Deleuze and Race

Arun Saldanha and Jason Michael Adams

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Deleuze Connections

'It is not the elements or the sets which define the multiplicity. What defines it is the AND, as something which has its place between the elements or between the sets. AND, AND, AND – stammering.'

Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*

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Edited by Arun Saldanha and
Jason Michael Adams

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Escaping Race

Nick Nesbitt

The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze continues to hold untold resources for those interested in the critique of racism, colonialism and neocolonial late capitalism. Deleuze allows us to think more fully, more richly, more powerfully a series of related problems including race, emancipation and decolonisation. In particular, it is possible to identify a series of concepts or problems related to race and decolonisation (to which readers will find a great many more developed in the pages that follow) that Deleuzian thought could bring to heightened powers of articulation.

The history of racism and colonialism itself indicates certain directions that conceptual intervention might take. One might argue that an event such as the Haitian Revolution, though never acknowledged by Deleuze or Guattari, constitutes a paradigmatic historical actualisation of a number of fundamental Deleuzian concepts. The Haitian Revolution, for all the insights decades of scholarship have brought to it, is still predominantly understood in precritical terms. In other words, though scholars since C. L. R. James's landmark 1938 *The Black Jacobins* (1989) increasingly came to celebrate (rather than denigrate) the world's first successful revolt of enslaved Africans and to reveal its previously disavowed historical depth, that celebration tends to be articulated teleologically in terms of contemporary values such as autodetermination, multiculturalism and tolerance for the Other and to reduce the events of 1791–1804 to a (failed, if promising) moment in the creation of the modern liberal subject of wage labour and free markets in the post-slavery, post-monarchic world-system of global capitalism.

Against any superficial reduction of the thought of the author of *Difference and Repetition* (1994) to an avatar of multicultural doxa, the relevance of Deleuzian thought to such an event must be located elsewhere. A critical reading of the Haitian Revolution, as of any other moment in the critique of racism, colonisation or global capital, must

take into account the *a priori*, transcendental determinants that allow for the taking place of such processes of subjection and exploitation, as well as the flight from those situations by novel subjects of emancipation (collective or individual), the becoming-minoritarian and becoming-other, the subtractive politics of constituting other worlds. As Christian Kerslake (2009) has argued, Deleuze must be understood as a fundamentally post-Kantian philosopher, one whose 'transcendental empiricism' offers theoretical tools for escape from the various prison-houses of modern subjectivity of which race and colonialism are to be counted among the most vicious and dehumanising.

A fully Deleuzian illumination of the Haitian Revolution would necessarily offer new modes of understanding the collective subjectivity of the half-million former slaves who, after 1791, accomplished the impossible, creating a 'war machine' in the precise sense Deleuze and Guattari (1987) give to the term in *A Thousand Plateaus* through the violent destruction of the striated, regimented space of domination that was the slave plantation system, and the creation of novel lines of maroon flight through a suddenly smooth space, across the plains of Northern Saint Domingue. Led by Toussaint Louverture, they then created a guerrilla, improvisatory form of warfare that, by 1804, defeated, for the first time, the most powerful army in the Atlantic world (see Louverture 2008). A critical Deleuzian reading of these events might go on to analyse the subsequent failure, after 1804, to sustain this becoming-minoritarian and dis-identification from the representational apparatuses of racial stratification. It would elucidate the failures and unheralded successes in the struggle to avoid recapture by these dissident subjects (the *moun en deyo* or excluded Haitian peasant majority), as well as 'microfascist' tendencies within the new subjectification to power, both that of Toussaint Louverture's dictatorial authoritarianism (1797–1802) and that of the Haitian state itself after 1804.

A Deleuzian critique of Haitian decolonisation and racial dis-identification (the 1805 Haitian constitution, for example, identified all citizens of the new state as 'black', exploding through general banalisation the contemporary Atlantic racial regime) might go on to develop Deleuze's concept of Masochian 'dissidence' (1991), underscoring the extent to which Toussaint, as much as Deleuze's Masoch or Deleuze and Guattari's Kafka, is the destroyer of Laws, of the Law of the Father, for Toussaint quite literally the Law of the Master that structures the world of plantation slavery. Masochism is for Deleuze an operation, a methodical political procedure. It is the enactment of a systematic subversion. Louverture put into practice with utter perfection the peculiar form of

contractual sabotage of the rule of constituted law that Deleuze identifies as masochism. In other words, Toussaint destroyed the constituted laws of the post-1789 plantation by following through the logic of that world point by point, exploding it as the French Revolution had already done to the Ancien Régime, through faithful adherence to the formal stipulations of its ontological determination under the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (Louverture 2008).

In these few years of 1791–1802, Toussaint moved from what Deleuze (1991) calls a 'Socratic' relation to the law, in which the law is an external, received model of the Good, the law of the plantation, Bréda, where Louverture manœuvred himself into relative freedom in an unfree world, to a Kantian one, collapsing some three thousand years of development into the flash of a moment. Toussaint instituted, above all in his 1801 constitution, what might be described as a destructive Kantian practice of dissidence, one in which, Deleuze says,

> law no longer has its foundation in some higher principle from which it would derive its authority, but that is self-grounded and valid solely by virtue of its own form. For the first time we can now speak of THE LAW, regarded as an absolute, without further specification or reference to an object. (1991: 82)

Above all, perhaps, a Deleuzian critique of race and colonial exploitation would work to escape from the logic of identity and identification with one's political and existential subjection at the heart of the Hobbesian narrative of political modernity. Deleuze's critique of identity, above all in the first chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, 'Difference in Itself', addresses the common(-sensical) distribution of beings according to (Aristotelian, Leibnizian and Hegelian) categories and hierarchies, and the cognitive judgment of the propriety of any distribution or attribution of identity. In this conservative, sedentary distribution of roles and identities, 'difference is in effect fully subject to the identity of the concept, the opposition of predicates, the analogy of judgment and the resemblance of perception' (1994: 52). Instead, Deleuze compels us to think identity not as illusory attribution (including racial categorisation), but rather as the repetition of pure difference, to think the singularity of any entity in terms of its protean powers of transformation. Here, Deleuze envisages not only or even principally the transformation of any determinate being as a subtraction from actualised identities, but as the event he calls differentiation, the transformation of the virtual itself. Disidentification, in other words, is for Deleuze always and necessarily a critical process, in the Spinozian, Kantian and

even Marxian sense (I am thinking here of the Marx of the 'Theses on Feuerbach'), aiming at no less than the radical reformulation of the transcendental operators governing any world.

The world-historical importance of the Haitian Revolution lies in its transcendence of any identity-based politics to politicise instead the Idea of the universal human right to be free from enslavement. This Idea of 1804 must be emphatically distinguished from any conscious articulation of a political doctrine by individual participants in the various revolts from 1791 on. Instead, universal emancipation, the idea of the Haitian Revolution, like any true Idea in Deleuze's precise use of the concept, is preconscious, independent of its representation under the aegis of a reflexive cogito (1994: 214–79).

The Idea of the Haitian Revolution as the pure multiplicity of a swarming war machine was arguably first actualised as a disembodied claim of absolute equality in the Bois Caïman ceremony and in Boukman's famous call to the slaves to '*Koute libete li pale nan kè nou tous*' (Listen to the voice of liberty that speaks in all our hearts'). The call for *libete* sparked a non-localisable chain of connections within an anonymous, enslaved multitude that enjoyed no place in their post-1789 world. *Libete*'s multiplicity linked up to a series of adjunct fields that further informed this pure Idea (including the unfulfilled promise of the incomplete and partial French and American Revolutions and the political implications of voodoo), and moved to operate a specific condensation or actualisation of the singular nature of their claim. This claim, as ideal, finding no identity or place in the world of Saint Domingue, focused around signifiers such as the creole *libete*. At the same time, it evinced an unsuspected power to enact, to unfold, and to dramatise on the world stage the implications of this Idea. This Idea was, in 1791, preconscious in Deleuze's sense, literally a dream, in the way that we recall Martin Luther King's celebrated phrase 'I have a dream.'

This proto-Haitian multiplicity was self-defining. On the night of 29 August 1791, a massive uprising of some half-million slaves first began to actualise this pre-individual idea as a complex, unfolding differenc/tiation of relationships and elements. In fact, it would doubtless be more accurate to contrast in Deleuzian terms the formalised concept of 1804 (as the independent state of Haiti and its constitution) to the properly virtual Idea of the initial uprising of 1791, and, moreover, to conclude that 1804 represented, inevitably, an impoverishment of the Idea of 1791. The idea of universal emancipation was at first only a pure problem (inherent to that of actual slavery prior to the 1791 uprising), but quickly became the struggle to instantiate a real solution to that

problem. This subtractive politics, one that violently withdrew from the Atlantic world-system of plantation slavery in a manner analogous to the Brazilian *quilombos*, culminated in the 1804 declaration of Haitian independence and the universal right of all humans to freedom from enslavement and racial subjection. To think with Deleuze the destruction of racial identity, of law, of subjection, and to trace and follow through the immanent lines of flight from those various regimes is in this sense to unfold the extraordinary potentiality of any pure differenc/tiation and becoming beyond the actual state of our human, all-too-human, racialised being.

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Bastard and Mixed-Blood are the True Names of Race

Arun Saldanha

> The attempt at social control on a world scale through the production of subjectivity clashes with considerable factors of resistance from processes of permanent differentiation that I would call 'molecular revolution'. But the name is not important.
>
> Félix Guattari and Suely Rolnik, *Molecular Revolution in Brazil*

> Naming black Africa the epicentre of emergency for the Whole-World. Remembering the crimes suffered, teaching histories of disparity, patching wounds, canceling debts, opening access to education and knowledge, installing equitable practice into everybody, legislating against all predation . . . Naming!
>
> Édouard Glissant and Patrick Chamoiseau,
> *L'Intraitable beauté du monde. Adresse à Barack Obama*

> All true names are 'above every name'.
> Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*

Deleuze and Race

The relevance of Gilles Deleuze for feminism has been amply demonstrated (Buchanan and Colebrook 2000). What this key philosopher of difference can do for theorising racial difference has received comparatively scant attention, and this despite the explicit, if fragmentary, formulation of a theory of race in his collaborative work with Félix Guattari. Part of the explanation of why there has been a relative silence on Deleuze within critical race, postcolonial and multicultural theory is that the philosophical impetus for overcoming racism has for decades been derived from the legacies of Kant and Hegel, which Deleuze's entire œuvre laboured to reassess.[1] Building on phenomenology, psychoanalysis and ethical philosophy, today's most sophisticated theorisations of racism continue, in diverse ways, a fundamentally Euro-American

programme of retrieving a cosmopolitanism *above* the ostensibly incon-sequential phenotypical differences Europeans have, for centuries, called race.

Are phenotypical differences really inconsequential? The idealist metaphysics of the Enlightenment presupposes a *de jure* equality of the human species to be actualised. However, as is well known, in practice the Enlightenment condoned slavery, invented racist anthropology and posited a teleological model of societal maturation (Walls 2005). Deleuze asks whether the conceptual bases for critique and the legalistic recognition of otherness within an unfolding universal history do not foreclose the Enlightenment's otherwise commendable political aims. While today's poststructuralist thinkers of racism have done much to dismantle the notion of a rational individual acting independently from exploitation elsewhere in the world, their radical force is tempered by their shared adherence to the post-Kantian paradigm founding univer-salism upon consciousness and representation allegedly entirely *con-tingent* in relation to materiality.[2] But, like all power relations, racism operates first of all through the materialities of desire and landscape far 'below' any mental or linguistic detectability. Through Deleuze it becomes possible to inquire whether the representationalism and dialec-tical logic that have guided the antiracist programme actively suppress an immanentist–materialist legacy that may be better suited to grasp-ing how bodies are materially differentiated into hierarchies in the first place.[3] Universalism would derive its impetus not by transcending but literally passing through the cluttered corporealities of race.

It is symptomatic of the continuation of Enlightenment idealism that Foucault's notion of biopolitics, so close to Deleuze and Guattari's mate-rialist writings on the state and population, is often taken up without its explicit grounding in racism and the territorialisations of capitalist subjectivity. Those that twist biopolitics into a theory of labour (Negri) or law (Agamben) lose the emphasis on racial and sexual entanglement found in both Foucault and Deleuze–Guattari. It is therefore high time for a rigorous exploration of the many possible conceptual linkages between Foucault, Deleuze–Guattari, Marxism, corporeal feminism and critical race theory.

This is not to say that no important inroads have been made to apply Deleuze to colonialism and geopolitics (Bignall 2010; Buchanan and Parr 2006; Patton 2000 and 2010; Patton and Bignall 2010). Concentrating on race instead of the postcolonial, however, furnishes a different set of problems. Race names registers of violence and purification with a far longer *durée* than the colonial scene's. Now mostly disavowed except

in the US, race was a category explicit in all biopolitical and learned discourse. Thinking it simply 'disappeared' in 1945 is the worst form of ideology. Since Frantz Fanon (1986 and 2001) we know that Europe's xenophobia is entirely entwined not just with the racism constituting settler societies but also with the continuing impoverishment of the peripheries. More: racism is essential to the nation-state, as well as a tendency of capitalism. Fanon would note that Marxist analyses of race, such as Étienne Balibar's and Immanuel Wallerstein's (1991), lose sight of the looking, desiring, struggling *bodies* through which racial difference is necessarily constituted. Balibar's influential identification of an allegedly debiologised racism cannot account for the continuation of racial profiling and taboos on interracial sex in almost all countries.

Hence the effects of exploitation, slavery, displacement, war, migration, exoticism and miscegenation are too geographically diffuse and too contemporary to fit under the term 'postcolonial'. This book seeks to illuminate the materio-sensorial divergences that phenotypical variation necessarily involves within any statist–capitalist locus. More ontologically, the artistic, scientific or political *representations of* racial differences, which are often the objects of critique, beg the question whether those differences are real, symbolic or imaginary (Saldanha 2010). This volume affirms that race is real, investigating racial difference *in itself* as it persists as a biocultural, biopolitical force amid other forces. This does not mean for a moment that race is set in stone. On the contrary, the absurdity of racial essentialism is brought into much clearer focus when its intractable fluidity is appreciated.

A focus on race also summons some of the most controversial questions relating to human-being impelling most thinkers between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Like Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari are not afraid of asking whether inequality is located in bodies (it is, but not genetically); like both Nietzsche and Freud, they ask what is wrong with civilisation itself (it overcodes filiation). Reaching into the deep recesses of culture, an archaic and convoluted logic of differentiating civilisation from savagery and barbarism is exposed. This logic preceded European colonialism by centuries (see Han chauvinism, Brahmanism, Arab–black relations and so on). Though not European in origin, this logic formed the basis for a retrospective Judeo-Christian narcissism, for the oceanic slave trade, nationalism and fascism. Far from 'naturalising' race, Deleuze's nomadological and biophilosophical geology of morals can demonstrate that race is built upon fully contingent territorialisations of power and desire which could be disassembled and differently reassembled. That race is immanent to the machinics of

bodies and flows does not mean it is automatic, any more than that it is autonomous in relation to, for example, capital or sexual difference. The immanence of race does suggest, however, that an end to racism is an always already incipient reality.

My contention is that Deleuze and Guattari's two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* present a hitherto undeveloped theory of biopower and hence of race. This is not to argue against existing interpretations but to recast desire, territory and capital towards the category of race. Deleuze and Guattari's theory of biopower has a much greater historical and geographical scope than what Foucault (2003 and 2008) introduced roughly during the same period. If Foucault famously states in his foreword to *Anti-Oedipus* that it is a guide for antifascist living, I contend that countering fascism means, above all, delving into the machinic depths of civilisation's intrinsic racism. Sidestepping the pitfalls of biological reductionism Deleuze and Guattari not only argue that there is a materiality of race, but also forge an affirmative kind of antiracism quite different from the liberal–democratic kinds prevalent today. Supplementing Deleuze and Guattari with Sylvain Lazarus, my suggested antiracism consists in naming, accelerating and staying true to the bastard and mixed-blood probe-heads escaping the global faciality machine.

Identity is Coherence

The theory of race proposed in the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* books is to be understood as a logical exponent of the Deleuzian œuvre, which, as is well known, hardly touches on sociopolitical matters directly. Deleuze's ontology (1994) is one of the emergence of identity and structure *from* primordial difference: difference as continuous differentiation without the guidance of any logic or principle. Difference will be thought 'in itself', outside the Kantian horizon already tainted by what the mind wants to impose on it. Since Plato, it has been the dominant habit in Europe to reduce difference to what can be fixed into an overarching Whole (Order, Nature, Spirit) so that analogies between forms can be drawn. Deleuze excavates this traditional 'image of thought', propped up by identity–opposition–analogy–resemblance, and recovers a non-dialectical, non-totalisable, yet monist form of difference. Such difference has an intrinsic temporal dimension in that it continually becomes other-than-itself because it is already part of a series of iterations.

Racial difference has been overwhelmingly thought of as a grid of intimately related but mutually exclusive categories. In Fanon and his

legacy in postcolonial theory, the binary of black and white is critiqued or deconstructed by analysing how they unconsciously hold each other in place precisely by negating each other – the basic logic of Hegel's master–slave dialectic. From a Deleuzian perspective. the alleged binary is structurally traversed by brownness, agriculture, animality (Saldanha 2010). At its most fundamental level, the Hegelian logic of inequality takes the form A = not-B because B = not-A and vice versa. Dialectical logic can be very powerful, as in Badiou's and Žižek's Marxisms, but the terms doing the differing are still regarded as only defined through relationality, hence through higher-level identity. Master and slave are unified by their very dividedness from one another, being is related-being. Deleuze instead privileges *internal difference* generated by problems: being is ?-being (1994: 64). Each thing is an incomplete answer to a virtual field of questions posed to it while bumping into other things. White settler society in Algeria composes itself from a set of problems (who can bear my sons? how to avoid the heat and stench? how to make this enjoyable?) which, taken together, form an exploitative relationship with the colonised. Dismantling colonialism becomes effective once these problems are displaced.

Identity is not synthesis of opposites but the coherence (*co-* + *haedere*, to stick) of an actual multiplicity. Through repetition, a positive feedback loop emerges, selecting from the surroundings what homogenises and homeostatises the multiplicity, affirming what already exists, remembering fondly how it achieved stability. Such ontology of emergent viscosity insists true difference is singular. Hence for Deleuze (1994: 148–50), an individual organism's reality precedes that of the species to which it belongs. Individuation is the unfinishable trajectory an organism follows. A human body is likewise unique in its morphology, coloration, affects and memories, individuating itself by feeding on all sorts of inhuman elements (DNA, books, money, ships, horses), which it mostly shares with other bodies. Only secondarily does a body become lumped together with other bodies, to give rise to populations circumscribed on the basis of perceived similitude and proximity. As can be seen in the residential segregation characterising any city, this lumping is a real territorial process (Saldanha 2007).[4] 'African-Americanness' really exists, not as an Aristotelian–Linnaean essence or category, but a fuzzy collection of biological, social and political problems, an obscure attractor actualised in varying degrees, thereby itself permutating.

What is to be done with these sticky, lazy identities in which we get trapped? Deleuze's ontology never ceases to undermine any position we thought we were safely inhabiting while contemplating the world. Being

is alienated absolutely (or beyond what is possible), towards continuously divergent Becoming. Deleuze's truest difference

> is an otherness that cannot be identified, because its being erased or forgotten is a condition of identity as such and more important, being named or identified is one way in which this difference is effaced, compressed into a schema by which it can be comprehended. (Widder 2002: 4)

Such a quest for truth ends in perfect anonymity, an inhuman 'perspective' without place and name, like the asubjective subject of impersonal verbs: the *it* in *it snows*. As Deleuze predicts (2007: 45, trans. mod.): 'Still way beyond a becoming-woman, a becoming-black, a becoming-animal, etc., beyond a becoming-minority, there is the final enterprise of the becoming-imperceptible.'

Badiou (2000) criticises this ontology of imperceptibility for smuggling in a mystical Oneness which traverses and produces all particular differentiations (*the* Plane of Immanence, etc.). Yet it is such vitalism that will allow for a sharper examination of capitalism and racism than Badiou can provide. If linked to Eastern traditions without Orientalism, a Deleuzian mysticism could, in fact, sidestep Badiou's Eurocentric heritage of Platonism and Christianity (Glass 2001; Delpech 2012). Howard Caygill (1997) meanwhile detects in Deleuze's biophilosophy a moralisation of nature not found in Darwin himself but central to Social Darwinism. Donna Jones (2009) argues that the vitalist series Nietzsche–Bergson–Deleuze communicates with a Romantic *fin-de-siècle* concoction of organicism, esoterism and nationalism into which – showing its constitutive contradictions – both fascism and negritude tapped.

How does vitalism mixed with echoes of German Idealism regress into racial essentialism? Claire Colebrook (2010) demonstrates that Deleuzianism often strangely repeats vitalist yearnings for authenticity, but also how Deleuze himself argues for the opposite. Whether embarking deliberately toward full-scale ecstasy or imperceptibility – an integral option in Deleuze's ontology – and the creation of functional rebellious subjectivities along the way – an equally undeniable call in his work – are mutually exclusive, is for us readers to decide.

All Delirium is Racial

Foucault's preface to *Anti-Oedipus* names what could be called transcendental fascism as the prime target for the Deleuze–Guattarian critique,

not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini – which was able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively – but also fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us. (1983: xiii)

Uncovering the violent imposition of social order through the very morality that is supposed to make us civilised, Foucault and Deleuze–Guattari are both heavily indebted to Nietzsche. As Deleuze (1983) had asserted a decade earlier, Nietzschean critique recognises just how pernicious our instincts towards moralism and docility really are, even or especially in the purportedly critical legacy of Kant. Against the continuing suspicion that Nietzsche was a protofascist, Deleuze carefully shows that what Nietzsche wants to affirm is divergence from normality, decidedly away from such bovine ideas as the nation-state, democracy and racial purity.

Another precursor to *Anti-Oedipus* is Wilhelm Reich's classic psychoanalytical study of fascism (1970), first published in 1933, which Deleuze and Guattari credit (1983: 29) for naming the fundamental problem coterminous with stratified society: why do ordinary people desire to be oppressed? Their schizoanalysis goes further by theorising psychic investment in totalitarian racism not as pathological but as integral to capitalism's social field. So, given Nietzsche's and Reich's influence, it is no surprise *Anti-Oedipus* abounds in allusions to race. Echoing the antibourgeois comparativisms of Bataille, Lévi-Strauss and, I would add, Lenin, the book's dissection of ubiquitous fascism relies on a battery of concepts deliberately provocative under a postcolonial assimilationist multiculturalism: the gleeful ethnology of primitives and savages; barbarians and Asian despotism versus civilised men; universal history; the Holy Family and the White Man; filiative stock and the full body of the earth.[5] Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2009) is a leading authority in making empirical anthropology fuel this philosophical non-anthropology, and it is perhaps no coincidence that he hails from Brazil.

A third inspiration for antifascist ethics flows from the adventurous poetic imaginations of Rimbaud and Artaud, as well as the memoirs of Judge Schreber. The main argument of *Anti-Oedipus* is that the profound intensities which eccentrics, artists and madmen experience – Artaud's body-without-organs is paradigmatic – are ideologically obscured when psychoanalysis explains them as dramatisations of the nuclear family. Instead, schizoanalysis proposes that schizophrenia, like true art, is a transcendental voyage of discovery: 'everything commingles in these intense becomings, passages, and migrations – all this drift

that ascends and descends the flows of time: countries, races, families, parental appellations, divine appellations, geographical and historical designations, and even miscellaneous news items' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 84–5). Suffering psychosis is being pulled apart, on the spot, by world-historical and not simply Oedipal forces. Below the geopolitical-capitalist order we catch a glimpse of an 'intensive order'.

> What is the nature of this order? The first things to be distributed on the body without organs are races, cultures, and their gods. The fact has often been overlooked that the schizo indeed participates in history: he hallucinates and raves universal history, and proliferates the races. All delirium is racial, which does not necessarily mean racist. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 85)

This requires unpacking. Deleuze and Guattari speculate that the central affect of psychoses ('both the common root and the principle of differentiation of deliriums and hallucinations') is organised according to racial and cosmological gradients. What European schizophrenia shows, *at this historical juncture*, is the immense libidinal investment of the geopolitical order in racial difference. Schizophrenia is not 'racially determined' in a biologistic sense but only to the extent that it is a concentrated short-circuiting of capitalist colonialism, that it implicates in brain intensities the exotic clichés, phobias and sadisms which circulate in extensive globalisation. If historians claim to discover truths of historical progress, the event of schizophrenia may venture closer to systematically ignored truths of history, which are both ugly and open-ended.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, schizophrenia is always a process of creative racialisation. Typically, racist illusions are entangled with mystical and strongly anti-establishment conspiracy theories. Schizophrenic (and aesthetic) affects can be *racial* yet not *racist*, conjuring new hybrid assemblages of phenotype and divinity. Generalising, we can say that overcoming humanity's division into 'races' and mutually exclusive perspectives cannot be an exercise in axiomatic transcendence, whether through monotheism, law, reason or entrepreneurialism, but is an immanent critique heeding the deep entrenchments of race in institutions and affect.

Rimbaud

Deleuze and Guattari build on many *poètes maudits* (bohemians accursed by polite society) to expose the deep-seated racial intensities of globalisation. Artaud's counter-discriminatory notion of the body-without-organs

is inseparable from his encounter with peyote amongst the Tarahumara in Mexico and subsequent vilification of American militarised supremacism, while his conception of a theatre of cruelty fell upon him while witnessing Balinese dance (Scheer 2009). Arthur Rimbaud's *A Season of Hell* of 1873 is explicit about race qua race and it is mentioned at crucial moments in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. The poem is, amongst other things, a sarcastic meditation on biopolitics – on good and bad ancestry in the French Republic and how Rimbaud's miserable body does not fit in it – induced by 'delirium' (fuelled by absinthe, hashish, opium and the frenzied relationship with lover / fellow poet-traveller Paul Verlaine). In 'Bad blood', Rimbaud admits to inheriting indolence and restlessness from his Gallic ancestors: 'I have always belonged to an inferior race' (2005: 267). He feels proximity to the serf, leper, mercenary, witch, orphan, tramp, pagan, drunkard, convict, animal, slave and savage. For roving Europeans like him, vagabondage culminates in exploitative adventures overseas:

> Here I am on the shore of Brittany. Let the cities light up in the evening. My day is done. I am leaving Europe. The sea air will burn my lungs. Lost climates will tan me. I will swim, trample the grass, hunt, and smoke especially. I will drink alcohol as strong as boiling metal – just as my dear ancestors did around their fires.
>
> I will come back with limbs of iron and dark skin and furious eyes. By my mask they will think I am from a strong race. I will have gold. I will be idle and brutish. Women nurse these ferocious cripples back from the torrid countries. I will go into politics. Saved.
>
> Now I am accursed. I loathe my country. The best thing for me is to sleep, fully drunk, on the beach. (2005: 269, trans. mod.)

Inverting Fanon's black skin / white mask deception, the vagabond appropriates exotic darkness (from Amerindians?) to become worthy in martial, monetary, sexual and even political terms in France. The magic does not last, however, and he sinks to the rock bottom again. His racial non-belonging is, after all, eternal.

Rimbaud declares, as did Joan of Arc, an innate immunity to biopolitical standards:

> Priests, teachers, masters, you are wrong to turn me over to justice. I have never belonged to this race. I have never been Christian. I am of the breed that sang under torture. I do not understand your laws. I have no moral sense. I am a brute. You are making a mistake.

Deleuze and Guattari are deeply fond of the lines that follow: 'Yes, my eyes are closed to your lights. I am a beast, a Negro' (1983: 86 and

105). It is interesting that their translators render Rimbaud's *nègre* into something polite; the English translation has been 'nigger' until it was recently changed to 'savage'.[6] The poem continues:

> But I can be saved. You are fake niggers; maniacs, wildmen, misers, all of you. Businessman, you are a nigger. Judge, you are a nigger. General, you are a nigger. Emperor, old scratch-head, you are a nigger. You have drunk untaxed liquor from Satan's still. – This nation is inspired by fever and cancer. Cripples and the elderly are so respectable they *ask* to be boiled. – The meanest thing would be to leave this continent, where insanity prowls about to provide hostages for these wretches. I am entering the true kingdom of the children of Ham. (2005: 271, trans. mod.)

The weakness of France is that, from top to bottom, it embodies the very degeneracies attributed to blacks: irrationality, wantonness, stinginess. The more bourgeois, the tastier the cooked white body for a would-be vengeful cannibal. *True* blacks are stronger, with their drums and fierceness, and Rimbaud desires to be one of them and perversely share the curse the Judeo-Christian tradition conferred upon them.[7]

In short, '*desire is part of the infrastructure*' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 104). The Oedipal structure (Rimbaud's perverse masculinity) is not originary but an effect of the spatiotemporal ordering of populations through the state and capitalism: 'Oedipus depends on this sort of nationalistic, religious, racist sentiment, and not the reverse.' Obscure ritualisations of kinship, virility and ancestry precede the very peculiar form of the bourgeois nuclear family. Moreover, inequalities between man and woman, boss and worker, adult and child, king and subjects, master and slave are desired by both parties but in a more direct way than Freud accounts for:

> It was not by means of metaphor, even a paternal metaphor, that Hitler was able to sexually arouse the fascists. It is not by means of a metaphor that a banking or stock-market transaction, a claim, a coupon, a credit, is able to arouse people who are not necessarily bankers.

Schizoanalysis evades the socialist opposition to hegemony, which usually reproduces the white patriarchical utilitarianism and paranoia that drive capitalism in the first place. For this it returns to Rimbaud's intoxicated deterritorialisation of whiteness:

> The revolutionary unconscious investment is such that desire, still in its own mode, cuts across the interest of the dominated, exploited classes, and causes flows to move that are capable of breaking apart both the segregations and their Oedipal applications – flows capable of hallucinating history, of reanimating the races in delirium, of setting continents ablaze.

> No, I am not of your kind, I am the outsider and the deterritorialized. 'I am of a race inferior for all eternity . . . I am a beast, a Negro.' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 105)

The final formula on the matter reads: 'Delirium has something like two poles, racist and racial, paranoiac-segregative and schizonomadic.' Delirium is understood here as central to capitalism: the madness of the scramble for Africa (Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*), the suicidal arrogance of Wall Street. Racist assemblages can only be maintained through the desperate exclusion or incarceration of bodies that may threaten them – thieves, terrorists, addicts, communists. A distinction needs to be drawn in these obsessive configurations between the forces tending towards racial aggregation and those tending towards what Deleuze (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 131) calls 'molecular races like little lines which no longer respond to the great molar oppositions', which may well subtend racism (Saldanha 2010). As Freud knew well, segregation inevitably sets up the possibility of transgressing it.

Paranoiac segregation and schizonomadism do not form a dialectic, because the latter always runs a little too much ahead for the former relate to it. Racism is what race leads to under certain conditions. When racism is established, the productive dimension of race is domesticated but not obliterated. The task of schizoanalysis is to retrieve the mobility, indeterminancy, subversion in race. Good literature is defined by its capacity to overcome the ubiquitous postcolonial obsessions with the past and *invent a people* that no existing group can claim,

> a bastard people, inferior, dominated, always in becoming, always incomplete. *Bastard* no longer designates a familial state, but the process or drift of the races. I am a beast, a Negro of an inferior race for all eternity. This is the *becoming* of the writer. (Deleuze 1997: 4)

Partly inspired by Deleuze and Guattari, many lyrical travels of Alphonso Lingis (1998) offer glimpses of an ethics of joyous becoming within racial difference. The hyperproductivity of technocapital itself sweeps up fragments of becoming which, before they are reterritorialised on to the commodity or nostalgia, can be seized to construct new affective bonds. But what kind of 'new'?

The First Deviances are Racial

The second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* offers a more systematic catalogue of modalities through which the segregative and schizoid attractors of racialising capitalism develop themselves. It is

no coincidence that the volume's most tantalising statement on race is found in its great archaeological portion theorising the state as a bio-political megamachine averting the nomadic war machine and thriving on mythology, taxation, royal science and segmentarity:

> The race-tribe exists only at the level of an oppressed race, and in the name of the oppression it suffers: there is no race but inferior, minoritarian; there is no dominant race; a race is defined not by its purity but rather by the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination. Bastard and mixed-blood are the true names of race. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 379)

Immediately after this proclamation, Deleuze and Guattari repeat Rimbaud's self-nomination as racially aleatory and inferior. They ask, 'what can be done to prevent the theme of race from turning into a racism, a dominant and all-encompassing fascism, or into a sect and a folklore, microfascisms?' The impurities and politics of *race* exceed the purification programmes of *racism*. Nomad thought is radically forget-ful of lineage and emerges from non-essentialisable intercontinental composites of environments and spiritualities: 'race only exists in the constitution of a tribe that peoples and traverses smooth space.' The disavowed *truth* of race consists in its vanishing from categorisation.

The quotation above supplies one important improvement vis-à-vis *Anti-Oedipus*: a new concept of minorities, which 'are not necessarily defined by the smallness of their numbers but rather by becoming or a line of fluctuation, in other words, by the gap that separates them from this or that axiom constituting a redundant majority' (1987: 469). Of all antiracist terms, the minor has proved the most fertile (for instance, Lecercle 2002; Zamberlin 2006). The concept is elaborated in Deleuze and Guattari's study of Kafka (1986), the Jew from Prague who wrote not in Czech (reterritorialising on nationality), Hebrew (reterritorialis-ing on race) or Yiddish (reterritorialising on folklore), but German, the language of Kant and Goethe – as well as of Bismarck and Hitler.

Kafka's minoritarian status derives from forcing a dominant language to do things its guardians never expected it could do, in the name of an as yet non-existent collective without state, birthplace or ideology, a people 'to come' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 377). Majorities are not only hegemonic but imperialist and bureaucratic, while minorities are non-denumerable or fuzzy sets which majorities, with state and capitalist axiomatics, attempt to capture, manage and gain profit from. Across the European Union today, the resentful stupidity of xenophobic populism and the petty defence of possession are logical outcomes of the liberal nation-state. Revising Kant, Deleuzian politics posits, as Peter

Hallward (2001) suggests, the universalisability not of common sense and laws, which follow majority interests after all, but of their ubiquitous margins: 'Minority as a universal figure, or becoming-everybody/everything (*devenir tout le monde*). Woman: we all have to become that, whether we are male or female. Nonwhite: we all have to become that, whether we are white, yellow, or black' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 470).

Why are molecular races so easily made harmless through populism and the census? Plateau 7 argues that, in Western civilisation, all bodies are overcoded by a faciality machine comprising religious iconography, urban planning, audiovisual and information technologies, novels, clothing, tools, speech – anything that identifies bodies as belonging to consumer and residential aggregates. Capitalism continually expands its surfaces to generate profit from faciality, proliferating databases and screens everywhere we go. Facialisation employs an ever-swelling grid of choices organised biunivocally: man or woman, straight or gay, sexy or ugly, etc. 'You don't so much have a face as slide into one' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 177). This grid has now become paradigmatic in the social-networking megamachine Facebook. In eight years it facialised one billion bodies, thanks to the countless libidinal investments its pages absorb. The twenty-year-old Harvard student who launched Facebook (interestingly, initially only for Ivy League students) is a billionaire. A film had to follow. As Guattari says, 'Capitalist profit *is* basically the production of subjective power' (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 45, my emphasis).

The norm overdetermining faciality's pigeonholing is what Deleuze and Guattari call White Man, whose first incarnation the Renaissance and colonial missionaries retroactively claimed in the birth (or more precisely death) of Jesus.

> If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence-types, are racial . . . Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves . . . From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 178)

Richard Dyer (1997) illustrates how the privileging of heterosexual whiteness, starting with the pictorial whitening of sacred figures from the Middle East and Northern Africa, continues unabated in cinema and

advertising (and, we should add, not just in the West). Like their concept of delirium, Deleuze and Guattari's concept of faciality does not simply insist that there are 'intersections' of phenotype, sexuality and power, but holds that the 'first' differences created by state-stimulated capitalism are racial. This is because differences are selected and cultivated against a biopolitical backdrop of colonialism. While hallucination and art are local oscillations between the paranoid-segregating pole and the schizoid-amalgamating pole (witness the molecular races in Hieronymus Bosch's Christian fantasies), faciality is a planet-wide technocapitalist apparatus devouring difference and reproducing it 'in its own image', as Marx and Engels would say. Instead of a dialectic of white European self and excluded brown other, racism is *inclusive* in so far as it embraces the entire species by measuring each body's proximity to White Man. Representation and capitalism are *intrinsically* racialising, whether in France, Japan or Mexico. Ideology is involved only as the tip of a machinic iceberg.

Probe-heads

We have seen that Deleuze's metaphysics ultimately strives for the thoughtful disappearance from all predicates. Faciality can and should be dismantled but it is dangerous because its other side is entirely unknown. Defacialising is certainly not returning to a primitive realm or appropriating Eastern 'wisdom' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 186–9). New Ageism mostly rehashes white masculine fantasies of transcendence (Saldanha 2007). Defacialisation brings forth 'probe-heads' (*têtes chercheuses*), little faceless fragments looking forever for an owner, which can be temporarily reassembled into a collective becoming as part of an antiracist politics.

Examples of racial becomings can be found across the musical spectrum. Eugene Holland (2008) hears in the improvisational techniques of jazz, for example, a people-to-come irreducible to the racist world in which it originated. Probe-heads are especially prevalent in popular electronic music, where deejaying, sampling and voice are often used beyond the trenchant black / white divide. An articulate probe-head-creator is DJ Spooky, who produced an audiovisual remix of the quintessential biopolitical epic, D. W. Griffith's *The Birth of the Nation* (1915), with its notorious support of the Klu Klux Klan as harbinger of law and order in the American South. The smooth space of Spooky's eclectic music, as juxtaposed with Griffith's facialisation of Reconstruction Era populations, spawns probe-heads commonly suppressed. Deleuze (1986: 30–2

and 148–51) identifies in Griffith's montage and close-ups the invention of an 'organic' nation-building representation, uniting men and women and poor and rich, effectively hiding the nation's patriarchal and racist violence.[8] Deleuze says the American Dream has two 'ethical' tendencies, the melting pot and the deft leader. Imagining a national 'community' is always a majoritarian facialisation and territorialisation of its constituent populations. From such organicist representations as Griffith's, probe-heads can be knocked off only with large doses of irony and cunning.

In painting, one could point to the defacialisations of French pop artist Gérard Fromanger. Deleuze (1999: 64) understands his friend to be an 'artist-mechanic of a civilisation' who, with effaced figures and commodity iconography set in everyday Parisian street scenes, reduces the great metropolis to complexes of contrasting colours and temperatures serving as place-holders for any urban body whatsoever. Another friend of Fromanger, Foucault, focuses on the bursting-out of images which the combined technique of photography+painting accomplishes, a speediness indexed by Paris's crowds and passages:

> The paintings no longer need represent the street; they are streets, roads, paths across the continents, to the very heart of China or Africa . . . Fromanger's painting [of the black street-cleaner, 1974] discovers and liberates a whole series of events buried in the distance: rain in the forest, the village square, the desert, the swarming people. (Foucault 1999: 98–9)

Foucault's eye catches probe-heads leaping from the canvas, and they become reterritorialised upon exoticist images of the street-cleaner's supposed birthplace. But this is precisely the argument: the event that matters is the encounter between probe-heads and eye. While the faciality machine has migrant labourers *already* categorised when it emits their image, Fromanger's art requires Foucault's imagination (I myself don't see any Africa or China, just Paris). Fromanger's probe-heads themselves contain no nostalgia, no moralism, no feel-good multiculturalism or exoticism. Unlike many on the post-1968 left, especially regarding Maoist China and anti-imperialism, Deleuze (1999: 76) hails Fromanger's lack of resentment: 'It is strange, the way a revolutionary only acts because of what he loves in the very world he wishes to destroy.'

A second friend of Deleuze worth revisiting in light of revolutionary race-becoming is Michel Tournier, whose *Friday* effectuates a remarkable spin on one of the foundational narratives of colonial capitalism, Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719): white man lands on deserted

island, cultivates island, enslaves and civilises savage man. Robinson masters nature through the construction of a home, domestication of goats and cereal, schedules, prayer, etc. When the half-caste savage he will name Friday arrives, and later a sailor, the latter are inserted into a proto-colonial scheme once Robinson has saved them from their persecutors.

> My Island was now peopled, and I thought myself very rich in Subjects; and it was a merry Reflection which I frequently made, How like a King I look'd. First of all, the whole Country was my own meer Property; so that I had an undoubted Right of Dominion. *2ndly*, My People were perfectly subjected: I was absolute Lord and Law-giver; they all owed their Lives to me, and were ready to lay down their Lives, *if there had been Occasion of it*, for me. It was remarkable too, we had but three Subjects, and they were of three different Religions. My Man *Friday* was a Protestant, his Father was a *Pagan* and a *Cannibal*, and the *Spaniard* was a Papist: However, I allow'd Liberty of Conscience throughout my Dominions. (Defoe 2001: 222)

All features of biopower are in place: property, sovereignty, division of labour, readiness for war, even multiculturalism. The three bodies form a population fully facialised. Deleuze remarks, in light of *Suzanne and the Pacific* by Jean Giraudoux, how the Robinson myth depends on Friday being

> docile towards work, happy to be a slave, and too easily disgusted by cannibalism. Any healthy reader would dream of seeing him eat Robinson. *Robinson Crusoe* represents the best illustration of that thesis which affirms the close ties between capitalism and Protestantism. (2004: 12)

In Tournier's novel, however, the Weberian thesis is foreclosed by injecting the crucially missing dimensions of eroticism and delirium (sadly, Luis Buñuel's *Robinson Crusoe* allows for just a little to enter). According to Deleuze drawing on Lacan, the Other-structure (the big anonymous Other) dissolves to make room for a pure confrontation with the island's sheer elementality. Not content with mere survival, Tournier's Robinson obsessively produces useless surpluses of goods and planning; furthermore, through new voluptuous rites, he indulges in secret becomings-mandrake, -goat, -solar, -island.

Friday is immediately facialised (no exterior in racist capitalism!), but gradually disrupts Robinson's neurotic adherence to the Other-structure of England. Seemingly naively, he not only sabotages Robinson's entire edifice but makes him incrementally shed his civilisation and love him as brother and superior in knowing the environment. The probe-heads

liberated when Friday accidentally blows up the island reconstitute Robinson from White Man to something neither savage nor white nor even man. So Friday 'alone is able to guide and complete the meta-morphosis that Robinson began and to reveal to him its sense and its aim' (Deleuze 1990: 315–16). In a remarkable ironic twist, Tournier has Friday choose England above any loyalty to Robinson when a ship finally arrives after twenty-eight years. As Ronald Bogue (2009) con-cludes, Deleuze finds his politics of transformation fully affirmed in the multilayered antiracism of *Friday*.

What about probe-heads constituting antiracist 'truth procedures' (Badiou) other than art – science, love and politics? In science, Darwin himself has for decades offered resources for jettisoning the callow models of sexual and racial difference still used by the majority of scien-tists (two famous examples being Dobzhansky 1955 and Gould 1981). Elizabeth Grosz (2004) is at the forefront in reclaiming the disruptive dimensions of evolutionary thought for feminist and antiracist theory. Deleuze's concept of love is implicit, closely entwined with that of friendship, clearly favouring relationships of mutual becoming wherein it is the physical singularity (not, as in Badiou, fidelity woven from irrec-oncilable femininity and masculinity) of each partner that inaugurates and sustains the becoming. 'Interracial' love risks becoming facialised through the density of taboos and stereotypes it negotiates and it is not by itself a Deleuzian tactic. Still, whatever creates the conditions for such love to eventuate should be bolstered in so far as its intensity proves the tide of faciality it tries to escape. And to create conditions there has to be politics.

True Names for Antiracism

It is easy to chastise Deleuze for refusing to theorise how transracial becomings can and do gain momentum beyond affective singularities to demolish the racist-paranoid structures he and Guattari so accurately map. Whereas, in the radical tradition, the masses are mobilised by clearly naming the enemy ('bourgeoisie', 'imperialists', 'patriarchy', 'pigs') and rallying around names whose very sound stirs up hopes of new belongings ('freedom', 'workers', 'black power'), Deleuze is methodical in seeing in nomination and leadership the loss of the masses' essentially molecular massiveness. But Deleuze does not have the last word on where his thought goes. In a well-known joke, he understands 'the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception. I [see] myself as taking an author from

behind and giving him a child that would be his own child, yet monstrous' (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 6). Such queer coupling is especially apt for begetting concepts capable of addressing racisms outside the confines of Parisian philosophy circles.

Bastard and mixed-blood are the 'true names' of race. In truth, in itself, race is entanglement and unknowable kinship, while the function of civilisation is to impede bastard and mixed-blood bodies. What race is, ontologically speaking, is most fundamentally what *escapes* categories of filiation which are only false distortions of underlying singularities of phenotype and behaviour. If Deleuze and Guattari's concept of truth here is weak (compare Badiou's or Sartre's), the appeal to naming is even more so. But what if we take their declaration literally, as if they are proposing a new slogan? Unlike what Guattari says in the epigraph to this chapter, naming *is* indispensable for politics precisely to work through instead of merely regret its fragility. By being an integral component *within* the singularisation it names, a decisively subversive name pre-empts its usurpation by the status quo. Deleuze agrees with structuralism that language is a transcendental, impersonal system of differences which confers on words their capacity to signify, but emphasises its dissipative, always adulterated nature (Lecercle 2002). Naming is not imprisoning 'meaning' but virtualisation, a reshaping of practice. A name creates new contact surfaces for the multiplicity it names, and on rare occasions jams the structure from which it was pinched.

What political naming consists in can be formalised with the help of the strange 'anthropology of the name' proposed by Sylvain Lazarus. Like Badiou a former student of Althusser's, Lazarus is, in many respects, at odds with Deleuze and Guattari. They nevertheless agree that post-sixties politics cannot occur within the constrictions of state, party, class, identity or Hegelian dialectic (on 'dedialectalisation', see Lazarus 1996: 170–7). 'Politics, in this sequence [Lenin's, February–October 1917], is in a never-ending discussion with history, just as with philosophy, while maintaining disjunctive relations with both. Politics is charged with assuming its own thought, internal to itself' (Lazarus 2007: 260).

'Anthropology' is the framework for seizing singularities because it comprehends the statement *people think* without having to specify which people, though Lazarus takes care not to regress into populism or relativism. The force of the name is entirely immanent, generated by directly plunging the political practices happening under its banner into the Lacanian real of the sociopolitical situation, which itself cannot be named. Building on Badiou's reading (2005a: 31–4), what grants the

name reality for Lazarus is, firstly, that it is not descriptive but *prescriptive* (it names a people to come); secondly, that it is *singular*, never objectified in a referent (it gathers bodies without facialising them); and thirdly, that the name is entirely bound to the geographical *places* whose very materiality likewise becomes politically subjective and prescriptive (interstices of striated space, especially of cities, are made smooth and eventual – and repeatedly so: think of Syntagma Square in Athens). Names give deterritorialisation direction.

For Lazarus, political thinking begins only if a rupture has been definitively named and prescribed as necessary with simple words already available. Such words exist outside what is acceptable and cannot represent identities, but literally bring to being that which *will have been* unified. Badiou locates the prototype of such illegal hopeful naming in Saint Paul's nomination of heterogeneous bodies as Christian, whose universality traverses existing differences between Jews, Greeks, Romans, men, women, philosophers and lay people, 'for if differences are the material of the world, it is only so that the singularity proper to the subject of truth – a singularity that is itself included in the becoming of the universal – can puncture that material' (2003: 101). What Guattari calls singularisation coincides with what Badiou calls universalisation, provided they are both understood to cut through mere materiality.

Badiou devotes one of the densest sections of *Being and Event* to mathematically proving the seeming paradox that a name can conjure something indiscernible in a present situation (2005b: 372–87). The paradox can be grasped by emphasising the retroactive temporality of prescriptive nomination: the name names a collective risk-taking, a hypothesis which wagers that the future will gradually make it less precarious.

> On the surface of the situation, a generic procedure is signalled in particular by this nominal *aura* which surrounds its finite configurations, which is to say its subjects . . . The names generated – or rather, composed – by a subject are suspended, with respect to their signification, from the 'to-come' of a truth. (Badiou 2005b: 398)

The name is an infinitisation, to borrow a word Guattari (2006: 87) introduces in a note on revolution. The name contains affects capable of pulling ever more bodies into a becoming away from the status quo. The politics of Lazarus (Badiou) and Guattari (Deleuze) differ in that, for the former, subjectivity is 'homogeneous' – bodies lose their differences through an experience of the prescriptive force of the name and

its places – whereas, for the latter, subjectification entails continuous 'heterogenesis'. Deleuze and Guattari would rejoice about the infinitisation that took place on Cairo's Tahrir Square in early 2011 as much as Badiou does, but, for them, naming it communist would sabotage its multiplicitous desires for change. Where Lazarus and Badiou trust the thought that political subjects deliver to the philosopher, Deleuze and Guattari are supremely attuned to the microfascism lurking in every subjectivity.

Bastardisation, Crossbreeding

Two examples of the successful repoliticisation of names are *freak* and *queer* (though note that the communism of Lazarus demands more ambitious naming; he examines only the name 'worker', and its place, the factory). Hippies discovered that the existing connotations of monstrosity, deviance and obsession associated with 'freak' could be harnessed to give their decision to drop out a name (Saldanha 2007). Likewise, queer theory and activism discover that the reversal of a slur becomes a battle cry. Importantly, to be effective, *freak* and *queer* cannot merely be oppositional identities and remain at the level of sexuality. Deleuzian queering necessarily spills over into antiracism (Tukhanen 2009). The need to become-freak and become-queer is universal in capitalism.

Also importantly, such discovery of a name averts the word wars characterising public spheres the world over. Judith Butler asserts: '*the state produces hate speech*' (1997: 77). Nominalist neuroses are symptomatic of faciality having encapsulated, disjoined and depoliticised dynamic minorities. Hence, for example, 'the turn against the lyrics of gangsta rap may also operate as a deflection from a more fundamental analysis on race, poverty and rage, and how those conditions are graphically registered in African-American popular musical genres' (Butler 1997: 23).[9] The question is how materialist analysis can forge revolutionary trajectories not hampered by loaded identity-names such as 'African-American'.

Antiracist words therefore exist, though we do not know yet what they are. In the US, the creative revaluations of the N-word in black slang are necessary but by further hystericising the public sphere they prevent more properly political naming (Kennedy 2002). And we should go further than Rimbaud's 'I am a nigger.' The scandalous adoption of a denigrated identity depends on the assumption that 'nigger' ('Negro', 'black') is a stable predicate and Rimbaud is recognisably not it. When antiracism exclaims that we are all Jews, blacks, Palestinians or creoles,

one particularity is singled out to be universalised. When Deleuze names Palestinians 'Indians', whom the state of Israel tries to expunge, he takes antiracism one cogent step further (2006: 194–200). Yet even such substitution retains (American) indigeneity as ideal. As Deleuze suggests himself, the Palestinian struggle is at its most forceful when it is considered, just as the struggle against anti-Semitism, entirely *unexceptional*. Echoing Nietzsche, Palestinians

> want to become what they are, that is, a people with an 'unexceptional' status. As opposed to history as apocalypse, there is a sense of history as possibility, the multiplicity of what is possible, the profusion of multiple possibilities at every moment. (Deleuze 2006: 199–200)

Deleuze understood, as Butler, Badiou and Žižek do today (see Aloni 2011), that Israel's systematic use of an allegedly absolute trauma to justify the worst racist biopolitics is of the greatest geopolitical and philosophical urgency. He would also criticise how the memorialisation of the apocalypse of 9/11 similarly allows the US to unleash its gigantic paranoid imperial war apparatus. Becoming has no place for exceptionalism.

What thwarts all claims to identity can only be the proclamation of universal orphanage and miscegenation: 'I am a bastard, my blood is mixed.' This formula is more precise than Rimbaud's famous 'I is an other' (in a letter, 2005: 370), which is not a political naming but a basic Lacanian formula. Let us examine the two names in turn. Growing up a bastard precludes recognised parentage, hence inheritance and entitlement. Bastards cannot be claimed as progeny. In all civilisations, but especially during European colonialism, the shame surrounding orphanage maintains patrilineal caste, class and racial barriers.

Suppose this shame be turned into affirmation? By redeeming the name *bastard*, the North American non-profit Bastard Nation (www.bastardnation.org) fights for the unconditional right of access to birth records for adoptees. As the flows of babies managed by the adoption industry reinforce the racial-economic striations of globalisation (Madonna in Malawi, Angelina Jolie in Cambodia), the politics of Bastard Nation would require the internationalisation of their efforts and dropping the focus on individuals' identity issues. It starts to do this by taking a stand against importing Haiti's earthquake orphans.

For Deleuze–Guattari the objective should not be rights for bastards in one nation-state, however, but the bastardisation of all households and genealogies. The name Bastard then becomes a more radical call for a universal attack on possession, heteronormativity and paternalism

through what *Anti-Oedipus* calls the orphan-unconscious (1983: 82). Since most property changes hands between men, it is no coincidence that the derogatory term *bastard* is gendered as male (calling a man a bastard emasculates him; patronym and ownership are cut off). It is in White Man that bastardisation is most urgent. The 'burden' of global antiracism lies primarily not with adoptees, trafficked women or refugees but with White Man, made accountable by molecular revolutions of orphans joining ranks.

Why exactly has the increasing circulation of the evidence for widespread and unexpected entanglement of gene flows changed so little? In Thailand as in Sweden, in Saudi Arabia as in Alabama, bodies are still effortlessly categorised. Giving a *name* such as Mixed-Blood to the irrevocable impurity of DNA samples at least hails the unclassifiability of a human body, a life. Mixed-Blood is no utopian veiling of phenotypical patterns. Building on the illicit affects which blood and mixture evoke, it first exposes a 'system of domination' based on purification and facialising databases, then suggests truth follow rather a line of *impurification*. Robert Young (1995: chapters 6 and 7), drawing on Deleuze–Guattari, and Ann Laura Stoler (1995), drawing on Foucault, argue that colonial biopolitics produced *both* anxious policies to protect settlers (workers, bourgeois, women and children, in different ways) from contamination from the tropical natives *and* an 'ambivalent driving desire at the heart of racialism: a compulsive libidinal attraction disavowed by an equal insistence on repulsion' (Young 1995: 149). Mixed-Blood validates the manifest proliferation of half-breeds and the subsequent bastardisation of cultural norms occurring under all invasion and slavery. That miscegenation often resulted from rape, expulsion and sex tourism *avant la lettre* reminds us, however, that the name Mixed-Blood should not prescribe interracial sex as much as the foreclosing of any claim to genealogical integrity.

Inspired by rhizomatics and the post-plantation languages of the Americas, and in a far more materialist and fluid vein than Paul Gilroy's oceanisation of blackness (1993), the recently deceased Martinican writer Édouard Glissant elaborates a theory of creolity qua new universality implanted in the postcolonial predicament. *Métissage* or cross-breeding is not simply combining or blending entities which were pure before. Creolity is creative and erratic *because* it is a sensuous but serious engagement with the quotidian exchanges across racial and geographical difference. Biology and geology are not metaphors here; languages and imaginations mix like blood and currents do. Against the earlier Francophone geopoetic vitalism of negritude (Jones 2009),

today's Caribbean thinkers shun the remythologisation of origins and what Glissant (1997) calls filiation. Glissant restores not only the deterritorialising impetus of Central America but also subversive metropolitan exoticism (Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Segalen); whiteness has often mocked itself too.

In an open letter to the first black president of the USA, Glissant and Patrick Chamoiseau (2009) evince cautious hope that, from the capitalist and military mayhem Barack Obama inherited, a new global black consciousness can be named, as the epigraph to this chapter puts it, not as an identity but as a becoming. Such para-black politics of the Whole-World (*Tout-monde*) derives from the *contingency* of the oppression of sub-Saharan Africans and their diasporas, not from (the desirability of) their cultural coherence. Another contemporary Caribbean theorist, Alain Foix (2009), understands Obama and Mandela as belonging to that great anticolonial tradition whose first success was the Haitian Revolution, with today's global racist assemblage demanding the same powerful optimism of two centuries ago.

The Brazilian psychoanalyst Suely Rolnik (1998), who organised Guattari's tour of Brazil just when future president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was becoming known as opposition leader under the dictatorship, suggests a synonym of Mixed-Blood perfect for Brazil: cannibalism (*anthropofagia*). Much inspired by Freud, the 1928 *Manifesto Antropófago* of surreal poet Oswald de Andrade demanded that Brazilians work through the stereotypes of savages and the uneasy imposition of Christianity, not to reach a dialectical synthesis of Old and New World but to create a new humanity particular to Brazil. Like Rimbaud, Brazil is strong enough to announce that it does not fit the European scheme, that it cannibalises the Other (= Europe), that it is in-itself, ontologically, *other* (Viveiros de Castro 2009). Rolnik discusses the proximity of Andrade's and Deleuze–Guattari's wariness of identity-thinking, noting that Brazil's history is indeed one of miscegenation and maladaptation. She warns, however, that anthropophagy should never be confused with mere hedonism. The celebration of Brazil's biocultural splendour (beaches, samba, rainforest, football) feeds a patriotism almost as visceral and commercialised as the USA's. 'The machinic-anthropophagic unconscious is not exclusive to the tropics and even less to Brazilians. As principle immanent to the production of subjectivity it is proper to the human species as a whole' (1998: 474, my trans.). Instead of becoming-Brazilian, therefore, Mixed-Blood names a becoming-cannibal in which all modern humans are to engage.

Bastard and Mixed-Blood are the names for the schizoid underbelly

of race. Instead of dwelling in the spaces the hegemonic system has conferred upon them, the *truly* racialised and sexualised subjects of a militant left embrace the cracks between categories and thereby challenge White Man Himself to dissolution. As Guattari reminds his audience in Brazil, 'One of the conditions for the maintenance of capitalist societies is that they should be modeled on a certain axiomatic of subjective segregation. If blacks did not exist, it would be necessary to invent them somehow.' Segregation and paranoia cannot be broken with the politics of reaction so prevalent in antiracism. As Lazarus asserts, true politics breaks with history itself. Guattari continues:

> What seems to me to be important in these issues is to get away from a purely defensive character in the struggle of minorities – 'we are victims, nobody recognizes our rights' – and, on the contrary, to develop an offensive position that, as in the work of Rimbaud, evokes a 'becoming-black', a becoming-Indian . . . a becoming-woman, a becoming-homosexual, or a becoming-child. (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 107)

If madness and faciality expose the two poles of the fundamentally racialised workings of majoritarian globalisation, the 'first' becomings are racial and subvert received stereotypes: becoming-cannibal, becoming-Moor, becoming-nigger, becoming-Indian, becoming-vagabond. Resentment and exceptionalism are very frequent obstacles to combatting racism. Amid the various becomings, to invent and assemble them and give them direction, this chapter advocates a stronger nomination procedure than Deleuze and Guattari offer precisely in order to *sustain* their antifascist singularisation. A people-to-come – or better, simply *people*-to-come – capable of overthrowing White Man can be gathered once names are found and resignified in decidedly minoritarian and generic fashion. While it is unlikely that Bastard and Mixed-Blood turn out to be these names, what is important for now is that they affectively point to a revolutionary universality that biopolitical capitalism does not want you to know.

Notes

1. See Simone Bignall's critique of postcolonial theory's Hegelianism (2010). On Christian Kerslake's thorough reconstruction (2009), Deleuze completes the critical project inaugurated by Kant and refined by Hegel, Schelling, Freud, Heidegger and others. Though this is a crucial philosophical option, I side here with a Marxian and geophilosophical route capable of explaining how the brilliance of Kant's transcendental turn and universalism obscures the bourgeois and colonial schemes of his place and time, which he paradoxically justified (Eigen and Larrimore 2006). It can be objected that such 'geohistoricism' evades the eternally

productive paradoxicality that is the Enlightenment, but the question is whether a critical universalist outlook could not *end* instead of start with Kant.

2. Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari note the contemporaneous justification of the modern nation-state in State philosophy: 'Common sense, the unity of all the faculties at the center constituted by the Cogito, is the State consensus raised to the absolute. This was most notably the great operation of the Kantian "critique", renewed and developed by Hegelianism' (1987: 376).

3. A foundational statement of dialectical antiracism is Jean-Paul Sartre's 1948 *Anti-Semite and Jew* (1995). Major post-Hegelian inspirations for antiracism include Giorgio Agamben (1999), Alain Badiou (2005a), Seyla Benhabib (2004), Judith Butler (1997), Jacques Derrida (2001), Paul Gilroy (1993), Charles Taylor, et al. (1994) and Slavoj Žižek (2006). Only a handful of antiracist theorists find their inspiration in Nietzsche rather than Hegel or moral philosophy (Brown 2010; Gooding-Williams 2006; Scott and Franklin 2006).

4. Committed to introducing a new paradigm for the antidogmatic *cogito*, Deleuze's solo-authored œuvre largely confines the conceptualisation of individuation-through-multiplicity to the *singular* human organism. Only with Guattari does he engage the properly *populational* thinking characteristic of geophilosophy (Antonioli 2003).

5. Given that Guattari hardly mentions race in his preparatory writings (2006), it is an open question whether it was Deleuze who insisted on the centrality of the theme of race for reconceptualising Oedipus.

6. While 'nigger' is admittedly too loaded, 'savage' does not account for the fact that Deleuze and Guattari frame Rimbaldian becoming in racial and not merely cultural terms (becoming-black). Rimbaud inaugurated a legacy of such becoming. Another of Deleuze's great literary inspirations, Henry Miller, pinpointed in 1946 the Nietzschean, nomadic, 'assassinating' (derived, it is to be remembered, from the Arabic *hasisi*, the hashish-eaters) vector in what Rimbaud called his 'pagan' or 'nigger book'. Miller calls his own first publication, *Tropic of Cancer*, his 'nigger book' (1962: 47). His essay seeks throughout a new spiritualisation of what is blasphemous to industrial modernity and *nigger* becomes the basest name for this elusive goal. The first to have been touched by Rimbaud's becoming-black was obviously his lover Paul Verlaine: 'You, dead! Dead! But dead at least the way / You wanted: white Negro, splendidly civilized / Savage, civilizing as you went . . . / Dead! I'd say burning brightly on in me' ('To Arthur Rimbaud', 1999: 219). In *Psychedelic White* (2007), I argue that such transracial intensity is finally constitutive of whiteness itself.

7. Ham or Canaan, son of Noah, was cursed for having sex either with Noah himself while the latter was drunk, or with Noah's wife (Genesis 9: 20–5). Black Africans have been traditionally identified as his descendants (Canaanites).

8. Deleuze was always swayed by the lines of flight composing American art, which he discerned especially in what could be named 'race traitors' (Ignatieff and Garvey 1996), such as Miller, Kerouac and Castaneda. 'What other reason is there for writing than to be traitor to one's own reign, traitor to one's sex, to one's class, to one's majority?' (Deleuze, in Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 44). But we also need to explain how these New World becomings were precisely what constituted light-skinned privilege.

9. Watch the 2008 music video of Ice Cube's 'Gangsta Rap Made Me Do It' for a vernacular and visceral rejoinder to Butler's argument. The twist in Ice Cube's masculinist logic makes his analysis of racist materiality all the more compelling.

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Chapter 1

Face Race

Claire Colebrook

Defacing and Facing Humanity

The human race is facing extinction. One might even say that there is a race towards extinction, precisely because humanity has constituted itself as a race. The idea of a single species, seemingly different but ultimately grounded on a humanity of right and reason, has enabled human exceptionalism, and this (in turn) has precluded any questioning of humanity's right to life. In *actuality*, humanity is not a race; it becomes a racial unity only via the virtual, or what Deleuze and Guattari describe as a process of territorialisation, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. In the beginning is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the 'intense germinal influx', *from which* individuated bodies (both organic and social) emerge. Race or racism is not the result of discrimination; on the contrary, it is only by repressing the highly complex differentials that compose *any* being that something like the notion of 'a' race can occur. This is why Deleuze and Guattari argue for a highly intimate relation between sex and race: all life is sexual, for living bodies are composed of relations among differential powers that produce new events: encounters of potentialities that intertwine to form stabilities. Race and racism occur through such intersections of desire, whereby bodies assemble to form territories. All bodies and identities are the result of territorialisation, so that race (or kinds) unfolds from sex, at the same time that sexes (male or female) unfold from encounters of genetic differences. All couplings are of mixed race.

It is through the formation of a relatively stable set of relations that bodies are effected in common. A body becomes an individual through gathering or assembling (enabling the formation of a territory). A social body, tribe or collective begins with the formation of a common space or territory but is *de*territorialised when the group is individuated by an

external body – when a chieftain appears as the law or eminent individual whose divine power comes from 'on high'. This marks the socius *as* this or that specified group. *Race* occurs through *re*territorialisation, when the social body is not organised from without (or via some transcendent, external term) but appears to be the expression of the ground; the people are an expression of a common ground or *Volk*. The most racially determined group of all is that of 'man', for no other body affirms its unity with such shrill insistence. 'Humanity' presents itself as a natural unified species, with man as biological ground from which *racism* might then be seen as a differentiation.

The problem with racism is not that it discriminates, nor that it takes one natural humanity and then perverts it into separate groups. On the contrary, racism does not discriminate enough; it does not recognise that 'humanity,' 'Caucasian' and 'Asian' are insufficiently distinguished. Humanity is a virtuality or majority of a monstrous and racial sort. One body – the white man of reason – is taken as the figure for life in general. A production of desire – the image of 'man' that was the effect of history and social groupings – is now seen as the ground of desire. Ultimately, a metalepsis takes place: despite seeming differences, it is imagined that, deep down, we are all the same. And because of this monstrous production of 'man in general', who is then placed *before* difference as the unified human ground from which different races appear, a trajectory of extinction appears to be relentless. Man's self-evident unity, along with the belief in a historical unfolding that occurs as a greater and greater recognition of identity (the supposed overcoming of tribalism towards the recognition of one giant body of human reason), precludes any question of humanity's composition, its emergence from difference and distinction and the further possibility of its un-becoming.

Humanity has been fabricated as the proper ground of all life – so much so that threats to all life on earth are being dealt with today by focusing on how *man* may adapt, mitigate and survive. Humanity has become so enamoured of the image it has painted of its illusory beautiful life that it has not only come close to vanquishing all other life forms, and has not only imagined itself as a single and self-evidently valuable being with a right to life, it can also only a imagine a future of *living on* rather than face the threat of living otherwise. Part of the problem of humanity as a race lies in the ambivalent status of art, for art is the figure that separates white man *par excellence*; humanity has no essence other than that of free self-creation, and so all seemingly different peoples or others must come to recognise their differences as merely cultural, as the effect of one great history of self-distinction. On the other hand, if art

were to be placed outside the human, as the persistence of sensations and matters that cannot be reduced to human intentionality, then 'we' might begin to discern the pulsation of differences in a time other than that of self-defining humanity.

Far from extinction or human annihilation being solely a twenty-first-century event (although it is that too), *art* is tied essentially to the non-existence of man. Art has often quite explicitly considered the relation between humanity and extinction. For it is the nature of the art object to exist beyond its animating intention, both intimating a people not yet present (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 180), and yet also often pre-supposing a unified humanity or common 'lived'. Wordsworth – yes, Wordsworth! – was at once aware that the *sense* of a poem or work could not be reduced to its material support, for humanity is always more than any of the signs it uses to preserve its existence:

> Oh! why hath not the Mind
> Some element to stamp her image on
> In nature somewhat nearer to her own?
> Why, gifted with such powers to send abroad
> Her spirit, must it lodge in shrines so frail?
> (1850, *The Prelude* V 45–9: 109)

If the archive were to be destroyed, would anything of 'man' remain? Art gives man the ability to imagine himself as eternally present, beyond any particular epoch or text, and yet also places this eternity in the fragile tomb of a material object: 'Even if the material lasts only for a few seconds it will give sensation the power to exist and be preserved in itself *in the eternity that coexists with this short duration*' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 166). 'Man' as a race (as a unified body imagining himself as a natural kind) is essentially tied to extinction: for man is at once an *ex post facto* or metaleptic positing of that which must have been there all along, awaiting eternal expression, at the same time that 'man' is also that being who hastens extinction in general by imagining himself as a single tradition solely worthy of eternal life. This unified humanity that has become intoxicated with its sense of self-positing privilege can only exist through the delirium of Race, through the imagination of itself as a unified and eternal natural body:

> All delirium is racial, which does not necessarily mean racist. It is not a matter of the regions of the body without organs 'representing' races and cultures. The full body does not represent anything at all. On the contrary, the races and cultures designate regions on this body – that is, zones of intensities, fields of potentials. Phenomena of individualization and

> sexualization are produced within these fields. We pass from one field to another by crossing thresholds: we never stop migrating, we become other individuals as well as other sexes, and departing becomes as easy as being born or dying. Along the way we struggle against other races, we destroy civilizations, in the manner of the great migrants in whose wake nothing is left standing once they have passed through. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 94)

Racial delirium is not only a passage through differential flux from which identity emerges; it also entails that 'we destroy civilizations' – affirming the potentiality of leaving any produced culture or tradition in ruins. If racial delirium occurs as an affirmation of the possibility of anything becoming extinct, racism is a neurotic grip on survival. Racism – including, and especially, the affirmation of 'man' – is a repression of racial delirium; humanity is always a virtual production or fabrication that posits itself as ultimate actuality, occluding the differentials from which it emerges.

The fabrication of man as a race that at once enables the lure of essential unity, and yet places that unity in the fragile monuments of art, now (in the twenty-first century) faces the actual threat of extinction. Given that threat, how might art adjust to a milieu of imminent, probably certain, disappearance? How might this race that has for so long surrounded itself with art, and mirrored itself in art, open out to the world upon which it depends but which it has nevertheless almost annihilated? How does the human race turn from mirroring itself, enclosing itself in the cave of its own images, to thinking its inextricable intertwining with fragile life?

These questions are not new. All art has the problem of extinction and race at its core. Any sentence that begins with '*All* art . . . ' needs to be treated with extreme suspicion. The logic of racism, after all, has always defined the properly human from a single moment – deep down, they are all (or should be) just like 'us'. Such claims are less often made by art historians than they are by philosophers, who are fond of speaking of art as such, or art in general, or the essence of art, and who usually deploy such concepts to smuggle in normative concepts of humanity. When a philosopher defines what art *is*, he is usually making a moral claim about life, and this is especially so when philosophy seemingly absolves itself explicitly from the assumptions of normativity, when philosophy speaks for man in general. Kant's insistence on aesthetic judgment as reflective presupposes Western art practices of framed and detached art objects; man realises that he is not just a physical body, but a subject who can feel himself as a creative being responsible for the reason of the world.

When Derrida affirms that 'literature is democracy' (see Thomson 2005: 33; Kronick 1999: 166), he includes all literary practice under a high modernist norm of framed voice; when Adorno (1984), more explicitly, shows the aesthetic as properly disclosed in modernist formalism, he allows art in general to be oriented towards the disjunction between concept and reality; various Marxisms or historicisms will begin an account of art in general from this or that exemplary object (the social novel, Greek tragedy, postmodern reflexivity). Deleuze and Guattari both seem to fall into this (possibly unavoidable) universalising tendency with their distinction between an art of affects and percepts and a philosophy of concepts. And yet their insistence that art emerges from a pre- or counter-human animality and that this 'art' lies in the capacity of sensations to persist in themselves, opens the thought of an inhuman time, an eternity outside man (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 182). This is why, also, they pay so much attention to the twinned concepts of race and face: for it is art that at once forms the figure of a common humanity (man as *homo faber*), at the same time as the resistance and decay of art objects opens life and creation to temporalities beyond those of a self-legislating humanity.

It is most often philosophers, determined to secure a domain of life that is not yet submitted to convention, instrumentality, recognition, opinion or assumptions of human nature, who will find in art *as such* that which precedes, exceeds or disturbs given systems. Art either offers us the capacity to reflect upon the worlds 'we' have formed (Habermas 1987), or brings 'us' back once again to humanity's eternal capacity to be nothing other than the image it creates from itself (Agamben 1999: 98). But there are two ways in which this eternity might be thought: as humanity's destiny – man as the capacity to create the thought of the universal – *or* as humanity's annihilation – for perhaps it is not man (or man alone) that witnesses or evidences a temporality outside organic specified life. If art is necessarily always concerned with annihilation and specification (or the production of species, and the persistence of sensations beyond the life of the creator), then any claim that art is essentially or eternally of a certain mode belies art's distinct fragility. That is, the claim to something like art in general reinforces the sense of man or humanity in general, and occludes what Deleuze and Guattari have presented as the animality of art, its existence in pure matters of sensation.

When Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 165) argue for art as the preservation of sensations that exist before man – sensations that persist in themselves – they go a long way to destroying the race of man:

phenomenology must become the phenomenology of art because the immanence of the lived to a transcendental subject must be expressed in transcendent functions that not only determine experience in general but traverse the lived here and now, and are embodied in it by constituting living sensations. (1994: 178)

Art is not the expression of humanity, in general, but the destruction of any such generality through the preservation and temporality of the 'nonorganic life of things' (1994: 180). Art is racial in a double sense: it offers figures of man in general (always – in Western art – the white face of the subject); and is then archived as the expression of a humanity that comes to know and feel itself through the creation of its own pure images.

Art, Face, Race

Art is always the preserving of a sensation that is of its time, but that is submitted to existence for all time. If art is to figure something like 'the human' – and if the human is, philosophically, an openness to world that is given best in the face – then it must always do so through the material figure of some specified head. Levinas's argument that the face is singular, and that the singular relation to any face disrupts a logic of calculation and specification, is an extreme philosophic argument; it takes up the premise of philosophy – of a radical transcendence that is not of this world of beings – and yet returns that transcendence to the privileged body of man:

> The same and the other can not enter into a cognition that would encompass them; the relations that the separated being maintains with what transcends it are not produced on the ground of totality, do not crystallize into a system. Yet do we not name them together? The *formal* synthesis of the word that names them together is already part of a discourse, that is, of a conjuncture of transcendence, breaking the totality. The conjuncture of the same and the other, in which even their verbal proximity is maintained, is the *direct* and *full face* welcome of the other by me. This conjuncture is irreducible to totality; the 'face to face' position is not a modification of the 'along side of . . .'. Even when I have linked the Other to myself with the conjunction 'and' the Other continues to face me, to reveal his face. (1979: 80–1)

The Levinasian elevation of the face relies on an experience of a singularity that would be liberated from all generality, that would not be a specification of this or that general type. If, however, such a face were to be figured in art, it would need to take on some specification, where

specification is always *of the species* or race. A face 'in general' might be *thought* but it could only be figured through this or that concrete head. Even when it does not figure human bodies, persons or faces, art is always about face and always about the extinction of species. It is always a presentation of this earth of 'ours' witnessed from our race: 'All faces envelop an unknown, unexplored landscape; all landscapes are populated by a loved or dreamed-of face, develop a face to come or already past' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 191).

So there are two twinned (yet necessary) impossibilities. First, a work of art can live on, as eternal and monumental, only if it takes on a material support; my thoughts can be read after my life only if I inscribe them in matter. And yet, second, that matter is also essentially fragile, corruptible and subject to decay. A face – or the witnessing of the subject in general – can only occur through some racialised head; I can only imagine humanity in general, as spirit, through the species. The eternal – the sense of art, the subject of the face – is always effected through this object, this head. The logic that intertwines face, race and art is the logic of life; a unified body or species can only occur through persisting beyond individual bodies – a race is like an artwork or monument, surviving beyond individual life – and yet, such persisting unities also only survive through variation. A race or species varies and opens to other differences in order to live on, just as the individual human subject can persist through time, beyond himself, only by supplementing himself through the matters of art.

A work of art is only a work if it has taken on some separable and repeatable form, but it is just that taking on of a body (or incarnation) that enables a process of decay. That is, just as the art object is possible because of a selection of matters that will both resist dissolution (in the short term) and be exposed to inevitable decay, so the bounds of a race are possible only because of a specification that requires an ultimately annihilating variability; a race or species is possible only because of something like *an art in life*, a variability that both enables the formation of living borders but that also entails the annihilation of bounds.

In the following sections of this chapter, I want to explore two ideas about extinction and race in relation to the work of art that will allow us to look at the ways in which all life is oriented to an oscillation between extinction and specification (or 'raciation'), and that this leads to an impure border between the faces of philosophy – or the idea of a humanity as such – and the heads of art, or the material figures through which that humanity is given.

As a preliminary opening to these two ideas of race and extinction, I

want to consider three visual images, the first of which is the smiley face that came to stand for acid house culture, while the second is William Blake's death mask refigured first by Francis Bacon's 1955 'Study for Portrait II (after the Life Mask of William Blake)', and second by the contemporary Edinburgh photographer Joanna Kane (Kane 2008). All of these images, in different ways, problematise the distinctions between the face and the head, between philosophy and art, or between species survival and extinction. If we want to consider something like a pure form of the face and philosophy at one end of the spectrum, then we could turn to Levinas's detachment of the face from all generality, calculation, mediation and specification; for Levinas a face is not a head. The latter is a body part, and might also figure something like the biological human species to which 'we' would owe certain allegiances and contracts. On a bodily, psychophysical or (for Levinas) non-ethical level, it is because others have bodies like mine that I enter into certain sympathies, and this would allow 'us' to maintain ourselves in relation to external threats and a milieu of risk (so the head would also signal something like Bergson's 'morality' (1935), which is a bonding formed through relative likeness).

For Levinas, all philosophy that has been grounded on being, or that has tried to determine some ideal of justice, humanity and order *in advance* from a general physical humanity, annihilates the radical singularity of the face. It is the encounter with this face, here, that disrupts convention, sign systems, repeatability and doxa; it is this singular face that precludes the reduction of otherness to an event within the world. The face enables us to pass from (or through) the heads that we recognise as part of a common species, to the spirit that we can think but never know. Or, in Bergson's terms: from something like a common morality of humanity premised on a specified kind, one would pass to the thought of a virtual, not yet present and singular other.

The face would give us something like pure life: not the form or matter that one recognises as the same through time and that is subject to decay and exposure to risk, but the animating spirit of which matter is a sign. The face for Levinas is, after all, not a sign or mediation of humanity so much as an experience or rupture with all mediation and sense. (The same applies for those who invoke his work today, amid conflicts among peoples (Butler 2006: 133).) Life, of course, is never pure and its processes of variation and creativity are known only through the relative stability of bounded forms. These forms and bounded beings are perceived as the beings that they are only by reducing the intense fluctuations and differences into ongoing and recognisable figures. At

Figure 1.1 'Portrait of a Man, William Blake, 1757–1827'. Photograph from Life Cast in the collection of the Edinburgh Phrenological Society. From The Somnambulists series by Joanna Kane. Copyright Joanna Kane. With thanks to the Scottish National Portrait Gallery and the William Ramsay Henderson Trust.

the other end of the spectrum from the pure life of a perception that is not yet frozen or determined into any relatively inert figure is the mere head. If the head, for Deleuze and Guattari, occurs with a premodern tribal individuation that is not yet that of humanity, it is possible to see this head again today in the post- or counterhuman head of the smiley face. So lacking in distinction that it has neither race, nor humanity, nor artfulness, the smiley face signals loss of life (having become a punctuation mark in emails and text messages: ':)'). It is the retreat from specification and the removal of any definitive body – anything that would allow for engaged sympathy – that makes the smiley face at once the most vulgar of heads, as though even the primitive animal totem heads (or portraits commissioned through patronage) were still too singular to really enable the joys of a loss of face.

In two recent books, the neuroscientist Susan Greenfield has

commented on the contemporary problem of meaning, sensation and identity. Drugs that work to overcome depression may operate by relieving the brain of its syntactic work, allowing the body to experience *sensation as such* without labouring to tie it into significance. A depressed person cannot, Greenfield (2000) argues, simply enjoy a sip of espresso, the feel of sunshine on the skin or the sound of a flowing stream. The depressive is focused on meaning or connection, tying sensations into a resonant whole, and cannot therefore experience the senseless ecstasy of sensation as such. An experience is meaningful if it is placed in the context of past encounters and future projects, but a certain joy is possible only if that neural network of sense is also open to sensation. One must be a self – having a certain face and singularity that defines one as who one is in terms of one's projects – but one must sometimes also be just a head: a capacity to feel or be affected without asking why, or without placing that sense in relation to one's own being and its ends. Greenfield's more recent book, *I.D.* (2008), has – despite her earlier recognition that we sometimes need to let go of identity and meaning – lamented what she sees to be an attrition of our neural architecture. While the current drug- and computer-fuelled retreat from syntax and recognition – and its accompanying sense of self – has its place, contemporary culture's focus on flashing screens, disconnected sensations and immediate intensities is hurtling in an alarming manner to a total loss of face. There is a widespread loss of being *someone,* and a disturbing tendency towards being 'anyone'.

That such a process of neural extinction accompanies species extinction is not a mere coincidence, and that such a movement towards *not* being someone is symbolised by the smiling head of ecstasy use should give us pause for thought. As the species comes closer to the extinction that marked its very possibility *as species*, it has retreated more and more into its own self-identity, becoming more and more convinced of the unity of race (the humanity of man in general). One could only become this or that marked race – especially the race of man – by closing off absolute difference and englobing oneself into a determined and self-recognising kind: 'When the faciality machine translates formed contents of whatever kind into a single substance of expression, it already subjugates them to the exclusive form of signifying and subjective expression' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 199). Is it any surprise that today, faced with actual species extinction, 'man' ingests drugs that relieve him of meaning, buys screens that divert his gaze away from others, and consumes media that pacify him with figures of a general and anodyne 'we'? Today's culture of self-annihilation – an overcoming

Figure 1.2 Acid house smiley.

of face, sense and bounded recognition – may not be as lamentable as Greenfield and others suggest. It may be a perfectly inhuman (and therefore wonderful) response to a world in which the value and art of one's species is no longer unquestionable. Is face, human face in its radical distinction and immateriality, really what one wants to save?

Acid house visual and aural culture, apart from being signalled by the smiley face, relies on an elimination of a time of development and figuration in favour of a time of pulsation. It destroys the man of speech and reason for the sake of sensations liberated from humanity. Not only do the drugs that accompany trance and house music allow for the experience of sensation without a framing of sense, but also the music is characterised by instrumental – usually digitally synthesised – repeated chord sequences, with infrequent and non-complex modulations, pulsing rhythms and uses of language that are sonorous rather than semantic. Visuals that accompany this music are not so much abstract as minimal, not geometric forms and figures but intensities of light and colour. That this movement of acid house is part of a broader tendency towards loss of face (being 'off your face') is signalled by the smiley head it takes as its totem, by the general culture of counter-syntax described by Greenfield, and by the strange neural tie between the face and specification.

What such late capitalist events disclose is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a 'higher deterritorialisation': there is not a movement back to the one single ground of humanity, but a creative release that opens out towards a cosmos of forces beyond humanity. More specifically, one

might note, then, that it is not by inclusion or *extension* of the categories of rights and humanity that one might overcome the intrinsic racism (which is also a speciesism) in the concept of man. Rather, it is by intensifying sensations that one is liberated from the face of the signifying subject, opening forces to the inhumanity of the cosmos:

> The face is not animal, but neither is it human in general; there is even something absolutely inhuman about the face . . . To the point that if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facialisations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine, not by returning to animality, nor even by returning to the head, but by quite spiritual and special becomings-animal, by strange true becomings that get past the wall and get out of the black holes, that make *faciality traits* themselves finally elude the organisation of the face . . . (2004b: 189)

One of the most commonly cited neural disorders in the current literature is Capgras syndrome, where a patient without any delusion or loss of *cognitive* function sees a close relative but then claims that this relative is an alien or imposter (Feinberg and Keenan 2005: 93). (This would be the opposite tendency of ecstasy culture, where every stranger appears as a beloved.) What is missing is not any visual or cognitive input but affective response: if the emotional intensity or affect is not experienced, then I claim – despite all evidence to the contrary – that this is not my mother, or child or partner. This syndrome has been widely cited in order to claim that we are not solely or primarily cognitive beings, and that our relation to others requires an affective response to their visual singularity – not simply the knowledge or recognition of who they are.

This might seem both to support and refute the Levinasian face. On the one hand, it seems that – despite Levinas's claims that *the* face of *the* other makes an impelling claim on me – it is really only certain faces with a specific visceral genealogy pertinent to our own being that are truly experienced as faces; everyone else is a mere head. On the other hand, it also appears that the face is not one object in the world among others, not reducible to a knowable and identikit type, for faces are radically singular. Faces engage affective registers that cannot be overridden by cognitive or simply visual inputs. A face at once has no race, for if I see this other as a face then I am devoted to an affective response that has nothing to do with general specifications. On the other hand, the face is absolutely racial, for there is no such thing as the face of humanity in general, or a global fellow feeling; the face that engages me, disturbs me and transcends cognition is the face that is bound up with my own organic and specified becoming. The face is at once that which is

radically exposed to extinction, given that I experience *as face* only those heads bound up with my world, time and life.

At the same time, the face appears to be quite distinct from organic survival; the body of the other person is before me, and yet something is missing. The affect, which is not a part of their body but is bound up with their capacity to be perceived in a certain manner, is what marks their singularity:

> The human head implies a deterritorialization in relation to the animal and has as its correlate the organisation of a world, in other words, a milieu that has itself been deterritorialized (the steppe is the first 'world', in contrast to the forest milieu). But the face represents a far more intense, if slower, deterritorialization. We could say that it is an *absolute* deterritorialization: it is no longer relative because it removes the head from the stratum of the organism, human or animal, and connects it to other strata, such as significance and subjectification. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 191)

One response to the border of the face – to this strange body part that is at once an organic head and also a marked-out, fragile and exposed singularity – is a form of willed extinction. If there has been a tradition of art dominated by portraits, signatures, leitmotifs and claims to radical distinction and living on, there is also a counter-tradition of the head rather than the face, concerned with annihilation, indistinction and becoming no one. Faced with the all too fragile bounds of one's specified being, one could either cling more and more desperately to one's englobed humanity – asserting something like Levinas's pure face as such – or one could confront the head head-on.

Both Bacon's portrait of Blake and Joanna Kane's photograph are taken from William Blake's death mask. Blake, perhaps more than any other artist, exposed the impure logics of extinction, specification and art. Resisting an increasing culture of commodification and the annihilation of the artist's hand, Blake would not submit his poetry to the printing press, nor his images to the usual methods of reproduction. Determined not to lose himself in the morass of markets, mass production and already given systems, Blake engraved every word of his poetry on hand-crafted plates, coloured every page with his own hand, invented his own mythic lexicon and gave each aspect of every one of his 'characters' a distinct embodied form. As a consequence of seizing the act of production from the death of general systems, and directly following the assertion of his own singularity against any general humanism, Blake's work is more subject to decay, extinction and annihilation than any other corpus. Because Blake resisted the formal and repeatable modes of

typeface, and because he took in hand his own creation of pigments and techniques of illuminated printing, it is not possible to detach the pure sense or signature of Blake's work from its technical medium. The more Blake took command of technicity or matter – the more he rendered all aspects of the work artful – the more exposed his work was to the possibility of annihilation. It was because Blake's work was so specific, so distinct, so committed to the living-on and survival of the singular, that it was also doomed to a faster rate of extinction.

Similarly, one can note that it is because it was so masterful at survival, at securing the sense of itself and its worth as a species, that humanity as a race faces accelerated destruction. Both Bacon and Kane depict Blake not through the surviving portrait, but through the death mask. If the *portrait* is one of the ways in which the head is framed, signed, attributed and placed within a narrative of artist as author, creator and subject of a world of intentionality that can be entered by reading and intuition, this is because the face of the portrait is tied to an aesthetics of empathy, in which the hand of the artist is led by the idea of a world that is not materially presented but that can be indicated or thought through matter. In this respect, the portrait can be aligned with what Deleuze (2005: 79) refers to as a history of digital aesthetics, in which the hand becomes a series of 'digits' that in turn allows the world to be visualised, not as recalcitrant matter, but as a quantifiable mass in accord with the eye's expectations.

The digital – as universalising and generalising of the world – therefore presupposed what Derrida (1989: 84) referred to as a Western assumption of a pre-personal 'we' – the humanity in general that *would be able* to view and intuit the sense that is before me now. For all its supposed resistance to mediation, representation and a history of Western being that has reduced the event of encounter to a general 'being', Levinas's 'face' is insistent on an immediate relation to otherness that is not diverted, corrupted or rendered opaque by the decay-prone flesh of the head. What sets the aesthetics of empathy that would discern a spirit in the bodily figure apart from the aesthetics of abstraction is just this positing of an immateriality that transcends matter. It is this other, given through the face, whose presence is not arrived at by way of analogy or concepts. This is possible only if all those matters that tie a subject to specification and therefore certain extinction are deemed to be transparent or external to some pure otherness as such, to some pure face that is not corrupted by the head.

The portraits of Blake, like the sense of Blake's work in general, do indeed survive and circulate beyond the author's living body. Even

so, that face of Blake and that sense of the work that survives beyond decaying matter are possible and released into the world only through a matter that is intrinsically self-annihilating. An aesthetics of abstraction, in contrast with empathy, is possible through a production, from matter, of pure forms – the constitution of potential relations distinct from the singular, localised and subjective experiences of living organisms. One might therefore say that it is only through racial delirium – passing through and annihilating all the species of man – that one finds something other than racism, or man as he properly is. This might effect an 'about-face'. Blake's work already confronted this relation between, on the one hand, discerning the world as possessed of spirit (a world of innocence in accord with an ultimately human face), and a world of matter devoid of any life other than its reduction to pure forms of digits (the world of 'single vision and Newton's sleep', where experience knows in advance all that it will encounter). In his illuminated printing and engraving techniques, his works confronted the resistance of the hand in relation to a matter that was neither pure form, nor living spirit, but yielded something like an analogical aesthetics – the genesis of forms and life from the chaos of materiality. One could refer to this as a radically haptic aesthetic in which the eye can see the resistance of form emerging from matter, feeling the resistance of (in Blake's case) the hand, and, in the case of the death mask, the curvature of the head.

Bacon's paint adds its own flesh of colour to the form of the mask, while Kane's highly finished photography renders the material object spiritual, not by gesturing to the face but by granting the matter itself its own luminosity – the visual surface, rather than the gazing face of the portrait seems to possess at once its own spirit and its own temporality, specification and line of duration. It is matter itself, and not the living form it figures, that seems to endure, opening its own line of survival, extinction and specification. These faces-heads are higher deterritorialisations in two senses. The face that opens empathy and alterity becomes a head again, but not a head of the living organism so much as a material artefact of matters that are themselves expressive. And the art object that would seem to signal the human organism's potentiality to free itself from mere biological life, to create that which endures beyond its own being, itself shows all the signs of material fragility, exposure and annihilation. Philosophy finds faces in art; art is that creation of a signification of a sense beyond any body, of an endurance liberated from the instrumentality of the human organism. But there is always something of the crumbling, decaying, unspecified head in the faces of art.

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Chapter 2

A Deleuzian *Ijtihad*: Unfolding Deleuze's Islamic Sources Occulted in the Ethnic Cleansing of Spain

Laura U. Marks

Deeply enfolded into the history of European thought live the philosophy, science and culture of the medieval Muslim world. Some of the deepest of those folds were made in the Iberian peninsula, over a long period from the establishment of the first Muslim caliphate in Andalusia in 756 to the expulsion of the last Muslims from Christian Spain in 1614. In these folds, I argue, lie the sources of many concepts central to Deleuze's thought. *Ijtihad* is a self-reflexive Arabic noun derived from the verb *jahada*, 'to strive, to fight', from which also derives the familiar noun *jihad*. *Ijtihad* means to struggle within oneself, endeavour or interpret. This chapter's *ijtihad* is to unfold a place and time where Arabic philosophy throve; Muslims, Christians and Jews engaged in tense and lively collaborations; translators brought Arabic thought into Latin; and Islamic culture shaped the nascent Europe. Those folds were seared shut in Spain in an ethnic cleansing based on a notion of Christian nationhood, in one of the first articulations of modern racism. Philosophy, too, underwent an ethnic cleansing.

One of Deleuze's greatest contributions to contemporary thought was to liberate the world conceptually from any kind of preordained causality, so that causes can be really immanent and we can understand the world as a constant becoming. Every being individuates according to immediate circumstances: this is life in its magma-like diversity. What guarantees the freedom of becoming is the *univocity of being*, being as a contentless, universal predicate. Deleuze found numerous allies, including Leibniz, Spinoza and Duns Scotus, in his fight against Platonism, a top-down determinism in which the world is ultimately a representation of Ideas. These allies, in turn, relied on concepts developed in Islamic philosophy. Their source, and therefore Deleuze's, for the concept of the univocity of being was Abu 'Ali al-Husayn ibn Sînâ (980–1037), the great Persian philosopher who lived in Bukhara and wrote in Arabic.

Like other classical Islamic thinkers, Ibn Sînâ struggled to come up with a concept of causality that is not representational, responding to the Muslim concept of God as a Being beyond comprehension.

Muslims do not comprise a 'race'; the vast and variegated body of thought we might call classical Islamic philosophy comprises the work of Arab, Persian, Indian and Turkish thinkers. (Some prefer to refer to Arabic philosophy, designating a linguistic rather than a religious-political site. Both terms are useful.) However, racism informed the way European thinkers constituted European philosophy as independent of its Islamic heritage. As Martin Bernal (1987) has established, the historiography of philosophy eradicated the Middle Eastern and North African contributions to modern European thought. Late-medieval Christian Scholastics acknowledged what they borrowed from Muslim philosophers. But later European thinkers disingenuously claimed a direct link between European and Greek thought, disavowing the hundreds of intervening years of Islamic philosophy upon which emerging European thought relied. The term 'Renaissance' itself suggests that philosophy was dead until it was reborn *in Europe*. Much of the Islamic genealogy of European thought is only recently coming to light (Saliba 2007). For a long time, Western historians, when they acknowledged Islamic scholarship at all, claimed it only preserved Greek thought until Europeans could get their hands on it. But lately historians have been demonstrating that Islamic scholars critiqued and significantly developed Greek works, and also developed intellectual traditions independent of Greek philosophy, producing a specifically Islamic body of thought; and that these works were known, translated and taken up by European scholars. To decolonise European philosophy we need to rediscover its Islamic (and many other) origins. For Deleuzian thinkers, decolonising philosophy has the added benefit of historicising the philosophy of becoming.

The *ijtihad* of this chapter, then, requires a visit to Muslim Andalusia and Christian Spain. I will point out some concepts from Ibn Sînâ that, acknowledged or not, inform Deleuze's conceptions of the univocity of being, the virtual and becoming. We will learn how Ibn Sînâ's writings were translated in the twelfth century, against the backdrop of creative intercultural ferment, in what was to be the last major intellectual connection between Islamic and European thought. We will discover how the idea of race originated in fifteenth-century Spain as a canny power grab. And we will witness the violence with which Christian powers gouged the living Islamic heritage out of the nascent Europe.

The Rise of the Concept of Race in Christian Spain

How did a concept of race develop from religious difference? In the ancient period, the Latin word *Maurus* signified a native of Mauritania, a region corresponding to present-day Algeria and Morocco (*Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*)). According to James Glick (2005: 185), in medieval Spain people of all religions perceived ethnicity in terms of religious affiliation. Though most usages of the word referred to dark skin, Spanish Christians used the word *moro* to speak of Muslims of any kind, regardless of skin colour and of what we now call ethnicity; Arabs, Berbers and former Christians who converted to Islam were all *moros*. (In contrast, *cristiano* signified a Romance speaker from the north of Spain.) Later, the word became a synonym for dark skin, as in an early English usage, 'Ther was no grace in the visage . . . Sche loketh forth as doth a Moor' (1390, *OED*). Yet usages of *moro* or, in English, Moor, indicate that the imprecision of the word confused writers; they needed to distinguish 'black Moors' and 'whyte Moors' (Boorde, *Introduction to Knowledge*, 1547; *OED*) and, in later years, to distinguish shades of skin colour further. Lithgow's *Travels* of 1632 mentions 'A Towne inhabited by Christians, Arabes, and Moores: not Black Moores, as the Affricans be, but . . . a kind of Egyptians'. In short, the word *moro* (and its variants in other European languages) evolved from a geographical term to one for religion to one that indicated skin colour, each connotation blurring with the others.

The word *race* originated in Spanish. Rarely used before the fifteenth century, the word *raza* was early used to connote the succession of generations. However, L. P. Harvey (2005: 7n4) argues that it originates from the medieval word *raça*, meaning 'defect': for example, in a bolt of cloth. Other scholars suggest that *raza* and *raça* have distinct origins but that, in the fifteenth century, *raza* took on the negative connotation of *raça* as a defect or fault (Wilson and Frederiksen 1995: 11). In practice, the word came to indicate the threat to the purity of blood posed by Jews and Muslims in Spain, which I will discuss later.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) attribute racism to the abstract machine of faciality, the particular configuration of subjectivation and signification that requires a face-like organisation. This organisation of power, they argue, arose with Christianity. I would suggest that the association of Christianity with faciality did not arise at year zero, as their chapter title indicates, but a couple of centuries later, after Christianity was established as a religion and possessed a figurative art. To historicise even more, the etymologies above suggest that, in medieval Spain, when

Muslims governed most of the peninsula, Christians did not yet seek to distinguish race, the visible sign of difference. Christians only invented the category of race when they began to compete with the Muslims for power. And then racism did indeed function as Deleuze and Guattari say it does, by 'propagat[ing] waves of sameness until those who resist identification have been wiped out' (1987: 178). When Muslims and Jews fell under Christian rule, their rulers forced them to convert and to abandon all signs of religious, cultural and linguistic difference. Yet, after imposing sameness on Muslims and Jews, the Christian rulers refused to consider the converts truly Christian – I must add, rightly so for the most part, for the converts developed elaborate strategies to pursue their religions invisibly. Racism, and the word *race*, arose in Spain when it was no longer possible to tell a person's religion from her or his appearance. Racism arose as a need to make visible a difference that was not visible.

Racism's cruelty, Deleuze and Guattari continue, 'is matched only by its incompetence and naïveté' – as Monty Python's Spanish Inquisition skits have demonstrated forensically. The elaborate hedging that characterises the usage of *raza* and 'Moor' bears this out, as did the Inquisitors' need to cast their eyes down from a man's face, where no sign of religious difference showed, to his penis. More on this later.

Thus, as the Spanish sought to distinguish their Christian whiteness from the non-Christians of the peninsula, the words that would come to indicate race seized up, became *facialised*. Philosophy too underwent a kind of coagulation as Christians adapted it, and finally cut it off, from its Islamic origins.

From Islamic Philosophy to Deleuze

In our present climate of 'clash of civilisations', few Westerners realise that philosophy from Iran and the Muslim world provided the spark that jump-started philosophy in the West. Yet the history of philosophy is very much a history of migrants and refugees; philosophy itself is a refugee. Philosophy in the Christian West had been almost moribund ever since the Emperor Justinian closed the School of Athens in 529. The Neoplatonist philosophers expelled from Athens sought refuge in Iran, where the Sasanian monarch Khosrow I endowed chairs in philosophy for them, as well as Zoroastrian magi, Nestorian Christian theologians and Jewish physicians (Lewis 2008: 20–1). Thus, before the advent of Islam, Iran provided a healthy environment for philosophy. Then, just over a century after Mohammed's *hijra*, the 'Abbasid Caliphate,

founded in Baghdad in 750, sponsored a full-fledged intellectual renaissance, an enormously productive movement of translation and new creation of philosophy, science, mathematics, poetry and art. In ensuing centuries, a vast and varied philosophical tradition developed throughout the Muslim world from India to Andalusia, intertwining Greek thought, Islamic rationalist theology, Isma'ili thought, Sufi mysticism and many other strands.

In examining how Arabic philosophy was translated in medieval Spain, and thence became thoroughly braided into European thought, I seek to identify elements that ultimately inform Deleuze's thought. Surveying the history of philosophy with an eye to influences is a demanding *ijtihad*. Many Deleuzians lack the thorough steeping in philosophy that Deleuze stated was necessary to understand his own work. Yes, some of the concepts at work in contemporary philosophy have a three-thousand-year history, though this does not mean that all philosophy is a set of footnotes to Plato or Aristotle – in fact, some of it is a set of footnotes to Ibn Sînâ. In this chapter, in tracing historical connections from Ibn Sînâ to Duns Scotus, and from them, mostly via Leibniz, Spinoza and Whitehead, to Deleuze, I seize what are actually the most obvious points to unfold. The presence of Ibn Sînâ's thought in Deleuze is relatively easy to discover, for he was the magister, influencing almost every strain of Islamic and Western medieval thought, even though little of this influence is acknowledged in the West now.

There remain many other connections to explore, a few of which I examine in *Enfoldment and Infinity* (Marks 2010). For example, a little more digging may ascertain whether and what links exist from the tenth-century experimental and theoretical optics of Ibn al-Haytham to Henri Bergson's theories of perception and memory and from Bergson to Deleuze (Marks 2010: 62–5). Other research might yield a deep history of the Hermetic tradition, the secret and unofficial underside of official thought that informs Deleuze and Guattari's concept of minor science. We might trace the transmission of Isma'ili Shi'ite ideas of the secret, alchemy (ibid.: 244–6), and cryptography from the Arabic science of letters (*'ilm al-hurûf*) through intermediaries such as the Majorcan philosopher and missionary Raimón Llull to Leibniz (Cramer 2005; Link 2010; Zielinksi 2006) and from Leibniz to Deleuze.[1] The more minor the tradition, the more enfolded its influence.[2]

Ibn Sînâ's Legacy in Deleuze

Often one can discover parallels between Islamic and Western philosophy, although a clear path of influence cannot be asserted. But sometimes the path of transmission itself is discernible. In the case of Ibn Sînâ, we can retrace the path quite well, for much of his work was translated into Latin in Spain in the twelfth century. Ibn Sînâ's writings distilled almost all the major currents of Arabic philosophy: Peripatetic philosophy both Aristotelian and Platonic, Islamic Neoplatonism, Islamic rationalist theology, Sufism and elements of Isma'ili Shi'ite thought. His thought was diffused throughout the Muslim world, where, as late as the eighteenth century, philosophers were creating new concepts based on Ibn Sînâ's body of work. His metaphysics, logic and psychology also had an enormous impact on medieval European philosophy and comprise some of the occulted sources of Deleuze's philosophy.

Kalâm theologians of the eighth to tenth centuries developed an ontology of radical contingency in which essence is fundamental and existence must be caused. They posited that the most broadly applicable category in reality is the thing (*shay'*), which in turn divides into existent (*mawjûd*) things and non-existent (*ma'dum*) things. All of these can be placed in relation to a predicate, the most universal subject: God. God commands a thing to exist, or not. This gave God, in *kalâm* theology, perfect freedom, including the freedom to make the universe disappear. Yet at the same time, Islamic philosophers in the Greek tradition wanted to incorporate the Aristotelian conception of causality, with God as the First Mover, in order to support both the monotheistic doctrine of creation and the assumption of a stable universe necessary for scientific inquiry.

Ibn Sînâ's entirely innovative ontology in the *Metaphysics* of his compendium *Al-Shifâ'* (the Healing) brought these currents together. It stabilised the radical contingency of *kalâm* theology by synthesising it with Aristotelian causality, as well as the emanationist cosmology of Neoplatonism. Ibn Sînâ shifted the emphasis from the *kalâm* theologians' distinction between thing and existent to the distinction between essence (*mâhiyya*, whatness) and existence (*wujûd*). In this he also adapted Aristotle's distinction between essence, what a thing is, and existence, whether it exists. But he modified Aristotle's First Cause, making it ontological rather than temporal: creation results from causal, not temporal ultimacy (Goodman 1992).

Being, Ibn Sînâ argued, applies to all entities, existence to actualities that have been realised. Everything that is contingent must be caused

by something else, except for the one being that is necessary in virtue of itself, God. God is the one predicate. Every other being is either necessary in virtue of another – that is, it is caused, and therefore necessarily exists – or possible in itself. Thus he innovated three categories of being: the necessary of existence in itself (*wâjib al-wujûd bi-dhâtihi*); the necessary of existence through another (*wâjib al-wujûd bi-ghayrihi*) and the possible of existence in itself (*mumkin al-wujûd bi-dhâtihi*). God's essence and God's existence are identical, while for other beings, existence is accidental to essence. Considered in itself, each effect is radically contingent (Wisnovsky 2000). As the seventeenth-century Iranian philosopher Mullâ Sadrâ Shîrâzî summarised, for Ibn Sînâ 'an essence is in itself indifferent toward existence or non-existence' (Janssens 2006: 3). In rejecting the pre-existence of essences, Ibn Sînâ threw out both Platonic essences and Aristotelian categories: being is precategorical. This is Ibn Sînâ's doctrine of the *ontological indifference of essence* (Gilson 2002: Chapter 4), or the univocity of being. As Robert Wisnovsky writes (2000: 115), this was a concept 'made almost from scratch, using materials that were still quite raw in the year 1000'.

This doctrine informs the *Logic*, the first book of *The Healing*, in which Ibn Sînâ wrote that essences of things (*mâhiyyât al-ashyâ'*) have three aspects: neither concrete nor mental existence; concrete, extramental existent; and mental existent. Using the example of 'horse', Ibn Sînâ asserted that, first, it exists in itself, without any relation to either concrete or mental objects (equinity); second, it exists as actualised essence, existent in the real world (this horse); third, it exists in the mind (idea of equinity). Equinity is the horse's nature, but it is not a horse's nature to exist; I can think of a horse even when no horse exists. This tripartite concept gives essence a remarkable liberty, for it is 'indifferent' to existents, concrete or mental, indifferent to both singularity and universality.[3]

The Scholastics Roger Bacon, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, among others, adopted Ibn Sînâ's three categories of existence, clearly attributing them to him. They termed them *esse proprium* (nature as just in itself: for example, equinity as such, also known as common nature), *esse essentiae* (nature as existent in thought: for example, the idea of equinity) and *esse existentiae* (nature as existent in the world: for example, this horse). John Duns Scotus made an important modification to Ibn Sînâ's three categories of being. In Book II of the *Ordinatio*, compiled shortly before his death in 1308, Scotus argued that *esse proprium* or common nature, indifferent to individual existence as it is, can only exist in particular things. Common nature individuates, 'contracts', according to a principle of individuation Scotus called

haecceitas, 'thisness'. This concept, as we know, became indispensable to Deleuze. *This* horse has a grey patch on its left jawbone and a fear of children in ponytails. The concept of haecceity celebrates the mercurial power of individuation, the unpredictable arrival of newness in the world. Each thing possesses a degree of liberty of becoming, and in its haecceity it thumbs its nose at Platonic forms and Aristotelian species. Though it is Scotus's innovation, the concept of *haecceitas* is deeply indebted to Ibn Sînâ's categories.

Now we can identify a number of clear antecedents in Ibn Sînâ for some of Deleuze's most important concepts.

The univocity of being

The clearest resonance of Ibn Sînâ's thought in that of Deleuze is the concept of the univocity of being. As we have seen, it derives, via Duns Scotus, from Ibn Sînâ's doctrine of the *ontological indifference of essence*, which arises from the category of necessary of existence in itself. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze wrote:

> There has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal. There has only ever been one ontology, that of Duns Scotus, which gave being a single voice. We say Duns Scotus because he was the one who elevated univocal being to the highest point of subtlety, albeit at the price of abstraction. However, from Parmenides to Heidegger it is the same voice that is taken up, in an echo which itself forms the whole deployment of the univocal. A single voice raises the clamour of being. (1994: 35)

From Parmenides to Heidegger . . . but with a significant stop in eleventh-century Bukhara. Deleuze attributes the univocity of being here to Duns Scotus but, as we have seen, the latter drew it directly from Ibn Sînâ. Deleuze's next sentences, 'We have no difficulty in understanding that Being, even if it is absolutely common, is nevertheless not a genus. It is enough to replace the model of judgement with that of the proposition,' directly paraphrase Ibn Sînâ's propositional logic.

In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze acknowledges Ibn Sînâ's doctrine of the ontological indifference of essence and the categories essence in itself, essence as a mental object, and essence in actual existents, which he takes from Étienne Gilson's 1948 *L'Être et l'essence* (2002). Having converted the concept *essence* to *sense*, and again echoing Ibn Sînâ's propositional logic, Deleuze plays Ibn Sînâ off Lewis Carroll to demonstrate that sense is independent of the modality of the proposition, as Ibn Sînâ demonstrated that essence is indifferent to existence.

It . . . behooves the event to be cited by the proposition as future, but it behooves the proposition no less to cite the event as past . . . Carroll asks the reader to guess whether he composed the verses of the gardener's song in accordance with the events, or the events in accordance with the verses.

The importance of this simultaneity for Deleuze is to demonstrate the 'splendid sterility or neutrality' of essence in itself, indifferent to universal and singular, to affirmation and negation, indeed to all opposites: 'Is it, then, the status of the pure event . . . to surmount all the oppositions in this way?' (1990: 34–5).

The virtual

We are beginning to see relationships between Ibn Sînâ's innovative distinction between necessary, contingent and possible being, and Deleuze's Bergsonian concept of the virtual. Discussing their relationship, I have proposed this synthesis: 'The virtual . . . is the field of all nonexistents; it is the necessary being from which every being either arises or does not arise' (Marks 2010: 14). Ibn Sînâ's metaphysics permits the existence of non-being, a concept he gained from the Stoics via Plotinus. The Stoics' criticism of Aristotle stated that the broadest category is not being but being *and* non-being, subsumed in the Stoic category 'the something', entities, including all that are or are not but can be spoken of (Goodman 1992: 69).[4] The category of 'the something' thus includes both virtual and actual beings (a concept that informed both Spinoza's *Ethics* and Deleuze). Plotinus, whose philosophy was foundational to Islamic Neoplatonism, adopted the Stoic approach in his critique of Aristotle. Ibn Sînâ in turn adapted the Islamic Neoplatonist conception of a One that contains both being and non-being to his concept of the Necessary Existent.

Here lies the Ibn Sînian origin of Deleuze's famous 'clamour of being' (1994: 35): Being is full existence that is not actualised. Being is greater than existence, for we can conceive of the being of things that do not exist. Existence or actuality is the tip of the iceberg of essence or virtuality.

However, Ibn Sînâ's category of the necessary of existence through another states that what is caused must exist. In this, as Goodman (1992) notes, he fell into Aristotle's trap of thinking that whatever is truly possible will become actual. Non-being exists, but impossible objects do not. Thus the main difference between Ibn Sînâ's necessary being and Deleuze's virtual is that the latter's concept of the virtual is vaster – more infinite, we can say precisely – because it encompasses the impossible.

In the section of *The Logic of Sense* discussed above, Deleuze critiques Ibn Sînâ by converting the concept *being* to the concept *sense*. He argues with Ibn Sînâ for a fourth category: not only the necessary of being in itself, the necessary of being through another and the possible of being in itself, but also the *impossible* of being.

> Impossible objects – square circles, matter without extension, *perpetuum mobile*, mountain without valley, etc. – are objects 'without a home,' outside of being, but they have a precise and distinct position within this outside: they are of 'extra being' – pure, ideational events, unable to be realized in a state of affairs . . . If we distinguish two sorts of beings, the being of the real as the matter of denotations and the being of the possible as the form of significations, we must yet add this extra-being which defines a minimum common to the real, the possible *and the impossible*. (1990: 35)

A square circle is impossible, but it has a sense. As Paul Bains writes, 'For Deleuze it is the univocity of being that allows it to escape the circle of the proposition' (2006: 68). This is the sole correction needed to make Ibn Sînâ's first category of being identical to Deleuze's category of the virtual. In fact, al-Ghazâlî (whose work was translated under the Latinisation Algazel) already argued with Ibn Sînâ that not everything possible is actual. Moses Maimonides developed this argument, and then Leibniz, who offered it to Deleuze. Thus, to some degree, Deleuze is taking up al-Ghazâlî's critique of Ibn Sînâ. All these corrections, each of which expands the powers of the virtual, augment Ibn Sînâ's utterly foundational designation of a Being teeming with virtuality.

Becoming and the univocity of being

A Neoplatonist thread runs from Plotinus to Ibn Sînâ's thought, all the way to Leibniz and Deleuze. The Neoplatonist element introduces a problem into the genealogy above, because it plays up the quality of becoming yet undermines the freedom of the virtual. As I mentioned, Ibn Sînâ's Necessary Existent borrow some characteristics of Plotinus' One. In turn, the way existing entities differentiate in Ibn Sînâ echoes Plotinus' insistence that all beings have in common that they differentiate from the One and seek to return to it. Lenn Goodman writes:

> To be sure, Aristotle was right that there is no common trait that all beings share in sheerly by the fact that they are beings. But, as Plotinus saw, the very fact of differentiation from absolute unity, the attempt at self-affirmation and turning back toward the unity of the One, are in a way something that all beings have in common, not in *how* they interpret the

possibilities of existence, but in the fact that each being and kind *does* in its own way interpret these possibilities. (1992: 69–70)

For Plotinus, the history of a being equals its struggle to realise its potential. It is clear how welcome this idea was to Islamic religious thought, for it animates the beautiful metaphors of worldly striving to become the mirror of God that informed Islamic Neoplatonism and Illuminationism. The concept of *ijtihad* also relates to this self-struggle. This concept of a thing's perfectibility also informed Spinoza's *Ethics* (Goodman 1992: 71), and it models Deleuze's category of becoming. It sounds as if all these conceptions of perfectibility involve a reabsorption into a One.

Yet the immanence of Ibn Sînâ's concept of Being makes the crucial difference. Ibn Sînâ's ultimate Being is not prior to being, as in Plotinus and Plato; it is being, being *in process*. Thus Parviz Morewedge (1992) argues that the conception that process is fundamental reality originates in Ibn Sînâ's concept of being.[5] Morewedge quotes this passage: 'In their natures, entities are disjunctively "many" in process of passage into conjunctive unity. This Category of Ultimate replaces Aristotle's category of "primary substance"' (1992: 62). The source is not Ibn Sînâ, nor a Neoplatonist or Sufi thinker, but Alfred North Whitehead's *Process and Reality* (1978), characterising concrescence or creative coming-together.

To what degree does Ibn Sînâ's being differentiate without regard for a teleological return? In its Neoplatonist aspect, Ibn Sînâ's divinely driven becoming appears teleological, for the purpose of each entity is to become more like God. But the immanence of Ibn Sînâ's being and its propositional nature seems to allow entities creative freedom – as much creative freedom as God has, but not more. As Goodman writes, 'Ibn Sînâ does not explain how God's wisdom leaves room for real alternatives, a question taken up by Ghazâlî, Maimonides, and Leibniz, and in our own [twentieth] century by Bergson and Whitehead.' Yet 'not until Spinoza was a more adequate way found than the Neoplatonism relied on by Avicenna for integrating particulars with the wholeness of God' (1992: 95–6). Goodman points out that it remains a question whether the conception that things might have been different from how they are can work without creation as their cause. Leibniz (taking up, as we saw, the argument of al Ghazâlî, who in turn developed Maimonides, who drew on Ibn Sînâ) still needed a creationist model to ensure that this is the best of all possible worlds.

A more fluid concept of becoming lies in Ibn Sînâ's *Physics*, Chapters 10 to 13 of *The Healing*. There Ibn Sînâ distinguishes two notions of motion: a mental notion, grasping the totality of motion from beginning

to end point; and a notion of the intermediary state between the two points, which, existing in reality, constitutes motion proper. His entirely new emphasis on motion as 'situs' (position) and objective existence of time, Jules Janssens writes, means that time 'defined as a continuum produced by the passing of the "flowing now"'. But mentally, time is still infinitely divisible, so 'now' presents itself as a limit: a concept of flowing-now that produces real time (Janssens 2006: 12–13). Ibn Sînâ's account of time thus uncannily anticipates Bergson's; however, I cannot demonstrate a direct line of influence.

Deleuze is not a Platonist – because Ibn Sînâ wasn't

Deleuze has been slammed as a closet transcendentalist and Platonist, in particular by Alain Badiou, who, in *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being* (2000), criticises Deleuze for privileging an ultimate unity that transcends differences. Badiou argues that, with the concept of the univocity of being (which we now know to come from Ibn Sînâ), Deleuze did not 'reverse Platonism' as he intended but reaffirmed it: the univocity of being results in 'a single clamor of Being for all beings'. Badiou argues that the virtual / actual pair posits the virtual as a Platonic One, of which the actual is a kind of simulacrum. Thus, he concludes, Deleuze's virtual remains transcendent. Others have made similar charges. Peter Hallward (1997) argues that Deleuze's Real is merely the self-differentiation of the Plotinian One. The Neoplatonist ring of this resonates further in Hallward's comparison of Deleuze to the Illuminationist philosophy of al-Suhrawardî (1997: 18).

But the study of Deleuze's antecedents provides a much more nuanced view. The above discussion of Neoplatonist tendencies in Ibn Sînâ might seem to confirm Badiou's critique, but it does not precisely because Ibn Sînâ synthesised Neoplatonism with the very different cosmologies of *kalâm* theology and Aristotle. The Aristotelian element is obvious to readers of medieval philosophy such as Nathan Widder (2001), who refutes Badiou by demonstrating that the univocity of being is not a Platonic doctrine but an Aristotelian one refined by Duns Scotus. 'Univocity is hardly concerned with establishing a unity among differences, but rather with linking differences *through their difference*' (Widder 2001: 438). Unfortunately, Widder drops the essential link between Aristotle and Scotus that Ibn Sînâ created. But further exploration into the Arabic sources of univocity shows its debt to Ibn Sînâ's synthesis of Aristotle and Islamic thought, as I have shown, with particular elements of Neoplatonism. Regarding this last, it is helpful to keep in mind that, while in Plato and in the Neoplatonism of Plotinus, the One

is outside being and knowledge, for Ibn Sînâ the source of being, the Necessary Existent, is *immanent*: a category of being within being (see Morewedge 1992: 60; Owens 1992: 44). All this does not quite put Badiou's critique to rest, but it invites Deleuzians to examine deeper the non-Platonist sources in Islamic thought.

Because of the racialising politics that caused Europe to turn its back on its Islamic heritage, Ibn Sînâ's ideas continued to develop differently in the West and the Muslim world. While Ibn Sînâ's writings were being translated in Spain, disseminated in Europe, tinkered with and absorbed so completely that their origins were forgotten, philosophers in the Muslim world, especially in Iran, India and Ottoman Asia Minor, continued debating and refining them (Gutas 2002). Mullâ Sadrâ in particular seems to have developed Ibn Sînâ's thought in a direction similar to that taken by Deleuze. A monist and radical existentialist and one of the most influential early modern Islamic thinkers, Mullâ Sadrâ argued that God is devoid of essence. Existence is ontologically prior, dynamic and in flux; existence is a principle of *individuation* (*tashakhkhus*) and, in turn, things are *modulations* of the singular reality that is existence. Essences, Mullâ Sadrâ wrote, citing the mystic Ibn al-ʿArabî, 'have never smelt the fragrance of being' (Rizvi 2005). We can hear the Neoplatonist and mystical elements in Mullâ Sadrâ's monism, but this concept of the universe as non-deterministic, dynamically individuating system resonates strongly with Bergson, Whitehead, Simondon and Deleuze.

More knowledge of philosophy in the Muslim world since Ibn Sînâ would shed light on the limits of Deleuze's non-Neoplatonism and find new meeting points between the thought of the two philosophers. It seems to me that this is a good time to rebuild the highway between the philosophy of the Muslim world and the West, which thinned to a skinny path after the twelfth century and then sank away altogether.

The Iberian Peninsula in the Twelfth Century

Ibn Sînâ's work, and that of other thinkers writing in Arabic, passed selectively into the West through a very narrow bottleneck: most were translated into Latin in Toledo in the twelfth century. Those translations were carried out against a background of enormous cultural and political foment. We need some sense of the rich centuries of mutual influence and intercultural collaboration in the Iberian Peninsula, first under the Islamic caliphates, sultanates and *taifa* states (a very long period, 756–1492), and second (overlapping the first), in the emergent culture of Castilian Spain, beginning in 1085 and concluding in 1516.

In the early eighth century, Visigoths, recent Christian converts, occupied the Iberian Peninsula. By most accounts, Visigoth government was sporadic, so in 711 it was easy for Berbers from North Africa to conquer large areas of the peninsula. In 756, Abd al-Rahman, the only one of the Umayyads of Damascus to have survived the massacre that established the 'Abbasid caliphate, arrived in Andalusia. He established a new Umayyad caliphate with its court in Córdoba. During the three hundred years of Umayyad rule, the population began to grow and Andalusia became prosperous. Some Christians fled north, while others converted to Islam. The Islamic culture of Andalusia thrived, its achievements in governance, agriculture, science, urbanism, poetry, philosophy and art utterly dazzling the Christians across the Pyrenees. Andalusians adopted Arab irrigation methods and drought-resistant crops, some of these learned from Indian agriculturists (Glick 2005: 68–9). The caliphate sponsored philosophy, literature, music and all the courtly arts. Muslim artisans practised the fine arts and crafts of the East, including ceramics, textiles, metalwork, bookbinding, leatherwork and ivory carving, becoming a centre for the export of luxury goods to the Church and nobility northward and well beyond the Pyrenees. These crafts kindled desires among Christians to the north and dominated the economy accordingly. In the tenth century, a finely worked saddle of Cordovan leather cost more than the horse, and a saddle could be traded for a mill (ibid.: 132–3).

In calling this culture Islamic, I include the Jewish and Mozarab or Arabic-speaking Christian people (from *mustarib*, made-Arab) of the Iberian peninsula who lived under Islamic governments. According to Islamic law, monotheistic 'people of the book' who live in Muslim-controlled lands were protected (*dhimmi*) by the Muslim rulers. In Andalusian towns, Christians lived among Muslims, while Jews, no strangers to persecution, lived in walled quarters with gates. Muslims and Jews participated vigorously in the secular high culture, Mozarab Christians less so. The public language of all Andalusians, Muslim, Christian and Jew, was Arabic.

After three centuries of Umayyad-ruled Andalusia, however, power relations became more fraught. Two successive invasions from North Africa, the Almoravids in 1056 and the Almohads in 1130, broke up Umayyad unity. Christian rulers to the north gained power and territory at the same time. Loyalties fell along lines of power and protection, not religion: established Muslim rulers formed alliances with Christian kings against the invading North African Muslims, while Christian rulers fought among themselves for territory. In 1085 Alfonso VI, the

Christian ruler of Castile and León, captured Toledo; in the next two centuries Christians won other battles, until Spain became a chequerboard of Muslim political enclaves (*taifas*) and Christian-ruled regions. The emirate of Granada remained as the only Muslim-ruled territory in Spain until its demise in 1492.

Yet during these centuries, Islamic culture and trade continued to dominate the peninsular landscape. In the eleventh century, Muslim *taifas* paid tribute to Christian rulers, who promptly reinvested it by purchasing Muslim-made luxury goods (Glick 2005: 132–3). Even when Christians were officially crusading against Muslims in Spain, Christian relics were wrapped in luxury silks from Andalusia woven with Arabic blessings (O'Neill 1994).

Andalusia's role in the history of cosmopolitanism is fundamental. Between 756 and 1492, Andalusia was a 'first-rate' place, María Rosa Menocal writes, borrowing an idea from an author dear to Deleuze, F. Scott Fitzgerald, because it was 'capable of accepting that contradictions – within oneself, as well as within one's culture – could be positive and productive' (2002: 11). Andalusia produced multiplicities and thrived with a rhizomatic hardiness. Popular accounts of medieval Andalusia, such as Menocal's, usually refer to it as an idyllic period of free cultural mingling, with Christians, Muslims and Jews 'working side by side' in construction, crafts and translation. Scholarly evidence suggests, however, that these groups interacted with a great deal of negotiation, mutual suspicion and occasional violence, and when they worked together it was for perceived mutual benefit. Yet through these opportunistic local alliances, language, religion and art in Andalusia became irremediably hybrid.

Thus, when the Christian monarchs of the north sought to conquer Andalusia, and to consolidate it as a Roman Catholic state under Castilian rule, they faced an inextricably mixed culture. As Menocal argues, the idea of Spanish, or specifically Castilian, identity had to be manufactured. And the need to subsume the lively, writhing creature of Andalusian culture surely fuelled Christian racism in Deleuze and Guattari's sense of incorporating or obliterating difference.

The Translation Movement: Reterritorialising Islamic Knowledge

After Alfonso conquered Toledo, the city became the twelfth-century world's centre of translation. Scholastic clerics travelled from afar to take part in the hothouse of intellectual activity. Refugees from the

Almohad-occupied south, especially Jews who fled persecution, further enriched Toledo's culture and translation activity. Christians recognised that they urgently needed Islamic knowledge, but they also had to neutralise its Islamicness. Yet to do so, they needed to immerse themselves in Islamic thought and work intimately with Muslim collaborators. Thus the translation movement incurred an Islamic deterritorialisation of Christian thought and Christian submission to Islamic culture before the Christian scholars could reterritorialise Islamic thought.

The major tradition of translation was most keenly focused on Islamic science, mathematics and agriculture. Church fathers also commissioned a number of apologetics that would help Christian readers understand Islam, the purpose being to arm them to convince Muslims of the error of their religion. Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny, argued that the polemic with Islam should be carried out intellectually (in opposition to the bellicose Crusade-flogger Bernard of Clairvaux). Thus, in 1142, Peter sought a translator for the Qur'an, to provide Christian theologians with a 'true account of Law of the Saracens and their prophet Mohammmed's life'. He found Robert of Ketton, translator of the mathematics of Al-Khwarizmî. Robert worked with Peter of Poitiers, a Mozarab identified as Patrus Toletanus, and a 'Saracen' named Mohammed. This was a very free translation, incorporating commentary and explanations from recent exegesis that reflected local Muslims' current understanding of the Qur'an, and addressing a Christian readership. Known as *Lex Mahumet pseudoprophete*, the translation was a 'medieval best-seller'; there exist twenty-five extant manuscripts and two sixteenth-century printed versions (Burman 1998: 704; Menocal, et al. 2008: 202–3). This popular book thus paradoxically compelled Christians seeking to discredit Islam to absorb it as a living tradition.

Most translators worked as teams, relying on the Castilian spoken language as intermediary. Menocal (2002) emphasises that the translation movement could only have happened in the context of Castilian Spain, for Castilian was the shared language of Mozarabs, Jews and Mudejars (Muslims under Christian rule). An Arabic speaker would translate orally from Arabic to the Romance vernacular; another person would translate from the vernacular to Latin; and a third, usually the credited translator, would write down the Latin version.

Most of the collaborators' names are not known, but two accounts state that Ibn Sînâ's *De Anima* was translated word for word from Arabic to the local Romance vernacular by an intermediary, the Mozarab Johannes Hispalense (simply, John of Spain) and then into Latin by Domingo González (Dominicus Gundissalinus). Abraham Ibn

Da'ud (Avendauth), a Jewish philosopher who fled from Córdoba to Toledo to escape Almohad persecution and who would have known both Arabic and Romance, also worked with Gundissalinus on the translation (Menocal et al. 2008: 206). Gundissalinus 'and an unknown collaborator' also translated Ibn Sînâ's *Metaphysics* (Burnett 2005: 395).

In short, the translation movement exposed Christian scholars to Muslim influence even as the translation movement tended to elide the contributions of all but the Latin scholars. This, and the Latinisation of Arabic names, were first steps in the European reterritorialisation, the Christian *whitewashing*, of received Islamic thought. Yet the European Renaissance would never have occurred without these sources in Islamic philosophy written in Arabic.

Ethnic Cleansing and the Birth of Racism in Spain

The Andalusian creative coexistence was made possible, in large measure, by Islamic law, which protects – in principle and, under the Umayyad caliphate in Andalusia, in practice – all non-Muslim 'people of the book'. The *dhimmi* paid higher taxes, were not permitted to marry Muslims and in other ways were reminded of their minority status, but protection was written into the law. The Christian monarchs of Spain had a similar practice but based on civil not religious law, and thus open to revision and reneging (Harvey 2005: 29). This is one reason why the fates of Muslims and Jews declined so precipitously as Christian monarchs gradually conquered Muslim-held territories.

In 1492, the army of the Castilian monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella defeated the last Islamic caliphate, the Nasrids, in Granada. That same fateful year, Columbus carried out the monarchs' mission to find a new sea route to India, and Ferdinand and Isabella forced all Jews of Spain either to convert or to be expelled. As a people without a nation to rally behind them, Jews were particularly vulnerable; already England, France, Scotland, Sweden and other countries had expelled them (Harvey 2005: 17). Probably because of the strength of Muslim nations that could rally to Andalusian Muslims' aid, Ferdinand promised, in the 1492 terms of surrender, that Muslims would be allowed to continue to worship.[6] But the Church in Spain quickly reversed this promise. On the excuse of a Muslim revolt in 1499, Archbishop Cisneros overturned the terms of the 1492 peace and declared that all Muslims, like Jews, must either convert, be expelled or be sold into slavery. Some Muslim administrators and businessmen made deals with the Castilian government to

convert and keep their positions. From 1500 to 1502, rural Muslims revolted against the conversion decree, and the Castilians besieged and bombarded their villages, massacring residents, and in one case blowing up a mosque in which 600 women and children took refuge. Some Muslims were able to buy back their confiscated property at a punishingly high price; if not, they had no recourse but to become slaves when their property was confiscated (ibid.: 34–42).

In the decades that followed, race and religion operated as covers for the economic exploitation of Muslims, as of Jews. The state gradually criminalised every aspect of Muslim culture and disenfranchised Muslims of their property. Christians moved into villages that Muslims had evacuated. They took over farms and artisanal works. Interestingly, after 1501, an *anti*-emigration policy took hold, apparently because the state needed Muslim converts – Moriscos, 'little Moors' – as a tax base, source of cheap labour and source of expertise in all kind of manufacture. A rash of detailed laws listed all the things that were now forbidden, as a result accurately describing Muslim practices: from halal meat to decorating one's skin with henna to bathing on Fridays (to prevent secret worship in clandestine mosques) and Sundays (to prevent Moriscos from secretly enacting Muslim devotions while attending church). Over the ensuing century, Muslim ways went deep underground.

In 1504, the conquered Muslims of Spain received a deeply compassionate message from a mufti in Oran, Algeria. The 'Oran fatwa' allowed Muslims to practise their religion in secret through dissimulation (*taqiyya*), and gave them detailed suggestions as to how to go about it. Christians would test Muslim converts' sincerity by forcing them to drink wine and eat pork, practise usury, and marry their daughters to Christians; the Oran fatwa advises to do the deed but 'Reject it in your heart' (Harvey 2005: 63). In these and many ways, the Spanish Muslims learned to be crypto-Muslims. Appearing to erase their differences in accordance with Christian facialisation, Muslims enfolded their religious and cultural ways so deeply as to become imperceptible.

In 1449, the government of Toledo declared the infamous doctrine of *limpieza di sangre*, 'purity of blood', meant to distinguish the so-called New Christians – Jews who had converted but now offensively called *marranos*, pigs – and the Muslims who had converted (Moriscos, Mudejars), from the 'Old Christians', who had supposedly never intermingled and descended straight from the Visigoths. Pope Nicholas V rejected this new statute because it made religious conversion impossible. In fact, the goal was not religious but political: to keep power in Catholic hands by keeping Jews and Muslims out of public office. And

'purity of blood' was an impossible proposition – the beginning of the absurdity of modern racism. The people of the Iberian Peninsula had intermingled for centuries; in fact, Muslims had been encouraged by their religion to marry Christian and Jewish women, while Christians had converted to Islam to obtain access to power. Many Muslims were descendants of Christians who had converted. Many other minorities inhabited the peninsula: Arabs, Berbers, people of Gothic and Roman descent, black Africans and so on. It was impossible to detect a person's 'race' by skin colour or facial features alone – which is why the Inquisition had to resort to examining men's foreskins (Harvey 2005: 7–9).

In a fantasy of ethnic purity, the Castilians disingenuously but famously called their war on the Muslims the *Reconquista*. 'Reconquest' suggests a return to Visigothic times, an impossible and surely undesirable disentangling of the rich cultural weave of Andalusia. Instead, the emergent Christian Spain of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries absorbed the best of its Jewish and Muslim heritage, while its rulers sanctioned massacre, relocation and deportation of Jews and Muslims.[7]

Conclusion

Between 1609 and 1614, Spain expelled all remaining Muslims under brutal conditions. More than a hundred thousand Muslims died either resisting expulsion, during their passage by land or sea, or at the hands of fellow Muslims when they landed in North Africa (Majid 2009: 40). Spain was at last ethnically 'clean' – though the Spanish and Portuguese were required to prove the purity of their blood for centuries to come. Fraternities, religious orders, military orders and other organisations wrote into their statutes rules that postulants had to submit to an inquiry into their ancestry. Of course, this was open to abuse. In 1618, an official remarked that

> to be regarded as of noble or pure blood, you needed either to have no enemies or to be rich enough to buy false witnesses, or else to be of such obscure origin that nobody knew where you had come from; if you were completely unknown, you could pass for an Old Christian. (cited in Pérez 2005: 55)

The Inquisition gave Spaniards other worries too; the Edict of Faith listed heresies including possession of works of Judaism, Luther, Qur'anic texts, and after 1738, freemasonry. This last is provocative, given freemasonry's crypto-heritage of Islamic hermetic traditions.

What remained of the Muslim and Jewish heritage of Castilian Spanish philosophy and culture would be mostly homogenised within Castilian culture; what could not be subsumed would be excluded. The 'first-rate' multiplicity of Andalusia's long period of brilliant cultural exchange gave way to repulsive ethnic violence, neurotic protestations of white Christian purity and a perverted version of Andalusian intellectual promise.

The ethnic cleansing of Muslims and Jews from Spain, and emergent Christian nations' expurgation of their Islamic intellectual roots, fashioned a rupture in what we have discovered to be have otherwise been a continuity in philosophy. Even though Islamic philosophy passed selectively through the translation bottleneck of twelfth-century Toledo and Christian whitewashing, it forever shaped philosophical activity in Europe all the way to what we call 'French theory'. Dreaming that events might have gone another way, I imagine how rich modern philosophy might have been if West European and Islamic philosophies had maintained contact. If only Deleuze had been able to engage with the thought of Mullâ Sadrâ! If Leibniz had had direct intercourse with Isma'ili Shi'ite thought . . . Whitehead with *kalâm* theology . . . and Deleuzianism with contemporary Muslim scholars like Mohammed Arkoun. May these imaginings stimulate new becomings! For Deleuzians have exciting, productive acts of unfolding still in front of them, of unfolding the real connections with the rich history of Islamic thought, and to invent new ones.

Notes

1. Raimón Llull embodies the multiplicity of fifteenth-century Spain: he advocated for the expulsion or conversion of Jews, and he was also inspired by Islamic mysticism and translated the logic of the Sufi philosopher Al-Ghazâlî (Akasoy 2009: 128). He had a Muslim slave on whom he likely relied to learn some of the more closely guarded aspects of Islamic thought (see Vernet 1975).
2. Part of the problem seems to be a lack of communication between scholars of medieval and modern philosophy; the former are usually aware of at least some of the influence of Islamic philosophers, while the latter are not.
3. Joseph Owens (1992) argues that Ibn Sînâ's liberation of thought from a concrete object in the concept of mental existence constituted a radical break no less than the rupture between medieval and modern thought, though it would not be fully realised until Descartes.
4. It would be wonderful to know more about how Ibn Sînâ and other Islamic philosophers developed Stoic thought, especially given the latter's importance to Deleuze.
5. Other scholars argue that there is no evidence for a mystical or illuminationist strain in Ibn Sînâ's thought, as Morewedge claims: see Szpiech (2010) and Gutas (2002).

6. As L. P. Harvey (2005: 32) points out, this stipulation meant that an individual could follow his or her own judgment against the doctrine of the Church – then a controversy raging throughout Western Europe.
7. Jews had apparently fled or been forced into exile by the end of the fifteenth century. Yet, in fact, the Spanish Inquisition targeted crypto-Jews almost entirely, with very few of its prisoners accused of crypto-Islam. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the Inquisition charged twelve thousand Moriscos with apostasy, half in the thirty years before expulsion. But between 1615 and 1700, only 9 per cent of Inquisition judgments were against Moriscos. This suggests the Moriscos really did leave, while some Jews remained in Spain in disguise.

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Dismantling the White-Man Face: Racialisation, Faciality and the Palm Island Riot

Simone Bignall

In twenty-first century Australia, race can determine one's chances of living or dying, or of getting away with murder. In November 2004, an Aboriginal man died in police custody on Palm Island in the far north of Queensland. Mulrunji Doomadgee's liver and spleen had been ruptured, and yet the autopsy report also found that these injuries were not caused by force. In 2007, following a Coronial Inquiry, the arresting officer was acquitted on a charge of murder. In the days following this death in custody, the Palm Island indigenous community took to the streets in violent protest to vent their anger and express their frustration with a legal system that they feel patently refuses to operate on the principles of equal treatment and fair justice. While the overrepresentation of indigenous individuals in gaols and Aboriginal deaths in custody have been the subjects of a Royal Commission and are formally recognised to be systemic problems within Australia's criminal justice system, events concerning these issues tend to pass largely unremarked in public discourse.

Although the Palm Island riot successfully drew attention to the racist circumstances surrounding Doomadgee's death, the participants in the riot soon became the primary focus of widespread public condemnation. They were discursively positioned in accordance with standard colonialist representations of aboriginality: as deviant, disordered and undisciplined. This chapter explores this complex set of encounters through a reading of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 'faciality', which conveys the idea that language functions as a disciplinary ordering device operating at the nexus of the signifier and the subject. By paying special attention to their assertion that racism operates by the representation of degrees of deviance from the White-Man face, I argue that the politics of becoming associated with dismantling the face describes a strategy for combatting racist power relations and transforming racist structures of signification.

White Face and National Space

In his work on cinema, Deleuze's discussion of the roles of 'the face' (1986: 99) mainly explores the affective dimensions of the encounter between particular or individual faces, primarily those of the viewer and the face on the screen (see also Conley 2005; Rushton 2002). However, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari identify the face as 'the *white wall / black hole* system' (1987: 167). Here they use the term 'face', not in concrete reference to a particular visage, but rather to image an abstract process of sense-making and the consolidation of an emergent structure of sense. The concept of 'faciality' conveys the idea that language functions as an ordering device, operating at the nexus of the signifier and the subject. Ronald Bogue explains that, for Deleuze and Guattari,

> language's purpose is less to communicate than to impose order. Language enforces a codification of the world according to orthodox categories and classifications, its various speech-acts shaping, guiding, and policing thought and behaviour. Hence the regular patterns of socially sanctioned practices effected by language may be said to constitute a *regime* of signs, a power structure that forms individual subjects and places them in social and political relation to one another. (2003: 83)

The operation of the news media as an ordering device, working through language to reproduce the structures of signification and understanding that institutionalise and normalise the 'White-Man face', could be clearly observed during the reportage of the events at Palm Island (Hollingsworth 2005). The role of news media in framing Australian race relations came under scrutiny in 1991, when the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and the Human Rights Commission National Inquiry into Racist Violence each found that media representation exerts a powerful influence on community attitudes and behaviours towards indigenous people. Despite the recommendations made by these reports, with the aim of reducing incarceration rates and improving the material experiences of indigenous Australians in gaol and in society, there has been little improvement noted since that time. Media representations of indigenous affairs have remained stereotypically negative, and incarceration rates for indigenous Australians have in fact increased; recent statistics indicate that indigenous adults are thirteen times more likely to be imprisoned, and indigenous youths twenty-eight times more likely to be held in juvenile detention, in comparison with non-indigenous Australians (Calma 2009).

In fact, Australia's history of discrimination and exclusion of indige-
nous and ethnic minority populations and the concurrent development of
a white Australian identity has been consistently reflected in news report-
ing, which often has made overt reference to phenotype-based inferiority
(Hartley and McKee 2000; Meadows 2001). More recently, news dis-
course is observed to employ a more subtle form of 'new racism', which
utilises cultural and nationalist criteria rather than biological identifiers
for marking difference (Barker 1981; Miles 1989). As Ghassan Hage
(1998) explains, this more restrained form of racist discourse maintains
ideological and practical boundaries of nationalist inclusion and exclu-
sion by naturalising a hierarchy of whiteness that effectively perpetuates
and privileges the managerial power of a dominant white Australia.

In line with the 'new racism' paradigm, indigenous Australians are
frequently portrayed as a threat to the social order, which must be
appropriately managed; journalists almost always report on indigenous
people and ethnic minorities as a source of conflict, disunity and divi-
sion within the nation and therefore as a problematic disruption to
the orderly, 'normal' or 'mainstream' Australia that is, by implication,
'white'. Australian news media typically reports stories about indig-
enous affairs only when they are about crisis or conflict, 'with issues
overwhelmingly framed as intractable and requiring radical intervention
by governments' (McCallum and Holland 2010: 7). Unsurprisingly, the
news media coverage of the events on Palm Island focused on the riot
itself, rather than attending primarily to the causal event of (colonial)
state violence that resulted in the death of Mulrunji Doomadgee. The
news discourse was characterised by 'copy that mobilised dominant
ideological constructions of Aboriginality around the terms "riot",
"drunk" and "police [protection]" . . . reflect[ing] a profound structural
racism in which the mainstream news media is *organisationally* com-
plicit' (Little 2010: 51).

Ghassan Hage usefully describes Australian racism as a way of man-
aging national space in accordance with the hierarchical positioning of
bodies across a 'field of whiteness'. This enables its complex conceptu-
alisation, not only as a system of thought and a technology defining a
nationalist political ideology and informing the development of institu-
tions, but also as a more informal, everyday practice of micropolitical
engagement. Racism in this second sense is a bodily practice of social
relating, in which actors struggle to assert and embody a privileged mode
of 'occupying the nation' that enables them to be 'spatially empowered to
position / remove the other' from the national domicile (Hage 1998: 42).
One's 'spatial empowerment' within the nation is helped by imagining

the nation as one's 'home' and oneself as (potentially) invested with the cultural capital that entitles a proprietary enjoyment and management of homely national space. Here, nationalism is 'a state of the body. It is a way of imagining one's position within the nation and what one can aspire to as a national' (ibid.: 45). In Australia, national development was shaped by the colonial denigration of Indigenous Peoples and by the 'White Australia' policy, each valorising whiteness as a primary signifier of the cultural capital that is prerequisite for a citizen's enjoyment of the governmental 'power to position others within the nation' (ibid.: 65). As a valuable form of cultural capital, whiteness creates '*differential modalities of national belonging* as they are experienced within society' (ibid.: 51, original italics).

Of course, not all shades of white are counted as equal; within white-ness there exists a hierarchy of cultural capital and associated political entitlement, determined by the complex interplay between race, gender, class and other modalities of political identification. Those at the top of the whiteness hierarchy will typically also enjoy gender and class privi-leges; differentiations between these categories assist the political distri-bution of bodies within national space, determining citizens' differing capacities for governmental action. Citizens in possession of sufficient characteristics of whiteness (inflected by their gender, class and other assignations) are able to enjoy 'governmental belonging' associated with their perceived right to manage the homely space of the nation by decid-ing who should be made to 'feel at home' and who should be 'told to leave'. However, other 'non-white' or 'off-white' citizens experience a far less powerful form of national belonging in which they are system-atically 'managed' rather than 'managerial', corresponding with their marginal positioning within the 'field of whiteness' that is Australia. Eileen Moreton-Robinson (1999: 35) explains that indigenous people 'are constantly reminded of our place in society by representations within the media: we are presented as 'the problem' in the margins of Australian society'. Similarly, Lilian Holt (1999: 41–3) comments on her experience as an Aboriginal girl growing up in Australia: 'white-ness shamed and whiteness blamed. It defined and delineated . . . who could come into the fold and who stayed out . . . whiteness was about apartness.' For the most part, the reportage of the events at Palm Island uncritically reproduced these discourses demarcating managerial white-ness and unruly aboriginality.

When it is conceptualised in terms of a strategic distribution of bodies across a field of whiteness, it becomes apparent that nationalism is not simply concerned with naturalising particular values or racial attributes,

but rather involves naturalising a national order headed by a 'national aristocracy'. Such aristocracies 'consolidate their power by naturalising their own topography of the nation: the positions that constitute the national field and the capital needed to occupy them'. Accordingly, Hage insists:

> A national ideal does not only idealise the position of the dominant within the nation, but also a whole series of positions and the relations between them. It consists of a map of what for the dominant are idealised positions and idealised types constituting these positions. That is, the dominant in the national field do not only have an ideal of themselves in the field, but also an ideal of all the positions in it, that is, an ideal of the field itself which they struggle to impose. (1998: 65–6)

One gains access to the national aristocracy by accumulating whiteness as cultural capital and thus by aligning one's identity with the majoritarian 'White-man face' that pronounces itself the 'will of the nation and the protector of its order' (ibid.: 67). The power of racist nationalism lies in the apparent self-evidence of this will, which manifests itself in the 'process of establishing a White national order that reciprocally valorises the very Whiteness that operates as its principle of organisation, the White national will that is behind it and of which it is the expression' (ibid.). It is in this respect that Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of faciality can be instructive, for they provide a way of understanding how the distribution of relations of domination in a signifying field is never given, but rather is constructed and may always be transformed.

Faciality

Deleuze and Guattari's concept of faciality describes a 'pure abstraction', a conceptual topography which diagrams the intersection of the two semiotic systems operating as signification and subjectivation (1987: 115). They define the face as 'a surface . . . the face is a map,' which is comprised of a broad featureless space – a 'formless white wall' of signification – marked by 'dimensionless black holes' of subjectivity (ibid.: 170). These black depths disturb the blank surface to suggest 'faciality': 'a suggestive whiteness, a hole that captures, a face' (ibid.: 168). Thus, faciality is a concept intended to convey diagrammatically the rigid structure of a dominant system of meaning, the particular 'regime of signs' defined by Deleuze and Guattari as 'despotic-authoritarian', which corresponds with distinct 'patterns of sanctioned action' and

particular modes of subject formation (Bogue 2003: 86). Accordingly, the process of facialisation describes the dynamic of emergence of a dominant system of meaning, in which events and identities are captured semantically and represented by the two semiotic orders of signifier and subject.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the face takes a particular form – it is a 'concrete assemblage' – but is always produced by an 'abstract machine of faciality' (ibid.: 168). The face takes shape alongside the 'ensemble of material connections in which bodies and things are drawn . . . People become facialized not because of ideology, repression, or texts, but because of their commingling with places, tools, and each other' (Saldanha 2007: 100–1). Habits of connectivity draw constituting elements into regular assemblages or arrangements, thus establishing structures of coherence. In the process of facialisation, the function of the subject is to establish the rhythm of coherence that organises various interpretations of such arrangements into a consistent worldview. Thus, facialisation relies upon the interpretive work of the subject, who is responsible for the territorialisation – the selection and consolidation – of a privileged set of significations from a range of possible alternatives, and the perpetuation of these meanings through the ongoing repetition of a given mode of expression. In this sense, the face is a 'territory' that is carved out from a broader 'landscape' – the collection of diverse orders of meaning that form any given social, political and discursive milieu (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 172–3). The face expresses a dominant outlook and mode of understanding; it encodes a particularly powerful regime of signs. A face is powerful for as long as its expression remains fixed: that is, for as long as the regime of signs it expresses repeats regularly and persuasively through time. Its resistance to transformation ensures its continuation in its given form. Patricia MacCormack (2004: 137) comments:

> the face is a landscape. The faced landscape is rigid, changeable only in relation to a set of predictable variances. The landscape is also cultivated by a certain set of people, who own, run and map the land. The land is recognised in a certain way.

As Hage (1998) illustrates, this facial landscape is recognised from the privileged point of view of a political aristocracy.

The face is, then, an apparatus of capture which records and organises events and concepts into meaningful sequences and structures of expression that serve the interests of a political aristocracy. It is comprised of 'a general space of comparison and a mobile centre of appropriation'

(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 444). The 'white wall' of the signifier acts to 'define zones of frequency or probability, delimit a field that neutralises in advance any expressions or connections unamenable to the appropriate significations' (ibid.: 168). The 'black hole' of subjectivity constitutes a perceptive and interpretive centre, which draws in, assimilates and transforms alterity, encompassing and internalising various interpretations within an existing structure of significance and comprehension. Together, the 'white wall' of the signifier and the 'black hole' of subjectivity effect the operation of representation. In this process, difference is compared and measured in terms of its recognised resemblance to a given or established representative form; this privileging of similitude and resemblance categorises inassimilable difference as 'unruly' or 'outcast' and reproduces an expanding principle of identity or sameness in the process of signification. Thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, faciality privileges the conceptual cluster of identity, resemblance and analogy that underscores the possibility of representation and the politics of recognition underlying the management and hierarchical distribution of identities within a political space, such as that described by a nation.

The facial system produces an abstract model of identity that is generalised and standardised; the face enables a 'computation of normalities' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 178). MacCormack (2004: 136) explains that, as a consequence, 'when we are facialised, we are made visible only within one dominant system and in the only manner that the dominant system understands . . . certain bodies are read and valued according to how they differ from the majoritarian face.' Faciality corresponds with a politics of representative identity, in which the recognition of difference is achievable only in relation to that identity: 'the face is a politics' resting upon technologies of normalisation and discipline (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 181). The facial structure thereby describes a general system of representation that underscores the possibility of a generalised politics of capture, which may be mobilised in a range of concrete circumstances in specific bodily practices and techniques of control. Racism is therefore not the only mode that can be taken by facialised politics, which in fact extends to all majoritarian practices of power, including, for example, masculinism, capitalism and heteronormativity. However, Deleuze and Guattari identify racism as one privileged example of facial politics, which 'operates by degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face' (1987: 181, 178).

In general, then, 'the face brings the body of that which varies from the majoritarian into comprehension for dominant culture . . . they always exist in comparison with the majoritarian face' (MacCormack

2004: 136). Or, as Bogue comments: 'the face of despotic-passional power identifies, classifies, *recognizes* . . . the facialized object is recognized, pinned to the wall, or stuffed in a hole, imprinted with a look that it returns as a reverberation of the force that shapes it' (2003: 104–5). In fact, as is evidenced by the example of the reportage of the events at Palm Island – which focused on disorderly, rioting Aborigines and deflected public attention away from the causal factor of police violence – a facial regime maintains its majoritarian form by attributing a negative value to any fragments of *signifiance* that threaten to elude capture:

> In a signifying regime, the scapegoat represents a new form of increasing entropy in the system of signs: it is charged with everything that was 'bad' in a given period, that is, everything that resisted signifying signs . . . finally, and especially, it incarnates the line of flight the signifying regime cannot tolerate . . . the regime must block a line of this kind or define it in an entirely negative fashion . . . Anything that threatens to put the system to flight will be killed or put to flight itself. Anything that exceeds the excess of the signifier or passes beneath it will be marked with a negative value. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 116)

The Palm Islanders protesting against the violent treatment of their people held in custody became scapegoats, negatively identified in dominant news discourse and social discussions that maintained emphasis on the riots and thereby refrained from scrutinising the inciting violent behaviour of the white police officer. This framing of the events and the actors implicitly upheld whiteness as an unremarked category of social 'normality' against which Australia's internal 'others' are represented as 'unruly', measured as deviant and finally 'managed' within the space of the nation.

Causal Power and the Ruin of Representation

The 'ruin of representation' is a central aspect of Deleuze's task in *Difference and Repetition* and indeed forms a consistent thread through his entire œuvre, including his work with Guattari (Olkowski 1999). The aim in *Difference and Repetition* is to shake off the 'four iron collars of representation: identity in the concept, opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgement and resemblance in perception' (Deleuze 1994: 262). In *A Thousand Plateaus*, the discussion of faciality likewise involves a critique of representation; in particular, how faces 'form loci of resonance that select sensed or mental reality and make it conform in advance to a dominant reality' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 168). For Deleuze, at the heart of representation and aligned forms of politi-

cal practice is the misconception that the established regime of power /
knowledge (the face) causally structures the productive force of desire
and assemblage. Within this model of causation, an established signifier
or set of significations predetermines the possibility of recognition and
limits the potential for inventing new configurations of meaning and,
hence, of social organisation. The imposition of an already-given order
of meaning upon an actual variety of subject-forming events reduces
them to a limited and predetermined interpretation of experience, as was
the case in the narrow reportage of the events at Palm Island. According
to Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 177), all interpretation then becomes
assimilated to an existing structure of meaning: 'You don't so much
have a face as slide into one.'

Deleuze and Guattari encourage us in *Anti-Oedipus* (1983) to under-
stand alternatively that the established forms of power described by the
subject and the signifier are not the (already-given) causes of *signifiance*,
but are, in fact, themselves reactive effects of a process in which meaning
is constructed through the association of elements into a coherent form
(see, for example, 1983: 129). They therefore assert: 'concrete faces
cannot be assumed to come ready-made. They are engendered by an
abstract machine of faciality (*visagéité*), which produces them' (Deleuze
and Guattari 1987: 168). This engendering involves the process of
facialisation, in which the face 'takes shape' and 'begins to appear' as
certain regular features are inscribed and emerge as fixed strata upon
a mobile 'surface', thereby forming the landscape of the face with the
repetition of their occurrence over a period of time. However, these fea-
tures are not inevitable characteristics of the facial landscape; they occur
according to a particular and contingent coding of elemental conjunc-
tions to define a particular emergence of faciality.

Thus, a 'concrete face' is always defined by the assembly rules that
code the causal force of desiring-production within the 'abstract machine
of faciality' that causes the face to emerge as such. When the established
political regime of the face is erroneously taken as the cause of *signifi-
ance*, it operates as a 'site of transcendental illusion' which suggests the
apparent inevitability of that regime of signs (Deleuze 1994: 265). When
everything must conform in advance to a regime of signification already
given, then there is no room for creative divergence in the productive
process. There is nothing new, no new desires or alternative associa-
tions that might construct different expressions in the established face,
which grimly sets its features into a representative order. In this way, in
the rigid structures of a formed face, 'the whole of desiring-production
is crushed, subjected to the requirements of representation, and to the

dreary games of what is representative and represented in representation' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 54).

It is helpful to read 'Plateau 7 – Year Zero: Faciality' in conjunction with 'Plateau 5 – 587BC–AD70: On Several Regimes of Signs'. There, Deleuze and Guattari analyse 'a certain number of semiotics displaying very diverse characteristics' (1987: 135). They explain that there is

> such diversity in the forms of expression, such a mixture of these forms, that it is impossible to attach any particular privilege to the regime of the 'signifier'. If we call the signifying semiotic system semiology, then semiology is only one regime of signs among others, and not the most important one. (1987: 111)

In fact, any particular regime of signs subsists in a milieu where competing regimes circulate. Accordingly, any given discourse of race is not a fixed or closed system of signification, but is flexible and relative to other modes of expression and possible interpretations. A racialised entity might occupy many classifications simultaneously and thus can transfer between meanings. For example, during the time when Australia had a formal policy sanctioning the forcible separation of 'half-caste' indigenous children from their families, communities, country and culture, a person may have been considered 'white enough' to be adopted and assimilated within a colonial household, but 'not white enough' to enjoy the same treatment or life opportunities received by the natural children within that household.

A complex mixture of various semiotic regimes forms a milieu or landscape that furnishes material for the constitution of the sense of a particular body, identity or event. The milieu constitutes an exterior context in which a dominant organisation of meaning subsists. At its points of contact with this milieu, a representation is fundamentally unstable, as its elements combine, shift, transfer and pass between other regimes of sense. Thus, there are possible passages between regimes of signs, enabling movements of destratification or the mixing and translation of established regimes of signification. The face depicts a systemic collection of the dominant representations that comprise a majoritarian order of sense. Whereas the semiotic regime of the signifier and the subject works to capture and reduce diverse meanings to a limited version of 'truth' that masquerades as uniform and universal, excluded alternative and polyvocal regimes of sense and expression are always possible (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 136; see also Deleuze 2004). However, the potential for discovery of these alternative and contesting regimes of sense 'requires a rethinking of the majoritarian face and

a willingness to envisage more than one system of comprehension and function for the face' (MacCormack 2004: 138).

Deleuze and Guattari suggest:

> when the face is effaced, when the faciality traits disappear, we can be sure that we have entered into another regime, other zones infinitely muter and more imperceptible where subterranean becomings-animal occur, becomings molecular, nocturnal deterritorialisations overspilling the limits of the signifying system. (1987: 115)

In his early reflection on his experiences with racism and resistance, Frantz Fanon writes:

> I am not a prisoner of history. I should not seek there for the meaning of my destiny. I should constantly remind myself that the real leap consists in introducing invention into existence. In the world in which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself. I am a part of Being to the degree that I go beyond it. (1967: 229)

Repression occurs when calls for acknowledgement of a group's just political concerns – such as those voiced by the Palm Island rioters – are confronted by a 'white wall' of signification, which responds only by bouncing back given structures of meaning and is not capable of recognising creative inventions of sense or differences that depart from the majoritarian perspective. Racism constructs an empire of uniformity and digs a 'black hole' of subjectivation in accordance with an established or normative model of identity, in which the minoritarian self is imprisoned or buried. Deleuze and Guattari accordingly ask a question relevant for antiracist strategising: 'How do you get out of the black hole? How do you break through the wall? How do you dismantle the face?' (1987: 186).

Dismantling the Face

Deleuze and Guattari assert: 'If the face is a politics, dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings' (1987: 188). While faciality involves a politics of territorialisation and form, dismantling the face involves a politics of deterritorialisation and transformation. The starting point for such a transformative politics is the face itself: 'the white wall of the signifier, the black hole of subjectivity and the facial machine are impasses, the measure of our submissions and subjections; but we are born into them, and it is there we must stand battle' (ibid.: 189). For Deleuze and Guattari, battling the face requires the cultivation of an intimate knowledge and awareness about the face one inhabits, and they

warn: 'find your black holes and white walls, know them, know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight' (ibid.: 188). Dismantling the face therefore requires a careful analysis of the signifying discourses and representations that make up one's social context, as well as a critical and reflexive understanding about how these shape identity. This includes analysis of how it is at times possible for one to constitute one's own identity selectively in relation to the multiplicity of established significations one is 'born into'. Because dominant meanings are always open to a contextualising milieu in which mixed and conflicting regimes of signs subsist, their stability is challenged as they come into contact and are forced to shift and morph in partial destratifications in order to accommodate such conflicting significations.

Thus, dismantling the face involves locating the points at which meaning shifts and becomes unstable: searching for the points in a collection of social discourses where meaning is contradictory, or the points in one's own identity where one occupies multiple and contradicting classifications. One may be simultaneously altruistic and selfish, active and passive, free and constrained, wilful and aimless, friend and lover, parent and professional, and so forth. A police officer simultaneously may be a protector of society and an embodiment of white state violence. In finding such points of ambiguous identification, one is potentially able to apply pressure to the signifying system in which identities are embedded, perhaps provoking an 'uncertain moment' where conventional significations collapse and established meanings shift (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 189).

At such moments, the abstract machine of faciality that shapes the emergence of particular and concrete facial assemblages may become (partially) transparent. The increased visibility of the constructive mechanisms underlying a set face undermines its pretensions to inevitability and stability. This can have the effect of destabilising the face, potentially enabling a critical line of flight from established structures of representation and a recomposition of meaning according to an alternative constitutive process that defines an alternative regime of signs. This process requires complementary critical and constructive movements, which at once deconstruct the established power of the face by destabilising its territory and simultaneously attend to the composition, or reterritorialisation, of alternative structures of meaning that we can rely upon to make sense of our worlds and ourselves. However, in reterritorialising meaning, the challenge is not simply to recreate the territory that has been dismantled, but to invent a process of composi-

tion enabling an entirely new form of sensibility, a new framework of understanding for a 'new people' and a 'new earth': 'beyond the face lies an altogether different humanity' (ibid.: 190).

For Deleuze and Guattari, key to this complex destructive-creative process is the invention of a 'probe-head' capable of penetrating an opaque or self-evident regime of signs and forcing it to transform. The concept of the 'probe-head' is best understood in light of their Spinozist ontology of the complex relational individual, which enters into multifaceted processes of transformation during encounters with others (ibid.: 253–60; on Spinozan embodiment, see Gatens 1996). In fact, for Deleuze, an individual entity is an emergent, multilevelled, complex union of parts. The structure takes form when the relations of desire binding its parts into a loose collective become habitual and consistent relations of power, lending the entity a regular structural organisation and investing it with an interest in maintaining its existence as such. The structure is complexly relational, since its composing elements are drawn together from a contextualising environmental milieu and furnished through the relations it forms with other individuals and structures within this milieu. For example, a national identity such as the Australian 'mate' is a complex individual discourse. It is recognisable because it enjoys a structural unity which is defined by the consistent inclusion of certain composing elements ('white male bonding', 'fair-go tolerance', 'tough altruism', 'classless egalitarianism', and so forth) and their regular organisation in relationships that privilege the dominance of some elements in relation to others (shared sameness over divisive difference, masculine identity over feminine, tolerance over prejudice, toughness over gentleness, and so forth).

However, the composing parts are selectively drawn from a relative context, in which diverse structures provide alternative elements that may compete for privileged inclusion in the discourse of national identity. For example, the virtue of 'tolerance' is much lauded in the version of Australian nationalism presented above, but also forms a significant part of an alternative discourse of national identity and nationhood defining 'multicultural Australia'. Furthermore, as Ghassan Hage (1998: 94) persuasively argues, the politics of tolerance is often mobilised in discourses of antiracism, but can also serve to reinforce the managerial power of a dominant white national elite, which in being tolerant is not required to give up its position of power but is merely asked to refrain from exercising it in acts of racist exclusion. Shared dimensions of similarity and divergence create complex and uneven forms of relationship between various national identities. This can become apparent as

the discourses come into affective contact with one another during the course of public conversation and practice, sometimes reinforcing one or both, but at other times prompting subtle transformations and mutual becomings in each, potentially leading to a radical shift in powerful public conceptualisations and imaginaries.

Accordingly, an individual structure is always also a multiplicity; it is 'defined not by its elements, nor by a center of unification or comprehension. It is defined by the number of dimensions it has' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 249). The 'number of dimensions' enjoyed by an entity is determined by the complexity of its affective relations; these include not only the internal relations between the composing elements that give the individual a certain structural definition, but also the range of external relations that the individual forges with multifaceted aspects of its neighbouring bodies.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the relational nature of complex entities entails that 'each multiplicity is already composed of heterogeneous terms in symbiosis, and . . . a multiplicity is constantly transforming itself into a string of other multiplicities, according to its doors and thresholds' (ibid.: 249). Sending out a probe-head is one way in which a multiplicity experiments with the possibility of forging new symbiotic relations with neighbouring bodies, thus altering its dimensions of complexity and changing in nature according with shifts in its affective connections. Complexly relational individuals have 'shifting borderlines', because their composing elements form 'passages and bridges', 'doors and thresholds', when they are shared by neighbouring individuals (ibid.: 252, 249). As they come into contact, individual entities can enter into processes of becoming-otherwise, either when they absorb new elemental influences from the encounter, or when the encounter causes a shift in the power relations binding elements into coherent forms of order.

Through encounters with others an entity is transformed, not necessarily in entirety, but more often in piecemeal and selective ways at particular sites of elemental affection. The probe-head describes a technique of transformation an entity may engage or be engaged in, when brought into proximity or intimacy with other structures, in ways that are receptive to the formation of new elemental connections. The possibility of self-transformation through the creation of novel combinations with other individuals is facilitated initially by the identification of those sites of structural vulnerability: those 'moments of uncertainty' in which a self may be redefined. In such moments, a 'probe-head is that which explores the terrain beyond the face, the terrain from which the face is

nothing more than an extraction or a crystallisation. Probe-heads are in this sense a move into chaos' (O'Sullivan 2009: 254).

In sending out a probe-head to the interstitial space or the chaotic plane of consistency beyond the face, the structure accordingly engages with the primary, chaotic force field of desiring-production where bodies are caused to form and transform in accordance with their fluid dynamics of association and coexistence. The propulsion of the probe-head involves an act of desire, prompting the sort of relational effort called for by Fanon: to 'touch the other, to feel the other, to explain the other to myself' (1967: 231). Careful observation of the nature of one's affective engagements allows a developing understanding of the ways in which new styles of community might be forged, supporting new forms of individuality along with new modes of interpretation and structures of *signifiance*.

The discovery of new and alternative possibilities for relationship increases an individual's dimensions of complexity and so invents the potential for processes of structural transformation. Thus,

> between substantial forms and determined subjects, between the two, there is not only a whole operation of demonic local transports but a natural play of haecceities, degrees, intensities, events and accidents that compose individuations totally different from those of the well-formed subjects that receive them. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 253)

Dismantling the face involves exploring this interstitial space 'between substantial forms and determined subjects'. The following section considers whether a privileged emphasis on destabilising and transforming the face, as part of a political sensibility concerned with the 'undoing of the regularities of signification and subjectification' (Bogue 2003: 105), can open up spaces for new kinds of counter-racial thinking.

Beyond Tolerance: Race, Desire and Power

In a recent work towards a political philosophy of race, Falguni Sheth (2009: 4) defines race as 'a tool of political management and social organisation [that functions as] a mode or vehicle of division, separation, hierarchy, exploitation, rather than a description modifier'. The three techniques that Sheth describes in order to explain how race is deployed as a weapon for political management reflect the process of facialisation, discussed above. These are: the *representation* of difference as 'unruly' and in need of management; the *naturalisation* of the represented unruliness of the difference in question; and, the consequent

concealment of the political interests at stake in the process of classifying difference negatively (ibid.: 28). Accordingly, I have suggested that Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the face can serve as a 'political-theoretical framework by which the building blacks of racialisation can be identified' and that facialisation can model the 'fundamental dynamics that occur repeatedly to racialize populations within a given society' (Sheth 2009: 167).

However, there is an important difference between the conceptualisations of causation in the process of facialisation and in Sheth's framework for thinking about how race is constructed. Attention to this difference can assist thinking about how race and racism might be transformed. Sheth's analysis begins with the Foucaultian proposition that 'power constitutes race' (2009: 4). Accordingly, race is considered as a power structure, which is itself constituted by power. By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari insist that power is never a primary cause of productive processes. Instead, power is an emergent *effect* of the causal force of desiring-production, which draws elements together into the associations that are initially fluid and flexible and only *subsequently*, with repetition of the association over time, will they take on the rigid structures of representation and formal organisation characteristic of systemic power relations. As Deleuze (2007) explains, because it opens up new possibilities for thinking about resistance and transformation, this emphasis on the causal force of desire (rather than power) marks a crucial distinction between Foucault's political philosophy and the political thought of Deleuze and Guattari.

When race is conceived as a function of social management that is constituted by power, mechanisms for undoing racist identifications must similarly be imagined as forms of power capable of strategically intervening in the politics of race. For example, the discourse of 'tolerance' frequently figures in antiracist strategising; however, as Fiona Jenkins (2002) and Ghassan Hage (1998) both point out, 'being tolerant' is implicitly understood to convey an act of generosity, in which the gift of tolerance implies 'an attitude that can be sustained only in so far as it does not undermine the dominant position of the one who "gives"' (Jenkins 2003: 119). In other words, tolerance is itself a technique of power invested in a managerial strategy; tolerant antiracism is 'not about making the powerful less so, it is about inviting them not to exercise their power' (Hage 1998: 94). Toleration of racial difference thus preserves intact the structure of the White-Man face that embodies the political aristocracy in Australia and the national will that it strives to manifest.

Interrogating race through the conceptual framework of faciality allows us to see that race is a way of coding desire *before* it is a technique of power. In fact, on this view, racial identification (like cultural or national identification) is not, of itself, a bad thing (cf. Gilroy 2000). In fact, claiming racial difference can be an important factor in self-concept and political action, as Bruce McGuinness (n.d.: 3) asserted during his time as editor of the indigenous Australian journal *The Koorier* from 1968 to 1971:

> I am not a hate-filled racist. If anyone considers me to be such they are wrong. But . . . I want the Aboriginal people to have an Identity. I want them to have the power to make policy changes for their betterment. I want to be able to be responsible as a Koorie, not a so-and-so Abo.

Race has often been the basis of a socially cultivated separation of groups, but race can also be *positively* seductive; it can draw disparate bodies together in joyful acts of association and communal identification. Race is therefore not essentially negative, but rather is simply one way of shaping desire through apprehending and interpreting others in order to shape the form of an alliance. On this view, racial identification is not essential and nor can race be a simplistic marker of identity (which is always complex and multilevelled); the very meaning of race is contextual and constituted through the shifting alliances that give meaning to identities through the act of relationship. In fact, racial identification turns bad when it becomes rigidly conceived or essentialised and so becomes the basis of a hierarchical relationship between individuals or between groups, or when it is a causal factor in systemic or structural discrimination.

Because it primarily involves an engagement with desire rather than an act of power, dismantling the face *is* about 'making the powerful less so' and about countering the tendency of dynamic conceptualisations of 'racial identification' to ossify into rigid and oppressive structures of 'racism'. In one sense, dismantling the face is a technique of desire or of forming new associations that can be used to erode the powerful structure of the (racist) face subtly by contesting the rigidly established boundaries between self and other – fixed categories of identity and difference – upon which racist structures rely. According to Deleuze and Guattari, an identity is defined when the initially fluid relations between the parts that comprise its body take on regular and habitual forms. However, because the body is a complex and multilevelled association of elements, the borders of an identity constantly shift as the entity enters into new combinations with bodies it encounters and which

furnish it with new elements that then become part of the order that it represents.

This strategic destabilisation of sovereign political boundaries through the creative force of desire can be useful in countering the 'apartness' that whiteness seeks to establish and preserve as it distributes bodies in national space. While desire is, in this way, a strategy of incremental destabilisation or 'relative' deterritorialisation of existing political forms such as those based on racial segregation or discrimination, a far more radical transformation can also be imagined when power structures are understood to be constituted by desire. This second kind of 'absolute' deterritorialisation can take place when communities strive to combine their elements in such a way that racism is not implicated in the forms of sociability that emerge. Accordingly, rather than acting on an existing racist structure in order to undermine it, this second politics of desire can work in a wholly constructive way, to create new forms of social structure in which race does not play a causal formative role.

On that fateful day on Palm Island in 2004, when Mulrunji Doomadgee encountered a white police officer and died in custody a few hours later, the meeting between these individuals was characterised by a domesticated relation of desire that had been already shaped by a political background of entrenched Australian racism. This had been constructed in the historical context of colonialism and reinforced by the stereotypical representations of white national identity and racialised difference that continue to saturate the Australian media. The Aboriginal man was apprehended on the street for singing 'Who Let the Dogs Out?'; he was perceived and labelled as drunk and disorderly, deviant, degenerate and in urgent need of policing. And the police officer acted in the name of the state, as the privileged embodiment of white managerial power, which in this case was fatally extended to the use of violence as a means of imposing order.

However, their association need not have taken this course. In any association, other modes of desire – other styles of engagement – are always possible. Counter-racial politics can be most effective when agents struggle to resist systemic forms of racial oppression by taking action at the level of desire. This may involve individuals in the careful practice of quotidian acts of engagement not tempered by established representations of racialised self and other. However, on a more abstract level, it may also involve the collective effort to mobilise the primary creative force of desiring-production in the service of entirely new regimes of signification, supporting novel institutions that will not be structured

by racist forms of representation but by conceptions and practices enabling a fairly shared occupation of national space.

Acknowledgements

Note

1. Indigenous Australians were deliberately excluded from citizenship at the time of Australian federation in 1901 and an official policy of assimilation was introduced in 1937 with the intention of eventually ridding the nation of a discrete indigenous people. At the same time, immigration was limited by the 'White Australia' policy (Immigration Restriction Act 1901), which actively prohibited certain racial and ethnic groups from settling in Australia.

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Chapter 4

Symptomatology and Racial Politics in Australia

Ian Buchanan

> The world is a set of symptoms whose illness merges with man.
>
> Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*

In this one tantalising sentence Gilles Deleuze sets forth an entire programme of study and, though he would turn to it again and again, he never tackled it in anything like the same systematic manner in which he approached his other projects.[1] I would argue that *Essays Critical and Clinical*, which appeared two years before his death, is more a tacit admission of failure than the summation of a project it pretends to be. The essays it collects, which were written over the span of a couple of decades, make two things very clear: first, the notion of 'the clinical' preoccupied Deleuze for a long time – it underpins his early books on Proust and Masoch and is central to his interest in Kafka (his passion for Proust and Kafka was shared by Guattari, an important point of commonality between them that is rarely, if ever, mentioned); second, despite several attempts to deploy the notion of 'the clinical' for critical purposes, Deleuze never succeeded in overcoming the project's principal theoretical problem – namely the problem of causation.

Perhaps like the clinicians he mentions, such as Roger and Parkinson, who identified diseases but never solved the question of their causation, it is enough for Deleuze that literature is able to make us aware of certain cultural 'syndromes' and there is no need, or indeed any expectation, that they should also disclose the causes of these syndromes (1997: 15; Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 120). But my sense is that Deleuze *was* interested in the problem of causation – there are several passages on it scattered throughout his work, particularly his collaborative work with Guattari – he just did not figure out how to solve it to his satisfaction.[2] In this sense, the clinical project should be regarded as incomplete; it is an encounter with a problem, but not yet a full-scale engagement with

a problem. It is as much a problem *with* his work as it is a problem *in* his work.

Problems in a work are not necessarily flaws, however, and it should not be thought that my purpose in saying that the clinical project is problematic is intended as a critique. On the contrary, it is actually a way of saying that the clinical project is still worth thinking about. And I do not mean this as the proverbial backhanded compliment. As Deleuze argues in *Difference and Repetition*, the first of his books in which, by his reckoning, he *did* his own philosophising, problems are not simply there to be solved, after which they disappear. He describes this view of them as an illusion and argues that it reduces problems to phantoms. This, in turn, has a pernicious effect on the whole of thought, he argues, because it casts thinking (together with the truth and falsehood that thinking adduces) as an activity that only commences with the search for solutions.

> According to this infantile prejudice, the master sets a problem, our task is to solve it, and the result is accredited true or false by a powerful authority. It is also a social prejudice with the visible interest of maintaining us in an infantile state, which calls upon us to solve problems that come from elsewhere, consoling or distracting us by telling us that we have won simply by being able to respond. (Deleuze 1994: 158)

In saying this, Deleuze's aim is to establish the notion that problems are neither provisional nor contingent; they are not some arbitrary hurdle that the solution dissipates more or less magically, there only to prop up the solution that never budges from centre-stage. Instead, Deleuze wants to position problems as the very source of truth in philosophy – they are 'at once both the site of an originary truth and the genesis of a derived truth' (1994: 159). My point is that the fact that Deleuze posed an interesting and remarkable problem he could not solve does him no discredit. The onus is on us as inheritors of his legacy to continue with this project and see if the problem cannot be made to yield a solution and still more truth.[3] As I will try to show in what follows, there are several good reasons why we should want to do this.

Deleuze's 'clinical' hypothesis is that the literary text can be read as a kind of symptomatology of the world in which it is produced. Rather than revealing an author's neuroses, which is how psychoanalysis generally treats literature, Deleuze hypothesis is that the work is the writer's diagnosis of the world – Deleuze (1997: 3) will even go so far as to say it is their indictment of the world. By the same token, the writer does not use the work to represent the world's neuroses; that is not how art

is made, according to Deleuze. Artists do not make their art by trying to say in a direct way what is wrong with the world – this would lead to bad, conceptual or programmatic art in Deleuze's view. Neither the writer nor the work can be treated as 'patients', Deleuze argues, and in that sense they cannot be 'psychoanalysed'. Texts and authors have nothing to tell us about themselves, or how they were formed; they have no history (in the psychoanalytic sense). They can only speak to us about how they function and the world which produced them.

Texts have surface, but no depth, which is why Deleuze often describes the analysis of texts as cartography. 'For authors, if they are great, are more like doctors than patients. We mean that they are themselves astonishing diagnosticians or symptomatologists' (1990: 237). The work of art does not exhibit symptoms in the manner of a patient or a 'case'; rather it isolates, identifies and tabulates symptoms in the manner of a clinician or, what amounts to the same thing for Deleuze, a cartographer (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 127). Symptoms are the contours of the world, its grooves, its hills and valleys, its diagram, as Deleuze also puts it (ibid.: 119). This is especially true of authors like Masoch and Sade, whose work appears to be merely the outgrowth of their own peculiar sexual fantasies. To fail to appreciate that these authors, to focus on them for a moment, have something essential to tell us about masochism and sadism is, Deleuze argues, to neglect 'the difference between the artist's novel as a work of art and the neurotic's novel' (1990: 237–8).

Deleuze never discussed how symptoms are produced. I want to suggest that Fredric Jameson offers an answer to this question: history. In *The Political Unconscious*, which Jameson admits was inspired by Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, Jameson proposes that all literary works are allegories of their time, by which he means that it is only by reconstructing the historical context in which the works are produced that we can fully understand them. By context Jameson means the intellectual currents of the times, as well as the particular events and day-to day-circumstances (1981: 81).[4] History, as Jameson sees it, is an active force that every writer has to confront, so the choices they make in confronting that force – choices to do with how they construct their characters, the shape of the narratives, down to the style of their sentences – are symptomatic of the times because the way writers choose to confront history changes with time. Jameson's authors are thus every bit as much clinicians as Deleuze's; they are constantly producing symptomatologies, tabulating syndromes and taking the temperature of their times (to borrow Jameson's own analogy), the difference being that Jameson does not shy away from the question of causation.

In what follows, then, I want to splice Deleuze's clinical hypothesis with Jameson's and explore the critical possibilities of that fusion in relation to the Australian film *Jindabyne* (2006), which in my view is one of the most interesting creative works dealing with race relations in Australia. It is important, in my view, because its way of dealing with race is to examine how ordinary Australians, and, more especially, recent migrants assimilating themselves to Australian ways of living, are almost casually racist: that is, racist without a conscious antipathy towards the racial other. It is the racism of those people who declare they are not racists, but . . . ; it is the racism of those people who think race is not an issue for them, but . . . ; it is the racism of those people who, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 178) put it, do not see others, but just see people who are not like themselves.

My starting point is this. It cannot be a coincidence that this film should give such prominence to the cultural problematic of the apology at this particular juncture in Australia's history. Although this aspect of the film is scarcely mentioned in any of the reviews that accompanied the premiere, it strikes me that the timing is symptomatic; it is a topic that, as Deleuze once said about difference, was very much in the air. Produced only two years before the official national apology that the Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, made to the Indigenous Peoples of Australia on 13 February 2008, *Jindabyne* responds to a complex assemblage of cultural problematics that have been on the national political agenda ever since the release in 1995 of *Bringing Them Home*, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission's report on its national inquiry into the so-called Stolen Generation of indigenous people who, as children, were removed from their families and placed with white foster families.

For over a decade and a half, and still today, the issue of whether the government should issue an apology to these children and what that would mean has been the subject of widespread public debate in Australia, at all levels of society. A national apology was one of the key recommendations of the report, but it took more than a decade – effectively the length of time for which Prime Minister John Howard was in power – for it to be acted on. Howard's rationale was that the present generation could not be expected to apologise for acts they themselves were not responsible for and did not themselves commit, though perhaps the real reason was that he simply did not want to expose the government to possible reparations claims. Rudd's apology did not confront the questions of blame or responsibility and quite deliberately steered clear of any suggestion that it could be seen as the precur-

sor to reparations. As such, 13 February 2008 marks the moment of a lost opportunity, or better yet, that of an event that did not take place.

As welcome as the apology was, it did nothing material to alter the living conditions of indigenous Australians. The reason for this is obviously complex, but central to it, I will argue, is the fact that it did not confront the foundational 'crime', if you will, that enabled the removal of children from their families: namely, the act of dispossession that occurred when the putative First Settlers planted their flag at Sydney Cove and claimed the land as their own. The legacy of this dispossession continues to inform and give shape to the lives of all indigenous Australians in ways that are both obvious and not so obvious. As has been amply documented, the Australian government's treatment of the indigenous people since the occupation began in 1788 has been nothing less than appalling.

While statistics can never do justice to the actual pain and suffering endured by the victims, it is nevertheless sobering to confront the stark reality that today, as Tatz puts it, the indigenous people are

> at the very top, or bottom, of every social indicator available: top of the medical statistics for diseases they didn't exhibit as recently as thirty years ago – coronary disease, cancer, diabetes, respiratory infections; bottom of the life expectancy table, at fifty to fifty-five or less for males and around fifty-five for females; with much greater rates of unemployment, much lower home ownership and considerably lower *per capita* income; an arrest and imprisonment rate grossly out of proportion to their numbers. (Tatz 2003: 104–5)

And so on. Although things are changing and the actual living conditions and opportunities to flourish for indigenous people are improving, their position at the top and bottom of all such metrics has not altered at all. Against this background, then, I want to suggest that *Jindabyne* can usefully be read as a national allegory (in Jameson's sense of the word).[5] It maps or diagrams the cultural and political tropes of the present moment in history.

Jindabyne is the third feature film by the decidedly non-prolific Australian director Ray Lawrence, whose other credits include *Bliss* (1985), from a Peter Carey novel, and *Lantana* (2001), from Andrew Bovell's award-winning play *Speaking in Tongues* (1996). Adapted by Beatrix Christian from Raymond Carver's 1981 short story 'So Much Water So Close to Home', *Jindabyne* is a slight departure from *Bliss* and *Lantana* in that it is the work of an American writer rather than an Australian, but its focus is as keenly Australian as his previous works.[6]

The film transposes Carver's story from ex-urban California to a small town in rural New South Wales: namely, Jindabyne. The location is significant or – to use a word not much in fashion these days – overdetermined because, in the 1960s, the original town of Jindabyne was relocated to make way for a dam (as part of the Snowy River hydroelectric scheme). Now almost completely forgotten, the old town of Jindabyne lurks beneath the water as an obvious metaphor for the uncertain way the present and the past coexist in contemporary Australia.[7]

Like the Carver story, *Jindabyne* is about a group of four men (Gabriel Byrne, John Howard, Stelios Yiakmis and Simon Stone) who go on a fly-fishing trip which takes an unexpected turn. The men discover the half-naked body of a young Aboriginal woman floating in the river, but decide not to report it to the police straightaway because to do so would interrupt their plans for a relaxing couple of days of sport. When the men return from their weekend away and finally report their grisly find, word of what they did – or, more precisely, failed to do – leaks out and they find themselves being called to account by family, friends and indeed the whole town, but are unable, at least the first instance, to recognise that what they did was wrong. The resonance here with Australia's response to the national apology to the indigenous people is unmistakable.

The film's symptomatology is brought into view in four key moments: the first is opening scene of the film, in which we see a young Aboriginal woman abducted and, we presume, murdered (we do not see the actual murder, but it is obvious that this is what happened); second, the discovery of the body and the failure to act; third, the denial that a wrong occurred and the refusal to accept that there is any need for an apology; fourth, recognition that a wrong did occur and the offer of an apology. The whole story turns on the second moment and our shock at the fact that the four men choose to do nothing, but in some ways the first moment is more significant. It is worth noting, on this point, that this opening sequence is not found in the original Carver story. So it is clearly intended to give the film as a whole a very specific kind of foundation yet, in doing so, it does not conform to our expectations. As with the discovery of the body, the significance of the first moment lies more in what did not happen than in what did.

Obviously, the murder of a young Aboriginal woman is not unimportant, but what is noteworthy about this scene is the way it seems to set up a generic murder-mystery narrative in which the guilty are located and brought to justice. But this does not eventuate – the murderer is not brought to justice; indeed, there is not even an attempt to identify

or locate him. One can imagine that the reason that the creators of the film did not incorporate this storyline into the film was precisely to avoid turning it into a murder mystery. Whatever the reason for this decision, it sets up a very interesting national allegorical frame for the film in as much as it situates the whole story in the context of a foundational act of violence against an indigenous person that, like the founding of the nation itself, is placed outside the realm of justice.

When the four fishermen discover the body, we expect them to call the police immediately. This is as much a generic expectation as a cultural expectation, in that this is what is supposed to happen in movies: the discovery of a body is supposed to initiate action. But in this case the very opposite happens. The discovery of the body is met with a powerful form of inertia, which is resonant of the way most Australians respond to the situation of Australia's indigenous people. But the inaction of most Australians in the face of the appalling living conditions of Australia's indigenous people attracts little or no moral reprobation, whereas, when the four fisherman decide not to act, we automatically judge them to be morally and ethically culpable. But on what grounds do we make this judgment? Why does it matter so much that they fail to contact the police? To put it another way, what is the nature of the obligation on them to act that they fail to fulfil?

The answer to these questions is not immediately obvious, but our sense of indignation at the men's inaction and their apparently callous disregard for the needs of the dead suggests quite strongly that culturally we assume, in whatever inchoate form, that the dead impose an obligation on us to grieve or mourn the extinction of a life. In Western culture, grieving is supposed to take the form of an interruption of one's daily activities, one's plans, particularly if they are leisure-oriented, to mark the passing of a life, and this is, of course, precisely what the four men fail to do. They observe none of the expected 'rites' that we are supposed to perform in the face of death. Not only do they not report the death to the authorities as we expect them to, but they also continue to *enjoy* their day, indeed their weekend, as though death had not touched them in any way. And indeed, that is undoubtedly what is most troubling about their response – death does not seem to touch them. The body is seen simply as a problem, right down to whether it should be left in the water or not. Ultimately they decide not to remove the body because it is less likely to putrefy in the cool river water, but they tie it down so it does not float away. They treat the dead young woman, then, as so much meat, a mere corpse, a body without a face.

What does it mean to say a corpse *lacks a face*? We can only answer

this question by first of all asking what it means to have a face. According to Emmanuel Levinas (1969), the face signifies the presence of the Other: namely, that which reminds us that we are social beings unable to survive alone on this planet and, as such, obliged to consider how we may preserve their life. More than that, the face calls upon me to meet my ethical obligations to the Other. Its call, Levinas argues, is unignorable. Given that the men seem unmoved by the corpse – yes, they are shocked, but no, they are not moved by it, they do not perform any of the expected rituals in response to their discovery – we might conclude that, in Levinasian terms, the dead aboriginal woman lacks a face; or, to put it even more strongly, she somehow lacks alterity. Paradoxically, then, it is as though she is not other enough. Her presence seems not to impose any immediate or strongly felt ethical demands on the four fishermen. One cannot help but think that Lawrence's decision to make the victim Aboriginal (and not white, as in the original Carver story) was intended to make us ask whether the men would have acted differently if the corpse had not been black.

That this question is even conceivable is, in itself, an indictment of the state of race relations in Australia. It assumes that there is a profound schism in Australia between the hegemonic 'white' or 'non-Aboriginal' population and the Aboriginal people, and that this schism does indeed have a moral and ethical dimension to it. We cannot know if the men would have acted differently if they had found a white corpse, but we can say that they do not appear to grieve the loss of life that they are witness to and appear not to have any sense that they ought to grieve, where grieving would mean interrupting their daily routines and plans in order to take time to *feel* the loss of life and to perform the socially prescribed rituals of mourning. As it turns out, *feeling* is the last thing they want to do – they respond by rendering themselves insensible with alcohol. They are shocked by their discovery, but they react to it in the same way that one might react to the news that one's flight has been cancelled – it is an inconvenience rather than an occasion for grief.

This absence of grief is, as Judith Butler's recent work argues, ethically and politically significant because, as she puts it, it is only when the loss of life matters that the value of life becomes apparent: 'Only under conditions in which loss would matter does the value of the life appear. Thus, grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters' (2009: 14). As I have said already, this is what is so striking about this moment in the story – the men do not apprehend the life that was lost as grievable, as mattering. Butler puts it even more strongly:

Without grievability, there is no life, or, rather, there is something living that is other than life. Instead, 'there is a life that will never have been lived', sustained by no regard, no testimony, and ungrieved when lost. The apprehension of grievability precedes and makes possible the apprehension of precarious life. (ibid.: 15)

Following Butler's logic here, we may speculate that the dead Aboriginal woman is not grieved because she is not perceived to have had a life; that is to say, because she is Aboriginal her life is invisible to the white men who discover her corpse. Her identity is her face and because of that it is a featureless face incapable of inciting an ethical response. 'An ungrievable life is one that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as a life at all' (ibid.: 38) The men's inaction says nothing so clearly as this: the dead Aboriginal woman did not count to them – she was dead to them before she died. Lawrence amplifies the poignancy of this moment by giving one of the four men (Stelios Yiakmis) an Aboriginal girlfriend (Leah Purcell), as though to say *he* at least should have *felt* something, even if the others did not, and this is certainly not how his girlfriend responds.

In Butler's terms, the men's response is significant because, as she conceives it, moral responsibility presupposes affect – it is only because we are moved emotionally that we act ethically, she argues. If we are not moved to act ethically by our grief for the plight of the other, then we will not do so. Butler's hypothesis, which she acknowledges is not entirely new, is that 'whether and how we respond to the suffering of others, how we formulate moral criticisms, how we articulate politi-cal analyses, depends upon a certain field of perceptible reality having already been established' (ibid.: 64). We have to 'see' the Other in order to be moved by them. Blindness to the Other is not merely unethical in this respect, but the absence of the very possibility of ethics. But this blindness is never purely personal; it is a product of social and cultural framing. The fact that the four men fail to respond to the discovery of the corpse in the manner we might expect of them cannot be put down to a sheer quirk of character, then, but has to be treated as symptomatic of the frame – the society – that produced them. The four men responded as they did because the Aboriginal woman was not perceptible in their *field* of vision – she was not alive to them in any sense of the word.

How we respond to the world, the kinds of moral and ethical choices we make, is conditioned by what Butler refers to, drawing very loosely on Erving Goffman, as the 'frames' in which our own lives are situated. The frame is a social and cultural formation, like Pierre Bourdieu's

habitus that the individual subject internalises without ever being aware of having done so. This amounts to saying that, in a certain sense, our affect is not our own; it is socially conditioned, or to use Butler's preferred term, it is framed (ibid.: 50). Understanding how this frame is constituted then becomes central to any understanding of ethics for Butler. 'In particular,' she writes, 'I want to understand how the *frames* that allocate the recognisability of certain figures of the human are themselves linked with broader *norms* that determine what will and will not be a grieveable life' (ibid.: 64).

Butler thus stipulates that compassion is the true wellspring of ethics, which may well be so but nevertheless poses insuperable problems for the construction of an ethics whose principles could, in the best Kantian sense, be applied universally and uniformly. What should we do, for example, in the case where our sense of compassion deserts us, as it apparently does for the four fishermen? Butler's way around this problem is to try to determine how and under what conditions compassion fails, but this is not a solution so much as the opening up of a different kind of problem. Asking why people are not compassionate is not the same kind of project as determining what would count *as* project; the former is an anthropological inquiry (that may well be inflected by both sociology and psychology), while the later is a philosophical project. From a philosophical perspective, ethics cannot (and should not) be based on the presence or absence of compassion because this rules out the possibility of constructing an ethics on the basis of purely intellectual or 'affectless' abstract grounds. The main reason for this is that there are plenty of situations one can imagine when affect might fail us, at least in so far as the elaboration of an ethics is concerned. For example, I may feel very compassionate towards animals but nevertheless have no problem eating meat in the full knowledge that an animal had to die to provide my meal. My compassion does not guarantee or even necessarily lead to an ethical reaction or response on my part.

And more importantly, from a cultural and social point of view, there is no perceivable flaw in my 'frame' for acting in this way. The same impossible problem is raised by the issue of abortion; my compassion for all human life is contradicted if I accept the necessity for abortion. If, by the same token, I am compassionate about the needs of the individuals whose lives are affected by unwanted pregnancy, then I might want to make an exception to my 'rule' regarding compassion for all life. At this point, affect ceases to be of any use and the ethical decision one arrives at has to be arrived at by reason. As such, we have to call into question the so-called 'corporeal turn' in cultural studies and ask whether it is

really taking us in a direction that we want to go. Having said that, I am obviously in agreement with Butler that the absence of an ethical response can and should be treated as the symptom of a particular kind of cultural or social problem.

This brings us to the third narrative moment of the film, which is, in many ways, the most interesting and the most troubling. When the men return from their fishing trip and finally report their discovery, their inaction is met with shock and disbelief, particularly from their friends and family. At this point of the story, in both the Carver and Lawrence versions, the point of view of the story switches over to Stewart's wife, Claire (Laura Linney), who is literally disgusted by her husband's inaction. This disgust is sexualised, in as much as Stewart informs Claire of what happened on his fishing trip only after he has first had sex with her. In the Carver story, she is haunted by thoughts of the dead girl and, in some strange way, identifies with her, thus doubling her anger towards her husband. She wonders if Stewart was thinking about the dead girl whilst making love to her and all but accuses him of necrophilia.

This response is important because it suggests that there are two quite different dimensions to the national apology: on the one hand, there is the sociopsychological dimension, the felt need to expiate guilt, self-reproach and shame, while on the other hand, there is the political dimension, the acceptance of responsibility and the offer to make amends. Claire's response to her husband's inaction takes both routes. By contrast, Rudd's apology was very much of the first variety – it very carefully steered a course that kept it clear of the political dimension and played up the sociopsychological dimension. The fact that a substantial number of Australians did not share the feelings of remorse Rudd expressed on their behalf raises the interesting question of how they might have responded to a more straightforward political *mea culpa*.

Claire is ashamed of her husband (Gabriel Byrne) and his friends, and she tries to atone for that shame by first of all trying to make contact with the dead girl's family and then, more concretely, by raising money to pay for the funeral. Her fundraising efforts are viewed with suspicion by the townsfolk, who would generally prefer that she let matters lie. Her husband Stewart, whose decision it was to continue fishing, is seemingly incapable of understanding that what they did was wrong, and is baffled and incensed by her actions: 'Tell me what I did wrong and I'll listen' (Carver 1993: 69). Crucially, the Claire character is an immigrant, as though to say that only someone from outside of the frame of Australian cultural and political life is capable of seeing the truth and feeling the shame of it. Perhaps, too, it is meant to remind

us that all Australians, with the exception of the Indigenous Peoples, are immigrants. Importantly, it is the actions of her husband and his friends that shame her, actions that she is not personally responsible for, but nevertheless feels responsible *before* (to use Deleuze's important distinction).

Shame is, in this sense, a necessary complement of grief – there where grief was, so shame should follow. Shame is what grief becomes when we take responsibility for the loss of life that grieves us. Shame transforms the sociopsychological into the political. Without this transformation, grief is always at risk of becoming melancholia, an indulgence in the pleasure of being sad (as Victor Hugo memorably defined it). Butler's work spans this spectrum from grief to mourning, but omits any consideration of shame as a philosophical concept – she treats shame as the conservative's weapon against the culturally marginalised. Shame is, on this view, a destructive emotion that leaves people feeling unable to enjoy their life or feel secure in being who they are. Butler's examples, drawn largely from the experiences of people who have been persecuted because of their gender, race, sexuality or religion, do tend to bear this out. Her most telling example in this regard is the US military's utilisation of shame as an instrument of torture at the prisons of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo (2009: 89). Yet, one might also say that it is precisely because of the absence of shame on the part of the perpetrators that these hurtful acts of shaming can occur.

It is, in fact, the power of shame that finally compels the four men to acknowledge that they had actually committed a wrong for which some form of amends was necessary. The difficulty the men have in recognising that what they did was wrong mirrors Australia's own difficulty in accepting that its actions toward the Indigenous Peoples constitutes a wrong. The major source of this difficulty is the fact that they themselves were not responsible for the woman's death – yes, they neglected her dead body when they discovered it, but ultimately that is unimportant in face of the larger crime – namely, her murder – and they had no part in that. The logic here is similar to what Roland Barthes (1972: 164) described as the 'inoculation' strategy, which consists of admitting to a 'small' crime so as to conceal a 'big' crime. Of course, the men did not commit the murder, so they cannot be expected to confess to this, but the woman's murder is not the only wrong at issue here. There is the wrong implicit in the very 'frame' in which the men find themselves; their utter disregard for the life of the Aboriginal woman, evidenced by their inability to grieve for her, is testament to a much greater prior wrong – namely, that of racism itself. Not only do the four men not

grieve the death of the Aboriginal woman whose body they found; they also do not notice their lack of grief, and it is this absence that is the more telling of the two. It is against this standpoint that former Prime Minister John Howard's insistence that the present generation cannot be expected to take responsibility for the actions of previous generations must be rejected as both unjust and, more importantly, false.

This brings us to the fourth narrative moment of the film, the apology itself. The four men attend the funeral of the murdered woman, which is conducted by the family in traditional fashion. Stewart attempts to make an apology on behalf of the group and a young Aboriginal man confronts him and spits on him. From a national allegory perspective, this moment is, in many ways, the most crucial – two years before the official apology was made it anticipates how the Indigenous Peoples might be expected to respond to an apology that is, in reality, too little too late. Of course, the apology was important and many within the indigenous community welcomed it, but that does not mean we should not criticise it. The national apology, when it was finally given, was addressed specifically to the Stolen Generations for the treatment they had suffered. And, while there can be no question that they were owed an apology, at the very least, they were not the only ones owed an apology; nor were their experiences the only experiences the Indigenous Peoples suffered for which an apology might conceivably be owed (the loss of their land, forced displacement from their land, genocide, and so on; the list of crimes is long). As wrong as the Australian government was in removing children from their families, behind that wrong there is an even greater wrong, which, like the proverbial elephant in the room, has been studiously ignored by all Australian governments. I want to suggest that the apology to the Stolen Generations was hollow without an accompanying apology for the act of dispossession that created the conditions under which it could have occurred.

Giorgio Agamben (1998) shows, in his discussion of Nazi Germany's extermination of European Jewry, that it is the act of dispossession, which should be understood to mean exclusion from the realm of rights and law, that creates the conditions of possibility for all actual brutality. As Agamben writes:

> It is impossible to grasp the specificity of the National Socialist concept of race – and, with it, the peculiar vagueness and inconsistency that characterize it – if one forgets that the *biopolitical body* that constitutes the new fundamental political subject is neither a *quaestio facti* (for example, the identification of a certain biological body) nor a *quaestio iuris* (the identification of a certain juridical rule to be applied), but rather the site of a

sovereign political decision that operates in the absolute indistinction of fact and law. (1998: 171)

The sovereign political decision he is referring to is the proclamation, on 28 February 1933, of the so-called 'decree for the protection of the people and the State' which set in place a permanent state of exception in which all the previously existing laws protecting personal liberty, freedom of expression, and so on, were suspended indefinitely. It was this suspension of laws protecting the rights of citizens, and indeed the right to citizenship, that opened the way for the creation of the concentration camps – as the head of the Gestapo noted, no official decree was needed to bring the camps into existence since there was no law to impede their creation. The camps effectively gave a specific spatial arrangement to what had become (since 28 February 1933) a generalised state of affairs affecting the whole of Germany.

> The paradoxical status of the camp as a space of exception must be considered. The camp is a piece of land placed outside the normal juridical order, but it is nevertheless not simply an external space. What is excluded in the camp is, according to the etymological sense of the term 'exception' (*excapere*), *taken outside*, included through its own exclusion. But what is first of all taken into the juridical order is the state of exception itself. Insofar as the state of exception is 'willed', it inaugurates a new juridico-political paradigm in which the norm becomes indistinguishable from the exception. The camp is the structure in which the state of exception . . . is realised *normally*. (Agamben 1998: 169–70)

I have quoted Agamben at length because what I want to propose is that the declaration of *terra nullius* should be considered 'biopolitically'; it too declares a state of exception, in which the sovereign gives themselves the right to determine who is to be included and who is to be excluded. By declaring the land 'empty' or 'vacant', the colonialists gave themselves the right to occupy land they could see was 'owned' by somebody else; the casuistry concerning the definition of 'occupied' was simply their way of bringing the 'facts' into alignment with the 'law', but obviously had no influence on their actual decision to occupy the land. It created legal dispossession as an organising frame. The issue concerning the right to occupy the land was determined after the fact and was only an issue at all to the occupiers because they did not want to have to share their territorial booty with other European nations who might happen along and decide to stake out a claim as well.

The right to occupy was, from the start, a right to exclude. The colonialists imposed the same model of right on foreign lands that was

exercised over their own – the sovereign has the absolute right to declare an exception to any laws that they have previously upheld. This perhaps explains why it did not trouble the consciences of the men who conjured this juridico-political foundation stone out of thin air. *Terra nullius* did not so much deny the prior ownership of the land by its existing inhabitants as exclude them from the state that established itself on their land; or, to put it another way, it determined that henceforth they would only be part of the state as its excluded. That is to say, as Agamben might put it, following the declaration of *terra nullius*, the Indigenous Peoples of Australia were included in the state that established itself on their land through their exclusion. And that is how the indigenous of Australia have been treated ever since Captain Phillip planted his flag at Sydney Cove on 26 January 1788.

This is why the apparent overturning of *terra nullius* by the High Court judgment in *Mabo v. Queensland* in June 1992, while important, did not change the excluded status of indigenous people as much as might have been expected, or indeed as much as has been claimed. To put it in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, *terra nullius* is the content of the form – it is the particular shape the state of exception took in the establishment of Australia as a sovereign, colonial nation, not the formative, originary instrument it is often taken to be. That distinction must be reserved for the sovereign right to declare a state of exception and, as the years since *Mabo* have shown all too clearly, that right is intact now as it ever was. The state of exception is the form of the content, in other words.

Contrary to the standard view of things, then, I am arguing that *terra nullius* is the expression of sovereignty, not its basis.[8] It was a convenient means of legitimating at law (by suspending the 'existing' law of the land) what had already been accomplished in fact. Indeed, as is the case with most declarations of a state of exception, it is the fact that demands the suspension of law – confronted by the need to justify their act of occupation, the colonial powers declared the land *terra nullius* in order to retain their entitlement to the land by suspending their own laws regarding the right to occupy another person's land. This is clear in the judgment that so-called native title can coexist alongside Crown title, but the Crown reserves the right to extinguish it. So the judgment is, in effect, a case of yet another exception being made under the auspices of an already existing state of exception. This is further confirmed by the fact that the judgment also found that the previous failure to recognise native title, as regrettably and egregiously racist as it undoubtedly was, did not constitute the legal basis for any future compensation claim.

Putting it bluntly, it amounts to saying that while *terra nullius* was wrong *as* law, it was not *a* wrong *at* law.

The Australian government has shown itself to be profoundly unwilling to treat the Indigenous Peoples as ordinary citizens, or indeed as individuals, with the same rights and needs as other Australians. Instead, in a manner that stands comparison with Israel's treatment of Palestinians, it insists on treating the Indigenous Peoples as a race apart. It justifies its stance with a duty of care rhetoric, but as the Stolen Generations make plain, this model of care is largely unconcerned by the plight of the individual. The policy of removing 'half-caste' children from their Aboriginal families and placing them with white foster families that created the Stolen Generations was, in its own way, well intentioned in as much as it was designed to address a specific cultural 'problem', a problem that the government felt it had a responsibility to address: it was thought by the white policy-makers that 'half-caste' children, as neither fully white nor fully black, had no 'proper' place within the caste system of (post-)colonial society.[9]

But such a policy idea could only have been enacted because the Indigenous Peoples were literally non-citizens.[10] More than that, it could only have happened because the policy-makers viewed things from the perspective of some notional 'greater good' – the good of the nation and the good of the race – that rendered the misery endured by the children as so much collateral damage. The historical sleight of hand here is the policy-maker's presumption that the situation of the 'half-castes' was exceptional, thus requiring and legitimising exceptional actions on their part. But one has only to try to imagine a similar policy being framed for use on the hegemonic 'white' Australian population to realise that the reality is that such exceptional action could only be taken because, as 'half'-Aboriginal people, they were 'always already' locked into an exceptional situation. Putting it bluntly, it was only because they were already members of 'the excluded' part that has no part that they could be treated in the way they were.

The government intervenes into the lives of indigenous Australians not only because it has the right and the wherewithal to do so, but because, ever since First Settlement, the Indigenous Peoples have been regarded as 'bare life'. The persistence of this viewpoint – that the government has the right to intervene in the lives of indigenous Australians – was amply demonstrated by the extraordinary events of June 2007 that have become known simply as The Intervention.[11] Prompted by the release of the *Little Children Are Sacred* report prepared by the specially convened Northern Territory Board of Inquiry into the Protection

of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse, The Intervention refers to former Prime Minister John Howard's ill-fated decision to send military personnel into several indigenous communities and impose what amounted to martial law in the lead-up to the 2007 federal election. Howard argued that the government not only had a right but also a duty to intervene, likening the situation to a 'national emergency' of the order of Hurricane Katrina. The comparison might not have sounded so misplaced if it had also come with the admission that, if the problem were a national emergency, then it was so because the federal government had systematically failed to heed all warnings of an impending crisis and diverted the necessary funds to address the issue elsewhere.

As Rebecca Stringer (2007) explains, Howard deflected criticism of his policies by saying that the children in Aboriginal communities are living in a Hobbesian nightmare that must be remedied by the imposition of 'social order enforced by legitimate authority'. While the report was unequivocal in finding that the incidence of sexual abuse in some Aboriginal communities is at crisis level and that the matter should be treated as one of national significance, nowhere in the report is there a recommendation calling for an immediate and militarised intervention, and yet that is precisely the course Howard chose in formulating the Northern Territory National Emergency Response (NTNER). On the contrary, the report specifically recommended extensive consultation with indigenous communities and a systematic attempt to end the chronic, real material deprivation these communities endure by improving government service levels to them.[12]

If the NTNER proved politically toxic for Howard, I would argue that it was not because he asserted the government's right to intervene into the affairs of indigenous people and both curtail their rights and deny them their livelihoods; rather, I would suggest it was because it exposed too openly the depth of the government's responsibility for their plight. It made all too apparent what had otherwise been forgotten: namely, that the founding of the nation was an act of violent dispossession. Rudd needed to offer an apology not only to distance himself from Howard, but also to close down any debate about the government's right to decide the fate of the Indigenous Peoples of Australia. And it is noteworthy that his apology makes no apology for this – he apologises for the wrongs done to the indigenous people, but not for the dispossession of their land that not only led to these wrongs being committed, but also gave the perpetrators the sense that they had the right to commit these wrongs.

What makes *Jindabyne* so interesting, to me at least, is the way it exposes and explores this schism in the core of the national apology.

The apology follows a double refusal: first, there is a refusal to accept that a wrong has occurred; then, as the evidence mounts and it becomes impossible to deny that a wrong has occurred, there is a refusal to accept any blame for the wrong. The apology that follows is thereby rendered worthless in advance because it fails to meet its own minimum conditions of possibility – as defined by Jacques Derrida (2001: 39) – namely, that it follows both an admission that a wrong occurred and an acceptance of responsibility for that wrong. The national apology to the Indigenous Peoples has taken precisely this course too – first, there was a refusal to accept that a wrong has occurred; when the Stolen Generations report made that position untenable, there was a steadfast refusal to accept responsibility for the wrongs documented in the report. And, in this sense, the apology that was offered by Rudd was basically worthless, irrespective of its supposed symbolic value, because it did not acknowledge the founding violence that, for many, continues to underpin the government's right to commit these wrongs as the NTNER demonstrated all too clearly.

Viewed as a national allegory, *Jindabyne* is asking us to look at the countless instances where Aboriginal people have been treated as the socially dead, as the non-living, as leading lives that do not count as lives. *Bringing Them Home* catalogued hundreds of actual examples and even then only scratched the surface. The point I want to make here in conclusion, though, is not simply that the hegemonic white people of Australia treat the marginalised black people of Australia very poorly; that is obviously the case. There is, however, an even more disturbing point to be made and that is that the hegemonic white people of Australia are, for the most part, unaware that there is anything 'wrong' in the way they act. Like the four fisherman, they do not think they have anything to apologise for and are awaiting someone to tell them what they have done wrong. One wonders if they will listen.

Acknowledgement

Notes

1. For an extended and highly detailed examination of Deleuze's clinical project, see Aidan Tynan's new book (2012).

2. One might also argue, as I do in *Deleuzism* (2000: 31–3), that causation is central to Deleuze's ethics because, for Deleuze (following Spinoza), the only ethical idea is an adequate idea, and the adequate idea is one that knows its own cause.

3. As Deleuze also writes, 'A solution always has the truth it deserves according to the problem to which it is a response, and the problem always has the solution it deserves in proportion to *its own* truth or falsity – in other words, in proportion to its sense' (1994: 159).

4. I discuss Jameson's use of history in detail elsewhere (Buchanan 2006a: 57–62).

5. For useful discussions of the concept of national allegory that separates it from debates about nationalism, see Buchanan (2006b) and Szeman (2006), but also Jameson's own clarification of what he means by allegory in his recent *Valences of the Dialectic* (2010).

6. This story is also featured in Robert Altman's film, *Short Cuts* (1993), a compendium of nine different Carver stories.

7. See, for example, Richard Flanagan's novel and film, *Sound of One Hand Clapping*. But see also Cate Shortland's film, *Somersault* (2004), also set in Jindabyne, which similarly makes symbolic use of the town's dislocated history.

8. Compare Paul Patton (2000: 125).

9. The fact that these children were living with black families to begin with because, for the most part, their white fathers had deserted their mothers (or raped them, as was more often the case) was never taken into consideration. By the same token, the fact that these children were not treated as 'out of place' by their families was also ignored and, in spite of the policy-makers' rhetoric about the importance of family, they privileged social position over family ties.

10. The choice of term, 'half-caste', rather than 'half-Aboriginal' or 'half-white', was influenced by British colonial experience in India and reflected a vision of society in which every racial group had its designated place.

11. See Stringer (2007) for an excellent account of these events and their meaning within the Australian political context.

12. The full text of the recommendations can be viewed at http://www.inquirysaac. nt.gov.au/pdf/report_by_sections/bipacsa_final_report-recommendations.pdf.

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Colourblind Colonialism in the '50th State of America'

Bianca Isaki

> It is up to us to go to extreme places, to extreme times, where the highest and deepest truths live and rise up. The places of thought are the tropical zones, not temperate zones or the moral, methodical or moderate man.
>
> Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*

To assert Hawai'i as a 'tropical' place of thought is not to misunderstand Deleuze's metaphor. What makes Hawai'i tropical is the extremity to which concepts of race and equality have been taken by colourblind conservatives, both from the US continent and those who are local to Hawai'i. Truths are 'elemental to a time and place' (Deleuze 2006: 110), and in Hawai'i, assertions of race and racial equality are embedded in colonial contestations to Native Hawaiian sovereignty. The elements that mark Hawai'i's singular political setting consist in the violent suturing of an illegally overthrown Hawaiian Kingdom into a US settler colony, a social memory of racialised class oppression characteristic of post-plantation economies, and a 'colourblind' conservative movement. Racism in Hawai'i is foremost a colonial problem. Projects of Hawaiian political self-determination do not fit within frameworks of racial minority rights that seek equality under US rule as an endpoint.[1] Using Deleuze's topography of thought, this chapter focuses on Hawai'i as a place where thinking about race is unsettled by Hawaiian sovereignty struggles and, further, how that unsettling bears on conservative reactions to antiracist initiative.

Although I look to Deleuze for a discussion of racism and colonialism in Hawai'i, it is also the case that he did not say very much about either race or colonialism. This chapter is less concerned with Deleuze as a *race* theorist than as a theorist of *thought*, particularly of what we think when we think we see colour. As I will show, exploring what I call colourblind racism, after Edouardo Bonilla-Silva (2006), can contribute to

understanding Deleuze's sparse notes on race. In other words, instead of using Deleuze to rethink race, I use colourblind racism to rethink what is political about Deleuze's immanent and material conception of social reality. His conceptual tools offer race studies and its ancillaries in post-colonial, colonial and ethnic studies, new materialist frameworks that engage immanent, concrete, phenotypic actualities of race beyond paradigms of representation. Instead of discrete identities of representations in which 'I = not you', Deleuze analyses the multiplicity that comprises identity as an open term of ongoing existence (1988: xiii). By contrast, colourblindness urges an equation of all 'I = you = other' and considers the remainder to be a threat to an equality that is supposedly the aim of American society.

Vis-à-vis the US, Hawai'i is, alternately, the fiftieth American state, a sovereign nation under US military occupation, and a US settler colony.[2] In 1893, the last monarch of the Kingdom of Hawai'i, Queen Lili'iuokalani, was overthrown by a coterie of *haole* (white Euro-American settler) plantation owners and politicians with the help of the US military. This colonial 'Hawaiian Republic' lasted from 1894 until 1900, when it was formally reorganised as a US Territorial government under the US Organic Act. Pressed to choose between continuing their Territorial status and US statehood, Hawai'i's increasingly settler-dominated electorate voted for the latter in 1959.[3] These political misdoings have continued into a colonial present in which Hawaiians have been subject to biopolitical management by Washington, DC, by diasporic displacement, categorical erasure through the institution of blood quantum, and actual deaths that attend their statistically low socioeconomic and health status (Kajihiro 2008; Kauanui 2008; Trask 2000).

In view of their Native national history, Hawaiians are inappropriately understood as racialised US citizens subject to US domestic law. But colourblind conservatives have taken a view that collapses race and colonisation, to depict Hawaiians and their trusts and institutions as 'racist'. Allied with like-minded groups, both in Hawai'i and the US continent, colourblind conservatives (mis)apply 'racial privilege' to what is rather a colonial contradiction. Hawaiian entitlements are 'racist', they argue, because they are race-based. This view reformulates institutional distinctions that are the legacy of Hawaiian political and historical identities in order to represent them as 'race-based' public policies in legal arguments.[4]

In 1996, a *haole* Hawai'i resident, Harold 'Freddy' Rice, argued that Hawaiian-only voting restrictions in the State's Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) trustee elections violate the Fifteenth Amendment, which

disallows voting restrictions that refer to colour, race or condition of servitude. Rice argued his case before the US Supreme Court and won. The Court's decision was followed by a flurry of new legal attacks on Hawaiian entitlements and consequent anxieties about the precarious position of Hawaiians under US law.[5] Seemingly marginal to the main arena of US politics, these legal attacks on Hawaiian institutions are strongly supported by national organisations such as the Campaign for a Color-Blind America, which is a 'not-for-profit organisation designed to challenge race-based public policies and educate the public about the injustices of racial preferences'. Colourblind conservatives consider policies that recognise Hawaiian ancestry and entitlements as 'race-based' and therefore in violation of the US constitution.

American Indian studies scholar, Jodi Byrd (2009), situates conservative legal activism in Hawai'i within a larger Republican agenda.

> In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the state of Hawai'i became a test ground for virulent anti-Affirmative Action cases that sought to establish precedent within U.S. law by taking advantage of those legal indeterminacies that left Native Hawaiians somewhere between a racial category and a political entity.

As a test case in their state and federal courts, Hawai'i has responded ambivalently to these colourblind conservative onslaughts against race-based entitlements. US continent-based conservatives thus enter the fray over Hawai'i's unresolved political status by putting forth a set of interlinked legal challenges to Hawaiian institutions on the basis of their 'racial preferences' for Hawaiians. Advocates of Hawaiian trusts and entitlements (institutions that have been set up for people of Hawaiian ancestry) counter attacks on their allegedly 'race'-based policies by citing Hawaiians' standing as a Native national people. Their ongoing dealings with the US settler state thus take the form of obligations and institutions, which are specific to Hawaiians and not US racial minority citizens. Pushing past the slippery terrain of colourblind US jurisprudence, Hawaiians have also sought to procure juridico-political recognition of their independence from the US in international fora, such as the United Nations.

Deleuze and Race Studies

A project that posits new uses for Deleuze's conceptual tools begs the question of why they have not been used to understand race and racism before – by others, or by Deleuze himself. One way in which

this question has been approached interrogates the bounded material conditions, which include colonial, racial, gender and class inequalities, under which Deleuze's tools were produced and developed. This point is raised in criticisms of Deleuze and Guattari's references to racialised and imperial identities – the Hopi and Crow, Papua New Guineans, China, Japan, blacks, Mongols, Jews, Arabs, ancient Egypt and so on – as philosophical figures that supposedly do their conceptual work on a virtual rather than actual plane. In Deleuze's borrowings from colonial materials, Christopher L. Miller notices, 'strange things happen: ethnographic authority is exerted even as it is denied; the real comes and goes; the shadow of colonialism fades in and out; New Guinea is transposed to Africa . . . ' (2003: 133).

Miller's point is that Deleuzian nomadological citation has a history in common with colonialism – that Deleuze's 'creative virtuality is "extracted" from an *actual* state of affairs' (2003: 133, quoting Peter Hallward). Whether or not the material complicity of nomadology with colonialism means that it *cannot* be called to comment critically on empire is a labour that has been taken up by Deleuze's interlocutors. While, in representationalism, thoughts are imagined as representations of truths, nomad thoughts are rather immanent to their material instantiations – the histories, sensations and things that constellate those instances. Against a sedentary image of thought, Deleuze and Guattari's nomadology (1988) provides concepts-vehicles for collecting these conditions into a study of what thoughts can *do* – in hands beyond their initiators'. This is, not incidentally, the wager that Deleuze and Guattari's line of flight places on the possibilities of thought. The line of flight can press against impossibility; it can transform a multiplicity itself (1988: 9–10). In other words, concepts exceed what their conditions of production have predicted for them. The mooredness of Deleuze's concepts in colonialism is rather a provocation to rendering his thoughts on race nomadological.

When Deleuze engages the term 'race', he specifies two meanings – a race-tribe and a milieu-space. In the first, race describes an alterity that is recalcitrant to governmental striations. Deleuze and Guattari's striated spaces are subjected to the state's coding machine, which turns smooth spaces into striated ones where meaning is manipulable and fixed. Posited as smooth, race conjures fantastic spaces – the Orient, the Gobi Desert. These fantastic and singular forms constitute race in ways that teeter towards two interlinked forms of racism, 'a dominant and all-encompassing fascism, or into a sect and a folklore, microfascisms' or 'a phantasy that reactivates all the fascisms in a different way' (1988:

379–80). To combat these racisms, one must do something other than travelling 'to escape phantasy' or 'by invoking a past, real or mythical'. Deleuze importantly points out that truth presented by travel and history is not only what counters the falsity of exoticised and Other-ed margins. The antiracist confrontation is rather with the *powers* of the false, the power to create fantasy in the first place.

Deleuze points to what is difficult about the ahistorical racist fantasy of colourblindness: it is recalcitrant to the real and the historical-material. Instead of insisting that racists have their history wrong or that they dream the wrong dreams, Deleuze allows that neither racial difference nor the place that it is presumed to inhabit can cross an epistemic gap.

> In the same way that race is not something to be rediscovered, the Orient is not something to be imitated: it only exists in the construction of a smooth space, just as race only exists in the constitution of a tribe that peoples and traverses a smooth space. (ibid.)

I am not suggesting that lived realities of racial identity are not historically constituted, or that racialised spaces are only ideas. I *am* suggesting that colourblind racism trades on a concept of racial difference as opaque and unknowable in order to propose its own ontology that, in turn, abolishes race from public, especially legal, spheres. Put otherwise, while colourblind conservatives abolish what is unruly about race, Deleuze and Guattari turn that same unruliness into evidence of a multiplicity to be cultivated.

(White) Settler Citizenship

Deleuze's approach to subjectivity as a material practice supplements efforts to counter racism by calling attention to the production of Hawaiians as racialised citizens; 'There's no [racial] subject, but a production of [racial] subjectivity' (1995: 113).'[6] Colourblindness functions as a biopolitical strategy whereby citizenship is produced alongside a Hawaiian 'race'. Not homogenously gathered together across its adherents, colourblindness is a set of ideas about the whiteness of equality that work in different fora. In Hawai'i, two organisations promulgate these ideas to contest Hawaiian legal entitlements. According to Aloha for All's website, 'All citizens of Hawaii, regardless of ancestry, are entitled to the equal protection of the laws.' Likewise, the website of the Grassroots Institute of Hawai'i warns, 'Bad law chases out good behavior.' Their common ideological denominator is a demand for a legal lens that sees colour in place of experience, history and colonialism.

Importantly, while a patriotic animus attends many settler claims to Hawai'i, American hegemony is not always what holds them together. Settlers want a settler Hawai'i, not necessarily a nominally, or administratively, American one. 'Freddy' Rice, of *Rice v. Cayetano* (2000), has explicitly stated: 'if I had to make a choice, a citizen of U.S. or citizen of Hawai'i, I'd never think twice, I'd be a citizen of Hawai'i' (quoted in Sodetani 2003). Elsewhere in this interview, Rice affirms his family's multigenerational tenure in Hawai'i and his grandfather's Hawaiian Kingdom citizenship. These affirmations support his claim to Hawai'i's political space, and in so doing, articulate a distinctively settler colonial nationalism. He desires Hawai'i to be a *settler*, but not necessarily American, place. A colourblind Hawai'i is a settler possession; it is not a replica of the US (notwithstanding Rice's readiness to call on the US Constitution's Fifteenth Amendment), and it has specific antimonies towards a Hawaiian Hawai'i.

Colourblind activists in Hawai'i adopt the language of citizenship to denude the American subject into someone *through* whom everyone can be and belong. This stripped citizen proceeds from the Aloha for All coalition's motivated interpretation of the Hawaiian Kingdom's citizenship policies on their website:

> During the reign of Kamehameha III, it was made clear by the Constitution of 1840 and the Declaration of Rights of 1839 that the Kingdom included both Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian on equal terms. There was no Hawaiian-only tribe. The Declaration of Rights of 1839 says that 'God hath made of one blood all nations of men . . . ' and refers to rights, 'given alike to every man . . . '.

Perversely claiming to champion and embody Hawaiian values in 'the proud tradition of Kamehameha III', Aloha for All seeks '[e]qual rights to all, without reference to ethnicity' by insisting that Hawaiians are ethnic Americans, as opposed to Hawaiian nationals. Aloha for All's account is selectively true.[7] This is a recognisable colourblind strategy that 'respond[s] to an emerging structural understanding of racism by positing instead an ethnic reconceptualisation of race' (López 2007: 985). That is, Aloha for All deliberately ethnicises a 'Hawaiian-only tribe' in order to erase the structural dismemberment of a Hawaiian nationality that was assumed under the reign of Kamehameha III. Put plainly, colourblindness expects Hawaiians to trade in their Hawaiian national identity for an American ethnicity. Here, US hegemony is being stretched to fit a conservative settler desire for a Hawai'i that is most itself when it is determined, not by Hawaiians, but by colourblind citizens.

Aloha for All's fidelity to Hawaiian political traditions is belied by their refusal to recognise Hawaiian rights to political self-determination. Aloha for All asserts an identity with Hawai'i through a serendipitous alignment between the Aloha Spirit and US constitutional rights. 'That principle [equal rights]', reads Aloha for All's website, 'also fits perfectly with the Aloha spirit and, in effect, makes Aloha part of the constitutional law of the United States.' Hawaiian political history is installed in a settler Hawai'i as a circumscribed mark of distinction. Different, but still 'fit[ting] perfectly', Aloha for All's Hawai'i is one that can be continued by settlers. The strategy aims to assimilate Hawai'i into a white multiculturalism in which colourblind citizenship serves as the vehicle for shuttling Hawaiian political claims into forms, like civil rights, that can be remediated by American justice.

The disjuncture between racial minorities and Native nationals appears through Japanese settlers' participation in colourblind legal attacks. In the fallout from *Rice*, Charles Ota, a Japanese American war veteran and banker, was elected to an OHA Trustee seat. A Japanese settler, James Kuroiwa, brought a (now dismissed) case, *Kuroiwa v. Lingle and the State of Hawai'i* (2008), against the US constitutionality of OHA, an agency set up, amongst other things, to administer Hawaiian land trusts. In another suit against OHA, Wendell Marumoto argued that the Hawaiian ceded lands trust be 're-vested in Executive branch to benefit all the people of Hawai'i'. Earl Arakaki of *Arakaki et al. v. the State of Hawai'i* (2005), which brought suit against the state's 'race-based' support of Hawaiian institutions, has also loudly voiced colourblind arguments.[8] Not incidentally, these plaintiffs are supported by Aloha for All, the Grassroots Institute of Hawai'i and, in the *Arakaki* case, the national Campaign for a Race-Blind America. These settler alignments complicate a presumed tension between equality and white privilege. Within colourblind ideology, these concepts conspire to broaden citizenship. Rather than equality, Hawaiian self-determination fits better with the radical multiplicity of existence of Deleuzian ontology.

A Colourblind Image of Thought

The colourblind conservative of Hawai'i seems a straw man for critical inquiry. His transparently bad history, philosophy and social analysis proceed from a refusal to consider how US settler colonialism fractures a citizenly public along lines of Native and settler difference. At the same time, colourblind conservativism provokes questions about how

its claims to the uniform Americanness of Hawai'i and Hawaiians are sustained. Neither legal and political history nor concern for antiracist equality is the basis for colourblindness. Critically targeting these bases presumes an empirical reality that is merely misrecognised by colourblind subjects who have the luxury and power to choose not to see it. Instead, we should consider how the 'fact' of race is formulated. Within colourblind regimes of thought, race is conceived as an abstract and universal category that is coextensive with difference that should not be legally cognizable. This conception of race fails to refer

> to the real forces that *form* thought, thought itself is never related to the forces that it presupposes *as thought*. Truth is never related to what it presupposes. But there is no truth that, before being a truth, is not the bringing into effect of a sense or the realisation of a value. (Deleuze 2006: 104)

Deleuze enjoins us to understand that colourblind assertions presuppose values or beliefs in order to recognise them as truths. This is precisely the way in which Deleuze proceeds to interrogate the image of thought. He summarises the 'dogmatic' image of thought into three theses: (1) 'the thinker *as* thinker wants and loves truth'; (2) 'we are "diverted" from the truth but by forces which are foreign to it (body, passions, sensuous interests)'; and (3) 'all we need to think well, to think truthfully, is a *method*' (2006: 103–4). For instance, Earl Arakaki comments on his anti-Hawaiian legal activity:

> I believe everyone should be treated equally, and I don't see why there are racial preferences, and monies to be disbursed, based on what happened a hundred years ago . . . If you want money, work hard and earn it for yourself. I've done it, and I'm no genius. (quoted in Murphy 2002)

Equality, hard work and the power to get right with history are banal values. And, it is their very banality that does away with a sense that their assertions need to be moored in more than a faith in their truth. Arakaki's 'method' aligns with conservative ideology's hallmark of individual enablement – the idea that any effort to get right with a history that happened before us stops us from seizing opportunities of the moment in which we live. I think we should take this argument seriously, as a feature of colourblindness that appeals to a hard-working citizen whose struggle must entitle him to membership in a country recognises no wrongs in its history. This vision of Hawai'i summons settlers to colourblind politics. Its figure and his history are part of an affective apparatus through which individual experiences are turned into ligaments of a settler community. The question we might put to Deleuze's

concepts is thus: how does the truth of one's hard work become a way to 'realise the value' of equality as colourblindness?

Reformatting Race

According to the 1990 US Bureau of the Census, race is a mélange of governmentally determined classifications that follow no particular prior pattern. Colourblind politics takes advantage of this legal ambivalence by affirming everything seen as race as nothing but skin colour. Against this view, US leftist politics pins the legal visibility of race to a subject's material experience of structural subordination.

Rather than contesting blindness with sight, however, Deleuze calls attention to interpretive struggles over what we think when we think we see colour. The subject of colourblind ideology matches up with the image of thought; both endeavour to effect a universal truth. 'The classical image of thought, and the striating of mental space it effects aspires to universality,' Deleuze and Guattari write. 'It in effect operates with two "universals," the Whole as the final ground of being or all-encompassing horizon, and the Subject as the principle that converts being into being-for-us' (1988: 379).

A concept of race as immanent and embodied contrasts with a theoretical orientation towards the materiality of life and history as always already under a law that is 'an enabling and constitutive condition for subjectivity' (Colebrook 2009: 6). The differentiation of ideal and immanent distinguishes the Deleuzian approach. Claire Colebrook describes this approach as one that

> does not seek ideal conditions that would be radically other than the given, for theory is the overcoming of our located and given viewpoint . . . in the name of *real* conditions: *not* conditions for how the world is given to, or lived by 'us' but the real or time *in its pure state*. (2009: 12)

Colourblindness does not adhere to Deleuze's agenda for theory. Even if it also seeks to actualise a pure state for the citizen, this purity is (problematically) indexed by his inoculation from race. In this imagination it matters that Hawai'i is an island. Deleuze considers the 'desert island' a fundamental topos of colonial imagination. Unlike continental islands like Great Britain, oceanic islands like Hawai'i are not places where people live – they are 'deserted' (even if Hawaiians live there) lands that call on Western subjectivity towards a 'rebeginning . . . a second origin' (2004: 13). Usually, historically, white settlers re-begin by recreating continental society: Robinson Crusoe. 'Everything is taken from the

ship. Nothing is invented. It is all painstakingly applied on the island'
(ibid.: 12). Deleuze urges distance from this banal colonial subject:
'every healthy reader dreams of seeing Friday eating Robinson.' This is
Deleuze's anticolonial caution to colourblind settlers who belligerently
apply US convervative or neoliberal / postracial approaches in Hawai'i.

Race in Hawai'i is a machinic assemblage; it has no inherent or pre-
scribed identity, truth or personality, but only achieves these in actual
situations.

> As an assemblage, [it] has only itself, in connection with other assemblages
> and in relation to other bodies without organs . . . [it] exists only through
> the outside and on the outside . . . [It] is a little machine. (Deleuze and
> Guattari 1988: 4)

Race is a situation that condenses in embodied tastes, smells and geogra-
phies of, for instance, white ravers in a Goan village. Irreducibly mate-
rial and immanent, race retains a relationship to 'a virtual reservoir of
ways to connect to its changing environment' (Saldanha 2008). These
assembled features of race allow us to pose questions about 'how an
assemblage functions, how it manages to emerge and persist in its own
right' (ibid.). Specifically, how does colourblindness function, emerge
and persist over and against the material histories that make race
matter in Hawai'i? The ways that race exists, colourblind settlers argue,
somehow should not matter to the governance of Hawai'i's polity. We
are here concerned with this 'somehow'. That is, *how* is race exactly (im)
materialised in colourblindness? The implicitly white *ideality* of citizen-
ship is a crucial vehicle.

Race, as authored by colourblind conservatives, is not a facile chro-
matism. It is a means whereby historical and cultural difference becomes
evidence of disunity that is possibly harmful to the unsullied space of the
political – the place where equality is supposed to happen. Colourblind
racism sweeps the stakes of the political by producing a subject shorn
of all but his citizenship, which, in Hawai'i, is insistently an American
citizenship. *Citizenship* becomes a vehicle for disarticulating difference
from the political. This disarticulation is under-recognised in legal anal-
ysis as a form of denying self-determination to native and other minor-
ity collectivities. Discussing the shifting career of colourblind politics
in America is exploring the question: how does race become something
losable along the path to white citizenship? Such historical analysis
attends to Deleuze's proposition, 'bastard and mixed blood are the true
names of race' by calling attention to the fact that 'citizen' is an already
racialised concept (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 379).

Left to Right: Colourblind Race and Racism

> Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law . . . The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his colour when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.
>
> (Justice John Marshall Harlan)

Justice Harlan's famous dissent in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), which upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation, articulated an antiracist position on the side of equality. Over a century later, the concept of citizenly equality has migrated towards the side of colourblind critics. One such critic, Kenneth Conklin, echoed Harlan in his opposition to Hawaiian sovereignty on US National Public Radio in 2009:

> It's not so much that I'm against Hawaiian sovereignty, but rather that I am in favor of unity and equality. And I believe that everyone should be treated equally by the government, which means that I oppose racial entitlement programs, of which we have many, many here in Hawai'i.

Legal scholar Ian F. H. López parses the perverse likeness between liberal histories of colourblind tolerance and conservative invocations of colourblind equality. The problem, López explains, is 'the conflation of colourblindness as an ideal vision of a future society, and as a means to achieve this end' (2007: 5). If what is good about imagining a dissolution of racial inequality is also what is bad about thinking about how to get there, then we need to engage the ways that this endpoint constellates modes of activity and attention. Bracketing the state's mode of recognising race as a safeguard against discrimination is not identical with a vision of society in which difference is always bracketed. That is, we need to see how colourblind ideology affirms politically different engagements with its project. Eduardo Bonilla's *Racism Without Racists* (2003) describes colourblindness as a conservative politics that has proven resistant to liberal arguments against racist *discrimination*. In the rubric of discrimination, racist inequality devolves from social structures that limit access to employment, social services or voting, for example. Proving that an act of 'discrimination' is racially motivated requires a discriminating subject – that is, a racist. Yet, proving racist *intent* on the part of colourblind litigants within the doctrine of discriminatory purpose is difficult.[9]

None of this wordplay is lost on colourblind activists. By professing to be entirely indiscriminate, they evade accusations of racial

discrimination. And, they go on the offensive, accusing Hawaiian trusts and entitlements of racist discrimination. With López, I am arguing that the new utility of liberal concepts of race for colourblind racism means that another way of thinking race is needed. In part, the problem inheres to a biopolitical logic of jurisprudence itself that localises subjects within bodies (Colebrook 2009). Here, Deleuze's refusal of the classical subject and representation disallows liberal tendencies that make conflicts between settler and Hawaiian politics into objects of US legal therapeutics. Historically, liberals posited political identity on an ideal plane. Equality is rendered thinkable on an infinitely partitionable and immaterial field where, because differences are non-overbearing, they could accommodate each other (Goldberg-Hiller 2006: 8). This liberal imagination articulates with a juridico-legal apparatus that confers remediative US justice on those who unequally bear the weight of social disrepair.

The subject produced in this nexus is a trauma effect, rather than what Lauren Berlant calls a 'complex subject with rights, needs, reciprocal obligations to the state and society, conflicting self-interests, or prospects for happiness in realms beyond the juridical' (2000: 54). Felt trauma of society's failings supposedly 'symptomatize[s] the unruly bad social somethings that law is meant to repair' (ibid.). Pain, sentimentality and the idea of the individual work in tandem to produce *as political* evidence that is deeply sited and definitively ineloquent (Berlant 2001). To make personal injury directly meaningful politically, as the injuring effect of social policies, requires a sentimental mode of legal visibility. This sentimental order has a much longer history (reaching back well into the eighteenth century), and achieved renewed vigour during the 1960–70s civil rights era. Scholars frame this history within a relationship between nineteenth-century American sentimental narratives and the American political cultures of protest (Klein 2003: 145–55).

Conservatives invert the nature of social subordination while responding to the subjective effects of social pain. Claims to social injury are rhetorically stigmatised as '"victim politics", a phrase that deliberately suppresses the complexity, ambivalence and incoherence of social antagonism in the everyday life of contemporary citizenship' (Berlant 1997: 7). The liberal argument for civil rights is upended to claim that a 'proliferation of spaces . . . had been the cause of economic and political unviability of those who call themselves minorities' (Patton 1995: 224–5).

When 'colour' turns to skin colour, race can be the benign materials that fit into the ideal space of citizenship where US constitutional law rules. In this space, Hawaiians' racial distinctiveness violates the princi-

ple of equal rights for all citizens. If America is the space where identity and success happen, then benevolence to Hawaiians means facilitating access to that presumably desired America; this is the 'equal treatment' demanded by conservatives (Kauanui 2005). Aloha for All's spokesperson and lead counsel for *Arakaki v. Lingle*, William Burgess, thus explains the anti-Hawaiian activism of his group in affirmative tones: 'Hawaiians have the right to be part of the American Dream, to make it on their own, and enjoy the fruits of success.' Here, the racism of colourblindness is the racial chauvinism of the citizen. By manifesting race as more than a colour of injury, Hawaiians trespass the space allotted to their citizenly belonging.

In the liberal concept of citizenship, the complexity of social subordination is reduced to an image of subjects of felt suffering. Once aimed at proliferating spaces for diverse cultural identities, liberal political space now accommodates the repressive tolerance of conservative politics that have hijacked liberal politics' 'practical logics of space', as Cindy Patton has argued (1996–7: 3–4). Juridico-political remediation of identity-based social subordination makes subjectivity coextensive with social injury. Now used in colourblind legal attacks on Hawaiians, this format for legal calculations of minority suffering outlines the need for an alternative. This calls us to interrogate liberal 'places of thought' as limited vehicles for negotiating against anti-Hawaiian conservative politics. What is new is the call of colourblindness on a desire for 'the overcoming of our located and given viewpoint' (ibid.) precisely to render the places this viewpoint came from irrelevant.

Instead of a subject that gets race-as-inequality layered on to her, Deleuze rethinks the subject as an unfolding of temporalities. He writes of subjectivity: 'It is as if the relations of the outside folded back to create a doubling, allowing a relation to oneself to emerge, and constitute an inside which is hollowed out and develops its own unique dimension' (1988: 100). Deleuze's subject is not a carrier of past or present trauma but a fold, a space interior to time (1989: 82). Subjects are embedded in the event and not, as in the colourblind schema, in an ideal space reserved apart from the messy, empirical world where racial difference continually complicates the implicit or explicit whiteness of the state and the law.

Conclusion

Colourblind ideology offers a sense in which Hawai'i can belong to the settlers who love living there and have a history (however toxic it

may be to Hawaiians). It sees no reason why historical and ongoing structures of inequality cannot be overcome by the sheer will to a local community. Hawaiian assertions of political sovereignty make no sense to certain conservative (and liberal) settlers. Colourblindness manifests a democratic rhetoric by making noises that mimic affirmations of equality, justice and diversity. Colourblindness endorses a very particular *citizen-ontology*, the bottom-line ontological presumption being of the citizen whose colour is merely painted on to him. If race is not who we are on top of who we really are, then we may be able to push away this given and put something new in its place. W. E. B. DuBois in 1940 wrote that the concept of race refers to 'a group of contradictory forces, facts and tendencies' (1986: 651). Deleuze would agree. Race and its subjects are material forces, facts and tendencies that are not simply *de-raced* in colourblind eyes, but rather strategised into a kind of citizen.

Race is the vehicle for colourblind legal assertions of what citizenship ought to mean. It is a material practice of (not) seeing difference made possible by a philosophy of jurisprudence that deceptively shares much with democratic and liberal legal tactics. Deleuze, however, pushes towards another logic of legality. His tactic is to refuse the unitary subject of legal thought and rather embrace immanent and sensuous encounters, making of citizenship itself a contingent result of the encounter between racial difference and the law. At stake in articulating a new 'place of thought' that does not form injured claimants nor US citizen-subjects, is a form of decolonial justice embedded in the deep materiality of Hawai'i's landscapes. Encountered in Hawai'i, colourblind racism shows that Hawaiian demands for land and self-determination cannot be structurally coherent with the identity-spaces of American liberal politics.

Notes

1. Hawaiian demands to separate from the US often cite their condition of second-class citizenship. Hawaiians have a lower socioeconomic status than other groups in Hawai'i.
2. Keanu Sai (2008: 4–5) has argued that Hawai'i is a nation-state under occupation rather than a settler colony. I think it can be both.
3. Designated a non-self-governing territory by the United Nations in 1946, Hawai'i was entitled to a plebiscite to determine whether or not to pursue US statehood. In 1959, Hawai'i became an American state by a process that violated international law (Kauanui 2005: 4). Most recently, the 1993 'Apology Bill', a joint resolution which Bill Clinton signed that acknowledged US complicity in the aftermath of the 1893 Overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, has been contested in *Hawai'i v. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs et al* (2009) No. 07–1372, in which the US Supreme Court decided that the Apology does 'not [use] the kind of language Congress uses

to create substantive rights, especially rights enforceable against the cosovereign States'.

4. In Hawai'i, 'Hawaiian' is commonly understood to identify a Native Hawaiian, and not a resident of Hawai'i.

5. These anxieties complicate debates over the dubious good of the US federal recognition offered by the Akaka Bill or the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganisation Act (S. B. 310, H. R. 505). The Bill has undergone many revisions since Hawai'i's US Senator, Daniel Akaka, introduced it in 2000.

6. Arun Saldanha's work (2008) makes explicit the implications of Deleuze's concepts of subjectivity for theorisations of race (see also Young 2001).

7. King Kamehameha III's 1839 Declaration of Rights marked the Hawaiian Kingdom's departure from a system of common law that vested the authority in the high chiefs and king into the people as a whole. The 'authority of law' was used to position 'everyone, chiefs and people, kanaka and haole, into one definition of people, all entitled to the rights granted by God' (Osorio 2002: 25).

8. The Arakaki lawsuit involves sixteen Hawai'i resident plaintiffs who argue against the constitutionality of OHA and the Hawaiian Home Lands Department. As taxpayers, these plaintiffs claimed standing to contest that the use of state and federal income tax revenues for Native Hawaiian institutions violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, the equal protection clause (Kauanui 2008).

9. This doctrine is most commonly associated with the 1976 decision, *Washington v. Davis* (Lawrence 1987).

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Chapter 6

A Thousand Tiny Intersections: Linguisticism, Feminism, Racism and Deleuzian Becomings

Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin

> Signifier enthusiasts take an oversimplified situation as their implicit model: word and thing. From the word they extract the signifier, and from the thing a signified in conformity with the word, and therefore subjugated to the signifier. They operate in a sphere interior to and homogeneous to language.
>
> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*

> There is always another breath in my breath, another thought in my thought, another possession in what I possess, a thousand things and a thousand beings implicated in my complications: every true thought is an aggression.
>
> Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*

Introduction: Gender Theory is a Representationalism

The current-day apotheosis in much of feminist theory is an enthusiasm for the theoretical mappings of Judith Butler. Her hugely influential work circles, ever since her dissertation entitled *Subjects of Desire* (1987), around the (French) rereading of Hegel. Her dissertation already showed her great interest in Lacan and Lacanian psychoanalysis and in the way 'French theory' allows for rethinking the concepts of sex and gender. In the introduction to her dissertation, Butler admitted a lack of knowledge of the work of more contemporary – that is, post-Hegelian – French theorists, notably Deleuze, which is of importance to us. This is not to say, of course, that Butler travels an entirely different path from us. Her admission does, however, explain – at least to readers experienced in French philosophy – why her later theorisations of sexuality and gender have never been easily appreciated as 'materialist', but rather continue to emphasise Lacanian, Derridean and early Foucaultian conceptualisations of *language*. Even when talking of embodiment, Butler

herself notices that 'Everytime I write about the body, the writing ends up being about language' (2004: 198). Butler immediately adds to this that 'the body' is not to be reduced to language and she keeps searching for ways to think 'bodily signs' in their coexistence with more formally linguistic ones; the two, however, are treated as separate.

Here, and in many other places, Butler herself offers a complexification of the by now common concern about her work being structured along linguisticist lines (see Butler 1993; Sönser Breen and Blumenfeld 2005; Kirby 2006). Building from a materialist Deleuzian perspective, Claire Colebrook states that, in the Anglo-American realm of gender theory, the work of Butler needs to be rewritten while paying attention to the conceptual juxtapositions and contradictions that result, in particular 'a constant tension between the insistence on a common humanity on the one hand, and an emphasis on the insurmountable and fundamental gender difference on the other' (2004a: 12). In other words, one is either accidentally male or female owing to human nature, or essentially gendered, rendering the human as such conceptually redundant. And if the latter stance is taken, should we not study how, rather than assume that, what Colebrook calls 'sexual gender' became the 'model of all difference' (ibid.; emphasis in original)? And furthermore, are we looking at 'a biological difference, a cultural difference or a metaphysical difference, expressing two essentially different principles' (ibid.)? The possible answers to these questions are heavily determined by the theoretical tensions between constructivism versus essentialism. But, whereas most of Butler's work and the canonised reception of it have found a distinctive answer on the constructivist side of the dichotomy, Colebrook asks whether these issues can be rewritten through the materialist or ontological register.

Colebrook's essay, 'Postmodernism is a humanism', reminds us also of the fact that the essentialism–constructivism dichotomy appears as non-exhaustive in Butler itself, yet that this important move is undone in the very same gesture. Butler tries to complexify the relation between gender and sex that is generally considered to be Beauvoirian. For her, gender is *not* to be the system of signs that imposes itself 'upon' sexual difference, and sex is *not* to be a neutral and inaccessible materiality. At the same time, however, following Butler, the

> position within a system of norms produces a radical difference between norm and that which the norm supposedly orders, organizes and represents. It is in the repetition of norms or signifiers of gender that one produces oneself, one's sex or the real as that which was there to be signified. (Colebrook 2004b: 293)

Eventually, sex ends up being a neutral, passive and inaccessible materiality. Butler enacts a feminist departure from Lacanian psychoanalysis on the basis of the privileging of new Master signifier, a representation governed by the logic of One, which actually '*precludes* real difference' (Colebrook 2004b: 293, emphasis in original). The assumptions of both essential and accidental femininity or masculinity stem from a representationalism, according to which 'any linguistic entity exists only in virtue of the association between signal and signification' (Saussure 2006: 99, 144). To Butler, the essentialist stance of incommensurable and fundamental sexual difference cannot understand its own implication in a system of norms or signifiers of gender, while 'the real' is wholly out of reach for the constructivist alternative, is 'impossible', to put it in the Lacanian paradigm, which is to say it is mute and non-intelligible. The body, whether female or male, is then just as possible as signs allow it to be. Butler claims: 'Signs work *by appearing* (visibly, aurally) and appearing though material means' (quoted in Blanton 2007: 135). From which, medievalist Virginia Blanton rightfully concludes: 'If the corpse cannot be displayed, it cannot signify' (ibid.).

In *Gender Trouble*, Butler's most famous book of 1990, there is no attempt to rethink the notion of race next to (or with) gender and sexuality. Yet, at the end, Butler invites all thinkable differences into her theory of signification:

> theories of . . . identity that elaborate predicates of color, sexuality, ethnicity, class, and able-bodiedness invariably close with an embarrassed 'etc.' at the end of the list. Through this horizontal trajectory of adjectives, these positions strive to encompass a situated subject, invariably fail to be complete. (1999: 143)

Reading this 'etc.' once again as an emphasis on the 'illimitable process of signification itself', Butler prefigures not a theorisation of racialised subjecthood but the later theories of intersectionality, by offering them all a radically linguistic basis.

Pushing Feminist Theory to Ontology

Deleuze and Guattari are, no doubt, among the fiercest critiques of the work of Lacan and Hegel, and can very well be read as a critique of the Butlerians that rule feminist and queer theory today and who have by now also applied Butler to race, class, physical fitness and age, to name only a few. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari fiercely reject Lacan's notion of the real, claiming that 'the real is not impossible; on

the contrary, within the real everything is possible, everything becomes possible' (1983: 27, 35). How different a starting point this is compared to the Lacanian foundations of Butler. For, indeed, accepting the real to be possible, a wholly new materialist theory of sexuality (or racialisation, or age) and all possible categorisations of reality starts to expand. Not waiting for a particular sign to appear but opening thought on to the unforeseen, on to whatever the body might be capable of doing: this is what makes possible theories of difference *itself*.

Following Deleuze and Guattari, Colebrook's suggestion to develop 'sexual gender' ontologically as the 'model of all difference' necessarily pushes representationalism out of sexual difference theory. Such a development of 'sexual gender' is much inspired by the feminism Deleuze and Guattari offered in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) with its 'becoming-woman'. Their realist or neo-materialist alternative to Saussurian representationalisms leads to a radically different feminism requiring no language or signification but built *only* upon this real and its morphogenetic real-ity: 'it must be said that all becomings begin with and pass through becoming-woman. It is the key to all the other becomings' (1987: 306). Rather than pursuing any kind of dualist identity politics, the feminism of Deleuze and Guattari is thus not so much a (Hegel-inspired) *opposite* of power, but comes rather with a wholly different ontology. Becoming-woman is much more an act upon the fundamental phallogocentric organisational politics of society, claiming that every emancipation (also of men) has to take up a femininity as a necessary means to undo patriarchy. Probably inspired by Beauvoir's idea that femininity is necessarily a becoming (2010), Deleuze and Guattari accept that what we call 'woman' has always already been the sum of trajectories away from the centres of power, an introductory power (*puissance* / *potentia* instead of *pouvoir* / *potestas*) entirely necessary for any metamorphosis, or 'nomadic ethics' as Rosi Braidotti calls it (2006: 205), to take place.

In a 1985 interview, Félix Guattari commented on the initial, primarily negative reception of his and Deleuze's ideas in feminist theory, by emphasising that the goal of the concept of becoming-woman was to move away from the essentialism–constructivism dichotomy that haunted the theoretical field. Guattari then suggested a becoming-homosexual as another concept proposing emancipation from patriarchy, providing an example:

> This could be a 'becoming-homosexual' . . . to present this simply, brutally: if you want to be a writer, if you want to have a 'becoming-letters,' you are necessarily caught in a 'becoming-woman'. That might be manifested to a

great extent through homosexuality, admitted or not, but this is a departure from a 'grasping', power's will to circumscribe that exists in the world of masculine power values. (in Stivale 1988: 217)

The example of the writer not representing but becoming his or her 'letters' shows how fundamental and prior to every possible identification and signification Deleuze and Guattari wish to position the movements of emancipation. Rather than connecting becoming-woman to some biological, cultural or social identity and opposition (of women opposed to men, for instance, which, especially in the early years, Deleuze and Guattari were falsely accused of), Guattari suggests understanding becoming-woman as 'the first sphere of explosion of phallic power, therefore of binary power, of the surface-depth power [*pouvoir figure-fond*] of affirmation'. He concludes: 'the "becoming-woman" has no priority' (ibid.: 217).

Keeping in mind that becoming-woman is primarily about situating emancipation *before* identity, we cannot but conclude that the concept is by no means limited to a rethinking of the female or feminine. Becoming-woman is a necessity for all emancipations from phallogocentrisms and perhaps even humanisms (as Colebrook could have it) that haunt society. This is why Kaja Silverman (1992: 347) concludes that Deleuze and Guattari's becoming-woman is, in the end, 'a process leading beyond the symbolic order altogether'. The symbolic order of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Saussurian linguistics that denies the possibility of the real, that insinuates a dichotomy between constructivism versus essentialism, is the first and foremost myth Deleuzian materialism exposes.

Intersectionality is a Representationalism

Intersectionality theory revolves around representational issues similar to those found in Anglo-American gender theory after Butler. It was installed vis-à-vis a canon of Western feminist and antiracist theory, as structured by a seemingly inexhaustible dichotomy framed as 'sameness versus difference'. Just as there is preference for 'gender' when it comes to sexual difference, intersectional theorists have voiced a preference for understanding differentiation in terms of *diversity* while trying to complexify both the scope of difference and the dualism between difference and sameness. The question is, however, whether a radical ontological shift, as scholars like Colebrook, Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz and others inspired by Deleuze's emphasis on becoming are establishing in feminist theory, has also taken place with intersectional thinking.

In what is about to follow, we will show that at least the major voices of intersectional theory founded their distinctive framework on the same grounds as Butler and Butlerians, that is, by sticking to difference as a linguistic 'construction', to a representationalism, while conceptualising that difference as diversity, not what Deleuze calls difference in itself. Difference, the claim is, should never be conceived of through essence. What we thus witness is a repetition of a problematic representationalist logic of the One to the detriment of what was set out to be a revolution in thought in French poststructuralist philosophy. Thus we will both work through the diagnosis just provided and present a radically alternative conceptualisation of intersectionality theory's concerns.

To do so, we must return to the first writings on intersectionality by Kimberlé Crenshaw. In 'Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: a black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics', Crenshaw (1989: 150) surveys several US court cases dealing with discrimination in order to conclude that:

> Black women are regarded either as too much like women or Blacks and the compounded nature of their experience is absorbed into the collective experiences of either group or as too different, in which case Black women's Blackness or femaleness sometimes has placed their needs and perspectives at the margins of the feminist and Black liberationist agendas.

Here we are looking at a situation of *either* universalism (a common humanity) *or* marginalisation (through essentialised racial and sexual differences). Universalist theories of sex are unable to specify sexual blackness, and universalist theories of race are unable to specify black femaleness. And on the other side of the spectrum, sexual blackness is subsumed under sex and black femaleness under race. The analytical differentiation notwithstanding, Crenshaw claims that the effect is the same: 'Black women [have been treated] in ways that deny both the unique compoundedness of their situation and the centrality of their experiences to the larger classes of women and Blacks' (ibid.). Leaving the reference to (black) feminist standpoint theory (Harding 1986; Collins 1991) aside,[1] how is this 'unique compoundedness' theorised? Similar to the Deleuzian questions Colebrook asks about Butlerian gender theory, it seems necessary to ask the fundamental question about the way in which this new approach to difference relates to the seeming duality between signification / representation (active) and materiality / reality (muted).

Intersectional theory sets out to break through 'single-axis' or 'either-or' approaches in court, but also in feminist and antiracist research

and political practices. Crenshaw (1989: 140) states that the latter 'are predicated on a discrete set of experiences that often does not accurately reflect the interaction of race and gender', thus working towards a politics of 'inclusive' or 'both-and' approaches. After all, feminist philosophy is based on the insight that substance dualism has been key to the naturalisation of women (Beauvoir 2010; Lloyd 1993), just like antiracist philosophy is based on the insight that European substance dualism naturalised, thus muted, the non-white (Zack 2002). Intersectional theory has thus far been a representationalism, wherein 'representationalism is the belief in the ontological distinction between representations and that which they purport to represent; in particular, that which is represented is held to be independent of all practices of representing,' as Karen Barad puts it (2003: 804). Barad shows how the axiometric approach of intersectional theory is indeed based on an implicit agreement about substance dualism that underlies both essentialism and constructivism and prevents ontological developments. The attempt to shift axiometry is not new, but we argue it can only be fully enfleshed within a Deleuzianism.

Anthony Appiah has already argued for a shifting of axiometry structuring black philosophy, albeit in a postscript that he himself called 'unscientific' at the time. After reviewing the work of W. E. B. Du Bois in 'The uncompleted argument: Du Bois and the illusion of race', Appiah (1986: 36) stated:

> In his early work, Du Bois took race for granted and sought to revalue one pole of the opposition of white to black. The received concept is a hierarchy, a vertical structure, and Du Bois wished to rotate the axis, to give race a 'horizontal' reading. Challenge the assumption that there can be an axis, however oriented in the space of values, and the project fails for loss of presuppositions.

Sexual Difference Equals 'A Thousand Tiny Sexes'

The canon of feminist theory being Anglo-American, there is another response to the type of theorisation that comes from intersectional theorists that can be found in the work of what is commonly termed 'French feminism'. Quite paradoxically, the linguistic turn towards constructivism has mostly been picked up by Anglo-American and sociologically oriented feminist theorists, which is where the intersectional 'paradigm' in feminist theory is further developed. The other side of what has been called the 'trans-Atlantic dis-connection' (Stanton 1980) is less prone to engaging intersectional theory, for conceptual reasons which we will now discuss.

Overlooking feminist epistemology from a French point of view, inter-sectionality overlaps with what Sandra Harding in the mid-1980s called 'feminist postmodernism' (1986): that is, with the move from construc-tivist difference to constructivist diversity. The French response shows that what motivates intersectionality has always already been part of the concept of 'sexual difference'. It is only the difference paradigm of the Anglo-American feminist theory of the second feminist wave, which needed to be broken through in order for an inclusive feminist politics to come to fruition, since sexual difference theory has never been a universalist essentialism, nor has it been linguistically overcoded. The specificities, or uniqueness for that matter, of the lives of black women and other women from ethnicities that are not subsumable under the label 'American', 'European' or 'French' have always been thinkable with Braidotti's 'sexual difference' framework, which has, in addition, always focused on, to borrow a term of Donna Haraway (1988: 595), the 'material-semiotic'. The French take on the intersectional concern would thus be that intersectional theorists capitalise on a new dualism (diversity is better than difference), whereas 'difference' would have been reconceptualised in order to sort the desired theoretical effect. Not doing that, difference remains caught within the net of the dichotomies of sameness versus difference and essentialism versus constructivism, leaving no space for ontological precision, which is precluded through the (mostly implicit) adherence to representationalism.

French feminist theories of sexual difference have a conceptual genealogy that is quite distinct from Anglo-American gender theory. In *Nomadic Subjects*, Braidotti (1994: 147ff) shows exemplarily how difference in Western thought has always been a dualism structured by negation. Following Deleuze's critique of Otherness as it was developed mainly in *The Logic of Sense*, in which he famously stated: 'The error of philosophical theories is to reduce the Other sometimes to a par-ticular object, and sometimes to another subject' (1990: 307), Braidotti concludes that there has only been difference (the Other) as opposed to sameness (the One), and consequently 'different' came to mean 'differ-ent from', and 'worth less than'. It is exactly this set of implications that French feminists of sexual difference have wanted to revolutionise by stating that power remains distorting (*pouvoir / potestas*), even when the Other gets to be revalued by the theoretical moves associated with iden-tity politics. Opening up to difference in itself, to power as *puissance / potentia*, takes away intersectionality's need to posit that 'gender is not a monolithic category that works for all women in the same way' (Wekker 2002: 17). When sexual difference entails the differences between men

and women, as well as the differences *amongst* women and men and the differences *within* each and every individual body (Braidotti 1994: 158–67), there is no need to prefer constructivism to essentialism, because sexual identity becomes nothing more than a *strategic* essentialism, as it is called after Gayatri Spivak (Danius and Jonsson 1993: 35). The Other might be actualised by real 'characters', as Deleuze puts it, but we should not forget that otherness itself is always an *a priori* Other that *pre-exists* these characters. The Other is, then, necessarily a 'structure of the possible' that can be realised in many different ways.

Elizabeth Grosz's essay, 'A thousand tiny sexes: feminism and rhizomatics', iniated the ontological discussion that we now ought to have. Following up on conceptualisations of difference and otherness in Deleuze and Guattari while also addressing the well-known feminist reservations about their work, the discussion of Grosz focuses precisely on the concept of difference as 'a difference capable of being understood outside the dominance or regime of the One . . . in which what is different can be understood only as a variation or negation of identity' (1993: 170). With Deleuze and Guattari, Grosz thus invites a conceptualisation of difference that is not framed by identity but that necessarily precedes it, and as such she wants 'a pluralised notion of identity, identity multiplied by n locations' to break through. Grosz questions, like Appiah, the specific *locatedness* that comes with both constructivist difference and constructivist diversity, which leads her to affirming a Spinozist, rather than Cartesian, take on the body, desire and representation. 'A thousand tiny sexes', then, entails precisely freeing difference from spatial (and temporal) fixity and, indeed, from the sameness that also comes with the differentiation of n forever-fixed, because linguistically overcoded, locations. Arun Saldanha (2006: 20–2) makes the same point when affirming 'a thousand tiny races', as he too is in search of what Deleuze (1990: 317) calls 'anotherness' or a 'wholly otherness'. Anotherness is not the expression of a *possible* world (which is how Deleuze conceptualises the Other). It does not intend to colonise the perceptual field, creating dichotomies and identifying bodies as opposites to each other. The concept of a thousand tiny races offers a fluid reontologisation of difference that indicates a supposedly true world, yet a world entirely unforeseen. A world that had always been hidden from us by these possible sexed and raced others.

From Geometrical Axiology to Topological Dynamics

Intersectional theory is sometimes seen to have been preceded by 'matrix theory'. In Susan Harding's terms, matrix theory wants to

enable . . . us to think how each of us has a determinate social location in the matrix of social relations that is constituted by gender, class, race, sexuality and whatever other macro forces shape our particular part of the social order (e.g., Collins 1991). Women are located at many positions in this matrix, and starting thought from each such group of lives can be useful for understanding social phenomena (including our relations with nature) that have effects on those lives. (1995: 344)

It should be noted that, according to Harding, one's location does not determine one's thought (1995: 345). However, matrix theory once again shows a dependency upon the Hegelian notion of Other. Like intersectionality theory, matrix theory is an ultimately Cartesian sociology which sets out a series of coordinate axes that striate the world (hide its smooth surface), into which subject 'positions' can be placed. Karen Barad, coming from physics (Bohrian quantum mechanics), has recently made some very interesting contributions to intersectional theory that clearly echo Deleuze's for a world without others, not organised through a Cartesian grid but rather attentive to the intra-action, as she calls it, that folds the inside from the outside, or rather, that understands that interiority is about the in-side of the limit, as Deleuze reads this in Gilbert Simondon (cf. Bergson 1913; van der Tuin 2011). Barad wants to rewrite intersectionality according to what she calls an 'agential realism', a concept close to Deleuze and Guattari's materialist notion of *agencements* (usually translated as 'assemblages'). In her words:

an agential realist notion of dynamics . . . is not marked by an exterior parameter called time, nor does it take place in a container called space, but rather iterative intra-actions are the dynamics through which temporality and spatiality are produced and reconfigured in the (re)making of material-discursive boundaries and their constitutive exclusions. Exclusions introduce indeterminacies and open up a space of agency; they are the conditions of possibility of new possibilities. (Barad 2001: 90)

Rethinking time as something that does not happen exterior to the event, and rethinking the inside precisely as the inside of an outside, Barad thoroughly rethinks the spatiotemporal, the 'world', that is, matrixial or axiological, parameters of intersectional thinking. Intersectionality, Barad claims, has been developed 'as a mutually perpendicular set of axes of identification within which marked bodies can be positioned'.

Regarding the theorisation of racial difference, the following observations can be made. First, gender, ethnicity *et cetera* come to the fore as separate characteristics of individual human beings that can and should

be added to one another. According to the reworked notion of agential realism's *topological* dynamics, the focus lies on *inseparability*, which excludes predeterminable intersections (Barad 2001: 98–9). Again, this crucial rethinking of spacetime in terms of the sexual (and the racial) was already set up in *The Logic of Sense*:

> Caught up in the system of language, there is thus a co-system of sexuality which mimics sense, nonsense, and their organisation: a simulacrum for a phantasm. Furthermore, throughout all of that which language will designate, manifest, or signify, there will be a sexual history that will never be designated, manifested, or signified in itself, but which will coexist with all the operations of language, recalling the sexual appurtenance of the formative linguistic elements. This status of sexuality accounts for repression. It does not suffice to say that the concept of repression in general is topical: it is topological. (Deleuze 1990: 243)

This intensive, topological notion of power as capacity is, in the end, precisely how Barad wants to rethink intersectionality. For whereas intersectionality works with a notion according to which, when a person is marked by a category, the category is already at work (and up for analysis), Barad's notions of repression but also of potentiality works with fluid structures that 'are constraining and enabling, not determining' (2001: 99). This is also a Groszean point, when she reworked the notion of (topological) sexual multiplicity of Deleuze and Guattari. Furthermore, as a corollary, intersectionality suggests that it can be known, in advance, that only 'your' gender and 'your' ethnicity are at work, whereas the topological dynamics proposed by Deleuze, Barad and Grosz does not centre on the constraints of linguistic over-codification or prior knowability. Reference should be made here to Manuel DeLanda, who, talking of topology and Deleuzian difference, noted that 'topology is *the least differentiated* geometry, the one with the least number of distinct equivalence classes, the one in which many discontinuous forms have blended into one continuous one' (2002: 24; emphasis in original). It is precisely this homeomorphism which allows intersectionality to create its categories, to mould subjectivity in such a way that race and sex can be definitively defined. Finally, Barad and Grosz show how a return to the ontological takes us out of the essentialism–constructivism opposition laid down by Butler: 'The space of possibilities does not represent a fixed event horizon within which the social location of knowers can be mapped [essentialism], nor a homogenous fixed uniform container of choices [constructivism]' (Barad 2001: 103).

Becoming, or: A Thousand Tiny Intersections

Replacing linguistics with ontology, the Other with another or the wholly-other (world), and difference-between-identities with difference-itself, we have moved from a Butlerian notion of intersectionality to what a Deleuzian take on this might be. Underneath a representationalist intersectional theory based on codification (an axiometric epistemology), we found another intersectionality of becomings (a topological ontology) that had been there all along but that had been continuosly overcoded. Affirming the possibility of the real (contrary to Lacan) was necessary to allow for a truly intersectional revolution in thought. Thinking through compounded experience cannot be done by prioritising linguisticality. A compounded experience is only to be reached when linguisticality, and the implied pre-existing Cartesian axes, is broken through via a theory of 'emergence' (Saldanha 2006: 17–18). With topology we have moved to the ontologically prior. We have shown how a pre-existing compoundedness in fact equals a thousand tiny intersections: what pre-exists is multiplicity and relatings, and what becomes or emerges is unforeseen.

The main driving force behind intersectionality has been an attempt to deal with racism and sexism, and with the ways in which an antiracism might be sexist, and an antisexism racist, as scholars like Crenshaw keep stressing. Perhaps our attempts to rethink intersectionality along Deleuzian lines have been to show how, in Spinoza's 'common notions', metamorphoses happen that shake up racist and sexist power as *pouvoir / potestas* and the Logic of One. Deleuze (1988: 115–16) noted, with respect to common notions, that they are to be understood as 'physico-chemical or biological ideas' that offer a materialist alternative to more representationalist (neo-Darwinist) efforts to define genus and species as geometric states, which have been harassing the biology of sex and race for such a long time now.

Or better even, let us search for the topological ontogenesis of intersectionality within what Deleuze called 'the theatre of movement' (that is, against the false drama of Hegel and Butler) and within the representations it keeps pushing forward.

> The theatre of repetition is opposed to the theatre of representation, just as movement is opposed to the concept and to representation which refers back to the concept. In the theatre of repetition we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organized bodies, with

masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before characters – the whole apparatus of repetition as a 'terrible power'. (Deleuze 1994: 10)

The theatre of repetition keeps pushing us back into those undefined states of sexes and races *to come*. Instead of offering us space, time and the traceable (sexual, racialised) subject within it, repetition introduces us to the power of the unforeseen topological intra-action of bodily production. It will not allow *any* signification, *any* identity to happen from the myriad of kaleidoscopic movements, and thus it allows for the real adventures of the spirit to take place, to rediscover the body in all that it can do.

Note

1. Note however that Mieke Verloo (2009) has recently argued that Crenshaw's epistemic privileging of the underprivileged is still prominent in intersectional theory. Verloo tries to undo this 'feminist standpoint theory' or 'identity politics' by thinking through intersecting axes according to an interference pattern. Following Barad, we will use this physical phenomenon too in this chapter. We will not discuss Verloo in depth, however, because, contrary to Verloo, interference is not a metaphor in our work.

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Chapter 7

Between Facialisation and the War Machine: Assembling the Soldier-Body

Brianne Gallagher

> The face is not universal. It is not even that of the white man; it is White Man himself, with his broad white cheeks and the black hole of his eyes.
>
> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*

> War is beautiful because it initiates the dreamt-of metallization of the human body.
>
> Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, cited in Walter Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction'[1]

Introduction

In *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari write that 'the face is a politics' that organises not only relationships between apperceptions of self and other but also social formations of power and knowledge that emerge at a particular time and place (1987: 187). '*Certain* social formations need face, and also landscape' (1987: 181, original emphasis) in order to establish particular regimes of intelligibility and established truths within the social order of things. In these terms, the face is not simply a mirror image of the self and the other within a more Lacanian sensibility of language and subjectivity. Nor is the face an external surface that sheaths a hidden psychic interior or unique personality masked by regimes of signification. Rather, the production of the face emerges for Deleuze and Guattari within the *abstract machine of faciality* (*visagéité*) that facialises not only the head but also other parts of the body within the *white wall / black hole* system and through the production of the White-Man face (1987: 167–8).

This chapter draws attention to the US *soldier-body* as a productive

site of knowledge and power in contemporary state apparatuses, war machines and faciality machines. It demonstrates the ways in which the US soldier-body circulates as an important site of power for the production of a 'face of war' not only of the White Man, but of bodies and faces that do not conform to the White-Man face – those faces that are rejected by the abstract faciality machine. In the analysis that follows, I provide a brief genealogical gloss on the facialisation machine and production of the face of White-Man and warrior body. By doing so, this chapter illuminates the ways in which the soldier-body circulates as an assemblage of desires, affect and microfacisms within contemporary militarised technoscience. Moreover, by taking heed of Paul Virilio's concepts of 'super-racism' (2002) and 'vision machines' (1994), this chapter illustrates the ways in which the US soldier-body is continuously produced as a Super-Human / Iron Man / White Man within contemporary cinema, video games, prosthetic technologies and Hollywood media assemblages.

Iron Man / White Man / Super-Human Soldier-Body

CONCEPT ONE: *Facialisation Machines*

> The face, what a horror.
> > Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*

While Deleuze and Guattari do not provide a detailed genealogy of the historical production of the face of White Man, it is necessary to do so in order to appreciate how modern masculinities and warrior bodies emerge alongside ideals of whiteness, civilisation and sexual difference. Significantly, the *visual matrix* of the production of modern masculinity turns our attention to the ways in which the production of the face of White Man has always been a visually oriented colonialist and imperial project. As George Mosse (1998) illustrates, for instance, the construction of modern masculinity and standards of manliness that emerged during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment in Western Europe depended simultaneously on the construction of counter-standards to manly ideals, which were upheld, most minimally, by normative understandings of sexual difference.

Richard Dyer (1997) makes clear in his important work on regimes of whiteness and imperial formations of power that these ideas and visual matrices of power were explicitly invested within the norm-making processes of whiteness. Particularly, white femininity and the figure of the body in European culture and Christian art functioned as a way in

which whiteness was exalted as an ideal within imperialist projects and *molar identifications* of the subject within binary logics of male / female, private / public and so forth. I use the term *molar* here in Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of molar segments of identity as particular formations of macropolitical power in juxtaposition to more micropolitical or 'molecular' assemblages of power and lines of flight.

In their discussion on the macropolitical or molar lifeworld of what constitutes 'a life' in Henry James's first novella, 'In the Cage', Deleuze and Guattari illuminate how molar identifications are forcibly, affectively felt amongst bodies in the social order of everyday life. In James's novella,

> Not only are the great molar aggregates segmented (States, institutions, classes), but so are people as elements of an aggregate, as are feelings as relations between people; they are segmented, not in such a way as to disturb or disperse, but on the contrary to ensure and control the identity of each agency, including personal identity. (1987: 195)

Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis on the social assembling of persons in everyday life through molar aggregates helps reframe the historical production of the soldier-body and women's bodies within Western male fantasies. For example, while women's bodies figured as national symbols during the revolutionary wars of the late eighteenth century, these feminine figures, Mosse writes, 'did not embody generally valid norms such as the virtues that masculinity projected but, instead, the mother qualities of the nation, and pointed to its traditions and history' (1998: 8). These traditions include the dominant divisions between the public sphere as a male space and the private sphere as a domestic female space.

However, normative images of the male body circulated in the public sphere and popular culture around aesthetic ideals of chivalry, male honour, morality, physical toughness, dress, status, a middle-class sensibility and beauty (ibid.: 23). Importantly, these ideals were not limited to the former aristocratic classes and feudal caste systems of the sixteenth century (when the duel became ritualised). The new bourgeois society that emerged during the eighteenth century reconfigured the former privileged status of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century warrior castes, wherein ideals of manhood remained privileged ideals limited to the aristocracy (ibid.: 17). The concepts of honour and manliness through the aristocratic duels, for instance, and their privileged spaces of ritual and performance, became an 'ideal of manliness' and visual matrix that the emerging middle class attempted to redefine

through ideals of republican virtue and justice. For instance, in contrast to the privileged space of the duel in the German officer corps in the late eighteenth century, in France, 'everyone could duel, and the duel was less a sign of caste than an instrument of civic manhood' (ibid.: 20).

The spectacle-image of the male warrior body and attending ideals of chivalry and male honour circulated within Enlightenment ideals that linked the body of man to nature and hence to ideals of civilisation and whiteness. Indeed, as Gail Bederman (1996) illustrates, white middle-class men attempted to reaffirm male power by recruiting civilisation discourses in order to affirm their racial dominance over competing images of masculinity, such as African American masculinities. For example, African American heavyweight champion Jack Johnson challenged ideals of the 'civilised' male body – signified as an optically white body within racialised codes and norms – through a multiplicity of bodily acts, such as dressing elegantly. 'Johnson consciously played upon American fears of threatened manhood by laying public claim to all three of the metonymic facets of manhood – body, identity, and authority' (Bederman 1996: 8). Hence, ideologies surrounding manhood, masculinity and civilisation are never totalising ideologies, but rather contradictory and always capable of being remade and reimagined. 'Although whites insisted tenaciously that civilisation was built on white racial dominance,' Bederman continues, 'African Americans were equally tenacious in insisting that civilization was not necessarily white' (1996: 38). Images of what it meant to be civilised and masculine during turn-of-the-twentieth-century America therefore involved a complexity of competing actors – from Jack Johnson to Ida B. Wells to Teddy Roosevelt – who all recruited ideologies of civilised behaviour in order to re-embody and reimagine what Western civilisation constituted.

As these examples also suggest, the making, remaking and militarisation of modern masculinity and whiteness (both in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and in early twentieth-century America) materialised through an array of media and pop cultural spectacles. The production of a White-Man face through the facialisation of bodies as muscular and warrior-like conditioned the possibilities for militarised masculinities to emerge, along with a new science of the face, as evidenced by the classification of all bodies as inferior when they deviate from the norm of White Man. Enlightenment ideals of masculinity thus materialised within a new visual economy of images, informed by scientific narratives of, for instance, physiology and modern medicine. Physiognomy, the science of judging one's character based on

its corporeal expressions, was especially important for the construction of modern masculinity, as Mosse argues, 'because in an obvious manner it reflected the linkage of body and soul', and 'introduced a new way of seeing men and women: not according to the clothes they wore but through their physical profile – the shape of the nose, the color of the eyes, and bodily structure' (1998: 25–6).

I want to suggest that Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the facialisation machine enables us to understand better how the racial profiling of faces also operates by facialising the entire body and its surrounding landscape. Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate how the faciality machine operates by creating binary categorical orderings (self–other, master–servant, male–female, teacher–student) within racialised regimes of signification and through processes of differentiation. The white wall functions in this sense not as a face but as a wall or screen of what constitutes the significance of faciality traits within a certain regime of signs. Meanwhile, the black hole, as a mode of subjectification, 'acts as a central computer, Christ, the third eye that moves across the wall or the white screen as general surface of reference' (1987: 177).

> Regardless of the content one gives it [Deleuze and Guattari write], the machine constitutes a facial unit, an elementary face in biunivocal relation with another: it is a man *or* a woman, a rich person or a poor one, an adult or a child, a leader or a subject, 'an x *or* a y'.

While the black hole / white wall system multiplies facialities through these biunivocal relationships of power, it also operates by rejecting faces that fail to conform to these 'computations of normalities' (1987: 178).[2]

Deleuze and Guattari focus specifically on the historical production of Christian imagery in order to map the ways in which particular faces are rejected from the normalising functions of the abstract faciality machine. White Man is the face of Christ, or of 'Jesus Christ superstar: he invented the facialization of the entire body and spread it everywhere' within the scenes of colonialism and imperialism (1987: 176). As Dyer illustrates, Christian imagery and religious sensibilities about 'the flesh' historically inform the peculiarly 'European feeling for self and the world'.

> If Christianity as observance and belief has been in decline in Europe over the past half-century [Dyer writes], its ways of thinking and feeling are nonetheless still constitutive of both European culture and consciousness and the colonies and ex-colonies (notably the U.S.A.) that it has spawned. (1997: 15)

Thus, the production of the face functions as a surface politics of the body, landscape and objects within particular milieus. In the following quotation, Deleuze and Guattari describe the face as a map and facialisation as *the process of overcoding the body with the production of a face:*

> The face is a surface: facial traits, lines, wrinkles; long face, square face, triangular face; the face is a map, and when it is applied to and wraps a volume, even when it surrounds and borders cavities that are now no more than holes. The head, even the human head, is not necessarily a face. The face is produced only when the head ceases to be part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code – when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be *overcoded* by something we shall call the face. (1987: 170, original emphasis)

Importantly, face is not to be understood as an ideological or universal category within dominant regimes of representation. Instead, the abstract machine of faciality demands the overcoding of *bodies* and the identification of faces that deviate from the normalised and racialised binaries of social identities.

> If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergences, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the wall, distributed by the hole. They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized. (1987: 178)

Images of modern masculinity and of the White-Man face are deeply embedded within Enlightenment theories of reason, as well as scientific racism, both of which visually and discursively link the health of the body to that of the nation. John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau both emphasised a fit and able body that would, during the French Revolution, come to reflect the entire nation and a modern society. Both thought that a physically fit body was essential for a proper moral posture. Locke and Rousseau popularised this linkage through their theories of education and human nature: '*outward appearance became a symbol of inner worth, a sign for all to see and to judge*' (Mosse 1998: 27, my emphasis). Significantly, these outward appearances of modern masculinity emerged specifically through ancient Greek ideals of beauty (and Greek sculptures of the male body) that configured 'manly beauty' as a 'sign of moral worth' (ibid.: 41). Greek ideals of masculinity were based on Greek sports and gymnastics, with sculpture representing young, powerful athletes whose 'bodies and [their] comportment exemplified power

and virility, and also harmony, proportion, and self-control' (ibid.: 29). This visual economy surrounding male beauty and health necessitated the simultaneous construction of bodies that were excluded from this norm. As symbols of moral and physical disorder, these 'other' bodies were those that were considered 'unsettled' bodies, bodies 'without roots', which in early modernity included 'Gypsies, vagrants, and Jews, who, being without territory of their own, were placed into this category [countertypes] by their enemies' (ibid.: 56–7).

Within these discursive formations, bodies became inscribed within discourses of filth and involved a heteronormative feminisation of female bodies through discourses that equated femininity with passivity (hence, non-production). Speed and movement became markers of racial superiority, while slowness without aim, such as the figures of the 'wandering Jew' and 'dandies' or 'effeminate' men, became abnormalised as markers of racial difference. Within this discursive nexus, 'Jews and women were equated as creatures of passion and emotions, lacking true creativity; both were without any individuality, devoid of self-worth' (Mosse 1998: 69). Yet, while Mosse emphasises the discursive apparatuses surrounding the visual production of whiteness and masculinity, Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis on racism as a material and inclusionary process of determining which bodies fail to conform to the face of White Man offers a more fruitful point of entry for contextualising the normative production of whiteness and masculinity. Following Deleuze and Guattari, facialisation under conditions of nation formation, colonisation and war demands that all bodies that deviate from White Man are to be rejected as lazy, dirty or nomadic in juxtaposition to a superhuman race of the masculine warrior body. In their words:

> Racism operates by the determination of degrees of whiteness from the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (It's a Jew, it's an Arab, it's a Negro, it's a lunatic . . .). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are only people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be. (1987: 177)

These assemblages of modern white masculinity recall Klaus Theweleit's study of male fantasies and fascism of the paramilitary volunteers of the *Freikorps* in 1920s and 1930s Germany. Theweleit illustrates that German anti-Semitism emerged, in part, by inscribing Jewish bodies with 'natural' attributes such as 'effeminacy, unhealthiness,

criminality, Jewishness' (1989: 13). He provides a compelling analysis of the ways in which speed, technology, desire and masculinity operate within machine-like fascist assemblages and desiring machines. His discussion on the metallisation of the *Freikorps* body and desire of death through military machinery is an important illustration of the (fascist) militarisation of masculinities and bodies:

> In war, soldier's pleasure appears massively intensified by the war's machinery (guns and machine-guns) to which he is coupled, and by noise, the sounds of the grenade strikes in which nature seems to 'come alive' . . . Explosion is likened to a birth, the long-awaited birth of a fleshless body, a body that becomes the relished site of catastrophe . . . The man longs for the moment when his body armor will explode, strengthening his rigid body-ego; but a body such as his cannot atomize, as does the mass, by allowing itself to be penetrated, fragmented, and thus destroyed. His body atomizes only if he himself erupts outward. He desires to move beyond himself, bullet-like, toward an object that he penetrates. But he also desires to survive. (1989: 178–9)

Theweleit's emphasis here on soldier's pleasures within fascist desiring machines is important in so far that it directs our attention to how the militarisation of masculinities is informed by structures of desire, an insight first developed through Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis on the microfascisms of everyday life in *Anti-Oedipus* (1983).

Indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari, microfascisms at the molecular level are just as dangerous as molar fascisms, especially since one may not so readily see the fascist desiring machines in oneself. They write:

> Desire is never an undifferentiated instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered setup rich in interactions: a whole supple segmentarity that processes molecular energies and potentially gives desire a fascist determination . . . It's too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective. (1987: 215)

In these terms, the *Freikorps* soldier's desire to both surpass and survive the assemblages of war and violence operates at a molecular level. Through his desire to become a fleshless body, and to become one with his armour and the landscape of objects, bodies and technologies that he inhabits, the soldier comes ultimately to desire his own death and self-destruction.

Moreover, the metallisation of the body in Theweleit's description of the German *Freikorps* provides a guide to popular soldier-body images

circulating within contemporary media assemblages. Indeed, dominant images of the technologically equipped US soldier fighting the so-called war against terror with advanced weaponry systems are historically informed by fascism's linking of the soldier-body to machines (as both an explosion and birth of the subject). In this vein of thought, Christina Jarvis provides a study of the differences and similarities between Nazi ideals of beauty and American representations of muscular soldier-bodies during World War II. In *The Male Body at War* (2004), Jarvis compares, amongst other cultural objects, representations of muscular bodies in Uncle Sam posters during the World Wars with Nazi body ideals to elucidate how images of male strength and fitness sutured, in similar albeit different ways, mass images of nationhood. Both fascist and US war bodies are materially produced through the imagination of a male body made of steel: 'The hardness of the shells and guns lend strength and impenetrability to the men's bodies, adding a phallic dimension to the men's physiques' (Jarvis 2004: 47). However, unlike American representations of steel-bodied soldiers, Nazi ideals of the aesthetic male body emerge from the reterritorialisation of the classic Greek nude sculpture, which featured hairless men lacking expression. 'Just as the fascist body was stripped of individual identity,' Jarvis writes, 'so too was it dispossessed of sensuality despite its nude state' (ibid.). In contrast, representations of American soldier-bodies featured images of soldiers with individual facial features, virile chest hair and a broader range of muscles.

Interestingly, these images of virile, hairy and muscular soldiers displayed within the US World War body politic were partially informed, according to Jarvis, by contemporary comic book norms, which were 'predicated not on the natural perfection of the human body but on the realm of the superhuman'. As superheroes, American soldiers could 'with the aid of a magic word or swirling costume change, transform themselves and their bodies into superhumans with abilities and bodily characteristics that exceeded the realm of mortal powers' (2004: 52). Drawing on Julia Kristeva's notion of the abject body and Elizabeth Grosz's suggestion that 'abjection of bodily fluids and waste has distinct meanings for sexed bodies', Jarvis provides a compelling analysis of how US soldiers' wounded bodies circulated as abject bodies upon returning from war in juxtaposition to the ideals of the superhuman (2004: 89). Reports of soldiers vomiting, urinating or enacting other signs of bodily reactions to the violence of war were rendered as signs of 'leaky' American male bodies.

> Despite [these] cultural prohibitions against representing men's bodily fluids, World War II forced its participants to deal with a tremendous amount of the abject. Through its corpses, filth, and injured bodies, combat undermined the notion of the impenetrable male body in multiple ways. (ibid.)

Jarvis's emphasis on the abject wounded soldier-body provides a helpful framework for approaching state appropriations of the war machine since the events of 9/11. The historical images of a Man of Steel that find their genealogical roots within the desiring fascist machines of the World Wars are visibly present in today's militarised video games, films and media culture in general. It is no coincidence Marvel Entertainment (owner of icons such as Spiderman, the X-Men, Thor, Iron Man and the Fantastic Four) was recently sold for four billion dollars to the Walt Disney Company. Disney plans to utilise its rights over the characters by marketing them more extensively to global audiences. This includes plugging these characters into the existing popular imaginaries of the US soldier-body. In *Iron Man I*, for example, Tony Stark (Robert Downey, Jr) begins in Las Vegas and ends in a cave in Afghanistan, hunted down by evil terrorists. His phallic steel body and other high-tech military technology enable him, however, to survive the net-war assemblages as an iron man, as White Man himself.

Today's entertainment and graphic novel characters (as supermen) have a genealogy rooted in American soldier masculinities (rather than the aesthetic ideal of the Greek male body), in so far as comics provided the popular image of the masculine wartime body politic during the First and Second World Wars. However, the (mostly white) muscular bodies of comic characters are increasingly more like the Man-of-Steel bodies Theweleit describes. Spiderman best illustrates this Man-of-Steel body, increasingly imagined as a militarised US soldier-body in contemporary war machines. Describing this 'new man' of steel, Theweleit writes:

> The new man is a man whose physique has been machined, his psyche eliminated – or in part displaced into his body armor, his 'predatory' suppleness. We are presented with a robot that can tell the time, find the North, stand his ground over a red-hot machine-gun, or cut wire without a sound. In the moment of action, he is as devoid of fear as of any other emotion. His knowledge of being able to do what he does is his only consciousness of self. (1989: 162)

The Department of Defense has produced its own video games like *America's Army* (see www.americasarmy.com), delivering the 'authentic' US war experience via the US military's extensive imperial network

across a global spectrum of potential markets. In the opening narrative clip to *America's Army*'s graphic novel (also available online), the fabulation of a 'region of the Democratic Republic of the Ostregals' illustrates perfectly the ways in which the virtual production of place in video games and comics affirms absolute American exceptionalism – there has never been an army more powerful – 'answering the call' to fight the ongoing threat of nationalist uprisings and human rights abuses abroad. Moreover, because the game can be played online, individuals from different geopolitical and national landscapes can imagine themselves as courageous, trigger-happy, white US soldiers fighting terrorist forces from the intimate privacy of their bedrooms.

Video war games, in these terms, function both as weapons of racist propaganda and as explicit recruitment strategies, producing images of a necessary and clean war. As Jean Baudrillard famously argued, the first Gulf War did not take place in so far as it was not a 'war' in any traditional sense of the term, but rather a war of images and censored images, of excessive information and simulations.

> Unlike earlier wars, in which there were political aims either of conquest or domination [Baudrillard writes], what is at stake in this one is war itself: its status, its meaning, its future. It is beholden not to have an objective but to prove its very existence. (1995: 32)

The illusory media effects of a clean war with no casualties during the first Gulf War function as a 'pure sign of madness' in our postmodern times (ibid.: 43). For Baudrillard, the cybernetic and media-technological aspects of war are materially inscribed as actual events of war: 'We are no longer in a logic of the passage from virtual to actual but in a hyperrealist logic of the deterrence of the real by the virtual' (ibid.: 27).

This madness hugely expanded in the second Gulf War. Since the illegal US-led invasion of Iraq, it was estimated by the British medical journal *The Lancet* in July 2006 that over 655,000 Iraqi men, women and children died, with some 600,000 of these deaths directly related to military violence (*The Lancet* 2006). This inordinate production of deaths is a clearly racialised outcome of imperial politics. During the first Gulf War, Gilles Deleuze referred to the Pentagon as a 'branch of state terrorism' and as a mode of appropriating United Nations and humanitarian 'screenings' of the violence. His comments on the first Gulf War are worth revisiting in light of the mediatisation of the current 'war against terror':

> This war is despicable. Did the Americans really believe that they could carry out a quick and precise war with no innocent victims? Or did they use the UN as a screen to give themselves time to prepare and motivate public

opinion for a war of extermination? Under the pretext of liberating Kuwait, then toppling Saddam Hussein (his regime and his army), the Americans are destroying a nation.

Deleuze continues:

> Under the pretext of destroying strategic targets, they are killing civilians with mass bombardments; communications, bridges and roads are being destroyed far from the front; historical sites are menaced with destruction. The Pentagon is in command today. It is a branch of state terrorism testing its weapons. Concussion and firebombs ignite the air and burn people deep in their shelters: they are chemical weapons ready for action. (2006: 375)

The technological and virtual dimensions of contemporary war machines, and grand narratives of what Paul Virilio (2008) calls Pure War, are important for contextualising the racist dimensions of geopolitics and the affects resulting from militarising the West's audiovisual habits. As Virilio might put it, contemporary video games such as *America's Army* circulate within 'vision machines' – such as weather 'forecasting', simulation, cameras and surveillance systems, Motivac TV monitors, night goggles, computer programmes, satellite communications – designed to see and foresee in our place. This new 'industrialisation of vision' forces us to ask questions such as: What is the real-ness of an image when our vision is itself artefactually produced? One can no longer separate 'the real' from the processes of simulation, calculation and surveillance.

Similar to the ways in which many Europeans understood the machine gun as a symbol of technological superiority over natives during the African colonial wars and the massacre of indigenous peoples, the cyborg soldier-body now derives from a racialised system of control (Ellis 1986). Within this system of techno-racist violence, some bodies are rendered intelligible as technologically equipped and racially superior, while others are rendered inferior, hence requiring 'intervention' and cultural reprogramming or, if that does not work, brute machinic force. This 'super-racism', as Virilio (2002) calls it, now threatens not only those coded as inferior, but potentially all who remain *merely human* in the face of the now-superhuman soldier.

> The biggest racist knows that there exists a unity of the species [writes Virilio]. Even the degraded are degraded within the unity of the species. He says 'inferior', but it is a man or a woman. Through all its excesses, its massacres, its horrors, racism remains within the unity of the human species. (ibid.: 107)

Hi-tech super-racism is the species turning against itself.

To conclude, molar identifications have historically necessitated the homogenisation of difference within regimes of imperial whiteness. 'The U.S.A. is of course a highly multiracial society,' Dyer writes, 'but the idea of being an "American" has long sat uneasily with ideas of being any other colour than white' (1997: 149). Hence soldiers of colour and immigrant soldiers who attain expedited citizenship through military service experience the traumatic effects of war differently from white male soldiers (Parpart and Zalewski 2008). Moreover, as Cynthia Enloe (2007) argues, paying attention to women soldiers' experiences in the so-called war against terror demands directing attention to the multiplicity of differences amongst women in the US military as well. Since 2006, women constitute between 16 and 17 per cent of all active-duty army recruits. However, while women constitute a growing minority of the all-volunteer US Army, African American women are overrepresented. Of course, this diversity amongst US soldiers is rendered invisible within dominant representations of the white, male, steel soldier-body. Moreover, as the next section suggests, the emergence of bodies that fail to conform to the face of White Man in contemporary war machines are also racialised in terms of speed and ability.

Machine Assemblages and the US Soldier-Body

CONCEPT TWO: *War Machines*

> A racism beyond the human race is something unthinkable, but it will make it necessary to think the unthinkable, that is, to make the jump beyond ethics.
>
> Paul Virilio, *Crepuscular Dawn*

The war machine, for Deleuze and Guattari, operates on a different set of principles from the state apparatus. In terms of the latter, Deleuze underlines the ways in which an apparatus is best understood as what Michel Foucault called a *dispositif*. An apparatus or a *dispositif* is firstly a 'skein, a multilinear model' that is composed of different lines of becoming that are always subject to change and variation depending on the particular assemblage of power that one is mapping (2006: 348). Apparatuses are assemblages that are 'composed of lines visibility, utterance, lines of force, lines of subjectivisation, lines of cracking, breaking and ruptures that all intervene and mix together and where some augment the others or elicit others through variations and even mutations of the assemblage' (ibid.: 342). Importantly, apparatuses are not universal and there are multiple apparatuses that overlap, each with

a creative capacity for processes of becoming. 'Each apparatus is therefore a multiplicity where certain processes of becoming are operative and are distinct from those operating in another apparatus.'

Deleuze and Guattari describe the state apparatus as one that is composed of varying lines of segmentarity, abstract machines of coding, visibility and milieus of interiority. Distinctly different from the war machine, state apparatuses of capture and control operate through 'binary machines' such as the facialisation machine, 'which run through us and the abstract machine which overcode us: a whole "police"' (1987: 106). The facialisation of the soldier-body operates in these terms as a line of force and becoming within the state apparatus. Indeed, the processes of overcoding the soldier's body as a superhuman face of White Man within assemblages of technology, speed and desire constitute the ways in which soldier-bodies are policed as a site of capture by the state apparatus. War machines, on the other hand, operate with a different set of principles that find their origin in nomads attempting to evade state formations. War machines condition the possibilities for multiple becomings, such as 'woman-becomings, animal-becomings, the becomings-imperceptible of the warrior'.

> One might say that the State apparatus and the war-machine do not belong to the same lines, are not constructed on the same lines: while the State apparatus belongs to the lines of rigid segmentarity, and even conditions them in so far as it realizes their overcoding, the war-machine follows lines of flight and of the steepest gradient, coming from the heart of the steppe or the desert and sinking into the Empire. (ibid.)

Hence, the state apparatus and the war machine – rather than being separate entities – coexist '*in a perpetual field of interaction*' (1987: 357–61). While there is a multiplicity of war machines, each one is an assemblage that can also be appropriated by the state apparatus. As Robert Deuchars puts it,

> War machines are assemblages and all assemblages as well as possessing material properties possess enunciative ones. It is not only nomads that can form a war machine, but eventually the state itself can become something altogether different; a war-machine formed by social formations that proceed to 'take over' the state apparatus itself; Nazi Germany for example. (2011: n.p.)

For example, machinic prosthetics can be appropriated by the state apparatus through the creation of the institutional assemblages of the military–industrial complex. In these terms, the state apparatus is in continual competition with the war machine as it attempts to manage

and appropriate how bodies, such as 'able' and 'disabled' soldier-bodies, will be mobilised and assembled for the continuation of empire. As a site of capture within the state apparatus, the soldier's injured body is, in particular, continuously overcoded by the abstract machines of the state.[3]

Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis on the dynamic and interactive nature of the state apparatus is crucial for conceptualising how the soldier is a body always in the processes of becoming. In order to provide a brief gloss on how the US soldier-body becomes a site of capture within the interaction between state apparatus, war machine and faciality machine, I turn to DARPA's robotic arm and the creation of new prosthetic technologies for soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan with missing arms and limbs. The robotic arm developed at DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) is one amongst many projects geared towards transmorphing the soldier-amputee-body from one unable to perform everyday functions to a body able to walk and handle objects like guns with increasingly less difficulty. The DEKA arm is a 'neurally controlled prosthetic arm' that is able to detect the body's neural pathways and conduct them to move the prosthetic arm.[4] The development of bionic organs for wounded veterans is part of the Revolutionizing Prosthetics Program funded by DARPA, which collaborates with the private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), government agencies and over thirty US universities and research departments. Unsurprisingly, DARPA's mission, as stated on their website, is to 'maintain the technological superiority of the U.S. military and prevent technological surprise from threatening our national security'.

DARPA's research agenda is fundamentally racialised, especially since it functions as the prosthetic machine of the US imperial war machine, but also in so far as it models an ideal soldier type, described earlier as the Man-of-Steel body. As Manuel DeLanda (1991) illustrates, military commanders have, for a while, dreamt of a battlefield without soldiers, where robots and drones take the place of the human soldier-body. DARPA was created in 1958 in response to the USSR's success with Sputnik and mounting paranoia surrounding Japan's massive global software enterprise that challenged US dominance within Cold War security and technology balances. Within these political economies of control, fear, computers and outer space, DARPA was envisioned by the Pentagon as an assemblage that would produce 'the new machines [that] will be endowed with lethal capabilities and terminal homing instincts,

thus becoming the first machines capable of viewing humans as their prey' (DeLanda 1991: 169–70).

Moreover, these techno-dynamic dimensions of the war machine operate, as James Der Derian (2001) puts it, as 'virtuous war' assemblages constituting the convergence between the military, simulation technologies and the media industry, which he terms the military–industrial–media–entertainment network, MIME NET. I prefer the term assemblage here in order to refer to what Deleuze and Guattari call the 'passional . . . compositions of desire' that organise relationships within fundamentally hybrid (human and non-human) technologies of power (1987: 399). As a machinic assemblage of microfascist desires, MIME NET operates through the hyperreality of the symbolic realm, blurring the distinctions between the real and the fictional while reassembling embodied knowledge itself according to the needs of military networks of imperial power. Collapsing the spatial-temporal distances between the soldier and enemy through new technologies – such as the Land Warrior Uniform, which systematises the soldier's prosthetic vision within a 'system of systems' connected to satellite and digital surveillance technologies – so-called virtuous war is embedded within a desire to 'actualize violence from a distance – *with no or minimal casualties*' (Der Derian 2001: xv, original emphasis). As illustrated in the first Gulf War, the Kosovo War and current drone attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, virtuous war 'promotes a vision of bloodless, humanitarian, hygienic wars' (ibid.), whereas in fact the deaths of Iraqi, Afghan, Somali, Libyan and other civilians far outnumber the deaths and injuries of US soldiers.

In the endless US-led 'war against terror', the *injured* soldier-body becomes problematic for the Pentagon when it attempts to maintain the image of a clean and virtuous war. Similar to the policing of images of soldier- and civilian-bodies in the first Gulf War and much of the Vietnam War, Defense attempts to control tightly the circulation of images of wounded and dead soldiers. The facialisation of the soldier's body and injured soldier-body as a superhuman face of White Man, and the state appropriation of the prosthetics war machine, thus illustrates the ways in which the US military attempts to create a soldier-body that is more likely to evade all forms of pain, injury and trauma. As is well known, many soldiers might never experience direct combat and will instead identify, target and kill so-called enemies (including civilians) in Iraq and Afghanistan by controlling drones on the 'home-front', such as in Florida or Arizona. But soldiers returning from the 'wars' in Iraq and Afghanistan with combat-related trauma, violent

tendencies, drug addictions, traumatic brain injuries, missing arms and legs, and resistance to the US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan are real problems. These problematic soldier-bodies must be refacialised and reterritorialised as soon as possible through advanced technology so as to be able and loyal again to America's seamlessly endless imperialist war.

It is crucial that we situate these insights on the prosthetic industry, the US soldier-body and the violence of the state within Deleuze's understanding of 'control societies'. In which ways does the injured US soldier-body reaffirm the intrinsic racialised nature of such society? In his seminal essay, 'Postscript on the societies of control' (1992), Deleuze demonstrates the ways in which societies are increasingly replacing the disciplinary societies that Foucault analysed. In societies of control, the individual no longer passes from one disciplinary institution or space of enclosure to the next, such as from the school to the factory. Instead, specialised knowledges and 'perpetual training' *motivate* the individual to partake actively in her own subordination to structures of domination. While institutional structures become fragile in increasingly global circuits of power, the 'man of control' and rivalry in societies of control becomes an important element in keeping these institutions alive. For instance, no longer does the army slogan go 'Join the army!' but rather 'Be all that you can be!' and, more recently, 'Be one!' Within this apparatus of diffuse control – when one is 'never finished with anything' – the militarist racialisation and heterosexualisation of individuals are no longer confined to 'war time' or even a military career.

Chris Hables Gray (2002) argues that contemporary practices of militarisation, as compared to modern forms of warfare and military paradigms, operate within new codes of geopolitical spacetime. Besides a smaller, more technologically efficient army, US military practices increasingly demand a specialised and highly flexible soldier able to operate in globally circuited information networks and urban warfare spaces. For example, soldiers' bodies have emerged as highly informationalised technologies for mapping and policing urban battlespaces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and so on. Elaborating on the transformation of soldiering, Gray writes that 'it is the weapons themselves that are constructing the U.S. soldier of today and tomorrow,' as soldiers both 'able-bodied' and 'disabled' are restructured into a new kind of militarised globalisation. Soldier-bodies thus function as a central site for new machine assemblages of war, morality and violence. The following quotation from Gray is particularly insightful and timely:

Today . . . it is not just that the soldier is influenced by the weapons used; now he or she is (re)constructed and (re)programmed to fit integrally into weapon *systems*. The basic currency of war, the human body, is the site of these modifications – whether it is of the 'wetware' (the mind and hormones), the 'software' (habits, skills, disciplines) or the 'hardware' (the physical body). To overcome the limitations of yesterday's soldier, as well as the limitations of automation as such, the military is moving towards a much more subtle man / machine integration: a cybernetic organism ('cyborg') model of the soldier, that combines machine-like endurance with a redefined human intellect subordinated to the overall weapons system. (1989: 196–7)

The reconfiguration of soldier-bodies as tools for hi-tech warfare is best illustrated by the Land Warrior suit, a two-billion-dollar project developing future uniforms for soldiers acting as nodes in a 'battle network'. Not surprisingly, then, General Dynamics, which manufactures the uniforms, describes (2005) the Land Warrior as 'a high tech "system of systems" designed to provide every soldier with enhanced capabilities'. Hence, the soldier's body becomes integrated into highly specialised comportments: a lethal, survivable and partially cybernetic body integrated into multiple communication and visual systems. Each suit weighing 12 pounds and costing $30,000, General Systems prides itself on Land Warrior's integrated 'site' systems. The monocle – mounted to the soldier's helmet and placed at the right eye of the soldier – is powered by a satellite mapping system and enables the soldier to locate his 'buddies' and identify, target and kill enemy combatants hidden around corners. Connected to a weapon site, the monocle features a long-range zoom, night vision and laser targeting.

As prosthesis of the soldier's eyes and ears, Land Warrior reorganises space and time while also enhancing and modifying surrounding sounds. The soldier becomes a synchronised, discontinuous site for controlling sensations and actions – an apex of the possibilities of Deleuze's societies of control. Thus, rather than disciplining the soldier through discipline and punishment, as Foucault so brilliantly illuminated, the superhuman soldier becomes a participant in the continuous reorganisation of space and time. 'The disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy,' Deleuze writes, 'but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network. Everywhere surfing has already replaced the older sports' (1992). As a *dividual* in machinic assemblages, a soldier thus depends upon being manipulated by shifting networks of visual and computer technologies, *being* surfed by imperial interests instead of surfing himself.[5]

The integration of the soldier's body into multiple communication and vision machines is accompanied by the production of the face of White Man. Indeed, as Arun Saldanha emphasises, it is important to approach the faciality machine as a corporeal process first.

> Faces are virtual and emerge through the machinic interactions of bodies with objects and physical environments [Saldanha writes]. People become facialised not because of ideology, repression, or texts, but because of their material comminglings with places, tools, and each other. (2007: 101)

The facialisation of the soldier-body also involves the meshing and commingling of the soldier with audiovisual technologies, prosthetics, robotic enhancements, pharmaceuticals, video games and a multiplicity of other vision machines. The monocle of the Land Warrior Uniform operates as the black hole of a colonialist facialisation machine that overcodes which bodies will become identified, targeted and killed on the white-wall screen of quasi-simulated battlespace. A moving body in battlespace or behind a hidden corner becomes identified and 'screened' as enemy: rejected by the facialisation machine, then eliminated by the war machine.

Following this brief gloss on Deleuze's understanding of societies of control, it is not surprising that the Land Warrior Uniform has also spewed video games, such as NovaLogic's *Delta Force Land Warrior*, enabling users virtually to re-embody the Land Warrior soldier and urban battlespace with fellow gamers online. 'What you don't see', the game's headline reads, 'will kill you . . . '. The production of militarised video games through new forms of governmentality and virtual space signal the ways in which cyborg worlds are integrated into military information societies: video games, advertising, entertainment industries, workplaces and the domestic sphere are all integral to the state appropriation of the war machine. By blurring the boundaries between the 'private' indoor space of the home and the outdoor 'frontier' space of war, *Delta Force Land Warrior*, like many other military gaming technologies, reconfigures the private citizen-body into a public warrior-body, manipulating traditional boundaries between soldiering and entertainment. NovaLogic describes the body's ability to transform in the game: 'Engage the enemy across vast outdoor environments and expansive indoor environments as you take control of the U.S. Army's elite anti-terrorist unit.' Distinctly different from the societies of enclosure that Foucault mapped in the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries, the army's Land Warrior uniform and NovaLogic's re-enactment of Land Warrior through video game technologies illuminate what Deleuze

emphasises as a shift from societies of enclosure and passwords to societies of control that operate through codes and modulations: 'Enclosures are molds, distinct castings,' Deleuze writes, 'but controls are a modulation, like a *self-deforming* cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point' (1992: 4).

Yet, while US injured-soldiers are rendered visible as sites of technological experimentation for the production of more capital and US military imperialist efforts abroad, civilians maimed by the effects of US military speed and technology are rendered invisible, or if they are visible, only as expendable rather than spectacular bodies. As bodies that are rejected by the facialisation and vision machines, civilian bodies fail to conform to the emerging standard of the White Man as a super-human soldier-body. Civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan injured by roadside bombs and 'friendly fire' receive prosthetic limbs that might be up to thirty years old, if they receive any at all. In contrast to the smooth reproduction of the US soldier-body, the distribution of artificial limbs to civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan is done by relief agencies and non-profit agencies. The relief agency CHF International (acting a partner with three other international relief agencies and Unicef) has provided $5 million in funds for projects 'assisting civilians and communities who suffered loss of life, limb, property and economic livelihoods as a result of military actions taken by U.S. and Coalition forces' since 2006, signalling a growing NGO-isation of providing prosthetic limbs for civilians affected by the US war machine. This reproduction of expendability has to be seen in sharp – and sharply racialised – contrast to the highly integrated prosthetic industry for soldiers.

Conclusion

> For what can be done to prevent the theme of a race from turning into a racism, a dominant and all-encompassing fascism, or into a sect and a folklore, microfascisms?
>
>   Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*

When US soldier-bodies are unable to perform everyday movements within military networks of speed and movement, they become 'disabled' because they threaten the ideal surrounding the soldier-body as a technologically enhanced superman. This is doubly the case when the so-called able body is rendered subordinate to the Iron Man soldier-body aided by robotic exoskeletons.[6] By collaborating with pharmaceutical, neurotechnological and prosthetics manufacturers, the state

apparatus thus reappropriates industrial and scientific advancements to reconstruct an ever-abler soldier-body. Speed is determined in relation to the question of the limits of ability and disability. Indeed, as we have seen Virilio argue, the hierarchy of speeds in the political present is best understood in relation to *super-racism*, or that which allows certain bodies to become hypertechnological and hyperaccelerated, while others (the disabled, the natives, the poor, the homeless) are rendered primitive, slow, retarded. As Virilio demonstrated long ago in *Speed and Politics*, the politics of speed within contemporary regimes of military spatiality and vision constitutes a new *dromocracy* that 'establishes and reproduces standard forms of assembly and disassembly for the systematic integration of human energy into specific infrastructures' (2007: 14). Historically, this includes the creation of *doubly unable bodies* of proletarian soldiers enmeshed within technologies such as machine guns ('cannon fodder'), vehicles and aircraft carriers. In a vivid description of this historical formation of 'super speed' and the soldier-body, Virilio writes that:

> Futurism provides the most accomplished vision of the dromological evolutionism of the 1920s, the measure of super speed! In fact, the human body huddling in the 'steel cove' is not that of the bellicose dandy seeking the rare sensations of war, but of the *doubly unable body of the proletarian soldier*. Deprived, as he has always been, of will, he now requires physical assistance from a vehicular prosthesis in order to accomplish his historical mission, Assault. (2007: 84)

By underlining the complicity between the US Department of Defense, the information and prosthetics industry, the 'war against terror', the politics of dromocratic society and the super-racism that Virilio outlines, we can more clearly see the ways in which the US soldier-body circulates as *already* injured. We can also see how the soldier-body is already racialised, as derived from previous imperial and biopolitical constellations, and is now being deployed in contrast to the hundreds of thousands of unidentified 'non-technological' injured bodies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Iran or wherever a next 'intervention' will occur. Indeed, discourses surrounding the US injured soldier-body as one capable of 'moving beyond' physical and emotional limits through high-tech prosthetic devices in order to continue permanent war illuminate the thirst for mass destruction to which the dromocratic state is intrinsically geared.

We might turn to films and art within dromocratic societies as sites of possibility for rendering the politics of speed strange and unfamil-

iar. In which ways do everyday soldiers, activists and artists challenge the facialisation of the US soldier as White Man within Hollywood assemblages, for example? As Deleuze suggests in his essay on control societies, 'there is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons' (1992: 4). Which weapons might be wielded (and by whom and where?) to disrupt the racialised technological and visual assemblage of the soldier-body and wounded? This essay does not provide a final conclusion to these questions (as if one were possible), but instead offers possible points of entry into these questions by illuminating the relationships between Deleuze's political thought and the facialisation of bodies on the one hand, and the politics of the soldier-body within current state appropriations of the war machine in the endless 'war against terror' on the other. As this chapter has demonstrated, returning to our emphasis at the beginning that '[c]*ertain* social formations need face, and also landscape,' the need emerges to establish new regimes of intelligibility, to establish new truths against the existing order of things. This chapter has attempted to map several regimes of power / knowledge that require urgent attention. I hope that these mappings open more sites for resisting the dominant racial formations of the global present.

Acknowledgements

Notes

1. This quotation is from Marinetti's manifesto, inspired by the colonial war of Italy in Ethiopia, which Benjamin provides as an example of the aestheticisation of politics within fascist desiring machines and imperialistic warfare, and by extension, within the technical reproducibility of art in modernity (1969: 241–2).
2. However, Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis on the white wall and black holes of the facialisation machine seems, as Arun Saldanha (2007: 112) suggests, to connote determinism, and are limited perhaps by an overwhelming emphasis on the visual economies of faciality.
3. I would like to thank Jairus Grove for bringing my attention to the important distinction between the war machine and state apparatus in Deleuze and Guattari's thought during a conversation held at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa in the Spring 2012 semester, and for his keen insight on the injured soldier-body as a site of capture within contemporary war machines and state apparatuses.

4. See the 2009 feature story entitled 'Winner: the revolution will be prosthetized' at http://spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/medical-robots/winner-the-revolution-will-be-prosthetized.
5. I use the term 'cyborg' here as Gray conceptualises the term in his book *Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the Posthuman Age* (2002). The cyborg here refers to the transformation of the body (citizen-body) through new technologies within the proliferation of technoscience, infomedicine, cybernetics and contemporary war assemblages.

> A cyborg [Gray writes] is a self-regulating organism that combines the natural and artificial together. Cyborgs do not have to be part human, for any organism / system that mixes the evolved and the made, the living and the inanimate, is technically a cyborg. (2002: 2)

Gray provides a robust definition of the cyborg body in order to map the multiple ways in which it is geopolitically wielded. By turning from critical feminist approaches – Donna Haraway's 'A manifesto for cyborgs' – to the more dominant understandings of the cyborg within US military networks of power and knowledge – apparently the term was first coined at a NASA conference on 'modifying the human for living space' (ibid.: 18) – Gray illuminates the ways in which the cyborg circulates as an always already contested body of intelligibility in particular times and places. However we approach the politics of the cyborg, Gray puts it well when he writes that 'Tools are here to stay, machines are here to stay. The real issue is which tools, which machines, which cyborgs we will have in our society and which will be excluded or never created' (ibid.: 6).
6. I would like to thank Jason Michael Adams for this extremely helpful insight.

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Chapter 8

The King's Two Faces: Michael Jackson, the Postracial Presidency and the 'Curious Concept of Non-white'

Jason Michael Adams

It may be that the sound molecules of pop music are at this very moment implanting here and there people of a new type . . .

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, '1837: of the refrain',
A Thousand Plateaus

Universality, in Major and Minor Chords

Less than one year before the above words were published in the original French, the Michael Jackson album *Off the Wall* (1979) became the first in the United States to produce four top ten singles, while rising to platinum status in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and France. It was this achievement, in the lead-up to the then-unrivalled sales of *Thriller* (1982), that secured MJ's claim to the title 'King of Pop'. Like other pop musicians, however, he did not do so by simply reiterating already constituted music genres, such as funk, soul, R&B or disco, which had by then become relatively commonplace. Rather, the title was earned by way of MJ's commitment to innovation in the face of convention. By making music that was 'off the wall', in the black vernacular sense of spontaneous creativity, MJ produced modes of worldliness, Americanness and African Americanness that remained unexpressed prior to his creations. Each of them derived not from the relative deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations of the majority already at play in the actual, but instead from absolute deterritorialisation, the potential of universal minoritisation, in the virtual. Put differently, MJ's work circumvented biracial signification in which faces are coded according to a binary, numerical logic, unleashing a pluralist, non-numerical, minor universality: that which Deleuze and Guattari theorise as 'nonwhiteness' (1987: 469). Because he did not conceive of the existing genre or racial categories as mere points in a universal galaxy, but instead as one galaxy

amongst others, the new virtualities MJ unleashed could then be actualised in the most diverse of domains, leading all the way up the highest office of state. Parting from the Motown sound of his youth, *Off the Wall* and later *Thriller* were deterritorialisations of at least six separate genre conventions and played a key role in the development of contemporary pop music and pop politics alike.

Of course, that MJ's creations derived *from* absolute deterritorialisation does not mean that they were not subject to later reterritorialisation, or their restriction to relative deterritorialisation. Indeed, it is precisely because they were that they helped to consolidate the familiar style of today's pop culture, all of which has been recoded according to neoliberal capitalist dynamics. In the case of relative deterritorialisation, everything that emerges derives from the actual, as it exists following the reterritorialisation of emergent absolute deterritorialisation. For instance, liberal multiculturalism in the 1980s and 1990s forced a greater acceptance of difference than was previously the case, but only did so on the basis of the more fundamental changes in sensibility brought about by the earlier Civil Rights movement, as well as the popularisation of rhythm-and-blues and the early phase of rock-and-roll. Absolute deterritorialisation, on the other hand, is that which enabled the emergence of all three. In short, it is what makes ontological difference itself primary, at least potentially, rather than that which is later predicated upon it. Like *Off the Wall* and *Thriller*, it derives from a differen*t*iation that is molecular and transgalactic, rather than a differen*c*iation that is molar and totalising. The difference between relative and absolute deterritorialisation, in short, is the difference between 'the fierce urgency of now', the de-essentialisation of time and space in the works of Dr Martin Luther King, Jr, and the temporally and spatially essentialist tolerance discourse of the liberal multiculturalists that followed in his wake.

This chapter argues that it is also that between the de-essentialisation of a molarly racialised sight and sound in the works of the early MJ and the normalising political aesthetics of the neoliberal postracialists that followed in his wake. This is why the non-whiteness in *Off the Wall* and *Thriller* was more transformative than is often assumed. The two works, along with the culture they intersected with more broadly, enabled the redistribution of bodies and sensibilities, beyond the existing grids of racial intelligibility, without in the process denying the reality of racial hierarchy. They did not deterritorialise in a merely relative way, but rendered visible and audible, for however brief a time, a potentially infinite minority and potentially 'indefinite majority' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 469), precisely when the antiracist gains of the sixties

and seventies encountered the emerging neoliberalism of the eighties and nineties. The retooled planetary capitalism of the time required a *new racial order* in response to the intensification of global migration and demands for greater inclusion by transforming its imperial processes. Deleuze and Guattari argue that this late-modern phase of capitalism dealt with such demands by way of hierarchical inclusion, focusing on the quantitative rather than the qualitative, so that doing so only intensified the power of elite forces. 'Non-white', then, became a threat that could potentially refer to any body, in so far as it referred less to specific attributes than to those not included in the count but who nevertheless demanded to be made of account.

Deleuze and Guattari argue:

> That is the situation when authors, even those supposedly on the Left, repeat the great capitalist warning cry: in twenty years, 'whites' will form only 12 percent of the world population . . . they are not content to say that the majority will change or has already changed, but say that it is impinged upon by a nondenumerable and proliferating minority that threatens to destroy the very concept of majority, in other words, the majority as axiom. And the curious concept of nonwhite does not in fact constitute a denumerable set. (1987: 469)

In contrast with Simon Frith's claim that the generality of pop, as opposed to the authenticity of rock, is 'essentially conservative' (2001: 96), MJ's creations (and many others like them) required the introduction of an emergent, singular style, one that resisted this demand for denumbering. Pluralising each prior mode on the level of the absolute to render them pure sonic material for the introduction of the new, MJ redeployed the universal as a minor universal, as non-white. In the terms of Deleuze and Guattari, he rejected the traditional notion of the artist as 'One-Alone drawn into himself' (1987: 346). Instead, he affirmed a sensibility predicated on mobilising the force of the preindividual, disrupting the prevailing molarly racialised, denumerable individuations. Shunning the liberal model of the individual as earthbound and territorial, he was thereby enabled to call into being a people who did not yet exist. In the light of such a project, the established genres proved insufficient, requiring MJ to take a line of flight from the striations by which they were constituted, so that he could 'integrate the universe into them through a continuous variation' (Karlheinz Stockhausen, cited in Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 551). If it is the case, however, that, in retrospect, MJ and other formative pop musicians are remembered by rock-oriented theorists like Frith as consolidators rather than innovators, how does one account for the role of becoming, of absolute

deterritorialisation, in the constitution of what is only ever temporarily solidified after the fact as the norm? In what follows, we consider this question in relation to the often similarly described, but more reterritorialising arc that led to the 2008 election of US President Barack Obama, who boasted, in his own words, 'a father from Kenya, a mother from Kansas; and a story that could only happen in the United States of America' (Obama 2008). In short, we question whether, without the deterritorialising aesthetic of the King of Pop prior to him, there even could have been a postracial King of State, since the latter required the reterritorialisation of non-whiteness, the prior ground of 'people of a new type' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 346).

The reference to the microracial, transversal component of pop music in the recasting of the late-modern state as a more formally tolerant and inclusive institution is, of course, such a banality today that it would hardly seem to bear repeating. However, if, as Deleuze asserts, every repetition is productive of difference, perhaps there do remain some virtualities in the race–music–state assemblage that warrant further consideration, to unleash the still-unexpressed potentialities once more. This chapter, however, does not only repeat this claim, but signals it as a trend that requires creative analysis in order to take it beyond the mere repetition of the same. An engagement with Deleuze's and Deleuze and Guattari's concepts in this area is helpful in so far as they complicate celebratory claims to an already achieved and stable postraciality. Indeed, this chapter questions such representations of national or epochal progress, emphasising not metaphysical nations with clearly delineated molar-racial compositions, but peoples among peoples, who derive from an ontology of continuous transformation. Indeed, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, state-forms, whether actualised in ancient Greek, ancient Roman, early-modern English, modern American or other modes (see Dean and Massumi 1992), have always been besieged by microracial, transversal becomings that, amongst other aesthetic forms, molecularly populate the rhythms and resonances of music.

Thus, from the earliest recesses of Western civilisation, the race–music–state assemblage has been a particularly dense site of contestation, since the war machine it seeks to appropriate complicates the unambiguous, eternal consolidation of any particular mode of governance, as well as any macroracial form by which it is attended. Its constant threat is that of absolute deterritorialisation, a generalising, yet always already *minor universal*: in other words, the non-whiteness that haunts the relative deterritorialisation of liberal multiculturalism just as it does the reterritorialisation that is the basis for neoliberal

postracialism. Of course, for Deleuze and Guattari, the state-form, which they refer to as the *Urstaat*, is itself always already in motion. It is reducible neither to the Marxist image of the mode of production, nor to the liberal image of the social contract, but is instead an abstract machine that assumes a variety of forms across space and time. In their theorisation, it has always emerged in opposition to the war machine, which, in a similarly various number of forms, mobilises musical resistance. Through the deterritorialising force of music, which they affirm as the 'strongest' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 348) of the aesthetic modes, heads of state, including 'jurist-kings', 'emperor-despots' (ibid.: 424) and what we theorise as 'censor-presidents', have been repeatedly delegitimised, destabilised or overthrown.

Postracialism, the *Urstaat* in the Present

The populations rulers govern have continually produced new political aesthetics conflicting with those of nation and nativity, through the transversal, microracial becomings afforded by music – for instance, Beethoven's compositions in the shifting sensibilities from monarchism to liberalism that lead up to the French Revolution, or the manner in which Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson responded to the new musical foundation upon which African American claims to equality began to resonate throughout the populace after the popularisation of rhythm-and-blues / rock-and-roll (Kraus 1992). Indeed, several millennia prior to modern European imperialism, under which the *Urstaat* became planetary, its sovereigns were already produced through a macroracial order that reterritorialised its errant subjects in this manner. The state has always sought to censor, capture or contain the microracial within reterritorialising rhythms and resonances, for if it did not, its molar authority could not be reproduced. Which is certainly not to say that aesthetic parochialism takes only a single form, as the case of neoliberal postracialism indicates to be untrue today. If the threat potential of absolute deterritorialisation is its infinite variety and continuous reinvention / redeployment, the promise of the *Urstaat* is that such continuous variation will always be subject to reterritorialisation.

Plato, of course, famously argued early on that, when the modes of music change, the most fundamental laws of the state change along with them (1976: 226). In his writings, this claim provided for a kind of internal parochialism, censoring Lydian musics, panharmonic instruments and other threats to the proper training of the guardians, lest they become opened up to a deterritorialising sensibility that might

challenge the major universality that particular state-form required. In this respect, Plato's aesthetic conservatism can be equated with that of Deleuze and Guattari's jurist-king, who proceeds by 'treaties, pacts, contracts' (1987: 424), just as for related reasons, it also resonates with that of the formalist musicologist who stresses particular notes, arrangements and structures over and above the intensive musicality of sound itself: its ultimate derivation from minor universality, or non-whiteness. As the Greeks understood, 'music is deterritorialising when it moves in a different direction, when it no longer gives primacy to formal relations and structures, but to the sonorous material itself' (Murphy and Smith 2001: n.p.). In the external parochialism that distinguished the *Urstaat* of ancient Rome, the approach was zonal, due to its constantly shifting territoriality: in the words of Deleuze and Guattari, it was that of the emperor-despot, operating through 'bonds, knots and nets' (1987: 424). In this case, which recalls today's liberal multiculturalism and neoliberal postracialism alike, it was not only a question of defending a musical interiority from a barbarian exterior, but even more of appropriating and recontextualising, for instance, Etruscan and Greek forms for the empire. Just as neither liberal multiculturalism nor neoliberal postracialism forms a true, minor universality, this imperial model is all-encompassing precisely in the service of its further territorial expansion.

Indeed, this aesthetic mode extended to all imperial territories in the period, including that of *Anglia*, the Roman–Latin name for England, until the Reformation brought about its end. With it, the dissolution of a multiplicity of Celtic, Flemish and continental influences that had previously circulated through the Church also came to an end. What had previously been captured and recontextualised became a new, starkly defined 'outside' that England, in its essentially Greek parochialism, would expel. This became particularly clear when, in the wake of the Reformation and secession from Rome, King Henry VIII issued a series of decrees that, much as Plato counselled in a different situation, forced the development of a supposedly independent, territorially defined music, even though it could only be constituted in opposition to deterritorialisation as such. In both cases, then, whether under the jurist-king or the emperor-despot, the *Urstaat* was marked by its versatility, but in the service of a profoundly territorial political ontology: censoring, appropriating and recontextualising, in other words, only in order to impede the molecular flows through which extraterritorial impulses might develop, so as to consolidate the molar forces upon which sovereign legitimacy relied. Neither of the two poles, in short, was 'off the wall'.

As the MJ–Obama nexus reveals better than almost any other, contemporary state-forms, marked most notably by neoliberal marketisation, operate in a more eclectic manner that draws upon the Greek and the Roman approaches alike, while simultaneously intensifying the modern nationalism that gave birth to a supposedly secular, autonomous England. Current modes of aesthetic sovereignty cannot, therefore, be understood in isolation from their 'transpatiotemporal unity with the archaic State' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 459), any more than Obama's electoral success can in isolation from his aesthetic progenitor, MJ. As his presidency has shown quite clearly, what is most distinctive about contemporary state-forms, in addition to the collapse of the inside / outside distinction, is the rise of a worldwide deregulated capitalist market. Particularly with the decline of liberal multiculturalism and the rise of neoliberal postracialism, it is the conduit through which a constant vacillation between the jurist-king and the emperor-despot is shepherded, coupled with what is now a global pop culture that variably legitimates and delegitimises it. Thus, as Deleuze and Guattari remind us, far from having attained a true universal that has collapsed the old molar racialities as such, 'capitalism has reawakened the *Urstaat*, and given it new strength' (1987: 460). Just as Pythagorean, Etruscan, Greek and Flemish musics served as interior and exterior bases for Greek, Roman and English instantiations, each of which constantly threatened to shift popular self-understandings through the questioning of major universals, so too has the *Urstaat* of the United States sought to reterritorialise its own immanent becomings and molecular differences. This is especially the case because of the effects of slavery, colonisation and other founding violences, which, in the endless play of becomings, eventually produced the need for what Deleuze and Guattari call 'civil capture' (ibid.): the production and appropriation of a continuously reconstituted racial hierarchy, an 'internal Third World' (1987: 468).

It is this that serves as the backdrop for the neoliberal postracialism that, in a reterritorialisation of the MJ-event, amongst others, gave rise to Obama's presidency. And it is for this reason that it opposes the false, major universality of the end of race as such to the true, minor universality of a generalised non-whiteness: 'negative absolute deterritorialisation', in short, rather than 'positive absolute deterritorialisation' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 134). Neoliberal postracialism draws upon absolute deterritorialisation, of course, but a form of it that Deleuze and Guattari refer to as 'negative and stratic', in so far as it is the basis for reterritorialisation and subjectivisation. All of this mobilised the Greco-English jurist-king and the Roman emperor-despot at once: thus

for instance, the phenomena in the nineties, when, rather than enabling the creative, spontaneous emergence of the new, the *Urstaat* proceeded in the Greco-English manner by censoring and maldeveloping musics that refused the Platonic model / copy distinction through the selective enforcement of copyright law, as occurred with hip hop; or, its alternate functioning in the Roman mode by capturing and recontexualising those that could not be directly censored, as with the remarketing of rhythm-and-blues as a whitened rock-and-roll in the sixties. As these examples demonstrate, in today's *Urstaat*, state and market have entered into a zone of indistinction that is the basis for a similar shift in status of the jurist-king and emperor-despot. The market forces of the former could not have succeeded without the nation-state's enforcement through the legal apparatus, while the nation-state forces of the latter could not have reterrorialised without the acquiescence of the commercial apparatus. As with its Greek, Roman and English antecedents, then, the United States also seeks to manage and govern the state–race–music assemblage in order to enable its sovereigns to reign over a populace that was rendered hierarchical and, in the process, governable. Obama's appropriation of MJ's positive absolute deterritorialisation is, therefore, not without precedent.

Facing the King's Two Bodies

As indicated above, in the contemporary period, the MJ–Obama nexus is one of the best examples of the difference between the absolutely deterritorialising potential of non-whiteness with its assemblage of microracial transversalities and the reterritorialising major universality of postracialism. Here, we engage Deleuze and Guattari's assertions through Ernst Kantorowicz's concept of 'The King's Two Bodies' (1997), which is referenced in *A Thousand Plateaus* in a slightly different manner from what we pursue. The quotation derives from Michel Foucault's specific use of Kantorowicz's concept in *Discipline and Punish* (1995: 28ff), which centres not on the *corpus naturale / corpus mysticum* nexus, but on that of the king's body and the body of the condemned man:

> the face or body of the despot or god has something like a counterbody: the body of the tortured, or better, of the excluded. There is no question that these two bodies communicate, for the body of the despot is sometimes subjected to trials of humiliation or even torture, or of exile and exclusion. 'At the opposite pole one might imagine placing the body of the condemned man; he, too, has his legal status; he gives rise to his own ceremonial . . . not in order to ground the surplus power possessed by the person of the

sovereign, but in order to code the lack of power with which those subjected to punishment are marked. In the darkest region of the political field the condemned man outlines the symmetrical, inverted figure of the king.' The one who is tortured is fundamentally one who loses his or her face, entering into a becoming-animal, a becoming-molecular the ashes of which are thrown to the wind. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 115)

Importantly, Deleuze and Guattari introduce this relation one paragraph after the first mention of faciality in *A Thousand Plateaus*, after which they assert that signification cannot function without a material, corporeal support: that of the body, or of the face, which is always already hierarchically ordered, due to the supreme authority of the king. Although our usage derives from a different aspect of Kantorowicz's argument, it arrives at a similar conclusion, that in a molarly racialised polity, the face constitutes a modular centre through which all other faces are judged by degrees of divergence from the model, and that the legitimation of the king's *corpus naturale* requires the continual reconstitution of the *corpus mysticum*.

It comes to the same thing to say that the sign refers to other signs ad infinitum and that the infinite set of all signs refer to a supreme signifier. At any rate, this pure formal redundancy of the signifier could not even be conceptualized if it did not have its own substance of expression, for which we must find a name: faciality. Not only is language always accompanied by faciality traits, but the face crystalizes all redundancies, it emits and receives, releases and recaptures signifying signs. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 115)

The assertion is that, while the specific body of the sovereign constitutes the *corpus naturale* of the individual, mortal body across space, its condition of possibility remains an impersonal cultural assemblage conferring legitimacy across time: the *corpus mysticum*. We can already detect some of the outlines of how the jurist-king and the emperor-despot have been reconstituted as a censor-president in today's neoliberal postracialism. As in the past, but in a much more accelerated, molarly racial modality today, this requires the permanent assistance of 'interpreting priests who continually recharge the signified in the temple, transforming it into signifier' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 116).

This is where Deleuze and Guattari's concept of faciality becomes important, the manner in which preindividual, microracial singularities become re-racialised on the macro level to produce a divided, hierarchically ordered population, centred around a modular face that is transformed from signified to signifier. As the MJ–Obama nexus

reveals, the deterritorialising and reterritorialising forces of pop music affect the actualisation of the signifier in the 'temple' (the White House) as a *corpus mysticum*. The process is irreducible to one or the other, because it is always in flux. Indeed, this is the basis of Deleuze and Guattari's argument that pop music, in so far as it extracts from and singularises elements of existing genres, renders perceptible the coexistence of minor universality within major universality itself: this is what they mean by the 'polylingualism of one's own language' (1986: 27). It is precisely because pop music invokes an indeterminate, implicitly singular anyone and everyone that it cannot simply reproduce already established forms, and therefore contributes to an aesthetic of minor universality, of non-whiteness. If the population is always already in a state of differentiation, if the 'priests' (network pundits) must continually recharge the relation of signified and signifier, pop music's refusal of originary authenticity, its emphasis on the ephemeral and its rejection of the hierarchy of taste all affirm a potentially absolute deterritorialisation that exceeds that captured by either market utility or unitary nationality. Thus, given Obama's phenotypical *corpus naturale*, we can see perhaps that, if it were not for the microracial transversality pop music provided, it may not have reterritorialised macroracially as a postracial presidency, a renewed instantiation of the *corpus mysticum*. Indeed, as Steven Shaviro (2009: n.p.) noted in the wake of MJ's death, 'one could say with equal justice that the sharp edges of mournful or joyous black expression had been "mainstreamed", or that the very "mainstream" itself had been alluringly or insidiously carried away'.

Of course, while MJ's early albums, videos and other media objects were a key condition of possibility for the rise of Obama, it is not for nothing that the musical sovereign himself is often funnelled through the macroracial images of our time. For instance, in the postmortem published by the *Huffington Post*, MJ is dubbed 'the post-racial King of Pop' (Shin 2009), a resignified take on the original title that was repeated upon his death *ad nauseam*. Even prior to these, however, popular histories typically emphasised his rise to fame in a context in which racial reconciliation was already enfolded into the cultural habitus. Rather than thinking through the ongoing and very different deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations of the eighties, nineties and 2000s, this has, more often than not, led to clichéd references to the advances made by the Civil Rights movement, occluding thereby its complex aftermath of liberal multiculturalism and neoliberal postracialism. For Deleuze and Guattari, such molar foci obscure the becomings that have marked them as still unfolding and ontologically ambiguous (Saldanha 2006).

One major reason for this, as Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994) have argued, is that popular history, particularly when it touches on race, often naturalises macropolitical presuppositions derived from representational accounts that hold post-Civil Rights significance to function according to a somehow unmediated, unchanging institutional register. Under this lens, the current racial order has been brought about by the transcendental authority of the judiciary, egged on, at most, by sympathetic social movements. This is the central assumption implicit in ready-to-hand references to the centrality of *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954). But even critically oriented studies, such as those in critical legal and race theory, have tended to assume the temporal priority of what even as nuanced a theorist as Judith Butler (1997) describes as law's ultimately linguistic grounding in speech acts that, as a matter of succession, only emerge in culture afterwards: for instance, in the *de jure* segregation that was 'officially' ended in *Brown* (*de facto* segregation, of course, is another story). Arun Saldanha's observations to the contrary suggest that, rather than seeing race as only a discursive or institutional classification system imposed on bodies,

> race is a nonnecessary and irreducible effect of the way those bodies themselves interact with each other and their physical environment. The spatiality of race is not one of grids or self/other dialectics, but one of viscosity, bodies gradually becoming sticky and clustering into aggregates.

The struggle against racism, therefore, should begin not with the transcendent overcoming of race, but rather with 'cultivating its energies against the stickiness of racial segregation' (2006: 10).

While the immediate post-Civil Rights period reterritorialised upon a shift in sensibility to give rise to the liberal multiculturalism of the eighties and nineties, the pop music of that period also laid the foundation for the neoliberal postracialism that Obamania reterritorialised more recently. As with all pop culture events, one cannot overestimate the incipient potentialities unleashed in the divergent visages, sartoria, postures, dances and inflections that the early MJ inscribed into the viscera of billions of people around the world. Indeed, in addition to the specifically auditory dimension of *Off the Wall* and *Thriller*, the music video for 'Billie Jean' provided an unprecented microracial resonance when it deterritorialised the audiovisuality that had coalesced in cable TV culture by 1983. It was the first clip on MTV to feature images of a black artist amongst the fledgling station's closely guarded broadcasts, though it was initially banned due to the marketist belief that, even if the sounds of black musicians would not be rejected on the radio, the sight of

them might be on television (Campbell 1993: 58). Indeed, while visual culture is routinely invoked in relation to questions of race, the specificity of the auditory culture of the late-modern period is its profoundly synaesthetic quality, which, in so far as it upsets the prior sense ratio, also suggests new politico-aesthetic potentialities. The specific domain of MTV, which after 'Billie Jean' became MJ's more than any other's, demonstrates the unprecedented force that had to be marshalled in order to bring about the contemporary order. Deleuze and Guattari's observations on this question bear repeating: 'sounds have a piloting role and induce colors that are superposed upon the colors we see' (1987: 348). Indeed, it is for this reason that Obama could only reterritorialise upon the implicitly audiovisual aesthetic that Deleuze and Guattari refer to as 'rhythmic faces' (1987: 318), faces that have become irreducible to faciality, now molecularly rather than molarly racial.

While what was presumed at the time to be an all-powerful white consumer market quickly proved infinitely more fragmented than it had been believed to be, it also was not long before the minor universality underlying and threatening majority status was itself recaptured. Even after the rise of neoliberal postracialism, non-whiteness remained a threat, one that could only be answered by the rise of a racially significant censor-president, even if only indirectly invoked. Just as the French boy was moved by Frantz Fanon's melanin to speak ('Look, mom, a Negro!') and not merely by the secondary discourse about it (Saldanha 2006), so too does errant musicality impact the *Urstaat* on a multiplicity of levels that exceed those of mere discursivity, musical score or structure. Indeed, it was into this that the 'Billie Jean' music video tapped, as the refrain of the previous sense ratio that had formed the aesthetic core of Civil Rights-era raciality was displaced by a modality having nothing to do with rights or recognition, something which emerged initially, for however brief a time, as microracial (on *signifiance*, see Deleuze and Guattari, 'November 20, 1923: postulates of linguistics', 1987: 75–110). Just as the latter modality eventually became reterritorialised, producing not a postracial but a liberal–multicultural–consumerist aesthetic throughout the eighties and nineties, so too did postracialism capture the microracial lines of flight unleashed by MJ. Indeed, it was because its deterritorialisation was more powerful than others that his enlistment of sight, sound and movement was eventually brought in line with the *Urstaat*'s reterritorialising strategy, marked most clearly by its first censor-president, Barack Hussein Obama.

It is no surprise, then, that by the time the video for 'Black or White' was making the circuits in 1991, the synaesthetic convergence of MJ's

visual phenotype with the audibility of his music no longer disturbed a populace that had by then domesticated its deterritorialising aesthetic, while the marketised state-form presided over its civil capture. Even amidst the representations of phenotypically divergent visages, shown ceaselessly dissolving and morphing into one another with his whitened image reappearing at the screen's centre, the King of Pop's body and head had still been subjected to the facialisation of the interpreting priests. Whether the skin-lightening disease vitiligo was the real culprit in the whitening is irrelevant, since the force of the transition was such that MJ became exemplary of a time in which phenotypical difference, at least ostensibly, would not matter for him any more than it did for Euro-Americans (Tate 1987). In the process, while the shift he helped procure in the eighties was still rupturing the audiovisual habituses of millions nationally and billions globally, this mass-mediated deterritorialisation was suddenly reversed by the imposition of a new countenance on to the event, a new signifier that had to be resignified. In the process, it reterritorialised the new modes of worldliness, Americanness and African Americanness that had emerged as a referenceless interior, whereas, with *Off the Wall* and *Thriller*, what rendered them resonant was their circumvention of the interior / exterior distinction, their opening on to a minor universality through the absolutely deterritorialising potential of non-whiteness.

Corpus Mysticum: Death and the Censor-President

While they develop a compelling theorisation of the jurist-king and the emperor-despot, Deleuze and Guattari do not, in any detailed form, explicate the unique character of what we refer to as the censor-president. What, then, is the specificity of the sovereign as actualised in the postracial state-form that encompasses not only the US, but also much of the rest of the planet today? In order to broach this question, let us reconsider Georges Dumézil's *Mitra–Varuna: An Essay on Two Indo-European Representations of Sovereignty* (1988). For the censor-president, who must continually recharge the *significance* of his person in order to keep non-whiteness at bay, capture implies the primacy of the virtual, as the doctrine of the king's two bodies suggests. This is one trait it shares with the sovereign modes that preceded it, particularly that of ancient Rome: what remains constant is that there is no successfully legitimated *corpus naturale* without a successfully reconstituted *corpus mysticum*. However, in contrast to the emperor-despot (Mitra), the sovereign of 'bonds, knots and nets', and the jurist-king (Varuna), the

sovereign of 'treaties, pacts, contracts', the censor-president is simultaneously violent and legislative, globalist and nationalist, spectacular and authentic, postracial and macroracial. This is the reason that in the late-modern period one cannot separate the roles of head of state, propagandist and economist, for they have entered into a zone of indistinction in order to accommodate what became a new political environment. No longer one *or* the other, then, but now, as Dumézil puts it (without intending our meaning here), the conjoint form Mitra–Varuna.

Whereas the censor in the Mitra state-form of ancient Rome was second to and separate from that of the dictator, monitoring the morality of public culture, the health of the economy and the production of the people through the census, the censor-president does all of this via mass media, network media and other fora, while retaining supreme executive authority. And just as the Roman censor's role expanded in tandem with the increasing diversity of the imperial population it governed through the granting of citizenship to allied and conquered alike, so too has this gone so far today that the distinction between head of state, propagandist and economist has dissolved in the analogous civil capture of an internal Third World. Indeed, as with ancient Rome, the United States in the postwar period formally interiorised an ongoing stream of particularities that were previously cast as exterior, reterritorialising them all in the contemporary period, through neoliberal postracialism. These shifts require a matrix between the sovereign and the populations it produces, mediatises and markets, through the Varuna state-form of a mythologised, then propagated social contract. Just as a range of thinkers have argued that a new relationship emerged that conjoined the image of the presidency and its legitimacy amongst the people from the beginning of the neoliberal period, so too must this question be revisited in its specifically postracial dimension. The emergent presidentiality of Mitra–Varuna, dubbed the 'rhetorical presidency', 'the symbolic presidency' or 'the mediated presidency', amongst many other signifiers, does not rely on institutionality or discursivity alone. Rather it is musical in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense that it requires a material, aesthetic foundation continually to recharge its signification, mobilising interior and exterior parochialism at once in a never-ending process of reterritorialisation.

It is when we begin to grasp how all of this converges with the macroracial and other 'civil' captures that we begin to grasp how far we have come from the emperor-despot or jurist-king. Indeed, this is where an interrogation of contemporary racial *signifiance* can learn not only from rethinking Mitra–Varuna, but also from conjoining the theories of

faciality and of the king's two bodies (Kantorowicz 1997: 39). 'The King is dead, long live the King!', goes the old French saying, amidst traces of the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. But, in the late-modern case, it is the postmortem of an aesthetic sovereign that illuminates the aesthetic foundation for a state sovereign in the antemortem. From the 1933 Roy Mack film *Rufus Jones for President* to Richard Pryor and Eddie Murphy's comedy routines (*A Black President Someday*, *Delirious*), from Mimi Leder's *Deep Impact* to Chris Rock's *Head of State*, and from the Fox TV series *24* to NBC's *The Event*, visual culture has provided a host of avatars through which to legitimate an imagined postracial presidency. But none of these direct representations deterritorialised the post-Civil Rights forms of *significance* that might have prevented its actualisation as powerfully as MJ did indirectly. It is telling that none was as violently reterritorialised, either. Again, for Kantorowicz, the king's two bodies centre around the question of mortality: in his formulation, the 'two bodies' were a means through which kingship overcame death, which always threatened its displacement. If the king's *corpus naturale* passed away, it was held that the *corpus mysticum* nevertheless remained, rendering immortal the authority and legitimacy of sovereignty, which could then be filled by a different mortal being. But since the censor-president requires an intensive and not just formal relationship with the global media in order to produce this legitimacy in a way that the jurist-king and the emperor-despot did not, it is not only the mortality of the King of State that is at issue, but also the death of the King of Pop.

This, of course, was not lacking, given the inauguration of President Obama just six months before MJ's death. Numerous blogposts, news articles, books and visual media made the connection, while an estimated billion watched the public memorial on television or online. But very few noted the reaction of the censor-president himself. When the death was announced on the afternoon of 25 June 2009, Obama did not release an official commentary that day or the next, but only mentioned off-hand to Press Secretary Robert Gibbs that, while 'obviously Michael Jackson was a spectacular performer and a music icon [other] aspects of his life were sad and tragic' (quoted in Orr 2009). As the *Christian Science Monitor* queried at the time, if, 'in presidential politics . . . issuing official statements when a high profile individual passes on is commonplace . . . why no statement from President Obama?' (Orr 2009). Just as the acquisition of the presidency by a non-Euro-American *corpus naturale* did not in itself erase the reality of the still macroracially inflected *corpus mysticum* (the first sign of this was the police beatings

and mass arrests of celebrating African Americans that occurred in South Chicago and other locales), nor did it for the censor-president himself. In addition to a range of other events, from Obama's own failure to challenge sufficiently the neoliberal logic that led to the economic crisis of 2008 through the Tea Party's racist caricatures, an indelicately carried out response to the death of MJ may well have upset the equilibrium that enabled the postracial presidency, had attention been drawn by an official statement. Mitra–Varuna, in other words, even amidst billions of grieving fans in the US and around the world, is not only charged with representing the new populations now interiorised as postracial, but also with upholding and propagating the mythology of the social contract as neutral. Instead of Obama addressing MJ's death at the 26 June 2009 joint news conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, then, Gibbs was sent out instead, with a concocted, truncated account of an aside over breakfast.

> Despite his lukewarm approach . . . the decision not to issue a piece of paper (electronic or not) that said 'Statement by the President' was discussed . . . By putting out an official White House statement on a celebrity, what message does it send? This celebrity had unmatched star power. His impact on society is / was immeasurable. His contributions to music, culture, and entertainment could be unsurpassed. But then there's the dark side. And that dark side is loud. (Orr 2009)

On the one hand, the censor-president requires the legitimacy of association with the star power of MJ that brought eyes and ears in front of screens. But the late MJ's reterritorialisation, on a multiplicity of levels, threatened the specificity of Obama's postracial *signifiance*. Not every politician had this problem. California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, for instance, immediately released a statement, with his press secretary affirming that there was no debate about whether to do so. Because the two faces are continually reproducing racial *signifiance* and because Mitra–Varuna both captures difference and propagates neutrality, the burden to respond appropriately falls differently on different bodies even if they are recast as the same. 'At every moment, the machine rejects faces that do not conform, or that seem suspicious' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 177). This is exemplary of the subtext hidden in claims that the unprecedented nature of Obama's censor-presidency and the manner in which it coalesced with the networked media environment required him to enter into a constant campaign mode. Continually recharging the relation of signifier and signified, rather than only preparing for the electoral event near the conclusion of his term, like those

before him, he could not survive without the interpreting priests. As Obama stated on his July 2010 appearance on *The View*,

> the one thing that does frustrate me sometimes is the sense that we shouldn't be campaigning all the time. There is a time to campaign and then there is a time to govern. What we've tried to do over the last twenty months is to govern. (Obama 2010)

To reinvoke Kantorowicz, for the first black president to be legitimated not merely as a *corpus naturale* but also as the *corpus mysticum* through which he acquires the power to act, the presidentiality of the president had to be continuously refreshed. Moreover, given its Roman quality, this was required intranationally and internationally. The earliest vestiges of the reterritorialisation of the MJ-event on both levels began well before Obama, however; since Mitra–Varuna presides over an *Urstaat* that interiorises an unprecedented array of populations internally and externally, it requires lip service, at the very least, to mitigate the disjuncture. The concept of the 'imperial presidency' (Schlesinger 2004), in which the sovereign has become ever more central to the state-form's functioning as it has become ever more hegemonic globally, required the re-equilibration of the king's two faces on every front, even before the first black president. American censor-presidents from Reagan forward relied not only on the global market and comprador states it produced but also on associations with an emerging technoculture of the Information Revolution. Thus, as Reagan boasted in his 1988 speech at Moscow State University, the microcomputers that the US had been developing would not only transform the design of technologies, but might also 'help Michael Jackson produce on one synthesizer the sounds of a whole orchestra' (Reagan 1988). Within a now-global sphere of influence, coupled with an ever more diversified interior, even a Euro-American *corpus naturale* required linkage to the differentiated planetary political body that had become its condition of possibility, through the *corpus mysticum*.

And indeed, from Reagan through the child abuse accusations of the early nineties to mid-2000s, every American president made at least one attempt to equilibrate the faces of the nation through association with MJ. Beyond the Cold War accolades of Reagan, George H. W. Bush presented MJ with the White House Artist of the Decade Award, in recognition of his cultural achievement and ubiquity throughout the 1980s; Bill Clinton had him perform at his 1992 inauguration, where MJ sang 'Heal the World', leading to a penultimate moment in which the two shared the stage; and while George W. Bush never directly met or asso-

ciated himself with MJ (no doubt because Euro-Americans reacted very differently to MJ's acquittal than did African Americans; see Dyson 2005), he did benefit from the bizarre spectacle of the dangling of the King of Pop's infant son over a balcony on 22 November 2003. The event coincided with the very moment the media had been focusing on the protests in London opposing Bush's visit, thereby justifying a shift of focus (Pitt 2003). Just as the emperor-despot under empire required the interiorisation of an ever more diverse populace, and the jurist-king under monarchy required a wax double to ensure the immortality of authority beyond the lifespan of his natural body, so too has the censor-presidency mobilised a doubling of its own that invokes a diversified array of governable subjectivities. In its absence, the *Urstaat* would be rendered unstable, out of line with the signifier–signified relation. Much the same can be said of the postracial instantiation of the censor-president. Upon returning to the earliest manifestations of Obama in the national consciousness, from the 2004 Democratic National Convention speech through the failure to close Guantánamo prison, the contrast with the censor-presidency that later emerged renders similarly evident how reterritorialising the facialising processes were, even if the presidency was always geared towards it.

The Face is Dead: Long Live the Face!

In considering this legitimating process through the concepts of bifaciality / bicorporeality, we can see that, without an equilibrium between *corpus naturale* and *corpus mysticum*, the sovereign would be as unstable temporally as spatially. The presidency requires a constant campaign, particularly after the rise of the postracial instantiation of the censor-president. Without the primacy of face over body, subjectivity over singularity, the presidency could neither reproduce itself nor prevent the absolute deterritorialisations of the minor universal. Still, while the above discussion embodies the essence of the process of civil capture, in order to theorise what might still be yet to come, we conclude by considering the nexus they argue is produced between body, face and head. Deleuze and Guattari argue that, in modern state societies, race functions by separating body and head, such that subjectivity becomes linked with the *significance* thereby enabled. The face emerges only when the head becomes divorced from the body and recoded within the macroracial thrall of normalising whiteness. This is how identification at a given degree of divergence from the face of 'White Man' (1987: 176) initially becomes possible: through the continual recharging of the relation

of signifier and signified, which props up the major universality Deleuze and Guattari dub 'Nobody' (1987: 105). While the question of race in a society of control that has gone postracial is that of deterritorialising the facialisation processes that produces these outcomes, this must be done without becoming enlisted into the discourses and rhythms of liberal progress every time more inclusive schemata emerge. Similarly, fetishising the pre-state societies that often did, in fact, resist interiorisation so as to encounter the stranger as Other, is also not Deleuze and Guattari's project. Their assertion is neither that of a macroracial embrace of the modern *Urstaat* nor a return to an unfragmented and noble past, but is actually much more along the lines of William Faulkner's *Flags in the Dust*: 'nonwhite: we all have to become that, whether we are white, yellow or black' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 470). So long as sovereignty can render a particular face as a standard-bearer writ large, it can accommodate the internalisation of difference. Similarly, so long as it can lay claim to immortality, it can relegitimate its authority after every conceivable crisis.

What is needed is not the evasion of face or race transcendentally, but a micropolitical engagement with both, that invokes White Man or Nobody no more than it does the postracial degrees of divergence produced in its thrall. The only way to dismantle the face in its hierarchical form is from within, transforming its molar *signifiance* into molecular *asignifiance*, by moving beyond the two visages of sovereignty as well as its negative inverse in the image of body and head: neither the essentialist return to the noble savage nor the passive acceptance of the normalised face, but instead, the affirmation of what Deleuze and Guattari describe as 'probe-heads' (*têtes chercheuses*, 1987: 190), automatic guidance devices that, like a GPS system, search for possible routes within specific givens, piloting fluxes molecularly within the immanence of the already-existing, to enable 'lines of deterritorialisation positive and absolute' (1987: 191). At his best, MJ did this, in so far as he moved from relative to absolute deterritorialisation. But in so far as he tried to escape race into a postracial domain that was, in reality, just another facet of the macroracial countenance, these attempts, as Obama's later reterritorialisation demonstrates, remained within the order of the negative rather than the positive. What, then, can we take away in the wake of our investigation of the MJ–Obama nexus? Here we should return to the concern of the first paragraph, Deleuze and Guattari's 'curious concept of nonwhite' (1987: 469). In the same Plateau in which they theorise the jurist-king and the emperor-despot, they assert that our time has increasingly become that of the proliferation of minorities,

the transversal multiplication of non-whiteness – not that of a specifiable, denumerable set, but of a divergence from the logic of number itself, a becoming-everybody in contrast with a being-Nobody: 'the gap that separates them from this or that axiom constituting a redundant majority' (ibid.), non-white as a potentially infinite minority, including not only those currently coded as non-white, but also those coded white. As Deleuze and Guattari assert, 'the face is not a universal. It is not even that of the white man; it is White Man himself' (1987: 176). Against this potentiality, neoliberal postracialism, from the Tea Party to Ron Paul, has stoked the Nobody's fear, propagating the spectre of majority–minority cities and a future majority–minority nation and / or globe, and triggering a backlash against even the *signifiance* of the Obama censor-presidency. Each of these emanates from a sense of the systemic withdrawal of a previously incontestable, specifiable, denumerable majority status, whiteness held in place by a modular face that admitted no outside, instead reorganising all difference in relation to it. Rather than affirming the revelation as the basis for a more pluralising politics, what is emerging is an attempt at the restoration of White Man: that is, of Nobody.

In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari engage the claim for the integration of those currently coded as minorities into a national majority, as well as the potential implications of a future rise of a non-Western global hegemon. But they do so molecularly, without assuming that integration can ever really do anything other than reconstitute the false universal of the face, of Nobody:

> nonwhites would receive no adequate expression by becoming a new yellow or black majority, an infinite, denumerable set. What is proper to the minority is to assert a power of the non-denumerable, even if that minority consists of a single member. That is the formula for multiplicities. Minority as a universal figure, or becoming-everybody / everything. (1987: 470)

It is for this reason that, in order to stave off White Man, Nobody, the most approximate actualisation of the concept of non-whiteness, is the task of our time. Deleuze and Guattari do not claim that the particular struggles of regions, or of the internal or external Third World, for integration into the majoritarian axiom is irrelevant to this process, whether these proceed through recognition or interiorisation. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari assert that such struggles are the very condition of possibility for the universalisation of non-whiteness. 'The Particular as an innovative form', in their theorem, remains crucial not only for

the modest advances it enables, but also for how it always reveals 'a point the axiomatic cannot tolerate'. Thus, 'the struggle around axioms is most important when it manifests, itself opens, the gap between two types of propositions, propositions of flow and propositions of axioms.'

What each amounts to, in the torsion between deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, is a double movement, a 'coexistent combat' (1987: 471). If Deleuze and Guattari are correct about the continuity of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, it was not only the force of MJ's *Off the Wall* and *Thriller* that may have served as a condition of possibility for Obama's electoral success; the *signifiance*-Obama, too, for all his political shortcomings, may be a condition of possibility for a further becoming – a becoming beyond not only the jurist-kings, emperor-despots and censor-presidents, but the hierarchical, macro-racial subjectivities they require. This does not mean that the *Urstaat*, bicorporeality / bifaciality or Mitra–Varuna would not reappear; but in politics, as in aesthetics, what the future holds depends not upon the end of the face, but upon the relation between the face and its ontological status. When Deleuze and Guattari state, at the end of Plateau VII, 'the face has a great future, but only if it is destroyed' (1987: 171), what they suggest is that minor particularity and universality emerge only when major particularity and universality are destabilised. MJ's deterritorialisations were themselves merely new rhythms, new blocks of sight and sound; creation is open-ended and need not stop at those elements. The domain that pop music mobilises at its highest points makes us question not only the hierarchical organisation of categories but also the unitary claims of the categories themselves, without this necessarily leading to the deposition of the particular. Deleuze and Guattari:

> it is not one *or* the other, fixity or variability . . . we should say, rather, that territorial motifs form rhythmic faces or characters, and that territorial counterpoints form melodic landscapes. There is a rhythmic character when we find that we no longer have the simple situation of a rhythm associated with a character, subject, or impulse. The rhythm itself is now the character in its entirety. (1987: 318)

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Chapter 9

From a Society of Sons to a Society of Brothers: Miscegenating Melville's *Moby-Dick*

Susan Shin Hee Park

Introduction

Commonality. Difference. Contract. I intend to engage these terms to reconceptualise difference as the starting point from whence Deleuzian theories of heterogeneous social assemblages charge the plane of lived politics in Melville's *Moby-Dick*. *Moby-Dick* not only exemplifies commonality, difference and contractual alliance through its narrative form and characterisations; it also proposes alternative forms of social organisation for a contemporary audience. This is especially true given the interracial composition aboard Captain Ahab's vessel, the *Pequod*. One may not automatically consider Gilles Deleuze, writing independently and with Félix Guattari, in an analysis of racial relations and nineteenth-century American literature. Although Deleuze has written on the subject of race and far more on the subject of American literature, this is not an intersection about which he has explicitly theorised. I therefore propose that, in addition to scholarship dealing directly with race and nineteenth-century American literature contributed by scholars in the fields of ethnic studies, critical race theory and critical ethnic studies, and American literary studies, we would benefit by adding Deleuzian ontological-social concepts such as 'camaraderie', 'immanence', 'desiring machines' and 'becoming'.

  Moby-Dick is a historical 'anomaly' (Negri 1991). It is a book outside of its own time whose textual emergence in the middle of the nineteenth century portends politico-philosophical strategies flourishing at the turn of the twenty-first century.[1] One way in which this is accomplished is through the deployment of a concept of miscegenation. The concept of miscegenation is a hoax, but a productive one. It gained purchase in the mid-nineteenth century in Western biologistic and social science discourses, while in the US these discourses were used to discredit

Lincoln's abolitionist reform policy. The history of the term conveys transgression, both in the way it has been used in racist rhetoric and also as it can be repurposed as an antiracist tactic. Miscegenation in *Moby-Dick* occurs on two levels. First, it refers to orthodox meanings: that is, to the 'interbreeding' of differently raced bodies and its association with genetic doctrines. I also deliberately reappropriate the trope miscegenation to frame the blending of two different conceptual lineages leading to alternative forms of social assemblage. These lineages are the Freudian primal horde, or 'society of sons', and what Deleuze, in his essay 'Bartleby; or, The Formula', refers to as the society of brothers. (To avoid any confusion, henceforth in this chapter the term 'brother' shall be used in accordance with chosen bonds of affinity rather than hereditary ones.) These lineages include the concepts commonality, difference and contract. As I hypothesise, commonality (sanguinary / allied), difference (particular / singular) and contract (moral / ethical) actually can be conceived as sets of dyads; these sets are different because they belong to two distinct lineages despite being similar in appearance. These conceptual pairs have the capacity to 'pass' interchangeably due to their shared semblance and due to acts of grafting. Making recourse to a genealogical paradigm, such as the one I am proposing here, emphasises existing codes of formal and structural traits. Using the trope miscegenation reveals transgressive acts of blending that, on the one hand, have enabled the ability for moral contracts to graft upon ethical ones and, on the other hand, are capable of inspiring forms of social contract that disinherit the transcendent patriarchal model.

My analysis begins with a summary of Freud's primal horde myth and the Deleuzian intervention against it. I then review the primary interracial relationships in *Moby-Dick* in order to propose my hypotheses regarding commonality, difference and contract. I refer to the work of Deleuze, particularly Spinozist Deleuze, to analyse these terms. My analysis thus broaches concepts inspired by Spinoza, such as commonality and multitude, and includes supporting commentary by Spinoza's recent interlocutors. I conclude by proposing how these miscegenated lineages reflect back upon the issue of race.

Miscegenation

In the 1850s, emerging discourses based on biologistic rhetoric oversaw the US construction of racial categorisation legitimising domination and terror.[2] Coloured bodies were perceived as crucial to the labour practices of the era, in the plantation fields of the South, the emerging

factories nationwide, and the move toward white expansion enabled by railways, canals and shipping. From the perspective of the white hegemony, racialised labour was cheap. However, it also carried the perceived threat of coloured races living in too close proximity to whites, breaking the ground for discourses of white supremacy measured through purity. The juridical notion of whiteness as an armoury, as a stony-faced fortress fortified by the purity of blood, is born out of nineteenth-century racist rhetoric. For example, the 'one drop rule' adopted by US Southern legislation maintained racial segregation by sanctioning heredity over perceived colour. White anxiety over miscegenation was quelled by the prohibition that 'passing' as white was insufficient for claiming white status.

Deleuze and Guattari address the transgressive potential for 'contaminated' blood lines to bring forth 'monstrous' results in their writings on human to animal, man to woman, white to coloured processes of 'becoming'. The becoming-human-animal, for instance, is said to initiate a secondary alliance between various unlike groups 'elaborated in assemblages that are neither those of the family nor of religion nor of the State. Instead, they express minoritarian groups or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognised institutions' (1987: 247). For Deleuze and Guattari, the power of a 'demonic' becoming lies in the capacity of a formerly incongruous aggregate to overstep categorical boundaries (1987: 366). This admixture of 'monstrous crossbreeds' is not to be confused with a synthesis of oppositions: the former accumulates differences rather than suppressing them. Tainted blood is the blood flowing through the inclusionary, universal bodies of desiring machines, for desiring machines are inherently mixed. Desiring machines are always subject to varying degrees of heterogeneity, if only 'one drop', from various sources. Likewise, Ahab, captain of the *Pequod*, is only too aware of the taboo of tainted, racialised blood, even in small quantities. He bids his illustrious coloured deckhands to christen his harpoons with a taste of their blood: 'What say ye, pagans! Will ye give me as much blood as will cover this barb?' (Melville 1988: 489). Ahab's request brims with the ultimate threat against racial purity: what to Ahab could be more destructive against the white whale than a talisman of dark, 'savage' pollution?

In order to contextualise the interracial relations aboard the *Pequod* according to the model of the society of sons and the model of the society of brothers, consider Freud's theory of the former. Freud's primal horde myth traces a triangulation between family, religion and the primitive state.[3] In *Moses and Monotheism* he contends that the figure of God is

tied to a structure of patriarchy, citing the phenomenon of monotheism cross-culturally from the ancient Egyptians to the ancient Greeks. Freud further argues that the transcendent father, 'autocratically governing a great world Empire', enabled a conception of a 'universal ruler of the world' as opposed to the 'national' God of Judaism (1939: 80). The transcendent father is rooted in the myth of a single patriarch ruling over a primal horde. This patriarch, having sole access to the women in the group, suppressed competition through execution, castration and banishment. However, a band of brothers in exile 'clubbed together, overcame the father, and – according to the custom of those times – all partook of the body' (ibid.: 102–3). The fatherless sons, filled with guilt and dread, formed a pact never to repeat this act. The cannibalistic patricide left a legacy of affective ambivalence wherein the sons 'not merely hated and feared their father, but also honoured him as an example to follow' (ibid.: 106). The sons redistributed the booty of the father – that is, the women – as a 'fraternal clan, whose existence was assured by the blood tie' (Freud 1950: 181). The cannibalistic act led to the formation of a rudimentary social covenant. This covenant, unlike the modern and rational social contract, is based on prohibition rather than agreement. The Law of the living father was posthumously transferred on to the social laws of the sons. The dead father then ascended as Limit. In death he became a legal deity, governing beyond the grave both in his absence (as depersonalised spectre) and in his presence (as social limit). After their mutiny, the sons resurrected the father as 'totem' (Freud 1939: 168). Freud then argues that the primal horde is reproduced in inverted form in all social organisation. That is, the creation of state and nation that emerged out of the destruction of the originary family form returns as a psychic reconstitution of the family through an affective link to the primal father.

The primal horde legacy prompts Deleuze and Guattari to raise the question, 'are "the names of history" derivatives of the name of the father, and are the races, cultures, and continents substitutes for daddy–mommy, dependent on the Oedipal genealogy? Is history's signifier the dead father?' (1983: 89). Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* thus collapses the primal horde myth into another of Freud's famous myths, the myth of Oedipus. In attempting to undo the Oedipalisation of the unconscious, Deleuze and Guattari argue that between the 'murderous identification of the Oedipal bond' and 'the restoration and internalisation of paternal authority' is 'the celebrated latency – which is without doubt the greatest psychoanalytic mystification: this society of "brothers" who forbid themselves the fruits of the crime' (ibid.: 80–1).

Oedipalisation occurs when the psyche is harnessed for its libidinal, productive power to a set of discursive mechanisms and institutional apparatuses. This, in turn, prompts 'an aggregate of destination fabricated to meet the requirements of an aggregate of departure constituted by a social formation' (ibid.: 101). Deleuze and Guattari propose that the legacy of Freudian psychoanalysis is ultimately responsible for impregnating the unconscious with the very symptoms that it ostensibly seeks to treat. The malefic influence of Oedipus is thus twofold: first, it manufactures the mythic content for the father, as Law, Limit and citation of the Past. Second, Oedipalisation actually disciplines the unconscious, despite the latter's productive capacity, by providing the means through which absolute moral laws are internalised.

Deleuze and Guattari also charge Freud with focusing on individual responses to the repressive structures of family, religion and the primitive state at the expense of scrutinising the structures themselves (ibid.: 50). Yet, as it is currently understood, this triangular model of authority, composed of family, nation and religion-myth, is incomplete. To comprehend the complexion of the horde fully requires, instead, reimagining the Oedipal triangulation as a pyramidal structure, including the additional dimension of race.[4]

Returning to *Moby-Dick*, we see that the crew-mates aboard the *Pequod* are a community in exile constituted through a diverse range of racial identifications. This exile is a form of sexual, as well as racial, banishment: while serving as host to the pariahs of the world, the *Pequod* also functions as a bit of mobile space at sea resisting heteronormativity. Remember that, in the primal horde myth, the sons are exiled from the women. Likewise, the *Pequod* is absent of women. In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud discusses what he calls a period of 'forced celibacy', or the moment in which the brothers had to 'institute the law against incest . . . In this way they rescued the organisation which had made them strong – and which may have been based on homosexual feelings and acts, originating perhaps during the period of their expulsion from the horde' (1950: 179). The 'homosexual feelings and acts' that were eventually repudiated by the primal horde are blissfully enjoyed aboard the *Pequod*. Thus, alongside the reproductive imperative, the exchange of women is removed from the site of exile. The emergence of innovative, interracial forms of sexual, erotic and romantic intimacy unsettles the imperial patriarchal foundation which utilises sexual difference and reproduction as principles of the sexual contract strengthening the homosocial bonds of colonial men.

In the primal horde myth, negative feelings associated with the primal

patricide, including guilt, dread, hate and fear, transform into a type of honour for the father and an attempt to make restitution through totemic observance and ritual deference (Freud 1950: 177). The father thus becomes a symbol of 'numen', a representation of fear and fascination that captivates the sons. Freud's primal father is very much a classic taboo (*tabu*); he is so powerful he is untouchable, so horrible he is unapproachable. Yet he compels. The father's simultaneous absence, in materiality, and presence, in spirit, is achieved through cannibalism, effectively conjoining the act of destroying the father with the act of incorporating him. Ishmael regards Moby-Dick with a similar sense of numen. The whale's colour, especially, invokes so many contradictory feelings. Ishmael describes the white whale as 'sweet', 'sublime', 'honourable', 'repelling', 'shocking', 'appalling', 'ghostly' and 'supernatural'. Moby-Dick's whiteness signals anything, by its lack of definitive marking, and nothing, by its absence of colour.

Freud, on the other hand, is less preoccupied with the semiotics of colour and much more concerned with race as the amalgamation of psychic and genetic components in the individual. Freud writes, 'a Savage's attitude to his ruler is derived from a child's infantile attitude to his father' (1950: 64). This statement invites speculation upon the maxim 'ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,' or the discredited biological idea that the development of the individual organism is a re-enactment of the evolution of its species.[5] Freud's uptake of this idea is complicated, however, by a slippage between the terms 'species' and 'race'. For instance, in the glossary of *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud defines the term 'phylogenetic' as 'pertaining to racial development' (ibid.: 177). Freud's 'racial memory', as well, refers to the accumulated knowledge of the human species. If and how species are subdivided into particular races for Freud is vague. It is also unclear whether Freud is simply using the terms interchangeably. It is notable, however, that Freud's example of 'a Savage's attitude to his ruler' implies a social evolutionary, and perhaps even atavistic, ladder.

Freud likens the horde, a savage assembly, to an organism in a primitive evolutionary stage, or to an infant in an early stage of individual development. The rise of civilisation depends on moving beyond the initial actions of the horde even as we are held forever bound to an organisational point of departure which is distinguished by crimes of mythic and monumental proportion. Yet, through a Deleuzian approach to reading *Moby-Dick*, we might deliberate upon how the masses, indifferent to the tremendous discursive, psychic and historical baggage associated with the myth of the primal horde and the myth of Oedipus,

will constitute alternative modes of social agreement. Indifference, or strategic impassivity, creates opportunities for more options than identification or dialectical resistance. For example, when confronted with a horizon of possibilities, Pip and Ahab choose the model of the patriarchal state, living in the shadow of the society of sons. Ishmael and Queequeg, however, choose to experiment and create new forms of identification, desire and union. What they find in each other's presence is a multiplicity of common features, attractive differences and unscripted potential. Ishmael and Queequeg's union eschews the values of the transcendent family; theirs is, instead, an intentional family corresponding to 'an affair of world-wide population on the full body of the earth, not organic familial generation' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 5).

Moby-Dick

Melville's sunny depiction of cooperative racial relations could not entirely escape the racist attitudes suffusing his times. The *Pequod* provides a heterotopic space in which races mix. But the most celebrated examples, the harpooners Queequeg, Tashtego and Daggoo, are distinctively and unambiguously raced. The intensity of the harpooners' ethnic particularity and racial difference, negatively highlighted on land in New Bedford, is celebrated on board. They form a heroic trio of exotic, courageous, robust, capable and conspicuously gorgeous 'primitives' reflecting 'pure' difference in the white imaginary. Compare these characters to the elderly, shuffling cook Fleece and diminutive, childlike, 'insignificant' ship-keeper Pip. The latter bodies bear the taint of civilisation and, by extension, hint at the possibility of miscegenated heritages. Yet, despite these citations of black servile labour, Melville's work stages experimental encounters between raced bodies that at times reproduces, but also very much challenges, prohibitions meant to uphold codes of purity.

For instance, in *Moby-Dick*, one form of sexual transgression obliquely addresses another. Ishmael and Queequeg's same-sex intimacy is permitted because the reproductive consequences of heterosexual relations are nullified. They simulate a romantic, egalitarian matrimony. Ishmael declares that, 'Upon waking next morning about daylight, I found Queequeg's arm thrown over me in the most loving and affectionate manner. You had almost thought I had been his wife,' and that 'henceforth we were married; meaning, in his country's phrase, that we were bosom friends' (Melville 1988: 251). Same-sex intercourse carries no reproductive threat of racial contamination. However, in the place

of their merging chromosomes, expressed through 'mixed' children, one can imagine Queequeg and Ishmael in other mergers. One can imagine them swapping semen, blood, saliva and sweat as they submerge their limbs in a tub of whale 'sperm' during the workday or bed together in a shared bunk at night. Ishmael, in particular, is quite taken with and eager to explore all the valences of mysterious otherness he projects on to his 'wife'.

Compare their interracial romance to Ahab and Pip's. Ahab and Pip's relationship mirrors the affective structure of paternal benevolence. They are tied together with 'heart-strings' and 'man-ropes', instead of the 'monkey-ropes' joining Ishmael and Queequeg. The paeans Pip utters when grasping Ahab's white 'velvet shark-skin' hand counter the famously homoerotic passage referenced above wherein the pleasure of hands touching, grabbing and caressing provides the opportunity to 'squeeze hands all round . . . squeeze ourselves into each other . . . squeeze ourselves universally into the very milk and sperm of kindness' (Melville 1988: 416).

This encounter also signals Ahab's transmogrification into sea animal. Ahab's 'becoming-whale', which Deleuze mentions several times in his œuvre, transpires when 'Ahab does not imitate the whale, he becomes Moby-Dick, he enters into the zone of proximity where he can no longer be distinguished from Moby-Dick, and strikes himself in striking the whale' (Deleuze 1997: 78). Ahab, with ivory leg supplanting the one lost in an earlier hunt for the whale, is obsessed with his desire to seek out and destroy the animal. Obsession, devotion and prosthetic leg are all symptomatic of his identification with the whale. In this way, we might interpret Moby-Dick as a castrating father-phantom returning to haunt his son Ahab. Melville writes Ahab as the primal son of the whale. Ahab then functions as father to Pip, to whom Ahab is also part shark.

Disidentifying with the family model of the absent-present father (whale), primal son (Ahab) and secondary sons (crew-mates), rattles the pyramidal structure of family / nation / religion-myth / race encoded on to the Freudian unconscious. Deleuze and Guattari write: 'the unconscious itself is no more structural than personal . . . it does not symbolize any more than it imagines or represents; it engineers, it is machinic' (1983: 53). By disregarding a shared legacy of psychic myths, the unconscious is salvaged as a site of production rather than relegated to being a mere signifying practice. Distinguishing a body of invention from the socially marked, coded and recorded body reveals that materiality, in unrepresentable form, is universally present. Queequeg is paradigmatic of this ineffable, uninterpretable, non-representational

body.[6] Queequeg's body counterposes the whale's body. They both embody indiscernible forms, one through the inscrutability of ink on coloured skin and the other through the horror of absolute whiteness. As an indiscernible form, Queequeg moves freely and openly pursuing his singular desires. Both the desire for alliance, and alliance itself, are what Ishmael and Queequeg produce. Through their erotic friendship they demonstrate how to constitute a society of two. With added bodies, this miniature society can unfurl into a society of brothers that disinherits the legacy of a society of sons fathered by a primal patriarch.

When discussing Ahab's paternal function, Deleuze writes,

> to liberate man from the father function, to give birth to the new man or the man without particularities, to reunite the original and humanity by constituting a society of brothers as a new universality [is to conceive of] the society of brothers, alliance replaces filiation and the blood pact replaces consanguinity. (1997: 84)

Deleuze expands upon the notion of this new kind of pact founded upon a 'zone of uncertainty haunted by brothers' by using the analogy of schizophrenia as productive and neurosis as static. Deleuze designates the three crucial characteristics of the American dream, which he cites Walt Whitman as affirming, as the 'trait', the 'zone' and the 'function'. In literary America, the trait of expression surpasses the image, the subject loses its selfhood in the zone of indiscernibility / imperceptibility and the function of the father loses authority. On the topic of the function, Deleuze writes that the 'psychoses' of American literature 'pursues its dream of establishing a function of universal fraternity that no longer passes through the father, but is built on the ruins of the paternal function'. Moreover, this dissolution of the father function creates a 'line of alliance or proximity that makes the woman a sister, and the other man, a brother, like the terrible "monkey-rope" uniting Ishmael and Queequeg as a married couple' (1997: 78).

Blood Brothers

If, as Deleuze and Guattari maintain, desiring-production and social production are 'one and the same', then an intensification of desires crisscrossing multiple fields would correspondingly vitalise social production (1983: 116). The 'recording surface of desire' is inscribed by the 'agent' of the family. The surface of the 'body without organs' is, on the other hand, impressed upon by non-familial 'genealogical networks' (1983: 120). From this position, Deleuze and Guattari propose alliance

as a means of creating social assemblages unfettered by familial prohibitions. This assemblage functions, instead, through the mechanism of desire. And it draws its power to compel through a consensual commitment to common purposes. Thus, by engineering a shift from bloodline to 'blood pact', Deleuze dares us to consider the heretofore-unimagined possibilities of 'blood brotherhood'. Blood brotherhood implies non-heredity friendships that are performatively realised, for instance, by the mingling of bodily fluids. The 'mixed blood' resulting in such acts urges a re-evaluation of categorical structures such as race. The category of race imposes boundaries on the potentiality of corporeality, 'fields of potential', whereby 'we pass from one field to another by crossing thresholds' (ibid.: 85). In modernity, blood itself has been classed and distributed along an array of cultural valuation and social hierarchy. The emergence of institutions created to keep races segregated follows close behind, situating ontogeny from a 'field of potential' to a plane of racist organisation.

Another remarkable feature of Deleuze's shift from bloodline to blood pact is precisely the emphasis on *pact*, the contract. Ishmael and Queequeg's matrimonial contract reflects specifically Whitmanesque attributes of camaraderie: '"Camaraderie" is the great word Whitman uses to designate the highest human relation, not by virtue of the totality of a situation but as a function of particular traits, emotional circumstances, and the "interiority" of the relevant fragments' (Deleuze 1997: 59). As two such fragments, Ishmael and Queequeg defy the sanctions of the society of sons and, in so doing, resist the totalising clutch of the patriarchal state. Ishmael and Queequeg illustrate a fraternal relation constituting a Deleuzian new universalism filled with men and women who vigorously pursue their own self-creation, their 'becoming', in unforeseen ways. Deleuze further de-genders the society of brothers by referring to women, as well as men, as swept up in a zone of indiscernibility: they are a 'community of celibates', which can then challenge the principles of woman as property and sister exchange (Deleuze 1997: 84–6). This 'community of celibates' corresponds to Deleuze and Guattari's 'celibate machine', which the authors claim is capable of 'forming a new alliance between the desiring machines and the body without organs so as to give birth to a new humanity or a glorious organism' (1983: 17). Deleuze's new universal, exhibited by both sexes, engages a multiplicity of sexual orientations and a multiplicity of sexual desires, and then gleefully dances on the grave of a mythic, monomaniacal, heteronormative father. For Deleuze, this disavowal of patriarchy perfectly parallels the break American literature made with the literature

of the Old World. The possibility of interracial, same-sex alliance is, in this sense, absolutely consistent with the as-of-yet unrealised promise of American democratic invention. Be what you desire. Act according to your being. Affirm yourself.

Commonality, Difference, Contract

In keeping with the spirit of innovation, I propose two hypotheses about commonality, difference and contract in relation to the society of sons and the society of brothers. First, although these concepts hail from different lineages, they are interchangeably used due to a shared semblance. Second, they can merge their distinct lineages through acts of grafting, through a form of conceptual miscegenation that mirrors racial miscegenation.

Ishmael and Queequeg's relationship illustrates Spinoza's idea of empowerment through alliance. Specifically, consider his philosophy of natural rights with an emphasis on utility. Spinoza writes, 'nothing, therefore, is more useful to man than man,' 'for if (for example) two individuals of the same nature are joined with each other, they constitute an individual which is twice as powerful as either' (2000: 240). Indeed, the individual's endeavour to persevere, his 'conatus', is made more 'efficacious' by agreement between all men such that

> the minds and bodies of all should as it were constitute one mind and one body, and that all should simultaneously endeavour, as far as they can, to preserve their own being, and that all should simultaneously look for the common advantage of all. (ibid.)

For Spinoza, the laws through which right is exercised exist within the 'natural condition' of a thing in itself to persevere as itself.

Before continuing, I propose a pre-emptive clarification of how to understand the concept multitude as it pertains to the society of sons and society of brothers. Recently, the concept of multitude has garnered a great deal of attention and distinguished itself as one of the most significant critical interventions from Italian thought at the turn of the last century (Virno and Hardt 1996). Two major figures making frequent recourse to the concept, Antonio Negri and Paolo Virno, do so specifically in relation to genealogical critiques of Spinoza *contra* Hobbes. Virno's work elaborates upon the Spinozist 'multitude' as opposed to the Hobbesian 'people'. The multitude reflects a diverse 'plurality' within the public which resists being collapsed into an undifferentiated mass of 'One' (Virno 2004: 21). For Virno, this multitude has a shared

biological basis which also 'becomes a historically determined way of being; ontology revealing itself phenomenologically' (ibid.: 98). It is the 'prevalent mode of being' today in that it describes the condition of the 'being-many' of individuals which comes to form a network-singularity.

Negri, writing alone and in collaboration with Michael Hardt, also distinguishes the multitude from the category of the people and associates the multitude with 'multiplicity', 'plurality' and 'singularity'. Negri's work insists that one of the socially transformative features associated with the multitude is its capacity to compound ontology with history and politics (Casarino and Negri 2008). Hardt and Negri also emphasise difference as a constitutive feature of the multitude. They describe the internal differences within the multitude in a tone reminiscent of Deleuze's argument about difference in *Difference and Repetition*. Hardt and Negri regard the multitude as composed of 'a set of *singularities* . . . whose difference cannot be reduced to sameness, a difference that remains different'. They contrast this to the Hobbesian and Lockean notion of 'people' whose constitutive parts are 'indifferent in their unity; they become an identity by negating or setting aside their differences' (Hardt and Negri 2004: 99).

Though typically not recognised as a contract theorist in a strict sense, Spinoza does inspire ideas for the basis of an ethical contract built around the needs of the multitude which is distinct from both a moral covenant and the liberal-humanist social contract. The liberal-humanist contract also follows an ethical, as opposed to moral, imperative. However, the form of social contract intended to remove humanity from a state of childlike dependence to a state of agreement has been seized and held captive under the cloak of state-sanctioned ideals. An ethical contract and a moral contract could mistakenly go misidentified as one and the same due to a shared semblance that allows them to 'pass' for one another indistinguishably. But, they could also form a united identity when a graft between the two bridges their disparate conceptual lineages. Let us suppose this to be so. For the purpose of bearing out the proposition of two ancestries, let us further visualise how the following might look in a Deleuzian landscape: an Oedipal, that is, primal horde, lineage is situated upon the plane of transcendence and an an-Oedipal, multitudinous, lineage dwells upon the plane of immanence. Let us also assume these lineages reflect two separate ways of coding social production and anti-production.

Let us further develop this genealogical model of Oedipal and an-Oedipal psychic inheritance and social formation by proposing that the plane of transcendence is susceptible to the totemic aura of the paternal

function. The absent-present father maintains the highest authority in this inherently tribal, endogamous realm through moral covenants. It follows that patriarchy, monarchy and theocracy are exemplary forms of social organisation on this plane, populated, as it were, by a society of sons. Correspondingly, the primal horde / society of sons preserves itself through the homosocial bond of sister exchange and through the heteronormative sexual prohibition. Commonality upon the Oedipal plane is determined by familial 'sameness'. That is to say, commonality is forged through shared identity, be it sanguinary, such as family, clan, race, tribe and so on, or ideological. Upon the transcendent plane, difference is held in opposition to commonality. Difference is also subject to a logic of sameness which subordinates it to what Deleuze (1994) refers to as 'the four iron collars of representation'.[7] Difference converts into the particular. The particular further refracts into a multiplicity of positions coded as identity.

Contrast the plane of transcendence to the plane of immanence whereupon the fraternal lineage dwells. Here, force and desire constitute the impulse of the social body, the society of brothers, whose fraternity is forged through affinity rather than common ancestry. In the transcendent realm, dread, guilt and fear are the invisible hands tracing the inscriptions of perpetual citations; the father's codes of prohibition indelibly mark the psyche. However, in this field of indeterminacy, the plane of immanence, promiscuity prompts new encounters. Exogamous, ethical alliances displace tribally bound filiation fortified through moral covenants.

Miscegenation between differing peoples is not transgressive. Indeed, Hardt and Negri explicitly refer to miscegenation as a 'virtue' of the multitude (2000: 361–2). Sorority, as well, is not perceived as a violation within a community that does not define itself through a homosocial bond or through sister exchange. As Spinoza's writings prepare us for, one possibility in this fiercely antinomian world is the absence of organisation. This, in turn, can lead to mob rule, disorder and despotic force. Yet another possible outcome, considering how the lineage of the society of brothers has been historically suppressed by the society of sons, is a revolt. This revolt holds the promise of intentional and ethical forms of political assemblage, alliance and agreement. Commonality, for the society of brothers, is based neither on blood relations nor on an allegiance to those vectors identified in Freud's Oedipal triangle. Commonality is forged within alliance. Alliance is stimulated by desire, utility and disposition. Commonality does not trample difference. Difference upon the immanent plane is affirmed in a-relational form, as singularity, rather than as an identity-based particular.

In summary: the sons' commonality is sanguinary, the brothers' is based on alliance; the sons' legacy of contract is founded on a moral covenant, the brothers' is based on ethics. The similarity between these two conceptual sets enables the sets to graft, leading to entirely new lineages. Thus, in the place of an ethical contract, a moral contract, haunted by the memory of a primal patriarch, can reattach itself to forms of democracy intended to break all ties to a father, god or monarch. In contrast, the purpose of an intentionally ethical contract would be to gain autonomy from these ideal, sovereign figures. The ethical contract would be based on consent, utility and invention; it would function through and be founded upon the needs of a 'commonwealth'.[8]

On an important note, despite the formal separation I am making between the moral contract and the ethical one, I am in no way implying that the ethical contract is somehow pure, true or ideal. Instead, my objective is to consider how an ethical contract might be used to fulfil the liberatory desires of a miscegenated populace. With this in mind, the following is clear. An ethical contract, dedicated to the principle of fraternal alliance, needs to embrace an ethics of difference, especially difference thought incongruously rather than oppositionally. Despite this, oppositional difference has left an oppressive legacy that demands attention. Oppositional difference has been used in dialectical form throughout modernity to privilege the heterosexual white male property owner, over his designated 'other', as the implied self and unmarked transcendental subject. The turn towards the particular within 'politics of difference' discourses has received much criticism. However, these discourses effectively challenge the ideological assumptions that privilege a historically raced and sexed subject passing itself off as universal. Thus, difference must, out of political necessity, contend with a history of the particular before it can embrace the singular with a genuinely egalitarian stance.

Conclusion

I have purposefully exploited the loaded term miscegenation for its literal, historically specific racial valence, and for describing interbreeding between politico-philosophical concepts. I do so in both cases because the term carries jarring overtones of impurity, transgression and categorical dissolution. Unlike 'hybridity', miscegenation signals a white / colour binary revealing the maintenance of asymmetrical power relations through racial exclusion (Young 1995). Thus, through their capacity to endure and flourish, miscegenated bodies and ideas provoke

innovative methods of subversion. Miscegenation illustrates how the most destabilising subversive coordinates are neither inside nor outside. They are in between points of alteric difference. Miscegenation not only indexes the virtues of difference, but reflects the tactical possibilities of indifference as well. Resistance happens not merely through opposition but also, and in some instances more effectively, through seemingly incongruous and wayward mergers, or grafts. These grafts join desiring-machines as desiring-machines follow their undetermined impulses for promiscuous connections. As Deleuze and Guattari write,

> desiring-machines . . . continually break down as they run, and in fact run only when they are not functioning properly: the product is always an off-shoot of production, implanting itself upon it like a graft, and at the same time the parts of the machine are the fuel that makes it run. (1983: 31)

Miscegenation is one such promiscuous graft trajectory connecting formerly unbecoming entities. The society of sons and the society of brothers are dissimilar, but there are moments of interconnection that can and do occur. This does not mean that miscegenation is inherently progressive. However, the society of brothers is not destined to become the society of sons when genetic swapping transpires. This is because the multitudinous, fraternal horde is already a miscegenated entity, increasing its magnitude and strength when accumulating internal differences. The society of brothers is realised through heterogenesis; their presence is testament to the 'monstrous power of alliance when alliance overturns filiation' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 540).

The concept of family, as well, is useful in so far as we recognise and abide by the desires of the family of invention instead of a family model entrenched in stagnant mythology.[9] This also holds true for the concept of race. Race is a category that has little revolutionary use; it is static, self-limiting and reproduces apparatuses of capture. Yet the invocation of race enables ways to identify and attack racism in its historical and its present forms. In *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*, Paul Gilroy calls for a 'politics of transfigura-tion' in order to deal with these antinomies. A 'politics of transfigura-tion' lays 'an emphasis on the emergence of qualitatively new desires, social relations, and modes of association within the racial community of interpretation and resistance *and* between that group and its erstwhile oppressors' (1993: 37).

Ishmael and Queequeg demonstrate just this form of transfiguration. This applies not only to their erotic and romantic predilections but also to the productive indifference they exhibit towards racial endogamy

and sexual morality. On a broader scale, a politics of transfiguration is necessary within a society endorsing utility and embracing difference. The reality of racism remains a problem for us all because structures of oppression, which function through racism, gain power that can eventually be used to wield against anyone, independent of race. 'Race is a biological myth, but a social reality.' Racism remains a legitimate concern for the society of brothers, persistent in its dedication to camaraderie.

Notes

1. The question of why I am analysing a book published a century and a half ago to describe contemporary arguments is anticipated by C. L. R. James in the middle of the last century: 'the question of questions is: how could a book from the world of 1850 contain so much of the world of the 1950's?' (1953: 69). James entertains this question as he is detained on Ellis Island as a direct consequence of the McCarran Walter Act. The McCarran Walter Act of 1952 was one of many amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1924, which set immigrant quotas on the basis of racial and ethnic origin in order to limit the immigration of 'inferior races' into the US. The McCarran Walter Act reformed some of the racial and ethnic biases of the INA and exclusion acts targeted directly at Chinese immigrants. On the other hand, this act also prohibited immigration from Africa and created ideological criteria for entry in the interest of fighting communism. Also keep in mind that James is writing this book during the period of the Korean War, the first war of the Cold War era and one that has never come to an official end. Melville is writing approximately a decade before the Civil War, or what James calls 'the first great War of Modern Times' (1953: 123).
2. For example, Robert Knox's *The Races of Man* is published in London and Philadelphia in 1850. Joseph de Gobineau publishes *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* in Paris in 1853. In the US, Josiah C. Nott publishes with George R. Glidden *Types of Mankind* in 1854, after publishing the article 'The mulatto, a hybrid – probable extermination of the two races if the whites and blacks are allowed to intermarry' in 1843 in the *American Journal of Medical Sciences*.
3. The primal horde myth has multiple points of origin. For example, in a footnote in *Totem and Taboo* Freud credits Atkinson and Darwin for helping to develop the primal horde myth (1950: 176).
4. Deleuze and Guattari eschew the model of the 'Oedipal triangle' in favour of an open field of vectors. They write that the shape of Oedipal influence is 'a poorly closed triangle, a porous or seeping triangle, an exploded triangle from which the flows of desire escape in the direction of other territories' (1983: 96).
5. See James Stachey's introduction to Freud's *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1962) for more on 'recapitulation theory'. Freud's articulation of this theory is preceded by the work of nineteenth-century German racial theorist and Darwinist Ernst von Haeckel.
6. See Cesare Casarino's analysis of the 'hieroglyphic' and 'meaningless' tattoos etched on Queequeg's skin (2002: 106).
7. See, especially, Chapter I and the Conclusion of Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* (1994) for more on 'the four iron collars of representation', which include identity (concept), opposition (predicate), analogy (judgment) and resemblance (perception).

8. In the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, Spinoza writes that, in the interest of 'security' and 'comfort', a commonwealth 'can only exist by the laws being binding on all' (1951: 13). In the *Political Treatise*, however, he concludes that 'a compact is only made valid by its utility, without which it becomes mull and void.' Moreover, 'every commonwealth has the right to break its contract' (1951: 204, 307).
9. Although I argue that a loosely defined concept of family can still be retained for its utility, others may not be so relaxed about the term. Consider Negri's comment, 'frankly, I cannot think of a type of relation that is worse than filiation. The family must be destroyed' (Casarino and Negri 2008: 118).

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Chapter 10

Love in a Cinematic Time of Race: Deleuze and Emergent Race-Intimacy Assemblages

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Beginning with the ending: a forlorn man steps out of a courthouse and into the wintery night. Upon crossing the road and hearing a voice call his name, he turns around. He sees a woman scampering up to him, bearing a look of gratitude. She asks if she may hold him; he replies with slight nods. Embracing him tightly, she whispers 'I'm so grateful for your gentle heart.' A few moments pass before she smiles and returns to her husband and children waiting outside the courthouse. The man glances at the reunited family. Then, as little more than a silhouette, he walks alone into the darkness of the night.

The closing scene of *Snow Falling on Cedars* (Scott Hicks, 1999; hereafter referred to as *Snow*) displays the apparent erasure of race and racism by the powers of love: Ishmael Chambers finally acquiesces to quotidian racisms and accepts the years-old dissolution of a romantic relationship with his childhood sweetheart, Hatsue Miyamoto. The ending is a strange exchange wherein one bundle of intimate attachments has replaced another; romantic love is crushed by racism which, in turn, is overcome by true love. In other words, race itself vanishes in this sentimental account of love.

But because I believe that race still matters to intimacy and that the film thinks so too, I engage with *Snow*, along with the work of Deleuze and Guattari, to cultivate a concept of 'emergent race-intimacy assemblage'. By its emphasis on materiality, 'assemblage' marks Deleuze and Guattari's uniqueness amongst theorisers of race and intimacy. Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 344) describe an assemblage as a 'fuzzy aggregate' aswarm with dissimilar elements and energies provisionally gathered in a degree of consistency which is nothing more than the concerted effect of their contact. Rather than merely a matter of discursive practices shaped by history and normatively enforced, race-intimacy assemblages are composed of vibrant materials in a world of becoming. Because com-

ponents of race-intimacy assemblages make contributions relative to each other, neither race nor intimacy materials, regardless of the potency of their force, solely determine the outcome of these transactions; race-intimacy assemblages do not materialise by predetermined plans.[1]

Race-intimacy emerges as an assemblage between the organisational imperatives of monochromatic romance and the ongoing intensive processes of inchoate interracial intimacies.[2] The film of emergent race-intimacy assemblages screened below makes two points. First, the anti-miscegenational demands of monochromatic romance fail to exhaust inchoate interracial intimacies; race does not get rid of intimacy. Second, sentimentalisations of love portray race as a stain to erase rather than as an essential element enabling and enabled by incipient intimacies; intimacy does not get rid of race.

One might say that the interplay between monochromatic romance and inchoate interracial intimacies renders emergent race-intimacy assemblages cinematic. Accordingly, this chapter inter-articulates its conceptualisation of emergent race-intimacy assemblages with Deleuze's comments on film, its organic and crystalline dimensions in particular. Monochromatic romance develops organically: time proceeds seemingly seamlessly and race-intimacy assembles in the couple-form. Alternatively, inchoate interracial intimacies gestate in protracted moments of time and burst forth as virtual flows that uncouple race-intimacy assemblages. Taking cues from *Snow*, this chapter charts cinematic constellations of emergent race-intimacy assemblages infused by those inchoate interracial intimacies dimly twinkling within the darkness of racisms shaded by monochromatic romance.

Monochromatic Romance and Organic Narration

A brief synopsis of *Snow*. In San Piedro, Washington, nine years after Japan's bombing of Pearl Harbor, Kazuo Miyamoto, a Japanese American, is held on trial for the murder of Carl Heine, a Euro-American of German descent. Ishmael Chambers, a white reporter covering the trial afire with racial prejudice, retains strong lingering feelings for Hatsue, the Japanese wife of Kazuo. The film's narrative unfolds with interwoven flashbacks: Ishmael's and Hatsue's growing-up in a climate saturated by racial in/tolerance and tension; the outbreak of World War II along with episodes in it; and the development and decomposition of Ishmael and Hatsue's romantic relationship. Ishmael remains painfully chained to his romantic persuasions, which restrain him from stepping forward with evidence he discovers that would exonerate Kazuo.

Reflection leads Ishmael to unhinge his attachments to Hatsue and produce the evidence vindicating Kazuo, after which the film ends with the scene sketched above.

Following a story of monochromatic romance, *Snow*'s narrative imbricates race-intimacy assemblages and an 'organic' regime of film. According to Deleuze (1989: 126–7), the organic regime presents a plot that is merely traced by the camera, establishes causal and logical storyline continuities, and frames the actions of characters as disclosures of narrative truth. Monochromatic romance within an organic regime of cinema follows an explanatory trajectory in which racial characters and their intimate stories function as base units of narrativity. Race-intimacy assemblages become co-opted by the couple-form to broadcast episodes of love's triumphs, failures and regroupings wherein race matters only as racism – a barrier to love that, strangely yet sweetly, crumbles because of love if it is true enough. Monochromatic romance antithetically renders and narratively resolves race and intimacy by the organic dimension of race-intimacy assemblages.

Organic narration of monochromatic romance proceeds through a segmentation of race-intimacy assemblages and the spaces inhabited by characters. *Snow* exhibits this race-intimacy segmentarity by tracking Ishmael and Hatsue across various locales; the film reel threads through, among other spaces, a courthouse, home rooms, forests and internment camps. Segmentarity materialises as spatial fault lines whereby characters of the couple-form act and react, bargaining with the relative durability and elasticity of monochromatic romance in different spaces. In the organic regime, montage manages these topological segmentations and character performances, thus signalling the various manifestations of monochromatic romance within disparate spaces across the narrative arc.

The organic dimension of race-intimacy assemblages is targeted by practices of policing framed by the spaces in which they emerge. In one scene of *Snow*, a street in San Piedro hosts a Strawberry Festival Parade highlighted by Hatsue, the crowned Strawberry Princess. Although spectators seemingly celebrate what Ishmael's father describes as 'racial harmony', racial boundaries have become deterritorialised only marginally, evident in their reterritorialisation upon the continued surveillance of proper gazing. In a montage sequence tracking a conversation of countenances, the camera closes in on Ishmael's face that is looking longingly; shifts to a close-up of Hatsue who, cheerfully waving to the crowd, notices Ishmael's look, by which her grin fades and her face turns away; and captures Ishmael's mother disapprovingly glaring at her son's desirous gaze. For race-intimacy assemblages, heightened sensitivity to

and scrutiny of the shape, direction, duration and affections of gazes persist despite or precisely due to the allocation of some interracial intermingling disallowed in other spaces by stark segregation and the consequent conduct of proximity, tactility, attention and attraction (as depicted in scenes aboard a school bus wherein Japanese and white students sit on opposite sides, looking in different directions).

When attending to the resonances between race and space, we thus note a third rhyming term: face. White walls of racism and black holes of miens allow and regulate intimate activities within permissible 'degrees of deviance' from the faciality of monochromatic romance, the unspoken normative backdrop staging the play of race-intimacy. Deleuze and Guattari note that a white wall designates a relative 'redundancy' effected by '*signifiance*', or the interplay of signifiers that, with 'consciousness' and 'passion', congeals as substantial subjectivities in a black hole (1987: 167). The faciality of monochromatic romance screens, in part, which and how differently coloured faces may meaningfully shape their expressions and gazes in relation to each other; more broadly, it facialises bodies through and through, regulating all their relational comportments and interactions by multitudinous forms of sense surveillance. The racist frame of the faciality of monochromatic romance 'propagates waves of sameness' that drown those race-intimacy assemblages unable to surf the norm (ibid.: 178).

Note that the faciality of monochromatic romance does not simply couple together those of the same race and opposite sex at the expense of all other permutations of race-intimacy. Assemblages of the faciality of monochromatic romance abound: in *Snow*, race-intimacy becomes homosocial, intergenerational and familial by varying degrees of encouragement, acceptance and tolerance. At times, the faciality of monochromatic romance may even begrudgingly condone interracial romances and queer encounters. The faciality of monochromatic romance first determines the 'units' of race-intimacy with which it deals and then 'assumes a role of selective response' to snap together those units into race-intimacy assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 177). Rather than belonging to particular personae, the faciality of monochromatic romance charts grids of 'frequency or probability' that strategically 'neutralise in advance' all those manifestations of race-intimacy uncooperative with its chief determinations (ibid.: 168). Thick striations exhaust tendencies toward inappropriate interracial intimacies by amplifying their centripetal pull toward the faciality of monochromatic romance through fortification of white walls of racism and densification of black holes of miens.

The faciality of monochromatic romance resonates with the land-scapity of segmented spaces to materialise race-intimacy assemblages differently. *Snow* confirms this inter-articulation of faciality and land-scapity by depicting spaces of nature, in contrast with the striated town, as supple, smooth and hence favourable to the potential emergence of alternative race-intimacy configurations. The film's cinematography renders nature as open, unpeopled and unsurveilled; the camera captures the pristine landscape of the Pacific Northwest, the calm grandeur of towering trees enveloped in snowy whiteness, and mountains, lakes and forests shaded by misty grey and sunny haze. In nature, the cover from urban scrutiny goes appreciated by Ishmael and Hatsue; in their youth, they often withdrew from the town to a hollow at the base of a cedar tree where offshoots of the faciality of monochromatic romance blossomed. In the hollow, tender activities of intimacy seem to smoothen space and crush race by the powers of love's blindness, which does not see the white walls of racism and shines through the black holes of miens. The hollow scenes confirm that, within the organic regime of cinema, the conditions of emergence for race-intimacy assemblages are differentially distributed across various spaces.

In film, the close-up shot frames faces as shifting landscapes. Deleuze and Guattari observe that film's close-up shots initiate an intimate 'complementarity' of faciality and landscapity: 'The close-up in film treats the face primarily as a landscape; that is the definition of film, black hole and white wall' (1987: 172). The potentialities of race-intimacy become evident in this correlation between face and landscape. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, 'the face has a correlate of great importance: the landscape, which is not just a milieu but a deterritorialized world.' Close-up shots, or what Deleuze calls 'affection-images', unleash bodily surfaces 'from spatial-temporal coordinates in order to call forth the pure affect as the expressed' (1986: 96). Accordingly, affection-images of monochromatic romance attend to the 'tiny local movements' shading racial specificity and shaping affective comportment (ibid.: 87).

The smoothness of space thus correlates with the smoothness of face in the emergence of race-intimacy assemblages. Film reflects such in its montage sequences which juxtapose embodied space with the spatiality of embodiment, tracking the striate and smooth proclivities of race-intimacy situated in space (medium shots) and inscribing the negotiation of those forces on bodyscapes (close-up shots). This cinematic technique attends to molecular flows and their molarisation. In most instances, intensive molecularities tend to coagulate relatively within immanent 'limits' (what effects a 'necessary rebeginning') to form

molarised states of monochromatic romance (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 438). At other times, they flow messily through 'thresholds' (points of 'inevitable change'), which lack definitive discernibility, to emerge via inchoate interracial intimacies. Within smooth space, race-intimacy assemblages potentially generate new moods, performances and postures by alternately testing the elasticity of its rigid segments and smoothing its supple segments in experiments with inchoate interracial intimacies unseen and unforeseen by the faciality of monochromatic romance.

A view dichotomously parsing space by rigid striations and supple smoothness would, however, problematically purify the latter of any remnants and segments of monochromatic romance. Deleuze and Guattari remind us that a 'simple opposition' between striated and smooth space occludes the multifarious 'passages' between and 'combination' of the two (1987: 500). Smooth space, marked by proclivities to striation, is the arena where 'life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new obstacles, invents new paces, switches adversaries'. Accordingly, as the conjunction of rhizomatic and arborescent impulses, smooth spaces (exemplified in *Snow* by the hollow, where trunk meets roots) are sites less of guaranteed rupture than of brief relief; they pulsate with time and room for respite from, meditation upon and the potential smoothing of the striations drawn by the faciality of monochromatic romance. Smooth space opens opportunities to 'stand battle' (ibid.: 189) against rigid striations of the white walls of racism and black holes of miens, and to explore the suppleness of racial affinity.

Rather than mapping space alone, cartographies of segmentarity by which race-intimacy assemblages emerge must first track time. Deleuze and Guattari remind us that, rather than reductively spatial, segmentarity appears in two distinct rhythmical modes: 'rigid' and 'supple' (ibid.: 213ff). Importantly, the rigid and the supple are not opposed as simple spatial or ontological properties since the former is infused by the latter; supple segments oscillate without necessarily tearing the limited elasticity of the rigid segments they tense up. But while rigid segments attain a relative stability that enables their policing, the microscopic fluctuations of supple segments potentially orchestrate the cataclysmic crescendo that disrupts the melody, by and into which rigid segments apparently harmonise. Accordingly, race-intimacy assemblages become refashioned periodically; they attain varying degrees of immutability (rigid lines) and flexibility (supple lines) by the faciality of monochromatic romance while occasionally accelerating into modes of creative activity (lines of flight) through inchoate interracial intimacies. Segmentarity sets the

temporal rhythms of race-intimacy assemblages for which spatialisation is only secondary.

The transformations of race-intimacy assemblages thus become chronicled as a temporally linear narrative of monochromatic romance that the organic regime of film offers to tell. Organic narration traces the effects of monochromatic romance on couples: racism's eventual triumph over intimacy, then the eventual nullification of racism by true love. It proceeds causally, displaying clearly what happens to the characters of race-intimacy assemblages in different spaces as successional time marches on.

For example, *Snow* organically narrates Hatsue's surrender of race-intimacy potentialities to an increasingly rigidified segmentarity of monochromatic romance. Through a letter, she rescinds her romantic relationship with Ishmael and later marries Kazuo. A scene depicting the marital ceremony and aftermath both pens Hatsue's love story and pins Hatsue to a molarised race-intimacy assemblage, sentimentally outlined and monochromatically coloured: the film exhibits the young Hatsue, being 'taught' to be Japanese by her mother, wearing in her hair a wedding pin captured in the camera's next shot; and when Hatsue and Kazuo first have sex, Hatsue whispers that she has not done 'it' before and that Kazuo is her 'only', thereby erasing her racial history and sentimentally sealing the sex scene through the gift of virginity. A race-intimacy assemblage of monochromatic romance has emerged.

But organic narratives of monochromatic romance twist strangely by the sweetness of sentimentality. Rather than allowing racism the final word in its stories, monochromatic romance welcomes a sentimental turn by summoning that love which can conquer racism. Ishmael's noble sacrifice – discarding his hopes in Hatsue and producing the evidence exonerating Kazuo – marks interracial romance as a bittersweet failure by the racist torrents of monochromatic romance in a world, envisioned by Hatsue, in which 'things end'. But here something beats and bleeds on, impassioned by a blind, true love that is compensation for the loss of the potentialities of inchoate interracial intimacies.

Monochromatic romance is racist and sentimentalist. If race-intimacy has lost, it is because racism has won. And if racism simultaneously loses, it is because sentimentality claims the day.

Inchoate Interracial Intimacies and Crystalline Compositions

Film may disapprove of monochromatic romance's racist or sentimental hijacking of race-intimacy assemblages by its organic dimension. Film

is more than narration and representation; it is composition and creation. While its organic narration of monochromatic romance mobilises images and montage to trace a linear story, a film renders race-intimacy much more messy and complex through its crystalline composition. The crystalline facet of race-intimacy assemblages turns away from monochromatic romance, and toward inchoate interracial intimacies.

In contrast with the organic regime of film, the 'crystalline regime' doesn't concern itself with 'truthful narration' (Deleuze 1989: 126, 133). It openly exhibits its non-reflexive, constitutive operations, detaches images from causal connections and suspends the capacities of characters to act and react readily. Race-intimacy assemblages no longer inhabit a simple story of love's development, dissolution and determination because, in the crystalline regime, there is no story to tell. Hostile to causal narration, a crystalline torsion of temporality loops back on itself through dips into the past that are not triggered narratively. Those dips flash as images of 'disconnected places and de-chronologized moments', which are spots of the past preserved in the present (ibid.: 133). These images declare their independence from causal sequences of narrativity and assert their own presence. Crystalline cinema sidesteps and interferes with any truthful narration spun organically through smooth transitions in space and a chronological succession of time, of race-intimacy as monochromatically romantic. Instead of simply unfolding a monochromatic love plot, film may, through its crystalline composition, 'falsify' the narrative present of race-intimacy assemblages.

Films discontent with organically narrating race-intimacy assemblages as arrangements of monochromatic romance are 'Bergsonist' because inchoate interracial intimacies are themselves Bergsonist.[3] Drawn to the virtualities of race-intimacy recalcitrant to actualisation as monochromatic romances, crystalline film enacts 'jumps' into 'sheets of past' (Deleuze 1989: 99). These filmic leaps recur because the virtualities of race-intimacy do not depend for their reality on any actualised monochromatic romance explicated through the narrative present; they are 'real without being actual' (ibid.: 96). Accordingly, the crystalline composition of film actualises virtual race-intimacy assemblages not by 'resemblance and limitation' (organic operations) but by 'divergence' and 'creation' (ibid.: 97). Rather than deviating from actualised instances of the faciality of monochromatic romance (recall that faciality functions through its constitution of acceptable degrees of deviation), the creative difference of race-intimacy emerges through crystals between the virtualities of inchoate interracial intimacies and actualised race-intimacy assemblages. If monochromatic romance develops organically, then the

virtualities of race-intimacy falsify any truthful narration through leaps into sheets of past.

In cinema, therefore, race-intimacy assemblages emerge through leaps into sheets of past effected by and in 'crystal-images'. According to Deleuze, crystal-images form 'small internal circuit[s]' between actual and virtual images, which remain distinct while exchanging roles (1989: 69). The crystal-image thus becomes the contact point between actualities of monochromatic romance and virtualities of inchoate interracial intimacies. It links and intersperses the actualised present of monochromatic romance with the virtual past of inchoate interracial intimacies in 'pure optical and sound situations' dislodged from narratives of race-intimacy assemblages (ibid.: 47). This shuffling of the actual and the virtual in sequences of crystal-images thus allows montage to deliver an 'order of non-chronological coexistences' incongruent with successional temporalities (ibid.: 111). Leaps into sheets of past depart the chronological time underpinning the organic regime of monochromatic romance and, from the present moment swelling with the preserved past, tap into inchoate interracial intimacies. Crystal-images bring monochromatic romance and inchoate interracial intimacies into contact and conversation to allow new race-intimacy assemblages to emerge.

Through crystal-images, cinema thus presents pure optical and sound situations in which the characters of monochromatic romance no longer know how to act and react. Deleuze writes that pure optical and sound situations neither spill into nor flow from action (ibid.: 18). Overwhelmed by the fecund present, characters captured within such situations become incapacitated. No longer 'agents' capable of functioning fluently within a segmented spatiotemporal milieu of monochromatic romance, characters become 'seers' of inchoate interracial intimacies (ibid.: 128). These seers do not actually view inchoate interracial intimacies; rather than seeing the imperceptible-made-perceptible, they sense the limits of perceptibility under the organic regime of monochromatic romance. Seers are former agents who are blasted blind by the immensity of time; they are no longer able to see through the visual frames clocked by the chronological time of monochromatic romance. Befuddled and bedazzled within the sonic and visual dimensions of inchoate interracial intimacies, seers, for the moment, no longer retain the 'sensory-motor schemata' to operate within a monochromatically romantic world (ibid.: 20).

Hence pure optical and sound situations of inchoate interracial intimacies release race-intimacy assemblages from subsumption to characters of the couple-form. As an assemblage, race-intimacy is a nebula

thickened by multiple, momentary resonances between its intensive forces and materials occupying and overflowing the same charged slice of time. The organic regime of monochromatic romance assimilates these race-intimacy materials as the props and playthings of human couples enjoying an existence independent of those enhancing elements. But race-intimacy is a matter neither primarily nor only about humans. Within the crystalline regime of inchoate interracial intimacies, race-intimacy materials of all sorts retain their own potency. Rather than the sugar and spice topping the couple-form, race-intimacy materials shimmer and shimmy alongside and with any (number of) humans they happen to sweep up and whisk away. Race-intimacy assemblages are not simply the components of relationships in the couple-form; if there are couples, it is only by dint of being aggregated as such by the race-intimacy assemblages into which they enter. The pure optical and sound situations of inchoate interracial intimacies dislodge human agents of monochromatic romance from participation in the couple-form and spread race-intimacy through diverse non-human materials.

A pure optical and sound situation that unveils Hatsue's break-up letter to Ishmael well illustrates these points. Although the scene begins narratively with Hatsue reading her letter aloud, Hatsue's voice becomes a voiceover as the camera meanders, leaping into various sheets of past to locate race-intimacy across various topographies – spaces and faces – and chronographies. The soundtrack becomes multitemporally polyvocal, a clamorous composite of an orchestral suite full of anguish, the screams of children and echoes of Hatsue's oration. The lines of the letter register through occasional repetition and overlap, at different cadences and with moments of inaudibility. In her letter, Hatsue notes that she loved and did not love Ishmael at the same moment – contradictory feelings magnetised by the race-intimacy materials of memories, a cedar tree, rubbings bodies, felt phenotypes, the sounds of a heartbeat and emotive proximity. She does not mention race and racism, though the film earlier shows the two eroding the confidence of her feelings for Ishmael. A crystal-image displays Hatsue, a solemn seer, gazing into the camera with a tear, a tiny crystal, frozen on her cheek. She loves and does not love in the same 'crystal of time' in which a race-intimacy assemblage is emerging (Deleuze 1989: 82).

Crystals of time signal potential detachment from monochromatic romance without detailing the race-intimacy assemblage to emerge. Nels, the defence lawyer to Kazuo, surmises that 'it takes a rare thing, a turning point, to free oneself from any obsession, be it prejudice or hate or . . . even love.' Detachment from obsession is a turning point –

an 'event', or the intrusion into an actual state of affairs of virtualities that cannot be fully tamed because of a 'shadowy and secret part' that persists independent of any actual form (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 156). There is no specific consolation prize for forfeiting the game of love; the event of detachment nudges a race-intimacy assemblage to the threshold between monochromatic romance and the vast unknown of an inchoate interracial intimacy. Crystals of time bring into dialogue monochromatic romance and inchoate interracial intimacies without planning how they part ways. Floods of inchoate interracial intimacies effecting events of detachment do not determine the form of emergent race-intimacy assemblages.

There may be some modest agentic role for humans in the formation of race-intimacy assemblages. Nels continues: 'Accident rules every corner of the universe. Except maybe . . . the chambers of the human heart.' *Snow* proposes that race-intimacy links a broad universe to the depths of the heart wherein its bearer may play a part ('chambers' refers to both that pocket of the heart and Ishmael Chambers). Race-intimacy spans materials by a 'Universe fiber' that, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 249) propose, 'constitutes a line of flight or of deterritorialisation' with which one may experiment to fashion new race-intimacy assemblages. Interwoven with every strand of race-intimacy, accident initiates detachment from monochromatic romance but might not rule the chambers of the heart from which new race-intimacy assemblages emerge through creative cultivation.[4]

The chambers of the heart remain sensitive to, enrich and energise the potentialities of race-intimacy materials rather than absorbing them into the couple-form of monochromatic romance. Importantly, the heart's chambers are not judicial. Judgment, by its fidelity to monochromatic romance, 'prevents the emergence of any new mode of existence' of race-intimacy (Deleuze 1997: 135). Instead, the chambers of the heart, by its parliamentary air, may produce decisions. A 'decision', according to Deleuze, 'springs vitally from a whirlwind of forces that leads us into combat' that is resolved without being suppressed or ended (ibid.: 134). It loosens engagements with monochromatic romance by 'supplement[ing] force with force and enrich[ing] whatever it takes hold of' (ibid.: 133). Combat with the faciality of monochromatic romance does not demand the definitive departure from its lingering terms (as if the past could, against our Bergsonist remarks above, simply be past). Rather, it means experimentation with the limits and thresholds of monochromatic romance by heeding the potential for tapping into inchoate interracial intimacies. Rather than an organ issuing judgments by decree

of monochromatic romance, the chambers of the heart generate decisions that electrify emergent race-intimacy assemblages.

The chambers of the heart may be relatively and provisionally privileged amongst other assemblages along the Universe fibre only by its 'latitudinal' axis. 'Longitudinally', the chambers of the heart are situated within the Universe fibre stringing together 'particle aggregates' into race-intimacy assemblages, by variable degrees of 'speeds and slownesses' and differential coefficients of 'movements and rest' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 256). If the molecularities of inchoate interracial intimacies flow through the chambers of the heart as nothing but tiny trickles, it is because, at the moment, the capacities of emergent race-intimacy assemblages remain contained and weakened by the faciality of monochromatic romance's consolidation of race-intimacy materials; Deleuze and Guattari insist that, to every longitudinal relation, 'there corresponds a degree of power' – a latitude – designating an assemblage's capacities within and amongst other assemblages (ibid.: 256). Continually combatting the forces of racism and sentimentality latitudinally heightens the chambers of the heart in the formation of emergent race-intimacy assemblages not surrendered to the terms and times of monochromatic romance.

The chambers of the heart elevate to new latitudes through its longitudinal engagement with crystals of time. Importantly, the consolidation of race-intimacy materials into compositional patterns with longitudinal relations is a temporal affair. As Deleuze and Guattari observe, the emergence of race-intimacy assemblages partakes of 'elements and particles, which do or do not arrive fast enough to effect a passage, a becoming or jump' (1987: 255). These jumps between assemblages happen 'because there are always elements that do not arrive on time, or arrive after everything is over'. In other words, the events of detachment from assemblages of monochromatic romance and emergence of new race-intimacy assemblages are untimely matters. To create a new race-intimacy assemblage, the chambers of the heart attend to, extract and cultivate those race-intimacy materials that arrived too late or too early to become absorbed by the faciality of monochromatic romance and its narrative time. These untimely materials – molecular flows of inchoate interracial intimacies – are real without being actual, the past preserved as virtualities in the present coloured by monochromatic romance, the incipient future. They vibrate subtly in crystals of time that offer the potential for new race-intimacy assemblages to emerge.

The crystalline dimension of race-intimacy assemblages thereby faces the body-without-organs (BwO) of interracial intimacy. The BwO of

interracial intimacy vibrates with 'dynamic tendencies involving energy transformation and kinetic movement' that elude appropriation by the faciality of monochromatic romance and transform race-intimacy assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 153). It is in the chambers of the heart attuned to the BwO of interracial intimacy that race-intimacy buzzes as 'nonstratified, unformed, intense matter' yet to be actualised in and as concrete assemblages. The faciality of monochromatic romance assembles race-intimacy materials such that racism kills romantic intimacy and sentimental intimacy erases race. Upon the BwO of interracial intimacy, on the other hand, race-intimacy materials resonate together such that both race and intimacy matter in the assemblages emergent therefrom; neither race nor intimacy is rid of the other.

The BwO of interracial intimacy and assemblages of monochromatic romance thus exist in different times. Whereas monochromatic romance comports with organic narration and its successional time, the BwO of interracial intimacy, by its crystalline composition, dwells in the preserved past and the incipient future. Crystals of time form a circuit between the faciality of monochromatic romance and the BwO of interracial intimacy to open a passage by which new kinds of sociality, charged by the materials of inchoate interracial intimacies, may emerge.

Love and Emergent Race-Intimacy Assemblages

I introduce the notion of the BwO of interracial intimacy because it redeems love from monochromatic romance:

> What does it mean to love somebody? It is always to seize that person in a mass, extract him or her from a group, however small, in which he or she participates, whether it be through the family only or through something else; then to find that person's own packs, the multiplicities he or she enclosed within himself or herself which may even be of an entirely different nature. To join them to mine, to make them penetrate mine, and for me to penetrate that person's . . . *Every love is an exercise in depersonalisation on a body without organs yet to be formed* and it is at the highest point of this depersonalisation that someone can be named. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 35; emphasis mine)[5]

This type of love cares not for organic development, chronological time, characters in the couple-form or monochromatic romance. Instead, it unhinges couples, depersonalising and joining them to packs of unformed matter in experiments that may form new ways of being together.

Love unearths crystals of time. It is neither emotive comportment nor sentimental relation, normative performance nor discursive practice in successional time. Love is a depersonalising affair in the chambers of the heart attuned to a BwO of interracial intimacy 'yet to be formed' – a BwO existing virtually, yet to be actualised in and as a race-intimacy assemblage. Depersonalisation marks detachment from the organic regime of monochromatic romance and signals the specific situation of materials within the crystalline regime of inchoate interracial intimacies; it subtracts, extracts, connects and creates from virtualities flowing as molecularities that arrive too early or too late to the narrative present of monochromatic romance. Love energises practices attendant to the past preserved in the present bursting with untapped elements of raciality.

Cinematic renditions and enactments of love address cinematographic art's task of 'contributing to the invention of a people' (Deleuze 1989: 217). To the faciality of monochromatic romance, the people of inchoate interracial affect are 'missing': 'there are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 178). Because the white walls of racism and black holes of miens germinate in every degree of deviation from their governing norms, attempts to secure a sentimental story of love make minorities of their proponents within the majoritarian order of monochromatic romance. Rather than a statistical superiority, 'majority' for Deleuze and Guattari refers to a 'constant' or 'standard measure' from which deviations, or minorities, are drawn (ibid.: 105). While generally informed by the majoritarian order of monochromatic romance, minorities become more than simply subordinates by mining their 'crystals of becoming', which are crystals of time (ibid.: 206). They become enriched precisely by a becoming-minoritarian through which they detach from monochromatic romance and its majoritarian-defined minorities (ibid.: 106, 291). The crystalline regime of film does more than enact non-chronological time; its crystal-images present crystals of becoming that can create peoples of love.

Becoming-love – the becoming-minoritarian of race-intimacy – cultivates an emergent race-intimacy assemblage not determined by the terms and times of conventional romance. Rather than carving out cavities within molarised race-intimacy assemblages to be populated with new subjectivities and significations, becoming-love maintains its basis in the BwO of interracial intimacy to create social relations directly from molecular materials. Because it does not follow a preplanned programme, becoming-love entails a temporal trajectory that is neither teleological nor predictable. Detaching from successional time, it steps out into the unknown of inchoate interracial affection and indulges in

the non-chronological forking of time. The process of inventing race-intimacy assemblages reveals neither a predetermined terminal point nor a predictable rhythm by which it proceeds.

Indeed, experimental engagements with becoming-love may end in a recommitment to romantic convention just as it may sustain inchoate interraciality. *Snow* reflects this indeterminacy in some crystal-images that could be called 'recollection-images', by which leaps into sheets of the past reinvigorate 'psychological states' or a 'consciousness' loyal to the monochromatic present (Deleuze 1989: 80).[6] One scene infusing the narrative present with memories contains such an indeterminate image, which depicts Ishmael pausing in the hollow, contemplating the past and whether to cling to or let go of his affections for Hatsue. Ishmael is shaded as nothing but a silhouette. Only a shadow of a character remains, and we know not whether it will be coloured by monochromatic romance or inchoate interracial intimacies. The indiscernibility between crystal-image and recollection-image cinematically reflects the unpredictability of the outcomes of experimenting with the BwO of interracial intimacy. There may be a 'stratific proliferation' of monochromatic romance, 'too-violent destratification' (as when Ishmael attempts to discard his life) or the 'construction of a plane of consistency' prolonging the emergence of new race-intimacy assemblages without climactic resolution (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 165).

Experimentations with becoming-love are ethical and aesthetic engagements with the matters of racial formations whirling within a time whose vicissitudes promise neither recommitment to nor detachment from hegemonic love. Such an approach to race-intimacy along organic and crystalline dimensions cultivates sensitivity to molecular flows of race-intimacy materials potentially pertinent to the formation of a new politics; as Deleuze and Guattari write, 'we can be thrown into a becoming by anything at all, by the most unexpected and insignificant of things' (ibid.: 292). Inchoate interracial intimacies accumulate as virtual, unformed morsels within the fecund present. They may be ingested by the racism or facial sentimentality of monochromatic romance to fortify traditional patriarchy. But the chambers of the heart compose a many-splendoured thing. Inchoate interracial intimacies therein assemble themselves in enchanting, sublime and surprising ways. The chambers of the heart orchestrate an emerging race-intimacy assemblage from a tree, a scent of cedar, war atmospheres and courtroom climates, fleeting and sustained glances, a sacrifice and a smile, the postures and conduct of compassion and fairness, sheets of snow and sheets of past, and a hug overflowing with intensities. Love.

Leap into a sheet of past: he is relieved of his obsessions with romance. He leaves the closed courthouse courting racism and starts to depart into the night. The call of his name halts his walk. She, no longer his, scurries up to him, pursues him for once, though he had pursued her for so long. Her face gifts a look she has not given him before: deep appreciation. She requests an embrace that he once requested. She clasps him tightly for a few seconds as her tender words delicately grace his ear. Standing back, she smiles before returning to her family. He sees this and, seemingly satisfied, turns toward and wanders into the depths of the night ahead. They are uncoupled. But as the snow faintly falls on cedars, they float on, amidst a mist of love, adrift across this Universe.

Acknowledgements

Notes

1. I have learned to think about the materiality of race primarily from Arun Saldanha (2006, 2007) and Jasbir Puar (2007). For thoughts on materiality in regard to vibrant matter and a world of becoming, see Jane Bennett (2010) and William Connolly (2011).
2. I am more interested in the lures and tendencies by which race-intimacy assemblages emerge than the particular materials involved, which are innumerable and ungraspable. Accordingly, I do not definitively demarcate the components of emergent race-intimacy assemblages. In this chapter, 'emergent race-intimacy assemblage' incubates as an embryonic ambition with 'irregular contours' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 35). To this end, the concept of concepts opened by Deleuze and Guattari proves useful. Rather than ascending to the authority of transcendent truths, concepts periodically transform by furnishing immanent connections with other concepts (ibid.: 19). At stake is how 'emergent race-intimacy assemblage' attains conceptual efficacy with other concepts elaborated here.
3. Here, I refer to Deleuze's attention in *Bergsonism* (1988) and *Cinema 2* (1989) to the relationship between the actual and the virtual, the present and the past.
4. I conspicuously drop 'human' from Nels's 'chambers of the human heart' to highlight the not-so-human dimension of race-intimacy assemblages.
5. Many thanks to Jason Adams for bringing to light this lovely passage.
6. I am indebted to Jairus Grove's incisive reaction to a draft of this chapter, in which he rightly points out that the organic and crystalline dimensions of *Snow* sit closer than I had presented. Jairus reads the leaps into sheets of past as recollection-images presented at traumatic moments that drive forward the narrative. I agree,

in part. While some of the film's leaps into the past do reinstate psychological subjectivities and narrative trajectories, other ones, that capture disconnected spaces and de-chronologised moments, do not. Jairus's point is well taken, and the image I describe in this paragraph reflects a moment when the recollection-image and the crystal-image, the organic and the crystalline, blend together.

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Chapter 11

The Eternal Return of Race: Reflections on East European Racism

Suzana Milevska and Arun Saldanha

This chapter is an attempt to explain the political and conceptual difficulties which arise when conceiving the possibility of something returning as the same, as opposed to the emergence of something completely new. Taking as our starting point Gilles Deleuze's interpretation of the Nietzschean concept of eternal return, we will address the revival of nationalist populism in Europe today to judge whether we are seeing a return of the 'very same' racist phenomena under the regimes of eugenics, the genocides and displacements associated with the Nazi military state, and the violent demise of European empires, or whether they are qualitatively new. In Nietzsche's German, *ewige Wiederkunft* suggests the arriving-again from an eternal realm specific to the living. Indeed, *ewig* has Indo-European roots pertaining to life (related to *eon*; Greek *aion*, lifetime, vital force; Sanskrit *ayu*, life). Life is the eternal and always ambiguous struggle of the different against the inertia of the same. For humans, the possible return of Auschwitz is the most intense site of this struggle.

We also want to ask how the reawakened authoritarian conservatism of Eastern Europe follows from its post-Communist economic situation. It is obvious that nationalism and racism today seem to operate very well with neoliberal capitalism. Whether subtly or blatantly, the workings of normative whiteness and racist essentialism are visible in processes ranging from urban regeneration to the commodification of sporting events, the handling of refugees, the relentless promotion of the creative industries and tourism, widespread unemployment and the current restructuring of the European Union (EU). Some artistic responses to the resurgence of racism and the displacement policies in Eastern Europe and the Balkans will be discussed to extend their affects, hoping they are capable of overcoming the profoundly reactionary resentment that has taken over Europe.

It is helpful to follow Slavoj Žižek's advice that, if it is to be politically committed, Deleuzian aesthetics does not merely provide cultural-historical context for understanding art but should rather help *defamiliarise* oneself in order to intervene in the absolutism of, for example, a nation-state like Serbia:

> Against this historicist commonplace, a Deleuzian counter-claim would be not only that too much of a historical context can blur the proper contact with a work of art (i.e., that, in order to enact this contact, one should abstract from the work's context); even more, it is, rather, the work of art itself which provides a context enabling us to properly understand a given historical situation. If, today, someone were to visit Serbia, the direct contact with raw data there would leave him confused. If, however, he were to read a couple of literary works and see a couple of representative movies, they would definitely provide the context that would enable him to locate the raw data of his experience. (2004: 15)

Though there is much to disagree with in Žižek's Hegelianising of Deleuze, we can side with the antisociologistic impetus of this statement. Deleuze's empiricism is, after all, transcendental, not positivist. What counts in art are the timeless, placeless affects that can be summoned against the status quo.

Learned racist discourse today is usually quite sophisticated, often disguised and transformed into either a call for new values of productivity (as in neoconservative capitalism), or an anti-imperialist call for a return to roots and authenticity (nationalism). Both justify chauvinist statements and actions by economic and racial 'majorities' in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense. Racism has to be understood structurally, as held together by what threatens to escape its grip. Hence what is marginalised – the homeless, the insane, the addicted, the jobless, the infected, the illiterate, the elderly – is actually central to the system. However, how the system works has to be obfuscated. We are interested therefore in the position of Roma in Eastern Europe now that the hatred against them has become more subtle, turned into the familiar form 'I have nothing against Roma, but . . . '. What is the ideological force of this 'but . . . '? How different is racism if it is prefaced by its denial?

Not only have there been many incidents in recent years revealing how deep-seated anti-Roma feelings are in Eastern Europe, but governmentality, policing and border control are explicitly formulated with Roma in mind. The controversial deportations of nearly a thousand Roma to Romania and Bulgaria in August 2010 from France was supposedly not discriminatory but part of a clampdown on all sorts of travelling minorities. Embarrassingly for President Nicolas Sarkozy, his

personal memo was leaked to *The Guardian*, and in this the names of the Roma camps that were to be abolished were listed. Sarkozy thereby exposed the biopolitics of 'fortress Europe', as well as some fundamental moral contradictions of French republicanism. His expulsion policy received significant international criticism for breaching human rights, but the criticisms – based mostly on a rather hypocritical rediscovery of the Roma's humanity – ultimately did not lead to a reversal of Sarkozy's ethnic cleansing. In this anti-Roma memo, as in his famous remarks on the non-white youths of the Parisian *banlieus*, Sarkozy embodies perfectly the perverse, pseudo-democratic, racist petty-mindedness which Alain Badiou (2008) argues has always been the dark side of the French Republic.

Change and Difference

The metaphysical and ethical problem of the eternal return brings into proximity the concepts of repetition (or reiteration), sameness (or identity), difference (or inequality) and time (or duration). It is immediately clear that there can be no straightforward opposition between sameness and difference as there is in both common sense and traditional logic. According to Deleuze's pivotal book *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, first published in 1962, it is not the empirically same, but difference, multiplicity and becoming that 'return'. What remains eternal and 'the same' is the movement of recurring itself. 'It is not the "same" or the "one" which comes back in the eternal return but return is itself the one which ought to belong to diversity and to that which differs' (1983: 46). The Deleuzian reading wrests the concept of the eternal return from its commonly understood sense of a perpetual motion of sameness, as in the circular temporality of premodern, archaic, equilibrial, agricultural, feudal and 'primitive' societies (Eliade 1971). Cosmological theories of cyclical development, evolution, seasonality and history have been crucial to ancient Egypt, Confucianism and Buddhism. Many thinkers in the Western tradition too have held to a cyclical notion of time, going from the Pythagoreans and Stoics to Giovanni Battista Vico, Johann Gottfried Herder, Eugen Dühring, Auguste Blanqui, Gustave Le Bon, Oswald Spengler and Arnold J. Toynbee. It is no coincidence that most of these were highly conservative of the sociopolitical situation of their day.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze seizes the Nietzschean problematic of returning in order to open up the concept of time itself to the potentialities generated by a return of difference: 'It is not the same which returns, it is not the similar which returns; rather, the Same is the

returning of that which returns – in other words, of the Different; the similar is the returning of that which returns – in other words, of the Dissimilar' (1994: 374). Deleuze's unorthodox emphasis on eternal recurrence leads to an entirely different understanding of temporality as productive and history as not simply cosmologically embedded, *thereby* ultimately unrepresentable in consciousness or language.

Thus it is necessary to emphasise at this point the danger of misunderstanding the main thrust of Deleuze's unique defence of Nietzsche's quirky doctrine. When we note with Deleuze–Nietzsche the predictable emergence of vehemently conservative, nationalist and racist sentiments and policies in politically and economically emergent European states, we do not mean that these are necessary to the human mind, to modern history or to the clash of civilisation. Especially when it comes to race, we must heed Deleuze's warning about the danger of the simplified interpretation of the eternal recurrence in so far as it designates *the more-than-historical*. As Lee Spinks explains, in Deleuze's view one should explicitly repudiate:

> the naïve reading of Nietzsche that envisages eternal return as a doctrine proclaiming the infinite recurrence of every historical moment in exactly the same order throughout eternity. The perversity of this naïve reading, argues Deleuze, is that it converts Nietzsche's vision of being as the endless becoming of differential forces into a simple principle of 'identity'. (2006: 84)

Collapsing differentiation into the identity-over-time of remaining-the-same is 'perverse' because it limits the pleasure (becoming) of the other, cloaking history in what is advantageous to the selfish enjoyment of the retrospective subject himself (the subject of simplistic return is a quintessential masculine subjectivity). This is poignant for any discussion of identity formation under nationalism and racism. For Deleuze, eternal return implies that difference and becoming, as basic ontological principles, split the very heart of being from the beginning, and thus multiplicity cannot but fundamentally *occur*, which is recur. He does not put the 'repetition of a universal equality' at stake, 'but the movement that produces everything that differs' and thus 'the synthesis of becoming and the being . . . affirmed in becoming' (Spinks 2006: 84).

Deleuze argues that there are two aspects of the eternal return in Nietzsche. The first is its cosmological aspect, under which Nietzsche attacks the thermodynamic notion of entropy prevalent at the time he was writing (and rediscovered in cybernetic theory at the time Deleuze was writing). The universe does not evolve towards equilibrium,

Nietzsche says, because, mathematically speaking, since it is infinitely old, it would have had the chance to recombine in such way as to have reached that state by now: 'Not having become, it would already be what it is becoming – if it were becoming something' (Deleuze 1983: 47). More important for most of Nietzsche's commentators is the second, ethical aspect, through which one *selects* the past that has to return to one's present *as if* this present were perpetually repeated. In the famous aphorism 341 of *The Gay Science* (1974: 273–4), Nietzsche performs a crushing thought experiment – suppose I will in order to will my will's eternal return – in which he reaches the highest point of affirmation:

> *The greatest weight.* – What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence – even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!' . . . The question in each and every thing, 'Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?' would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life *to crave nothing more fervently* than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?

On Deleuze's reading, Nietzschean ethics derives from the affirmation of the hypothetical inescapability of eternal return. What the nightmare scenario of immortality entails is the choice of active over reactive forces. If everything would return, would one not do the utmost to have only the creative, pleasing, peaceful, interesting return? Would one go along with the stupidity of consumerism, xenophobia, misogyny? The ultimate fearless subject for Nietzsche is the one who can stare destiny in the eye – a cosmological, secularised day of judgment already here – and hold true to one's desire in the certitude that it is not reactive. As Paul Patton (2000) has elaborated in the context of Australia, choosing the side of active forces is moving away from, if not against, the constrictions that the racial state imposes upon encounters, imaginations and the practices of art and politics. Racism returns as reactionary resentment but the Nietzschean overman desires everything which cannot be mobilised for it.

The Cycle of Nationalism and Racism

Nationalism and racism fundamentally prevent becoming and affirmation exactly by insisting on negation (of otherness), identity (of the majoritarian society to be defended) and, most metaphysically, being (an alleged essence and substance of identity is discovered underneath the complexities of social change). The sharp distinguishability of insider and outsider, the homogeneity of the populace and the ontological accessibility of these to any discourse involved are tightly connected in the reactive image of thought. In this context it is important to reiterate that we do not claim that the old returns by a simple cyclical movement, perpetuating the past because of the disproportional relation between time (or the infinite) to matter (or the finite), a popular thesis among many scientists, philosophers and poets in Nietzsche's time (for instance, Henri Poincaré and Heinrich Heine). Quite the opposite: rather than assuming that the resurgence of nationalism and racism is due to the limitations of human thought and imagination – after all, these are not finite and exhaustible, unlike matter is supposed to be – it should be remembered that, for Nietzsche, the eternal recurrence was primarily related to thought, hence open to redefinition, not locked away in the physical reality of the 'wheel of life' or contingencies of history. Another question is whether the 'wheel of life' and thought as such could be isolated from each other at all in the framework which Deleuze says Nietzsche shares with Kant. When it comes to racist thought, nothing is necessary.

It is a continuing problem whether and how to make distinctions between anti-Semitism, the historical racism directed at black Africans, the displacement of indigenous peoples, the scandalous segregation of the cities of the United States, and the escalating racism of Eastern Europeans against Roma people and other ethnic minorities. With Deleuze, we argue that differences between the racisms of various countries can be mapped on an empirical but not on the transcendental, immanently conceptual level. What the real interlinkages and cross-fertilisations between various racisms point to is the role of the reactive herd-like mechanisms of the state and the populace, of moralism and of the rightwing populism Nietzsche so abhorred, which we argue exist *a priori* in all civilisation.

The entwining of biologistic and historicist versions of racism is furthermore clarified through Michel Foucault's thinking of the racial state. In his influential lectures on the management of living populations, Foucault (2003) coins the term *state racism* as intrinsically connected

to – and not merely an exceptional abuse of – modern sovereignty. Although various racist phenomena differ historically and geographically from New Zealand to Argentina, from Saudi Arabia to Serbia, they are ultimately founded on the same assumption: that there is a hierarchy between different people(s), who are divided into superior and inferior kinds according to their supposed origin, which is deemed tangible especially in skin colour and speech.

It is worth reminding ourselves that genetics continues to disprove any classifiable subdivisions of the human species. Although there are obviously different genes for physical traits such as height or skin and hair colour, no consistent boundaries within the patterns of genes across the human genome have ever been drawn. Serious palaeoanthropology agrees that all humans derive from only a few small populations of hominids in Eastern Africa too short a time ago and too internally promiscuous for any significant neurological differences to emerge. This should have long since meant the annulment of any scientific backing for racist thought. But when it comes to implicit public perception in all modern societies, such expositions of the falsity of innate hierarchies among humans have obviously not been powerful enough to overcome centuries of entrenched prejudice and, more generally, of irrational hatred of the different, the unknown, the singular.

This does not mean that racist science is dead. We need to be clear about the deeply complicit relationship between everyday prejudice and stereotypical representations in the media on the one hand and the residual racism in cognitive and evolutionary psychology, criminology, genetics and economics on the other. Phenomena such as hate speech or racist jokes are paralleled by the old, but still existent, argument that there are clear-cut genetic differences between populations. For example, across the world it is depressingly easy to find pseudo-evidence of the innate intellectual inferiority of sub-Saharan Africans. There are some differences amongst the new nationalisms and racisms arising in North and Eastern Europe, and those before, during and after the Second World War concentrated in Nazi Germany, exactly the difference that returns in the Deleuzian eternal return, making the racism the same on the transcendental level. The 'difference' that the repetition of the 'old' Nazi racism in the 'new' or 'cultural' racism introduces is obviously hegemonically emphasised. Insisting on this difference obscures the real question: will racism simply end when we attest, as does everyone after 1945, that racism is intolerable? Does racism disappear by reaffirming the dimension of *solidarity* in humanism and the Enlightenment, as Paul Gilroy famously does?

Having a Racial Identity

To be sure, Gilroy is careful when positing solidarity as framework for politics. When asked the thorny question, in light of his book *Against Race* (2000), as to whether people 'have racial identities', he states:

> I don't know the answer to your question, but I do know that the need or desire to attach oneself and represent oneself in that way might look different if things were more equitably dealt with, and might assume a different significance if white supremacy and racial hierarchy were not ubiquitous. So the argument that I made – and maybe I didn't make it well, I don't know – was a strong suggestion that, in order to do effective work against racism, one had to in effect renounce certain ontological assumptions about the nature of race as a category, which cheapened the idea of political solidarity, in my view, because it said that solidarity somehow was an automatic thing, that it would take care of itself. But I believe that solidarity – as you, I think, believe – doesn't take care of itself, that we have to do things to produce that solidarity. (Shelby and Gilroy 2008: 126)

In this statement lies the answer to the question of whether social justice can be achieved without the category of race. Gilroy thinks it can, by making of solidarity a performative problem, not something sociologically, philosophically or legally given. Rallying against the ontology of race means, for him, denouncing all categorisation on the basis of phenotype and affirming that politics occur without the defence of identities we supposedly 'have', however difficult that may be in light of personal experience.

We suggest that we should be wary of utopian ideas for ridding our mindsets of racism once and for all (sometimes called 'the new abolitionism'). Racial identities are not things one possesses like an umbrella or a handbag, but material processes of segregation and affect deeply implicated in one's being (Saldanha 2006). Racial identities offer existential stability but, per definition, also lead to racist outbursts and anxieties. As long as there are nation-states and racial divisions of labour, there is imposed group sameness, and such outbursts will recur. Liberal humanism has repressed racism, but in so far as it simultaneously upholds the democratic and bourgeois state form, this repression has to be understood in its Freudian sense, as capable of making what it represses – racist affects – return with a vengeance.

Gilroy (2000) does not fully investigated the complex interplay between racialist eugenic policies on both sides of the Atlantic, which explicitly focused on genetic and physical differences, and the populist racism emerging in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of complex historical

struggles around territory, ownership and employment. He rightly questions the notion of racial identity in so far as it hides several different layers of philosophical investigation: 'So when you say racial identity, I immediately triangulate it this way: there's the question of sameness; there's the question of solidarity (which we've already dealt with); and there's the issue of subjectivity' (Shelby and Gilroy 2008: 126). But it is precisely because of a libidinal investment in the social sanctification of profound sameness and the (false?) solidarity and subjectivity derived from it that racial identity is so intractable, especially to working- and lower middle-class Europeans.

We accept Gilroy's critique of clinging to interior sameness – whether racial, ethnic, national, class or professional – when establishing political solidarity. There has to be a continuous pursuit of the potentiality for solidarity persisting *in between* the samenesses of accepted groups. This makes it centrally important to organise antiracist artistic and activist movements which create new solidarity *across* differences, but without emphasising the *diversity* of identities, as in multiculturalism; solidarity has to continue differentiating. Elsewhere, Gilroy points to another important component of any system of racism. In racialising its every member, society conceptualises the subject (or group of subjects) that is perceived as the 'other', the Different, the minority, both as a 'problem' or threat and as a 'victim' to be pitied: a problem, because the racial other disturbs the established order of similitude; a victim, because the patronising compassion that is encited by the victimisation is a kind of redemption from majoritarian guilt (Gilroy 1991: 11–12). If it is not be racialised, compartmentalised and co-opted again, true solidarity requires an inventiveness that overrides the endless cycle of problem and victim. Evidently, this has turned out to be excessively difficult to realise.

Strategies to conceive of viable ways out of racism should include the deliberate attempt on the part of intellectuals to deconstruct it by pointing out the migrations, hybridisations, ambivalences and different understandings that already accompany any racial identification. But we conclude that race must also be thought on a transcendental level in order to grasp the biopower that is stored up by the very process of its institutionalised forgetting. Here one should evoke the psychoanalytical conception of melancholia, as does Gilroy himself in *Postcolonial Melancholia* (2006), in order to explain the return of ethnic absolutisms in Europe. The reactions against racially marked neighbours and foreigners can then be understood as the effect of a twisted mourning of the loss of moral certainty, which strong, mythologised leaders of the past bestowed upon entire national populations. Imperialist grandeur was

central to the sense of self of almost every European country, whether they had far-away colonies (Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands) or not (Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Sweden).

> In this precarious [post-World War, postcolonial] state, individual and group identifications converge not on the body of the leader or other iconic national object [since this is no longer tolerated in the EU] but in opposition to the intrusive presence of the incoming strangers who, trapped inside our perverse local logic of race, nation, and ethnic absolutism, not only *represent* the vanished empire but also refer consciousness to the unacknowledged pain of its loss and the unsettling shame of its bloody management. (Gilroy 2006: 101)

As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) remind us, however, a merely psychoanalytical account of postcolonial European nationalism and racism hides the capitalist mechanisms which not only pushed countries towards colonisation and war in the first place, but also produce depressive, paranoid or schizophrenic subjects in their wake. Ideologies positing inescapable hierarchies amongst humans first emerged as justifications of exploitative economies, not as false consciousness but as ways of making sense, *post factum*, of violently maintained divisions of labour.

Hannah Arendt, in her monumental *Origins of Totalitarianism* (2004, first published in 1948), already came very close to our approach to racism. Anti-Semitism could not, for Arendt, be understood separately from the formation of the imperialist nation-state itself. Racist ideologies and even humanism helped to legitimise the conquest and exploitation of foreign territories and the interpersonal acts of physical domination that accompanied it. Commentators seldom pick up on Arendt's detailed Leninist analysis of imperialism. With Arendt, it was already possible, therefore, to see that racism is not a pathology of some individuals, but a process at once political-economic and ideological, constitutive of capitalist modernity as such. What returns in racism is simply the *raison d'être* of white Europe as the quintessential matrix of bourgeois national identities.

Balkanisation and the EU as Project of Capital

For a long time, 'Balkanisation' has been metonymic for any desperate and intractable clinging to visible, cherished, traditionalist identity. The redrawing of state boundaries and invention of new national symbolics in order to accommodate the jarring ethnic identifications living side by side in Eastern Europe makes all the Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts

regarding the state painfully manifest. As the break-up of Yugoslavia showed, national reterritorialisation is an intrinsically impossible, hence violent and resentful process, posing a great threat to peace in the post-Communist world. Three remarks need to be made here. First, only seldom are Balkanisation and the conflicts of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus understood in their properly racial and sexual aspects. To repeat, reterritorialisation is as much biopolitical as socioeconomic, as much about melancholic and nostalgic patriarchy as about geopolitics. Second, any resurgence of nationalism (or sub- or supranationalism) entails severe racism towards various ethnic and gendered / sexual minorities which do not fit the overcoded, majoritarian idea of the 'community'. Third, the urge of business elites to enlarge the space of European capital flow since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ill-fated Eurozone puts new pressures on these minorities. Particularly during the transitional period towards the application of neoliberal economics for entry into the EU, the plights of the various minorities are systematically ignored.

Serbian nationalist aspirations are perhaps the best example of the racialised apparatus of capture that capitalism has spawned in its collusion with state structures and the masculinist culture of resentment. As a state, the Republic of Serbia is undergoing substantial changes virtually overnight. While it holds on to its claim over Kosovo, it is torn between the desire to catch up with the other Balkan states in the race for accession to the EU on the one hand and profound affects of loss over sovereignty because of international intervention on the other. The transition into deregulated finance capitalism, which the EU demands, is the benchmark all Eastern states have been gradually moving towards after the fall of communism. But as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue, while capital urges for deterritorialisation, the majoritarian culture and the state aim at segmentation and facialisation. The Serbian hatred towards Kosovars living in Serbia, who, in the eyes of the conservative majority, are to blame for the shrinking of Serbian territory and power, cannot be entertained openly as it was before; such racism has had to be repressed in the last decade or so in order to gain points in the assessments from Brussels. But this repression resulted in the outbreak of another kind of racism, one more ancient and more general in the region, hence not simply a symptom of Serbian expansionism: hatred of Roma.

The Roma people are unique in the Eurasian racial-ethnic landscape by virtue of their crisscrossing all the contested inter- and intra-state borders. A nomadological analysis of the EU arguably starts with them (they have been more mobile than the 'wandering Jews'), showing how

their ambiguous place in the nation-state framework partially *fuelled* that framework. While Serbians attempt to deny the psychical and political effects of their losses, they simultaneously reaffirm their virile power through racist denunciations and spatial exclusions of Roma. This process is buttressed through a neoliberal policy designed to be recognisable to corporate elites, with at once an alleged cosmopolitanism and tough pro-business fervour. On 3 April 2009, the barracks called 'Belleville' in Belgrade were evicted of their illegal Roma inhabitants with no prior warning, and were torn down in a sudden and aggressive act of urban cleansing. The barracks were in close vicinity to the new residential complex also called Belleville, which was built on the occasion of the international sports event Summer Universiade 2009. An articulation between sports, tourism, racism, gentrification and masculinised business practices is fundamental to today's capitalism.

Neither is biopower only a matter of explicit targeting and containment; neglect and political indifference have racist effects. Displaced Roma in detainee camps and in towns across Eastern Europe, but especially perhaps in Kosovo and Serbia, continue to suffer precisely because of the lack of a legitimate framework. This is exacerbated by the weakness of the judicial system and the complacency of police forces and civil society. Because most of the Roma do not possess legal property documents, even after having lived for decades on the same piece of land, it would be difficult to apply David Harvey's concept of accumulation by dispossession (2003) to their displacement and exclusion from ownership. Their land is instead appropriated entirely legally and becomes available for 'regeneration' in the neoliberal parlance (note in the term the root *genus*, 'lineage' or 'race', directly implying, despite itself, a biopolitical dimension). Roma never acquire rights to the land they inhabit, not only because of their poverty or the inaccessibility of state structures, but also because the more tolerant policies under communism did not make ownership necessary and a semi-nomadic lifestyle was, for most, tolerable. More recently, on top of legal loopholes enabling forced evictions, demolitions and deportations no different from previous projects of ethnic cleansing in the region and in Europe, racist violence and riots on a local scale have actually facilitated this official process of disappropriation.

Another key component of today's racist political situation in Eastern Europe is the hegemony of multicultural liberalism, which has, in fact, made it possible for most commentators to argue that today's racism is *not* the repetition of older fascism. For example, Žižek addresses the failure of multiculturalism as intrinsic to its ideological intentions.

Echoing Deleuze and Guattari, he argues that capitalism overcodes all previous modes of production, that there is no real outside to capitalism, or at least no viable economic alternative is offered any more. The fact that Marxist ideology is quasi-obsolete in the EU is fundamental to capital's smooth functioning. Capital overwrites everything, *including racism and antiracism*. Global capitalism, at the same time, constructs its own opacity and turns into the Lacanian Real, the realm which structures desire without consciousness or discourse being able to represent it (Žižek 2005). Finance flows have become as fundamental to what we are as sexual difference is, and as impossible to know objectively.

Hence Žižek writes,

> in so far as we conceive of the politico-ideological resignification in terms of the struggle for hegemony, today's Real which sets the limit to resignification is Capital: the smooth functioning of Capital is that which remains the same, that which 'always' returns to its 'place', in the unconstrained struggle for hegemony. (2000: 223)

Multiculturalism was invented by well-meaning governments, city councils, non-profit organisations and cultural workers ostensibly to put an end to racist prejudice but it never questioned its dedication to making capital flow. Capital is race's real. By entrenching the racial diversity of postcolonial Europe into the division of labour of deindustrialisation, by creating new commodity markets, and by reducing the question of race to the level of the rational individual, multiculturalism effectively delayed a more precise analysis of the political-economic mechanisms of population and migration. Under today's 'societies of control', spectacle and comfort are more efficient a socialising force than top-down discipline. The complicity of the state and of capital with discriminatory violence on the ground is, for the most part, yet to be brought out into the open.

Reconfiguring the Camp

Racism towards Roma has existed for centuries in Eastern Europe and has not vanished in the era of EU-sanctioned human rights advocacy. It returns by covering itself up. There are few artists who understand the complexity and responsibilities this racism entails, and even fewer who have the courage to embark on taking aim at this veiling of the negative side of national identity. A good example is the performance piece *Pearls Before Swine*, carried out on 13 May 2000 by the Austrian Roma artist Alfred Ullrich.[1] The performance took place in front of the former

concentration camp of Lety in Czechia. Set up and run solely by Czechs from 1939 – before the Nazis invaded the region – until the end of the Second World War, Lety had the express purpose of forcing Roma to work. An estimated 3,500 gypsies were interned and ultimately killed in the camp; some 500 were sent to Auschwitz. As is typical in Europe, Czechoslovakia erased the memories of its genocidal biopolitics. In the 1970s, the site was transformed into a pig farm. More recently, historians and activists have brought the racist past back into view. Testimonies of survivors – who are officially deemed not to exist – were finally collected in Paul Polansky's *Black Silence* (1998). There is now a memorial stone in homage to the genocide of Roma across Europe that still perpetuates the wrong but convenient assumption that Lety was a Nazi camp.

Ullrich has family members who were killed in various camps. His performance piece consisted in throwing pearls from a necklace belonging to his sister on to the ground in front of the memorial stone, through the farm's locked gate. The only record of the performance besides a series of photographs is an article in a Prague Anglophone weekly (Levy 2000). The artist's simple act, its ephemerality and its ironic title contest the attempt, at once absurd and disturbing, by European governments to overwrite racist history. The very existence of the Lety concentration camp has been denied for decades. The public's memories relating to the concentration and extermination camp were erased by concentrating a different kind of animal in the place, a different kind of dirt, further desecrating the memory of Roma who were killed there.

The expression 'pearls before swine' comes from Matthew 7:6, in which Jesus moralises with the help of the species (pig) and the bodily organs (feet) which Middle Eastern cultures consider filthy: 'Don't give that which is holy to the dogs, neither throw your pearls before the pigs, lest perhaps they trample them under their feet, and turn and tear you to pieces.' It is a violent image and contains more than a little biopolitics (the polity has scarce resources; only some are worthy of being educated and cared for; only some can touch sacred objects; there are intrinsically disgusting and dangerous people who will kill you if you let them), quite contradictory to the Jesus of loving one's enemy. In the light of this scriptural backdrop, Ullrich's title might refer to the fact that, just like the state, Czechoslovakian and Czech intellectuals have not wanted to 'waste' their talents to retrieve the memory of racisms other than anti-Semitism, because the Roma would not appreciate it anyway.

Drawing on Deleuze, Adrian Parr (2006) points out the reactionary possibilities of memory, especially around the Shoah, whose memory

has become a managerial procedure (see also Parr 2008). The affects surrounding the Jewish experience of the Second World War are mostly immediately territorialised on to the 'Jewish' state of Israel, which itself repeats the basic structure of state racism in its treatment of Palestinians. In contrast, the memories of the Roma Holocaust have hardly begun to be enunciated, let alone tied to a renewed sense of belonging and place. This is a question not simply of quantity – though crucial for combatting revisionism, an obsession with numbers taints many a memorial procedure – but also of the position of Roma in European and Asian societies. Most Roma do not have access to education or the public domain in order to learn about the historical context of their own suffering. What Ullrich accomplished in this singular, fleeting gesture is a non-verbal, non-moralising and non-statist memorialisation, the reinvention of a people through a critique of how they have been treated as animals and how the genocidal past weighs into the still-racist present.

Another work by Ullrich, *Crazy Water Wheel* (2010), consists of a video showing only a loop of a turning wheel of a watermill. The wheel brings to mind the wheels of horse carts; the Romani flag has a wheel. This video comments, therefore, on the old stereotype of Roma people as exotic creatures full of wanderlust, genetically incapable of leading sedimentary lives in contentment, in a house without wheels. The wheel also refers to the eternal recurrence of racism, however. The filmed watermill lies in vicinity of the Nazi extermination camp of Dachau. What hope is there if Roma are doomed to be excluded, despised, obscured? The video is a loop, but the repetition is not perfect and the artist allows subtle details to transform what first seemed to be a scene of blind repetition. There is, for example, a chicken entering and leaving the frame. Perhaps this chicken, in a somewhat surrealist way, stands for the difference that can be engendered in repeating stereotypes and tragic history.

The death camp is, of course, the ultimate spatial instantiation of state racism and has to be occluded as such in order to work. Camps and torture chambers have to be obliterated from memory. As Giorgio Agamben writes, 'What happened in the camps so exceeds the juridical concept of time that the specific juridico-political structure in which those events took place is omitted from consideration' (1998: 166). But the temporality of the camp also contains the possibility of its return. Agamben asks: 'What is the juridical structure that allowed such events to take place?' He erroneously implies that merely by avoiding similar juridico-political structures can the return of racism and genocide be avoided. Racism is not exceptional. Our view is that Foucault's original

concept of biopower is far better suited to understanding sovereignty than Agamben's adoption of it. The Foucaultian take on state racism shows that the state manages populations of bodies not just through law and policing but also through the official toleration of everyone's everyday racism. Hate speech, lynching, covering up the past are crucial components of racism as a system, but not thinkable in Agamben's scheme. That the perpetrators of racist violence often go unpunished is key to biopolitics. There is a failure in Agamben to recognise that it is not always a 'state of exception' that creates *homo sacer* and the stripping of human rights. Many have no rights to start with – many are not considered citizens at all – and most discrimination happens in non-legal, non-militarised, yes, even non-violent frameworks.

Distinguishing between official, scientific and everyday racism is helpful but one must be aware that in reality – transcendentally, so to speak – all racisms collapse into one. Deleuze finds an appropriate formulation of this essence of racism in the testimonies of Auschwitz:

> I was very struck by all the passages in Primo Levi where he explains that Nazi camps have given us 'a shame at being human.' Not, he says, that we're all responsible for Nazism, as some would have us believe, but that we've all been tainted by it: even the survivors of the camps had to make compromises with it, if only to survive. There's the shame of there being men who became Nazis; the shame of being unable, not seeing how, to stop it; the shame of having compromised with it; there's the whole of what Primo Levi calls this 'gray area'. (1995: 172)

As Elspeth Probyn (2005) has argued with the help of Deleuze, shame opens up ethics and has to be clearly distinguished from guilt, indebtedness and resentment. Race and racism on the conceptual level are fundamentally ambiguous and touch on what it means to be human.

The Roma artist and filmmaker Milutin Jovanović, in his semi-staged documentary *Migration* (2011), addresses his interest in the lives of the displaced inhabitants from the former Roma settlement that used to live under Belgrade's Gazela Bridge.[2] The audience is invited to follow the storyline as it evolves through the eyes of the artist's friend, Gagi, one of the residents of the new Roma settlement where some of the evicted Roma families were forced to move after the Gazela settlement's destruction. Gagi has a genuine aspiration to shoot a documentary about his neighbours' unfulfilled expectations and starts to shoot his film in the labyrinth of narrow streets and tinny container-homes. However, his search for 'witnesses' who would testify about their difficult living conditions in the new settlement turns out to be difficult and futile. The

potential witnesses have been already silenced by a warning not to speak publicly about their daily survival.

Similar issues have been addressed in the collaborative and participatory art of the Serbian-German artist couple Vladan Jeremić and Rena Rädle. They relate the discrimination against Roma to nationalism and the first wind of neoliberal politics in Serbia in their video documentary, *Belleville* (2009, 22 minutes). Jeremić and Rädle recorded the consequences of the violent eviction of forty-five Roma families from barracks in New Belgrade, showing the emptied-out territory, ready to be regenerated.The eviction was assisted by police and supported by some neighbours. In the video, the detailed testimonies of the evicted are juxtaposed with activists' attempts to reach the Mayor of Belgrade to present him with the basic demands for immediate shelter and food. The video shows the protests of the next several days taking place in front of the Belgrade City Hall, where hundreds of Roma and not-Roma activists protested against the state action. They are recorded while shouting and carrying signs with slogans 'Stop Racism', 'Solidarity is Our Strength' and 'We Don't Want Concentration Camps for Roma and the Poor'. This display of solidarity received no support from the mayor or any other state institution.

In the feminist performance art of Serbian artist Tanja Ostojić, as in her video performance 'Naked Life' (2005, 24 minutes), she addresses various instances of racism in transitional capitalist societies. The expelled, the displaced, the ghettoised, the imprisoned, the immigrated, the war refugees and the detained or deported: all these bodies are central to the society of control, and inspire activist artists like Ostojić to lay bare its racialising repercussions in Eastern Europe. The video performance was triggered by the research of the original letters sent by Roma and published by the United Nations Human Rights Committee. The performance takes place in the artist's own home, in a bare room where she monotonously reads personal oral histories collected and transcribed from Roma witnesses of ethnic cleansing. She gradually undresses. Her direct nakedness is a comment on Agamben's notion of bare life but adds the mediatisation and the banality of Deleuze's society of control, through which the fragility of any human life becomes exposed. Exposed to surveillance, stripped of identity markers, and without the addition of any eroticism, 'Naked Life' asks how we are all both born in and mesmerised by the racialising and sexing machines of the nation-state, EU, mass media, United Nations, International Monetary Fund and so on.

In a well-publicised pastiche on Gustave Courbet's explicit 1866

Figure 11.1 Tanja Ostojić, 'Untitled / After Courbet (L'Origine du monde)', 46 × 55 cm, 2004. Colour photo / poster. Photograph by David Rych. Copyright / courtesy: Ostojić / Rych.

painting *L'Origine du monde*, once owned by Jacques Lacan and Sylvia Bataille, Ostojić briefly became a subversive participant in the European public sphere when it was controversially chosen as a poster to celebrate European integration in Austria. The commodification of belonging and reproduction is on a par with pornography in its shameless exploitation of base affects. Instead of Courbet's purely erotic bare vulva, the EU flag covering Ostojić implies that sexuality is fundamentally aligned with the racial state. *Natio* derives from *nascere*, to be born, and under the society of biopolitical control the vulva is the most intensely regulated and least erotic site of society. For psychoanalysis too, the twelve stars revolve around and point to what is the most disturbing and psychically constitutive place of the universe, the place we all have to forget we come from. The unknown temporality indicated by the clock without hands is that of the ostensibly eternal nation-state. Unlike Oliviero Toscani's equally intense comments on race, sex and violence for Benetton, the

work of Ostojić takes issue with the sexism of an explicitly named territorial entity. In short, feminist analyses of generalised prostitution and alienation such as Ostojić's remind us that lives are decided upon and legitimised by an opaque entanglement of institutions and interests. Against Agamben, no life is completely naked, only hierarchically organised in terms of worth.

Ostojić created another unique meditation on the precarious position of women in transitional societies and their frontal conflicts with state power in *The Roma Question* (2006). This installation sharply criticises the head of the EU delegation for Slovakia when it joined the EU in May 2004: the Dutch politician Eric van der Linden proposed that Roma children be taken away from their families in order to be brought up in a 'different cultural setting'. This was nothing less than the return in the EU of the biopolitics of whitening in Australia's Stolen Generation. Van der Linden's eugenic ideas are far from unique. In the 1970s, Roma women were targeted by the Czechoslovakian government for forced sterilisation, which continued until the late 1990s in the Czech Republic. Ostojić interlaces interviews of women activists, Roma policy analysts, social workers, artists, philosophers and journalists with original material from Dutch and Slovak TV and EU press briefings to show how 'the Roma question', like the Jewish one before, leaves nobody untouched.

Ostojić's art evokes a female version of Agamben's notion of *homo sacer*, *femina sacra*, and the entanglement of nation, class, race and gender, and transforms these into a powerful image of defiance (Lentin 2006). She boldly enters a realm of bare life herself to produce new conditions of generic life, taking issue first and foremost with the ignorance of gender specificity in Agamben. As is clear from sterilisation programmes, biopolitics is sexist as much as it is racist. Woman's body births nations and symbolises the demarcation of territories as controlled by the state. Due to the fundamental link between birth and nation, therefore, the intersection of state racism and state sexism means that Roma women, the 'producers' of future generations of racially 'inferior' collectives, are always already excised from civil society as impure.

Affirmation of Difference

In Žižek's view (2004: 66), Deleuze is not really expanding the philosophical concept of repetition and difference at all in comparison to Hegel and he finds the latter's triad of the universal, the particular and the individual intact in Deleuze's ontology. Given Deleuze's abhorrence of Hegelian dialectics (Deleuze 1995: 6), it is clear that Žižek

is attempting here to 'take Deleuze from behind', driven by a desire to prove that Deleuze's affirmation of becoming is actually a negative gesture in the good old Hegelian tradition (Žižek 2004: 48). Equally slyly, Žižek accuses Deleuze and Guattari of complicity with capitalism, arguing that, far from providing a means of concerted resistance against the established order, Deleuze and Guattari's 'smooth spaces' only mimic capitalism's deterritorialising logic (ibid.: xii–xii and 183–5). Regardless of whether one agrees with this analysis, we have to agree with Žižek that the political question is what happens after deconstructing race and nation, *homo sacer* and *femina sacra*, birth and war. The affirmation of a different sense of man and woman, the invention of a people-to-come, has somehow to combat biopower. Politico-theoretical trajectories have to be drawn from somewhere within the tensions between Žižek's Hegelianised psychoanalytical anticapitalism and Deleuze–Guattari's schizoanalysis of capitalist flow and desire.

The question becomes more difficult once we understand why Gilroy's deontologising of race is insufficient (Saldanha 2006). Most thinkers relying on psychoanalysis, poststructuralism and postcolonial theory succumb to the vicious epistemological circle of the discursive structures they unravel. If their conceptualisations of race as discourse are correct, we do not think they can explain the targeting of *a priori* distinguished bodies by biopower. What exactly keeps nurturing all the differentiations of postcolonial capitalism? Despite all pedagogical and political attempts to eliminate racism, we see it coming back time and again. Only through a rigorously materialist understanding of the wider histories and geographies of the racial order can we understand phenomena like the Serbian harassing of Roma. By pretending that racism (slavery, totalitarianism, torture) is a thing of the past, it is perpetuated in the present.

We have seen that what returns for Deleuze's Nietzsche is not some thing or order but affirmation itself and its consequences. Moreover, Nietzsche's eternal return is *selective*. 'It is no longer a question of selective thought but of selective being; for the eternal return is being and being is selection' (Deleuze 1983: 71). It is an existential test: whatever we want, we must want its eternal return. As Deleuze writes in his final essay 'Immanence: a life . . . ', offering an un-Kantian return to Kant, the selective act becomes law for the autonomy of the will but 'freed from any morality' (2001: 88).

We suggest that the only ethical way to respond to the non-historical return of racism is to understand it as the eternal recurrence of a selective test that always offers us the potentiality of a turnaround: a new

chance for grasping radically different avenues, affirming against the compartmentalising and exploitative mechanisms of the neoliberal state the illicit joys of solidarity, cohabitation and compossibility. Instead of the hope that the deconstruction of racialising discourse itself clears space for its transcendence, the Nietzschean way to deal with racism is to affirm fully that racial thinking – *qua* biopower – is coextensive with civilisation. Within the recurrence of race, as several artists in Eastern Europe show, there is the possibility of engendering affirmations of a different difference.

Notes

1. Alfred Ullrich's work was discussed at the Call the Witness project, part of the Roma Pavilion at the prestigious Venice Biennial 2011, which Suzana Milevska co-curated (see www.callthewitness.net).
2. According to Amnesty International, the Gazela settlement was destroyed on 31 August 2009. Despite the fact that the Belgrade City Assembly's decision for eviction was hotly contested by Amnesty and local non-governmental organisations, 114 of the families were forced to move to live in metal containers at six different sites on the outskirts of Belgrade, while the remaining 64 families were transported to parts of southern Serbia.

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Cinema–Body–Thought: Race-habits and the Ethics of Encounter

Sam Okoth Opondo

> We speak of consciousness and its decrees, of the will and its effects, of the thousand ways of moving the body, of dominating the body and the passions – *but we do not even know what a body can do.*
>
> Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*

> O my body, make of me always a man who questions!
>
> Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*

In an interesting summation of Deleuze and Guattari's project in *Anti-Oedipus*, Michel Foucault posits that the book can best be read as an 'erotic art' and a 'work of ethics'. To the extent that *Anti-Oedipus* is a work of art, it is informed 'by the seemingly abstract notions of multiplicities, flows, arrangements, and connections, the analysis of the relationship of desire to reality and to the capitalist machines' (Foucault 2004: xiv). As Foucault puts it, *Anti-Oedipus* is an art that 'yields answers to concrete questions' concerned with how to precede, how to introduce desire into thought, into discourse, into action. But *Anti-Oedipus* is more than a work of erotic art. It is a book of ethics that explores various ways in which fascism is lodged in the body, and raises fundamental questions on how one can keep from becoming fascist, 'even (especially) when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant'. In so doing, the text brings to the fore the 'microfascisms' engrained in our habits, in our bodies, 'our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures', and presents an 'art of living counter all forms of fascism, whether already present or impending' (ibid.: xv).

Heeding the insights from Foucault's reading of *Anti-Oedipus* as a work of both art and ethics, the following explorations summon Deleuze's experiments with cinema and / as philosophy to engage a number of micropolitical encounters that force us to think about the

possibilities of arousing and maintaining becomings in a world that race-habits make intolerable. More specifically, I interrogate race in light of established thought-imbued conventions and the elements of thinking that are often erased or trivialised by racially coded regimes of intelligibility. Taking this as my point of departure, I would like to explore a series of fugitive realities in order to illustrate how race-habits rely on the *recognition* of individuals and types, and how such recognition is used to configure the world as a stable *distribution* of places, times, identities and competencies, that is, of people who are already 'formed' and always already 'in place'.

The inter-articulation of aesthetics and the ethics of encounter in this chapter supplies a disclosure of the racism constitutive of various institutions, habits, passions and dispositions. The aesthetic and ethical dispositions that I treat supply, as well, a critique of the lack of belief in the possibilities of a different form of encounter between bodies considered to be of different 'races'. At a minimum, it illustrates how race, to be more precise, stifles thought; how racism acts as a way of creating order or introducing identities and stability into a world that reaffirms and protects 'our' habitual ways of acting.

The partialities, habits and image of thought productive of race relations are the subject of Ousmane Sembene's novel *Black Docker* (1987, first published 1956). Here, Sembene treats various voices and narratives surrounding the trial of the Senegalese émigré docker and writer Diaw Falla, who stands accused of the rape and murder of the French writer, Ginette Tontisane. Against the backdrop of the institutions and discourses that organise life in post-World War II Marseilles, the different testimonies that the novel enacts yield insight into the manner in which anxieties about the black man's sexuality, literacy and migrancy are inserted into a *dispositif* that invokes the law, medicine, literacy and popular culture to fix the possibilities and necessities of race relations in France. As such, the institutions and personalities that the court summons as witnesses in Diaw's trial only work to fix the already established elements that prefigure French social, intellectual and artistic life, thus reducing the complex relations that existed between Diaw and Ginette Tontisane to a set of recognisable racial stereotypes. Among other things, the institutions solicit habitual conceptions of the abilities of the black body and are not convinced by Diaw's authorial claims or his account of the events leading to Ginette's death. The limits to thought arising from such a conception of black and white functions, orders and relations means that 'French society' can only 'imagine how the negro, in a frenzy of sexual passion, seized poor Ginette Tontisane

and raped her, then banged her head against the edge of the table' thus killing her (Sembene 1987: 10).

However, based on Diaw's testimony (which he also presents in a letter to his uncle and therefore is both inside and outside the legal system), we are invited to a different reading of the conditions surrounding Ginette's death and authorial practices. From the testimony, we learn that Ginette's accidental death occurs as Diaw tries to retrieve evidence of his authorship of an award-winning text, *The Last Voyage of the Slave Ship Sirius*, which Ginette had stolen and published under her own name. As such, it becomes clear that Diaw's real crime, contrary to the evidence presented in court, lies in breaching the established racial codes through his non-coercive sexual involvement with a white woman on one hand, and his venturing into a literary tradition that was considered the exclusive domain of a certain class / race in French society on the other. However, the court delivers a guilty verdict, backed by medical reports each reconfirming French society's need to distribute bodies and functions in a manner that maintains a mosaic of identities, each assigned a function equipping it to fit into its rightful place in the world.

The disturbances occasioned by Diaw's physical presence, sexual liaisons and literary practices, when located historically, are emblematic of the break in European society instantiated by colonialism and the Second World War. As Deleuze puts it in his *Cinema* books, the 'postwar period [has] greatly increased the situations in which we no longer know how to react in spaces which we no longer know how to describe' (1989: x). It is ironic that, as the European city became unfamiliar due to these 'any-space-whatevers' – deserted, disused or demolished yet inhabited spaces – more recognisable means of managing or reacting to the black presence in the city were mobilised. The restrictive value of such habits is well illustrated when we turn to Frantz Fanon's oft-cited experience of being hailed in public space by a little boy, which, like Diaw's trial, involves the summoning of the 'Negro threat' as a means of constituting identity and policing space (1967: 112–13).

Like Diaw's testimony, Fanon's reaction to the hailing reveals a great deal about the world in which the racialised subject finds himself or herself. For Fanon, the hailing was an 'amputation', an excision and an interpellation that initiated his move from the *automatic* or *habitual recognition* (where he identifies with 'White France') to a more *attentive* mode of recognition that marks his complete dislocation and inability to 'be abroad with the white man'.[1] The alienation that arises from the racial regime that he finds himself in leads Fanon to deploy the attentive

mode of recognition to interrogate the invention of the Jew and the Nigger that brings the white European self into being (1967: 154–7).

Doubtless, Fanon's encounter provides some useful insights into colonial and racial relations. He emphasises the manner in which recognition of racial types is predicated on what he famously calls an 'epidermal schema' while remaining 'uninterested in the true links that might exist between surface and depth, colour and intelligence' (Saldanha 2010: 2413). In other words, this schema annuls the real continuities that exist between bodies and the capacities of bodies to do or experience certain things. Fanon's concept of the epidermal schema can be conceptually and politically related with Deleuze and Guattari's understandings of corporeal habits (Saldanha 2010). As Fanon illustrates in his analysis of the alienation of 'the black man', the epidermal schema contributes to the formation of reactive forces and identities, foreclosing the possibility of racialised subjects becoming otherwise. Race works through abstractions and disavowals that are intricately intertwined with the arrangements of capitalism, colonialism, sexual intercourse, art, language and urbanisation, among many other things.

To treat the question of race critically it is necessary, then, to engage the image of thought, the identities, emplacements and forms of recognition that produce it, as well as those creative moments of encounter that oblige us to think otherwise, to live – to become. Such a critical approach to the question of race can be derived from three insights emerging from Deleuze's thought and their implications for thinking about race-habits. First is the diagnostic of how racism works to be found in Deleuze and Guatari's conceptualisation of race, in the chapter 'Year zero: faciality' (1987: 167–91), as the product of *faciality* – that abstract machine of modernity that produces significance (the white wall) and subjectification (the black hole). The second and third insights emerge from Deleuze's critical attitude towards habits and partialities and the ethico-political and aesthetic possibilities to be found in his experimentations with empiricist ethics and cinema, respectively. In each of these experiments, Deleuze points towards the promotion of lines of flight and encounters that interrupt the habitual individualities and moralising tendencies that impose a limit to life, experience and thought.

Faciality and Empiricist Ethics: Reflections on *A life . . .*

In presenting faciality as a non-dialectical theory of racism, one that is not predicated on the notion of racial Others, Deleuze and Guattari

invite an appreciation of modern racism's propensity to totalise rather than to exclude. According to Deleuze and Guattari, modern racism operates through the erasure of exteriority. The simple formula it presents works by totalising, such that 'there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be' (1987: 178). As a product of faciality, racism operates on the logic of the *same* and 'propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification have been wiped out (or those who only allow themselves to be identified at a given degree of divergence)'. Consequently, faciality and racism do not operate through essentialising opposition marked by binary categories such as black / white or self / other. Instead, the faciality machine presents racial difference as a range of deviations from the dominant standard – the Christ, White-Man face. As Deleuze and Guattari put it:

> Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it's a Jew, it's an Arab, it's a Negro, it's a lunatic . . .)

The social production of face, therefore, involves the facialisation of the entire body and all its surroundings and objects, and the 'landscapification' of all worlds and milieus (ibid.: 181). Accordingly, what I call *race-habits* are actively involved in the production of the self, the world and the truth, which they use to limit the possibility of thought and ethical encounter through racialised modes of recognition and distribution of stable identities.

In the era of decolonisation, new race-habits and forms of facialisation manifest themselves in an 'immigration complex' arising from the 'reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises, and the division of humanity within a single political space', as Étienne Balibar argues (1991: 21). Rather than a focus on biological heredity, this 'racism without races' emphasises the insurmountability of cultural difference, the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers and the incompatibility of lifestyles and traditions. The dismantling of race / face, therefore, involves an abandonment or evacuation of the self and of the love of the habits associated with it in order to become imperceptible. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, rather than creating a new identity, the way out is 'to be nobody, to no longer be anybody' (1987: 197).

In order to obtain a better sense of what is at stake in associating

the abandonment of self with de-facialisation, we can heed some of the insights from Deleuze's essay 'Immanence: A life . . . ' and his engagement with the empiricist philosophy of David Hume (both in Deleuze 2005), an engagement going back to his very first book (Deleuze 1991). In these two essays, a Deleuzian–Humean concept of 'a life . . . ' is presented in stark contrast to what John Locke (2008, first published 1690) termed 'the self' – a category that came to dominate Western philosophy and capitalist social life. In an attempt to demonstrate the limit that the concept of self places on thought and relations, Deleuze (and Hume) discuss how self, as conceptualised by Locke, is associated with the categories of self-consciousness, memory and personal identity. Self is neither the 'I' nor the 'me'. Rather, it is defined by individualised ownership (myself, yourself) and sameness over time (identity) (see John Rajchman's introduction, 2005: 12–13). Thus, Locke and contractarian thought in general introduce the problem of identity and diversity into the Western philosophical tradition that came to dominate how Europeans apprehend the world and their place in it. This being the case, the self, rather than being seen as an artifice, is taken as given. Through habit, 'the self' becomes a part of nature – *our* nature – and is taken as the basis of sensations and relations.

Addressing himself to the habits of thought that dominate Western philosophy, Deleuze suggest that Hume's opening-up of the question of other ways of compositing sensations other than those of the habits of the self is one of his main contributions to thought. Deleuze goes on to illustrate how Hume makes it possible for us to think of an empiricism concerned with what is singular and in-human in the composition of selves, which derives precisely by putting self into crisis. Such a move enables 'us' humans to rethink 'life' and its logic as unfolding in a manner radically different from that presented by the focus on self as the primary site for philosophy and politics.

A life, in this sense, is predicated on a logic of impersonal individuation rather than personal individualisation, of singularities rather than particularities. A life can never be completely specified. It is always indefinite. In contrast to the self, *a life* is always 'impersonal and yet singular' and so requires a 'wilder' sort of empiricism (Rajchman 2005: 8–9), one that makes possible a conception of society wherein what we have in common is singularity itself, and not particular individualities, a 'society not as a contract but as an experiment with what in life is prior to both possessive individuals and traditional social wholes' (ibid.: 14–15).

In effect, Deleuze's reading of Hume presents partiality as a central

problem for thought, thus making empiricist philosophy profoundly ethico-political and aesthetic in its orientation. Inter-articulated with his insights on faciality and race, the partialities and the habits that the faciality machine generates can be seen as contributing to the limitation of thought, sensation and ethical encounter. The faciality machine feeds on a Lockean concept of the self and creates a world of 'limited sympathies' predicated on a certain essentialist Idea of human nature(s). As Deleuze puts it, Hume's statement that man is by nature partial rather than egotistical is more than a simple nuance added to British empiricism:

> rather, we should see it as a radical change in the practical way the problem of society is posed. The problem is no longer how to limit egotisms and the corresponding natural rights, but how to go beyond partialities, how to pass from a 'limited sympathy' to an 'extended generosity', how to stretch passions and give them an extension they do not have on their own. Society is thus seen no longer as a system of legal and contractual limitations but as institutional inventions. (Deleuze 2005: 47)

In presenting society as a set of 'institutional inventions', Deleuze provokes us to think about ways of arousing and maintaining becomings based on the protest against individualist *principles*. Drawing on Hume's crucial discovery that '*relations are external to their terms*' (Deleuze 1991), Deleuze points out that a consideration of the 'exteriority of relations is not a principle; it is a vital protest against principles' (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 55). Thinking the exteriority of relations presupposes a departure from the principles of identification and distribution used to organise the self and the world in racialised ways. It also privileges experimentation and flux, forcing 'us' to think that which 'runs through life, but is repugnant to thought' (ibid).

Being cognizant of the limits to thought arising from the order of being, accompanied by hierarchies, norms and frames characteristic of racial signification and subjectification, Deleuze spurs us always to 'go further'. He suggests we 'make the encounter with relations penetrate and corrupt everything, undermine being, make it topple over'. He urges readers to create something new. 'To substitute the AND for IS. A and B' – a crucial subtension of relations that 'makes relations shoot beyond their terms and outside the set of their terms, and outside everything that could be determined as being. One, or whole' (ibid.).

Such interruptions and conjunctions present ways of thinking and experiencing relations that undermine the stable categories and principles (essentialisms, reifications, reductionisms) that race-habits seek to maintain. For race operates through fixing and distributing attributes

and functions. The White Man IS. The black man IS – his hair, his skin, his nose. As such, the relations that they enter into are seen as being internal to the names Negro, White Man, Arab or Jew, and serve as the basis for placing bodies in their proper positions within the grand scale of being. The denigrations and approbations of these categories are taken as a given and mobilised as basis for mediating estrangement.

Giorgio Agamben (2003) has argued that Deleuze's play on punctuation and conjunction in the title of 'Immanence: a life . . . ' is more than linguistic strategy.[2] It is of philosophical, political and ethical significance, as it generates new concepts and relations. It is an experimentation that makes 'one *and* the other imperceptible', thus pointing towards a new acceptance of interrelatedness. Playing with punctuation creates possibilities, connects and cuts, generates lines of flight and becomings through unlikely juxtapositions and pauses, and creates a space for more conjunctions still. As Deleuze puts it, the conjunction AND is an 'extra-being, an inter-being . . . it gives relations another direction, and puts to flight terms and sets, the former and the latter on the line of flight which it actively creates' (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 57; see also Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 206–7). If brought to bear on the scene of racial relations, the conjunction AND is the condition of possibility for non-racialised relating. Not only does the AND suggest a new form of proximity between heterogeneous categories, but it also interrupts and reorients perception, action and affects by staging an encounter. For example, the oft-cited Fanonian statement, 'The Negro is not. Any more than the White man', is sent in different directions if it is rephrased as 'the negro becomes AND so does the white man'. Through the meeting of two or more becomings the faciality machine is jammed and bodies are allowed to relate to one another in terms of their movements, their haecceities, rather than what they are.[3]

Race-habits and Shame

It is with cognizance of a crisis of race and raciology in the world today that we can approach the political and philosophical significance of setting the aforementioned empiricist ethic in motion. For instance, Paul Gilroy (2000), in his attempt to 'imagine political culture beyond the colour line', observes that raciology persists due to the difficulty of relinquishing both the privileged positions and oppositional identities characteristic of racism. In part, the difficulty arises from the fact that the 'beneficiaries of racial hierarchy do not want to give up their privileges' (Gilroy 2000: 12). Instead, privileged populations seek to maintain the

selves and habits that they forged for themselves through narratives and representations reinforcing racist regimes of truth. Similarly, the people subordinated by racism do not escape race-thinking. Instead, they develop 'elaborate, improvised constructions that have the primary function of absorbing and deflecting abuse'. Gilroy notes that these attempts to deflect abuse sometimes produce new race-habits, as they go 'beyond merely affording protection' for these groups but serve as a means of identification predicated on the inversion of 'polarities, insult, brutality and contempt, which are unexpectedly turned into important sources of solidarity, joy and collective strength' (ibid.: 12). At the centre of Gilroy's diagnostic of raciology are race-habits established through the subordination of difference to identity, encounter to recognition, experimentation to habit. Gilroy illustrates how all racialised populations are caught up in habits that curtail creative ways of relating, thinking and living, given that identities are taken as a form of Truth, hence not easily relinquished.

For example, acting out of a desire to maintain the racial status quo in South Africa, Eugene Terreblanche's paramilitary group AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) remained fiercely opposed to the end of apartheid. But a similarly raciological logic is expressed by a section of the black South African population when they commemorate their history of struggle against Afrikaner 'minority rule' as the sole determinant of their identities and concomitant ontological anxieties. In both cases, real shame of apartheid is foreclosed, thus making it impossible to relate differently to one another. Hence AWB's wish to maintain the privileges the racist system afforded whites corresponds to the black South Africans' inversion of the ideas of racial particularity in a defensive manner, that 'provides pride rather than shame and humiliation' (Gilroy 2000: 12).

From Gilroy's reading of race, we can discern that shame reveals the violence and partialities characteristic of race-habits and provides an incentive for breaking away from the moralities and hierarchies that have their roots in racialised selfness. For example, shame at the violence and limits on life and relations imposed by apartheid provides an incentive for an ethically oriented analysis of the social relations characteristic of the 'new' South Africa. Not only does it highlight the aspects of life in the past that were intolerable, but it also forces us to think through that which race-habits invent, that which they conceal, and the limits they impose on the present and future. That is, Deleuze would call for a general retrospective shame at the inhibitions imposed by legislation like the Immorality Act of 1949 that sought to institute apartheid's

racial-spatial order through the surveillance of homes and the collection of underwear as evidence of interracial sexual encounters, thereby fixing what a black or white body could do across time and space. A Deleuzian shame, which excludes guilt and resentment, inflects a more fruitful critique of the codes of infrahumanity under racist rule than that produced by black South African nationalism, which has recently turned into populist xenophobia. While apartheid epidermalised difference and privileged the visual realm in its attempt to partition space and ruthlessly police the relationship between bodies based through a violent political and libidinal economy, the present macropolitical dispensation privileges aurality / orality as it fixes the relationship between African (im)migrants and nationally defined 'autochthonous' members of society. This is because *Makwerekwere* – meaning one with limited competence in the vernacular language required to engage in intercourse with autochthonous society – cannot speak in the post-apartheid township for fear of being identified by their accents and victimised for usurping scarce jobs and spreading AIDS (Comaroff and Comaroff 2002).

How, then, are we to create new possibilities for life in such a racialised world? A world whose intolerability derives not only from serious injustices, but from the permanent state of daily 'banality' (Deleuze 1989: 170)? For Deleuze, the 'subtle way out' lies in believing 'not in a different world, but in a link between man and the world, in love or life, to believe in the unthinkable, which none the less cannot but be thought' (1995: 173). Here Deleuze introduces a new concept of shame, which he considers a 'powerful incentive toward philosophy', provoking us to think the unthought in life in order to arouse becomings. Citing Primo Levi's account of life in the lager, Deleuze provides insight into the various ways in which the horrors of Nazi racism and fascism have given us all 'a shame at being human':

> Not, he says, that we're all responsible for Nazism, as some would have us believe, but that we've all been tainted by it: even the survivors of the camps had to make compromises with it, if only to survive. There's the shame of there being men who became Nazis; the shame of being unable, not seeing how to stop it; the shame of having compromised with it; there's the whole of what Primo Levi calls this 'grey area' . . . What's so shameful is that we've no sure way of maintaining becomings, or still more of arousing them, even within ourselves. (1995: 172–3)

Auschwitz is the most intense case of racism's stifling of becoming and thought. Racism confiscates reality from the world and reorders it in terms of recognisable organic units. A face. A legitimate, yet racialised

idea of Self, World and God. However, it is worthwhile noting that the things that we are ashamed of betray our partialities more than 'we' (or Deleuze and Levi) would like to appreciate. For example, while the Nazi concentration camp is approached with shame, the partiality of memories of suffering and atrocity means that the African and Asian training grounds where the methods applied in the lager were tested remain unmentioned and do not elicit similar responses. While the experiences of the Vagogo, the Herero and countless other colonialised peoples illustrate that the atrocities of World War II were not isolated phenomena, the 'limited sympathies', as conditioned by racial, spatial and historical partialities, prescribe that racist events are trivialised or spotlighted according to dominant regimes of recognition.

It is precisely such partialities that Aimé Césaire has in mind when he calls attention to the disparate treatment accorded to violences that were deployed in a similar manner but upon different bodies in another place and time. Commenting on the exceptional status accorded to Nazism, he writes succinctly:

> Before they were its victims, they were its accomplices; that they tolerated Nazism before it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimised it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples . . . [I]t is not the humiliation of man as such, it is the crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white man, and the fact that he has applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India, and the blacks of Africa. (1972: 14)

This is the circulating and thought-provoking shame of Auschwitz *and* apartheid *and* Gaza, and other less known, yet not necessarily less intense racialised situations.

Cinematic Montage

Besides being an incentive for philosophy, the Deleuzian concept of shame illustrates well how society is indeed a set of 'institutional inventions' that can be oriented otherwise. Deleuze invites us to continue thinking, to 'invent *artifices*', to 'create institutions that force passions to go beyond their partialities and form moral, judicial, political sentiments (for example the feeling of justice)' (2005: 47). In line with this ethico-aesthetic orientation, Deleuze turns to cinema, which he sees as a useful way of engaging habits of perception, sensation and thought. As Jacques Rancière argues, in his essay 'Deleuze and the Ages of Cinema', Deleuze sees cinema

as that which 'puts perception back into things because its operation is one of restitution' of the reality that the brain has 'confiscated' (2006: 111). According to Rancière, the brain 'confiscates the interval between action and reaction for its own benefit and then proceeds from this interval to place itself at the centre of the world'. From this position, the brain constitutes a world of images for its own use, a world of readily available information, a world that it can *recognise*: in short, a world predicated on habit. Unlike the brain, however, cinema, through its re-constitutive and restitutive capacities, undoes the work of the brain and 'constitutes an order of art that returns the world to its essential disorder'. Cinema has the capacity to disturb the habits of thought and the logic of sense, presenting other ways of sensing and making sense of the world.

However, it is worthwhile noting that cinema is a site of profound multiplicity and ambiguity. Not only does it disturb race-imbued realities, but it also acts as a site for the reconfirmation of habits, identities and social reality, a site for the consolidation of the world of recognition and selves. A classic illustration of how cinema can be invested with race-habits is found in D. W. Griffith's use of the indirect image of time in his cinematic compositions. To assess the ethico-political implications of Griffith's *Birth of a Nation* (1915), we can turn to Deleuze's conception of how exactly montage works and extend his insights to rethinking race. To begin with, we must heed how Griffith's cinematic composition involves a process of partitioning (of both cinema and the world) that determines the character of what he considers the whole by setting up continuities, cutting and creating false continuities that are then mobilised for purposes of the representation of 'races' who are already formed.

According to Deleuze, Griffith 'conceived of the composition of the movement-images as an organisation, an organism, a great organic unity' (1986: 30). As such, the political value of Griffith's composition is apparent in his production and attempt to preserve organic unity, be it the idea of 'the nation' in *Birth of a Nation*, or of a thousand years in the history of 'civilisations' in his *Intolerance* the following year (1916). For Griffith, writes Deleuze, the organism is

> a unity in diversity, that is, a set of differentiated parts; there are men and women, rich and poor, town and country, North and South, interiors and exteriors etc. These parts are taken in binary relationships which constitute a *parallel alternate montage*, the image of one part succeeding another as part of a rhythm. (ibid.)

Alongside the binaries of the parallel montage, there also exists a *convergent* or *concurrent* montage. Here, parts act and react on each other

in a manner that threatens the unity of the organic set while some parts act in a manner that defends or restores the unity of the organism.

In *Birth of a Nation*, Griffith uses the above forms of montage to demonstrate how the American South had been right about black people and how the North had been right about the preservation of the Union. Through a series of close-ups, the 'objective set' is endowed with subjectivity such that Griffith effectively portrays the threat posed by the freed Negro who is portrayed as a lustful, arrogant and villainous person. Griffith's montage also invites us to witness how 'the Reconstruction which freed black people also endangered the most precious asset of the South, its White women'. Having presented the free black man as a threat to the purity of white women, the 'heroic deeds of the Ku Klux Klan' become the legitimate means of defending and restoring the unity of the nation as it vanquishes 'the rapacious lust of the black man for pure white womanhood' (Ross 1996: 11). Attentiveness to Griffith's subordination of time to movement in *Birth of a Nation* furnishes Deleuze with some precise readings of scenes. On the cinematic register, such subordination is achieved through the action-image which relates movement to a centre, thus enabling Griffith to present a story of personal and collective triumph that fuels a nation's macrodesire by quelling any disturbances that call into question the racial habits that define its monumental history.

While *Birth of a Nation* mobilised the movement-image to articulate a racialised idea of US ethnogenesis, John G. Avildsen's *Rocky* (1976) plays on white racist anxieties to articulate a desire to reclaim the dignity and 'face' of a threatened idea of America. Here, the action-image is used to enact the imagination of a self-made man's reclamation of an American dream which has been put into crisis by the dystopia characterised by urban decay, squalor amongst whites, Afro-American opulence, and a general loss of purpose. In terms of its narrative structure, *Rocky* is about a series of events leading to the definitive duel between Rocky (Sylvester Stallone), a small-time Philadelphia boxer who also doubles up as a collector for the local loan shark, and the black world champion, Apollo Creed (Carl Weathers). The fight becomes intensely historical by marking the American independence bicentennial and is set against the backdrop of white poverty and unemployment or engagement in 'dirty jobs' under degrading conditions, as contrasted to recent African American material success (Martin 1995: 130).

Heeding Deleuze's insights on the workings of the action-image, we can appreciate more fully that the spiritual universe that Griffith's *Birth of a Nation* established is the one *Rocky* fights to reclaim. Following

Deleuze, the progression or rebirth of a specifically American civilisation in Hollywood cinema is characterised by 'the ideal of a melting pot in which minorities are dissolved and that of ferment which creates leaders capable of reacting to all situations' and is predicated on situation–action–situation (SAS) causal relationships modelled on milieus (in *Rocky*, deindustrialisation, white flight, racialised fear, the loss of the American dream) and the behaviour of a character (Rocky) (1986: 148). More specifically, such an action-image is a representation of what Nietzsche called monumental history.

> A milieu and its forces incurve on themselves, they act on a character and throw him a challenge, and constitute a situation in which he is caught. The character reacts on his part . . . so as to respond to the situation to modify the milieu or his relation with the milieu, with the situation, with other characters. He must acquire a new mode of being (*habitus*) or raise his mode of being to the demands of the milieu, the situation. Out of this emerges a restored or modified situation, a new situation. (Deleuze 1986: 141–2)

In this way, *Rocky*, like *Birth of a Nation*, reinforces established partialities and national habits. It continues the narrative of white American ethnogenesis and stabilises the progression of the nation's time complete with its Truths and anxieties, such that characters acquire 'modes of being' consistent with the functions and capacities assigned by a national-racial temporality and its distribution within cinematic space. Such a mimetic distribution of bodies within a racialised cinematic space and nationalised time prescribes the proper ways in which characters and audiences should manage relations if the moral order is to be maintained.

Cinema–Body–Thought

It is worthwhile noting that the manner in which time is treated in *Birth of a Nation* and *Rocky* does not, of course, exhaust the temporal and relational possibilities that cinema supplies in the articulation of Americanness. In order to illustrate the multiple possibilities for thought that cinema evokes, we summon the postwar cinema of the time-image. According to Deleuze, the cinema of the time-image frees time from movement and provides a fundamental challenge to our powers of recognition and association. Unlike the cinema of the action-image that fixes possibilities and identities, the cinema of the direct image of time is an experimental mechanism that produces sensory forms that affect the

body in ways that undo the dogmatic image of thought. At a minimum, the time-image restores *belief in this world*. It disallows the prevailing system of values from clinging to the perception of things and does not let affects slip into pre-established patterns such that everything becomes 'tolerable' while the world itself becomes intolerable.

It is this disruptive aspect of cinema that Deleuze engages in *Cinema 2* (1989). Among other things, he treats the *cinema–body–brain–thought* nexus in order to illustrate how the cinema of the body, the cinema of the brain and modern political cinema (where *the people are missing*) present different problems for philosophy, and invite a different truth from that posed by the classical cinema of the movement-image. Unlike the action-image that constructs and maintains a certain spiritual or moral universe, the time-image is a machinism putting truth into crisis, thus rebuilding it (Deleuze 1989: 130).

In the case of modern political cinema, the 'Ego = Ego' form of identity (or its degenerate form, Them = Them) characteristic of race is displaced as cinema serves as a site for the dis-identification of bodies and functions. In so doing, modern political cinema, through the power of the false, presents a useful venue for the dismantling of race-habits and even goes further to reconstitute a dis-identified people. Unlike Griffith's use of montage to restore and legitimise an organic racial whole, in the direct image of time there 'is no longer *Birth of a Nation*'. On the contrary, the political and ethical codes cinema mobilises enables one to forge and pass through inventions and artifices that enable Rimbaud's proclamation, '*I is another*.' That is, through the direct image of time, 'the film-maker and his / her characters become others together and the one through the other.' Such a tactical withdrawal from the selves that race-habits and other forms of partiality prescribe involves the 'simulation of a story of simulation which deposes the form of the truthful story' (Deleuze 1989: 153).

Mira Nair's *Mississippi Masala* (1991) is exemplary in this sense. Through its exploration of the establishment and dissolution of identities in the face of an interracial romance between an émigré Indian woman in a small Mississippi town, Mina (Sarita Choudhury), and an African American carpet cleaner and businessman, Demetrius (Denzel Washington), *Masala* invites us into a critical reading of the problematics of crossing-over within a context of national, cultural, racial and sexual exclusiveness and copresence. Set against the backdrop of the 1972 expulsion of Indians from Uganda by Idi Amin, *Masala* traces the experiences of the Loha family as they move from Uganda to England and finally settle in Greenwood, Mississippi, where they live and work

in motels. Mina's father, Jay (Roshan Sheth), a Ugandan lawyer of Indian 'origin', decides to leave Uganda due to the disappointment he experiences after his 'black brother' Okello (Konga Mbandu) reiterates the all too familiar narrative that 'Africa is for Africans; black Africans,' proclaiming Uganda's racialising nation-building discourse that identifies socioeconomic and sexual exclusiveness as a pathos in need of normalisation through the expulsion of all non-blacks, especially Indians.[4]

In its deployment of cinematic time, *Masala* maps the modes of spatialisation, identification and intelligibility that are complicit in nation-state and racial identity formation and presents a number of shameful encounters that pose a different problem for thought. Masala – mixture – is what the modern state and 'community' intrinsically seek to manage. The anxieties triggered by Mina's and Demetrius's love affair shows the fragmentary character of the term 'coloured people' in the US, thus dispelling the conveniently invoked claim that 'all people of colour should stick together' and reworking the us–them dichotomy in white-dominated America. *Masala* also treats the problematic of class and race as interwoven with a commercial orientation towards public life and its role in the fragmentation or consolidation of communal identities. For example, Anil (Ranjit Chowdry), the money-minded 'Americanised' motel owner, only considers relations that are financially beneficial to him. This commoditisation of relationships is at the core of his constant outbursts, which are connotative of the 'expulsion' of those who do not comply with the governing logic of capitalist society and of the American dream, which he had been drawn to through watching the get-rich-quick television personality Dave Deldado. Two salvos against older members of the émigré community who advise against his materialism deserve mention. First he reminds Jay that 'this is not Uganda' where 'money grows on trees'. In another scene, he responds to his father's admonition of his overwhelming Americanness (read money-mindedness) by telling him to 'go back to India' if he cannot put up with the reality of a 'money-first' society. The simultaneous push–pull forces at play in the negotiation of a diasporic population's identity contribute to the declining cohesion of its networked bodies, while its assimilation of the consumerist and individualist values of the host society opens up the likelihood of a majoritarian form of identity formation: a 'model minority' indeed.

Anil's outbursts and the business ethic underlining the motel business (the customer comes / cums first) tie the flows of bodies to flows of capital and interest. In contradistinction, Mina's engagements in a

libidinal economy characterised by a heterogeneous flow of desire invest the film with a number of dis-identifications that invite a critique of colour- and class-based sociality. Her encounter with Demetrius and her family members reveals the violence that underlines what Fanon calls the epidermal schema, mobilised by members of the Indian diaspora in order to mediate interactions between the different populations. The schema also operates within the Indian 'community' itself, where it is used to mark spaces, establish one's socioeconomic status and police the possibilities for social and physical mobility.

In a conversation between Mina and her mother (Sharmila Tagore), who would like to marry her off to a more affluent and light-skinned Harry Patel (Ashok Lath) and ensure that Mina 'sticks with her kind', Mina tells her mother to face the fact that she 'got a darkie daughter'. This same discourse is replayed in a scene about gossip, in which Mira Nair plays herself highlighting the racialised 'common sense' amongst Indians and Indian migrants: 'you can be dark and have money, you can be fair and have no money, but you can't be dark and have no money and expect to get Harry Patel!'

Masala's exposure and disturbance of globally prevailing race-habits is achieved through its engagement with bodies and spaces that simultaneously inhabit and invent multiple times and worlds. Through a series of flashbacks, cuts and excursions into intimate space, Nair stages encounters between characters in a manner that resists a single biographical perspective or national narrative. As such, she reveals the various forms of race-habits that exist as part of the minute texture of everyday life and suggests a treatment of race that is concerned with more than the official macropolitics of the city or the nation-state and also more than the embodied identity politics of the epidermal schema. Through an inter-articulation of cinematic time and motel space, Nair presents a site for disturbing the forms of racial fixity and partiality that engage peoples already formed, their functions and possible relationships predefined. In *Masala*'s motels, we encounter different notions of private / public, home / away, home / work, inside / outside and journey / destination, and it is through motel space that *Masala* explores the forces of recognition and those of encounter. It is here that the instability of South Asian American and African American alliances is played out, revealing the falsity of the myth of a coherent 'people of colour' collectivity that would exist in solidarity against Euro-American racism.

Similarly, a careful manipulation of presence and absence in the film reveals the conditions under which different peoples are produced and how they become allied to each other. What we see in *Masala* is the

attempt by both African American and Indian émigré populations to maintain racialised homogeneity and boundaries, enabling them to disseminate their narratives and sameness from one generation to the next through endogamous practices ('it's my culture') and meritocracies that take the form of capitalist specialisations and culturally specific evaluations of marital propensity. Such practices set bodies apart by marking what social territories, functions, professional competences and rhythms and temporalities are sanctioned for them as a 'kind of people'.

Concluding Thoughts

In many ways, *Mississippi Masala* illustrates that race / racism is, as Deleuze and Guattari intimate, far more than the working of an epidermal schema. For example, Demetrius's reinvention of an Indian body as 'equally black' or having a skin that is just a shade away from his own, and his transformation of motel-space from a non-place of economic transactions to a site for secret intimacy and sexual and social intercourse enables him to put into question the racial and historical tensions surrounding his affair with Mina. Through its exploration of shameful relations and collective memory, *Masala* raises key historical concerns underlining Amin's expulsion of Indians, by juxtaposing a racialised political economy (flows of interest and capital) with a libidinal economy (flows of desire) in order to present an experience of the body and the 'community' as contestable fields of possibility. In this way, *Masala* highlights the different ways in which the classical Lockean monological conception of self, which is furthermore always a racialised self, silences or erases difference. The film suggests a futural temporality and encourages both libidinal and economic experimentation.

Through periodic summoning of a white presence, *Masala* adds another dimension to the race-habits at play in Mississippi. By presenting white criticisms of both African American and Asian American populations, Nair illustrates US facialisation: that is, how non-white bodies are graded on the basis of their degree of deviation from the white middle-class heterosexual standard. The extraordinary force of race-habits in the US becomes evident in a scene where two white shop assistants, irritated with the noise from an Asian wedding, make apparent their ignorance by expressing their desire for the 'Indians' to 'go back to the reservation'. However, white Americans also jump at the earliest opportunity to ally themselves with the Indian 'community' against blacks when the news of Mina and Demetrius's affair becomes public knowledge. In a telling telephone conversation between a white

character and an Indian, the former asks the latter if he is 'having nigger troubles'.

In short, through these complex encounters, a story of race emerges that displays, but does not conform to, the Hollywood conventions of montage, temporality and modes of relating spaces and bodies to a central racial or national narrative. Nair contests the originary and fixed conceptions of the self and exposes the strategies that are used to fix boundaries and habits that limit the possibilities of life. Together with the different forms of boundary crossings explored in the film, Nair invites us into a world characterised by play, flight and circulation, which she uses to pose sensitive ethical and political questions. In very Deleuzian fashion, *Masala* illustrates how the body's affective capacities and rhythms can stage reversals, connections or interruptions that encourage experimenting with relationships and that disturb or undo race-habits. By punctuating conventional relationships in very common spaces – ubiquitous motels, suburbia – Nair succeeds in restoring our belief in the world.[5]

Through provocative encounters such as *Mississippi Masala* we can start mapping the ways in which 'people' can become-minor through everyday forms of dis-identification with racial codes and practices. Cinema becomes directly *political* and supplies an aesthetic and ethical impetus for thinking differently about race. Race is not just a value system but a limit to thought itself. To life. To the world. Such an ethico-aesthetic stance resonates with Deleuze's take on 'art, and especially cinematographic art', which he sees as having to take up the task 'not of addressing a people, which is presupposed already there, but of contributing to the invention of a people' (1989: 217).

Unlike the racially peopled cinema where aesthetic practices define and imprint a fixed moral code, Deleuze's alternative ethico-political sensibility is one through which new social formations are invented in those very spaces which racism and colonialism consider either not to be peopled at all (*terra nullius*), or peopled by degenerate types, creating the conditions of possibility for an encounter with the 'missing people' who have yet to be constructed. We have also seen that Deleuze offers a provocation to experience productively the shame emerging from the violent spread of waves of sameness aimed at consolidating the standard model, be it a nation, a civilisation or a race. These missing people, always composite, often excised from the mainstream, are composed of 'minorities' in the Deleuzian sense of not being recognised. They 'represent a subversive political force' (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 117) that deviates from, rather than aspires to, the dominant standard.

In this way, minor cinema supplies a way of thinking and of becoming that undoes the identity-based race-habits prescribed by (post)colonial capitalism and the faciality machine. Rather than addressing itself to a people who already exist – whites, blacks, Indians, the USA, Americans, the French and so on – it provides a means of constituting *a people who are not yet* by producing utterances and relations that continuously urge those involved towards becoming otherwise. The critical edge of such politics is realised not through addressing an identity defined through memory, origin, spatial segregation and habits of perception, but through an experimental speaking to 'several peoples, an infinity of peoples, who remain to be united, or should not be united, in order for the problem [of race] to change' (Deleuze 1989: 220).

Notes

1. Here I draw on Deleuze's reading of Bergson, who distinguishes two kinds of recognition. *Automatic* or *habitual* recognition 'works by extension: perception extends itself into the usual movements; the movements extend perception so as to draw useful effects'. Habitual recognition involves the passing from one object to another but remaining within the same plane. The second mode of recognition, *attentive* recognition, 'is very different and abandons the extending of perception and returns to the object so as to emphasize certain contours and takes a few characteristics from it. Here we see the object remaining the same but passing through different planes' (Deleuze 1989: 44).
2. Agamben (2003) provides an insight into the philosophy of punctuation by looking at how the punctuation in the title of Deleuze's essay, 'Immanence: A life . . . ' must have been carefully considered. The use of the colon between 'Immanence' and 'A life', as well as the final ellipsis, carries out a decisive intention. The same can be said for the particle 'AND' that is characteristic of Deleuzian encounters.
3. I thank Michael J. Shapiro for drawing my attention to this crucial point.
4. In General Idi Amin's Uganda, the relationship between citizenship and consanguinity led to a drive for transethnic marriages within the country. Thus, one became a full citizen only through practices that involved blood coalescence with Ugandans or by marrying into the society. In theory, Amin took pride in contributing to the social integration of Uganda through official polygamy by taking wives from the Lugbara, Basoga, Langi and Buganda tribes. It is on the basis of this ethnocratic biopolitics that Idi Amin held that people who were not prepared to intermarry were not prepared to form a shared political community. As such, the sexual exclusiveness of the 'Asians' (Indian immigrants) in Uganda was interpreted as an unwillingness to share political community with the black Ugandans; hence their expulsion from Uganda in 1972. However, the economic determinants and justification for this expulsion should not be overlooked (Mazrui 1975).
5. Paola Marrati (2008: 86) presents an elaborate reading of Deleuze's call for a belief in the world. She looks at how this 'new faith invest the world as it is' is not a justification for what is intolerable, but it makes us believe that, although the organic form of the link that attached us to the world is broken, the link itself is not broken, and other forms of it can still be invented. Belief here concerns our possibilities of living within this world, the only world we have.

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Chapter 13

Race and Ontologies of Sensation

Amit S. Rai

In his provocative analysis of the intersection between ecological philosophy and cognitive science, Andy Clark, in *Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment Action and Cognitive Extension*, argues that an important characteristic of embodied, embedded cognition may be called the Principle of Ecological Assembly (PEA). 'According to the PEA, *the canny cognizer tends to recruit, on the spot, whatever mix of problem-solving resources will yield an acceptable result with a minimum of effort*' (2008: 13; original italics). Intensive, autoreferential ecologies evolve slowly by correlating sensory, motor and neural capabilities, and hence, after a threshold, reach a balance between the organismic bundle and its ecological niche. Ecological assembly further complexifies this tendency of correlation by tracking a kind of near-instantaneous version of such overall balance: the balanced use of a set of potentially highly heterogeneous resources assembled on the spot to solve a given problem. 'Ecological balance of this latter kind is what a flexible ecological control system seeks to achieve' (ibid.).

What are the implications of Clark's argument for an engagement with race and virtual philosophy? In a recent posting (2011) on the blog Larval Subjects, Levi Bryant suggests that Clark's arguments can help transform social and political analysis. Bryant notes that Clark's extended mind hypothesis has a number of implications for 'feminist, racial, queer, and Marxist thought'. If it is true that mind is extended, he writes, then a crucial part of understanding 'race and gender will involve careful and nuanced investigation of the *worldly scaffolding* that comes to structure race and gender'. Bryant notes, moreover, that this also concerns sexuality and its institutions.

> We need to ask, for example, what the extended mind is that comes to structure sexual institutions. What are the scaffoldings, in other words, that

ground heteronormativity? What are the scaffoldings that ground patriar-chy and male privilege? These scaffoldings, additionally, should be seen as simultaneously channeling men and women, queer and straight, white and brown, etc. If we don't engage in object-oriented archaeologies of these scaffoldings then we will be unable to develop universal-egalitarian politi-cal interventions that respond to them.

What does the practice of feeding back into *worldly scaffoldings* have to teach us about questions of race, sexuality, gender and class in a Deleuzian ontology of becoming? In this chapter, drawing on examples from contemporary media assemblages in India, I argue that forms of 'racialisation' (not a common concept in Indian sociological discourse, we should note) must be approached through an affirmation of becom-ing in ecologies of sensation. My itinerary follows an elaboration of affirmation in virtual philosophy and its implication for an ethical practice of *race racing* in the first section, and a pragmatic definition of ecology and sensation in the second section. Throughout these two sec-tions I offer various speculative examples from contemporary art and filmic cultures in globalising India that actualise affects of ecologies of sensation.

To Make an Affirmation of Becoming

The reason why Gilles Deleuze continues to exert a defining influence on contemporary thought is because he made an affirmation of becoming. Throughout his work, Deleuze shows us that the first effort in the process of such an affirmation is to diagram differential forces, senses and values of our contemporary habits, bodily capacities and sensorimotor circuits: the processes of composing multiplicities. This immanent differentiation is the first affirmation. What is the second? Deleuze pointed out that the diagram of our habits must include matter, memory, durations, tech-nologies, biomass and energies with which bodies form open, far-from-equilibrium assemblages, ecologies, planes of immanence. To affirm by experimenting, then, with these immanent differentiations, would be to make an affirmation of becoming itself.

This double affirmation sharply diverges from the mass of current criticism of processes of racialisation, which remain, by and large, repre-sentational and social-constructivist. For instance, in the work of Sarah Ahmed, the bodily dimension of affect is reduced to the racist symptom that inhabits the psychic apparatus (2010: 143; for a very different take on similar processes, see Puar 2007). On the contrary, it is our argument that racial becomings occur through correlated, functionally resonant

processes mutating in a precognitive, postrepresentational plane characterised by gradients of intensity, force, sense and value (Thrift 2005). To affirm becoming, we need a plan or diagram of intensity, not yet another interpretation of representation, no matter how polysemic or aporetic (Vitale 2011). By postrepresentational I do not mean that representation does not exist or that it has been overcome. Rather, in a virtual ontology, representation (or signification) must be situated as actualised (relatively congealed) forms of affectivity *abstracted from* the flow of bodily-machinic intensity – blocs of sensation, sensorimotor circuits – that is its plane of potentiality.

It is in this congealed form that affectivity becomes emotion, as Brian Massumi so persuasively argues (2002: 27). Representation is itself material, in so far as perception emerges from material forces, spectrums of light, tactile frissons, muscle memory, sensorimotor habituations and neuronal fluxes. In other words, representation is involved / evolved in the dynamic affective charges of the body's affordances; representational and postrepresentational do not form a binary because representation is already embodied in affection-images. In contemporary cultural critique, the postrepresentational and the representational are usually only contrasting methods of thought. But affection-images are preindividual and intensive. Second, by diagram I mean something like a 'plan' in the sense of an intersection of vectors, or processes of composition, which suggests that diagrammatic thought pursue ethical experimentations with sensation (Deleuze 1988: 122–8; I return to this below). Thought is diagrammatic to the extent that its concepts attain an affective intensity, or what amounts to the same thing, an ethical validity. Thus, the critique of the critique of racism is multiply affirmative in so far as it accomplishes at least three things through its procedures.

The *first* is to bring into a diagrammatics of race the specific embodied, qualitative differences that give to race its immanent, durational, intensive variability across and within populations: to push, in other words, the critique of race toward a thought of *race racing* (the being of race's speedily becoming) as both qualified and qualifying, that is, as a virtual multiplicity (Ansell Pearson 2002). This would enable a topology and typology of the will to power as a virtual force, real but not actual. Deleuze writes in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*:

> what does 'the will to power manifests itself' mean? The relationship between forces in each case is determined to the extent that each force is affected by other, inferior or superior, forces. It follows that will to power is manifested as a capacity for being affected. This capacity is not an

abstract possibility, it is necessarily fulfilled and actualized at each moment by the other forces to which a given force relates. (2006: 61–2)

Indeed, there is a double (or cyclical or looped) aspect to the will to power: from the standpoint of the genesis or production of forces, it determines the relation between forces but, from the standpoint of its own manifestations, it is determined by relating forces. It is an open whole: 'This is why the will to power is always determined at the same time as it determines' (ibid.). It is, as Deleuze states later, plastic,

> inseparable from each case in which it is determined; just as the eternal return is being, but being which is affirmed of becoming, the will to power is unitary, but unity which is affirmed of multiplicity. The monism of the will to power is inseparable from a pluralist typology. (2006: 86)

The will to power is determined and determining, it is both cause and effect, it is quasi-causal (on the quasi-causal, see Deleuze 1990a; DeLanda 2002: 75, 113; Clark 2008: 7).

> The genetic element (power) determines the relation of force with force and qualifies related forces. As plastic element it simultaneously determines and is determined, simultaneously qualifies and is qualified. What the will to power wills is a particular relation of forces, a particular quality of forces. And also a particular quality of power: affirming or denying. (Deleuze 2006: 85)

Here we come back to the theme of the virtual as determined and determining that remains crucial in Deleuze's thought throughout his life. There is no virtual (will to power) without the possibility of it being actualised in particular relations of forces, particular emergent capacities (qualities that arise from the interactions of finite multiplicities); but simultaneously, there is no actual without the genetic and differential element of the virtual.

In other words, immanent intensive differentiation necessitates that diagrams of becoming correlate into affective relations. This is our *second* criterion for an affirmation of becoming. As we saw above, the will to power (the virtual) is qualified at the same time as it qualifies. The power of the virtual manifests itself as the capacity for being affected (affection and affect), 'as the determinate capacity of force for being affected' (there is strong Spinozist inspiration here in both Nietzsche and Deleuze). Affective relations measure the force of a body or express its power. On the one hand, this power is not a simple logical possibility, for it is actualised at every moment by the bodies to which a given body is related; in other words, virtual multiplicities are both immanent

and irreducible, in that their emergent properties are irreducible to their parts, and they are immanent to the interaction of those parts (DeLanda 2010; Clark 2008). On the other hand, this capacity is not a physical passivity; the only passive affects are those not adequately caused by the given body (Deleuze 2006: 61–2).

We must carefully consider Deleuze's different conceptions of affect and affection, something that is relegated in the too-quick assimilation of affect to emotion or even to sentiment in some contemporary criticism (Colman 2010: 12; Massumi 2002: 27). In his wide-ranging engagement with Baruch Spinoza, Deleuze notes that affections are 'that which happens to the mode [what we have been referring to as an intensive multiplicity], the modifications of the mode, the effects of other modes on it' (1988: 48). As I hinted above, Deleuze gives a definition of these modifications that involves us in thinking about representation in a materialist, affective manner. As modifications of the mode, affections are images or 'corporeal traces', and their ideas involve both the nature of the affected body and that of the affecting external body.

Deleuze quotes Spinoza thus: 'The affections of the human body whose ideas present external bodies as present in us, we shall call images of things . . . And when the mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines' (1988: 48). These image-affections or ideas affect, in turn, the state of the body, pushing it along gradients of intensity, strengthening or decomposing its capacities to affect and be affected:

> from one state to another, from one image or idea to another, there are transitions, passages that are experienced, durations through which we pass to a greater or a lesser perfection. Furthermore, these states, these affections, images or ideas are not separable from the duration that attaches them to the preceding state and makes them tend toward the next state. These continual durations or variations of perfection are called 'affects', or feelings (*affectus*). (Deleuze 1988: 48–9)

So affect is the durational difference or variation in a body's phase space, while affection is compositional. Intensive difference passes through the durations of affect such that it both repeats and potentialises the compositional state that is the body's affection.

Deleuze shows that an existing mode (body) is thereby defined by a definite and yet plastic capacity to affect and be affected. When one mode encounters another mode, an affect-event may be produced in which an operation of correlating resonance takes hold of both modes, such that both modes enter into composition or decomposition. Most often we have complex mixtures of both processes, and which one

becomes dominant has to do with the patterned but unpredictable nature of processes of correlating resonance. When the composition increases the power to affect of both modes, Spinoza calls this joy; when it decreases this power, he calls it sadness. But we should not get lost in the representational morass of what will impel the deconstructively inclined semiotician to identify a metaphysical opposition or binary between sadness and joy. We affirm that these are vectors along complex gradients that follow a fuzzy logic of partial and shifting belonging to sets that are themselves plastic and durational.

But there is a doubling back that also happens (and this is strictly symmetrical with the doubling of affirmation I have already pointed to, and will return to below), as a kind of image of the image-affection takes hold of the body.

> The feeling affect (joy or sadness) follows from the image affection or idea that it presupposes (the idea of the body that agrees with ours or does not agree); and when the affect comes back upon the idea from which it follows, the joy becomes love, and the sadness, hatred. In this way the different series of affections and affects continually fulfill, but under variable conditions, the capacity for being affected. (Deleuze 1988: 50)

If, then, the power of the virtual manifests itself through the phase space of affection and the durational intensive processes of affect, how are we to make an affirmation of becoming? Our *third* criterion, in order to make an affirmation of becoming, is doubling difference to its $N–1$th dimension. As I have argued above, the plasticity of the virtual is both unitary (an open whole) and an affirmation of non-dialectical, mutational difference (qualitative, intensive multiplicity, or affective phase space). But affirmation, says Deleuze, is double. Affirmation comes for the first time as multiplicity, becoming and chance. 'For multiplicity is the difference of one thing from another, becoming is difference from self and chance is difference "between all" or distributive difference.' But then to affirm is to take this first coming of affirmation as an object, to affirm affirmation.

> But in this way affirmation is redoubled: as object of the second affirmation it is affirmation itself affirmed, redoubled affirmation, difference raised to its highest power. Becoming is being, multiplicity is unity, chance is necessity. The affirmation of becoming is the affirmation of being etc. – but only insofar as it is the object of the second affirmation which raises it to this new power. Being ought to belong to becoming, unity to multiplicity, necessity to chance, but only insofar as becoming, multiplicity and chance are reflected in the second affirmation which takes them as its object. (Deleuze 2006: 189)

Difference reproduces itself, and affirmation returns; return is the being of difference. In this we must see the will to power (the virtual) as the differential element that produces and develops difference in affirmation, that 'reflects difference in the affirmation of affirmation and makes it return in the affirmation which is itself affirmed'.

What is the relevance of this double affirmation to what I call race racing? First, the affirmation of race racing is a strategy of embodied thought, an event of thought that dehabituates the body by taking sensory motor circuits to the fractal $N–1^{th}$ dimension of its own flat multiplicity (DeLanda 2002: 131–2). In that sense, race racing must involve / evolve through the experimental double affirmation of both chance and intensive difference, fractionally folding in on themselves, repeating differently the intensities of racialisation. DeLanda notes that flat multiplicities operate in $N–1$ dimensions, unlike a transcendent source of unity which must operate from a supplementary (that is, $N+1^{th}$) dimension (DeLanda 2002: 132; Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 9).

Now, the concept of the plane of immanence derives from the Spinozist conception of nature as a realm composed of an infinite number of other individuals 'varying in an infinite number of ways' (Deleuze 1988: 122; quoted in Armstrong 2002: 48). Thus, the plane of immanence is also a 'plane of composition of Nature'. Spinozist ethics is rooted, then, in an experimental method that tweaks the common compositional plan of at least two multiplicities. In contrast to the plane of organisation, this kind of plane 'has no supplementary dimension; the process of composition must be apprehended for itself, through that which it gives, in that which it gives' (Deleuze 1988: 128; Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 265–72). For Deleuze, to live in an affectively ethical manner, one must install oneself on this plane and *actively* construct it, '[f]or at the same time it is fully a plane of immanence, and yet it has to be constructed' (Deleuze 1988: 123). This immanent construction suggests that race racing involves / evolves (de)habituation (in this sense, ethically speaking, there are better and worse habits, given the ecology one is actively constructing). By developing ethological diagrams of habit, which proceed through common notions (a notion common to at least two multiplicities) of techno-perceptual assemblages, collective practices of experimentation in and with habituated sensations will mutate race. But to what end?

To create a new sense, new values: evaluate to transvaluate in the processes of race racing. An example from Ranjit Kandalgaonkar's visual art practice (see http://cityinflux.com/). Mumbai-based Kandalgaonkar

works at the intersection of the visual arts and the archival documentation of urban flows. As he writes:

> cityinflux.com brings together my photography and painting. I have attempted to document the often ignored spaces / episodes that form blindspots within the cityscape of Mumbai. These areas contain glimpses of the unofficial city that appear aberrant, useless, obscure, or otherwise tangential to urban order. My work deals with directing the eye to access just parts of the visual narrative playing out in front of me, or in the case of others, a moment in its entirety. The apparent dead space that forms the backdrop of the images of the city is what interests me: *cityinflux* is a kind of storehouse of spatial entropy for a city in constant motion. (personal correspondence)

Kandalgaonkar's art experiments in the durations (affects) of matter and media. He wishes to convey a sense of change over time.

> In these time-sets, I attempt to (dis)locate junctures of time over infinitesimally small periods, through for instance the expression of T-0 or 'settling time', or much larger time-scales (months / years). This specific technique of an event's timeline highlights the location and processes unfolding within the event at multiple scales.

This experimental technique of expressing duration draws on contemporary information theories (Kandalgaonkar's advanced degree training is in telecommunications engineering). Thus:

> In my art practice, some experiments involve documenting the everyday durations of life as 'data bursts', which for a particular duration contain 'markers' signaling the most important and often usually ignored data about that event (blindspots / spikes / white noise). In short, my work is a way of creatively unfolding normalised duration into their constituent and potential data bursts. An example would be exploring duration as an experience of diagrammatic creation (e.g. train transient – http://cityinflux. com/transient.html).

cityinflux brings together Kandalgaonkar's different artistic practices. Through his photography and painting, he has attempted to document the 'often ignored spaces / episodes that form blindspots within the cityscape of Mumbai'. For Kandalgaonkar, these areas contain glimpses of the unofficial city that perpetually run unseen, alongside the dominant redundancies. Thus his practice is to document a city's in-between spaces that appear aberrant, useless, obscure, or otherwise tangential to urban order.

The city-body unfolds non-linearly in Kandalgaonkar's art. His per-

spective brings out the contortions of everyday life, from the mundane rituals of bodies boarding and leaving a local train, to the meticulous fractures of peeling cement on a forgotten wall, to a body literally unstitching itself (the actual painting is, in fact, torn and stitched). These contortions unfold stochastically because the work shows the different timescales in which these processes are embedded. From the rush of that one crucial hour heading home, forming unseen, unthought patterns of human multiplicity, to the geological rifts in the cityscape (the ground seeming to claim an abandoned rickshaw): such processes are hidden from view because time moves so fast that the city's kinesis is a blur or slows to an imperceptible crawl. Such an aesthetic aims to grasp the city's kinesis in moments of subtle transmutation, types of movement, patterns of interaction, forms of non-linear life. As a whole, 'cityinflux' wagers that one can creatively become through these patterned but unpredictable movements, that a new habit of perception is necessitated once the imperceptible flows of the urban take on a certain urgency.

This helps us to develop a non-dialectical, postrepresentational notion of ethical difference. It is basic to an understanding of any body whatsoever as a non-coinciding resonant unity. The body is less represented in 'Rush Hour' as the body stretches imperceptibly into various flows, internal, external, the boundaries breaking down, and the crush of movement on a Mumbai local at 8 a.m. on a Tuesday is grasped through another kind of perception, biopolitical, singular and populational at once: a non-coinciding resonant unity. To affirm this body-assemblage is to affirm an adventure of racial difference as transmutation and transvaluation (Deleuze 2006: 158–9). Here race racing is a becoming of a 'moving whole' or a plastic material extensity, in which bodies, with 'clearly defined outlines – they have their own substance and individuality', move in terms of their relations with each other and emerging from this moving whole as 'zones of indetermination' (Ansell Pearson 2002: 144).

To summarise the argument thus far: in an effort to wrest the practice and concept of race away from reactive dialectics and the closure of representation, I have sought to make an affirmation of becoming in the processes of race racing. By now it should be clear that by race racing I mean intensive, preindividual, aggregate processes of sensations in ecologies that assemble bodies, objects, technologies, information, energy, populations and capital in an open, moving whole with emergent capacities and non-actualised tendencies. Race racing, the being of racial becoming, modifies techno-perceptual composites through experimental practices of duration, attention, sense, sensation and timescale.

Race is a mode of matter's (life, nature, the world, substance) attribute of extensity. But race racing is a modification of sensation; race racing is expressed in this or that mode in the sense that race racing is a modification of the affectivity of sensation itself (Deleuze 1990b: 110–11). In this sense, ecologies are virtual-actual circuits, sensations are non-human quanta-becoming-qualia, and race racing is an ethical practice that unfolds experimentally as lines of flight.

The Ontology of Race is an Ecology of Sensation

In this section, I propose to define ecology and sensation more rigorously. To anticipate my argument a bit, it has seemed to me for some time that the question of race, if it is to move beyond the impasse that seems to have bottled up its potentiality for radical politics (social constructivism, dialectics, ressentiment, representationalism, humanism and so on), must be posed in terms of *what a body can do*: its affection-states, its affect-durations, its composition of multiplicities, its gradients of intensity, its contraction of quantity-into-quality. As I will show, coevolutionary processes of becomings mobilise important available resources in a given ecology to refunction correlated flows of energy, information, biomass, sensation and technology. Media-machinic assemblages of bodies have specific emergent properties because of a continuous but unstable refunctioning of correlated processes. The coevolution immanent to techno-perceptual technologies in societies of control, in biopolitical projects of gene-splicing and neuromarketing, suggests that a new ecology of sense and sensation in the mode and scale of the nanodigital bodies forth a cyborg race. In short, ecological diagrams (or assemblages of assemblages) help to pose race racing as a question of distributed affective relationality.

Relations, for Deleuze, are outside their terms; they are never relations between parts summed up together to make a self-same whole, because this whole is always open to outside perturbations: 'machinic relationality entails a primary invention of the new out of mismatching connections between the abstract and concrete worlds of a body' (Parisi 2008: 288; see also O'Rourke 2011). We now have three further characteristics of the 'amodal relationality' of ecologies: (1) ecological relations are outside their terms (Deleuze 2001: 35–40; James 1905: 37–8); (2) ecologies are immanent compositions of intensive forces; and (3) ecologies are irreducible to their components, and yet without their material interactions would cease to function.

An ecology is necessarily transversal to social, subjective and material

'Universes of reference'. Citing Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stenger (1984) on temporal irreversibility, Félix Guattari in *The Three Ecologies* of 1989 wrote with some prescience that the question of 'subjective enunciation will pose itself ever more forcefully as machines producing signs, images, syntax and artificial intelligence continue to develop' (ibid.: 41). For Guattari, this requires a transversal thought that will diagram ecologies beyond the 'intelligibility of interlocking sets or the indeterminate interlocking of fields of signification' (ibid.: 44). The logic of ecological assemblages is 'a logic of intensities, of auto-referential existential assemblages engaging in irreversible durations' (ibid.; Guattari 1995: 97; Ansell Pearson 2002: 37). As Andy Clark's notion of PEA, with which I began this chapter, shows, ecological assembly further complexifies this tendency of correlation by tracking a kind of near-instantaneous version of such overall balance:

> Such approaches recognize the important contributions that embodiment and environmental embedding can make to the solution of a problem and then seek to understand those contributions by identifying the role of specific operations (perhaps some gross bodily, some environment involving, and some neural) in real-time performance of the task. (Clark 2008: 14)

To summarise, then, what is at stake in ecosophy: first, ecologies demand a thoroughgoing *realist* ontology that diagrams the interconnections and fluctuations between Universes of reference (Bryant et al. 2011). Second, time is an *irreversible* dimensionality of becoming that traverses environments and correlates timescales of assemblages of assemblages (that is, of interpenetrating multiplicities). Third, ecologies are *pragmatic* assemblages, or feedbacked compositions of human neurology, technology, energy flows and information (DeLanda 2010; Clark 2008). Lastly, ecologies are at once extensive (actual, material, metric: quantitative multiplicities), intensive (self-differentiating and self-diverging: qualitative multiplicities) and virtual (tendencies and capacities that may never be actualised) (Guattari 1995). In other words, ecologies are composed of three different immanent dimensions of change, as Manuel DeLanda clarifies: extensive properties, production processes defined by intensive differences, and the domain of virtual structures, which accounts in a purely immanent way for the regularities in the processes and the products (2010: 128–9).

If we bring this definition of ecology to bear on our conception of race racing, we can suggest the following: embodied duration gives to race its immanent intensive variability across and within populations. A racialised body is both a modification of the attribute of extensity

and a mode of a historically specific but virtually plastic ecology of sensation (Deleuze 1990b: 76–9). Race racing is a singular process of experimenting with the ecological intensities of embodied duration. The history of Hindi cinema provides outstanding examples of experiments in ecological intensities (without considering them or naming them in terms of 'race'). Beyond the stereotypical melodramatic form (itself a clichéd sensorimotor circuit borrowed and renewed from nineteenth-century British fiction and drama), the mobilisation of sensation through an embodied experience of media history has become a defining feature of contemporary *hat ke* cinema (the new new wave: R. G. Varma, S. L. Bhansali, A. Kashyap, D. Benegal, A. Sen, A. Chaubey, V. Bhardwaj, D. Banerjee, S. Shah and P. Balagopalan, among others). Take, for instance, the use of radio as background noise in Kamal Swaroop's masterpiece *Om Darbadar* (1988). Adding to the surrealist tonality of the editing and *mise-en-scène*, the disjunctive and tangential radio broadcasts give to scenes of bizarre, eroticised domesticity a paradoxical sense of both absolute claustrophobia and unending vectors of events beyond the diegesis (the visual and aural style is quoted at length in Kashyap's rendering of the Devdas story in *Dev. D*, 2009).[1]

This aural style is amplified across all channels in Kashyap's experimental *No Smoking* (2007). Im-mediated intensities resonate in *No Smoking* through a visual and aural style that explicitly reminds the audience of the history of other media substrates with which cinema has evolved. Locating an unfixable *mise-en-scène* through the technoglocial and sensual layers of an evolving media assemblage, Kashyap mobilises digital imaging (computer-generated imagery, or CGI) to call attention to the thickness of the screen, showing demons and 'shades' haunting, even disrupting, the habituated quotidian, while in other scenes CGI literally bends realist codes by collapsing bodies and geometric spaces into a topological folding. Kashyap's stylisation of narrative bits brings vision and sound to the limit of their own ecology of sensation. As only singular acts of creativity can, *No Smoking* plays with visual and aural style and narrative technique in a way that suggests new connectivities forming, habits dissolving into the incipience of sensing. More specifically, its presentation strikes the senses as a kind of hallucination, making perceptible the norms of reception that form the set of habituations of contemporary cinema itself.

A movie 'about' breaking the habit of smoking, the film concatenates various visual clichés to, at times, stunning and dizzying effect. For example, animated internal dialogue bubbles borrowed from comics flash at various moments, signalling what a character 'really' thinks

of another character or the situation. Subtle digital effects and figures intimate a shadow world of lost souls inhabiting a progressively unclear reality. The intermittent bleach bypass cinematography gives a kind of vortex of greyness to the *mise-en-scène* of a postindustrial image of liberalising India. Thus, the blurring of reality, dream, present, past, film, TV and comic book, through various digital effects and the curiously forking narrative, produces effects of disorientation and estrangement. In these cinematic examples we see an 'ethico-aesthetic practice' (Guattari), potentialising an ecology of variable intensities in order to confront the stratified field of habituation, and thereby deforming bodily habit. And it is to this deformation of the body that I turn in a consideration of sensation.

Thus, having defined ecologies as extensive, intensive and virtual multiplicities of resonant processes with intercalated timescales, let us turn to a pragmatic definition of sensation, and then synthesise our two definitions through two examples from contemporary Indian art. As Massumi (2002) has shown, sensation is a crucially important category of thought and experience in Deleuze's philosophy. I would suggest that sensation is too often neglected, rendering Deleuzian philosophy overly scientistic or rationalist (consider the relegation of the concept, for instance, in DeLanda's otherwise brilliant work; or the reduction of sensation to being in Bryant's otherwise excellent book, 2008). In what follows, I attempt to locate a Deleuzian conception of sensation in the experience of a bodily transformation that is multisensory and temporal.

Steven Shaviro (2011) has recently argued that Western philosophy, at least since Descartes, has generally given far too large a place to 'presentational immediacy' or the clear and distinct representation of sensations in the mind of a conscious, perceiving subject. But Shaviro notes that, in fact,

> such perception is far less common, and far less important, than what Whitehead calls 'perception in the mode of causal efficacy', or the 'vague' (nonrepresentational) way that entities affect and are affected by one another through a process of vector transmission.

Indeed, presentational immediacy does not merit the transcendental or constitutive role that thinkers such as Kant attribute to it; this mode of perception is confined to 'high-grade organisms' that are 'relatively few' in the universe as a whole. On the other hand, as the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead shows, causal efficacy is far more widespread in both human and non-human life, transversal even to inert and living matter. Shaviro insists that causal efficacy 'plays a larger role

in our own experience than we tend to realize', and it can be attributed 'even to organisms of the lowest grade'. From the viewpoint of causal efficacy, all actual entities in the universe stand on the same ontological footing. No special ontological privileges can distinguish God from 'the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space': in spite of all 'gradations of importance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level' (Shaviro 2011: 281; Whitehead 1978: 229–35; see also Clark 2008). Shaviro and Whitehead help give us our first definition of sensation: in the prehension of sensation, a living or non-living entity is affected by another living or non-living entity in the mode of causal efficacy, entering into relations of motion (Spinoza 2005; Vitale 2011).

How can we understand the nature of this mutual, pragmatic affectivity? Sensations are obscure, yet distinct, because they are intensive multiplicities that unfold in duration (DeLanda 2002: 21) and conjoin or resonate with other durational multiplicities with specific effects (that may or may not be discernible to human perception). Coming to terms with this process was the aim of radical empiricism for William James, who wrote:

> Our concepts and our sensations are confluent; successive states of the same ego, and feelings of the same body are confluent. Where the experience is not of conflux, it may be of conterminousness [things with but one thing between]; or of contiguousness [nothing between]; or of likeness; or of nearness; or of simultaneousness; or of in-ness; or of on-ness; or of for-ness; or of simple with-ness; or even of mere and-ness. (1905: 35)

This theory of the concatenated union of sensations recalls the empiricism of David Hume, for whom, as Deleuze reminds us,

> the mind and its fantasies behave with respect to passions not in the manner of a wind instrument but in the manner of a percussive instrument, where, after each beat, the vibrations still retain some sound which gradually and imperceptibly dies. (2001: 48)

Deleuze notes that it is up to the imagination to 'reflect passion', to make it 'resonate and go beyond the limits of its natural partiality and presentness'. Hume shows how aesthetic and moral sentiments are formed in this way: in reflecting the passions, the imagination liberates them, stretching them out infinitely and projecting them beyond their natural limits. But Deleuze adds a crucial correction:

> Yet on at least one count, we must correct the metaphor of percussion: as they resonate in the imagination, the passions do not simply become

gradually less vivid and less present; they also change their colour or sound, as when the sadness of a passion represented in a tragedy turns into the pleasure of an almost infinite play of the imagination; they assume a new nature and are accompanied by a new kind of belief. Thus the will 'moves easily in all directions and produces an image of itself, even in places where it is not fixed'. (ibid.)

Hume, James and Deleuze give us two more defining characteristics of sensation: sensations hang together in a concatenated, non-coinciding resonant unity-in-multiplicity; but as sensations resonate, they change in kind, becoming unhinged from causal efficacy, and their movement is organised on the one hand by associational habituations and the infinite resonances of an embodied mind.

Deleuze and Guattari write of 'blocs' of sensation that are perceptible as 'varieties', or of compounds of sensations, and they give the following examples: *the vibration*, which, while a simple sensation, is already durable or compound, 'because it rises and falls, implies a constitutive difference of level, follows an invisible thread that is more nervous than cerebral'; *the embrace or the clinch*, as when two sensations resonate in each other by embracing each other so tightly 'in a clinch of what are no more than "energies"'; *withdrawal, division, distension*, as when two sensations draw apart, release themselves, but 'so as now to be brought together by the light, the air, or the void that sinks between them or into them, like a wedge that is at once so dense and so light that it extends in every direction as the distance grows, and forms a bloc that no longer needs a support' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 168). Kandalgoankar's 'Murjah' (acrylic and pencil on handmade paper) is the very figure of this bodily deformation of sensation, at once vibration (the taught lines of neck and face against gridded ground), the resonant embrace of fractal organs becoming wilting thread-flower, and the tragic-comic division of the self in the infinite giddiness of bodily unwinding and decay.

Or consider Krishnaraj Chonat's 'My Hands Smell of You' made from e-waste, sandal soap, wood and mirrors (various dimensions, 2010; see http://www.galleryske.com/KrishnarajChonat/index.html). The movement of the installation is neural. 'Strands' of wire drip-hang from hundreds of thousands of discarded component-innards of electronic detritus (techno-entropy), while from the ground, blood-red tentacles stretch out laterally and horizontally, both meeting the neuronal nets of waste and connecting with an unspecified outside. Thus, we are confronted by 'blocs of sensation' that in-volve us in their own deformative performance of a network extimating its own ground. As Christopher Vitale puts it:

Figure 13.1 Ranjit Kandalgaonkar, 'Murjah', 2006, 56 × 77 cm. Acrylic and pencil on handmade paper. Used with artist's permission.

The concept of the ground in the network diagram represents the principle of indistinction. Grounds are neither / nor, for they are neither fully inside a network nor outside of it, and in this sense, we can say that they are extimate to networks. This is not the only manner in which grounds are neither

/ nor, however, for they are also neither unified nor dispersed, neither nodes nor links, and while they may be the background of a network, depending on how that network is deployed in the world, they may also be the foreground. (2011: 248)

What Kandalgaonkar's and Chonat's experimentations help us grasp, in short, is the essential power of race, that is, its specific capacity to affect and be affected, which is of the nature of an embodied style of composing differential forces into a non-coinciding resonant unity: an aesthetico-ontological style. This composition of forces is at once human and technological. The history of race is inseparable from the historical tendencies immanent to the machinic phylum; this is why the concept of techno-perceptual media assemblages roots itself in diagrams of ecologies of sensation. The power of race is a gradient that goes from sensation or affectivity to identity or representation, following Spinoza's insight that the more power a thing has, the more it can be affected in a great number of ways (intensive dimensions of qualitative change) (Deleuze 1990b: 102). The expressive forms of race affirm the absolute quality of sensation (ibid.: 80).

Let us summarise and conclude. I have suggested that race racing is an affirmation of becoming in so far as it becomes a practice of experimentation in ecologies of sensation. I have defined both ecologies and sensations as composed of virtual-actual processes that require us to think of human perception as materially and continually assembled with the world and its fluxes. This implies that there are non-human, non-carbon 'races', monstrous entities for which we as yet have no name (Derrida 1995) because they are involved / evolved in an ethics of race racing that sorts 'entities', to recall Bryant, based not on embodied resemblances but on capacities to do. These emergent capacities are the effects of the interaction of assemblages of assemblages in ecologies of sensation. Sensations are events of bodily deformation and they are fully ecological in so far as they are actualisations of virtual tendencies and capacities; ecologies make sensations resonate quasi-causally and transversally; as virtual multiplicities, ecologies never coincide with their own resonations because they are caught up in lines of flight that affirm their power, or capacity to become.

These becomings are transversal to race, gender, class and sexuality, and as such are no longer simply reactive and defensive. Becomings are affirmative and creative; indeed, they become reactive only when they are separated from what they can do (Deleuze 2006). In other words, and finally, race racing as a mode of affirmative becoming is actualised

in mutating ecologies of sensation, when a set of intensive processes crosses a critical threshold and self-differentiates. An ethics of race racing diagrams affection-states by demarcating the virtual and actual capacities and tendencies of a multiplicity through which a practice of experimentation in affect-durations can deform the body.

Note

1. I owe this insight to architect and cultural critic Rohan Shivkumar and cinematographer Avijit Mukul Kumar.

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Chapter 14

Poetics of the Mangrove

John Drabinski

When Édouard Glissant passed away on 3 February 2011, the intellectual world lost a great thinker and poet. Glissant's theoretical work on poetics and the chaotic dynamics of creolisation, which interrupts so much of what had preceded his work in Afro-Caribbean theory, has its companion in a poetry and fiction whose richness draws from the complexity and opacity of Caribbean historical experience. A thinker and a poet arriving after negritude, after Frantz Fanon's existentialism, and after all of that aftermath, Glissant's contribution to contemporary philosophy and cultural theory is only beginning to register.

With his death, the world also lost one of the great Deleuzians. In recasting the rhizome and nomad as creolised subjects, collectivities and geographies, Glissant reminded us, by telling us for the first time, perhaps, that the Americas are already Deleuzian, that the single-root no longer makes sense, and that fixity in place and land is the origin of nationalism's great, terrifying myths. In particular – for Glissant always insisted on thinking in particulars – the Caribbean and its historical experience, mapped perfectly by its chaotic archipelagic geography, is rhizomatic and nomadic from the moment of inception. There is no single-root that precedes the creation of the Caribbean as a cultural location, and no single-root survives the storm of violence that defines that creation. Conquest, genocide, the Middle Passage, plantation slavery, colonialism and the postcolonial moment – this is origin, this is creation.

And yet there is more, because life goes on. After disaster, and even in the midst of disaster, there is life. In that life, fragments grow roots, and yet never depend on fantasies of a single source of vitality, whether that be the spiritual *something* of an ancestral land or the raciological foundations of the nation-state. Glissant's thought is always a displaced and displacing thought, moving where one expects stasis, wandering where one expects. The movement of territorialisation – this is where *we*

become – and de-territorialisation – this place is never fixed – is described by Glissant as a movement and series of moments of Chaos. Not just chaos as a feature of the world, but as the world itself: *chaos-monde*. Everything is unexpected. Indeed, the Deleuzian moment of Glissant's work consists of just that unexpected moment. An unexpected, fragmentary moment that is always productive, while at the same time refusing all conventional economies of productivity, assemblage and calcification of thought. *Chaos-monde.*

But this gets us a bit ahead of ourselves. Whence Glissant? And why the Deleuzian Americas? How can we get to Peter Hallward's now well-known claim (2001) that Glissant was the intellectual world's great Deleuzian?

Glissant's life and work were, from the beginning, engaged with the critical issues and moments of anticolonial struggle and decolonisation. He was born in Martinique in 1928. This places his birth in such an interesting historical moment, dated just three years after Frantz Fanon's birth and two years before Derek Walcott. Glissant moved to Paris in 1946 to study philosophy, history and ethnology, and we see the intersection of the sensibility and interests of those studies (and so much more) in his work – how can we conceive subjectivity, time, aesthetic meaning, and how are all of those conceptions embedded within historical experience, the emergence of a people, and the complex paths of decolonisation? These questions lead Glissant to as many questions as answers, a destination determined as much by his Deleuzian metaphysics as by the historical moment – departmentalisation, decolonial thinking within that relation, exile, diasporic experience and so on. While in Paris as a student and after, Glissant famously joined the movement for a radical anticolonial politics with Paul Niger and others. His involvement in this movement prompted Charles de Gaulle to block Glissant's return to Martinique and then dissolve the Front des Antilles-Guyane pour l'autonomie (FAGA) in one of those all-too-familiar moments of backlash against articulations of independence and cultural specificity.

After the ban was lifted in 1965, Glissant returned to Martinique and founded the Institut Martiniquais d'Études in 1967, and then created the important (and still perhaps underappreciated) journal *Acoma* a few years later. Glissant relocated from Martinique to Paris in the eighties (working for the newsletter of Unesco), later took a position at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge (travelling the US South, which provoked him to write *Faulkner, Mississippi*), and eventually settled into a position in the Department of French at City University in New York in 1995. His work continued into the first decade of

the twenty-first century, producing an impressive range of compelling stuff, including theoretical texts in poetics (*La cohée du Lamentin, Une nouvelle région du monde* and others), a philosophical reflection on his life's work (*Philosophie de la relation*, translated as *Poetics of Relation*, 2000), work on the intersection of memory and politics (a series of pamphlets co-authored with Patrick Chamoiseau, the 2007 masterwork *Mémoires des esclavages*, for which Dominique de Villepin wrote an avant-propos), and the utterly enigmatic, borderless collection of what Glissant, in his familiar turn of phrase, called *la poésie du tout-monde* entitled *La Terre, le feu, l'eau, et les vents*.

This last collection of 2010 gathers pieces from the *tout-monde* of poetic expression, drawing in that register, as is fitting, from the canon of Western and non-Western writing, but also from the chance occurrences of poetic expression in Socrates, Shakespeare, Montaigne, Perse, Muhammad Ali, Neruda, Ibn Arabi, Gandhi and many more. The collection tells so much of Glissant's intellectual story and, as a sort of capstone publication, seems a perfect way for him to have left our world. *La Terre, le feu, l'eau et les vents* brings the playful, erudite and global character of Glissant's poetics to the page, creating for the reader a swirling, chaotic play of words that testify, in writing and voice, to a genuinely global sense of vernacular poetic expression. There is no centre in the collection, no measure generated by a name or tradition or reputation or mode of composition, rather only poetry itself. The rhizomatic character of expression and mode of expression forms the non-centred centre, the poly-rooted root of *La Terre, le feu, l'eau et les vents*. As well, questions of poetics and thinking through what he termed *tout-monde* turned increasingly more toward direct political work in the last years of his life. That work was entwined with the project of national and trans-Atlantic memory, which placed the Francophone black Atlantic at the heart of New World culture and history, to be sure, but also in the centre of Europe – France in particular. Often working with Chamoiseau, Glissant produced engaging, provocative pamphlets on nationalism, memory and even Barack Obama's election to the presidency in the United States. Those pamphlets add political bite to Glissant's poetics, just as we might say that his writing on the memory of the slave trade in *Mémoires des esclavages*, along with the companion cultural projects in France and elsewhere, puts the trauma of historical memory back into the heart of French history and identity.

Perhaps we can say that these last projects are written for a future that has not yet arrived, a future in which the meaning of a people, a nation, a region or whatever other configuration is defined by movements of

deterritorialisation, then reterritorialisation, and then deterritorialisation again. For traumatic memory does not sit peacefully when placed at the heart of an identity; regions and places become unstable. So it is with traumatic memory and its historical experience. This memory is unruly, disruptive and often cruel. But it is also what it means to *be*. Glissant made that clear in his life's work. The life's work of many others will surely be dedicated to elaborating and extending that clarity. The meaning of the world hangs in that dedication, to be sure.

Glissant's life is comprised of an astonishing range of reflections in poetry, theatre, novels, cultural criticism and philosophy. Those reflections systematically, in their peculiar antisystematic sensibility, rewrite the *histoire* of the Americas in order to obligate us to think otherwise. *Otherwise* is the crucial re- or dis-orientation, for theorising the Americas requires a very different sense of knowing and being. This shift in epistemology and metaphysics, of course, requires another sense of poetics and aesthetics. Or perhaps the poetics and aesthetics begin epistemology and metaphysics. It is impossible to discern a starting point here, largely because of the originary situation of the Americas themselves. The New World is mixed and mixing, an inheritance of violence, survival, reinvention and invention. Glissant also rewrites the identity of Europe as he rewrites the meaning of the Americas, asking if, then how, the project (and not *place*) called 'the West' can be thought outside the entanglements of empire. Perhaps so much involvement for so long and with such dependency – life in Europe was lived from subjugation, violence and extraction – alters the meaning of the identity of the metropolitan nation and that strange, culturally constructed 'region' called 'Europe'.

No, not perhaps. *It must be so*. Five centuries of entanglement cannot be disentangled just like that. Europe lived both economically and intellectually from a machine of exploitation and violence. Can we imagine European wealth without the slave trade and colonial exploitations? Have we begun to fathom the significance of the fact that all aspects of European culture – from literature to theology to philosophy to natural science – intervened to justify slavery and colonial subjugation? Yet, when we theorise (or even just casually remark upon) European national and regional identity, we easily forget the reach of entanglement and, as a result, imagine this bordered terrain to have a unique, centralised cultural meaning. Europe, we too often assume, has its *own* meaning, which is then exported across the web of empire. We can remember empire and forget entanglement. All too easily, in fact. What colonial fantasies underpin that sort of imagined purity? There is no meaning to

'Europe' without the violence of conquest, subjugation and domination. Caribbean identity, which has always wrestled with entangled cultural forces as an analytical starting point, is entwined with this very same complicated legacy of colonial power, even as the inheritance of that legacy charts a very different cultural course.

The movement of deterritorialisation is therefore the movement of the world. Empire's geographical and political centre cannot isolate it from the rhizomatic effects and after-effects of entanglement. Entanglement is that beginning and centre that do not have an origin point or foundation. *Glissant's Deleuzian moment*. Glissant's challenge to us, no matter our location or cultural milieu, is to think, live and create within this incredibly complicated intellectual space. A poetics of the mangrove, we might say. Glissant writes the Caribbean future at the shores of a traumatic black Atlantic history, which in turn is the history of the West, the history that the West forgets as the condition of its own possibility.

For these reasons, then, one cannot write without Glissant. Or at least one should not. To write without Glissant in mind is to miss, then eclipse some of the most overwhelming and system-overturning conceptual critiques to be found on the contemporary scene. Glissant's account of New World history and memory requires so much of us as thinkers. Space and time curve and fragment, rather than loop and fold. Continuity is broken and the imagination, working with fragments, becomes a kind of intellectual *djobber* – that Caribbean figure of the day-worker, odd-job labourer who works between connection and disconnection. Nomads and rhizomes replace homes and roots, putting a decisive and compelling twist on Deleuze and Guattari's revolutionary reinvention of philosophy. In the wake of curves and fragments, in the space of nomadic movement and rhizomatic contact with place, the historical experience of the New World produces and is produced by a *creolised* and *archipelagic* space. The fraught myth of bloodlines, coupled to the strange geography of the sea, becomes, in this cluster of conceptual innovations and disorientations, a figure of the new transcendental: mixture as the condition for the possibility of composite cultural formation.

Creolised, archipelagic space is defined by its creative chaos and fractal character, rather than by fixity and continuity. Creolised space emerges *after* so much violent and traumatic history. In Glissant's work, memory of pain is not just remembrance of the dead and their unspeakable suffering, but also, thought at the shoreline between the Old and New Worlds, the memory of a great remaking of the world in the strange temporality of a globalised and globalising geography. The Caribbean,

after all, is that first geography – writing the *geos* at the violent cross-roads of civilisations – of globalised culture, language and meaning – a strange and terrifying experiment in devastation, violence and creation that has produced hybridisation for over five centuries. This mixed space of becoming exceeds so many of the philosophical categories and conceptual schemes one finds in Western philosophy. These are Glissant's great and foundational insights. These are the insights to which we who work in his wake have to answer and must continue, not only out of a reverence for a great thinker, but firstly out of respect for the pain and beauty of the history and memory of making the New World.

This is where we catch first sight of Glissant's appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari, an appropriation that is worth considering both for its testimony to the fecundity of that theory and for its case study, as it were, of creolisation. It is perhaps recalling Hallward's words in *Absolutely Postcolonial*, where he advances the provocative claim that Glissant is 'perhaps the most thoroughly Deleuzian writer in the francophone world', and whose recent works 'provide, in fiction and in theory, an extraordinary tribute to Deleuze's smoothly nomadological philosophy' (Hallward 2001: 67). What form of tribute works through Glissant's texts? And what would it mean to link two or three (do we not always collapse Deleuze and Guattari in this moment?) thinkers so closely?

Let me begin a short reflection with a set of familiar passages. In the introductory remarks to *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari begin with the two guiding figures of their book. The first figure is the figure of the tree, a conception of writing and describing that identifies a single-root as the foundation of difference. Atavism, we come to learn from Deleuze, Guattari and Glissant all, is the root of totalitarianism – that social and political condition in which the multiple issue from the one. They write:

> A first type of book is the root-book. The tree is already the image of the world, or the root the image of the world-tree . . . The law of the book is the law of reflection, the One that becomes two.

An image of the world – with that turn of phrase, the imaginary, in a non-Lacanian sense, transforms the relation between oneself and another, one place and another, and so on in relation to any place whatsoever. And further:

> the book as a spiritual reality, the Tree or Root as an image, endlessly develops the law of the One that becomes two, then of the two that become four . . . Binary logic is the spiritual reality of the root-tree. (1987: 5)

Binary logic, which becomes in Fanon's hands, for example, the Manichean economy of colonialism, begins with the fantasy of origin and the domination of difference by the one. If the one births the two, and so also births every multiple that follows, then the one is set as the measure of difference. The book tells this story. This story is an epic story. An origin story. A story that always comes back to a homeland. Odysseus and Moses, those two great wanderers in the Western imagination, tell this atavistic story of the root-book.

Against this figure of the tree, Deleuze and Guattari famously propose the fascicular root. This term 'fascicular' is peculiar and exceptionally suggestive. On the one hand, it describes a book that is written in divisions, published in parts. Writing as fascicular therefore does not simply uproot itself, contesting the single-root from the fragmentation of its derivative parts. *That* is the logic of difference that still maintains an essential relationship, then destructive tension, to identity. Rather, fascicular writing operates with a wholly other logic, beginning with a sense of difference that, at best, only makes partial allusion to a whole, which then prompts Deleuze and Guattari to refer to William S. Burroughs's cut-up method of writing – 'the folding of one text onto another, which constitutes multiple and even adventitious roots' (ibid.: 6). On the other hand, and in concert with the first, fascicular describes a small bundle, which, like fascicular writing, is only single when seen from the outside or when the discreteness of the threads is obscured by false vision (hence Mussolini's reterritorialisation of *fasces*). The interior composition is multiple. The oneness of a bundle is allusive or functional, both of which, when taken too seriously, betray the originary difference of composition.

The multiple and adventitious roots of the fascicular root puts the term 'root' under a certain kind of erasure. There is no root in any conventional sense of the term, except for the fact that, perhaps, there is something set up and into the earth that gives life to Life. But the root does not hold life to it and it alone; life is not dependent upon a single source. Everything is cut up as a matter of original condition; bundling does not eliminate difference, but rather only assembles. Deleuze and Guattari's fascicle gives way to the organic case of the rhizome, which they claim is not a figure or metaphor. Multiple roots *literally*. In their enumeration of the features of rhizome, Deleuze and Guattari keep the aporetic character in full view when they write:

> Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes and order. (ibid.: 7)

Deleuze and Guattari bring this to bear on the problem of language, which, under the anti-regime regime of the rhizome, functions as an elimination of centre and foundation. Rather than the condition of nation and belonging – those cornerstones of micro- and macrofascism – language puts difference into play as irreducible, open, virile. They write:

> There is always something genealogical about a tree. It is not a method for the people. A method of the rhizome type, on the contrary, can analyze language only by decentering it onto other dimensions and other registers. A language is never closed upon itself, except as a function of impotence. (ibid.: 8)

We can see here why Deleuze and Glissant prove so important in Glissant's work. In the Caribbean context, the problem of language as fixed and national is the source of the very colonial anxiety that begins, perhaps most famously, Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* (2008, first published 1952). In that text, Fanon leaves the problem open: how can the colonised liberate themselves when they speak the language – and so inhabit the world – of the coloniser? Fanon's work remains stuck in the root-book model of language. But Glissant, engaged with Deleuze and Guattari in just this moment, encounters another language, a creolised language, and so a language that does not refer back to itself and the One from which it descended. Instead, language is decentred and decentring – something Deleuze and Guattari announce as a general condition, but which Glissant encounters as a geographically specific incarnation. Difference in the theory of difference.

The rhizome, then, opens the system and disrupts any pretensions to genealogy, signifying instead a multiplicity whose life is not dependent upon a unity or single-root, but rather fascicled as a first principle, set outside the logic of fragmentation as loss of unity. And so Deleuze and Guattari write in a crucial passage:

> A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines . . . Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialisation down which it constantly flees. There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. (1987: 9)

A number of features of the rhizome come into focus in this passage. First, the general form of Deleuze and Guattari's claims about the rhizome is largely ontological. That is, the rhizome describes the

complex interactions that comprise the intersections of body, action and life – conditions and sites of being. Second, life and multiplicity are primordial. There is no prior condition from which multiplicity derives, nor is life separable from multiplicity. Multiplicity and life are coextensive, both as conditions of one another and, if we can employ the term here, as being itself. Life and multiplicity as a radical *becoming* without origin or *telos*. Third, and as the becoming-geography or geography-becoming of the prior two, territorialisation and deterritorialisation are not contraries. Nor is deterritorialisation a privative form of territorialisation. Rather, the heterogeneity of territory – that pull in opposing or just different directions – and the dynamics of relation to place are themselves constitutive of space, time and the existential crossing of bodies, actions and life into sites of meaning formation and deformation. Deleuze and Guattari write:

> How could movements of deterritorialisation and processes of reterritorialisation not be relative, always connected, caught up in one another? The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid's reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. (ibid.: 10)

Difference is not surmounted by identity. This reversal of Platonism, to recall another Deleuzian text (Deleuze 1994), is played out most importantly in the antifascistic, antitotalitarian conception of place generated by a radical theory of difference. Multiplicity, that refusal of the single-root, is sustained, rather than compromised, by the simultaneous movement of territorialisation, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Movement replaces connection, even as movement itself is conceived as its own kind of connection to place. The nomad grows out of this notion of territory and difference. And it should be no surprise to learn that Glissant, in this subversive renarration of the foundations of being and place, sees an emerging new conceptual language for the Caribbean and its historical experience.

Yet, Glissant is not simply a Deleuzian in the Caribbean. Indeed, just as Deleuze and Guattari insist on the differentiation of difference, the movement of notions of rhizome and nomad across the Atlantic – from empire to the other of empire – fundamentally changes the meaning of Deleuzian ideas. What is the creolised rhizome? This is Glissant's question in the last two-and-a-half decades of his working life.

It is worth taking note, by way of closing, of the sorts of historical

experience that underpin these two notions of rhizome. For Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* emerges from at least two formative historical experiences (and surely many more): the two World Wars and May 1968. These events engage, militantly, with the problem of fascism and nationalism. As well, they reveal two crucial features of the Western philosophical tradition: complicity with totalitarianism and the inability to theorise emerging forms of political resistance. Theorising the rhizome therefore takes place in the context of two urgent forms of resistance, resistance to both the historical moment of fascist and nationalist regimes (which recur post-war, of course) and to philosophy's calcification. The rhizome disrupts philosophy and thereby opens up horizons of possibility one cannot see within the tradition – or that one sees only in glimpses and incomplete, marginal thought.

The Caribbean begins otherwise. To put it simply, the Caribbean does not come to the rhizome as a moment of resistance, for Glissant, but instead as the very condition of being itself. Glissant does not turn to the rhizome as a way *out of* micro- and macrofascism, but rather as a direct description of Caribbean historical experience. The swirl and chaos of history have made the Caribbean a rhizomatic place; there is not temptation of the One, except by way of nostalgic fantasy (negritude's imagination of Africa) or radical alienation (the comparison of the colony to metropolitan life). The Middle Passage – that traumatic memory and history whose effects lie in the problem of beginning again, without the single-root – and the moment of arrival – the chaotic disorientation of rootlessness in a new place – are figured in the mangrove tree, whose roots lie above ground, multiple and tangled, immersed in and marking the shoreline. Between drowning and life, perhaps. The swirl of concepts and catastrophes is saturated with melancholic affect, to be sure, but also a sense of reterritorialisation after deterritorialisation. Catastrophe, then survival, then another beginning.

It is worth reading Glissant's words in *Poetics of Relation* (2000, first published 1990) here, for he is direct and blunt about the importance of Deleuze and Guattari for coming to terms with this historical moment. Glissant notes the basic form of Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome, underscoring how it contests and resists the 'predatory' character of the single-root without giving up the very notion of rootedness. The single-root is not just a wrong-headed fantasy or bad metaphysics. Rather, the single-root, when generated as a measure of being and beings, consumes and destroys difference. And where has this been more apparent, more terrifying, than in the Caribbean, where predation has meant slavery, then colonialism, then the anxious conditions of so-called postcolonial

life? To be is to be *somewhere* and *in some place*, and the mobility of the single-root – it can always transfer its meaning and domination across oceans and continents – has meant, historically, that predation makes new borders for consumption and destruction. Glissant begins with this terror, this New World terror, and then asks about beginning again and the meaning of having roots in the archipelago. Put another way, the question is this: how can we imagine belonging without predatory roots? Glissant writes:

> The notion of the rhizome maintains, therefore, the idea of rootedness but challenges that of a totalitarian root. Rhizomatic thought is the principle behind what I call the Poetics of Relation, in which each and every identity is extended through a relationship with the Other. (2000: 11)

The relation to the Other, however, cannot be conceived as a going-out-toward, which is rather the condition of empire and the centre of global power. Or the test of the subject's post-predatory character. Glissant does not begin with the line *out* toward the Other, toward difference, but rather with the condition of difference itself as intractable. That is, the Caribbean context is already a relation to the Other, the primordial mixture and composite character of culture *as the first expression of being*. The Caribbean begins with forced migration and the connection to place that *begins* with both the abyss of history – the Middle Passage as traumatic loss – and the mixing of the fragments of what remains after forced migration. This is a rhizome at the shoreline, the mangrove as a figure of thinking and being. Everything is set adrift, yet everything connects to place. Glissant writes again:

> Roots make the commonality of errantry and exile, for in both instances roots are lacking. *We must begin with that*.

Rhizomatic thought is the thought of beginning. Here, for Glissant, it is both the thought of the beginning of the Caribbean as an historical experience of loss and the creolising cultural formation in the plantation. Exile marks the loss of home. This is radical exile, without the possibility of return (Glissant's deep critique of negritude begins with this exilic condition). Exile, in this radical mode, conditions Glissant's enigmatic notion of errantry, which operates as a sort of rhizomatic epistemology. To know without the predatory root is to know without seizing upon or domination. Knowing otherwise, yes, but also, as Glissant underscores, a condition of commonality. Exile makes the Caribbean *we*.

At the close of *Poetics of Relation*, Glissant returns to the rhizome. The body of the text has already fully engaged his eclectic education and

poetic practice: philosophy, historiography, ethnology. He tracks the movement of the plantation, movement inside the plantation, and the struggle of decolonisation after the disaster and the disaster's aftermath. Musings on being and becoming, the science of chaos, and so on. But it comes back to the rhizome in the end, because it has to. There is no other model for connection and disconnection, roots that unroot. The mangrove, that great Caribbean rhizome, sits at the shore as memory of the dead, sustenance from the sea, but also the introduction to the land and landscape of the Caribbean as archipelago. In that mangrove, there is the whole of a poetics. A rhizomatic poetics, yes, but a rhizome that is distinctively Caribbean all the way down. Passing through the mangrove, taking on its poetic command to create in and with (and maybe as) Chaos, from exile and with a productive errantry, Glissant stops and muses, wondering and reflecting on the wondrous:

> I am doing the same thing in the way I say *we* – organizing this work around it. Is this some community *we* rhizomed into fragile connection to a place? Or a total *we* involved in the activity of the planet? Or an ideal *we* drawn into the swirls of a poetics?

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