

## DESIGNING THE DIFFERENCE

AT Bergson \*

The notion of the difference should shed some light on the philosophy of Bergson, but conversely Bergsonism must make the greatest contribution to a philosophy of difference. Such a philosophy always plays on two levels, methodological and ontological. On the one hand it is to determine the differences in the nature of things: only in this way that we can "return" to the things themselves, realizing without reducing them to something else they seize them their being. But then, if the being of things is somehow in their different nature, we can expect that the difference itself is something that she has a nature, then it will give us the Be. These two problems, methodological and ontological, perpetually refer to each other: the differences in kind, the nature of the difference. Bergson, we meet them in their relationship, we surprise the passage from one to the other.

*What Bergson essentially blames his predecessors, is not seeing the real differences in nature. The constancy of such criticism tells us at the same time the importance of the theme in Bergson. Where there were differences of nature, we retained only differences of degree. Probably sometimes appears the opposite reproach; where there were only differences of degree, there has been differences in nature, eg between said perceptive faculty of the brain and the reflex functions of the spinal cord between the perception of the material and the material itself. But this second aspect of the same criticism is not the frequency and importance of the first. To judge the most important, one must wonder about the purpose of philosophy. If philosophy has a positive and direct relationship with things, it is only insofar as it claims to grasp the same thing from what it is in its difference with all that is not it, c that is to say in its *internal difference*. It will be objected that the internal difference makes no sense, that such a notion is absurd; but then one must deny the same time there are differences in nature between things of the same kind. If there are differences in nature between individuals of the same genus, we must recognize that in fact the difference itself is not just space-time, it is not generic or specific, in short, it is not outside or above the thing. That's why it's important to show that Bergson general ideas, at least in most cases, we have a group only utility extremely different data: "Suppose that in examining the states grouped under the name of pleasure one discovers their nothing in common, if not to be states that man search: "It is in this sense that the nature of differences are already the key to everything: we must go, we must first find them.*

Without prejudging the nature of the difference as an internal difference, we already know that it exists, *assuming that there are differences in nature between things of the same kind*. So either philosophy offer *this* medium and *this* purpose (kind of differences to get to the internal difference), or it will have with things that a negative report or generic, it will result in the element of criticism or generality, at least in a state the only external reflection. Placing the first point of view, Bergson proposed the ideal of philosophy: cut "to the subject an appropriate concept to the object alone, a concept which can hardly say that it is still a concept, since it applies to this one thing ". This unity of the thing and the concept is the internal difference, which one rises by the different nature.

Intuition is the enjoyment of the difference. But it is not only the enjoyment of the result of the method, it is itself the method. As such it is not a single act, it proposes a plurality of acts, a plurality of effort and directions.

Intuition in his first effort is the determination of the different nature. And since these differences are between things, there is a real distribution, a distribution problem. Divide reality from his joints. Bergson and likes to quote the famous text of Plato on cutting and good cook. But the difference in nature between two things is not yet the internal difference of the thing itself. of the *joints of the real* we must distinguish *facts lines*. defining another effort of intuition. If compared to the joints of reality, Bergson's philosophy is as a true "empiricism", she will present to the facts instead of lines like "positivism" and even a probabilism. The joints of the actual distribute things according to their differences in nature, they form a differentiation. The facts lines are directions that follows each through, directions that converge on a single thing; they define a integration, each represents a probability line. In *Spiritual Energy* Bergson shows us the nature of consciousness to the point of convergence of three lines of facts. In *The two sources*, the immortality of the soul is the convergence of two facts lines. Intuition in this sense is not opposed to the hypothesis, but includes assumption. In short, the joints of reality correspond to a cutting facts lines, a "crossover". Reality, at once, this is what is cut and overlaps. Surely in both cases are the same paths, but the key is the sense that it takes, according to the discrepancy or to convergence. We always presentiment two aspects of difference joints give us the real differences in the nature of things; facts lines show us the same thing identical to its difference, the same internal difference to something.

Neglecting the different nature for the benefit of genres, so lie in philosophy. These differences in nature, we have lost. We are faced with a science which has substituted their simple *differences in degree*, and before a metaphysical that their

especially substituted simple *intensity differences*. The first issue of science: how do we see only differences of degree? "We melt the qualitative differences in the homogeneity of space which underlies<sup>10</sup>. "Invokes Bergson, as we know, the combined operations of need, social life and language, intelligence and space, the space being that intelligence is a matter which it ready. In short we substitute the joints of the real utility group only modes. But that is not the most important, the utility can not base that makes it possible. So should we emphasize two points. First the degrees have an effective reality,

*in a form other than space*, are already included in some way in the differences in nature "behind our quality distinctions" there are often numbers<sup>11</sup>. We will see one of the strangest ideas of Bergson is that the difference itself has a number, a virtual number, a sort of numbering number. The utility has only just released and spread the degrees included the difference until it is no longer one of degree. But then, if the degrees can be free to form alone of the differences, we must seek the reason in the state of experience. That the space present to the understanding, that understanding in space, they are things, products, results and nothing else. But between things (as defined results), there is never and can not be that differences in proportion<sup>12</sup>. What is different in kind are not things nor things of the states, not the characters, but the *trends*. That's why the design of the specific difference is not satisfactory: we must look not to the presence of characters, but their tendency to develop. "The group will be defined more by the possession of certain characters, but by its tendency to accentuate<sup>13</sup>. "As Bergson does show in all his work that the first trend is not only in relation to his product, but compared to the causes of it in time, the causes are always retrospectively obtained from the product itself same: a thing in itself and its true nature is the expression of a trend before the effect of a cause. In a word the simple difference of degree is just the status of separate things trend and entered into their basic causes. The causes are actually the domain of quantity. Next we consider it as a product or in its tendency, the human brain, for example present with a simple animal brain of degree or nature of difference<sup>14</sup>. So Bergson tells us, *from a certain point of view*, differences in kind rather disappear or may not appear. "By placing this perspective, he writes about religion static and dynamic religion, we perceive a series of transitions and as differences of degree, where actually there is a radical difference in nature<sup>15</sup>. "Things, products, results are always *mixed*. The space will never present, intelligence will never find as mixed, the mixed and closed and opened, the geometrical and the vital order, perception and affection, perception and memory ... *etc*. And you need to understand is that the joint is not

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probably a mixture of trends that differ in nature, but as such a state of affairs where any difference in nature is impossible. The joint is what is seen from the perspective where nothing is different in kind with nothing. The uniform is mixed by definition, because the way is always something different in kind: only the trends are simple, pure. So what really is different, we can not find that finding the trend beyond its product. It will serve us as we present the mixed differences of degree or proportion, since we do not have anything else, but we **are only serve as a measure of the tendency to arrive at the trend as sufficient due to the proportion.** <sup>16</sup> "

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For its part metaphysics hardly holds that differences in intensity. Bergson shows us this vision of browsing intensity Greek metaphysics: because the latter defines the space and time as a simple relaxation, a decrease of being, it is between the beings themselves that intensity differences, situating between the two **limits of perfection and a nil**. We'll have to see how this illusion arises, what founds in turn in the different nature themselves. Note that already relies less on mixed ideas about the pseudo-ideas, disorder, **nothingness. But cellesci are still a kind of mixed ideas**, and the illusion of strength ultimately rests on that of space. Finally there is a kind of false problems, problems that do not meet their stated differences in kind. This is one of the roles of intuition to denounce the arbitrary.

To achieve the real differences, we must reach the point of view from which split the joint. These are the trends that opposed pairs, which differ in kind. This is the trend that is subject. A being is not the subject, but the expression of the trend, and still be only the expression of the trend as it is opposed by another trend. Thus, intuition is as a method of difference or division: divide into two mixed trends. This method is something other than spatial analysis, more than a description of the experience, and less (apparently) an analysis transcendental. It rises well to the given conditions, but these conditions are trend-topics, they are themselves data in some way, they are experienced. Much more, they are both pure and lived, live and experience the **absolute and experiences. That is the foundation foundation but in no less *found*, such is the essential and we** know how Bergson insists on the empirical nature of the life force. So we should not raise the requirements as to the conditions of all possible experience, but as the conditions of real experience: Schelling already proposed this purpose and defined his philosophy as a superior empiricism. The formula is suitable for both the Bergsonism. If these conditions

can and must be entered in an intuition, it is precisely because they are the conditions of real experience, because they are not wider than the conditioning, because the concept they form is identical to its purpose. It is therefore not surprising to find in Bergson a kind of principle of sufficient reason and indistinguishable. What he denies is a distribution that puts the result in the genre or category, and that leaves the individual in contingency, that is to say in space. We need the right to go to the individual, the real concept to the thing, understanding to "this". Why this rather than that, Bergson always ask this question of difference. Why is she such a perception evoke memories over another<sup>197</sup> Why perception is she "pick" certain frequencies, why those ones over others<sup>207</sup> Why such a voltage duration<sup>1217</sup> In fact, you have the reason is because of what Bergson called

*shade*. In the psychic life there are no accidents<sup>22</sup> the grade is gasoline. As long as we did not find the concept that only suits the subject itself, "the unique concept", we simply explain the subject by several concepts, general ideas "it's supposed to participate "<sup>22</sup> which then escapes is that the object is one rather than another of the same kind, and that in this kind he has such proportions rather than others. Only the trend is the unity of the concept and purpose, such that the object is no longer contingent or the general concept. But all these details concerning the method does not seem to avoid the deadlock it seems successful. For the joint must be divided into two trends: the difference in proportion in the joint itself does not tell us how we will find these trends, what is the division rule. Moreover, the two trends which will be right? The two are not the same, they differ in value, there is always a dominant trend. And only this dominant trend that defines the true nature of the joint, it alone is unique concept and is pure because it is the purity of the same thing: Another trend is the impurity that comes compromise the upset. The animals exhibit behaviors we instinct as a dominant trend, and human behavior, intelligence. In the mixed perception and affection, affection plays the role of impurity which is mixed with pure perception<sup>22</sup> In other words, there is a division in the left and right halves. What we do we solve to determine? We find that form a difficulty that Plato met. Responding to Aristotle when it noticed that the Platonic method of difference was only a weak syllogism unable to conclude what kind of divided half to put away the Idea sought, since the average term missing? And yet Plato seems better armed than Bergson, because the idea of a transcendent Good can effectively guide the choice of the right half. But Bergson generally refusing the relief of finality, as if he wanted the difference method is sufficient in itself.

The difficulty may be illusory. We know that the real joints do not define the essence and purpose of the method. Probably the difference in nature between the two

trends is it an improvement on the degree of difference between things, on the difference in intensity between people: it remains an external difference, even external difference. At this point, Bergson intuition to be full no shortage of external term that can serve as a rule, on the contrary, it presents too externality. An example: Bergson shows that the abstract time is a mixed of space and time, and, more profoundly, the space itself is a mix of matter and time, matter and memory. So the joint which is divided into two trends: the material is indeed a trend, since it is defined as a release; duration is a trend, being a contraction. But if we consider all definitions, *enter* these two trends. Finally the different nature itself is *a* trends, and opposes the other. Indeed what duration? All that Bergson says always comes to this time, *this is what differs with itself*.

The matter, however, which does not differ with you, what is repeated. In the *immediate data* Bergson not only shows the intensity is a joint which is divided into two trends, pure quality and extensive quantity, but especially the intensity is not a property of the feeling, that sensation is pure quality, and pure quality or feeling different in kind with yourself. The feeling is that changes in nature and not quantity<sup>26</sup>. The psychic life is the difference of nature itself: in psychic life there is always *other* without ever *number* or *many*<sup>27</sup>. Bergson distinguishes three kinds of movement, quality, scalable and extensive<sup>28</sup>, but the essence of all these movements, even pure translation as the Achilles' race is impaired. The movement is qualitative change and qualitative change is movement<sup>29</sup>. Short duration is what differs, and what is different is not what is different with something else, but what differs with itself. What differs is itself become a thing, a *substance*. The thesis of Bergson could be expressed as: real time is altered, and the alteration is material. The difference in kind is no longer between two things or rather between two tendencies, the different nature is itself a thing, a tendency opposed to another. The decomposition of the Joint does not just give us two trends that differ in kind, it gives us the difference in nature as one of the two trends. And as the difference has become substance, the movement is no longer the nature of something, but took himself a substantial nature, it presupposes nothing else, no moving<sup>30</sup>. The duration, the trend is the so difference with itself; and what differs is with you

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at once Single substance and the subject.

At once we know divide the joint and choose the right trend, since there is always the right which differs with itself, that is to say the length, which is revealed in each case in one aspect, in one of his "shades". nevertheless be noted that, according to the joint, the same term is sometimes right, sometimes left. The division of animal behavior puts

intelligence on the left since the time, the life force through them is expressed as instincts, while it is right on the analysis of human behavior. But intelligence can change sides by revealing in turn an expression of time, this time in humanity: if intelligence is the form of matter, it has the sense of duration because it is organ of **domination of matter, meaning only manifested in man**. The duration and has several aspects that are the nuances, we not surprising since it is what differs with itself; and it will go on, until the end, until finally see the matter one-last nuance of the term. But to understand this last point, the most important, we must first remind ourselves what became of the difference. It is no longer between two trends, it is itself one of the trends and **always makes right**. The external difference has become internal difference. *The difference in nature has become itself a kind*. Moreover, it was early on. It is in this sense that the joints of reality and facts lines sent back to each other: the joints of the real facts also drew lines that showed us at least the internal difference as the limit of their convergence, and vice versa facts lines also gave us real joints, such as the convergence of **three different lines leads us in *Matter and Memory* the real distribution of what comes to the subject, which is to subject**. The difference of external nature was only in appearance. Already in this same appearance, she was different from the difference in degree of intensity difference, the specific difference. But in the state of the internal difference, other distinctions are now doing. While the term may be shown as the substance itself is since it is simple, indivisible. The alteration must be maintained and find its status without being reduced to the plurality, or even contradiction, or even otherness. The internal difference must be distinguished from the *contradiction, of otherness of The negotiation*. This is where the method and theory of Bergson difference will oppose this alternative, this other theory of difference is called the dialectic, both the dialectic of otherness that Plato's dialectic the contradiction of Hegel, involving both the presence and the power of the negative. The originality of Bergson's conception is to show that the internal difference will not and should not go up to the contradiction, to otherness, to negative, because these three concepts are actually shallower or that are views taken on it only from the outside. Think internal difference as such, as pure internal difference, reach the pure concept of difference, raising the difference in absolute terms, this is the sense of effort Bergson.

The duration is only one of two trends, one of two halves, but it is true that in his whole being it differs with itself, does not contain the secret of the other half? How would still leave outside itself *of which* it differs, another trend? If the time differs with itself, it differs is still time, somehow. This is not to divide the duration as the Joint divided: it is simple, indivisible, pure. This is another

thing simply is not divided, *it differs*. Differentiation is the essence of the single or the movement of difference. Thus the mixed is divided into two trends, one of which is the indivisible, but the indivisible differentiates into two trends, the other is the principle of divisible. The space is divided in terms and duration, but the duration is different in contraction and relaxation, relaxation is the principle of the matter. The organic form is divided into matter and life force, but the life force is different in instinct and intelligence, intelligence is the principle of the transformation of the space material. This is not the same way of course that the joint is broken and that simply stands out: the difference method is the set of these two movements. But now it is this power of differentiation that we must question. It is he who will lead us to the pure concept of the internal difference. Determine this concept well, it will show *how* which differs from the term, the other half can still be of duration.

In *Duration and simultaneity*, Bergson ready to duration a curious power to cover itself, both to share in flux and concentrate in a single stream, depending on the nature of attention<sup>3</sup>. In the *immediate data* appears the fundamental idea *virtuality* which will be taken and developed in *Matter and Memory*: duration, indivisible is not exactly what does not let divide, but which changes its nature in dividing, and thereby change its nature defines the virtual or the subjective. But it is mainly in *Creative Evolution* that we will find the necessary information. Biology shows us to implement the process of differentiation. We seek the concept of difference as to not be reduced below that of the degree or intensity, to otherness or the contradiction such a difference *is*

vital, although its concept is not itself organic. Life, it is the process of difference. Here Bergson thinks less differentiation than the embryological differentiation of species, that is to say to changes. Darwin the problem of difference and that of life were identified in this idea of evolution, that Darwin himself was made the vital difference a false conception. Against some mechanism, Bergson shows that the vital difference is a difference *internal*. But also, the internal difference can not be conceived as a simple *determination*: a determination may be accidental, at least she can hold her being only a cause, a purpose or by accident, it implies a subsistent exteriority; more the ratio of a plurality of determinations, is never as association or addition<sup>3</sup>. Not only the vital difference is not a determination, but it is rather the opposite, it would be to choose the same indeterminacy. Bergson always insists on the unpredictability of living forms "indeterminate, I mean unpredictable"<sup>3</sup>. And at home, the unexpected, the unknown is not accidental, but rather essentially the negation of the accident. By making the difference a simple determination or we the book at random, or it does not make necessary depending on something that by making even accidental compared to life. But compared to life, the tendency to change is not accidental; more, the

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changes themselves are not accidental. life force "is the root cause of changes". This means that the difference is not a determination, but in this essential relationship with life, differentiation. No doubt the differentiation comes from the resistance encountered by life from the matter, but it is first and foremost the internal explosive force that life carries with it. "The essence of a vital tendency is to grow shaped wreath, creating, by the mere fact of its growth, divergent directions between which share momentum." "Virtuality is such that it is realized by dissociation, she is forced to dissociate to happen. Differentiation is the movement of a virtuality that is actualized. Life differs with you, so we will be faced with diverging lines of evolution and, on each line, in front of the original processes; but it is still and only with you it is different, so that each line too, we find some devices, some of the same organ structures obtained by different means. Divergence of series, identity of some devices, this is the double movement of life as a whole. The notion of differentiation poses both *simplicity* a virtual, the

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*divergence* series in which it is realized and *resemblance* some fundamental results it produces in these series. Bergson explains how the likeness is an important biological category. it is the identity of which differs with itself, it proves that even virtuality is realized in the divergence of the series, it shows the *gasoline* remaining in change as the divergence showed the change itself acting in gasoline. "What chance will be there for that, all different two series of accidents that add two different developments all reach similar results."

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In *The two sources*, Bergson returns to this process of differentiation: the dichotomy is the law of life. But something new appears: alongside biological differentiation, a properly historical differentiation appears. The biological differentiation is probably principle in life itself, but it is nonetheless linked to the material so that its products remain separate, external to each other. "The materiality that [species] have given prevents them from coming to reunite to bring in stronger, more complex, and more evolved the original trend." "In terms of history, on the contrary, it is in the same individual in the same society evolve the trends are formed by dissociation. Therefore they operate sequentially, but at the same being: the man will go as far as possible in one direction and then back to the other." This text is all the more important that it is one of the few where Bergson recognizes a specificity of history in relation to life. What is the meaning ? it means that with man and with man becomes conscious only difference amounts to self-awareness. If the difference itself is biological, consciousness of difference is historical. It is true that we should not exaggerate the function of this historical consciousness of difference. According to Bergson, even more than it brings new it releases the old one. Consciousness was already there, and with the difference in itself. The length by itself

same is consciousness, life itself is consciousness, but it is *in law*. If history is what revives consciousness, or rather the place where she revives and lands in fact, it is only because that same consciousness to life was asleep, numb in matter, consciousness canceled, not no consciousness.<sup>46</sup> Consciousness is not historical in Bergson, the story is just the one point where consciousness springs, passed through the area. So there is a right of identity between the same difference and consciousness of difference: the story is never in fact. This identity right of difference and consciousness of difference is the *memory*; it must give us finally the nature of the pure concept.

But even before we get there, we must see how the process of differentiation sufficient to distinguish Bergson method and dialectics. The resemblance between Plato and Bergson is that they have both a philosophy of difference where it is thought as such and not be reduced to the contradiction, *do not go* until the contradiction.<sup>46</sup>

But the point of separation, not the only but the most important seems to be necessary in the presence of a principle of finality in Plato: Although only reflects the difference of the thing and makes us understand itself as in the famous example of Socrates sitting in prison. Also in his Plato dichotomy he needs the well as the rule of choice. No intuition Plato, but inspired by the Good. At least one text Bergson would in that very Platonic: in *The Two sources* it shows that to find the true joints of reality, we must question on functions. What does each faculty, which is for example the function of storytelling.<sup>47</sup> The difference of the thing comes by its use, its purpose, its destination, the Good. But we know that cutting or joints of reality are only a first expression of the method. What governs the division of things is actually their function, their purpose, so they seem at this-level receive from outside their difference itself. But precisely this is why Bergson both critical purpose, and does not stick to the joints of the real: the same thing and the same end are actually one and the same, being considered firstly mixed as it forms in the space, and secondly as the difference and the simplicity of its pure duration.<sup>48</sup> There is no need to talk about the end: when the difference has become the thing itself, it is no longer necessary to say that the thing receives its difference to an end. Thus the conception that Bergson makes the difference in nature allows him to avoid, unlike Plato, a real recourse to the purpose. It can also, from some texts Bergson, provide the objections he would do a Hegelian dialectic, which he is also much more than that of Plato. Bergson, and thanks to the concept of virtual, the thing differs with itself *First, immediately*.

According to Hegel, the thing differs with itself because it differs first with all that is not it, so that the difference goes to the contradiction. We do not care here distinguish the contrary and contradiction, the contradiction is that the presentation of all

as the opposite. Anyway, in both cases, was substituted for the difference of the game determination. "There is hardly a reality on which we can take both the two opposing views, and that is therefore subsumes the two antagonistic concepts<sup>ss</sup>. "With these two views is claimed then recompose the thing, for example, say that the time is synthesis of unity and multiplicity. Now, if the objection that Bergson could do to Platonism was to stick to a concept of *yet external difference*, the objection that it is a dialectic of contradiction is to stick to a concept of *only abstract difference*. "This combination [of two contradictory concepts] can present neither a diversity of degrees nor a variety of forms: it is or it is not<sup>ss</sup>. "What has neither degrees nor shades is an abstraction. Thus the dialectic of contradiction lack the difference itself, which is due to shade. And contradiction, finally, is just one of many retrospective illusions Bergson denounces. What differentiates into two divergent trends is a potentiality, and as such something absolutely easy come true. We treat it as a real component with the characteristic elements of both trends have yet been created only by its very development. We believe that the duration differs with itself because it is the first product of the two determinations contrary, we forget that it is differentiated because it was first what differs with itself. Everything comes to criticism Bergson made the negative: achieve the design of a difference without negation, which does not contain the negative, this is the greatest effort of Bergson. Both in his criticism of the mess of nothing or of contradiction, he tries to show that the negation of a real term with another is only the positive realization of virtuality which contained both the two terms . "The fight here is only the superficial aspect of progress<sup>ss</sup>. "It is ignorance of the virtual believed to contradiction, to the denial. The opposition of two terms is only the realization of virtuality which contained them both: that is to say that the difference is deeper than the denial, that contradiction.

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Whatever the importance of differentiation, it is not the deepest. If it were, there would be no reason to talk about a concept of difference: the differentiation is an action, a realization. What differs is *first* which differs with itself, that is to say the virtual. The differentiation is not the concept, but the production of objects that find their reason in the concept. Only if it is true that what differs with itself must be such a concept, it is necessary to virtual a consistency, objective consistency that makes him able to differentiate, capable of producing such objects. In key pages on Ravaisson Bergson explains that there are two ways to determine what colors have in common<sup>ss</sup>.

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Or it clears the abstract and general idea of color, it exudes the "erasing red making it red, blue making it blue, green making it green": it is then to a concept that is kind to objects that are more for the same concept. The concept and the object are two, the ratio of the object to the concept of

subsumption. It remains so to spatial distinctions, to a state of the external difference to the thing. *Or* we passed through a colored lens that leads to the same point: what we get in this case is "pure white light" which **"highlighted the differences between the colors."** While the different colors are not objects *under* a concept, but the shades or degrees of the concept itself. Degrees of difference itself, and not differences of degree. The report is more than subsumption, but participation. White light is a universal yet, but a concrete universal, which makes us understand the special because he himself is in the end especially. As things became shades or degrees of the concept, the concept itself has become the thing. It's a universal thing, if you will, since the objects it draw as many degrees, but a real, not a genre or a generality. There are more strictly multiple objects to the same concept, but the concept is the same as the thing itself, it is the difference between them objects reported to it, not their similarity. The concept became concept of difference that is the internal difference. What was needed for this higher philosophical purpose? He must give up thinking in space: the spatial distinction indeed **"has no degrees"**. It was the place of the spatial differences temporary differences. The essence of the temporary difference is to make the concept a concrete thing, because things are as many shades or degrees that come within the concept. It is in this sense that Bergsonism put the difference, and the concept with her in time. "If the most humble role of the mind is to link the successive moments of the duration of things, whether it is in this operation it contacts the material and also it differs from first, we conceive an infinite number of degrees between matter and fully developed mind". **"The distinctions between subject and object, body and spirit are temporal and are in that matter of degree, but are not mere differences of degree.** We see how the virtual becomes the pure concept of difference, and that such a concept can be: such a concept is *the possible coexistence of degrees or shades*. If, despite the apparent paradox, we call *memory* this coexistence possible, as Bergson, we must say that the life force is not as deep as memory, and memory, shallower than the duration. *Time, memory, life force form three aspects of the concept are distinguished precisely.* The duration is the difference with itself; Memory is the coexistence of degrees of difference; the life force is the differentiation of the difference. These three stages define a schematic in the philosophy of Bergson. The direction of the memory is to give the potentiality of the same duration objective consistency that makes of it a concrete universal, that makes it suitable to be realized. When virtuality is realized, that is to say is different, **this is life and it is in a vital form; in this sense it is true that the difference *is* vital.** But virtuality could differentiate that from degrees that coexist in it. The differentiation is only the separation of which coexisted in duration. The differentiation of the life force are deeper unlike degrees

herself. And product differentiation are objects absolutely consistent with the concept, at least in their purity, because they are nothing but the truth that the complementary position of the different degrees of the concept itself. It is in this sense always the theory of differentiation is shallower than the theory of shades or degrees.

The virtual now defines an absolutely positive way of life. The duration is the virtual; Real is a particular degree of duration, in so far as this degree differs. For example, the time is not in itself psychological, but the psychological is a certain degree of duration which is realized among others and among other<sup>56</sup>. Probably the virtual mode itself is what is not, since it will only differentiating, by ceasing to be itself while retaining something of its origin. But thus it is the fashion *which is*.

This thesis of Bergson is particularly famous: the virtual is pure memory and pure recollection is the difference. The pure memory is virtual because it would be absurd to look for the brand of the past into something current **and already realized<sup>57</sup>: the memory is not the representation of something, there is nothing, he is, or if you still** like to talk about representation "does not represent us something that was, but just something that's ... that's a *Remember this*"<sup>58</sup>: it does not have to be in effect, to form, he did not expect that the perception disappears, there is no post to perception. *The coexistence of the past with the present it has been an essential theme of Bergsonism*. But from these characters, when we say that the memory is defined as the difference even, we say two things at once. On the one hand pure memory is the difference because no memory is like another, because each memory is immediately perfect, because it is a time that will always: the difference is the subject remembrance, as the similarity, the object of perception<sup>59</sup>. Just dream to approach this world where nothing is like nothing; a pure dreamer would never get out of the individual, he would seize only differences. But the memory is the difference in yet another sense, it *brings* the difference ; because if it is true that the requirements of this introduce some resemblance between our memories, memories inversely introduced a difference in this, in that it is following each moment as something new. The fact that the past is preserved, "the next time still contains in addition to the previous remember that it left him"<sup>60</sup>.

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"Homeland is the life continues with a memory which prolongs the past into the present, whether this includes the image directly constantly growing from the past, or rather he shows by its continual change of quality of **care increasingly heavy being dragged behind you as you get older more** »<sup>61</sup>. Alternatively Freud but also deeply, Bergson saw that memory was a function of the future, the memory and the will were a same function, only a memory could be able to turn away his past, break away, do not repeat, do again. Thus the word "difference" refers to both *an individual who is and the new is happening*. The memory is both defined by reference to the perception that he is contemporary and relative to the time

Next wherein it extends. To meet both directions was a strange feeling: to be done and act together. But how can we bring them together, these two senses, because my perception is already the next moment?

Start with the second direction. How important will Bergson We know this idea *novelty*, in his theory of the future and freedom. But we need to study this notion in the most precise level, when it is formed, it seems, in the second chapter of the *Trial*. To say that the past is preserved in itself and that it continues in the present, this means that the next time appears without the previous disappeared. This implies *contraction*,

and that is the contraction which defines the duration. What opposes the contraction is pure repetition or material: repetition is the mode of a present that appears only when the other is gone, instantly or externality, the vibration relaxation. Contraction refers instead the difference, because in essence it makes it impossible to repeat, because it destroys the very condition for any possible repetition. In this sense the difference is the new, the same novelty. But how to define the appearance of something new *in general* ? can be found in the second chapter of the *Trial* the recovery of this problem that Hume had attached his name. Hume posed the problem of causality by asking how pure repetition, repetition of similar cases that produces nothing new in the subject, may yet produce something new in the mind which contemplates. This "something new", waiting for the thousandth time, that's the *difference*. The answer was that if the repetition produced a difference in the spirit who was watching, was under principles of human nature, particularly the principle of habit. When Bergson analyzes the example shots of the clock or the hammer, it is the problem the same way, and solves the similar way: it happens again, it's nothing in objects, but in the mind that contemplates a "merger" an "interpenetration" an "organization", a conservation precedent that did not disappear when the other appears, brief contraction happens in the mind. The resemblance goes further between Hume and Bergson as Hume similar cases were based in the imagination but at the same time remaining distinct in the understanding, Bergson states are based in duration but keep the same time something of the externality they come; thanks to this last point that Bergson realizes the construction of space. So the contraction begins to be somehow *in* mind, it is like the origin of the mind, it gives rise to the difference. Then, but only then, the mind takes up, it shrinks and contracts, as seen in Bergson's theory of freedom. But we just have to have grasped the concept in its origin.

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Not only the life and matter differ in nature, but which differs as well, it is the difference itself and repetition. We then find an old problem: both, the different nature was between two tendencies, and, more profoundly, was one of two trends. And it was not just these two states of difference, there were two

again, the preferred trend, the trend right differed in two, and it could be different because, more profoundly, in contrast there were degrees. It is these four states which must now regroup: *the difference in nature, the internal difference, differentiation and the degree of difference*. Our lead wire is that the difference (internal) is different (in kind) with repetition. But we see too that such a sentence is not balanced: both the difference is called internal and differs externally. But if we're guessing that a solution is emerging, it is because Bergson attempts to show that the difference is even a repetition, and repetition already a difference. Indeed repetition, the material is a difference; oscillations are distinct as "one faded when the other appears". Bergson does not deny that science is trying to achieve the difference itself and can not succeed, he sees in infinitesimal analysis effort of this kind, a true science of the difference. Moreover, when Bergson shows us the dream alive in particular to enter only pure differences, he tells us that this region of the mind joins the field, and that dream is losing interest, be indifferent. It would be wrong to confuse repetition with generality, generality suppose the contrary contraction of the mind. Repetition creates nothing in the object, it leaves the stand, even she keeps in its particularity. Repetition well as goals genres, but these types are not in themselves general ideas because they do not include a plurality of objects that are similar, but we only have the feature of an object that repeated identical to itself, therefore the repeat is a sort of difference; only difference is always outside itself, an indifferent difference itself. Conversely *the difference in turn is a repetition*. We have seen in fact that the difference was in its very origin and in the act of this origin contraction. But what is the effect of this contraction? It amounts to the coexistence which was repeated on the other. The mind, in its origin, is only the contraction of identical elements, and that is where it is memory. When Bergson speaks of the memory, this always two aspects, and the second, deeper than the first: memory-memory and memory-contraction.

By contracting the element of repetition coexists with itself, if we are to multiply, restrains himself. Thus define degrees of contraction, each presents its level of coexistence with oneself of the element itself, that is to say everything. It is no paradox that the memory is defined as the coexistence in person. For, in turn, all possible degrees of coexistence coexist themselves and form memory. Identical elements of material repetition blend into a contraction; this contraction has us both something new, the difference, and degrees are degrees of this difference itself. It is in this sense that the difference is even a rehearsal, Bergson constantly returns to this theme: "sections of the cone are "

many repetitions of our past life as a whole " <sup>76</sup> "Everything happens as if our memories were repeated any number of times in these thousands and thousands of possible reductions of our past life" <sup>77</sup>. We see the distinction is left to do between this mental rehearsal and rehearsal material: it is at the same time that our whole past life is infinitely repeated, repetition is virtual. Moreover, virtuality has no other consistency than it receives from this original repetition. "These plans are not cheap ... as all things do, superimposed on each other. Rather they exist virtually, of this existence which is proper to things of the spirit. <sup>78</sup> "At this point one might almost say that Bergson is the material that is succession and duration, coexistence" Attention to life that would be powerful enough, and sufficiently clear of practical interest and embrace in this one undivided whole **past history of conscious person**. <sup>79</sup> "But the term is a coexistence of a different kind, a real coexistence, simultaneity. This is why the virtual coexistence that defines the duration is also a real estate, while the matter finally gives us a succession less than the simple matter of a simultaneity of real coexistence, a juxtaposition. In short psychic levels are all virtual planes of contraction, voltage levels. The philosophy of Bergson ends in a **cosmology in which everything is changing voltage and energy, and nothing else**. <sup>80</sup> The duration as it engages in intuition is as capable of a thousand possible tensions, an infinite variety of expansions and contractions. Bergson criticized the combination of antagonistic concepts will be able to present us one thing in a block **without degrees or shades. Rather intuition gives us "a choice between an infinity of possible durations"** <sup>81</sup> "Continuity of durations which we must try to follow either downwards or upwards" <sup>82</sup>.

Both directions of the difference have they joined the difference particularity is, and the difference as personality, uncertainty, novelty is done? Both directions can be united by and in the coexisting degrees of contraction. The feature occurs effectively as the greatest relaxation, spreading, expansion; in sections of the cone is the basis bringing memories as individual formulations. "They take a more banal form when memory tightens further, more personal when it expands. <sup>83</sup> "Over the contraction relaxes, the more memories are **individual, separate from each other and are located**. <sup>84</sup> The individual is at the limit of relaxation or expansion, and its movement will be extended by the material itself he prepares. The terms and duration are two extreme levels of relaxation and contraction, as are in the same time the pure past and the pure present, memory and perception. We see that this will be defined in its opposition with the particularity, as the similarity or even universality. One who would live in the pure present would evolve into the universal, "habit being to action what **generality is to thought**" <sup>85</sup>. But the two terms



thus oppose the extremes are only degrees that coexist. The opposition is never as virtual coexistence of two extreme degrees: the memory coexists with what it is the memory, with the corresponding perception; this is **only the most contracted degree of memory, that is a *immediate past***. **Between the two we therefore find all the** intermediate stages, which are those of the generality or rather who themselves form the general idea. We see how the matter was not the generality real generality implies a perception of similarities contraction. The general idea is a dynamic whole, a swing; "The essence of the general idea is to move continuously between the sphere of action and that of pure memory," "it consists in the double current which goes from one to the other" <sup>81</sup>. **Now we know that the intermediate degrees between the two extremes are able to return these** extremes as the same product differentiation. We know that the theory of degrees founded a theory of differentiation: it is enough that the memory can be two degrees opposite to each other so that they are at the same time differentiation through two trends or movements which differ in kind. Because the present and the past are two inverse degrees, they differ in nature, they are differentiation, duplication at all. Every moment the **duration splits into two symmetrical jets "of which falls to the past, while the other runs to the future"** <sup>82</sup>. To say that this is the most contracted degree of the past, it also means that he opposes in kind with the past, he is a *imminent future*. We enter the second sense of difference: something new. But what does this new, exactly? The general idea is that everything that differentiates into particular images and posture, but this same differentiation is still **all the degrees that go from one extreme to the other, and put one in the other** <sup>83</sup>. **The general idea is what puts** the memory in action, which organizes the memories with the acts, which transforms the memory in **perception, exactly what makes pictures from the past itself "more able to fit in the engine diagram "** <sup>84</sup>. The particular set into the universal, that is the function of the general idea. Novelty, something new, it is precisely that the individual is in the universal. The new course is not the pure present: this one as well as the particular memory goes to the state of the material, not by virtue of its spread, but its immediacy. But when the individual falls into the universal memory or in motion, automatically act gives way to free and voluntary action. The novelty is the characteristic of one who, at a time, coming and going from the universal to the particular, opposed the one to the other and put it in one. Such a being at once thinks, wills and remembers. In short, what unites and brings forth the difference, they are all degrees of generality.

A lot of readers, sometimes Bergson gives an impression of vagueness and inconsistency. Wave, because what we eventually learn is that the difference is the unpredictable, the same uncertainty. On the inconsistency, because it seems to take its turn has to turn each of the concepts that he criticized. His criticism focused on

degrees, but here they are returning to the fore in the same period, so that Bergsonism is a philosophy of degrees: "We pass by insensible degrees memories arranged along time with movements in emerging or incipient action possible in the space " <sup>85</sup> "Remembrance is transformed gradually into perception" <sup>86</sup> so there are degrees of freedom <sup>87</sup>. Bergson's criticism focused especially on intensity, but now the relaxation and contraction are cited as the fundamental principles of explanation; "Between the raw material and mind most capable of thinking there are all possible intensities of memory or, equivalently, all degrees of freedom" <sup>88</sup>.

Finally it focused on the negative and the opposition, but here they reintroduced the reversal: the geometric order is negative, it was born of "the inversion of true positité" an "interruption" <sup>89</sup>. if we compare the science and philosophy, we see that science is not relative, but "involves a reverse reality" <sup>90</sup>.

Yet we do not believe that this inconsistency is justified printing. First, it is true that Bergson returns to degrees but not differences of degree. His whole idea is this: there are no differences of degree in being, *but the degree of difference itself*. The theories that proceed by differences of degree are precisely all confused, because they have not seen the differences in nature, they are lost in space and mixed it presents. Still, what differs in kind is ultimately what is different in kind *with himself*, so that what is different is only the lowest *degree*; such is the

*duration* defined as the difference in kind person. When the difference in nature between two things became one of two things, one is the only *latest* degree of celle- this. Thus the difference in nature, when it passes in person is exactly the virtual coexistence of two degrees *extremes*. As they are extreme, the double current which goes from one to the other form of intermediate degrees. These will be the principle of joint and we will believe in differences of degree, but only if we consider for themselves forgetting that the ends together they are two things that are different in kind, being in truth the degrees of difference itself. So what differs is the relaxation and contraction of matter and duration as the degrees as the intensity of the difference. And if Bergson does not fall so in a simple vision differences of degree in general it is not more particularly in view of differences in intensity. The expansion and contraction are degrees of difference itself because they oppose, as they oppose. Extreme, they are *inverses*. What Bergson criticizes the metaphysical, that is, not having seen that expansion and contraction are the opposite, they believed they were only two degrees more or less intense in the degradation of the same be immobile, stable, eternal <sup>91</sup>. In fact, as the degrees not explain the difference and not the other, the intensities are due to inversion and assume. There is no principle in a stationary and stable Being; *that he must go*, it's the same contraction is the length of which the expansion is reversing. We always meet

Bergson this desire to find the true beginning, the real point to be from: and to the perception and affection, "rather than from the disease, which can be said nothing since there no reason for it to be what it is rather than anything else, we start from the action"<sup>82</sup>. Why relaxation which is the inverse of contraction, and not the reverse contraction relaxation? Because doing philosophy, *that's just start with the difference*, and that the difference in nature is the term which matter is only the lowest degree. The difference is the real beginning; this is where Bergson would separate most of Schelling, at least in appearance; starting with something else, a stationary and stable Being, we put the principle indifferent, it takes less to more, we fall into a simple vision intensities. But when he founded the intensity of the inversion, Bergson seems to escape this vision to return to the negative, to the opposition. Again such an allegation would be incorrect. Ultimately the opposition of two terms that differ in nature is only the positive realization of a potentiality that contained both. The role of intermediaries degrees is precisely in this realization: they put one in the other, memories in motion. We therefore do not believe that there is inconsistency in the philosophy of Bergson, but to a large deepening the concept of difference. We do not think more, finally, that the indeterminacy is a vague concept. Uncertainty, unpredictability, contingency, freedom always mean independence from the causes: it is in this sense that Bergson honors the life force of many contingencies<sup>83</sup>. What he means is that the thing has somehow *before*

its causes, we have to start the same thing since the causes come after. But indeterminacy never means that the thing or action could have been others. "The act could it be different? "Is an empty issue direction. Bergson The requirement is to understand why the thing is this rather than anything else. This is the difference that is explanatory of the thing itself, and not its causes. "We must seek freedom in a certain shade or quality of the action itself and not in a report of this act with what is not or what it could have been<sup>84</sup>. "Bergsonism is a philosophy of difference, and realization of difference: there is a difference in person, and this is done as a novelty.

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\* *The Bergson Studies* flight. IV, 1956, p. 77-112. [References in notes have been updated and supplemented. Pagination refers to the current edition of each book Bergson PUF, coll. "Quadrige".]

1. *MM* p. 19, p. 62-63.

2. *PM*, p. 52-53.

3. *PM*, p. 197.

4. *PM*, p. 207.

5. *PM*, p. 23.

6. *ES*, p. 4.

7. *ES*, first chapter.

8. *MR*, p. 263.

9. *MR*, p. 292.

10. *EC*, p. 217.
11. *PM*, p. 61.
12. *EC*, p. 107.
13. *EC*, p. 107.
14. *EC*, p. 184, 264-265.
15. *MR*, p. 225.
16. *EC*, p. 107.
17. *EC*, p. 316 sq.
18. *EC*, p. 232, 235.
19. *MM* p. 182.
20. *PM*, p. 61.
21. *PM*, p. 208.
22. *PM*, p. 179.
23. *PM*, p. 199.
24. *MM* p. 59.
25. *DI*, first chapter.
26. *DI*, p. 90.
27. *EC*, p. 302-303.
28. *MM* p. 219.
29. *PM*, p. 163, 167.
30. *EC*, p. 267, 270.
31. *PM*, p. 81.
32. *DS* p. 67.
33. *EC*, Chap. I.
34. *EC*, p. 127.
35. *EC*, p. 86.
36. *EC*, p. 88.
37. *MR*, p. 313.
38. *EC*, p. 53 sq.
39. *PM*, p. 58.
40. *EC*, p. 54.
41. *MR*, p. 316.
42. *MR*, p. 314.
43. *MR*, p. 313-315.
44. *ES*, p. 13.
45. *ES*, p. 11.

46. We do not believe, however, that on this point Bergson has been influenced by Platonism. Closer to him, there was Gabriel Tarde that characterized his philosophy as a philosophy of difference and distinguished philosophies of the opposition. But the design that Bergson is of the essence and the process of the difference is other than Tarde.

47. *MR*, p. 111.
48. *EC*, p. 88 sq.
49. *PM*, p. 198.
50. *PM*, p. 207.
51. *MR*, p. 317.
52. *PM*, p. 259-260.
53. *MM* p. 247.
54. *MM* p. 249.
55. *MM* p. 74.
56. *PM*, p. 210.
57. *MM* p. 150.

58. *ES*, p. 137.  
59. *MM* p. 172-173.  
60. *PM*, p. 183-184.  
61. *PM*, p. 200-201.  
62. *ES*, p. 140.  
63. *EC*, p. 201.  
64. *DI*, 3<sup>e</sup> chapter.  
65. *PM*, p. 214.  
66. *EC*, p. 203 sq.  
67. *PM*, p. 59.  
68. *MM* p. 83 sq.  
69. *MM* p. 115.  
70. *MM* p. 188.  
71. *MM* p. 188.  
72. *MM* p. 272.  
73. *PM*, p. 169-170.  
74. *MM* p. 226.  
75. *PM*, p. 208.  
76. *PM*, p. 210.  
77. *MM* p. 188.  
78. *MM* p. 190.  
79. *MM* p. 173.  
80. *MM* p. 168.  
81. *MM* p. 180.  
82. *ES*, p. 132.  
83. *MM* p. 180.  
84. *MM* p. 135.  
85. *MM* p. 83.  
86. *MM* p. 139.  
87. *DI*, p. 180.  
88. *MM* p. 250.  
89. *EC*, p. 220.  
90. *EC*, p. 231.  
91. *EC*, p. 319-326.  
92. *MM* p. 65.  
93. *EC*, p. 255.  
94. *DI*, p. 137.