the most excellent, and probably the most vigorous, passage in the works of Marx and Engels, so to speak, "against the State."
>
> 1. We must abandon all the nonsensical talk about the State.
>
> 2. "The Commune was *no longer* a State in the real meaning of the word." (What was it then? Obviously, a transitional form from the State to the non-State.)
>
> 3. The anarchists have "thrown in our teeth" (*in die Zähne geworfen*) the "people's State" far too long (that is, Marx and Engels were ashamed of the obvious error of their German friends;—however, they regarded it, and, of course, *in the circumstances that then existed*, correctly regarded it, as a far less serious error than the error of the anarchists. This N.B.!!)
>
> 4. The State "falls to pieces of itself and disappears" … "dissolves" (Nota Bene) (compare later "dies out") "with the introduction of the Socialist social order." …
>
> 5. The State is a "temporary institution," which is needed "in the struggle, in the revolution" … (needed by the *proletariat*, of course)….

6. The State is required *not for freedom*, 7. (when there will be freedom, there will be no State), but for the suppression (*Niederhaltung* is not suppression in the real meaning of the word, but preventing restoration, keeping in submission) of the enemies of the proletariat.

8. "We" (*i.e*. Engels and Marx) would suggest "everywhere" (in the programme) to say, instead of "State," "community" (*Gemeinwesen*), "the commune"!!

This shows to what extent Marx and Engels were vulgarised and defiled, not only by the opportunists but also by Kautsky.

The opportunists have not understood a single one of these eight rich ideas!!

They have taken *only* what is practically necessary at the present time: to utilise the political struggle, to utilise the *present* state for teaching and training the proletariat, for "extracting concessions." That is true (as against the anarchists), but that is only one-hundredth part of Marxism, if one can thus express it arithmetically.

In his propagandist works, and publications generally, Kautsky has completely ignored (or forgotten? or not understood?) points 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and the "zerbrechen" of Marx (in his polemic against Pannekuk in 1912, or 1913, Kautsky (see below, pp. 45–47)[1] completely lapsed into opportunism on this question)….

What distinguishes us from the anarchists is (α) the use of the State *now* and (β) during the proletarian *revolution* (the "dictatorship of the proletariat")—points of extreme and immediate importance in practice. (But it is these very points that Bukharin *forgot*!)

What distinguishes us from the opportunists is the more profound "more permanent" truths regarding (αα) the "temporary" nature of the State, (ββ) the *harm* of "twaddle" about it now, (γγ) the not entirely State character of the dictatorship of the proletariat, (δδ) the contradiction between the State and freedom, (εε) the more correct thought (conception, programme, term) "community" in place of State, (ζζ) the "smashing" (*zerbrechen*) of the bureaucratic-military machine. It must not be forgotten also that the avowed opportunists in Germany (Bernstein, Kolb, etc.) directly repudiate the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, and the official programme and Kautsky *indirectly* repudiate it, ignore it in their day-to-day agitation and *tolerating* the renegacy of Kolb and Co.

In July, 1916, Bukharin was written to! "allow your ideas regarding the State *to mature."* Without, however, allowing them to mature, he broke into print, as "Nota Bene," and in such a way that, instead of unmasking the Kautskyites, he *helped* them in their errors…. Yet, as a matter of fact, Bukharin is nearer to the truth than Kautsky. (N. Lenin.)

Such is the short history of the theoretical controversy on the question of the State. The matter would appear to be clear: Bukharin was guilty of semi-anarchist errors—it is time for him to correct those errors and proceed further in the footsteps of Lenin. But only Leninists can think like that. Bukharin, it appears, does not agree. On the contrary, he asserts that it was not he who was in error, but Lenin, that it was not he who followed, or ought to have followed, in the footsteps of Lenin, but, on the contrary, Lenin was compelled to follow in the footsteps of Bukharin. You do not believe that, comrades? Well, listen to this. After these debates, which took place in 1916, nine years later, during which interval Bukharin maintained silence, *a year after the death of Lenin*, namely, in 1925, Comrade Bukharin wrote an article which was published in the *Revolution of Law*, entitled "The Theory of the Imperialist State." This article at one time had been rejected by the editors of the *Sbornik Sotsial Demokrata* (*i.e*. by Lenin). In a *footnote* to this article Bukharin directly declares that not Lenin was right in this dispute, but he, Bukharin. That may appear incredible, comrades, but it is a fact.

Listen to the text of this footnote:

> V. I. [*i.e*. Lenin] wrote a short article in opposition to the article in the *Youth International*. The reader will easily see that I was not guilty of the errors ascribed to me, for I clearly saw the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat; on the other hand, from the notes of Ilyitch it will be seen that he then *had a wrong attitude to the postulate on the blowing up of the State* (the bourgeois State, of course) *and confused that question with the question of the dying out of the dictatorship of the proletariat*.[1] Perhaps I should have developed the question of the dictatorship further at that time. But in justification I may say that *at that time* there was such a wholesale exaltation of the bourgeois State by the Social-Democrats that it was natural to concentrate all attention on the question of the *blowing up* of that machine.
>
> When I arrived in Russia from America and saw Nadezhda Konstantinovna (that was at our illegal Sixth Congress and at that time V. I. was in hiding) her first words were: "V. I. asked me to tell you that he had no differences with you now over the question of the State." Studying this question, *Ilyitch came to the same conclusion*[1] regarding the "blowing up," but he developed this theme, and subsequently the theory of the dictatorship, to such an extent as to create a whole epoch in the development of theoretical thought in this field (*Revolution of Law*, Vol. I, Communist Academy, 1925, p. 5).

That is what Comrade Bukharin writes of Lenin a year after his death.

And so you have a pretty example of the hypertrophied pretensions of a half-educated theoretician.

It is quite possible that Nadezhda Konstantinovna[1] did, in fact, tell Comrade Bukharin what he writes here. But what follows from that? It follows that Lenin had certain reasons for believing that Comrade Bukharin had renounced, or was ready to renounce, his errors. That is all. But Comrade Bukharin thought differently. He decided that henceforward, not Lenin, but he, *i.e*. Comrade Bukharin, was to be regarded as the creator, or, at least, the inspirer, of the Marxist theory of the State.

Hitherto we regarded ourselves, and we continue to regard ourselves, as Leninists. But it now appears that both Lenin and we, his pupils, are Bukharinites. Rather funny, comrades. But what can we do when dealing with the puffed-up pretentiousness of Comrade Bukharin?

It might be thought that Comrade Bukharin's footnote to the article above-mentioned was a slip of the pen, as it were; that he wrote a piece of nonsense and afterwards forgot about it. But that does not seem to be the case. Comrade Bukharin, it appears, spoke in all seriousness. That is evident, for example, from the fact that the assertion he made in this footnote regarding the *errors* of Lenin and the *correctness* of Bukharin was reproduced recently, namely in 1927, *i.e*. two years after Comrade Bukharin's first sortie against Lenin, in a biographical sketch of Bukharin written by Comrade Maretsky (cf. the *Soviet Encyclopedia*), and it never occurred to Comrade Bukharin to protest against the … boldness of Comrade Maretsky. It is obvious that Comrade Bukharin's attack on Lenin cannot be regarded as accidental.

It follows, therefore, that Bukharin is right, and not Lenin, that the inspirer of the Marxist theory of the State is not Lenin but Bukharin.

Such, comrades, is the picture of the theoretical distortions and the theoretical pretensions of Comrade Bukharin.

And after all this, the man has the hardihood to say in his speech here that there is "something rotten" in the theoretical position of our Party, that there is a deviation towards Trotskyism in the theoretical position of our Party. And that is said by the very Comrade Bukharin who is guilty (and has been guilty in the past) of a number of gross theoretical and practical errors, who only recently was a pupil of Trotsky, who only the other day was

seeking a *bloc* with the Trotskyites against the Leninists and ran off to them by the back door. Funny, is it not, comrades?

(*g*) *A Five-Year Plan or a Two-Year Plan*

Permit me now to pass to the speech delivered by Comrade Rykov. While Comrade Bukharin endeavoured to provide a theoretical foundation for the Right deviation, Comrade Rykov in his speech endeavours to place under it a basis of practical proposals and to frighten us with "horrors" drawn from our difficulties in the sphere of agriculture. That does not mean that Comrade Rykov did not touch upon theoretical questions. He did touch upon them. But in doing so he committed at least two serious errors.

In his draft of the Five-Year Plan, which was rejected by the commission of the Political Bureau, Comrade Rykov says that "the central idea of the Five-Year Plan is the growth of the productivity of national labour." In spite of the fact that the commission of the Political Bureau rejected this absolutely false standpoint, Comrade Rykov defended it here in his speech. Is it true that the central idea of the Five-Year Plan in the *land of the Soviets* is the growth of the productivity of labour? No, it is not true. It is not *any kind* of increase in the productivity of national labour that we need. We need a *specific* increase in the productivity of national labour, namely, an increase that will guarantee the *systematic supremacy of the Socialist sector of national economy over the capitalist sector*. That is the point, comrades. A five-year plan which overlooks this central idea is not a five-year plan but five-year rubbish. Every society, even capitalist and pre-capitalist society, is interested in increasing the productivity of labour in general. The distinction between the *Soviet* and every other kind of society lies in the very fact that it is interested not in any kind of increase of productivity of labour, but in such an increase as will guarantee the supremacy of Socialist forms of economy over other forms, and particularly over capitalist forms of economy, and which will thus guarantee that capitalist forms of economy will be overcome and driven out of existence. Yet Comrade Rykov forgot this really central idea of the Five-Year Plan of development of *Soviet* society. That is his first theoretical error.

His second error consists in the fact that he does not distinguish or does not want to understand the distinction—from the point of view of commodity exchange—between, let us say, a collective farm and any kind of individual enterprise, including an individual capitalist enterprise.

Comrade Rykov assures us that from the point of view of commodity exchange on the grain market, from the point of view of securing grain, he does not see any difference between a collective farm and a private holder of grain; to him, therefore, it is a matter of indifference whether we buy grain from a collective farm, or a private holder, or from an Argentine grain speculator. That is wrong, comrades, absolutely wrong. It is a repetition of the well-known statement of Comrade Frumkin who at one time assured us that it was a matter of indifference to him where and from whom grain was bought; from the private dealer or from the collective farm. That is a masked form of defence, of rehabilitation, of justification of the machinations of the kulak on the grain market. The fact that this defence is conducted from the point of view of commodity exchange does not alter the fact that it is, nevertheless, a justification of the machinations of the kulak on the grain market. If, from the point of view of commodity exchange, there is no difference between collective and non-collective forms of agriculture, is it worth while developing collective farms, is it worth while granting them exemptions, is it worth our while devoting ourselves to the difficult task of overcoming the capitalist elements in agriculture? It is obvious that Comrade Rykov has taken up a false position. That is his second theoretical error.

But that is just in passing. Let us examine the practical questions raised in Comrade Rykov's speech.

Comrade Rykov declared here that, in addition to the Five-Year Plan, we need another, a parallel plan, namely, a two-year plan for the development of agriculture. He based this proposal for a parallel two-year plan on the difficulties now being experienced in agriculture. He said: the Five-Year Plan is a good thing and he was in favour of it; but if at the same time we drew up a two-year plan for agriculture it would be still better—otherwise agriculture would get nowhere. On the face of it there appears to be nothing wrong with this proposal, but when we examine it more closely we find that the two-year plan for agriculture was invented in order to lay stress on the argument that the Five-Year Plan was not feasible, that it was a plan only on paper, while the two-year plan was feasible. Could we agree to that? Of course not. We said to Comrade Rykov: if you are dissatisfied with the Five-Year Plan in respect to agriculture, if you think that the funds we are assigning to agriculture in the Five-Year Plan are inadequate, then say what your supplementary proposals are, your supplementary investments—we

are ready to introduce these supplementary investments in agriculture into the Five-Year Plan. And what did we find? We found that Comrade Rykov had no supplementary proposals as to supplementary investments in agriculture. One asks oneself, Why then the parallel two-year plan for agriculture? We also said to him: in addition to the Five-Year Plan, there are the yearly plans which are a part of the Five-Year Plan—let us introduce into the first two yearly plans those concrete supplementary proposals for the development of agriculture that you have to make. That is, if Comrade Rykov has any such proposals at all. And what did we find? It turned out that Comrade Rykov had no such concrete plans for supplementary investments to offer. We then understood that Comrade Rykov's proposal for a two-year plan was not made for the purpose of developing agriculture, but sprang from a desire to stress the unreal, paper character of the Five-Year Plan, a desire to discredit the Five-Year Plan. For "conscience'" sake, for appearances' sake, a five-year plan; but, indeed, for practical purposes, a two-year plan—that was the strategy of Comrade Rykov. Comrade Rykov brought forward the two-year plan in order subsequently, during the practical work of carrying the Five-Year Plan into effect, to set it in opposition to the Five-Year Plan, to reconstruct the Five-Year Plan and adapt it to the two-year plan, and thus cut down and curtail the assignments for industry.

It was on these considerations that we rejected Comrade Rykov's proposal for a parallel two-year plan.

(*h*) *The Question of the Sowing Area*

Comrade Rykov tried to frighten the Party here by insisting that the area under seed throughout the U.S.S.R. reveals a systematic tendency to decline. Moreover, he threw out the hint that the policy of the Party was responsible for the decline of the sown area. He did not say openly that it was a case of deterioration. But the impression left by his speech is that something like deterioration is taking place. Is it true that the sown area is showing a systematic tendency to contract? No, it is not. Comrade Rykov argued here on the strength of the average figures of the sown area for the country. But the method of averages, uncorrected by figures for the individual regions, is not a scientific method. Comrade Rykov has probably read Lenin's *Development of Capitalism*. If he has read it he ought to remember how Lenin inveighed against the bourgeois economists for using the method of

averages for the expansion of the sown area and ignoring the figures for the individual regions. It is strange that Comrade Rykov should now repeat the errors of the bourgeois economists. Well, if we examine the movement of the sown area according to regions, *i.e*. if we approach the matter scientifically, it will be seen that in certain regions the sown area is expanding *systematically*, while in others it *sometimes* contracts, depending chiefly on meteorological conditions, and that, moreover, there are no facts that indicate anywhere, even in a single important grain-bearing region, a *systematic* contraction of the sown area.

As a matter of fact, in the regions which have been affected by frost or drought, in certain districts of the Ukraine, for instance, the sown area has recently shown a decline.

A VOICE*:* But not the whole Ukraine.

SCHLICHTER: The area under seed in the Ukraine increased by 2.7 per cent.

STALIN: I am referring to the steppe belt of the Ukraine. In other regions, for instance, Siberia, the Volga, Kazakstan, Bashkiria, which were not affected by unfavourable climatic conditions, the sown area is expanding systematically. What is the explanation for the fact that in certain regions the sown area is systematically expanding, while in others it sometimes contracts? It cannot be asserted that the Party has one policy in the Ukraine and another in the east or midlands of the U.S.S.R. That would be absurd, comrades. It is obvious that climatic conditions play no unimportant part in this.

It is true that the kulaks are reducing their sown area irrespective of climatic conditions. There, if you like, the policy of the Party is "guilty," a policy which supports the poor and middle-peasant masses *against* the kulaks. But what follows from that? Did we ever undertake to conduct a policy which would satisfy all the social groups in the countryside, including the kulaks? And, in general, can we possibly conduct a policy which would satisfy both the exploiters and the exploited—that is, if we want to conduct a Marxist policy? What is there strange in the fact that, as a result of our Leninist policy, which is calculated to restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in rural districts, the kulaks begin partly to reduce their sown area? Can it be otherwise? Perhaps that policy is wrong? Then let it be said openly. Is it not strange that people calling themselves Marxists in their fright claim that the partial contraction of the sown area of

the kulaks is a contraction of the sown area *in general*, and forget that apart from the kulaks there are also poor and middle peasants, whose sown area is expanding, and that there are collective and Soviet farms, the sown area of which is growing with increasing rapidity.

Finally, I will mention another error which Comrade Rykov committed in his speech regarding the sown area. Comrade Rykov complained here that in certain places, namely in those places where the collective farms are most developed, the tilled area of the individual poor and middle peasants is beginning to decline. That is true. But what is wrong with that? How could it be otherwise? If the poor and middle-peasant farms are beginning to abandon individual tillage and are adopting collective farming, is it not obvious that the expansion and multiplication of collective farms is bound to result in a certain contraction of the individual tillage of the poor and middle peasants? What would you have? The collective farms now cover over two million hectares of land. At the end of the Five-Year Plan period, the collective farms will cover more than 25 million hectares. At whose expense is the tilled area of the collective farm expanding? At the expense of the individual tillage of the poor and middle peasants. But what would you have, dear comrades? How otherwise are the individual farms of the poor and middle peasants to be transferred to the lines of collective farming? Is it not obvious that in a large number of regions the tilled area of the collective farms will expand at the expense of individual tillage? Strange that people will not understand such elementary things.

(*i*) *The Grain Collections*

A pack of fables has been spread here regarding our grain-collection difficulties, but the main features of our present temporary grain difficulties have been lost sight of. First of all, it has been forgotten that this year we harvested about 500 to 600 million poods of rye and wheat—I refer to the gross harvest—less than last year. Surely this must have had an effect on our grain collections? Of course it had. Is the policy of the Central Committee responsible for that? No, the policy of the Central Committee has nothing to do with it. It is due to the serious failure of the crops in the steppe regions of the Ukraine (frost and drought), and to a partial failure of the crops in the Caucasus, the Central Black Earth Region, and, finally, in the North-Western Region. That is the main reason why by April 1 last year we collected grain (rye and wheat) in the Ukraine to the extent of 200

million poods, and this year only 26 to 27 million poods. This also explains the drop in the wheat and rye collections in the Central Black Earth Region to about one-eighth and in the Northern Caucasus to a fourth of what it was last year. In certain regions in the east, grain collections this year almost doubled. But this could not compensate, and, of course, did not compensate, for the deficiency in grain in the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, and in the Central Black Earth Region. It must not be forgotten that in normal harvest years the Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus collect more than one-half, and at times two-thirds, of all the grain collected in the U.S.S.R. It is strange that Comrade Rykov has lost sight of this fact.

Finally, as to a second circumstance, which represents the chief factor in our present temporary grain-collection difficulties. I refer to the resistance offered by the kulaks and the well-to-do elements in the rural districts to the grain collection policy of the Soviet Government. Comrade Rykov ignored this circumstance. But to ignore it means ignoring the most important factor in the grain collections. What does the experience of the grain collections of the past two years teach us? It teaches us that the well-to-do sections of the rural districts, who hold considerable grain surpluses, and who play a dominating role in the grain market, refuse to give us voluntarily the necessary quantity of grain at the prices fixed by the Soviet Government. In order to provide bread for the towns and industrial centres, for the Red Army and the regions growing technical crops, we require about 500 million poods annually. We are able to collect 300 to 350 million poods by grain offered voluntarily. The remaining 150 millions have to be secured by exerting organised pressure on the kulaks and the well-to-do sections of the rural districts. That is what the grain collection experience of the past two years teaches us.

What has occurred during these two years: why these changes; why was the voluntarily offered grain adequate in former years, and why is it inadequate this year? The reason is that during these years the kulak and well-to-do elements have grown, a series of good harvests has not been without benefit to them, they have become stronger economically; they have accumulated a little capital and now they are in a position to manœuvre in the market; they hold back their grain surpluses in expectation of higher prices and offer other products instead. Grain is not an ordinary commodity. Grain is not like cotton, which cannot be eaten and which cannot be sold to everybody. Unlike cotton, grain, under our present

conditions, is a commodity which everybody will take and without which it is impossible to exist. The kulak knows this, and acts accordingly, and thereby infects grain-holders in general. The kulak knows that grain is the currency of currencies. The kulak knows that having a suplus of grain is not only a means of self-enrichment, but also a means of enslaving the poor peasant. Under present conditions, grain surpluses in the hands of the kulak represent a means of economically and politically strengthening the kulak elements. Therefore, by taking the grain surpluses from the kulaks, we not only facilitate the supply of grain to the towns and the Red Army, but we also destroy a means of economically and politically strengthening the kulaks.

What must be done in order to obtain these grain surpluses? We must, first of all, put an end to the mentality of waiting for the grain to come itself, as a harmful and dangerous one. Grain collections must be *organised*. We must mobilise the poor and middle peasant against the kulaks and organise their public support for the measures adopted by the Soviet Government for increasing the grain collections. The importance of the Ural and Siberian method of grain collection, carried out on the principle of local voluntary taxation, consists in the very fact that it permits the mobilisation of the toiling sections of the village against the kulaks for the purpose of increasing the grain collections. Experience has shown that this method produces good results. Experience has shown that these good results are obtained in two directions: firstly, we extract the grain surpluses from the well-to-do sections of the rural districts, and thereby facilitate the supply of the country; secondly, we mobilise in this cause the poor and middle-peasant masses against the kulaks, educate them politically, and out of them mobilise a powerful political army of many millions in the countryside. Certain comrades fail to realise the importance of this latter factor. Yet it is one of the most important, if not the most important, result of the Ural-Siberian method of grain collection. It is true that this method is sometimes coupled with the application of emergency measures against the kulaks, which calls forth the comical wailings of Comrades Bukharin and Rykov. But what is wrong with that? Why is it wrong, sometimes, under certain conditions, to apply emergency measures to our class enemy, the kulaks? Why is it permissible to arrest the speculators in the towns by hundreds and exile them to the Turukhan region, and not permissible to take surplus grain from the kulaks—who are trying to take the Soviet Government by the

throat and enslave the poor peasants—by methods of public coercion and at the prices at which the poor and middle peasants sell their grain to our grain-collection organisations? What is the logic of this? Has our Party ever declared itself *opposed in principle* to the application of emergency measures against the kulaks? Comrades Rykov and Bukharin apparently are opposed in *principle* to the application of any kind of emergency measure to the kulaks. But that is a bourgeois-Liberal policy, and not a Marxist policy, dear comrades. You cannot but know that, after the introduction of N.E.P., Comrade Lenin even expressed himself in favour of a return to the policy of the Committees of Poor Peasants—under certain conditions, of course. And what, indeed, is the partial application of emergency measures to the kulaks? Not even a drop in the ocean compared with the policy of the Committees of Poor Peasants.

Those who support Comrade Bukharin's group hope to persuade the class enemy that he should voluntarily forgo his interests and voluntarily surrender his grain surplus. They hope that the kulak, who has grown, who is able to avoid giving grain by offering other products in its place and who conceals his grain surplus they hope that this same kulak will give us his grain surplus voluntarily at our collection prices. Have they lost their senses? Is it not obvious that they do not understand the mechanism of the class struggle, that they do not know what classes mean? Do they know with what derision the kulaks treat our people and the Soviet Government at village meetings called to assist the grain collections? Have they heard of facts like this, for instance: one of our agitators in Kazakstan for two hours tried to persuade the holders of grain to surrender that grain for supplying the country. At the end of the talk a kulak stepped forth with his pipe in his mouth and said: "Do us a little dance, young fellow, and I will let you have a couple of poods of grain."

A VOICE: Swine!

Stalin: Try and persuade people like that. Class is class, comrades. You cannot get away from that truth. The Ural-Siberian method is a good one for the very reason that it makes it easier to set the poor and middle-peasant masses against the kulaks; it makes it easier to smash the resistance of the kulaks and compel them to surrender the grain surpluses to the organs of the Soviet Government.

The most fashionable word just now among the new opposition, or among Comrade Bukharin's group, is the word "excesses," as applied to

grain collections. That word has become the most popular word among them, since it helps them to mask their own line. When they want to mask their own line they usually say: we, of course, are not opposed to pressure being exerted on the kulak, but we are against the excesses which are being committed in this sphere and which hurt the middle peasant. They then go on to relate stories of the horrors of these excesses; they read you letters from "peasants," panic-stricken letters from comrades, such as Comrade Markov, and they then draw the conclusion: the policy of bringing pressure to bear on the kulaks must be abandoned. How do you like that? It appears that *because* excesses occur in carrying out a correct policy, *the correct policy should be abandoned*. That is the usual trick of the opportunists: on the pretext that excesses are committed in carrying out a correct line, to abandon that line and replace it by an opportunist line. Moreover, the comrades in Comrade Bukharin's group are very careful to say nothing about the fact that there is another kind of excess, which is more dangerous and more harmful, namely, excess expressed in a tendency to become merged with the kulak, to adapt oneself to the wealthy sections of the countryside, to replace the revolutionary policy of the Party by the opportunist policy of the Right deviationists.

Of course, we are all opposed to excesses. None of us wants the blows directed against the kulaks to fall on the middle peasants. That is obvious, and there can be no doubt on that point. But we are most decisively opposed to the nonsensical talk about excesses which Comrade Bukharin's group so zealously indulge in being used in order to secure the abandonment of the revolutionary policy of our Party and to substitute for it the opportunist policy of the Bukharin group. No, comrades, "that won't work."

Is there a single political measure taken by the Party that has not been accompanied by excesses? The conclusion we must draw is that we have to combat excesses. But ought we *for this reason* decry the line itself, the only correct line. Take a measure like the seven-hour day. There can be no doubt that this is one of the most revolutionary measures carried out by our Party in recent years. Who does not know that this measure, which in itself is a most revolutionary one, is frequently accompanied by excesses, sometimes of a most objectionable kind? Does that mean that we ought to abandon the policy of the seven-hour day? Do the comrades of the new opposition understand what a mess they are slipping into when they try to make capital out of the excesses committed during the grain collections?

4. The Fight Against the Right Deviation

Thus, we have examined all our main points of difference in the sphere of theory, in the sphere of the policy of the Comintern and the internal policy of our Party. From what has been said it is apparent that Comrade Rykov's declaration to the effect that we have a common line does not conform to the truth. From what has been said it is obvious that there are, in fact, *two* lines. The first line is the general line of our Party, the revolutionary Leninist line of our Party. The second line is the line of Comrade Bukharin. That second line is not yet clearly formulated, partly because incredible confusion of ideas exists in the ranks of Comrade Bukharin's group, and secondly because, as they carry very little weight in the Party, efforts are made to mask this second line in one way or another. But, as you see, this line nevertheless exists, and it exists as a line *distinct* from the line of the Party, as a line which *puts itself in opposition* to the general line of the Party on almost every question of policy. That second line is fundamentally a line of *Right* deviation.

Comrade Bukharin spoke here of the "civil execution" of three members of the Political Bureau, who, according to Bukharin, "were being picked to pieces" by the organisations of our Party. He said that the Party subjected these three members of the Political Bureau, Comrades Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, to "civil execution," criticising their errors in the Press and at meetings, while they, the three members of the Political Bureau, were "compelled" to keep silent. That is nonsense, comrades. These are the false words of Communists who are behaving like Liberals, and who are trying to weaken the Party in its fight against the Right deviation.

According to Bukharin, even though he and his friends have associated themselves with Right deviationist errors, the Party has no right to unmask these errors, the Party must cease the fight against the Right opportunists until such time as it will please Comrade Bukharin and his friends to dissociate themselves from their errors. Is not Comrade Bukharin asking too much? Is he not under the impression that the Party exists for him, and not he for the Party? And who is compelling him to keep silent, to maintain his peace, when the whole Party is mobilised against the Right deviation and is conducting a decisive attack against difficulties? Why should not he, Comrade Bukharin, and his close friends come forward now and engage in a decisive fight against the Right deviation and conciliationism? Can

anyone doubt that the Party would welcome Comrade Bukharin and his close friends if they decided to take this, after all, not so difficult step? Why do they not make up their minds to take this step, which, as a matter of fact, is obligatory on them? Is it not because they place the interests of their group higher than the interests of the Party and its general line? Who is to blame if Comrades Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky were not in evidence during the fight against the Right deviation? Is it not obvious that talk about the "civil execution" of the three members of the Political Bureau is a badly concealed attempt of the three members of the Political Bureau to compel the Party to keep silent and to discontinue the fight against the Right deviation?

The fight against the Right deviation is not a secondary duty of our Party. The fight against the Right deviation is one of the most decisive duties of our Party. If we, in our own ranks, in our own Party, in the political General Staff of the proletariat which leads the movement and leads the proletariat forward—if in this General Staff we tolerated the free existence and the free functioning of the Right deviationists, who are trying to demobilise the Party, to demoralise the working class, to adapt our policy to the tastes of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie, and thus give up in face of the difficulties of our construction—if we tolerated all this, what would it mean? Would it not mean that we want to put the brake on the revolution, demoralise our Socialist construction, flee from difficulties, surrender the position to the capitalist elements? Does Comrade Bukharin's group understand that to refuse to fight the Right deviation is to *betray* the working class, to *betray* the revolution? Does Comrade Bukharin's group understand that unless we overcome the Right deviation and conciliationism it will be impossible to overcome the difficulties facing us, and that unless we overcome these difficulties it will be impossible to achieve decisive successes in Socialist construction? Compared with that, what is the value of the miserable talk regarding the "civil execution" of three members of the Political Bureau?

No, comrades, the Liberal talk about "civil execution" will not frighten our Party. The Party demands that you carry on a decisive struggle against the Right deviation and conciliationism, side by side with all the members of the Central Committee of our Party. It demands it of you in order to facilitate the mobilisation of the working class, to organise the Socialist offensive along the whole front, to break down the resistance of the class enemies, and to guarantee that the difficulties of our construction shall be

overcome. Either you carry out this demand of the Party, in which case the Party will welcome you; or you do not, in which case you will have only yourself to blame.

[1] My italics.—J. STALIN.
[1] Professorial Socialism.—ED.
[1] My italics.—J. STALIN.
[1] N.E.P. = New Economic Policy.—ED.
[1] A term of contempt applied by the peasantry at that time to measures of collectivisation.—ED.
[1] Stenographic Report of the July Plenum, 1926. My italics.—J. STALIN.
[1] *Yogend International*. A magazine published by the revolutionary youth organisation in Switzerland in 1916.
[1] The reference is to Lenin's MS., *Marxism on the State*, from which the passage is quoted.—ED.
[1] My italics.—J. STALIN.
[1] Lenin's wife.—ED.

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE

(*On the occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution*)

THE past year witnessed a great change on every front of Socialist development. The change expressed itself, and is still expressing itself, in a determined drive of Socialism against the capitalist elements in town and country. The characteristic feature of this drive is that it can already claim a number of decisive *successes* in the main spheres of the Socialist reconstruction of our national economy.

We may, therefore, conclude that our Party has made good use of the retreat effected during the early stages of the New Economic Policy in order to organise for the changes in the subsequent stages and to launch a *successful offensive* against the capitalist elements.

When the New Economic Policy was introduced Lenin said:

> We are retreating just now, but we are doing it in order to go back a little at first and then take a run and take a longer leap forward. It was only on this sole condition that we retreated in applying our New Economic Policy … in order, following the retreat, to begin a most stubborn advance (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVII, pp. 361–362).

The results of the past year undoubtedly show that the Party is successfully carrying out in its activity the important advice given by Lenin.

Examining the results of the past year in the economic field which for us is of decisive importance, we find that the successes of our attack along this front, our achievements for that year, may be reduced to three main heads.

1. IN THE SPHERE OF PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOUR

There can be little doubt that one of the most important features, if not *the* most important feature, of our economic development during the past year is the decisive change that occurred in the field of labour productivity, and which found expression in an outburst of *creative initiative* and intense labour *enthusiasm* of millions of workers on the front of Socialist construction. That is our first main achievement during the past year.

The flow of creative initiative and labour enthusiasm on the part of the masses was stimulated along these lines: (1) the fight against bureaucracy (which shackles the labour initiative and labour activity of the masses) by means of *self-criticism*; (2) the fight against the labour shirkers and underminers of proletarian labour discipline by means of *Socialist competition*; and (3) the fight against routine and inertia in industry by means of the introduction of the uninterrupted week.[1] The result has been a tremendous achievement on the labour front in the form of an outburst of labour enthusiasm and emulation among millions of workers in every corner of our vast country. This achievement is frankly inestimable, since only the labour enthusiasm and energy of the masses can guarantee the progressive increase of labour productivity, without which the final victory of Socialism over capitalism is not to be thought of.

Lenin said:

> In the final analysis, the productivity of labour is the prime and most important factor in the triumph of the new social order. Capitalism has created a degree of labour productivity unknown to the feudal system. Capitalism can be finally overthrown, and will be finally overthrown, by the fact that Socialism will create a new and much higher level of labour productivity (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 342).

From which Lenin concluded:

> We must become imbued with the enthusiasm for work, with the will to work, with the tenacity upon which the rapid salvation of the workers and peasants and the salvation of our national economy now depends (*Ibid*., Russian edition, Vol. XXV, p. 477).

That is the task Lenin laid upon our Party.

The past year has shown that the Party is successfully coping with the task and is determinedly surmounting the obstacles that stand in its path.

Such is the position regarding the first important achievement of our Party during the past year.

2. In the Sphere of Industrial Development

The second achievement of the Party is closely associated with the first. It consists in the fact that in the main we have satisfactorily solved the *problem of accumulating* resources for capital investment in heavy industry,

have *accelerated* the *rate* of development of the production of means of production, and have created the necessary prerequisites for the transformation of the country into a *metal* country. That was our second and main achievement during the past year.

The problem of light industry presents no exceptional difficulties. We solved that problem several years ago. The problem of heavy industry is more difficult and more important. It is *more difficult* because it demands vast investments of capital, and, as the history of industrially backward countries has shown, heavy industry cannot be developed without huge long-term loans. It is *more important* because, unless we develop heavy industry, no industry can be developed at all and industrialisation becomes impossible; and since we have been, and still are, deprived of long-term credits, and, in fact, of long credits of any kind, the acuteness of our problem is more than obvious. That, indeed, is why the capitalists of the world refuse us loans and credits, confident that, left to our own resources, we cannot cope with the problem of capital accumulation, that we are bound to come to grief over the task of reconstructing our heavy industries, and shall at length be forced to come to them cap in hand and sell ourselves into slavery.

But what do the results of the past year prove in this respect? The results of the past year prove that the calculations of messieurs the capitalists have been completely shattered. The past year has shown that in spite of the open and covert financial blockade of the U.S.S.R. we did not sell ourselves into slavery to the capitalists; that with our own resources we successfully solved the problem of capital accumulation and have laid the foundations for heavy industry. Even the most embittered enemy of the working class cannot deny that now. And, indeed, since capital investment in large-scale industry last year amounted to 1,600 million rubles, of which 1,300 million rubles was invested in heavy industry, and the investment in large-scale industry during the present year will exceed 3,400 million rubles, of which over 2,500 million rubles will be invested in heavy industry; and since the gross output of large-scale industry last year increased by 23 per cent, with an increase of output of heavy industry of 30 per cent, and the estimated increase of gross output of large-scale industry during the present year by 32 per cent, with an increase in the output of heavy industry of 46 per cent, is it not obvious that the problem of accumulating capital for the development of heavy industry no longer entails insuperable difficulties?

How can anyone doubt that we are progressing at an accelerated rate of speed towards the development of our heavy industry, leaving behind us the rates of development of past times and breaking away from our "traditional" backwardness?

After what has been said, need we be surprised that the estimates for the Five-Year Plan were exceeded during the past year, and that the *optimum* variant of the Five-Year Plan, which the bourgeois scribblers considered a "wild fantasy," and which caused our Right opportunists (the Bukharin group) to fall into a state of panic, has in actuality been transformed into a *minimum* variant?

Lenin said:

> We know that the salvation of Russia does not merely depend on a good harvest in our peasant farms—that is not enough; and not merely on the healthy condition of our light industry, which produces for the peasants means of consumption—that also is not enough. What we need also is *heavy* industry…. Unless we rescue and restore our heavy industry we shall not be able to develop any industry at all. Without heavy industry we shall cease to be an independent country…. Heavy industry needs State subsidies. Unless we can find those subsidies, we are lost as a civilised State—let alone as a Socialist State.

In such blunt terms did Lenin formulate the problem of capital accumulation and the task of our Party with regard to the development of heavy industry.

The past year has shown that our Party is successfully coping with this task and determinedly overcoming all obstacles in its path.

That does not mean, of course, that industry will not encounter any more serious difficulties. The task of developing heavy industry not only comes up against not merely the problem of capital accumulation; it also comes up against the problem of cadres, namely the problem (*a*) of *enlisting* tens of thousands of engineers and experts loyal to the Soviet system in the work of Socialist construction, and (*b*) of *training* new Red engineers and Red experts from among the working class. While the problem of capital accumulation may in the main be regarded as solved, the problem of cadres still awaits solution. And the problem of cadres has now—in view of the technical reconstruction of industry—become the key problem of Socialist construction.

Lenin said:

> What we chiefly lack is culture, administrative ability. Economically and politically the New Economic Policy offers us every possibility for laying the foundations of Socialist economy. The problem is *only one* of the cultural resources of the proletariat and its vanguard.

We see that Lenin lays emphasis here on the problem of "cultural resources," on the problem of the cadres required for economic development in general, and for the development and administration of industry in particular.

From this it follows that, in spite of important achievements in the sphere of accumulating the capital so essential for heavy industry, the problem of developing heavy industry cannot be fully solved until we have solved the problem of cadres.

Hence it is the duty of our Party to attack the problem of cadres in all seriousness and to conquer this position at any cost.

Such is the position regarding the second achievement of our Party during the past year.

3. In the Sphere of Agricultural Development

Finally, as to the third achievement of our Party during the past year. This achievement is closely associated with the two first achievements, and consists of a *radical change* in the development of our agriculture from the small backward individual farming to large-scale advanced *collective* agriculture, to the common cultivation of the land, to machine and tractor stations, to artels and collective farms based on a new technique, and, finally, to the giant Soviet farm, equipped with hundreds of tractors and combines. The achievement of the Party consists in the fact that in a large number of regions we have been able to *divert* the majority of the peasant masses from the old *capitalist* path of development, from which only a small group of rich capitalists benefit, while the vast majority of the peasants are compelled to suffer in poverty, to the new *Socialist* path of development, which squeezes out the wealthy capitalists, which re-equips the middle and poor peasants, supplies them with new implements, tractors and agricultural machinery, and enables them to climb out of poverty and enslavement to the kulaks on to the broad path of joint and collective tillage. The achievement of the Party consists in the fact that we have managed to effect this *radical change* in the very depths of the peasant class and to assume the leadership of large masses of the poor and middle

peasants, in spite of incredible difficulties and the desperate resistance of all the forces of darkness, from the kulaks and priests to the smug hidebound philistines and the Right opportunists.

Here are some figures: In 1928, the area sown by the Soviet farms was 3,847,000 acres and the marketable output of grain products was more than 600,000 tons; the area sown by the collective farms was 3,753,000 acres and the marketable output of grain products to about 350,000 tons. In 1929 the sown area of the Soviet farms amounted to 4,903,000 acres and the marketable output of grain products to about 800,000 tons; while the sown area of the collective farms amounted to 11,507,000 acres and the marketable output of grain products to about 1,300,000 tons. In the coming year, 1930, according to the Control Figures, the sown area of the Soviet farms should amount to 8,856,000 acres with a marketable output of grain products of 1,800,000 tons; while the sown area of the collective farms should amount to 40,500,000 acres with a marketable output of grain products of 4,900,000 tons. In other words, in 1930, the marketable output of grain products of the Soviet and collective farms together should be 6,700,000 tons, or more than 50 per cent of the marketable output of grain products of the *whole* of agriculture (grain sold outside of the rural districts).

It must be confessed that such an express speed of development is *not matched* even by our socialised large-scale industry, the development of which has been very rapid.

Is it not clear that our young large-scale Socialist agriculture (the collective and Soviet farms) has a great future before it and will display miracles of growth?

This unprecedented success in the development of collective farming is due to a variety of causes, of which the following at least are worth mentioning.

It is due in the first instance to the fact that our Party followed Lenin's policy of educating the masses and of progressively attracting the peasants into collective farming by instituting co-operative organisations, that the Party conducted a successful campaign both against those who attempted to run ahead of the movement and force the development of collective farming by means of decrees (the "Left" phrasemongers) and against those who endeavoured to hold the Party back and remain in the tail of the movement (the Right muddle-heads). Had it not pursued such a policy the Party would

never have succeeded in transforming the movement towards collective farming into a real movement of the peasant masses themselves.

Lenin said:

> When the Petrograd proletariat and the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison seized power, they were perfectly well aware that constructive work in the village would encounter great difficulties; that here one would have to proceed more gradually; that to attempt to introduce the common cultivation of the soil by decrees and legislation would be the height of folly; that only an insignificant number of intelligent peasants would agree to this, while the vast majority of the peasants did not desire it. We, therefore, confined ourselves to what was absolutely essential in the interests of the development of the Revolution; in no circumstance to outrun the development of the masses, but to wait until, by the experience of these masses themselves, by their own struggles, the movement would be pushed ahead (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIII, p. 252).

The Party has achieved a great victory in the field of collective farming; it observed the tactical advice of Lenin to the letter.

Secondly, the unprecedented success in the development of collective farming is due to the fact that the Soviet Government comprehended the crying need of the peasants for new implements and for a new technique, and realised the hopelessness of the peasants under the old methods of farming. And having realised all this, it came to their aid in good time by organising machine-hiring stations, tractor columns, and machine and tractor stations; by organising the collective tillage of the soil, by introducing collective farms, and finally arranged for the Soviet farms to render all possible aid to peasant farming. For the first time in the history of mankind there has appeared a Government, the Government of the Soviets, which has proved in action its readiness and ability to give systematic and prolonged *productive* aid to the toiling masses of the peasantry. Is it not obvious that the masses of toiling peasants, suffering from time immemorial from lack of equipment, jumped at the offer and joined the movement for collective farming? And is it surprising that the old slogan of the workers, "face toward the village," will henceforward be supplemented by the slogan of the peasant members of the collective farms, "face toward the town"?

Finally, the unprecedented success in the development of collective farming is due to the fact that the matter has been taken in hand by the advanced workers of our country. I refer to the workers' brigades which in

tens and hundreds have spread over the most important regions of our country. It must be admitted that of all existing and possible propagandists of the collective farm movement, the best propagandists among the peasant masses are the worker propagandists. What is there surprising in the fact that the workers have succeeded in convincing the peasants of the advantages of large-scale collective farming over individual small farming, the more so since the already existing collective and Soviet farms offer a striking demonstration of these advantages?

Such was the basis for the success achieved in the development of collective farming, a success which, in my opinion, is the most important and decisive achievement of all those achieved in recent years.

The "scientific" denials of the possibility and expediency of creating large-scale grain factories of from 125,000 to 250,000 acres each have proved to be hollow and groundless. Practice has refuted the objections of "science," and it has once more been demonstrated that not only has practice to learn from "science," but that "science" has a lot to learn from practice. Large-scale grain factories do not take on in capitalist countries. But our country is not a capitalist country. This is a "trifling" difference which should not be overlooked. In order to create large-scale grain factories in capitalist countries, where private ownership in land prevails, large tracts of land have to be bought up and absolute ground rent has to be paid; which, of course, lays a *heavy* burden on production. In our country there is no such thing as absolute ground rent, or the purchase and sale of land, for private property in land does not exist. Therefore conditions favour the development of large-scale grain farms. The purpose of large-scale farming in capitalist countries is to extract the maximum of profit, or at least to extract the so-called average rate of profit, without which, in fact, there would be no stimulus for the investment of capital in large-scale grain production. In our country, on the contrary, large-scale grain-producing enterprises are at the same time State enterprises, and therefore do not require for their development to extract a maximum of profit, nor even the average rate of profit; they can limit themselves to a minimum of profit, and even at times forgo profits altogether, which again favours the development of large-scale grain farms. Finally, in capitalist countries large-scale grain farming does not enjoy credit and taxation privileges, whereas under the Soviet system, which is designed to encourage Socialist economy, such

privileges exist and will continue to exist. Our esteemed "scientists" overlooked these few simple facts.

Hollow and groundless, too, proved to be now the assertions of the Right opportunists (the Bukharin group) to the effect (*a*) that the peasants would not go into the collective farms; (*b*) that an intense rate of development of collective farming would only arouse mass discontent and drive a wedge between the peasant and working classes; (*c*) that the "high-road" of Socialist development in the countryside is *not* the collective farm, *but* the cooperative society; and (*d*) that the development of collective farming and the drive against the capitalist elements in the village may in the end deprive the country of grain altogether. All these assertions have been proven to be as hollow and groundless as any old bourgeois-Liberal rubbish.

Firstly: The peasants have gone into the collective farms; whole villages, whole districts, whole regions.

Secondly: The mass collective farm movement does not weaken the tie between the workers and the peasants, but, on the contrary, strengthens that tie by placing it on a new productive basis. It is now clear to the most short-sighted that if there is any dissatisfaction at all among the main sections of the peasantry it is not because of the collective farm policy of the Soviet Government, but because the Soviet Government is not able to keep up with the collective farm movement by supplying the peasants with sufficient tractors and machinery.

Thirdly: The dispute as to the "high-road" of rural Socialist development is a scholastic dispute, worthy of young petty-bourgeois Liberals of the type of Eichenwald and Slepkov. It is obvious that, as long as there was no mass collective farm movement, the "high-road" was the lower form of the co-operative movement, the supply and sale co-operatives; but when the higher form of co-operation appeared, the collective farm, the latter became the "high-road" of development. The high-road (without quotation marks) of Socialist development in the village is the co-operative plan of Lenin, which embraces all forms of agricultural co-operation, from the lowest (supply and sale) to the highest (productive collective farms). To contrast collective farming to co-operation is to make a mockery of Leninism and to advertise one's own ignorance.

Fourthly: Now even the blind see that without the drive against the capitalist elements in the village, and without the development of the

collective and Soviet farm movement, there would have been no decisive successes to register now in the field of grain collections this year, nor should we have had the tens of millions of poods of permanent grain reserves which have already accumulated in the hands of the State. Moreover, it can now be confidently asserted that, thanks to the development of the collective and Soviet farm movement, we are definitely coming out or have already definitely passed out of the grain crisis. And if the development of the collective and Soviet farms is accelerated, there is not the slightest doubt that in about three years we shall become one of the largest, if not *the* largest, grain countries of the world.

What is the *new* feature of the present collective farm movement? The new and decisive feature is that the peasants are joining the collective farms not in individual groups, as was formerly the case, but in whole villages, whole volosts,[1] whole districts, and even whole regions. And what does that mean? *It means that the middle peasant has joined the collective farm movement*. And therein lies the essence of the radical change that has occurred in agriculture, and which represents the most important success of the Soviet Government during the past year.

Hollow and groundless is proving to be the Menshevik "conception" of the Trotskyists that the working class can never head the great mass of the peasantry in the cause of Socialist construction. It is now obvious to all that the middle peasant has turned toward the collective farm; it is now obvious to all that the Five-Year Plan of industry and agriculture is a five-year plan for the construction of a Socialist society, and that those who do not believe in the possibility of Socialism in our country cannot welcome our Five-Year Plan.

Hollow and groundless is proving to be the last hope of the capitalists of all countries, who dream of restoring capitalism and "the sacred principle of private property" in the U.S.S.R. The peasants, whom they regarded as material fertilising the soil for capitalism, are abandoning in masses the banded banner of "private property" and have taken to the path of collectivism, the path of Socialism. The last hope for the restoration of capitalism is collapsing.

And that, by the way, explains the desperate attempts of the capitalist elements in our country to rally all the forces of the Old World against the advance of Socialism, attempts which have led to the intensification of the class struggle. The capitalist does not want "to grow into" Socialism.

That also explains the furious outcry against the Bolsheviks which has been raised recently by the watchdogs of capitalism of the type of Struve, Hessen, Miliukov, Kerensky, Dan, and Abramovitch. The shattering of the last hope for the restoration of capitalism is no joke for them.

What else can be the explanation of the violent rage of our class enemies and the furious howling of the lackeys of capitalism if not that our Party has actually achieved a decisive victory on the most difficult front of Socialist construction?

Lenin said:

> Only if we succeed in practice in demonstrating to the peasants the advantages of communal, collective, joint, and artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasants with the aid of joint artel farms, only then will the working class, which holds the power of the State in its hands, really prove to the peasants that it is right, will really win over to its side, firmly and permanently, the many millions of the peasant masses (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 519).

That is how Lenin saw the problem of winning the millions of peasants over to the working class and of directing the peasants along the path of collective farming.

The past year has shown that our Party is successfully coping with the task and determinedly overcoming every obstacle standing in its path.

Lenin said:

> The middle peasant in a Communist society will come over to our side only when we improve his standard of living. If to-morrow we could procure 100,000 first-class tractors, supply them with gasoline and mechanics (and, as you all know, that at present is a sheer fantasy), the middle peasant would cry, "I am for the communia"[1] (*i.e.* for Communism). But to do that we must first beat the international bourgeoisie and force them to give us the tractors, or we must so raise our own level of production as to be able to produce them ourselves. That is the only correct solution of the problem (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 170).

That is how Lenin saw the problem of technically re-equipping the middle peasant and winning him over to the side of Communism.

The past year has shown that the Party is successfully coping with this problem also. We know that by the spring of 1930 we shall have over

60,000 tractors in the field; a year later we shall have over 100,000 tractors, and a year after that we shall have over 250,000 tractors. What was a "fantasy" several years ago we are now able to do, and even more.

And that is why the middle peasant has turned towards the "communia."

Such is the position with regard to the third achievement of our Party. Such were the main achievements of our Party during the past year.

Conclusion

We are moving at full speed along the path towards industrialisation and towards Socialism; we are leaving behind us the age-old "Russian" backwardness. We are becoming a metal country, an automobile country, a tractor country. And when we have put the U.S.S.R. on an automobile, and the muzhik on a tractor, let the worthy capitalists, who boast so loudly of their "civilisation," then try to overtake us! We shall then see which countries are to be classified as backward and which as advanced.

Pravda, No. 259, November 7, 1929.

[1] The arrangement of the work at the factory in such a way that, while all the workers get their weekly rest day, the factory as a whole works without interruption.

[1] A rural administrative unit embracing several villages.—Ed.

[1] "Communia" is the term used by the peasants and by the author.—Ed.

QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION

(*Speech delivered at the Conference of Marxist-Agrarians on December* 27, 1929)

COMRADES,

The fundamental fact of our social economic life at the present juncture, a fact attracting general attention, is the vast growth of the collective farm movement. It is the characteristic feature of the present collectivisation movement that not only separate groups of the rural poor are joining the collective farms, as has been the case hitherto, but also the masses of the middle peasantry. This means that the collectivisation movement has changed from a movement among individual groups and strata of the working peasantry into a movement embracing millions and millions of the main mass of the peasantry. Here we find, *inter alia*, the explanation of the enormously important fact that the collectivisation movement, which has assumed the character of a mighty and growing *anti-kulak avalanche*, is sweeping the resistance of the kulak from its path, breaking the kulak power, and clearing the road for widespread Socialist construction in the rural districts.

But although we can be proud of the *practical* successes achieved in the building up of Socialism, the same cannot be said in regard to our *theoretical* work in the sphere of economics in general, and of agriculture in particular. Moreover, we must acknowledge that theoretical thought does not keep pace with our practical success, that there is a certain gap between our practical success and the development of theoretical ideas. But it is necessary that our theoretical work not only keeps pace with practical work, but be ahead of it and supply our practical workers with weapons in their fight for the victory of Socialism.

I shall not deal at any length here with the importance of theory, you are well aware of its importance. You know that a theory, when it is a genuine theory, gives practical workers the power of orientation, clarity of perspective, faith in their work, confidence in the victory of our cause. All this is, and must be, of enormous importance for the cause of our Socialist reconstruction. It is unfortunate that precisely in this sphere, the sphere of

the theoretical working out of problems concerning our economy, we are beginning to limp. How can we otherwise explain the fact that on questions of our economy various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories are still current in our social and political life? How can we explain why these theories and this theorising have not yet been rejected as they should be? How can we explain why a number of fundamental assertions of Marxist-Leninist political economy representing the most effective antidote to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories are beginning to be forgotten, are not popularised in our Press, and for some reason are not placed in the foreground? Is it so difficult to grasp that without an irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois theories, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, the complete victory over the class enemy cannot be won?

The new methods of actual practice are calling into being new methods of dealing with the economic problems of the transition period. The questions of the New Economic Policy, of classes, of the *tempo* of construction, of the ties with the peasantry, of Party policy, are being raised in a new form. If we are not to lay behind actual practice, we must immediately proceed to tackle all these problems from the standpoint of the new situation. Otherwise it is impossible to overcome the bourgeois theories which are confusing the minds of our practical workers. Otherwise these theories, which possess the tenacity of prejudices, cannot be exterminated. It is only by combating the bourgeois prejudices in the field of theory that the position of Marxism-Leninism can be consolidated.

Permit me to characterise at least a few of these bourgeois prejudices called theories, and to demonstrate their inadequacy in the light of certain cardinal problems of our reconstruction.

1. The Theory of "Equilibrium"

You know, of course, that the so-called theory of the "equilibrium" between the sectors of our national economy is still current among Communists. This theory has, of course, nothing in common with Marxism. Despite this, it is propagated by a number of comrades in the camp of the Rights. On the basis of this theory it is assumed that we have a Socialist sector in one compartment, as it were, and a *non*-Socialist or, if you like, a capitalist sector in another compartment. These two compartments move on different rails and glide peacefully forward, without colliding with each other.

Geometry has taught us that parallel lines do not meet. But the authors of this remarkable theory believe that their parallel lines will meet some day, and that the result will be Socialism. This theory omits to observe that there are classes standing behind these so-called "compartments," and that the compartments are being kept in motion by a desperate class struggle, a life-and-death struggle, a struggle on the principle of "Who will defeat whom?"

It is not difficult to comprehend that this theory has nothing in common with Leninism. It is not difficult to comprehend that this theory objectively pursues the aim of defending the positions of individual peasant farming, of furnishing the kulak elements with a "new" theoretical weapon in their struggle against the collective farms, and of discrediting the positions of the collective farms. And yet this theory is still current in our Press, and it cannot even be said that it is being seriously combated by our theoreticians, much less ruthlessly crashed. This inadequacy can only be explained by the backwardness of our theoretical thought.

And yet all that would have been necessary was to bring forth from the treasury of Marxism the theory of reproduction, to oppose this to the theory of the equilibrium of the sectors—and not an atom of this theory would have been left. For the Marxist theory of reproduction teaches that modern society cannot develop without accumulating year after year, and accumulation is impossible unless reproduction expands from year to year. This is clear and comprehensible. Our great centralised Socialist industry is developing on the basis of the Marxist theory of expanded reproduction, for its dimensions increase from year to year; it is accumulating and advancing in seven-league strides. But our *national economy* is not confined to large-scale industry alone. On the contrary, the small-peasant farm still predominates in our national economy. Can we then maintain that our small-peasant farms are developing on the principle of expanded reproduction? No, we cannot maintain this. Our small-peasant agriculture, in the main, is not only not developing on the principle of expanded reproduction yearly, but is not even always able to realise simple reproduction. Is it possible for our Socialist industry to continue to accelerate its speed of development, when it relies for support on an agricultural basis like the system of small-peasant farms, which are incapable of increasing reproduction, but which at the same time represent the preponderant force in our national economy? No, by no means. Can the Soviet Government and the work of Socialist reconstruction depend for

support for a more or less lengthy period on two different bases: on the basis of the greatest and most concentrated socialised industry, and on the basis of the most backward and scattered peasant farming with its small marketable output? No, this is impossible. This would be bound to end sooner or later in the complete collapse of the whole national economy. What is the solution? The solution lies in enlarging the agricultural units, in rendering agriculture capable of accumulation, of expanded reproduction, and in thus reorganising the agricultural basis of national economy. But how are the peasant farms to be combined to form larger units?

There are two ways: the *capitalist* way, in which the agricultural units are enlarged by grafting capitalism upon them, and which leads to the impoverishment of the peasantry and to the development of capitalist enterprises in agriculture. We have rejected this way, for it is incompatible with Soviet economics.

There is a second way: the *Socialist* way, which is to set up collective and Soviet farms. This way leads to the combination of the small-peasant farms in large collective ones, technically and scientifically equipped, and results in the squeezing out of capitalist elements from agriculture. We are taking this second way.

We therefore have to choose between the one way and the other! Either *back* to capitalism or *forward* to Socialism. There is no third way, and there cannot be one. The "equilibrium" theory represents an attempt to find a third way, and, for the very reason that it assumes that there is a third (non-existent) way, it is Utopian and anti-Marxist.

You see, therefore, that all that was needed was to confront this theory of equilibrium between the sectors with Marx's theory of reproduction and not a trace would remain of this theory.

Why do our Marxist agrarian research workers not do this? Who benefits by the propagation of the ridiculous theory of "equilibrium" in our Press while the Marxist theory of reproduction is hidden under a bushel?

2. The Theory of "Automatic Development" in the Building Up of Socialism

We now come to a second prejudice of political economy, to a second theory of the bourgeois type. I refer to the theory of the "automatic development" of Socialist construction. This theory has nothing in common with Marxism; nevertheless it is being zealously propagated by our

comrades in the Right camp. The authors of this theory assert approximately the following: Capitalism once existed in this country and industry developed on a capitalist basis, while the village followed the capitalist town spontaneously and automatically, and assumed the image of the capitalist town. Since this was the case under capitalism, why should the same not follow under Soviet economy, why should not the village, the small-peasant farm, automatically follow the Socialist town and become spontaneously transformed into the image of the Socialist city? On this reasoning, the authors of this theory conclude that the village could automatically follow the Socialist town. Hence the question arises: Is it worth our while to bother about organising Soviet farms and collective farms; is it worth while disputing, when the village can follow the Socialist town without this?

Here we have another theory, the aim of which, objectively, is to furnish fresh weapons to the capitalist elements in the rural districts in their struggle against the collective farms. The anti-Marxist character of this theory is beyond all doubt. Is it not extremely strange that our theoreticians are not taking the trouble to extirpate this peculiar theory, which is causing so much confusion in the minds of our practical workers on the collective farms?

There can be no doubt that the leading role played by the Socialist city towards the small-peasant village is of great and inestimable value. It is upon this basis that industry performs its task of reorganising agriculture. But does this factor suffice to cause the small-peasant village automatically to follow the town in Socialist construction? No, it does not suffice. Under capitalism the village followed the town spontaneously, for the reason that capitalist production in the town and small commodity production carried on by the peasant belong essentially to *one and the same type* of production. It goes without saying that small-peasant commodity production is not yet capitalist production. But fundamentally it belongs to the same type as capitalist production, for it is founded on the private ownership of the means of production.

Lenin was a thousand times right when he referred, in his notes on Comrade Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period*, to the "*capitalist* commodity tendency of the peasantry" as opposed to the "*Socialist* tendency of the proletariat."[1] This explains why "small production gives

birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, and hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale" (Lenin).

Can it be asserted that small-peasant commodity production is fundamentally of the same type as Socialist production of the town? It is obvious that this cannot be asserted without breaking with Marxism. Otherwise Lenin would not have said that "so long as we live in a small-peasant country, capitalism has a firmer economic basis in Russia than Communism." Accordingly, the theory of "automatic development" in the sphere of Socialist construction is a rotten and anti-Leninist theory. Accordingly, in order that the small-peasant village may follow the Socialist town, it is necessary, apart from everything else, to establish large-scale Socialist economy in the rural districts in the form of Soviet and collective farms as the basis of Socialism, which will be able to lead the main masses of the peasantry, under the guidance of the Socialist town.

The matter is clear. The theory of "automatic development" of Socialist construction is an anti-Marxist theory. The Socialist town must *lead* the peasant village by introducing Soviet and collective farms in the rural districts and reorganising the village on a new Socialist foundation.

It is surprising that the anti-Marxist theory of "automatic development" in Socialist construction has not yet met with a proper rebuff on the part of our agrarian theoreticians.

3. The Theory of the "Stability" of Individual Small-Peasant Farming

Now we come to the third prejudice in political economy, the theory of the "stability" of small-peasant farming. The objections raised by bourgeois political economy against Marx's well-known thesis on the advantages of large-scale enterprises over small enterprises, which, these economists argue, applies to industry only, and does not apply to agriculture, are well known. Social-Democratic theoreticians of the stamp of David and Herz, who propagate this theory, have sought to "base" their arguments on the fact that the small peasant has endurance and patience, that he is ready to bear every hardship only to retain his plot of ground, and that in the struggle against large-scale agricultural enterprises small farming displays stability. It is not difficult to grasp that such a "stability" is worse than instability. It is not difficult to grasp that this anti-Marxist theory pursues one sole aim: to eulogise and strengthen the capitalist order. It is precisely because this

theory pursues this aim that it has been so easy for the Marxists to shatter it. But this is not what concerns us at present. The fact is that our actual practice, our reality, is supplying us with fresh arguments against this theory; but our theoreticians, strangely enough, either will not or cannot make use of this new weapon against the enemies of the working class. I refer to the practical experience we have gained in the abolition of the private ownership of land, in the nationalisation of the land, in liberating the small peasant from his slavish attachment to his patch of soil, by which we have facilitated for him the transition from small-peasant husbandry to large-scale collective farming.

What in reality tied, and continues to tie, the small peasant of Western Europe to his small commodity producing farm? Above all and mainly the fact that he owns his piece of ground, the fact of the private ownership of land. He has saved for years in order to buy a piece of land; he has bought it, and now, comprehensibly enough, he does not want to part with it; he will endure anything, suffer the greatest hardship, live like a savage only in order to retain his piece of land, the basis of his individual farm. Can it be maintained that this factor now operates in this form under the conditions created by the Soviet system? No, this cannot be maintained. It cannot be maintained because in our country there is no private ownership of land. And since there is no private ownership of land in this country, for this very reason there is no such slavish attachment of the peasant to the land as may be observed among the peasants of the West. And this fact is found to facilitate the switching of the small-peasant farm on to the tracks of collective farming.

This is one of the reasons why the *large*-scale enterprise in the village, the collective farm, is able, in our country, where the land is nationalised, so easily to demonstrate its *advantages* over the small-peasant farm. Here lies the great revolutionary importance of the Soviet agrarian laws, which have abolished absolute rent, abolished the private ownership of land, and established the nationalisation of land.

But it follows from this that we now have at our command a new argument against those bourgeois economists who proclaim the stability of the small farm in their struggle against the large-scale enterprise. Why, then, is this new argument not sufficiently utilised by our agrarian theoreticians in their struggle against all kinds of bourgeois theories?

When we nationalised the land, we followed, *inter alia*, the theoretical assumptions given in the third volume of *Capital*, in the well-known book of Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, and in Lenin's well-known agrarian theoretical works, which represents an extremely rich treasury of theoretical thought. I refer to the theory of ground rent in general and to the theory of absolute ground rent in particular. It is now clear to everyone that the theoretical postulates laid down in these works have been brilliantly confirmed in the actual practice of our Socialist construction in town and country. Only it is incomprehensible why our Press should be thrown open to the unscientific theories of such "Soviet" economists as Chayanov, whilst the works of genius of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, on the theory of ground rent and absolute ground rent, are not popularised and brought into the foreground, but lie hidden under a bushel.

You will, of course, recollect Engels' well-known essay on *The Peasant Question*. You will recollect, of course, the care and deliberation with which Engels approaches the question of the transition of the small peasants to the path of co-operative farming, to the path of collective farming. Permit me to quote the passage in question from Engels' essay:

> We stand decisively on the side of the small peasant: we shall do everything possible to render his lot more bearable, to facilitate his transition to the co-operative if he decides in favour of this; if, however, he is not yet able to come to this decision, we shall give him *plenty of time* to ponder over it on *his own piece of land*.[1]

Please observe the circumspection with which Engels approaches the question of the transition of the individual peasant farm to the path of collectivism. What is the explanation of this circumspection which at first glance appears exaggerated? Obviously it was the fact of the existence of the private ownership of land, the fact that the peasant owns his patch of soil and will not part with it easily. This is the peasant of the West. This is the peasant in the capitalist countries, in which private ownership of land exists. It is comprehensible that there the matter must be approached carefully.

Can it be maintained that such a situation exists in the Soviet Union? No, this cannot be maintained. And the reason is that we have no private ownership of land chaining the peasant to his individual farm. It cannot be maintained for the reason that our land is nationalised, which smooths the

way of transition from the individual peasant farming to collective farming. This is one of the reasons for the comparative ease and rapidity with which the collective farm movement has developed among us of late.

It is regrettable that up to the present our agrarian theoreticians have not yet attempted to draw a clear line showing this difference between the position of the peasantry in the Soviet Union and in the West. Yet such a work would be of the utmost value, not only for us Soviet workers, but for the Communists of all countries. It is not a matter of indifference for the proletarian revolution in the capitalist countries whether Socialism will have to be built up there, from the first day of the seizure of power by the proletariat, on the foundation of the nationalisation of the land or without this foundation.

In my recent article, "A Year of Great Change," I advanced the well-known arguments on the advantages of the large-scale farming over small farming. In this I had in mind the large Soviet farms. It need not be proved that all these arguments apply equally to the collective farms as large economic units. I speak here not only of the advanced collective farms working on a mechanical and tractor basis, but also of the primitive collective farms representing, so to speak, the manufacture period of collective farm construction, and working with the implements of the peasant farm. I refer to these primitive collective farms being formed at the present time in the regions of mass collectivisation, based upon the simple pooling of the peasants' means of production.

Let us take, for instance, the collective farms of the Khoper district in the former Don province. Outwardly, the technique of these collective farms scarcely differ from the small-peasant farm (few machines, few tractors). And yet the simple pooling of the peasant means of production as the basis of the collective farms has produced an effect undreamt of by our practical workers. How has this effect been expressed? In the fact that the transition to collective farming has brought with it an increase of the cultivated area by 30, 40, and 50 per cent. And how is this "dizzy" effect to be explained? By the fact that the peasants, powerless under the conditions imposed by individual labour, found themselves converted into a mighty force when they combined their tools and joined together in collective farms. By the fact that it became possible for the peasantry to till waste and virgin soil which is difficult to cultivate by individual labour. By the fact that it enabled the peasantry to take virgin soil into their hands. By the fact that the

waste land, the untilled spots, the field boundaries,[1] etc., etc., could now be cultivated.

The question of the cultivation of waste and virgin soil is of the utmost importance for our agriculture. We know that in old Russia the pivot upon which the revolutionary movement turned was the agrarian question. We know that one of the aims of the agrarian movement was to do away with the lack of land. At that time there were many who believed that this shortage of land was absolute, that there was no more free cultivable land to be had.

And what actually transpired? Now everyone sees plainly that there were and still are scores of millions of hectares[2] of free soil in the Soviet Union. The peasant, however, was quite unable to till this soil with his wretched implements. Since he was unable to cultivate waste and virgin land, he inclined to "soft soil," the soil belonging to the landowners, the soil adapted to tillage with the aid of the implements at the disposal of the peasant under the conditions of individual labour. This was the cause of the "shortage of land." It is not to be wondered, therefore, that our Grain Trust now finds it possible to place under cultivation about 20 million hectares of unoccupied land, hitherto untilled by the peasantry, and, indeed, uncultivable by individual labour with the equipment of the small-peasant farmer. The importance of the collectivisation movement in every one of its phases, whether its most primitive phase or in the advanced phase in which it is equipped with tractors, lies in the fact that the peasantry is now placed in a position to till waste and virgin soil. This is the secret of the tremendous expansion of the cultivated area with the adoption of collective forms of labour by the peasants. This is one of the advantages of collective farming over individual peasant farming.

It need not be emphasised that the advantages of the collective farms over the individual farms will be even more incontestable when our machine and tractor stations and tractor columns hasten to the aid of the collective farms in the regions of mass collectivisation, and when the collective farms themselves are able to concentrate tractors and combines in their own hands.

4. The Town and the Village

A prejudice exists, cultivated by bourgeois economists, relating to the so-called "scissors."[1] Ruthless war must be declared against this prejudice, as

well as against all other bourgeois theories which, unfortunately, are rife in the Soviet Press. I have in mind the theory which alleges that the October Revolution gave less to the peasantry than the February Revolution, that, in fact, the October Revolution gave nothing to the peasantry.

This prejudice was for a time circulated in our Press by a "Soviet" economist. This "Soviet" economist, it is true, later abandoned his theory. (Interjection: Who was it?) It was Groman. This theory, however, was seized upon and made use of by the Trotsky—Zinoviev opposition against the Party. Nor can one maintain that it is not current at the present time in Soviet public circles. That is a very important question. It touches the problem of the relations between town and country. It touches the problem of eliminating the antithesis between town and country. It also touches the very urgent question of the "scissors." I think, therefore, that it is worth while for us to deal with this strange theory.

Is it true that the peasant received nothing from the October Revolution?

Let us turn to the facts.

I have before me the well-known table worked out by the well-known statistician, Comrade Nemchinov, published in my article "On the Grain Front." According to this table the landlords "produced" in pre-revolutionary time no less than nine million tons of grain. Hence, the *landlords* were then the holders of 600 million poods of grain. The kulaks at that time "produced" 1,900 million poods of grain. That represents a very great power which the kulaks at that time had at their disposal. The rural *poor* and the *middle* peasants produced 2,500 million poods of grain. That was the situation in the old pre-revolutionary countryside. What change has taken place in the countryside since the October Revolution?

I take the figures relating thereto from the same table. Let us take, for instance, the year 1927. How much did the *landlords* produce in this year? It is clear that they produced nothing, and could not produce anything, because they were annihilated by the October Revolution.

It is plain that this must have meant a great relief for the peasantry, as the peasants have been freed from the yoke of the landlord. That is naturally a great advantage which the peasantry have derived from the October Revolution. How much did the *kulaks* produce in the year 1927? Six hundred million poods of grain as compared with 1,900 million before the Revolution. Thus in the period following the Revolution the kulaks have

lost more than two-thirds of their economic power. It is obvious that this was bound to ease the position of the village poor and the middle peasants.

And how much did the *poor* and *middle* peasants produce in the year 1917? Four thousand million poods, as compared with 2,500 million before the Revolution; that is to say, that after the October Revolution the poor and middle peasants produced 1,500 million poods more grain than in pre-revolutionary times.

These are facts which show that the poor and middle peasants have derived great benefit from the Revolution. That is what the poor and middle peasants received from the October Revolution. How can one assert in the face of these facts that the October Revolution has not given the peasants anything?

But that is not all, comrades. The October Revolution abolished private property in land, abolished the sale and purchase of land, and introduced the nationalisation of the land. What does that mean? That means that the peasant has no need to buy land in order to produce grain. Formerly he was compelled to save up for years in order to be able to purchase land; he got into debt, submitted to extortion, solely in order to get possession of a piece of land. The sums expended on the purchase of land naturally went into the value of the grain produced. The peasant no longer has to do that now. He can now produce grain without buying land. Now does that ameliorate the position of the peasant or not? It is clear that it does ameliorate the position of the peasant.

Moreover, until recently, the peasantry was compelled to "scratch" the soil with obsolete stock and implements and by individual labour. Everyone knows that individual labour, equipped with obsolete means of production which are already unsuitable, does not yield that profit which is necessary in order to lead a tolerable existence to improve systematically one's material position, to develop one's level of culture, and to get on to the highway of Socialist construction. To-day, after the increased development of the collectivisation movement, the peasants are able to combine their labour with the labour of their neighbours, to unite in collective farms, to break up virgin soil and to cultivate waste land, to obtain machines and tractors and thereby double or even treble the productivity of their labour. And what does that mean? That means that to-day the peasant, by joining the collective farms, is able to produce much more than formerly with the same expenditure of labour. That means that grain can be produced much

more cheaply than was the case until only recently. That means, finally, that if the price of grain remains the same, the stable peasant can obtain much more than he has done hitherto.

How can one maintain after all this that the peasant has not gained anything by the October Revolution?

Is it not clear that people who talk such nonsense slander the Party and the Soviet Government?

But what follows from all this?

It follows that the question of the "scissors," the question of closing the "scissors," must to-day be approached in quite another manner. It follows that if the collectivisation movement grows at the present rapid rate, the "scissors" will be closed in the near future. It follows, therefore, that the question of the relations between town and country will be placed on a new basis, that the antithesis between town and country will disappear at an accelerated pace.

This fact is of the very greatest importance for our whole work of construction. It changes the psychology of the peasant and turns him towards the town. It creates the conditions for the abolition of the antithesis between town and country. It creates the basis on which the slogan of the Party, "face to the village," will be supplemented by the slogan of the peasants united in the collective farms, "face to the town."

There is nothing very wonderful in this, as the peasant is now getting machines, tractors, agronomists, organisers, and, finally, also direct aid from the town in the fight to overcome the kulaks. The old type of peasant, with his animal mistrust of the town, which he regarded as a plunderer, is passing away. His place is being taken by the new peasant, by the peasant of the collective farms, who regards the town with confidence, expecting to receive from there real *productive* aid. The old type of peasant who is afraid of sinking down to the status of the village poor, and stealthily (for fear lest he be deprived of the franchise) seeks to raise himself up to the position of a kulak, is giving way to one with a new perspective: to join the collective farms and thereby escape from his poverty-stricken condition to the high-road of economic progress.

That is how things turn out, comrades. It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that our agrarian theoreticians have not taken all measures to exterminate root and branch all bourgeois theories which seek to throw

doubt on the achievements of the October Revolution and of the growing collective farm movement.

5. The Nature of the Collective Farms

The collective farm as an economic type is one of the forms of Socialist economy. There can be no doubt about that.

One of the speakers at this Conference sought to throw doubt on the collective farms. He maintained that the collective farms, as economic organisations, had nothing in common with the Socialist form of economy. I must declare, comrades, that such a characterisation of the collective farms is quite wrong. There can be no doubt that this characterisation has nothing in common with Leninism.

What is it that determines an economic type? Obviously, the mutual relations of human beings in the process of production. How otherwise can one determine economic types? Are there two classes in the collective farms, one class the owners of the means of production, and another class which is deprived of these means of production? Is there an exploiting and an exploited class in the collective farms? Does not the collective farm represent the socialisation of the most important means of production on the land, which, moreover, belongs to the State? What reason is there for maintaining that the collective farms as an economic type do not represent one of the forms of Socialist economy?

Of course, contradictions are to be found in the collective farms. Of course individualistic, even kulak survivals may be found in them which have not yet been overcome, but which must inevitably disappear in the course of time the more the collective farms are developed and the more they are equipped with machinery. Can one, however, deny that the collective farms, taken as a whole, with all their contradictions and shortcomings—the collective farms as an *economic* fact—represent, in the main, a new path of development of the countryside, the *Socialist* path, as *opposed* to the kulak, to the *capitalist*, path of development? Can one deny that the collective farms (I am speaking of the real and not the sham collective farms), under the conditions obtaining in our country, represent a basis and a centre of Socialist construction in the countryside which have grown up in desperate fights against the capitalist elements?

Is it not clear that the attempts made by some comrades to deprecate the collective farms and represent them as a bourgeois form of enterprise are

devoid of all foundation?

In 1923 we had no mass collective farm movement. In his article, "On Co-operation," Lenin had in mind all kinds of cooperation, both the lower forms (sale and supply co-operatives) and the higher forms (collective farms). What did he say at that time regarding co-operation and on co-operative enterprises? Here is one quotation from Lenin's pamphlet, "On Co-operation":

> Under the system of society prevailing in our country, the cooperative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises in that they are collective enterprises; they *do not*,[1] however, differ from Socialist enterprises if they operate on land and with means of production which belong to the State, *i.e*. to the working class.

Lenin therefore regarded the co-operative enterprises, not as something apart, but in connection with the system prevailing in our country, in connection with the fact that they function on land which belongs to the State, and in a country where the means of production belong to the State. And having considered them in this light, Lenin declares that co-operative enterprises do not differ from Socialist enterprises.

That is what Lenin says regarding co-operative enterprises in general. Is it not clear, then, that we are even more justified in saying the same of the collective farms in the present period?

This also, by the way, explains why Lenin regarded the "simple growth of co-operation" under our conditions as "identical with the growth of Socialism."

Thus you see that the speaker before-mentioned committed a great error against Leninism when he belittled the collective farms.

From this error there follows a second, regarding the class struggle in the collective farms. The speaker portrayed the class struggle in the collective farms in such glaring colours that one might think that the class struggle in the collective farms *does not differ* from the class struggle outside of the collective farms, and that, in fact, it is raging there even more fiercely.

It should be mentioned, however, that the speaker mentioned before is not the only one who has erred in this question. The idle talk about the class struggle, the whining about the class struggle in the collective farms, is to-day one of the characteristic features of all of our "Left" shouters. The most comical thing about this squeal is that these squealers "see" the class

struggle where it does not exist, or scarcely at all, but, on the other hand, do not notice it where it exists and exceeds all bounds.

Are there elements of the class struggle in the collective farms? Yes. There are bound to be elements of the class struggle in the collective farms when remnants of individualistic or even kulak psychology, as well as a certain inequality, still exist. Can one say that the class struggle in the collective farms is the same as the class struggle outside of them? By no means. The very mistake that our "Left" phrasemongers make is that they do not perceive this difference. What does the class struggle *outside* of the collective farms, *before* the latter have been set up, mean? It means a fight against the kulak, who *owns* tools and means of production with the aid of which he keeps the village poor in bondage. This struggle is a life-and-death struggle. What, however, is the meaning of the class struggle on the basis of the collective farms? It means, in the first place, that the kulak is crushed, that he no longer possesses tools and the instruments of production. It means, in the second place, that the poor and middle peasants are united in collective enterprises on the basis of the socialisation of the most important implements and means of production. It means, finally, that it is now a question of a fight between members of collective farms, many of whom have not yet discarded the individualistic and kulak traditions and are endeavouring to use the inequality which still exists to a certain extent on the collective farms to their own advantage, while the rest desire to eliminate these traditions and this inequality from the collective farms. Is it not clear, then, that only the blind fail to see the difference between the class struggle on the basis of the collective farms and the class struggle outside of the collective farms?

It would be a mistake to believe that, once a collective farm exists, all that is necessary for the building up of Socialism exists. It would be an even greater error to believe that the members of the collective farms have already become Socialists. No, considerable work has still to be done in order to transform the peasant members of the collective farm, to set right their individualistic psychology, and to remould them into real toilers of a Socialist society. The more rapidly the collective farms are equipped with machinery, and the more rapidly they are supplied with tractors, the more quickly will the transformation of the peasant be brought about.

That does not, however, in any way reduce the tremendous importance of the collective farms as an instrument for the Socialist transformation of the

countryside. The great importance of the collective farms lies precisely in the fact that they represent the principal basis for the employment of machinery and tractors in agriculture, the principal basis for the transformation of the peasant, for remoulding his psychology in the spirit of proletarian Socialism. Lenin was quite right when he said:

> The remoulding of the small farmer, the remoulding of his whole psychology and customs, requires generations. Only the material basis, technique, the application of tractors and machines in agriculture on a large scale, electrification on a large scale, can solve this for the small farmer, can cure, so to speak, his whole psychology.

Who can deny that the collective farms constitute that form of Socialist economy by which alone the millions of the small peasantry can connect themselves with machines and tractors, as with the lever of economic progress and of Socialist development of agriculture?

Our Left phrasemongers, and also our speaker, have forgotten all this.

6. The Class Shiftings and the Turn in the Policy of the Party

We come finally to the question of the class shiftings and the Socialism offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside.

The characteristic feature of our work during the past year is that we, as a Party, as the Soviet Power, (*a*) have developed an offensive on the whole front against the capitalist elements in the countryside; and (*b*) that this offensive, as is known, has led and is leading to very palpable and *positive* results.

What does that mean? It means that we have gone over from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of *liquidating* the kulaks as a class. This means that we have carried out, and are still carrying out, one of the most decisive changes in our whole policy.

Up till quite lately the Party pursued the policy of *restricting* the exploiting tendencies of the kulak. As is known, this policy was proclaimed already at the Eighth Party Congress.

The same policy was again announced at the time of the introduction of the New Economic Policy and at the Eleventh Party Congress. We all remember Lenin's well-known letter to Preobrazhensky (1922), in which he again raised the question of the necessity of such a policy. Finally, this

policy was confirmed by the Fifteenth Congress of our Party; and it is this policy that we carried out right until recently.

Was this policy correct? Yes, it was indubitably correct. Could we have undertaken an offensive against the kulak five or three years ago? Could we have counted on such an attack being successful at that time? No, we could not. That would have been the most dangerous adventurism. That would have been playing a dangerous game. We would certainly have come to grief and thereby strengthened the position of the kulaks. Why? Because we had not yet at our disposal those strongholds in the countryside in the shape of a broad network of Soviet and collective farms upon which to rely in the decisive attack on the kulaks. Because at that time it was not possible for us to *substitute* the capitalist production of the kulak by Socialist production in the shape of the collective and Soviet farms.

In 1926–27, the Zinoviev—Trotsky opposition *wanted at all costs* to force upon the Party the policy of an immediate attack on the kulaks. The Party did not enter on this adventure, as it knew that serious people could not permit themselves to play at attacks. The attack on the kulaks is a very serious matter. One must not confuse it with declamation against the kulaks. One must not confuse it with a policy of scratching the kulaks, which the Zinoviev—Trotsky opposition energetically endeavoured to force upon the Party. To attack the kulaks means to smash the kulaks, to liquidate them as a class. Without these aims, attack is a declamation, mere scratching, empty noise, anything but a real Bolshevist attack. To attack the kulaks means to make proper preparations and then deliver the blow, a blow from which they could not recover. That is what we Bolsheviks call a real attack. Could we have undertaken such an attack five or three years ago with any prospect of success? No, we could not.

In 1927, the kulak produced over 600 million poods of grain, 130 million of which he disposed of by exchange outside of the rural districts. That is a fairly serious force with which one must reckon. And how much did our Soviet and collective farms produce at that time? About 80 million poods, of which they brought a little over 35 million (marketable grain) to the market. Judge for yourselves whether at that time we were in a position to *replace* the production and the marketable grain of the kulaks by the production and the marketable grain of our Soviet and collective farms. It is clear that we could not have done so. What would undertaking a decisive attack on the kulak under such conditions have meant? It would have meant

inviting failure strengthening the position of the kulaks, and remaining without grain. Therefore, we neither could nor should have undertaken any attack on the kulak at that time, in spite of the adventurist declamations of the Zinoviev—Trotsky opposition.

What is the position at present? We now have an adequate material basis from which to deliver a blow against the kulak, to break his resistance, to liquidate him as a class, and to *replace* his production by the production of the Soviet and collective farms. You are aware that the grain produced on the collective and Soviet farms in 1929 amounted to no less than about 400 million poods (200 million poods less than the gross production of the kulak farms in 1927). You also know that the collective and Soviet farms delivered more than 130 million poods of marketable grain (that is, more than the kulaks in 1927). And finally you know that in 1930 the gross production of the collective and Soviet farms will amount to no less than 900 million poods (*i.e*. more than the gross production of the kulaks in 1927), and they will supply not less than 400 million poods of marketable grain (*i.e*. incomparably more than the kulaks supplied in 1927).

That is the position now, comrades. That is the change that has taken place in the economics of the country. That is the shift of class forces that has recently taken place. As you see, the material basis exists to-day which enables us to *replace* kulak production by that of the collective and Soviet farms. That is why our attack on the kulaks has now met with undeniable success. That is how one must attack the kulaks, when it is a question of a real attack and not empty declamation. That is why we recently gave up the policy of *restricting* the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks and adopted the policy of *liquidating* the kulaks as a class.

Now how shall we approach the policy of dekulakising the kulaks? Can we permit it in the regions of mass collectivisation? This question is put from various sides. A ridiculous question! We could not permit it as long as we were pursuing the policy of restricting their exploiting tendencies, as long as we were unable to commence a determined offensive against them, and as long as we were unable to replace their production by the production of the collective and Soviet farms. At that time a policy which did not permit the dekulakisation of the kulaks was correct and necessary. What is the position now? Now the position is different. To-day we are able to make a decisive attack on the kulak, to break his resistance, to liquidate him as a class, and replace his production by the production of the collective and

Soviet farms. To-day, the dekulakisation of the kulaks is being carried out by the masses of poor and middle peasants themselves, who are carrying through mass collectivisation. In the regions of mass collectivisation the dekulakisation is to-day no longer a simple administrative measure; it forms an integral part of the formation and development of collective farms. Therefore it is ridiculous and nonsensical to expatiate on this now. "Weep not for the hair, when the head is off."

No less ridiculous is the other question, whether we can admit the kulak into the collective farms. Of course not, as he is a sworn enemy of the collectivisation movement. This would appear to be plain.

7. Conclusions

These, comrades, are the six cardinal questions which the theoretical work of our Marxist agrarians must not ignore.

The importance of these questions lies above all in the fact that a Marxist analysis of them provides the means of exterminating root and branch all and every kind of bourgeois theory which at times—to our shame—are spread by our Communist comrades, and which confuse the minds of our practical workers. And it is really high time that these theories were rooted out and discarded. For only in a ruthless fight against these theories can the theoretical ideas of the Marxist agrarians grow and become strong.

The importance of these questions lies, finally, in the fact that they put the old problems of the economic system of the transition period in a new aspect.

To-day the question of the New Economic Policy, the question of classes, of collective farms, of the economics of the transition period are presented in a new way. The mistakes of those who regard the New Economic Policy as a retreat, and only as a retreat, must be dragged into the light of day. As a matter of fact, even at the time of the introduction of the New Economic Policy, Lenin said that it is not only a retreat, but that it was at the same time the preparation for a new and decisive attack on the capitalist elements in town and country.

It is necessary to expose the mistakes of those who believe that the New Economic Policy was necessary only for the purpose of connecting the town and the country. It is not any kind of connection between town and country that we need. We need a connection that will guarantee the victory of Socialism. And if we adhere to the New Economic Policy, it is because it

serves the cause of Socialism. As soon as it ceases to be of service to the cause of Socialism, we will cast it to the devil. Lenin said that the New Economic Policy was introduced seriously and for a long time. But he never said that it had been introduced for all time.

We must also raise the question of popularising the Marxist theory of reproduction. We must study the question of the structure of the balance of our national economy. That which the Central Statistical Office put forward in the year 1926 as the balance sheet of national economy is not a balance sheet, but a game with figures. Nor is the manner in which *Bazarov* and *Groman* treat the problem of the balance sheet of national economy suitable. The revolutionary Marxists must define the structure of the national economic balance sheet if they wish to engage at all in the study of the economic problems of the transition period.

It would be a good thing if our Marxist economists appointed a special group, who would have the task of studying the problems of the economics of the transition period in their new aspect.

[1] Lenin's italics.—J. STALIN.

[1] My italics.—J. STALIN.

[1] Under individual peasant farming each peasant's field is marked off from that of his neighbour by a furrow. Considering the number of such furrows in each rural district, they make up together a fairly considerable area of land, which of course remained unsown.—ED.

[2] 1 hectare = 2.5 acres.—ED.

[1] "Scissors," a term implying the disproportion between the prices of industrial and agricultural goods.—ED.

[1] My italics.—J.STALIN.

ON THE POLICY OF LIQUIDATING THE KULAKS AS A CLASS

THE article, "The Liquidation of the Kulaks as a Class," in No. 16 of the *Krasnaya Svyezda*, while undoubtedly correct on the whole, contains two inaccuracies of formulation. It appears to me essential to correct these inaccuracies.

(1) The article states:

> During the restoration period we conducted a policy of restricting the capitalist elements in town and country. With the beginning of the reconstruction period we passed from the policy of restriction to a policy of squeezing out the kulak.

This thesis is incorrect. The policy of restricting the capitalist elements and the policy of squeezing them out are not two different policies. They are one and the same policy. The squeezing out of the capitalist elements of the countryside is an inevitable result and a *component* part of the policy of restricting the capitalist elements, the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks. But to squeeze out the capitalist *elements* of the countryside does not mean squeezing out the kulaks as a *class*. To squeeze out the capitalist elements of the countryside means squeezing out and overcoming *sections* of the kulaks that are unable to withstand the pressure of taxation, to withstand the system of restrictive measures of the Soviet Government. It is obvious that the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks, the policy of restricting the capitalist elements of the countryside, cannot but result in the elimination of certain sections of the kulaks. Hence, the elimination of certain sections of the kulaks can be regarded only as an inevitable result and a component part of the policy of restricting the capitalist elements of the village.

This was the policy we conducted not only during the restoration period, but also during the reconstruction period, in the period following the Fifteenth Congress (December, 1927), during the period of the Sixteenth Party Conference (April, 1929), and in the period following that Conference, right down to the summer of 1929, when the phase of mass collectivisation began and when the *swing* toward the policy of *liquidating* the kulaks as a *class* commenced.

If we examine the most important documents of our Party, beginning, for instance, from the Fourteenth Congress in December, 1925 (see the Resolution on the Report of the Central Committee), down to the Sixteenth Conference in April, 1929 (see the Resolution on "Methods of Raising the Level of Agriculture"), we cannot help but observe that the thesis regarding "the restriction of the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks," or "the restriction of the growth of capitalism in the countryside" always *accompanies* the thesis regarding "the squeezing of the capitalist elements out of the countryside," and "the overcoming of the capitalist elements of the countryside."

What does that signify?

It signifies that the Party *does not separate* the squeezing out of the capitalist elements from the countryside from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks and from the policy of restricting the capitalist elements of the countryside.

The Fifteenth Party Congress, like the Sixteenth Conference, took its stand wholly on the policy of "restricting the exploiting propensities of the rural bourgeoisie" (Resolution of the Fifteenth Congress on "Work in the Countryside"): on the policy of "adopting fresh measures for restricting the development of capitalism in the countryside" (same Resolution); on the policy of "decisive restriction of the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks" (the Resolution of the Fifteenth Congress on the Five-Year Plan); on the policy of "an attack on the kulaks" in the sense of "proceeding to a further, more systematic, and rigid restriction of the kulak and private trader" (same Resolution); on the policy of "a more decisive economic elimination" of the "elements of private capitalist economy in town and country" (the Resolution of the Fifteenth Congress on the Report of the Central Committee).

Hence, (*a*) the author of the above-mentioned article is wrong when he represents the policy of restricting the capitalist elements and the policy of squeezing them out as two different policies. The facts show that here we have a general policy of restricting capitalism, a component part and consequence of which is the squeezing out of individual sections of the kulaks.

Hence, (*b*) the author of the above-mentioned article is wrong when he asserts that the elimination of the capitalist elements of the countryside began only in the reconstruction period, in the period of the Fifteenth

Congress. As a matter of fact, elimination proceeded prior to the Fifteenth Congress, during the restoration period, and after the Fifteenth Congress, *i.e*. in the reconstruction period. In the period of the Fifteenth Congress the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks was merely tightened up by new and supplementary measures, as a consequence of which the squeezing out of individual sections of the kulaks could not but be intensified.

(2) The article states:

> The policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class entirely follows from the policy of squeezing out the capitalist elements and is a continuation of that policy at a new stage.

This thesis is inexact and therefore wrong. Of course, the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class could not have dropped from the skies. It was prepared by the whole preceding period of restriction and, hence, of squeezing of the capitalist elements out of the countryside. But still, that does not mean that it does not *radically* differ from the policy of restricting (and squeezing out) the capitalist elements of the countryside, that it is, as is asserted, a *continuation* of the policy of restriction. To assert what our author asserts means to deny the *turn* in the development of the countryside which began in the summer of 1929. To assert that means to deny that since that period we have accomplished a *change* in the rural policy of our Party. To assert that means to provide a certain ideological shelter for the Right elements in our Party, who are now clinging to the decision of the Fifteenth Congress as against the *new* policy of the Party, just as at one time Comrade Frumkin clung to the decision of the Fourteenth Congress as against the policy of setting up collective and Soviet farms.

On what assumption did the Fifteenth Congress proceed when it proclaimed the intensification of the policy of restricting (and eliminating) the capitalist elements of the countryside? On the assumption that, in spite of the restriction of the kulaks, the kulaks *as a class* for the time being *must remain. On this assumption* the Fifteenth Congress retained in force the law regarding the leasing of land, knowing very well that the mass of those who leased land were kulaks. *On this assumption* the Fifteenth Congress retained in force the law regarding the hiring of labour in the rural districts and demanded that it should be strictly observed. *On this assumption* the impermissibility of expropriating the kulaks was once more proclaimed. Do

these laws and these decisions contradict the policy of *restricting* (and squeezing out) the capitalist elements of the countryside? They certainly *do not*. Do these laws and these decisions contradict the policy of the *liquidation* of the kulaks as a class? They certainly *do*! Hence it follows that these laws and these decisions must now be laid aside in the districts of mass collectivisation, the area of which is extending daily and hourly. Incidentally, they have already been set aside by the very march of the collective farm movement in the regions of mass collectivisation.

After what has been said, can it be maintained that the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class is a *continuation* of the policy of restricting (and squeezing out) the capitalist elements of the countryside? Obviously not.

The author of the article forgets that it is impossible to eliminate the kulak class, as a class, by taxation measures and all other methods of restriction, while at the same time *leaving* in the hands of that class the means of production, with the right of freely using land, *retaining* in our practice the law on the hiring of labour in the rural districts, the law on the leasing of land, and the ban on the expropriation of the kulaks. The author forgets that, under the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks, we can count only on squeezing out individual sections of the kulaks, which fact does not contradict but, on the contrary, presumes the *retention* for the time being, of the kulaks as a class. In order to squeeze the kulaks out as a class, a policy of restricting and squeezing out individual sections of the kulaks is not enough. In order to squeeze the kulaks out as a class we must *break down* the resistance of this class in open fight and *deprive* it of the productive sources of its existence and development (the free use of land, means of production, leases, the right to hire labour, etc.). This marks the *turn* toward the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class. Without that, all talk of squeezing the kulaks out as a class is idle chatter, pleasing and profitable only to the Right deviationists. Without that, serious, not to speak of mass, collectivisation of the countryside is inconceivable. The poor and middle peasants in our village who are smashing up the kulaks and carrying out mass collectivisation have understood that quite well. Apparently, some of our comrades still fail to understand that.

Hence, the present policy of our Party in the village is not a *continuation* of the old policy, but a *change* from the old policy of *restricting* (and

squeezing out) the capitalist elements of the countryside to the new policy of *liquidating* the kulaks as a class.

Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 18, January 21, 1930.

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS

EVERYBODY is now talking of the successes achieved by the Soviet Government in the sphere of the collective farm movement. Even our enemies are compelled to admit important successes. And indeed these successes are considerable.

It is a fact that by February 29 of this year 50 per cent of the peasant farms of the U.S.S.R. had already been collectivised. That means that by February 20, 1930, we had *exceeded* the Five-Year Plan by more than 100 per cent.

It is a fact that by February 28 of this year the collective farms had *already* stored more than 36 million centners[1] of seed for the spring sowing, *i.e*. more than 90 per cent of the amount planned—about 220 million poods of seed. It cannot but be admitted that the storing of 220 million poods of seed by the collective farms alone—after the grain collection plan had been successfully fulfilled—is an enormous achievement.

What does all this show?

It shows that a radical swing of the village toward Socialism may already be regarded as guaranteed.

There is no need to prove that these successes are of first-class importance for the fate of our country, for the whole working class in its capacity as the leading force of our country, and, finally, for the Party itself. Apart from the direct practical results, these successes are of tremendous significance for the internal life of the Party itself, for the education of our Party. They inspire our Party with a spirit of confidence and faith in its own power. They arm the working class with faith in the victory of our cause. They bring to our Party new millions of reserves.

Hence follows the task of our Party: to *consolidate* the successes already achieved and to *make systematic use of them* for further advances.

But successes also have their seamy side; especially when they are achieved with comparative "ease," "unexpectedly," so to speak. Such successes at times induce a spirit of conceit and pride: "We can do anything!" "That's easy!" People frequently are intoxicated by such successes, they become dizzy with success, they lose all sense of proportion, they lose the faculty of understanding realities, they reveal a tendency to overestimate their own strength and to underestimate the strength of the enemy; reckless attempts are made to settle all the problems

of Socialist construction “in a trice.” There is no longer any concern for the *consolidation* of the successes achieved and for making *systematic use* of them for further advances. Why trouble about consolidating successes? We shall reach the complete victory of Socialism “in a trice,” anyhow—”We can do anything!” “That’s easy!”

Hence follows the task of the Party: to conduct a determined struggle against this dangerous frame of mind, which is so harmful for the cause, and to eradicate it from the Party.

It cannot be said that this frame of mind, dangerous and harmful for the cause, is widely prevalent in the ranks of our Party. But this frame of mind nevertheless exists in our Party and, moreover, there are no grounds for asserting that it will not become more widespread. And should this frame of mind acquire the rights of citizenship among us, there can be no doubt that the cause of the collective farm movement will be considerably weakened and the danger of the breakdown of that movement become imminent.

Hence follows the task of our Press: systematically to expose any such anti-Leninist frame of minds.

A few facts.

1. The success of our collective farm policy is to be explained, among other things, by the fact that this policy is based on the collective farm movement being a *voluntary* one and on the *recognition of the diversity of conditions* existing in the various regions of the Soviet Union. Collective farms cannot be set up by force. To do so would be stupid and reactionary. The collective farm movement must lean on the active support of the basic masses of the peasantry. Forms of collective farm construction in the developed regions cannot be mechanically transplanted to the backward regions. To do so would be stupid and reactionary. Such a “policy” would discredit the idea of collectivisation at one blow. In determining the speed and methods of building collective farms we must carefully take into account the diversity of conditions prevailing in the various regions of the Soviet Union

In the collective farm movement the grain-bearing regions stand ahead of all. Why? Because, firstly, it is in these regions that we have the largest number of Soviet and collective farms that have taken a solid foothold, thanks to which the peasants have been able to convince themselves of the strength and importance of the new technique, of the strength and importance of the new collective organisation of farming. Because,

secondly, these regions already have behind them two years of schooling in the fight against the kulaks during the grain collection campaigns, which could not but assist the cause of the collective farm movement. And because, finally, it is these regions that during the last few years have been most intensely supplied with the best cadres from the industrial centres.

Can it be said that these exceptionally favourable conditions exist in other districts, too—for instance, in the grain-importing regions, such as our northern oblasts[1], or in the regions of the still backward nationalities, such as, let us say, Turkestan?

No, it cannot.

It is obvious that the principle of taking into account the diverse conditions of the various regions of the Soviet Union, taken together with the voluntary principle, is one of the most important prerequisites for a sound collective farm movement.

But what do we sometimes find taking place in practice? Can it be said that the voluntary principle and the principle of taking local peculiarities into account are not violated in a number of regions? No, unfortunately, that cannot be said. It is known, for example, that a number of the northern regions of the grain-importing belt, where favourable conditions for the immediate organisation of collective farms are comparatively less than in the grain-bearing regions, not infrequently endeavour to *replace* the preparatory work for the organisation of collective farms by bureaucratically decreeing the collective farm movement, by paper resolutions regarding the growth of collective farms, by the organisation of collective farms "on paper," farms which in reality do not yet exist, but regarding the "existence" of which there is a pile of braggart resolutions. Or, let us take certain regions of Turkestan, where conditions favouring the immediate organisation of collective farms are even less than in the northern oblasts of the grain-importing belt. We know that in a number of regions of Turkestan there have already been attempts to "overtake and surpass" the advanced regions of the Soviet Union by resorting to threats of applying military force, by threatening to deprive the peasants who do not yet wish to enter the collective farms of irrigation water and of manufactured goods.

What relation is there between this Sergeant Prishibeiev[1] "policy" and the policy of the Party, which is based on the voluntary principle and on a

regard for local peculiarities in collective farm construction? It is obvious that they have nothing in common.

Who benefits by these distortions, this bureaucratic decreeing of the collective farm movement, this wretched threatening of the peasants? Nobody but our enemies!

What may be the result of these distortions? The strengthening of our enemies and the discrediting of the collective farm movement idea.

Is it not obvious that the authors of these distortions, who think they are Lefts, are in fact bringing grist to the mill of the Right opportunists?

2. One of the greatest merits of the political strategy of our Party consists in the fact that it is able at any given moment to pick out the *key link* in a movement, and by seizing hold of this link it is able to swing the whole chain towards one common aim and thus attain the solution of the task in hand. Can it be said that the Party has already picked out the key link in the collective farm movement and in the system of collective farm construction? Yes, that can and should be said.

What is this key link?

Is it the *Associations for Joint Tillage*? No, it is not. The Associations for Joint Tillage, in which the means of production are not yet socialised, represent a stage in the collective farm movement which has already been passed.

Is it, perhaps, the *agricultural communes*? No, it is not the agricultural communes. The communes are still isolated phenomena in the collective farm movement. The conditions are not yet ripe for the agricultural communes as the *predominant* form, in which not only all production but distribution also is socialised.

The key link in the collective farm movement, its *predominant* form at the present moment, which we have now to seize hold of, is the *agricultural artel*.

In the *agricultural artel* the basic means of production, mainly in grain cultivation, are collectivised—labour, the use of the soil, machines and other implements, draught animals, farm buildings. But in the artel small household gardens (vegetable, fruit), living premises, a certain portion of the milch cows, small livestock, domestic poultry, etc., are *not collectivised*. The artel is *the key link of the collective farm movement*, because it is the most expedient form of solving the grain problem. The grain problem, on the other hand, is the key link in the whole agricultural system because

unless that is solved it is impossible to solve either the problem of animal-raising (large and small livestock) or the problem of producing technical and special crops which provide the basic supplies of raw materials for industry. That is why the agricultural artel is at the present moment the key link in the system of the collective farm movement.

It is on this that the "Model Statutes" for collective farms—the final text of which is being published to-day—is based.

It is from this that our Party and Soviet workers must start, and it is their duty to make a thorough study of these statutes and carry them into practice completely.

That is the line of the Party at the present moment.

Can it be said that this line is being carried out without infractions and distortions? No, unfortunately it cannot. You know that in a number of regions of the Soviet Union, where the struggle for the existence of the collective farms is still far from completed, and where the artels are not yet consolidated, attempts are being made to skip the artels and to form agricultural communes from the outset. The artel is not yet consolidated, and they are already "collectivising" living premises, small livestock, and domestic poultry; and this sort of "collectivisation" degenerates into bureaucratic paper decrees, for the conditions which would make such collectivisation necessary do not yet exist. One might think that the grain problem is already solved in the collective farms, that it is a stage already passed, that the main task at the present moment is not to solve the grain problem, but to solve the problem of animal and poultry raising. One asks oneself who benefits by this blockheaded "work" of throwing into one heap the various forms of the collectivisation movement. The question arises: Who benefits by this supid and harmful precipitancy? Irritating the peasant collective farm member by "collectivising" living premises, all the milch cattle, all the small livestock, and the domestic poultry, when the grain problem *is still unsolved*, when the artel form of the collective farm is not yet *consolidated*—is it not obvious that such a "policy" can please and benefit only our sworn enemies? One such fiery "collectiviser" even went so far as to issue an instruction to the artel ordering "that within three days every single head of poultry in every household be registered," that special "commanders" be appointed to register and supervise, "to occupy the key positions in the artel," "to lead the fight for Socialism, without quitting their posts," and—of course—to seize the whole artel by the throat. What do you

call that—a policy of leading the collective farm or a policy of *disintegrating and discrediting it*? I will not speak of those "revolutionaries"—save the mark!—who *begin* the work of organising an artel by removing the church bells. Just think of it—to remove the church bells, is not this r-r-revolutionary!

How could such blockheaded exercises in "collectivisation," such ludicrous attempts to lift oneself by one's own bootstraps—attempts the purpose of which is to ignore classes and the class struggle, but which in practice bring grist to the mill of our class enemies—occur in our midst? They could occur only because of the atmosphere of "easy" and "unexpected" successes that has prevailed on the front of collective farm construction. They could occur only as a result of the blockhead frame of mind prevailing in the ranks of a section of our Party: "We can do anything!" "That's easy!" They could occur only as a result of the fact that certain of our comrades became dizzy with success, and for a while lost clear-mindedness and sober vision.

In order to straighten out the line of our work in the sphere of building collective farms *we must put an end to this frame of mind*.

That is now one of the immediate tasks of the Party.

The art of leadership is a serious matter. One must not lag behind a movement, because to do so is to become isolated from the masses. But one must not rush ahead, for to rush ahead is to lose contact with the masses. He who wishes to lead a movement, and at the same time keep touch with the vast masses, must conduct a fight on two fronts—against those who lag behind and against those who rush on ahead.

Our Party is strong and invincible because, while leading the movement, it knows how to maintain and multiply its contacts with the millions of the worker and peasant masses.

Pravda, No. 60, March 2, 1930.

[1] Centner = one-tenth part of a metric ton, equal to 220.46 lb.—Ed.

[1] Oblast, a large administrative unit.—Ed.

[1] A personage of one of Tchekhov's tales, who introduces into private life the manners of the barracks and drill ground.—Ed.

REPLY TO COMRADES ON THE COLLECTIVE FARMS

IT will be known from the newspapers that Stalin's article "Dizzy with Success" and the well-known decision of the Central Committee regarding "The Fight Against Distortions of the Party Line in the Collective Farm Movement" have called forth numerous responses from among the ranks of practical workers in the collective farm movement. In this connection I recently received a number of letters from comrades, collective farmers, calling upon me to reply to the questions contained in them. It was my duty to reply to the letters in private correspondence; but that proved to be impossible, since more than half the letters received did not have the addresses of the writers (they forgot to send their addresses). Nevertheless, the questions raised in these letters are of tremendous political interest for all our comrades. Moreover, I could not, of course, leave unanswered the letters of those comrades who forgot to send their addresses. In view of this I found myself faced with the necessity of replying to the comrades from the collective farms in an open letter, *i.e*. in the Press, taking from their letters all the questions necessary for the purpose. I did this all the more willingly since I had a direct decision of the Central Committee to this purpose.

FIRST QUESTION: Wherein lies the *root* of the errors committed in the peasant question?

ANSWER: In an incorrect approach to the middle peasant; in the employment of forcible methods in the economic relations with the middle peasant; in forgetfulness of the fact that the economic *smychka* (bond) with the masses of middle peasants must be built up not on forcible measures, but on agreement with the middle peasant, on an alliance with the middle peasant; in forgetfulness of the fact that the foundation of the collective farm movement at the present moment is an alliance of the working class and the poor peasants with the middle peasants against capitalism in general, and against the kulaks in particular.

As long as the attack was directed against the kulaks in a united front with the middle peasant, all was well. But when certain of our comrades, intoxicated by success, began imperceptibly to slide from the path of attack

on the kulak to the path of a fight against the middle peasant; when, in the pursuit of high percentages of collectivisation, they began to apply forcible methods to the middle peasant, depriving him of the franchise, "dekulakising" and expropriating him, the attack began to assume distorted forms, the united front with the middle peasant began to be undermined, and naturally the kulak was able once more to try to get on to his feet.

It was forgotten that force, which is essential and beneficial in the fight against our class enemies, is impermissible and fatal when applied to the middle peasant, who is our ally.

It was forgotten that cavalry sorties, which are essential and beneficial in the solving of military problems, are unwarranted and fatal in solving problems of collective farm construction, which, moreover, is being organised in alliance with the middle peasant.

Therein lies the root of the errors committed in the peasant question.

This is what Lenin says on the question of economic relations with the middle peasant:

> Primarily, we must depend on the truth that here, by the very nature of the case, nothing can be obtained by forcible methods. The economic task here is something entirely different. Here there is not that pinnacle, which can be removed, while leaving the foundation and the whole buildings intact. That pinnacle, which in the town was the capitalists, does not exist there. *To act here by force would be to ruin the whole cause…. There is no greater folly than the very idea of applying force in the sphere of economic relations with the middle peasant* (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 168).

And further on he says:

> *Violence as against the middle peasant is the greatest of evils*. This is a multitudinous stratum, numbering many millions. Even in Europe, where nowhere does the middle peasant attain such strength, where technique and culture, city life and railways have received gigantic development, where it would have been easier to think of such a thing, no one, not even the most revolutionary of Socialists, has ever proposed the employment of forcible measures with regard to the middle peasant (*Ibid*., p. 167).

Clear, I should think.

SECOND QUESTION: What are the chief errors committed in the collective farm movement?

ANSWER: There are at least three such errors.

1. Lenin's voluntary principle in the construction of collective farms has been violated. The basic instructions of the Party and the Model Statutes for agricultural artels concerning the voluntary principle in collective farm construction have been violated.

Leninism teaches that the peasants have to be led into the path of collective farming voluntarily by convincing them of the superiority of social collective farming over individual farming. Leninism teaches that the peasants can be convinced of the superiority of collective farming only if it is *demonstrated* and *proven* to them in practice, by experience, that the collective farm is better than the individual farm, that it is more profitable than the individual farm, and that the collective farm offers a way of escape to the peasantry, the poor and middle peasant, from poverty and want. Leninism teaches that unless these conditions are observed the collective farms cannot be stable. Leninism teaches that every attempt to impose collective farming by force, every attempt to set up collective farms by compulsion, can only produce negative results, can only repel the peasants from the collective farm movement.

And, indeed, as long as this basic rule was observed, the collective farm movement achieved success after success. But certain of our comrades, intoxicated by success, began to neglect this rule, began to display excessive precipitancy, and in the chase after high percentages of collectivisation began to set up collective farms by means of compulsion. No wonder the negative consequences of this "policy" soon revealed themselves. The collective farms which arose so suddenly began to dissolve as rapidly as they arose, and a section of the peasants who had but recently entertained tremendous confidence in the collective farms began to turn away from them.

That is the first and chief error committed in the collective farm movement.

This is what Lenin says regarding the voluntary principle in collective farm construction:

> Our task is now to pass to *communal* cultivation of the soil, to *large-scale* common farming. But there must be no compulsion on the part of the Soviet

> Government. There is no law which enforces this. The agricultural *commune* must be founded *voluntarily*, the transition to *communal cultivation* of the soil must be *exclusively voluntary*. There cannot be the slightest compulsion in this respect on the part of the Workers' and Peasants' Government, nor is it permitted by law. If any of you have observed any such compulsion, you must know that it is an abuse, that it is a violation of the law, which we are endeavouring by every effort to correct, and shall correct (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 43).

And further on he says:

> Only if we succeed in practice in *demonstrating* to the peasants the advantages of communal, collective, joint, and artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasants, with the aid of joint artel farms, only then will the working class, which holds the power of the State in its hands, really prove to the peasants that it is right, will really win over to its side, firmly and permanently, the many millions of the peasant masses. Therefore the importance of any undertaking which assists joint artel agriculture cannot be exaggerated. We have millions of individual farms, scattered far and wide throughout the country…. Only when *practically*, *by experience*, in a way understandable to the peasants, it is *proven* that the transition to joint artel agriculture is essential and feasible, only then shall we be entitled to say that in so vast a peasant country as Russia an important step along the path of Socialist agriculture has been accomplished (*Ibid*., pp. 579–580).

Finally, one more quotation from the Works of Lenin:

> While encouraging co-operatives of every kind, as well as agricultural communes of middle peasants, the representatives of the Soviet Government must not permit the *slightest compulsion* in their creation. Only such combinations are valuable as are brought about by the peasants themselves, by their own free will, and the advantages they have are proved to themselves in practice. *Excessive haste in this matter is harmful*, since it can only intensify the prejudice of the middle peasants against innovations. Any representatives of the Soviet Government who permit themselves to apply, not merely direct, but even indirect compulsion, with the object of bringing the peasants into the communes, must be called to most strict account and removed from work in the rural districts (*Ibid*., p. 174).

Clear, I should think.

It need hardly be said that the Party will carry out these instructions of Lenin with the utmost rigour.

2. The Leninist principle of taking into account the variety of conditions prevailing in the various regions of the Soviet Union has been violated in regard to collective farm construction. It has been forgotten that the most diverse regions exist in the Soviet Union, with differing economic forms and levels of culture. It has been forgotten that among them there are advanced, medium, and backward regions. It has been forgotten that the pace of the collective farm movement and the methods of collective farm construction *cannot be identical* in these far from identical regions.

Lenin says:

> It would be a mistake for comrades to write stereotyped decrees for all parts of Russia, and for Bolshevik-Communists, Soviet workers in the Ukraine and on the Don, to extend them wholesale, and without discrimination, to other regions … for "in no case do we bind ourselves by a uniform stereotype, we do not decide once and for all time that our experience, the experience of Central Russia, can be completely transferred to all the outlying districts (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, pp.125–126).

Further, Lenin says:

> It would be the greatest folly to stereotype Central Russia, the Ukraine, Siberia, to subject them to a certain stereotyped formula (*Ibid*., Russian edition, Vol. XXVI, p. 243).

Finally, Lenin says that the duty of the Communists of the Caucasus

> is to understand the peculiarities of the situation in their republic which differs from the situation in the R.S.F.S.R., to understand the necessity of not imitating our tactics, but of intelligently modifying them in accordance with the development of the definite conditions (*Ibid*., p. 191).

Clear, I should think.

Acting on these instructions of Lenin, the Central Committee of our Party, in its decision on "The *Tempo* of Collectivisation" (*Pravda*, January 6, 1930), divided up the regions of the Soviet Union, from the point of view of rates of *tempo* of collectivisation, into three groups, of which the North Caucasus, the Middle Volga, and the Lower Volga may complete the

process of collectivisation, in the main, by the spring of 1931; the other grain-producing regions (the Ukraine, the Central Black Earth Region, Siberia, the Urals, Kazakstan, etc.) may complete it, in the main, by the spring of 1932; whereas the remaining regions may extend the period of completing the process of collectivisation to the end of the five-year period, *i.e*. until 1933.

Clear, I should think.

But what do we find in practice? It appears that certain of our comrades, intoxicated by the first successes achieved in the collective farm movement, managed to forget both the instructions of Lenin and the decision of the Central Committee. The Moscow Oblast, in its feverish pursuit of swollen figures of collectivisation, began to direct its functionaries to complete the process of collectivisation in the spring of 1930, although it had not less than three years at its disposal (until the end of 1932). The Central Black Earth Oblast, not desiring to be "left behind," began to direct its functionaries to complete the process of collectivisation in the first half of 1930, although it had no less than two years at its disposal (to the end of 1931). And the Caucasians and Turkestanians, in their zeal "to overtake and outstrip" the advanced regions, set out to complete the process of collectivisation in "the shortest possible period," although they had fully four years at their disposal (to the end of 1933). It goes without saying that, with such a quickfire *tempo* of collectivisation, the regions which were less prepared for the collective farm movement, in their zeal to "surpass" the more prepared regions, found themselves obliged to resort to intense administrative pressure, and endeavoured to substitute the factors that were lacking for a rapid *tempo* of development of the collective farm movement by their own administrative zeal. You know the results. Everybody knows the confusion which resulted in those regions, which had subsequently to be disentangled by the intervention of the Central Committee.

Therein lies the second error committed in the collective farm movement.

3. The Leninist principle that it is not permissible to skip an uncompleted phase of a movement was violated in regard to collective farm construction. The Leninist principle of not racing ahead of the development of the masses, of not decreeing the movement of the masses, of not isolating oneself from the masses, but of moving together with the masses and of leading them forward, of guiding them towards our slogans, and of assisting

them in convincing themselves by their own experience of the correctness of our slogans, was violated.

> When the Petrograd proletariat and the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison seized power, they were perfectly well aware that constructive work in the countryside would encounter great difficulties; that there one would have to proceed more gradually; that to attempt to introduce the common cultivation of the soil by decrees and legislation would be the height of folly; that only an insignificant number of intelligent peasants would agree to this, while the vast majority of the peasants did not desire it. We therefore confined ourselves to what was absolutely essential in the interests of the development of the Revolution; in no circumstance to outrun the development of the masses, but to wait until these masses themselves move forward as a result of their own experience and their own struggles (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIII, p. 252).

Proceeding from these directions of Lenin, the Central Committee, in its decision on "The *Tempo* of Collectivisation," recognised (*a*) that the chief form of the collective farm movement at the present time is the agricultural artel; (*b*) that, in view of this fact, it was necessary to draw up Model Statutes for the agricultural artel as the chief form of collective farm movement; and (*c*) that "decreeing" the collective farm movement from above and "playing at collectivisation" must not be permitted in our practical work.

That means that at present we must direct our course, not towards the commune, but towards the agricultural artel, as the chief form of collective farm construction; that we must now allow any skipping over the agricultural artel directly into the commune, and that the mass movement of the peasants must not be replaced by "decreeing" collective farms or "playing at collective farms."

Clear, I should think.

But what actually took place in practice? It appeared that certain of our comrades, intoxicated by the first successes achieved in the collective farm movement, forgot completely both the directions of Lenin and the decision of the Central Committee. Instead of organising a mass movement in favour of the agricultural artel, these comrades began to "transfer" the individual peasants directly to the statutes of the commune. Instead of consolidating the artel form of the movement, they began to "communalise" by compulsory measures the small livestock, poultry, non-commodity milch

cattle, and dwelling-houses. The results of this precipitancy, unforgivable in a Leninist, are now known to all. As a rule, well-established communes were, of course, not created. And, on the other hand, they lost control of a number of agricultural artels. It is true "good" resolutions remained; but what is the use of them?

Therein lies the third error committed in the collective farm movement.

THIRD QUESTION: How could these mistakes have arisen, and how must the Party correct them?

ANSWER: They arose out of the rapid successes we achieved in the sphere of the collective farm movement. Success sometimes turns people's heads. It sometimes engenders excessive self-opinion and conceit. That may easily happen to the representatives of a Party which holds power, especially in the case of our Party, the strength and authority of which are almost immeasurable. Here, cases of Communist conceit, against which Lenin fought so fiercely, may very easily occur. Here belief in the omnipotence of decrees, resolutions, and orders is quite possible. Here there is a real danger of the revolutionary measures of the Party being transformed into empty, bureaucratic decreeing by individual representatives of the Party in this or that corner of our vast country. I have in mind not only local functionaries, but even certain Regional Committee members, and even certain members of the Central Committee. "Communist conceit," said Lenin, "means that an individual, who is a member of the Communist Party and has not yet been cleaned out of the Party, imagines that he can perform all his duties by Communist decrees" (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVII, pp. 50–51).

That is the soil from which sprang the errors in the collective farm movement, the distortions of the Party line in the matter of collective farm construction.

Wherein lies the danger of these errors and distortions, should they further continue and not be liquidated rapidly and without a trace?

The danger here is that these errors lead us by direct route to the discrediting of the collective farm movement, to the alienation of the middle peasant, to the disorganisation of the poor peasant, to the confusion of our ranks, to the weakening of our whole Socialist construction, and to the restoration of the kulak. Briefly, these errors have a tendency to push us off the path of consolidating the alliance with the main masses of the

peasantry, the path of consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, on to the path of a rupture with these masses, on to the path of undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This danger made itself evident even in the latter half of February, at the very moment when a section of our comrades, blinded by their previous successes, started at a gallop away from the path of Leninism. The Central Committee of the Party realised this danger and did not delay intervening, instructing Stalin to warn the erring comrades in an article on the collective farm movement. Some people believe that the article, "Dizzy with Success," is the result of the personal initiative of Stalin. That is nonsense, of course. Our Central Committee does not exist in order to permit the personal initiative of anybody, whoever it may be, in matters of this kind. It was a reconnaissance on the part of the Central Committee. And when the depth and seriousness of the errors were established, the Central Committee did not hesitate to strike against these errors with the full force of its authority, and accordingly issued its famous decision of March 15, 1930.

It is difficult to stop in mid-course people who are heading madly for a precipice, and to divert them to the right path. But our Central Committee is called the Central Committee of the Leninist Party for the very reason that it is able to master such, and not only such, difficulties. And, fundamentally, these difficulties have already been mastered.

It is difficult in such cases for whole sections of the Party to stop their rush, turn to divert to the right path, and to reform their ranks while on the march. But our Party is called the Party of Lenin for the very reason that it possesses sufficient flexibility to overcome such difficulties. And, fundamentally, it has already mastered these difficulties.

The main thing in this matter is to have the courage to admit one's errors and to have the strength to correct them in the shortest possible time. The fear of admitting one's errors after the recent intoxication by successes, the fear of self-criticism, unwillingness to correct one's errors rapidly and decisively—that is the main difficulty. It is worth while mastering these difficulties; it is worth while casting aside swollen figures and bureaucratic maximalism; it is worth while switching our attention over to the tasks of organisational and economic construction of the collective farms, in order that not a trace of these errors shall remain. There is no reason whatsoever for doubting that, fundamentally, the Party has already mastered this alarming difficulty.

> All revolutionary parties [Lenin said] that have hitherto perished, perished from the fact that they got a *swelled head* and were unable to see where their strength lay, and *were afraid to speak of their own weaknesses*. But we shall not perish, because we are not afraid to speak of our weaknesses, and we shall learn how to overcome our weaknesses. (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, pp. 260–261).

These words of Lenin must not be forgotten.

FOURTH QUESTION: Is not the fight against distortions of the Party line a step backward, a retreat?

ANSWER: Of course not! Only those who regard the continuation of mistakes and distortions an advance, and the fight against errors as a retreat, can argue that this was a retreat. To advance by piling up mistakes and distortions is a fine "advance" indeed!

We proposed the agricultural artel as the basic form of the collective farm movement at the present moment, and provided Model Statutes for that purpose, as a guide in the work of collective farm construction. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

We proposed that the productive ties between the working class and the poor peasants and the middle peasants, as the basis for the collective farm movement at the present moment, be consolidated. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

We advanced the slogan of liquidation of the kulaks as a class as the main slogan in our practical rural work at the present moment. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

In January, 1930, we adopted a certain *tempo* of collectivisation of the agriculture of the Soviet Union, dividing up all the oblasts into a number of groups and determining the speed of development for each group. Are we retreating from that? Of course not!

Where, in all this, is there a "retreat" by the Party?

We want those who committed errors and distortions to retreat from their errors. We want the muddle-heads to retreat from their muddle-headedness to the Leninist position. We want that, because only if that is done shall we be able to continue the real advance against our class enemies. Does that mean that we are taking a step backward? Of course not! It only means that we want to conduct a *proper* attack, and not engage in a muddle-headed pretence of an attack.

Is it not obvious that only fools and Left twisters can regard this line of the Party as a retreat?

Those who talk this nonsense about a retreat fail to understand at least two things.

1. They do not know the laws of advance. They do not understand that an advance *without consolidating* the positions already captured is an advance doomed to failure. When can an advance be successful, in the military sphere, let us say? When the advancing force does not confine itself simply to moving forward headlong, but tries at the same time to *consolidate* the positions captured, to *regroup* its forces in accordance with the changed circumstances, to *strengthen* the rear, and to *bring up* reserves. Why is all that necessary? As a protection against surprises, in order to close up possible breaches in the line of attack, which may happen in every advance, and thus to prepare for the complete liquidation of the enemy. The mistake the Polish armies made in 1929, if we take only the military side of the matter, was that they ignored this rule. That, among other reasons, is why, having advanced headlong to Kiev, they were obliged to retreat in a no less headlong manner to Warsaw. The mistake the Soviet forces made in 1920, again if we take only the military side of the question, was that, in their advance on Warsaw, they repeated the error committed by the Poles.

The same is true of the laws of advance on the front of the class struggle. It is impossible to conduct a successful advance with the purpose of liquidating the class enemies *without consolidating* the positions already captured, without *regrouping* the forces, without supplying the front with *reserves*, and without bringing up the *rear*, etc.

The whole point of the matter is that the muddle-heads do not understand the laws of advance. The whole point of the matter is that the Party *does* understand them and carries them out in practice.

2. They do not understand the class nature of the attack. They talk loudly about attack. But an attack on *which* class, and in alliance with *which* class? We are conducting an attack on the capitalist elements of the countryside in alliance with the middle peasant, for only such an attack can assure us victory. But what is to be done when, in their onrush, certain sections of the Party begin to divert the attack from its right direction and to turn its edge against our ally, against the middle peasant? Is it *any kind* of attack we want, and not an attack against a definite class, in alliance with a definite class? Don Quixote also imagined he was attacking enemies when he

attacked windmills. But we know that he only got a bruised head from this apology for an attack.

Apparently our "Left" distortionists are envious of the laurels of Don Quixote.

FIFTH QUESTION: What is the chief danger, the Right or the "Left"?

ANSWER: The chief danger is the Right danger. The Right danger was, and still is, the chief danger.

Does not this thesis contradict the thesis contained in the decision of the Central Committee of March 15, 1930, to the effect that the errors and distortions of the "Left" distortionists is now the main hindrance to the collective farm movement? No, there is no contradiction. The fact of the matter is that the errors of the "Left" distortionists in the domain of the collective farm movement are of a kind which create favourable conditions for the intensification and strengthening of the Right deviation in the Party. Why? Because these errors represent the line of the Party in a false light—that is, they make it easier to discredit the Party—and, therefore, they facilitate the struggle of the Right elements against the leadership of the Party. Discrediting the Party leadership is the very elementary basis on which alone the fight of the Right deviationists against the Party can develop. The "Left" distortionists, their mistakes and distortions, provide the Right deviationists with this basis. Therefore, in order to combat Right opportunism successfully, we must overcome the errors of the "Left" opportunists. Objectively, the "Left" distortionists are the allies of the Right deviationists.

Such is the peculiar connection between the "Left" opportunists and the Right deviationists.

And it is this connection that explains the fact that certain "Lefts" so often talk of a *bloc* with the Rights. This also explains the peculiar phenomenon that a section of the "Lefts," who only yesterday were "carrying out" rush attacks and tried to collectivise the Soviet Union in some two or three weeks, have to-day fallen into a state of passivity, have thrown up the sponge, and have completely vacated the field in favour of the Right deviationists, thereby taking up a line of real retreat (without quotation marks) in the face of the kulaks!

The peculiar feature of the present situation is that the fight against the errors of the "Left" distortionists is a condition and a specific form of the

successful struggle against Right opportunism.

SIXTH QUESTION: What significance is to be attached to the fact that a section of the peasants have withdrawn from the collective farms?

ANSWER: The withdrawal of a section of the peasants signifies that of late a certain number of unstable collective farms have sprung up, which are now being cleansed of their unstable elements. That means that fake collective farms will disappear, while the well-established farms will remain and become stronger. I regard this as an entirely normal phenomenon. Some comrades fall into despair over this, they fall into a panic and convulsively cling to exaggerated percentages. Others gloat over this fact, and prophesy the "collapse" of the collective farm movement. Both, however, are profoundly mistaken. Both are very far from a Marxist understanding of the essential meaning of the collective farm movement.

In the first place, it is the so-called "deadsouls"[1] that are leaving the collective farms. It is not so much a withdrawal as an exposure of a vacuum. Do we need these deadsouls? Of course not. In my opinion, the North Caucasians and the Ukrainians are acting quite correctly by dissolving the collective farms which are made up of deadsouls, and are organising really live and really stable collective farms. The collective farm movement will only benefit thereby.

In the second place, it is the alien elements that are leaving the collective farms, elements directly hostile to the cause. Obviously, the sooner these elements are kicked out, the better for the collective farm movement.

And, finally, it is the wavering elements that are leaving, those who can be regarded neither as alien nor as deadsouls. These are the peasants whom we are *to-day* still unable to convince of the correctness of our cause, but whom we shall certainly convince *to-morrow*. The withdrawal of these peasants is a serious, although temporary, loss to the collective farm movement. Hence, the struggle for these wavering elements is now one of the most urgent tasks of the collective farm movement.

It follows, therefore, that the withdrawal of a certain section of the peasants from the collective farms is to be regarded not only as a negative phenomenon. It follows that, inasmuch as their withdrawal cleans the collective farms of so many deadsouls and of downright alien elements, it represents a beneficial process which sanitises and strengthens the collective farms.

A month ago it was estimated that over 60 per cent of the farms in the grain-bearing regions were collectivised. It is now clear that, as far as real and in any way solid collective farms are concerned, this figure was obviously exaggerated. If, after the withdrawal of a section of the peasants, the collective farm movement stabilises at 40 per cent collectivisation in the grain-bearing regions—and that is certainly an attainable figure—it will be a great achievement for the collective farm movement at the present moment. I am taking the average figure for the grain-bearing regions, knowing very well that there are districts where mass collectivisation has been achieved, covering from 80 to 90 per cent of the farms. Forty per cent collectivisation in the grain-bearing regions means that we have been able by the spring of 1930 to fulfil the original Five-Year Plan of collectivisation *twice over*.

Who dares to deny the *decisive* character of this *historical* achievement in the Socialist development of the Soviet Union?

SEVENTH QUESTION: Are the wavering elements acting rightly in leaving the collective farms?

ANSWER: No, they are not acting rightly. In leaving the collective farms they are acting contrary to their own interests, for only the collective farms offer the peasants a way out of their poverty and wretchedness. By leaving the collective farms they place themselves in a worse position, for they deprive themselves of the facilities and benefits which the Soviet Government offers the collective farms. The mistakes and distortions committed in the collective farms are not an excuse for leaving them. Mistakes must be corrected by united effort, and by staying in the collective farms. And it will be all the easier to correct them, since the Soviet Government will fight them with all the forces at its disposal.

Lenin says:

> The system of small farming under commodity production is not capable of saving humanity from the poverty of the masses and from their oppression (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XX, p. 418).

Lenin says:

> Small farming cannot help to abolish poverty (*Ibid*., Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 540).

Lenin says:

> If we continue to remain as of old in small farms, even though we remain in them as free citizens on free land, we shall be faced by inevitable ruin (*Ibid*., Russian edition, Vol. XX, p. 417).

Lenin says:

> Only with the help of joint, artel, co-operative labour can we escape from the blind alley into which the imperialist war has driven us (*Ibid*., p. 587).

Lenin says:

> It is necessary to adopt common cultivation in large-scale model farms, for without that it will be impossible to escape from the devastation, from the really desperate situation in which Russia finds itself (*Ibid*., p. 418).

What does that all signify?

It signifies that the collective farm is the *sole* means by which the peasant can escape from want and wretchedness.

It is obvious that the peasants are not acting rightly in leaving the collective farms.

Lenin says:

> The Soviet Government *attaches tremendous importance* to the commune, the artel, and any other kind of organisation directed towards the transformation, to the gradual promotion of the transformation of the small individual peasant farm into a communal, co-operative, or artel farm (*Ibid*., Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 578).

Lenin says:

> The Soviet Government has given *direct preference* to the communes and co-operatives, placing them in the first place (*Ibid*., Russian edition, Vol. XXIII, p. 399).

What does that mean?

It means that the Soviet Government will offer the collective farms facilities and advantages over the individual farms. It means that it will grant the collective farms facilities in respect of land, the supply of

machines, tractors, seed grain, etc., in respect of tax alleviation and in respect of credits.

Why does the Soviet Government grant advantages and facilities to the collective farms?

Because the collective farm is the only means of saving the peasants from poverty.

Because preferential aid to the collective farms represents the most effective form of aid to the poor and middle peasants.

The other day the Soviet Government decided to *exempt* from taxation *for two years* all communalised draught animalised in the collective farms (horses, oxen, etc.), and all cows, pigs, sheep, and poultry both in the collective possession of the collective farms and in the individual possession of the collective farm members.

In addition, the Soviet Government decided to *extend* the repayment of credits granted to collective farms until the end of the year, and to *waive* all fines and court penalties imposed prior to April 1 on all peasants who have joined collective farms.

Finally, it decided to advance credits to the collective farms in the present year to the amount of 500 million rubles.

These facilities will go to assist peasants belonging to collective farms. These facilities will assist those peasant members of collective farms who withstood the wave of withdrawals from the collective farms, who have become tempered in the fight against the enemies of the collective farms, who have defended the collective farms, and who have kept the great banner of the collective farm movement flying. These facilities will go to assist the poor and middle-peasant members of the collective farms, who now form the main kernel of our collective farms, who are strengthening and moulding our collective farms, and who will win over to the side of Socialism millions and millions of peasants. These facilities will go to assist the peasant members of the collective farms who now form the fundamental cadres of the collective farms, and who fully deserve to be called heroes of the collective farm movement.

These facilities *will not* be *granted* to the peasants who have withdrawn from the collective farms.

Is it not obvious that the peasants who leave the collective farms are committing a mistake?

Is it not obvious that only by rejoining the collective farms will they obtain these facilities?

EIGHTH QUESTION: What about the communes, ought they not to be dissolved?

ANSWER: No, they ought not, and there is no reason why they should be. I refer to real communes, and not to those that exist only on paper. In the grain-bearing regions of the Soviet Union there are a number of excellent communes that deserve to be encouraged and supported. I have in mind those old communes that have survived years of trial, and have become tempered in the fight and have fully justified their existence. As regards the new communes that have been formed only recently, they will be able to continue to exist only if they have been organised *voluntarily*, with the active support of the peasants and without *compulsory* socialisation of the means of life.

The organisation and administration of communes is a complicated and difficult matter. Large and well-established communes can exist and develop only if they possess experienced cadres and tried leaders. Quickfire transition from the statutes of the artel to the statutes of the commune can only drive the peasants away from the collective farm movement. Accordingly, this matter must be treated with exceptional seriousness and without precipitancy of any kind. The artel is a simpler affair and more easily understood by the broad mass of the peasants. Hence, the artel is the most widespread form of the collective farm movement at the present time. Only as the agricultural artels become stronger and consolidated will the soil be prepared for a mass movement of the peasants toward the communes. Therefore, the communes, which represent a higher form, can become the key link in the collective farm movement only in the future.

NINTH QUESTION: What is to be done with the kulak?

ANSWER: So far we have spoken only of the middle peasant. The middle peasant is an ally of the working class, and our policy towards him must be a friendly one. The case of the kulak is different. The kulak is an enemy of the Soviet Government. There is not and cannot be peace between him and us. Our policy toward the kulak is to liquidate him as a class. That, of course, does not mean that we can liquidate him at one stroke. But it does

mean that we shall proceed in such a way as to encircle him and liquidate him.

This is what Lenin says on the subject of the kulak:

> The kulaks are the most brutal, most ruthless, and most savage of exploiters, who more than once in the history of other countries have restored the power of the landlords, Tsars, priests, and capitalists. The kulaks are more numerous than the landlords and capitalists. Nevertheless, the kulaks are a minority of the population…. During the war these bloodsuckers grew rich out of the poverty of the people; they accumulated thousands and hundreds of thousands of rubles by forcing up the price of bread and other products. These spiders grew fat at the expense of the peasants ruined by the war, at the expense of the starving workers. These leeches sucked the blood of the toilers, becoming richer the more the workers in the towns and in the factories starved. These vampires grabbed, and are continuing to grab, the estates of the landlords; they are again and again enslaving the poor peasants (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXIII, pp. 206–207).

We have tolerated these bloodsuckers, spiders, and vampires, pursuing a policy of restricting their exploiting tendencies. We tolerated them because there was nothing to replace the kulak farms, nothing to replace kulak production. We are now in a position to replace, and more than replace, their farms by collective and Soviet farms. There is no longer any reason to tolerate these spiders and bloodsuckers. To tolerate these spiders and bloodsuckers, who are burning down collective farms, murdering the advocates of collective farming, and attempting to undermine the sowing campaign, any longer would be to go against the interests of the workers and the peasants.

Hence, the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class must be pursued with all the firmness and consistency of which Bolsheviks are capable.

TENTH QUESTION: What are the immediate practical tasks of the collective farms?

ANSWER: The immediate practical tasks of the collective farms are to carry through the sowing campaign, to fight for the largest possible extension of the ploughed area, to fight for the best organisation of the sowing campaign.

All other tasks of the collective farms must now be made to conform to the task of sowing.

All other work in the collective farms must now be subordinated to the work of organising the sowing.

That means that the stability of the collective farms and the stamina of their active non-Party members, the capacity of the collective farm leaders and the Bolshevik core among them, will be tested not by high-sounding resolutions and pompous greetings, but by the vital work of correctly organising the sowing.

But in order to fulfil this practical task with credit, the attention of the collective farm leaders must be directed toward the *economic* problems of collective farm construction, toward the problems of the *internal* construction of the collective farms.

Until quite recently, collective farm leaders were mainly concerned with chasing after high figures of collectivisation, while at the same time they refused to see the difference between real collectivisation and collectivisation on paper. This passion for figures must now be abandoned. The attention of the officials must now be concentrated on *strengthening* the collective farms, upon the organisational *moulding* of the collective farms, on *organising* the practical work of the collective farms.

Until quite recently, the attention of collective farm officials was concentrated on the organisation of large collective farm units, on the organisation of the so-called "giants." And not infrequently these "giants" developed into huge red tape headquarters, devoid of economic roots in the villages. Window-dressing swallowed up practical work. This passion for window-dressing must now be abandoned. Attention must now be concentrated on the organisational and economic work of the collective farms in the villages. When this work begins to show the required results the "giants" will appear of themselves.

Until quite recently, little attention was directed toward getting the middle peasants to take a leading part in the work of the collective farms. Yet, as a matter of fact, there are excellent farmers among the middle peasants capable of becoming excellent administrators in the construction of collective farms. This defect in our work must now be removed. Our duty now is to attract to the controlling work in the collective farms the best among the middle peasants and give them an opportunity to apply their capacities in this sphere.

Until quite recently, insufficient attention was devoted to work among peasant women. The past period has shown that work among peasant

women is one of the weakest points in our activity. This defect must now be removed decisively and for good.

Until quite recently, the Communists in a number of regions assumed that they could solve all the problems of collective farm construction by their own forces alone. On this assumption, insufficient attention was paid to drawing non-Party people into the responsible work of the collective farms, to promoting non-Party workers to administrative work in the collective farms, to organising a large group of active non-Party members in the collective farms. The history of our Party has shown, and the period just elapsed in collective farm construction has demonstrated once more, that such a course is radically wrong. If Communists shut themselves up in their shells, walled themselves off from non-members of the Party, they would ruin the whole cause. One of the reasons why the Communists succeeded in winning fame in the fight for Socialism, and why the enemies of Communism were beaten, was that because the Communists knew how to draw the best elements among non-members of the Party into the cause, because they drew their forces from among the broad strata of non-members of the Party and knew how to surround the Party by an extensive group of active non-Party workers. This defect in our work among those who are not members of the Party must now be removed, decisively and for good.

To correct these defects in our work, to eradicate them completely, that is what is meant by placing the *economic* work of the collective farms on a sound footing.

Hence:

1. The proper organisation of sowing—that is the task.

2. The concentration of attention on the economic problems of the collective farm movement—that is the means essential for the fulfilment of the task.

Pravda, No. 92, April 3, 1930.

[1] *i.e.* fictitious members, persons who are registered as members of collective farms, but who had not actually joined.—Ed.

POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

(*Report delivered June* 27, 1930, *and speech in reply to debate delivered July* 2, 1930)

I. THE GROWING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION OF THE U.S.S.R.

COMRADES:

Two and a half years have passed since the Fifteenth Congress. This is not a very long period of time, I think. Yet during this period most important changes in the life of peoples and States have taken place. To characterise this period in a few words, we might call it the *turn of the tide*. The tide turned not only for us in the U.S.S.R., but also for the capitalist countries of the whole world. But there is a radical difference between these two turns. While the turn for the U.S.S.R. meant a turn toward a new and more important economic *advance*, for the capitalist countries it meant a turn toward economic *decline*. In the U.S.S.R. there is *increasing progress* in Socialist construction, both in industry and in agriculture. In the capitalist countries there is a *growing* economic crisis, both in industry and in agriculture.

That is the picture of the present position in few words.

Recall the state of affairs in the capitalist countries two and a half years ago. A growth in industrial output and trade in nearly all the countries of capitalism. A growth in output of raw materials and foodstuffs in nearly all agrarian countries. The U.S.A. surrounded by the glamour of the country of the most full-blooded capitalism. Pæans of victory about "prosperity." The whole world bowing low before the dollar. Exalted speeches in honour of the new technique and of capitalist rationalisation. The proclamation of the era of "recovery" of capitalism, and of unshakeable firmness of capitalist stabilisation. "Universal" noise and din about the "inevitable doom" of the land of the Soviets, the "inevitable collapse" of the U.S.S.R.

That was the state of affairs yesterday. And what is the picture to-day?

To-day: an economic crisis in nearly all the industrial countries of capitalism. To-day: an agricultural crisis in nearly all agrarian countries. Instead of "prosperity," mass poverty and colossal growth of unemployment. Instead of a boom in agriculture, the ruin of millions of peasants. The collapse of illusions about the omnipotence of capitalism generally, and United States capitalism in particular. The strains of triumph in honour of the dollar and of capitalist rationalisation grow feebler and feebler. Louder and louder and the pessimistic groans about the "mistakes" of capitalism. And the "universal" din about the "inevitable doom" of the U.S.S.R. is being replaced by "universal" malevolent hissing, about the necessity of punishing "this country," which dares to develop economically while crisis reigns around.

That is the picture to-day.

Things have happened just as the Bolsheviks said they would happen two or three years ago.

The Bolsheviks said that the growth of technique in the capitalist countries, the growth of productive forces and capitalist rationalisation, in view of the restricted limits of the standard of living of millions of workers and peasants, must inevitably lead to a severe economic crisis. The bourgeoisie Press jeered at the "queer prophecies" of the Bolsheviks. The Right deviators dissociated the Bolshevik forecast, replacing Marxist analysis by Liberal chatter about "organised capitalism." And what happened in reality? What the Bolsheviks said would happen.

These are the facts.

Let us now examine the data on the economic crisis in the capitalist countries.

1. The World Economic Crisis

(*a*) In studying the crisis we are struck first of all by the following facts:

(i) The present economic crisis is a crisis of *over-production*. This means that more commodities have been produced than the market can absorb. It means that more textiles, fuel, manufactured articles, foodstuffs have been produced than can be bought for cash by the main consumer—the mass of the people—whose income remains at a low level. And as the purchasing capacity of the mass of the people in conditions of capitalism remains at the lowest possible level, the capitalists leave the "surplus" commodities—

textiles, grain, etc.—in store or even destroy them, in order to maintain high prices. They reduce production, dismiss their workers, and the mass of the people are forced to suffer privation because too many commodities have been produced.

(ii) The present crisis is the first *world* economic crisis since the war. It is a world crisis not only in the sense that it embraces all, or nearly all, *industrial* countries of the world—so that even France, which systematically injects into its organism the milliards of marks paid by Germany as reparations, has not been able to avoid a certain depression which, according to all appearances, must become a crisis: it is a world crisis also in the sense that the *industrial* crisis has coincided with an *agricultural* crisis, embracing the production of all forms of raw material and foodstuffs in the principal *agrarian* countries of the world.

(iii) The present world crisis is developing *unevenly* in spite of its *general* character, striking various countries at various times and with various degrees of force. The industrial crisis began first of all in Poland, Roumania, and the Balkans. It developed there during the whole of last year. Obvious signs of an approaching agricultural crisis could already be seen in Canada, the U.S.A., Argentine, Brazil, and Australia by the end of 1928. All this time the industry of the U.S.A. was climbing up and up. By the middle of 1929 industrial production in the U.S.A. had achieved an almost record level. The turn of the tide commenced in the second half of 1929, after which there developed a headlong industrial crisis which threw the U.S.A. back to the level of 1927. In its train came the industrial crisis in Canada and Japan. Then followed bankruptcies and crises in China and the colonial countries, where the crisis is aggravated by the fall in the price of silver, and where the crisis of over-production is combined with the destruction of peasant economy, reduced by feudal exploitation and overwhelming taxes to a state of complete exhaustion. As for Western Europe, the crisis there begins to develop only at the beginning of the present year, and not everywhere with equal force; while France, even in this period, continues to show an increase in industrial output.

I do not think it is necessary to quote a lot of statistics to prove that there is a crisis. There is no longer any argument is to whether a crisis exists or not. I shall confine myself, therefore, to quoting one small but characteristic table published recently by the German “Institute of Economic Research.” The table illustrates the development of the mining industry and the main

branches of large-scale manufacturing industry in the U.S.A., Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. from 1927 onwards, taking the level of output in 1928 as 100.

Here is the table:

Year	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	U.K.	Germany	France	Poland
1927 ..	82·4	95·5	105·5	100·1	86·6	88·5
1928 ..	100·0	100·0	100·0	101·0	100·0	100·0
1929 ..	123·5	106·3	107·9	101·8	109·4	99·8
1930 .. (1st quarter)	155·5	95·5	107·4	93·4	113·1	84·6

What does this table show?

It shows, first of all, that the U.S.A., Germany, and Poland are going through a *sharply marked crisis* of large-scale industrial production. During the first quarter of 1930 in the U.S.A., after; a *rise* in the first half of 1929, the level of output fell by 10.8 per cent in comparison with 1929, coming down to the level of 1927. In Germany, after three years' *stagnation*, the level of production fell in comparison with last year by 8.4 per cent, and in comparison with 1927 by 6.7 per cent. In Poland, after last year' *crisis*, the level of production fell in comparison with last year by 15.2 per cent, or 3.9 per cent lower than 1927.

Secondly, it shows that Great Britain has been marking time for three years around the level of 1927, and in a state of a severe economic *stagnation*. In the first quarter of 1930, however, production dropped by 0.05 per cent as compared with last year thus entering into the primary phase of *crisis*.

Thirdly, it shows that, among the large capitalist countries only in France is there a certain *growth* of large-scale industry But the percentage of increase in 1928 was 13.4 per cent, in 1929 by 9.4 per cent, and in the first quarter of 1930 only 3.7 per cent in comparison with 1929, thus presenting a picture of a *declining* curve of growth year by year.

Finally, it shows that of all the countries in the world only the U.S.S.R. has an *enormous increase* in large-scale industry; the level of output in the first quarter of 1930 being more than *double* the level of 1927, while the percentage increase rises from 17.6 per cent in 1928 to 23.5 per cent in

1929, and 32 per cent in the first quarter of 1930, thus presenting a picture of a *rising* curve of growth year by year.

It might be said that, even though this was the state of affairs up to the end of the first quarter of the present year, a change for the better is not out of the question in the second quarter. But the facts of the second quarter definitely refute such a suggestion. On the contrary, they show that the position is becoming even worse in the second quarter. They show a new *fall in shares* on the New York Stock Exchange and a new *wave of bankruptcy* in the U.S.A.; a new *reduction* of output, *lowering* of wages, and *growth* of unemployment in the U.S.A., Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, South America, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, etc.; a number of branches of French industry entering a period of *stagnation*, which in the present international economic circumstances is a sign of commencing crisis. There are now over six million unemployed in the U.S.A., about five million in Germany, over two million in Great Britain, a million each in Italy, South America, Japan, 500,000 each in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria. This is apart from the further intensification of the agricultural crisis, which is ruining millions of farmers and working peasants. The crisis of over-production in agriculture has gone so far that, in order to maintain high prices and profits, the bourgeoisie in Brazil threw two million sacks of coffee into the sea, maize has been used as fuel in America instead of coal, in Germany millions of poods of rye have been used as pig fodder, while as for cotton and wheat, every possible step is being taken to reduce the area sown by 10 to 15 per cent.

Such is the general picture of the developing world economic crisis.

(*b*) To-day, when the destructive effects of the world economic crisis are spreading, sending to the bottom whole layers of middle and petty capitalists, ruining whole groups of the labour aristocracy and farmers, and condemning to starvation millions of workers, all are asking: What is the reason for the crisis; where is its basis; how can it be fought, how can it be wiped out? The most varied "theories" of the crisis are being invented. Elaborate schemes for "mitigating," "preventing," and "liquidating" the crisis are being brought forward. The bourgeois oppositions point to the bourgeois Governments, and accuse them of not having taken "all possible steps" to prevent the crisis. "Democrats" accuse "Republicans," "Republicans" accuse "Democrats," and both together accuse the Hoover group, with its "Federal Reserve System," of having failed to keep the crisis

"in check." There are even wise men who see the cause of the world economic crisis in "Bolshevik plots." I have in mind the well-known "industrialist," Rechberg, who, as a matter of fact, is very little like an industrialist: he looks like an "industrialist" among literary men and like a "literary man" among industrialists. (Laughter.)

Of course all these theories and schemes have nothing in common with science. It must be confessed that the bourgeois economists have proved their utter bankruptcy in face of the crisis. More than that, they have turned out to be lacking even in that minimum contact with real life which cannot always be denied their predecessors. These gentlemen forget that crises cannot be considered an accidental event in the system of capitalist economy. They forget that economic crises are the inevitable result of capitalism. They forget that crises were born with the birth of capitalist supremacy. For over one hundred years periodic economic crises have been taking place, repeated at intervals of twelve, ten, and eight years or less. During this whole period bourgeois Governments of all ranks and colours, bourgeois politicians of all degrees and capacities, have all, without exception tried their hand at "preventing" and "abolishing" crises. But they all suffered defeat. They suffered defeat because you cannot prevent or abolish economic crises while remaining within the framework of capitalism. Is there anything surprising, therefore in the fact that the present bourgeois politicians also suffer defeat. Is there anything surprising in the fact that the measures taken by the bourgeois Governments lead in practice, not to the relaxation of the crisis or the improvement of the position of millions of toilers, but to new waves of bankruptcy, a new wave of unemployment, the absorption of weaker capitalist amalgamations by stronger capitalist amalgamations?

The basis and cause of economic crises of over-production like in the very system of capitalist economy. The basis of the crislies in the contradiction between the social character of production and the capitalist form of appropriation of the results of production. This basic contradiction of capitalism is expressed in the contradiction between the colossal *growth* in the productive capacity of capitalism, calculated to secure the *maximum* of capitalist profit, and the relative *reduction* of purchasing power of millions of toilers whose standard of living the capitalists are all the time trying to keep within the limits of the lowest possible *minimum*. In order to win in the game of competition and squeeze out more profits, the capitalists

are forced to develop technique, to apply rationalisation, intensify the exploitation of the workers, and raise the productive capacity of their undertakings to the extreme limit. In order not to fall behind one another all the capitalists are obliged, in one way or another, to enter this path of furious development of productive capacities. But the home and foreign markets, the purchasing power of millions of workers and peasants, who in the last analysis are the basic purchasers, remain at a low level. Hence crises of over-production. Hence the well-known results, repeated more or less periodically, of commodities remaining unsold, production reduced, unemployment increased, wages lowered, and thereby the contradiction between the level of production and the level of effective demand still is further intensified. The crisis of over-production is the expression of this contradiction in unbridled and destructive forms. If capitalism could adapt production, not to the acquisition of the maximum of profits, but to the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the mass of the people, if it could employ its profits, not in satisfying the whims of the parasitic classes, not in perfecting methods of exploitation, not in exporting capital, but in the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the workers and peasants, then there would be no crisis. But then, also, capitalism would not be capitalism. In order to abolish crises, capitalism must be abolished.

Such is the basis of economic crises of over-production in general.

But we cannot confine ourselves to this in characterising the *present* crisis. The present crisis is not a mere repetition of previous crises. It is taking place and developing in certain new conditions which it is necessary to bring out in order to get a complete picture of the crisis. It is complicated and aggravated by a number of special circumstances, and unless these are made clear it is impossible to obtain a clear conception of the present economic crisis.

What are these special circumstances?

They can be reduced to the following characteristic facts:

(i) The crisis has most profoundly affected the *principal country* of capitalism, its citadel, the U.S.A., which concentrates in its hands not less than half of the whole production and consumption of the world. Obviously this circumstance cannot but lead to a colossal extension of the sphere of influence of the crisis, to the sharpening of the crisis and the accumulation of "unbudgeted" difficulties for world capitalism.

(ii) In the course of development of the economic crisis, the industrial crisis in the chief capitalist countries has not simply coincided, but has become *interwoven* with the agricultural crisis in the agrarian countries, aggravating the difficulties and predetermining the inevitability of a general decline in economic activity. Needless to say, the industrial crisis will intensify the agricultural crisis, and the agricultural crisis will protract the industrial crisis, and this cannot but lead to the deepening of the economic crisis as a whole.

(iii) Present-day capitalism, as distinguished from older capitalism, is *monopolistic* capitalism, and this inevitably gives rise to the struggle between capitalist combines to maintain high monopolist prices of commodities in spite of over-production. Obviously, this circumstance, which makes the crisis particularly painful and ruinous for the mass of the people, who are the basic consumers of commodities, cannot but lead to the dragging out of the crisis, cannot but retard its dissipation.

(iv) The present economic crisis is developing on the basis of the *general crisis* of capitalism, which began during the period of the imperialist war, undermined the foundations of capitalism, and paved the way for the present economic crisis.

What does this mean?

It means first of all that the imperialist war and its aftermath have intensified the decay of capitalism and disturbed its equilibrium, that we are now living in the epoch of wars and revolutions, that capitalism no longer represents the *sole* and *all-embracing* system of world economy, that side by side with the capitalist system of economy there exists the Socialist system, which is growing, which is flourishing, which is resisting the capitalist system, and which by the very fact of its existence is demonstrating the rottenness of capitalism and shaking its foundations.

It means, furthermore, that the imperialist war and the victory of the revolution in the U.S.S.R. have shaken the foundations of imperialism in the *colonial* and *dependent* countries, that the prestige of imperialism in these countries has already been undermined, that it is no longer capable of governing in the old way in these countries.

It means, further, that during the war and after it, a young, native capitalism appeared and grew up in the colonial and dependent countries, which competes successfully in the markets with the old capitalist countries, sharpening and complicating the struggle for markets.

It means, finally, that the war has left to the majority of the capitalist countries a painful heritage in the shape of *chronic under-employment of factories* and *armies of unemployed running into millions*, which, moreover, have been transformed from reserve armies of labour into *permanent* armies of unemployed. This created a mass of difficulties for capitalism even before the present economic crisis, and must still further complicate matters during the crisis.

Such are the circumstances which aggravate and sharpen the world crisis.

It must be admitted that the present economic crisis is the most serious and profound world economic crisis that has ever occurred.

2. The Sharpening of the Contradictions of Capitalism

The most important result of the world economic crisis is that it has laid bare and sharpened the contradictions inherent in world capitalism.

(*a*) It is laying bare and sharpening the *antagonisms between the most important imperialist countries*, the struggle for markets, the struggle for raw materials, the struggle for export of capital. To-day none of the capitalist States are satisfied any longer with the old distribution of spheres of influence and colonies. They see that the relation of forces has changed, and that correspondingly markets, sources of raw materials, spheres of influence, etc., must be divided afresh. The principal amongst these antagonisms is the antagonism between the U.S.A. and Great Britain. Both in the sphere of export of manufactured goods and in the sphere of the export of capital, the struggle lies in the main between the U.S.A. and Great Britain. You have only to take up any economic journal, any document dealing with the export of goods and capital, to realise this. The principal arena of struggle is South America, China, the Colonies and Dominions of the old imperialist States. The balance of forces in this struggle, and a very definite balance, is in favour of the U.S.A. In the train of the principal contradiction come less important but fairly vital contradictions—between America and Japan, between Germany and France, between France and Italy, between England and France, etc.

There can be no doubt at all that, in connection with the developing crisis, the struggle for markets, raw materials, export of capital will be intensified month by month and day by day.

The means of struggle are tariffs policy, cheap goods, cheap credit, regrouping of forces and new military and political alliances, growth of

armaments, preparation for new imperialist wars, and, finally, war itself. I spoke of the crisis which has affected all branches of production. But there is one branch that has not been affected by the crisis, that is the armaments branch. The bourgeois States are furiously arming and re-equipping their forces. What for? Of course, not for a friendly talk, but for war. The imperialists need war because it is the only means of dividing up the world afresh, dividing up anew the markets, sources of raw material, and spheres for capital investment.

In such conditions, naturally, so-called pacifism is living its last days, the League of Nations is rotting even before burial, "disarmament schemes" are falling into oblivion, while conferences for reducing naval armaments become conferences for re-equipping and enlarging navies.

This means that the war danger will grow at an increasingly rapid rate.

Let the Social-Democrats chatter about pacifism, peace, the peaceful development of capitalism, etc. The experience of the Social-Democratic Governments in Germany and Great Britain shows that pacifism is to them only a mask necessary to conceal their preparations for new wars.

(*b*) The crisis is laying bare and sharpening the *antagonisms between the victorious and vanquished countries*. Among the latter I have in mind principally Germany. Undoubtedly, in connection with the crisis and the sharpening of the problem of markets, the pressure on Germany, not only as a debtor but also as one of the biggest exporters, will be increased. The peculiar relations which have been established between the victorious countries and Germany might be depicted in the form of a pyramid, on the peak of which America, France, Britain, etc., are seated in lordly attitudes, with the Young Plan in their hands inscribed "Pay!" while below, Germany lies flattened out, at the end of her resources, and forced to devote its last energies to carrying out the order to pay the milliards of indemnities. Would you like to know what this is called? It is called the "Spirit of Locarno." To imagine that such a situation can pass without any consequences for world capitalism means to understand nothing at all of real life. To imagine that the German bourgeoisie will be able to pay 20 milliard marks in the next ten years, while the German proletariat, living under the double yoke of "its own" and the "foreign" bourgeoisie, will allow the German bourgeoisie to squeeze these 20 milliards out of its muscles without serious struggles and convulsions, means to go mad. Let the German and French politicians

pretend that they believe in this miracle. We Bolsheviks do not believe in miracles.

(*c*) The crisis is laying bare and sharpening the *antagonisms between the imperialist States and the colonial and dependent countries*. The growing economic crisis cannot but reinforce the pressure of the imperialists on the colonies and dependent countries, which represent the basic markets and sources of raw material. And in fact this pressure is being reinforced to the last degree. It is a fact that the European bourgeoisie is now in a state of war with "its" colonies in India, Indo-China, Indonesia, and Northern Africa. It is a fact that "independent" China has already been divided up in effect into spheres of influence, while the counter-revolutionary cliques of Kuomintang generals, fighting among themselves and ruining the Chinese people, are carrying out the will of their masters in the imperialist camp.

We must consider that the bottom has finally been knocked out of the lying story that the staff of the Russian Embassies in China are responsible for the breaches of "peace and quiet" in China. The Russian Embassies have long ago left both Southern and Central China. But there are British, Japanese, German, American, and every other kind of mission. The Russian Embassies have long ago left both Southern and Central China. But there are German, British, and Japanese military advisors of the warring Chinese generals. The Russian Embassies have gone long ago. But there are British, American, German, Czecho-Slovak, and every other kind of weapons—rifles, aeroplanes, tanks, poison gases. And what is the result? Instead of "peace and quiet," in Southern and Central China the most unbridled and a most destructive war is raging, waged by the militarists who are financed and instructed by the "civilised" States of Europe and America. We get a fairly piquant picture of the "civilising" work of the capitalist States. The only mysterious thing is, what have the Russian Bolsheviks to do with it all?

It would be ridiculous to think that the imperialists can commit these outrages with impunity. The Chinese workers and peasants have already replied to them by setting up Soviets and a Red Army. It is said that already a Soviet Government has been formed there. If that is true, I think it is nothing to be surprised at. There can be no doubt that only the Soviets can save China from final collapse and beggary.

As for India, Indo-China, Indonesia, Africa, etc., the rise of the revolutionary movement in these countries, sometimes assuming the form

of a national war for liberation, cannot be doubted. Messieurs of the bourgeoisie expect to flood these countries with blood and to rely on police bayonets, calling to their help people like Gandhi. There can be no doubt that police bayonets are a bad support. Tsarism also tried to rely on police bayonets, but what kind of support it got from them everyone knows. As for helpers of the type of Gandhi, tsarism had a whole herd of them, in the shape of Liberal compromisers of every kind—which, however, led to nothing but disappointment in the end.

(*d*) The crisis is laying bare and sharpening the *antagonisms between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat* in the capitalist countries. The crisis has already intensified the pressure of the capitalists on the working class. The crisis has already produced a new wave of capitalist rationalisation, a further deterioration of the position of the working class, the growth of unemployment, the growth of the army of permanently unemployed, the lowering of wages. It is not surprising that these circumstances should revolutionise the situation, sharpen the struggle of classes, and push the workers forward to new class battles.

In this connection Social-Democratic illusions among the working masses are falling into decay and decline. After the experience of the Social-Democratic Governments, which break strikes, organise lockouts, and shoot down workers, the lying promises about "industrial democracy," "industrial peace," "non-violent methods" of struggle, etc., sound like a bad joke in the ears of the workers. Are there many workers who now believe the lying doctrine of the Social-Fascists? The well-known workers' demonstrations of August 1, 1929 (against the war danger), and of March 6, 1930 (against unemployment), show that the best members of the working class have already turned away from the Social-Fascists. The economic crisis will deal a fresh blow at Social-Democratic illusions among the workers. There will be few workers now who, after the bankruptcies and ruin consequent upon the crisis, will consent to believe in the possibility of "every worker becoming rich by buying stock in "democratised" limited liability companies. Needless to say, the crisis will inflict a crushing blow to all such illusions.

But the fact that the masses are turning away from Social-Democracy means that they are turning towards Communism. And this is what is actually taking place. The growth of the trade union movement connected with the Communist Party; the electoral successes of the Communist

Parties; the wave of strikes taking place under the leadership of the Communists; the development of economic strikes into political protests organised by the Communists; the mass demonstrations of workers sympathetic to Communism, which arouse a very lively response among the working class—all this shows that the masses of workers are regarding the Communist Party as the only Party capable of fighting capitalism, the only Party worthy of the confidence of the workers, the only Party which one can follow, and which it is worth while following in the struggle for emancipation from capitalism. This is the turning of the masses towards Communism. This is the guarantee that our brother Communist Parties will be transformed into large mass Parties of the working class. It is only necessary for the Communists to be capable of rightly summing up the situation and properly making use of it. Developing an irreconcilable struggle against Social-Democracy, which represents the agency of capitalism within the working class, and smashing to atoms each and every deviation from Leninism, which brings grist to the mill of Social-Democracy, the Communist Parties have shown that they are on the right track. It is essential that they should finally settle on that track. For only on this condition can they hope to win the majority of the working class and hope successfully to prepare the proletariat for the coming class battles. Only on this condition can we count on the further growth of the influence and authority of the Communist International.

Such is the position as regards the basic contradictions of world capitalism, sharpened to the extreme as a result of the world economic crisis.

What do all these facts show?

That the stabilisation of capitalism is coming to an end.

That the revival of the revolutionary movement of the masses will develop with new force.

That the world economic crisis will in a number of countries grow into a political crisis.

And this means, in the first place, that the bourgeoisie will seek a way out of the situation in further fascisation in the sphere of internal policy, and make use of all the forces of reaction for this purpose, including Social-Democracy.

It means, secondly, that the bourgeoisie will seek a way out through a new imperialist war and intervention in the sphere of external policy.

It means, finally, that the proletariat, fighting capitalist exploitation and the war danger, will seek a way out through revolution.

3. Relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Capitalist States

(*a*) I spoke earlier of the contradictions of world capitalism. But besides these contradictions there is still one more. I mean the contradiction between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R. True, it is not a contradiction of the *internal capitalist* type. It is a contradiction between capitalism as a whole and a country building Socialism. But this does not prevent it decomposing and shaking the very foundations of capitalism. Still more, it lays bare to the very roots all the contradictions of capitalism and gathers them up into one knot, making of them a question of life and death for the capitalist system itself. Therefore, every time that capitalist contradictions begin to grow acute the bourgeoisie turns its gaze toward the U.S.S.R. as if to say: "Cannot we settle this or that contradiction of capitalism, or all the contradictions taken together, at the expense of the U.S.S.R., the land of the Soviets, the citadel of the Revolution, which by its very existence is revolutionising the working class and the colonies, preventing us arranging for a new war, preventing us dividing the world anew, preventing us being masters of our extensive internal market so necessary for capitalists, particularly to-day, owing to the economic crisis?"

Hence the tendency to adventurist assaults on the U.S.S.R. and to intervention, a tendency which is bound to be strengthened as a result of the developing economic crisis.

The most vivid expression of this tendency at the present time is present-day bourgeois France, the birthplace of that most amiable scheme, "Pan-Europe," the "cradle" of the Kellogg Pact, the most aggressive and militarist country of all aggressive and militarist countries of the world.

But intervention is a two-edged weapon. The bourgeoisie knows this perfectly well. It will be a good thing, the bourgeoisie think, if intervention passes off smoothly and finishes up in the defeat of the U.S.S.R. But supposing it finishes in the defeat of the capitalists? There has already been one intervention, after all, which ended in defeat. If the first intervention, when the Bolsheviks were weak, ended in defeat, what guarantee is there that the second will also not end in defeat? Everyone sees that the Bolsheviks are far stronger to-day, economically, politically, and in the

sense of the defensive preparedness of their country, than they were then. And what about the workers in the capitalist countries, who will not permit intervention against the U.S.S.R., who will fight against intervention and, if anything happens, may strike at the rear of the capitalists? Would it not be better to take the line of developing commercial relations with the U.S.S.R.—which the Bolsheviks do not object to, either?

Hence, the tendency to maintain peaceful relations with the U.S.S.R.

Thus, we have two series of factors and two different tendencies acting in opposite directions:

(1) The policy of undermining economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries, provocative assaults on the U.S.S.R., open and clandestine efforts to prepare intervention against the U.S.S.R. These are factors menacing the international position of the U.S.S.R. It is the working of these factors that explain facts like the rupture of diplomatic relations by the British Conservative Cabinet, the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Chinese militarists, the financial blockade of the U.S.S.R., the clerical "crusade" headed by the Pope against the U.S.S.R., the organisation of wrecking through our technical experts by the agents of foreign States, the organisation of explosions and arson like those which were organised by members of the staff of "Lena Goldfields," attempts on the life of representatives of the U.S.S.R. (Poland), attacks on our exports (U.S.A., Poland), etc.

(2) Sympathy with and support of the U.S.S.R. by the workers in the capitalist countries, the growth of the economic and political might of the U.S.S.R., the growth of the defensive capacity of the U.S.S.R., the policy of peace undeviatingly pursued by the Soviet Government. These are factors which consolidate the international position of the U.S.S.R. It is the operation of these factors that explain events like the successful liquidation of the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway, the restoration of relations with Great Britain, the growth of economic relations with capitalist countries, etc.

It is the struggle of these two factors that determines the external position of the U.S.S.R.

It is argued that the stumbling-block in the way of improving economic relations with the bourgeois States is the question of debts. I think this is not an argument to secure payment of the debt, but a pretext in the hands of aggressive elements for interventionist propaganda. Our policy in this

sphere is clear and well grounded. On the condition that we are granted credit, we are ready to pay a small part of the pre-war debts, treating them as additional interest for the credits. Without this condition we cannot and should not pay. Do they want more of us? On what ground? Is it not known that these debts were contracted by the Tsarist Government which was overthrown by the Revolution, and for the obligations of which the Soviet Government cannot assume responsibility? They talk about international law and international obligations. But on the foundation of what international law did Messieurs the "Allies" cut Bessarabia off from the U.S.S.R. and hand her over to be enslaved by the Roumanian boyars[1]? By what international obligation did the capitalists and Governments of France, Britain, America, and Japan attack the U.S.S.R., intervene in its affairs, plunder it for three whole years, and ruin its people? If this is called international law and international obligation, what is robbery called? (Laughter and applause.) Is it not clear that, by committing these acts of robbery, Messieurs the "Allies" renounced the right of appealing to international law and international obligations?

They say further that the promotion of "normal" relations is harassed by the propaganda of Russian Bolsheviks. With the object of preventing the harmful influence of propaganda, the bourgeois gentlemen time and again shut themselves off with "cordons," "barbed wire entanglements," graciously conferring the honour of protecting these "entanglements" upon Poland, Roumania, Finland, etc. It is said that Germany is consumed with envy because they do not want to entrust her with protecting the "cordons" and the "barbed wire entanglements." Is it necessary to prove that the talk about propaganda is not an argument for establishing "normal relations," but a pretext for interventionist propaganda? How can people who do not want to look ridiculous "shut themselves off" from the idea of Bolshevism, if in their own country the ground is favourable for these ideas? Tsarism also "shut itself off" from Bolshevism in its day, but was not successful, as you all know. It was not successful because Bolshevism grows everywhere and anywhere, not from without but from within. It might seem that there are no countries more "shut off" from the Russian Bolsheviks than China, India, and Indo-China. Well? Bolshevism is growing there, and will grow, in spite of all kinds of "cordons," because, apparently, the conditions exist there which favour Bolshevism in those countries. What has Russian Bolshevik propaganda got to do with it? Now if the capitalist gentlemen

could in some way "shut themselves off" from the economic crisis, from the poverty of the masses, from unemployment, from low wages, from the exploitation of the toilers—then it would be a different story, then they would have no Bolshevist movement. But that is just the point, that every rogue tries to justify his weakness or his incapacity by throwing the blame on the propaganda of the Russian Bolsheviks.

They say, furthermore, that the stumbling-block is our Soviet system, collectivisation, the struggle against the rich peasantry, anti-religious propaganda, the struggle against wreckers and counter-revolutionaries amongst "men of learning," the expulsion of people like Bessedovsky, Solomon, Dmitrievsky, etc. But this becomes quite a joke. It appears that they do not like the Soviet system. But we do not like the capitalist system, either. (Laughter and applause.) We do not like the idea that tens of millions of unemployed should be obliged to live in starvation and poverty in their countries, while a tiny clique of capitalists own wealth running into milliards. But once we have already agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, is it not clear that there is no use returning to this question? Collectivisation, the struggle against the rich peasants, the struggle against wrecking, anti-religious propaganda, etc., represent the inalienable right of the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R., confirmed by our Constitution. We must and shall carry out the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. in all consistency. Consequently, it is obvious that people who do not want to reckon with our Constitution can pass on, wherever they please. As for Bessedovsky, Solomon, Dmitrievsky, and similar types, we shall continue to throw out such people as damaged goods, harmful and unnecessary for the Revolution. Let those raise them on their shields who cherish particular sympathy for refuse. (Laughter.) The mills of our Revolution grind well. They take all that is useful and pass it on to the Soviets, while they throw out the refuse. It is said that in France, amongst the bourgeoisie of Paris, there is considerable demand for these rejected commodities. Well, let them import them and be happy. True, this will somewhat burden the import side of France's balance of trade, against which the bourgeoisie are always protesting. But that is their affair. Let us not interfere in the internal affairs of France. (Laughter and applause.)

That is how matters stand as regards the "hindrances" which prevent the establishment of "normal" relations with other countries.

It turns out, then, that they are only fictitious "hindrances," brought into play in order to find a pretext for anti-Soviet propaganda.

Our policy is a policy of peace and of strengthening trade relations with all countries. The result of that policy is the improvement of relations with a number of countries and the conclusion of a number of agreements for trade, technical assistance, etc. Its result also is the adherence of the U.S.S.R. to the Kellogg Pact, our signature of the well-known protocol referring to the Kellogg Pact with Poland, Roumania, Lithuania, etc., and the signing of the protocol extending the validity of our treaty of friendship and neutrality with Turkey. Lastly, the result of that policy is the fact that we have succeeded in maintaining peace and have not allowed our enemies to draw us into conflict, despite a number of provocative acts and adventurist assaults by the war-mongers. We shall continue this policy of peace in the future with all our might and with all our resources. We do not want a single foot of foreign territory; but we will not surrender a single inch of our own territory either, to anyone. (Applause.)

That is our foreign policy.

Our task is to continue to pursue this policy in the future, with all the persistence characteristic of the Bolsheviks.

II. THE RISING TIDE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

Let us turn to the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

In contradistinction to the capitalist countries, where economic *crisis* and *growing unemployment* now reign, the internal situation in our country presents a picture of the *upward growth* of our national economy and the *progressive reduction* of unemployment. Large-scale industry has grown and has speeded up the rate of its development. Heavy industry has been consolidated. The Socialist sector of our industry has gone far ahead. A new force has grown up in agriculture—the Soviet and collective farms. Two years ago we experienced a crisis in grain production, and relied for our grain supplies mainly on the private farm: to-day the centre of gravity has shifted to the collective and Soviet farms, while the grain crisis may be regarded as solved in the main. The basic masses of the peasantry have finally turned towards the collective farms. The resistance of the kulaks has been broken. The internal situation in the U.S.S.R. has been still further stabilised.

Such is the general picture of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. at the present time.

Let us consider the concrete facts.

1. The Growth of National Economy as a Whole

(*a*) In 1926–27, *i.e*. at the time of the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, in the *whole of agriculture*, including forests, fisheries, etc., we had a gross output of 12,370 million pre-war rubles, *i.e*. 106.6 per cent of the pre-war level. The following year, *i.e*. 1927–28, we had 107.2 per cent, in 1928–29 we had 109.1 per cent, while in the current year, 1929–30, judging by the course of development of agriculture, we shall have not less than 112–114 per cent of the pre-war level.

We have an unswerving, albeit relatively slow, growth of agricultural output as a whole.

In 1926–27, *i.e*. at the time of the Fifteenth Party Congress, we had in the *whole of industry*, both small and large-scale, reckoning also flour milling, a gross output of 8,641 million pre-war roubles, *i.e*. 102.5 per cent of the pre-war level. The following year, *i.e*. 1927–28, we had 122 per cent, in 1928–29 we had 142.5 per cent, and in the current year, 1929–30, judging by the course of development of industry, we shall have not less than 180 per cent of the pre-war level.

We have an unprecedentedly rapid growth of output in industry as a whole.

(*b*) In 1926–27, *i.e*. at the time of the Fifteenth Party Congress, the total *freight* turnover on our *railways* amounted to 81.7 milliard ton-kilometres, *i.e*. 127 per cent of the pre-war level. In the following year, *i.e*. 1927–28, we had 134. 2 per cent, in 1928–29 162.4 per cent, and in the current year, 1929–30, according to all the data, we shall have not less than 193 per cent of the pre-war level. As for new railroad construction, during the period under review, *i.e*. from 1927–28 onwards, the length of our railways increased from 76,000 kilometres to 80,000 kilometres, which represents 136.7 per cent of the pre-war level.

(*c*) If we take the *commercial turnover* of the whole country in 1926–27 as equivalent to 100 (31 milliard rubles), we find that in 1927–28 the turnover grew to 124.6 per cent, in 1928–29 to 160.4 per cent, and in the

current year, 1929–30, judging from all data, the size of the turnover will be 202 per cent, *i.e*. will be doubled in comparison with 1926–27.

(*d*) If the *aggregate totals of the balance sheets* of all our *credit institutions* on October 1, 1927, be taken as 100 (9,173 million rubles) we find that on October 1, 1928, it had grown to 141 per cent, and on October 1, 1929, to 210.1 per cent, *i.e*. it had doubled in comparison with 1927.

(*e*) If we take the *aggregate State Budget* for 1926–27 as equivalent to 100 (6,371 million rubles), we find that in 1927–28 it rose to 125.5 per cent, in 1928–29 to 146.7 per cent, and in 1929–30 to 204.4 per cent, *i.e*. it had doubled in comparison with the Budget of 1926–27 (12,605 million rubles).

(*f*) Our *foreign trade turnover* (exports and imports) in 1926–27 represented 47.9 per cent of the pre-war level, in 1927–28 it grew to 56.8 per cent, in 1928–29 to 67.9 per cent, while in 1929–30, from all information, it will amount to not less than 80 per cent of the pre-war level.

(*g*) As a result, we have the following picture of the growth of the total *national income* during the period under review (in 1926–27 prices): in 1926–27, according to the data of the State Planning Commission, the national income was 23,127 million rubles; in 1927–28 it was 25,396 million rubles, an increase of 9.8 per cent; in 1928–29 it was 28,596 million rubles, an increase of 12.6 per cent; in 1929–30, judging from all the data, the national income must amount to not less than 34 milliard rubles, representing an increase of 20 per cent in one year. The average yearly increase during the three years under review, therefore, amounts to over 15 per cent.

If we take into account that the average annual increase of the national income in such countries as U.S.A., Britain, Germany, represents not more than 3 to 8 per cent, it must be recognised that the rate of increase of the national income in the U.S.S.R. is truly a *record* one.

2. The Successes of Industrialisation

National economic growth in our country takes place not in a haphazard fashion but in a definite direction, namely, in the direction of industrialisation, the watchword being: industrialisation; growth of the relative importance of industry in the general national economic system; transformation of our country from agrarian into an industrial country.

(*a*) The dynamics of the relationship between industry as a whole and agriculture as a whole, from the standpoint of the relative importance of

industry in the *gross* output of the whole of national economy, can be described for the period under review as follows. In pre-war years the share of industry in the gross output of national economy was 42.1 per cent and the share of agriculture 57.9 per cent; in 1927–28 the share of industry was 45.2 per cent, of agriculture 54.8 per cent; in 1928–29 the share of industry was 48.7 per cent, of agriculture 51.3 per cent; in 1929–30 the share of industry, according to all the data, must amount to not less than 53 per cent, and the share of agriculture to not more than 47 per cent.

This means that, in relative importance, industry is already beginning to prevail over agriculture, and we are on the eve of our transformation from an *agrarian* country into an *industrial* country. (Applause.)

(*b*) An even more definite advantage is gained by industry if we take the standpoint of its relative importance in the *marketed* production of national economy. In 1926–27 the share of industry in the total balance of marketed production represented 68.8 per cent, and the share of agriculture was 31.2 per cent. In 1927–28 we have 71.2 per cent for industry and 28.8 per cent for agriculture; in 1928–29 we have 72.4 per cent for industry and 27.6 per cent for agriculture; while for 1929–30, according to all data, we shall have 76 per cent for industry and 24 per cent for agriculture.

Incidentally, the particularly unfavourable position of agriculture is due to the small-peasant character and low degree of commercialisation of agriculture. It is therefore obvious that this position will alter to a certain extent, to the degree that agriculture is developed on a larger scale, through the Soviet and collective farms, and the degree to which the output of marketable produce is increased.

(*c*) But the development of industry as a whole is not sufficient to give a complete picture of the rate of industrialisation. In order to obtain a complete picture it is essential also to establish the dynamics of the relationship between heavy and light industry. Therefore the most vivid expression of the growth of industrialisation must be considered to be the progressive growth of the relative importance of the production of *tools and means of production* (heavy industry) in the total production of our industry. In 1927–28 the share of production of tools and means of production was 27.2 per cent of the total output of industry, while the share of the production of articles of mass consumption was 72.8 per cent; in 1928–29 the shares were 27.8 per cent and 71.3 per cent respectively; while in 1929–

30, according to all the data, the output of tools and means of production will amount to 32.7 per cent as against 67.3 per cent.

If, however, we take, not the whole of industry, but only the industry planned by the Supreme Economic Council, which embraces all the basic branches of industry, the relation between the production of tools and means of production and the production of articles of mass consumption acquires an even more favourable aspect, namely: in 1927–28, 42.7 per cent against 57.3 per cent; in 1928–29, 44.6 per cent against 55.4 per cent; in 1929–30, according to all data, not less than 48 per cent as against 52 per cent.

The development of our national economy is proceeding in the direction of industrialisation, in the direction of the strengthening and development of our own heavy industry; this means that we have already raised, and are developing further, the foundation of our economic independence, our heavy industry.

3. The Predominant Position of Socialist Industry and the Rate of its Growth

The development of our national economy is proceeding in the direction of industrialisation. But we do not require any kind of industrialisation. We require such industrialisation as will ensure the growing predominance of *Socialist forms of industry* over forms of *small* commodity production, and still more *capitalist* production. A characteristic feature of our industrialisation is that it is *Socialist* industrialisation, ensuring the victory of the *socialised* sector of industry over the *private property* sector, the sector of small commodity and capitalist sector.

Here are some data as to the growth of capital investments and gross output in the various sectors.

(*a*) If we take the growth of *capital investments* in industry according to sectors, we get the following picture. The *socialised* sector—in 1926–27, 1,270 million rubles; in 1927–28, 1,614 million rubles; in 1928–29, 2,046 million rubles; in 1929–30, 4,275 million rubles. The *private property and capitalist* sector—in 1926–27, 63 million rubles; in 1927–28, 64 million rubles; in 1928–29, 56 million rubles; in 1929–30, 51 million rubles.

This means, in the first place, that capital investments in the socialised sector of industry during this period have more than *trebled* (an increase of 235 per cent).

It means, secondly, that capital investment in the private property and capitalist sector has *declined* by almost one-fifth during this period (19 per cent).

The private property and capitalist sector is living on its old capital, and is moving toward its destruction.

(*b*) If we take the increase in the *gross output* of industry according to sectors, we get the following picture. The *socialised* sector—in 1926–27, 11,999 million rubles; in 1927–28, 15,389 million rubles; in 1928–29, 18,903 million rubles; in 1929–30, 24,740 million rubles. The *private property and capitalist* sector—in 1926–27, 4,043 million rubles; in 1927–28, 3,704 million rubles; in 1928–29, 3,389 million rubles; in 1929–30, 3,310 million rubles.

This means, in the first place, that the gross output in the Socialist sector of industry has *more than doubled* during the last three years (206.2 per cent).

It means, secondly, that the gross output of industry in the private property and capitalist sector has *declined* by almost one-fifth during the same period (18.9 per cent).

But if we take the production, not of the whole of industry, but only of large-scale (rated)[1] industry, and examine it by sectors, we get the following picture of the relationship between the socialised and private sectors. The socialised sector was responsible for the following proportion of the total output of the country's large-scale industry: 97.7 per cent in 1926–27; 98.6 per cent in 1927–28; 99.1 per cent in 1928–29; 99.3 per cent in 1929–30. The share of the private property sector was as follows: 2.3 per cent in 1926–27, 1.4 per cent in 1927–28; 0.9 per cent in 1928–29; 0.7 per cent in 1929–30.

Thus you see that the capitalist elements in our large-scale industry have already gone to the bottom.

It is clear that the question of "Who will defeat whom?" the question of whether Socialism will conquer the capitalist elements in industry or whether they will conquer Socialism, has already in the main been answered in favour of the Socialist form of industry. It has been answered finally and for good. (Applause.)

(*c*) Particularly interesting are the data showing the *rate of development* of State industry planned by the Supreme Economic Council during the period under review. If we take the gross production of the Socialist

industry planned by the S.E.C. in 1926–27 as equivalent to 100, we find that in 1927–28 it grew to 127.4 per cent, in 1928–29 to 158.6 per cent, and in 1929–30 it grows to 209.8 per cent.

This means that the Socialist industry planned by the S.E.C., which embraces all the main branches of industry and the whole of heavy industry, has succeeded in these years in more than *doubling* its volume.

It cannot but be admitted that not a single country in the world has ever known such an intense rate of development of its large-scale industry.

And it is this circumstance that gives us ground for talking of "the Five-Year Plan in four years."

(*d*) Some comrades regard the watchword of the "Five-Year Plan in four years" sceptically. Even quite recently certain of our comrades treated our Five-Year Plan confirmed by the Fifth Congress of Soviets as a fantasy. I will not speak of the bourgeoisie writers, whose eyes simply bulge out of their heads at the very words Five-Year Plan. But what is the actual position if we consider the Five-Year Plan from the point of view of what has been achieved during its first two years? What does the examination of the carrying out of the Five-Year Plan in its maximum variant show? It not only shows that we can carry out the Five-Year Plan in four years; it shows also that, in quite a number of branches of industry, we can carry it out in three years, or even two and a half years. This may seem incredible to the sceptics of the opportunist camp. But it is a fact, and it would be foolish and ridiculous to deny this.

Judge for yourselves.

According to the Five-Year Plan, the annual output of the oil industry was to reach the value of 977 million rubles in 1932–33, while in reality already in 1929–30 its output is 809 million rubles, *i.e*, 83 per cent of the output laid down in the Five-Year Plan for 1932–33. Hence, we are carrying out the Five-Year Plan in the oil industry in two and a half years.

In the *peat* industry, we had to reach an output of 122 million rubles in 1932–33, according to the Five-Year Plan, while in reality we have already reached an output of 115 million rubles in 1929–30, *i.e*. 96 per cent of the output laid down for 1932–33. Hence, we are carrying out the Five-Year Plan in the peat industry in two and a half years, if not less.

According to the Five-Year Plan, *general machine construction* had to reach an output of 2,058 million rubles in 1932–33, while in reality it has already, in 1929–30, reached an output of 1,458 million rubles, *i.e*. 70 per

cent of the output laid down for 1932–33. Hence, we are carrying out the Five-Year Plan in general machine construction in two and a half to three years.

According to the Five-Year Plan, the *agricultural machinery* industry had to reach an output of 610 million rubles in 1932–33, while in reality its output already, in 1929–30, has reached 400 million rubles, *i.e*. over 60 per cent of the output laid down for 1932–33. Hence, we are carrying out the Five-Year Plan in agricultural machinery industry in three years, if not before.

According to the Five-Year Plan, the *electrical engineering* industry had to reach an output of 896 million rubles in 1932–33, while in reality it has already, in 1929–30, reached an output of 503 million rubles, over 56 per cent of the output laid down for 1932–33. Hence, we are carrying out the Five-Year Plan in electrical engineering in three years.

Such are the unprecedented rates of development of our Socialist industry.

We are going ahead at an increasing rate, catching up in the economic and technical spheres with the foremost capitalist countries.

(*e*) This, of course, does not mean that we have already caught up with them in volume of production, that our industry has already reached the *level* of industrial development of the foremost capitalist countries. No, far from it, as yet. The *rate* of development of industry and the *level* of development of industry must not be confused. Many amongst us do confuse them, imagining that, if we have achieved unprecedented rates of development of industry, we have thereby already reached the level of industrial development of the foremost capitalist countries. But this is radically incorrect.

Take, for example, the production of electric power, where we have very high rates of development. In the production of electric power we have achieved an increase to nearly 600 per cent between 1924 and 1929, while the U.S.A. increased output during the same period to only 181 per cent, Canada to 218 per cent, Germany to 241 per cent, Italy to 222 per cent. Thus, you see, we have an absolutely unprecedented rate, far exceeding the rates of all other countries. But if we take the level of development of electric power output in these countries, for example, in 1929, and compare it with the level of development in the U.S.S.R., we get a far from consoling picture for the U.S.S.R. In spite of the unprecedented rate of development of

electric power output, the production of electric power in the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was only 6,465 million kilowatt-hours, while in the U.S.A. it was 126,000 million kwh., in Canada 17,628 million kwh., in Germany 33,000 million kwh., and in Italy 10,850 million kwh.

A colossal difference, as you see.

Thus, in the level of development we are behind all these States.

Or take, for example, our production of pig iron. If we take the pig-iron output in 1926–27 as equivalent to 100 (2.9 million tons) we have increased the pig-iron output in three years, *i.e.* from 1927–28 to 1929–30, to almost *double* its previous volume, reaching 190 per cent (5.5 million tons). A fairly high rate of development, as you see. But if we look at it from the standpoint of the level of development of pig-iron production in our country, and compare its volume with the volume of production in the foremost capitalist countries, we get a far from consoling picture. To begin with, we reach and surpass the pre-war level of pig-iron production only in the current year, 1929–30. This alone forces us to come to the inexorable conclusion that without a further speeding up of the rate of development of our metallurgy we run the risk of endangering our whole industrial production. As for the level of development of the iron industry here and in the West, we get the following picture: pig-iron output in the U.S.A. in 1929 amounted to 42.3 million tons, in Germany 13.4 million tons, in France 10.45 million tons, in Britain 7.7 million tons, while in the U.S.S.R., at the end of 1929–30, pig-iron output will amount to only 5.5 million tons.

Not a small difference, you see.

Thus, as regards the level of development of the pig-iron industry, we are behind all these countries.

What does all this show?

That:

(i) We *must not confuse* the rate of development of industry with its level of development.

(ii) We are devilishly *behind* the foremost capitalist countries in regard to the level of the development of our industry.

(iii) Only the *further speeding up* of the rate of development of our industry will enable us to catch up and outstrip the foremost capitalist countries in the technical and economic spheres.

(iv) People who chatter about the necessity of *reducing* the rate of development of our industry are enemies of Socialism, agents of our class

enemies. (Applause.)

4. Agriculture and the Grain Problem

I spoke earlier of the condition of agriculture as a whole, including forests, fisheries, etc., without dividing agriculture into its main branches. If we divide agriculture as a whole into its main branches as, for example, grain production, stock breeding, and industrial crops, the situation according to the data of the State Planning Commissions and the People's Commissariat for Agriculture can be depicted as follows:

(*a*) Taking the area *under grain* in 1913 as equivalent to 100, we set the following picture of the progress of areas under grain year by year: in 1926–27, 96.9 per cent; in 1927–28, 94.7 per cent; in 1928–29, 98.2 per cent; while in the current year, 1929–30, according to all the data, it will amount to 105.1 per cent of the pre-war level.

One is struck by the fact of the decline in the area under grain in 1927–28. This decline was not due to the degradation of grain production, as ignoramuses in the Right opportunist camp argued, but to the loss of the winter crop over an area of 7,700,000 hectares (20 per cent of the winter crop of the Soviet Union).

Furthermore, if we take the *gross* output of grain in 1913 as 100, we get the following picture. In 1927 the output was 91.9 per cent; in 1928, 90.8 per cent; in 1929, 94.4 per cent; while in 1930, according to all the data, we shall get about 110 per cent of the pre-war figure.

Here once again we have to note the decline in the gross production of grain in 1928, owing to the loss of the winter crop in the Ukraine and Northern Caucasus.

With regard to the part of the gross output *marketed* (outside the villages) we have an even more instructive picture. Taking the 1913 level as 100, it turns out that in 1927, 37 per cent was marketed; in 1928, 36.8 per cent; in 1929, 58 per cent; while in the current year, 1930, we shall have, according to all the data, not less than 73 per cent of the pre-war figure.

Thus we see that in respect of areas sown and gross output we reach the pre-war level, and exceed it somewhat, only in the current year, 1930.

We see, further, that as regards the *marketing* of grain we are still far from the pre-war level, and shall still be 25 per cent behind it this year.

Here lies the root of our grain difficulties, which grew particularly sharp in 1928. Here, too, is the basis of the grain problem.

(*b*) Approximately the same picture is revealed, but with more causes for anxiety, in the sphere of *stock breeding*.

If we take the number of head of cattle of all kinds in 1916 as equivalent to 100, we get the following picture year by year. In 1927 the number of horses was 88.9 per cent, large-horned cattle 114.3 per cent, sheep and goats 119.3 per cent, pigs 111.3 per cent. In 1928 the figure for horses was 94.6 per cent, large-horned cattle 118.5 per cent, sheep and goats 126 per cent, pigs 126.1 per cent. In 1929 the figure for horses was 96.9 per cent, large-horned cattle 115.6 per cent, sheep and goats 127.8 per cent, pigs 103 per cent. In 1930 the figure for horses was 88.6 per cent, large-horned cattle 89.1 per cent, sheep and goats 87.1 per cent, pigs 60.1 per cent of the 1916 level.

Thus you see that, taking into account the data of last year, we have patent signs of the beginning of decline in our stock breeding.

Even less consoling is the picture we get in respect of the *marketing* of animal products, particularly as regards meat and fat. If we take the gross output of meat and fat each year as 100, the part marketed represented in 1926, 33.4 per cent; in 1927, 32.9 per cent; in 1928, 31.4 per cent; in 1929, 29.2 per cent.

Thus we have patent signs of the instability and economic unreliability of small uncommercial enterprises in stock breeding.

Instead of exceeding the level of 1916 in stock breeding last year there are patent signs of a decline below that level.

Thus, in succession to the grain problem, which we are already solving successfully in the main, we are now being faced with the meat problem, the acuteness of which is already making itself felt, and which is awaiting its solution.

(*c*) We get a different picture from the development of *industrial* crops, which provide us with raw material for our industry. Taking the area under industrial crops in 1913 as equivalent to 100, we get the following figures. For *cotton*: in 1927, 107.1 per cent; in 1928, 131.4 per cent; in 1929, 151.4 per cent; in 1930, 217 per cent of the pre-war level. For *flax*: in 1927, 86.6 per cent; in 1928, 95.7 per cent; in 1929, 112.9 per cent; in 1930, 125 per cent of the pre-war level. For *sugar-beet*: in 1927, 106.6 per cent; in 1928, 124.2 per cent; in 1929, 125.8 per cent; in 1930, 169 per cent of the pre-war level. For *oil seeds*: in 1927, 179.4 per cent; in 1928, 230.9 per cent; in

1929, 219.7 per cent; in 1930, not less than 260 per cent of the pre-war level.

We get the same favourable picture, in the main, as regards the *gross output* of industrial crops. Taking the gross output in 1913 as 100, we get the following figures. For *cotton*: in 1928, 110.5 per cent; in 1929, 119 per cent; and in 1930, according to all data, we shall have 183.8 per cent of the pre-war level. For *flax*: in 1928, 71.6 per cent; in 1929, 81.5 per cent; in 1930, according to all data, we shall have 101.3 per cent of the pre-war level. For *sugar-beet*: in 1928, 93 per cent; in 1929, 58 per cent; in 1930, according to all data, we shall have 139.4 per cent of the pre-war level. For *oil seeds*: in 1928, 161.9 per cent; in 1929, 149.8 per cent; in 1930, according to all data, we shall have 220 per cent of the pre-war level.

Thus, for industrial crops, we have a more favourable picture, if we leave out 1929, when the beet harvest was damaged by pests.

Incidentally, in the sphere of industrial crops also, owing to the prevalence of small-scale production, serious fluctuations and symptoms of instability are possible and probable in the future, similar to the fluctuations and symptoms of instability which are revealed in the figures for flax and oil seeds, which are least affected by the influence of the collective and Soviet farms.

Thus, we are faced with the following problems in agriculture:

(i) The problem of consolidating the position of the industrial crops by ensuring to the respective areas a sufficient quantity of cheap grain.

(ii) The problem of reviving stock breeding and solving the meat problem by ensuring a sufficient supply of cheap grain and fodder for the respective areas.

(iii) The problem of finally settling the question of grain production, as the principal question in agriculture at the present time.

Thus it turns out that the grain problem is the principal link in the system of agriculture, and the key to the settlement of all its other problems.

It turns out that the solution of the grain problem is first in the order of tasks, as compared with other problems of agriculture.

But to settle the grain problem, and thereby bring about a serious improvement in agriculture, means to liquidate the backwardness of agriculture at its very roots, equip it with tractors and agricultural machinery, equip it with a new personnel of scientific workers, raise the

productivity of labour, and increase its commercial effectiveness. Without these conditions it is no use dreaming of solving the grain problem.

Can all these conditions be realised on the basis of small individual peasant farming? No, they cannot. They cannot because petty-peasant farming is not strong enough to take over and master the new technique, is not strong enough to raise to a sufficient degree the productivity of labour, and is not strong enough to increase to a sufficient degree the commercial effectiveness of agriculture. Only one path remains, the path of reorganisation in the direction of *creating large farms* equipped with modern technique. But the Land of the Soviets cannot enter the path of organising large *capitalist* farms. It can and must decide only to organise large farms of a *Socialist* type, equipped with the new technique. And this is what our Soviet and collective farms are.

Hence the task of setting up Soviet farms and amalgamating the small-peasant farms into large-scale collective undertakings as the *only* path for solving the problem of agriculture in general, and of grain in particular. It was on this path that the Party entered in its practical daily work after the Fifteenth Congress, particularly after the serious grain difficulties which made themselves apparent at the beginning of 1928.

It should be noted that our Party raised this radical problem as a practical task already at the Fifteenth Congress, when the serious grain difficulties had not yet arisen. The well-known resolution of the Fifteenth Congress on work in the rural districts contains the statement that:

> At the present time the task of amalgamating and transforming the small individual peasant farms into large collective undertakings must be laid down as the *main task* of the Party in the rural districts.

Perhaps it will not be out of place also to quote the corresponding passage in the report of the Central Committee at the Fifteenth Congress, where the problem of liquidating the backwardness of agriculture on the basis of collectivisation is stated just as sharply and definitely. Here is the passage:

> Where is the way out? The way out is in transforming the small disintegrated peasant farms into large-scale amalgamated farms on the basis of communal tillage of the soil, in adopting collective tillage of the soil on the basis of the new higher technique. The way out is to amalgamate the small and tiny peasant farms gradually but, steadily, not by means of pressure, but by example and

persuasion, into large-scale undertakings on the basis of communal, co-operative, collective tillage of the soil, applying agricultural machinery and tractors, applying scientific methods for the intensification of agriculture. *There is no other way out*.

5. The Turn of the Peasantry Toward Socialism and the Rate of Development of the Soviet and Collective Farm Movement

The peasantry did not turn toward collectivisation all at once. It could not begin all at once. True, the watchword of collectivisation was proclaimed by the Party even at the Fifteenth Congress. But it is not enough to issue a slogan to get the peasantry to turn toward Socialism. To secure such a change at least one more circumstance is needed, namely, that the masses of the peasantry themselves should become convinced of the correctness of the slogan proclaimed, and should adopt it as their own. Hence, this change was prepared gradually. It was prepared by the whole course of our development, the whole course of development of our industry, and particularly the development of those branches of industry which supply machines and tractors for agriculture. It was prepared by our policy of decisive struggle against the rich peasantry (kulaks) and the course of our grain-collecting campaign in its new forms in 1928 and 1929, which placed the kulak farms under the control of the poor and middle-peasant masses. It was prepared by the development of agricultural co-operation, which accustomed the individual peasant to the collective management of affairs. It was prepared by a network of collective farms, where the peasant tested out the advantage of collective forms of economy as compared with individual forms. It was prepared, finally, by the network of Soviet farms scattered throughout the whole of the U.S.S.R., and equipped with the new technique, where the peasant had the opportunity to become convinced of the strength and advantage of the new technique.

It would be a mistake to regard our Soviet farms merely as a source of grain supplies. In reality the Soviet farms, with their new technique, with the aid they give to the surrounding peasantry, with their unprecedented economic sweep, served as that leading factor which facilitated the turning of the peasant masses and directed them on to the path of collectivisation.

This is the basis on which arose that mass collective farm movement among millions of poor and middle peasants which began in the second half

of 1929, and which opened a period of. great change in the life of our country.

What measures did the Central Committee take to meet this movement fully equipped, and to take the lead of it?

The measures taken by the C.C. proceeded in three main directions: the direction of organising and financing Soviet farms, the direction of organising and financing collective farms, and, finally, the direction of organising the manufacture of tractors and agricultural machinery and their supply to the rural districts through machine and tractor depots, through tractor columns, etc.

(*a*) As early as April, 1928, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee adopted a decision to organise in the space of three or four years a number of *new Soviet farms*, calculating that by the end of that period these farms could produce not less than 100 million poods (1.6 million tons) of marketable grain. Later on this decision was ratified by the plenary session of the Central Committee. The Grain Trust (Zernotrest) was organised and put in charge of the carrying out of this decision. At the same time it was decided to strengthen the *old Soviet farms* and extend their sown area. The Central Soviet Farming Trust (Sovkhozcentre) was organised and put in charge of carrying out this decision.

I am bound to remark that these decisions met with considerable opposition on the part of the opportunist section of our Party. There was talk about the money invested in the Soviet farms being money "thrown away." There was also criticism on the part of men of "science," supported by the opportunist elements in the Party, to the effect that the organisation of large Soviet farms was impossible and senseless. However, the Central Committee pursued its course, and pursued it to the end, in spite of everything.

In 1927–28 (apart from current short-term credits), 65.7 million rubles were allocated for financing Soviet farms. In 1928–29, 185.8 million rubles were granted. This year 856.2 have been granted.

During the period under review 18,000 tractors of 350,000 horse-power have been handed over to the Soviet farms.

What are the results of these measures?

The areas sown by the *Zernotrest* amounted to 150,000 hectares in 1928–29, 1,060,000 hectares in 1929–30, and will be 4,500,000 hectares in 1930–31, 9,000,000 in 1931–32, and 14,000,000 hectares in 1932–33, *i.e*. at the

end of the Five-Year Plan. The area sown by the *Sovkhozcentre* amounted to 430,000 hectares in 1928–29 and 860,000 hectares in 1929–30; while in 1930–31 it will be 1,800,000 hectares, in 1931–32 2,000,000 hectares, and in 1932–33 2,500,000 hectares. The area sown by the *Ukrainian Amalgamation of Soviet Farms* amounted to 170,000 hectares in 1928–29, and 280,000 hectares in 1929–30; while in 1930–31 it will be 500,000 hectares, and in 1932–33 720,000 hectares. The grain sown by the *Union Sugar Trust* (Soyuz-Sakhar) amounted to 780,000 hectares in 1928–29 and 820,000 hectares in 1929–30; while in 1930–31 it will be 860,000 hectares, in 1931–32 980,000 hectares, and in 1932–33 990,000 hectares.

This means, in the first place, that the Grain Trust alone will have by the end of the Five-Year Plan *as much* area under grain as the whole of the Argentine has to-day. (Applause.)

It means, secondly, that all the Soviet farms taken together will have, by the end of the Five-Year Plan, one million hectares *more* under grain than the whole of Canada has to-day. (Applause.)

As for the *gross* and *marketed* output of grain by the Soviet farms, we have the following picture of their progress year by year. In 1927–28 we had a total gross output of 9.5 million centners,[1] of which 6.4 million cwt. were marketed; in 1928–29, gross output, 12.8 million cwt., 7.9 million cwt. marketed; in 1929–30, according to all the data, we shall have 28.2 million cwt., of which 18 million cwt. marketed; in 1930–31 we shall have 71.7 million cwt. gross, 61 million cwt. of these being marketed, etc., etc.

Such are the actual and anticipated results of our Party's policy as regards Soviet farms.

According to the decision of the Political Bureau of April, 1928, to organise new Soviet farms, it was laid down that we must receive from these farms not less than 100 million poods of grain by 1931–32. In reality it transpires that in 1931–32 these new Soviet farms alone will provide over 200 million poods. The programme is surpassed 100 per cent.

It turns out that the people who laughed at the decision of the Political Bureau of our Central Committee were actually laughing at themselves.

According to the Five-Year Plan confirmed by the Congress of Soviets, by the end of the Five-Year Plan period the area sown in Soviet farms of all categories was to be five million hectares. Actually, already this year the area sown in Soviet farms amounts to 3.8 million hectares, while next year

—the third year of the Five-Year Plan—the area sown will be eight million hectares.

This means that we are carrying out and surpassing the five years' programme of construction of Soviet farms in three years.

According to the Five-Year Plan, we were to have a gross output of grain in the Soviet farms of 54.3 million cwt. by the end of the Plan. In reality, we already have a gross output in the Soviet farms of 28.2 million cwt. this year, while next year we shall have 71.7 million cwt.

This means that in the gross output of grain we are carrying out and surpassing the Five-Year Plan in three years.

The Five-Year Plan in three years.

Let the bourgeois scribblers and their opportunist imitators talk now about it being impossible to carry out and surpass the Five-Year Plan of Soviet farm construction in three years.

(*b*) As regards *collective farming*, we have an even more favourable picture.

As far back as July, 1928, the plenary session of our Central Committee adopted the following resolution on the building of collective farms:

> It is necessary, unswervingly, to carry out the task laid down by the Fifteenth Congress of "amalgamating and transforming the small individual peasant farms into large collective undertakings" as *voluntary amalgamations*, built on the basis of the new technique and representing a higher form of grain enterprise, both in the sense of the Socialist transformation of agriculture and in the sense of ensuring a radical increase in its productive and marketable capacity (see the resolution of the July Plenum of the C.C. "On the Policy of the Grain Supply Campaign, in the Light of the General Economic Situation," 1928).

Later this decision was ratified by the resolutions of the Sixteenth Party Conference, and the special resolution of the plenary session of the C.C. in November, 1929, concerning the collective farm movement. In the second half of 1929, when the radical turn toward the collective farms on the part of the peasantry made itself apparent, and when the middle peasants in the main entered the collective farms, the Political Bureau of the C.C. adopted a special resolution (January 5, 1930) "On the Rate of Collectivisation and Measures of State Assistance to the Building of Collective Farms."

In this resolution the C.C.:

(i) Recorded the existence of a *mass swing of the peasants* toward the collective farms, and the possibility of surpassing the Five-Year Plan of collective farm construction in the spring of 1930.

(ii) Recorded the existence of the material and other conditions requisite for *replacing kulak production by collective farm production*, in connection with which it declared the necessity of passing on from the policy of restricting the kulaks to the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class.

(iii) Laid down the prospect that already by the spring of 1930 the area sown on collectivised lines *would considerably exceed 30 million hectares*.

(iv) Divided the U.S.S.R. into three groups of districts, establishing *approximate periods for each* to complete collectivisation in the main.

(v) *Revised the method of land surveying* in favour of the collective farms,[1] and also the forms of financing agriculture, allocating not less than 500 million rubles of credits for the collective farms in 1929–30.

(vi) Determined upon the *artel*[2] as the principal link in the collective farm system at the present time.

(vii) Reprimanded the opportunist elements in the Party who attempted to hinder the collective farming movement on the plea of the lack of machines and tractors.

(viii) Finally, warned Party workers of the possibility of excesses in the collective farming movement, and of the danger of decreeing the building of collective farms from above, a danger which creates the menace of replacing the real mass entry into the collective farms by playing at collectivisation.

It should be noted that this resolution of the Central Committee was met in more than unfriendly fashion by the opportunist elements in our Party. There was talk and whispering to the effect that the C.C. had plunged into fantasy, and that it was "squandering" the people's money in "non-existing" collective farms. The Right elements rubbed their hands, anticipating a "certain" collapse. However, the C.C. stubbornly pursued its course, and pursued it to the end, in spite of everything, in spite of the ignorant sneers of the Right wing, in spite of the excesses and swelled-headedness of the "Left."

In 1927–28 76 million rubles were granted for the financing of the collective farms, in 1928–29 170 million rubles, and in the present year 473 million rubles. In addition, 65 million rubles have been granted to the collectivisation fund. Rebates have been granted to the collective farms

which have increased their financial resources by 200 million rubles. The collective farms have been provided with the farm equipment of the liquidated kulaks to the value of over 400 million rubles. At least 30,000 tractors, with a total horse-power of 400,000 units, have been placed at the disposal of the collective farms, not reckoning 7,000 tractors of the Tractorcentre, which serve the collective farms, and the assistance afforded in the shape of tractors by the Soviet farms. This year the collective farms have been granted advances and other assistance in respect of seeds amounting to 100 million cwt. of grain. Finally, direct organisational help to the collective farms has been granted in the shape of setting up machinery and horse depots, the number of which exceeds 7,000, employing not less than 1,300,000 horses.

What are the results of these measures?

The area sown in the collective farms amounted in 1927 to 0.8 million hectares, in 1928 to 1.4 million hectares, in 1929 to 4.3 million hectares, in 1930 to not less than 36 million hectares, reckoning the spring and winter sowings.

This means, in the first place, that in three years the area sown in the collective farms has increased more than forty times. (Applause.)

It means, secondly, that our collective farms to-day have *as large* an area sown as France and Italy put together. (Applause.)

As for the *gross* output of grain and its *marketed* section, we have the following picture. In 1927, we received 4.9 million cwt. from the collective farms, 2 million cwt. of these being marketed; in 1928, 8.4 million cwt. gross, 3.6 million cwt. marketed; in 1929, 29.1 million cwt. gross, 12.7 million cwt. marketed; in 1930 we shall have, according to all data, 256 million cwt. gross, not less than 82 million cwt. of these being marketed.

It must be admitted that not a single branch of our industry, which as a whole is developing at a fairly rapid rate, has yet shown such unprecedented rates of progress as the building of the collective farms.

What do all these figures show?

They show, first of all, that the gross output of grain in the collective farms has increased more than fifty times in three years, while the quantity marketed has increased more than forty times.

They show, secondly, that it is possible that the collective farms this year will provide *more than half* of the total marketed output of grain in the country.

They show, thirdly, that the destiny of agriculture and its principal problems will henceforward be determined, not by the individual peasant farms, but by the collective farms and Soviet farms.

They show, fourthly, that the process of liquidating the kulaks as a class is going full speed ahead.

They show, finally, that such economic changes have already taken place in the country, that we have every reason to assert that we have succeeded in moving the countryside forward on to a new path, on to the path of collectivisation, thereby ensuring the successful building of Socialism not only in the towns but also in the country.

In its resolution of January 5, 1930, the Political Bureau of the C.C. fixed the programme of the area to be sown by collective farms at 30 million hectares for the spring of 1930. Actually, we have 36 million hectares. The programme of the Central Committee has been surpassed.

It turns out that the people who laughed at the decision of the C.C. were laughing at themselves. The opportunist chatterers in our Party got no comfort either from petty-bourgeois anarchy, or from the excesses in the collective farming movement.

According to the Five-Year Plan, we were to have by the end of the period 20 6 million hectares sown in the collective farms. Actually, we have 36 million hectares already sown in the collective farms this year.

This means that we have already surpassed the five-year programme of collective farm construction in two years, and by more than 50 per cent. (Applause.)

According to the Five-Year Plan, we were to have a gross output of grain in the collective farms by the end of the period amounting to 190.5 million cwt. But in reality we shall already this year have a gross output of grain in the collective farms amounting to 256 million cwt.

This means that we are already surpassing the Five-year programme of grain production in the collective farms in two years, and by more than 30 per cent.

The Five-Year Plan in two years. (*Applause*.)

Let the opportunist old women mumble now about it being impossible to carry out and surpass the Five-Year Plan of collective construction in two years.

6. The Improvement of the Material and Cultural Position of the Workers and Peasants

Thus, it turns out that the progressive growth of the socialised sector, both in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of agriculture, is a fact beyond all possibility of doubt.

What can this mean from the standpoint of the material position of the toilers?

It means that thereby the foundations have been laid for the radical improvement of the material and cultural position of the workers and peasants.

In what way?

In the first place, the growth of the socialised sector means first of all the diminution of the exploiting elements in town and country, the decline of their relative importance in national economy, and this means that the workers' and peasants' share in the national income must inevitably rise at the expense of the share of the exploiting classes.

Secondly, given the growth of the socialised sector, a part of the national income which hitherto has gone to feed the exploiting classes and their dependents must now remain in industry itself, to extend production, to build new factories and works, to improve the conditions of the toilers. And this means that the numbers and strength of the working class must grow, while the unemployment must decline and the unemployed be absorbed.

Finally, the growth of the socialised sector, to the extent that it leads to the improvement of the material position of the working class, signifies the progressive increase in the capacity of the home market and an increase in the demand for manufactured goods on the part of the workers and peasants. And this means that the growth of the home market will exceed the growth of industry, and push it forward towards ceaseless expansion.

All these and similar circumstances lead to the steady improvement of the material and cultural position of the workers and peasants.

(*a*) Let us begin with the question of the *numerical growth* of the working class and the *reduction of unemployment*.

The number of wage workers (without the unemployed) was in 10,990,000 in 1926–27, 11,456,000 in 1927–28, 11,997,000 in 1928–29, and not less than 13,129,000, according to all the data, in 1929–30. Amongst these, manual workers (including agricultural labourers and

seasonal workers) numbered 7,069,000 in 1926–27, 7,404,000 in 1927–28, 7,758,000 in 1928–29, and 8,533,00 in 1929–30. Amongst these, again, the workers in large-scale industry (without clerical staff) numbered 2,439,000 in 1926–27, 2,632,000 in 1927–28, 2,858,000 in 1928–29, and 3,029,000 in 1929–30.

Thus, we have a picture of the steady growth in numbers of the working class: and, while the growth in the number of wage workers represents 19.5 per cent in three years, and the growth in the numbers of manual workers represents 20.7 per cent, the growth in the number of industrial workers represents 24.2 per cent.

Let us take the question of unemployment.

It must be said that in this sphere there is considerable muddle both in the Commissariat of Labour and in the Central Council of Trade Unions. On the one hand, according to the data of these institutions, we have about one million unemployed, amongst whom only 14.3 per cent have the minimum of any skill, while about 73 per cent are persons of so-called intellectual labour and unskilled, the vast majority of the latter representing women and youths unconnected with industry. On the other hand, according to the same data, we are experiencing a severe shortage of skilled labour power; the labour exchanges cannot satisfy the demand of our factories for labour power by at least 80 per cent, and we are therefore obliged hastily, literally while on the march, to retrain completely unskilled people and develop skilled workers out of them, sufficient to satisfy even the minimum requirements of our industries. Try and make head or tail of this muddle. One thing is clear, at all events—that these unemployed do not represent a *reserve* or still more a *permanent* unemployed army for our industry. And what are the facts? Even according to the data of People's Commissariat for Labour, we find that recently the number of unemployed has *fallen* by more than 700,000 compared with the same period last year. This means a reduction in the number of unemployed, as on May 1 of this year, by more than 42 per cent.

That is yet another result of the growth of the Socialist sector in our national economy.

(*c*) An even more striking result will follow if we consider matters from the angle of the distribution of the national income according to classes. The question of the distribution of the national income according to classes is a root question from the standpoint of the material and cultural position

of the workers and peasants. It is not by accident that the bourgeois economists of Germany, Britain, and the United States try to confuse this question in the interests of the bourgeoisie, publishing report after report on their "quite objective" investigations on this subject.

According to the German Statistical Department, the share of wages in the national income of Germany represented 70 per cent in 1929, while the share of the bourgeoisie was 30 per cent. According to the Federal Trade Commission and the National Bureau of Economic Research, the share of workers in the national income of the U.S.A. in 1923 was over 54 per cent, while the share of the capitalists was over 45 per cent. Finally, according to the economists Bowley and Stamp, the share of the working class in the national income in Great Britain in 1924 was a little less than 50 per cent, while the share of the capitalists was a little over 50 per cent of the national income.

Naturally, we cannot accept the results of these investigations at their face value. This is because, apart from inexactitudes of a purely economic character, there is a different type of inexactitude in this investigation, which has as its object partly to conceal and to underestimate the income of the capitalists and partly to exaggerate and overestimate the income of the working class, by including among the workers officials who receive big salaries. I will not dwell on the fact that these investigations often do not distinguish the income of farmers and agricultural capitalists generally.

Comrade Varga has subjected this data to a critical analysis. And this is what he finds. It turns out that the share of the workers and other toilers of town and country, who do not exploit the labour of others, represented 55 per cent of the national income in Germany, 54 per cent in the U.S.A., 45 per cent in Great Britain, while the share of the capitalists in Germany was 45 per cent, in the U.S.A. 46 per cent, in Great Britain 55 per cent.

That is the state of affairs in the largest capitalist countries.

How do matters stand in the U.S.S.R.?

Here is the data of the State Planning Commission. We find that:

(*a*) The share of the *workers and toiling peasantry who do not exploit the labour of others* represented, in 1927–28, 75.2 per cent of the total national income (the share of the town and agricultural workers being 33.3 per cent); in 1928–29, 76.5 per cent (the share of town and agricultural workers being 33.2 per cent); and in 1929–30, 77.1 per cent (the share of town and agricultural workers being 33.5 per cent).

(*b*) The share of the *rich peasants (kulaks) and urban capitalists* represented, in 1927–28, 8.1 per cent; in 1928–29, 6.5 per cent; in 1929–30, 1.8 per cent.

(*c*) The share of *handicraftsmen*, the majority of whom are toilers, constituted, in 1927–28, 6.5 per cent; in 1928–29, 5.4 per cent; in 1929–30, 4.4 per cent.

(*d*) The share of the *State sector*, the income of which is the income of the working class and the toiling masses generally, constituted 8.4 per cent in 1927–28, 10 per cent in 1928–29, 15.2 per cent in 1929–30.

(*e*) Lastly, the share of the so-called *others* (which means pensioners) constituted 1.8 per cent in 1927–28, 1.6 per cent in 1928–29, and 1.5 per cent in 1929–30.

Thus we see that, while in the foremost capitalist countries the share of the exploiting classes in the national income constitutes 50 per cent, and sometimes more, with us in the U.S.S.R. the share of the exploiting classes constitutes no more than 2 per cent of the national income.

It is this, by the way, which explains the striking fact that in the U.S.A. in 1922, according to the American bourgeois writer, Denny, "one per cent of the property owners concentrated in their own hands 59 per cent of the total national wealth," while in England in 1920–21, according to the same Denny, "less than 2 per cent of the total owners of property owned 64 per cent of the total national wealth."[1]

Can such facts exist in the U.S.S.R., in the land of the Soviets: Clearly they cannot. In the U.S.S.R. such "property owners" have disappeared long ago.

But if in the U.S.S.R. in 1929–30 only about 2 per cent of the national income falls to the share of the exploiting classes, what happens to the remaining part of the national income?

Clearly it remains in the hands of the workers and toiling peasants.

This is the source of the strength and authority of the Soviet Government amongst millions of workers and peasants.

This is the foundation for the systematic improvement in the material welfare of the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R.

(*c*) In the light of these decisive facts, we can quite understand the systematic rise in real wages of the workers, the increase in the budget of workers' social insurance, the increase in assistance given to the poor and middle-peasant farms, the increase in the grants for workers' housing, for improvement of workers' living conditions, for maternal and child welfare,

and in connection with this the progressive increase in the population of the U.S.S.R. and decrease of the death rate, particularly among children.

It is known, for example, that the *real wages* of the workers, reckoning also social insurance and deductions from profits toward the fund for improving workers' living conditions, has increased to 167 per cent of the pre-war level. The budget for workers' social insurance alone has increased during the last three years from 980 million rubles in 1927–28 to 1,400 million rubles in 1929–30. Maternal and child welfare during the last three years (1927–28 to 1929–30) has involved expenditure of 494 million rubles. Pre-school education (kindergartens, nurseries, etc.) has involved 204 million rubles during the same period. 1,880 million rubles have been spent on workers' housing.

This does not mean, of course, that all that is necessary has already been done to secure a substantial increase in real wages, and that it was impossible to raise wages to a higher level. If all has not been done, the blame falls upon the bureaucracy of our machinery of supply in general, and the bureaucracy of the consumers' co-operatives primarily and in particular. According to the State Planning Commission, the socialised sector in internal trade in 1929–30 covers more than 99 per cent of the wholesale and over 89 per cent of the retail sections. This means that the co-operative movement is systematically conquering the private sector and is becoming a monopolist in the sphere of trade. This, of course, is good. But it is bad that this monopoly in a number of cases harms the consumer. It turns out that, in spite of their almost monopolist position in trade, the co-operatives prefer to supply the workers with more "profitable" goods, which give a bigger return (haberdashery, etc.), and avoid supplying them with less "profitable" goods, even though they are more necessary for the workers (agricultural produce). As a result the workers are forced to satisfy about 25 per cent of their requirements of agricultural produce in the private market by paying higher prices. Apart from this, the co-operatives are concerned most of all with their balance sheets, as a result of which they are difficult to move in the direction of reducing retail prices, in spite of categorical instructions given by the leading bodies. The result is that the co-operatives act in this case not as a Socialist sector, but as a peculiar kind of sector infected with a certain "Nepman" spirit. The question arises, Who needs this kind of co-operative, and what is the value of its monopoly to the

workers, if it does not carry out the task of substantially improving the workers' real wages?

But if, in spite of this, real wages nevertheless constantly increase year by year, it means that our order of society, the system of distribution of the national income, and the whole policy in regard to wages are such that they are able to paralyse and make up for each and every defect arising from the co-operatives.

If we add to this circumstance a number of other factors, like the increasing importance of public catering, the cheapening of houses for the workers, the tremendous number of scholarships for workers and children of workers, cultural services, etc., we can safely say that the increase in the wages of the workers constitutes a much larger percentage than is indicated in the statistics of some of our institutions.

All this taken together, plus the transferring of over 830,000 industrial workers (33.5 per cent) to the seven-hour day, plus the transferring of more than one and a half million industrial workers (63.4 per cent) to the five-day week, plus the existence of the wide system of rest homes, sanatoria, and health resorts for the workers, through which over 1,700,000 workers have passed during the last three years—all this creates conditions of work and life for the working class which give us the opportunity of bringing up a new generation of workers, healthy and vigorous, capable of raising the strength of the land of the Soviets to the height which is its due, and of boldly defending it against any attacks on the part of its enemies. (Applause.)

As for aid to the peasantry, both individual and collectivised, including also aid to the poor peasants, during the last three years (1927–28 to 1929–30) it amounted to a sum of not less than 4 milliard rubles granted through the credit system and the State Budget. We know that help in seeds alone to the peasantry during these three years amounted to not less than 154 million poods (2½ million tons) of grain.

It is not surprising therefore that on the whole our workers and peasants do not live badly. The death rate of the population has declined in comparison with pre-war days by 36 per cent as regards the general rate and 42.5 per cent as regards the child rate, while the *annual increase* of our population amounts to over three million. (Applause.)

As for the cultural position of the workers and peasants, in this sphere, too, we have some achievements, which, however, can in no way satisfy us

in view of their insignificance. Not reckoning workers' clubs of all kinds, reading huts, libraries, and classes for the liquidation of illiteracy, which cover 10½ million people this year, the situation as regards culture and education is as follows: The elementary schools this year provide for 11,638,000 children, the secondary schools 1,945,000; the industrial and technical schools, transport schools, agricultural schools, and courses for mass training in production provide for 333,100; the technical colleges and trade schools of the same standard provide for 238,700; and the universities, general and technical, 190,400. All this has made it possible to raise the percentage of literacy in the U.S.S.R. from 33 per cent in pre-war times to 62.6 to-day.

The main thing now is to introduce compulsory elementary education. I say "main" because such a change would mean a decisive step in the cultural revolution. And it has long been high time to begin this, because we have to-day all that is necessary to organise general elementary education in the vast majority of districts of the U.S.S.R. Up to the present we have been forced "to economise in everything, even in the schools," in order to "save and restore heavy industry" (Lenin). However, we have now restored heavy industry, and are now moving it further ahead. Consequently the time has come for us to set about the organisation of general compulsory elementary education.

I think the Congress will act correctly if it takes a quite definite and quite categorical decision on this question. (Applause.)

7. The Difficulties of Growth, the Struggle of Classes, and the Socialist Offensive Along the Whole Front

I have spoken of our achievements in the sphere of the development of national economy. I have spoken of our achievements in the sphere of industry, agriculture, and the reconstruction of the whole of national economy on Socialist foundations. I have spoken, lastly, of our achievements as regards the improvement of the material position of the workers and peasants.

But it would be a mistake to think that we have secured these achievements "easily and quietly," automatically, so to speak, without special efforts and strain of will, without struggle and disturbance. Such achievements do not come automatically. In reality, we won these

achievements by resolute struggle against our difficulties, by serious and prolonged struggle to overcome the difficulties.

Everybody is now talking about difficulties. But not all of us understand the character of these difficulties. Yet the problem of the difficulties is of the highest importance for us.

Hence the question arises, What are the characteristic features of our difficulties, what hostile forces are concealed behind them, and how do we overcome them?

(*a*) In characterising our difficulties, we must bear in mind at least the following circumstances.

First of all, it is necessary to bear in mind the circumstance that our present difficulties are difficulties of a *reconstructive* period. What does this mean? It means that they are radically different from the difficulties of the *restoration* period of our economy. While in the restoration period we talked of fully employing our old factories and assisting agriculture on its old basis, to-day it is a question of radically rebuilding and reconstructing both industry and agriculture, changing their technical basis and equipping them with modern technique. It means that we are faced with the task of rebuilding the whole technical basis of national economy. And this requires new and more substantial investments in national economy, new and more experienced personnel capable of mastering the new technique and of pushing it ahead.

Secondly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that the reconstruction of national economy is not limited to the reconstruction of its technical basis but, on the contrary, requires at the same time the reconstruction of social and economic relations. I have in mind here chiefly agriculture. In industry, which has already been amalgamated and socialised, technical reconstruction already has in the main a social and economic basis. The task of reconstruction here is to intensify the process of squeezing the capitalist elements out of industry. Matters are less simple in agriculture. The reconstruction of the technical basis of agriculture pursues, of course, the same aim. But the peculiar feature about our agriculture is that small-peasant economy still prevails in it, that small production lacks the possibility of mastering the new technique, and that, consequently, the reconstruction of the technical basis of agriculture is *impossible* without the simultaneous reconstruction of the old social and economic order, without amalgamating the small farms into large collective farms, without tearing

the roots of capitalism out of agriculture. Naturally, these circumstances cannot but complicate our difficulties, cannot but complicate our work in overcoming these difficulties.

We must bear in mind, thirdly, the circumstance that our work in the Socialist reconstruction of national economy, tearing asunder as it does the economic links of capitalism, and turning upside down all the forces of the old world, cannot help but arouse the desperate resistance of those forces. And this is the case, as you are aware. The malignant wrecking tactics of the upper group of the *bourgeois intelligentsia* in all branches of our industry, the fierce struggle the *kulaks* are waging against collective forms of economy in the villages, the sabotage of the measures decided upon by the Soviet Government on the part of the *bureaucratic elements* in the State machine who represent the agency of our class enemies—these, for the time being, are the principal forms of resistance offered by the dying classes in our country. Clearly these circumstances cannot serve to facilitate our work in reconstructing national economy.

Fourthly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that the resistance of the dying classes in our country does not take place in isolation from the outside world, but meets with the support of the capitalists who encircle us. Capitalist encirclement is not simply a geographical conception. Capitalist encirclement means that around the U.S.S.R. there are hostile class forces ready to support our class enemies within the U.S.S.R. morally, materially, by means of financial blockade, and, when opportunity offers, by means of military intervention. It has been proved that the wrecking tactics of our technical experts, the anti-Soviet acts of our kulaks, the burning and blowing up of our factories and public works, are subsidised and inspired from outside. The imperialist world is not interested in having the U.S.S.R. stand on its own legs and develop the ability to overtake and surpass the foremost capitalist countries. Hence the aid it grants to the forces of the old world in the U.S.S.R. Naturally, this circumstance also does not serve to lighten our burden of reconstruction.

But the description of our difficulties will be incomplete if we do not take into account one more circumstance. I mean the special character of our difficulties. I mean that our difficulties are not difficulties of *decline* or *stagnation*, but difficulties of *growth*, difficulties of *revival*, difficulties of *progress*. This means that our difficulties are radically different from the difficulties of the capitalist countries. When they talk of difficulties in the

U.S.A., they have in view difficulties of *decline*, because America is now passing through a crisis, *i.e*. economic decline. When people in England speak of difficulties, they have in view difficulties of *stagnation*, because England has for several years been in a state of stagnation, *i.e*. arrested progress. But when we speak of our difficulties, we have in view not decline and not stagnation in our development, but the *growth* of our forces, the *upward surge* of our forces, the *forward march* of our economy. How many points *to advance* by a given date, by what percentage to *increase* our output, how many million *more* hectares to sow, how many months *earlier* than the plan to build a works, a factory, a railway—these are the questions which we have in mind when we speak of difficulties. Consequently, our difficulties, in contradistinction to the difficulties of, say, America or Britain, are difficulties of *growth*, difficulties of *progress*.

And what does this mean? It means that our difficulties are of such a kind that *they contain within themselves the possibility of overcoming them*. It means that the distinctive feature of our difficulties consists in this, that *they themselves provide us with a basis for overcoming them*.

What follows from all this?

From this it follows, in the first place, that our difficulties are not difficulties of petty and accidental "mismanagement" but difficulties of class struggle.

It follows, secondly, that behind our difficulties are concealed our class enemies, that those difficulties are complicated by the desperate resistance of the dying classes in our country, the support these classes receive from outside, the presence of bureaucratic elements in our own institutions, the uncertainty and conservatism which exist in certain sections of our Party.

It follows, thirdly, that in order to overcome the difficulties it is necessary first of all to beat off the attacks of the capitalist elements, crush their resistance, and in this way clear the road for a rapid move forward.

It follows, finally, that the very character of our difficulties, which are difficulties of *growth*, enables us to crush our class enemies.

But there is only one method by which we can utilise these *possibilities* and transform them into *reality*, in order to crush the resistance of our class enemies and achieve the overcoming of our difficulties, viz. to organise the *offensive* against the capitalist elements *along the whole front* and isolate the opportunist elements in our own ranks, which hinder the offensive,

which rush in panic from side to side, and which create uncertainty in the Party as to our victory. (Applause.)

There is no other way.

Only those who have lost their heads can seek a way out in Comrade Bukharin's childish formula about the peaceful growth of the capitalist elements into Socialism. Our development has proceeded, and continues to proceed, not according to the formula of Comrade Bukharin. Our development has moved and continues to move according to Lenin's formula, "Who will defeat whom?" Shall we rout and crush them, the exploiters, or shall they rout and crush us, the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R.?—That is how the matter stands, comrades.

Therefore the *organisation of the offensive of Socialism along the whole front*—this is the task which has now arisen before us in developing our work of reconstructing the *whole* of national economy.

And this is exactly what the Party understood its mission to be when it organised the offensive against the capitalist elements in our country.

(*b*) But is an offensive, particularly an offensive along the whole front, permissible at all in the conditions of N.E.P. (the New Economic Policy)?

Some think that the offensive is incompatible with N.E.P., that N.E.P. is in essence a retreat, that as soon as the retreat has been ended N.E.P. must be abolished. This, of course, is stupidity. It is stupidity which emanates either from the Trotskyites, who understand nothing of Leninism and dreamed of "abolishing" N.E.P. "in half a jiffy," or from the Right opportunists, who also understood nothing of Leninism, and by their chatter about "the threat to abolish N.E.P." dream of being able to induce us to renounce the offensive. If N.E.P. were merely a retreat, Lenin would not have said at the Eleventh Party Congress, when N.E.P. was being consistently applied, that "the retreat has stopped." Did not Lenin, when speaking of the retreat having stopped, declare at the very same time that we intend to apply N.E.P. "seriously and for a long time"? We have only to put this question to realise the absurdity of the chatter about N.E.P. being incompatible with the offensive. In reality, N.E.P. presupposes not only a *retreat* and permitting a revival of private trade, a revival in capitalism while safeguarding the regulating role of the State (the initial stage of N.E.P.); in reality, N.E.P. also presupposes, at a certain stage of development, the Socialist *offensive* against the capitalist elements, the *restriction* of the field of activity of private trade, the relative and absolute reduction of capitalism, the growing *predominance* of the

socialised sector over the unsocialised sector, the victory of Socialism over capitalism (the present stage of N.E.P.). N.E.P. was introduced in order to bring about the victory of Socialism over the capitalist elements. In passing to the offensive along the whole front we are not abolishing N.E.P., for private trade and capitalist elements still remain, commodity circulation and money economy still remain; but we are certainly abolishing the initial stage of N.E.P. and developing its further stage, the present stage of N.E.P., which is its last stage.

This is what Lenin said in 1922, a year after the introduction of N.E.P.:

> We are retreating just now, but we are doing it in order to go back a little at first and then take a run and a longer leap forward more vigorously than ever. It was on this sole condition only that we retreated in applying our New Economic Policy. Where and how we must reconstruct ourselves, adapt ourselves, reorganise in order, following the retreat, to begin a most stubborn advance, we do not yet know. In order to carry out all these activities normally, we must, as the saying goes, measure not ten but a hundred times, before we make up our mind (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVII, pp. 361–363).

Clear enough, one would think.

But now comes the question, Has the time already arrived to pass to the offensive, is the moment mature for the offensive?

Lenin said elsewhere in the same year—1922—that it was necessary

> to link up with the mass of the peasantry, the rank and file working peasantry, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely more slowly than we ever dreamed, but in such a way that the whole mass will really move forward with us … that "then, in time this movement will begin to accelerate at a rate we cannot even dream of at present" (*Ibid*., pp. 231–232).

And now comes the same question: Has the time already come for such an acceleration of the movement, for speeding-up the rate of our development; have we correctly chosen the moment in passing to a resolute offensive along the whole front in the second half of 1929?

To this question the Party has already given a clear and definite reply.

Yes, such a moment has already arrived.

Yes, the Party has correctly selected the moment for passing to the offensive along the whole front.

This is proved by the growing activity of the working class and the unprecedented growth of the prestige of the Party among the millions of toilers.

It is proved by the growing activity of the poor and middle-peasant masses and the determined turn of those masses in the direction of collective farming.

It is proved by our achievements, both in the sphere of the development of industry and in the sphere of the building of Soviet and collective farms.

It is proved by the fact that we now have the possibility of not only replacing kulak production by the collective farms and the Soviet farms, but of exceeding it several times.

It is proved by the fact that we have already succeeded in solving, in the main, the problem of grain, and in accumulating certain reserves of grain, by shifting the centre of gravity of the marketing of grain from the sphere of individual production to the sphere of collective and Soviet farm production.

Here is the proof of the fact that the Party selected the right moment to begin the offensive along the whole front, and to adopt the slogan of liquidating the kulaks as a class.

Where would we have been if we had listened to the Right opportunists of Comrade Bukharin's group, if we had renounced the offensive, reduced the rate of development of our industry, delayed the development of collective and Soviet farms, and taken our stand on the individual peasant farm?

We would most certainly have ruined our industry, destroyed the Socialist reconstruction of agriculture, found ourselves without grain, and cleared the way for the domination of the kulak. We would have been left stranded.

What would have happened if we had listened to the Left opportunists of the Trotsky—Zinoviev group and opened the offensive in 1926–27, when we had no opportunity of replacing kulak production by the production of the collective and Soviet farms?

We would most certainly have broken down in this attempt, demonstrated our weakness, strengthened the kulaks and the capitalist elements generally, we would have thrown the middle peasants into the arms of the kulak, disrupted our Socialist construction and would have been left without grain. We would have been left stranded.

The results are the same.

It is not for nothing that our workers say:

"If you go 'to the Left,' you will come to the Right." (Applause.)

Some comrades think that the main thing in the Socialist offensive is repressions, and if repressions do not increase there is no offensive.

Is this true? Of course it is untrue.

Repressions are a necessary element in the offensive, but an auxiliary not a principal element. The principal element in the Socialist offensive, in present conditions, consists in increasing the rate of development of our industry, increasing the rate of development of the Soviet farms and collective farms, increasing the rate of the economic squeezing out of the capitalist elements in town and country, mobilising the masses around the cause of Socialist construction, mobilising the masses against capitalism. You may arrest and exile tens and hundreds of thousands of kulaks, but if at the same time you do not do everything necessary to hasten the building of new forms of economy, replace the old capitalist forms of economy by new forms, blow up and liquidate the productive sources of the economic existence and development of the capitalist elements in the countryside—the kulaks will be reborn and grow just the same.

Others think that the Socialist offensive is a headlong march forward, without proper preparation, without regrouping of forces in the course of the offensive, without consolidating the positions occupied, without utilising reserves to develop our successes, and, if symptoms have appeared of, say, an ebb of a part of the peasantry away from the collective farms, this means that we are already at "the ebb-tide of the Revolution," a decline in the movement, a check to the offensive.

Is this true? Of course it is untrue.

In the first place, not a single offensive, be it ever so successful, takes place without some breaks and overhastiness on individual sections of the front. To argue, because of this, that the offensive has been checked, or that it has collapsed, shows that the essence of the offensive has not been understood.

Secondly, there has never been, and can never be, a *successful* offensive without a regrouping of forces in the course of the offensive itself, without consolidating the occupied positions, without utilising reserves to develop successes and push the offensive to its conclusion. In a headlong movement, *i.e.* one that does not observe these conditions, the offensive

must inevitably work itself to a standstill and collapse. Rushing forward headlong is fatal in an offensive. Our rich experience in our civil war teaches us this.

Thirdly, how can you draw an analogy between "the ebb-tide of the Revolution," which usually takes place as a result of a *decline* in the movement, and the ebb of one part of the peasantry out of the collective farms, which occurred in the midst of continuous *progress* of the movement as a whole, continuous *progress* of all our Socialist construction, both in industry and in collective farming, the continuous *progress* of our Revolution? What can there be in common between these two totally different phenomena?

(*c*) What is the essence of the Bolshevik offensive in present conditions?

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, first of all, in mobilising the class vigilance and revolutionary activity of the masses against the capitalist elements in our country; mobilising the creative initiative and independent activity of the masses against the bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations which keeps the colossal reserves concealed in the heart of our social system idle and does not allow them to be utilised; organising competition and labour enthusiasm among the masses to increase the productivity of labour and develop Socialist construction.

Secondly, the essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies in organising the reconstruction of all the practical work of our trade union, co-operative, Soviet, and all other kinds of mass organisation in keeping with the demands of the reconstruction period; in organising in them a nucleus of the most active and revolutionary workers, pushing aside and isolating the opportunist, narrow craft unionist, and bureaucratic elements; driving out of them the hostile and degenerate elements, promoting new workers from below.

Furthermore, the essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies in mobilising the maximum resources for the financing of our industry, our Soviet farms and collective farms, and in putting the best members of our Party on the task of developing this work.

Lastly, the essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies in mobilising the Party itself to organise the whole offensive; strengthening and pulling together the Party organisations, driving out the elements of bureaucracy and degeneration, isolating and pushing aside those who express Right and Left

deviations from the Leninist line, pushing real, steadfast Leninists into the front ranks.

Such are the foundations of the Bolshevik offensive at the present time.

How has the Party carried out this plan of offensive?

You know that the Party has consistently carried out this plan.

First, the Party developed wide *self-criticism*, concentrating the attention of the masses on the defects in our construction, the defects in our work of organisation and institutions. As early as the Fifteenth Congress, the necessity of developing self-criticism was proclaimed. The Shakhti case and the sabotage in various branches of industry, which revealed the lack of revolutionary sensitiveness in individual sections of the Party, on the one hand, and the struggle with the kulaks and the defects in our village organisations which were revealed, on the other, gave a further stimulus to self-criticism. In its appeal of June 2, 1928, the Central Committee gave final shape to the campaign of self-criticism, calling upon all forces of the Party and the working class to develop self-criticism "from top to bottom and from the bottom to the top," "without respect of persons." Condemning the Trotskyist "criticism," which came from the other side of the barricades and was intended to discredit and weaken the Soviet Government, the Party proclaimed the task of self-criticism to be the merciless exposure of the weaknesses in our work in order to *improve* our construction and *strengthen* the Soviet Government. It is well known that the call of the Party aroused the most lively response amongst the masses of the working class and the peasantry.

Then the Party organised a wide campaign for the struggle against *bureaucracy*, putting forward the watchword of *purging* the Party, trade union, co-operative, and Soviet organisations of hostile and bureaucratised elements. The continuation of this campaign was the well-known resolution of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of March 16, 1930, which provided for the promotion of workers to positions in Government offices and for the organisation of mass workers' control over the apparatus of the State (patronage by the factories). It is known that this campaign roused supreme enthusiasm and activity among the working masses. The result of the campaign has been a vast increase in the prestige of the Party among the working class, an increase of their confidence in the Party, the entry into the Party of hundreds of thousands of new workers, and the workers' resolutions proclaiming their desire to enter the Party by whole

shops and works. Finally, the result of the campaign was that our organisations were freed from a number of stagnant and bureaucratic elements, and that the Central Council of Trade Unions was freed from the old opportunist leadership.

Furthermore, the Party organised wide Socialist *competition* and roused mass *labour enthusiasm* in the factories and workshops. The manifesto of the Sixteenth Party Conference on Socialist competition put matters on to the right track. The shock brigades are pushing them further. The Leninist Young Communist League and the working-class youth under its leadership are crowning the cause of competition and the shock brigades with decisive successes. It must be admitted that our revolutionary youth play an exceptional part in this campaign. It can now no longer be doubted that one of the most important facts, if not the most important fact, in our construction at the present time is the Socialist competition of factories and works, the roll-call of hundreds of thousands of workers on the results achieved in competition, and the widespread development of the *shock brigade movement*. Only the blind can fail to see that a tremendous revolution has taken place in the psychology of the masses and in their attitude to labour which has radically altered the features of our factories and works. Not so very long ago voices could still be heard amongst us talking of the "artificiality" and "futility" of competition and the shock brigade movement. To-day these "sages" do not arouse even a jeer: they are treated merely as "sages" who have outlived their day. The cause of competition and the shock brigade movement to-day is a cause which has been won and consolidated. It is a fact that not less than two millions of our workers are engaged in Socialist competition, while over a million have been drawn into the shock brigades.

The most remarkable feature of competition is the radical revolution it has wrought in men's views of labour, because it transforms labour from a disgraceful and painful burden, as it was reckoned before, into a matter of *honour*, a matter of *glory*, a matter of *valour and heroism*. There is not, and cannot be, anything similar to it in capitalist countries. There, under the capitalists, the most desirable end which earns social approval is to have an income, to live on one's property, and to be freed from toil which is regarded as a contemptible occupation. Here in our U.S.S.R., on the contrary, the most desirable course, which earns social approval, becomes the

possibility of being a hero of labour, a hero of the shock brigade movement, surrounded with the glamour of the respect of millions of toilers.

A no less remarkable feature of competition is the fact that it has begun to spread to the villages also and is already affecting our Soviet and collective farms. The numerous instances of real labour enthusiasm shown by millions in our Soviet and collective farms are known to all.

Who could have dreamt, a couple of years ago, of such successes in competition and the shock brigade movement?

Furthermore, the Party has mobilised the financial resources of the country to develop the Soviet and collective farms, supplied the Soviet farms with the best organisers, given as a help to the collective farms 25,000 of the most advanced workers, promoted the best amongst the collective farmers to lead the collective farms, organised a network of courses of training for collective farmers, and in this way laid the foundations for building up steadfast and tried cadres for the collective farming movement.

Finally, the Party has reorganised its own ranks for battle, re-equipped the Press, organised the struggle on two fronts, shattered the relics of Trotskyism, crushingly defeated the Right deviators, isolated the conciliators, safeguarded thereby the unity of its ranks on the basis of the Leninist line essential for a successful offensive, and has exercised the proper leadership of the offensive, bringing to book and putting in their right place both the apostles of gradualness in the Right wing camp and the Left exaggerators in the sphere of the collective farm movement.

Such are the basic measures taken by the Party to prosecute the offensive along the whole front.

Everyone knows that this offensive has been crowned with success in all spheres of our work.

This is the reason why we have succeeded in overcoming a number of difficulties in the period of reconstruction of our national economy.

This is the reason why we are able successfully to overcome the biggest difficulty in our construction, the difficulty of swinging the basic masses of the peasantry in the direction of Socialism.

Foreigners sometimes ask about the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. But can there by any doubt as to the fact that the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. is firm and unshakeable? Look around at the capitalist countries, at the growth of crisis and unemployment in those countries, at the strikes and

lockouts, at the anti-Government demonstrations. What possible comparison can there be between the internal position in those countries and the internal position in the U.S.S.R.?

It must be admitted that the Soviet Government is now the most stable Government in the world. (Applause.)

8. The Capitalist or the Socialist Economic System

Thus we have a picture of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R.

We also have a picture of the internal situation in the principal capitalist countries.

Involuntarily the question arises, What will be the results if we compare one with the other and contrast these two pictures?

This question is all the more interesting because the bourgeois politicians of all countries, the bourgeois Press of all degrees and ranks, from the out-and-out capitalist to the Menshevik and Trotskyist, are shouting as one man about the "prosperity" of the capitalist countries, the "collapse" of the U.S.S.R., the "financial and economic bankruptcy" of the U.S.S.R., etc.

And so, what are the results of an analysis of the situation here in the U.S.S.R. and there in the capitalist countries?

Let us note the principal, most generally known facts.

In the capitalist countries there is economic *crisis* and *decline* of production, both in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of agriculture.

In the U.S.S.R. there is economic *progress* and *increase* of production in all branches of national economy.

In the capitalist countries there is a *deterioration* in the material position of the toilers, *reduction* of the workers' wages, and the *growth* of unemployment.

In the U.S.S.R. there is an *improvement* in the material position of the toilers, an *increase* in the workers' wages, and a *reduction* in unemployment.

In the capitalist countries there is an *increase* of strikes and demonstrations, leading to the *loss* of millions of working days.

In the U.S.S.R. there are no strikes and a *growth* of labour enthusiasm among the workers and peasants which *gives* our social system millions of additional working days.

In the capitalist countries there is a *sharpening* of the internal situation and a *growth* of the revolutionary movement of the working class against

the capitalist regime.

In the U.S.S.R. there is a *consolidation* of the internal situation and a *rallying* of the millions of the workers around the Soviet Government.

In the capitalist countries there is a *sharpening* of the national question and a *growth* of the national liberation movement in India, Indo-China, Indonesia, the Philippines, etc., passing into a *national war*.

In the U.S.S.R. there is the *strengthening* of the foundations of national brotherhood, safeguarded national *peace*, and the *rallying* of the various nationalities of the U.S.S.R. in their millions, around the Soviet Government.

They, the capitalists, are *completely at a loss*, and have only the prospect of a further *worsening* of their position.

We in the U.S.S.R. have *faith in our strength* and the prospects of a further *improvement* in the situation.

They talk about the "collapse" of the U.S.S.R., the "prosperity" of the capitalist countries, and so forth. Will it not be more correct to talk of the inevitable destruction of those who have fallen so "unexpectedly" into the maelstrom of the economic crisis and cannot extricate themselves from the slough of despond?

What are the reasons for such a serious *collapse* among the capitalists, and the great *successes* here in the U.S.S.R.?

It is said that the condition of national economy depends to a great extent on the abundance or lack of capital. This, of course, is true. But is the crisis in the capitalist countries and the progress of the U.S.S.R. to be explained by the abundance of capital here and the lack of capital there? No, of course not. Everyone knows that there is much less capital in the U.S.S.R. than in the capitalist countries. If matters were *decided* in this case by the position as regards accumulation, we should be passing through a crisis and the capitalist countries through a boom.

It is said that economic conditions depend to a great extent on the technical and organisational experience of business personnel. This, of course, is true. But is the crisis in the capitalist countries and the progress of the U.S.S.R. to be explained by their lack of technical personnel and our superabundance thereof? No, of course not. Everyone knows that there are much larger technically experienced cadres in the capitalist countries than here in the U.S.S.R. We have never concealed, and we do not intend to conceal, the fact that in the sphere of technique we are the pupils of the Germans, the English, the French, the Italians, and, first and foremost, the

Americans. No, this is not a matter of abundance or lack of technical personnel, although the problem of cadres is of serious importance for the development of national economy.

Perhaps the solution lies in the fact that the level of cultural development is higher here than in the capitalist countries? Once again, no. Everyone knows that the general cultural level of the masses is lower here than in the U.S.A., Great Britain, Germany, etc. No, it is not a question of the cultural development of the masses, although the latter is of tremendous importance for national economic development.

Perhaps the reason lies in the personal qualities of those who rule the capitalist countries? Once again, no. Crises were born together with the supremacy of capitalism. For over a century now periodic economic crises of capitalism have been taking place, repeated at intervals of twelve, ten, eight, and less years. All the parties of capitalism, all capitalist politicians of any prominence at all, from the most "talented" to the most mediocre, have tried their strength at "preventing" or "eliminating" crises. But they all suffered defeat. Is it to be wondered at, then, that Hoover and his group also suffered defeat? No, it is not a matter of leaders or parties of capitalism, although leaders and parties of capitalism are of no small importance in this matter.

What, then, is the explanation?

Why is it that the U.S.S.R., in spite of its cultural backwardness, in spite of its lack of capital, in spite of its lack of technically experienced industrial leaders, is in a state of increasing economic *expansion* and has won decisive *successes* on the front of economic construction, while the foremost capitalist countries, in spite of their abundance of capital, their abundance of technical personnel, and their higher level of culture, are in a state of growing economic *crisis*, and are suffering *defeat after defeat* in the sphere of economic development?

The reason is the *difference* in the economic *systems* here and under the capitalists.

The reason is the *bankruptcy* of the capitalist system of economy.

The reason is the *advantages* of the Soviet system of economy over the capitalist system.

What is the Soviet system of economy?

The Soviet system of economy means that:

1. The power of the capitalist class has been overthrown and has been replaced by the power of the working class.

2. The tools and means of production, the land, factories, works, etc., have been taken away from the capitalists and handed over to the working class and to the peasantry.

3. The development of production is subordinated, not to the principle of competition and safeguarding of capitalist profit, but to the principle of planned guidance and systematic improvement of the material and cultural level of the toilers.

4. The distribution of the national income takes place, not in the interests of enriching the exploiting classes and their numerous parasitic hangers-on, but in the interests of systematically raising the material position of the workers and peasants, and extending Socialist production in town and country.

5. The systematic improvement of the material position of the toilers and the ceaseless growth of their requirements (purchasing power) being a constantly growing source of the extension of production, guarantees the working class against crises of over-production, against the growth of unemployment, etc.

6. The working class is the master of the country, working not for the capitalists, but for its own class.

What is the capitalist system of economy?

The capitalist system of economy means that:

1. Power in the country belongs to the capitalists.

2. The tools and means of production are concentrated in the hands of the exploiters.

3. Production is subordinated, not to the principle of improving the material position of the toiling masses, but to the principle of safeguarding high capitalist profits.

4. The distribution of the national income takes place, not in the interests of improving the material position of the toilers, but in the interests of safeguarding maximum profits for the exploiters.

5. Capitalist rationalisation and the rapid *growth* of production, having the object of safeguarding high profits for the capitalists, come up against the obstacle of the impoverished condition and the *reduction* of the material welfare of the millions of toilers, who are not always able to satisfy their needs even within the limits of the extreme minimum—which inevitably

creates the ground for unavoidable crises of over-production, growth of unemployment, etc.

6. The working class is an exploited class, working, not for itself, but for an alien class, the class of exploiters.

Such are the advantages of the *Soviet* system of economy over the *capitalist* system.

Such are the advantages of the *Socialist* organisation of economy over the *capitalist* organisation.

This is the reason why we in the U.S.S.R. have a growing economic progress, while they, the capitalists, have a growing economic crisis.

This is the reason why here in the U.S.S.R. the growth of consumption (purchasing capacity) of the masses constantly outruns the growth of production and stimulates it, while there, under the capitalists, on the contrary, the growth of consumption of the masses (purchasing capacity) never keeps pace with the growth of production, and constantly lags behind it, and again and again dooms production to crises.

This is the reason why they, the capitalists, consider it quite normal in a time of crisis to destroy the "surplus" of commodities and burn "excess" agricultural produce in order to keep up high prices and ensure high profits, while here in the U.S.S.R. those guilty of such crimes would be sent to a lunatic asylum. (Applause.)

This is the reason why there, under the capitalists, the workers strike and demonstrate, organising a revolutionary struggle against the existing capitalist Government, while here in the U.S.S.R. we have the picture of the great labour competition of the millions of workers and peasants ready to lay down their lives for the Soviet State.

This is the reason for the stability and firmness of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R., and for the instability and the unsteadiness of the internal situation in the capitalist countries.

It must be admitted that a system of economy which does not know what to do with its "surplus" output, and can only burn it at a time when the masses are in the grip of want and unemployment, hunger, and misery—such a system of economy signs its own death-warrant.

The last few years were a period of testing in practice, a period of examination for the two opposite systems of economy, Soviet and capitalist. During these years there were more than sufficient prophecies about the "destruction" and "collapse" of the Soviet system. There was still more talk

and glorification of the "prosperity" of capitalism. And what happened? These years have once again shown that the capitalist system of economy is a *bankrupt* system, and that the Soviet system of economy possesses *advantages* that not a single bourgeois State can dare to dream of, be it ever so "democratic," "popular," etc.

In his speech at the Conference of the C.P.S.U. in May, 1921, Lenin said:

> To-day we exercise our main influence on the international revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, all the toilers in all countries of the world, without exception and without any exaggeration. This has been achieved. The capitalists cannot hush up or hide anything, and, therefore, they try to seize upon our economic mistakes and our weakness. It is to this arena that the struggle has been shifted on a world scale. If we solve this problem we shall win on an international scale, decisively and permanently (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVI, pp. 410–411).

It must be admitted that our Party is successfully carrying out the task set by Lenin.

9. Our Next Tasks

(*a*) *General*

1. First of all the problem of *the proper distribution of industry throughout the* U.S.S.R. However we develop national economy, we cannot avoid the question of how properly to distribute industry, as the leading branch of national economy. To-day the position is that our industry, like our national economy, relies, in the main, upon the coal and metallurgical base in the Ukraine. Obviously, without such a base the industrialisation of the country would be impossible. And this base in our case is Ukrainian fuel and metallurgy. But can this alone in the future satisfy the requirements of the South, the Central Region of the U.S.S.R., the North, the North-East, the Far East, and Turkestan? Everything goes to show that this is impossible. One of the new features in our national economic development is, incidentally, the fact that this basis has already become inadequate for us. The new feature is that while continuing to develop this base in every possible way for the future, we must immediately begin to create a second coal and metallurgical base. This must be the Urals-Kuznetsk Combine, the combination of Kuznetsk coking coal with the ores of the Urals. (Applause.) The building of an automobile works at Nizhni, the tractor

works at Cheliabinsk, the engineering works at Sverdlovsk, the combine building works at Saratov and Novo-Sibirsk; the growing non-ferrous metal industry in Siberia and Kazakstan, which demand the creation of a network of repair shops and a number of basic metal works in the East; finally, the decision to build textile factories in Novo-Sibirsk and Turkestan—all this imperatively demands an immediate commencement of the work of creating a second coal and metallurgical base in the Urals.

You know that the Central Committee of our Party has declared in favour of this in its resolution on the Urals Metal Trust.

2. Further, the problem of *the proper distribution of the main branches of agriculture throughout the* U.S.S.R., the problem of *the specialisation of our regions in agricultural crops and branches of agriculture*. It can be understood that in small-peasant economy the serious introduction of specialisation is impossible. It is impossible because petty economy, being unstable, is lacking in the necessary reserves and is obliged to develop each and every kind of crop, so that in the event of one crop failing another will save the situation. It can be understood also that, without ensuring to the State certain reserves of grain, it is impossible to organise specialisation. To-day, when we have adopted the system of large-scale economy and have accumulated reserves of grain in the hands of the State, we can and must set ourselves the task of properly organising specialisation in crops and branches of agriculture. And the point of departure in this work is the final solution of the grain problem. I say "the point of departure" because without the solution of the grain problem, without the organisation of a broad system of grain storage in stock breeding, cotton-growing, sugar-beet, flax-growing, tobacco-growing districts, it is impossible to push forward stock breeding and industrial crops, it is impossible properly to organise specialisation of our regions according to crops and branches of agriculture.

The task is to utilise the opportunities which are opening, and to move this matter forward.

3. Next comes the *problem of personnel*, both in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of agriculture. All know the poor technical preparedness of our economic cadres, our experts, technicians, and economic workers. Matters are complicated by the fact that a section of the experts, connected with the former owners and stimulated from abroad, turned out to be at the head of the wrecking campaign. Matters are further complicated by the fact that a number of our Communist business men did not display revolutionary

vigilance, and frequently turned out to be in spiritual bondage to the wrecking elements. Yet we are faced with the colossal tasks involved in the reconstruction of the whole of national economy, which calls for a large number of new personnel, capable of mastering the new technique. Arising from this, the problem of personnel has become a really urgent problem for us.

Its solution is taking place along the following lines:

(i) Resolute struggle against the wreckers.

(ii) Maximum of care and solicitude for the vast majority of the experts and technicians, who have dissociated themselves from the wreckers. (I have in mind not talkers and phrasemongers like Ustrialov, but real scientific workers, who are working shoulder to shoulder with the working class and not playing a deep game.)

(iii) The organisation of technical aid from abroad.

(iv) The sending of our business men abroad for study and to acquire technical experience.

(v) The handing over of our technical training institutions to the appropriate economic organisations, with a view to the quickest possible training of a sufficient number of technicians and experts from amongst members of the working class.

The task is to set to work to carry out these measures.

4. The problem of *fighting bureaucracy*. The danger of bureaucracy lies first of all in the fact that it holds back the colossal reserves concealed in the bosom of our social system, not allowing them to be utilised; it tries to nullify the creative initiative of the masses, binding them hand and foot with red tape; and it aims at reducing every new undertaking of the Party into a petty and insignificant business. The danger of bureaucracy lies, secondly, in the fact that it cannot tolerate having the execution of orders verified, and strives to transform the principal directions of the leading bodies into a mere sheet of paper divorced from real life. The danger is represented, not only and not so much by the old bureaucrats derelict in our institutions, as particularly by the new bureaucrats, the Soviet bureaucrats, amongst whom “Communist” bureaucrats play far from an insignificant role. I have in mind those “Communists” who try to replace the creative initiative and independent activity of the millions of the working class and peasantry by office instructions and “decrees,” in the virtue of which they believe as in a fetish.

The task is to smash bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations, to liquidate bureaucratic "habits" and "customs," and clear the road for the utilisation of the reserves of our social order, for the development of the creative initiative and independent activity of the masses.

It is no easy task. It cannot be settled in the twinkling of an eye. But it has to be settled at all costs, if we really want to transform our country on Socialist lines.

In its struggle against bureaucracy, the Party works in four directions: in the direction of the development of *self-criticism*, in the direction of organising the *verification of the execution of orders*, in the direction of *cleansing* the apparatus, and, finally, in the direction of *promoting* into the State apparatus devoted members of the working class from below.

Our task is to concentrate all our forces upon carrying out these measures.

5. The problem of increasing the *productivity of labour*. Without a systematic increase in the productivity of labour, both in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of agriculture, we cannot solve the problems of reconstruction, and we shall not be able not merely to catch up with and outstrip the foremost capitalist countries, but even to maintain our independent existence.

Hence the problem of increasing the productivity of labour is a matter of first-class importance.

The measures adopted by the Party in solving this problem proceed in three directions: in the direction of systematically improving *the material position of the toilers*, in the direction of fostering *fraternal labour discipline* in our industrial and agricultural enterprises, and, finally, in the direction of organising *Socialist competition and the shock brigade movement*. All this on the basis of improved technique and the rational organisation of labour.

Our problem is to develop still further our mass campaign to achieve these measures.

6. The problem of *supply*. Under this heading we have the question of the *adequate supply* of the necessary produce to the toilers in town and country, the question of adapting the *co-operative machinery* to the requirements of the workers and peasants, the question of systematically increasing the *real wages* of the workers, the question of *reducing prices* of manufactured goods and agricultural produce. I have already spoken of the defects in the

consumers' co-operatives. It is essential to remove these defects and achieve the application of the *policy of reducing prices*. As for the shortage of goods (the goods famine), we now have the opportunity of developing the raw materials basis of light industry and pushing ahead with the production of town goods for mass consumption. The bread supply may be considered safe. Matters are more difficult with the meat, milk, and vegetable supply. These difficulties, unfortunately, cannot be overcome in the space of a few months. In order to overcome them we require at least a year. In a year's time we shall be able, thanks above all to the Soviet and collective farms organised for the purpose, to ensure the full supply of meat, dairy produce, and vegetables. And what does mastering the supply of these goods mean when we already have in our hands grain reserves, cloth, accelerated house-building for the workers, and cheap municipal services? It means that we are mastering all the basic factors which determine the workers' budget and their real wages. It means that we are ensuring the rapid growth of the real wages of the workers, decisively and permanently.

Our problem is to develop the activity of all our organisations in this direction.

7. The problem of *credit and currency*. The rational organisation of the credit system and proper manœuvring with our currency reserves are of great importance for the development of national economy. The Party's measures in solving this problem proceed in two directions: in the direction of concentrating the whole system of short-term credits in the State Bank, and in the direction of organising non-cash settlements[1] in the socialised sector. Thereby, in the first place the State Bank becomes the general State apparatus of accounting in production and distribution, and secondly, vast masses of currency are released from circulation. There can be no doubt that these measures will lead (they are already leading) to the improvement of the whole credit system and the strengthening of our Chervonetz.[1]

8. The problem of *reserves*. It has already been said several times, and it is unnecessary to repeat, that the State in general, and our State in particular, cannot do without reserves. We have reserves to some extent of grain, goods, and currency. Our comrades have had opportunities for realising during this period the beneficial influence of these reserves. But reserves "to some extent" are insufficient. We require more substantial reserves in all directions.

Hence our task is to accumulate reserves.

(*b*) *Industry*

1. The main problem is to accelerate the development of *heavy metallurgy*. Bear in mind that we reached the pre-war level of pig-iron production, and are exceeding it, only in the current year, 1929–30. This is a big menace to all our national economy. In order to eliminate this menace, we must organise the accelerated development of heavy metallurgy. We require by the end of the Five-Year Plan, not 10 million tons of pig-iron annually, as the Five-Year Plan lays down, but 17 million tons. We must carry out this task at all costs if we want really to develop the industrialisation of our country.

The Bolsheviks must show that they can grapple with this problem.

This does not mean, of course, that we must let *light*[2] industry go adrift. No, it does not mean that. Hitherto, we have been economising in everything, including light industry, in order to restore heavy industry. But we have already restored heavy industry. It only requires to be further developed. Now we can turn to light industry and push it forward at an accelerated rate. The new feature in the development of our industry consists incidentally in this, that we now have the opportunity of developing at accelerated rates both heavy and light industry. The surpassing of the plans for cotton, flax, and sugar-beet sowings this year, the successful solution of the problem of (kendir) fibre substitute and artificial silk, all show that we are able now really to push forward light industry.

2. The problem of *rationalisation, lower production costs, and improving the quality of production*. We can no longer put up with the gaps in the sphere of rationalisation, the non-fulfilment of the plan for reducing production costs, and the disgraceful quality of production in a number of our factories. These gaps and defects throw a burden on all our national economy and prevent it from moving forward. It is time, long time, to put an end to these disgraceful blots.

The Bolsheviks must show that they are able to grapple with this task.

3. The problem of *one-man management*. Intolerable also are becoming the breaches of our policy in applying one-man management in the factories. The workers again and again complain: “There is no master in the works,” “there is no system in the works.” We can no longer tolerate our factories being transformed from productive organisms into parliaments. Our Party and trade union organisations must at length understand that,

without ensuring one-man management and strict responsibility for work done, we cannot solve the problems of reconstructing industry.

(*c*) *Agriculture*

1. The problem of *stock breeding and industrial crops*. To-day, when we have already, in the main, settled the grain problem, we can set about the simultaneous solution of both the problem of stock breeding, which at the present time is the most burning problem, and that of industrial crops. In solving these problems we must proceed along the same path as we pursued in the sphere of the solution of the grain problem. That is, through the organisation of Soviet and collective farms, which are bulwarks of our policy, gradually to transform the technical and economic basis of existing small-peasant stock breeding and industrial crops. The Stock Breeding Trust, the Sheep Farming Trust, the Pig Breeding Trust, the Dairy Trust, together with collective farms in the sphere of stock breeding; the existing Soviet and collective farms in the sphere of industrial crops—these are the points of departure in solving the problems with which we are faced.

2. The problem of *further developing the building of collective and Soviet farms*. It is hardly necessary to dwell at length on the fact that this is a problem of the *first magnitude* for us in our work of reconstruction in the countryside. To-day even the blind can see that a tremendous and radical turn has been taken by the peasantry from the old to the new, from kulak bondage to free life in the collective farms. There is no returning to the old system. The kulak (rich peasant) class is doomed and will be liquidated. There remains only one path, the path of the collective farms. And this is no longer an unknown and untried path. It has been explored and tested in thousands of ways by the peasant masses themselves. It has been explored and summed up as something new, which brings the peasants emancipation from kulak bondage, from want and ignorance. In this lies the foundation of our achievements.

How will the new movement in the rural districts develop further? In the van will go the Soviet farms, the backbone of the reconstruction of the old order in the countryside. After them will follow the multitude of collective farms, as the bulwarks of the new movement in the countryside. The combined work of these two systems is creating the conditions for the complete collectivisation of all regions of the U.S.S.R.

One of the most remarkable achievements of the collective farm movement is the fact that it has already succeeded in producing thousands

of *organisers* and tens of thousands of *agitators* for the cause of collective farming from amongst the peasants themselves. Now it is no longer we trained Bolsheviks alone, but the peasants themselves from the collective farms, tens of thousands of peasant organisers and agitators in the cause of collective farming, who will carry forward the banner of collectivisation. And the peasant agitators are excellent agitators for the collective farming movement, since they find arguments in favour of the collective farms which will be comprehensible and acceptable to the remaining mass of the peasants, but which we trained Bolsheviks cannot even dream of.

Here and there voices can be heard to the effect that it is necessary to abandon the policy of mass collectivisation. We have information to the effect that even in our Party there are some who support this "idea." But such things can be said only by those who, willingly or unwillingly, have joined forces with the enemies of Communism. Without mass collectivisation the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan of collectivisation of all regions of the U.S.S.R. is impossible. How can we give it up without betraying Communism, without betraying the interests of the working class and the peasantry?

This does not mean, of course, that in the sphere of the collective farm movement we shall find everything going "smoothly" and "normally." There will still be waverings inside the collective farms. There will still be ebb and flow. But this cannot and must not disturb the builders of the collective farm movement. Still less can it serve as a serious obstacle to the powerful development of the collective farm movement. So sound a movement as the collective farm movement undoubtedly is, will achieve its goal in spite of everything, in spite of individual obstacles and difficulties.

Our problem is to prepare our forces and organise matters in such a way as to develop still further the collective farm movement.

3. The problem of *bringing our State machinery as close as possible to the districts and villages*. There can be no doubt that we should not have been able to carry out the tremendous task of reconstructing agriculture and developing the collective farm movement had we not carried through the principle of *regionalisation*. The amalgamation of the rural districts (volost) and their reorganisation as districts (rayon),[1] the abolition of the provinces (gubernia) and their reorganisation as smaller units (okrug), and finally the creation of regions (oblast) as the direct points of support for the Central Committee—this was the general scheme. Its object was to bring the Party,

Soviet, economic, and co-operative machinery closer to the district and village in order to make it possible to effect a timely settlement of the burning questions of agriculture, its development and reconstruction. In this sense, I repeat, regionalisation has conferred tremendous advantages upon all our construction work.

But has everything been done really to bring, actually to bring the machinery closer to the districts and villages? No, not everything has been done. At present the centre of gravity of collective farm construction has been shifted to the district organisations. Here are gathered up the threads of collective farm construction and all other economic work in the villages: co-operative, Soviet, credit, and supply. Are the district organisations sufficiently equipped with the necessary and requisite workers to deal with all this varied work? There can be no doubt that they are extremely inadequately equipped with workers. Where is the way out? What has to be done to remedy this defect and ensure that the district organisations in all branches of our work will be supplied with the requisite number of necessary workers? For this we need to take at least two steps: (1) To abolish the area (okrug) organisations (applause), which are becoming an unnecessary intermediary between the region and the district, and to reinforce the district organisations with the workers released from the area organisations. (2) To connect the district organisations directly with the regions (the regional committees, the Central Committees of the National Republics). And this will be the fulfilment of the work of regionalisation, the fufilment of the closer approach of the State machine to the districts and villages.

There was applause just now at the prospect of abolishing the area organisations. Of course the areas have to be liquidated. But it would be a mistake to think that this circumstance gives us the right to decry the areas, as some comrades have allowed themselves to do in the columns of *Pravda*. It should not be forgotten that the areas have borne the burden of a tremendous undertaking, and have played a big historical part in their day. (Applause.) I think also that it would be a mistake to display excessive haste in abolishing the areas. The Central Committee has taken a decision to abolish the areas. But it is far from thinking that this must be done immediately. Obviously, we shall have to carry out the necessary preparatory work before we can abolish the areas.

(d) Transport

Finally, the *problem of transport*. There is no need to dwell at length on the tremendous importance of transport for the whole of our national economy —and not only for national economy. You all know that transport is of the very greatest importance also for the defence of the country. Yet, in spite of the tremendous importance of transport, the transport organisation and its reconstruction are still lagging behind the general rate of development. Does it still have to be proved that in such a situation we run the risk of transport becoming "a weak spot" of our national economy and retard our further progress? Is it not time to put an end to such a state of affairs?

Particularly unsatisfactory is the state of affairs in river transport. It is a fact that the Volga Steamship Company has scarcely reached 60 per cent and the Dnieper Company 40 per cent of the pre-war level. Sixty per cent and 40 per cent of the pre-war level—this is all that river transport can put down in its list of "achievements." A big "achievement" indeed! Is it not time to put an end to this disgrace? (Voices: Yes, it is!)

Our task is to grapple at last in the Bolshevik way with the transport business and push it ahead.

These are the next tasks of the Party.

What is required in order to fulfil them?

First and foremost, to *continue* our general offensive against the capitalist elements along the whole front, and *carry it through to the end*.

This is the centre and basis of our policy at the present time. (Applause.)

III. THE PARTY

I come now to the question of the Party.

I spoke earlier of the advantages of the Soviet economic system over the capitalist system. I spoke of the colossal opportunities afforded us by our social system in the struggle for the complete victory of Socialism. I said that without these opportunities, without making use of these opportunities, we should not have been able to secure the successes which we have won during the period under review.

But now arises the question of whether the Party proved able properly to utilise the opportunities afforded us by the Soviet system. Did it not keep these opportunities under cover, thus preventing the working class from developing all its revolutionary strength to the utmost? Did we prove able to squeeze out of these opportunities all that could be squeezed out of them to develop Socialist construction all along the line?

The Soviet system provides colossal *opportunities* for the complete victory of Socialism. But *opportunities* are not yet *reality*. In order to transform opportunities into reality, a number of conditions are necessary, among which the line pursued by the Party and the correct application of that line play a far from insignificant part.

A few examples:

The Right opportunists assert that N.E.P. ensures the victory of Socialism, and consequently there is no need to worry about the rate of industrialisation, the development of Soviet and collective farms, etc., as the coming of victory is ensured just the same—automatically, so to speak. This, of course, is untrue and foolish. To say this means to deny the role of the Party in the building of Socialism, and to deny the responsibility of the Party for that building. Lenin did not say that N.E.P. would ensure the victory of Socialism. Lenin only said that "economically and politically N.E.P. fully guarantees us the *opportunity* of building the foundations of Socialist economy." But opportunity is not yet *reality*. In order to transform opportunity into reality we must first of all reject the theory of spontaneity, we must reconstruct national economy, and we must open a resolute offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country.

The Right opportunists assert, furthermore, that our social system does not contain the basis for a split between the working class and peasantry and, consequently, we need not worry about laying down a correct policy in respect of the social groups in the countryside, since the kulak will grow into Socialism just the same, and the alliance of the workers and peasants will be, so to speak, automatically ensured. This also is untrue and foolish. Only those can talk like this who fail to understand that the policy of the Party, particularly of a Party in power, is the decisive factor in this, which determines the fate of the workers' and peasants' alliance. Lenin never considered the danger of a split between the working class and the peasantry to be out of the question. Lenin said that "the grounds for such a split are not *necessarily inherent* in our social system," "but if *serious class differences* arise between these classes, then a split *will be inevitable*." In connection with this, Lenin thought that:

> The principal task of our Central Committee and Central Control Commission, as of our Party as a whole, is to give watchful heed to the circumstances which may give rise to a split, and *anticipate* them, since in the long run the fate of our republic will depend on whether the peasant mass goes with the working class

and remains loyal to the alliance with the latter, or whether it will allow the "Nepmen," *i.e*. the new bourgeoisie, to draw it apart from the workers, split it off from them.

Consequently the split between the working class and the peasantry is not out of the question, but it is by no means inevitable, as our social system contains the possibility of averting that split and consolidating the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. And what is necessary to transform this possibility into reality? In order to transform the possibility of *averting* the split into reality, we must first of all bury the theory of spontaneity, tear out the roots of capitalism by organising collective and Soviet farms, and proceed from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class.

Thus it appears that we must strictly distinguish between the *opportunities* which exist in our social system and the *utilisation* of those opportunities, their transformation into *reality*.

It follows, therefore, that cases are quite conceivable in which the opportunities for victory exist, but the Party does not see those opportunities or is not able correctly to utilise them; in consequence of which we may suffer defeat instead of achieving victory.

And so the same question arises: Did the Party succeed in properly utilising the *opportunities and advantages* afforded us by the Soviet system? Did it do everything in its power to *transform those opportunities into reality*, and thereby ensure the maximum of success for our constructive work?

In other words, did the Party and its Central Committee correctly direct the building of Socialism during the period under review?

What is required for correct leadership by the Party in our present conditions?

For correct leadership by the Party it is necessary, apart from everything else, that the Party policy should be correct, that the masses should understand the correctness of the Party policy and actively support it, that the Party should not confine itself to working out a general line of policy, but should direct its application in practice from day to day, that the Party should wage a resolute struggle against deviations from the general line and the conciliatory attitude towards deviations, and that in the struggle against deviations the Party should hammer out the unity of its ranks and iron discipline.

What have the Party and its Central Committee done to bring about these conditions?

I. The Direction of Socialist Construction

(*a*) The main objective of the Party at the present time is the *transition* from the Socialist offensive on *individual sectors* of the economic front to the offensive *along the whole front*, both in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of agriculture. The Fourteenth Congress was, in the main, the Congress of *industrialisation*. The Fifteenth Congress was, in the main, the Congress of *collectivisation*. It was the preparatory stage for the *general* offensive. In distinction from the previous stages, the period before the Sixteenth Congress was a period of the *general* offensive of Socialism *along the whole front*, a period of intensified construction of Socialism, both in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of agriculture. The Sixteenth Congress is a Congress of the *general Socialist offensive* along the whole front, the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, and the carrying out of mass collectivisation.

This in a few words is the essence of the general line of our Party.

Is that line correct?

Yes, it is correct. Facts show that the general line of our Party is the only correct line. (Applause.)

This is proved by the successes and achievements which we have on the front of Socialist construction. That the decisive success won by the Party during the period under review on the front of Socialist construction in town and country is not and could not be the result of an incorrect policy. Only a correct general line could give us such a victory.

It is proved by the furious outcry against the policy of our Party raised recently by our class enemies, the capitalists and their Press, the Pope and Bishops of all kinds, the Social-Democrats and "Russian" Mensheviks of the type of Abramovitch and Dan. The capitalists and their lackeys throw mud at our Party: that means the general line of our Party is correct. (Applause.)

It is proved by the fate of Trotskyism, which everyone knows. The Trotskyist gentry talked about the "degeneration" of the Soviet Government, "Thermidor," the "inevitable victory" of Trotskyism, and so forth. And what happened in reality? What happened was the disintegration

and the end of Trotskyism. One section of the Trotskyists, as you are aware, has broken away from Trotskyism, and in the numerous declarations of its members has recognised the correctness of the Party and testified to the counter-revolutionary character of Trotskyism. Another section of the Trotskyists has really degenerated into typical petty-bourgeois counter-revolutionaries who, in practice, have become the information bureau for the capitalist Press on the affairs of the C.P.S.U., while the Soviet Government, which was to "degenerate" (or had "already degenerated"), continues to flourish and build Socialism, successfully breaking the back of the capitalist elements in our country and their petty-bourgeois hangers-on.

It is proved by the fate of the Right deviators, which is now known to all. They chattered and shouted about the "fatal" character of the Party policy, the "probable catastrophe" in the U.S.S.R., the necessity of "saving" the country from the Party and its leadership, and so forth. And what has happened in reality? In reality, what has happened is that the Party has won the very greatest successes on all fronts of the building of Socialism, while the group of Right deviators, who wanted to "save" the country but later recognised the error of their views, is now stranded high and dry.

It is proved by the growing revolutionary activity of the working class and the peasantry, the active support given to the Party's policy by the millions of toilers, and, finally, by that unprecedented labour enthusiasm of the workers and collective farmers, the gigantic strength of which amazes the enemies and the friends of our country. I will not dwell on such signs of the growth of confidence in the Party as the applications of workers to join the Party by whole shops and works, the increase in the Party membership by over 600,000 between the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Congresses, the entry of 200,000 new members into the Party during the first quarter of the present year alone. What does all this show, if not that the millions of toilers are realising the correctness of the policy of our Party and are ready to support it?

It must be admitted that these facts would not exist if the general line of our Party were not the sole correct line.

(*b*) But the Party cannot confine itself to working out a general line of policy. It must also check from day to day the extent to which the general line is being applied in practice. It must direct the application of the general line, in the course of its work, improving and perfecting the plans for

economic construction which have been adopted, correcting and anticipating mistakes.

How did the Central Committee of our Party perform this work?

The work of the C.C. in this respect was principally in the direction of correcting and perfecting the Five-Year Plan, in the sense of increasing the rates of progress and shortening the periods, in the direction of verifying the degree to which the tasks laid down for the economic organisations were being carried out.

Here are some of the main resolutions of the C.C. which corrected the Five-Year Plan, in the sense of increasing the rate of construction and decreasing the periods of fulfilment.

In heavy metallurgy, the Five-Year Plan provides for raising the output of pig-iron in the last year of the Plan to 10 million tons. The resolution of the C.C. considers this standard insufficient, and that the output of pig-iron in the last year of the Plan must be raised to 17 million tons.

In tractor building, the Five-Year Plan provides for the raising of output of tractors in the last year of the Plan to 55,000. The resolution of the C.C. considers this task insufficient, and that the output of tractors in the last year of the Plan must be raised to 170,000.

The same has to be said about the *automobile industry*, in which, instead of an output of 100,000 automobiles (commercial and light cars) in the last year of the Plan, as provided by the original Plan, it has been decided to increase the output to 200,000.

The same is the case in the sphere of *non-ferrous metallurgy*, where the estimates of the Five-Year Plan have been increased by more than 100 per cent, and of *agricultural machine construction*, where the estimates of the Five-Year Plan have also been increased by over 100 per cent.

I do not dwell on the building of *combine harvesting machines*, which were not provided for at all in the Five-Year Plan, but the output of which has to be raised by the last year of the Plan to a minimum of 40,000 annually.

In Soviet farm construction, the Five-Year Plan provides for the extension of the sowing area by the end of the Plan to five million hectares. The resolution of the C.C. considers this standard insufficient, and that the areas sown in the Soviet farms by the end of the Plan must be raised to 18 million hectares.

In *collective farming*, the Five-Year Plan provides for the extension of the areas sown by the end of the Plan to 20 million hectares. The resolution of the C.C. considers this standard obviously insufficient (it has already been surpassed this year), and lays down that by the end of the Five-Year Plan the collectivisation of agriculture in the U.S.S.R. must be in the main completed, and the area sown in the collective farms by this date must cover nine-tenths of all the area under crops of the U.S.S.R. at present worked by individual farmers. (Applause.)

And so forth, and so on.

Such, in general, is the manner in which the Central Committee has guided the application of the general line of the Party, of the planning of Socialist construction.

It may be said that, by changing the estimates of the Five-Year Plan so fundamentally, the C.C. infringes the principle of planning and lowers the authority of the planning bodies. But only hopeless bureaucrats can talk in this way. For us Bolsheviks the Five-Year Plan is not something completed and finished once for all. For us the Five-Year Plan, like every plan, is only a scheme adopted as a first approach, which has to be made more exact, altered, and perfected on the basis of local experience, on the basis of the experience of its fulfilment. No Five-Year Plan can take into account all the possibilities which lie concealed in the heart of our social system, and which become revealed only in the course of work, in the process of applying the plan in the factory, the works, the collective farm, the Soviet farm, the district, etc. Only bureaucrats can imagine that the work of planning is *concluded* with the compilation of a plan. The compilation of a plan is only the *beginning of planning*. Real planned guidance develops only after the plan has been drawn up, after it has been tested on the spot, in the course of its application, by correcting it and rendering it more exact.

This is why the C.C. and Central Control Commission, jointly with the planning bodies of the Republic, found it necessary to correct and improve the Five-Year Plan, on the basis of the data of experience, in the sense of increasing the rates of construction and reducing the period of fulfilment.

Here is what Lenin said about the principle of planning and planned guidance at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, in the discussion of the Ten-Year Plan of the State Commission for Electrification:

> Our Party Programme cannot remain merely a Party programme. It must become the programme of our economic construction, otherwise it is useless even as a Party programme also. It must be supplemented by a second Party programme, a plan of work for reconstituting the whole of national economy and raising it to the level of modern technique…. We must arrive at the point of adopting a definite plan. Of course, it will be a plan adopted only as a first approach. This Party programme will not be as unalterable as our real programme, which is subject to alteration only at Party Congresses. No, every day, in every workshop, in every rural district, this programme will be improved, made more detailed, perfected and varied…. Following in the footsteps of scientific experience and local practice, we must strive always to the end that the plan should be carried out sooner than the time appointed, so that the masses should see that experience can reduce the long period which divides us as yet from the complete restoration of industry. It depends on us. Let us improve our economy in every workshop, in every depot, in every region—then we shall reduce the period. And we are reducing it (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. XXVI, pp. 73–76).

You see that the Central Committee took the road pointed out by Lenin, altering and improving the Five-Year Plan, reducing periods and increasing the rates of construction.

What were the opportunities on which the C.C. was relying when it raised the rates of construction and reduced the periods of fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan? On the reserves concealed in the heart of our social system and revealed only in the course of the work; on the possibilities afforded us by the period of reconstruction. The C.C. considers that the reconstruction of the technical basis of industry and agriculture *under the Socialist organisation of production* opens up such opportunities of accelerating rates of progress as not a single capitalist country can dream of.

Only by these circumstances can we explain the fact that our Socialist industry during the last three years has more than doubled its output, while the increase of output in industry during the year 1930–31 must be 47 per cent larger than the increase this year—and *this increase alone* will be equal in volume to the total output of the *whole* of large-scale industry in pre-war days.

Only by these circumstances can we explain the fact that in the building of Soviet farms we are surpassing the Five-Year Plan in three years, while in the collective farm movement we have already surpassed the Five-Year Plan in two years.

There is a theory according to which high rates of development are possible only in the period of restoration, and that when we pass to the period of reconstruction the rates of construction must fall sharply from year to year. This theory is called the theory of the "declining curve." It is a theory which justifies our backwardness. It has nothing in common with Marxism or Leninism. It is a bourgeois theory, calculated to retain the backwardness of our country for all time. Amongst the people who have had or have still connections with our Party, this theory is defended and preached only by the Trotskyists and, possibly, the Right deviators.

The Trotskyists have the reputation of being super-industrialists. But this opinion is only partly correct. It is correct only to the extent that we speak of the end of the period of *restoration*, when the Trotskyists were really developing super-industrialist fantasies. As for the period of *reconstruction*, the Trotskyists, from the standpoint of rates of progress, are *the most extreme minimalists and the most abject capitulators*. (Laughter, applause.) In their platforms and declarations, the Trotskyists gave no figures about rates of development, confining themselves merely to general chatter about rates of progress. But there is one document in which the Trotskyists expressed in figures their conception of the rates of development of State industry. I have in mind the report of the "Special Conference for the Restoration of Basic Capital in State Industry," which was drawn up on Trotskyist lines. It is interesting to cast our eyes briefly over this document, which dates back to the year 1925–26. It is interesting because the document completely reflects the Trotskyist scheme of the declining curve.

According to this document, it was proposed that we should *invest* in State industry: in 1926–27, 1,543 million rubles; in 1927–28, 1,490 million rubles; in 1928–29, 1,320 million rubles; and in 1929–30, 1,060 million rubles (in 1926–27 prices).

Such is the picture of the *declining* Trotskyist curve.

But how much did we invest in reality? In reality we invested in State industry; in 1926–27, 1,065 million rubles; in 1927–28, 1,304 million rubles; in 1928–29, 1,819 million rubles; and in 1929–30, 4,775 million rubles (in 1926–27 prices).

Such is the picture of the *ascending* Bolshevik curve.

According to the document, the *output* of State industry was to increase in 1926–27 by 31.6 per cent, in 1927–28 by 22.9 per cent, in 1928–29 by 15.5 per cent, and in 1929–30 by 15 per cent.

Such is the picture of the *declining* Trotskyist curve.

But what did we get in reality? In reality the increase in output of State industry in 1926–27 was 19.7 per cent, in 1927–28 26.3 per cent, in 1928–29 24.3 per cent, in 1929–30 32 per cent, while in 1930–31 it will amount to 47 per cent.

Such is the picture of the *ascending* Bolshevik curve.

You are aware that Trotsky specially defends this defeatist theory of the declining curve in his book, *Towards Socialism or Capitalism*. He says there plainly that as "before the war the extension of industry in the main consisted in the building of new works," while "in our day the extension of industry will, to a much greater degree, consist in the utilisation of the old works and the full employment of the old equipment," it is natural, therefore, "that with the *completion of the process of restoration* the coefficient of increase should be *considerably reduced"*; and he proposes, in addition, that "in the next few years the coefficient of industrial growth should be raised not less than twofold, but possibly threefold, as high as the pre-war 6 per cent, and possibly even higher."

And so, three times 6 per cent yearly increase in industry. How much does this mean? It means 18 per cent per annum. Consequently 18 per cent of yearly increase in the output of State industry represents, in the opinion of the Trotskyists, that uttermost limit to the planning of an accelerated rate of development *in the period of reconstruction*, which is the ideal that we should strive for. Now compare this pettifogging sagacity of the Trotskyists with the actual increase of output which we have had during the last three years (26.3 per cent in 1927–28, 24.3 per cent in 1928–29, and 32 per cent in 1929–30). Compare this pettifogging wisdom of the Trotskyists with the estimate of 47 per cent increase in 1930–31 given by the Control Figures of the State Planning Commission—an estimate which surpasses the *highest* rate of increase of output in the period of *restoration*. Then you will realise to the full the reactionary character of the Trotskyist theory of the "declining curve," all the depth of the Trotskyist disbelief in the possibilities of the *reconstruction period*.

That is the reason why the Trotskyists are now moaning about the "excessive" Bolshevik rates of development in industry and collective farming.

That is the reason why *you cannot distinguish the Trotskyists* nowadays from our Right deviators.

You will understand that, had we not shattered the Trotskyist and Right deviators' theory of the "declining curve," we should never have been able to develop a real plan or to increase rates and decrease periods of construction. In order to direct the application of the general line of the Party, in order to correct and improve the Five-Year Plan, in order to increase rates of development and prevent mistakes in construction, we had first of all to smash and liquidate the reactionary theory of the "declining curve."

And that is what the C.C. did, as I have already said.

2. The Leadership of Internal Party Affairs

It might be thought that the work of guiding Socialist construction, the work of applying the general line of policy of the Party, took place calmly and smoothly in our Party, without struggle and effort of will. But this is not the case, comrades. In reality this work proceeded in the midst of the struggle against internal Party difficulties, in a struggle against every kind of deviation from Leninism, both in the sphere of general policy and in the sphere of the national question. Our Party does not by any means live and work in a vacuum. It lives and works in the very thick of life, subjected always to the influence of its environment. And, as you are aware, our environment consists of various classes and social groups. We have undertaken a general offensive against the capitalist elements, we have pushed our Socialist industry far ahead, we have developed the building of Soviet and collective farms. But such events cannot pass unnoticed by the exploiting classes. These events are usually accompanied by the ruin of the dying classes, the ruin of the rich peasantry (kulaks) in the villages, the narrowing down of the sphere of activity of the petty-bourgeois elements in the towns. Naturally, all this is bound to sharpen the class struggle and intensify the resistance of the disappearing classes to the policy of the Soviet Government. It would be ridiculous to think that the resistance of these classes would not find some reflection in the ranks of our Party. And it actually did find reflection. The resistance of the disappearing classes is reflected by the various deviations from the line of Leninism which occur in the ranks of our Party.

Can we carry on a successful struggle against our class enemies without at the same time fighting deviations in our Party, and overcoming those deviations? No, it is impossible. It is impossible because we cannot develop

a real struggle against our class foes while we have in our rear their reflection in the Party, while we leave in our rear people who do not believe in our cause and try in every way to hinder our progress.

Hence, our irreconcilable struggle with deviations from the Leninist line as the next task of our Party.

Why is the Right deviation at present the principal danger in the Party? Because it reflects the kulak danger, while the kulak danger at the present time, at the time of our general offensive and our uprooting of capitalism, is the main danger in the country.

What did the Central Committee have to do in order to overcome the Right deviation, finish off the Left deviation, and clear the road for the maximum consolidation of the Party around the line of Leninism?

(*a*) We had first of all to put an end to the relics of Trotskyism in the Party and the survivals of the Trotskyist theory. We had long ago smashed and thrown out the Trotskyist group as an opposition. Now the Trotskyist group represents an anti-proletarian, an anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary group, which painstakingly informs the bourgeoisie of the affairs of our Party. But the relics of the Trotskyist theory, the survivals of Trotskyism, have not yet been completely winnowed out of the Party. So we had, first of all, to make an end of these relics.

What is the essence of Trotskyism?

The essence of Trotskyism consists, first of all, in the denial of the possibility of building Socialism in the U.S.S.R. with the forces of the working class and the peasantry of our country. What does this mean? It means that if, in the near future, help does not come in the form of a victorious world revolution, we shall have to capitulate to the bourgeoisie and clear the road for a bourgeois-democratic republic. Consequently, we have here the bourgeois repudiation of the possibility of building Socialism in our country masked by "revolutionary" phrasemongering about the victory of the world revolution. Is it possible, with such views, to inspire millions of workers with labour enthusiasm; enlist them into Socialist competition and the mass shock brigade movement; mobilise them for a general offensive against the capitalist elements? Clearly it is impossible. It would be foolish to think that our working class, which has gone through three revolutions, would accept intensification of labour and the mass shock brigade movement in order to manure the soil for capitalism. Our working class has accepted the intensification of its labour not for the sake of

capitalism, but in order finally to bury capitalism and build Socialism in the U.S.S.R. Deprive them of their confidence in the possibility of building Socialism, and you will destroy every possible ground for competition, for labour enthusiasm, for the shock brigade movement.

Hence, it follows that in order to raise the labour enthusiasm of the working class, enlist it in competition and organise the general offensive, we have, first of all, to bury the bourgeois theory of Trotskyism concerning the impossibility of building Socialism in our country.

The essence of Trotskyism consists, secondly, in denying the possibility of drawing the basic masses of the peasantry into Socialist construction in the countryside. What does this mean? It means that the working class is not strong enough to lead the peasantry after it in the task of shunting the individual peasant farms on to collective rails and that, if in the near future the victory of the world revolution does not come to the aid of the working class, the peasantry will restore the old bourgeois system. Consequently, we have here the bourgeois denial of the strength and opportunities of the proletarian dictatorship for leading the peasantry to Socialism, covered with the mask of "revolutionary" phrases about the victory of the world revolution. Given such views, is it possible to bring the peasant masses into the collective farm movement, organise a mass collective farming movement, or organise the liquidation of the kulaks as a class? Clearly it is impossible.

Hence it follows that, in order to organise the mass movement of the peasantry towards collective farming and to liquidate the kulaks, we had, first of all, to bury the bourgeois theory of Trotskyism about the impossibility of winning the toiling masses of the peasantry to Socialism.

The essence of Trotskyism consists, lastly, in the denial of the necessity of iron discipline in the Party, in recognition of the freedom of fractional groupings in the Party, in the recognition of the necessity of constituting a Trotskyist party. For Trotskyism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union must be not a united and single militant Party, but a collection of groups and fractions, each with its own central organisation, Press, and so forth. And what does this mean? It means proclaiming the freedom of political fractions in the Party. It means that following the freedom of political groupings in the Party must come the freedom of political parties in the country, *i.e*. bourgeois democracy. Consequently, we have here the recognition of the freedom of fractional groupings in the Party, leading

directly to the toleration of political parties in the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and all covered up with phrases about "internal Party democracy" and "improving the regime" within the Party. The fact that the freedom of fractional strife for groups of intellectuals does not yet mean internal Party democracy, and that the policy of extensive self-criticism and colossal activity of the Party masses, now being developed by the Party, are the expression of true and genuine internal Party democracy—that is beyond the comprehension of Trotskyism. Given such views of the Party, is it possible to ensure the iron discipline of the Party and safeguard iron unity in the Party, so necessary for successful struggle against our class enemies? Obviously it is not.

Hence it follows that, in order to safeguard the iron unity of the Party and proletarian discipline within it, we have first of all to bury the Trotskyist theory of organisation.

Capitulation in practice as its *content*, Left phrases and "revolutionary" and adventurist gestures as the *form*, which masks and passes off as genuine the capitulation content—this is the essence of Trotskyism.

This duality of Trotskyism reflects the duality of the town petty bourgeoisie as it sinks into ruin. Not being able to tolerate "the regime" of the proletarian dictatorship, it strives either to jump "straight" into Socialism, in order to climb out of its ruin (hence *adventurism* and *hysteria* in politics), or, if that be impossible, it is ready to make any concessions to capitalism (hence *capitulation* in politics).

This duality of Trotskyism explains the fact that Trotskyism usually crowned its alleged "frenzied" attacks against the Right deviators by a *bloc* with them, as capitulators without masks.

And what do the Left exaggerations, which took place in the Party in the sphere of the collective farm movement, represent? They represent a certain attempt, true an unconscious attempt, to revive the traditions of Trotskyism in practice and revive the Trotskyist attitude towards the middle peasantry. They are the result of the mistake in policy which Lenin calls "over administration." This means that some of our comrades, excited by our successes in the collective farm movement, began to approach the problem of building collective farms not as builders, but, mainly, as administrators, and because of this committed a number of gross blunders.

In our Party there are some who think that we ought not to have called a halt to the Left exaggerators. They think that we ought not to have offended

our workers and counteracted their excitement, even if this excitement led to mistakes. That is nonsense, comrades. Only those who want at all costs to swim with the stream can say that. They are the very same people who will never learn the Leninist policy of going against the stream when circumstances and the interests of the Party demand it. They are "taillists,"[1] and not Leninists. The very reason why our Party succeeded in heading whole detachments of our comrades back to the right road, in correcting mistakes and achieving successes, was that it went resolutely against the stream in the interests of the application of the general line of the Party. And this is Leninism in practice, Leninism in leadership.

That is why I think that, without having overcome the Left exaggerations, we should not have been able to achieve the successes in the collective farming movement which we have to-day.

That is how matters stand as regards the struggle with the relics of Trotskyism and their repetitions in practice.

Matters are somewhat different in regard to the question of Right opportunism, at the head of which Comrades Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky stand or stood.

It cannot be said the Right deviators do not recognise the possibility of building Socialism in the U.S.S.R. No, they recognise it, and this is the difference between them and the Trotskyists. But the unfortunate thing for the Right deviators is that, while they formally recognise the possibility of building Socialism in one country, they do not want to recognise the ways and means of struggle without which it is impossible to build Socialism. They do not want to recognise that the utmost development of industry is the key to the transformation of the whole of national economy on Socialist foundations. They do not want to recognise irreconcilable class struggle against the capitalist elements, and the general Socialist offensive against capitalism. They do not understand that all these ways and means constitute the system of measures without which it is impossible to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat and to build Socialism in our country. They think that Socialism can be built "on the quiet," spontaneously, without class struggle, without an offensive against the capitalist elements. They think that the capitalist elements will either die off unnoticed of their own accord or grow into Socialism. And as such miracles do not happen in history, the only conclusion to be drawn is that the *Right deviators are in*

practice sliding to the standpoint of denying the possibility of building Socialism in our country.

Nor can it be said that the Right deviators deny the possibility of drawing the main masses of the peasantry into the work of building Socialism in the countryside. No, they recognise it, and this is where they differ from the Trotskyists. But, while recognising it formally, they deny the ways and means without which it is impossible to draw the peasantry into the task of building Socialism. They do not want to recognise that the Soviet and collective farms are the main means and "high-road" for drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the task of building Socialism. They do not want to recognise that, without applying in practice the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class, it is impossible to bring about the transformation of the countryside on Socialist foundations. They think that the countryside can be shunted on to the rails of Socialism "on the quiet," spontaneously, without class struggle, by means of consumers' co-operation alone, because they are convinced that the kulak will himself grow into Socialism. They think that the principal thing to-day is not to achieve high rates of development of industry, not the collective and Soviet farms, but to "unleash" the elemental forces of the market, to "free" the market and "remove the bonds" from individual farming, including the capitalist elements of the countryside. But as the kulak cannot grow into Socialism, while to "free" the market means arming the kulaks and disarming the working class, it turns out that *the Right deviators in practice are sliding to the standpoint of denying the possibility of attracting the main masses of the peasantry to the task of building Socialism*.

This, as a matter of fact, explains why the Right deviators usually crown their cock-fights with the Trotskyists by negotiations behind the scenes for a *bloc* with the Trotskyists.

The principal evil of Right opportunism lies in the fact that it *breaks* with the Leninist conception of the class struggle and slides to the viewpoint of *petty-bourgeois Liberalism*.

There can be no doubt that the victory of the Right deviation in our Party would have meant the complete disarming of the working class, the arming of the capitalist elements in the rural districts, and an increase in the chances of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

The Right deviators are not in favour of the need for forming a new party, and this is another point that distinguishes them from the Trotskyists. The

leaders of the Right deviators have openly recognised their mistakes and capitulated before the Party. But it would be foolish to think because of this that the Right deviation has already been buried. The strength of Right opportunism is not to be measured by this circumstance. The strength of Right opportunism lies in the strength of the petty-bourgeois elements, in the strength of the pressure the capitalist elements in general and the kulaks in particular exercise on the Party. And precisely because the Right deviation reflects the resistance of the principal elements of the dying classes, the Right deviation is the principal danger the moment in our Party.

That is why the Party thought it necessary to commence a resolute and irreconcilable struggle against the Right deviation.

There can be no doubt that without a resolute struggle against the Right deviation, without the isolation of its leading elements, we could not have achieved the mobilisation of the forces of the Party and the working class, the mobilisation of the forces of the poor and middle masses of peasantry, in the cause of the general Socialist offensive, the cause of organisation of Soviet and collective farms, the cause of restoring our heavy industry, the cause of liquidating the kulaks as a class.

That is how matters stand with the "Left" and Right deviations in the Party.

Our task is to continue our irreconcilable struggle *on two fronts*, both against the "Left," representing *petty-bourgeois radicalism*, and against the Right, representing *petty-bourgeois Liberalism*.

Our task is to continue our *irreconcilable* struggle with the *conciliatory* elements in the Party which do not understand, or pretend that they do not understand, the necessity of a resolute struggle on two fronts.

(*b*) The picture of our struggle against deviations in the Party will be incomplete if we do not touch upon the deviations which exist in the Party in the sphere of the *national question*. I have in mind, first, the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism, and, secondly, the deviation towards local nationalism. These deviations are not so noticeable or insistent as "Left" or Right deviations. They might be called creeping deviations, but this does not mean that they do not exist. They exist and, what is more, they are growing. Of this there can be no doubt. There can be no doubt, because the general atmosphere of intensified class struggle is bound to lead to a certain sharpening of national friction, which must find its reflection in the

Party. Therefore, we must expose to the light of day the characteristic features of these deviations.

What is the essence of the deviation towards Great-Russian chauvinism in our modern conditions?

The essence of the deviation towards Great-Russian jingoism lies in the desire to ignore national differences in language, culture, mode of life; in the desire to prepare for the liquidation of the national republics and regions; in the desire to undermine the principle of national equality and bring into disrepute the policy of the Party in nationalising the machinery of government, nationalising the Press, schools, and other State and public organisations.[1]

The deviators of this type take their stand on the argument that, as with the victory of Socialism nations will fuse into a single whole, while their national languages will be fused into a single common tongue, the time has come to liquidate national differences and renounce the policy of developing the national culture of the peoples which were previously oppressed. At this point they usually refer to Lenin, misquoting him, and sometimes absolutely distorting and slandering him. They argue in the following manner: Lenin said that under Socialism the interests of all nationalities will combine in a single whole: does it not follow from this that it is time to put an end to the national republics and regions, in the interests of … internationalism? Lenin said in 1913, when arguing against the Bund,[1] that the watchword of national culture is a bourgeois watchword: does it not follow from this that it is time to put an end to the national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., in the interests of … internationalism? Lenin said that the national yoke and national barriers will be abolished under Socialism: does it now follow from this that it is time to put an end to the policy of reckoning with the national peculiarities of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., and adopt the policy of assimilation, in the interests of … internationalism? And so forth, and so on.

There can be no doubt that this deviation in the national question, which, moreover, is covered with the mask of internationalism and the name of Lenin, is the most subtle and, therefore, the most dangerous form of Great-Russian nationalism.

In the first place, Lenin never said that national differences must disappear, and national tongues be fused in one common tongue within the boundaries of a *single* State, *before the victory* of Socialism *all over the*

world. Lenin, on the contrary, said quite the opposite, namely, that "the national and State *distinctions* between peoples and countries … will exist for *a very*, *very long time* even *after* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat on a *world* scale" (*Collected Works*, Russian Edition, Vol. XXV, p. 229). How can people refer to Lenin and forget this basic statement of his?

True, one of the former Marxists, to-day a renegade and a reformist, Mr. Kautsky, says the exact opposite of what Lenin teaches us. He asserts, in spite of Lenin, that the victory of the proletarian revolution in the united Austro-German State in the middle of last century would have led to the creation of a *single common* German language, and to the *Germanising* of the Czechs, because "the force of modern culture alone, freed from the meshes of the system of exchange, introduced as it would be by the Germans without any violent Germanisation, *would have transformed into Germans the backward Czech petty bourgeois*, *peasantry*, *and proletarians*, *who could expect nothing from their decayed nationality"* (see his Preface to the German edition of *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*).

Naturally, such a "conception" quite harmonises with Kautsky's social-jingoism. It was against these views of Kautsky that I was fighting in 1925, in my speech at the Eastern People's University. But can we Marxists, who want to remain internationalists to the end, attribute any positive importance to this anti-Marxist rubbish of an aggressive German social-jingo? Who is right, Kautsky or Lenin? If Kautsky is right, how can we explain the fact that such relatively backward nationalities as the White Russians and Ukrainians, who are closer to the Great-Russian than the Czechs are to the Germans, have not been Russianised as a result of the victory of the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R. but, on the contrary, have been regenerated and have developed as independent nations? How are we to explain the fact that such nations as the Turkmēnis, the Kirghiz, the Uzbeks, the Tadjiks (not to speak of the Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidjanis, etc.), in spite of their backwardness, have not only not been Russianised in consequence of the victory of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. but, on the contrary, have been regenerated and have developed into independent nations? Is it not clear that our honourable deviators, chasing a sham internationalism, have fallen into the clutches of Kautsky and social-jingoism? Is it not clear that, in agitating for a common tongue within the boundaries of *one* State, within the boundaries of the U.S.S.R., they are really striving for the

restoration of the *privileges* of the previously dominant tongue, namely, *Great-Russian*? Where does internationalism come in, then?

Secondly, Lenin never said that the abolition of the national yoke and the merging of the interests of the nationalities into a single whole are equivalent to the abolition of national differences. We have abolished the national yoke. We have abolished national privileges and established national equality. We have abolished State frontiers in the old sense of the word, frontier posts, and customs barriers between the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. We have established the unity of the economic and political interests of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. But does this mean that we have thereby abolished national differences; national languages, culture, modes of life, etc.? Obviously, it does not mean that. But if national differences, language, culture, mode of life, etc., remain, is it not clear that the demand for the abolition of national republics and regions at the present period of history is a reactionary demand, directed against the interests of the proletarian dictatorship? Do our deviators understand that to abolish the national republics and regions now means to deprive millions upon millions of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. of the opportunity of being educated in their *native* language, to deprive them of the opportunity of having their schools, courts, administration, public and other oganisations and institutions working in their *own* language, to deprive them of the possibility of taking part in Socialist construction? Is it not clear that, chasing a sham internationalism, our deviators have fallen into the clutches of the reactionary Great-Russian chauvinists, and have forgotten, completely forgotten, the watchword of the cultural revolution in the period of the proletarian dictatorship, which applies equally for *all* the peoples of the U.S.S.R., both for the Great-Russians and for the non-Great-Russians?

Thirdly, Lenin never said that the watchword of developing national culture *in the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship* is a reactionary watchword. On the contrary, Lenin was always in favour of *helping* the peoples of the U.S.S.R. to develop their national culture. It was under the guidance of none other than Lenin that the Tenth Party Congress drew up and adopted a resolution on the national question which says plainly that:

> The task of the Party is to *help* the toiling masses of the non-Great-Russian peoples to catch up with Central Russia, which is far ahead, and to *help* them: (*a*) to develop and strengthen the Soviet State system in forms appropriate to the national and social conditions of these peoples; (*b*) to develop and strengthen

> courts, administration, economic bodies, organs of authority working in their native language and composed of local people acquainted with the life and psychology of the local population; (*c*) to develop their Press, schools, theatres, clubs and cultural and educational institutions generally in their native language; (*d*) to organise and develop a broad system of training courses and schools, both of a general and of an industrial and technical character, in their native language.

Is it not clear that Lenin stood absolutely and completely for the watchword of developing national culture *in the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship*?

Is it not clear that the denial of the watchword of national culture in the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship means to deny the necessity of the cultural progress of non-Russian peoples in the U.S.S.R., to deny the necessity of general compulsory education for these peoples, to hand them over into spiritual slavery to the reactionary nationalists?

Lenin, it is true, described the watchword of national culture *under the supremacy of the bourgeoisie* as a reactionary watchword. But could it be otherwise? What is national culture under the supremacy of the national bourgeoisie? A culture, *bourgeois* in its content and national in its form, having as its object to poison the masses with the venom of nationalism and consolidate the supremacy of the bourgeoisie. What is national culture under the dictatorship of the proletariat? A culture, *Socialist* in its content and national in its form, having as its object to educate the masses in the spirit of internationalism and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat. How can these two phenomena, different in principle, be confused without breaking with Marxism? Is it not clear that, in fighting the watchword of national culture under the bourgeois system, Lenin was striking at the bourgeois *content* of national culture, and not at its national form? It would be foolish to imagine that Lenin considered Socialist culture to be a *non-national* culture, without any definite national form. The Bundists did, in fact, at one time, attribute such nonsensical views to Lenin. But from Lenin's Works we know that he strongly protested against this slander and decisively repudiated such nonsense. Can it be that our honourable deviators have really gone wandering off in the trail of the Bundists?

What remains after all this of the arguments of our deviators?

Nothing, except juggling with the flag of internationalism and slander against Lenin.

Those who deviate in the direction of Great-Russian jingoism are completely mistaken if they think that the period of the construction of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. is the period of decay and liquidation of national cultures. Matters are exactly the other way round. In reality, the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. is the period in which national culture, Socialist in content and national in form, *flourishes*. Apparently they do not understand that the development of national culture must proceed *with redoubled strength* after the introduction and establishment of general compulsory elementary education in the respective native languages. They fail to understand that only if the national cultures develop will it be possible really to draw the backward nationalities into the cause of Socialist construction. They do not understand that this is the very basis of the Leninist policy of *assisting* and *supporting* the development of the national cultures of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

It may seem strange that we who are in favour of *amalgamating* the future of national cultures into one common culture, common both in form and in content, with one common tongue, are at the same time in favour of causing the national cultures to flourish at the present time, in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But there is nothing strange in this. We must let the national cultures develop and expand, and reveal all their potential qualities, in order to create the necessary conditions for merging them into one common culture with one common tongue. The flourishing of cultures, national in form and Socialist in content, in the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship in one country, for the *purpose of* merging them into one common Socialist culture, common both in form and in content, with one common tongue, when the proletariat is victorious throughout the world and Socialism becomes an everyday matter—in this lies the dialectical quality of the Leninist way of treating the question of national culture.

It may be said that such a way of approaching the question is "contradictory." But is there not the same "contradiction" in our treatment of the question of the State? We are in favour of the State dying out, and at the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which represents the most powerful and mighty authority of all forms of State which have existed up to the present day. The highest possible development of the power of the State, with the object of preparing the conditions for the dying out of the State: that is the Marxist formula. Is

it “contradictory”? Yes, it is “contradictory.” But this contradiction is a living thing, and completely reflects Marxist dialectics.

Or, for example, take Lenin’s attitude towards the right of nations to self-determination, and including separation. Lenin sometimes expressed the principle of national self-determination in a simple formula: “Separation for amalgamation.” Just think—separation for amalgamation. It smacks even of the paradoxical. And yet this “contradictory” formula reflects that vital truth of Marxist dialectics which makes it possible for the Bolsheviks to storm the most impregnable fortresses in the sphere of the national question.

The same must be said of the formula about national culture: the flourishing of national cultures (and languages) in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, with the object of preparing the conditions for their dying away and fusion into one common Socialist culture (and one common language) in the period of the victory of Socialism throughout the world.

Whoever has failed to understand this peculiarity and “contradictoriness” of our transitional times, whoever has failed to understand this dialectical character of the historical process, is lost to Marxism.

The unfortunate thing for our deviators is that they do not understand and do not want to understand Marxist dialectics.

That is the position with regard to deviations toward Great-Russian chauvinism.

It is not difficult to understand that this deviation reflects the striving of the dying classes of the previously dominant Great-Russian nation to win back their lost privileges.

Hence the danger of Great-Russian chauvinism, as the principal danger in the Party, in the sphere of the national question.

What is the essence of the deviation towards local nationalism?

The essence of the deviation towards local nationalism consists in the attempt to draw apart and shut oneself up within the framework of one’s own national shell, in the striving to smooth over class differences within one’s own nation, in the striving to resist Great-Russian jingoism by turning away from the general current of Socialist construction, in the striving not to see that which brings together and unites the toiling masses of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R., and to see only that which can divide one from another.

The deviation towards local nationalism reflects the dissatisfaction of the dying classes in the previously oppressed nations with the regime of the proletarian dictatorship, their striving to separate themselves off into their national State, and there establish their own class supremacy.

The danger of this deviation lies in the fact that it cultivates bourgeois nationalism, weakens the unity of the toiling peoples of the U.S.S.R., and plays into the hands of the interventionists.

That is the essence of the deviation towards local nationalism.

The task of the Party is to carry on a resolute struggle against this deviation, and to create the conditions necessary for the international education of the toiling masses of the people of the Soviet Union.

That is the position with regard to deviations in our Party, the "Left" and Right deviations in the sphere of general policy, the deviations in the sphere of the national question.

That is our internal Party situation.

To-day, when the Party has emerged victorious from the struggle for the general line of policy, when the Leninist line of our Party has triumphed all along the line, many are inclined to forget the difficulties created for us in our work by each and every kind of deviator. Furthermore, some comrades to this day adopt the shallow standpoint of the philistine, to the effect that we could have managed without a struggle against the deviators. Needless to say, these comrades are profoundly mistaken. We have only to look back and remember the performances of the Trotskyists and the Right deviators, we have only to recall the history of the struggle against the deviators during the period under review, to realise the hollowness and futility of this Party philistine attitude. There can be no doubt that, had we not checked the deviators and beaten them in open struggle, we could not have won the successes of which our Party is rightly proud to-day.

It was in the struggle against deviations from the Leninist line that our Party has grown up and grown strong. It was in the struggle against deviations that it hammered out *Leninist unity* in its ranks. No one now denies the unquestionable fact that never has the Party been so united around its Central Committee as it is to-day. All are obliged to recognise now that the Party is to-day more united and single-minded than ever before, and that the Sixteenth Congress is one of the few Congresses in our Party at which there is no longer an organised and well-defined opposition,

capable of putting forward its own particular policy as against the general policy of the Party.

To what does the Party owe this, its decisive achievement?

It owes it to the circumstance that in its struggle against deviations it has always carried on a policy of *principle*, never descending to arrangements behind the scenes and diplomatic compromise-mongering.

Lenin used to say that a policy of principle is the *only* correct policy. We have emerged victorious from the struggle against deviations because we have been honestly and consistently carrying out this testament of Lenin's. (Applause.)

I conclude, comrades. What is our general deduction?

During the period under review we have had a number of decisive successes on all fronts of Socialist construction. We achieved these successes because we have been able to hold aloft the great banner of Lenin. If we want to be victorious, we must continue to bear Lenin's banner on high and guard its purity and spotlessness. (Applause.)

That is the general deduction.

With Lenin's banner we were victorious in battle for the November Revolution.

With Lenin's banner we have won decisive successes in the struggle for the victory of Socialist construction.

With that same banner we shall be victorious in the proletarian revolution throughout the world.

Long live Leninism! (Loud and prolonged applause, passing into a general ovation.)

IV. SPEECH IN REPLY TO THE DEBATE

Comrades, after the discussion on the Central Committee's report, and after all that has taken place at this Congress in connection with the speeches of the former leaders of the Right opposition, there is little left for me to say in my closing remarks.

I said in my report that the Sixteenth Congress of the Party is one of the few Congresses in the history of our Party at which there is no opposition organised to any degree or capable of putting forward its own line of policy in opposition to the line of the Party. And that, as you see, is what proved to be the case. Not only has there been no organised opposition at our

Congress, at the Sixteenth Party Congress, but there has not been even a small group, not even individual comrades, who thought fit to come out on the platform and say that the Party policy was wrong. It is clear that the line of policy of our Party is the only correct line, and its correctness turns out to be so obvious and indisputable that even the former leaders of the Right opposition thought it necessary unhesitatingly to emphasise in their speeches the correctness of the whole policy of the Party.

Naturally, after that, there is no need to enlarge on the correctness of the ideas developed in my report. There is no need because the line of the Party, in view of its obvious correctness, does not require any further defence at this Congress. And if, nevertheless, I have not waived my right of replying to the discussion, it is because it is not out of place, I think, to reply briefly to some of the questions sent in by comrades to the Congress Presidium, and then to say a few words in connection with the speeches of the former leaders of the Right opposition.

The majority of the questions deal with secondary matters—why was nothing said in the reports about horse breeding, and could not this be mentioned in the closing remarks (laughter); why was nothing said about housing in the reports, and cannot something be said about it in the closing remarks; why was nothing said about the electrification of agriculture in the reports, and cannot this be mentioned in the closing remarks. And so on in the same sense.

My reply to all these comrades is that I could not in my report deal with all questions concerning our national economy. And not only could not, but had no right to do so, since I have no right to infringe on the sphere of the reports of Comrades Kubishev and Yakovlev, who will report to you on the practical problems of industry and agriculture. After all, if one touches on all these questions in the Central Committee's report, what will the reporters on industry, agriculture, etc., have to say in their speeches? (Hear, hear.)

In particular, I must say with regard to the note about the electrification of agriculture that the comrade who wrote it is wrong in several points. He says that we have already "come squarely up" to the electrification of agriculture, that the People's Commissariat for Agriculture is hindering its development, that Lenin had different ideas on this matter, etc. This is all wrong, comrades. We cannot say that we have "come squarely up" to the point of electrifying agriculture. If we had really reached this point, we

should now have ten or fifteen districts with electrified agriculture. But you know very well that we have nothing of the kind as yet. All that can now be said about the electrification of agriculture is that electrification is in the stage of experimental research here. And that was Lenin's view when he encouraged experiments in the electrification of agriculture. Some comrades think that the tractor has already outlived its day, and that the time has come to progress from tractors to the electrification of agriculture. That, of course, is fantastic nonsense. Such comrades have to be pulled up. And that is just what the People's Commissariat for Agriculture does with those comrades. Consequently, the dissatisfaction of the writer of the note with the People's Commissariat for Agriculture cannot be considered justified.

The second group of questions deals with the national problem. One of these questions which I consider most interesting compares the treatment of the problem of national languages in my report at the Sixteenth Congress with the treatment given in my lecture at the University of Eastern Peoples in 1925, and finds a certain unclearness which ought to be explained. The note says: "You objected then to the [Kautsky's] theory about the dying away of national tongues and the formation of a single common language in the period of Socialism (*in one country*), while now, in your report at the Sixteenth Congress, you declare that Communists favour of the merging of national cultures and national tongues into one common culture with one common language (*in the period of the victory of Socialism all over the world*). Is there not unclearness here?"

I think there is neither unclearness nor any contradiction here. When I spoke in 1925 I was opposing the national-jingoist theory of Kautsky, in virtue of which a victory of the proletarian revolution in the middle of last century in the united Austro-German State would have led to the amalgamation of nations into one common *German* nation, with one common *German* language, and to the *Germanising* of the Czechs. I opposed this theory as anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist, and quoted facts from the life of our country after the victory of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. which refute this theory. I still object to this theory, as you can see from my report at this Sixteenth Congress. I object to it because the theory of the fusion of all the nations of, say, the U.S.S.R. into one common *Great-Russian* nation with one common *Great-Russian* tongue is a national-jingoist anti-Leninist theory, which is in contradiction to the basic principle of Leninism that

national distinctions cannot disappear in the near future, and that they are bound to remain for a long time, even after the victory of the proletarian revolution *all over the world*. As for the development of national cultures and national tongues taken in more distant perspective, I have always maintained, and continue to maintain, the Leninist view that in the period of the victory of Socialism *all over the world*, when Socialism has been consolidated and become a matter of everyday life, the national languages must inevitably fuse into one common language, which, of course, will be neither Great-Russian nor German, but something new. I said this quite definitely in my report at the Sixteenth Congress. Where, then, is the unclearness, and what is it really that requires explaining?

I think the writers of the note were not absolutely clear on at least two things.

First, they were not clear on the fact that we in the U.S.S.R. have already entered the period of Socialism, and yet, in spite of the fact that we have entered this period, the nations are not only not dying away, but, on the contrary, are developing and flourishing. Have we, in fact, entered the period of Socialism? Our period is usually called the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism. It was called the transition period in 1918, when Lenin, in his famous article, "On 'Left' Childishness,"[1] first gave the description of this period with its five forms of economic life. It is called the transition period to-day in 1930, when some of these forms are obsolete and are already going to the bottom, while one of them, namely, the new order in the sphere of industry and agriculture, is growing and developing with unprecedented speed. Can it be said that these two transitional periods are identical, and are not radically different from each other? Clearly it cannot. What did we have in the economic sphere in 1918? Ruined industry and mechanical cigarette-lighters,[2] no collective or Soviet farms as a mass movement, the growth of the "new" bourgeoisie in the towns and the kulaks in the country. What have we got to-day? Socialist industry which has been restored and is being reconstructed, a widespread system of Soviet and collective farms, embracing over 40 per cent of the total sown are of the U.S.S.R. in the spring sowing alone, a dying "new" bourgeoisie in the town, a dying kulak class in the country. The first was a transitional period, the second is a transitional period. And yet they are as far apart from each other as heaven and earth. And no one can deny that we are on the eve of liquidating the last serious capitalist class, the kulak class. It is clear that we

have already passed out of the transitional period in the old sense, and have entered the period of the direct and full-fledged building of Socialism all along the line. It is clear that we have already entered the period of Socialism, because the Socialist sector now controls all the economic levers of the whole of national economy, although we are still a long way from the completion of Socialist society and the abolition of class differences. Nevertheless, the national tongues are not only not dying and not fusing into one common tongue, but, on the contrary, national cultures and national tongues are developing and flourishing. Is it not clear that the theory of the dying away of the national tongues and their amalgamation into one common tongue within the framework of a *single* State, and in the period of developed Socialist construction, in the period of Socialism in *one* country, is an incorrect, anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist theory?

The writers of the note were not clear, secondly, on the fact that the question of the dying away of national tongues and their fusion into one common tongue is not an *internal State questior*, is not a question of the victory of Socialism in *one* country, but an *international* question, a question of the victory of Socialism on an *international* scale. The writers of the note failed to understand that we must not confuse the victory of Socialism in *one* country with the victory of Socialism *internationally*. Lenin had a purpose in saying that national distinctions will remain for a long time, even after the victory of the proletarian dictatorship on an international scale. Furthermore, we must bear in mind yet one more circumstance which affects a number of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. There is a Ukraine in the U.S.S.R. But there is also another Ukraine in other States. There is a White Russian in the U.S.S.R. But there is also another White Russian in other States. Do you imagine that the question of the Ukrainian and White Russian languages can be settled without taking into account these peculiar conditions? Then take the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. situated along our Southern frontier, from Azerbaidjan to Kazakstan and Buriat-Mongolia. All of them are in the same situation as both the Ukraine and White Russia. Obviously here, too, we have to reckon with the peculiar conditions of the development of these nationalities. Is it not clear that all these and similar questions bound up with the problem of national cultures and national tongues cannot be settled within the framework of a single State, within the framework of the U.S.S.R.?

That is the situation, comrades, as regards the national question in general, and the note on the national question which I have already mentioned in particular.

Let me now come to the speeches of the former leaders of the Right opposition.

What does the Congress want of the former leaders of the Right opposition? Contrition or penance? Of course not. Never will our Party, or the Congress of our Party, ask Party members to do anything which would humiliate them. The Congress wants three things of the former leaders of the Right opposition: First, that they should realise that there is a gulf between the line of the Party and the line which they were supporting, and that the line which they were maintaining leads objectively not to the victory of Socialism, but to the victory of capitalism. (Hear, hear.) Secondly, that they should denounce this line as an anti-Leninist line, and repudiate it openly and honestly. (Hear, hear.) Thirdly, that they should fall into step with us and commence, together with us, a resolute fight against each and every Right deviator. (Hear, hear, prolonged applause.)

This is what the Congress demands of the former leaders of the Right opposition.

Is there anything in these demands that is humiliating to them as people who want to remain Bolsheviks?

Clearly there is not and cannot be anything humiliating here. Every Bolshevik, every revolutionary, every self-repecting Party man will understand that he can only stands to gain in the eyes of the Party if he openly and honestly recognises clear and indisputable facts.

That is why I think that Comrade Tomsky's remarks about his being sent into the Gobi Desert to eat wild honey and herbs are the empty jokes one hears in a provincial variety theatre, which have nothing in common with the question of a revolutionary's self-respect. (Laughter and applause.)

It may be asked, Why is the Congress again putting these demands to the former leaders of the Right opposition? Is it not a fact that these demands were put to them once before in November, 1929, at the plenary session of the Central Committee? Is it not a fact that they, the former leaders of the Right opposition, accepted those demands at that time, repudiated their line and recognised its mistaken character, admitted the correctness of the line of the Party, and promised to fight the Right deviation together with the Party? Yes, all this took place. What is the matter, then? The matter is that

they did not carry out their promise, they did not carry out and are not carrying out the obligations which they took upon themselves seven months ago. (Hear, hear.) Comrade Uglanov was quite right when he said in his speech that they had not fulfilled the pledges they had given to the November Plenum of the C.C.

Here lies the source of the distrust which they are encountering at the present Congress.

And this is why the Congress is again putting its demands to them.

Comrades Rykov, Tomsky, and Uglanov complained here that the Congress was taking up an attitude of distrust toward them. And who is to blame for this? They themselves are to blame. The man who does not carry out his promises cannot expect confidence.

Had they, the former leaders of the Right opposition, the opportunity and occasion to fulfil their promises and turn over a new leaf? Of course they had. And what did they do for seven months to utilise these opportunities and occasions? Nothing.

Recently, Comrade Rykov was at the Party Conference in the Urals. He had, consequently, the most favourable occasion for correcting his mistakes, but what did we find? Instead of openly and resolutely breaking with his vacillations, he began there to twist and manœuvre. Naturally, the Urals Conference was bound to give him a rebuff. Now compare Comrade Rykov's speech at the Urals Conference with his speech at the Sixteenth Congress. There is a wide gulf between them. There he twists and manœuvres, fighting the Conference. Here he tries openly and publicly to admit his mistakes, tries to break with the Right opposition, and promises to support the Party in the struggle against deviations. Whence comes such a change and how can it be explained? It is to be explained, apparently, by the dangerous situation which had been created in the Party for the former leaders of the Right opposition. It is not to be surprised at, therefore, that the Congress should form the definite opinion that, until you bring pressure to bear on these people, you will get nothing out of them. (Laughter and prolonged applause.)

Had Comrade Uglanov the opportunity of fulfilling the promise he made at the November Plenum of the C.C.? Yes, he had. I have in mind the general workers' meeting at the "Moselectric" works, where he recently spoke. And what happened? Instead of speaking as a Bolshevik should, he began to throw mud at the line of the Party. Naturally, he met with a suitable rebuff

at the hands of the Communist cell in the works. Now compare that speech with his statement printed in to-day's *Pravda*. There is a wide gulf between them. How can this change be explained? By the same dangerous situation which had been created around the former leaders of the Right opposition. What is there to be surprised at, then, if the Congress came to the definite conclusion that, until you have brought pressure on these people, you will get nothing out of them. (Laughter and applause.)

Or Comrade Tomsky, for example. He was lately in Tiflis, at the Transcaucasian Party Congress. Consequently he had a chance of atoning for his sins. And what happened? In his speech there he dealt with the Soviet farms, the collective farms, co-operation, the cultural revolution, and everything else of that kind, but did not say a word about the main thing, namely, his opportunist work in the Central Council of Trade Unions. And that is called fulfilling the pledges given to the Party! He wanted to outwit the Party, failing to understand that millions of eyes are watching every one of us, and it is impossible to fool anyone in such conditions. Now compare his speech at Tiflis with his speech at this Congress, where he frankly and openly admitted his opportunist mistakes in the leadership of the C.C.T.U. There is a wide gulf between them. How is the difference to be explained? By the same dangerous situation which had grown up around the former leaders of the Right opposition. What is there to be surprised at if the Congress tried to bring proper pressure on these comrades in order to get them to fulfil their obligations? (General applause and laughter.)

This then is the source of the lack of confidence which the Congress still displays towards these comrades.

How are we to explain this more than strange conduct of the former leaders of the Right opposition?

How are we to explain the fact that they did not once attempt during these last months to carry out their obligations voluntarily, without outside pressure?

It is to be explained by at least two circumstances.

First, by the fact that, not being as yet completely convinced that the Party policy was correct, they continued quietly to carry on a certain fractional activity, sitting quiet for the time being and waiting for a convenient opportunity to come out openly once more against the Party. When meeting at their fractional assemblies and discussing Party questions, they usually calculated in this way: Let us wait till the spring, maybe the

Party will come a cropper with the sowing, then we will strike hard. The spring, however, brought them no advantages, as the sowing passed off satisfactorily. Then they made a new calculation: Let us wait till the autumn, maybe the Party will come a cropper with the corn supply, then we will strike at the C.C. However, the autumn also let them down, and left them "in the soup." And, as spring and autumn come round every year, the former leaders of the Right opposition continued to lie low, again and again pinning their hopes first to the spring and then to the autumn. (General laughter.)

It is clear that, waiting as they did from season to season in anticipation of a favourable moment for striking the Party, they could not fulfil their obligations.

Then the second reason. The second reason is the fact that the former leaders of the Right opposition do not understand our Bolshevik rates of progress, do not believe in those rates, and, in general, do not accept anything beyond the framework of spontaneity. Moreover, our Bolshevik rates of progress, the new paths of our development linked up with the period of reconstruction, the sharpening of the class struggle and the consequences of that sharpening, inspire them with alarm, confusion, fear, and terror. It can therefore be understood why they should start back at everything that is bound up with the sharpest slogans of our Party. They are suffering from the same disease as afflicted that well-known hero of Tchekhov, Belikov, the teacher of Greek, the man in the leather case. Do you remember Chekhov's story: *The Man in the Leather Case*? That hero, you may remember, always went about in goloshes and a wadded coat, with an umbrella, both in hot and cold weather. "Why do you need goloshes and a wadded coat in July, in such hot weather?" Belikov used to be asked. "You never know," Belikov replied. "What if something happens? There might be a sudden frost; what should I do then?" (General laughter and applause.) He feared everything new, everything that went beyond the bounds of the daily rut of humdrum life, as he would the plague. A new restaurant was opened, and Belikov was already in alarm: "It might, of course, be a good thing to have a restaurant, but take care, see that nothing happens." A dramatic circle was organised and a reading-room opened and Belikov was again in panic: "A dramatic circle, a new reading-room—what for? Take care, see that nothing may happen." (General laughter.)

We have to say the same about the former leaders of the Right opposition.

Do you remember the affair of the technical colleges being transferred to the economic People's Commissariats? We wanted to hand over only two technical colleges to the Supreme Economic Council. A small matter, it might seem. Yet we met with the most desperate resistance on the part of the Right deviators. "Hand over two technical colleges to the S.E.C.? Why? Hadn't we better wait? Take care, see that nothing happens as a result of this scheme." And to-day all our technical colleges have been handed over to the economic commissariats. And we are getting on pretty well, nevertheless.

Or, for example, the question of the emergency measures against the kulaks. Do you remember what hysterics the leaders of the Right opposition fell into on this occasion? "Emergency measures against the kulaks? Why? Hadn't we better apply a liberal policy towards the kulaks? Take care, see that nothing happens as a result of this scheme." Yet to-day we are applying the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class, a policy in comparison with which the extraordinary measures against the kulaks are a mere fleabite. And we are getting along pretty well, all the same.

Or, for example, the question of the collective and Soviet farms. "Soviet and collective farms? What do we want them for? Why should we hurry? Look out, something may happen as a result of all these Soviet and collective farms." And so on, and so forth.

And it is this fear of something new, this incapacity to approach new questions in a new way, this alarm that "something may happen," these features of the man in the leather case that prevent the former leaders of the Right opposition from amalgamating properly with the Party.

These features take on particularly ridiculous forms when difficulties appear, when the lightest cloud makes its appearance on the horizon. If any difficulty or hitch has appeared anywhere, they already fall into panic lest something may happen. A cockroach somewhere stirs, without having time even to crawl out of its hole, and they are already starting back in terror, and beginning to shout about a catastrophe, about the ruin of the Soviet Government. (General laughter.) We try to calm them, we try to convince them that nothing dangerous has happened as yet, that it is only a cockroach, and there is no need to be afraid. But all in vain. They continue to shout as before: "What cockroach? That's no cockroach, it's a thousand

wild beasts! It's not a cockroach, but the abyss, the ruin of the Soviet Government." And reams of paper begin to pour in. Bukharin writes theses on the subject and sends them to the Central Committee, asserting that the policy of the C.C. has brought the country to a state of ruin, and that the Soviet Government will certainly perish, if not at once, then at least in a month's time. Rykov supports Bukharin's theses, with the reservation, however, that he has a very serious difference with Bukharin, namely, that the Soviet Government will perish, in his opinion, not in a month, but in a month and two days. (General laughter.) Tomsky supports Bukharin and Rykov, but protests against the fact they have not been able to do without theses, have not been able to do without a document which they will have to answer for later on: "How many times have I told you—do what you like, but don't leave a document behind, don't leave any traces." (Roars of laughter of the whole Congress, and prolonged applause.) True, later on, in a year's time, when every fool begins to see that the cockroach danger was nothing to get scared at, the Right deviators begin to recover and, growing bolder, do not mind even boasting a little, and declare that they are not afraid of any cockroaches, and, moreover, that the cockroach was such a puny and feeble specimen. (Laughter and applause.) But that is a year later. And meanwhile, if you please, we have all the worry of dealing with these people.

These, comrades, are the circumstances which prevent the former leaders of the Right opposition from coming closer to the nucleus of the Party leadership and completely amalgamating with it.

How can matters be improved?

There is only one means: They must finally break with their past, re-equip themselves completely, and unite with the C.C. of our Party in its struggle for Bolshevik rates of development in its struggle against the Right deviation.

There is no other means.

If the former leaders of the Right opposition are able to do this, well and good. If not, they have only themselves to blame. (Prolonged applause. Ovation. All rise and sing the *International*.)

[1] Feudal landlords.—ED.

[1] Industry controlled by the Supreme Economic Council.—ED.

[1] Centner = one-tenth of a ton.—ED.

[1] When a section of the peasants in a given district decide to form a collective farm, the land in that district has to be redistributed so that collective farm land shall as far as possible comprise a continuous area. The land, therefore, has to be re-surveyed.—Ed.

[2] Pooling of the means of production (land, tools, etc.), while retaining distribution of produce according to work done after the necessary deductions have been made for new capital investments, insurance, educational facilities, etc., and private property in all respects.—Ed.

[1] Denny, *America Conquers Britain*.

[1] *i.e*. the settlement of accounts between business organisations by means of transferring sums from one bank account to another.—Ed.

[1] Chervonetz = 10 rubles. The Soviet unit of currency.—Ed.

[2] *i.e*. industries producing goods for general use—textiles, clothing, boots, etc.—Ed.

[1] Rayon in Russia literally means district, which should not be confused with regions (oblast or krai). For convenience the reorganisation into "rayons" is translated as regionalisation.—Ed.

[1] *Literally*, "khvostists," from the Russian word "khvost," which means "tail," *i.e*. those who "drag at the tail" of events.—Ed.

[1] *I.e*. to conduct these institutions in the language of and by the people of the respective nationalities.—Ed.

[1] The Bund—Jewish Labour League (Menshevik)—was an organisation which placed Jewish cultural autonomy, and the separate organisation of the Jewish workers, to the forefront of their activities.—Ed.

[1] *Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder*.

[2] At the time the metal industry was in a state of disorganisation and the factories were idle, the workers spent their time making cigarette-lighters which they afterwards sold in order to make a little money.—Ed.

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS MANAGERS

(*Speech delivered at the First All-Union Conference of Managers of Soviet Industry, February* 4, 1931)

COMRADES:

The deliberations of your Conference are drawing to a close. You are now about to adopt resolutions. I have no doubt that they will be adopted unanimously. In these resolutions—I know something about them—you approve the Control Figures of industry for 1931 and undertake to fulfil them.

A Bolshevik's word is his bond. The Bolsheviks are accustomed to fulfil their promises. But what does the pledge to fulfil the Control Figures for 1931 mean? It means to ensure a general growth of industrial output by 45 per cent. And this is a very big task. Moreover, such a pledge means that you not only promise to carry out our Five-Year Plan in four years—this goes without saying, and no more resolutions are required for this—*it means that you undertake to fulfil it in three years in all the basic, leading industries*.

It is a good thing that the Conference undertakes to fulfil the programme for 1931, to fulfil the Five-Year Plan in three years. But we have been taught by "bitter experience" that not all pledges are fulfilled. In the beginning of 1930 a similar pledge to fulfil the yearly plan was undertaken. At that time it was necessary to increase the output of our industries by 31–32 per cent. However, that promise was not carried out completely. In reality, the industrial output in 1930 advanced only 25 per cent. We must ask ourselves, Will not the same thing occur again this year? The leaders of our industries now promise to increase the industrial production in 1931 by 45 per cent. But what guarantee have we that the promise will be fulfilled?

What is required in order to fulfil the Control Figures, in order to yield an increase in production of 45 per cent, in order to secure the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan not in four, but, as regards the key industries, in three years?

Two fundamental conditions are necessary. First, real, or as we usually term it, objective, possibilities must exist.

Secondly, there must be a willingness and ability to conduct our enterprises in such a way as to take advantage of these possibilities.

Did the objective possibilities for the complete fulfilment of the plan exist last year? Yes, they did. Undeniable facts testify to this. The facts are that in March and April of last year our industry increased output by 31 per cent as compared with the previous year. Why, then, did we fail to fulfil the plan for the whole year? What interfered? What was lacking? We lacked the ability to utilise the existing possibilities, the ability to manage the factories, mills, and mines properly.

We had the first condition: the objective possibilities for the fulfilment of the plan. But we did not have in sufficient degree the second condition: the ability to manage production. And precisely for this reason our plan was not carried out in full. Instead of 31–32 per cent increase we had only 25 per cent. Of course, a 25 per cent increase is a big achievement in 1930, nor are there any that are increasing production now. All capitalist countries without exception show a sharp decline in production. Under such conditions a 25 per cent increase is a big step forward. But we could have produced more, for we had all the necessary "objective" conditions for it.

What guarantee is there that the experience of last year will not be repeated this year, that the plan will be carried out in full, that the existing possibilities will be utilised by us properly, that your promise will not to a certain extent remain a paper promise?

In the history of States and countries, in the history of armies, there have been cases when every possibility for success and for victory was at hand, but these possibilities were neglected because the leaders did not see them, did not know how to utilise them, and the armies suffered defeat.

Have we all the possibilities required for the fulfilment of the Control Figures in 1931?

Yes, these possibilities are all at hand.

What are these possibilities? What is needed in order to realise them?

First of all adequate natural resources are required: iron ore, coal, oil, grain, cotton. Have we got these? Yes, we have. We have them in larger quantities than any other country. Take the Urals, for example, which represents a combination of wealth that cannot be found in any other country. Ore, coal, copper, oil, grain—what is there not in the Urals? We have everything, except perhaps rubber. But within a year or two we will have our own rubber as well. As far as natural resources are concerned we are fully secured. We even have more than enough.

What else is required?

The *existence of a Government* capable and willing to utilise these immense natural resources in the interests of the nation. Have we such a Government? We have. True, our work in utilising natural resources is sometimes accompanied by friction between our own workers. For instance, last year the Soviet Government had to wage a controversy on the question of the formation of a second coal and metal base without which we cannot develop further. We have already overcome these difficulties and shall soon have this base.

What else is required?

It is necessary that the Government should enjoy the *support* of the vast masses of workers and peasants. Does our Government enjoy such support? It does. No other Government in the world enjoys such support among its workers and peasants as does the Soviet Government. There is no need for me to deal in detail with the growth of Socialist competition, the spread of shock brigades, the campaign in the struggle for counter-plans. All these facts, which clearly reflect the support of the Soviet Government by millions, are well known.

What else is required in order to fulfil and surpass the Control Figure for 1931?

We must have a system free of the incurable diseases of capitalism and having serious advantages over capitalism. Crisis, unemployment, waste, general poverty, are the incurable diseases of capitalism. Our system does not suffer from these diseases because the Government is in our hands, in the hands of the working class, because we are conducting planned economy, are accumulating resources in a planned way, and properly distributing them among the different branches of national economy. We are free of the incurable diseases of capitalism. That is what distinguishes us from capitalism, that is what marks our decisive superiority over capitalism. See how the capitalists are trying to extricate themselves from the crisis. They are reducing the workers' wages to a minimum. They are reducing the prices of raw materials and food products as much as possible. But they do not want to reduce the prices of manufactured goods to any appreciable degree. This means that they want to overcome the crisis at the expense of the basic consumers, at the expense of the workers, at the expense of the peasants, at the expense of the toilers in countries producing raw materials and food. The capitalists are cutting the ground from under their own feet. And instead of ending the crisis they aggravate it, stimulate new conditions

leading to a new and even more serious crisis. The advantage of our system is that we know no crisis of over-production, we had not and will not have millions of unemployed, we have no anarchy in production, for we are conducting planned economy. Nor is this all. In our country industry is concentrated as nowhere else in the world. That means that we can build our industry on the basis of the best technique and thereby secure an unprecedented productivity of labour, an unprecedented rate of accumulation.

Our weakness in the past has been that this industry was based upon a scattered peasant economy. That *was* the case, it is not the case now. Soon, perhaps within a year, we will become the country of the largest scale agriculture in the world. The State and collective farms—and they are forms of large-scale agriculture—already this year yielded half our marketable grain. Thus our system, the Soviet system, affords possibilities of rapid progress which no single bourgeois country can even dream of.

What else is required in order to advance by leaps and bounds?

We need a *Party* sufficiently solidified and united in order to direct the efforts of the best members of the working class to *one purpose*, and sufficiently experienced not to be dismayed by difficulties, a Party systematically pursuing a correct, revolutionary, Bolshevik policy. Have we such a Party? We have. Is its policy correct? It is. Its successes have been considerable. This is now recognised not only by the friends but also by the enemies of the working class. See how all the well-known "honourable" gentlemen, Fish in America, Churchill in England, Poincaré in France, howl and rage against us! Why are they so disturbed? Because the policy of our Party is correct, because it is achieving success after success.

Such, comrades, are the possibilities which facilitate the fulfilment of the Control Figures for 1931, which make it possible to fulfil the Five-Year Plan in four years, and in the key industries even in three years.

Thus the first condition for the fulfilment of the plan—the "objective" possibilities—exists here.

Have we the second condition, the ability to utilise these possibilities?

In other words, are our factories, mills, and mines efficiently managed? Is everything in order in these fields?

Unfortunately, not everything is perfect here. As Bolsheviks we must state this frankly and openly.

What does it mean to manage production? We do not always observe a Bolshevik attitude toward this question of industrial management. Many among us think that management means signing papers. This is sad, but true. At times, one cannot help recalling Shchedrin's Pompadours. Do you remember how the lady Pompadour taught the young Pompadour: "Don't break your head over science, don't go into details, let others do this, this is not your business—your business is to direct, to sign papers." It must be admitted to our shame that among us Bolsheviks there are also a good many people who direct by signing papers. And as for getting a real insight into the business, learning technique, becoming master of the business, not a sign.

How has it happened that we, Bolsheviks, who have made three revolutions, who emerged victoriously from the bitter civil war, we who have solved the vast problem of creating an industry, who have directed the peasantry to the path of Socialism, how is it that in the matter of industrial management we bow to a slip of paper?

The reason is that it is easier to sign a paper than to manage production. Many managers therefore chose the line of least resistance. We, too, the centre, bear a share of the blame.

About ten years ago a slogan was issued: "Since Communists do not yet properly understand the technique of production, since they have yet to learn the art of management, let the technicians and engineers—the specialists—carry on production, while you, Communists, should not interfere with the technique of the business, but, while not interfering, study technique tirelessly, study the science of management in order later to become, together with our loyal specialists, true leaders of industry, true masters of business." Such was the slogan, and what has resulted therefrom? The second part of this formula has been cast aside, for signing papers is easier than learning, while the first part of the formula has been vulgarised and non-interference has been interpreted as a refusal to study the technique of production. The result has been nonsense, harmful and dangerous nonsense, which the sooner we discard the better.

Life itself has more than once signalled to us that there was trouble in this field. The Shakhti case was the first signal. The Shakhti case showed that the Party organisations and the trade unions lacked revolutionary vigilance. It showed that our business managers were disgracefully backward in regard to technique, that some of the old engineers and

technicians, who work without being controlled, slid more easily toward the path of wrecking activities, especially as they were constantly besieged by "offers" from our enemies abroad. The second signal was the "Industrial Party" trial.[1]

Of course, the underlying cause of wrecking is the class struggle. Naturally the class enemy frantically resists the Socialist offensive. This alone, however, is not adequate explanation of such a rich outcrop of sabotage.

How did it happen that sabotage assumed such wide dimensions? Who is to blame for it? We are to blame; for had we handled the business of industrial management differently, had we taken up earlier the work of studying its technique, the mastering of technology, had we more frequently and efficiently intervened in the management of business, the wreckers could not have done so much damage.

We must ourselves become specialists, masters of industry; we must turn to technical science—such has been the lesson of life itself. But neither the first signal nor even the second signal brought about the necessary change. It is time, it has long been, to turn towards technique. It is time to cast aside the old slogan, the obsolete slogan of non-interference in technique, and become specialists, experts, complete masters of the business.

It is frequently asked why we do not have individual management. We have not got it and will not have it unless we have mastered technique. We will not have real individual management until there are among us Bolsheviks who are thoroughly familiar with technical questions, economics, and finance. You can write any number of resolutions, you can make any number of vows, but unless you grasp the technique, economics, and finance of the factory, mill, and mine—nothing will come of it, there will be no individual management.

Thus, the task now is to study the technique of becoming masters of the business ourselves. This alone provides a guarantee that our plans will be carried out in full, and that single management will be established.

This, of course, is no easy matter, but it can certainly be accomplished. Science, technical experience, knowledge are all things that can be acquired. We may not have them to-day, but to-morrow we will. The main point is to have the passionate Bolshevik desire to master technique, to master the science of production. If a thing is passionately desired everything can be achieved, everything can be overcome.

It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down a bit in *tempo*, to retard the movement. No, comrades, this is impossible! It is impossible to reduce the *tempo*! On the contrary, it is necessary as far as possible to accelerate it. This necessity is dictated by our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the working class of the whole world. To slacken the *tempo* means to fall behind. And the backward are always beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. No, we do not want this!

Incidentally, the history of old Russia is the history of defeats due to backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal barons. She was beaten by the Polish-Lithuanian "squires." She was beaten by the Anglo-French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her for her backwardness, for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for Governmental backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. She was beaten because to beat her was profitable and could be done with impunity. Do you remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet: "You are both poor and abundant, you are both powerful and helpless, Mother Russia." These words of the old poet were well known to those gentlemen. They beat her, saying: "You are abundant"—so we can enrich ourselves at your expense. They beat her, saying: "You are poor and helpless"—so you can be beaten and plundered with impunity. Such is the law of capitalism—to beat the backward and the weak. The jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak, so you are wrong, hence you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty, so you are right, hence we must be wary of you.

That is why we must no longer be backward.

In the past we did not and could not have any fatherland. But now that we have a working-class Government, we have a fatherland, and we will defend its independence. Do you want our Socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this you must put an end to this backwardness as speedily as possible and develop genuine Bolshevik speed in building up the Socialist system of economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said during the October Revolution: "Either death, or we must overtake and surpass the advanced capitalist countries."

We are 50–100 years behind the advanced countries. We must cover this distance in 10 years. Either we do this or they will crush us.

This is what our obligation to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. dictate to us.

We have, however, still more serious and more important obligations. These are our obligations to the world proletariat. They coincide with our first obligations. But we regard them as being still higher. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world working class. We have triumphed not only as a result of the efforts of the working class of the U.S.S.R., but also as a result of the support of the working class of the world. Without this support we would long ago have been torn to pieces. It is said that our country is the shock brigade of the proletariat of all countries. This is well said. And this imposes very serious obligations upon us. Why does the international proletariat support us; how did we deserve this support? We merited it by the fact that we were the first to fling ourselves into the battle against capitalism, we were the first to establish a working-class State, we were the first to begin building Socialism. We merited it by the fact that we are working for a cause which, if successful, will change the whole world and free the entire working class. And what is wanted for success? The elimination of our backwardness, the development of a high Bolshevik *tempo* of construction. We must move forward so that the working class of the whole world, looking at us, might say: "Here is my vanguard, here is my shock brigade, here is my working-class State, here is my fatherland; they are promoting their cause which is our cause; well, let us support them against the capitalists and spread the cause of the world revolution." Must we justify the hopes of the world's working class, must we fulfil our obligations to them? Yes, we must if we are not hopelessly to disgrace ourselves. Such are our obligations internal and international.

You see, they dictate to us a Bolshevik *tempo* of development.

I cannot say that we have not accomplished anything in these years with regard to industrial management. In fact, we have accomplished a good deal. We have doubled our industrial production compared with the pre-war level. We have created the biggest agricultural production in the world. But we could have accomplished even more had we tried hard during this time to really master the art of management, technique, economics, and finance of industry.

In ten years at most we must cover the distance which separates us from the advanced countries of capitalism. We have all the "objective" possibilities for this. What is lacking only is the ability to properly utilise

these possibilities. And this depends upon us. *Upon us alone!* It is time we learned to utilise these possibilities. It is time to put an end to the rotten policy of non-interference in production. It is time to adopt a new policy more in harmony with the present period, a policy of intervening in everything. If you are a factory manager, take a hand in all the affairs of the factory, look into everything, let nothing escape you, learn and learn more. The Bolsheviks must master technology. It is time for the Bolsheviks themselves to become specialists. During the period of reconstruction technique decides everything. And a business manager who does not want to study technology, who does not want to master technology, is a joke rather than a manager.

It is said that it is hard to master technology. This is untrue. There are no strongholds which the Bolsheviks were unable to capture. We have solved a number of most difficult problems. We have overthrown capitalism. We have seized power. We have built up a huge Socialist industry. We have turned the middle peasants in the direction of Socialism. We have already accomplished the most important thing from the point of view of reconstruction. Little remains to do. We must study technology, master science. And when we do this we will show a *tempo* of which we dare not even dream at present. And we will do this if we really desire to do so.

[1] The trial—in 1930—of a group of wreckers who had formed a political Party of this name, the aim of which was to overthrow the Soviet Government.—ED.

NEW CONDITIONS, NEW TASKS

(*Speech delivered at the Conference of Leaders of Industry, June* 23, 1931)

COMRADES:

From the material presented to this Conference you will see that from the point of view of the fulfilment of the plan, industry presents a chequered picture. There are branches of industry in which production in the past five months has increased 40 to 50 per cent as compared with the corresponding period last year. There are other branches in which the increase in production is not more than 20 to 30 per cent. And, finally, there are certain branches that show a much smaller increase, only 8 to 10 per cent, and even less. Among the latter must be counted coal-mining and iron and steel production. The picture, as you see, is a chequered one.

What is the explanation? What is the cause of the backwardness of certain branches of industry? Why is it that certain branches of industry show an increase of only 20 to 25 per cent, and coal mining and iron and steel even less, and are trailing behind other branches?

The cause lies in the fact that the conditions of development of industry have been undergoing a profound change and that a new situation has been created that requires new methods of leadership, whereas certain of our business leaders, instead of adapting their methods to the new conditions, are working in the old, old way. In a word, it comes to this, that the new conditions of development of industry require new methods of working, but that certain of our business leaders have failed to see this and to realise that they have to adopt new methods of business management.

That is the reason why certain of our industries are falling behind.

What are the new conditions in the development of industry? How did they arise?

We can enumerate six such new conditions.

Let us examine them.

1. LABOUR POWER

The first question is the supply of labour power for our industries. Formerly, the rule was that the workers themselves came to the factories to seek work. There was a certain automatic influx. And this automatic influx arose from the existence of unemployment, from the differentiation of classes in the villages, from the existence of poverty and from the fear of starvation, which drove people from the village into the town. You remember the formula: the flight of the muzhik from the village into the town? What compelled the peasant to flee from the village and come into the town? The fear of starvation, unemployment, the fact that the village was his stepmother, as it were, from whom he was ready to flee to the devil himself, if only he could find some sort of work.

Such was the state of affairs in the not very remote past.

Can it be said that the same conditions exist now? No. On the contrary, conditions have now fundamentally changed. And because conditions have changed we no longer have the automatic influx of labour power. What has really changed? First of all, we have put an end to unemployment—in other words, we have abolished the force that weighed so heavily on the "labour market." Secondly, we have thoroughly uprooted the differentiation of classes in the village—in other words, we have removed that mass poverty that drove the peasant from the village into the town. And, finally, we have given the village tens of thousands of tractors and agricultural machines, we have smashed the kulak, we have created collective farms, and have given the peasants the opportunity to live and work like human beings. The village can no longer be called the stepmother of the peasant. And for that very reason the peasant is beginning to settle down in the village and there is no longer that flight of the muzhik from the village into the town and the automatic influx of labour power.

You see, therefore, that we now have an entirely new situation and new conditions for guaranteeing labour power for our enterprises.

What follows?

It follows, first, that we must no longer count on the automatic influx of labour power. That means that we must replace the "policy" of automatism by a policy of *organised* recruiting of industrial workers. There is only one way of securing that end, namely, the conclusion of contracts between business organisations, on the one hand, and collective farms and collective farm members, on the other. As you are aware, certain business leaders and collective farms have already adopted this method, and experience has

shown that the practice has very important advantages for both the collective farms and the business organisations.

Secondly, it follows that we must proceed immediately to *mechanise* to the widest possible extent the heavier processes of labour (lumbering, construction, coal industry, loading and unloading, transport, iron and steel production, etc.). This does not mean that we must ignore manual labour entirely. On the contrary, manual labour for a long time to come will continue to play an important part in production. But it does mean that mechanisation for us is the new and deciding factor, without which we shall not be able to stand either the *tempo* or the new scale of production.

There are not a few of our business leaders who believe neither in mechanisation nor in agreements with the collective farms. These are the leaders who fail to understand that new conditions have arisen, who do not want to work in the new way and sigh for the good old times when labour power came to industry of its own accord. It need hardly be said that such business leaders are as remote from the new tasks of business organisation demanded by the new conditions as the earth is from the sky. They apparently believe that the difficulty in the supply of labour is a temporary phenomenon and that the scarcity will disappear also, so to speak, automatically. That is a delusion, comrades. The difficulties with the labour supply will not disappear of their own accord. They will disappear only as a result of our own efforts.

And so our task is to recruit labour power in an organised way, by means of contracts with the collective farms, and to mechanise labour.

Such is the first new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the second condition.

2. Wages

I have just spoken of the organised recruiting of workers for our industries. But recruiting workers is not everything. In order to ensure the necessary labour power for our industries it is necessary to attach the workers to production and to make the staff of workers in the factory more or less permanent. It need hardly be said that without a permanent staff of workers, who have mastered the technical processes and have become accustomed to the new machinery, it is impossible to make any progress or to fulfil the production programmes. Otherwise, it would be necessary to be constantly teaching new workers and to spend half the time on training them, instead

of using them on production. And what do we find now? Can it be said that the staffs of workers in our industries are more or less permanent? Unfortunately not. On the contrary, we still have a heavy turnover of labour power. Indeed, in a number of industries the turnover of labour, far from decreasing, is increasing. At any rate, it would be hard to find an enterprise where the staff of workers does not change at least 30 or 40 per cent in the course of a half-year, or even in one quarter.

Formerly, during the period of restoration of our industry, when the mechanical equipment was not very complex and the scale of production not very high, it was more or less possible to tolerate this instability of labour power. It is different now.

Conditions have fundamentally changed. Now, in the period of extensive reconstruction, when the scale of production has become gigantic and the mechanical equipment complex to the extreme, the instability of labour power has become a plague of production, disorganising our industries. To tolerate instability of labour power at the present time would be to disrupt our industry, endanger the fulfilment of the production programmes, and destroy the possibility of improving the quality of the articles produced.

What is the cause of the instability of labour power?

The cause lies in an improper structure of wages, in mistaken wage scales, in “Left” equalitarianism in the sphere of wages. In a number of our industries wage scales are such as almost to destroy all difference between skilled labour and unskilled labour, between heavy work and light work. The consequence of equalitarianism is that the unskilled worker is not interested in becoming a skilled worker; he is thus deprived of the prospect of advancement, as a result of which he feels himself a sojourner in industry, working temporarily so as to earn a little and then go off to seek his fortune elsewhere. The result of equalitarianism is that the skilled worker is obliged to move from enterprise to enterprise until he is fortunate enough to find one that appreciates skill in labour.

Hence the general drift from factory to factory, hence the large labour turnover.

In order to put an end to this evil we must get rid of equalitarianism and break down the old wage scales. In order to put an end to this evil we must set up a wage scale that will take into account the difference between skilled labour and unskilled labour, between heavy work and light work. It cannot be tolerated that a rolling mill hand in a steel mill should earn no

more than a sweeper. It cannot be tolerated that a locomotive driver on a railway should earn only as much as a copying clerk. Marx and Lenin said that the difference between skilled and unskilled work would continue to exist even under Socialism and even after classes had been annihilated, that only under Communism would this difference disappear, and that, therefore, even under Socialism "wages" must be paid according to labour performed and not according to need. But our industrialist and trade union equalitarians do not agree with this and opine that that difference has already disappeared under our Soviet system. Who is right, Marx and Lenin or our equalitarians? We may take it that Marx and Lenin are right. But if so, it follows that whoever draws up wage scales on the "principle" of equality, and ignores the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, is at loggerheads with Marxism and Leninism.

In every branch of industry, in every factory, in every department of a factory, there is a leading group of more or less skilled workers who must be first and foremost attached to production if we want to make sure of having a permanent staff of workers. This leading group of workers forms the chief link in production. By attaching them to the factory, or to the department, we attach the whole staff of workers and put an end to the instability of labour power. And how can we manage to attach them to the factory? It can be done by advancing them, by raising their wages, by introducing such a system of payment as will give the skilled worker his due. And what is meant by advancing these workers and raising their wages? It means first and foremost opening up prospects for the unskilled worker, giving him a stimulus for advancement, for entering the ranks of the skilled worker. You know that we now need hundreds of thousands and even millions of skilled workers. But in order to make skilled workers we must furnish a stimulus to the untrained worker to advance himself. And the greater boldness we display in this respect, the better it will be; for it is the most important means of putting an end to the instability of labour. To economise in this respect would be criminal and contrary to the interests of our Socialist construction.

But that is not all.

In order to attach the workers to their factories we must still further improve the living and housing conditions of the workers. It cannot be denied that in this respect not a little has been done in the last few years. But what has been done is altogether too little in comparison with the

growing requirements of the workers. It is not enough to say that there were fewer houses than there are at present, and rest on the successes already achieved. It is not enough to say that the worker was far worse fed formerly, and accordingly content ourselves with the existing situation. One would be rotten through and through if he consoled himself by the thought of what existed in the past. We must set out, not from the past, but from the growing requirements of the workers at present. We have got to understand that the conditions of existence of the workers have changed fundamentally. The present-day worker is not what he once was. The present-day worker, our Soviet worker, wants to live so that all his material and cultural needs are satisfied—his food supplies, his housing conditions, and his cultural and all other needs. He has a right to expect it and it is our duty to meet his requirements. True, our worker does not suffer from unemployment, he is free from the burden of capitalism; he is no longer a slave, but the master of his destiny. But that is not enough. He demands the satisfaction of all his material and cultural requirements and we have got to meet his demands. Do not forget that we ourselves are now making certain demands of the worker—we demand labour discipline, intensity of effort, Socialist competition, shock brigade methods. Do not forget that the great majority of the workers have taken up the challenge of the Soviet power with enthusiasm and are carrying it out heroically. Do not be surprised, therefore, that while carrying out the demands of the Soviet power, the worker in his turn demands that the Soviet power shall fulfil its duty and continue to improve the material and cultural position of the workers.

And so our task is to put an end to the instability of labour power, to abolish equalitarianism, to organise wages properly, and to improve the living conditions of the workers.

Such is the second new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the third condition.

3. Labour Organisation

I have already spoken of the necessity of putting a stop to the instability of labour power and of attaching the workers to their factories. But that does not exhaust the matter. It is not enough to secure the termination of labour instability. We must place the workers in such conditions as will enable them to work efficiently, to increase their output, and to improve the quality of their products. In other words, it is necessary to organise labour in the

factories so that the output increases from month to month, from quarter to quarter.

Can it be said that the organisation of labour in the factories as it exists now answers all modern requirements of production? Unfortunately not. At any rate, there are still a number of factories where labour is organised abominably, where in place of order and co-ordination there is disorder and confusion, where in place of responsibility for the work done there is complete lack of responsibility and "de-personalisation."

What does "de-personalisation" mean? It means complete absence of responsibility for the work performed, absence of responsibility for machinery, lathes, and tools. Of course, where there is de-personalisation we cannot expect a serious increase in productivity of labour, improved quality of output, care for machinery, lathes, and tools. You know what the consequences of de-personalisation on the railways were. It leads to the same result in industry. We abolished de-personalisation on the railways and thus achieved considerable improvement. We must do the same thing in industry in order to raise it to the necessary level of efficiency.

Formerly we could somehow or other manage to get along even with the bad organisation of labour which accompanies de-personalisation and the absence of responsibility of every man for the task entrusted to him. But matters are different now. The conditions have entirely changed. In view of the vast scale of production and the existence of gigantic works, de-personalisation becomes a plague to industry and constitutes a menace to all the successes in production and organisation we have achieved in our factories.

How was it that de-personalisation took root in so many factories? It entered the factory as an illegitimate by-product of the uninterrupted working week. It would be wrong to assert that the uninterrupted week necessarily results in de-personalisation. If labour is properly organised, if responsibility is observed, the responsibility of each for a definite piece of work, if definite groups of workers are attached to definite machinery and instruments, if the shifts are properly organised so that they correspond in quality and skill; given such conditions, the uninterrupted week results in a tremendous increase in productivity of labour, in an improvement in quality of work, and in the abolition of de-personalisation. Such, for example, is the case on the railways, where the uninterrupted week is practised, but where de-personalisation no longer exists. Can it be said that the position with the

uninterrupted week is equally satisfactory in industrial enterprises? Unfortunately not. The fact is that a number of our factories adopted the uninterrupted system far too hastily, without the necessary preparation, without the proper organisation of the shifts, so as to secure more or less of equality in quality and skill, and without establishing the responsibility of each worker for a definite piece of work. The result was that the uninterrupted system, left to its fate, was transformed into de-personalisation. And, consequently, in a number of factories we have a fictitious—paper—uninterrupted system, and a by no means fictitious but very real de-personalisation. Hence, the absence of a sense of responsibility, a careless attitude towards equipment, the frequent breakdown of machinery, and no stimulus for increased productivity of labour. Not without justification do the workers declare: "We would raise the productivity of our labour and bring about real improvement, but who will appreciate us when nobody is responsible for anything?"

From which it follows that certain of our comrades were a little too hasty in introducing the uninterrupted production system, and in their hurry distorted it and transformed it into de-personalisation. In order to put an end to de-personalisation, two alternatives exist. Either alter the conditions of the uninterrupted week, so that it does not result in de-personalisation, just as was done in the railways, or, where the conditions do not favour this, abandon the fiction of an uninterrupted week and adopt the interrupted six-day week, as was recently done in the Stalingrad works, and then set about creating the conditions which will permit a return to a real and not fictitious uninterrupted week, an uninterrupted week without de-personalisation.

There are no other alternatives.

There can be no doubt whatever that our business leaders understand this perfectly. But they remain silent. Why? Because, presumably, they fear the truth. But since when have Bolsheviks feared the truth? Is it not true in a number of factories the uninterrupted week has resulted in de-personalisation and has been distorted to the extreme? One asks, Who needs such an uninterrupted week? Who would undertake to assert that the interests of this fictitious and distorted uninterrupted week are higher than the interests of the proper organisation of labour, higher than the interests of increased productivity of labour, higher than the interests of a genuine uninterrupted system, higher than the interests of our Socialist industry? Is it not obvious that the sooner we destroy the fictitious uninterrupted system

the sooner we shall achieve the organisation of a genuine uninterrupted system?

Some comrades seem to think that de-personalisation can be abolished by incantation, by widely broadcasted speeches. I, at least, know a number of business leaders whose fight against de-personalisation is confined to appearing now and again at meetings and abusing de-personalisation, apparently in the belief that after such speeches de-personalisation will disappear, so to speak, automatically. They are grievously mistaken if they believe that de-personalisation can be rooted out by speeches, by incantations. No, comrades, de-personalisation will never disappear of its own accord. We alone can put an end to it, for the power of government is in our hands and we are responsible for everything, including de-personalisation. It appears to me that it would be far better if our business leaders, instead of incantations and speeches, spent a month or two at some mine or factory, studied every trifle and detail of labour organisation, put an end to de-personalisation on the spot itself, and then went about spreading the experience thus gained to other enterprises. That would be far better. That would be genuinely fighting de-personalisation and working for a proper Bolshevist organisation of labour, for a proper employment of labour power in the factories.

And so our task is to put an end to de-personalisation, *to improve labour organisation, and to secure the proper employment of labour power in our enterprises*.

Such is the third new condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the fourth condition.

4. A Working-Class Industrial and Technical Intelligentsia

The situation has changed also in regard to the leading cadres of industry generally and in regard to engineering and technical cadres in particular.

Formerly, the main base of our industry was the coal and metallurgical region of the Ukraine. The Ukraine supplied metal to all our industrial regions—the South, Moscow, and Leningrad. It also supplied coal to most of the largest industries of the U.S.S.R. I exclude the Urals, since they played an unimportant part in comparison with the Donetz Basin. Accordingly, we had three main centres producing the higher personnel of industry: the South, the Moscow region, and the Leningrad region. It is clear that under

such conditions we were able to get along with that minimum of engineering and technical personnel that our country at that time possessed.

Such was the state of affairs in the not very remote past.

But conditions have now entirely changed. It is now obvious, I think, that if we are to maintain the present *tempo* of development and the gigantic scale of production we cannot get along with the Ukrainian coal and metallurgical base alone. You are aware that Ukrainian coal and metal are already inadequate, in spite of the increase in their output. You are aware that we have consequently been obliged to create a new coal and metallurgical centre in the East—in the Ural-Kuzbas region. You are aware that we are accomplishing that task not unsuccessfully. But that is not enough. We must create a metallurgical industry in Siberia to satisfy her own growing requirements. And we have already begun to create it. Moreover, we have to create a new centre for non-ferrous metals in Kazakstan and Turkestan. We have, finally, to develop extensive railroad construction. That is dictated by the interests of the U.S.S.R. as a whole—by the interests both of the outlying republics and of the centre.

It follows that we cannot now get along with that minimum number of engineers and technicians with which we managed formerly. It follows that the old centres of training of engineers and technicians are now inadequate and that we must create a number of new centres—in the Urals, in Siberia, and in Central Asia. We must now make sure of obtaining three times, five times, the number of higher industrial staffs if we seriously intend to carry out the programme of Socialist industrialisation of the U.S.S.R.

But it is not any kind of highly trained personnel, of engineers and technicians, that we need. We need such as are capable of understanding the policy of the working class of our country, who are capable of absorbing that policy and are prepared to carry it out conscientiously. And what does that imply? It implies that our country has entered on a phase of its development where the working class must create its own technical and industrial intelligentsia, one that is capable of protecting its interests in production as the interests of the governing class.

There has never been a governing class that has managed to get along without its own intelligentsia, nor is there any reason for believing that the working class of the U.S.S.R. can get along without its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.

The Soviet power recognises this fact and has opened wide the doors of all the higher educational institutions in every branch of the national economy to members of the working class. You know that tens of thousands of working-class and peasant youths are attending the higher educational institutions. Formerly, under capitalism, the higher educational centres were the monopoly of the sons of the rich; to-day, under the Soviet power, the working-class and peasant youth predominate in these institutions. There is no doubt that our educational institutions will soon be turning out thousands of new technicians and engineers, new leaders for our industries.

But that is only one side of the matter. The other side is that the industrial and technical intelligentsia of the working class will be recruited not only from people who have passed through higher schools of learning, but also from the rank-and-file workers in our industries, from the skilled workers, from the working-class cultural forces in the mines, factories, and workshops. The initiators of Socialist competition, the leaders of shock brigades, practical inspirers of labour enthusiasm, organisers of labour in the various sections of our construction—such is the new stratum of the working class that, together with the comrades who have passed through the higher schools of learning, must form the core of the intelligentsia of the working class, the core of leaders of our industries. We must not ignore and overlook these workers with initiative, but advance them boldly to commanding positions, give them the opportunity to display their capacity for organisation and the opportunity to extend their knowledge, and create suitable conditions for them to work in, and not spare any expense for this purpose.

Many of these comrades are not members of the Party. But that should not prevent us from advancing them boldly to leading positions. On the contrary, it is particularly these comrades who are not Party members who must have our especial solicitude and must be advanced to commanding positions so that they may be able to convince themselves that the Party knows how to appreciate ability and talent in workers. Certain comrades think that only Party members may hold leading positions in the mills and factories and for that reason ignore and hold back non-Party comrades who possess ability and initiative, and advance Party members instead, although they are less capable and possess less initiative. Needless to say, there is nothing more stupid and reactionary than such a policy, if it may be called a policy. There is no need to show that such a policy can only discredit the

Party and repel non-Party workers from it. It is by no means our policy to transform the Party into an exclusive caste. It is our policy to achieve, as between workers who are members of the Party and workers who are not, an atmosphere of "mutual confidence," of "mutual control" (Lenin). Our Party is strong among the working class, it should be stated, just because it pursues such a policy.

And so our task is to see to it that the working class of the U.S.S.R. *has its own industrial and technical intelligentsia*.

Such is the fourth condition of development of our industry.

Let us pass to the fifth condition.

5. Symptoms of the Change of Attitude of the Old Industrial and Technical Intelligentsia

Our attitude towards the old bourgeois industrial and technical intelligentsia is undergoing a change.

About two years ago the more highly skilled section of the old technical intelligentsia was infected with the wrecking disease. In fact, wrecking had become a sort of fashion: while some of them directly engaged in wrecking activities, others abetted the wreckers, others washed their hands of them and maintained a position of neutrality, while others vacillated in their adherence between the Soviet power and the wreckers. Of course, the majority of the old technical intelligentsia continued to work more or less loyally. But we are speaking now not of the majority, but of the more highly skilled section of the technical intelligentsia.

What gave rise to the wrecking movement, what fostered it? The increasing acuteness of the class struggle within the U.S.S.R., the attack of the Soviet power upon the capitalist elements of town and country, the resistance of the latter to the policy of the Soviet power, the complexity of the international situation, and the difficulties connected with the organisation of collective and Soviet farms. While the activities of the militant section of the wreckers were strengthened by the interventionist machinations of the imperialists in capitalist countries and by the grain difficulties within our country, the vacillations of the other section of the old technical intelligentsia towards the active wreckers were encouraged by the modish utterances of the Trotskyist-Menshevik babblers to the effect that "Nothing will come out of the collective and Soviet farms," "the Soviet power is bound to degenerate anyhow and will shortly collapse," that "the

Bolsheviks by their policy are themselves facilitating intervention," etc., etc. Indeed, when even certain old Bolsheviks among the Right deviationists could not withstand the "epidemic" and at that time were wobbling away from the Party, it is not surprising that a section of the old technical intelligentsia, who never had breathed the spirit of Bolshevism, should with the help of God also vacillate.

It is clear that under such circumstances the Soviet power could adopt only one policy towards the old technical intelligentsia, namely, smash the more active wreckers, divide the neutrals, and win over those who were loyal.

That was a year or two ago.

Can we say that the same situation exists now? No. On the contrary, an entirely new situation has arisen. Take the fact that we routed and are successfully overcoming the capitalist elements in town and country. That, of course, was not a pleasant thing for the old intelligentsia. It is quite possible that they still harbour sympathy for their defeated friends. But it never happens that sympathisers, still less those who were neutral or vacillated, voluntarily agree to share the fate of their more active friends, when the latter have suffered drastic and irreparable defeat. Further, we have overcome the grain difficulties. Not only have we overcome them, but we are now exporting a quantity of grain such as has never been exported during the whole period of existence of the Soviet power. Hence also this "argument" of the vacillators has disappeared. Further still, even the most obtuse can now see that, as regards collective and Soviet farm development, we have definitely triumphed and that our successes are gigantic. Hence the old intellectuals have lost the most effective weapons in their arsenal. As for the interventionist hopes of the bourgeois intelligentsia, they have proved to be—for the time being at least—like a house built on sand. And, indeed, for six years they have been holding out hopes of intervention, but not once have they dared to intervene. It is time to admit that our sapient bourgeois intellectuals have simply been led by the nose. And I need not add that the conduct of the active wreckers themselves at the time of the trial in Moscow was enough to discredit, and actually did discredit, the whole wrecking movement.

Clearly, these new circumstances could not but influence our old technical intellectuals. The new state of affairs was bound to bring about, and actually has brought about, a new mental attitude on the part of the old

bourgeois intelligentsia. That, in fact, explains why we are observing definite signs of a change of attitude on the part of a certain section of the intellectuals, who formerly sympathised with the wreckers, toward the Soviet power. The fact that not only this section of the old intelligentsia, but even those who yesterday were themselves wreckers—indeed, a large number of those who yesterday were wreckers—are beginning in a number of factories and workshops to work hand in hand with the working class—this fact definitely shows that a change of mind among the old technical intelligentsia is taking place. That, of course, does not mean that there are no longer any wreckers in our midst. By no means. Wreckers exist and will continue to exist as long as we have classes and as long as we are surrounded by capitalism. But it does mean that, since a large section of the old technical intelligentsia, who sympathised more or less with the former wreckers, have now turned to the side of the Soviet power, the active wreckers have become very few in number, that they have been isolated and are obliged to go deeply underground.

But from this it follows that we must change our policy toward the old technical intelligentsia. If, during the height of the wrecking movement, we adopted smashing tactics toward the old technical intelligentsia, now, when these intellectuals are turning toward the Soviet power, our policy toward them must be one of conciliation and solicitude. It would be wrong and dialectically incorrect to continue our former policy when conditions have changed. It would be foolish and unwise to regard almost every expert and engineer of the old schools as an undetected criminal and wrecker. "Expert-baiting" always was, and still is, regarded by us as a noxious and disgraceful phenomenon.

And so our task is to change our attitude towards the engineer and technicians of the old school, to show them greater attention and solicitude, to display more boldness in inviting their co-operation.

Such is the fifth new condition of development of our industry.

Let us now pass to the last condition.

6. Business Accounting

The picture would be incomplete if I did not deal with one other new condition. I refer to the sources of capital accumulation for our industry and our national economy and to the need for a greater rate of accumulation.

What is the new and peculiar feature in the development of our industry from the point of view of capital accumulation? The new factor is that the old sources of accumulation are already proving inadequate for the further expansion of industry and that it is, therefore, necessary both to seek new sources of accumulation and to strengthen the old sources if we wish to maintain and develop a Bolshevik *tempo* of industrialisation.

The history of capitalist countries shows that no young State that desired to build up its industry was able to do so without external aid in the form of long-term credits and loans. That is the reason why the Western capitalist countries refused point-blank to advance credits and loans to our country, in the belief that the industrialisation of our country would inevitable break down owing to the lack of credits and loans. But the capitalists miscalculated. They failed to realise that our country unlike capitalist countries, possesses certain peculiar sources of accumulation sufficient to restore and further develop our industry. And, indeed, we have not only restored our industry, not only restored our agriculture and transport, but have already tackled the tremendous job of reconstructing our heavy industry, our agriculture, and our transport. Of course, it required tens of billions of rubles. Whence did we derive those billions? From light industry, from agriculture, and from budget accumulations. Such was the case up to very recently.

But the case is entirely different now. Formerly the old sources of capital accumulation were sufficient for the reconstruction of industry and transport; they are now most certainly beginning to be insufficient. It is not now a matter of reconstructing our old industries. It is a matter of creating new technically highly equipped industries in the Urals, in Siberia, in Kazakstan. It is a matter of creating new large-scale agricultural production in the grain, stock-breeding, and raw-material producing regions of the U.S.S.R. It is a matter of creating a new railway system connecting the East and West of the U.S.S.R. It is obvious that the old sources of accumulation are inadequate for this gigantic task.

But that is not all. Owing to mismanagement in a large number of our factories and economic organisations, business principles are not being applied. It is a fact that a number of enterprises and business organisations have long ceased to reckon, to calculate, and to draw up a genuine balance sheet of income and expenditure. It is a fact that in a number of enterprises and business organisations the conceptions “regime of economy,” “the

cutting down of unproductive expenditures," "rationalisation of production" have long gone out of fashion. They apparently assume that "the State Bank will advance the necessary money, anyway." It is a fact that recently in a number of enterprises cost of production has begun to increase. They were told to reduce costs by 10 per cent and more, but they are increasing costs instead. And what is the significance of a reduction in cost of production? You know that a reduction of costs by 1 per cent means an accumulation of from 150 to 200 million rubles. It is obvious that under such circumstances to increase the cost of production is to deprive industry, and the whole national economy, of hundreds of millions of rubles.

From what has been said it follows that it is no longer possible to rely solely on the light industries, on the budget accumulations, on the revenue from agriculture. Light industry is a bountiful source of accumulation, and there is every prospect of its continuing to expand; but it is not an unlimited source. Agriculture is a no less bountiful source of accumulation, but it itself, during the period of its reconstruction, requires financial aid from the State. As to budget accumulations, you know yourselves that they cannot, and must not, be unlimited. What then remains? There remains heavy industry. Hence, heavy industry, and particularly its machine-building section, must also provide accumulation. Hence, while increasing and expanding the old sources of accumulation, we must see to it that heavy industry, and particularly its machine-building section, also provides accumulation.

That is the solution.

And what does that imply? It implies putting a step to bad management, it implies the mobilisation of the internal resources of industry, the introduction and more careful application of business accounting in all enterprises, the systematic reduction of production costs, and the increase of internal accumulation in every branch of industry without exception.

In that direction lies the solution.

And so our task is to introduce business accounting and apply it with greater care and to increase the accumulation of capital within industry itself.

7. New Methods of Work, New Methods of Leadership

Such, comrades, are the new conditions of development of industry. The significance of these new conditions is that they are creating a new state of

affairs in industry, demanding new methods of work and new methods of leadership.

And so:

(*a*) It follows that we can no longer count, as we did formerly, on the automatic influx of labour power. In order to supply our industries with labour power it must be recruited in an organised way; also labour must be mechanised. To believe that we can get along without mechanising labour at our present speed of work and our present scale of production is like believing that the sea can be emptied with a spoon.

(*b*) It follows, further, that we must no longer tolerate the instability of labour in industry. In order to escape that evil we must organise wages in a new way and render the staff of workers in industry more or less permanent.

(*c*) It follows, further, that we must no longer tolerate de-personalisation in industry. In order to escape that evil labour must be organised in a new way, and labour power must be so distributed that every group of workers will be responsible for its work, its machinery, its lathes, and for the quality of its work.

(*d*) It follows, further, that we can no longer get along with the minimum of old engineers and technicians we inherited from bourgeois Russia. In order to increase the present *tempo* and scale of production, we must see to it that the working class possesses its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.

(*e*) It follows, further, that we cannot, as formerly, throw all the experts, engineers, and technicians into one heap. If we are to take account of the changed conditions we must alter our policy and display the maximum care and solicitude for those specialists, engineers, and technicians who are definitely turning towards the working class.

(*f*) And, finally, it follows that we cannot get along with the old sources of capital accumulation. In order to guarantee the further development of industry and agriculture we must tap new sources of accumulation, we must put an end to mismanagement, introduce business accounting, lower production costs, and increase the internal accumulations of industry.

Such are the new conditions of the development of industry, demanding new methods of work and new methods of leadership in our economic construction.

What is needed for the new method of leadership?

It is necessary, first of all, that our business leaders should understand the new state of affairs that now exists, that they should study concretely the new conditions of development of industry and change their methods of work to conform with the new conditions.

It is further necessary that our business leaders control their enterprises not "in general," not "in the air," but concretely and objectively; that they attempt to solve every question that arises not by general phrases but in a businesslike manner; they do not confine themselves to vague written instructions, to vague words and slogans, but study the technique of the given matter and enter into its every detail and "trifle," for it is on "trifles" that our great cause is now being built.

It is necessary, further, that our present top-heavy combinations, comprising sometimes as much as 100 and 200 enterprises, should be immediately curtailed and split up into several combines. It is obvious that a chairman of a combine with several hundred factories cannot know those factories, their work, and capacities. It is obvious that if he does not know those factories he is not in a position to manage them. Hence, in order that the chairmen of combines should be in a position to study them thoroughly, they must be relieved of superfluous factories, the combines must be split up into several smaller ones, and the combines themselves must be brought into closer contact with the factories.

It is necessary, further, that our combines should replace management by collegium with individual management. The position at present is that in the collegium of a combine there are ten or fifteen men, all writing papers, all carrying on discussions. To continue to manage in this way, comrades, will not do. We must put a stop to paper leadership and adopt genuine, businesslike, Bolshevik methods of work. Let a chairman and several deputy chairmen remain at the head of the combine. That will be quite enough to take care of its management. The remaining members of the collegium should be sent to the factories and mills. That will be far more useful, both for the business and for themselves.

It is further necessary that the chairman and his deputies pay more frequent visits to their factories, stay and work there for longer periods, acquaint themselves more closely with the workers in the factories, and not only teach, but learn from, the men on the spot. To think that you can now manage by sitting in an office, far from the factories, is a grievous mistake. In order to manage the factories you must come into more frequent contact

with the managers in those factories, maintain real live connection with them.

Finally, a word or two regarding our production plan for 1931. There are certain near-Party philistines who contend that our production programme cannot be fulfilled. They are somewhat like Shchedrin's "sapient gudgeons" who are always ready to spread around themselves "a void of inanities." Is our production programme accomplishable or not? Most certainly it is. It is accomplishable because all the conditions necessary for its accomplishment exist. It is accomplishable because its accomplishment depends on us ourselves, on our ability and willingness to make use of the vast possibilities at our disposal. How else can we explain the fact that a large number of enterprises and whole branches of industry have already more than fulfilled their plan? It would be stupid to think that the production plan is a mere enumeration of figures and tasks. As a matter of fact, the production plan is the embodiment of the living and practical activity of millions of toilers who are engaged in creating a new life. The reality of our plan consists in live people, you and me, our will and our labour, our readiness to work in the new way, our determination to carry out the plan. Have we got that determination? We have. Well, then, our production plan can be carried out, and will be carried out. (Prolonged applause.)

SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM

To the Editors of Proletarskaya Revolyutsia

DEAR COMRADES:

I protest decidedly against the publication in *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia* (No. 6, 1930) of Slutski's anti-Party and semi-Trotskian article, "The Bolsheviks on German Social-Democracy in the Period of its Pre-War Crisis," as a discussion article.

Slutski asserts that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) underestimated the danger of *centrism* in German Social-Democracy and in pre-war Social-Democracy generally, that is, underestimated the danger of camouflaged opportunism, the danger of the conciliatory attitude towards opportunism. In other words, according to Slutski, Lenin (the Bolsheviks) did not carry on a relentless struggle against opportunism, for, when all is said and done, the failure to attach due importance to opportunism is renunciation of the struggle against opportunism on a wide front. Thus it is made to appear that in the period before the war Lenin was not yet a real Bolshevik, that it was only in the period of the imperialist war, or even at the close of this war, that Lenin became a real Bolshevik. That is what Slutski says in his article. And you, instead of branding this newfound "historian" as a slanderer and falsifier, enter into discussion with him, give him a platform. I cannot refrain from protesting against the publication of Slutski's article in your journal as a discussion article, since the question of Lenin's Bolshevism, the question as to whether Lenin *did or did not carry* on an unrelenting struggle against centrism as a certain form of opportunism, the question as to whether Lenin *was* or *was not* a real Bolshevik cannot be converted into a subject of discussion.

In your statement sent "in the name of the editors" to the Central Committee on October 20, you acknowledge that the editors made a mistake in publishing Slutski's article as a discussion article. That is, of course, a good thing, despite the fact that the editors' statement was very belated. But in your statement you commit a fresh mistake when you declare that "the editors consider it to be politically extremely urgent and necessary that the entire complex of problems connected with the mutual

relations between the Bolsheviks and the pre-war Second International be further discussed in the pages of *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia*. That means that you intend again to draw people into discussion on questions which represent the axioms of Bolshevism. That signifies that you are again thinking of turning the question of Lenin's Bolshevism from an axiom into a problem needing "further discussion." Why? On what grounds? Everyone knows that Leninism was born, grew up, and became strong in the ruthless struggle against opportunism of every brand, including centrism in the West (Kautsky), and centrism in our own country (Trotsky, etc.). This cannot be denied even by the direct enemies of Bolshevism. That is an axiom. But you are attempting to drag us backward by turning an axiom into a problem requiring "further discussion." Why? On what grounds? Perhaps, through lack of acquaintance with the history of Bolshevism? Perhaps, for the sake of a rotten Liberalism, so that the Slutskies and other pupils of Trotsky may not be able to say that they are being gagged. A strange sort of Liberalism this, exercised at the expense of the vital interests of Bolshevism.

What is there exactly in Slutski's article that the editors regard worthy of discussion?

1. Slutski asserts that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) did not pursue a line in the direction of a rupture, of a split with the opportunists of German Social-Democracy, with the opportunists of the Second International of the pre-war period. You wish to enter into discussion against this Trotskian thesis of Slutski's? But what is there to discuss in that? Is it not plain that Slutski is simply slandering Lenin, slandering the Bolsheviks? Slander must be branded, not transformed into a subject for discussion.

Every Bolshevik, if he is truly a Bolshevik, knows that already long before the war, approximately in 1903–4, when the Bolshevik group was first formed in Russia and when the Left wing first made itself felt in German Social-Democracy, Lenin took his course for a rupture, for a split with the opportunists here in the Russian Social-Democratic Party, and over there, in the Second International, particularly in German Social-Democracy. Every Bolshevik knows that it was for that very reason that even at that time (1903–5) the Bolsheviks won for themselves, in the ranks of the opportunists of the Second International, honourable fame as "heretics" and "disruptors." But what could Lenin do, what could the Bolsheviks do if the Left Social-Democrats in the Second International, and, above all, in German Social-Democracy, represented a weak and

powerless group, which had not yet acquired organisational form, which was ideologically not strongly prepared, which was afraid even to pronounce the words “rupture,” “split”? It could not be demanded of Lenin, of the Bolsheviks, that they should from Russia arrange a split in the Parties of Western Europe for the benefit of the Left wing. I will not go into the fact that weakness in organisation and ideology was a characteristic feature of the Left Social-Democrats, and not only in the period before the war. This negative characteristic, as is well know, was preserved among the Left wing even in the period which followed the war. Everyone knows the estimate of the German Left Social-Democrats, given by Lenin in his famous article, “Junius’ Pamphlet,”[1] written in October, 1916, that is more than two years after the beginning of the war; in it Lenin, in criticising a whole series of very serious political mistakes committed by the Left Social-Democrats in Germany, speaks of *“the weakness of the German Lefts, who are entangled on all sides in the vile net of Kautskian hypocrisy, pedantry, ‘friendship’ for the opportunists”*; in it he says that *“Junius has not yet freed herself completely from the ‘environment’ of the German, even the Left-wing Social-Democrats, who are afraid of a split, are afraid to express revolutionary slogans to the full.”*

Of all the groups in the Second International the Russian Bolsheviks were at that time the only group, which, by its experience in organisation and ideological training, could undertake anything serious in the sense of direct rupture or split with its own opportunists in its own Russian Social-Democracy. If people like Slutski would attempt, not to prove, but simply to presuppose that Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks did not exert all their efforts to organise a split with the opportunists (Plekhanov, Martov, Dan) and to expel the centrists (Trotsky and other partisans of the August *bloc*), then one might argue about Lenin’s Bolshevism, about the Bolsheviks’ Bolshevism. But that is just the point, that people like Slutski do not dare even to hint anything in favour of such a wild presupposition. They dare not, for they know that the facts, known to all, of the determined policy of rupture with the opportunists of all brands, which was carried out by the Russian Bolsheviks (1904–12), cry out against such an assumption. They do not dare, for they know that they would be pilloried for it the very next day.

But the question arises: Could the Russian Bolsheviks bring about a split with their own opportunists and centrists—reconciliators long before the imperialist war (1904–12)—without at the same time pursuing a policy of

rupture, a policy of a split with the opportunists and centrists of the Second International? Who can doubt that the Russian Bolsheviks regarded their policy towards the opportunists and centrists as a model policy for the Left wing in the West? Who can doubt that the Russian Bolsheviks did everything to urge the Left-wing Social-Democrats in the West, particularly the Left wing of German Social-Democracy, toward a rupture, toward a split with their own opportunists and centrists? It was not the fault of Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks that the Left-wing Social-Democrats in the West proved to be too immature to follow in the footsteps of the Russian Bolsheviks.

2. Slutski blames Lenin and the Bolsheviks for not supporting the Left wing in German Social-Democracy determinedly and irrevocably, for supporting it only with important reservations, for allowing factional considerations to prevent them from giving absolute support to the Left wing. You wish to open a discussion against this charlatan and thoroughly false reproach. But what is there in it, properly speaking, that requires discussion? Is it not plain that in this Slutski is manœuvring and trying, by hurling a false reproach at Lenin and the Bolsheviks, to camouflage the real blunders in the position taken up by the Left wing in Germany? Is it not plain that the Bolsheviks could *not* support the Left wing in Germany, which from time to time wavered between Bolshevism and Menshevism, *without* important reservations, without serious criticism of their errors, for to do so would be to betray the working class and its revolution. An impostor's tricks must be branded as such, not turned into a subject for discussion.

Yes, the Bolsheviks supported the Left-wing Social-Democrats in Germany only with certain important reservations, and criticised their semi-Menshevist errors. But for that they must be praised, not condemned.

Does anybody doubt this?

Let us turn to the best-known facts of history:

(a) In 1903 serious disagreements arose between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in Russia on the question of Party membership. By their formula on Party membership the Bolsheviks wished to put an organisational restraint upon the influx of non-proletarian elements into the Party. The danger of such an influx was very real at that time, in view of the bourgeois and Democratic character of the Russian Revolution. The Russian Mensheviks advocated the opposite position, which opened wide

the doors of the Party to non-proletarian elements. In view of the importance of the questions of the Russian Revolution for the world revolutionary movement, the Western European Social-Democrats in Germany intervened; Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, then the leaders of the Left wing, also intervened. And what happened? Both came out against the Bolsheviks. At the same time the Bolsheviks were accused of betraying ultra-centrist and Blanquist tendencies. Later, these vulgar and philistine epithets were caught up by the Mensheviks and spread throughout the world.

(b) In 1905 disagreements developed between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in Russia as to the character of the Russian Revolution. The Bolsheviks advocated an alliance between the working class and the peasantry under the hegemony of the proletariat. The Bolsheviks asserted that we must bring about the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry in order to pass immediately from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the Socialist revolution with the support of the rural poor. The Mensheviks in Russia rejected the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution; as against the policy of alliance between the working class and the peasantry they gave preference to the policy of compromise with the Liberal bourgeoisie; they declared that the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the working class and peasantry was a reactionary Blanquist scheme which ran contrary to the development of the bourgeois revolution. What was the attitude of the Left wing in the German Social-Democracy, of Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, in this controversy? They invented a Utopian and semi-Menshevist scheme of permanent revolution (a monstrous distortion of the Marxian scheme of revolution), which was completely permeated with the Menshevist refutation of the policy of alliance between the working class and peasantry, and opposed this scheme to the Bolshevist scheme of the revolutionary and democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Later, this semi-Menshevist scheme of permanent revolution was picked up by Trotsky (in part by Martov) and turned into a weapon of struggle against Leninism.

(c) One of the most urgent questions that confronted the parties of the Second International in the period before the war was the national and colonial question, the question of the oppressed nationalities and colonies, the question of liberating the oppressed nationalities and colonies, the question of the paths of the struggle against imperialism, the question of the

overthrow of imperialism. For the sake of developing the proletarian revolution and encircling imperialism, the Bolsheviks proposed a policy of supporting the liberation movement among the oppressed nationalities and colonies on the basis of the self-determination of nations, and developed the plan for a united front between the proletarian revolution in the progressive countries and the revolutionary liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and oppressed countries. The opportunists of all countries, the social-chauvinists and social-imperialists of all countries, hastened to rally against this scheme and against the Bolsheviks. They slandered the Bolsheviks, calling them mad dogs. What position did the Left-wing Social-Democrats in the West take up at that time? They developed a semi-Menshevik theory of imperialism, rejected the principle of the self-determination of nations in its Marxist sense (including separation and formation of independent States), resisted the thesis of the important revolutionary significance of the liberation movement of the colonies and oppressed countries, rejected the thesis of the possibility of a united front between the proletarian movement and the movement for national emancipation and opposed all this semi-Menshevist hodge-podge, representing an out-and-out underestimation of the national and colonial question in opposition to the Marxist scheme of the Bolsheviks. It is well known that this semi-Menshevist hodge-podge was later taken up by Trotsky and used by him as a weapon of struggle against Leninism.

Such were the errors, known to everyone, of the Left-wing Social-Democrats in Germany.

I shall not speak of the other mistakes of the German Left wing which were criticised in certain articles by Lenin.

Nor shall I speak of the mistakes committed by them in appraising the policy of the Bolsheviks in the period of the October Revolution.

What do these mistakes of the German Left wing, taken from the history of the pre-war period, show, if not that the Left-wing Social-Democrats, despite their Left character, had not yet thrown off their Menshevist baggage?

Of course, the Left wing in Germany have something else besides serious mistakes to record. They also have great and important revolutionary acts to their credit. I have in mind a whole series of services and revolutionary acts in connection with questions of internal policy and, in particular, of electoral struggle, on the questions of parliamentary and non-parliamentary

struggle, on the general strike, on war, on the Revolution of 1905 in Russia, etc. That was precisely why the Bolsheviks regarded them as a Left wing, supported and urged them forward. But this does not and cannot remove the fact that the Left-wing Social-Democrats in Germany did commit a whole series of very serious political and theoretical errors, that they had not yet thrown off their Menshevist burden and therefore needed very serious criticism on the part of the Bolsheviks.

Judge for yourselves now whether Lenin and the Bolsheviks could have supported the Left-wing Social-Democrats in the West *without serious reservations, without serious criticism of their mistakes*, and not betray the interests of the Revolution, betraying Communism.

Is it not clear that Slutski, in reproaching Lenin and the Bolsheviks for that for which he should have applauded them if he were a Bolshevik, exposes himself utterly as a semi-Menshevik, as a masked Trotskyist?

Slutski assumes that, in their estimate of the Left wing in the West, Lenin and the Bolsheviks took as their point of departure their own factional considerations, that, consequently, the Russian Bolsheviks sacrificed the great cause of the international revolution to their own factional interests. It is scarcely necessary to prove that there can be nothing more vulgar and vile than such an assumption. There can be nothing more vulgar, for even the frantic philistines among the Mensheviks are beginning to understand that the Russian revolution is not a private matter of Russians, that it is, on the contrary, the cause of the working class of all the world, the cause of the world proletarian revolution. There can be nothing more vile, for even the professional slanderers in the Second International are beginning to understand that the logical and thoroughly revolutionary internationalism of the Bolsheviks is the model of proletarian internationalism for the workers of all countries.

Yes, the Russian Bolsheviks did bring to the forefront the fundamental problems of the Russian revolution, such as the question of the Party, of the attitude of Marxists to the bourgeois-democratic revolution, of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, of the hegemony of the proletariat, of the struggle inside and outside of parliament, of the general strike, of the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing into the Socialist revolution, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of imperialism, of the self-determination of nations, of the liberation movement of oppressed nationalities and colonies, of the policy of supporting this movement, etc.

They advanced these problems as the touchstone on which they tested the revolutionary stamina of the Left-wing Social-Democrats in the West. Did they have the right to do so? Yes, they did. They not only had the right; it was their duty to do so. It was their duty to do so because all these questions were at the same time fundamental questions of the world revolution, to the tasks of which the Bolsheviks subordinated all their policy, all their tactics. It was their duty to do so, because only on such questions could they really test the revolutionary character of the various groups in the Second International. The question arises: What has the "factionalism" of the Russian Bolsheviks and "factional" considerations got to do with this?

As early as 1902 Lenin wrote in his pamphlet, *What is to be Done? that "History has confronted us with an immediate task, which is the most revolutionary of all the immediate tasks of the proletariat of any country whatsoever," that "the fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark not only of European, but of Asiatic, reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat*." Thirty years have passed since the pamphlet *What is to be Done?* appeared. No one will dare deny that the events of this period have brilliantly confirmed Lenin's words. But does it not follow from this that the Russian revolution was (and has remained) the key position of the world revolution, that the fundamental questions of the Russian revolution were at the same time (and now are) the fundamental questions of the world revolution?

Is it not plain that only on these fundamental questions was it possible to put the Left-wing Social-Democrats of the West to a real test?

Is it not plain that those who regard these questions as "factional" questions thereby expose themselves to the full as philistines and degenerates?

3. Slutski asserts that so far a sufficient quantity of official documents has not been found to prove Lenin's (the Bolsheviks') determined and relentless struggle against centrism. He employs that bureaucratic thesis as an irrefutable argument in favour of the postulate that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) underestimated the danger of centrism in the Second International. And you set about arguing against this nonsense, against this rascally hair-splitting. But what is there, properly speaking, to argue about? Is it not plain, without arguing, that by his talk about documents Slutski is trying to cover up the wretchedness and falsity of his, so-called, position?

Slutski regards the Party documents now available as insufficient. Why? On what grounds? Are the documents, known to everyone, regarding the Second International, as well as the internal Party struggle in Russian Social-Democracy, not sufficient to plainly demonstrate the revolutionary irreconcilability of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in their struggle against the opportunists and the centrists? Is Slutski at all acquainted with these documents? What other documents does he need?

Let us suppose that in addition to the documents already known a mass of other documents will be found, in the shape, for example, of resolutions of the Bolsheviks again urging the necessity for wiping out centrism. Does that mean that the mere presence of paper documents is sufficient to demonstrate the real revolutionary character and real relentlessness of the Bolsheviks toward centrism? Who, besides hopeless bureaucrats, can rely on paper documents alone? Who, besides archive rats, does not understand that the Party and its leaders must be tested first of all by their *deeds* and not only by their declarations? History knows not a few Socialists who readily signed any revolutionary resolution in order to escape their annoying critics. But that does not mean that they carried these resolutions into effect. History knows further not a few Socialists who, foaming at the mouth, called upon the workers' Parties of *other countries* to perform the most revolutionary actions imaginable. But that does not mean that they did not in their own Party, or in their own country, *shrink* from fighting their *own* opportunists, their *own* bourgeoisie. Is not that why Lenin taught us to test revolutionary Parties, tendencies, and leaders, not by their declarations and resolutions, but by their *deeds?*

Is it not plain that if Slutski really wished to test the irreconcilability of Lenin's and the Bolsheviks' attitude toward centrism, he should have taken as the *foundation* of his article, not separate documents and two or three personal letters, but their *deeds*, their *history*, their *acts?* Did we not have opportunists, centrists in our Russian Social-Democracy? Did not the Bolsheviks wage a determined and relentless struggle against all these tendencies? Were not these tendencies bound up in ideas and organisation with the opportunists and centrists in the West? Did not the Bolsheviks rout the opportunists and centrists as no other Left-wing group routed them anywhere else in the world? After all that, how can anyone say that Lenin and the Bolsheviks underestimated the danger of centrism? Why did Slutski ignore these facts which have decisive significance in characterising the

Bolsheviks? Why did he not make use of the more reliable method of Lenin and the Bolsheviks and test them by their deeds, by their acts? Why did he prefer the less reliable method of rummaging among casually collected papers?

Because the more reliable method of testing the Bolsheviks by their deeds would have upset Slutski's whole position in a flash.

Because the test of the Bolsheviks by their deeds would have shown that the Bolsheviks are the *only* revolutionary organisation in the world which has utterly destroyed its opportunists and centrists and driven them out of its Party.

Because the real deeds and the real history of the Bolsheviks would have shown that Slutski's teachers, the Trotskyists, were the principal and fundamental group which planted centrism in Russia and for this purpose created a special organisation as the hotbed of centrism, viz. the August *bloc*.

Because the testing of the Bolsheviks by their deeds would have exposed Slutski once and for all as a falsifier of the history of our Party, who is trying to cover up the centrism of pre-war Trotskyism by the slanderous accusation against Lenin and the Bolsheviks of underestimating the danger of centrism.

That, comrades editors, is how matters stand with Slutski and his article.

You see, the editors made a mistake in opening a discussion with a falsifier of the history of our Party.

What caused the editors to take this wrong road? I think that they were impelled on that road by decadent Liberalism, which has spread to a certain extent among one section of the Bolsheviks. Some Bolsheviks think that Trotskyism is a faction of Communism, which has made mistakes, it is true, which has done many foolish things, which has sometimes even been anti-Soviet, but which is, nevertheless, a faction of Communism. Hence, a certain Liberalism in dealing with Trotskyists and people who think like Trotsky. It is scarcely necessary to prove that such a view of Trotskyism is profoundly wrong and pernicious. As a matter of fact, Trotskyism has long since ceased to be a faction of Communism. As a matter of fact, Trotskyism is the vanguard of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, which is carrying on the struggle against the Communists, against the Soviet Government, against the building of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie its intellectual weapon against Bolshevism, in the form of the thesis of the impossibility of building Socialism in our country, in the form of the thesis of the inevitability of the degeneration of the Bolsheviks, etc.? That weapon was given it by Trotskyism. The fact that all anti-Soviet groups in the U.S.S.R. in their attempts to give grounds for their arguments for the inevitability of the struggle against the Soviet Government referred to the well-known thesis of Trotskyism of the impossibility of building Socialism in our country, of the inevitable degeneration of the Soviet Government, of the probability of the return to capitalism, cannot be regarded as an accident.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie in the U.S.S.R. its tactical weapon in the form of attempts at open attacks on the Soviet Government? This weapon was given to it by the Trotskyists, who tried to organise anti-Soviet demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad on November 7, 1927. It is a fact that the anti-Soviet actions of the Trotskysts raised the spirits of the bourgeoisie and let loose the work of counter-revolutionary sabotage of the bourgeois specialists.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie an organisational weapon in the form of attempts at organising underground anti-Soviet organisations? This weapon was given to it by the Trotskyists, who founded their own anti-Bolshevik illegal group. It is a fact that the underground anti-Soviet work of the Trotskyists facilitated the organised formation of the anti-Soviet group within the U.S.S.R.

Trotskyism is the vanguard of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

That is why Liberalism towards Trotskyism, even if it is shattered and concealed, is stupidly bordering on crime, bordering on treason to the working class.

That is why the attempts of certain “littérateurs” and “historians” to smuggle the disguised Trotskyist rubbish into our literature must encounter determined resistance from the Bolsheviks.

That is why we cannot admit a literary discussion with these Trotskyist smugglers.

It seems to me that the “historians” and “litterateurs” of the category of the Trotskyist smugglers are for the present trying to carry on their work of smuggling along two lines.

First of all, they are trying to prove that *Lenin* in the period before the war underestimated the danger of centrism, while leaving the inexperienced

reader to surmise that *Lenin* was not at that time a real revolutionary, but became one only after the war, after he had been "re-equipped" with Trotsky's help. Slutski may be regarded as a typical representative of such a type of smuggler. We have seen above that Slutski and Co. are not worth our bothering about much.

Secondly, they try to prove that *Lenin* did not understand the necessity for the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the Socialist revolution, while leaving the inexperienced reader to surmise that Lenin was not at that time a real Bolshevik, that he grasped the necessity for such a development only after the war, after he had been "re-equipped" with Trotsky's help. We may regard Volosevich, author of *Course of History of the* C.P.S.U., as a typical representative of such a sort of smuggler. It is true, *Lenin* already in 1905 wrote that *"from the democratic revolution we shall immediately begin to pass over, and that in proportion to our strength, to the strength of the conscious and organised proletariat, we shall begin to pass over to the Socialist revolution," that "we stand for uninterrupted revolution, we will not halt half-way."* It is true a great number of facts and documents of an analogous sort could be found in the Works of *Lenin*, but what concern have people like Volosevich with the facts and the life and activity of Lenin? People like Volosevich write in order, by camouflaging themselves in Bolshevik colours, to drag in their anti-Leninist contraband and to lie against the Bolsheviks and falsify the history of the Bolshevik Party.

You see, the Voloseviches are worthy of the Slutskies.

Such are the "paths and crossroads" of the Trotskyite smugglers.

You yourselves understand that it is not the business of the editors to facilitate the smuggling activity of such "historians" by granting them the platform for discussion.

The task of the editors is, in my opinion, to raise the questions concerning the history of Bolshevism to the proper level, to put the study of the history of our Party on scientific, Bolshevik lines, and concentrate attention against the Trotskyist and all other falsifiers of the history of our Party by systematically tearing the mask from them.

This is the more necessary since even several of our historians—I speak of historians without quotation marks—the *Bolshevik* historians of our Party —are not free of mistakes which bring grist to the mill of people like Slutski and Volosevich. In this respect even Comrade Yaroslavsky does not,

unfortunately, represent an exception; his books on the history of the C.P.S.U., despite all their merits, contain a number of errors of principle and history.

With comradely greetings,

J. STALIN.

Proletarskaya Revolyutsia, No. 6 (113), 1931.

[1] Junius, the *nom de plume* of Rosa Luxemburg, leader of the Lefts in the German Social-Democratic Party.

INDEX

ABRAMOVITCH, 251, 383
Accumulation, 440
Africa, Northern, 317
Agrarian Question, Thesis on, 30
Agriculture, Collectivisation of, 92
  do., Electrification of, 407
  do., Lenin's Work on, 232
  do., Rate of Development of, 162
  do., Reconstruction of, 151, 213
  do., Restoration of, 213
  do., Technical Basis of, 156, 157
  do., Two-Year Plan of, 230, 231
America, Absence of Mass Workers' Party in, 75
  do., Electoral System in, 77
  do., No State Insurance in, 74
American Federation of Labour, 72, 73, 78, 79
  do. Trade Unions, 72
Amsterdam International, 78
Anarchists, 226
ANDREYEV, 163
Anglo-American Antagonisms, 123
Anglo-French Capitalists, 423
Anti-Religious Propaganda, 70
April, 1917, 25, 27
Artel, Key Link of Collective Farm Movement, 284, 293, 296
Atheism, 69

Backwardness, Economic in U.S.S.R., 153
Bashkiria, 232
BAZAROV, 274
BEBEL, 225
BELIKOV, 414
BERNSTEIN, 226
BERZIN, 149
BESSADOVSKY, 324
Blanquism 450
Bolshevik Party, 13, 32, 34, 51, 57
Bolsheviks and New International, 177

do., "Factionalism" of, 453
do., Internationalism of, 453
BORAH, 77
Bourgeois Revolution and Feudalism, 171
do. do., Completing of, 25, 38, 39, 40
Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution and Proletariat, 17
Bourgeoisie, "Soviet," 168
BOWLEY, Economist, 348
BRANDLER, 195
BRENTANO, 199
BREBNER, 76
British Capitalists and Intervention, 51
BROPHY, 72, 78, 79
Budget, 327
BUKHARIN, 61, 161, 184, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 198, 199, 200, 202, 204, 205, 206, 208, 209, 211, 216, 217, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 236, 237, 238, 239, 244, 249, 258, 356, 359, 394, 415
Bukharin's Group, 197, 215
Bund, 398
Bureaucracy, 362, 372
Business Methods, 442

Cabinet Secrecy, 50
see also "Shadow" Cabinet
Cadets, 34
Cadres, Problem of, 245
Capital Investments in Industry, 329
Capitalism, see also under Crisis, Unemployment, Stabilisation
do., Basic Contradiction of, 313
do., Cataclysmic Development of, 44
do., Incurable Diseases of, 419
do., Monopolistic, 314
do., "Organised," 308
do., Present-day, 314
do., Restoration of, 142
do., Restricting Growth of, 276
do., Uneven Development of, 44, 227
Capitalist Elements, Liquidation of, 91
do. do., Offensive against, 241
do. do., Peaceful Growth of into Socialism, 356
do. do., Restricting of, 278

do. Governments and Big Banks, 48
do. System of Economy, 368
do. World and U.S.S.R., 125, 320
Caucasus, 234
Central Black Earth Region, 234
Centrism as Political Concept, 177
do. and German Social-Democracy, 446
do. in the Russian Communist Party, 176
do. do. do. U.S.S.R., 447
do. do. do. West, 447
CHAYANOV, 260
CHEKHOV, 414
CHERNOV, 83, 84
China, 47, 317
Chinese Revolutionary Movement, 124
Church and State, 70
CHURCHILL, 420
"Class against Class," 141
do. Struggle, 203, 204
do. do. and Collective Farms, 268
Classes, Abolition of, 16, 110, 134, 200, 201, 207
Collective Farming, 247, 266
do. Farm Movement, 106, 170, 280
do. do. Policy, 281
do. do. sole means of escape for Peasantry, 301
do. do., Transformation of Peasant Members, 269
do. do., Uniting of Peasantry into, 214
do. do., Voluntary, 281, 289
do. Farms and Class Struggle, 268
do. do., Distrustful Attitude to, 215
do. do., Financing of, 343
Collectivisation, 90, 253, 261, 338
do., Distortions in, 283
do., Solution to Grain Problem, 105
do., Tempo, 291
Collectivism, 89
Colonial and Dependent Countries, 317
do. Policy and U.S.S.R., 62
Comintern, 68, 127, 184, 190, 195, 238
do., Conciliation within the Sections of, 193
do., 2nd Congress of, 30

do., 3rd Congress of, 110
do., 4th Congress of, 109
Comintern, 5th Congress of, 180
do., 6th Congress of, 123, 194, 195
do., Programme of, 127
Commercial Turnover, 326
Commodity Grain, Demand for, 160
do. Exchange, 211
Communards, Errors of, 98
do. of Paris, 99
Commune, Paris, 293
do., do., and State, 225
do., do., Experience of, 44
Communes, 288, 303
Communism, 143, 157
Communist Conceit, 294
do. Party, 380
do. do. and Administration, 49
do. do. do. Caste, 437
do. do. a Leninist Party, 13
do. do. do. Monolithic Party, 178
do. do. and Government Planning, 49
do. do. do. Trade Unions, 50
do. do., Conditions of Membership of, 69
do. do., Discipline in, 47, 193
do. do., Function of, 47
do. do. Guides the Government, 49
do. do., Higher Form of Class Organisation of Proletariat, 47
do. do., Monopoly of, 58
do. do., Party of Non-Deception, 13
do. do., Triune Task of, in the Village, 114, 115, 116
do. do., Words and Deeds in, 13
do. do. of America, 68
do. do. do. Czecho – Slovakia, 196
do. do. do. Germany, 194, 196
do. do. do. Soviet Union, 68
do. do. do. do. do., Programme of, 113, 114
do. do. do. do. do., Theoretical Position of, 228
do. do. do. do. do., 5th Congress of, 124
do. do. do. do. do., 6th Congress of, 191
do. do. do. do. do., 8th Congress of, 29, 30, 113, 114, 115, 118, 120

Communist Party of Soviet Union, 10th Congress of, 400
do. do. do. do. do., 11th Congress of, 357
do. do. do. do. do., 14th Congress of, 31, 276, 383
do. do. do. do. do., 14th and 15th Congresses of, 107, 169
do. do. do. do. do., 15th Congress of, 106, 141, 170, 173, 275, 276, 277, 307, 338, 362
do. do. do. do. do., 16th Conference of, 275
do. do. do. do. do., 16th Congress of, 87, 342, 383
do. Society, General Characteristics of, 70
Communists, American, 66
do. and Disruption of Labour Movement, 66
do., Masses sympathise with, 51
Comsomol, see Young Communist League
Conciliationism, 41, 147, 148, 181, 189, 239
do. and 6th Congress of Communist International, 194
do., Check on, 191
Constituent Assembly, 34, 46
Contract System, 91, 108, 166, 167, 216
Control Figures, 158, 159
Co-operative Enterprises, 268
do. Movement, development of, 220
Co-operatives, 47, 90, 169, 351
do., Bureaucracy in, 350
do., "Nepman" Spirit of, 351
Councils of Workers' Deputies, 46
Countries, Backward and Advanced, 252
COYLE, 73
Craft, Principle of, 72
Credit and Currency, Problem of, 374
Credits, 64
Crisis, Economic, 306, 308
do. and Present General Crisis of Capitalism, 314
do., Agricultural, 308
do., Causes of, 312
do., Developing unevenly, 309
do., First World Crisis since War, 309
Crisis not repetition of Previous Crises, 313
do., Overproduction, 313
do., "Theories" of, 311
Cultural Resources, Problem of, 245

DAN, 83, 84, 257, 383, 448
DAVID, 259
DAUDET, ALPHONSE, 88
Debts, 95
"Declining Curve" Theory, 388
"Degradation" in Agriculture, 160, 161, 162
Dekulakisation, 116
Democracy and Dictatorship of Proletariat, 44
DENIKIN, 35, 52, 81, 137
DENNY, Ludwell, 349
"De-personalisation," 432, 433, 434
DETERDING, 89
Deviations, Social Basis of, 145, 167
Dialectics, 221, 222, 403
Dictatorship, see Proletarian Dictatorship
Difficulties, 146
  do., Nature of, 146, 147, 353, 355
Disarmament, 316
DMITRIEV, 13, 20
Don Province, 262
  do. Quixote, 298
DOUGLAS, 72, 77
Dumping by Soviet, 89

EBERT, 194, 195
E.C.C.I., 195, 196
Education, 352
EICHENWALD, 249
Electrification in Soviet Union, 157, 158
ENGELS, 43, 44, 45, 70, 223, 225, 226, 260, 261
Engineers, Red, 244
England, 46
  do. and America, Struggle between, 124
"Equilibrium," Theory of, 254, 256
Exploitation, Bondage forms of, 171, 172

Factory Council, 61
  do. under Soviet System, 62
Fascism, 78, 126
February Revolution, 1917, 27, 37, 41
  do. do. of 1917 and Landowners' Estates, 22

Fight on Two Fronts, 174, 236
Finance, Peoples' Commissariat of, 172
FISCHER, Ruth, 87
Fischer—Maslov Opposition, 88
FISH, 420
Five-Year Plan, 230, 231, 244, 250, 276, 280
  do. do. in Four Years, 331
  do. do., Rykov's Draft of, 229
Food Tax, 130
France, 46
Freedom, 226
French Liberals and *laissez-faire*, 171, 172
FRUMKIN, 160, 161, 165, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 230, 277
FRUNTOV, 139

GANDHI, 318
Genoa Conference, 64
GERHARDT, 194, 195
German Social-Democracy, 447
Germany, 46
GOMPERS, 77
Goods Shortage, 165
GOTZ, 84
Government, Definition of, 15
  do. does not embrace the State, 15
  do., Peak of State Organisation, 14
G.P.U., 97, 98
Grain Collection, Difficulties of, 216, 234
  do. do., Basis of, 100
  do. do., "Excesses" in, 237
  do. do., Lessons of, 235
  do. Factories, 248
  do., Marketable, 104, 130
  do. Problem, 159, 284
Great Britain, 316
  do. Russian Jingoism, 397, 403
GREEN, 75
GROMAN, 263, 274

HARRIMAN, 64
Heavy Industry and Capital Investment, 243

do. do. do. Socialism, 109
do. Metallurgy, Development of, 375
HERZ, 259
HESSEN, 251
HILFERDING, 192
HOOVER, 312
HUMBERT-DROZ, 195
Hungary, 47

Imperialism, 43
do. and Colonial Countries, 124
do. do. Redistribution of World, 44
do., Semi-Menshevist Theory of, 451
do., War and, 44
Imperialist Countries, Antagonisms between, 315
India, 47, 317
do., National Emancipation of, 124
Indo-China, 317
Indonesia, 317
Industrial Crops, 376
do. Party, 422
do. Proletariat and U.S.S.R., 424
do. Workers, Organised Recruiting of, 427
Industrialisation, Key to, 151
Industry, 34
do., Capitalist Construction of, 172
do., Nationalisation of, 63
do., Profits from, in Russia, 63
do., Revenues from, in Russia, 62
Intelligentsia, Technical, 123, 136, 138, 436, 438
International Language, 409
Intervention, Military, 321, 355
Interventionists, 99
Ireland, 47
Israels, 76

Joint Tillage, Associations for, 283

KAISER, 78
KAMENEV, 34, 36, 38
Kamenevism, 38, 41

Katheder Sozialismus, 201
KAUTSKY, 225, 226, 348, 407, 447
Kazakstan, 232, 237
Kellogg Pact, 321
KERENSKY, 51, 81, 83, 84, 251
  do. Government, 51
Khoper District, 262
KOLB, 226
KOLCHAK, 25, 52, 81, 137
KUBIAK, 166
Kulak, 23, 29, 41, 54, 55, 101, 115, 128, 132, 246, 303
  do. Activities, 172
  do. Farming, 104
Kulaks as Exploiters, 304
  do., Bukharin's Theory of, 197, 198, 215
  do., Class Enemy of Working Class, 205
  do., Liquidation of, 270, 272, 275, 277, 296, 303, 345
  do., Offensive against, 169, 186
  do., Resistance of, 234
  do., Restriction of Exploiting Tendencies, 270, 276
Kuomintang, 317

Labour, Mechanisation of, 428
  do., Men's Views on, 363
  do., Organisation of, 432
  do. Power, Supply of, 426
  do., Productivity of, 241, 373
  do. Unions, 47
LA FOLLETTE, Senator, 76
Laissez-faire, laissez-passer, 171
Land Nationalisation, 264
Large-Scale Production in Agriculture, Strength of, 102
  do. Model Farms, Necessity of, 301
Leadership, Art of, 285
  do. of Peasantry, 15
League of Nations, 80, 81, 316
LEE, Ivy, 79
"Left" Communists, 178
  do. Deviation, 173, 175, 179
  do. do., Over-estimation of, 148
  do. Distortionists, 298

do. Phrasemongers, 247
do. Wing, Fight against, 188
do. do. of Social-Democracy, Fight against, 192
Lena Goldfields, 64
LENIN—
On Abolition of Classes, 201
do. Alliance with Middle Peasantry, 120
do. Bukharin, 221, 222, 223, 225, 228
do. Centrism in Second International, 455, 456
As a Marxist, 43
Attempt on, 97
Characterisation of Peasantry, 110
On Collective Labour, 134
do. Collectivisation, 105, 130, 142, 143, 144, 232, 236, 245, 246, 247, 251, 252, 258, 260, 267, 268, 269, 288, 289, 290, 291, 293, 358
do. Communist Conceit, 294
do. do. Society, 70
On Constructive Revolution, 48
Co-operative Plan, 16
On Credits and the Vodka Monopoly, 96
do. Dictatorship of Proletariat, 16, 17, 44
do. the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Poor Peasantry, 36, 37
At the 8th Congress of the R.C.P., 29, 30
On the February Revolution, 27, 28
At the 4th Congress of the Comintern, 109
In Hiding, 83
On the History of Bolshevism, 446, 448
do. Industrialisation, 156, 157, 242, 244, 386, 387, 424, 437
do. Internationalism, 398, 399
do. Kamenevism, 34, 38
do. the Kulaks, 270, 304
do. Left Social-Democrats, 449, 452
do. the Middle Peasantry, 118
do. National and Colonial Revolutions, 47
do. do. Culture, 400, 401
do. N.E.P., 273, 274, 357, 381
do. the Party Slogan, 25, 26
do. do. Peasantry, 206, 208
do. do. Policy of the R.C.P., 35, 114
do. do. Poor and Middle Peasantry, 111, 115
do. do. Right Deviation, 149, 199, 200

do. do. do. and Left Deviations, 174, 176, 178
do. Socialist Culture, 401
do. do. Society, 45
On Soviet Policy, 370
And Soviet Power, 14
On State Power, 21
do. the State, 224
do. Strengthening of the Working Class, 108
do. Thermidorism, 145
do. the Transition Period, 408
do. do. Workers' State, 19
do. Workers' and Peasants' State, 20
Leninism, 18, 19, 40, 41, 105, 110, 131, 250, 266, 289
do. and Marxism, 43, 47
do., the Most Left Tendency, 175
Leninists, 134
Liberalism, Rotten, 447
LIEBER, 84
Light Industry not a Difficult Problem, 243
LLOYD GEORGE, 50
Locarno, Spirit of, 317
LUXEMBURG, Rosa, 448, 450

Machine Tractor Stations, 157, 214, 247, 263
Machinery and Tractors, Basis for Transformation of Peasant, 269
Machinists' Union, 74
Management, 376
do., Single, 422
March 1917, 27
MARETSKY, 228
MARKOV, 237
MARTOV, 448, 451
MARX, 24, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 70, 92, 98, 122, 225, 226, 258, 260
Marxism, 43, 105, 110, 255, 257, 258
Marxist Agrarians, 273
Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, 254
MASLOV, 87
Means of Production in Soviet Union, 151
Mensheviks, 38, 58, 81, 83, 174
do. and Party Membership in 1903, 450
Menshevism, 110

Middle Peasant in Communist Society, 251
do. do., Neutralisation of, 30, 31
Middle Peasant, Party Line and, 119
do. do., Tendency against, 173
do. do., A Wavering Class, 115, 116
do. Peasantry, 29, 30, 112, 288
do. do., Alliance with, 115, 118, 205, 303
do. do., Economic despair of, 169
Middlemen, 90
MILIUKOV, 251
MOLOTOV, 31
MOMONTOV, 137
Money under Socialism, 93
Mongol Khans, 423
Monopoly of Foreign Trade, Abolition of, 54
Moscow, "Orders from," 67

NADEZHDA KONSTANTINOVNA (Lenin's Wife), 228
National Civic Federation, 79
do. and Colonial Questions, 46
do. do. do. Revolutions, 47
do. Income, 327
do. do., Distribution of, 348
do. Languages, 407
do. Minorities, 64
do. Oppression Abolished in U.S.S.R., 65
do. Question, 397
Nationalism, Local, 397, 403
NEMCHINOV, 102, 264
N.E.P., 16, 45, 93, 144, 157, 208, 209, 211, 236, 241, 245, 270, 273, 357, 381
do., Dual Nature of, 208
do. not only a Retreat, 357
Nepmen, 54, 55, 105, 200
NEUMANN, 195, 196
Northern Caucasus, 234
North-Western Region, 234
November, 1918, 28
do. Revolution, 218

October Revolution, 24, 25, 39, 40
do. do., Achievements of, 22

do. do. and Bourgeois Revolution, 24
do. do. do. Peasantry, 263
do. do., Chief Aim of, 24
October Revolution, Completion of Bourgeois Revolution, 39
Offensive against Capitalist Elements, 356
do., Essence of, 361
do., Successful Conditions of, 360
Opportunism, Split with, 449
Opposition, Fraudulent Tricks of, 121
Oppositionists, 122
Otsovists, 174, 178
Overtaking and Surpassing advanced Capitalist Countries, 154, 155

Pacifism, 125, 316
"Pan Europe" and Kellogg Pact, 321
Parliamentarism, Bourgeois, 46
Parties and the Working Class, 57
Party, Slogan of Purging, 185, 186
PARVUS, 450
Peace, Philistine Viewpoint on, 39
do. Policy of Soviet Union, 64, 325
Peasant Economy, Collectivisation of, 91
do. Farms, 92
Peasantry, see also Workers and Peasants, Alliance of; Middle Peasantry; Poor Peasantry; Kulak
do., Alliance with whole Peasantry, 23, 26
do. and October Revolution, 103, 263
do., Last Capitalist Class, 110, 206
do., Socialist Re-education of, 45
do., "Whole," 28, 38
PENKOV, 149
Personnel, Problem of, 372
PETER THE GREAT, 153
Petty Bourgeoisie, 36
Petty-Peasant Economy, Transformation of, 45
PITIRIM SOROKIN, 112, 114
Platform of the "83," 61
PLATO, 193
PLEKHANOV, 53, 448
POINCARÉ, 420
POKROVSKY, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42

Poland, 47
Polish Armies in 1929, their mistake, 297
Polish-Lithuanian "Squires," 423
Poor Peasantry, 26, 28, 29, 30, 113
do. do. and Collective Farms, 169
do. do. do. Kulaks, 111
do. do. do. Working Class, 205
do. do., Committees of, 29, 112, 236
POPE, 383
Population, Decline in Death Rate, 352
PREOBRAZHENSKY, 270
Press, Freedom of, 82
Price Policy of Soviet Union, 94, 211
Priests, 246
Production, Ability to Manage, 418
do. Conferences, 61
do., Cost of, 185
do. Incentive and Private Profit, 61
do., Management of, 421
do., Marxist Theory of, 255
Proletarian Dictatorship, 17, 28, 44, 155, 199
do. do. and Democracy, 44
do. do. do. Socialist Class Aims, 18
do. do., National Culture in Conditions of, 401
Proletariat and its Allies, Problem of, 44
do., Hegemony of, 45
do. in Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution, 18, 450
do., Meaning of State Leadership of, 17
do., Party of, 47
do., Russian, 46
do. and Poor Peasantry, Dictatorship of, 17, 26, 27, 35, 37, 39, 40
PROUDHON, 225
PUTILOV, 87

RAKOVSKY, 95
Rationalisation, 376
RECHBERG, 312
Red Army, 30, 52
Religion, Attitude to, 70
Rent, Theory of Ground, 260
Repressions, 360

Reproduction, Marx's Theory of, 256, 274
Reserves, Problems of, 375
Revolution, and Tsarist Debts, 95
do., Creative, 43
do. of 1905, 41, 450
do., Popular and Constructive, 48
do., Shock Troops of, 46
do., Theory of Permanent, 45
do., World, 158, 453
Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship, Slogan of, 26
Right Deviation, 138, 140, 145, 146, 151, 179, 190, 239, 240, 296, 384
do. do., Chief Danger, 182, 391
do. do., Ideology of, 140, 141, 167, 168, 175, 176, 180, 247
Right-Left Anti-Leninist *Bloc*, 176
ROBESPIERRE, 145
ROSIT, 198, 199
Russia, Backwardness of Old, 423
RYKOV, 61, 162, 168, 190, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 236, 239, 394, 411, 415

SACCO, 86
SAGHOLIN, 64
SAKHAROV, 150
SCHEDRIN, 421, 444
SCHLICHTER, 232
"Scissors," 93
Second International, 179
do. do., and Centrism, 177, 449
do. do. do. Left Social-Democrats, 448
do. do. do. Leninists, 175
do. do. do. Mensheviks, 84
do. do. do. National – Colonial Question, 451
do. do. do. Socialist Revolutionaries, 84
do. do., Bolsheviks and the Pre-War, 447
do. do., Unity between Second and Third Internationals, 85
Self-Criticism, 121, 185, 242, 362, 373
Self-Determination, National, 403
"Shadow" Cabinet and Lloyd George, 50
Shakhti Case, 136, 138, 185, 187, 203, 362, 422
SHATUNOVSKY, 168
Shock Brigade Movement, 364
Siberia, 232

Skilled and Unskilled Workers, Difference between, 430
Slogans, Basis of, 21
SLUTSKI, 446, 448, 449, 452
Small-Farming, Weaknesses of, 102, 300
Smychka, 117, 129, 133, 134, 135, 157, 165, 166, 168, 211, 287
Social-Democracy, Counter-Revolutionary Force, 82
do. do., Fight against, 188, 190, 192
do. do., Main Support of Capitalism, 128
Social-Democratic Party of Pre-War Days, 177
do. Press, 84
do. Traditions, Ridding Communist Parties of, 189
Social-Democrats (Mensheviks), 51
do. and Liberal Bourgeoisie, 82
Socialised Industry and Agriculture, 45
Socialism, 202, 280, 331
do. and money, 93
do., Possibility of Triumph in U.S.S.R., 143
do., Victory of, 44
Socialist Agriculture, 102, 246
do. Competition, 242, 363
do. Construction, 256
do. do. and Peasantry, 16
do. do., Phase of, 29
do. do., Theory of Automatic Development of, 257
do. Development and Co-operation, 250
do. Dictatorship, Slogan of, 26
do. Industrialisation, 329
do. Industry, Motive Power of, 61
do. Offensive, 186, 187, 270
do. Revolutionaries, 38, 51, 57, 58, 83, 110, 207
do. do., Left *Putsch* of, 27
do. Society, Construction of, 45
do. Tasks, 40
Socialists and Anarchists, Differences between, 222
SOLOMON, 324
Soviet Apparatus, Purging it of Bureaucracy, 185
do. Farms, 107, 131, 245, 247, 339, 340, 341
do. do., Right Deviation and, 170
Soviet Farms, Socialist Levers, 167
do. Forces, Mistake of, in 1920, 297
do. Union, 80

Soviets, 34, 37, 46
do., Dual Power of, 112
do., 5th Congress of, 331
do., 8th Congress of, 157, 387
do., State Form of Dictatorship of Proletariat, 44
Specialisation in Agricultural Crops, 371
Split, 448
Stabilisation, 188, 191
do. of Capitalism, End of, 86, 320
Stability of Peasant Farming, Theory of, 258
STALIN, 295
STAMP, Economist, 348
State, 222, 224, 402
see also Government, Dictatorship
do. and Anarchists, 223
do. do. Dictatorship of Proletariat, 226
do. do. Government, 14
do. do. Socialists, 223
do., Blowing up of, 224, 227
do., Bureaucratic Distortions of, 19, 20
do., Class Nature of, 14, 15, 19
do. Machinery, 378
do., Marxist Theory of, 228
do. Organisation, 47
do. Power, Importance of, 21
do., Temporary Nature of, 225, 226
STEN, 223, 224
STEPKOV, 249
Stock Breeding, 376
STRUVE, 251
Super-Industrialisation, 173
Supply, Problem of, 374
Supreme Council of National Economy, 137, 172
Swedish Feudal Barons, 423

TARTARIN OF TARASCON, 88
Tax Assessment, Individual, 164
Technical Development, Aim of, in U.S.S.R., 152
do. Schools, 137
Technique, Deciding Factor, 425
Technology, Mastering of, 422

THALHEIMER, 195
THALMANN, 144, 195, 196
Thermidor, 145, 384
THIERS, 99
Third Period, 192
Toilers, Material position of, 346
TOMSKY, 190, 239, 394, 410, 411, 412, 415
Trade Union Work, Improvement in, 185
  do. Unions, American Workers organised in, 72
  do. do., Bureaucracy in, 186
Transition from Capitalism to Socialism, 223
  do. do. First Stage of Revolution, 36
Transport Commissariat, 137
  do. Problem, 379
TROTSKY, 60, 161, 162, 180, 229, 359, 389, 418, 447, 451
Trotskyism, 35, 36, 146, 173, 174, 179, 180, 206, 250, 357, 383, 391, 456
  do., Vanguard of Counter-Revolution, 456
Trotskyist Smugglers, 457
TSERETELLI, 83, 84
Turkish Beys, 423
Turukhan Region, 236

UGLANOV, 182, 411, 412
Ukraine, 232, 234, 370
Under-Employment, 315
Unemployment, 308
  do., Progressive Reduction of, 325
Uninterrupted Week, 242, 433
Union between Town and Countryside, 90
United States of Europe, 127
Urals-Kuznetzk Combine, 371, 435
URITSKY, Member of Revolutionary Committee, killed by Socialist-Revolutionary, 97
U.S.A., 316
U.S.S.R., Financial Blockade of, 243
  do., Workers' Insurance in, 75

VANZETTI, 86
VARGA, 348
Versailles, 98
Vodka Monopoly, 95, 96, 97

Volga, 232
VOLODARSKY, 97
VOLOSEVICH, 457, 458
Voting, Right in Soviet Elections, 53

Wages, Equalitarianism of, 429
  do., Rise of Real, 350
War and Policy, 52
  do. and Technique, 52
  do. Communism, Difficulties under, 92
Wars and Revolutions, Epoch of, 314
  do., National, 125
  do., Peasant, 24, 40
Warsaw, Soviet Advance on, 297
WEBB, Sidney, 199
Who will Defeat Whom? 204, 255, 330
WILSON, Woodrow, 78
WITTORF, 194
WOLL, Matthew, 79
Workers, Improvement in Conditions of, 431
Workers' Brigades, 248
  do. and Peasants' Alliance, 18, 110
  do. do. do. Government, 13, 14, 18
Working Class and Peasantry, Possibility of Split between, 381
Works Managers in Russia, 61
WRANGEL, 52
Wrecking, 185, 187, 354, 438, 439

YAN-SKY, 41
YAROSLAVSKY, 458
Young Communist League, 53, 363
  do. Plan, 317
Youth International, 224

ZAPOLSKY, 139
ZINOVIEV, 42, 181, 359
Zinoviev-Trotsky Opposition, 263, 271

Table of Contents

Cover 1
Half Title 2
Title Page 3
Copyright Page 4
Table of Contents 7
REGARDING THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT: REPLY TO COMRADE DMITRIEV 13
THE THREE BASIC SLOGANS OF THE PARTY ON THE PEASANT QUESTION: REPLY TO COMRADE YAN-SKY 21
THE SLOGAN OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY IN THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION: REPLY TO S. POKROVSKY 32
INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION IN RUSSIA (SEPTEMBER 9, 1927) 42
1. Questions Put by the Delegation and Stalin's Replies 42
2. Stalin's Questions to the Delegation and its Replies 69
INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS' DELEGATIONS ON NOVEMBER 5, 1927 78
ON THE GRAIN FRONT: EXTRACT FROM A TALK TO STUDENTS OF THE INSTITUTE OF RED PROFESSORS, THE COMMUNIST ACADEMY, AND THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY ON MAY 28, 1928 98
LENIN ON THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANTS: REPLY TO COMRADE S. 110

THE JULY PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U.: SPEECH DELIVERED TO A MEETING OF THE ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE LENINGRAD ORGANISATION OF THE C.P.S.U. ON JULY 13, 1928 121
I. COMINTERN QUESTIONS 121
1. The Fundamental Problems of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern 121
2. The Programme of the Comintern 124
II. QUESTIONS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IN THE SOVIET UNION 126
1. The Grain Collection Policy 126
2. The Problem of Cadres for Industrial Construction 133
III. CONCLUSION 134
THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.: SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE PLENUM OF THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE AND THE MOSCOW CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE C.P.S.U. ON OCTOBER 19, 1928 136
THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.: SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U., NOVEMBER 19, 1928 148
1. The Rate of Industrial Development 148
2. The Grain Problem 156
3. Deviations and the Conciliatory Attitude Towards Deviations 163
THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION: FROM A SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U. IN APRIL, 1929 179
1. The Shifting of Classes and Our Differences 179

2. Differences on Comintern Questions 185
3. Differences on Internal Policy 190
(a) The Class Struggle 191
(b) The Intensification of the Class Struggle 196
(c) The Peasantry 199
(d) N.E.P. and Market Relations 202
(e) The Rate of Development of Industry and the New Forms of Smychka 206
(f) Comrade Bukharin as a Theoretician 214
(g) A Five-Year Plan or a Two-Year Plan 222
(h) The Question of the Sowing Area 224
(i) The Grain Collections 226
4. The Fight Against the Right Deviation 231
A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE: ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWELFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 234
1. In the Sphere of Productivity of Labour 234
2. In the Sphere of Industrial Development 235
3. In the Sphere of Agricultural Development 238
Conclusion 245
QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION: SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE CONFERENCE OF MARXIST-AGRARIANS ON DECEMBER 27, 1929 246
1. The Theory of “Equilibrium” 247
2. The Theory of “Automatic Development” in the Building Up of Socialism 249
3. The Theory of the “Stability” of Individual Small-Peasant Farming 251
4. The Town and the Village 255
5. The Nature of the Collective Farms 259
6. The Class Shiftings and the Turn in the Policy of the Party 262

7. Conclusions 265
ON THE POLICY OF LIQUIDATING THE KULAKS AS A CLASS 267
DIZZY WITH SUCCESS 272
REPLY TO COMRADES ON THE COLLECTIVE FARMS 278
POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION: REPORT DELIVERED JUNE 27, 1930, AND SPEECH IN REPLY TO DEBATE DELIVERED JULY 2, 1930 298
I. THE GROWING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION OF THE U.S.S.R. 298
1. The World Economic Crisis 299
2. The Sharpening of the Contradictions of Capitalism 306
3. Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and the Capitalist State 311
II. THE RISING TIDE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R. 315
1. The Growth of National Economy as a Whole 316
2. The Successes of Industrialisation 317
3. The Predominant Position of Socialist Industry and the Rate of its Growth 319
4. Agriculture and the Grain Problem 324
5. The Turn of the Peasantry Toward Socialism and the Rate of Development of the Soviet and Collective Farm Movement 328
6. The Improvement of the Material and Cultural Position of the Workers and Peasants 335
7. The Difficulties of Growth, the Struggle of Classes, and the Socialist Offensive Along the Whole Front 341
8. The Capitalist or the Socialist Economic System 353
9. Our Next Tasks 358
(a) General 358

(b) Industry 363
(c) Agriculture 364
(d) Transport 366
III. THE PARTY 367
1. The Direction of Socialist Construction 370
2. The Leadership of Internal Party Affairs 377
IV. SPEECH IN REPLY TO THE DEBATE 391
THE TASKS OF BUSINESS MANAGERS: SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF MANAGERS OF SOVIET INDUSTRY, FEBRUARY 4, 1931 403
NEW CONDITIONS, NEW TASKS: SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE CONFERENCE OF LEADERS OF INDUSTRY, JUNE 23, 1931 412
1. Labour Power 412
2. Wages 414
3. Labour Organisation 417
4. A Working-Class Industrial and Technical Intelligentsia 420
5. Symptoms of the Change of Attitude of the Old Industrial and Technical Intelligentsia 423
6. Business Accounting 425
7. New Methods of Work, New Methods of Leadership 427
SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM: TO THE EDITORS OF Proletarskaya Revolyutsia 431
INDEX 444