

*Memoirs of*  
**Nikita Khrushchev**



*Edited by* Sergei Khrushchev

VOLUME 2

**R E F O R M E R**

[ 1945–1964 ]

**MEMOIRS OF NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV**

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*Memoirs of*  
Nikita Khrushchev

VOLUME 2

**REFORMER**

〔 1945–1964 〕

*Edited by*  
Sergei Khrushchev

*Memoirs translated by George Shriver*  
*Supplementary material translated by Stephen Shenfield*

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*Sergei Khrushchev, editor*



## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
AUCP(B)	All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)
CC	Central Committee
CEC	Central Executive Committee (of Soviets)
Cheka	Extraordinary Commission for Combating Sabotage and Counterrevolution (original name of the Soviet secret police)
Comintern	Communist International
CP(B)U	Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Gosplan	State Planning Commission
Gostroi	State Committee for Construction
GPU	General Political Administration (secret police)
KGB	Committee for State Security (secret police)
Komsomol	Young Communist League
MGB	Ministry of State Security (secret police)
MTS	Machine and Tractor Station
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs
NKVD	People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (secret police)
OGPU	Unified General Political Administration (secret police)
Orgburo	Organizational Bureau
Politburo	Political Bureau
RCP(B)	Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)
RSDLP	Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
Sovinform	Soviet Information Bureau
Sovnarkom	Council of People's Commissars
SRs	Socialist Revolutionaries (members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party)
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
TASS	Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



# Soviet Missile Codes

SOVIET MISSILE CODES	EQUIVALENT WESTERN CODES <sup>1</sup>
----------------------	---------------------------------------

## *Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)*

R-7	SS-6
R-9	SS-8
R-16	SS-7
UR-100 family	SS-11, SS-19

## *Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)*

R-5	SS-3
R-11	SS-1
R-12	SS-4
R-14	SS-5
R-36	SS-18

## *Cruise missiles*

P-5	SS-N-3C
P-6	SS-N-3A
P-15M	SS-N-3
P-35	SS-N-3B
P-120	SS-N-9
Amethyst (Amethyst)	SS-N-7
Bazalt (Basalt)	SS-N-19
Granit (Granite)	SS-N-12
Kometa (Comet)	AS-1
Yakhont <sup>2</sup>	SS-N-X-5

## *Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)*

S-75	SA-2
S-125	SA-3
S-200	SA-5
S-300	SA-10, SA-12

## *Antiballistic missiles (ABMs)*

A-35	ABM-1, SH-01
A-35M	ABM-1A, SH-04
A-135	ABM-3, SH-11

## *Notes*

1. According to the system devised by the U.S. Department of Defense and most commonly used in Western sources. Other systems have also been in use. For fuller information, see <http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/weapons/q0180.shtml>.

2. An old Russian word that was used for ruby, sapphire, and various other precious stones.



**THE MEMOIRS**



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# *From Victory Day to the Twentieth Party Congress*

## THE FIRST POSTWAR YEARS

In 1944 all of Ukraine was liberated from the Hitlerite aggressors and their allies.<sup>1</sup> Males of military age were drafted into the Red Army. Our army moved forward, fighting as it went, and reinforcements came mainly through the mobilization of men who had stayed behind in enemy-occupied territory. The majority of these men understood the need to perform their civic duty and didn't really need to be "talked into" going and fighting Nazi Germany. It immediately fell to those who stayed home—the elderly, invalids, and others unfit for military service, mainly women—to rebuild the economy, especially agriculture.

In the industrial sector, first of all coal and metallurgy, some of the workers and engineering personnel had been exempted from the draft. Women were also mobilized to work in industry, especially young women. And people mobilized willingly. There was a twofold explanation for this. On the one hand, a big role was played by patriotism, as well as by Communist Party propaganda stressing that industry had to be restored, that this was the only possible salvation, the only possibility for raising the people's standard of living. On the other hand, a supply system had somehow been organized in eastern Ukrainian industrial districts, in spite of everything. For example, the provision of food to the population was better there than in other Ukrainian districts, especially in 1946.

Yegor Trofimovich Abakumov was in charge of our coal industry. He had been specially assigned to our region as a first-rate expert on the Donbas. At that time we took the correct course of digging shallow mines to exploit the upper coal beds—what miners called "the tails" (*khvosty*)—in other words, those seams of coal that were almost at the surface. In the old days, we used to call such shallow mines "mousetraps." The aim was to dig a few hundred such mines as quickly as possible and, using a low level of mechanization,<sup>2</sup>

with shallow [open] pits or sloping [rather than deep] shafts, to extract the necessary amount of coal as quickly as possible. And that coal was extracted!<sup>3</sup>

Metallurgy, machine building, and local industry<sup>4</sup> were all restored as well. This rebuilding proceeded at an accelerated pace. People's determination and persistence were amazing, their total understanding of the need for them to give all they had so that industry and agriculture could be revived as soon as possible.

The war was over; gradually the triumph of victory subsided, together with the people's jubilation over it; people who had survived returned to the factories, the mines, the state farms, and the collective farms. Rebuilding now went on at a quicker pace than ever. But not without problems.

There was a severe drought in 1946, and Ukrainian agriculture suffered greatly. Other republics suffered also. I can't say that much about the other republics. But Ukraine is something I know all about. As autumn approached, it became obvious that the harvest was going to be just terrible. I did everything I could to make sure Stalin understood this in time. The bad harvest was caused by difficult weather conditions, and besides that, poor mechanization, which was further aggravated by the absence of tractors, horses, and oxen. There was an overall shortage of horsepower of any kind for pulling farm machinery (*tyaglovaya sila*). Work was also poorly organized. People returned from the army and went to work, but they didn't all settle into their jobs. Some had lost their skills, and others never had them in the first place. As a result we had a very bad harvest.

I don't remember what plan they handed down then: I think around 400 million poods<sup>5</sup> or maybe more. The plan was set arbitrarily, although in the press and official documents it was "substantiated" by scientific data—that is, by taking one square meter (*metrovka*), estimating its yield, and converting that into an overall "expected biological yield," after deductions for normal losses, the expense of maintaining people and livestock, and allowance for marketing expenses.<sup>6</sup> The plan was mainly based, not on what could actually be grown, but on how much could be obtained "in principle," how much could be wrung out of the people to fill up the state granaries. And this wringing-out process had begun. I saw that the year threatened to be a catastrophe. It was not hard to predict how it all would end.

When grain deliveries to the state were under way and we got a final picture of the harvest, it was possible to determine more or less precisely how much grain might go into the state reserves. All possible efforts were exerted to achieve this. The collective farmers understood their duty and did everything in their power to provide the country with grain. The Ukrainians had suffered

terribly during the Civil War and collectivization, as well as during the republic's occupation [by Nazi Germany]. They knew what grain meant for the country and knew its value; they understood that without grain the rebuilding of industry would not be achieved. Besides that, another factor was at work: the people's confidence in the Communist Party, under whose leadership victory had been achieved.

But at the top, the attitude toward the people was different. I received letters from collective-farm chairmen that were simply heart-rending. The lines of the following letter, for example, are engrained in my memory: "So, Comrade Khrushchev, we have fulfilled our plan for grain deliveries completely. We have handed over everything and now have nothing left. We are sure that the state and the party won't forget us and that they will come to our aid." This implied that the author of the letter thought that the fate of the peasants depended on me. You see, I was then chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, and he thought that since I was head of the Ukrainian state, I wouldn't forget the peasants. I knew of course that he was deluding himself. After all, regardless of my personal desires, I couldn't do a thing, because once grain was handed over to the state collection centers, I no longer had any authority over it. I myself was forced to beg that some be left behind for our use. They did give us something, but not much.

On the whole I saw that the state plan wouldn't be met. I had a group of agronomists and economists sit down and make some estimates. Starchenko,<sup>7</sup> a good worker and an honest person, headed up the group. I thought that if we informed Stalin candidly about everything and used statistics to demonstrate the validity of our arguments, he would believe us. I had managed previously on some issues to overcome the bureaucratic resistance of the apparatus and to appeal directly to Stalin. I had done the same kind of thing on those occasions, choosing my material well and logically constructing my arguments. As a result, the truthfulness of my position had won out. Stalin had supported me. So I was hoping that this time too I would prove that we were right and Stalin would understand that no one was committing "sabotage." In Moscow, people were quick to resort to that sort of terminology; they always found justification for repression and for wringing more output from the collective farmers.

I don't remember now what total I thought we could reach in grain deliveries at that time. As I recall, in the memorandum we presented to the central government we wrote in terms of 180 or 200 million poods plus. Of course that was a very small amount, because before World War II Ukraine had

reached an annual production level of about 500 million poods. It was clear to everyone that our country was in dire need of food products. And not just for our own use: Stalin wanted to extend aid to the newly democratic countries.<sup>8</sup> This was especially true for Poland and East Germany, which could not get along without our help. Stalin had in mind creating future allies. He was already wrapping himself in the toga of “great military leader” in possible future campaigns.<sup>9</sup>

In the meantime starvation was imminent. I ordered that a document demonstrating our needs be drawn up for the USSR Council of Ministers. We wanted them to give us ration cards<sup>10</sup> that would guarantee not just city dwellers but rural people, too, a certain amount of centrally supplied food, and to make sure that, in some places, the starving would simply be fed. I don’t remember now how many millions of these food ration cards we asked for. But I doubted we’d succeed in this, as I knew Stalin, his cruelty and coarseness. My friends in Moscow tried to dissuade me. They said: “We’ve reached an agreement [made an arrangement] that if you sign this document and address it to Stalin (and all such documents were addressed only to Stalin in any case), it won’t actually go to him, won’t fall into his hands. We’ve arranged things with Kosygin. (Kosygin was in charge of such matters at the time.) He said he’d be able to give us so many million ration cards.”

I wavered for a long time, but in the end I signed the document. When the document reached Moscow, Stalin was on vacation in Sochi. Malenkov and Beria found out about the document. I think they decided to use this memorandum to discredit me in Stalin’s eyes, and instead of solving the problem (at that time they could decide things in Stalin’s name; many documents he’d never even laid eyes on were issued over his signature), they sent our document on to Stalin in Sochi. Stalin sent me the rudest, most insulting telegram, declaring that I was a “suspicious element,” that I was writing memoranda falsely claiming that Ukraine couldn’t fulfill its state procurement orders and wrongly asking for a huge number of ration cards to feed people. This telegram had a devastating effect on me. I understood that tragedy now hung over not just me personally but over the Ukrainian people, over the republic: starvation had become unavoidable, and it soon began.<sup>11</sup>

Stalin returned from Sochi to Moscow and I immediately went there from Kiev. I got the angriest reprimand imaginable. But I was ready for anything, even to end up on the list of enemies of the people. At that time this often occurred just like that—in the blink of an eye the door was flung open and you found yourself in the Lubyanka.<sup>12</sup> Although I tried to convince Stalin that the document I had sent reflected the true state of affairs and that

Ukraine needed help, this only provoked his wrath further. We got nothing from the central government. Starvation began. We began to receive indications that people were dying. In some places, cannibalism occurred. I was told, for example, that a head and a pair of human feet were found under a bridge in Vasilkov (a little town near Kiev). In other words, a cadaver had been used for food. Later on, such instances became more frequent.

Kirichenko (who was then first secretary of the party's Odessa province committee) reported that when he arrived at a collective farm to check on how people were getting through the winter he was told to go to the house of a certain peasant woman. He went there: "I saw a terrible sight. I saw this woman cutting up the corpse of her child on the table—I don't know if it was a boy or a girl—and repeating all the while: 'We've already eaten Manechka, and now we're salting Vanechka. This will last us for some time at least.'" This woman, driven crazy by hunger, had butchered her own children. Can you imagine that?<sup>13</sup>

Moldavia was in the same situation. Stalin sent Kosygin to Moldavia; he was then minister of trade and was handling ration-card matters. Kosygin returned and reported that people there were starving and were suffering from dystrophy [the result of malnutrition]. Stalin got all worked up and also started yelling at him. And after that, to the day of Stalin's death, when he encountered Kosygin he would say jokingly: "Well, here's Brother Dystrophy." At that time Kosygin was very skinny. And some others began calling him Brother Dystrophy too (in the inner circle only, of course, imitating Stalin).

I reported on everything to Stalin, but the only response was more anger: "This is spinelessness! They're playing tricks on you. They're reporting this on purpose, trying to get you to pity them and make you use up reserves."<sup>14</sup> Was Stalin perhaps receiving some other information that he trusted more? I don't know. But I do know that he thought I was succumbing, supposedly, to local Ukrainian influence, that I was being pressured in this way, and that I was virtually a nationalist who didn't deserve to be trusted. Stalin began treating my reports with noticeable reserve. But where was other information coming from? From Chekists and Central Committee "instructors" [officials of the party's Central Committee] who had visited various districts of Ukraine. Some degree of truthful information seeped through to Stalin, but usually people were very afraid to give it and tried covering it up in order not to "get into trouble," not to make themselves a target, because Stalin reacted very harshly. He thought that, under his rule, everyone was prospering. As [the nineteenth-century Ukrainian poet Taras] Shevchenko wrote: "From the Moldavian to the Finn, in every language silence reigns, because everyone

is prospering.”<sup>15</sup> Except that Shevchenko was writing about the time of Nicholas I, not Joseph I.

Stalin raised the question of the need to call a plenum of the party’s Central Committee to deal with agriculture. I don’t remember how many years had gone by since one had been called. Probably not since 1938, when for the umpteenth time the question of the fight against “enemies of the people” was discussed, along with the question of the excesses committed in that fight. At that time Stalin was playing the role of noble fighter against the excesses that he himself had organized.

So now Stalin was raising the question of a plenum on how to boost agriculture. They started discussing who should be assigned the task of giving a report. At a Politburo meeting Stalin, thinking out loud, asked: “Who should give the report?” At that time, Malenkov was personally responsible for agriculture. Stalin mused: “Malenkov? He’s in charge of this. But what kind of report can he give when he doesn’t even know agricultural terminology?” He said that right in front of Malenkov. And as a matter of fact, he was absolutely right. Only it’s amazing that Stalin, knowing Malenkov, nevertheless put him in charge of agriculture. I had wondered about this for a long time. It’s hard to figure out. But with Stalin anything was possible. . . .

Suddenly he said to me: “You’re going to give the report.”

An assignment like that was frightening to me. I said: “Comrade Stalin, I ask you please not to assign this to me.”

“Why?”

“I could give a report on Ukraine, which I know. But I don’t know the Russian Federation. I know nothing whatever of Siberia, have never been there, and haven’t been involved in this work. Strictly speaking, before Ukraine, I never had anything at all to do with agriculture. After all, I’m an industry man. I’ve been involved with industry a lot, and also the Moscow municipal economy. And what about Central Asia? I’ve never even seen how cotton is grown.”

But Stalin insisted: “No, you’ll give the report.”

“No, Comrade Stalin, I really ask you to spare me from this. I don’t want to let the Central Committee down or put myself in the awkward position of having agreed to report on a subject that I really don’t know. I won’t be able to report to the plenum.”

He thought about it a little bit more: “Well, all right, let’s assign it to Andreyev.” Andreyev had once worked in agriculture and had earned himself a reputation in the party as an expert on the rural part of the country. Of course, in comparison with other Politburo members, he knew agriculture

better, although I didn't hold a particularly high opinion of his knowledge. He was a rather dry and formal person, who usually made use of various bureaucratic memoranda and would construct his report on the basis of memoranda from the same type of experts on agriculture as himself. In any case, I was glad that this cup had passed from me. Andrei Andreyevich [Andreyev] was confirmed as the reporter for the Central Committee on this question at the plenum. He was a Politburo member then, and a secretary of the Central Committee. Some other committee on agriculture also existed then—something that served as a link between the party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. Andreyev was chair of this committee, and I was listed as his deputy and a member of one of the committee bureaus. This surrogate institution had been created by Stalin. I don't know what it was for or what role exactly it was supposed to play.

The time came and the plenum was convened.<sup>16</sup> Andrei Andreyevich gave the report. The report turned out to be well put together, logically constructed in his usual manner of doing things. The plenum was held in the Sverdlov Hall of the Kremlin. The presiding committee (the Presidium) at that plenum was a small one; only members of the Politburo sat on it. I found myself next to Stalin and saw that he was listening closely. They announced a break. We went into the lounge where Presidium members gathered to drink tea. Sometimes we ate there too and exchanged opinions. We sat down at a table and were served tea, and Stalin asked me: "What do you think of the report?"

I said: "The speaker shed light on all the issues."

"But you sat there completely apathetic. I was watching you."

"If you want the truth, then, from my point of view, the questions in the report should have been posed differently. Everything was touched on, but in a stereotyped way."

He flew into a rage. "First you refused to give the report, and now you criticize it." I saw that Stalin was not pleased with me at all.

A discussion of the report ensued. Many joined in the debate, including me. I don't remember now what questions I took up; most likely I talked about the current problems of restoring the Ukrainian economy. I'll tell about only one thing. At that time I thought the most urgent problems were mechanization and the question of seed stocks. In those days a certain rule served effectively as the collective farmer's "first commandment": first you fulfill your obligations for deliveries to the state, then you fill up seed and grain reserves, and what's left is distributed among the farmers, based on their workday units.<sup>17</sup> I thought it was necessary to violate this commandment,



which Stalin had dreamed up, that seed should be stockpiled first. You see, in the old days individual peasant farmers, even on their deathbeds, wouldn't eat the seed because that was the future, that was life. How was it that we were taking this seed from the peasants and then later had to give grain back to them for sowing? But by then no one knew what kind of seed it was, what region it came from, to what extent it was "acclimatized" [i.e., suitable to the climatic conditions of the region it was sent to].

My comments aroused Stalin's fury. A special commission was established. Andrei Andreyevich [Andreyev] was appointed its chairman, and I was included as a member. But an even heavier cloud hung over me after a speech by Maltsev,<sup>18</sup> an experienced specialist from the Urals region, who really did know the agriculture in his region well. The farming done under his management was excellent, and in his speech he told about how matters stood with them and what good harvests of spring wheat he was getting. As soon as he mentioned spring wheat, I immediately felt I had been jabbed in the sorest spot of all. You see, I knew that Stalin, not understanding things, would drag up the question of spring wheat right away and throw it in my face. I had come out against the idea that the sowing of spring wheat should be obligatory. Spring wheat is less productive in Ukraine, especially in the south, although on a few collective farms it was fairly successful. Therefore, in my opinion, the farms that could sow it successfully should do so, but it shouldn't be written down as obligatory that every collective farm should sow a certain percentage of spring wheat, because sometimes it hadn't even returned the seed. Stalin knew nothing of this and didn't care to know—although at one time before the war I had reported to him on spring wheat and he had then agreed with me, after which a decision was made not to make it obligatory for all Ukrainian collective farms to sow spring wheat.

As soon as a break was called and we went into the lounge, Stalin irritably and spitefully flung a question at me: "Did you hear what Maltsev said?"

"Yes, Comrade Stalin, but he was talking about the Urals. While the most productive crop in Ukraine is winter wheat, in the Urals they don't sow that at all; they sow only spring wheat. They have studied it, they know how to cultivate it and get a good harvest, but even so, that's not true on all the collective farms. As for Maltsev, he's an expert in his field, a real master."

"No, no, if the spring wheat there yields such a harvest, then here we have"—and he smacked himself on the stomach—"such deep black earth that the harvest will be even better. We have to write it into the resolution."

I said: "If you write it in, then write in that I disagreed. Everyone knows that I'm against spring wheat. But if this is what you think, then write it in

for the Northern Caucasus, including Rostov province. They're in roughly the same geographical position as we are."<sup>19</sup>

"No, we'll write it down just for you!" In other words, I was supposed to show initiative, so that others would follow suit.

In the work of the commissions established at the plenum, when this question was discussed, I also took part, but I didn't go all out. The plenum ended, everyone headed back to their home regions, and I also had to leave. Malenkov and Andreyev were finishing up the resolution.

Before leaving, I raised the question once again at a commission about the need to revoke the decision on the collective farmer's "first commandment" and proposed instead that seed stocks be filled parallel with state grain deliveries in fixed proportions. Of course, this was a concession on my part. Since nothing was being left behind, I thought that even this would be beneficial. Certain percentages of grain would still be going to the state and to seed stocks. I left. Malenkov called me within a few days and said: "The resolution's ready. Your proposal about how to fill up seed stocks at collective and state farms wasn't included in the resolution; we'll report on it to Stalin. What do you think? Should we report on your proposal separately, or should we say nothing about it at all?" This was clearly a provocative question. Everyone knew, including Stalin, that I had raised this question at the commission, fought for my proposal, and now, when the question was whether to report it to Stalin, if I said to say nothing, that would seem to be an expression of cowardice.

I said: "No, Comrade Malenkov. I ask that you report my point of view to Comrade Stalin."

"Very well!"

They informed Stalin. I found out from another of Malenkov's phone calls that Stalin was terribly displeased and my proposal wasn't adopted. Stalin simply went into a frenzy when he heard about it. After the plenum Stalin brought up the question of the need to help Ukraine. He said this and then looked at me, waiting for my reaction. I remained silent, and he continued: "Khrushchev needs some support; he has to be helped. Ukraine is in a state of ruin [because of the war], but the republic is huge and has great significance for our country."

I thought to myself: "What's he driving at?"

Stalin continued: "I think we should send Kaganovich down there to help Khrushchev. How do you see it?" he asked, addressing me.

I answered: "Kaganovich was formerly secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party; he knows Ukraine. Of course Ukraine is a land where there's enough to keep not just two but ten people busy."

“All right, we’ll send Kaganovich and Patolichev<sup>20</sup> there.” At that time Patolichev was a secretary of the AUCP(B) Central Committee.

I responded: “Please do. That will be very good.”

And that’s how it was noted down. Stalin proposed splitting the posts of chairman of the Ukrainian government’s Council of Ministers and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. At one time those posts had been merged, at Stalin’s suggestion, and I had argued then that it wasn’t necessary. That was done in Ukraine and Belorussia. I don’t know whether it was instituted in other republics.

Stalin proposed: “Khrushchev will be chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers; and Kaganovich first secretary of the Ukrainian party’s Central Committee. As for Patolichev, he’ll be Central Committee secretary for agriculture.”

Again I said: “Very well.”

We called a plenum in Ukraine. The plenum confirmed these appointments, and we all took our places and began work. “First of all,” I said to Kaganovich and Patolichev, “we have to get ready for the sowing campaign. We have no seed. Besides that, we have to get something to feed the people: they’re dying; cannibalism has begun. There can be no talk of a sowing campaign if we don’t organize a public food-supply system. It’s doubtful that we’ll get enough grain to hand out loans; we’ll have to feed people with some kind of thin, watery soup, or ‘gruel,’<sup>21</sup> so they don’t die of hunger. And we have to get seed, too.” We presented the question to Moscow. In order to have a harvest in 1947 and stockpile grain for 1948 we had to get seed urgently. If we didn’t get seed, there wasn’t anything we could do, because everything had been taken out of the villages according to Stalin’s first commandment.

Much earlier we’d calculated what was essential. Again we made a request to Stalin and got a certain amount of seed and help with foodstuffs. February had begun. At that time, in some parts of southern Ukraine, sowing usually begins, and by March many southern collective farms would be sowing grain. So by March we were supposed to be ready for a massive sowing campaign in the south, and in Kiev province the sowing would be finished in April. I said to Kaganovich: “Let’s think about what to do.”

He said: “We need to travel around Ukraine.”

I answered: “Yes, but that’s not the main thing right now. You haven’t been in Ukraine for a long time, so go ahead, but I’ll stay in Kiev. Right now the main thing isn’t that I go and visit one, two, three, or five collective farms. That means nothing. To push the seed down the railway line and into the provinces and from the province centers to the collective farms—that’s

the main thing right now. The success of the crops depends on it.” So that’s what we agreed on. Kaganovich went to Poltava province. And I stayed in Kiev as a telephone dispatcher—to push through the seed and other cargo necessary to ensure good crops: spare parts, fuel, and lubricants [for the farm machinery]. There was no question of mineral fertilizers then; there was practically no such fertilizer in our country.

After he’d traveled around a bit, Kaganovich became convinced that his job as first secretary was loaded with responsibilities: the situation was very hard, the collective farmers were swaying in the wind, unfit for work, emaciated from starvation, dying. Later he shared with me his impressions of one collective farm and of Mogilnichenko, the chairman of that farm. He said: “I don’t understand what kind of person this is. Rigorous, persistent. He’ll probably have a good harvest. No sooner had I gotten to the field than they were tilling the soil. I saw that they were tilling shallowly and said, ‘Why are you tilling so shallowly?’” You had to know Kaganovich to understand how he said it, barking at the chairman. And the latter, knowing his work well, had answered: “I do it the way it needs to be done.”<sup>22</sup> [Kaganovich had said:] “So now you’re tilling shallowly and later you’ll be asking the state for grain, eh?”

The other man had answered: “I have never, Comrade Kaganovich, asked the state for grain. I myself provide it to the state.”

Earlier I had proposed to Kaganovich: “You’re going to the countryside; might as well have Koval go with you. He’s an agronomist and knows agriculture very well, so you can ask him for advice and he’ll suggest things. He’s a person who knows his business.” At that time Koval was minister of agriculture for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. So Koval was there and saw that “our people were being attacked”; they were attacking the First Secretary. And who was doing it? A [lowly] collective-farm chairman. Koval said to him: “What are you saying, Comrade Mogilnichenko? I am an agronomist and Minister of Agriculture of Ukraine, and I think that you aren’t tilling correctly.”

Mogilnichenko looked at him sideways and answered: “So what if you’re an agronomist and minister? I’m going to do it the way it needs to be done.”<sup>23</sup> And he stuck to his guns.

A year later I made a special trip to get to know him and to see the collective farm. And this person really did know his business. I saw a very rich collective farm, one that not only didn’t have arrears but submitted all agricultural products to the state six months in advance.

So what was bothering Kaganovich? Kaganovich had told me: “I’m afraid he really will have a good harvest with such shallow tilling.” The thing was

that Kaganovich had taken a hand in the fight against shallow tilling. At that time criminal trials were literally being used to fight against the use of drill plows—tools for the shallow tilling of soil. Advocates of using these for tilling soil were being condemned and liquidated. And here suddenly Kaganovich had come up against shallow tilling. That's against the law! As a matter of fact, at one time in Saratov province, "drill-plow theory" was being developed, and some professor there suffered because of it. He was given a heavy sentence and sent off to jail, if not shot.

So that was how our joint work with Kaganovich started up again, this time in Ukraine. He was looking for ways to prove himself and decided that he had to distinguish himself by having Ukraine "overfulfill to the maximum" the plan for growth in industrial production, especially local industry. When the State Planning Commission of the Ukrainian Republic proposed its figures, I had a look at them beforehand (as chairman of the Council of Ministers) and then presented them to the Politburo of the Ukrainian party. At that session of the Politburo Kaganovich kept looking, now at the figures, now at me as if to ask, Was I in agreement with this plan?

I said: "Lazar Moiseyevich, these figures can be accepted. They definitely can."

He said: "No, just look at those high growth rates!"

"But these aren't annual growth rates under normal conditions. This is just a one-year plan for rebuilding industry and the growth of production on that basis. That's why it's feasible. After all, over the past year we had such-and-such a percentage of growth."

Instead of increasing the figures, he barely agreed to accept the ones being proposed, for he was afraid they would mean failure for him. He didn't want to accept a plan that wouldn't be fulfilled; he wanted a plan that aimed lower, so that it could be overfulfilled. It was a lot easier to write lower figures into the plan and then go around shouting that the plan was not only being fulfilled but overfulfilled. Unfortunately, this is a very widespread practice in our economy. I think it's used even now, and rather liberally.

Things didn't go well for me in spring 1947: I caught a cold, came down with pneumonia, lay in a hospital bed being given oxygen,<sup>24</sup> and barely survived. To a certain extent this helped Kaganovich launch his activities without stopping to look around, because I had been a restraint on him. In spite of everything, he still had had to reckon with me. But now he let himself go, even giving free rein to his boorishness. Literally boorishness. For example, he got Patolichev worked up into such a state that he came to me when I was still in bed, soon after the worst had passed, and complained: "I can't take it!

I don't know what to do." Later he was unable to restrain himself any longer and wrote Stalin a letter asking to be relieved of his assignment in Ukraine, because he couldn't stand being around Kaganovich. I think they sent him to work in Rostov. Patolichev left Ukraine.

I started to get well, but was still bedridden for a few months or more before going back to work. Relations with Kaganovich were shaping up very badly; they were simply intolerable. He had begun frantic work in two areas: against Ukrainian nationalists and against the Jews. He was a Jew himself—and yet he was against the Jews? Or maybe this was really directed against those Jews with whom I had friendly relations? Most likely that was it. In particular, we had someone who worked for us as the editor of a newspaper—Troskunov.<sup>25</sup> Kaganovich fired him. He not only mistreated him, but simply made a mockery of him. Yet Troskunov was a decent man who had edited a newspaper at the front during the war. And in competitions with other front-line newspapers his publication had been recognized as the best. I remember Troskunov from as far back as Yuzovka, when I was a student at the workers' school,<sup>26</sup> and he had also worked on a newspaper there. I think I even vouched for him when he joined the party. But that ended up hurting him more than helping.

Regarding the nationalists, when I got on my feet again after my illness I received a stream of complaints. They concerned questions of a political character, and practically speaking, as chairman of the Council of Ministers, I wasn't working on such things. The party leadership of the republic had jurisdiction over such questions. We discussed them in the Central Committee, and sometimes they were even brought to me, but mainly they were decided in the Central Committee secretariat, in whose work I did not participate. These questions came up rarely in meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. However, I did everything I could to relieve Kaganovich's pressure on the so-called nationalists.

There began a stream of memoranda from Kaganovich to Stalin on "problematic issues." It got to the point where Stalin once called me: "Why is Kaganovich sending me memoranda that don't have your signature on them?"

"Comrade Stalin, Kaganovich is secretary of our republic's Central Committee, and he's writing to you in your capacity as general secretary of the AUCP(B) Central Committee. That's why my signature isn't needed."

"That's not right. I told him that in the future we aren't going to accept a single memorandum without your signature."

No sooner had I hung up than Kaganovich called me. "Did Stalin call you?"  
"Yes."

“What did he tell you?”

“That now we both have to sign all the memoranda sent to Moscow.” Kaganovich didn’t even ask what else Stalin talked about; we understood each other implicitly. It turned out that I barely had to sign any memoranda because the stream of memoranda dried up. Kaganovich knew that I couldn’t possibly sign them. Those that he sent me anyway were either redone or I simply refused to sign them and so they didn’t go any further.

For me personally the main thing was that Stalin’s trust in me seemed to be returning. His phone call was, for me, a signal of that. It improved my morale: my full rights as a member of the Politburo were being reinstated; I wasn’t a member in name only.

Concerning the plan: we fulfilled the plan for government grain procurements, delivering around 400 million poods. The harvest [in 1947] wasn’t bad for those days. It’s true that the plan wasn’t that big, but the republic’s economy had been destroyed by the war. That was why, against the general backdrop of agriculture in the USSR after the war, those were good numbers.

In fall 1947, Stalin summoned me and Kaganovich to come see him. Even before that, when we’d fulfilled the plan, we had asked that he receive us in Sochi, where he was vacationing. We flew there to see him. And now, with Stalin having returned to Moscow, he summoned us himself and raised the question of Kaganovich’s having nothing to do in Ukraine, and suggested he be recalled to Moscow. Thus, I was reinstated as first secretary of the Ukrainian party’s Central Committee. I was happy, of course, and took up the familiar work with great gusto.

Things were going well for us. Agriculture in Ukraine was being revived significantly faster than in other areas ruined by the war. We were competing with Belorussia<sup>27</sup> then. And Ukraine was outstripping it in every way. Of course, Belorussia had been devastated terribly. Nevertheless, this fact raised Ukraine’s significance together with the authority of the Ukrainian leadership. I was pleased.

The last year I spent in Ukraine was 1949. Stalin called and told me to come to Moscow, saying that I was being reassigned to work in the all-union capital for a second time. Looking back on it, I’ll say that the Ukrainian people treated me well. I recall warmly the years I spent there. This was a period full of responsibilities, but pleasant because it brought satisfaction: the republic’s agriculture and industry both were developing quickly and growing. On many occasions Stalin assigned me to give reports in Ukraine, especially concerning our progress in raising more livestock, then he submitted these reports to *Pravda* for publication, so that others, in his words, would do



what we had been doing in Ukraine. But far be it from me to inflate my significance. The entire Ukrainian republic was exerting great efforts.

I know Ukraine pretty well. I thought earlier, and I think now, that in comparison with other republics Ukraine has a highly developed agriculture and comparatively advanced farming practices on the everyday level. It's true that I don't know how to evaluate the standards of cotton growing in Central Asia. Comparing Ukraine with other republics (I don't mean the Baltic countries, because they had only recently become part of the USSR), I'll say that the Russian Federation, Belorussia, and the other republics lagged behind Ukraine. This was probably the result of historical development [which differed in the various republics]. Within the RSFSR, the Kuban region stood out favorably; it also had excellent land, and the farming practices there were on a high level. So I attribute Ukraine's successes to the Ukrainian people as a whole.

I won't elaborate further on this theme, but in principle it's very easy to demonstrate. I'm Russian myself, and I don't want to offend the Russians. I'm just stating the fact that in Ukraine there's a higher standard of farming. Right now a process of equalization is under way; everywhere great effort is being applied to boost agriculture, and big sums are being spent. The state is investing more and more in new technology, mineral fertilizers, and all the other elements on which the level of agricultural production depends in order to even out the standard of farming among the republics and to raise it higher and higher each year, to satisfy fully our people's needs for the products of agriculture.

1. Romania and Hungary as well as Germany took part in the Nazi invasion of Soviet Ukraine. Forces from Mussolini's Fascist Italy also fought on Hitler's side in the southern part of the USSR, and there were small contingents from other countries in Germany's coalition of allies taking part in the invasion of the USSR. [SS/GS]

2. A literal translation of the Soviet term used here (*malaya mekhanizatsiya*) would be "small, or minor, mechanization"—that is, mechanization on a low level, small in scope. It meant the use of mechanical devices based on very simple technology. The coal-mining engineers were forced to resort to such methods in the wake of wartime devastation. [SS/GS]

3. The details of coal production discussed in the preceding paragraph reflect Khrushchev's experience as a mine worker himself, beginning at the age of fifteen.

In connection with Khrushchev's early years and original profession, it may be useful for readers

to have the following information in one note, because it is only at scattered places in the four volumes of his memoirs in Russian that Khrushchev refers to his early years and discusses, sometimes at length, his work as a machinist (*slesar*) and related activities, such as serving on a strike committee.

The Russian term designating Khrushchev's original profession, as indicated above, is *slesar*. Dictionary definitions given for this are varied: "locksmith; fitter; mechanic; metalworker; machinist." Many choose the term "fitter," but that does not seem to me a commonly used term for industrial work in modern American English. For most modern readers, "fitter" probably conveys the notion "pipefitter," but that does not fully or accurately describe Khrushchev's work.

In Russian, *slesar* originally meant "locksmith"; the word apparently entered Russian from German around the time of Peter the Great (the German word for "locksmith" being *Schlosser*, or



Schloesser). Later, *slesar* was used for anyone doing metalwork or mechanical jobs. One technical dictionary defines the related verb *slesarnichat* as “to do mechanical jobs; to do metalwork.” The term “bench work” is also given for *slesarnye raboty* (“jobs of a *slesar*”).

Although the terms “mechanic,” “metalworker,” and “fitter” may be used for *slesar*, I prefer to translate it as “machinist” in one of the senses given by the Merriam-Webster Third Unabridged English Dictionary, “a worker who fabricates, assembles, or repairs machinery [or related equipment],” because that seems to have been the nature of Khrushchev’s work. More precise terms, and terms used more commonly than “fitter” in today’s American English, would be “machine repairman” or “maintenance machinist.”

The tools that Khrushchev reports he kept with him up to 1935 seem consistent with the tools of a maintenance machinist or machine repairman—calipers, a meter rule, a center punch, a marking tool (awl), various try squares, and a liter measure.

The following comments by my friend David Riehle, a historian of the American labor movement and himself an industrial worker, may shed further light on the nature of Khrushchev’s work.

“The tools Khrushchev kept with him are those a maintenance machinist would use working in a repair and maintenance shop, more so than out in the mine, working directly on machinery.” (Riehle described what the tools were for and how a maintenance machinist would use them.)

Khrushchev’s profession then involved mainly the maintenance and repair of machinery and equipment, but apparently included working at a lathe, welding, and pipefitting as well. For example, in a reminiscence Khrushchev wrote in the Yuzovka newspaper *Diktatura Truda* (Dictatorship of Labor) in March 1922, he said that it was “at a lathe in the repair shop” that he and his fellow workers first read the news of the fall of Tsar Nicholas II five years earlier, in March 1917.

Following is a brief summary of Khrushchev’s work, and related political activity, in his early years (largely based on the book *Khrushchev*, by Roy Medvedev, New York: Doubleday, 1983, pp. 4–7).

“[W]hen he was 15 he was taken on as an apprentice fitter [or machine repairman] at the Bosse factory, a German-owned enterprise. He worked in a machine shop in which equipment for the local mines was repaired.” (During the Soviet period the E. A. Bosse factory was known as the Engineering Plant named after the Leninist Komsomol of Ukraine [Mashinostroitelny zavod imeni Leninskogo Komsomola Ukrainy]. It is now called the Donets Association for Mine Engineering [Donetskoye obyedineniye gornogo mashinostroyeniya], or Gormash for short.)

After being fired from the Bosse factory for participation in a sympathy strike in 1912 to protest

the massacre by tsarist troops of mine workers in the Lena River goldfields, he was “taken on at the French-owned Rutchenkovo coal pits and worked as a fitter” [I would say “maintenance machinist” or “machine repairman”] at Mine No. 31. “He was transferred to a machine shop that repaired equipment for several of the pits.”

After the revolution that overthrew tsarist rule in March 1917, “Khrushchev was elected to a Soviet [council] of workers’ deputies at Rutchenkovo and, as one of its leading members, planned and supervised the arrest of local police officials and the formation of a workers’ militia.” Historical documents reprinted in an appendix to Volume 1 of the 1999 Russian edition show that Khrushchev was chairman of that Soviet in May 1917.

In December 1917 Khrushchev was elected chairman of the Union of Metal Workers in the mining industry. He supported the Bolsheviks, although he had not yet joined their party. In early 1918 he was co-leader of a Rutchenkovo mine workers’ battalion, which “joined the First Regiment of the Red Guard of the Donets Basin, known to the workers simply as the Donets Proletarian Regiment” to resist an attack led by a White Cossack general, Kaledin. It was at that stage that Khrushchev formally joined the Bolsheviks.

After serving in the Red Army during the Civil War, Khrushchev returned to Yuzovka and became assistant manager of the Rutchenkovo mine, where he had previously worked and which was now state-owned. The manager was his friend Yegor Trofimovich Abakumov, also a former worker at the Rutchenkovo mine before the revolution. [GS]

4. “Local industry” (*mestnaya promyshlennost*) comprised enterprises that were subordinate to local government authorities rather than to central (unionwide) or union republic ministries. Local industry produced certain consumer goods for local needs. [SS]

5. A pood was an old Russian unit of weight equal to approximately 16 kilograms or 36 pounds. [SS]

6. Under the *metrovka* system, a count was made, on a selected square meter of cropland, of the average number of ears of grain and the average number of grains per ear. This indicated the grain harvest that could be expected from one square meter. The expected harvest from one square meter (or *metrovka*) was extended to the rest of the cropland in a particular district; that is, it was multiplied by the number of square meters in the district. This was called the “expected biological yield,” as distinct from what actually ended up in state granaries. Naturally, in applying this method, there was a tendency to make high “estimates,” to increase, on paper, the size of the expected harvest. [SK/GS]

7. Vasily Fyodorovich Starchenko (1904–48) was a plant breeder and a deputy chairman of the

Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. See Biographies.

8. For a decade or so after World War II, the Soviet authorities referred to the Eastern European countries where pro-Soviet regimes had been established, not as “socialist countries,” but as “people’s democracies.” [GS]

9. In the years 1946–47 the Soviet Union exported 2.5 million tons of grain (150 million poods). In 1946 aid in the form of grain was supplied to Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Grain was also exported to Western Europe to pay for machinery and equipment obtained from there. (The source for this information is the book by I. Ye. Zelenin, *Agrarnaya politika N. S. Khrushcheva i selskoye khozyaistvo* [Khrushchev’s Agrarian Policies and Agriculture], [Moscow: Institute of Russian History, 2001], 27.) [SK]

10. Rationing of products of prime necessity was introduced in certain areas of the country by a resolution of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars of June 18, 1941. From September 1, 1941, rationing was extended to 197 towns and urban and workers’ settlements, and from November 1, 1941, to all other towns and workers’ settlements. Workers in defense industry and transportation and their children were also guaranteed supply in accordance with the same norms. In rural areas, products were distributed in exchange for coupons or according to lists. In 1942, special ration cards were introduced for the supplementary feeding of certain categories of citizens. From February 1, 1942, ration cards were used to regulate the sale of non-food consumer goods in the largest urban centers, and from April in other urban centers. On December 14, 1947, rationing was ended by a resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) “On the Implementation of a Monetary Reform and the Abolition of Ration Cards for Food and Non-food Products.”

11. The famine in 1946–47 affected 100 million people in the USSR, with approximately 2 million dying of hunger, according to Zelenin, op. cit. note 9 above, 29. [SK]

12. The Lubyanka, located on Lubyanka Square in downtown Moscow, was a prison and the main headquarters building of the state security police. [SK/GS]

13. In preparing to abolish the wartime rationing system (which was done at the end of 1947), Stalin decided to build up the government’s food reserves. On September 27, 1946, the USSR Council of Ministers and the party Central Committee adopted a secret resolution entitled “Economizing on Bread Consumption” (*Ob ekonomii raskhodovaniya khleba*). According to this resolution, as of October 1, 1946, the number of people being supplied with food by the government would be reduced by 70 percent (23 million people). This applied in rural

areas to the dependents of blue-collar and white collar-workers on state farms, at machine-and-tractor stations, in local industry, and in the forestry service. In the cities, adult dependents (that is, the elderly and the disabled) were deprived of food ration cards, and for other dependents, particularly children, the amount of bread to be given out in return for ration cards was reduced to between 250 and 300 grams a day per person. (*KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh . . .* [The CPSU in Its Official Resolutions . . .], 8th ed., vol. 3 (1946–55) [Moscow, 1958]; and Zelenin, op. cit. note 9 above, 27.) [SK]

14. The Soviet government’s reserves of grain, flour, etc., in 1946 amounted to 16,987,400 tons, according to Zelenin, op. cit. note 9 above, 28. [SK]

15. Taras Shevchenko (1814–61) is considered the Ukrainian national poet. His works played an important role in the rise of Ukrainian national consciousness in tsarist Russia. In 1847 he was exiled to Siberia for ten years by order of Tsar Nicholas I. [SS] The lines that Khrushchev quotes are from Shevchenko’s 1845 poem *Kavkaz* (“The Caucasus”). See the collection of his verses *Kobzar* (Kharkov: Yarina, 1996), p. 324. [SK/GS]

16. The plenum was held in Moscow between February 21 and 26, 1947.

17. That is, the remainder was distributed among families in proportion to the numbers of workdays that the members of each family had contributed to the collective farm that year. [SS]

18. Terenty Semyonovich Maltsev (1895–1994) was a tiller and agricultural innovator in Shadrinsky county of Kurgan province. He pioneered the use of a plow without a mold board. He joined the party in 1939 and was an honorary academician of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences and twice Hero of Socialist Labor (in 1955 and 1975).

19. These are areas of southern Russia neighboring Ukraine, in which climatic and soil conditions are similar to those in Ukraine. [SS]

20. Nikolai Semyonovich Patolichev. See Biographies.

21. The Russian word that is rendered here as “gruel” is *balanda*. It was used to refer to the kind of poor-quality food that was given to prisoners in the forced-labor camps—containing, for instance, cabbage leaves or herring heads. [SK]

22. In the text Khrushchev quotes Mogilnichenko saying this in Ukrainian. [SS/GS]

23. Here Khrushchev quotes Mogilnichenko speaking in a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian. [SS/GS]

24. In the Russian text Khrushchev says literally that he “lay [in a hospital bed, having oxygen administered] with oxygen pillows” (*lezhal s kislorodnymi podushkami*). “Oxygen pillows” are not the same thing as an oxygen tent, although

*Khrushchev Remembers* (p. 242) renders the Russian wording as: "I had to lie for a long time in an oxygen tent." In Soviet medical practice, according to the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (New York: Macmillan, 1976, 12:675), the oxygen pillow, or oxygen cushion, is "the simplest piece of equipment" used for oxygen therapy. It is "a 12–16 liter rubberized sac filled with oxygen and equipped with a rubber tube with a stopcock and nozzle. Nasal catheters or plastic tubes are attached to two . . . ends of a T-pipe; the third end is joined to the oxygen source [at the nozzle]. The catheters are introduced along the inferior nasal passage, and the oxygen is fed through a humidifier at the rate of 2–3 liters per minute." (Cf. *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* [Moscow, 1973], 12:199.) [GS]

The oxygen pillow was not in fact a Russian invention; it came to the Soviet Union from the West. It was filled from a tank with oxygen under very high pressure. When it was empty it was replaced. It has now been replaced by a more compact oxygen cylinder. [SK]

25. During World War II, L. I. Troskunov edited two magazines for troops fighting on the front lines: *Za chest Rodiny* (For the Honor of the Homeland) for the Voronezh Front and *Krasnaya Armiya* (Red Army) for the Don, Stalingrad, Southwestern, and Southern Fronts.

26. The Russian word used here is *rabfak*, an acronym for *rabochy fakul'tet*, workers' faculty. Strictly speaking, this was not a separate school but a special section of an institution of higher education in which poorly prepared entrants from working-class backgrounds received compensatory instruction. [SS]

27. The reference is to the Soviet institution known in Russian as *sotsialisticheskoye sorevnovaniye*, translated either as "socialist competition" or as "socialist emulation"—a highly publicized contest, organized from above as a moral incentive, to see which factory, region, and so on could achieve the best economic results. [SS/GS]

## IN MOSCOW AGAIN

What motivated Stalin to recall me from Ukraine to Moscow in 1949, in my opinion, was a kind of mental disorder that he was suffering from. That is, not the fact that I was recalled, but what prompted Stalin to act so hastily. I was in Lvov at the time. The Ukrainian nationalists had assassinated an internationalist writer by the name of Galan,<sup>1</sup> and I held a meeting with the students of the Technical Institute for Forestry. The student who assassinated Galan had attended that institute, and therefore I decided to have a talk with his classmates.

Suddenly I was summoned to the phone. It was Malenkov calling. He told me that Stalin wanted an order conveyed to me, that I should immediately come to Moscow.

"What do you mean immediately?" I asked.

"As soon as you can. Fly tomorrow."

The next day I arrived in Moscow. Stalin greeted me quite well. He said: "Well, what's going on? Are you going to be sitting there in Ukraine for a long time? You've already turned into a Ukrainian agronomist out there. It's time for you to come back to Moscow." He began to explain: "It's our thinking

here that you should once again occupy the post of first secretary of the party's Moscow city and province committees. Things are bad here in Moscow, and in Leningrad they're even worse. We've arrested conspirators in Leningrad, and it turns out there are conspirators in Moscow, too."<sup>2</sup>

[Stalin continued:] "We want Moscow to be a base of support for the party's Central Committee, and therefore it will be more useful for you to work here. You will immediately become secretary of the Moscow Committee and a secretary of the Central Committee." I of course thanked him for his confidence. I said I would be glad to come back to Moscow because I had enjoyed my work in the capital eleven years earlier. I thought that the length of time I had been working in Ukraine was quite sufficient and it would be useful for me to move.

After I had seen Stalin I returned [to my apartment in Moscow]. Wasilewska and Korneichuk,<sup>3</sup> who were also in Moscow, stopped in to see me. I told them about the conversation that had just happened. Wanda Lvovna [Wasilewska] began to cry. She was literally moaning and groaning. I had never seen her in such a state. She said: "How could you leave Ukraine? How could this happen?" Here was this Polish woman weeping over the fact that a Russian was leaving Ukraine. Pretty strange! Apparently the reason for her behavior was that we had developed a very close friendship. I respected her highly. She was a remarkable woman and a remarkable Communist. And she respected me as well. I will not conceal that aspect of things, which perhaps shows a little vanity on my part, but unquestionably it was pleasant for me. This incident has surfaced in my memory and I have decided to tell about it.

Again, concerning Stalin's motivation for his decision, he handed me some sort of document supposedly showing definitively that the state of affairs in Moscow was not good. He said: "Here, familiarize yourself with this, and we'll talk later." I didn't start to read it immediately—it was a long document—I just put it in my pocket. I read it the next day. It turned out to be an anonymous declaration. Although there were signatures at the bottom, there was an "anonymous" quality about the document. I don't remember now whose signatures were there. The text stated that in Moscow there was a group of conspirators opposed to the Central Committee and the Soviet government and that the head of this group was [Georgy Mikhailovich] Popov,<sup>4</sup> secretary of the Moscow Committee and a Central Committee secretary as well. Furthermore the document indicated that among those belonging to this group were secretaries of party district committees, some chairmen of executive committees of district soviets, factory directors, and engineers. My immediate sense was that the document had been deliberately

fabricated, or had been written by a madman or scoundrel. I put the document in my safe and decided not to talk with Stalin about it for a while, thinking that the more time went by without such a conversation, the better.

When I was leaving to go back to Ukraine to make my transfer to Moscow official, Stalin asked me: “Will you get back to Moscow in time for my seventieth birthday celebration?” (That would have been in December.)

“Undoubtedly! When I get back to Ukraine I’ll immediately convene a plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U; we’ll elect a new leadership, and I’ll get back here on time.” Earlier I had already come to agreement with him that I would recommend [Leonid G.] Melnikov<sup>5</sup> to be first secretary of the Central Committee in Ukraine. Stalin didn’t know him, but trusted my judgment. I arrived back in Moscow just before the celebration on December 21. We celebrated our leader’s seventieth birthday. I was elected secretary of the party’s Moscow province and city committees, and I got down to work.

Soon Stalin asked me, having remembered it himself: “I gave you a document. Did you familiarize yourself with it?” And he watched me closely.

“Yes, I familiarized myself with it.”

“Well, what about it?” He had a certain habit of lifting his nose in the air when he looked at you.

I answered: “Some sort of scoundrels or else madmen wrote that document.”

“What’s that?” He disliked it very much when people showed lack of confidence in documents of that nature.

“Comrade Stalin, I’m absolutely convinced that this document has nothing in common with reality. I personally know many of the people who are named there as conspirators. They are very honorable people. Besides, I’m absolutely sure that Popov is not a conspirator. He has perhaps conducted himself unwisely. Undoubtedly, as it turns out, he’s not up to the demands of the high position he holds. But he’s not a conspirator. He’s an honest man. I never doubted that, and I don’t doubt it now. And even if he may have become a conspirator, the people whose names are listed in the document as supposed members of a conspiratorial group—I myself don’t know what [alleged ‘conspiratorial things’] they might have done with him.”

Evidently my confident tone had an effect on Stalin: “You think the document deserves no further notice?”

“Without a doubt, Comrade Stalin, it doesn’t deserve any further notice. In my opinion, this is either madness or a provocation.”

Stalin uttered a curse and the matter ended there. Can you imagine? If one had wanted to adapt oneself to Stalin’s moods, if one had wanted to

distinguish oneself and win greater confidence in his eyes, it would have been very easy to do. All one would have had to do is say: "Yes, Comrade Stalin, this is a serious document. We have to look into it and take measures." Such a statement on my part would have been sufficient for him to immediately order the arrest of Popov and his so-called group. Under interrogation they would of course have "confessed," and there you would have had a conspiratorial group in Moscow, and I could have been the person to take credit for this. People would have said: "Look, he came, looked around, and immediately exposed and crushed these conspirators." But that would have been such a rotten thing to do! Yet that is actually what was done by other people, in Leningrad [that is, in the Leningrad affair].

I began work in Moscow. But I knew all the same that once Stalin had taken aim at Popov as a conspirator he wouldn't rest till he had finished him off. Malenkov and I consulted about the problem, and I proposed: "Let's transfer Popov out of Moscow; let's select a good position for him [elsewhere]." And that's what we did. After some time had passed, we sent Popov to be director of a major factory in Kuibyshev<sup>6</sup> [in 1951].

Stalin would sometimes remember him and say: "Where's Popov?" (At one time he had been a favorite of Stalin's.)

I would answer: "He's in Kuibyshev."

And Stalin would calm down. Evidently he was still thinking to himself: "Hasn't Khrushchev made a mistake? Hasn't this conspirator remained somewhere in the vicinity, continuing his activity in the capital city?" He would never have reconciled himself to that, but when he found out that Popov was off in some remote spot he calmed down.

Later I was told that Popov was furious with me. He's dead now [died in 1968], so why condemn him? He failed to understand that not only should he not have been cursing me, but the opposite. If it hadn't been for me, he would have perished, because Stalin was already laying the groundwork for that. After all, the reason Stalin summoned me from Ukraine was because he had received a document denouncing Popov and believed in the veracity of that document. I saved Popov. But it sometimes happens that a person doesn't understand and expresses dissatisfaction with those who put their bodies on the line in his defense. I really did take a risk then. If Stalin hadn't believed me, he might have thought I was part of the "conspiracy" together with Popov.

I just heard over the radio the tragic news that Gagarin has died.<sup>7</sup> No information was reported about the circumstances of his death. I feel very bad

about this. The only thing they reported was that he died in an airplane accident. Apparently the causes of the accident are not yet known, and an investigation by technical experts has yet to be carried out. The question of what caused the accident is one thing, but the actual fact that this remarkable man has perished is not in dispute. I feel very bad. He was a good and courageous man, the first human being to fly in space.

Returning to the account of my work in Moscow after being interrupted by such sad news—when I became a secretary of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) and of the Moscow party organization, the Leningrad Kuznetsov,<sup>8</sup> as we used to call him among ourselves, had already been arrested. A full-scale witch-hunt against the Leningraders had developed, and the Leningrad party organization had been totally demolished. When Stalin said it was necessary for me to transfer to Moscow, he had referred to the fact that a conspiracy had been exposed in Leningrad. In general he regarded Leningrad as a “conspiratorial city,” a city of subversives.

A lot of people had been sent to Moscow from Gorky province at that time. [Mikhail I.] Rodionov,<sup>9</sup> chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, was also from Gorky. I think it was [Aleksi Aleksandrovich] Zhdanov, who had worked in Gorky for many years and knew the cadres there, who promoted Rodionov.<sup>10</sup>

Rodionov was a good chairman and I liked him. He was a young, energetic man who had his own views about things and thought in the long-term perspective. But he, too, was arrested. Not only he, but many others were seized. I hadn't worked in Moscow for many years and therefore didn't know the people who had been arrested. I knew Kuznetsov more or less. Voznesensky<sup>11</sup> I knew very well. Voznesensky had not yet been arrested when I arrived in Moscow, but he had already been removed from his former posts. He was going around with nothing to do and waiting to see how it all would turn out and what the next day would bring.

Previously Stalin's attitude toward Voznesensky had been quite good; he had had a lot of confidence in him and respect for him. That was also true of Kosygin and Kuznetsov; it was true for this entire threesome. The expectation then was that this “troika,” or threesome, of younger men—Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, and Kosygin—was going to replace us [older officials]. Stalin had begun promoting them. Kuznetsov was going to replace Malenkov. Stalin made Voznesensky the first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, that is, his own first deputy, and assigned him to chair the sessions of the Council of Ministers. Kosygin was concerned with problems of light



industry and finance. I assume that the deaths of these men (not counting Kosygin) resulted precisely from the fact that Stalin had been promoting them and getting ready to replace the older cadres with them. Above all, that meant the replacement of Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, and Mikoyan, men who no longer enjoyed Stalin's confidence as much as they had previously.

It's hard for me to say now exactly how Malenkov and Beria succeeded in undermining Stalin's confidence in these new men, turning Stalin against his very own protégés. I can only draw conclusions from my observations and from scattered remarks I picked up from conversations between Malenkov and Beria. Besides, I saw how Malenkov and Beria conducted themselves in Stalin's presence when any discussion of these men came up. I had the definite impression that Malenkov and Beria were exerting every effort to do these men in. Beria took the lead in this operation, and he used Malenkov as a battering ram. Because of Malenkov's position in the party's Central Committee, he had access to all information and documents that were transmitted to Stalin. A number of documents had the aim of turning Stalin's anger against the younger group. Beria and Malenkov knew in advance how Stalin would react.

[Aleksii Ivanovich] Shakhurin,<sup>12</sup> who had been people's commissar of the aircraft industry during the war, was already in prison then. I had known Shakhurin very well when he had been active in party work and in particular when he was party organizer for the Central Committee at Aircraft Factory No. 30 [in Moscow]. [Pyotr Vasilyevich] Dementyev<sup>13</sup> replaced him as people's commissar. I had known both men and had a positive attitude toward them, regarding them as very sensible and capable engineers and organizers of industry. Shakhurin was jailed for allegedly producing "poor quality aircraft" during the war. This happened when I was still in Ukraine, and therefore I didn't know the details. Later Malenkov told me that Vasily Stalin, Stalin's son, had written the relevant memorandum denouncing them (or personally told his father about it). He said that such-and-such aircraft had been produced and had had such-and-such defects, and that Shakhurin was to blame for this.<sup>14</sup>

This accusation was injurious to Malenkov also, because one of his Politburo assignments during the war was to oversee the work of the aircraft industry. He was now replaced as punishment for covering up poor work by the people's commissariat. There was some justification for this charge, because the rush to achieve quantity had a harmful effect on quality. But after all, there was a war going on! It was necessary to do this kind of thing in many branches of industry. Accusations like these, coming after the fact,



led to the arrest of Shakhurin and to Malenkov's being temporarily relieved of his duties in the Central Committee. He was sent to Tashkent then, it seems to me.<sup>15</sup> But he didn't stay there long; he soon returned. Many people today don't remember that such a thing took place. It was Beria who got him back to Moscow. During the time when Malenkov was not in Moscow, Beria, according to his own account, step by step, gradually but persistently, kept raising the idea with Stalin of having Malenkov return. Finally he was returned, and he resumed his post as a secretary of the party's Central Committee.

What grounds were there for the arrest of Kuznetsov and the others? It was impossible for me to know all the details, but I do know something, and I want to tell about it. Nowadays many things sound simply unbelievable and even cause surprise and amazement that such reasons could result in people's deaths and the destruction of entire party organizations after they came under suspicion. Here are the facts. Back before World War II (I don't remember what years) a Bureau for the Russian Federation was established in the Central Committee. This Bureau for the RSFSR was headed, it seems to me, by Andrei Andreyevich Andreyev.<sup>16</sup> I don't know under what circumstances this Bureau ceased to exist, but once again there came into existence a situation in which the RSFSR did not have its own higher party body that could look into all ongoing questions of the economy and so forth. All such questions were distributed among the people's commissariats on the union-wide level; only some questions of tertiary importance were considered by the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. Partly for this reason the functioning of the RSFSR was considerably worse than that of other republics.

Once after the war, when I arrived from Ukraine, I stopped in to see Zhdanov.<sup>17</sup> He began telling me about some new ideas he had in mind: "All the republics have their own Central Committees, which discuss relevant questions and decide them or present them to the unionwide Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. They operate more boldly, they hold conferences on internal problems of the given republic, they discuss these problems, and they mobilize people. As a result, life is humming along. And that helps develop the economy, culture, and party work. On the other hand, the Russian Federation for all practical purposes has no access to its own provinces. Each separate province is stewing in its own juice.<sup>18</sup> There can be no question of gathering for some sort of conference within the RSFSR. And there is no higher body that can even call for a party conference within the framework of the republic."

I agreed with him. I said: “You’re right. The Russian Federation has been placed in an unfair situation. It’s operating under conditions that are not equal to those of the other republics, and its interests suffer as a result.”

Zhdanov continued: “I’ve been thinking about this question. Maybe we need to go back to what existed before, to reestablish the Bureau for the Russian Federation? It seems to me that would restore party work to the proper kind of functioning that’s needed in the RSFSR.”

I said: “I think that would be helpful. Even under Lenin there was no party Central Committee for the RSFSR within the USSR. And that was correct, because if the Russian Federation had some sort of central elected party body, as the other republics do, a conflict could arise. The Russian Federation is too large and powerful in terms of the size of its population, industry, and agriculture. Besides, that would mean two Central Committees in Moscow: one for the RSFSR and the other for all the union republics. Lenin was not about to take that step. Evidently he didn’t want to create a dual center; he didn’t want such centers to come into conflict; and he strove for monolithic unity in the political and party leadership. So then, a Central Committee is not necessary for the RSFSR; it’s better to have a Bureau.”

Zhdanov said: “Yes, it would seem to be more expedient to establish a Bureau.”

Zhdanov called me in Kiev before he went on vacation in the Valdai region,<sup>19</sup> where he was going to rest and recuperate [in 1948]. He said: “You were in Moscow, but I didn’t have a chance to talk with you. I have an important question I want to talk about. I’m leaving now, but let’s talk when I get back from the Valdai.” I wished him all the best. And shortly after that I received word that Zhdanov had died. Thus, it remains a mystery for me what he wanted to talk about. He rarely called me in Kiev, just as I rarely called him from Kiev. Mostly there were personnel questions and questions concerning agriculture that came up between us. There was a lot of phone-calling back and forth between Moscow and me, but it was mainly with Malenkov, not with Zhdanov. And now charges were being brought against the “Kuznetsov group” in Leningrad, alleging that they had displayed manifestations of “Russian nationalism” and were trying to counterpose themselves to the union-wide Central Committee. It was something along that line. I don’t remember exactly, and I didn’t see documents. Why did I form that impression? I heard conversations between Malenkov and Beria relating to this, and sometimes conversations in Stalin’s presence. Stalin would ask Malenkov some questions, and their conversation would revolve around this subject.

On one occasion the following conversation came up between Malenkov and me. I was then working on the problem of creating a ministry of the coal industry and the metallurgical industry on the union-republic level in Ukraine. And as my starting point I took the realities that had existed in Lenin's time. When Lenin had still been alive, after the Civil War, a Committee for the Coal Industry had been established in Ukraine. It was headed by an Old Bolshevik, Semyon Shvarts.<sup>20</sup> I was still serving in the Red Army then. We're talking about roughly 1921 or early 1922. When I returned to the mines and began working again at the Rutchenkovo coal pits, Georgy Pyatakov,<sup>21</sup> a prominent political figure and economic expert, was in charge of the coal industry in the Donbas. He was considered a major economist and had an authoritative reputation. Later he was replaced, I don't know exactly for what reasons, but the main reason was of course political, because Pyatakov was one of those closest to Trotsky, and a sharp struggle against Trotsky was going on at the time. Apparently that was a factor in Pyatakov's being replaced and removed from the Donbas. [Vlas] Chubar<sup>22</sup> replaced him there. A lot of political ditties on the events of the day were sung at party conferences then. One of them had these words: "Now the CC sends us Chubar. What do you think will change around here?"

In those days coal was being mined mainly in the Donbas. Its share of total Soviet coal production was about 80 percent. Even today I think a unified administration for the coal industry should be created in Ukraine, returning to what existed under Lenin and immediately after Lenin. There was also an organization in Ukraine called Yugostal [a central administration for the steel industry in the Soviet "south"]. It was headed by [A. V.] Ivanov,<sup>23</sup> also an Old Bolshevik. He was a rather heavy-set fellow. The offices of Yugostal were in Kharkov, and the Committee for the Coal Industry had its offices in Bakhmut, which is now Artyomovsk.<sup>24</sup> Later its offices were also moved to Kharkov, and [Moisei Lvovich] Rukhimovich<sup>25</sup> headed that committee, while Chubar became chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine.

I greatly respected Rukhimovich. He was a remarkable man, a veteran Bolshevik, very simple and accessible, sensible and smart. He often held conferences for officials working in the coal industry, and I always went to those conferences when I was head of the organization department of the party's Stalino district committee. Rukhimovich knew me personally and had a good attitude toward me. Apparently he found me useful because I was working energetically in his region. Besides I was a local person who had grown up among the miners, and knew the conditions of industry both in the mines and at the metallurgical factories.

In the late 1940s I also wanted to establish some sort of Ukrainian structure for coal mining, metallurgy, and rail transport. I went to Moscow, but before signing my documents and giving them to Stalin I decided to consult with Malenkov. I saw that Malenkov was looking at me in a horrified way. His eyes were popping: "What are you saying?" he asked. "What in the world?"

"What's wrong?" I asked him.

"Hide those documents of yours away and don't say anything more about them to anyone. Do you know that such-and-such and such-and-such is going on now in Leningrad? And the main accusation against the Leningraders is that they were displaying local independence. They organized a bazaar on their own initiative in Leningrad and began selling off items that had been sitting on the shelves for a long time."

I didn't see any crime in that, or any manifestation of Russian nationalism. We had done the same thing in Kiev. We had a bazaar where we sold off products that had been lying around unsold, that found no buyers in the stores; we sold them at a discount, with the price marked down. There was a huge amount of all sorts of trash that some people had produced unsupervised after the war. We got rid of it. And here this kind of harmless and even useful activity had apparently been denounced to Stalin in the usual fashion and given a political coloration.

Who was it that did this? Beria and Malenkov, of course. In general it didn't take much to set Stalin off, given his pathological suspiciousness. The tangle of intrigue began to unwind. I don't know concretely how it unwound, but as the saying goes, it unwound all the way to the end. From Stalin's point of view it was necessary to nip "hostile activities" in the bud and for that purpose, above all, to arrest Kuznetsov and Rodionov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation. Besides everything else, they had raised the question of establishing some sort of republicwide bodies that supposedly would function without being subordinated to unionwide bodies. In short, they were accused of counterposing the periphery to the center.

Arrests began. A mass of people in Leningrad were arrested, as well as people the Central Committee had transferred from Leningrad and promoted to positions in other localities. For example in the Crimea the leadership was then made up of former Leningraders, and everyone there was arrested. Voznesensky was relieved of all his duties, because he too was a Leningrader. In general, as the saying goes among the people, a "den of wild beasts" had been discovered. Thus, a conspiratorial nest of Leningraders was concocted, one that was supposedly pursuing anti-Soviet aims. Once again a tragic

situation arose in our country and in our party. This plague of repression could easily be extended to whomever one wished.

A thought occurs to me now. Wasn't the letter that Stalin gave me to read something that had been fabricated on Beria's orders and by his agents in order to frighten Stalin with the idea that not only in Leningrad but in Moscow too there were conspirators? Stalin decided to summon me then, so that I would head up the Moscow party organization. And what if it is true that after acquainting myself with the letter, I put a stop to the whole affair as far as Muscovites were concerned when I confidently told Stalin that these were imaginary charges thought up by scoundrels or the hallucinations of madmen? If that's true, then I turned out to be the barrier that prevented widespread arrests in Moscow. If it hadn't been for that, I don't know how many heads would have rolled in Moscow among those active in the party and in economic management.

Actually, to a certain extent, this process had already begun in the capital city. When I returned to Moscow [from Ukraine] major arrests had been made among the staff at the Stalin Auto Plant.<sup>26</sup> An assistant to [Ivan Alekseyevich] Likhachev, director of the Stalin Auto Plant, was said to be head of a "conspiratorial organization of American spies." I don't remember his name now, but I knew this man personally. He was a slender, frail-looking Jewish fellow.<sup>27</sup>

I got to know him accidentally. I met Likhachev one day and asked him how he was doing. "I'm working," he said, "but I don't feel very well."

"You ought to come visit us in Kiev and have a vacation. It's nice where we are. Come whenever you like. I'll always be glad to see you. We'll arrange things for you and you'll have a good vacation."

"All right," he replied, "I'll take you up on that invitation." Then one day he called: "Can I come visit? I'd like to bring my assistant along."

"Come right along, with your assistant. Please! Bring whoever you like." I arranged things for them and they had a good vacation in Kiev.

Likhachev and his assistant often came to visit at my apartment or came out to my country place on weekends or days off. That was how I happened to know his assistant. He was an ordinary person who diligently sought to carry out Likhachev's orders. I never dreamed that he was what they called him later—the head of the American Zionists through whom all Zionist activity in the Soviet Union was organized. He was arrested and confessed. Of course I know how it was that people "confessed" to being British spies, agents of Hitler, and so on. These weren't confessions; it was extortion; statements were forced out of people—statements that were needed by those pursuing their own selfish aims.

Likhachev too was implicated in this case. At that time, as I recall, Likhachev was minister of auto transport. Stalin assigned three of us—Beria, Malenkoy, and me—to interrogate Likhachev. We summoned Likhachev and began to question him. It was painful for me to see this, but I couldn't do anything because the charges were based on "documentary evidence," the "confessions" of people who had worked with Likhachev. That was considered irrefutable evidence. We interrogated him on the third floor of a building used for sessions of the Bureau of the USSR Council of Ministers. Lenin's office had been there previously, and Lenin's desk and chair were still there. Even today, as far as I know, that chair is still kept in a corner of that room, cordoned off behind black ribbon.

When the charges against him were presented to Likhachev, he began to say something in his defense, then cried out and fell over in a faint. Water was poured on him, he was brought back to his senses, and then he was sent home because it was impossible to question him further. We told Stalin everything that had happened. Stalin listened, looked at us, and cursed Likhachev. Previously his attitude toward Likhachev had been very good. He used to call him Likhach, which means "bold, dashing fellow." Stalin had taken Likhachev from Sergo Ordzhonikidze. Likhachev had been one of Sergo's favorites. And Sergo had always called him Likhach. So Stalin also called him that. Apparently Stalin's favorable attitude from that previous time had its effect, and Likhachev was left in peace. He returned to work and outlived Stalin.

But reprisals were taken against others from the ZIS plant. The inquisition was led by Abakumov,<sup>28</sup> who was minister of state security (head of the MGB). And after all, if Abakumov personally was in charge of the case, everyone confessed quickly to being inveterate enemies of the Soviet Union. And they were all shot. That was the kind of atmosphere that existed in Moscow when I came there from Ukraine for the second time. Stalin was already getting old. His suspiciousness began to develop more and more, and he became more dangerous than ever. We no longer viewed him as we had in earlier years, when "enemies of the people" were being exposed, when we thought that he could see through walls and through cast iron, that he could see through everything. Our former confidence in him had already been shaken. But after the defeat of Hitler a halo of glory and genius remained around Stalin's head.

I remember the days when Voznesensky, who had been relieved of his former duties, still came to the dinners at Stalin's home. The man I saw was no longer the one I had known earlier: a man who was smart, abrupt, direct,

and bold. It was his boldness that did him in. Because he often clashed with Beria when he was drawing up the latest plan for the national economy. Beria had many people's commissariats that were directly under him, and he demanded a lion's share of the resources for those commissariats, but Voznesensky as the representative of the State Planning Commission wanted to see the country develop evenly and in a balanced way. It was not so much he, but the country itself, that was unable to satisfy the demands of the commissariats under Beria's control. But it was not the commissariats that took action against Voznesensky; it was Beria.

As a man who was close to Stalin, Beria had vast opportunities. You had to know Beria to see what he was like, to understand his craftiness and jesuitical qualities. He could bide his time and choose the right moment to submit something to Stalin that was favorable or unfavorable for someone else. It all depended on Beria's own interests, and he made skillful use of his opportunities.

The man who was sitting with us at dinner at Stalin's place was no longer Voznesensky, but a shadow of his former self. Although Voznesensky had been relieved of his responsibilities, Stalin still seemed to be hesitating; he still believed in Voznesensky's honesty.

I remember more than once he would address Malenkov and Beria, saying: "So what is this, you still haven't given any assignment to Voznesensky? He's not doing anything? He should be given some work. What are you dawdling for?"

They would answer: "We're thinking about it."

Some time would go by, and Stalin would again say: "Why haven't you given him any assignment? Maybe he should be assigned to the State Bank? He's an economist and a financial expert; he knows about that. Let him head up the State Bank." Nobody objected, but time still went by and these proposals were not implemented.

In earlier times Stalin would not have tolerated such impertinence. He would immediately have forced Molotov or Malenkov to pick up a pencil and take down an order or resolution that he dictated, as he usually did, and he would have signed it right there and then. Now he only said: "Give him an assignment. Give him one." But nobody did anything. Things ended with Voznesensky being arrested. What charges were brought against him directly, what served as the final pretext, to this day I don't know. Evidently Beria foisted off some new material against Voznesensky, and thus when "the cup had overflowed" Stalin ordered him arrested.



Beria was able to organize this from several different directions. Through party channels Malenkov brought material in, and through the state security channels Abakumov did the same. But the source for all the different versions was Beria, an intelligent and capable person and a resourceful organizer. He was capable of anything! And he needed not only to remove Voznesensky from the Council of Ministers. He was afraid that Stalin might restore him to that body, and so Beria pursued the aim of destroying Voznesensky altogether, doing away with him entirely and burying him so that there could be no question of Voznesensky's return. As a result of such intrigues Voznesensky was arrested. An investigation began. Who was the director? Stalin of course. But the first violin was in the hands of Beria; he was in charge of the immediate business of "working the person over." Even though Stalin thought he personally was in charge of everything.

Why do I say this? Because Abakumov was a man who had been trained by Beria. Stalin appointed him to be head of state security when Beria was relieved of those duties so that he could concentrate his attention on the USSR Council of Ministers. Stalin wanted the Ministry of State Security to report all matters directly to him, and Abakumov did report to him personally. It's possible that Stalin didn't know it, but I'm convinced that Abakumov never brought a single question before Stalin without asking Beria how he should present it. Beria gave the orders, and Abakumov reported without referring to Beria, obtaining Stalin's approval in the process.

The atmosphere of political intrigue grew thicker. It was assumed that in our government serious political questions were discussed either by the Politburo or the Council of Ministers. That kind of discussion was necessary in order to avoid major mistakes. But there was not even a hint of such a thing. No sessions of either body were held. The members of the Politburo gathered at Stalin's place and simply listened to his orders. And he handed out his orders strictly off the cuff. Sometimes he would listen to others if he liked what they were saying, or else he might growl at them and immediately, without consulting anyone, formulate the text of a resolution of the Central Committee or Council of Ministers all on his own, and after that the document would be published. This is an extreme form of rule by a single individual. It was completely arbitrary rule. I don't even know what to call it, but it's a fact that that's the way things were.

I remember that Stalin many times brought up the question of Shakhurin, who was still in prison. [Aleksandr Aleksandrovich] Novikov,<sup>29</sup> the former chief marshal of the air force, was also in prison. He too had



been jailed after the war for accepting “airplanes of poor quality,” that is, in connection with the same case concerning the aircraft industry.

I knew Novikov personally. He had commanded our air force virtually throughout the war. I can say something about his shortcomings. He drank more than he should. But he was an honorable man, devoted to his homeland; he himself was a pilot and he knew his business. Apparently a little worm of doubt, or a recollection of his former good attitude toward Shakhurin and Novikov, stirred within Stalin. He looked at Beria and Malenkov and said: “What are they in prison for—Novikov and Shakhurin? It might be worthwhile to release them.” It was as though he was thinking out loud. Of course no one said anything in reply. Everyone was afraid of saying something wrong, and the matter ended there. A little while later Stalin brought it up again: “Think about it. Maybe they should be released? What are they in jail for? They can still do good work.” He was addressing Malenkov and Beria because they were in charge of this matter.

When we left Stalin’s presence, I heard some remarks tossed back and forth between Malenkov and Beria, and I heard Beria say: “Stalin himself has brought up the question of these aviators. If they are released, it could spread to others as well.” The conversation was being held in the bathroom where we gathered to wash our hands before and after dinner and sometimes exchanged opinions. It was a spacious bathroom, and we sometimes gathered there before sessions and after sessions. Before the sessions we would talk about what was to come, and after dinner we would discuss how the meal had gone and what the consequences were.

When I thought about this incident, I began to wonder what “others” Beria was talking about. Apparently he was afraid that if Shakhurin and Novikov were released, Stalin might return to the question of Kuznetsov and Voznesensky, who had not yet been tried. Both Beria and Malenkov were afraid of this. The entire “Leningrad affair” might then be called into question. Nevertheless, they were apparently agreeable to releasing Shakhurin and Novikov because those men did not stand as obstacles in the path of Malenkov or Beria. Of course Malenkov was afraid to say anything about Shakhurin and Novikov because Malenkov had also been accused in that case. After all, he had been in charge of the commissariat of the aircraft industry and had permitted many “poor-quality aircraft” to be produced, and as a result we had lost some of our best air force personnel during the war.

Stalin never talked with me about the “Leningrad affair,” and I have never heard that he outlined his point of view on this matter in detail anywhere. He touched on the subject only once when he summoned me from Ukraine

to transfer to Moscow and talked with me about the so-called Moscow conspirators. In spite of everything Malenkov and Beria never did allow Shakhurin and Novikov to be released. Consequently, the people arrested in the “Leningrad affair” were also not released. Not knowing the details of this affair, I assume that my signature might appear in the investigative materials relating to the case.

It often happened that when a case had been concluded, Stalin, if he thought it necessary, would sign a paper right in the middle of a Politburo session and pass it around for others to sign, and the others without looking, but simply relying on the information from Stalin, would also sign. In this way a collective sentence against the accused would come into being. Of course in the “Leningrad affair,” if previous practices in the struggle against “enemies of the people” are any indication, an extensive legal procedure was followed. Not only did the investigators conduct their investigations, but also the procurator came [to oversee the “correctness” of the procedures]; then a trial was organized where the active members of the Leningrad party organization were invited, the defendants were cross-examined at the trial, and then they were given a chance to make a final statement. Well, what of it? Had things really been any different in the show trials of the 1930s?

Stalin was told (I was present when this happened) that when it was announced to Voznesensky that he would face a death sentence, he made a great long speech. In this speech he cursed Leningrad, saying that Saint Petersburg had been the scene of every possible kind of reactionary conspiracy—starting with Biron<sup>30</sup> and coming up through the followers of Zinoviev. He cursed the fact that he himself had ended up in Leningrad. He had been a student there, but by birth he was from the Donbas.<sup>31</sup> He cursed the day that he had come to Leningrad. Evidently this man had already lost his ability to think normally and was saying absurd things.

Of course Leningrad was not the issue. And what did the Zinovievites have to do with it? In the 1920s the political struggle had been based on entirely different foundations. There were conflicting points of view on the road that should be taken for socialist construction in the USSR. It was possible to take one point of view or another. I, among others, had taken Stalin’s point of view and had fought against Zinoviev. As for Biron, that was a different era altogether. These were terms and concepts that didn’t fit together at all.

I don’t remember what Kuznetsov was supposed to have said in his final statement, or the other Leningraders, but no matter what they said, they had in fact been sentenced to death much earlier, before the trial made it official

and before the sentence was officially signed. They were sentenced to death by Stalin even before they had been arrested. Many people perished in Leningrad itself and in other places to which people from Leningrad had gone to work. Kosygin's life also hung by a thread. Stalin distributed the confessions of the arrested Leningraders to the other members of the Politburo, and a great deal was said there about Kosygin. It seems that Kuznetsov was related to Kosygin. Their wives were blood relations of some sort. Thus wedges had been driven deep under Kosygin as well. He was relieved of his former duties and was given an assignment in one of the ministries. Earlier he had been close to Stalin, but suddenly things took this ugly turn, and the "confessions" implicating Kosygin were phrased in such heavy, dark colors that even now I can't understand how he survived or why Stalin didn't order him arrested. Undoubtedly Kosygin was interrogated and he wrote out statements. The most absurd accusations—all kinds of nonsense—were brought against him. But as the saying goes, Kosygin drew a lucky ticket and the cup passed from him.

This could have happened with any of us. Everything depended on what Stalin's view of you was or what might strike him at any particular moment. Sometimes he would say: "Why aren't you looking at me today? Your eyes keep darting around." Or something along those lines. And all that would be said with such viciousness! An intelligent investigator would not behave that way even with a confirmed criminal; yet this kind of thing was said at the dinner table, supposedly among friends. We would be sitting there eating, and suddenly people would be awarded with insulting remarks like these—people he himself had invited to his table, people he was having a conversation with. That's the kind of painful and difficult time it was.

1. Yaroslav Alekseyevich Galan (Vladimir Rosovich; 1902–49) was a Lvov publicist, a member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (CPWU) from 1924, and the author of antifascist and anticlerical pamphlets and plays. He was assassinated on October 24, 1949.

2. The "Leningrad affair," which Khrushchev discusses at length in this part of his memoirs, began with widespread arrests of party officials in and from Leningrad in 1949 and culminated in the 1950 trial and execution of such leading figures as Nikolai Alekseyevich Voznesensky, head of the State Planning Commission; Aleksei Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (he had helped lead the defense of Leningrad against the German invaders and headed the Leningrad party organization in 1945–46); and

Mikhail Ivanovich Rodionov, prime minister of the Russian Federation. Their alleged conspiratorial activities included promoting "Russian nationalism" and trying to turn the provinces against the central government. [GS] For a recent analysis of the Leningrad affair, based on newly accessible archival sources, see Benjamin Tromly, "The Leningrad Affair and Soviet Patronage Politics, 1949–1950," *Europe-Asia Studies* 56, 5 (July 2004): 707–29. [SS]

3. Wanda Wasilewska (1905–64) was a Polish writer who moved to Ukraine in 1939, after the beginning of World War II. (The patronymic "Lvovna," meaning daughter of Leon, was added to her name by Khrushchev. In Russian culture, this form of address, using a first name and patronymic, is meant to express politeness and warmth. The patronymic is not used in Polish

culture.) Aleksandr Korneichuk (1905–72) was a Ukrainian playwright, writer, and journalist and Wasilewska's husband. For more on Wasilewska and Korneichuk, see Biographies and also the chapters “The Beginning of the Second World War” and “Forward to Victory!” in Vol. 1 of these memoirs and the chapter on Poland in Vol. 3 (forthcoming). [GS/SS]

4. Georgy Mikhailovich Popov. See Biographies.

5. Leonid Georgyevich Melnikov. See Biographies.

6. Kuibyshev (until 1935 and since 1991, Samara) was an industrial city on the Volga River. The Soviet government was based there during the first two years of the war. According to the *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (*Great Soviet Encyclopedia*), 3d ed., Popov was director of a factory in Kuibyshev from 1951 to 1953. [GS/SS]

7. Colonel Yuri Gagarin, the first man in space, died on March 27, 1968. See Biographies.

8. Aleksei Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov. See Biographies.

9. Mikhail Ivanovich Rodionov. See Biographies.

10. After serving as the top party official in Gorky (formerly and currently Nizhny Novgorod) from 1924 to 1934, Zhdanov became head of the party's Leningrad province committee, following the assassination of Kirov (December 1934). Zhdanov retained his ties with the city of Gorky and served as a bridge, or connecting link, between party officials promoted from both cities. This led to arrests of people in and from Gorky at the time of the Leningrad affair. See Biographies. [SK/GS]

11. Nikolai Alekseyevich Voznesensky. See Biographies.

12. Aleksei Ivanovich Shakhurin. See Biographies.

13. Pyotr Vasilyevich Demytyev. See Biographies.

14. Stalin's son Vasily was a pilot in the air force. Though dissolute and a drunkard, thanks to his father's position he rose to the rank of Guards major general and commander of the 286th air division. [SS]

15. On March 8, 1946, Malenkov became a member of the Politburo, Organizational Bureau, and Secretariat of the AUCP(B) Central Committee. On April 13, the commander of the Soviet air force, Marshal Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Novikov, and the minister of the aviation industry, Aleksei Ivanovich Shakhurin, were arrested after being denounced by Stalin's son Vasily for the poor quality of airplanes produced during the war. (Vasily Stalin had served as a pilot in the air force.) Malenkov, who was responsible for overseeing the aircraft industry, “fell from the CC Secretariat,” as he himself put it at the Plenum of the CC CPSU held June 22–28, 1957 (*Molotov. Malenkov. Kaganovich, 1957: Dokumenty* [Moscow: Mezhdunarodny fond “Demokratiya,” 1998], 491).

In the middle of April, Malenkov lost Stalin's confidence. He was not invited to Stalin's dinners,

and on May 4, 1946, he was removed from the Politburo. On May 13, 1946, by a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, he was appointed chairman of the Special Committee for Jet-Engine Technology. On June 10, he was appointed chairman of the Commission on Radar, and on August 2, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, as well as deputy chairman of the Operational Bureau of the USSR Council of Ministers. (This bureau was headed by Beria.)

Vladimir Shamberg, at that time Malenkov's son-in-law, who lived with him at his state residence, told me that from the middle of April until May 13 Malenkov stayed at his dacha near Moscow “not receiving any official mail, not going to his office, just waiting for his arrest.” Rumors about Malenkov's fate spread in Moscow. According to one rumor, he had been exiled to Central Asia. Khrushchev did not meet Malenkov at Stalin's place. He could not inquire about Malenkov, as this would have been too dangerous. He believed the rumor and later repeated it in his memoirs. The rumor was also widely accepted as fact in Russian and foreign literature. No supporting evidence for it has been found in the archives.

According to the historian R. G. Pikhoya, Malenkov's personal secretariat began to function again on October 5, 1946 (*Sovetsky Soyuz: Istoriya vlasti, 1945–1991* [The Soviet Union: History of Political Power, 1945–91] [Moscow: Izdatelstvo RAGS, 1998], 45–47, 58–59). [SK]

16. See Biographies.

17. Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov. See Biographies.

18. In Russian the idiom “to stew in one's own juice” actually means “to be left to one's own resources,” being deprived of the opportunity to interact, collaborate, confer with others. [GS]

19. The Valdai uplands and lakes are about halfway between Moscow and Leningrad. [SS]

20. Semyon (Isaak) Izrail'yevich Shvarts. See Biographies.

21. Yuri (Georgy) Leonidovich Pyatakov. See Biographies.

22. Vlas Yakovlevich Chubar. See Biographies.

23. Andrei Vasilyevich Ivanov. See Biographies.

24. Bakhmut (Artyomovsk) is in the Donbas, to the north of Donetsk. [GS]

25. Moisei Lvovich Rukhimovich. See Biographies.

26. The Russian name of this plant was Zavod imeni Stalina, giving the initials ZIS, an abbreviation also for cars made at this plant. Similarly, the ZIL was a car made at the Zavod imeni Likhacheva, the Likhachev Auto Plant. [GS]

27. The person to whom Khrushchev refers here is Aleksei (Aron) Filipovich Eidinov (1908–50). He was an aide to Ivan Alekseyevich Likhachev. He had worked at the Engineering Stock Company (Russian abbreviation AMO) since 1930. (This was the same factory that was renamed the

Stalin Auto Plant in 1934. [SS]) He was arrested in 1950 at ATE-2 (a branch of the Stalin Factory that supplied it with electrical equipment) and executed. See Biographies.

28. Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov. See Biographies.

29. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Novikov. See Biographies.

30. Count Ernst-Johann Biron (Bühren) (1690–1772), from the Baltic German nobility in the Russian empire, had been an influential favorite of the Empress Anna Ioanovna (who reigned from

1730 to 1740). Under Biron's harsh leadership in the imperial capital of Saint Petersburg a so-called German party, according to popular legend, had carried out many cruel reprisals against Russians; several thousand were executed and twenty to thirty thousand exiled to Siberia. The Empress's favorite, Biron, became the hated symbol of this period in the 1730s. [GS]

31. Actually, Voznesensky was born in Tula, but he was a party official in the Donbas in the late 1920s, before his transfer to Leningrad. [GS]

### SOME COMMENTS ON CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS

Shcherbakov<sup>1</sup> also took a hand in these unpleasant matters. In this connection I want to recall an episode involving Shcherbakov, who had a reputation as a “capable builder” of the Red Army, although how he ended up in the illustrious cohort of such builders is anybody's guess. During the period of our retreats along the front lines of the war, especially in early 1942, many critical articles were printed in which shortcomings of the Red Army were brought to light and specific instances of retreat were criticized. In particular, Aleksandr Petrovich Dovzhenko,<sup>2</sup> a remarkable film director and a good writer on current affairs, came out with some very sharply critical articles at that time. He had a clear mind and he swung a sharp pen. And so his articles were scathing, and they met with approval and praise from Stalin. In 1943 he wrote a screenplay entitled *Ukraine in Flames*. It was a very impressive screenplay. He took most of the episodes for the screenplay from his own articles. The very title, *Ukraine in Flames*, attracted attention. It really was true that all of Ukraine was in flames then. The author was unstinting in his critical remarks about the Red Army. In particular, he criticized those who were responsible for military preparations, demonstrating that the military preparedness of the Red Army had not measured up to the requirements of modern warfare.

Dovzhenko presented his screenplay to the party's Central Committee. I was familiar with the text. Also, Malenkov and some others had read it, but I don't remember now exactly who. Dovzhenko wanted it published so that he

could later make a film based on it. When Stalin summoned me to Moscow on one occasion he asked me: "Have you read Dovzhenko's screenplay?"

I said: "Yes." Actually I hadn't read the whole thing, but had listened while Dovzhenko read it to me. This happened at a time of great tension for me: heavy fighting was going on, and I really couldn't concentrate on the text as he read it. It was at the beginning of the German offensive against the Kursk salient, in July 1943. My thoughts were preoccupied with the course of the battle three-quarters of the time. Dovzhenko sometimes said to me: "Well, I took this passage from such-and-such an article of mine, and this other passage from some other article." It seemed to me a sharply worded piece that corresponded to the needs of the time and told the truth about our weaknesses.

So then, Stalin had summoned me and asked: "Are you familiar with this screenplay?" I told him the circumstances under which I had become familiar with it. Stalin thought I was just making an excuse; he began to criticize the text. He gave Dovzhenko such a verbal thrashing that I was surprised. Formerly Stalin's attitude toward this author had been very positive; he had praised and supported him, despite the fact that we had previously encountered some people who were suspicious of Dovzhenko or openly accused him of Ukrainian nationalism and other sins. It was the fashion then to hunt for such defects, both actual and nonexistent, in regard to virtually every cultural figure of Ukrainian nationality. Kaganovich also made his little contribution to this during the time of his activity in Ukraine. He even declared that every Ukrainian was a potential nationalist. There's a stupidity for you!

One evening Stalin invited me to his place. Shcherbakov also came. There began a round of critical discussion of the screenplay. At that point I understood what was up. Malenkov held his tongue, even though he knew the screenplay and had given it his blessing. As I recall, he used to receive Dovzhenko as a visitor to his office. Shcherbakov made a speech like a prosecutor, stirring up the wrath of Stalin and denouncing Dovzhenko's work as one of "extreme nationalism," one that supposedly challenged all the foundations of the Soviet system. Stalin became furious. I'm not going to talk about myself in this connection. But knowing what Stalin was like, people will understand what I was forced to go through in this instance. Stalin didn't limit himself to criticism. He proposed that I summon a number of Ukrainian leaders, members of the government, and secretaries of the Central Committee in charge of propaganda, and in addition, Korneichuk, Bazhan, Tychina, and, as I recall, Rylsky.<sup>3</sup> Dovzhenko was also present at this gathering. Stalin blasted

Dovzhenko to bits. Dovzhenko's future in the world of arts was literally hanging by a thread, and there was a danger of even worse. Stalin suggested to me that, on the basis of this "exchange of opinions," a resolution be drafted concerning the unfavorable state of affairs on the ideological front in Ukraine.

We of the Ukrainian leadership drew up a resolution, and two or three days later we went to see Stalin. We had done everything ourselves. No one else from among the members of the Central Committee took part in this—only we of the Ukrainian leadership were involved. We submitted the resolution to Stalin, in the presence of numerous others, a broad and varied group, and he looked over the draft resolution. To my great relief he said: "Yes, good, this is quite acceptable. Have it adopted!" Of course the resolution criticized us very sharply. But the good thing was that we had written it ourselves: we gave ourselves a whipping, as the saying goes, but we did it in a way that wouldn't be too painful. And the resolution was adopted. Shcherbakov felt that he was in seventh heaven. For a long, long time after that I had to choke over that piece of writing by Dovzhenko. On every appropriate occasion Shcherbakov would maliciously stir Stalin up by reminding him about the screenplay.

I have been told that when Maxim Gorky was head of the executive board of the Union of Soviet Writers, Shcherbakov was installed as Gorky's secretary, and that Shcherbakov occupied himself with questions of ideology, so that all of Gorky's work as head of the Writers' Union would be steered in a particular direction. But Gorky was not the kind of man Shcherbakov could boss around. Things ended up with Gorky demanding Shcherbakov's removal. That's just one indication of the poisonous, viperlike nature of Shcherbakov.

I first got to know him in 1942 when he became head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Red Army. His daily activity essentially came down to this: he would extract information, by fair means or foul, on the course of the day's combat operations and, taking advantage of the fact that he had wormed his way into Stalin's confidence, would submit this information earlier than the operations department of the General Staff. Yet strictly speaking, this was exclusively a function that the operations department was supposed to perform. (Shcherbakov had even established a special bureau for the purpose of obtaining such information.) Thus Shcherbakov succeeded in placing all the personnel at the operations department in a position of dependence on him. Soon there began the phase of victory after victory for our side on the front lines. The liberation of Soviet cities and the successful advance of our troops—all the information about such things was presented first of all to Stalin by Shcherbakov. His aim was to make sure that he would



get the credit for it all. It sounds ridiculous today, but that's precisely how things were back then. I judge Shcherbakov according to his merits, with my judgment being a very negative one. Of course, all in all, the one chiefly to blame was Stalin. He created the circumstances in which this kind of thing became possible.

As for Dovzhenko, it was as though he had been placed in the bottom of a deep, cold well. He became depressed and moody. The former favorable attitude toward him had changed. In fact, he was very much out of favor. This of course had an effect on his work. It made me sad just to look at him, but there was nothing I could do, because I was being criticized then even more harshly than Dovzhenko. And that bad situation [for Dovzhenko] continued almost to the time of Stalin's death. Later we restored Dovzhenko to his former eminent position, as he deserved, and encouraged his useful functioning as much as possible. He began making movies again, and after his death his wife, Solntseva,<sup>4</sup> produced a very good film based on the screenplay mentioned above. I was genuinely pleased when I saw the film. It truly conveyed Dovzhenko's spirit. I considered him an honest, devoted, and forthright individual. Sometimes he might say things unpleasant for the leaders to hear. But that is a good thing, after all, because it's better to hear everything from an honest person than from an enemy. You can explain things to a friend if he's wrong. Or if he makes a correct observation, you can take that into account. After Dovzhenko's death I recommended to the Ukrainians: "You should name the Kiev film studio in honor of Dovzhenko because he did a great deal for the development of the film industry in Soviet Ukraine. He did a lot of work in that sphere, and without doubt his name is the one that most of all deserves to be emblazoned on the banner of the Kiev film studio." And that's what they did.

Here is another feature characteristic of Dovzhenko. After Beria was arrested, Dovzhenko asked if he could see me, and when he came he told me the following story: "I wanted you to know about a fact that has preoccupied me a great deal. The film director Chiaureli,<sup>5</sup> who made the film *The Fall of Berlin*, once invited me to come see him" [in 1953]. This film director had the personal support of Stalin and Beria. It was no accident that he had made a film in which Stalin did the main work of the Stavka in a room full of empty chairs. Only Stalin is present in the scene except that Poskrebyshv is with him, the head of the Central Committee's secret department. This is a bootlicker's idea of art! I will say, for my own part, that after Stalin's death and the arrest of Beria we suggested to Chiaureli that he should leave Moscow. He went off to some remote location and continued his work [at



the Ural Film Studio in Sverdlovsk]. I don't know what position he occupies in the art world nowadays and to what extent he might have drawn correct conclusions from the things that were pointed out to him.

Dovzhenko continued his story: "Chiaureli said to me: 'Comrade Dovzhenko, I would advise you to drop in to see Comrade Beria. Beria is very interested in you. It will be to your advantage to visit him and hear what he has to say.' Why did he suggest this to me? I never went to visit Beria because I never had any questions relating to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Why would I go there?"

I said to Dovzhenko: "He was trying to send you there to become an agent of Beria's. He understood correctly that you were an influential figure both in Ukraine and in the world of the arts. They would have made you an ally in the actions that Beria was planning to take in Ukraine in order to claim support from you as well as others in carrying out these operations. These operations couldn't have been anything but bloody because those were the only methods Beria ever entertained."

As for Shcherbakov, he continued his reprehensible activities. I don't know to what extent he was organically inclined toward heavy drinking. I don't think he himself liked doing it. But since it was pleasing to Stalin, he personally chugged down many a strong drink. And to please Stalin, he drew others with him into the habit of heavy drinking. I remember one incident in particular. Beria, Malenkov, and Mikoyan had made an arrangement with the young women who served the wine. They were to bring them bottles of "wine" into which they had actually poured water slightly colored with wine or juice. This way fluid of the right color would appear in the wine glass. If the wine was white, there'd be white fluid; if the wine was red, red fluid. But it was simply water and they drank it. But Shcherbakov exposed them. He poured himself some "wine" from one of those bottles, tried it, and shouted: "Hey, they're not drinking wine!" Stalin was furious that they were trying to deceive him, and he made things hot for Beria, Malenkov, and Mikoyan. All of us were angry with Shcherbakov because we didn't want to drink all that wine. We drank to get Stalin off our backs, but we wanted to keep it down to the minimum so as not to ruin our health and not become drunkards. Shcherbakov also suffered from this situation. But he was a malicious bootlicker. Not only did he lick Stalin's boots himself but he encouraged others to do so as well. This all ended rather sadly. Beria was right when he said at the time that Shcherbakov died because he drank so terribly much. He drank too much and killed himself.

Stalin spoke otherwise. He said that Shcherbakov had been a fool; that he was beginning to get better [after a heart attack or stroke], was regaining his health, but refused to listen to the doctor's warnings and died at night committing "excesses" with his wife. But we knew that he died from drinking too much in an effort to please Stalin and not because of any insatiable urge of his own for wine. I am left with the most unpleasant impression of this man. He was not a decent man and he was capable of anything. He had no conscience, not the slightest drop. He would do anything to promote himself and was ready to do in anyone else, whoever you please. But Stalin liked this. He liked to set us against one another, and he encouraged and strengthened Shcherbakov's baser inclinations.

When I went back to Moscow to work, it was a great honor of course to function directly under Stalin's leadership and to interact with him in person. I would say that this was also useful for our work. After all, we did receive much that was helpful from Stalin because he was a major political figure. Things came out especially well when he was in a healthy and sober frame of mind. At such times he gave the people around him a great deal of helpful advice and direction. To tell the truth, I had a high regard for him and great respect. But I suffered more in Moscow than in Ukraine, where I was not immediately within reach, so to speak.

Almost every evening the phone rang: "C'mon over, we'll have dinner." Those were dreadful dinners. We would get home toward dawn, and yet we had to go to work. I would try to reach the office by 10:00 A.M. and during the lunch break take a nap because there was always the danger that if you didn't sleep and he called you again to come to dinner you would end up dozing off at his table. Things went badly for people who dozed off at Stalin's table.

It was simply unbelievable what Stalin would do sometimes. He would throw tomatoes at dinner. For example, during the war when we were sitting in a bomb shelter. I personally saw this happen. When we came to see him on military matters, after our report, he invariably invited us to go down to his bomb shelter. Dinner would begin, and it would often end with fruits and vegetables being thrown around. Sometimes at the ceiling and the walls, either by hand or with forks and spoons. This made me angry. How could this man, the leader of our country and an intelligent person, drink himself into such a state and allow himself to do such things? Almost all the commanders of the Fronts, who are now marshals of the Soviet Union, also went through this painful experience and observed this shameful spectacle. This kind of thing began in 1943 and continued later. This was at a time when

Stalin had regained his former proud bearing and felt assured that we would win the war. Previously he had gone around looking as bedraggled as a soaked chicken. I don't recall such dinners with heavy drinking back at that earlier time. He was so depressed and downcast that it was pitiful to look at him.

Here is another incident that helps to characterize Stalin. But this is from a different angle. After the war, things were improving quickly in Ukraine. Our republic restored agriculture and industry, and Stalin's attitude toward the Ukrainian leadership improved accordingly, including toward me as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U. At one point an argument flared up about a tractor factory. Mikoyan was reporting about a diesel tractor called KD-35, which was being produced in Belorussia. It was a good tractor, but expensive. Mikoyan praised it. Stalin asked my opinion and I also praised it. Actually, I saw that not all the kinks had been worked out with this tractor and that it was not very powerful, despite its diesel engine. The fact that the tractor had a diesel engine and therefore used less expensive fuel helped to win Stalin's support. Suddenly the thought occurred to him (or was whispered in his ear by someone) that it would be a good thing to switch other factories over to production of these diesel tractors. And he proposed first of all that the Kharkov tractor factory switch over to production of these tractors.

I tried to demonstrate convincingly that this was not advisable. Akopov,<sup>6</sup> the people's commissar for the tractor industry, also spoke against the idea and provided me with the necessary figures to support my argument. But Stalin was implacable and had his idea written up as a resolution of the Politburo.

However, this idea was unpopular with the other members of the Politburo, too, and they all took the same position as Akopov and I. That included Beria, a thing that rarely happened. There was a lot of heated arguing before Stalin imposed his resolution.

Some time later Stalin remembered his idea and asked: "How about it? Has the Kharkov factory been switched over to production of the KD-35?" I said: "No, it has not." He flew into a terrible rage and made an ugly scene. Akopov was reprimanded for not carrying out an order of the Politburo. At this point Beria, Malenkov, and Mikoyan threw up their hands. Their attitude was that since this was what Stalin wanted, there was nothing you could do.

I, on the other hand, continued to fight. Once when Stalin was on vacation in Sochi, he invited me there from Ukraine and I went. Malenkov was already

there, and later Beria and Molotov arrived. Stalin again raised the question of this tractor, and he chewed me out thoroughly, up one side and down the other, as the saying goes. But I argued with him as follows: “Comrade Stalin, don’t do this. It will be harmful. Look, the KD-35 has 35 horsepower, but at the Kharkov tractor factory we’re now producing tractors with 54 horsepower. We’re producing 100 tractors a day. If we switch over to this other model, we’ll be starting from scratch and we’ll lose a lot of time. And after all, we have a shortage of tractors. This will undermine agriculture and lower the productivity of labor. Today one tractor driver is operating with 54 horsepower, but then he’ll switch over and be operating with only 35. A tractor with 54 horsepower can pull five plowshares at a time, but the other tractor can only, in the best of cases, pull three plowshares or maybe only two. The productivity of labor during the plowing season will be reduced by a factor of two or more.” But Stalin remained adamant.

Beria and Malenkov whispered to me: “Don’t be so stubborn. Why are you asking for trouble? You can see for yourself it’s no use.” But I stuck to my opinion. And here’s what’s interesting (which is also typical of Stalin): he was a man who could do a lot of damage in a fit of temper. But when you demonstrated that you were right, and if you had solid facts to present, in the end he would realize that a person was sticking up for what was the most useful thing and he would support you. For me it turned out to be a surprise what happened when Stalin returned to Moscow that fall, and I also came to Moscow from Kiev. We met. I saw that Stalin was in a good mood. He was pacing around his office as always. We all took our seats; each in the usual place. Suddenly he said: “Well, what do you say, boys?” (It was only in exceptional cases that he used this term [*rebyata* in Russian].) “Maybe we can make a concession to this devil over here,” and he pointed at me.

The informal way he was talking indicated that he was favorably disposed toward the person he was pointing at. He went on: “Let’s make a concession to him on the question of the tractors.”

Later I said to him: “Comrade Stalin, you are doing a good thing. We would have been deprived of thousands of tractors, because in fact the Kharkov factory would have stopped making any during the switchover.”

Yes, there were such instances when if you persistently argued your case and he became convinced that you were right, he would back off from his own point of view and accept the point of view of the person he was talking with. This of course is a positive quality. But unfortunately you can count on your fingers the number of times this happened. More often, if Stalin

said something, whether it made sense or not, whether it was useful or harmful, he would force people to do it, no matter what, and they did it!

Some present-day supporters of Stalin consider this a good quality in a leader. For my part I contend that it is a bad quality. Today when I am recording my memoirs and trying to remember the most vivid moments from the past, I also recall those that had a harmful effect on the life of our society. I am not talking about the positive things in the life of the USSR, because that side of things has been described quite well in our press, even though perhaps with too much embellishment. In and of itself the development of our Soviet state and the victory of socialism in the USSR attest to this positive aspect of things. If we look back over the path we have traveled during the past fifty years, if we look at what we were and what we have become, then everything is clear.

There are different evaluations of the path we have traveled. Some people literally think that all our victories should be credited to Stalin. Yes, Stalin deserves credit for our victories, and great credit at that. But really our people as a whole achieved these successes, and the basis for them was laid by Lenin and his ideas. To the extent that we have applied Leninist ideas, they have produced positive results in spite of the Stalinist distortion of Lenin's views and Lenin's instructions. Marxist-Leninist theory, as the most progressive, has enriched our people, strengthened it, and armed it well. It was precisely on the basis of this theory that we achieved the results we did.

My task as a memoirist, as I see it, is to talk about the negative aspect of events. What is involved here is not just errors but abuse of power. If the abuses committed by Stalin had not occurred, our achievements would have been many times greater. That is why I am focusing my memoirs on that aspect of things, in order to help rule out the possibility of a repetition of events that were harmful for the working class and the peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia, for all the working people of the USSR and for the other socialist countries, because the Soviet Union more or less imposed its own mistakes and the Stalinist abuse of power on all the other fraternal countries.

1. Aleksandr Sergeevich Shcherbakov. See Biographies.

2. Aleksandr Petrovich Dovzhenko (1894–1956) was one of the founders of Soviet cinematography. See Biographies.

3. Aleksandr Korneichuk, Mykola (Nikolai) Bazhan, Pavlo Tychina, and Maksim Rylsky were leading Ukrainian writers, intellectuals, and cultural figures. [GS] Pavlo Tychina (1891–1967) was a lyric poet; seven collections of his verse appeared

between 1920 and 1961. On the playwright Korneichuk and the poets Bazhan and Rylsky, see Biographies. [SS]

4. This film, *Povest ognennykh let* (A Tale of Fiery Years), was produced by Yuliya Solntseva in 1961. See Biographies.

5. Mikhail Edisherovich Chiaureli. See Biographies.

6. Stepan Akopovich Akopov. See Biographies.

**ONE OF STALIN'S SHORTCOMINGS — ANTI-SEMITISM**

A hostile attitude toward the Jewish nation was a major shortcoming of Stalin's. In his speeches and writings as a leader and theoretician there wasn't even a hint of this. God forbid that anyone assert that a statement by him smacked of anti-Semitism. Outwardly everything looked correct and proper. But in his inner circle, when he had occasion to speak about some Jewish person, he always used an emphatically distorted pronunciation. This was the way backward people lacking in political consciousness would express themselves in daily life—people with a contemptuous attitude toward Jews. They would deliberately mangle the Russian language, putting on a Jewish accent or imitating certain negative characteristics [attributed to Jews]. Stalin loved to do this, and it became one of his characteristic traits.

I remember in the early 1950s there were certain disturbances, something like a work slowdown, among the young workers at Aircraft Plant No. 30 [in Moscow]. This was reported to Stalin through party channels. And the state security people also reported it. The ringleaders were said to be Jews.

We were sitting at Stalin's place, having an exchange of opinions, and he said to me in my capacity as secretary of the party's Moscow city committee: "Some healthy elements among the workers need to be organized. Let them take clubs and when the workday ends give these Jews a beating." I was not the only one present. Molotov, Beria, and Malenkov were also there. Kaganovich was not. Stalin would not indulge in anti-Semitic statements in Kaganovich's presence. I listened to him and thought to myself: "What is he saying? How could this be?"

As a child when I lived in the Donbas I was witness to a pogrom against the Jews. I was on my way home from school. (I used to walk about four versts<sup>1</sup> to school from the settlement at the coalmine where my father worked.) It was a nice, sunny autumn day. This kind of Indian summer happens around Donetsk in the fall. The air was full of gossamer filaments, as though it were snowing. It was a beautiful time of year. My schoolmates and I came across a driver in a cart that had stopped in the middle of the road. He was weeping. "Little ones," he said to us, "terrible things are happening in Yuzovka!" [That was the name of Donetsk in 1905.] We didn't know who he was, why he had spoken to us, or what was going on in Yuzovka.

We stepped up our pace. As soon as I got home and threw down my schoolbag full of notebooks I ran to Yuzovka. It was several versts from our house to the town. When I got there I saw a lot of people standing by the railroad tracks. There were large piles of iron ore along the tracks. They were

shipped from the Krivoi Rog [iron-mining] region, and the ore was heaped up in piles and held in reserve for use in the winter, so there would be no interruption in the operations of the blast furnaces. These heaps of iron ore formed a natural obstacle to anyone trying to cross the tracks. Paths or trails had been worn up and down these heaps. The miners clambered over them when they went to the bazaar in Yuzovka, making their way over these piles of iron ore.

On top of the pile stood a crowd of people. I saw that Cossacks were coming, and a bugle sounded. I had never seen troops in action before. This was something new for me. When the bugle sounded, some workers who had formerly been soldiers said it was a signal to prepare to fire and that now the troops would fire a volley. The people poured down the side of the giant heap of iron ore away from where the soldiers were. The soldiers' assignment apparently was not to let the workers go into the city.

A volley of gunfire thundered. Someone shouted that they were firing into the air, and someone else said they were firing blanks just to scare people off, but some said the soldiers were firing real bullets. People shouted whatever occurred to them. Then there was a pause, and this time the people poured down the slope toward the soldiers. It was late in the evening before everyone dispersed. Later I heard conversations among workers from our coalmine who had gotten into Yuzovka. They told about how the Jews' homes and shops were plundered and ransacked, and some of them brought plunder home themselves. One person had boots—an entire dozen—and another person had a dress. Others told a story that the Jews had been marching in a crowd under some sort of banner, carrying their own king on their shoulders! The Russians had greeted them with clubs. They said the king of the Jews had taken refuge in a leather factory. They set fire to the factory, and in fact it burned down. They said that the Jewish king had been burned up in the fire. This kind of primitive understanding of things by backward workers was promoted by the Black Hundreds.<sup>2</sup> The aim of the Black Hundreds and the tsarist police was to stir up the workers against the Jews and incite the workers to attack them.

On the next day, right after school, I ran to Yuzovka to see what was going on. No one was being restrained. There were people pouring through every street of the town, looting. I saw watch-repair shops that had been smashed to bits, and a lot of down and feathers were blowing through the streets. When they looted the homes of the poor Jews they ripped open people's feather beds and feather comforters and dumped out the feathers. An old woman was walking along dragging an iron bed. There were soldiers coming

down the same street. One soldier hopped over to where she was and said: "Here, grandma, I'll help you." And he helped her carry off someone else's bed.

According to rumor, an order had been given that people could do whatever they wanted with the Jews for three days. And for three entire days no obstacles were placed to this kind of looting. I heard that a lot of Jews who had been beaten up were lying in the factory hospital, and I decided to go there with one of my friends. He and I arrived and saw a dreadful sight: many corpses were lying in several rows. Only after three days did the authorities begin to restore order, and the pogrom was ended. There was no prosecution of the looters. Sure enough, three days had been allowed for the Black Hundred thugs to do their work, and there were no consequences either for the looting or for the killing.<sup>3</sup>

Later many workers came to their senses and realized that all this was a provocation by the police and the authorities. They came to understand that the Jews were not at all enemies of the workers and that among the Jews there were participants and leaders of workers' strikes. The main political speakers of that time were of Jewish origin, and the workers listened avidly when they spoke at rallies.

Late in the fall of that year I went to my home village together with my father's brother, Martyn, who also worked at the coalmine. My mother and father sent me back there with him. (They had a longing to work on the land; they still had a dream of returning to the village and having their own little house with a horse and a piece of land, becoming "property owners.") This was my second time going back to my grandfather's place in Kursk gubernia. I went back to grandfather's village right at the time when workers' strikes began in the Donbas; red flags were unfurled, and rallies were held. After I returned to the Donbas from the village I was told about the local events, including the names of the leading activists, the absolute majority of whom were Jews. The response to those Jewish speakers was warm and positive. That is, even after the workers had been taken in and some of them had participated in the pogrom, they became ashamed of what happened. They were ashamed that they had allowed the pogrom to occur and had not taken appropriate measures to oppose the Black Hundreds and the police out of uniform who had organized the pogrom. The whole thing was a terrible shame.

And now Stalin was saying that the workers should take up wooden clubs and beat the Jews. After we had left his presence Beria ironically said to me: "Well, did you get your orders?" I said: "Yes, I got them. My father was illiterate, but he would not take part in pogroms. That was considered shameful. And



now I am a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and I'm given an order like this." I knew Stalin. Even though he had given a direct order, if something like this was actually done and became widely known, a commission would be appointed and those to blame would be harshly punished. Stalin stopped at nothing and would destroy anyone whose actions might compromise his own name, especially in such a poisonous and disgraceful matter as anti-Semitism.

After the war Stalin frequently made anti-Semitic remarks during conversations, and we got used to them. We listened, but we didn't take them to heart, nor did we do anything along those lines.

Melnikov,<sup>4</sup> who had been chosen secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party after me, once came to see Stalin. Korotchenko was also with him. Stalin invited them to visit him at the "nearby dacha." He gave them a lot to drink and accomplished what he was aiming at. This is the first time these people had been at Stalin's place. We, on the other hand, knew what he would do. He always gave new people a lot to drink. They drank willingly because they considered it an honor to be the guests of Stalin himself. But the main thing involved here was not a display of hospitality. Stalin was interested in getting them drunk to the point where their tongues would loosen and they would blurt out things they never would have said when they were sober, because they would have thought first. And sure enough, their tongues were loosened, and they began to blurt things out.

I was sitting there feeling nervous. First of all, I was responsible for Melnikov; I had proposed him for promotion to his position. As for Korotchenko, there was nothing much to be said. I knew he was an honest man, although fairly limited. Stalin also knew him. But this was also Korotchenko's first time at Stalin's table. In those days Stalin never missed a chance to express his anti-Semitism, and he began making comments in that vein. He found receptive soil in Melnikov, who was inwardly inclined toward this kind of thing. Korotchenko and Melnikov sat there with open mouths and listened to their leader. When the dinner was over we went our separate ways, and the two of them went back to Ukraine.

When I had transferred to work in Moscow a resolution had been passed by the Politburo of the Central Committee that I should oversee the work of the CP(B)U. Copies of all the Ukrainian newspapers were sent to me. I would look through the main publications, and my assistants would report to me everything that deserved attention in the other publications. Not long after the dinner I've just mentioned, my assistant Shuisky<sup>5</sup> brought me a Ukrainian newspaper and pointed to the editorial. Certain shortcomings

were being criticized, and the names of specific individuals were mentioned. There were about sixteen names, and all of them were Jewish. I was indignant. How could this have happened? Who had authorized this? I immediately guessed what direction the wind was blowing. Melnikov and Korotchenko had taken to heart the criticisms they heard Stalin make about the Jewish nation. They interpreted this as an order, and they had taken concrete action accordingly. They had started searching for people to blame for specific shortcomings and were using the newspaper to do it. After all, if a struggle was to be waged, it had to be done on a broad front, mobilizing the party and the masses.

I immediately called Melnikov: "I read your editorial. Aren't you ashamed of doing something like this? How could you dare to publish a paper containing such things? Why, this is an open call for anti-Semitism. What did you do it for? You should bear in mind that if Stalin reads this editorial, it will boomerang on you. I don't know how exactly, but it will—because here we have a secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party preaching anti-Semitism! How is it that you failed to understand that this provides material for our enemies? Our enemies will take advantage of this shameful display. They'll say that Ukraine has raised the banner of anti-Semitism, the banner of war against the Jews." He began trying to justify himself. Then he started sobbing. I said: "If anything like this happens again, I personally will report it to Stalin. You didn't understand Stalin correctly when you were at dinner at his place." Of course, in this case too, I was running a risk, because I had no guarantee that the phone conversations weren't being monitored. I was also not sure that Melnikov himself wouldn't write to Stalin saying that Khrushchev gave an order contradicting what he himself had heard from Stalin when he visited the "nearby dacha." Stalin probably would not have forgiven me for that.

My wife, Nina Petrovna, soon received a letter from Kiev, and this is the story she told me. There is a clinic in Kiev for children who suffer from tuberculosis of the bone. The head of this clinic was Professor Frumina.<sup>6</sup> She had often visited us at our apartment when my son Sergei was suffering from tuberculosis of the bone, and she put a great deal of effort into curing him. No symptoms of this illness remain for Sergei today. He has been cured completely. This can be attributed above all to Frumina. There was another prominent specialist, an authority on tuberculosis of the bone who lived in Leningrad, and we sought his advice, too, on treating this disease. He had said to Nina Petrovna at the time: "What are you coming to me for? You have Frumina right there in Kiev. No one knows the subject better than she

does.” Now Frumina, in her letter, was telling us that she had been dismissed from her job, and the formula used in justification for this was that her abilities did not correspond to the position she held.

I was irate. I called Melnikov again: “How could you do this? To dismiss an honored and esteemed person from her job, and using a formula like that: to say she was not qualified for the post she was holding. A certain highly placed academician in the medical world has told me that she has a better knowledge of tuberculosis of the bone than anyone. Who is it that gave the opposite evaluation? Who wrote that she wasn’t qualified for the position she holds?” Again he began trying to justify himself, referring to someone or other. Of course in such cases people will always be found who will affirm that everything was done properly. I said to him: “You are bringing shame upon the worthy name of Communist.” I don’t remember how this matter ended. As I recall, Doctor Frumina was restored to her position. But it was a shameful incident.

After that we held anti-Semitism back somewhat. But that’s all we could do, just hold it back, because, unfortunately, elements of it have persisted. Today I live outside the city [of Moscow] as a recluse. I have hardly any communication with people. I communicate only with those who are either guarding me or guarding others from me. It’s hard for me to tell which it is. Most likely they are guarding others from me. They’re not bad fellows. I talk with them, and often during our conversations pretty shameful remarks slip out. Evidently the necessary explanations are not being given to people, and resistance is apparently not being offered to this particularly shameful phenomenon [that is, anti-Semitism]. Why is this happening? First of all, anti-Semitism appeared in the upper levels of our society back in the old days. How many pogroms there were! People of the older generation remember Purishkevich, who held first place in the tsarist Duma even though he was openly a supporter of the Black Hundreds.<sup>7</sup>

Even under Soviet power Stalin supported and encouraged the bacillus of anti-Semitism. And he never gave an order to eliminate it completely, to nip it in the bud. Inwardly he himself was afflicted with this very foul shortcoming—the one that bears the name anti-Semitism.

And what are we to say about the harsh reprisals taken against the worthy people who proposed the establishment of a Jewish autonomous region in the Crimea? Certainly it was an incorrect proposal. But should these people have been dealt with as harshly as Stalin dealt with them? He could have simply rejected their proposal and explained matters, and that would have been enough. But no, he had all those who actively gave their support to the

document containing this proposal physically destroyed. Only Zhemchuzhina survived, by some miracle. She got off with being sent into internal exile for many long years.<sup>8</sup> Undoubtedly this kind of action became possible only as a result of the inner workings of the bacillus of anti-Semitism dwelling in the brain of Stalin.

There was also the savage reprisal taken against Mikhoels,<sup>9</sup> director of the Jewish theater in Moscow, an outstanding performer in the Jewish theater and a man of great culture. He was savagely beaten to death, secretly assassinated, and later his assassins were rewarded, even though their victim was buried with honors. This is more than the mind can grasp! They made it appear as though he had fallen in front of a truck, but in fact the truck ran over his dead body [after the assassins had killed him]. This operation was carried out with artistic skill, and who was it that did this? Beria and Abakumov's men, on orders from Stalin.<sup>10</sup>

The intention was to organize the assassination of Litvinov<sup>11</sup> in the same way. A number of documents were discovered after Stalin's death, and some officials of the Ministry of State Security were interrogated. It turned out that Litvinov was supposed to be killed along the road from Moscow to his dacha outside the city. There is a bend in the road near the entrance to his dacha, and it was precisely at that location that they were going to organize the attempt on his life. I know this place very well because later on, for a certain time, I lived in that very same dacha.<sup>12</sup>

Stalin had two reasons for wanting Litvinov assassinated. Stalin considered him a hostile element, an agent of America. That's what his victims were always called: agents, traitors to the homeland, betrayers, and enemies of the people. The fact that Litvinov belonged to the Jewish nation was the second factor that played a role in this.

If we are to talk about anti-Semitism on the official level, Stalin formally fought against it as secretary of the Central Committee, as the leader of the party and the people, but inwardly and in the small circle of his closest associates he encouraged anti-Semitism.

Here is another incident. During the war the Soviet Information Bureau [acronym: Sovinformburo] was established to gather all possible material about our country, the operations of the Red Army, the struggle against Hitler's Germany, and to distribute these materials as widely as possible in our press and the Western press, above all in the United States. Since there were highly influential people of Jewish nationality in top circles in the United States, quite a few Jews who held important positions in our country were included in the Sovinformburo. The deputy head of the bureau, and

later the actual head of it, was Lozovsky,<sup>13</sup> who had previously been general secretary of the International Trade Union Federation, the so-called Profintern, and a deputy people's commissar of foreign affairs.

The Soviet Jewish Antifascist Committee<sup>14</sup> also made its appearance. Among other members, based on recommendations from on high, was General Kreizer,<sup>15</sup> who bore the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Mikhoels was also on that committee. He was a relative of the philosopher Mitin,<sup>16</sup> a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. And of course Molotov's wife, Zhemchuzhina, was part of the committee.

Lozovsky approached me many times when I came to Moscow, and sometimes he called me on the phone from there, asking that materials be provided to his propagandists regarding the atrocities committed by the Hitlerites in Ukraine. I gave the assignment to the appropriate people, and these materials were sent to the United States, where they were widely used to publicize the successes being achieved by the Red Army and to describe the atrocities committed by the aggressors who had seized Ukraine. Lozovsky's work in this campaign was very positive. He was a very energetic man, and he persistently begged us: "Send more material, send more material!" In 1944-45 we were very busy trying to restore the economy, and sometimes we weren't able to provide him with the material he asked for. But he insisted: "Please try to understand how important it is for us to show others the face of our common enemy, to describe the atrocities the Nazis committed, and to show how hard it is for us to rebuild our cities and villages."

I think that this organization devoted to research on the atrocities of the Hitlerites [that is, the Sovinformburo] was founded on Molotov's initiative. But it may be that Stalin himself proposed that it be organized. The committee was very energetic in the work it did, and its propaganda activity, as well as the activity of the Jewish Antifascist Committee, obviously served the interests of our state, our policies, the policies of the Communist Party, and they were rightly considered useful and necessary. When Ukraine had been liberated a document was drafted within the Jewish Antifascist Committee. I don't know exactly who initiated it, but it proposed that the Crimea (after the Crimean Tatars had been forcibly deported from the peninsula) be made into a Jewish autonomous republic within the RSFSR. This proposal was addressed to Stalin. That's when all hell broke loose.<sup>17</sup> Stalin's assessment of the matter was evidently that it was a proposal inspired by the American Zionists. The members of the Jewish Antifascist Committee, he concluded, were agents of Zionism who wanted to establish their own independent state in the Crimea, to break away from the Soviet Union, establish a foothold

for American imperialism, and serve as agents of American imperialism. Full and free rein was given to the imagination.

I remember that Molotov called me, to consult with me on this question. Molotov was evidently drawn into this business through his wife, Zhemchuzhina. Lozovsky and Mikhoels had played the most active roles in the committee. As for Stalin, he literally went into a frenzy. After a certain length of time arrests began. They grabbed Lozovsky and then Zhemchuzhina. Molotov was discredited. Relevant materials were distributed among members of the Central Committee, and in those everything possible was done to discredit Zhemchuzhina and to besmirch Molotov's masculine pride as her husband. I remember one filthy document that said she had been untrue to her husband, and it even named the names of her alleged lovers. A lot of foul things were written then.

All sorts of persecution and retribution against this committee began, and this served in turn as a pretext for stirring up anti-Semitism. The fabricated notion that the Jews wanted to create their own separate state and secede from the Soviet Union was interwoven in all of this. The question of the Jewish nationality itself, and its place in our country generally, was placed on the agenda. Reprisals followed. I don't know how many people were arrested in connection with this affair. But other methods were used as well. Stalin again began to engage in secret acts of assassination. I repeat that Mikhoels was secretly assassinated this way. I don't know what the reason was, but he was making a trip either to Smolensk or to Minsk, or it's possible he was being taken there under special circumstances. To put it briefly, that's where they found his corpse. A supposedly accidental death was staged. The truth is that his corpse was dumped in the street, and things were organized in such a way that a truck ran over the body. At his funeral the Soviet public paid proper respects to him, but they didn't know how he had really died. And his assassin was given an award (as Malenkov told me).

The investigation in the case of this committee lasted a long time, and it all ended tragically. Lozovsky was shot, and the rest were sent into internal exile. I thought at the time that Zhemchuzhina also had been shot, because no one was told anything about her and no one gave any report on the matter. Everything was reported to Stalin, and Stalin personally decided who would be killed and who would be spared. It was only after Stalin's death that I learned she was alive, when Molotov said that Zhemchuzhina was in internal exile. Everyone agreed that she should be released. After releasing her, Beria ceremoniously handed her over to Molotov. He told me about how Molotov came to see him at his ministry and met there with Zhemchuzhina. She was

barely alive and he embraced her. Beria related all this with a certain irony, but he did express sympathy for Molotov and Zhemchuzhina, trying to make it look as though her release was the result of his initiative.

And now to get down to the essence of the matter. Should an autonomous Jewish republic have been established in the Crimea? In my opinion since a Jewish autonomous district already existed,<sup>18</sup> it was hardly necessary to set up something additional in the Crimea.

But back then we all took our nourishment from Stalin's opinions and pronouncements and were under his influence. Stalin's notion that espionage was involved arose because the Crimea is on the seacoast and is accessible to foreign vessels. In his view there was no way this could be permitted because of considerations of defense. And we of course took the same position that our defense needed to be strengthened and not weakened. It's true that this question was never really discussed; all that happened was that various points of view in favor of caution and vigilance were expressed. Here, too, Stalin gave the appearance of displaying "vigilance." He was supposedly thwarting the creeping encroachments of world Zionism and its attempt to establish a foothold in our country, a base for American imperialism's campaign against us. From this point of view of course a Jewish autonomous republic could not be permitted. And that's the way the question was decided. But there was no official discussion or decision making, and the arrests began.

People who had played a major role during the war in gathering antifascist informational material were seized. All this work went for nothing really, and honest people were destroyed. One more shameful affair!

It was after this that the incident at the Stalin Auto Works occurred [described in Chapter 2 of this volume]. Here, too, the machinations of American imperialism were detected, operating through "Zionists" employed at the factory. Of course this was the sheerest nonsense. This was one of the results of the arbitrary rule and absolutely unchallengeable position of Stalin. There were no official bodies that could control or monitor his activity. The party's Central Committee was an institution that existed in name only. Stalin was not bound by it in any way, and it could not make any decisions without Stalin's blessing. The absence of any control over his activities also led to the results that Lenin warned against, when he said that Stalin was capable of abusing power and therefore should not be retained in the high position of general secretary. The bitter fruits that we had to taste confirmed the correctness of Lenin's remarks, written in the last year of his life.



I have spoken about the death of Lozovsky. On March 28, 1968, an article in the newspaper *Izvestia* was devoted to Lozovsky.<sup>19</sup> Much biographical information about him is given there, but the article remains shamefully silent about how he died. The article simply gives the date of his death as 1952. But what happened that year? Did he simply disappear into the ground or fly off into the skies? This is a shameful business. I think the author of the article wanted to tell the truth about what happened. And such truthfulness would help to prevent in the future the repetition of the tragedy that erupted then within the party and among the people of the Soviet Union. A tragedy as a result of which thousands of Soviet citizens perished, among them Comrade Lozovsky. I think that a time will come when all this will be brought to the light of day more widely and a profound analysis will be made of how this happened, so that in the future nothing like it could ever be repeated.

1. A verst is an old Russian measure of length, equal to 3,500 feet—that is, about two-thirds of a mile or just over one kilometer. [SS]

2. Coming to prominence at the time of the 1905 revolution in Russia, the Black Hundreds might be called precursors of the Fascist gangs that later appeared in Italy, Germany, and elsewhere. In Russia, they were gangs organized or encouraged by the tsarist authorities to attack Jews and revolutionaries and to deflect mass discontent away from the tsarist regime, using the Jews as scapegoats. Their ideology was a mix of extreme patriotism, loyalty to the autocracy, and defense of the existing social order. [GS]

3. Khrushchev refers here to the events of October 18–20, 1905, when the Black Hundreds carried out anti-Jewish pogroms in 690 different cities, towns, and villages in Russia. Between 3,500 and 4,000 victims were killed and about 10,000 injured.

4. Leonid Georgyevich Melnikov (1906–81) was a secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(B) of Ukraine from July 1947, second secretary from December 1947, and first secretary from December 1949 to June 1953. See Biographies.

5. Grigory Trofimovich Shuisky. See Biographies.

6. The specialist in traumas of tubercular origin Anna Yefremovna Frumina.

7. Vladimir Mitrofanovich Purishkevich (1870–1920), Russian monarchist politician from the landowning nobility in Bessarabia; a deputy in the Second, Third, and Fourth Dumas, 1906–17, notorious for his anti-Semitic speeches advocating pogroms. He was a founder of the “Union of the Russian People,” the most prominent Black Hundred organization; in the Russian Civil War, he was active on the side of the Whites. [GS]

8. Jewish colonization in the Crimea (and adjoining areas of southern Ukraine) was promoted in the early postrevolutionary years with a view to the eventual creation of a Jewish autonomous region there. The idea was revived during and immediately after the war by Jewish cultural figures such as the actor Solomon Mikhoels and the poet Isaak (Itsik) Feffer in their capacity as leaders of the Jewish Antifascist Committee (see note 14 below). In 1946 these figures submitted a memorandum in support of their proposal to the Soviet leadership.

Polina Semyonovna Zhemchuzhina (1897–1970; see Biographies) was the wife of Foreign Minister Molotov and a friend of Mikhoels; she acted as a liaison between the advocates of the scheme and the Soviet leadership. See Allan Laine Kagedan, *Soviet Zion: The Quest for a Russian Jewish Homeland* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). [SS]

9. Solomon (Vovsi) Mikhailovich Mikhoels (1890–1948) was the director of the Moscow State Jewish Theater and a leader of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. See Biographies and notes 8 above and 14 below. [SS]

10. Further on in this chapter, Khrushchev states: “A supposedly accidental death was staged. The truth is that Mikhoels's corpse was dumped on the road, and things were organized in such a way that a truck ran over the body.” [GS] Recent works by Russian historians have clarified the real circumstances of Mikhoels's death. According to one biographer, Mikhoels was taken during his stay in Minsk to the dacha of the minister of state security of Belorussia Tsanova (original name Dzhandzhgava), a close associate of Beria, and killed there. The participants in the operation were awarded medals on its completion (Matvei Moiseyevich



Geizer, *Mikhoels: zhizn i smert* [Mikhoels: Life and Death], 1998). For another account, see Leonid Mlechin, *Smert Stalina: Vozhd i ego soratniki* [The Death of Stalin: The Leader and His Comrades-in-Arms] (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003), 129–37. [SK]

11. Maxim Litvinov (Vallakh). See Biographies.

12. The dacha is on the Kurkinskoye Road northwest of Moscow. In the 1970s it was the residence of China's ambassador to the USSR. [SK]

13. Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky (Dridzo). See Biographies.

14. The Jewish Antifascist Committee (full name—the Antifascist Committee of the Soviet Jewish Public) was created by the Soviet leadership in 1942 mainly for the purpose of mobilizing political, and above all financial, support from Jews abroad for the Soviet war effort. [SS]

15. Yakov Grigoryevich Kreizer. See Biographies.

16. Mark Borisovich Mitin. See Biographies.

17. A literal rendering of this Russian expression would be something like, “The whole damn forest caught fire.” [GS]

18. The reference here is to the Jewish autonomous region of Birobidzhan that was established in 1928 as an alternative to Jewish colonization of the Crimea. Birobidzhan is a sparsely inhabited area of southeastern Siberia on the border with China (Manchuria); its use as a Jewish autonomous region was motivated in part by strategic considerations. However, the area has never attracted Jewish colonists on a very large scale. See Robert Weinberg, *Stalin's Forgotten Zion: Birobidzhan and the Making of a Soviet Jewish Homeland. An Illustrated History, 1928–1996* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998). [SS/GS]

19. The present chapter was dictated not long after the article about Lozovsky appeared. [SK]

## BERIA AND OTHERS

After the war, when I began meeting with Stalin frequently, I sensed more and more that he no longer trusted Beria. It was more than just not trusting him; he was afraid of Beria. I didn't understand then what his fear was based on. Later, when Stalin's machinery for destroying people was revealed, as well as the resources expended to achieve such goals—and, after all, Beria was in charge of those resources and carried out the actions assigned to him by Stalin—then I understood that Stalin had evidently drawn the following conclusion: if Beria could do these things on Stalin's instructions to the people at whom Stalin pointed his finger, then Beria could do the same kind of thing on his own initiative, choosing his own targets. Stalin was afraid of the possibility of becoming such a target himself. That's why he began to be afraid of Beria. Of course he never said anything about this to anyone. But it became evident.

One day when we had gathered at Stalin's place as usual, I noticed something different. The personnel of Georgian nationality who normally functioned as Stalin's servants had disappeared; there were only Russians left.

At dinner the previous day, Stalin had suddenly brought up a question: Why were there so many Georgians around; where had they come from?

Beria was immediately on his guard and answered: “Comrade Stalin, these are people who are loyal to you.”

Stalin got angry: “What are you saying? That Georgians are loyal and Russians are not?”

Beria said: “No, I’m not saying that. I’m just saying that the people here have been selected for their loyalty.”

Stalin began to shout: “I don’t need these loyal people!”

All the men and women of Georgian nationality who had been his servants disappeared the next day. That is, Stalin returned to the situation that had existed around him before the war. Back then there were only Russians among the servants at Stalin’s dacha and his home apartment, and you didn’t see any Georgians.

But how many there had been [since Beria came]! The man who prepared and served the shashlik<sup>1</sup> had a Russian name, but from his outward appearance he was a typical Georgian. I was amazed once when I arrived in Moscow from the front lines and saw him walking around in a general’s uniform; he was already a major general. He ended the war as a lieutenant general.<sup>2</sup>

Later there appeared some sort of old friend who had been at school with Stalin. This so-called general was in charge of supplies. He brought in the wine, the mutton, and the other products consumed in the Kremlin. He had been a *dukhanshchik* [owner of a small restaurant in the Caucasus],<sup>3</sup> but he was an old friend of Stalin’s. Later he began to be showered with various orders and medals. You’d come back from the front lines and see that he had been awarded one or two more new medals; you could see this from the medal ribbons on his shirt.<sup>4</sup> This was an outrageous thing!

When Stalin said he didn’t want any more Georgians around, this man also disappeared. I assume that other people who saw what was going on felt indignant about it, just as I did. But we all held our tongues because it was useless to criticize any arrangements that Stalin had put in place.

I remember once that Stalin chewed me out in the presence of this Caucasian restaurant owner, this “lieutenant general” who sat at the table with the rest of us. It was one thing to have him serve the food and drink, but another to be eating and drinking in the company of this man, who we really didn’t know, and to have highly confidential discussions about government matters in his presence. Once I flew in from the front lines and had to fly out again the very next day. I got Stalin’s agreement that I would be flying out early the next morning. For that reason I was very much averse to having too much to drink at Stalin’s place and then having to travel and fly back to the battlefield with a hangover. It would be embarrassing to

meet people at the airfield, because invariably you met someone and started talking with him, and he saw the condition you were in. This was shameful. And I decided one way or another to get away from the dinner, not to stay there for a long time, and yet it was already late. (Of course, according to Stalin's reckoning of time, two o'clock in the morning was still early.)

I said to him: "Comrade Stalin, may I please leave now? I have to fly back very early tomorrow, as we agreed."

He said: "Tomorrow?"

"Yes," I said, "tomorrow." There was a pause.

And suddenly he made this pronouncement: "You are responsible for the death of General Kostenko, who died in 1942."

I said: "Yes, I'm responsible because I am a member of the Military Council of the Front and I have to answer for the death of every general or soldier. But this is war, and someone is always being killed in war." It was from me that he had learned of Kostenko's death. I had praised Kostenko to him highly. He himself had never met Kostenko. But he kept bringing this up again and again. I don't remember how many times he dragged the matter up and chewed it over. He was literally making a mockery of me. I felt very embarrassed. The other members of the Politburo, who knew what was going on, took the attitude: "You today, me tomorrow." That was how Stalin did things; he went around the circle.<sup>5</sup>

The restaurant owner from the Caucasus was also standing there, a man I had never had anything to do with; I had never "broken bread with him," as the saying goes.<sup>6</sup> And to be punished that way, to be made to stand there as an innocent person being made guilty, to be placed in a humiliating position, and on top of it all in front of someone who had no business there, a stranger and an outsider—only Stalin could allow himself such things.

He was completely free of any control or restraints! We would sometimes say among ourselves that one day he would reach the point where he would pull down his trousers and relieve himself right there at the table and then say it was in the interests of the fatherland. No doubt he was already a little touched in the head. It seems to me that his psyche had been disturbed somehow, because previously he had conducted himself in a rather strict manner and had behaved in a way appropriate to one holding such a high position.

So then, when his trust in Beria was broken, all the Georgians suddenly disappeared.<sup>7</sup> Stalin no longer trusted Beria's people. But because of Stalin's unhealthy frame of mind he didn't trust the Russian servants either, because Beria had chosen them, too. Beria had worked in the state-security apparatus

for a long time and knew all the cadres. Everyone toadied to him, and it was easy for him to use these people for his own purposes.

Now things reached the point that, when Stalin was at the dinner table, he would neither eat nor drink until someone else tried a certain dish or drank from a certain bottle. And he would find some pretext. For example, there was a wine-tasting session. The Georgians had sent some sort of vintage wine to be tasted. Of course he knew our wine-tasting “system” and had no regard for it whatsoever. He himself would dictate what was a good wine or a bad one. But he asked us to taste the wine first. He waited to see whether one of us fell over. When no one fell he took a little sip, savored it, and then began to drink with gusto.

Here’s another example: say he wanted something to eat. In that case each of us had a “favorite dish” and each one had to try that dish first.

He would say [for example]: “Nikita, here’s some goose giblets, haven’t you tried them yet?”

I would answer: “No.” I could see that he wanted to eat some but was afraid to, so I would try them, and then he would immediately start to eat.

He would say: “Here’s some unsalted herring.” He loved it unsalted. And each of us would salt it afterward to our own taste. I would take some and then he would eat. And in the same way every dish invariably had its taster, by whose example you could tell if it was poisoned or not, and Stalin would watch and wait.

Everyone except Beria served as a taster. Beria had his meals served from his own kitchen separately, even when eating at Stalin’s place. Old Matryona Petrovna, who served the meals, would say: “Comrade Beria, here’s your plate of grass.” Everyone would laugh, and he would eat his “grass” the way they do in Central Asia. He would pick it up with his fingers and put it in his mouth. I don’t know how the Georgians eat their pilaf, with their fingers or not, but Beria always ate with his fingers.

And what about the ritual when we went on vacation? Several times I became the sacrificial victim of this ritual. Beria tried to encourage me: “Listen, somebody has to suffer.” The suffering consisted in going on vacation at the same time as Stalin, when he was vacationing in the Caucasus. This was considered a punishment for us because it really was no vacation. You found yourself with Stalin the whole time, spending endless dinners and suppers together. Stalin’s attitude toward me was favorable, and when he went on vacation he often invited me: “Come along. You need a vacation, too.”

“All right. Glad to,” I would answer, although I would have preferred not to. But it was absolutely impossible to tell him that.

I remember one vacation at Borzhomi<sup>8</sup> in the Caucasus. As I recall, that was the only time he took his vacation in Borzhomi. He called me on the phone from there. I was in Sochi, and Mikoyan was in Sukhumi.<sup>9</sup> He summoned everyone who was on vacation in the Caucasus—plus Beria, who was still at work [in Moscow] at the time—to come to his place, and we all gathered in Borzhomi. It was a large building but poorly furnished. A museum had been located there previously. For that reason there were no real bedrooms, and we lived in really cramped quarters. I slept in the same room with Mikoyan, and we both found it unpleasant, being dependent on Stalin in all matters. Our daily regimen was different from Stalin's. We would already be out taking walks or hiking and he would still be sleeping. When he got up, that's when the day officially began.

One day Stalin summoned us and said: "Rakosi<sup>10</sup> has come to vacation in the Caucasus." This was not the first time Rakosi had been there for a vacation. "He called up and asked if he could visit me." We said nothing. He said: "We have to tell him it's all right for him to come." A call was put through to Rakosi, but meanwhile Stalin was saying to us: "Where does Rakosi get his information from? How does he always know when I'm vacationing in the Caucasus? Whenever I'm in the Caucasus he comes here too. Apparently some spies are keeping him informed." Thus Rakosi joined the number of those under suspicion. Stalin went on: "We have to break him of this habit."

Rakosi arrived, and of course he also took part in the dinners with the heavy drinking. One evening, when he himself had had too much, he said: "Listen, what is this? What are you people doing? Why, this is drunkenness!" He was calling things by their real names.

We ourselves knew this, but the justification we found was that we were Stalin's victims. Nevertheless we felt offended, and Beria told Stalin that Rakosi had said we were behaving like drunkards. Stalin's response was, "All right, we'll see about that." We sat down to eat, and he began pumping Rakosi full of wine; he poured two or three bottles of champagne and other wines into him. I was afraid Rakosi wouldn't be able to hold up under this assault, that he might die right there on the spot. But no, he got through it. The next morning he somehow or other managed to get up (and he had come to an agreement with Stalin that he would be leaving that morning), but he asked that his breakfast be brought to him separately in his own room. Stalin was left to have breakfast without him. Rakosi didn't come to join Stalin for breakfast, and Stalin joked about it: "There, you see what condition I got him into!" But Rakosi became a suspect person in Stalin's eyes. Where had he obtained the information that Stalin was on vacation in

the Caucasus, and why wasn't he eating with the rest of us that morning? Of course there was nothing to it. All Rakosi had to do was call the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and they told him Stalin was in the Caucasus.

On that occasion Stalin remained in Borzhomi a little longer, and Mikoyan and I barely got away from him. Stalin was receiving visitors there, in Borzhomi, Georgian old-timers he had known as a young man. There was a certain railroad worker who especially stuck in his memory. I didn't see this man, but Stalin told me later: "I received him as a guest, and he told me what was going on in Georgia. It's disgraceful." This railroad worker had told Stalin that many young people, after receiving their education, were not working anywhere. They couldn't find appropriate work for themselves in Georgia, but they didn't want to leave Georgia and were hanging around doing nothing. He also told Stalin about the illegal profiteering that was going on. Evidently he was an honest man, a veteran Communist, and a good fellow.

Stalin was irate. Beria was in charge of Georgia. Earlier, for many years he had worked as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. He treated it as his private fiefdom and didn't allow anyone else to have anything to do with Georgia. It was only Beria who gave any information to Stalin about Georgia, and suddenly a hole had been poked in this closed system, and the result was that Stalin's wrath was aroused. As for the shortcomings that existed in Georgia, which it was necessary to fight against, I don't attribute them to the alleged traits of the Georgian national character, not at all. What was at work here was the peculiarity of Georgia's geographical location. This part of the Soviet Union is a paradise, with citrus trees growing year round. There are many temptations in Georgia for speculators: the climate is warm; there are many vineyards and many other human delights. Of course it's not so easy to leave a place like that, especially if the training you had was poor. If people of some other nationality had lived there, the same weaknesses would have been true of that nationality. For example, nowadays I often hear my guards saying things like this: "There are Georgians everywhere. And they're profiteering and speculating everywhere they go." I always say to them that if Russians lived in Georgia, they would do the same thing.

During my time in the leadership of the Soviet Union there began to be profiteering and speculation in bay leaf. At that time I said to [Georgian party leader] Mzhavanadze:<sup>11</sup> "Expand your cultivation of bay leaf as much as you can." I proposed the same thing to the leaders in the Crimea. Pretty soon profiteering in bay leaf ended. That's the best way to fight profiteering: to eliminate the shortage. But there are some products that grow only in

Georgia, and not in very large quantity, especially on the little plots of land that collective farmers have next to their homes. And naturally the temptation arises to earn a little bit more than you have. So it's not a question of nationality, but one of everyday life. If there is speculation in vegetables that are in short supply, increase the output of those vegetables. This is a matter that is easily within the government's reach. Hotbeds and greenhouses can be used for this purpose. It no longer becomes economically profitable to bring these food products from far away because it's cheaper to get them right there in the local area. This way a nationality also becomes ennobled; it ceases to be a plague in the eyes of others, and it loses its reputation as a nation of speculators.

Stalin didn't want to understand the situation. In his view it was necessary to fight against phenomena of this kind by using administrative methods, up to and including arrest and deportation. It was around the same time, after he met with the old railroad worker—I don't know to what extent the two events were connected—but it was then that Stalin's distrust of Beria became more palpable. It was then that Stalin drafted the so-called anti-Mingrelian resolutions.<sup>12</sup> These Central Committee resolutions said that the Mingrelians, that is, the western Georgians, had some sort of conspiratorial organization and were pursuing a policy of rapprochement with Turkey, aimed at linking up with Turkey and seceding from Georgia. This was obvious nonsense and the product of an inflamed imagination! These resolutions were actually aimed against Beria because Beria himself was a Mingrelian. Stalin frequently emphasized this and drew a sharp distinction between western Georgians and eastern ones, the Kartvelians.<sup>13</sup> He would say that the Mingrelians weren't real Georgians.<sup>14</sup>

The secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia was the former editor of the newspaper *Zarya Vostoka* (Dawn of the East) and had assumed the post of secretary of the Communist Party after Beria.<sup>15</sup> Of course Beria had recommended him. In my opinion he was not a bad person, although I only knew him from a distance. A campaign of denunciation followed. Things reached the point where Stalin raised the question of deporting antisocial elements from Georgia to Siberia. The secretary of the Georgian Central Committee "failed to understand" this. He didn't see any reason for it and therefore did not display the necessary zeal. Stalin became furious, and all this came down on Beria's head, because he was right there close at hand. In principle Stalin's reaction was justified, because the Georgian secretary was completely dependent on Beria and did whatever Beria told him.



Things ended up with Beria going to Georgia to “restore order.” Later we were told that many tens of thousands of Georgians were deported [in 1952]. Beria was outdoing himself, but Stalin was still dissatisfied. The initiative for all this was coming from Stalin. As for Beria, he paid with the blood of the Georgian people to have his former prestige restored in Stalin’s eyes. What should have been done is to demonstrate to Stalin that he had been led astray, that indeed there were parasitic elements in Georgia, as there are everywhere, but that other means should be used to fight against them. This could have been demonstrated if Beria had undertaken the job. But Beria took the road of bloodshed, which was the usual one for him. What did the lives of thousands of people matter to him, people whose heads rolled or who were sent into exile to eke out a miserable existence in Siberia branded as “traitors to the homeland”? What did that matter to him? For him, the sufferings of the people did not count. The main thing for him was his own career and his own position. And he knew how to take advantage of Stalin’s weaknesses, especially his cruelty and his amoral qualities, in order to achieve his own ends. When Beria returned from Georgia and reported the results of his work, Stalin again became favorably disposed toward him.

This whole affair—is it even conceivable? I am in favor of arresting, trying, and exiling or imprisoning real criminals. But investigations and trials should be held following all the standards of the law, with open public trials, so that everyone can be convinced that the defendants really are guilty. Then no one will try to come to the defense of those who are punished, and public opinion will sincerely support the actions taken by the punitive agencies of the government.

At that time we simply added our voices in “support” of the accusations. But how did this come about? Someone would give a report, pounding himself on the chest, cursing and swearing, without really having investigated whether these “enemies of the people” existed or not. Resolutions would be passed and hands would be raised. But this is not really judging the essence of the matter. People voted for others to be exterminated without knowing what their crimes were and without even knowing the people concerned. We didn’t really have true judicial processes. In the 1930s secret trials were presided over by the so-called troikas [special three-member boards]. The troikas were made up of the very same people who did the arresting; they also carried out the investigations, and they handed down the sentences. All the people who lost their lives in the Stalin era were tried by “troika” members like this.

Now the Mingrelian affair had come along. I am absolutely convinced that Stalin simply invented it as a way of fighting Beria. But since Stalin was



already ill, he turned out to be inconsistent in carrying through the plans he had made, and Beria wriggled out of it; he bought himself off with the blood he shed during his visit to Georgia. He made every effort to get permission to make that trip himself. He didn't want any of the rest of us to interfere in matters in the Georgian republic. In fact that was strictly forbidden. And all of this left one more negative imprint on the life of our society. The more control society has over the leadership, the better things go—and then there can be more protection for society against actions that are incompatible with the socialist worldview and the socialist way of doing things.

1. Pieces of meat and vegetables roasted on a skewer, like shish kebob. [GS]

2. This was Aleksandr Yakovlevich Egnatashvili. Apparently he was a childhood friend of Stalin's, and his official title was deputy chief of the Main Administration of the Guard (Glavnoye Upravleniye Okhrany) for household affairs (*zames-titel nachalnika Glavnogo Upravleniya Okhrany po khozyaistvennoi chasti*). See Vladimir Loginov, *Teni Stalina* (Shades of Stalin)(Moscow: Sovremennik, 2000), 23–27. [SK]

3. A *dukhanshchik* was the proprietor of a *dukhan*, which in the Caucasus means a small restaurant. [GS] This man was Pavel Mikhailovich Rusishvili, a Georgian from Gori, Stalin's hometown (Loginov, op. cit. note 2 above, 55–68). [SK]

4. A medal ribbon (*planka*) was a ribbon that symbolized and substituted for a specific medal. Medals were worn only on suits reserved for parades and other ceremonial occasions. On everyday clothing they were replaced by medal ribbons. [SK]

5. That is, he would harass one Politburo member one day and another the next. [GS]

6. Literally the Russian saying here is “I'd never tended geese with him.” [GS]

7. According to the account given by Loginov (25), Stalin gave instructions to dismiss some of the Georgians in his entourage and transfer others to Georgia. [SK/SS]

8. Borzhomi is a health spa in the mountains of southern Georgia. A brand of mineral water of the same name, well known throughout the former USSR, is produced there. [SS]

9. Sochi and Sukhumi are popular resorts on the northeastern shore of the Black Sea. Sochi was in the RSFSR; Sukhumi (or Sukhum) was the main town of the region of Abkhazia within the Georgian SSR. [SS]

10. Matyas Rakosi (1892–1971) was general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of Hungary from 1945 to 1948 and of the Hungarian Workers' Party from 1948 to 1956.

11. Vasily Pavlovich Mzhavanadze. See Biographies.

12. Resolutions of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) of November 9, 1951 and March 27, 1952 concerning the exposure in Georgia of a Mingrelian nationalist organization headed by Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(B) of Georgia M. Baramiya. These resolutions were annulled on April 10, 1953, by the Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee “Concerning Infringements of Soviet Laws by the Former Ministries of State Security of the USSR and of the Georgian SSR.”

13. “Kartvelian” is apparently the preferred form that has come into English for the language or people of this part of Georgia, but the form “Karthli” is also used, and the region is also called Karthlia. [GS]

14. The Georgian nation emerged through the fusion of various regional groups who originally spoke distinct though related languages. The Kartvelians were the core group in this process. To varying degrees, these groups retain a sense of their own identity while also regarding themselves as Georgians. The languages of some of the non-Kartvelian groups, such as the Mingrelians, the Svan, and the Laz, have survived into the modern period. However, there are no grounds for claiming that they are any the less “real Georgians” than the descendants of the Kartvelians. [SS]

15. In 1938 Kandid Nestorovich Charkviani (1907–?) was promoted from third to first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia when Beria became first deputy to the people's commissar of state security Yezhov. Charkviani remained in the post until 1952, when he was replaced by Akaky Irakliyevich Mgeladze (1910–?). [SK/SS]

**STALIN'S FAMILY, AND HIS DAUGHTER SVETLANA**

Today is March 30, 1968. The funeral of Yuri Gagarin. We have lost a splendid man. I feel sorrow to the depths of my soul at taking leave of this man, who was at the height of his powers and could have served the people much longer. But death is no respecter of persons, and today the people of the whole world will say goodbye to Gagarin. The circumstances of his death are incomprehensible to me. Why all of a sudden did he have to make this flight in an airplane?<sup>1</sup> The news reports were formal, bureaucratic, not forthcoming. There were no details that could help you sort things out. Maybe he was making a test flight with some sort of equipment that needed to be tried out. Is that possible? It's hard for me to judge now, but over the course of time everything will become known. Even if this flight was necessary to prepare for future operations in the conquest of outer space, it seems that the airplane's readiness for use was not checked over very carefully. A lot depends on the skills of the technical support staff. His death may have been the result of a technical failure, something that didn't work the way it was supposed to. It was the duty of those making the necessary preparations for the flight to ensure that it would be safe from accidents. They failed, and the result was a disaster, the premature death of a man who was dear to all the peoples of the earth. It's a bitter thing to read about.

Stalin's character was harsh and abrupt, and his habits were coarse and rude. But his rudeness was not at all a reflection of his anger about a particular situation or his attitude toward a specific individual. It was a kind of generalized anger, an inborn rudeness and crudeness, although it was most likely exacerbated by his upbringing and the influence of his environment. I experienced his rudeness many times as it affected my own person despite the fact that Stalin had a good attitude toward me. If he had had a bad attitude toward me or some lurking mistrust, he could have taken reprisals against me quite easily, as he did with many people he found not to his liking. Granted that he did send me a very harshly worded telegram in regard to grain deliveries after the war. I've already spoken about that. (In that telegram he informed me that I was a "dubious element.") But he didn't take reprisals against me!

I would even say that he treated me with a certain respect. More than once after he had treated me harshly he would change and show a favorable attitude toward me. But God forbid that this ever would take the form of an apology. No, to express his feelings in that form was alien to his character. After all, he indulged in rude behavior even toward those closest to him. I

want to talk about one episode in particular as an illustration. This was probably during the last year of his life. We gathered at Stalin's place after he had invited us to bring in the New Year at his "nearby" dacha. Nothing special happened at that New Year's celebration to distinguish it from other evenings we had spent with him. The same group of people gathered, but of course their mood was more high-spirited than usual. After all, it was New Year! We ate dinner and had drinks and hors d'oeuvres. Stalin was in a good mood, and therefore he drank a lot and made others do so as well. A fairly large amount of wine was drunk. Then he went to the record player and began putting on records. We listened to orchestral music, Russian songs, and Georgian songs. Then he put on dance music and everyone started to dance.

One man was "recognized" among us as an accomplished dancer—Mikoyan. But any one of his dances was just like the one before, whether it was called Russian or Caucasian. He always started by dancing the lezghinka.<sup>2</sup> Then Voroshilov would join in, and others would follow. I personally was not inclined to "shake a leg," as the saying goes. I was like a cow on ice. That's the kind of dancer I was. But I, too, went through the motions of "dancing." As a dancer Kaganovich was not much classier than me, and the same was true of Malenkov. Bulganin had danced well, it seems, at one time in his youth. He would stamp out something Russian to a good rhythm. Stalin also would move his feet around and stretch out his arms. I would say that the general mood was a good one. Only Molotov was not there with us. Molotov was quite the man about town when it came to dancing. He had grown up in a family of the intelligentsia, and then he had been a college student and danced a lot at student parties. Besides that, he loved classical music. He himself played the violin and was quite a musical person in general. In my eyes, although I am a poor judge, he was a first-rate dancer. We sang along with the records that Stalin put on, and we also sang our own songs.

Then Svetlanka<sup>3</sup> showed up. That's what Stalin called her, and we followed suit. I don't know if he had called her on the phone or whether she came on her own initiative. She found herself among a flock of older people, to put it mildly. Here she was, a sober young woman, but the moment she came into the room her father forced her to start dancing, even though she was tired. I could see that she was barely dancing. Her father kept insisting, but her heart wasn't in it. She stopped and stood leaning her shoulder against the wall next to the record player. Stalin went over to her and so did I. We stood there together. Stalin joked with her and said: "Well, Svetlanka, why don't you dance? Come on and dance, little housekeeper."<sup>4</sup> "I've already danced, Papa. I'm tired." He grabbed a fistful of her hair and pulled her by the forelock

out onto the dance floor. I saw that she had gone all red in the face, and there were tears in her eyes. It was such a pitiful thing to see. But her father pulled her by her hair and jerked her around. This was supposed to be an expression of a father's love. There's no doubt that he did love Svetlanka. He also loved his younger son, Vasya,<sup>5</sup> although he criticized him for his drunkenness and lack of discipline. But Svetlanka was a good student, and her behavior as a young woman was just fine. I never heard anything bad about her, and Stalin was proud of her. This was simply his strange way of expressing his fatherly feelings. And he did this rudely and crudely, not because he wanted to cause her pain. He just didn't know any other way.

I have started talking about Svetlana because today she is in an unfortunate position. I can't understand how she decided to do what she did, something unforgivable for a Soviet citizen. She abandoned her homeland, left her children behind, and gave the enemies of socialism a chance to slander us and use her name, the name of Stalin's daughter, to harm our country and our society. She explains herself in the book she wrote.<sup>6</sup> I have heard excerpts from the book over the radio, and I read a synopsis prepared by our journalists. Of course it's not an intelligent book. It's written irrationally. It was evidently the result of a spiritual and physical breakdown. I don't think Svetlana was a religious person initially. But she writes that she has been baptized. This is strange. I find it hard to accept. In my view what we have here are the expressions of an unhealthy state of mind.

I had great respect for Svetlana's mother [Nadezhda Alliluyeva], and I knew her well. We were students together at the Industrial Academy, where I was secretary of the party organization and she was elected by the students to be the organizer of a Communist student group. Thus she often came to see me to have one or another political question explained. It was a turbulent time in the life of the Industrial Academy then. It was 1929 and 1930, and our fight against the "Rights" was under way. The Industrial Academy was simply littered with them, and for a while the party organization at the Academy unofficially supported the "Rights." Later the Academy became a bastion of support for the Central Committee, and my role in that, as the saying goes, was not the least. Putting modesty aside, I can say that the role I played was foremost in that struggle. That's why I was elected secretary of the party organization at the Academy. I headed a group that stood firmly for the party's general line as pursued by Stalin during the 1920s.

Evidently this brought Nadya and me close together. That's what we called her at first. Later we began to call her Nadezhda Sergeevna.<sup>7</sup> When we studied together or discussed political questions she never in any way

brought up her association with Stalin; she knew how to hold back. When I became secretary of the party's Moscow committee I met with Stalin more frequently and was at his home for family dinners. That's when I realized that Alliluyeva had told Stalin about the political life at the Industrial Academy and about my role there. In his conversations with me he sometimes reminded me about events that I never would have remembered or had completely forgotten. That's when I realized that Nadya had told her husband about them.

I assume that that is what determined Stalin's attitude toward me, not only then but later as well. I call this my lucky lottery ticket. I drew a lucky ticket, and that's why I remained alive. The majority of my contemporaries, my schoolmates, and the friends I worked with in party organizations, laid down their lives as "enemies of the people." And I often ask myself, "Why was I spared?" The fact that I really was devoted to the party's cause is not a matter for doubt. I know that very well. But the comrades who worked with me were also devoted to the party's cause, and to a man they took part in the battle for the party's general line and in support of Stalin just as much as I did. Nevertheless, even though they were blameless, they perished. Probably Stalin saw my activities through Nadya's eyes, since she and I had worked so closely together. She saw me almost every day, respected my political work, and told Stalin about it all, and that became the basis for his confidence in me.

Sometimes he would attack me, insult me, and treat me rudely. Nevertheless I will say that until the last day of his life he had a favorable attitude toward me. You can't speak of any kind of love on the part of this man. That would be too sentimental. It was not in his character. But his respect for me was expressed in the support he always gave me.

In the early 1930s, at the family dinners at Stalin's home, besides himself and Nadezhda Sergeevna as host and hostess, there were also Nadya's parents, her mother and father, the Alliluyevs,<sup>8</sup> her brother and his wife, her sister Anna Sergeevna and Anna's husband, Stanislav Redens (who headed the NKVD administration for Moscow province), a very good comrade, who was Polish by nationality. Stalin had him shot as well, even though he must have known him very well and known he could trust him. Those dinners were like any family dinner. It was pleasant for me to be invited to them. Bulganin was also invited. Stalin sat us side by side and was quite attentive toward us.

Nadya was quite different from Stalin in her temperament. One thing I liked about her very much was her modesty, a good sign in a human being. When she was a student at the Industrial Academy only a very few people

knew she was Stalin's wife. She was just Alliluyeva, that was all. There was another person with the same last name who was also a student, formerly a miner, but he was not related to her. Nadya never took advantage of any privileges. She didn't come to school by car or go back to the Kremlin by car; she traveled on the streetcar and in general tried not to set herself apart from the mass of the students. That was wise of her—not to be demonstrative about the fact that she was close to the man who was considered the number-one figure in the world of politics.

Vasya Stalin was an intelligent lad, but self-willed. It was early in his young manhood that he began to drink. He did his studying just any old way, behaving in an undisciplined fashion, and caused Stalin a lot of bitterness. As I recall, Stalin used to beat him because of this and assigned Chekists to keep their eye on him. Svetlanka was different. She would always go running around the house when we arrived. Stalin called her his "little housekeeper," and we used to call her the same thing. She was always well dressed. I remember her [sometimes] wearing a Ukrainian costume with an embroidered blouse or [at other times] a Russian *sarafan*.<sup>9</sup> She looked like an elegant little doll. Svetlanka had a great resemblance to her mother. Her hair was a dark chestnut color, and she had tiny freckles on her face. The mother's hair, to be sure, was a little darker than the daughter's.

The "little housekeeper" grew up before our eyes. When we arrived, Stalin would usually say: "Come on, little housekeeper, serve the treats. The guests have arrived." And she would run to the kitchen. Stalin told us: "When she gets angry at me she threatens me. She says, 'I'll go to the kitchen and complain to the cook about you.' And I tell her: 'Oh, have mercy on me, don't complain. I won't get off lightly if you complain!' Then she insists even harder that if I treat her badly, she'll tell the cook."

Yakov was Stalin's older son by his first wife, a Georgian woman.<sup>10</sup> He was already a grown man at that time. He was an engineer by profession. I didn't know Yakov. When I began to visit Stalin at his home I rarely saw Yakov there. He lived in his own separate quarters and had his own family. I saw him at family dinners at Stalin's only a few times, and he was always there by himself. He never brought his wife and daughter to his father's place when I was there. After Nadya committed suicide, when we visited Stalin's home we always found Vasily and Svetlana there. I gradually got to know little Svetlana. I became rather attached to her and took a kind of fatherly attitude toward her. I simply felt sorry for her in an ordinary human way, because she was a kind of orphan. Stalin was rude and inattentive. He had no sense

of parental tenderness. He was dry and abrasive in his personal relations. Everywhere he turned he left an unpleasant aftertaste in his contacts with people. His was an aggressive and vexatious character.

Coming back to the present time, when I heard that Svetlana had gone to India and refused to return to the Soviet Union I couldn't believe it. How was this possible? I thought at first that it was one more slanderous invention by the bourgeois journalists. But several days went by, and soon no doubt remained that she was not going to return. To this day I feel sorry for her. It's like the lines in a poem by the poet Nekrasov<sup>11</sup>: "Sorrow for the forest reaches the point of tears./ How many leafy birches there had been!" Of course she is not a birch forest, but a living human being. And I feel all the sorrier for her that her fate has taken the course it has, a complicated and difficult fate. After all, she lost her mother when she was a child and was raised alone by a nurse. Her father paid very little attention to her. He always went on vacation alone, never took his children with him. She grew up without feeling parental affection. Even little kittens love to have their mother lick them in the sunshine. Any creature needs affection. And that includes human beings. This girl was deprived of that, and as a result certain troubled layers or "encrustations" built up in her innermost nature.

Later she married. I didn't know her husband. His name was Morozov, as I recall. His name sounded Russian, but actually he was Jewish. Stalin tolerated him for a while, although as far as I could see Morozov was never invited as a son-in-law to be a guest in Stalin's home. They had a son, but I don't think Stalin ever saw him. And that too left its mark on Svetlana's spiritual makeup. Then Stalin was taken with a fit of anti-Semitism, and she was forced to divorce Morozov. He was an intelligent man, a good specialist; he had a doctoral degree in economics and was a loyal Soviet citizen.<sup>12</sup>

When Stalin demanded that Svetlana divorce her husband he evidently said approximately the same thing to Malenkov. Malenkov's daughter, a very pleasing young woman named Volya,<sup>13</sup> had married a man named Shamberg, the son of a friend of Malenkov's. His father was an excellent party official and a very decent, highly cultured person. He had worked in the party apparatus under Malenkov for many years. All the resolutions that Malenkov was assigned to prepare were drafted by Shamberg, who was a very well-spoken and clever fellow. I met Shamberg's son at Malenkov's place many times, and I liked him very much. He was young, capable, and well educated. He was also an economist. And suddenly I was told by Malenkov's wife, Valeriya Alekseyevna, for whom I had great respect, that Volya had divorced her first husband and married an architect. I'm not about to try and compare which



of them was better or worse. That's a private matter. A wife herself decides who is a better husband, the first or the second. As I see it the second one was also a good fellow. He was a few years younger than his wife, and Volya might have found that pleasing. But to leave the son of a close friend of your father? That was incomprehensible to me, and unpleasant.

Malenkov was not an anti-Semite, and he never told me that Stalin had said anything to him on the subject. Still, I'm convinced that even if Stalin said nothing directly, when Malenkov heard that Stalin demanded Svetlana divorce her husband because he was a Jew, Malenkov must have "guessed" what was required of him, and he made his daughter do the same thing.<sup>14</sup> Here again is evidence of shameful anti-Semitism of a very base kind. I don't attribute this to Malenkov personally. What we are confronted with here is the behavior of a toady. If Stalin did something, Malenkov had to do it, too. In general I think Malenkov was a normal person in his overall views, and I don't think he suffered from the shameful sickness of mind represented by anti-Semitism.

Svetlana also married for a second time. Stalin wanted her to marry the son of Zhdanov, Yuri, who today is the rector of Rostov University.<sup>15</sup> I liked him, too. He was a smart, well-educated, and sensible person. Stalin also liked him, but Svetlana did not, and after Stalin died she divorced Yuri Zhdanov. I suffered over that also. I simply didn't want to hear the bad things people were saying about her, that she was making a display of inconstancy. After that she lived alone for a long time. Two children remained with her: a son by her first husband and a daughter by her second.

About a year before the end of my political activity Mikoyan told me that Svetlana had approached him and asked his advice: she wanted to marry a journalist from India. Mikoyan said that she loved the man, that the Indian was older than she was, but that she had known him a long time, and he was a decent man, and besides that a Communist.<sup>16</sup> He said: "She asked me to find out what your attitude would be toward this." I answered: "If she thinks he's a worthy person, let her marry him. It's her choice, and we have nothing to do with it. We won't interfere. The fact that he's not a citizen of the Soviet Union cannot serve as an obstacle. Let her decide for herself." And she married him. I found out about this after I had been pensioned off, and I was pleased because I wanted to see her happy at last, with her personal life arranged to her own satisfaction.

Then this Indian journalist died, as I came to find out. Svetlana went to bury him in his homeland and didn't return.<sup>17</sup> I was literally dumbfounded. For several days I refused to believe it—until irrefutable confirmation arrived.



I didn't read her book in its entirety. Western radio broadcasts carried excerpts, ones that they found advantageous. Perhaps these passages were not typical of the book as a whole, but the parts that were broadcast seemed to me peculiar, to say the least. As a Soviet citizen who had grown up under the conditions in our country, and on top of that as the daughter of Stalin, how could she write something like this? After all, she had been brought up and trained in Soviet surroundings. I wouldn't say that she was influenced only by the inner circle around Stalin. I don't know exactly who the people were that were in charge of her upbringing. I remember that there was an attractive Georgian woman, who was around for a while, but only a short while; she soon disappeared. Someone told me that she was Svetlana's governess.<sup>18</sup> I don't know what kind of governess she was or where she came from. Rumor had it that she was installed by Beria, as much to keep an eye on Stalin as on Svetlana. In school Svetlana was a good student and never had to be scolded.

I assumed that what happened [Svetlana's defection] was a result of a psychological breakdown suffered by this young woman. No wonder. Her mother had died young and under what circumstances! She understood that her mother had died as a result of the strained relations between her mother and father. And it's not just that she died. She committed suicide. There was even gossip that Stalin had killed her. Even today I can't say what the truth is, because I know of two versions: one that Stalin shot her; and the other, more likely version, that she shot herself as the result of an insult to her pride and honor as a wife. Certainly Svetlana knew some version of this and suffered greatly from it; it must have had a powerful effect on her. Then she got married and divorced, being left with a son. She again married and left her second husband of her own accord, being left with a daughter from him. None of this is very normal for a young woman.

Also her relationship with her father was difficult and complicated. Her father loved her, but expressed his feelings in brutal ways, like the tenderness of a cat toward a mouse. This could also have contributed to the psychological deterioration that went on within Svetlana as a child, then as an adolescent girl, and finally as a young mother. After that, there came the death of her father, with all the attendant upheaval and the revelations about his abuses of power, which must have been terribly upsetting for her. These circumstances, as they took shape, must have torn at her soul and affected her psychological state. Then came the last straw, the drop that caused the cup to overflow: the death of her third husband and his funeral.

What happened next is something I've been told by people whose information was based only on rumor. Why was it that she didn't return? I am speaking about a version of events that I've heard, but I really don't know for certain. It is said that after her husband's funeral she went to our embassy in India. The ambassador there was Benediktov.<sup>19</sup> I knew him well. He was a "seasoned" Soviet official. She wanted to stay in India for a few months, but Benediktov advised her to return to the Soviet Union right away. If an ambassador urged a Soviet citizen to return home immediately, that would put anyone on their guard. Especially because Svetlana knew all the routines that were typical for us in this kind of situation. It meant they were showing mistrust of her. Such mistrust could have grave consequences for the individual who was being told to return to the homeland immediately. No care or concern was shown for the particular individual, but rather political distrust and insulting, humiliating treatment—even a well-balanced person would be thrown off by that.

And Svetlana was not a well-balanced person, as can be seen from the content of her book. She was in a state of psychological disorientation, and she turned for help to a foreign power. She went to the American ambassador, traveled to Switzerland, and then to the United States. This was a foolish move that cannot be justified in any way. But it was also foolish the way she was treated. It was rude and crude. These people were acting like policemen when they should have displayed tact and respect for this woman as an individual and a Soviet citizen.

What, in my opinion, should have been done? I am convinced that none of this would have happened if she had been treated differently. When she came to the Soviet embassy and said she found it necessary to remain in India two or three months, the reply should have been: "Svetlana Iosifovna, why only three months? Get yourself a visa for a year or two or three. You can also get an unlimited visa and simply live here. When you want to, you can come home to the Soviet Union." She should have been given freedom of choice, and thus her morale would have been strengthened. She should have been shown that people trusted her.

I'm convinced that if she had been treated that way, even though she had with her the book she had written, she might not have published it or she might have revised it. But she was shown that she was not trusted. She is an intelligent woman and she understood that right away. This political distrust for her as the daughter of Stalin caused the cup to run over. And so she plunged into the maelstrom of émigré existence, deprived herself of her

homeland, and parted with her children and friends. It is very, very sad. I feel sorry for Svetlanka. I still speak of her that way, although as a grown woman the correct way to refer to her is Svetlana Iosifovna. So then, her life as one of our Soviet citizens has ended in a dreadful way. It's a terrible shame!

There are examples proving the correctness of what I'm saying. When I headed the Soviet government the young pianist Vladimir Ashkenazi<sup>20</sup> won first prize at the musical competition in Moscow named after Tchaikovsky. Ashkenazi was married to a British woman, who had been studying at a conservatory in our country, and they had a child. They made a trip to England, where his wife's parents lived. I was told that she had been born in Ireland but was a British citizen. Ashkenazi was a good pianist. I heard him play, and I congratulated him after he was awarded the prize. I still listen to his performances on the radio. At any rate, he went to the Soviet embassy in London and informed them that his wife refused to return to the Soviet Union. But, he said, he loved her very much, and they had a child together. He asked what he should do. The ambassador immediately reported to Moscow about what had happened, and Gromyko passed this along to me. He said some sort of telegram had been received from our ambassador.

I consulted with the comrades and proposed the following: "Let's give him a passport for foreign travel for as long as he wants. With this passport he can always come to the Soviet Union if he wishes. This is the only possible rational solution. If we start forcefully insisting that he return, he obviously won't do that. He's not an anti-Soviet element, but we could artificially turn him into one, because if we assert our will and he doesn't comply, then it will be a confrontation between him and the Soviet government. Sideline observers and commentators will immediately appear and start churning things up, making an anti-Soviet campaign. Why would we want to create such a situation? What would be the problem, anyhow, if he stayed in London and came here occasionally to give concerts? After all he's a musician, a professional. He could continue to give concerts in his homeland and remain a citizen of the Soviet Union." Everyone agreed. And that's what we did. And I find it pleasant today when I turn on the radio and hear them announce that the pianist Ashkenazi will be giving a concert in Moscow. It's a pleasant and satisfying thing, the fact that we kept the honest name of this major pianist on our side—linked with the Soviet Union—and at the same time we did not disrupt his family life.

It may be that a time will come when he and people like him will want to come and make their base of operations here. Or it may happen that they will base themselves outside our country. I don't rule that out. But what of

it? I propose that the time has come when Soviet citizens should be given the opportunity to live where they want. If they want to travel to some other country, please do so! It's an unbelievable thing after fifty years of existence of Soviet power to keep people under lock and key. We, Communists, consider capitalism an accursed system. There, in the capitalist world, working-class people are doomed to a miserable existence. Meanwhile, we are building socialism and have succeeded in this effort in many respects, and we will succeed even more in the future. Without question, our system is the most progressive at the present stage of human development. If we were to use biblical terms, we would call it a paradise, not in the sense that all sorts of goodies are pouring out of a "horn of plenty," and all you have to do is open your mouth and swallow your fill. No, that kind of paradise doesn't exist, and I don't know when it will. But then everything has to be viewed in relative terms.

The point is, why are we contradicting ourselves? We're building a better life, and in order to keep people here living this better life, we're locking up our borders tight as a drum. Sometimes our own Soviet jokesters, and not the enemy, have said: "Why drive people into paradise with a club?" We heard these words when we were carrying out collectivization by forcible methods, and in other cases too. I think it's time to stop handing such arguments to the enemies of socialism. Why don't we trust the people who are building socialism? We must show that they are all free citizens, free builders of a new and better life, that they are building socialism on the basis of their own convictions, without compulsion, not that they are creating conditions in which they themselves will have nowhere to turn. That kind of thing would be shameful for us. The time has come to eliminate anything like that. Look at Yugoslavia. It is no richer than we are. But the last time I was in Yugoslavia [in 1963] I talked with Tito, and I remember those talks now with pleasure. I asked him: "How do things stand in your country with regard to your borders?"

He said: "Our borders are like this: someone comes up to the border, says where he's going, and that's it, that's all, no checking. Someone leaving the country goes through certain elementary formalities, then the barrier is raised, and the car leaves Yugoslavia. This is true for people from other countries visiting Yugoslavia. And every Yugoslav can leave the country just as freely." He told me that they had a lot of miners who went to West Germany to work. They would say: "I'm going to earn money to buy a car." That's all. And what has happened to Yugoslavia? Has it disappeared because of this? No.

Incidentally, when I raised the question of restoring good relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, Suslov could not in any way understand the need for it. He tried to argue that they didn't have socialism in Yugoslavia, that it

was not a socialist country. I said to him: "Let's analyze this. Let's set up a commission and have it study the elements that are the social indicators of what kind of system exists in each country, whether it's a capitalist country or one we can call socialist." Such a commission was established and the appropriate documents were submitted. I was convinced of what the results would be, but I wanted an authoritative commission to analyze all this in a visible way. Those documents are still on file in the party's Central Committee offices. They demonstrate convincingly that the defining characteristics of socialism are present in Yugoslavia and that the Yugoslav state has been built on socialist foundations. So then, why can't we follow Yugoslavia's example and open our borders?

If that's impossible, what kind of freedom do we have? It could be said that we have a certain class structure of society. But that relates to an earlier period of our existence, which has long since passed. Today, fifty years after we eliminated enemy classes,<sup>21</sup> these are arguments for fools only, as the saying goes. For thinking people this is a shameful line of argument.

Well now, what if we had let Svetlana decide for herself and she had not returned? What of it? That would have been too bad, but there's nothing you can do about it. After all, even under the existing travel-visa system, she didn't return. There was another incident having to do with this heritage that lies like a heavy chain on the consciousness of Soviet leaders. Our number-one ballerina, the best ballerina not only in the Soviet Union but in the world of ballet globally, Maya Plisetskaya<sup>22</sup>—what was her fate? When the Bolshoi Theater troupe went abroad, she was always excluded from the list of those traveling. It was reported to me that she could not be trusted, that she might not return. I didn't know her personally. I had never spoken with her, and I had no idea what her sentiments were. Of course it would be unpleasant if a ballerina like Plisetskaya abandoned the Soviet Union. That would be a demonstrative act and a painful thrust for us to bear.

Then one day when the latest ballet troupe was getting ready for a tour abroad I received a letter from Plisetskaya in my capacity as first secretary of the Central Committee, quite a long and sincere letter. She wrote that she was a patriot and felt offended by the lack of confidence being expressed toward her, and she gave assurances of her reliability. So the question arose of what to do. I made copies of her letter, and all the members of the Central Committee Presidium read it. I proposed that she be added to the list of those traveling abroad. Doubts were expressed: she might not return. I said: "Yes. She might not. But she says that that will not happen. And I believe her. We can't live without trust. If she's been dishonest in what she's written

and simply wrote it in order to get out, well, so what? We'll survive that." She made the trip. I felt recompensed many times over when she performed brilliantly on her tour abroad and returned, having added greatly to the glory of Soviet culture and the Soviet art of ballet. And what if we had continued not to let her go abroad? We would have crippled her or made an anti-Soviet person out of her. Because the human psyche is a very fragile thing. You have to treat it with care in order not to cause a breakdown. An incautious step can throw anyone off balance, and it can prove to be a fatal step for a person's entire life. I was proud of the correct decision we made, and I was pleased that the ballerina properly appreciated the trust we showed in her.

There was another case involving the famous pianist Svyatoslav Rikhter.<sup>23</sup> The question of his making a trip abroad also came up. It was reported to me that there were objections. As I recall, it was [Soviet Minister of Culture Yekaterina] Furtseva<sup>24</sup> who reported to me that our state-security people had objections. On what grounds? He had a mother living in West Germany, and they didn't know if he would return to his homeland or not. Of course the loss of such a major musician as Rikhter would be damaging to our country. After all, he was number one in the world of music. What was to be done? I said: "Let him go." The idea was raised of requiring a commitment from him not to travel to West Germany. I said: "If he travels beyond our borders after a commitment has been extracted from him not to go to West Germany, and not to meet with his mother, that would be the stupidest thing possible. Instead we need to suggest to him: 'You haven't seen your mother for so many years. Why don't you go visit her?' He should feel that we are not opposed to that." As it turned out, Rikhter went to West Germany and met his mother. I was told that during the German occupation of Ukraine, Rikhter's mother had virtually abandoned him and left the country. She had been living in Odessa then, as I recall. Her son grew up here. After all was said and done, he did return from his trip abroad.

Later he made a tour of America, giving concerts. There he was given a marvelous grand piano as a gift. Furtseva came to me and said: "What are we to do? Under our laws a substantial customs duty must be paid if you bring a grand piano across the border. Evidently Rikhter is not in any position to pay the amount required."

I said: "Tell those in charge of customs on my behalf that everything must be officially arranged so that he will not have to pay any customs duty at all. Since he received this piano as an award in the United States, it's not for us to erect obstacles to his keeping the gift. If we deprive him of this gift, it will

leave a bitter taste in his mouth. It will kill his spirit. For a musician to have a good instrument is a great joy. Don't deprive him of that joy. He deserves it. He deserves far more than that!" Furtseva was also pleased with this resolution of the problem. Today Rikhter gives concerts all over the world. He travels everywhere, and as far as I know, there is no question whatsoever concerning his reliability as a Soviet citizen.

Could there be cases where our trust in a person might be betrayed? Among the 200 million and more people that live in our country of course both the pure and the impure are to be found. The impure will float to the surface, like any lightweight substance in water, and the waves will wash them away from our shores. Let them swim away themselves, going with the current. The same kind of decision can be made with people of whom we have nothing bad to say. Some people may display a passing phase of vacillation. Others may simply want to have a taste of life abroad, which in some respects might be attractive. Let them! We can't take power in order to erect a fence around our country and not let anyone near the fence, never mind cross the fence. We can't do things that way! Remember Lenin. During the first years of the revolution and Soviet power, we ourselves expelled enemies from the country, and every opportunity was left open for those who wished to leave. We said: "Please, pack your suitcases and go!" And they went.

I remember in 1919 I was in the Red Army, serving in Kursk, and many people were relocating from there to Ukraine.<sup>25</sup> We heard stories from the "grapevine," the word-of-mouth newspaper among soldiers in the Red Army, about how people hid their personal possessions when they crossed the border, the various secret places they chose for hiding things. That's how reality was spiced up by the inventive minds of young soldiers. But cases like that did occur. Because people were openly allowed to leave the country. And today, fifty years later, there is all the more reason for us to create the kind of social atmosphere in which a person is no longer regarded as a potential defector. To take any other position is to disgrace our own ideas, our doctrines, and our social system. I feel very distressed and aggrieved that such methods were applied in the case of Svetlana. Even today I don't think that all is lost. I think that she might still return.<sup>26</sup> The idea of coming back to see her children may gather strength in her mind. She at least should have that opportunity. She should know that if she wants to return, she can, and that her past weakness would not be held against her. While I condemn Svetlana for making an unwise decision, I also condemn those who didn't offer her a helping hand, didn't assist her in finding a proper solution, but instead, by the foolish measures they took, drove her to incorrect action.



1. Yuri Gagarin (1934–68) was the first man in space. Before volunteering and being selected for training as a cosmonaut he had been an air force pilot and later he returned to this work. (See Biographies.) While flying a MIG-15 in cloudy conditions on March 27, 1968, Gagarin lost control of his aircraft, rapidly lost height, and crashed into the ground. There are a number of conflicting accounts of the cause of the disaster. According to the note on the subject in the Russian edition of Khrushchev's memoirs published by *Moscow News* (Vol. 2, p. 75; note 1), Gagarin's plane got caught up in the tailwind of another plane that had crossed his flight path. However, a more recently published book by the military test pilot Stepan Anastasovich Mikoyan (son of the Soviet leader Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan) argues in favor of an alternative explanation—namely, that Gagarin's plane collided with a weather balloon (*shar-zond*). This explanation was accepted by the government commission appointed to investigate the accident (*Vospominaniya voennogo letchika-ispytatelya* [Reminiscences of a Military Test Pilot] [Moscow: Izdatelsky Dom "Tekhnika—molodezhi," 2002], 375–83). [SS]

2. The lezhinka is defined in the Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary as a "courtship dance of the Caucasus mountains in which the woman moves with graceful ease while the man dances wildly around her." [GS] The Lezhins (or Lezgins), after whom the dance is named, are a people of the eastern Caucasus. They live mainly in the southern part of Daghestan and the north-eastern part of Azerbaijan. [SS]

3. Svetlana Stalina (Alliluyeva) (born 1926) was Stalin's youngest child and only daughter. She was born in 1926 to Stalin's second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva (1901–32). (For further information on both mother and daughter, see Biographies.) After her father's death in 1953 she renounced his name and adopted her mother's maiden name, Alliluyeva. [SS] Svetlanka is an endearing form of the name Svetlana. [GS]

4. "Little housekeeper" was Stalin's nickname for his daughter. [GS]

5. Vasya is short for Vasily. [GS]

6. This is a reference to *Twenty Letters to a Friend*, published in the West in 1967. [GS] Svetlana defected to the United States in 1967, leaving behind her children Joseph (Iosif) and Yekaterina. [SK]

7. Nadya is short for Nadezhda, Stalin's wife. Nadezhda Sergeyevna is a more formal or polite form of address; Nadya suggests a girl, Nadezhda Sergeyevna, a young woman. [GS]

8. Stalin and his father-in-law Sergei Yakovlevich Alliluyev (1866–1945) were old comrades who had known each other since September 1911. See Biographies. [SS]

9. A *sarafan* is a sleeveless tunic that buttons in the front. [GS]

10. Stalin's son Yakov and his first wife Yekaterina Grigoryevna Svanidze. See Biographies. [SS]

11. The Russian poet, journalist, and publisher Nikolai Nekrasov (1821–78) was best known for his lyric and narrative verse and acquired the reputation of Russia's first "poet of the people." From 1847 to 1866 he edited and published *Sovremennik* (The Contemporary), which became a major literary and political journal. [SS]

12. Grigory Morozov (Moroz) was one of Svetlana's fellow students at Moscow State University. They met and married in 1943, when she was seventeen. Their son Joseph (Iosif) was born in 1945. They divorced in 1947. See Biographies.

This was not the first occasion on which Svetlana's private life was affected by her father's anti-Semitism. At the age of sixteen she had fallen in love with the Jewish filmmaker Aleksei Kapler; Stalin arranged for him to be sentenced to a ten-year term in prison camp. See Biographies. [SS]

13. In the 1940s, Volya Georgiyevna Malenkova was a student of architecture. Her husband at that time was Vladimir Shamberg, a student of economics and the son of Mikhail Shamberg, deputy head of a department of the CPSU Central Committee. See Biographies. [SK]

14. Malenkov's son-in-law was Vladimir Shamberg, son of Malenkov's colleague Mikhail Shamberg and grandson of Solomon Lozovsky (see Biographies). Malenkov and Mikhail Shamberg had studied together at the Moscow Bauman Higher Technical School, and the Malenkov and Shamberg families were on friendly terms.

On January 12, 1949, Malenkov ordered Vladimir Shamberg to divorce his daughter Volya. Vladimir telephoned his father, who told him that Malenkov had called him and tried to persuade him, giving very vague reasons, that it would be better for the children to divorce. Vladimir's father told him not to resist: it was Malenkov, not Volya, who needed the divorce for reasons of his own.

On the same day, Malenkov's chief bodyguard took Vladimir to the Moscow City Court, where the divorce was finalized in contravention of all the legal requirements. (According to law, first an attempt should have been made to reconcile the couple, then the case should have gone to the district court and only after that to the city court.)

Also on the very same day, Vladimir was given a new passport in which there was no indication that he had ever been married to Volya.

The next day, January 13, on Stalin's orders, Malenkov summoned Lozovsky, accused him of separatism and of trying to organize a Jewish autonomous region in the Crimea.

On January 18 Lozovsky was expelled from the party, and on January 26 he was arrested. By this time no one could say that there was any family connection between Malenkov and an "enemy of the people."



This note is based on information provided by Vladimir Shamberg, who now lives in the United States. [SK]

15. Yuri Andreyevich Zhdanov. See Biographies.

16. Svetlana's Indian husband was Brajesh Singh, a prominent official in the Communist Party of India. They met in 1963 at a Soviet sanatorium to which the ailing Singh had been invited. Later he returned to Moscow to be with Svetlana. [SS]

17. Singh died in Moscow in 1966. He was cremated, and Svetlana took his ashes back to his family in India, where they were placed in the holy River Ganges. [SS]

18. Svetlana's "governess" Aleksandra Nikolayevna Nakashidze was a "nurse-housekeeper" (*sestrakhozyaika*), a lieutenant and then a major in the NKVD (secret police), and a distant relative of Beria (Varvara Samsonova, *Doch Stalina* [Stalin's Daughter] (Moscow: Olimp, 1998), 178). [SK]

19. Ivan Aleksandrovich Benediktov. See Biographies.

20. Vladimir Davidovich Ashkenazi (born 1937) is a pianist and conductor. He graduated from the Moscow Conservatoire. He won the Chopin competition in Warsaw in 1955 and the Tchaikovsky competition in 1962. He has lived abroad since 1963. In 1987 he was made conductor of the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra in London. [SS]

21. Here Khrushchev expresses his own ideological conception of Soviet society, according to

which the revolution of October 1917 did away with mutually antagonistic classes and established an "all-people's state." This conception stood in contrast to Stalin's conception, in which the Soviet state embodied the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and was engaged in an increasingly acute "class struggle" against desperate remnants of former hostile classes. [SS]

22. The ballet dancer Maya Mikhailovna Plisetskaya (born 1925) performed at the Bolshoi Theater from 1943 to 1988. She was made a People's Artist of the USSR in 1959, won the Lenin Prize in 1964, and became a Hero of Socialist Labor in 1985.

23. The pianist Svyatoslav Teofilovich Rikhter (1915–97) won the State Prize in 1950 and the Lenin Prize in 1961. He was made a People's Artist of the USSR in 1961 and a Hero of Socialist Labor in 1975.

24. Yekaterina Alekseyevna Furtseva. See Biographies.

25. At that time, Ukraine was occupied by the German army and under a pro-German government that had proclaimed Ukraine independent. [SK]

26. In 1982 Svetlana left the United States for Britain. In 1984 she returned to the Soviet Union, reacquired Soviet citizenship, and settled in Tbilisi, Georgia. In 1986 she went back to the United States, which she again left for Britain a few years later. [SS]

## STALIN'S LAST YEARS

After the Great Patriotic War it became more noticeable every year that Stalin was growing physically weaker. This was especially evident in his lapses of memory. Sometimes when we were sitting at his table, he would start to address some person he had interacted with for dozens of years or perhaps even longer, and suddenly he would stop. He couldn't remember the person's name. He would get very exasperated in such situations, and he didn't want others to notice. This only diminished his mental powers more than ever. I remember once he was addressing Bulganin and couldn't for the life of him remember his name. He looked at him and looked at him, then said: "What's your name?" "Bulganin." "Oh, yes, Bulganin!" And only then

did he say what he had originally wanted to say. Such lapses occurred fairly often, and this infuriated him

He would vent his anger by taking it out on the people he had worked with, who had traveled the long road together with him, and who unfortunately were witnesses to the undeserved deaths of many honest people. In the case of individuals like Bulganin and Malenkov, there was probably a lot they didn't know. They had actively assisted in the development of the destructive process, but it was as though they were acting blindly. The source of all these actions was in Stalin's hands, and all the materials concerning the alleged necessity to expand the operations of the "meat grinder" were provided by him personally; they were officially drawn up and explained by him personally. These explanations were used to make the harsh measures seem justified in the interests of the revolution, to strengthen its gains and advance the cause of building socialism. In short, everything was explained by the very best of motives. I don't know whether Stalin was led astray, even partially [by others]. For my part, I doubt it, because I sense and know, in remembering various remarks and statements he made, that he did this consciously, with the aim of excluding the possibility that any individuals or groups might appear in the party desiring to restore the internal democracy of Lenin's time and turn the country toward a democratic social structure. He didn't want to let that happen.

He behaved toward people as though he were God and had created them; his attitude was at once patronizing and contemptuous. God created the first human being out of clay, as we were taught as children from the Bible. So what kind of respect can you have for clay? Stalin said that the people were so much manure, a formless mass that would follow a strong leader. He showed his strength by destroying everything that might give nourishment to a true understanding of events, to sensible reasoning that might contradict his point of view. That was the tragedy of the USSR. And that was in keeping with the warning Lenin made, that Stalin was a man of intolerant character and capable of abusing power. How many times I've repeated this! These words constantly remain in my memory. What a prophecy that was of Lenin's! And how foolishly our party behaved in not listening to his advice and not drawing the necessary conclusions at the first plenum of the Central Committee after Lenin's death! Or at least at the first Congress. It turned out to be history's wish that the party and the Soviet people should travel the road of building socialism via the tragic detour of the Stalin era.

I remember when Stalin took a vacation for the last time at Novy Afon.<sup>1</sup> This was in 1951. (I know this, because in 1952 Stalin didn't take a vacation.

And since Stalin didn't take one, the rest of the leadership didn't either, and then in 1953 he died; consequently this had to have been in 1951.) He invited me to come stay with him, as often happened. I was on vacation then in Sochi,<sup>2</sup> as I recall, and I went from there to his place at Novy Afon. We vacationed there together. Then he called up Mikoyan, who was vacationing in Sukhumi.<sup>3</sup> He too came to Novy Afon. Thus the two of us were living alongside Stalin. I don't remember how many days we spent there, but it wasn't a long time. One day before dinner Stalin got up, got dressed, and left the house. We joined him, and the three of us stood in front of the building. And suddenly for no reason Stalin looked at me so piercingly and said: "I'm a rotten person. I don't trust anybody. I don't even trust myself." When he said that, we were literally struck dumb. Neither Mikoyan nor I could say anything in response. Stalin said nothing further. We stood there a while and then began a normal conversation.

Afterward I couldn't get those words out of my head. Why did he say that? It's true that all of us for quite a long time had observed his lack of trust in people. But when he spoke in such a categorical way, that he didn't believe in anyone, even himself—that seemed frightful. Can you imagine? A man occupying such a high post, who decided the fate of the entire country and influenced the fate of the world, to make such a statement. If you think about it and analyze it from that point of view, all the evil that Stalin did becomes comprehensible. The fact is that he really never did trust anyone. But there is another aspect to this matter. It is one thing for him not to trust people. That's his right, so to speak (although, of course, a person having such an outlook must suffer a lot of psychological pain). But it's something else altogether when a person who trusts no one has a temperament that drives him to destroy everyone he doesn't trust.

That's why the people in his inner circle were there only temporarily. As long as he trusted them to some degree, they continued to exist physically and do their work. But as he lost trust in them he started "watching them more closely." Then the cup of distrust toward one or another of these people who had worked with him would overflow, and their turn would come to meet a sorry end; they would join the ranks of the departed. That's actually what happened time after time with those who worked next to him and fought together with him in the ranks of the party with the aim of consolidating its ranks. Later almost all these people were destroyed. Kamenev,<sup>4</sup> for example. I don't know what Stalin's attitude was toward Trotsky<sup>5</sup> back in the earlier years. In the note that Lenin wrote before his death, he indicated

that the two outstanding figures in the party were Trotsky and Stalin. And immediately after that, Lenin wrote about Stalin's negative features.<sup>6</sup>

Stalin's admission that he didn't trust anyone, including himself, raises the curtain on some of the reasons for the tragedy that raged during his time as leader of the party and the country. And the Stalin era lasted a very long time. Heads flew, the heads of honest people who were guilty of absolutely nothing. Their names have been brought back to light so that the people will remember them. They were restored to history by the Twentieth Party Congress. But now, to our shame and disgrace, the reasons for the deaths of these people are being concealed again, and the ones guilty of these foul deeds are being covered up. This is of course not very intelligent, but the fact is, that's what's happening.

Returning to that bygone era, I will say again: things went so far that Stalin began to think that even Voroshilov<sup>7</sup> was a spy! It was probably for about five years that Stalin refused to invite Voroshilov to any important sessions that were held, above all Politburo sessions. Incidentally, no real sessions went on anyhow; there were simply episodic gatherings, held literally on the run, before dinner, although the questions decided there included both routine matters and major questions, questions of prime significance. Voroshilov was no longer admitted to such gatherings. On rare occasions he would appear without prior arrangement, that is, he would show up on his own initiative, or sometimes he would call first, but that happened very rarely.

To suspect Voroshilov of being a British spy was the greatest foolishness. I don't know what point one would have to reach in one's distrust of people to get into such a frame of mind. Suddenly Stalin distrusted the very same Voroshilov with whom he had for many years fought side by side and worked hand in hand. Voroshilov's loyalty to the party and to the working class could not be open to doubt in the slightest degree. His work in the post of people's commissar of defense is a different matter altogether. He demonstrated his incapacity as people's commissar because the Red Army was not prepared for the war. And it was not only because of the unjustified annihilation of officer cadres; the Red Army was not prepared as it should have been in terms of arms and equipment. Those arms, equipment, and reserve supplies did not correspond to the material and technical potential of the USSR and to the tasks of the time. Given our level of production, we could have had sufficient reserves to wage war for more than a year or even two years without running short. Yet at the beginning of the war it turned out we didn't have even enough rifles to meet our needs! Some of the most elementary things

necessary for an army simply were not there in sufficient quantity. We suffered from a shortage of weapons up until 1942. The shortage of anti-aircraft guns was felt especially severely, and as a result we suffered great losses from enemy air attacks.

There is no question that Voroshilov failed to measure up in his capacity as people's commissar of defense. I don't know how to explain this, but I, at any rate, felt that he didn't display the necessary diligence in his work as people's commissar.<sup>8</sup> I can compare him with Kaganovich.<sup>9</sup> The latter was less appealing to me as a person. But if we speak about his diligence and his capacity for work, Kaganovich was a regular whirlwind. He was such a human tornado that sometimes it seemed he was even capable of uprooting trees. He worked to the fullest extent of his powers, absolutely never spared himself, and never kept track of the time. He gave everything for his work for the party. Of course he was a careerist, but that is another question, for now I am simply talking about his style of work. Voroshilov was different. You could always find him at every festival or celebration. He made a great show of himself and his upright military bearing, but he really didn't pay much attention to military matters.

When Gamarnik, Tukhachevsky,<sup>10</sup> and the others were still there, men who really knew how to manage the political work and to organize the economic functioning of the army and provide for the necessary arms and equipment, the work moved forward even without Voroshilov. When those men were destroyed, and others took their places—figures like Mekhlis, Shchadenko, and Kulik,<sup>11</sup> who were unworthy of their posts—the People's Commissariat of Defense was transformed, and this is no lie, into an honest-to-goodness madhouse, if not into some sort of mad dogs' kennel, if we keep in mind who the leaders were. I have already told about how Timoshenko<sup>12</sup> once literally dragged me by the coattails to attend a session of the Chief Military Council of the Red Army.

Timoshenko was then the commander of the Kiev Special Military District (Russian initials, KOVO), and he and I had made a trip to Moscow. Timoshenko was a man with his own kind of cunning, as I have said. He apparently wanted me, as a member of the KOVO Military Council, to have a look at this kennel, to see how they were going for one another's throats, tearing at one another over trifles, but not attending to the real work in front of them.

Who was to blame for this? Both Voroshilov and Stalin. I think that even then Voroshilov no longer enjoyed Stalin's confidence to the extent that he should have. Otherwise, why would he have accepted such people? I'm not

talking about their political loyalty to the state and the country. They were honest people and above reproach in that respect. But their personalities were such that they simply couldn't tolerate one another, and therefore no coherent, coordinated activity resulted. And who suffered from that? The army, the people, and our country. But is it possible perhaps that Stalin deliberately arranged the situation so that this internecine squabbling would go on?

Now a few words about Molotov. It was always said of him that he was "Stalin's club."<sup>13</sup> Molotov was promoted to chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR after Rykov's ouster in 1930.<sup>14</sup> I was then a student at the Industrial Academy and one of the active party members in the Bauman district of Moscow. When we heard about Molotov's appointment all sorts of rumors were circulating around Moscow. In those days there still existed supporters of Bukharin and Rykov, of Zinoviev and Kamenev, and also of Syrtsov and Lominadze,<sup>15</sup> who were close to the Bukharinites. In fact today I can't even remember exactly what the differences were between them. In general they were people of the same political tendency.<sup>16</sup> Molotov was promoted to replace them since he was Stalin's most loyal and steadfast friend and comrade-in-arms. He stated as much himself at the Central Committee plenum at which his candidacy was proposed. And when I worked as secretary of the party's Moscow city committee and Moscow province committee and when Stalin used to invite me to his home, most often I would encounter Molotov there. I considered Stalin and Molotov the closest and most inseparable of friends. Also, they always went on vacation together.

Even today I can't say for sure what prompted Stalin to turn his back on Molotov. Of course, if we recall that Stalin jailed Molotov's wife, Zhemchuzhina,<sup>17</sup> Molotov never agreed, to the end of his days, with Stalin and the Central Committee plenum on that question. When the question of her removal from the Central Committee was before the plenum, everyone voted "aye," but Molotov abstained. He didn't vote against, but he abstained. This made Stalin explode in fury. Even after that—it's true—Molotov remained a supporter of Stalin. But this event at the plenum left its mark on the subsequent relations between Stalin and Molotov. If we keep Stalin's character in mind, it's clear that such an incident couldn't pass without having an impact on their relations. Nevertheless they remained close and continued to work together.

Later on, however, Stalin began to abuse Molotov viciously. A particularly clear barometer of Molotov's uncertain position was Kaganovich. Stalin apparently encouraged him to play the role, as it were, of a kind of attack dog whom Stalin would unleash in order to rip at the body of some Politburo member. This happened whenever Kaganovich sensed that Stalin had grown

cool toward a Politburo member. Kaganovich had always been hostile to Molotov. I heard Kaganovich say that he disliked him very much, even hated him. But he knew his place. After all, Molotov was Molotov. In the postwar period, however, Kaganovich began to attack Molotov, and quite harshly at that, and he also attacked Voroshilov when he was at Politburo meetings. This annoyed the rest of us. I am speaking of myself, Bulganin, and even Beria.<sup>18</sup> We were displeased with Kaganovich and sometimes made remarks to counter him and restrain him. Then Kaganovich would immediately put his tail between his legs. He was a cowardly person.

Molotov's position had now become unenviable, but still he bore himself well and expressed his views courageously on all major questions. I would say that he was the only member of the Politburo who sometimes disagreed with Stalin on one or another question. The objections he would raise didn't have to do with any kind of political struggle. There was no political conflict, but the comments he would make and the show of stubbornness he would put up on one or another question pleased me. My attitude toward him was one of very great respect for that reason, although from the point of view of the effectiveness of his work and his ability to work, I had a critical opinion of him. Not only I but other comrades as well noticed this ineffectiveness. But Molotov's political position and his general orientation were always above reproach, and that made up for everything.

When Molotov lost Stalin's confidence in the last years of Stalin's life, the latter once raised the question, while on vacation in Sukhumi, of whether Molotov wasn't an American agent, collaborating with the United States. It's simply impossible to imagine now that such a thing could be uttered. Molotov immediately began appealing to the others. I was there, and Mikoyan and all of us said that this was hardly likely. Stalin said: "But don't you remember, when Molotov was at some General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) he reported that he traveled from New York to Washington. If he made that trip, that means he had his own railroad car. But how could he have had it? It means he was collaborating with the Americans." We replied that they didn't have private railroad cars for government officials in that country. Stalin was thinking in terms of the system he himself had introduced in the USSR, where he not only had his own railroad car but his own separate train—an entire train!—for his personal use. In other words, he thought the same kind of arrangement existed in capitalist countries.

He reacted sharply when we showed lack of agreement with the statements he had made, and he immediately dictated a telegram to Vyshinsky, who was

then in New York [as Soviet representative to the UN].<sup>19</sup> He demanded that Vyshinsky investigate, to find out whether Molotov had his own railroad car. A coded telegram to this effect was immediately sent. Vyshinsky promptly replied that according to fully verified information Molotov did not have his own railroad car in New York. Stalin was not satisfied with the answer. In fact, he had no need for an answer. The main thing was that distrust of Molotov had become fixed in his mind. And he was seeking justifications for his distrust, confirmation of it, to show others that they were blind and couldn't see what he could see. He loved to repeat the statement to us: "You are blind like little kittens. Without me the imperialists would strangle you." That's what he wanted to think. That was necessary for him. He wanted to show somehow that Molotov was not to be trusted.

A little while later Mikoyan<sup>20</sup> fell into the same kind of disfavor. To this day I can't say what it was that Stalin accused him of. Molotov was supposedly some sort of American agent because he had his own railroad car in the United States and therefore that's where his real masters were. But what about Mikoyan? What country was he an agent of? Even after Stalin's death I often joked with Anastas Ivanovich [Mikoyan] and asked him: "Now listen, tell me, which country are you an agent of? After all, if you're an agent, you've got to be an agent of some country?" Mikoyan, who loved to joke, would respond to my joke with another, and so we were able to joke about it. But it was only after Stalin's death that it became a joke. While Stalin was alive, if he had lived another half year, he would have sent Molotov and Mikoyan to meet their ancestors, just as he did with all the "enemies of the people" when he dealt with them. That's what things had come to!

If we look at Stalin as a mighty unbendable oak tree, if we regard him that way, he was the kind of oak tree that cut off its own branches. And when there were no branches left and the leaves had disappeared, the trunk was no longer getting proper nourishment, the roots were rotting, and the tree was doomed. The people with whom Stalin had worked, with whom he had reorganized the party and led the country—he began to express lack of confidence in them, to imagine they were "enemies of the people," and he began to cut off their heads. Some of the people he considered his closest cohorts, men he relied on, shot themselves. People like Ordzhonikidze. Or he had them executed—people like Rudzutak, Rykov, Kamenev, Chubar, and Stanislav Kosior.<sup>21</sup> It seems that of all the people who had belonged to the Politburo only Petrovsky, by some miracle, remained alive after he had been removed from the Politburo. The explanation for this miracle is



to be sought in the fact that Petrovsky was quite elderly and could no longer function as a political leader. He had been a prominent political figure in the past, but he no longer represented any threat.<sup>22</sup> Evidently that is what determined his fate, and he remained alive.

1. Novy Afon is in Abkhazia on the Black Sea coast. It was the location of one of the state residences (dachas) that Stalin used in the Caucasus. It was near the Novy Afon (New Athos) Monastery; the original Athos Monastery is in Greece. [SK]

2. Sochi is a very popular seaside resort and health spa on the Black Sea coast. It is in Krasnodar territory of the Russian Federation. The distance from Sochi to Novy Afon is about 110 kilometers. [SK/SS]

3. Sukhumi (Sukhum in Abkhaz) is the capital of Abkhazia. The distance from Sukhumi to Novy Afon is about 15 kilometers. [SK/SS]

4. Lev Borisovich Kamenev. See Biographies.

5. Lev Davidovich (Leon) Trotsky. See Biographies. Relations between Stalin and Trotsky were poor even in the early postrevolutionary years. Trotsky looked down on Stalin as a nonentity and a mediocrity, while Stalin resented Trotsky's erudition and oratorical brilliance and distrusted him on account of his non-Bolshevik past. In his "testament" (see note 6 below), Lenin warned that the hostility between Stalin and Trotsky could lead to a split in the party, as it indeed did. [SS]

6. Khrushchev makes repeated reference to "Lenin's testament" and the remarks about Stalin's "rudeness" or "crudeness" (*grubost*) contained in it; see, for instance, the chapters "The Kirov Assassination" and "Forward to Victory!" in Vol. 1 of these memoirs. Lenin dictated the passage in question on January 4, 1923, as an addition to his "Letter to the Congress" of December 24, 1922. The English translation of the passage given in the *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress, 1966, 36:596) reads as follows: "Stalin is too rude and this defect, although quite tolerable in our midst and in dealings among us Communists, becomes intolerable in a Secretary-General. That is why I suggest that the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing another man in his stead who differs from Comrade Stalin only in having one advantage, namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc."

In the same document, Lenin made the following remarks about Trotsky: "Comrade Trotsky . . . is distinguished not only by outstanding ability. He is personally perhaps the most capable man in the present Central Committee, but he has displayed excessive self-assurance and shown preoccupation with the purely administrative side of the work."

Lenin's "testament" was read to the delegates at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1925, a year after Lenin's death. They were sworn to keep the contents secret. After the consolidation of Stalin's power in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the document was suppressed; people were arrested by the security police simply for having a copy of it. Only after Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 was Lenin's "testament" published in the USSR. [SS/GS]

7. Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov. See Biographies.

8. One of the reasons why Voroshilov was an incompetent commissar of defense was his failure to understand the changes that were occurring in the technology of warfare—in particular, the crucial roles to be played in the forthcoming war by tanks and aircraft. He remained oriented toward the experience of the Civil War, in which cavalry played the predominant role. [SS]

9. Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich. See Biographies.

10. Yan Borisovich Gamarnik (1894–1937) and Marshal Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky (1893–1937) occupied senior military posts. In contrast to Voroshilov, they understood tank warfare. Tukhachevsky, in particular, was one of its leading theoreticians. Tukhachevsky was executed in 1937; Gamarnik committed suicide to escape arrest. See Biographies. [SS]

11. Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, Colonel General Efim Afanasyevich Shchadenko, Marshal Grigory Ivanovich Kulik. See Biographies.

12. Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko. See Biographies. The episode in which Timoshenko "dragged" Khrushchev to a session of the Chief Military Council is recounted on pp. 208–9 of Vol. 1 of these memoirs. [SS]

13. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. See Biographies. Molotov was one of those Bolshevik leaders who were known by specially coined party names, not by their original names, and it may be pertinent in this connection that the party name "Molotov" was derived from *molot*, meaning "hammer." ("Stalin" was also a party name, derived from *stal* [steel]. "Kamenev" was derived from *kamen* [stone].) [SS]

14. Aleksei Ivanovich Rykov. See Biographies.

15. Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin, Grigory Yevseyevich Zinoviev, Sergei Ivanovich Syrtsov, Vissarion Vissarionovich Lominadze. See Biographies. Bukharin and Zinoviev were leading figures

in the “Right” and “Left” oppositions to Stalin, respectively. Syrtsov and Lominadze were accused of forming a “Right-Left” opposition bloc in the party. [SS]

16. By lumping together as “people of the same political tendency” figures from the “Left” opposition to Stalin such as Zinoviev and figures from the “Right” opposition such as Bukharin and Rykov, Khrushchev reveals the very limited understanding that rising party activists of his generation had of ideological standpoints and divisions among the Old Bolsheviks. [SS]

17. Polina Semyonovna Zhemchuzhina. See Biographies and the chapter “One of Stalin’s Shortcomings—Anti-Semitism.” [SS]

18. Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. See Biographies.

19. As the Soviet minister of foreign affairs from 1949 to March 1953, Andrei Vyshinsky often spoke at sessions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly in New York. See Biographies.

20. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan. See Biographies.

21. Grigory Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, Yan Ernestovich Rudzutak, Vlas Yakovlevich Chubar, Stanislav Vikentyevich Kosior. See Biographies.

22. From 1940 until his retirement Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky (1878–1958) was deputy director of the Museum of the Revolution in Leningrad, a position of no political importance. See Biographies. [SS]

## THE KOREAN WAR

I now want to tell what I witnessed in connection with matters involving Korea. It seems that it was in 1950, when I was again working in Moscow, or a little bit earlier, before my return to Moscow, that Kim Il Sung<sup>1</sup> came to visit us, along with a delegation of his people. During a conversation with Stalin, he brought up a question: he said he would like to probe South Korea “with the bayonet.” He asserted that, with the very first prod from North Korea, there would be an internal explosion in South Korea and people’s power would be established there, the same kind of government as in North Korea. Stalin did not oppose this. After all, it was consistent with Stalin’s own point of view and his general convictions, especially since this was an internal question, concerning Korea only. North Korea wanted to extend the hand of friendship to its brothers in the south, who found themselves under the heel of Syngman Rhee.<sup>2</sup>

Stalin made an agreement with Kim Il Sung that the latter would think things over, make exact calculations about everything, and come back again with a specific plan. It was arranged either that he would return at a specific time or that he would do so as soon as he had prepared his proposals. Kim Il Sung came and reported to Stalin that he was absolutely sure of the success of this venture. Stalin expressed some doubt. He was concerned about whether the United States would get involved or would just let it pass. They were

both inclined toward the view that if everything were done quickly—and Kim Il Sung was confident that everything would happen quickly—then U.S. intervention would be ruled out; the United States would not try to intervene with its armed forces.

Stalin decided all the same to ask Mao Zedong<sup>3</sup> about Kim Il Sung's proposal. I must state clearly and emphatically that this move was proposed not by Stalin but by Kim Il Sung. Kim was the initiator, but Stalin did not try to restrain him. And in my opinion, no real Communist would try to restrain anyone from such a worthy aim—the liberation of South Korea from Syngman Rhee and the American reactionary forces. To oppose that aim would contradict the Communist worldview. And so I am not condemning Stalin. On the contrary, I am completely on his side. I myself would probably have made the same decision if it had been up to me. Mao Zedong also answered in the affirmative. I don't remember word for word how Stalin's inquiry was formulated. As I recall, he asked essentially what Mao's attitude would be toward such an action and whether he thought the United States would intervene or not. Mao responded with approval of Kim Il Sung's proposal and expressed the opinion that evidently the United States would not intervene, since this was strictly an internal question that should be decided by the Korean people themselves.

I remember at the dinner at Stalin's dacha there was a lot of joking. Kim Il Sung told us about the way of life of the Korean people, about the climate of Korea, and about the conditions there for rice cultivation and the fishing industry. He said a lot of good things about South Korea and argued that after the reunification of the two halves of Korea, the country would become more able to achieve its full potential. It would have the possibility of providing raw material to all its industries, and it could meet the needs of its people through the fishing industry and the cultivation of rice and other crops. We all wished Kim Il Sung success and expected that he actually would achieve success. We had already provided North Korea with arms. There was no discussion at that dinner about exactly what arms and equipment had already been allocated to North Korea. For me personally this was an unknown quantity. But it goes without saying that Kim Il Sung was sure to receive or had received the necessary quantity of tanks, artillery, rifles, and other arms and equipment. Our planes provided protective cover for Pyongyang and were based there.

It remained totally incomprehensible to me why, when Kim Il Sung was preparing for this campaign, Stalin recalled our advisers, who earlier had been present in each division of the army of the Korean People's Democratic

Republic, and perhaps even on the regimental level. In general he recalled all our military specialists who were acting as consultants for Kim Il Sung and helping him build an army. At that time I expressed my opinion to Stalin, and he reacted in a very hostile way to my comment. He said: "We can't do that! [That is, leave them there.] They might be taken prisoner. We don't want any evidence that could be used to charge us with participating in this action. This is Kim Il Sung's affair." Thus our military advisers disappeared. And this left the North Korean army in a difficult situation.

The appointed moment came, the war began, and it began successfully.<sup>4</sup> The North Koreans advanced quickly into the south. But what Kim Il Sung had assumed—that at the very first shots there would be an internal uprising of the South Korean people, that an insurrection would break out and Syngman Rhee would be overthrown—that unfortunately did not happen. The forces of the Syngman Rhee clique were cleared away only as a result of the advance of the North Korean troops. Resistance was weak. In that sense Kim Il Sung proved to be correct. The system in South Korea was teetering and unable to defend itself. This indicates that the Syngman Rhee regime in South Korea had no popular support. On the other hand, there were insufficient forces to carry out an internal insurrection. Evidently the organizational work of preparing for an uprising was ineffectual. Yet Kim Il Sung had believed that all of South Korea was covered with Communist Party organizations, that they were only waiting for the signal, and that the people would immediately rise in rebellion. But no, the rebellion did not occur.

Seoul was taken, and the North Korean army kept advancing successfully. We all rejoiced and wished Kim Il Sung new and greater successes, because in essence this was a war of liberation. Moreover, it was not a war by one nation against another, but a class war. The workers, peasants, and intellectuals of North Korea under the leadership of the Workers Party, which stood on socialist positions and still does, were fighting against the capitalists. That is, this war was a progressive phenomenon. However, as Kim Il Sung's army reached the approaches to Pusan it lost momentum, and yet Pusan was the last major city in South Korea, a port city in the south. It needed to be taken, and then the war would have been over. In that way a unified Korea would have emerged; it would not have remained divided. Undoubtedly a more powerful socialist Korea would have resulted, with a strong industry, a country rich in raw materials and with a strong agricultural base. But that's not how things went.

When stubborn fighting began to drag out in the southernmost part of Korea [around Pusan], I suffered a lot. We received reports that Kim Il

Sung was in a dejected state of mind. I greatly sympathized with him, and I proposed once again: "Comrade Stalin, why not send more qualified people to help Kim Il Sung? He himself is not a military man, although he was a guerrilla fighter." To my way of thinking he certainly was a revolutionary who wanted to fight for his people and liberate all of Korea. He wanted his country to be independent. But now this had become a war against the American armed forces.<sup>5</sup>

Our ambassador to the Korean People's Democratic Republic was Shtykov.<sup>6</sup> He was the former second secretary of the Leningrad province committee of the AUCP(B), and during the Great Patriotic War he had been awarded the rank of lieutenant general. Although he had been a general in wartime, he really was not a professional military man and didn't have the appropriate military training. His advice was no substitute for a qualified military person trained to conduct combat operations. We had Marshal Malinovsky. He had commanded the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front in the war.<sup>7</sup> Why not put Malinovsky in place now at some location in Korea so that he could direct military operations incognito, give the necessary orders, and thereby provide aid to Kim Il Sung? General Krylov<sup>8</sup> could also have done that. He commanded the troops of the Far Eastern Military District.

Stalin again reacted very sharply against my proposal. I was surprised! After all, he had given his blessing to Kim Il Sung, had not restrained him, but had encouraged him in this line of action. We had given Kim Il Sung the necessary arms and equipment. In short, we were fully on Kim's side. Without our help he of course could not have started this struggle. I assume that the armaments we supplied were a decisive factor. But if we gave further aid in the form of skilled and qualified military men who could soberly evaluate the balance of forces on the battlefield, then without a doubt North Korea would win. I think that if Kim Il Sung had received another tank corps from us, or at the maximum two tank corps, the advance into South Korea would have gone faster, and Pusan could have been taken right off the bat. Even the American press was writing that it had been decided in Washington then that if Pusan fell, the United States wouldn't intervene in the conflict with more armed forces than were already taking part in the fighting.

But Pusan was not taken all at one blow. Nothing like that happened. A great hesitation and confusion in the operations of the North Korean army occurred, and the expeditionary forces of the United States were thus able to deal a powerful counterblow.<sup>9</sup> And so they retook Seoul and then advanced farther, crossing the 38th parallel, the dividing line between North and

South Korea that had been established earlier. A desperate situation now arose for North Korea and for Kim Il Sung personally. Our ambassador sent us tragic reports about Kim Il Sung's state of mind and the state of his morale. He was thinking that he would go into the hills and carry on guerrilla warfare, but he would not surrender to the enemy.

In the face of this danger Stalin had already reconciled himself to the prospect that North Korea would be defeated and that the Americans would establish a land border with the Soviet Union. I remember very well that he said one day during an exchange of opinions on the situation in North Korea: "Well, what's to be done about it? Let the United States of America be our neighbor now in the Far East.<sup>10</sup> They're going to arrive there, but we are not going to fight them now. We are not yet ready to fight." No one made any further comment of any kind, and the question was discussed no further, because Stalin personally had complete charge of such matters. This question was considered something like the personal prerogative of Stalin.

If our troops were involved then, it was only as a protective force to cover the airfields. I don't remember exactly whether we had our own airfields on the territory of North Korea or if they were located in Manchuria. The cities of Port Arthur and Dalny<sup>11</sup> actually belonged to us then. In the first stages, when the war had just broken out, our aircraft successfully dealt with the task of covering and protecting the cities and electric power plants, preventing any bombing of those sites and shooting down American planes. Our air force was mainly using MIG-15 fighters—new planes with jet engines. These planes were highly maneuverable and of good quality. During the course of the war, the Americans upgraded their aircraft and brought in new fighter planes that were more powerful and faster.<sup>12</sup> Our MIG-15s turned out to be weak by comparison, and we began to suffer losses in the air. Now the Americans broke through into the air space over North Korea and bombed it with impunity. We were no longer able to provide protective cover, and we lost our former supremacy in the air.

At that time Zhou Enlai<sup>13</sup> came to see us. I was not present when he met with Stalin. Stalin was on vacation in the Caucasus at that time, and Zhou Enlai flew directly there. I learned about these talks later after Zhou had flown home. When Stalin returned to Moscow, he said that Zhou Enlai had flown in on assignment from Mao Zedong to consult with us on what to do. He had asked Stalin whether Chinese troops should move onto North Korean territory. The North Koreans no longer had any troops. It was necessary to block any further advance of the South Koreans and Americans into North Korea. Or was it not worth it?

At first Zhou Enlai and Stalin concluded that it was not worthwhile for China to intervene. But later, when Zhou Enlai was getting ready to leave, someone made a further display of initiative (either Zhou Enlai himself, acting on orders from Mao, or Stalin), and they again returned to the discussion of this question, after which they agreed that China would take action in support of North Korea. Chinese troops were already prepared and were in position on the border of North Korea. Zhou Enlai and Stalin thought that these troops could fully cope with the task before them, that they could smash the American and South Korean forces and reestablish the previously existing status quo. And so Zhou flew home. I didn't see him or hear what he had to say. I'm just relating what I learned later from Stalin himself.

I don't even remember, actually, whether it was Zhou Enlai who came or someone else. Evidently it was him. Incidentally, I considered him the most intelligent and capable man [among the Chinese leaders] on complicated questions. Zhou Enlai was a flexible and quite modern person with whom it was possible to talk about many things and come to a full mutual understanding. Thus the question of China entering the war was decided. But these would be volunteers. China would not declare war, just send in volunteers. The man in charge of these volunteers was Peng Dehuai.<sup>14</sup> Mao valued Peng very highly. He said that he was the best and brightest star in the Chinese military firmament.

Now new fighting broke out. The Chinese were able to stop the advance of the South Koreans and Americans. Documents in which Peng reported on the situation to Mao remain in the archives. Peng composed lengthy telegrams in which he laid out his plans for military operations against the Americans. The fighting lines were designated, the timetable for actions stated, and the forces to be used were indicated. He categorically declared that the enemy would be surrounded and smashed, that decisive blows would be dealt to the enemy's flanks. To put it briefly, according to these plans—which Peng reported to Mao, and which Mao in turn sent to Stalin—the U.S. forces would be smashed several times over, and the war would be won.

Unfortunately the war didn't end. The Chinese suffered great losses. We received reports that a Chinese general, the son of Mao Zedong, had been killed during an air raid on his command post.<sup>15</sup> And so Mao lost his own son in North Korea. But the fighting continued—very stubborn, protracted, and bloody fighting. China suffered heavy casualties because its arms and equipment were substantially inferior to those of the Americans. The Chinese tactics relied mainly on manpower in both defense and offense. The war



became a long drawn-out affair. Slowly, gradually, the North Koreans and Chinese pushed the South Koreans and Americans back. They took Pyongyang and drove the enemy back to the 38th parallel. Eventually the front was stabilized. Offensive action by either side seemed to come to a halt, although each side continued to defend its positions stubbornly.

When Stalin died the war was still on. I am giving only a very schematic account of the course of the war, because I am speaking entirely from memory. The documents dealing with the question of providing aid to the North Koreans were something I never saw. Probably no one in our circle saw them besides Stalin. But I knew the fundamentals of our policy there. I read all the documents that we received from our ambassador in North Korea.

At that time Stalin had given me “the rights of a citizen,” and I was allowed to read all the mail for the Politburo. Stalin ordered that all such documents be sent to me, whereas previously I had not received that kind of mail. For example, after World War II, when I was working in Ukraine, I received no mail as a Politburo member other than documents on questions directly concerning Ukraine or me personally. But now I was receiving copies of the reports from Peng Dehuai, which Mao had forwarded to Stalin and which Stalin then distributed to us. Thus I was able to acquire a better knowledge of the state of affairs in Korea.

Later on I will tell about the end of the war in Korea.

1. Kim Il Sung (1912–94) joined the Manchurian-based armed resistance to the Japanese occupation of Korea in 1932. In 1941 he fled to the Soviet Union, where he received military training and rose to the rank of major in the Red Army. In 1945 he returned to Korea. From 1948 he was chairman of the cabinet of ministers of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic (North Korea), and from 1949 chairman (from 1966 general secretary) of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party.

2. Yee Sung Man (1875–1965), better known as Syngman (or Synghman) Rhee, was elected president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1948. He was forced to resign in 1960 by a popular uprising against his authoritarian rule. [SS]

3. In 1950, Mao Zedong (1893–1976) was chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the Central People’s Governing Council of the Chinese People’s Republic.

4. The Korean War lasted from June 25, 1950, to July 27, 1953.

5. By this time, U.S. forces had formed a defensive perimeter around Pusan. [GS]

6. Terenty Fomich Shtykov (1907–64) was Soviet ambassador to the Korean People’s Democratic

Republic from 1948 to 1951 and to Hungary from 1959 to 1960. See Biographies.

7. Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky. See Biographies. The Trans-Baikal Front covered the section of eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East to the east of Lake Baikal. Thus Malinovsky would have been familiar with the terrain of the region. [SS]

8. Nikolai Ivanovich Krylov (1903–72) was commander and first deputy commander of the Far Eastern Military District from 1947 to 1956. He was commander in chief of Strategic Missile Forces from 1963 to 1972. See Biographies.

9. U.S. forces made an amphibious assault landing at Inchon, near Seoul, striking the North Korean forces in the rear. [GS]

10. Stalin was overlooking the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States were already neighbors in the Far East, where the peninsula of Chukotka in the far northeast of Siberia faces Alaska across the narrow Bering Straits. [SS]

11. Port Arthur (Chinese name Lüshun) and Dalny (Chinese name Dalian, Japanese name Dairen; the Russian name means “distant”) are port cities on the shore of the Yellow Sea in Liaoning



province of northeastern China (Manchuria), about 350 kilometers due west of Korea's northern border with China. Between 1945 and 1955 the cities were under joint Soviet-Chinese administration. For a fuller historical account, see note 2 to the chapter "The Soviet Navy" in this volume. [SS/GS]

12. The American fighter plane to which Khrushchev here refers was the F-86 or Saber, the U.S. Air Force's first swept-wing jet fighter. It made its initial flight on October 1, 1947, and the first production model flew on May 20, 1948. On September 15, 1948, an F-86 set a new world speed record of 671 miles per hour (1,074 kilometers per hour). In the Korean War, the F-86 saw service as a daytime fighter. [SS]

13. Chou Enlai (1898–1976) was at this time premier of the State Administrative Council of the Chinese People's Republic, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and a member of its Politburo.

14. Peng Dehuai (1898–1974) joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1928. He became a member of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee in 1935. He was deputy commander in chief of the communist forces in the war against Japanese occupation and then commanded the

First Field Army of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the civil war against the Kuomintang. He was supreme commander of Chinese forces in the Korean War, a marshal in the PLA, and minister of defense of the Chinese People's Republic. In 1959 he was removed from all his positions and placed under house arrest for criticizing the Great Leap Forward. He was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. [MN] He was rehabilitated posthumously. [SS]

15. General Mao Anying, Mao's eldest son by his first wife Kaihui, went to Korea in October 1950. He was killed in an American bombing raid the next month. The exact circumstances of his death are unclear. According to one version, he went to Korea with a headquarters unit of the PLA, which set up base in a cave. Some officers went out to bask in the sunshine at a time when they did not expect a raid and were caught by surprise. Three were killed, including Mao Anying. According to another version, Mao Anying was killed while leading an artillery unit toward the front. The first version sounds more plausible: perhaps the second version was invented to make the death of Mao's son seem more heroic. [SS]

## DOCTORS' PLOT

Now I will tell about the so-called Doctors' Plot. One day Stalin invited us to his office in the Kremlin and read us a letter. A certain woman by the name of Timashuk<sup>1</sup> reported that she worked in a medical laboratory and had been in the Valdai region<sup>2</sup> when Zhdanov had died there. She wrote that Zhdanov had died because the doctors hadn't given him proper treatment. They used procedures that were bound to result in his death, and they did it all intentionally. Of course if this had been true, anyone would have been outraged at such evil-doing. Especially on the part of doctors. That would have been completely against nature. A doctor is supposed to cure a patient, to be concerned about the patient's health, not to destroy his life.

If Stalin had still been normal at the time, he would have reacted differently to that letter. There were plenty of such letters arriving from people

with unbalanced psyches or people who took a wrong approach to events or the actions of others. Stalin was extremely receptive to such "literature." I think that Timashuk herself was a product of Stalin's policy, which was to instill in the consciousness of all our citizens the barbaric idea that not only was our country surrounded by enemies but that we should regard virtually everyone right next to us as an enemy who had not yet been exposed.

In appealing for vigilance, Stalin said that if a denunciation was only 10 percent true, that was already a positive thing. But what are we talking about? Only 10 percent! And in general did the contents of these letters lend themselves to estimation of the percentage of truth in them? How could you estimate such a percentage? To call on people to adopt such an approach to those who worked next to them is to create a madhouse, where each person is trying to dig up nonexistent evidence against his or her friend or neighbor. And that's how things actually were. This kind of thing was officially encouraged. Children were egged on to attack their parents, and parents were incited to denounce their children, and this was called a class approach.

I understand that the class struggle often divides family members, one against the other, and does so very harshly. There is no boundary line at which the class struggle must stop. The position one or another member of a family takes in public life is often determined by the class struggle. I consider this to be in the nature of things, because we are talking about creating a better future, about building socialism. And this is not just some grand parade, but a bloody and painful struggle. I know this well, because I myself participated in a very fierce class war. From 1917 to 1922, when civil war was raging in Soviet Russia and the Far East, I understood the necessity for such an approach. Especially because after the defeat of the White Guards there were large and small rebel bands that had not yet been defeated and that continued to rampage for a long time. The northern Caucasus was swarming with rebel bands; it was literally saturated with them.

I took part in a conference once on the struggle against these bandit elements. The conference was organized by Levandovsky,<sup>3</sup> commander of the Ninth Kuban Army, and by Dmitry Furmanov<sup>4</sup> [later famous as a Soviet novelist], who was then chief of the political department of that army. After the conference a photograph was taken of its participants. I am also present in the photograph. A woman named Vera sent me this photograph. She was also serving in the political department of that army and is a pensioner now. I am very pleased that she is alive and well, although I don't know how the cup of repression passed from her during the "meat grinder" that chewed up our society in the 1930s.

Back then, up to 1922, there really was a class war. The bands of insurgents drew their recruits and reinforcements mainly from the officer class. Many former tsarist officers gathered in the northern Caucasus, having fled to that region from all parts of Soviet Russia. There were also quite a few local Cossack officers in the area. A bloody class war went on. Although even in those days Lenin, with his penetrating vision and far-sightedness, displayed humanity and did everything he could to win wavering elements over to our side and reinforce positive positions they might take, to give them support, to turn them at first into neutrals, and then gradually to draw them into active participation in building the new life. I understood and approved of this line that Lenin followed.

That stage of history has long since passed. Yet here before us, supposedly, we still find wreckers and saboteurs from the enemy class. This alleged manifestation is really the product of an unintelligent policy. Yes, it's true that Zhdanov was treated by Kremlin doctors. It must be assumed that all of the best and brightest lights known to the world of Soviet medicine were enlisted to work at the Kremlin hospital. Who specifically was treating Zhdanov I don't remember now. But that is not the point!<sup>5</sup>

Arrests began. Among those arrested was a member of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, Vladimir Nikitych Vinogradov.<sup>6</sup> After he had been released much later, I got to know him quite well, because I went to him as a patient more than once. Vasilenko,<sup>7</sup> a major expert in therapeutic medicine, was also arrested. I didn't know him well personally, but I heard very positive reports about him from Academician Strazhesko,<sup>8</sup> whom I respected highly.

I knew Strazhesko from Kiev. He was one of the leading lights in the field of medicine, not only in the Soviet Union but also internationally. When the Great Patriotic War ended, it was he who asked me to recall Vasilenko from the army, so that he could work at the clinic Strazhesko was in charge of. He stated candidly: "Vasilenko is my student; he trained under me, and I would like him to remain here after me, so that the clinic will be in reliable hands." Strazhesko had established his clinic back before the revolution, and it had been famous for a long time. Mikhail Kotsyubinsky, the prominent [Ukrainian writer and moderate] democrat,<sup>9</sup> had at one time been treated at this clinic, among others.

A large number of doctors, in addition to Vinogradov and Vasilenko, doctors who had worked at the Kremlin hospital and had been involved in treating Zhdanov, were arrested. As soon as they were arrested, Stalin immediately sent Timashuk's letter to be published along with an accompanying

note by himself. With this note he intended to mobilize the broad masses, to arouse their anger against the doctors who had "committed this evil deed," causing Zhdanov's death.

Actually Zhdanov's health had been undermined long before that. I don't know exactly what ailments he suffered from. But one of his ailments was his lack of willpower. He couldn't control himself when it was necessary to refrain from excessive drinking. Sometimes it was pitiful to watch him. I remember Stalin shouting at him sometimes, telling him he shouldn't drink—and that was quite a rarity [Stalin telling someone not to drink]. On such occasions Zhdanov would pour himself some fruit juice while the rest of us were drinking alcohol. I assume that if Stalin had to restrain Zhdanov that way during meals at Stalin's place, then when Zhdanov was home alone, what do you suppose must have happened when he was free of such monitoring? This failing was the cause of Shcherbakov's death,<sup>10</sup> and to a significant extent it hastened Zhdanov's demise.

By no means am I placing Shcherbakov and Zhdanov on the same level. Zhdanov was on a higher level, even though Soviet intellectuals have nursed a great dislike for him because of his famous denunciatory speeches concerning literature and music.<sup>11</sup> In that situation Zhdanov was carrying out a role assigned to him. He was following Stalin's direct orders. If Zhdanov personally had been the one formulating policy in such matters, I think he would not have been so harsh.

After all, you can't regulate the development of literature, art, and culture in general by waving a nightstick and shouting at people. You can't plow a furrow and order everyone to walk along that furrow without deviating one step from the straight line. In such a case there would be no clash of opinions, and there would be no criticism, and consequently no one would arrive at the truth, but instead a dull and gloomy stereotype would prevail, of no use to anyone. Not only would no one be attracted to such a stereotype, no one would be disposed to make use of the achievements of literature and art, but also people's attitude toward literature and art would be poisoned, and culture in general would be stifled.

To restate things briefly, the doctors were arrested. Letters were sent to the newspapers from all parts of the country, branding the doctors as traitors. I understand the thinking of the authors of these letters. These letters expressed the views of those who believed that if Stalin himself had published a statement about the case, then the crime must have been proved beyond question. And everyone was outraged. Marshal Konev,<sup>12</sup> who was himself a sick man at the time, sent Stalin a very long letter in which he reported that doctors had

also poisoned him, had given him improper treatment, using the kinds of medications and treatment methods which Timashuk described in her letter and which intentionally resulted in Zhdanov's death.

All this was simply shameful! Evidently many members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee sensed that these charges were unfounded. But we didn't discuss the matter, because once Stalin had made a pronouncement, and especially since he had "taken charge" of this case, there was nothing more to be said. But when we gathered unofficially, away from the conference table of the Presidium, when we had an exchange of opinions among ourselves, we were outraged most of all by that letter from Konev. Because if the people accused in the death of Zhdanov were behind bars, the letter sent by Konev not only lambasted those who had already been exposed but also encouraged Stalin to widen the circle of suspects and in general to distrust all doctors. This was no laughing matter! After the enemy had been defeated in World War II, after our own Soviet intelligentsia had come into existence and had existed for such a long time, an intelligentsia born in the Soviet era and receiving its training and education since 1917, suddenly the representatives of this intelligentsia, the doctors, turned out to be wreckers, and distrust of them all was being advocated. Such a cruel attitude was totally uncalled for!

I remember the early days when I was young. In 1910 a cholera epidemic was raging in the Donbas. At the coalmine where my father and I worked, many miners died. Miners who fell ill were immediately sent to a barracks for cholera patients, from which no one returned. Then rumors began to circulate that the doctors were poisoning the patients, and "eyewitnesses" were found, people who had seen someone or other walking past a well and dropping some sort of powder into it.<sup>13</sup> All kinds of absurd things were heard at the time. Even earlier, in 1902, there was a "cholera revolt" in Makeyevka. The doctors there were beaten up by the ignorant and benighted part of the population. And yet here it was 1952, and again ignorant and benighted forces were raising their heads. Once again doctors were being persecuted, and even Marshal Konev was taking a hand in this foul business.

Of course this happened because of Konev's unhealthy frame of mind and the fact that he and Stalin were "kindred souls." In large part Konev and Stalin really were "kindred souls." That's why even to this day Konev suffers over the fact that the Twentieth Party Congress condemned the misdeeds of Stalin and the Twenty-Second Party Congress added further to this condemnation. I think that we members of the Central Committee Presidium did not do enough at the end of 1952. I direct this reproach against myself as well.

We should have shown greater decisiveness at that time and not allowed this barbaric campaign to develop. Unfortunately, there's no use shaking your fist after the fight is over,<sup>14</sup> and I accept the blame for the fact that I didn't do enough at that time. More should have been done in the interest of our people, in the interest of the party, and in the interest of our future.

Interrogation of the defendants began. I personally heard Stalin call up Ignatyev<sup>15</sup> more than once. Ignatyev was then head of the Ministry of State Security (Russian initials, MGB). I knew Ignatyev. He was seriously ill at the time. He was a man of gentle character, thoughtful and well liked. My attitude toward him was very positive. He had suffered a heart attack that had been nearly fatal (and we all knew about Ignatyev's physical condition). Stalin would call him and talk to him on the phone in our presence, shouting and threatening. He was beside himself with rage; he told Ignatyev he would pulverize him. He demanded that Ignatyev beat and beat these unfortunate doctors, thrash them unmercifully, and put them in irons.

Vasilenko, it seems, was in China at that time. He was recalled. And as soon as he crossed the Soviet border he was placed in irons. It has stuck in my memory that all of these unfortunate doctors "confessed" to their crimes. But I can't condemn people who in fact slandered themselves in this way. There were too many cases of people of all different kinds, loyal and devoted to our party and revolution, who "confessed." One example is our prominent military leader Meretskov,<sup>16</sup> who is living out his final days bent over in the shape of a bow. He too at one time "confessed" that he was an English spy. The situation the doctors found themselves in was no better than Meretskov's, and naturally they, too, "confessed."

In October 1952 the Nineteenth Party Congress opened. At that congress I gave a report on the party rules, and I myself fell ill. I was unable to leave the house when my report was being discussed. It was probably a day or two before I could go out again. A professor of medicine came to see me and listen to me with his stethoscope. He was a man well on in years, as the saying goes, an old and experienced doctor. Not only did he listen to my heartbeat with the stethoscope; he put his ear right up against my chest, and he did this so carefully and gently; he was so comforting toward me. It reassured me. This man's attentiveness and concern literally touched me to the quick. And I thought to myself, "They'll probably grab this man, too, when the doctors' case comes to trial." I was soon back on my feet and managed to take part in the final work of the Nineteenth Party Congress. But that is not the point. My fear was that people like this doctor would all be arrested, and once they "confessed," Stalin would have no mercy on them. Vinogradov

himself had treated Stalin (and it rarely happened that Stalin submitted to treatment by a doctor). Nevertheless Stalin had no mercy on Vinogradov and ordered that he be beaten. All of them were beaten. They all ended up in the same cooking pot.

That was how the notorious “Doctors’ Plot” unfolded. What a happy occasion it was, later on, when this whole case blew apart, like the bursting of a soap bubble.<sup>17</sup>

1. Lidiya Fyodorovna Timashuk (1893–1983) was a physician at the Kremlin Hospital who collaborated with the state security agencies. In 1948 she reported the “incorrect treatment” of Andrei Zhdanov. She became active again in summer 1952. For a recent study of the “doctors’ plot” episode, see Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov, *Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948–1953* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004). [SS]

2. A region of lakes and uplands about halfway between Moscow and Leningrad. [SS]

3. Mikhail Karlovich Levandovsky. See Biographies.

4. Dmitry Andreyevich Furmanov (1891–1926) was a member of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party who joined the Bolshevik party in 1918. He was a political commissar on the front lines during the Civil War, then a writer. His novels include *Chapayev* and *Myatezh* (The Mutiny). See Biographies.

5. The point was the unreasoning suspicion of everyone, everywhere. [GS]

6. Vasily Nikitych Vinogradov (1882–1964) was a nonspecialist physician. He was chairman of the All-Union Society of Physicians from 1949 and editor of the journal *Terapevtichesky Arkhiv* (Physicians’ Archive). He became an Honored Scientist of the RSFSR in 1940, a member of the Academy of Medical Sciences in 1944, and a Hero of Socialist Labor in 1957.

7. Vasily Kharitonovich Vasilenko (1897–1976) was a nonspecialist physician. He was director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Gastroenterology from 1967 to 1974. He became a member of the Academy of Medical Sciences in 1957 and a Hero of Socialist Labor in 1967.

8. Nikolai Dmitriyevich Strazhesko (1876–1952) was a nonspecialist physician. He was director of the Ukrainian Institute of Clinical Medicine from 1936. See Biographies.

9. Mikhail Mikhailovich Kotsyubinsky (1864–1913) was a writer, translator, and public figure. See Biographies.

10. Aleksandr Sergeyeich Shcherbakov died in 1945. See Biographies.

11. In 1947–48, Andrei Zhdanov, who was at that time the Central Committee official in charge of ideological matters (see Biographies), led a campaign for greater ideological orthodoxy in the arts, harshly criticizing works by a number of writers and composers, including satirical tales by Mikhail Zoshchenko, an opera by Vano Muradeli, and works by Dmitry Shostakovich (see Biographies), for allegedly kowtowing to Western influences and expressing “rootless cosmopolitanism.” Tighter controls were imposed on all forms of cultural expression, some magazines were shut down, and some cultural figures found themselves unable to practice their art or profession. Others confessed their errors and began to follow party orders more closely than ever in their “creative work.” These harsh restrictions, called *Zhdanovshchina*—a term that suggests “the Zhdanov reign of terror”—continued until after Stalin’s death, when the “thaw” relaxed cultural controls to some extent. [GS]

12. Ivan Stepanovich Konev (1897–1973) was commander of the Ciscarpathian Military District from 1952. He was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1944. See Biographies.

13. This may have been a survival of medieval fears of evildoers who poison wells at the behest of the devil. [SS]

14. A saying equivalent to “locking the barn door after the horse is gone.” [GS]

15. Semyon Denisovich Ignatyev. See Biographies.

16. Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov (see Biographies) made the “confession” to which Khrushchev refers here as deputy people’s commissar of defense in July 1941, when he was under investigation and subjected to torture.

17. A resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee of April 3, 1953, fully rehabilitated thirty-seven doctors and members of their families who were awaiting trial in connection with the affair of the “doctor-wreckers.”



## THE NINETEENTH PARTY CONGRESS

At the end of 1951 or, it seems, the beginning of 1952—I don't recall the exact month, but Stalin gathered us together and expressed the thought that it was time to convene a congress of the AUCP(B). There was no need to try and persuade us. We all considered it incredible that no party congress had been held for twelve or thirteen years.<sup>1</sup> There had also been no plenums of the party's Central Committee, and there had been no major conferences of the active party membership on an all-union level, or even of party officials.<sup>2</sup> The Central Committee had taken no part in the supposed collective leadership of the USSR. Instead, everything was decided unilaterally by Stalin, bypassing the Central Committee. The Politburo [Political Bureau of the Central Committee] signed the documents submitted to it, while Stalin often didn't even bother to ask the opinions of other Central Committee members but simply made decisions himself and ordered those decisions to be published.

We readily agreed that a party congress should be held. It was scheduled for fall 1952. Stalin didn't propose an agenda for the congress right away, and we discussed among ourselves whether Stalin would take on the job of presenting the main report or would assign the task to someone else. We began trying to guess whom he might assign. We thought that if he didn't give the report himself, feeling that he was physically weak and wouldn't be able to stand at the rostrum for the necessary time, he might distribute the text of the report in written form and not try to deliver it orally. That was also a possibility. It seems that such a practice was followed by the Labour Party in Britain, where the reports were printed and distributed to conference participants in advance.

In my opinion that wasn't a bad procedure, because there was very little difference between the printed text and the oral report. Besides, the person who presented the report wasn't always the author of the material. After all, many different departments and a wide range of individuals were called in to participate in drafting the main report to a party congress. Later, at some stage, all the material was brought together, and the designated presenter of the report would put the material in the proper order. Of course the one presenting the report would make his own personal contribution in this process. Later he would submit the draft of the report for approval by the leadership, and in that process, revisions would be made in the text. Then the document was accepted as the basis for the report. This is the kind of procedure we used to follow, and apparently this is still done.



When Stalin finally drew up the agenda, he said we should assign Malenkov to give the main report, Khrushchev to report on the party rules, and Saburov,<sup>3</sup> chairman of the USSR State Planning Commission (Gosplan), to report on the five-year plan. That's how the agenda for the congress was approved. Whatever Stalin said, that's what was written down, and no comments or objections were made.

I must confess that when I was assigned to prepare a report on the party rules I shuddered. For me it was a great honor, but I was not happy about it, because I knew how difficult it would be to prepare an intelligent report on such a question and even more difficult to have the report approved. I knew in advance that everyone would attack my text, especially Beria. And Malenkov would follow his lead. And that's what happened.

We began preparing the reports. The report on the party rules was also drafted. The various texts were approved with revisions. My report was drastically abridged and went to Stalin in that form, but he never saw the original text, because Stalin assigned Malenkov, Beria, myself, and someone else to look over the texts of my report and Saburov's. Beria kept repeating: "Why do you have this? Listen, really, what's this for? It should all be much shorter, much shorter!" As a result a lot of material was deleted. In the end my report took about an hour. Nevertheless, the substance of the report was not affected. The text was shortened by cutting out all sorts of illustrative examples, and that is a matter of literary style, as the saying goes. These were just proofs being presented in support of one or another general proposition. To a certain degree I was following Zhdanov's example. Zhdanov gave a report on the party rules at the Eighteenth Party Congress [in 1939], and he used a great many illustrative examples. I don't know to what extent they were necessary, but I assumed that that style had already been approved, and so I followed along the same road.

A question arises: Why didn't Stalin assign Molotov or Mikoyan to give the main report? Historically the positions they had held in the party were higher than Malenkov's, and they were famous party figures. Here's why: whereas we, the people of the prewar era, had previously regarded Molotov as the future leader of the country who would replace Stalin when Stalin departed from this life, in the postwar period, by way of contrast, there could be no thought of any such thing. Every time Stalin encountered Molotov and Mikoyan, he "snapped at them." These two found themselves very much out of favor, and in fact their lives were in danger.

The congress began. The reports were given, and discussion of them proceeded. The debates were brief. In fact the conditions necessary for any real

debate or discussion did not exist. Among other questions the report on the fifth five-year plan was discussed.<sup>4</sup> That was the worst of all the five-year plans that we ever adopted. In my view, the plan was prepared in a very incompetent fashion and presented to the congress the same way. Immediately after Stalin's death we were obliged to assume the responsibility of making substantial corrections in this five-year plan so that it could be fulfilled.<sup>5</sup> This was something unheard of—making corrections in a decision that had already been adopted by a party congress. But we were forced to do it because this five-year plan simply didn't measure up. We sent out the proposed corrections of the plan to the delegates of the Nineteenth Party Congress a good while after it had been held, seeking in this way to find a democratic form for making the necessary changes in the five-year plan. And we made these changes because life itself required it. We could not have defied common sense, just on the basis that the congress had already approved the plan. That is, we did what any sensible person would have done.

The Nineteenth Congress reached its culminating point. It was necessary to elect the leading bodies of the party. All the preliminary work had been done by the Central Committee apparatus. Things were always done that way. The apparatus had already selected all members of the future leading bodies of the party well before the beginning of the congress. The actual delegates to the congress were selected the same way. The determination was made as to how many people should be elected to the Central Committee—how many workers, collective farmers, representatives of the intelligentsia, and who in particular should be elected. In short, the entire structure and composition of the future Central Committee was worked out in advance. But when the elections were held at the congress, new recommendations were suddenly made as to who exactly should be elected. That is, in practice people were not elected the way they had been in the early years of Soviet power; instead, people were informed right there on the spot that so-and-so should be made a delegate to the congress, because the intention was to elect him to the Central Committee or to be a member of the Central Inspections Commission, and so forth. All the work had already been done for the congress. Unfortunately, this kind of procedure continues to this day.

The elections at the Twentieth Party Congress were conducted in the same way. This distorted kind of "democracy" still persisted. Such methods are wrong in principle, and today they are simply intolerable. New forms of work must be found. I did try to find such new forms, and at the Twenty-Second Party Congress I sought to introduce the appropriate revisions in the party rules. The new text of the rules was discussed at that time, and a

report on it was given by Frol Kozlov.<sup>6</sup> But we did all this very timidly. I want to be understood correctly as to why were timid. We ourselves, the leaders of the country, were products of the revolution and had later been trained in the Stalin era. For us Stalin was a star of incredible magnitude, and our attitude was that we shouldn't try to come up with something ourselves, but should simply learn from him and follow his example. It was only much later that we clearly saw his shortcomings. Still, psychologically we were not able to free ourselves from our earlier state of mind; we couldn't bring ourselves to seek out something fundamentally new so as to return the party to a Leninist track and restore party democracy. That was very difficult for us, and we were really just feeling our way blindly.

At the Nineteenth Party Congress this kind of procedure was simply accepted as the way things were done. The new Central Committee was elected. And the congress ended. We sang the "Internationale;"<sup>7</sup> then Stalin took the floor and made a short speech at the end, for just a few minutes. Everyone was delighted with him, overjoyed at the brilliant way he phrased everything, and so forth. He ended his short speech, left the rostrum, and the congress was adjourned. Then the Politburo members went to the room assigned for the Central Committee Presidium. Stalin said to us: "There, you see, I can still do it!" He was at the speaker's stand for all of about seven minutes, and he considered that a great victory. We all concluded from this that he must be very weak physically if it turned out to have been an incredible accomplishment to make a speech of seven minutes. Yet he thought he was still strong and fully capable of working as usual.

The congress ended.<sup>8</sup> Suddenly late at night we were summoned and asked to vote for Marshal Govorov<sup>9</sup> and three others to be candidate members of the Central Committee. They had been overlooked. Stalin had recalled their names after the congress was over and had added them to the list of members to be elected. It seemed to us a good thing that he was concerned about this. What was bad about it was that he violated party rules, violated the theory and practice of party building, by making this decision on his own without any discussion. It occurred to him that these people had been overlooked or forgotten when the list of members of the Central Committee was printed. Of course nothing had been overlooked, and it would be easy to prove that. It was simply that he had thought it over, after the fact, and wondered why these people hadn't been elected and so he ordered that they should be.

We were even more surprised by the following event, which is also rather indicative. The ruling bodies of the party were being designated: there was the Central Committee Presidium and its Secretariat, and the Party Control

Committee attached to the Central Committee. This was a crucial moment: selecting the governing bodies of the party from among the elected members of the Central Committee. We saw that a Central Committee plenum was being convened, but no preliminary discussion had been held by Stalin about the membership of the Politburo.<sup>10</sup> What would be the composition of the Presidium? Neither the number of members nor the proposed individuals had been reported to us. We knew nothing!

When Stalin spoke at the plenum he gave Molotov and Mikoyan a thorough going-over, calling into question their honesty. His speech made it clear that he had no political confidence in them and suspected some sort of political unreliability on their part. Well now, how about that?

The voting began. We looked at one another. I looked at Malenkov. If there was someone who ought to propose candidates, it was surely Malenkov. Stalin didn't know people personally with the exception of the upper echelons among whom he circulated. He would have had to ask Malenkov about new people.

Malenkov told us: "I don't know anything. I haven't been given any instructions, and I haven't taken any part in this."

We were amazed: "How could that be? Then who made up the list of candidates?"

Stalin himself opened the plenum proceedings and immediately made proposals about the composition of the Central Committee Presidium. He pulled some sort of papers out of his pocket and read them off. He proposed twenty-five members, and this was adopted without discussion. We were already accustomed to the idea that if Stalin proposed something, there was no question about it. This was a God-given proposal. Whatever the Lord dispenses, you don't discuss it; you're just grateful for it.

When he read off the list of members of the Presidium we all kept our eyes down. But we wondered: twenty-five members? It would be hard for such a large number to function and resolve questions from day to day. The Presidium after all was the operational body of the party and should not be very large. When the session ended we looked at one another as if to ask: "How did this come about? Who drew up this list?" Stalin didn't know the people he named and couldn't have drawn up the list by himself. I must admit I suspected that Malenkov had done it, but was concealing the fact from us, keeping us in the dark. Later I asked him in a friendly way: "Listen, I think you lent a hand in this business, although it's obviously not just a product of your thinking but includes revisions made by Stalin."

He said: "I assure you, I had absolutely no part in it. Stalin didn't include me and gave me no instructions. I didn't make any proposals." We were both

even more amazed at that point. I didn't think Beria had taken part because there were people on the list that Beria could not in any way have suggested to Stalin.

Nevertheless I asked him: "Lavrenty, did you have a hand in this?"

"No! I jumped all over Malenkov, thinking it was him. But Malenkov swears to God he had no part in it."

Molotov was ruled out, and so was Mikoyan. Bulganin also said he knew nothing. Various thoughts whirled around in our heads, but it got us nowhere. We kept trying to figure out who was the author of this list. Of course it was Stalin, but who had helped him? None of us had participated. At that time Poskrebyshev<sup>11</sup> headed Stalin's personal secretariat, but not even he could have drawn up this kind of list without the help of the Central Committee apparatus. Maybe Stalin had gone around Malenkov and recruited someone from the apparatus. But we didn't think that likely because Malenkov would surely have known. People in the apparatus had worked alongside him and under him for many years. Therefore they would have secretly said something to Malenkov if they had received such a commission from Stalin. And so we were unable to solve the riddle.

Twenty-five people were elected. I won't try to list them all now. I will just say that there were various people of varying merit. They were deserving of confidence, and in principle you couldn't say that any of them was unworthy. But many of them were not really ready for this kind of work, the kind that previously the Politburo had engaged in. We had no doubts about that. We had strong opinions on this aspect of the matter. Nevertheless when Stalin proposed a Presidium of twenty-five members and listed their names, he also said that this Presidium would be cumbersome and it would be necessary to elect a Bureau from among that number. What kind of Bureau would this be? This proposal was not in accordance with the party rules. We had just adopted new party rules, and here they were being violated. Stalin added that it would be an operational bureau that would meet more frequently and make decisions on current questions. He proposed a Bureau of nine members and stated their names right then and there.<sup>12</sup>

As he read off the list of names of Presidium members, I thought to myself as I listened: "Will Molotov, Mikoyan, and Voroshilov be included?" I doubted it. Stalin had essentially dismissed these men "with a wave of the hand," and the danger of falling into the category of newly exposed enemies of the people was already hanging over their heads. But no, they were included after all. I was overjoyed. What a good thing this was! When he read off the list of members of the Bureau, the names of Molotov and Mikoyan

were not included, but Voroshilov was there. Once again I couldn't understand anything. How could this be? No Molotov or Mikoyan, but Voroshilov! Yet Stalin had begun to be suspicious of Voroshilov much earlier than he had of Molotov and Mikoyan.

The Bureau consisted of Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Pervukhin, and Bulganin. Thus Voroshilov was part of the Bureau. I thought to myself, all's well that ends well. Stalin has finally realized it was a mistake to think Voroshilov was a British agent or God knows what. Everything was a function of Stalin's imagination when it came to who was an agent and what imperialist country he was an agent for.

1. The preceding Eighteenth Congress of the AUCP(B) had taken place between March 10 and 21, 1939.

2. In May 1939, there took place a meeting of members of the Orgburo of the party Central Committee with the participation of the secretaries of republic Communist parties and territory and province committees of the AUCP(B) on questions of the development of the coal industry. The May 1939 plenum of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) dealt with questions of collective-farm land tenure. The March 1940 plenum of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) considered the work of the Economic Council attached to the USSR Council of People's Commissars, while the July 1940 plenum examined the question of creating the Union-Republican People's Commissariat of State Control. Between February 15 and 20, 1941, there took place the Eighteenth All-Union Party Conference on problems of the accelerated development of industry and transportation. The February 1941 plenum of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) dealt with organizational questions. Before the Great Patriotic War there also took place congresses of the republic Communist parties and meetings of party activists in various branches of the economy and in the armed forces.

During the war years, special meetings were convened of leaders of local party organizations and of state officials and economic managers; there took place plenums of the central committees of republic Communist parties and meetings of local party organizations, but there was only one all-union party gathering—the plenum of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) of January 27, 1944, which considered problems of the rights of union republics and the forthcoming session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and approved the introduction of a new state hymn of the USSR. In May 1944, the party Central Committee convened a meeting of historians. In December 1944, there took place also a meeting of secretaries of republic Communist parties and territory and province

party committees and heads of party departments on the condition of propaganda work in party organizations. There were many branch party-technical conferences.

After the war, the number of all-union party gatherings was sharply reduced. The first postwar plenum of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B), which dealt with the activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet and organizational questions, was held on March 11, 14, and 18, 1946. The next plenum, which discussed measures to improve the condition of agriculture, took place between February 21 and 26, 1947. Thereafter there was another gap until August 15, 1952 (the party Central Committee plenum on the question of convening the Nineteenth Party Congress).

3. Maksim Zakharovich Saburov. See Biographies.

4. The Fifth Five Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR in the Period 1951–55.

5. The first serious corrections were outlined by the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of September 3–7, 1953, which adopted a resolution "On Measures for the Further Development of Soviet Agriculture."

6. Frol Romanovich Kozlov (1908–65) was a Soviet state and party figure. At the time to which this refers—that is, in 1961—he was a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. See Biographies.

7. The lyrics of the stirring song that came to be known as the "Internationale" were composed in French in 1871, in the aftermath of the fall of the Paris Commune, by Eugène Pottier, a woodworker from Lille. They were set to music in 1888 by Pierre Degeyter. Later the song was translated into many other languages and became the hymn of the international Socialist and Communist movements. The "Internationale" to which it originally referred—the last line goes: "The Internationale will be the human race"—is the International Working Men's Association or "First International" in which Karl Marx was active (1864–76). The

“Internationale” served as the Soviet national anthem from 1921 to 1944, when Stalin had it replaced by the “Hymn of the Soviet Union” in order to boost the patriotic morale of the troops. However, as we see, the old anthem continued to be sung at party gatherings. [SS]

8. The Nineteenth Congress of the AUCP(B) ended on October 14, 1952, and the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee took place on October 16.

9. Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov (1897–1955) was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1944. At this time, in 1952, he was in command of anti-air defense forces.

10. Here by “Politburo” Khrushchev clearly means “Presidium.” The term “Politburo” was not in use at this time. [SS]

11. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Poskrebyshv. See Biographies.

12. Beria, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Stalin, and Khrushchev were appointed members of the new operational bureau. Stalin, Averkly Borisovich Aristov, Brezhnev, Nikolai Grigoryevich Ignatov, Malenkov, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Mikhailov, Nikolai Mikhailovich Pegov, Ponomarenko, Suslov, and Khrushchev were appointed members of the Secretariat of the party Central Committee. Mikhail Fyodorovich Shkiryatov was appointed chairman of the Party Control Committee attached to the CPSU Central Committee. Then the Central Inspection Commission of the CPSU elected Pavel Grigoryevich Moskatov as its chairman.

## AFTER THE NINETEENTH PARTY CONGRESS

Work began. But it didn't go as it had before, because out of the nine members of the Bureau, Stalin picked five to actually do the work, according to his own choice and preference, although nothing was said about this openly. Only those he considered desirable were invited to his home. It was considered a great honor to be invited there. On the other hand, it was considered a bad sign if someone who previously used to be invited no longer was. The select five were Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Khrushchev. More rarely Stalin would invite Kaganovich and Voroshilov, but he absolutely never invited Molotov and Mikoyan any longer.

In general the leadership continued to function as it had before the Nineteenth Party Congress. There was no collective leadership. All decisions were made by the same methods and procedures that had become standard practice for Stalin after 1939. Before the Eighteenth Party Congress in that year, democratic procedures in the work of the Politburo<sup>1</sup> had been maintained more or less, to a certain degree. After that, all those procedures were gradually reduced to nothing, and the trend was toward one-man rule. That's when the practice of rude and coarse shouting at people, unchallengeable orders, and so forth,



began. This happened after the Central Committee membership elected [in 1934] at the Seventeenth Party Congress had been obliterated and the most active party members had been destroyed—the “old-timers,” as we called them, those who had gone through the pre-revolutionary struggle of building our party, organizing the working class, and carrying out the October revolution.

Everything now became dependent on the will of Stalin. The role assigned to us was merely that of extras in a movie production. This was true even when it came to discussions about the future. During Stalin’s last years the talk would sometimes turn to the question of his successor. I remember Stalin thinking out loud about this question in our presence: “Who will we assign after me to be chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR? Beria? No, he’s not a Russian; he’s a Georgian. Khrushchev? No, he’s a worker; we need to appoint someone more from the intelligentsia. Malenkov? No, the only thing he knows is how to be led on a leash by someone else. Kaganovich? No, he’s not a Russian; he’s a Jew. Molotov? No, he’s already too old; he wouldn’t be up to it. Voroshilov? No, he’s old, and in general he’s weak and not very capable. Saburov? Pervukhin? They’re suitable for secondary roles. The only one left is Bulganin.” Naturally no one interrupted as he voiced these thoughts. We all held our tongues.

We were concerned about the fate of Molotov and Mikoyan. The fact that they were not included in the Bureau looked ominous. Stalin had something in mind. When he spoke at the CC plenum, I was astounded that he included in his speech the accusations against Molotov and Mikoyan that I have mentioned. This was certainly no laughing matter! This was not just a dinnertime conversation in the inner circle of five to seven people. Molotov spoke after Stalin. Mikoyan also had something to say. I don’t remember what. Probably everything is there in the stenographic record. But it’s possible that none of this was recorded. Stalin could give those kinds of orders. We were on our guard, thinking that apparently Molotov and Mikoyan were doomed.

After the party congress Molotov and Mikoyan, following the established practice when we all gathered at Stalin’s place, continued to come there of their own accord, without being notified. They would find out whether Stalin was at the Kremlin or not, and if he was, they would come to his apartment. If he left the city to go to one of his dachas, they would go there, too. The guards allowed them to enter. And they would spend the evenings together with the rest of us at Stalin’s dacha. I won’t return to the subject of what those evenings were like. I’ve already told about them. But one day Stalin said bluntly: “I don’t want them to come.” I don’t know exactly what he did, but evidently he ordered someone not to let them know when he



was at the Kremlin, and if Mikoyan or Molotov called up and asked where Stalin was, his instructions were not to tell them. They would ask about Stalin's whereabouts, because by attending his dinners they sought to preserve their status not only as leaders and members of the party but also as living human beings. Their hope was that Stalin's confidence in them would be restored. I understood this, sympathized with them, and was wholeheartedly on their side.

After he issued orders not to notify them of his whereabouts, they were no longer able to be in his presence. They then spoke with me, with Malenkov, and perhaps with Beria. In short, the three of us (Malenkov, Beria, and I) agreed to occasionally inform Molotov and Mikoyan where we were, to tell them we were going to the nearby dacha<sup>2</sup> or somewhere else. And then they would come, too. Stalin would be very displeased when they arrived. The situation continued like that for some time. They were receiving information thanks to our "acting as agents"; in effect, we had become agents of Molotov and Mikoyan.

Stalin understood what we were up to. It wasn't hard to figure out. He probably asked the people on duty in his waiting room, and they told him that they had not informed either Molotov or Mikoyan of his whereabouts. But since they showed up anyway—and they would arrive fairly promptly on a regular basis—that meant someone was notifying them, that is, someone from among those he had invited. And so one day he gave us all a big chewing-out. He didn't name anyone by name, but addressing Malenkov most of all, he made this statement: "Stop trying to bring us together! Stop playing the matchmaker!"

1. Khrushchev means the Presidium. The term "Politburo" was not in use at that time. [SS]

2. Stalin's "nearby dacha" was located in Volynskoye, which was then a suburb of Moscow (now

part of the city). It is on the left as one drives westward out of Moscow, just beyond Poklonnaya Gora, a place with a large monument to victory over Germany in World War II. [SK]

## ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR

Often when Stalin wanted to take up some question with us, he would invite us to see a movie. He would sleep until evening and then come to the Kremlin (he slept most often at the “nearby dacha”),<sup>1</sup> and then he would summon us.

Stalin used to call up and say: “Come see a movie at such and such a time.” And we would come. He chose the movies himself. Mostly these were films that had been captured during the war. Many were American cowboy movies. He liked them a lot. He would curse them for being primitive and criticize them roundly, but he would immediately have another one shown. The movies had no subtitles, but USSR Minister of Cinematography Ivan Grigoryevich Bolshakov<sup>2</sup> would give a running translation. He translated for us from all different languages. We often joked, especially Beria, about these translations. You see, Bolshakov actually didn’t know any foreign languages. His staff would tell him what the content of the movie was, and he would try as best he could to remember and then “translate.” In certain episodes he would sometimes get completely confused or simply say: “There, now he’s walking,” and so forth. Beria then would start to help. He would say: “There, you see, now he’s running, he’s running!”

In such cases we would let Molotov and Mikoyan know: “We’re going to see a movie.” And everyone knew that Stalin watched films only at the Kremlin. There was a room equipped with a film projector that was already outdated for that time. That special room for showing movies is no longer being used. The movies we watched were American, German, British, and French. There was a big film library, mostly of films captured during the war. The Germans had stolen many films that they chanced across in the occupied countries, and then a certain number of those films ended up in our possession. Sometimes we encountered interesting movies, but more often they weren’t to our liking.

There was one film we saw there—I don’t remember its title now<sup>3</sup>—but it was a gloomy and unpleasant tale on a historical theme. As I recall the setting for the story was in England. Some treasure needed to be brought from India to London, but there were pirates on the rampage along the sea routes. Ships were often sunk and their crews perished with them. But since this treasure had to be shipped, the authorities remembered a certain sea captain who was then in prison in Britain. He was a very bold and fearless pirate, a real cutthroat. They decided to ask him to take on the job of delivering the treasure. He agreed, but only if he was allowed to select his own crew from

among the people in prison with him, who were also former pirates. They let him do this and gave him a ship, and he sailed off to India. But on the return passage, after he had the treasure on board, he began taking measures against his own partners in crime. What was his method? He would indicate the next person to be destroyed by placing a portrait of the person on the desk in his cabin. When this person had been destroyed and thrown overboard, a new portrait would appear. I don't remember how many of his retinue he eliminated, but as I recall, he too perished in the end. They say that this was based on actual historical events.

When we watched this movie and saw how perfidious this captain was, it reminded us to some extent how the people who had worked around Stalin had disappeared. An inner feeling prompted us to wonder: Wasn't this the same way the so-called enemies of the people had perished? Usually after we had watched a movie Stalin would suggest: "Well, let's go to dinner, what do you say?" We didn't feel like eating. After all, it was one or two o'clock in the morning. We needed to rest. The next day was a working day. But Stalin didn't think about us. "Shall we go?" he said. And then everyone said they were hungry; acting on reflex, they lied. We all went to Stalin's place and a dinner began. Since we had already called Mikoyan and Molotov, they had phoned each other and had come together to the movie; then they went with the rest of us to Stalin's place. And things continued that way until he made a scene. We stopped doing this because things could have ended badly for us as well as for them. We would no longer be helping them, and we'd be undermining ourselves in Stalin's eyes. No one wanted to do that, no one! Without consulting among ourselves we all naturally waited for this barbaric situation to reach its conclusion, but the denouement came only after Stalin's death.

What I'm talking about might seem unbelievable to people on the sidelines. But here's something else that actually happened. Stalin began to say all sorts of vile things about Voroshilov! Nevertheless Voroshilov became a member not only of the Central Committee Presidium but also of the more select group on the Bureau. After some time passed, we were at one of Stalin's dinners at the "nearby dacha" after seeing a movie. Stalin was a little tipsy. He was often in that condition in those days.

Suddenly he asked: "Who's on the Bureau of the Presidium?"

We listed the names for him, and we mentioned Voroshilov.

"Who, who? Voroshilov? How did he get there?"

We looked at one another in silence. Then someone said: "Comrade Stalin, you named him yourself, and the plenum elected Voroshilov a member of the Bureau."

Stalin didn't expand on what he was thinking at that point. But we drew the conclusion that he had not forgiven Voroshilov and that when he spoke at the plenum he had included Voroshilov's name simply out of old habit. And so even though Voroshilov had been elected, he didn't really enjoy the rights of a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Stalin didn't always invite him to sessions of the Presidium or to watch movies and come to dinners, the dinners that actually took the place of meetings where governmental matters were decided. Still it was considered a great honor to be invited to those dinners. And Voroshilov showed up at those dinners rarely now. Sometimes he would call up on his own initiative and come.

We would go to Stalin's place quite often, almost every evening. But when his health began to fail there were interruptions. There was no other reason for such interruptions, because Stalin [always wanted us there]. He felt so alone he didn't know what to do with himself. He was like the merchant in the play by Ostrovsky, *A Warm Heart*, the part played by Tarkhanov at the Moscow Art Theater.<sup>4</sup> Ostrovsky's merchant had, in his retinue, a person whose duty it was to think of things with which the merchant could fill up his time. The merchant would say: "Well, what are we going to do today?" And his retainer would think up something for them to do. They would play cops and robbers and engage in all sorts of escapades. Stalin, just like that merchant, used to say to us: "Well, what shall we do today?" He was no longer capable of doing anything serious. But we were supposed to work at our jobs and the posts to which we had been elected and, besides that, attend Stalin's dinners like some sort of characters in a play and entertain him. That was a difficult and painful time for us.

Even before the Nineteenth Party Congress Stalin got involved in a theoretical discussion on the question of linguistics.<sup>5</sup> It was a very strange debate. At one time Stalin had been visited by a Georgian academician and expert on linguistics, whose name was Chikobava,<sup>6</sup> and had a discussion with him. By some means this man [Chikobava] aroused in Stalin a desire to join this scholarly debate. Stalin spoke out against the legacy of Academician Marr, a noted historian and linguist, and in opposition to works written by Marr.<sup>7</sup>

In the end Stalin spoke out against the very same Georgian academician [Chikobava] who had got the whole thing started. Earlier this man had been close to him, and Stalin had invited him for dinner more than once. As a result of this discussion Stalin's pamphlet on linguistics, one of his last theoretical works, was published.<sup>8</sup>

Then Stalin began to occupy himself with economic problems. He organized a debate on the subject<sup>9</sup> and published his thoughts on it. Here too,

the discussion had a peculiar origin. One of the specialists in economics, a man with the Ukrainian name Yaroshenko, seems to have been the initiator of the debate. He wrote an essay on socialist economics and appealed to the USSR Academy of Sciences with a request that a discussion be organized. The Academy discussed his essay, but in Yaroshenko's opinion the Academy didn't evaluate his work at its true worth. He was a stubborn individual, a party member, it seems, from the time of the Civil War, and he wrote to the AUCP(B) Central Committee and literally began terrorizing everyone, demanding that the CC discuss his work so that it would be evaluated as it deserved to be.

One day during the summer at the height of this discussion and debate, we gathered at Stalin's dacha. Voroshilov was there that time. The usual Stalin dinner was under way, long and tortuous. Suddenly Voroshilov (and we were convinced that he hadn't read this economist's writing, just like the other members of the Politburo) said to Stalin: "Koba, (he often addressed him by his old party nickname), you didn't read the document that Yaroshenko circulated, did you?"<sup>10</sup> And for some reason he began cursing him, saying that he was such a bad person and that he wrote such-and-such and so-and-so. Stalin replied: "No, I haven't read it." And he looked at Malenkov and the rest of us. Everyone said right off that they hadn't read it. But Malenkov added that it seemed that this essay was in the possession of the Central Committee. It turned out that this material had been distributed by the author himself to all members and candidate members of the Politburo. Voroshilov began cursing the man very harshly and adding: "He ought to be arrested, the scum, he ought to be arrested!"

Stalin expressed his support: "Well, what kind of louse is this? Arrest him!"

How was this possible? A person had written a scholarly work, perhaps even a bad one, possibly even a harmful one, but he had sent it to the Central Committee for discussion, considering the question an important one. That was his point of view. He was a longtime member of the party, had traveled a long and difficult road, had been a guerrilla fighter when Siberia was under Kolchak.<sup>11</sup> Yaroshenko himself was a Siberian, though he had a Ukrainian name. But a signal had been given from on high that he should be crushed, and the order was passed along to the party organizations. They discussed the case and stigmatized this man and held him up to public shame and ridicule. And for what? They themselves didn't know. For daring to write something.

If Voroshilov hadn't brought up the matter, this person would have continued to stubbornly insist on his own point of view and would have called everyone bureaucrats, but the matter would have ended there. But now it

ended with him actually being arrested and expelled from the party, and he served time in prison for nothing. He was set free after Stalin's death. He addressed a letter to the party's Moscow committee, expressing his indignation against the Moscow committee and me personally. Of course he knew nothing about my role in his case, and he criticized me for not intervening and reaching out a helping hand to him.

A further incident occurred involving this economist, which is also typical of Stalin's behavior. When Stalin began to prepare his work on economic problems of socialism in the USSR, just before his death, he made everyone read and study what he had written. Literally the entire party sat and sweated over Stalin's work. He proposed that the speakers at the Nineteenth Party Congress also express their views on this question. Malenkov in his report devoted a great deal of attention to it. So did the other speakers with the exception of myself. But the reason I didn't talk about it was not that I was "courageous and clever" or that I took a critical attitude toward Stalin's work, but simply because I gave the report at that congress on the party rules and I had no reason to take up this work of Stalin's.

One fine day Stalin summoned all of us and began denouncing us for our poor selection of people in the various secretariats. He claimed that confidential material was leaking from our secretariats and going beyond the confines of the Presidium and that we had to find out who was doing this and how. We looked on without understanding a thing and simply waited to see how it all would end.

Suddenly Stalin turned to me: "It's in your department; there's a leak in your secretariat."

I said: "Comrade Stalin, I'm sure nothing like that could happen. My people are tried and tested. I have confidence in them. They are honest party members. It's impossible that any of them would disclose confidential documents that I had received as a member of the Presidium."

He said: "No, it's in your department. The information was leaked by such-and-such a person." And he began giving proofs to support his assertions. It turned out that some proposition he had formulated in his work on economics coincided almost word for word with certain formulations in the work by Yaroshenko, the very same Yaroshenko that he was criticizing. He said: "How could that have happened? Where did he get this from? He couldn't have overheard me. That means that he received the material that I dictated and distributed to all of you. The material reached this person I was criticizing, and he made use of my formulations." At this point Stalin really began to get lathered up.

I understood what it was all about. Yaroshenko had a Ukrainian name, and Stalin knew that Shuisky, who worked as my assistant, was also Ukrainian. I myself had told him about Shuisky, and he would sometimes jokingly refer to him as the “Boyar Shuisky.”<sup>12</sup>

Sometimes I would repeat Stalin’s expression: “Look who I’ve got working for me in my secretariat, the Boyar Shuisky.” Suspicion fell on him and on others. In Stalin’s view my secretariat was full of Ukrainians, and the information was being leaked through them. When I realized that this was what was going on, I went to the party’s Moscow committee offices the next day and summoned Shuisky. I asked him calmly: “Do you know Yaroshenko?”

“No,” he said, “I don’t know him.”

“Haven’t you heard of him?”

“I’ve heard of him.”

“Are you acquainted with him?”

“I’m not acquainted with him, and I’ve never met him.”

“Good. Find his records for me.”

Shuisky soon brought me his records. I wanted to have a good look, to see who this person was and where he was from, to get to know him. His records showed that although his name was Ukrainian, his grandfather had moved to Siberia from Poltava gubernia.<sup>13</sup> So the grandson was a Siberian. He had been born and raised there, joined the party there, and took part in the guerrilla struggle against the White Guard Cossacks there. The entire revolutionary road that he had traveled had been in Siberia. He was not just some accidental member of the party, but an active participant in the Civil War. When I acquainted myself with his record, I understood that Stalin was operating with his favorite method of trying to stun you or get you frazzled. He would say something to you and look you in the eye and see whether you would tremble or not.

When I met with him the next day, I said calmly: “Comrade Stalin, you asked about Yaroshenko, and I took a look at his record. You know, he’s not from Ukraine at all.” I said this to divert the blow from myself and to show that my secretariat had not been involved. There were two Ukrainians working in my secretariat, Shevchenko<sup>14</sup> and Shuisky, both irreproachably honest men.

I continued: “He wasn’t even born in Ukraine. His grandfather migrated from there, and he was born in Siberia.”

Stalin gave me a savage look: “Devil!” He uttered some kind of expression like that, but he immediately became milder. It was his own way of apologizing for attacking me. “So he’s from Siberia?”

“Yes, from Siberia. And in general where is it that you don’t find Ukrainians? They’re dispersed throughout the country. There are a lot of them in the Far East and in Siberia and even in Canada and other countries beyond the borders of the USSR.”

I had diverted the blow from myself, but Stalin didn’t let the matter rest. He continued to hunt for the source from which this man had supposedly obtained this confidential material. Later Stalin came to the conclusion that Poskrebyshev was the source of the leak.<sup>15</sup> This was quite an unpleasant thing, because Poskrebyshev had worked with Stalin for many years and was as loyal to him as a dog to its master. How could you even have the thought that a man like him would pass on confidential material? What was the idea? That he was a special agent in the service of this economist? And yet he could not have had any ties with anyone in general. You had to know Poskrebyshev to understand what he was like! He was no fool to be sure and by that time had accumulated enough power so that he gave himself airs. He behaved rather arrogantly, in fact not only arrogantly but boorishly, toward members of the Central Committee Presidium. Sometimes he would snap at Molotov and Mikoyan, and others as well. But none of us could talk back to him. This was humiliating and insulting, but he was always in Stalin’s presence and was the first to know about expressions of disfavor toward one or another person on Stalin’s part, and therefore he would attack that person, who had thus been designated as the next sacrificial victim.

And now suddenly Poskrebyshev had come under suspicion by Stalin. Of course, all Stalin’s material passed through Poskrebyshev’s hands. Besides, it was Poskrebyshev who took dictation from Stalin. Stalin usually walked up and down the room when he was dictating. He couldn’t sit still when he was thinking. He would walk around and dictate, but always to Poskrebyshev, never to stenographers. Poskrebyshev would take down the dictation. He was used to Stalin’s method of dictation and had learned how to take down everything he said. Then he would immediately read back what he had taken down. If he had taken down something incorrectly or if a more exact formulation had occurred to Stalin, he would then rephrase it, and Poskrebyshev would make the correction or insert the new material by hand. Here I have to give Stalin credit. Right up until his death when he dictated something or formulated a statement, he did it very clearly and exactly. Stalin’s formulations were brief, clear, and easy to understand. This was one of his great talents, and this is something you can’t belittle or take away from him. It constituted one of his tremendous powers. Everyone



who knew Stalin was impressed by this ability of his, and this made us proud to work with Stalin.

This was Stalin's positive side. Today I'm placing my main emphasis on the negative. So much has been said about his positive aspects that even if you reduced it by 80 percent, there would be enough positive stuff for a thousand people. But what I'm talking about are the things that did great harm to our party, personal characteristics that he had and traits of character that gave rise to actions that cost us tens of thousands of deaths among the best sons and daughters of our country. Much of this unfortunately is still being kept under wraps and remains unknown to the people. All this is again being suppressed and will have to wait for another time to become known. All the same, it will come to light some day and will get the kind of treatment it deserves. I think that telling the truth is by no means a discredit to our party. It is unpleasant, of course, but when the party itself takes up this question it will be a process of self-cleansing. Even more supporters will then come into the ranks of the party, and everyone will understand that this was an alien phenomenon that was essentially not characteristic of our party.

Lenin warned against such a thing. And after all, he was the founder of our party and the person who built it. He developed the theories on whose basis our Soviet state was built and expanded. That is where the basic foundations are. This means that if we do things in Lenin's way, there is nothing to be afraid of. Stalin was a great man and for many years was the leader of our party. But Lenin spoke of his shortcomings way back at the beginning of his activity, and life itself subsequently confirmed the correctness of what Lenin had said. Even today the party is correcting Stalin's mistakes, so that they will never again be repeated. That is why I am not afraid to speak of them. This is not slander, and it is not belittling to our party; on the contrary, it is self-cleansing.

So then, to return to the subject, Stalin dismissed Poskrebyshev and promoted someone else to take his place. Poskrebyshev, as the saying goes, was left hanging in midair. I'm convinced that if Stalin's life had lasted a little longer, Poskrebyshev would have been destroyed as a traitor. Stalin told us: "It was Poskrebyshev who passed on the material. No one else could have. It was Poskrebyshev who leaked confidential documents." What confidential material was he talking about? How could it be confidential when all this had been published openly in the press? What it was all about was simply that Stalin felt wounded by the fact that his formulation coincided word for word with a formulation used by this economist, whom he considered

half-baked and a total upstart. After all, no one else had the right to think as Stalin did. He was the only genius. Therefore he should be the only one to say anything new, and everyone else should repeat the new laws he had discovered and spread the word about them. Yet here some sorry specimen, someone who had crawled out from under a rock, as Stalin liked to say; some Siberian totally unknown to everyone, had written the same thing he had.

If Stalin had been an objective person and not so vain, if he had been a person who could analyze things self-critically, it wouldn't have taken much effort to see that Yaroshenko's work, the work of this half-baked upstart theoretician, as Stalin called him, had been written much earlier, long before Stalin took up his work on this question. Yaroshenko's writings had circulated in the Academy of Sciences, had been discussed there, multiple copies had been made, and they had been distributed to members of the Politburo. In short, this author had been knocking on every door and literally shouting, demanding recognition of his priority in this field. Stalin began to occupy himself with these questions after this author's material was already in Stalin's possession. So in fact this author could have said to Stalin: "It was you who stole *my* formulation."

It's possible of course that Stalin read Yaroshenko's work and later, without even realizing it himself, dictated the very same formulation. I'm not saying that that author was smarter than Stalin. All sorts of people make new discoveries, even people who are lower on the scale than someone like Stalin. Whatever rung of the ladder a person is on, whatever position he occupies in society, he can still make a new discovery, because every great person was just another ordinary human being before he took whatever step it was that made him great. Stalin, however, couldn't admit this. Since he was alive and he was the Leader, then he always had to have the first word on theoretical questions, and it was the job of everyone else to repeat what he said.

This episode, as I have said, ended with the poor fellow being arrested and spending time in prison. Later we released him, but I don't remember what his subsequent fate was. He evidently didn't receive the recognition he deserved. I assume that his scholarly work probably did deserve attention. But the fact that our so-called scholars and scientists always based themselves on propositions put forward by Stalin, praised him, and simply repeated what he said over and over—that had a big effect in this case. They had already stated their views on this subject while Stalin was alive, and they didn't want to change their point of view and thus lower themselves in the eyes of readers. So it's possible that this man was undeservedly denied

recognition, but I'm not about to pass judgment. This is a specific field of knowledge, so let the economists themselves, if they wish to, return to the question of his work, draw their own conclusions; let them analyze and sort out their conclusions as to who deserves recognition and who does not. Let them do it.

The incident involving this economist is also fairly typical of Voroshilov. If we are to study the arrests made in that period, we can take him as kind of a starting point when we analyze the events. That's how "profoundly" the work of one or another party member or scientist or scholar was studied when they came to the conclusion that he was "an enemy of the people." The official documents were just worthless scraps of paper. The charges and justifications for arresting someone were literally plucked out of the clear blue sky. Or it might depend on which ear someone scratched. Action like this was taken against thousands of people. This kind of behavior was typical not only of Voroshilov but of Molotov as well.

In 1937, at the height of the repression, it was Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov who were setting the political line, and Kaganovich was running around them on his tiptoes like a yes-man, wagging his tail. Kaganovich was not the kind of man Molotov was, but he wanted to be even worse than Molotov. Molotov was closer to Stalin. Although Kaganovich was also very close to him, and Stalin held him up as a model because of his supposed keen sense of class consciousness, his intransigent class position against enemies, the model of a resolute Bolshevik. But we found out quite well how "resolute" he was. This was the man, after all, who didn't even say one word in defense of his own brother, Mikhail,<sup>16</sup> and Mikhail took his own life when he no longer had any way out. The charge was made that he was a German agent and that Hitler had marked him down to be a member of a future Russian government. This was simply delirium! What could be more absurd? That Hitler would choose the Jew Mikhail Kaganovich to be a member of a future Russian government? From the point of view of the fascists such a selection in itself would have been a crime.

I never heard subsequently that anyone said anything about this incident, and Lazar Kaganovich himself never returned to the question of his brother's tragedy when it became clear that a gross error had been committed. Neither Stalin nor anyone else ever came back to this question. It was simply that Mikhail Kaganovich, people's commissar of the aviation industry, had previously existed, and now he did not, as though he never had existed. This was typical of Lazar Kaganovich. How he fawned on Stalin, licking his boots more than ever after this incident.

1. Stalin's "nearby dacha" was located in Volynskoye, which was then a suburb of Moscow (now part of the city). It is on the left as one drives westward out of Moscow, just beyond Poklonnaya Gora, a place with a large monument to victory over Germany in World War II. [SK]

2. Ivan Grigoryevich Bolshakov. See Biographies.

3. The film was *Captain Kidd*, a classic Hollywood pirate movie released by the United Artists Corporation in 1945, written and directed by Rowland V. Lee and with Charles Laughton starring as the pirate captain. [SS]

4. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Ostrovsky (1823–86), Russia's most notable dramatist of the mid-nineteenth century, wrote plays about the lives of merchants and other representatives of the rising "Third Estate" in Russia. The Moscow Art Theater was founded by Konstantin Stanislavsky (1863–1938; see Biographies; his real name was Alekseyev; he was the son of a textile merchant and invested his capital in the theater, which was also supported by his cousin, Savva Timofeyevich Morozov, another scion of a wealthy textile merchant family). After the 1917 revolution the theater continued to exist with the same name and the same director. [SK/GS] The actor Mikhail Mikhailovich Tarkhanov (1877–1948) was made a People's Artist of the USSR in 1937. The merchant in this play whose part Tarkhanov played was named Gradoboyev. [MN]

5. The linguistic discussion arose out of differences of view over Academician Nikolai Yakovlevich Marr's doctrine concerning language and his intellectual legacy. It opened in June 1950 on the pages of *Pravda*. Stalin published his own arguments on the matter in the same newspaper ("Regarding Marxism in Linguistics"—June 20, "On Some Questions of Linguistics"—July 4, and "Reply to Comrades"—August 2). The three articles were then brought out together as a brochure (I. Stalin, *Marksizm i voprosy yazykoznaniiya* [Marxism and Questions of Linguistics], Moscow, 1950).

6. Arnold Stepanovich Chikobava (1898–1985), a Soviet linguist specializing in the languages of the Caucasus; became a member of the Georgian Academy of Sciences in 1941; his contributions include works on general linguistic theory. His knowledge of linguistics enabled him to counter unscientific assertions made by Marr (see note 7 below). [GS]

7. Academician Nikolai Yakovlevich Marr (1864–1934) was an Orientalist and linguist, who did groundbreaking work in the study of the Armenian and Georgian languages and other languages of the Caucasus. He became a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1912 and under Soviet rule continued as a leading figure in the field of linguistics. In the 1920s Marr advanced a number of hypotheses that have not been confirmed, including his own unique theories about the "Japhetic" (that is, Indo-European) language family

and his assertions that the Georgian, Semitic, and Basque languages were related. The American historian Nicholas Riasanovsky gives the following view concerning Marr's bizarre role in Soviet linguistics: "[Marr] apparently fell prisoner to some weird theories of his own invention [and] played the same sad [antiscientific] role that Trofim Lysenko had played in biology. Endorsed by the [Soviet Communist] Party, Marr's strange views almost destroyed philology and linguistics in the Soviet Union, denying as they did the established families of languages in favor of a ubiquitous and multiform evolution of four basic sounds. The new doctrine [of the origin of language] seemed Marxist because it related, or at least claimed to relate, different families of languages to different stages of the material development of a people, but its implications proved so confusing and even dangerous [to accuracy in science] that Stalin himself turned against the Marr school in 1950, much to the relief and benefit of Soviet scholarship" (Nicholas Valentine Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 4th ed. [Oxford University Press, 1984]). [GS]

8. In *Khrushchev Remembers*, Edward Crankshaw speculates on why Stalin took up the obscure question of Marr's theories, as follows: "Marr, with official approval, had argued in Marxist terms that language was an aspect of the superstructure of society and would change as society changed; that is, in due course, with the global advance of Communism, language differences would wither away and there would be one universal language. Stalin decided it was time to put a stop to woolly internationalism of this kind. The language of the future would be Russian." [GS]

9. In November 1951, the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) organized a discussion on a draft textbook of political economy. In this connection, Stalin wrote "Remarks on Economic Questions" (February 1, 1952), "Reply to Comrade Aleksandr Ilyich Notkin" (April 24, 1952), "On the Errors of Comrade L. D. Yaroshenko" (May 22, 1952), and "Reply to Comrades A. V. Sanina and V. G. Venzher" (September 28, 1952). (On Venzher, see Biographies.) These articles were then brought out together in a brochure (I. Stalin, *Ekonomicheskiye problemy sotsializma v SSSR* [Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR], Moscow, 1952). The discussion was closed, and Stalin personally decided who should be invited to take part in this restricted forum. One of those invited was Luka Danilovich Yaroshenko, a specialist from the State Planning Commission (see Biographies). An old party member who fought in the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, he naively imagined that he could express his ideas freely and even criticize any other participant in the discussion, which he was told would be scholarly in character.

In the course of the discussion, Yaroshenko made critical references to the prepared draft of the textbook on political economy and expressed uncomplimentary judgments regarding economics in the USSR. Stalin was offended by this criticism and replied to Yaroshenko, who then appealed to the members of the Politburo in a letter in which he tried to prove that he was right. However, he was quickly given to understand where truth lay and who was its sole bearer. In a letter addressed to Malenkov, Yaroshenko then admitted his "errors": "In my letter to the members of the Politburo, I made a crude, serious error: on the question of the basic economic law of our society I put forward my own point of view, which differed from the point of view of Comrade Stalin. This is, without a doubt, a crude error. For every party member the opinion of Comrade Stalin is and must be an inviolable law. . . . The organizer and leader of the construction of a socialist society and the inspirer of all our victories embodies in his thoughts and actions all that is necessary for the sole correct solution of any question of the theory or practice of our life. On my part this was an unconsidered act, truly a mistake. By way of explanation, I can say that I made this error under the impression of the recent discussion, but this of course is no justification. I ask to be forgiven for this error."

The Central Committee instructed the Moscow city party committee to discuss Yaroshenko's action. Khrushchev spoke at the session and sharply criticized Yaroshenko. He angrily reprimanded Yaroshenko for daring to express an opinion of his own that did not coincide with Stalin's views. However, when he summed up the discussion, Khrushchev declared: "We are a strong and united party. We shall be magnanimous. We shall not impose any penalties on Comrade Yaroshenko, but we shall propose that the Central Statistical Administration . . . make use of Comrade Yaroshenko somewhere in Eastern Siberia."

This proposal was adopted, and the following day, when Yaroshenko asked the second secretary of the Moscow city committee Yekaterina Alekseyevna Furtseva what he should tell the party organization at his new place of work, Furtseva replied that "the question of your errors was discussed in the bureau of the Moscow committee and no penalties were imposed on you." With this Yaroshenko left for Irkutsk.

However, when he arrived in Irkutsk and went to the offices of the province party committee, he was acquainted with the official decision of the Moscow city committee. It contained harshly worded accusations against him—he had propagated hostile Bukharinite-Bogdanovite views on questions of political economy, had set out these views in a letter to the members of the Politburo, and at the session of the Moscow committee had

concealed his collaborators and been unable to expose the Bukharinite riffraff—and ended by stating that the Moscow city committee gave Yaroshenko a severe reprimand with warning. Such formulations in the decision of the Moscow city committee, adopted after Yaroshenko's departure from Moscow, might lead to stern repression. Yaroshenko was summoned to Moscow, where in Khrushchev's presence the chairman of the Party Control Committee M. F. Shkiryatov pounced on him with an angry speech, condemning him for anti-Soviet and antiparty acts. After this "conversation" Yaroshenko was arrested right away, as he left Shkiryatov's office. Not only he himself suffered repression, but also his brother, who had nothing to do with economics, and his wife. The family was expelled from Moscow.

In effect, the leadership corrected the "liberalism" that Khrushchev had shown earlier. One glance at the proposal that Khrushchev made at the session of the Moscow city committee bureau and at the new formulations that appeared after intervention by the leadership is enough to show what a serious difference there had been between Khrushchev's position and that of the Politburo.

Yaroshenko was released from confinement at the end of December 1953, was readmitted to the party, and returned to work in his field. However, at a party meeting to discuss the results of the Twentieth Party Congress he openly expressed his opinion of the personality cult—in sharper language, moreover, than party agencies recommended and than Khrushchev had used in his report. The party Central Committee was informed of his speech. A document exists from which it is clear that all the secretaries of the Central Committee—and, consequently, Khrushchev, too—were acquainted with the memorandum about Yaroshenko's speech and were unanimous in their conclusion: Yaroshenko was expelled from the party and deprived of work. How are we to understand Khrushchev's position? Under Stalin he took a liberal attitude to Yaroshenko's critical statements and as a result received an instruction from the Central Committee and was forced radically to change an already prepared decision, while in 1956 he himself sanctioned Yaroshenko's expulsion from the party for the same kind of speech. In the words of the document that the Central Committee adopted on December 19, 1956, Yaroshenko had dared to "criticize the foundations of the party's policy."

But that is not the end of the intersection of the fates of Khrushchev and Yaroshenko. After the Twenty-Second Party Congress Yaroshenko was readmitted to the party. He was no longer able to work and lived on a pension; however, his readmission to the party would have been impossible without Khrushchev's consent.

10. His letter of March 20, 1952, was sent to the members of the Politburo the same spring.

11. Admiral Aleksandr Vasilyevich Kolchak (1874–1920) was head of the White armies controlling Siberia during the Russian Civil War, 1918–20. [GS]

12. Grigory Trofimovich Shuisky (1907–85) was an assistant to Khrushchev from 1948 to 1964. He headed Khrushchev’s “editorial group” (speech-writers). After 1964 Shuisky worked in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee (CC). In 1964–65, he was a consultant to the CC’s ideological department; in 1965 it was renamed the department of propaganda, and he continued as a consultant to that department until his retirement in 1976. See Biographies. [SK]

Vasily Ivanovich Shuisky (1552–1612) was a leading member of the boyar *duma*, or council of the nobility, during the “Time of Troubles” following the death of Ivan the Terrible (1584). The

Time of Troubles lasted into the beginning of the seventeenth century, ending with the establishment of the Romanov dynasty in 1613. (The boyars were powerful nobles, usually from the landowning families, who played an influential role in old Russia.) During the Time of Troubles, Shuisky was made tsar in May 1608 but was deposed in July 1610. [SK/GS]

13. Poltava is in eastern Ukraine. [SS]

14. Andrei Stepanovich Shevchenko (1911–93) was an agronomist and an assistant to Khrushchev on agricultural matters. See Biographies. [SK]

15. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Poskrebysh. See Biographies.

16. Mikhail Moiseyevich Kaganovich. See Biographies.

## STALIN ABOUT HIMSELF

In his speeches Stalin always spoke highly of Lenin and called himself a Leninist. In the narrow circle of Stalin’s intimates I had occasion to hear him reminisce about his meetings with Lenin and his conversations with Lenin. He would tell about what position Lenin had taken on one or another question, and it always turned out that Lenin, after learning Stalin’s point of view, would then put forward this same view, representing it as his own idea. That is, Stalin gave us to understand that it was he who had suggested these ideas to Lenin and Lenin made use of them. There were times when it became simply uncomfortable and awkward for us to listen to this. When he would express obvious disrespect for Lenin, we would glance at one another.

During the October revolution and the Civil War, Stalin held a position against the use of bourgeois specialists. He was what we then called a “*spets-eater*.”<sup>1</sup> He had no confidence in the specialists from the old regime. In contrast, Lenin appealed to them to help in the work of constructing a new system, above all in building the Red Army, because without trained officers it was impossible to build a real army. At that time Trotsky headed

the armed forces. Trotsky carried out this directive of Lenin's and drew many former tsarist officers into the work. Stalin was very demonstrative in telling us about specific cases, for example, when Trotsky recommended such-and-such an officer and sent that officer to Tsaritsyn, but Stalin refused to accept the man. He said that this man had later turned out to be a traitor to the homeland.<sup>2</sup>

The thing is, you had to know those times in order to understand the situation. Distrust of the bourgeois intelligentsia was very widespread then, and often this distrust was justified. In the first days of the revolution the intelligentsia, unfortunately, did not, for the most part, take a clear and strong stand. It was divided. Some of the intelligentsia emigrated, some took a wait-and-see attitude, some engaged in sabotage, and some actively joined the struggle against Soviet power and even helped organize armed resistance. There were not many at first who joined in building the new system. Among the people, therefore, especially among the workers, there was a strong feeling against the bourgeois specialists. The "*spets-eating*" attitude was widespread, and the party organizations had to put a lot of effort into trying to restrain such sentiments.

The trend toward leveling, or extreme egalitarianism, was also very strong. This was understandable because our country was in ruins, and the workers were worse off than they had been under capitalism. They were starving. Besides that, the workers were affected by the fact that the revolution was victorious, and it seemed to them that they should immediately start living better than they had before. They also felt that if people were equal before the law, they should be equal in material respects. Lastly, when our party changed its name to Communist and we set about the building of socialism; many thought that the means of consumption should be distributed equally among all those who worked. And now suddenly the Soviet government was singling out the specialists and giving them big salaries.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, the workers were being paid the same wages as before or even less. This fanned the flames of "*spets-eating*" sentiments.

The specialists in those days had apartments of their own, provided with municipal services, such as running water, whereas the workers never saw the likes of that. For them municipal services took the form that at some coal mines and pits in the Donbas, for example, water was delivered in barrels, while at some there was a standing pipe with a spigot, for distributing water. Often the source of water was a long distance away, and the workers had to wade through mud to get there and back. The specialists rode to market, along with their wives and servants, in carriages. The workers had an especially bitter attitude toward the wives and servants. No workers' assembly went by without



this question being raised. Even after the victory of the revolution, the situation had not changed as far as municipal services and utilities went.

What was this all about? The Bolsheviks understood that bourgeois specialists had to be enticed to join in the work. It was not enough just to threaten them; their material interests had to be addressed. In the first period after the revolution this took the form of granting them privileges to some degree, although not to the full extent they had enjoyed under capitalism. For example, they were given means of transportation, fairly decent apartments, and so forth. A chief engineer at a mine would have a pair of horses, and at our mine the chief of the workshop, an engineer named Gladovsky, had a horse and a carriage driver. These of course were not especially lush material conditions. But the workers didn't even have that much, naturally. Besides that, these specialists were hostile elements, representatives of the bourgeois class and loyal servants of capital. Thus the question became complicated, and it was difficult for the party to combat these antispecialist attitudes. Nevertheless, there was no other way of attracting specialists to work for us. And without specialists, without knowledge of engineering, and without scientific knowledge in general, it would be impossible to build a new society that would be based above all on science. Communism is precisely that kind of society. To build it requires extensive and intensive knowledge, the ability to organize a new society on a scientific basis, which is an indisputable teaching of Marxism and Leninism. Otherwise there is no point in even trying to talk about a communist society.

We encountered the antispecialist attitude above all in the army. At that time, as I have said, Stalin was one of the biggest "*spets*-eaters." And he told us about many incidents related to that (I can't remember them all now), which seemed to testify against Lenin, because it was none other than Lenin who had raised the question of drawing specialists into the work of building socialism. And Lenin was absolutely correct. Lenin's genius was expressed in this. In those very tense times he called on us to learn from the capitalists, to draw bourgeois specialists into the work and even bring them into the army. He said that it was necessary to give them certain unavoidable powers, while assigning commissars to oversee them, but to maintain the principle of "one-man management" (*yedinonachaliye*) in the army. This was no joking matter! Here you would have a former officer of the tsarist army in the Red Army, and suddenly he was a *yedinonachalnik* [that is, one man having full authority to make crucial decisions]. Although there was a commissar to oversee him, the "*spets*" was the one who issued the military orders. When I served in the Red Army, a vast number of misunderstandings and disagreements arose from this situation. There were grounds for distrust [of



orders given by former tsarist officers] because incidents involving treachery and betrayal did occur as well as the defection of former tsarist officers to the Whites.<sup>4</sup>

This was a natural process that was going on. A process of selection was under way among people who had been trained by the old order, a process of selection among the intelligentsia educated under the old capitalist-landlord system. They were being drawn in and won over to the side of the revolution. Some came fearfully, while others believed in the new society and wanted to help; still others came because they had no choice; they had to earn the means of existence. Besides that, there were some who took the opportunity to work in industry or in Soviet institutions with the conscious intention of becoming agents for their former masters and committing sabotage against the socialist system. There were many different kinds of people, and the Soviet system had no choice. It was forced to try to attract bourgeois specialists in order to build something new, and without them it was impossible to move forward. That is why Lenin's policy was absolutely the correct one.

I remember a specific case when Stalin directly expressed his displeasure with Lenin. According to his account, this was when he was in Tsaritsyn. He had gone there to obtain grain supplies, but he also took measures to organize the defense of Tsaritsyn. At that time Voroshilov, heading the Fifth Army, had retreated to Tsaritsyn from Ukraine, and he and Stalin really hit it off.<sup>5</sup> Stalin said that Lenin summoned him to return to Moscow and report on the state of affairs. Then Lenin said to him: "Listen, old fellow, reports have reached me that there's a lot of drinking going on there. That you are drinking yourself and encouraging others to drink. That kind of thing can't be done!" Stalin didn't deny that he'd been drinking. What of it? That was his attitude. "You see, someone had told on me. It was the specialists who told on me, and Lenin read me the riot act." Stalin said this with obvious displeasure. We talked this over among ourselves. Evidently this shortcoming that we suffered from in working under Stalin's leadership was one of long standing. Even back then he had been a heavy drinker. Lenin had found out about it and warned him.

One incident Stalin told about at one of his places of exile became engraved on my memory. Today I can't say what year this happened. He had been exiled to some place in Vologda gubernia.<sup>6</sup> A lot of political prisoners were exiled there, but also a lot of criminals. He told us about this several times. He said: "What good fellows there were among the criminals in that exile colony in Vologda gubernia. I became good friends with the criminals. They were really good fellows. We used to go into a tavern, and we would see

who had a ruble or, let's say, three rubles. We would stick the money to a windowpane, order wine, and drink until we had drunk up all the money. One day I would pay, the next day someone else, and so it would go. They were good, sociable fellows,<sup>7</sup> those criminals. But the so-called politicals—there were a lot of bastards among them. They organized a so-called comrades' court<sup>8</sup> and condemned me for drinking with the criminals." I don't know what kind of sentence was passed by that comrades' court. No one asked about it, of course; we just glanced at one another. Later we exchanged opinions on the subject. This meant that even as a young man he had this tendency [toward heavy drinking]. Evidently it was inherited.

Stalin told us about his father, that he had been a shoemaker and that he drank heavily, that he ruined his waistline from excessive drinking, developing a drinker's paunch. For a Georgian to ruin his waistline from excessive drinking was the worst possible thing. Stalin went on: "When I was still an infant lying in the cradle, he used to come up to the cradle, dip his finger in a glass of wine, and have me suck on his finger. He taught me to drink when I was still lying in the cradle." I don't know about Stalin's father from the way things are written now in the official biography of Stalin. But in my early years the rumor circulated that his father had not been a worker at all. In those days people were very picky about who came from what background. If a non-working-class background was discovered, that person was considered of a lower sort. And that was understandable. The working class was the most revolutionary and the most sturdy and reliable class. It bore on its shoulders the whole burden of the struggle for a new society, and therefore had a negative attitude, not just a guarded attitude, but a negative attitude toward other classes and strata of society. The workers had a very mistrustful attitude toward those others.

So then, what they used to say was that Stalin's father was not just a shoemaker but had a workshop for making shoes where ten or more people worked for him. For those days it was considered a factory. If that had been someone else and not Stalin, they would have put him through the ringer in the various party purges; they would have put him through the ringer until his bones cracked. But explanations were found in this case to smooth everything over. Nevertheless people still talked about it. I'm simply recalling this fact to mind here. It provides no grounds for drawing any particular conclusions, because it doesn't really have great significance. I am simply telling what kind of attitude people had toward such questions back then.

I remember Stalin telling us about another place of exile. He ended up in the remote region called the Turukhansk territory (*Turukhanskii krai*)<sup>9</sup> and

lived in the same village as Sverdlov.<sup>10</sup> At first they became friends, but later, judging from his account, they had a falling out and went their separate ways. At least they stopped living in the same peasant hut. Sverdlov moved out of the hut and found himself an apartment, leaving Stalin behind. Stalin always told us that when they lived together the local people, among whom they found themselves in that village, considered Yashka [that is, Sverdlov] to be the main one (*glavny*) and not Ryaboi [the pock-marked one; that is, Stalin]. They called Stalin the pock-marked one because his face had been disfigured by smallpox. When Yashka moved to different quarters they began to say: “We thought the doctor was the main one, but it turns out it’s not the doctor but the pock-marked one.” The local peasants called Sverdlov a doctor. He had been a pharmaceutical chemist earlier in his life and apparently had helped some sick people in the village; he had some medicines in his possession. That’s why he had the reputation of being a doctor.

Stalin told the following story: “We would make dinner for ourselves. Actually there was nothing much to do because we didn’t work but lived on the funds that the authorities disbursed: three rubles a month. The party also helped us. The main thing we did in the way of earning a livelihood was to fish for white salmon. That didn’t take any great skill. We also went hunting. I had a dog and called it Yashka. Of course for Sverdlov that wasn’t pleasant, he was Yashka and the dog was Yashka, and so then Sverdlov used to wash the dishes and spoons after dinner, but I never did. I would eat and put the dishes on the dirt floor and the dog would lick everything clean. That dog had a passion for cleanliness.” Again we glanced at one another. We ourselves had traveled a hard road either as peasants or as workers and had not been pampered by having anyone serve us. But not to wash the dishes, spoons, and cups that you ate from? To have a dog lick it all clean? That amazed us.

Stalin told us about this many times. So we would know in advance when he began to tell a story how it was going to end. There were also stories about his life in internal exile about which children might say: “Grandpa, are you making this up?” But we got used to it, the fact that in the last stage of his life, when he didn’t have good control of himself, he made up a lot of things. For example, he would tell stories like this: “One day I went hunting. I took my shotgun and went to the Yenisei River.<sup>11</sup> At the place where I lived the Yenisei was about twelve versts wide. I crossed the Yenisei on skis. This was in the winter. I looked around and saw some partridges sitting on a tree limb.” (I must confess I don’t know whether partridges sit on the limbs of trees or bushes. I have done some partridge hunting, but I always thought

they were creatures of the steppes and hid in the grass.<sup>12</sup> But I don't know. I'm only telling you what I heard. Take it for what it's worth.)

Stalin went on: "I got up close to them and opened fire. I had twelve cartridges and there were twenty-four partridges sitting there. I killed twelve of them and the rest still sat there. But I had no more cartridges. I decided to go back for cartridges. I went back, got some cartridges and returned. They were still sitting there." At that point I couldn't help it, and I interrupted, asking: "How's that? All of them? They were all still sitting there?"

"Yes," he answered, "all of them."

Then Beria made some sort of comment encouraging him to go on with his story.

He continued: "I shot those partridges, too, and then I took a rope, tied them all together, and tied the rope to my belt and pulled all the partridges behind me and dragged them all home."

We were at dinner when we listened to this story. On our way out of the dacha, as we were getting ready to leave—before we left, we went to the bathroom, and there we literally spat out our disbelief. On a winter's day he supposedly traveled twelve versts, killed twelve partridges, returned another twelve versts, got cartridges, went back another twelve versts, shot some more partridges, and then went back home. That would be a total of forty-eight kilometers on skis.<sup>13</sup> Beria said to me: "Listen, how could a man from the Caucasus who had never skied very much travel that far? Ah, he's telling tall tales!" None of us had any doubt about it. Why he had to fib like that it's hard to say. He had some sort of need to do it. But these tall tales were amusing, and of course they didn't do any harm. We also had serious conversations, of course.

Later I found out that Stalin really didn't know how to shoot. He picked up a gun once when we were at the "nearby dacha."<sup>14</sup> He was going to scare away some sparrows, but he ended up wounding one of the security police of his personal bodyguard. On another occasion, because he didn't really know how to handle a weapon, his gun went off at the table, and it was purely by chance that Mikoyan wasn't killed. He was sitting close to Stalin and the gunshot dug up a piece of ground at our feet. Both the table and Mikoyan were sprayed with sand. We looked around dumbfounded. No one said anything, but we were all shaken to the core.

Stalin told us a lot about Lenin. He often became angry over the fact that when Lenin was on his sickbed, and Stalin had an altercation with Krupskaya,<sup>15</sup> Lenin demanded that Stalin apologize to her. I can't remember now exactly what the reason for the dispute was. It seemed that Stalin was trying to get

through to see Lenin and Nadezhda Konstantinovna was protecting Lenin, so that he wouldn't be overburdened with troubles; she was just following the doctor's recommendations. Or perhaps it was something else. Stalin said something rude to Nadezhda Konstantinovna, and she told Lenin about it. Lenin demanded that Stalin apologize. I don't remember what Stalin did, whether he gave in to Lenin or not. I think that he probably did apologize in some form, because otherwise Lenin would not have made peace with him.

After Stalin's death we found an envelope in a secret compartment, and there was a note written to Stalin in Lenin's handwriting. Lenin wrote to Stalin that he had insulted Nadezhda Konstantinovna, Lenin's companion, and he demanded that Stalin apologize. Lenin wrote that if Stalin did not apologize, Lenin would no longer consider him his comrade. I was surprised that a note like this would have been preserved. Probably Stalin had forgotten about it.<sup>16</sup>

Stalin had great disrespect for Nadezhda Konstantinovna [Krupskaya]. He was also disrespectful toward Lenin's sister, Maria Ilyinichna [Ulyanova].<sup>17</sup> In general he used to comment on both of them very negatively. In his view they didn't represent anything of value to the party, even though in the past perhaps they had played some role in the struggle to build the party and achieve its victory. I felt very uncomfortable when I heard and saw the disrespect with which Stalin behaved toward Nadezhda Konstantinovna when she was still alive.

Krupskaya spoke once at a party conference in the Bauman district in Moscow in 1930 at the beginning of the struggle against the "right deviation" headed by Rykov and Bukharin.<sup>18</sup> She defended Bukharin and Rykov, and a number of delegates spoke out against her. After that she was given a thorough working-over, without these speeches being published in the press. This "working-over" was done in all the party cells, the base organizations of the party. Maria Ilyinichna was also given a thorough going-over. There was nothing exceptional about Maria Ilyinichna. She was a great friend of Bukharin's. Bukharin was the editor of *Pravda*, and Maria Ilyinichna worked as a secretary in the editorial offices. In those days everyone called him "Bukharchik." He was well loved in the party and Lenin commented in a flattering way about him. It was Lenin who usually used that endearing term "our Bukharchik." He was a major theoretician, who at Lenin's suggestion had written the *ABC of Communism*, and all of us Communists of that era got to know the science of Marxism-Leninism by studying that book. Everyone that joined the party studied it.

I was educated in the party as a young Communist whose record began after the October revolution. I was accustomed to regarding Lenin with respect as the leader of the party, and I regarded Nadezhda Konstantinovna as a person inseparable from Lenin. Therefore it was a bitter experience for me to see her at meetings of party activists. A bedraggled old lady would come in; everyone would avoid her because she was a person who didn't follow the party line; she was regarded as a person who didn't understand the party's policies correctly and who spoke out against some of its positions. Today when I analyze everything that was done back then, I think that it is precisely she who was correct on these questions. But back then everything was mixed up and thrown together in a heap, and both Nadezhda Konstantinovna and Maria Ilyinichna were the targets of a lot of mudslinging.

When I was already working in the party's Moscow committee, Nadezhda Konstantinovna was in charge of looking into complaints. I don't remember what institution she worked for then, but party members who felt insulted or injured came to her with requests and appeals or wrote her letters. There were a lot of shortcomings in the functioning of the Moscow Soviet. Living conditions were generally hard for blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, and the working intelligentsia. If they could find no way out, they would appeal to Nadezhda Konstantinovna as a last resort. Krupskaya herself was limited in many respects in what she could do, and she wasn't able to satisfy the just requests of those who appealed to her for help. That's why she often sent these requests on to me as secretary of the party's Moscow committee. Unfortunately I, too, although I held a fairly high post, was rather limited in what I could do in the way of satisfying these requests.

The poor housing conditions were a general problem. People came with requests for better living quarters. The housing question was a total nightmare.<sup>19</sup> We were carrying out industrialization, we were building new plants and factories, but as a rule the increased number of workers living in Moscow was not taken into account at all. A minimal amount of new housing was built. The number of new buildings erected did not even make up for the ones that were lost through "amortization" [that is, became unusable and were torn down].

So then, Nadezhda Konstantinovna was sending petitioners to me, and I did what I could, and then I would respond to her, letting her know what I had done, or I would respond that in this case we were powerless. Sometimes I met with her personally because she knew that I was secretary of the party's Moscow committee. She understood correctly that I was the person

who expressed the general line of the party in the capital, and she treated me accordingly. She evidently assumed that I was a product of the recent Stalin generation. And that is my opinion as well. So in this case I am doing her thinking for her, but that is the way things were. I really was devoted to the party's general line, to the Central Committee, and to Stalin as our leader and as the leader of the country. In my view everything that we were doing and everything that Stalin said was correct, an expression of genius, and should be put into practice. And I did everything in my power to make it a reality.

But even in this kind of situation human feelings arise (*proyavlyayutsya*). Therefore I felt ambivalent when Nadezhda Konstantinovna came under fire from the party. I felt sorry for her. In the narrow circle of his intimates Stalin explained to us that she really wasn't Lenin's wife at all. Sometimes he spoke rather freely when referring to her. After Krupskaya's death, when he would recall that earlier time, he said that if she had lived longer we might have had to publicly raise the question of whether she really was Lenin's wife. He said that it could have been demonstrated that another woman was Lenin's wife, and he mentioned the name of another woman fairly well respected in the party. That woman is still alive today and therefore I will not give her name. I cannot act as a judge on such questions. I simply think that this was just one more expression of disrespect for Lenin. That's exactly what it was. Not slander, but disrespect for Lenin.

Nothing was sacred for Stalin. He didn't spare Lenin himself. Not even his name. Nowhere did Stalin publicly make such statements, but in the narrow circle of his intimates he allowed himself to talk this way. And he was not just blowing hot air when he did that. He wanted to influence our psyches, to have an effect on our consciousness, to shake our unlimited love for Lenin, so as to reinforce his own position as the Leader and the number-one thinker of our party and our epoch. Stalin very cautiously sought to ingrain it in the minds of people in his inner circle that Stalin's opinion of Lenin was not at all the same as what was written publicly.

At this point I should return to what I was saying about Kaganovich. I was indignant most of all over Kaganovich's behavior, and not only I. He was a real lackey. All of a sudden his ears would prick up [when he heard Stalin saying such things], and then he would start behaving like an utter scoundrel. He would stand up—he had a loud, stentorian voice, a really rich and strong one—and he would start to rumble away: “Comrades, it is time for us to speak the truth. In the party everyone is saying: Lenin, Leninism. But we have to state things as they really are, the reality that exists today.



Lenin died in 1924. How many years did he put in? How much was done under him? Compared to how much has been done under Stalin? The time has come now for everyone to take up the slogan not of Leninism but of Stalinism.” When he would go on and on like this, we would remain silent. The silence would fill the room.

Stalin was the first to take up the polemic against Kaganovich: “What are you saying? How dare you talk like that!” But the tone in which he said this seemed to be encouraging further objections to what Stalin himself was saying. This technique is well known among the people. When a mother goes to visit another village and wants her daughter or son to go with her, so that they’ll be fed there, she shouts out: “Don’t you come! Don’t you come with me, you little devil!” And she shakes her finger at them; then when no one is watching she beckons them: “Come along, come along!” And they run after her. I myself have witnessed such scenes in the villages. Here too Stalin began hammering away at Kaganovich for taking the liberty of talking that way, but it was obvious that what Kaganovich said pleased Stalin. Stalin would usually counter Kaganovich with words like this: “What was Lenin? He stood tall, like a garden pole. And what is Stalin? No taller than your finger.” And sometimes he would make comparisons that were simply unprintable.

I heard these comparisons repeated many times, and then Kaganovich would react in a stormy way to Stalin’s assertions. He would get worked up even more and insistently repeat what he had been saying, because he saw that Stalin obviously wasn’t really angry, that it was false indignation on his part.

Kaganovich was a great master at observing such things. He sensed what pleased Stalin and what did not. Right up until Stalin’s death this “argument” between Kaganovich and Stalin kept cropping up more and more frequently. None of us intervened in this discussion. I think that if Stalin had officially agreed with Kaganovich and measures had been taken to remove Lenin from his former pedestal and place Stalin on it instead, substituting Stalinism for Leninism, no one would have objected. Although I am convinced that inwardly everyone would have been disturbed and felt angry.

Stalin sensed that although the rest of us remained silent, we didn’t really support Kaganovich. There is no question that Stalin singled Kaganovich out and regarded him as the one who correctly understood the critical role and merits of Stalin himself. I don’t know whether this was the result of the decline of Stalin’s powers in old age or a weakened functioning of his brain, a weakening of those centers of the brain that exercise self-control. Perhaps Stalin suppressed such thoughts within himself earlier, but now they gained



strength, and Kaganovich was cleverly trying to make use of that. But what Kaganovich was advocating didn't come about. And it's a very good thing that it didn't.

In order to understand better the circumstances in which we members of the Politburo listened to Stalin's revelations about himself, it may be useful to comment a little about those surroundings and circumstances, because the way in which we perceived Stalin's remarks to a large extent depended on that.

In the last years of his life some kind of inner fear developed in Stalin. There were many signs that led me to notice this. For example, when we would leave the Kremlin after watching a movie, with the "nearby dacha" as our destination, we would suddenly start winding through the streets and alleys of Moscow. Although the distance from the Kremlin to the western bend of the Moscow River was rather short, we found that we still hadn't crossed the river. Usually Beria and Malenkov got in the car with Stalin, and the rest of us rode in whichever cars we chose. Most often I rode in the same car with Bulganin.

Later I asked those who had ridden with Stalin: "Why were you winding about in the back alleys?" They answered: "Don't ask us. We didn't decide what route to take. It was Stalin who said to take this street or that." Apparently he had a map of Moscow with him, and he would tell the driver what route to take, and as they were driving along he would say: "Turn here, turn there, go this way so that you come out at such-and-such a place." You don't have to be very smart to guess that he was taking these measures with the aim of throwing off enemies who might want to make an attempt on his life. He didn't even tell his bodyguard in advance what route he would be following, and he changed the route every time. What was the reason for this? Mistrust of everyone and fear for his own life.

Then when we arrived at the "nearby dacha," we commented ironically to one another on how the bolts and locks on the doors and gates had been reinforced. All sorts of new bars and bolts kept showing up, and in addition there would be wooden police barriers.<sup>20</sup> Now who, after all, could just drop in on Stalin unexpectedly at his dacha? There were two fences, with guard dogs running loose between them. Also an electric warning system had been installed, and other protective measures had been taken. Incidentally, we considered all this the right thing to do. Stalin occupied such a prominent position that for the enemies of the Soviet system he was quite a "tempting" target. This was no joking matter, although it would be a harmful thing to imitate what was done then. No ordinary citizen was allowed to enter the Kremlin. The Kremlin was off limits. The same could be said about the

special boxes for members of the government at theaters. Absolutely no one was admitted to them other than those who entered together with Stalin. Without Stalin's permission no one could enter the area where he was sitting. There, too, every possible preventive measure was taken.

Here is an incident that I witnessed once. Stalin went to the bathroom. The guard who was literally walking at his heels stopped at the door. When Stalin came out of the bathroom, right in front of us, he began cursing out the guard and gave him a real dressing-down: "Why didn't you carry out your duties? You're my bodyguard, and you should be guarding me, but you're out here lounging around."

The man tried to defend himself: "Comrade Stalin, I know that there are no other doors in there. The only door is right here, and I am standing right by it, keeping guard."

Stalin rudely interrupted him: "You should have gone in with me."

This was unbelievable, the idea that the man should go into the bathroom with him. That meant that Stalin was even afraid to go to the bathroom without a bodyguard. These were the workings of a sick mind. The man was frightening himself. But it seems that Beria had lent a hand in this whole matter.

Stalin and Beria developed very refined methods for killing people; they thought up incredible ways of doing it. Now he was projecting all this back on himself, thinking: "Why couldn't the people who want to see me wiped off the face of the earth use similar methods against me?" I think that these kinds of thoughts began to torment him. The actions that he had taken against people he distrusted were tearing at his own conscience. All of them had been "enemies of the people." But these interpretations were made too freely—as to who was an enemy and who was not. Unfortunately that's the way things were. And all of this has not yet been exposed and condemned sufficiently. Measures have not yet been worked out that could prevent the same kind of thing from being repeated.

That's how life went by during the last years of Stalin's existence. I've already told about the fact that at dinner he literally wouldn't taste a single dish unless someone else, in his presence, had tried it first. Each of us had his favorite dish, and the cooks prepared them well. The food there was very tasty. After everyone had taken some, Stalin's suspicions were relieved. As far as the hors d'oeuvres on the table went, there too he would always wait until someone else had tried them. He would wait a little while and then he would have some himself. This man had already got himself into an extreme state of mind. He didn't trust people who had served him for years and were unquestionably devoted to him. He didn't trust anyone!

Around the time of the New Year [1953] everything was going along like a well-oiled machine. If a day or two went by without his summoning us, we would think that something had gone wrong or something had happened to Stalin; perhaps he had fallen ill. He suffered from loneliness, and it was a burden for him to be without people; he needed to have people around him. When he would wake up, he would immediately summon us by phone, either inviting us to see a movie or dragging out some conversation that could have been decided in a couple of minutes; he would start such a conversation and then artificially drag it out. When he invited us to come to his place, it was not always just a pointless waste of time keeping him company. Sometimes important government and party questions were decided. But it was not a great percentage of the time that went to such serious matters, and the rest of the time, we had to somehow or other entertain Stalin, so that he wouldn't suffer and be burdened by loneliness and his fear of loneliness.

Within our inner circle Beria showed disrespect for Stalin more and more sharply. He spoke most openly and candidly with Malenkov, but it happened that he would speak that way in my presence also. Sometimes he would use very insulting phrases in regard to Stalin. I must confess that this put me on my guard. These outbursts against Stalin on Beria's part I regarded as a provocation, as an attempt to draw me into making anti-Stalin statements so that later he could expose me to Stalin as an anti-Soviet person and an "enemy of the people." I had observed Beria's perfidious ways already, and so I listened, without covering my ears, but I never got involved in such conversations and never expressed support for them. Nevertheless Beria continued along those lines. He was more than just confident that nothing threatened him. He understood of course that I was incapable of playing the role of informer [that is, that I would denounce him to Stalin]. Besides, I knew that Stalin and Beria were much closer to each other than Stalin and Khrushchev. When good friends curse at each other it's their way of showing affection. (Lovers' quarrels are soon mended.) The fact that both of them were from the Caucasus made it easier for them to come to an understanding. I also thought that this was probably a provocation. Beria wanted to draw me into such conversations in order to then betray me and destroy me. That was his provocateur's method of operation, and Beria was a master at such things. In general he was capable of everything foul and vile. Bulganin also heard such conversations, and I think that Bulganin also understood them correctly.

I don't know to what extent Beria allowed himself to take such liberties in the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov. There's no question that in the presence of Kaganovich he didn't do this, because he hated Kaganovich and

was afraid he would tell Stalin everything. Kaganovich also had a despicable personality, but his was different. He was more of a bootlicker. We sometimes had to pull Kaganovich back when he would attack Voroshilov or Molotov. He sensed that they had lost Stalin's confidence and that it was safe to kick them while they were down. And since it was safe to do that, he would do it. That was the kind of morality he had. He respected only those he depended on or those who could hurt him.

I have come right up to the last days of Stalin's life. I will begin my account of that with the last day that we saw Stalin still alive. After we left him that day, we didn't see him in his normal state again. The next day when we came was when we were informed that he had fallen ill, and we spent the last hours of his life with him. We had spent a Saturday night with him, and he was in a good mood, seemed healthy, and outwardly gave no cause for alarm, no reason to think that by the next morning his end would have come.

I should mention at this point that one day during the last weeks of Stalin's life Beria and I went past his dining room, and Beria pointed out that the table was covered with a huge pile of large red envelopes, lying unopened.<sup>21</sup> It was evident that a long time had gone by, and no one had touched them. Beria said: "There are probably papers from you lying there, too." After Stalin's death I was curious about what had happened to those envelopes. Vlasik,<sup>22</sup> the chief of Stalin's bodyguards, answered: "We had a specially assigned person who opened them all, but it seemed awkward to leave them like that, and so we returned the contents to those who had sent them."

1. "Spets" was the Russian abbreviation designating a trained specialist from the former privileged classes. [GS]

2. Khrushchev quotes Stalin as saying that Trotsky had sent a former tsarist officer to Tsaritsyn, but Stalin had refused to accept the officer, adding that later this officer "turned out to be a traitor."

Information exists on what really happened in this instance, and this information totally contradicts Stalin's assertion.

A note in the 1999 Russian edition of Khrushchev's memoirs says that the reference is to a case involving the alleged "conspiracy of General Nosovich" (giving no further explanation about this "conspiracy").

The note further states that Gen. Andrei Yevgenyevich Snesarev was accused of treason "in the 1930s" and became a victim of the Stalin-era repression.

The persecution of Snesarev (beginning with his arrest and imprisonment in 1930 and his execution in 1937, at the height of the "Great Terror")

was a classic case of Stalin taking revenge in the 1930s—after achieving a virtual monopoly on power—on someone who was far more talented than Stalin and whose good work at Tsaritsyn in 1918 was, in effect, a blot on Stalin's reputation. Snesarev's very existence constantly threatened to expose the falseness of Stalin's claims to a glorious record in the Civil War fighting, especially at Tsaritsyn in 1918.

The note in the 1999 Russian edition rightly states that Snesarev successfully organized the defense of Tsaritsyn from May to July 1918. What the note neglects to say is that in July 1918 Stalin *had Snesarev arrested on charges of "wrecking."* In fact, Stalin had most of the headquarters staff of the Soviet Tenth Army in Tsaritsyn and its supply services staff (*komissariat*) arrested and imprisoned on a barge on the Volga River. He did this on the basis of his hostility toward "bourgeois specialists" and in defiance of orders from the central command, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Soviet Republic (whose acronym in Russian was

Revvoyensovet Respubliki), and whose chair was Leon Trotsky, the *predrevvoyensovet*. This central command body was implementing Lenin's policy of using "specialists" to help build the Red Army.

As head of the Red Army, Trotsky sent a telegram to Tsaritsyn insisting that the military specialists and supply service personnel (*komissariat*) be permitted to function normally at Tsaritsyn. Stalin inscribed on this telegram the notation: "Disregard!" (*Ne priniimat vo vnimaniye!*)

In other words, he refused to follow orders and encouraged others to disregard those orders. One of those who saw Stalin's "Disregard" notation was a Colonel Nosovich, who was chief of operations of the Soviet Tenth Army at Tsaritsyn when Stalin arrived there in June 1918, but who later defected to the Whites.

It just so happens that Nosovich recorded for posterity this instance of Stalin's indiscipline in a local White paper, *Donskaya Volna* (Don River Wave), on February 3, 1919.

After Stalin's defiance of orders in July 1918, an investigating commission was sent from Moscow by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. The commission, headed by Aleksei I. Okulov, arrived in Tsaritsyn and found that Snesev was innocent and had been wrongly incarcerated. The Okulov commission recommended that Snesev be assigned to another front, which he was, in September 1918. The commission was highly critical in general of the Tsaritsyn group headed by Stalin and Voroshilov.

The others who had been arrested by Stalin at Tsaritsyn were not as lucky as Snesev. The prison barge on the Volga River, in which they were held, mysteriously sank, and all the prisoners were drowned.

Within a few months—that is, in the second half of October 1918—the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Soviet Republic, Leon Trotsky, was forced to demand Stalin's removal from Tsaritsyn for incompetence, refusal to follow orders, and disruption of the military effort. Likewise, Trotsky removed Kliment Voroshilov, Stalin's close ally at Tsaritsyn and the head of the so-called Military Opposition in the Soviet Communist Party. The views of the Military Opposition, which favored guerrilla-style tactics instead of a centralized army and which bitterly opposed the use of military specialists, were overwhelmingly defeated at the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in March 1919. The policy of Lenin and Trotsky on building a centralized modern army and making use of military specialists from the former tsarist army, which Khrushchev discusses and supports in the following pages, was the policy that prevailed. The policy of Stalin and Voroshilov was rejected.

Interestingly enough, Soviet military historians, studying the archives many years after the events, seem to echo the Okulov commission of 1918. The

historians in 1965 concluded that at Tsaritsyn Stalin "failed to grasp the role of military specialists" and "clung to guerrilla methods. Along with Voroshilov, he showed lack of discipline toward the high command [in Moscow] and the commander of the Southern Front." (See *Voyenno-istorichesky Zhurnal* [Journal of Military History] 1965, nos. 1 and 2.)

Although the Soviet military historians didn't explicitly say so in 1965, their conclusions suggest that Trotsky was right to remove Stalin and Voroshilov from Tsaritsyn.

Nevertheless, the two "specialist eaters," Stalin and Voroshilov, remained influential in the party and, with the twists and turns of fate, came out on top in the factional struggle—defeating all other party leaders from Lenin's time, including the Left Opposition, led by Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, and the Right Opposition, led by Bukharin and Rykov.

With the Stalin faction victorious, Voroshilov produced a pamphlet in 1929 with a print run of 100,000 (at a time of poverty and shortages). It was entitled *Stalin and the Red Army* and constituted a classic case of the rewriting of history. See the article by N. Markin (pen name of Leon Sedov, Trotsky's son), "Stalin and the Red Army," in *The Stalin School of Falsification* (New York, 1962).

Voroshilov's pamphlet was widely promoted in the Soviet Union, rewriting the history of what happened at Tsaritsyn and glorifying Stalin's alleged military genius in the Civil War (when in fact Stalin's military record in the Civil War had varied from mediocre to unsuccessful and even to disastrous, as in his ill-starred Lvov campaign of 1920).

Not long after Voroshilov's pamphlet came out Snesev was arrested—apparently on charges linked to the lies and distortions Voroshilov had put in his pamphlet.

This is where "General Nosovich" comes in.

In his 1929 pamphlet Voroshilov boasted that Stalin wrote a note on a military order from Trotsky—that is, from Red Army headquarters in Moscow: *Ne priniimat vo vnimaniye*. This is usually translated as "Disregard" or "To be disregarded," although more literally it could be rendered as "Pay no attention to this."

In other words, Voroshilov openly boasted that Stalin refused to follow orders and praised him for it.

It is peculiar that the source of this damaging information about Stalin's military indiscipline was none other than—Colonel Nosovich!

As we have said, Nosovich was a former tsarist officer, a military specialist serving in the Red Army, who actually did turn traitor. He had been in the headquarters staff of the Red Army at Tsaritsyn, but later defected and joined the Whites. We recall that it was Nosovich who, in a White Cossack news-

paper in 1919, told the story of Stalin's lack of discipline and quoted Stalin's infamous inscription, which amounted to: "This order is to be disregarded."

Thanks to Nosovich, this action of Stalin's became part of the historical record.

But Nosovich's revelation might have been forgotten if a decade later, in 1929, Voroshilov had not quoted favorably from this real turncoat (Nosovich) and praised Stalin for the indiscipline that Nosovich had revealed. Perhaps the ugliest side of this peculiar development was that as a result the loyal Snesarev was arrested! Apparently Snesarev was groundlessly accused of having had ties with Nosovich at Tsaritsyn.

Roy Medvedev reports in *Let History Judge*: "Many military specialists were arrested in 1930 on a trumped-up charge of having created a monarchist counterrevolutionary organization. Most of them were loyal commanders, such as . . . the former head of the [Red Army's] General Staff Academy, Andrei Snesarev, to whom the Central Executive Committee had [recently] given the Hero of Labor award [in 1928]." In a footnote, Medvedev adds that Snesarev was completely rehabilitated, citing *Voyenno-istorichesky Zhurnal* 1965, no. 11.

Although Snesarev's name was cleared and all the charges against him were annulled, it was too late. As we have said, Stalin had Snesarev killed in the great bloodletting of 1937.

In 1976, a Soviet encyclopedia provided significant information about Snesarev, including his loyal service to the Soviet Army (see the article on him in *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* [Moscow, 1976], 23:635).

Andrei Yevgenyevich Snesarev (1865–1937) had been a lieutenant general in the tsarist army and was also an outstanding Orientalist scholar, who made significant contributions to Asian studies.

Published works by Snesarev include the following: *Severo-indiyskiy tear* (The North India Theater), Parts 1 and 2 (Tashkent, 1903); *Indiya kak glavnyy faktor v sredneaziatskom voprose* (India as the Main Factor in the Question of Central Asia) (Saint Petersburg, 1906); *Voyennaya geografiya Rossii* (Military Geography of Russia), 2d ed. (Saint Petersburg, 1910); *Afghanistan* (in Russian; Moscow, 1921); *India*, vol. 1 (in Russian; Moscow, 1926).

In 1928 the Soviet government awarded Snesarev the title Hero of Labor.

A book about Snesarev was published in Moscow in 1973, entitled *Andrei Yevgenyevich Snesarev: Zhizn i nauchnaya deyatelnost* (the subtitle meaning "His Life and Scholarly Work").

Snesarev graduated in 1888 from Moscow State University, where he had majored in mathematics. He also completed the course of study at the Moscow Conservatory and mastered fourteen languages. After entering military service he graduated from the Moscow Infantry Academy in 1890 and the General Staff Academy in 1891. While

serving in Turkestan, he studied Central and South Asia and developed a descriptive account of the region from the standpoint of military geography. He traveled in India, Afghanistan, Tibet, and Kashgaria (an Uighur region in Sinkiang [Xinjiang], today part of northwest China).

In 1904 he became a member of the General Staff and taught military geography at military academies. In 1910 he became chief of staff of a Cossack division. During World War I he commanded a regiment, then a brigade, then a division. In September 1917, having the rank of lieutenant general, he was elected [by the troops] to be commander of the Ninth Army Corps.

In 1918 he voluntarily offered his services to the Red Army. From May to July 1918 he was military leader (*voyenruk*) of the North Caucasus Military District (which included Tsaritsyn). In September 1918 he headed the defenses of the Western region (that is, the units that formed a defensive screen there—*otryady zavesy*). Later he commanded the Soviets' Western Army (which in March 1919 became the Belorussia-Lithuania Army). From August 1919 to July 1921 he headed the General Staff Academy of the Red Army, and from 1921 to 1930 he was both a professor at and dean (rector) of the Institute of Oriental Studies. At the same time, beginning in 1924, he was a professor at the Red Army's Air Force Academy and, beginning in 1926, a professor at the Red Army's Military-Political Academy.

The information in this note comes from many sources, in addition to the ones already cited. They include Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, rev. and expanded ed. (New York, 1989); Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (New York, 1990); Robert Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929* (New York, 1973); Leon Trotsky, *My Life* (New York, 1970 ed.); and *Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence* (New York, 1941.) [GS]

3. This idea was first fully developed by Lenin in April 1918 in an article and pamphlet whose title is usually given as "Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" (in Russian, *Ocherednye zadachi Sovetskoi vlasti*). See the English edition of Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow, 1965), 27:235–77; see also the Russian edition of Lenin's "Complete Works," *Polnoye sobraniye sochinenii*, vol. 36. [SS/GS]

4. During the year 1917, amid the many revolutionary upheavals in Russian society, there occurred the formation of Red Guards, irregular units of industrial workers, sometimes merely factory guards, at other times a form of workers' militia. (Red was the color chosen by the international socialist movement to symbolize the workers' blood, shed in the struggle against their exploiters.)

In October 1917 (November according to the Western calendar), directed by the Bolshevik-led



Petrograd Soviet, Red Guard units assisted revolutionary-minded army units in carrying out insurrections in Petrograd and Moscow. As a result full political power was vested in the Soviets (councils of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies of a kind that had first arisen during the 1905 revolution; these institutions of popular rebellion against the tsarist system revived and spread all over Russia during 1917 and after).

The Soviet government that was established in October 1917 did not at first have a regular army, although many Red Guard units were active. Similarly, the counterrevolutionary forces, especially those who wished to restore the tsarist order, formed units called White Guards. In February 1918 the Soviet government established the Red Army and soon brought most of the numerous irregular Red Guards or Red guerrilla detachments under a central command. Thus, the forces fighting to defend and assert the authority of the Soviet government were commonly called "the Reds" in the Civil War. And the counterrevolutionary forces were called the White Guards (later reorganized as White armies) or, more simply, "the Whites." [GS]

5. These events occurred in 1918–19, during the Russian Civil War. [GS] Tsaritsyn was the town on the Volga River that was later to be renamed Stalingrad and then Volgograd. [SS]

6. From March 1908 to June 1909 he was in exile in the town of Solvychevodsk in Vologda gubernia.

7. The Russian adjective Stalin uses to describe the "fellows," *artelnye*, is derived from *artel*, a traditional form of cooperative association of workers or peasants. [SS] The significance of the adjective is, presumably, that warm friendship and good cheer traditionally prevailed in an *artel*. [GS]

8. This "comrades' court" resembled the institution of that name that existed during the early Soviet period and was revived briefly under Khrushchev. A comrades' court was composed of close associates of the accused and operated without formal rules of procedure. [SS]

9. He was in the Turukhansk territory from February 1913 to February 1917. [MN] The town of Turukhansk is situated at the confluence of the Yenisei and Lower Tunguska rivers in central Siberia. The Turukhansk territory no longer exists. [SS]

10. Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov (1885–1919), already a prominent Bolshevik organizer and orator, was also in exile in Turukhansk at this time. During and after the revolution of October 1917, he was to be a close collaborator of Lenin, chairman of the Central Executive Committee, and secretary of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party. See Biographies. [SS]

11. The Yenisei River rises in the East Sayan Mountains of southcentral Siberia, near the border

with Mongolia, and flows mostly north to empty into the Arctic Ocean. It is Siberia's greatest river, more than 4,000 kilometers long. [SS]

12. Not having lived or hunted in Russia's far northern taiga, or evergreen forest region, where Stalin was exiled, Khrushchev was not aware that there is a distinct type of partridge in that area. In Russian these birds are called *ryabchiki*. They roost in the trees and eat, in addition to berries and other things, the soft, newly grown needles of pine trees or other conifers. As a result their meat has a pine flavor. It has often been observed that when one of these partridges is killed by a gunshot, others, sitting nearby or even on the same branch, do not fly away. A second shot can bring down a second partridge, and so on. It is not known to science why these birds do not become startled and fly away. [SK]

13. This would be correct if a verst were exactly equal to one kilometer. In fact, a verst was equal to 3,500 feet or 1.06 kilometers, so 48 versts was about 51 kilometers. [SS]

14. Stalin's "nearby dacha" was located in Volynskoye, which was then a suburb of Moscow (now part of the city). It is on the left as one drives westward out of Moscow, just beyond Poklonnaya Gora, a place with a large monument to victory over Germany in World War II. [SK]

15. Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya (1869–1939) was Lenin's wife and longtime companion in revolutionary party work; see Biographies [GS].

16. In his "Secret Speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress, exposing Stalin's crimes, Khrushchev quoted Lenin's message to Stalin over the insult to Krupskaya, dated March 5, 1923. It was also published in the Russian-language *Polnoye sobraniye sochinenii* (Complete Works) of Lenin authorized under Khrushchev in the late 1950s and early 1960s. An English version is in Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress, 1970), 45:607–8. [GS] To be more precise, Lenin wrote that if Stalin did not apologize he would break off relations with him. [SS]

17. Maria Ilyichna Ulyanova (1878–1937) was one of Lenin's two sisters.

18. Aleksei Ivanovich Rykov and Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin. See Biographies.

19. According to the all-union census of 1926, 38 percent of workers' families in Moscow gubernia (including towns) did not have separate rooms and occupied parts of rooms. By 1932 the population of Moscow had risen to 3,600,000. Residential construction lagged greatly behind this growth. A decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) of March 25, 1932, envisaged the construction within two years of residential buildings first of all for specialists, scientists, engineers, and technicians in large cities—moreover, only 11,800 apartments

in all. The majority of Moscow's 56,280 residential buildings at the beginning of the 1930s were in dilapidated condition. A shift occurred toward the end of 1934, when about half a million Muscovites moved into new or renovated apartments.

20. These were temporary structures of the kind that can be disassembled and reassembled at a new

location. The Russian term is *sborno-razbornye barrikady*. [GS]

21. These large red envelopes contained confidential mail for members of the Politburo. [SK]

22. Lieutenant General Nikolai Sidorovich Vlasik. See Biographies.

### THE DEATH OF STALIN

Stalin was suddenly taken sick in February 1953. How did this happen? We had all been at his place on Saturday. This was after the Nineteenth Party Congress, when Stalin was already “weighing in the balance” the fates of Mikoyan and Molotov. At the very first plenum after the congress, he proposed that a Presidium of the Central Committee be established instead of the Politburo, to consist of twenty-five members, and he gave the names of many new people. I and other former members of the Politburo were surprised. We wondered how this list had been drawn up and by whom. After all, Stalin didn't know these people, so who was it that helped him? Even today I don't know exactly. I asked Malenkov, but he answered that he himself didn't know. Because of the post he held, Malenkov should have taken part in the formation of the Presidium, the selection of people, and the compiling of the list, but he hadn't been allowed to be part of it. Perhaps Stalin did it all on his own? Today I am guessing, from various indications, that he made use of Kaganovich's assistance in selecting the new cadres. Within the Presidium a narrower body would be operating—the Bureau. In fact no sessions of the Presidium were held at that time. Instead, all questions were decided by the Bureau. Stalin dreamed up this body, which was not provided for at all under the party rules.

Why did Stalin create this Bureau of the Presidium? Evidently he felt uncomfortable about kicking Molotov and Mikoyan out right away, and so he created an expanded Presidium [including them] and then he chose a Bureau of more restricted nature. This was for the purposes of operational, day-to-day leadership, as he said. And he didn't include Molotov or Mikoyan in that body; that is, he “left them hanging.” I am convinced that if



Stalin had lived a little longer, the lives of Molotov and Mikoyan would have ended catastrophically. In general, after the Nineteenth Party Congress, Stalin followed a policy of isolating Molotov and Mikoyan, not inviting them either to his dacha or to his apartment or to the screening room [to watch movies], although previously we had all gone to those places together.

However, Voroshilov was elected to the Bureau. It's typical of Stalin that once, when we were sitting at one of his long drawn-out meals, he said: "How did Voroshilov worm his way into the Bureau?"

We didn't look at him; we kept our eyes lowered. First of all what kind of expression was that, "wormed his way in"? How could he possibly "worm his way in"? Then we said: "You named him yourself and he was elected."

Stalin dropped the subject. But it was understandable that he made this statement because, before the Nineteenth Congress, Stalin had not been inviting Voroshilov to participate in the work as a member of the Politburo. He received no documents and attended no Politburo meetings. Stalin told those of us who were in his inner circle that he suspected Voroshilov of being a British agent. Of course this was unbelievable nonsense. He also expressed suspicions about Molotov once in my presence. As I recall, this was when I was at Stalin's dacha at Novy Afon.<sup>1</sup> Suddenly he took it into his head that Molotov must be an agent of American imperialism, that he had sold himself to the Americans, because he had supposedly traveled in a parlor car or sleeping car, while on business in the United States. To Stalin this meant that Molotov had his own private railroad car [such as Politburo members then had in the Soviet Union]. We explained that Molotov could not have his own railroad car, that all such things belonged to railroad companies in the United States.<sup>2</sup> These were the kinds of mental blackouts that Stalin was having in the last months of his life.

So then, one Saturday [February 28, 1953], he called us to come to the Kremlin. He invited Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and me. We went. He said: "Let's watch a movie." We watched it. Then he said the usual: "Let's go have something to eat at the nearby dacha." We went and had supper. The meal dragged on for a long time. Stalin called this kind of meal "dinner," though it was very late at night. It was probably five or six in the morning when we finished. That was the usual time when his "dinners" ended. Stalin was a bit tipsy and seemed very well disposed toward everyone. Nothing indicated that anything unexpected might happen.

When we went out into the vestibule, Stalin accompanied us as usual. He joked a lot, waved his hands around, and as I recall he poked me in the stomach with his finger and called me Mikita. When he was in a good

mood, he always used the Ukrainian form of my name—Mikita. We said goodbye and left.

We too were in a good mood when we left because nothing unpleasant had happened at the dinner, and not all these dinners ended that well. We all went home. My expectation was that since the next day was a day off, Stalin would surely call us, and therefore I didn't eat all day. I thought he might call up a little earlier than usual. Then I finally did have something to eat, because although I kept waiting and waiting, there was no phone call. I couldn't believe he would let us have our day off all to ourselves. That kind of thing hardly ever happened. But no, there was no phone call! It got to be late at night, and I undressed and went to bed.

Suddenly Malenkov called me: "I've just had a phone call from the fellows [that is, Stalin's bodyguards]." He mentioned the names of several of the Chekists<sup>3</sup> at Stalin's dacha and said they were reporting with concern that something had happened to Stalin. "We should go there immediately. I'm calling you now, and I've already informed Beria and Bulganin. You better head out there right away." I immediately called for a vehicle. I was at my dacha. I quickly got dressed and went to Stalin's dacha; it took about fifteen minutes all together.<sup>4</sup> We agreed that we wouldn't go into Stalin's room, but would go speak to the people on duty.

We went and asked: "What's going on?"

They said: "Usually Stalin calls us by this time of night, around eleven o'clock, without fail. He calls us and asks for tea. Sometimes he has something to eat. Tonight this didn't happen. We sent Matryona Petrovna,<sup>5</sup> one of the waitresses, in to see him." She was not a young woman. She had worked for Stalin for many years, and although she was a limited person, she was loyal and devoted.

The Chekists told us they had sent her in to see what was going on. She said that Comrade Stalin was lying on the floor, sleeping, and that the floor around him was wet. The Chekists lifted him and put him on a couch in the small dining room. There was a large dining room and a small one there. Stalin had been lying on the floor in the large dining room. This meant that he must have gotten out of bed, gone into the large dining room, and then fallen down and wet himself. When they told us what had happened and that he now seemed to be sleeping, we thought that since he was in such poor shape, it would be awkward for us to appear at his side and make our presence officially known. So we went back to our homes.

A short time later, the phone rang again. It was Malenkov: "The fellows at Comrade Stalin's dacha have called again. They're saying that there's

something wrong with him after all. Although Matryona Petrovna said he was sleeping peacefully, his sleep isn't normal. We should go there again." We agreed that Malenkov would call all the other members of the Bureau, including Voroshilov and Kaganovich, who had not been there at the dinner and had not gone to Stalin's dacha the first time. We agreed also that we should call the doctors. Again we went to speak with the people who were on duty. Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and the doctors arrived. I remember the name of one of the doctors. He was the well-known cardiologist Professor Lukomsky.<sup>6</sup> Some other medical experts showed up along with him, but I don't remember their names. We went into the room. Stalin was lying on the couch. We told the doctors to do their duty and find out what condition Comrade Stalin was in. Lukomsky went up to him first, very cautiously, and I understood his behavior. He touched Stalin's hand as though it was a hot iron. He was even trembling. Beria then said rudely: "You're a doctor. Take hold of his hand good and proper, the way you're supposed to."

Lukomsky said that Stalin's right arm was not functioning. His left leg was also paralyzed, and he was unable to speak. His condition was very bad. They cut away his clothing, dressed him in pajamas, carried him into the large dining room, and laid him on the couch there, where he continued to sleep but where there was more air. We decided there and then to have the doctors remain in attendance on him. We members of the Presidium Bureau also established an arrangement by which some of us would always remain present. We divided up these duties as follows: Beria and Malenkov would be on duty together, then Kaganovich and Voroshilov, and then Bulganin and me. The ones who mainly decided these things were Malenkov and Beria. They chose the daytime assignment for themselves, while Bulganin and I got the late night duty. I felt very upset. I confess that I regretted we might lose Stalin, whose condition was now so serious. Doctors said that a person with this kind of illness hardly ever returned to work. A person might continue to live, but it was unlikely that he would be capable of working. Most often this kind of illness was of short duration and ended in catastrophe.

We could see that Stalin was lying there unconscious, with no awareness of the condition he was in. They began to feed him boullion and sweet tea with a spoon. The doctors gave these orders. They helped him urinate, but still he didn't move. I noticed that when they were taking his urine it seemed as though he tried to cover himself, feeling embarrassment. That meant that he was aware of something. One afternoon Stalin regained consciousness. (I don't remember exactly which day after his illness began that this happened.) It was evident from the expression on his face, but he still couldn't speak. He

raised his left hand and began pointing either at the ceiling or at the wall. His lips seemed to form something like a smile. Then he began shaking our hands. I gave him my hand, and he shook mine with his left hand; his right arm was not functioning. He was trying to convey his feelings by shaking hands. Then I said: "Do you know what he's pointing at? At that picture." There was a reproduction of a painting by some artist hanging on the wall. It had been clipped out of the magazine *Ogonyok*. It showed a young girl feeding a lamb from a bottle. "We're feeding Comrade Stalin with a spoon, and apparently he's trying to show us by pointing at the picture and smiling, he's trying to say: 'Look, I'm in the same position as that lamb.'"

As soon as Stalin collapsed, Beria began openly showing his anger and hostility toward him. He cursed him and made fun of him. It was simply impossible to listen to! It's also interesting that the moment Stalin regained consciousness and it seemed that he might recover, Beria threw himself on his knees beside him, grabbed his hand, and began to kiss it. When Stalin lost consciousness again and closed his eyes, Beria got back up on his feet and spat on the floor. That was the true Beria! He was perfidious even in his attitude toward Stalin, a man he supposedly worshiped and glorified. It came time for Bulganin and me to be on duty. We had gone to Stalin's dacha in the afternoon when the doctors had come, but we ourselves were on duty that night. I was more open and candid with Bulganin than I was with the others, and I entrusted to him my most secret thoughts.

I said: "Nikolai Aleksandrovich, we apparently now find ourselves in a situation in which Stalin is soon going to die. He's obviously not going to survive. Even the doctors say he won't survive. Do you know which post Beria has indicated he wants?"

"Which?"

"He wants to take the post of minister of state security.<sup>7</sup> (At that time the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security were separate.) There's no way we can allow that to happen. If Beria takes control of State Security that will be the beginning of the end for us. He wants to take that post so that he can destroy all of us. And he'll do it!"

Bulganin said he agreed with me. And we began discussing what we should do. I told him: "I'll have a talk with Malenkov. I think Malenkov is of the same opinion. He certainly ought to understand all this. Something has to be done, or else it will be a disaster for the party." This problem concerned not only us but the entire country, although of course we ourselves didn't want to be knifed by Beria. A return to 1937–38 and perhaps something even worse would result. I had doubts about Beria. I didn't consider him a real

Communist. My guess was that he had simply wormed his way into the party. There came back to me some words, uttered by Kaminsky, that during the Civil War, when the British occupied Baku, Beria had been an agent of Britain's counterintelligence service.<sup>8</sup>

I felt that Beria was a wolf in sheep's clothing, who had wormed his way into Stalin's confidence and now was holding a high position. Even Stalin felt burdened by him. [As I have said,] it seemed to me there were times when Stalin himself was afraid of Beria.

A certain incident also prompted such thoughts, and I want to tell about it [again]. One day we were sitting at Stalin's place. Suddenly he looked at Beria and said: "Why are there nothing but Georgians around me now? Where did they come from?"

Beria said: "These are people who are loyal to you. Devoted people."

Stalin said: "But why is it only Georgians who are loyal and devoted? Does that mean that Russians are not loyal and devoted? Get rid of them!" And instantaneously, as though removed by an invisible hand, these people disappeared.

Beria was capable, through his own people, of doing to Stalin what he had done, on Stalin's orders, to many others: have them killed, poisoned, and so forth. And, therefore, Stalin apparently (if I can do his reasoning for him) considered Beria capable of doing the same to him. This meant that he had to get rid of the people around him through whom Beria had access to his bedroom and to the kitchen. In the days after that, Beria went around looking completely crushed.

Because he was getting old, Stalin didn't understand that Abakumov, who was then in charge of the Ministry of State Security, reported to Beria and received orders on how to present things to Stalin before he ever reported to Stalin himself. Stalin thought that he had promoted a fresh new face who would be doing only what Stalin ordered.<sup>9</sup>

The Mingrelian affair was a similar indication [of Stalin's mistrust of Beria]. Stalin dictated a resolution (and it was published) that the Mingrelians were linked with the Turks, that there were pro-Turkish elements among them. Of course this was nonsense! In my opinion, this was an action taken by Stalin against Beria, because Beria himself was a Mingrelian. This was his way of preparing a blow against Beria. A great many arrests were made then, but Beria skillfully slipped out of it. He himself acted as Stalin's agent in this matter and carried out the reprisals against the Mingrelians. Those poor people! He dragged them onto the chopping block like rams to the slaughter.<sup>10</sup>

There were other facts as well indicating Beria's perfidiousness and Stalin's distrust of him.

So then, Bulganin and I talked all this over, our night on duty ended, and I went home. I wanted to get some sleep because, while keeping watch at Stalin's place, I hadn't slept for a long time. I took a sleeping pill and lay down. I hadn't yet fallen asleep when I heard the phone. It was Malenkov: "Come immediately. Stalin has taken a turn for the worse. Come right away!" I summoned a car right away. Sure enough, Stalin was in a very bad state. The others arrived as well. Everyone could see that Stalin was dying. The doctors told us that his death agony had begun. He stopped breathing. They started giving him artificial respiration. Some huge fellow showed up who began poking him and manipulating him to try and restore his breathing. I must confess I felt very sorry for Stalin the way they were tormenting him. I said: "Listen, please stop that. The man is dead. What do you want? To bring him back to life?" He was dead, but it was painful to see the way they were knocking him around. And so these unnecessary procedures were stopped.

As soon as Stalin died, Beria immediately got into his car and rushed off to Moscow from the "nearby dacha." We decided to call all members of the Bureau, or it may in fact have been all members of the Presidium, I don't remember exactly. While we were waiting for them to come, Malenkov kept walking back and forth around the room obviously upset.

I decided to have a word with him. "Yegor," I said, "I need to talk with you."<sup>11</sup> "What about?" he asked coldly.

"Stalin is dead. What are we going to do now?"

"Why talk about that now? Everyone's coming and we'll talk about it then. That's what they're gathering for."

He seemed to be taking a democratic position in his reply. But I understood it differently. The way I understood it, he had already talked over all questions with Beria and come to an agreement long ago.

"All right," I said, "we'll talk about it later."

Everyone gathered. They saw that Stalin was dead. Svetlana also arrived. I greeted her. When I greeted her, I felt a very strong rush of emotion and began to cry. I couldn't hold it back. I sincerely felt sorry for Stalin and his children. I mourned his death with all my heart, and I was greatly troubled for the future of our party and our country. I felt that Beria would now take over, and that would be the beginning of the end for us. I didn't trust him and didn't consider him a real Communist. I considered him capable of anything, a butcher and a murderer who would make short work of those he didn't like.

Then the distribution of “portfolios” took place.<sup>12</sup> Beria proposed that Malenkov be appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and be relieved of his duties as a secretary of the Central Committee. Malenkov proposed that Beria be confirmed as his first deputy and that the two ministries, State Security and Internal Affairs, be merged into one, with Beria heading up the new ministry. I held my tongue. Bulganin did, too. I was concerned that Bulganin might make a move prematurely. It would have been wrong to give ourselves away in advance. I saw what the mood of the others was. If Bulganin and I had said we were opposed, the majority of those present would have accused us of being disrupters, trying to disorganize things, trying to start a fight in the party over posts when Stalin’s corpse had not yet grown cold. Everything was moving in the direction I had feared.

Molotov was also appointed a first deputy to Malenkov. Kaganovich was made simply a deputy. It was proposed that Voroshilov be elected chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and that Shvernik be relieved of that duty.<sup>13</sup> Beria expressed himself very disrespectfully about Shvernik. He said that in general no one in the country knew who he was. I saw that the details of Beria’s plan were now evident. He wanted to make Voroshilov the man who would sign the orders when Beria would start his meat grinder working. Beria proposed that I be relieved of my duties as secretary of the Moscow committee, so that I could concentrate on work in the Central Committee. We made other appointments. Arrangements for the funeral were adopted, and arrangements for notifying the people about Stalin’s death. That was how we, the heirs of Stalin, began the work of governing the country and leading the party on our own.

1. Novy Afon, where a state residence (dacha) used by Stalin was located, is in the autonomous republic of Abkhazia, in the northwestern Caucasus region. It is near a monastery called Novy Afon (New Athos), so named in honor of a famous monastery of the Orthodox Church at Mount Athos in Greece. [SK/GS]

2. In the Soviet Union at that time, each Politburo member had his own separate railroad carriage, called a *salon-vagon* (perhaps similar to the British “saloon carriage”). This railroad car had a dining room and kitchen, a study, a sleeping compartment, and cabinets for storage. [SK/GS]

3. “Chekist” was a colloquial word for an official of the secret police. It was derived from “Cheka,” the acronym for the first Soviet secret police established under Lenin, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution

and Sabotage. (Che-ka are the initials for *Chrezvychainaya kommissiya*—Extraordinary Commission.) The word “Chekist” remained in colloquial use throughout the Soviet period, despite the fact that the official name of the secret police was changed several times. [SS]

4. In this chapter my father gives an account of how Stalin was found lying on the floor of his dacha during the night of February 28 to March 1, 1953. There is another version of these events that differs somewhat from my father’s account. According to this other version, only Beria and Malenkov were present at Stalin’s dacha during that night, whereas Father and other members of the CC Presidium showed up only at 9 A.M. on March 1. This version is based on memoirs by Stalin’s guards, written decades after the events had occurred.



This other version is accepted by official historiography in today's Russia. However, I am more inclined to trust Father's account. He repeated it many times, without alterations, in the immediate aftermath of Stalin's death.

I also distinctly remember his unusual departure in the middle of the night. He usually went to work in the morning, and I went to the institute that I was attending as a student, so that if he had left in the morning, it would *not* have been memorable for me.

On the whole, of course, it is not of fundamental importance whether Father arrived at Stalin's dacha during the night or in the morning, but I would like to be accurate about all such details. [SK]

5. Matryona Petrovna (her last name is unknown to us) served as a waitress at Stalin's dacha for many years. [SK]

6. Pavel Yevgenyevich Lukomsky (1899–1976) was a prominent nonspecialist physician and professor. See Biographies.

7. Beria at that time, besides being a member of the Bureau of the party's Central Committee, was first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. The minister of state security was Semyon Denisovich Ignatyev. [SK]

8. Grigory Naumovich Kaminsky (1895–1938). He apparently said this at the Central Committee plenum that took place in March 1938, although some historians date it from a plenum in summer 1937. The stenographic records of those plenums do not seem to have been published. This charge

against Beria is described below, in the chapter "Once Again on Beria." [GS/SK]

9. The police official Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov (1908–54) was minister of state security from 1946 to 1951 (see Biographies). He should not be confused with Yegor [Georgy] Trofimovich Abakumov, Khrushchev's friend from the Donbas mining industry who later became minister of the coal industry.

In late 1951, Stalin removed V. S. Abakumov from his post as minister of state security and had him arrested (apparently in connection with the "Mingrelian affair"). He was replaced by S. D. Ignatyev.

In late 1954, Stalin's successors, a year after removing Beria, had Abakumov put on trial by the Military Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court (apparently in connection with his role in the "Leningrad affair"), and he was executed on November 19, 1954. [GS/SK]

10. See Khrushchev's earlier account of the Mingrelian affair in the fifth chapter of this volume, "Beria and Others." [GS]

11. Yegor is a Russian variant of Malenkov's first name, Georgy. [GS]

12. This happened at a hastily convened plenum of the Central Committee. [SK]

13. Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik (1888–1970), a veteran party official, was titular chief of state—that is, chairman of the Supreme Soviet—from 1946 to 1953. In 1946, he had replaced Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, the official chief of state since the early 1920s; see Biographies. [GS]

## MY REFLECTIONS ON STALIN

Often my friends and acquaintances, or people whom I meet by chance, after getting into a conversation, ask me whether I am writing my memoirs. I usually answer, "No." They express regret and reproach me. They say that such memoirs would be very much needed in the future, so that people could get their bearings better and gain a more profound understanding of the life of our country, party, and people, during the period when I lived, worked, and for many years was close to the leadership and then was part of the leadership. Perhaps I didn't understand all this earlier and was reluctant to undertake this task. But it seems that these people are right after all, and I now want to record something in addition to what I



have said previously. Here I want to pose the question of Stalin in a more general form.

Many people ask what Stalin was like as a person: his habits and his style of leadership. In the minds of some of our citizens, confusion still reigns on the question of Stalin, because both good things and bad are said about him. That's how things are with many historical personalities, and probably that's how it always will be. Especially since both qualities were interwoven in Stalin in real life. Distinctions have to be made [i.e., the good has to be separated from the bad]! So now I want to express my opinion about Stalin's role generally in World War II and the significance of his leadership in that period. And also to answer the difficult question of what would have happened if Stalin hadn't existed at all. That is the most difficult question, not only because you can't change what happened, but also because no objective judge can be found who could weigh matters on the most sensitive scales to determine who is right and who is not right. My conclusions are based on long and close association with Stalin before the war, during it, and after it. I was able to observe how Stalin's behavior changed over the course of time, how his evaluation of various events and his own actions and his own role in the war changed. I saw and heard how he behaved and what he said during the time of our defeats and during the time of our victories.

Some people react negatively above all to the fact that Stalin did such harm to the party and the people, destroying many honest and even heroic people who were devoted to the cause of the party and took an active part in the building of socialism. Other people claim that although that is true, we were nevertheless victorious in the Great Patriotic War, mainly because Stalin was leading us, and, they say, if it hadn't been for Stalin, who knows whether we could have coped with the enemy and defeated him? I cannot in any way agree with this latter point of view, regardless of my personal opinion of Stalin, regardless of what Stalin was like or what role he played in organizing our successful defeat of Hitler's hordes. Regardless of anything else, I cannot agree with this interpretation of events because it is a point of view that I can only call slavish.

Only slaves who cannot rise from their knees or see beyond the head of their master—only slaves like that must invariably have someone to do their thinking for them, to organize everything for them, someone on whom the blame can be placed in the event of ill fortune and to whom all successes can be attributed. This is a slave psychology. Not only is it absolutely groundless but it is also very dangerous. In general it is not a Marxist or scientific point of view; it is the philosophy of philistines. It is enough to recall that Stalin did

die, but life and our struggle did not end; they continued and society changed and has continued to develop. It has not stood still in one place.

If a new world war breaks out, it will be even bloodier and will require a greater number of sacrifices, so much that it's hard even to imagine, because such a war will require sacrifices in geometric progression in accordance with the period of history in which it occurs and the kinds of weapons the opposing armies will have. Today we have nuclear arms and missiles. When people fought only by hand and hit each other with clubs, the losses were of a lesser magnitude. Later, people fought with spears and battleaxes. When rifles and machine guns made their appearance, and rapid-fire weapons in general, war began to require even greater sacrifices because the means of destruction had become more refined. When airplanes, and the bombs they dropped, came into existence, many people thought that war had now become inconceivable because it took so many human lives! But no, another war broke out in regular succession, and tens of millions of people died in it. The Soviet Union alone lost more than twenty million people.

If a war of missiles and nuclear weapons begins, it's hard to imagine what it would lead to. It would not be a war fought on front lines. That is, armies wouldn't take up positions opposite one another. The war would be carried deep into the rear areas of the countries engaged in it, across all their territory, because the means of delivering weapons of mass destruction today are no longer of limited range. Literally every part of the globe can come under fire and be destroyed.

How could we get along without Stalin? Who would do our thinking for us? Who would organize the army, the country, our industry? It's obvious that these are foolish questions. The main force was and remains the people. Of course, the role of individuals in human history, including in organizing defense, has been great. But no one should be deified, no matter who. Not only because that distorts the true and correct evaluation of things, but also because that point of view takes the power away from the masses, dulls their will for victory, and paralyzes their initiative. Our great hero no longer exists. He has gone, and what does that mean—that we're going to perish? Of course not. There's a good reason why the words of the "Internationale" say: "Let us achieve our liberation by the work of our own hands."<sup>1</sup> If we hide behind the shield of some great hero and when we lose that hero we think we are doomed, I say that is simply a harmful point of view.

Still, we can ask: "What really was Stalin's role? Was it positive or not?" Despite all the subjective tendencies in his actions, his role was positive in the sense that he remained a Marxist in his basic approach to history. He

was a man devoted to the Marxist idea and did everything in his power for the victory of the cause of the working class, of working people, and in this case for the defeat of Hitler's hordes. That was his subjective desire. How he proceeded in practice to pursue that aim is another question. I have already said what effect his actions had on the country in real life. This included the extermination of the command staff of our armed forces and the extermination of the central core of our Bolshevik party. The Old Bolsheviks of Lenin's generation were destroyed first of all. Did that weaken or strengthen our country? Without a doubt it weakened it.

After the destruction of that most highly advanced nucleus of people, which had been forged in the underground struggle against the tsarist regime under Lenin's leadership, there followed the massive destruction of leading cadres of the party, the government, and scientific and military cadres, as well as millions of ordinary people whose way of life and thinking Stalin didn't like. Who exterminated all these people? Stalin. Why? He thought this was being done in the name of the ideas of the party, in the name of the new society. He didn't trust all these people. Of course some of them had ceased to support him when they saw what he was leading us toward. Stalin understood that there was a large group of people who had developed an oppositional attitude toward him.

Oppositional sentiments do not mean anti-Soviet, anti-Marxist, or anti-Communist Party sentiments. No, these people simply wanted to replace Stalin in the leadership. And that was something that even Lenin had called for. Consequently they were not anti-Leninists. They were people who took their stand on the position held by Lenin himself, who thought that Stalin, because of his character, should not continue in the post he held and that he should be replaced. The Communists who voted against Stalin at the Seventeenth Party Congress wanted to carry out precisely the recommendation Lenin made in his "Last Testament."

Stalin destroyed them. Why? Because he considered himself irreplaceable, the only man who really was a Marxist and had the right to lead the country. Added to this was his insatiable lust for power. But those were precisely the traits of character that Lenin talked about in his testament, where he said that Stalin was capable of abusing power.<sup>2</sup> And Stalin did abuse his power, to the detriment of the Soviet Union and to Communists throughout the world. He dealt a blow to the Marxist-Leninist cadres not only in his own country but in the fraternal Communist parties and in the Communist International. He dealt his blows against everyone he suspected might sympathize

with those who disagreed with him. That immediately made them in his eyes anti-Marxist, counterrevolutionaries, and “enemies of the people.”

Enemies of the people! Wreckers! Those were frightening concepts, bugaboos really, that he dreamed up and put into circulation, and they had their intended effect. He kept frightening and intimidating people who believed in him unconditionally, believed he was doing everything for the good of the party and the people. Of course it was hard to sort it all out. After all, enemies of the revolution, enemies of the working people, wreckers and saboteurs, had actually existed earlier. But it was not against those people that he turned his sword, thereby weakening the country, the party, and the army, giving the enemy a chance to do enormous harm to the Soviet Union. If Stalin had not done that (of this I am absolutely convinced), our army would have had strength and resources enough to smash the enemy right at the border as soon as they dared attack our country. This kind of outcome was energetically predicted with all sorts of palaver and empty chatter in the days when Voroshilov was commissar of defense, the days of the highly vaunted “Voroshilov marksmen.”<sup>3</sup>

We had slogans like: “Not one inch of land to the enemy! Not one step backward! If a war is imposed on us, it will be fought on enemy territory!”<sup>4</sup> And then what happened everyone knows. Of course Stalin desired victory. But when he saw the results of his “labors” in destroying the military cadres, when he saw that the army had been bled white and drastically weakened, and that the new people who had taken the leadership were insufficiently trained and insufficiently experienced and didn’t know how to command the troops; and earlier when he saw that our army received the rebuff it deserved from tiny Finland, that the heroic and remarkable people of Finland had bravely defended their country and caused us great losses—when Stalin saw all that, an elemental, physical fear of Hitler came over him, and he began doing everything he could to try to placate Hitler. But Hitler had plans of his own. Hitler’s aim in life was to destroy Bolshevism, and so to try and butter him up and persuade him to give up his plans for war was impossible. In this situation Stalin’s will was paralyzed by the will of his adversary.

I often remember Beria’s account of Stalin’s behavior when he was given the news that war had begun. At first he didn’t want to believe it and clung to the hope that it was just a provocation. He even ordered our forces not to open fire, hoping for a miracle. He wanted to hide behind his own illusions. Our military men persuaded him that it was too late to hide, and he finally had to believe what he was being told, that war with Germany had begun.

He began receiving reports about the victorious advance of Hitler's troops. At that point his panicky fear of Hitler was revealed openly, although he had tried to conceal it from everyone. Suddenly Stalin looked old, beaten down, and lost. He said to the Politburo members gathered in his office: "Everything that Lenin achieved and left to us as a legacy—we have sh— all over it. Everything is ruined." And without saying anything further, he left the office, went to his dacha, and refused to receive any visitors for quite some time.

According to Beria's account, everyone was left in confusion and dismay. But then they decided to take certain practical measures. After all, a war was on, and it was necessary to take action. After discussing matters they decided to go see Stalin themselves. I don't remember now who went there besides Beria, but he was not alone. Stalin received them, and they began trying to convince him that not everything was lost, that ours was a huge country, that we could still gather our strength together and repel the enemy. They tried to persuade him to return to the leadership and take charge of the defense of the country. Stalin agreed. He returned to the Kremlin and again went to work and spoke on the radio. He gave his celebrated speech of July 3, 1941.<sup>5</sup> But it was a long time after that before he began signing military orders himself. The signature on all documents from the top command said simply "Stavka" [General Headquarters]. He only began to sign them as supreme commander in chief later, when our troops were successfully offering serious resistance to the fascists. That is what Beria had to say about the condition Stalin was in at the beginning of the war.

In such a frame of mind of course it was difficult to take any decisive steps aimed at containing or deterring Hitler's aggressiveness. If Stalin had died at the beginning of World War II, that is, in 1939, the Great Patriotic War [of 1941–45] might have taken a different course. The country might have prepared for war more effectively. But he took charge of all such matters and he did things wrong. It's hard to estimate even approximately the harm he did to our country. He made a clean sweep. He destroyed everything that he imagined was opposed to him. He would look at someone close to him and say: "Why are your eyes darting around like that?" There were cases when people took their own lives after such a remark. Everything depended on his mood. There was no trial, no investigation, and no real attempt to sort things out. The "Oprichniki"<sup>6</sup> he trained took reprisals against people, attacking anyone he pointed his finger at.

Yes, it was enough for Stalin to move his little finger. He became so accustomed to this that after the war he said, when he had decided to take measures against Tito:<sup>7</sup> "All I have to do is wiggle my finger and there will

be no more Tito.” He didn’t succeed in the case of Tito. But inside our country he butchered and annihilated millions of people.

So then, to sum everything up and draw a balance sheet, I’m convinced that if there had been no Stalin, the war would have unfolded more successfully for us. After all, there have been many wars in history. Napoleon also attacked Russia after building up a huge army, and his was also a treacherous sneak attack. Many wars have started with sneak attacks. In 1812 Tsar Alexander I left the front lines and went to Saint Petersburg—he should be given credit for this, regardless of whether he came to this wise conclusion himself or took the advice of others—and later he placed Kutuzov<sup>8</sup> in command. Kutuzov was already an old man, who used to fall asleep at sessions of the Military Council. But the people believed in him, and he generally knew the correct strategy to pursue. The people did everything necessary to drive the French out and achieved this goal under Kutuzov’s leadership. Fortunately for our country and for Kutuzov as commander in chief, the means of communication were much too limited then, and Alexander I, after arriving in Saint Petersburg, did not have the physical possibility of interfering directly in matters involving command of the armed forces. In our times, on the other hand, Stalin in Moscow had the opportunity to interfere directly in everything, and sometimes his interference cost many lives on the battlefield. In the end, we won through to victory under Stalin’s leadership, but with extremely heavy casualties, incredibly heavy losses. Without Stalin the enemy would clearly have been defeated with fewer losses.

If a war has to be fought in the future, even such a new war could turn out to be victorious for us, if our country’s resources were used correctly and if the work of organizing in preparation for war was done correctly. It is also possible that the might of our armed forces would help to avoid a war altogether. Every country has intelligence agencies and is more or less well informed about the armaments and general condition of its adversary. The prospect of encountering a well-prepared army can cool down the hottest heads. I cannot say that war can be ruled out in general. That is a class question. As long as class antagonism exists, the possibility of war exists.<sup>9</sup> Therefore it is necessary to prepare for war. But if the party understands its tasks correctly, is solidly linked with the masses, knows how to organize mass support as well as to manage industry and agriculture, then it can and must succeed in making any war the ruination of whoever dared to attack the Soviet Union.

I must repeat again at this point that it is impermissible for us to have a slave psychology, as if to say, look, the great Stalin was born and we can

entrust our fate to him. That would mean that if he died and the country was left leaderless, it would no longer have the strong root from which everything else grew and on which everything else was based. This is foolishness! There was Marx and then there was Lenin, to whom Stalin was no comparison. Lenin really was a great leader, who foresaw everything many years ahead. Together with Plekhanov,<sup>10</sup> Lenin laid the foundations of our party and organized the struggle of the working class in Russia. Yes, that's how things turned out. He foresaw everything with great genius. But he lived for much too short a time. He successfully brought our country through the Civil War, during which many great heroes made their appearance. These were people filled with enthusiasm, who lived by Lenin's ideas. Sometimes they themselves did not grasp the heart of the matter very profoundly, but they desired the victory of the people and believed in Lenin, who stood for the people and against the capitalists and landlords. And under Lenin's leadership the people won through to victory over the enemies of the revolution.

Then Lenin laid out the lines for the further development of our country, its industry and culture. Unfortunately he died very early. The people mourned for him, but the country survived and moved forward. We reorganized our economy, educational system, culture, and achieved many things. If Stalin had not done the harm he did to the USSR when he began to exterminate our cadres, our forward movement would have been even more successful. He laid the basis for his war against the people in 1934, when Kirov was assassinated. I am convinced that Kirov was killed on Stalin's orders, in order to shake up the people and terrify them, as much as to say, look, our enemies have reached out their tentacles and killed Kirov and are now threatening the entire leadership of the country and the party.<sup>11</sup>

The people believed in the existence of these "enemies" and supported the tyrant, who picked and chose who would be taken to the slaughter, as though from a herd of sheep. Some people were openly picked out and annihilated, while others simply disappeared. Are these really the actions of a true Marxist? These were the actions of a despot and a deranged individual. In the name of the revolution and in the name of the people, he exterminated the flower of our leadership and of our party, and he exterminated a great many among the mass of the people themselves. There can be no justification for such actions. This was a terrible thing that happened, and today some people try to argue that only a man like Stalin could have led us to victory and that if it hadn't been for him we might have perished. No, no, and again no! I disagree with this. This is a slavish understanding of things. And it contradicts Marxist-Leninist doctrine. And I'm very sorry to say that



some of our prominent politicians, scientists, and military leaders have fallen into this error.

On the other hand, Stalin did remain in theory a Marxist (although not in his concrete actions). If we leave aside his unhealthy suspiciousness, his cruelty and perfidy, when he was not in the grip of these failings, he was capable of evaluating a situation correctly and soberly. In my presence he more than once denounced the slavish mentality [such as was held by the Socialist Revolutionaries]. “The philosophy of contrasting heroic individuals to the crowd is the SR [Socialist Revolutionary] philosophy. People who hold such views are not Marxist.<sup>12</sup> We believe in the masses, in the people, who always put forward their leaders when the time is right.” The only problem was that his actions differed from his words. That’s why, when we talk about the course of history, we need to stick to the facts and compare them, without suppressing anything, and then the role of each individual at one or another stage becomes clear. This is exactly the principle that I wish to adhere to, although of course sometimes it’s difficult, because each person, whether he wishes to or not, inevitably perceives events subjectively.

When Stalin died and we found ourselves without him, at first we grieved over our situation and were in a state of psychological shock. Not all of us knew what we were to do now or how things would go without Stalin. On the other hand, Beria was exultant. The majority of us in the leadership perceived him as an ominous figure. Everyone knew his bad influence on Stalin. Nevertheless, it was not Beria who invented Stalin, but Stalin who created Beria. Before Beria there was Yagoda in the NKVD. Stalin made a criminal out of him, assassinating Kirov by using Yagoda’s people. After Yagoda came Yezhov. Stalin made a murderer out of him, too. After Yezhov came Beria and with him later there came Abakumov, a man who was no better than Beria, not in the slightest, only more stupid.<sup>13</sup> Beria was the most dangerous of them all because he was intelligent and had great abilities as an organizer. Nevertheless, we coped with the situation, emerged from the shock caused by Stalin’s death, and things began to go better under us than they had under Stalin. But now I have started talking about postwar events.

Returning to the prewar period, let me recall again that we began the war with a shortage of weapons and with an army that had not been mobilized, nor was it fully trained, although Stalin knew better than anyone that war was inevitable. Yet he was paralyzed by Hitler, like a rabbit by a snake. He was afraid to take any decisive step that would be outwardly noticeable, toward strengthening our borders, because Hitler might take that as a sign that we were preparing to attack him. That’s what Stalin said to us when



Kirponos<sup>14</sup> and I proposed that collective farmers be mobilized to dig antitank ditches and other fortifications along the border. Stalin declared that that would be a provocation, that we couldn't do that. This means that although Stalin was convinced that Hitler was going to attack us, he was hoping he could somehow deflect the blow from our country. Everyone knows how that ended up. He didn't deflect the blow and he left our country unprotected. The viewpoint that it was only this heroic individual, Stalin, who brought our country out of the crisis created by the war, and that the army was victorious thanks only to the genius of Stalin's leadership, is totally insupportable. The army would have won even without Stalin, and it would have suffered fewer losses. After all, our army was fighting for its own country and its own people, for its life and its future. It was not fighting for Stalin. The slogan "For Stalin!"<sup>15</sup> was the result of an incorrect perception of things, a slogan artificially and persistently promoted and put into circulation for political reasons.

Stalin exaggerated his own role and cultivated a spirit of bootlicking in the people around him; at the same time, within his circle of intimates, he condemned the idea that he should be exalted and extolled as an individual. But didn't particularly interfere with Kaganovich, who constantly reiterated at Stalin's dinner table: "Here we have Stalin! Stalin has done this, Stalin has done that, without Stalin we are nothing." Usually Stalin would speak up and say that this was an SR point of view, but in fact he encouraged Kaganovich to be even more "active" along these lines.

I sincerely regret those who because of their own lack of understanding believe that without Stalin we would not have achieved anything good. This lack of mature thinking in the public mind could in the future result in harmful relapses into criminal activity. No one should expect that the people will forget about their losses and about the evil that befell them through the will of their former leaders. Although for some people this kind of "forgetfulness" suits them just fine. A lot has been written about Genghis Khan. Mao Zedong, for example, has called him a hero.<sup>16</sup> Many positive things have been written about Napoleon, despite the fact that he destroyed hundreds of thousands of people. All these men were killers with government power. They organized their people for war, organized their armies and led them to their deaths for the sake of their own interests as rulers. These were not murderers who came at night with a dagger or revolver and killed one or two people in order to rob them. No, these were robbers on a grander scale. They robbed entire nations, and the harm they did affected all of humanity. The proper educational work should be done so that this kind of thing is condemned.

Young people should be oriented properly and educated in the spirit of the correct understanding of the role of individuals in history, one's responsibility to history, and instead of praising and glorifying killers and tyrants, creative people who have contributed to peaceful life should be praised.

Now I want to talk about the people who lived by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and devoted all their efforts toward solidly establishing those ideas. How could it have happened that our best people, who traveled a great road together with Lenin from the founding of the Bolshevik party to the making of the October revolution—how could it have happened that they perished as “enemies of the people,” enemies of the party, enemies of the ideas of socialism and communism? Do you really suppose Lenin couldn't sort things out clearly when he chose these people and worked with them? Could this really have been a mistake by Lenin? Of course great men do make mistakes. There was an agent provocateur from the tsarist secret police, the Okhrana, by the name of Roman Malinovsky,<sup>17</sup> a man who also enjoyed Lenin's confidence. And there were other provocateurs. But it was the gendarmes, the tsarist police, who smuggled them into our ranks. The people I am talking about traveled the road of real struggle together with Lenin and showed themselves to be loyal to the cause of the Communist Party both before and after the revolution. They are the ones who were tortured and killed, who perished without trial or investigation in the Stalin era. A pretense was made of putting some of them on trial, but it was a kangaroo court that did everything it was ordered to do. It was a court organized to carry out reprisals in the service of one individual [Stalin].

I am trying to shed light on this complicated question objectively, by relating my understanding of what happened and telling what became known to me after Stalin's death. After the Twentieth Party Congress we established a commission that specifically undertook a study of this question.<sup>18</sup> It reported to me as first secretary of the party's CC on the results of its investigation. What was it that became clear from this? Why did Stalin turn out to be so bankrupt in his actions—when he too had been close to Lenin and had helped prepare the victory of Marxist-Leninist ideas together with Lenin and under Lenin's leadership? How can we fit these two things together? Was it perhaps that Stalin degenerated and in general became an opponent of socialist ideas? Was that the reason he destroyed the proponents of those ideas? Not at all. In principle Stalin remained loyal to the ideas of socialism. But his was a dictatorial character. He was a man who didn't listen and didn't want to listen to anyone but himself. That was a peculiarity of his personality. If some minor individual has this trait, his family and neighbors

suffer. But if this is a trait inherent in a person holding a high position, the masses suffer. People wanted to think things over, discuss them, and consult together. That is normal. But if it turned out that their thinking didn't coincide with Stalin's understanding of things, naturally a battle of ideas began. But because of the peculiarities of Stalin's character, in his eyes such people became his personal enemies, and he called his personal enemies enemies of socialism. And enemies had to be destroyed. And he did destroy them. Some people say: "But Stalin was for the revolution and for communism. How could he do such a thing?" Others doubt that the abuses of power were authorized by Stalin. They say that Yagoda, Yezhov, Beria, Abakumov, and their ilk were to blame.

Such arguments don't hold water. It wasn't Yezhov or Beria who pushed Stalin down this path. It wasn't they who selected a boss of their choosing, but rather the boss who selected accomplices according to his taste. If Stalin hadn't found Yezhov and Beria to his liking, he could have replaced them easily; there would have been no difficulties for him in doing so. Stalin needed Yagoda, Yezhov, Beria, and Abakumov in order to hide his own tracks. He promoted Yezhov and destroyed Yagoda, and then he promoted Beria and used him to destroy Yezhov. He thought that in this way his personal participation in what was done by these counterparts of Malyuta Skuratov<sup>19</sup> would be hidden forever. At first everything was blamed on "Yezhov's reign of terror." Then there was Beria's reign of terror, because Beria continued to do the same thing with just as much cruelty and brutality as Yezhov. Stalin didn't have a chance to remove Beria. He himself died before he could do that.

How did this all begin? Why did Stalin take this road in general? After all, during the first years after Lenin's death Stalin still employed party methods in the struggle he waged. Yes, there was a fight going on, and opposition existed; debates and discussions were held. The debating was done harshly, but it remained within the norms of party life. Party members had the opportunity to consider various points of view, listen to all sides, listen to one or another leader, and each party member could determine his own attitude toward these things. In these debates Stalin was victorious, and the party supported him. Of course the people who lost were embittered and displeased with Stalin.

So then, that was how we lived up until the convening of the Seventeenth Party Congress. I remember it well. I took part in all the party congresses beginning with the Fourteenth Party Congress (with the exception of the Sixteenth Party Congress, to which I was not elected as a delegate because I was a student at the Industrial Academy, but I did attend its sessions). On

the eve of the Seventeenth Congress a discussion unfolded, during the course of which, as always, the main theses of the report were discussed within the party, in order to prepare party members for a correct understanding of the decisions that would be made at the congress. That was a special congress in the sense that by 1934 there were no longer any opposition tendencies in the party.<sup>20</sup> The questions of industrialization and collectivization of agriculture were no longer the subject of debate. Instead they constituted the main practical work of the party and the people. For that reason the congress proceeded in a very favorable way.<sup>21</sup> When candidates for membership in the CC were nominated, my candidacy was also put forward. I felt very deeply stirred when the voting began and I along with others received my ballot. I remember Kaganovich telling me that we ought to vote against certain candidates for the CC. As I recall, he mentioned Molotov, Voroshilov, and some others, explaining that some delegates might vote against Stalin, and therefore we should do this so that no one else would get more votes than Stalin. In order to even everything out, we should vote against these others. It's hard for me to say whether Stalin had assigned Kaganovich to do this or whether Kaganovich was doing it on his own.

When I got to know Kaganovich better, later on, I thought that perhaps he might have done it on his own, in pursuit of his own interests. If no one else got more votes than Stalin, that would have been useful in all respects for Kaganovich, because it would also mean that no one would get more votes than Kaganovich.

The ballots were passed out; everyone went to some corner of the room to look over the list and cross out whoever they wished to. But some people went right over to the ballot boxes and dropped their ballots in.<sup>22</sup> I saw Stalin demonstratively go over to the ballot box and drop his ballot in without stopping. He didn't even look at it. There was nothing surprising in this, because not only had Stalin himself looked over the list in advance; he had approved it. Why should he waste time and look it over again? After all, there were people whose job it was to be sure that no one's name got on the list other than those who had been specified.

The break ended. The vote-counting commission did its job. The next session of the congress was convened to hear the report on the results of the voting. It was a tense and triumphal moment. I don't even know whether I felt more triumph or anxiety, especially for those who would be promoted to the leading bodies. Perhaps I'm just describing my own feelings, but I think others were anxious, too. The chairman of the vote-counting commission asked us to put away our pencils and notepads and not to write anything

down but just to listen. He announced that such-and-such a number of delegates had been present at the congress and such-and-such a number had taken part in the voting. After that he went down through the alphabet, announcing who had received so-and-so many yes votes. He came to Stalin. I wondered at the fact that he was short six votes. He came to my name and announced the vote. It turned out that I too had six votes against me. That is, six delegates had crossed out my name. I joked to myself: "They gave Stalin six black balls and they gave me the same."

I became a member of the CC for the first time. I hadn't aspired to that because of my age and my position in the party. It seemed to me too high a position. I was pleased that I had been elected to the CC, and I wasn't bothered at all by the six votes against me, especially in light of the fact that Stalin, too, had six votes against him. The only thing is that I felt indignant that some people had voted against Stalin. That's how the voting went. Why have I gone into it in such detail? That will become clear from what follows.

The congress ended. Everyone went back to the local areas and resumed work. We worked with great enthusiasm in those days. Everyone lived not for his or her personal life, but for the party and the interests of the people. (I judge from my own experience.) We paid no attention to money. Our view of things was expressed in the phrase, "As long as I don't die of hunger. . . ." Everything else was subordinated to the interests of the cause, and we denied ourselves even the basic necessities. For some bureaucrats nowadays that probably sounds strange. But it is the truth. Before the revolution when I worked as a machinist, I earned forty to forty-five rubles a month. That is, I was better provided for than when I worked as secretary of the party's Moscow province and city committees. I'm not complaining, just illustrating how we lived then. We lived for the revolutionary cause, for the future communist society; everything and everyone among us was subordinated to that end. Things were hard for us. But we remembered that we were the first in the world to be building socialism and therefore we should tighten our belts in order to allocate more resources to industrialization of the country. Otherwise the main ideas of the revolution would perish and our enemies would strangle us. What a splendid time that was! No material difficulties were of any consequence by comparison with the great idea that we were honestly serving!

I found it especially pleasant to work in Moscow, our great capital city. I had no previous experience with questions of municipal administration and the municipal economy. So much was new for me, and it was also interesting, both the economic and the administrative work and the people I associated

with and with whom I had to discuss and decide various questions of our life and of transforming and rebuilding the city of Moscow. It was fascinating work and I gave myself over to it entirely. I came home late at night and left quite early. But in those days that I'm talking about the ordinary flow of our working life was suddenly interrupted at the beginning of December 1934, when the telephone rang and I heard Kaganovich's voice: "Come to the Kremlin immediately, to Stalin's reception room." There it was reported to us that Kirov had been assassinated. The Trotskyists were named as the assassins, and they had supposedly been recruited by foreign intelligence agencies. It was clear to us that enemies of the revolution and enemies of the Soviet Union had killed Kirov. Therefore, to us it was only natural when the call for vigilance proceeded from Stalin's lips.

Repression on a massive scale unfolded quickly. Stalin called everyone who didn't agree with him an "enemy of the people." He said that they wanted to restore the old order, and for this purpose "the enemies of the people" had linked up with the forces of reaction internationally. As a result, several hundred thousand honest people perished. Everyone lived in fear in those days. Everyone expected that at any moment there would be a knock on the door in the middle of the night and that knock on the door would prove fatal. It was not by chance that when they knocked on Gamarnik's<sup>23</sup> door late at night he shot himself. Later his suicide served as the basis for Stalin's argument that Gamarnik had been an enemy who had not yet been exposed but who understood that they were coming to get him, that he didn't want to surrender and be brought to justice and therefore shot himself. But what if he had surrendered and "been brought to justice"? He would still have been shot. Gamarnik was an intelligent man and understood what was in store for him. After the Twentieth Party Congress his name was cleared; he was exonerated, as were many others.

But before the question of clearing the names of the innocent and "rehabilitating" them could be presented to the Twentieth Congress, along with the question of the cult of Stalin's personality, a big struggle went on inside the Presidium of the Central Committee. Molotov, Voroshilov, and Kaganovich were categorically opposed to bringing up these issues. That didn't surprise me, because these people, especially Molotov and Voroshilov, were responsible, along with Stalin, for all the violations of legality. I am convinced that Stalin consulted with them, and they made decisions jointly. There is no question that they were not always of one mind in regard to all the candidates for destruction. But they were all of one mind regarding the general direction and the kinds of measures to be taken—the barbaric extermination of party

members. They were the authors of the notorious slogans about fighting the “enemies of the people.”

When we established the commission that began to study in detail the documents concerning the repression that had gone on under Stalin, among others, a note from Yezhov to Molotov was found. It listed the names of the wives of a number of “enemies of the people” and proposed that they be banished from Moscow. A decision on this question was written down in Molotov’s handwriting: “Shoot them.” And they were shot. This was a horrible thing. Even the NKVD had written that they only needed to be banished; that meant they were not being charged with any crime. This document, along with a number of others, provided confirmation that Molotov, equally with Stalin, was fully responsible for the arbitrary actions and the murders that were committed. In this way people not to Stalin’s liking were annihilated, honest party members, irreproachable people, loyal and hard workers for our cause who had gone through the school of revolutionary struggle under Lenin’s leadership. This was utter and complete arbitrariness. And now is this all to be forgiven and forgotten? Never!

1. “The Internationale” was the anthem of the international Socialist and Communist movements. The Russian wording of the line Khrushchev quotes here is: *Dobyomysya my osvobodzhdeniya svoeyu sobstvennoi rukoi.* [GS] See note 7 to the earlier chapter “The Nineteenth Party Congress.” When the lyrics were translated into other languages from the original French, many changes were made to the exact wording for the sake of rhyme and rhythm. As a result, translations and retranslations have generated a multiplicity of versions. The relevant lines of the original French lyrics, translated directly into English, are: “There is no supreme savior / No God, no Caesar, no tribune / Producers, let us save ourselves / . . . / Let us break our own chains.” [SS]

2. See note 6 to the chapter “Stalin’s Last Years.” [SS]

3. Before World War II, the title “Voroshilov marksman” was awarded to the winners in shooting contests, which were widely publicized. [SK]

4. Many Russian and Western military analysts consider that even if the Soviet army had not been weakened by purges it would still have been unrealistic to count on repelling a massive German offensive right at the border and immediately taking the counteroffensive. The slogan of “fighting the war on enemy territory” may have been connected to the fact that Stalin was considering the possibility

of opening hostilities first. However, General Staff documents that are now available show that the Soviet Union was expected to be ready for war by 1942 at the earliest. The country was certainly not prepared for either offensive or defensive warfare in summer 1941. Whatever the reason may have been for the premature concentration of forces and armaments on forward lines near the border, it led to enormous losses of these forces at the onset of hostilities. [SK/SS]

5. The reference is to Stalin’s radio broadcast of July 3, 1941, in which he appealed to the Soviet people not only as “comrades” and “citizens” but also as “brothers and sisters” to rally around the party and government in the fight against the German invaders. [SS]

6. The Oprichniki were members of the Oprichnina, a private court and special armed force of Tsar Ivan the Terrible (Ivan IV) that conducted a reign of terror from 1565 to 1572. The terror was directed against the princes, boyars (nobles), and other perceived traitors and enemies of the autocracy. [SS]

7. Marshal Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) was the leader of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See the chapter “Yugoslavia” in Vol. 3 of these memoirs. [SS]

8. Marshal Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov (1745–1813) is one of the most celebrated Russian



generals. Earlier in his career he had fought against Poland and Turkey. In August 1812 he replaced Barclay de Tolly as commander in chief of Russian forces in the resistance to the Napoleonic invasion. [SS]

9. Khrushchev's position on this question, that war was possible but not inevitable, was an advance on the position held by Stalin, according to whom war was inevitable. Later, ideologists of Gorbachev's "new thinking" were to go further and argue that the possibility of war could in fact be eliminated even while class antagonism continued to exist in the world. [SS]

10. Georgy Valentinovich Plekhanov (1856–1918) was a founder of the first Marxist organization in Russia, the "Emancipation of Labor" group, and after its dissolution joined the RSDLP. He played the crucial role in introducing Marxist theory to Russia, and the young Lenin looked up to him as a mentor. Later Lenin and Plekhanov parted company: when the party split into Bolshevik and Menshevik wings Plekhanov took the side of the Mensheviks, and in his political "testament" he denounced Lenin and regretted that he had helped him. [SS]

11. See the chapters "The Kirov Assassination" and "Some Consequences of the Kirov Assassination" in Vol. 1 of these memoirs. [SS]

12. The Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs) was an agrarian party established by populist groups in 1901. The SRs believed that heroic acts by individuals could inspire the people to revolt, and for this purpose they had a secret "combat organization" that carried out assassinations of prominent tsarist officials. This emphasis on the crucial role of heroic individuals stood in opposition to the Marxist view that the crucial role in history is played by social classes. In 1917 the SRs split into a left wing that supported the Bolsheviks and a right wing that opposed them. The Right SRs won a majority in the short-lived Constituent Assembly of January 1918. The SRs were finally suppressed by the Bolshevik regime in 1922. [SS]

13. Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, Genrikh Grigoryevich Yagoda, Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov, Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov. See Biographies.

14. Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos. See Biographies.

15. Official instructions to lead Red Army men into battle under the slogan *For Stalin!* were transmitted to the troops from Moscow through party and military channels after Stalin in his radio broadcast of July 3, 1941, had publicly called upon "the whole people to unite around the party of Lenin-Stalin," although some political commissars, especially Lev Mekhlis (see Biographies), had already taken this initiative.

16. In one of his poems, Mao called Genghis Khan "the proud son of Heaven." [SS] The first open material for Soviet readers on the cult of

Genghis Khan in the contemporary East was published at the beginning of the 1960s, but without direct reference to Mao. [MN]

17. Roman Vatslavovich Malinovsky (1876–1918) was a prominent figure in the Bolshevik party who also acted as an informer for the tsarist secret police (Okhrana). See Biographies.

18. Khrushchev is referring to a commission of the CPSU Central Committee that was established on April 13, 1956, after the Twentieth Party Congress, to review the documents on the open trials of Bukharin, Rykov, Zinoviev, and other oppositionists in the 1930s. Initially Molotov was placed in charge of the commission, possibly because Khrushchev wanted to make him acknowledge that the trials had been fabricated. When in June 1957 Molotov was removed from the leadership as a member of the so-called antiparty group, he was replaced on the commission by N. M. Shvernik, then chairman of the Party Control Committee. Kaganovich was also a member of the commission until he too was removed from the leadership as a member of the "antiparty group." Other members of the commission were: Ye. A. Furtseva, first secretary of the Moscow city committee of the party and a Central Committee secretary; O. G. Shatunovskaya, a member of the Party Control Committee; and A. V. Snegov, the official responsible for rehabilitations at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Both Shatunovskaya and Snegov had themselves been imprisoned for many years under Stalin. KGB chairman I. A. Serov was not initially on the commission but was added later, perhaps on Khrushchev's initiative. See Biographies.

The Shvernik commission completed its work toward the end of Khrushchev's period in power. It produced a large number of volumes that were relegated to the archives and never published. The conclusion drawn by the commission was that the charges of terrorism made against the defendants in the show trials had been fabricated, but that the verdicts against them should not be annulled because they had engaged in "ideological struggle against the party."

Khrushchev comments on the work of the Shvernik commission in the chapter "The Kirov Assassination" in Vol. 1 of the present edition of the memoirs (pp. 87–91). It is also mentioned in the published protocols of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee (*Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954—1964* [Moscow: Rosspen, 2003], 119, 1048) and discussed in the memoirs of Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, (*Tak bylo: razmyshleniya o minuvshem* [Thus It Was: Reflections on the Past] [Moscow: VAGRIUS, 1999], 593–94), and in Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, *The Time of Stalin* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 81 ff. and 333–34.

Besides the Shvernik commission, there were a number of other commissions engaged in related



work in this period. In March 1956 a commission was established under the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, with the Central Committee secretary A. B. Aristov as chairman. The mission of the Aristov commission was "to check in places of deprivation of freedom the correctness of the conviction of every person accused of committing crimes of a political character, and also to consider the question of the expediency of keeping in detention persons who do not represent a danger to the state or to society" (*Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954—1964*, p. 934). There was also the commission set up by the CC Presidium on December 31, 1955, and chaired by the Central Committee secretary P. N. Pospelov, which studied documents on the purges of the 1930s but completed its work and reported to the CC Presidium on February 9, 1956, before the Twentieth Party Congress (unlike the Aristov and Shvernik commissions, which were set up after the congress). Khrushchev drew on the findings of the Pospelov commission in his "secret speech" to the congress. (See the chapter "From

the Nineteenth to the Twentieth Party Congress" in the present volume.) [GS/SK/SS]

19. Grigory Lukyanovich Skuratov-Belsky (nickname Malyuta; died 1573) was the official in charge of the Oprichnina (see note 6 above). [GS]

20. According to the point of view accepted at that time in the Soviet party press, before the Seventeenth Congress of the AUCP(B), "the party did not contain any fractional or opposition groupings" (*Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuz*, vol. 4, book 2 (Moscow 1971), 261).

21. It was called the "Congress of Victors." [GS]

22. This was the general practice in Soviet elections of all kinds. No mark was made on a ballot to vote for any candidate; in order to vote against a candidate one had to cross out his or her name. Thus everyone could see who was voting against one or more of the candidates on the list. [SS]

23. Army Commissar of the First Rank Yan Borisovich Gamarnik (1894–1937) was at this time head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. He committed suicide in May 1937. See Biographies.

## ONCE AGAIN ON BERIA

I have already spoken more than once about Beria, but mainly in connection with other people, or events that he was not fully responsible for. Now I want to talk specifically about Beria and his role and influence in the life of Soviet society. In the course of our frequent meetings and the acquaintance between us in general, his political physiognomy gradually became clearer and more comprehensible to me. In the first stage of our acquaintance he made a very good impression on me. We always sat side by side at plenums of the Central Committee, exchanging opinions, and sometimes joking, as often happens between people who are on good terms.

And then it started! But not all at once. When Stalin expressed the thought that Yagoda should be replaced as people's commissar of internal affairs, since he was not coping with his task, he named Yezhov as Yagoda's replacement. Yezhov was in charge of cadres for the party's Central Committee. I knew him well. From 1929, when I became a student at the Industrial Academy, and

especially after I was elected secretary of the party organization there, Yezhov to a certain extent became my supervisor, because the Industrial Academy was under the jurisdiction of the cadres department of the Central Committee and was subordinate to the Central Committee directly through Yezhov. As party organizer I reported to him about the state of affairs at the Industrial Academy. If a mobilization was under way to send Academy students out to local areas, to gather up materials of some sort, or to wage some political campaign, the Central Committee did this directly through me, and no other body (such as the Department of Higher Education or the party's Moscow committee) had the right to order us around or to take any of our people to carry out some other political campaign, and so forth. Nothing could be done except with the permission of the Central Committee. Those were the conditions in which I more or less frequently met with Yezhov. He made a good impression on me. I found him an attentive person, and I knew he had been a worker in Saint Petersburg and had been a member of the party since 1917. That was considered something of the highest caliber—to be a worker from Saint Petersburg.

When Yezhov was promoted to take charge of the NKVD [in 1936], I was not yet aware of the deeper motives behind this action or the inner logic of Stalin's thinking. My personal opinion of Yagoda was not a bad one. Nor had I seen or sensed any harmful tendencies in his actions. But Yezhov was appointed to replace him, and the repression intensified even more. A literal slaughter began of military and civilian personnel, party officials, and those in economic management. Ordzhonikidze headed the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, and Kaganovich headed the People's Commissariat of Railways. Wave after wave of arrests swept through both commissariats. Incidentally, Yezhov was on friendly terms with Malenkov and worked closely with him, so it can't be said that Malenkov was standing on the sidelines during the Yezhov terror.

It was the beginning of 1938. Stalin summoned me and proposed that I go to work in Ukraine. He said that Kosior was not coping with his task there. I had great respect for Kosior. I had known him when I first worked in Ukraine. He had become general secretary of the CP(B)U Central Committee after Kaganovich, in 1928. Kaganovich had transferred to work in the AUCP(B) Central Committee [in Moscow], and Kosior had come to replace him. In 1929, when I requested permission to go study at the Industrial Academy, it was Kosior who received me for a discussion of that question. When Stalin told me I would be replacing Kosior, that had a bad effect on me. I had a high regard for Kosior and didn't think it was possible in any way for me to

replace him; I didn't think I had grown to that level. The national question also played a role. Of course I had worked earlier in Ukraine and even in Kiev. The government of the Ukrainian SSR was still based in Kharkov at that time. Nevertheless, as a Russian I felt a certain awkwardness. But the Ukrainians treated me well, both the Communists and those without party affiliation. Still, I constantly felt it to be a shortcoming of mine that I couldn't give a speech in Ukrainian. My response to Stalin's proposal was this: "It hardly seems appropriate to send a Russian there." But Stalin argued that a Russian was no worse than a Pole. He said that Kosior was a Pole, so why should a Russian be any worse?<sup>1</sup>

I was very concerned that I wouldn't be able to cope with the task, but I can't deny that the proposal flattered me. The idea that the party Central Committee was entrusting me with such a high position! And so I went. Kosior turned over his affairs to me and I took up the job. He left Ukraine and was appointed deputy chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars under Molotov. Some time went by, and at the end of 1938 or the beginning of 1939 the proposal was suddenly made that I too should be appointed a deputy under Molotov. Molotov himself called me about this at first, and then during one of my visits to Moscow Stalin said to me: "Molotov is insisting you be given to him as a deputy. It seems that we should make this concession to Molotov. How do you see it?" I asked that this not be done. I was just getting accustomed to Kiev; it seemed that the Ukrainians had accepted me, and good relationships were being formed. But the main argument was that we were heading toward a war, and I knew Ukraine more or less. If a new person came there at that time, it would be more difficult for him to organize everything if a war broke out soon. Therefore it would hardly be in the interest of the cause for me to leave Ukraine; it would be easier to choose some other person to go to Moscow. Stalin agreed and said at a Politburo session: "Let's put an end to this conversation. Let Khrushchev remain in Ukraine."

In 1938 Stalin also brought up the point that it was necessary to "reinforce" Yezhov by providing him with a first deputy, and he asked Yezhov about that.

Yezhov answered: "That would be fine."

Stalin said: "Who would you have in mind?"

Yezhov said: "I would ask that Malenkov be made my first deputy."

This kind of conversation occurred several times, but the question was left unresolved. Finally Stalin said to Yezhov: "No, it wouldn't work for you to take Malenkov, because he's in charge of cadres at the Central Committee,

and he's needed there more." When Malenkov had been in charge of cadres at the Central Committee, Yezhov had been his sponsor, had overseen his work. Thus in fact cadres and personnel assignments had remained under Yezhov's control. This was a time when the party was beginning to lose some of its earlier features and was being subordinated more and more to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the NKVD. The middle of the 1930s was the dividing line in this respect.

The Party Control Commission and the Soviet Control Commission, in which Roza Zemlyachka<sup>2</sup> had played a prominent role—those commissions had been weakened. The "organs" of the NKVD came to have the final word regarding any changes or promotions of party, government, or economic cadres. And the agreement of the NKVD had to be obtained in all such cases. Of course this was a very shameful thing, the loss of the party's leading role! As for Yezhov, Stalin finally proposed that Beria be appointed his first deputy. In those days when people marched in demonstrations it was usually with posters or banners depicting a glove wrapped in barbed wire. This practice began after Stalin referred to Yezhov as the man in hedgehog gloves, a man like blackberry thorns.<sup>3</sup> This was Stalin's way of speaking highly of Yezhov's activities. But when Stalin appointed Beria, it was a sign that Yezhov was going to be replaced. Yezhov understood everything perfectly well. He understood that his star was in decline and that the end of his work was coming soon. Perhaps he also sensed that his existence was coming to an end, since he himself had carried out such operations.

Nevertheless, he said: "Of course, Comrade Beria is a worthy man. There is no question about it. He could not only be my deputy; he could be people's commissar."

Stalin demurred: "I don't think he could be people's commissar, but he would make a good deputy for you." And Beria was confirmed right then and there as Yezhov's deputy.

Since I was on good terms with Beria, I approached him after the session and half-joking, half-serious, I congratulated him.

He answered: "I don't accept your congratulations."

"Why?"

"You didn't agree when the question came up of your being a prospective deputy under Molotov. So why should I be happy that they've appointed me deputy to Yezhov? It would be better for me to stay in Georgia."

I don't know how sincere he was in saying that. But when Beria was transferred to take charge of the NKVD, he said to me more than once during the initial phase: "What is this? We're arresting everybody, one after the

other. We've already arrested a lot of prominent leaders, and soon there's not going to be anyone left to imprison. This has got to stop."

[At a Central Committee plenum in January 1938] a resolution about "excesses"<sup>4</sup> made its appearance. It was attributed to Beria's influence. Among the people it was thought that when Beria came to the NKVD he looked into things and reported to Stalin and that Stalin listened to him.

The Central Committee plenum [June 23–28, 1937] was sharply critical.<sup>5</sup> Everyone who took the floor criticized somebody. Among others I remember Malenkov's speech. He was then criticizing one of the secretaries of the party's Central Asia Bureau (who was later arrested). His criticism was aimed at the other person's self-glorification. Malenkov said that mountain climbers had reached the highest point in the mountains of Central Asia and named the peak after that secretary of the Central Asia Bureau.

The only person occupying a relatively high position in the party leadership who for some reason had so far avoided criticism was, of all people, Khrushchev. But then Yakov Arkadyevich Yakovlev<sup>6</sup> took the floor. He was in charge of the agriculture department of the party's Central Committee and he roundly denounced me. His criticism was rather original, by the way. He denounced me for the fact that everyone in the Moscow party organization called me Nikita Sergeyeovich.

I took the floor in reply. I said they were calling me by my real name, my first name and middle name. In saying this, I more or less hinted that he himself wasn't using his real name, which was not Yakovlev but Epshtein.

After the session Mekhlis<sup>7</sup> came over to me. He was then the editor of *Pravda*, and he started to speak angrily about Yakovlev's speech. Mekhlis was Jewish and was familiar with the ancient traditions of his people. He explained to me: "Yakovlev is a Jew, so he doesn't understand that it's customary among Russians to call one another by their first name and patronymic even in official situations."

Later Grisha Kaminsky took the floor.<sup>8</sup> In those days Grigory Naumovich was working as people's commissar of health for the USSR. He was a highly respected comrade with a pre-revolutionary record in the party, a man who had many times met with Lenin. I had made his acquaintance just when I began work in the Moscow party organization. He was then one of the secretaries of the party's Moscow committee. Later he was chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet, and then he was promoted to head the People's Commissariat of Health for the Russian Federation and later for the Soviet Union as a whole. He was a forthright, sincere person, loyally devoted to the party, a man of uncompromising truthfulness. This is

what he said: "All those speaking here have told everything they know about others. I would also like to say something, so that it will be known to the party. When I was sent to Baku in 1920 and worked there as a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and chairman of the Baku Soviet, persistent rumors were circulating that Comrade Beria, who is present here, during the occupation of Baku [by the British] collaborated with the counterintelligence services of the Musavat<sup>9</sup> and even that somewhat earlier he had collaborated with British counterintelligence." No one took the floor to refute what he said. Not even Beria made any comment on the subject. There was silence about it, and that was all. And soon Kaminsky was arrested and disappeared without a trace. I was tormented by this question for a long time afterward, because I believed Grigory absolutely, and I knew that he himself never made things up, nor would he repeat what others said without any basis. But who could speak out against the NKVD and its leaders? Who could compete with them?

One day within approximately a few months of that plenum, after a daytime session of the Central Committee of the party, we all dispersed to go eat. I was delayed for a bit and hadn't left the room yet when Stalin called out to me: "Khrushchev, where are you going?"

"I'm going to eat."

"Come to my place. We'll eat together."

"Thank you."

As we were leaving Yakovlev was fidgeting around in Stalin's vicinity. It was as though, without being invited, he was sticking with Stalin, going wherever Stalin went, and he too ended up at Stalin's apartment. So the three of us ate together. Stalin did most of the talking, and Yakovlev was obviously very agitated the whole time. You sensed that some profound inner emotion was tormenting him. Probably he was afraid he was going to be arrested and was seeking Stalin's protection.

I had known of Yakovlev earlier, from [party and government] work in Ukraine, but I first made his acquaintance under peculiar (*originalnykh*) circumstances. At that time, in the mid-1920s, the Zinoviev-Kamenev opposition<sup>10</sup> was coming to a head. When we arrived at a party congress [the Fourteenth], Yakovlev came to speak to our delegation and informed us about the situation that was likely to arise at the congress. He said that Zinoviev was evidently going to give an [oppositional] counter-report.<sup>11</sup>

This information was presented confidentially, so that we understood that Yakovlev was a trusted confidant of Stalin's, giving us information by order of Stalin. I refer to this to show that the man had been quite close to

Stalin and had devoted all his strength to the fight against the opposition, and later he went all out in implementing collectivization. In spite of that, a difficult situation had now arisen for him, although I don't know why. And his premonition was not wrong. He was arrested in spite of the amiable tone of the conversation with Stalin during that dinner at Stalin's apartment. Yakovlev's arrest came immediately after that dinner, and he soon perished.

The Central Committee plenum that I have been talking about [January 1938] passed a resolution condemning the excesses committed in the work of the NKVD. That plenum gave our people the hope that the savage and arbitrary practices that had prevailed in the country and that had created a feeling of uncertainty and insecurity for everyone were coming to an end. A person never knew if he or she was going to survive or would be destroyed, perhaps disappearing without a trace. I and many others had implicit faith in Stalin, and we blamed ourselves for being blind, for not seeing or sensing the enemies around us. We thought we didn't have the acute political sense of smell, the profound understanding of the class struggle, that Stalin had. We didn't know how to expose enemies the way Comrade Stalin did. Only gradually did I begin to realize that things were not that simple, not by far.

At that time Stalin frequently expressed dissatisfaction with Yezhov's work. He no longer trusted Yezhov and wanted to get rid of him for having committed illegalities. Later Yezhov was arrested. And all his deputies as well. People who at one time or another had been connected with Yezhov were also arrested. Malenkov too had a cloud over his head then. He had been a close friend of Yezhov's, and Stalin knew that. I knew it, too, because I had been friends with Malenkov for many years. We worked together in the party's Moscow committee. I drew the conclusion that suspicion was gathering over Malenkov's head after the following incident. One day when I had come to Moscow from Ukraine, Beria invited me to his dacha: "Let's go. I'm alone. There's no one else there. We'll go for a walk, and you can spend the night at my place."

I said: "It's all the same to me. I'm alone, too."

We went to his place and took a walk in the park. At that point he said to me: "Listen, haven't you been thinking anything about Malenkov?"

"What should I be thinking?"

"Well, after all, Yezhov has been arrested."

I said: "It's true that they were friends. But you were also friends with Yezhov, and so was I. I think Malenkov is an honorable and irreproachable person."



Beria said: “No, no, listen, you should think about it anyway. You’re close to Malenkov, too, now. You should think about it!”

Well, I did think about it, but I could come to no particular conclusion, and I continued to be friends with Malenkov. When I would come to Moscow I always spent my day off with Malenkov at his dacha. My supposition is that Stalin told Beria to warn me against Malenkov. Later Malenkov became close friends with Voznesensky,<sup>12</sup> and still later he became an inseparable friend of Beria’s.

After Yezhov’s arrest Beria quickly increased his powers. Above all he was busy with the reshuffling of personnel. In Ukraine at that time we had no one in charge of the NKVD, and he sent a man named Kobulov<sup>13</sup> to perform those duties. He was the younger brother of the other Kobulov,<sup>14</sup> who was Beria’s deputy in the unionwide NKVD and who had formerly worked with Beria in Georgia. The Ukrainian Kobulov was still just a youngster and relatively unprepared for his high position. This can be judged from the following incident. He came to the Central Committee offices of the CP(B)U and reported that a group of Ukrainian nationalists had been exposed for engaging in anti-Soviet activity. I said to him: “It’s possible in principle that such a thing exists. But who specifically do you have in mind? Tell me the names.” He mentioned several names, including prominent writers and other intellectuals. I knew them well. Among others he mentioned Maksim Rylsky<sup>15</sup>

I replied to him: “There is no way that these people could be conducting anti-Soviet activity. They might display some dissatisfaction with something or other and express criticism, but they are by no means anti-Soviet. What specifically are they being accused of? What did your agent inform you?”

“They get together and drink and sing songs.”

“Well, what of it?”

“They’re singing a song with the following words: ‘Oh my fate, where are you heading? I can’t catch up with you.’”

I burst out laughing: “You’re an Armenian and you don’t know Ukrainian culture. Your agent is making a mockery of you if he’s reporting things like that. Everyone here sings that song. If you and I were a part of a crowd at the same party, I couldn’t give you a guarantee that I wouldn’t join in singing that song, too. It’s an excellent folk song.”

You see the level this man was on, and yet he was performing the duties of a people’s commissar!

During those same weeks another one of Beria’s men went to Belorussia with the same assignment. Beria was sending his cadres out in all directions.



A situation had taken shape by then in which all officials, when they were promoted to party, government, economic, or military work, had to go through “purgatory” at the NKVD. In effect the NKVD became the chief governing body of the country. No one in a leadership position could be promoted except with Beria’s prior consent. Beria and I met more and more frequently with Stalin, and I gradually got to know Beria better. My attitude toward Beria was favorable then, and only later did I become aware of his two-facedness and double-dealing. Here is just one example. During dinner at Stalin’s place, he was capable of raising some question or another (and I was amazed that this was permitted), and if Stalin rejected the proposal he was making, he would immediately look at someone among those present and say: “You know, I told you this question shouldn’t be raised.” My eyes simply popped and my mouth fell open. How could anyone blurt things out like that right in Stalin’s presence? After all, although Stalin said nothing, he had seen and heard that Beria himself had just brought up this question. But nothing happened! And Beria continued unfazed! That’s how perfidious he was. As Beria grew stronger, his arrogance and baseness were also displayed more and more clearly.

Earlier I had heard that [Stanislav] Redens<sup>16</sup> had at one time been Beria’s deputy in the NKVD in Georgia. The older cadres knew Redens well. I had met him often when he worked as the NKVD authorized representative for Moscow province. Besides that, I often met him in domestic surroundings at family dinners at Stalin’s place, because Redens was married to Anna Sergeevna, the sister of Nadezhda Sergeevna Alliluyeva [Stalin’s wife]. So what measures had Beria taken to drive Redens out and estrange him from Stalin’s own family? His first goal was to drive Redens out of Georgia, because he didn’t want Stalin to have any information coming from there from anyone but himself. He ordered his people to lure Redens to some tavern. They took advantage of his weakness, a bad drinking habit. They gave him a lot to drink; then they took him out and threw him on the street, left him lying in a drainage ditch of the sewage system. Some policemen came by and saw Redens lying there like that, and they reported it to the proper authorities. Then things took their course! The matter was brought before Stalin, that Redens had discredited himself. That’s how Redens was recalled from Georgia and ended up in Moscow province. Later Redens was stripped of all his posts and not even allowed to enter the Kremlin, where he used to visit [his relatives in Stalin’s family].

In 1953 when Beria himself was stripped of his post, the CPSU Central Committee received a letter from a former prisoner. It was a long letter in

which he listed how many people in Georgia had been victims of Beria as a result of various provocations. But this of course became possible only after Beria's downfall. Earlier such a letter would probably have been intercepted. The Great Patriotic War sharply increased Beria's influence. He acquired enormous power then. Stalin really lost control over Beria, especially during those difficult months of our retreats on the front lines. Beria gradually became a threat to all the party cadres. He was a strong influence in Stalin's inner circle as well. The personnel who functioned as Stalin's servants were changed. As I have said, it was mainly Russians who had previously been servants for Stalin. During the war the waitresses continued to be Russians, but some Georgians showed up in those positions, too. And as I have said, the shashlik cook there became a general, and every time I came to visit I saw that he had more orders and medal ribbons, testimony to his constantly being decorated for his knowledge and ability—to make good shashlik. Stalin noticed me once looking at the rows of medal ribbons on the chest of this newly christened general, but he didn't say anything, and I also held my tongue.<sup>17</sup>

What about after the war? [Beria's increased power then] hardly needs to be mentioned! He became a member of the Politburo. Malenkov too gained more power, although the position he occupied changed dramatically during the war and after it. At one point Stalin even banished him to Central Asia.<sup>18</sup> At that point Beria held out a helping hand to him, and after that they became inseparable.

During dinners at Stalin's place, he often referred to Beria and Malenkov, in a joking way, as "the two swindlers." He didn't use an insulting tone; he seemed to be only joking, saying it in a friendly way. For example: "Where have those two swindlers gotten to?"

There was literally nothing that could be decided at that time without Beria. In fact there was almost nothing you could report to Stalin without ensuring yourself of Beria's support in advance. If you started to propose something to Stalin in Beria's presence, no matter what business you were bringing up, without fail he would raise all sorts of questions and start cross-examining you, discrediting you in Stalin's eyes, and what you were proposing would fail.

At the same time Beria had no respect or regard for Malenkov but was pursuing purely personal aims in his friendship with Malenkov. He said to me once: "Listen, that Malenkov is a weak-willed man. In general he's like a baby goat. He can make a sudden jump if you don't hold him tight. That's why I go around with him and keep a tight hold on him. On the other hand,

he's a Russian and a cultured person who can be of use on some occasions." The main thing for Beria was that someone could "be of use." As for me, I had been friends with both Malenkov and Bulganin ever since I had worked in the Moscow party organization. We had often taken our days off together and lived in the same dacha. Thus, in spite of the fact that Malenkov had displayed a kind of lackey's arrogance toward me during the war, especially when Stalin was dissatisfied with me, I didn't break off relations with Malenkov.

Stalin displayed dissatisfaction with me during the period of our retreats. It was as though he were saying, "Why have you abandoned Ukraine?" He was searching for scapegoats, people he could blame for the defeats. Of course I was the first to bear responsibility, since I was secretary of the CC of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Although Stalin was supreme commander in chief, it was as though he wasn't responsible for anything; only his subordinates were. During the time of retreats the orders were signed by the General Headquarters (the Stavka) or by the High Command (the Glavnoye Komandovanie, or Glavkom), but without any names.

Once after the war, when we all gathered at Stalin's place in Sochi, after being summoned by him (I from Ukraine, Malenkov and others from Moscow), we began to look into some questions, and then we went for a walk. I was walking with Malenkov, and I said to him: "It amazes me. Don't you understand how Beria is treating you?"

He remained silent.

I continued: "Do you think he respects you? In my opinion, he's making fun of you."

Finally Malenkov answered: "Yes, I see that, but what can I do?"

I said: "I simply wanted to be sure that you saw and understood. And you're right that you can't do anything right now."

So things went. Some definite apprehensions ripened in my mind. Stalin had reached those years in his life when at any moment our country could find itself in the difficult position of not having a leader. I feared Stalin's death. And I feared even more what would happen in our country after his death.

During those years, although for a long time I'd had doubts about the justness of the accusations against many of the "enemies of the people," on the whole I felt no lack of confidence in Stalin. I felt that excesses had been committed, but for the most part everything had been done correctly. I even exalted Stalin for the fact that he was not afraid of complications but had carried out purges and as a result the people had been united and rallied around him. Nevertheless on the eve of the 1950s I had already formed the

opinion that when Stalin died it would be necessary to prevent Beria from taking the leading position in the party. Otherwise that would be the end of the party! As I saw it, all the gains of the revolution could be lost, because Beria was capable of turning off the socialist road and onto the capitalist road. That was the opinion I had formed.

Once when I was in Lvov,<sup>19</sup> Stalin called me up and summoned me urgently to Moscow. This was in the last months of 1949. I went there without knowing what awaited me. Many unsuspected surprises could pop up. That was what the situation was like then. I went there without knowing why I was going or in what position I would end up. Bulganin expressed similar feelings after a dinner at Stalin's once, when he said to me: "You go to his place for dinner as though you were going to a friend's house, but you don't know whether you'll return home afterward or whether they'll take you off somewhere." He said this when he had had quite a few drinks. But after all, what sober people have on their minds gets expressed when they're drunk. Bulganin was expressing the opinion of many, if not all, of us. There was a general atmosphere of uncertainty about the future.

And so I had gone to Moscow. Stalin had said: "You've sat in Ukraine long enough. You've worked there for many years."

I said: "Yes, thirteen years. It's time for me to leave, although people there have treated me very well, and I'm grateful to all the people who were around me and helped me in the leadership of Ukraine."

Stalin said: "We want you to transfer to Moscow. Things aren't going well for us in Leningrad. Conspiracies have been exposed there. Things are in a bad way in Moscow, too, and we want you to head the Moscow party organization again. Let the Moscow party organization be a firm base of support for the Central Committee."

I said to him: "If you have this confidence in me, then I'll do everything in my power [to justify it], and I'll gladly return to Moscow as secretary of the party's Moscow committee."

He said: "No, not just that. You'll also be a secretary of the Central Committee." The conversation took place just before Stalin's seventieth birthday, and he added: "Be sure you get here by the time of my birthday." I did arrive by that day in December [December 21, 1949]. I turned over my affairs in Ukraine and made the move to Moscow. There I was elected secretary of the party's Moscow committee, and I began my work anew.

I soon saw that my arrival in Moscow conflicted with plans made by Beria and Malenkov. I formed the impression at that time that Stalin (although he didn't say this to me) had summoned me from Ukraine

because he wanted to alter the disposition of forces there in some way and reduce the roles of Beria and Malenkov. It even seemed to me sometimes that Stalin feared Beria, as I have said, that he would have been glad to be rid of Beria, but didn't know the best way of going about it. My transfer to Moscow created a counterweight to Beria, as it were, and tied his hands. It seemed to me that Stalin had a favorable attitude toward me and trusted me. Although he did criticize me frequently, he nevertheless supported me, and I appreciated that.

1. As Khrushchev explains elsewhere, although Kosior was by origin a Pole he was, unlike Khrushchev, fluent in Ukrainian and familiar with Ukrainian culture. [SS]

2. Rozaliya Samoilovna Zemlyachka-Samoilova (Zalkind). See Biographies.

3. These are two plays on Yezhov's name, the "Yezh" in his name meaning hedgehog in Russian. The phrase *yezhovye rukavitsy*, "hedgehog gloves," is used to suggest harsh treatment, the opposite of treating people with "kid gloves." Similarly the Russian word *yezhevika* means "blackberry thorns" and again suggests harsh treatment of people. [GS]

4. Khrushchev has in mind the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) that took place on January 11, 14, 18, and 20, 1938, "On the Errors of Party Organizations in Expelling Communists from the Party, the Formal-Bureaucratic Treatment of Appeals from Persons Expelled from the AUCP(B), and Measures to Eliminate These Shortcomings." After this, in March 1938, the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) adopted a resolution "On the Examination by Party Organizations of Appeals from Persons Expelled from the AUCP(B)." [MN] This January 1938 plenum, where Stalin pretended to allow an easing-up of repressive measures, was actually a smokescreen. Repression resumed as intensively as ever, especially with the trial of Bukharin, Rykov, and others in March 1938. [GS]

5. Khrushchev is confusing two different Central Committee plenums. The "sharply critical" plenum to which he here refers in fact took place between June 23 and 29, 1937, several months before the January 1938 plenum at which the resolution about excesses was adopted. [GS/SS/SK]

6. Yakov Arkadyevich Yakovlev (1896–1938) headed this department between 1934 and 1936. He was arrested at the end of 1937. See Biographies. [SS]

7. Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis. See Biographies.

8. Grisha is short for Grigory. His full name was Grigory Naumovich Kaminsky. See Biographies. [GS]

9. In 1917–18, Baku was under the control of the Baku Soviet. In July 1918 the Baku Soviet fell and the British government moved forces in from Iran to occupy the city. A Republic of Azerbaijan, independent of Russia, was established under British protection and survived for almost two years before Azerbaijan was occupied by the Red Army in May 1921. The Musavat Azerbaijani National Party was the leading political force in the Republic of Azerbaijan. [SS]

10. This was a "left" opposition to Stalin led by Zinoviev and Kamenev. See Biographies. [SS]

11. It was the practice to open a party congress, conference, or plenum with the presentation of an official report on the matters under consideration. At this period, the report would have embodied the views of the already dominant Stalinist faction, but one or another oppositional faction might still be able to present an alternative report or "counter-report." [SS]

12. Nikolai Alekseyevich Voznesensky. See Biographies.

13. Amayak Zakharovich Kobulov. See Biographies.

14. Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov. See Biographies.

15. Maksim Faddeyevich Rylsky (1895–1964) was a leading Ukrainian writer and poet. See Biographies. [GS]

16. Stanislav Frantsevich Redens. See Biographies.

17. For more on Pavel Mikhailovich Rusishvili, the shashlik cook-general, see the chapter "Beria and Others," earlier in this volume, and note 3 to that chapter. [GS/SS]

18. On the false rumor that Malenkov had been sent to Central Asia, see note 15 to the chapter "In Moscow Again."

19. Lvov is the principal city of western Ukraine. [SS]

**AFTER STALIN'S DEATH**

As I recall those days today, on June 1, 1971, I am obliged to state honestly that what we inherited after Stalin's death was painful and difficult. Our country was in disarray. Its leadership, which had taken shape under Stalin, was not a good one, if I may put it that way. An ill-assorted group of people had been lumped together. There was Molotov, who was incapable of any innovation, and Beria, who was dangerous for everyone. There was Malenkov, who was a real tumbleweed, a rolling stone, an unreliable element, and there was Kaganovich, a man who had always blindly carried out Stalin's will. Ten million people were in prison camps. The prisons were overflowing. There was even a special prison for party activists, which Malenkov had established as a result of a special order from Stalin. In the international situation there was no light at the end of the tunnel; the Cold War was in full swing. The burden on the Soviet people from the priority given to war production was unbelievable.<sup>1</sup>

During Stalin's funeral and afterward, Beria was very attentive toward me, making a great display of his respect. I was surprised at this. He certainly didn't break off his friendly relations with Malenkov in some demonstrative way, but he suddenly began to establish friendly relations with me as well. If the two of them were getting ready to take a walk around the Kremlin, they would invite me, too. In short they began making a public display of how close I was to them. Of course I didn't object, although my negative opinion of Beria hadn't changed; on the contrary, it had grown even stronger.

An agreement had been made that the agenda for Presidium meetings would be drawn up by two people—Malenkov and Khrushchev. Malenkov chaired the meetings, and I merely took part in drawing up the agenda. As for Beria, he kept accumulating more and more power, and his arrogance grew swiftly. All the cleverness of mind that this provocateur was capable of was put into action. The first clash between Beria and Malenkov, on the one hand, and other members of the Presidium, on the other hand, took place around this time. The composition of the Presidium had been changed. We had restored the former small number of members, and we eliminated the Bureau that Stalin had established at the first plenum after the Nineteenth Party Congress.<sup>2</sup>

Beria and Malenkov presented a proposal to cancel the decision made under Stalin to build socialism in the German Democratic Republic [East Germany]. They read the contents of the appropriate document, but didn't put it in our hands, although Beria had the written text. He read it aloud in

his name and Malenkov's. Molotov was the first to take the floor. He spoke emphatically against this proposal and presented his arguments well. I was happy that Molotov was speaking out so boldly and that his position was so solidly based. He said that we could not make this kind of move, that it would be surrendering our positions, that to abandon the building of socialism in East Germany would be to disorient the party forces in East Germany and not only there; it would be to lose our long-term perspective, and it would be a capitulation to the Americans. I was in complete agreement with Molotov and immediately asked for the floor and spoke in support of Molotov. After me Bulganin spoke—he had been sitting next to me—and then the other members of the Presidium spoke. Both Pervukhin and Saburov, as well as Kaganovich, expressed themselves in opposition to the proposal by Beria and Malenkov in regard to East Germany. At that point Beria and Malenkov withdrew their document. We didn't even vote on it, and the results of the discussion were not recorded in the minutes. It was as though this question had never been raised. This was a clever subterfuge.

After the meeting we went our separate ways, but I still felt bitter at heart. How could they come up with a proposal like this on such an important question? I considered it an anti-Communist position. We understood of course that Beria was just using Malenkov and that Malenkov was going along with him in this matter like some foolish young calf. When the meeting ended, three of us left the room together—Malenkov, Beria, and I. But we didn't say anything. That same day I saw Molotov again, and he said to me: "I'm very pleased that you took the position you did. I must confess I didn't expect it, because I always see the three of you together and I thought you would take the same position as Malenkov and Beria. I thought that Khrushchev had already probably taken a position in advance on this question. The sharp and firm position that you took pleased me very much." There and then he suggested that we address each other by the familiar form of you [*ty* rather than *vy*]. I in turn said that I was pleased that Vyacheslav Mikhailovich [Molotov] had taken the correct position.

A little while later Bulganin called me: "Haven't they called you yet?"

I understood everything immediately without any further explanation: "No, they haven't called me. And they aren't going to call me."

"But they've already called me."

"And what was your reply?"

"They said that I should think it over again whether I want to take the post of minister of defense."

"Who exactly was it that called you?"



“First one of them, and then the other. They both called.”

“No, they haven't called me, because they know their phone calls would just be harmful to them.”

After that Beria's attitude toward me did not seem to change outwardly. But I understood that this was just a subterfuge. The “Asiatic way.” By that term we mean that a person is thinking one thing and saying something completely different. I understood that Beria was pursuing a two-faced policy, toying with me, trying to calm me down, but really he was just waiting for the moment when he could deal with me first of all when the right time came.

At one Presidium meeting he made the following proposal: “Whereas many prisoners and exiles are coming to the end of their terms and would normally be returning to their former places of residence, I propose that we adopt a resolution stating that none of them have the right to return without permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but must continue to live in places specified by the Ministry.” This made me angry and I spoke against it, saying: “I am categorically opposed. This is arbitrariness. Too many arbitrary methods have already been allowed. It was State Security that arrested these people; the investigation was also carried out by State Security, and State Security passed the sentences. The three-member boards, the so-called troikas<sup>3</sup> that were established by State Security, did whatever they wanted. There was no independent investigator or procurator or court. There was none of that. People were simply dragged off and killed. Now people who have completed their terms of imprisonment, also after being sentenced by troikas, are once again being deprived of everything. They remain criminals, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs proposes to tell them where they can live. This is impermissible.” All the others supported me. Once again Beria shrewdly withdrew his proposal. Malenkov signed the minutes and the question was not recorded in them.

Here Beria had signaled his intentions in a more substantial way [than before]. Later he made what seemed to be a liberal proposal: to change some previously adopted resolution (he named the date it was adopted and the number of the resolution), which provided for people to be arrested and sentenced by troikas to twenty-year terms in prison or exile. Beria proposed that the term should be reduced to ten years. This seemed to be a merciful proposal. But I understood Beria correctly and I said: “I'm categorically opposed to this, because the entire system of arrests, trials, and investigation needs to be reviewed. It's arbitrary. And the question of whether people should be sentenced to twenty-year or ten-year terms doesn't have any particular significance, because you can sentence someone to ten years and then add



another ten years and still another ten years. This kind of thing has already been going on. We have received documents stating that such methods have been used. That's why I'm categorically opposed." And Beria again withdrew his proposal.

Now I had spoken out energetically against Beria on two questions. On the first question I had supported Molotov; on the second question all the others supported me. Thus I had no doubts any longer that Beria understood me correctly and was already working out the "measures" he would take against me, because there was no way he could accept someone standing in his way. Those were the conditions of work that had arisen. What did this beastly Beria come up with next? We were going for a walk one day, and he began to expound the following idea: "We all walk this earth at God's mercy, as they used to say in the old days; we're getting older, and anything can happen to any of us, but our families will be left behind. We need to think both about our old age and about our families. I propose that dachas be built that will be turned over by the government as the property of those for whom they were built." For me this kind of non-Communist way of thinking was no surprise. It was entirely in character for Beria. Moreover I was convinced that he was saying all this with the aim of carrying out a provocation. But he went on: "I propose that dachas be built not outside Moscow but in Sukhumi.<sup>4</sup> What a fine city that is!" And he went on about the glories of Sukhumi. "I propose that they be built not on the outskirts but in Sukhumi itself. Why go outside the city? We need to clear away a large area in the center of the city, plant an orchard there, and grow peaches." He began praising the kind of peaches that grow there, as well as the vineyards. Then he expanded further on his idea.

He had thought it all out, how many servants there would be, and what kind of staff. Everything was to be on a grand scale, truly baronial. "The Ministry of Internal Affairs will make an architectural plan for the proposed construction. I think the first dacha should be built for Yegor (that is Malenkov) and then for you [Khrushchev], Molotov, Voroshilov, and then for the others." I listened to him in silence. I was not going to contradict him for the time being. Later I said: "I need to think about it." The conversation ended, and we went to our dachas together with Malenkov. The three of us were riding in one car. We reached the turn off the Rublyovskoye Road,<sup>5</sup> at which point Malenkov and I were to continue on together. We took a left turn there, and Beria went off to the right. I got in the same car with Malenkov. I said to him: "What's your view of this? To me this is the purest provocation." "Why do you take that attitude toward what he was saying?" "I see through

him. He's a provocateur. Do you really think this kind of thing can be done? But let's not say anything against him. Let him occupy himself with this and let him think that no one understands his real intentions."

Beria began developing his idea further. He ordered architectural plans drawn up. When they were completed, he invited us, showed us the plans, and proposed that construction begin. There was a certain well-known architect who reported to us on such questions. This comrade is today in charge of construction for atomic-energy installations. I knew him even before the war and from certain events that occurred during the war. Beria considered him one of his close associates, because he worked for Beria and carried out whatever orders he gave. After our meeting I said to Malenkov: "Don't you get it? Beria already has a dacha. He's telling us that he will also build one for himself there, but he's not going to build one for himself. He's going to build one for you, and that will be done to discredit you." "No, no, what are you saying!" But for me the essential fact was that Beria was proposing that these private dachas be built right in the heart of Sukhumi. The architectural plans already indicated the location where Malenkov's dacha would be erected. The plans provided for the removal and relocation of a large number of people who were living there. The minister who reported to us on this question said that quite a large number of people would have to be relocated and that this construction project would be a real disaster for these people. This was no joking matter. They had their property there, and many generations had lived there, and suddenly they would be relocated.

Beria explained that the place had been chosen so that Malenkov could see the Black Sea from his dacha and beyond that he could see Turkey. He even made a joke: "The Turkish coastline will be on the horizon.<sup>6</sup> It will be very lovely." When everyone had gone and Malenkov and I alone remained, I said to him: "Don't you really understand what Beria wants? What he wants to do is like carrying out a pogrom, throwing people out, destroying their hearths and homes, so that a palace can be built for you. All that will be surrounded by a wall. And the mutterings of discontent will begin in the city. Everyone will be curious; who's this being built for? And when everything is completed and you arrive, people will see who's sitting in the car: the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. All this destruction, all this removal and relocation of people, was done for you. The indignation won't be limited to Sukhumi. It will spread to other places. And that's what Beria needs. You yourself will ask that your resignation be accepted." Malenkov began to think about it.

Beria also talked with Molotov about a dacha for him. I didn't expect this of Molotov, but he immediately agreed. Only he suggested that they build

him a dacha not in the Caucasus but outside Moscow. I was amazed. I had thought that Molotov would flare up and object. I don't know how this came about. But since no one spoke against it, the machinery was set in motion. All the architectural plans had been drawn up and Beria had looked them over. After work we would go to see Beria and he would show us his plans. He showed me the plan for my dacha:

"Listen," he said in his Georgian accent. "What a nice house! See how nice it is?"

I said: "Yes, I'm very pleased."

"Take the blueprint home with you." I took the architectural plans home, and I must confess I didn't know where to put them.

My wife, Nina Petrovna, said to me: "What's that you've got?" I confessed to her. She was indignant. "That's barbaric!"

I couldn't explain it to her, and I just said: "Let's put it away and we'll talk about it later."

And so things unfolded. Beria tried to force the pace of construction, but nothing essential had been accomplished when he was arrested. When we arrested him, we immediately canceled these plans. But the blueprint for the dacha was still lying around somewhere in my home.

Earlier, Beria had begun to engage in frenzied activity, intervening in the affairs of party organizations. He fabricated a document about the state of affairs in the Ukrainian leadership. He decided to strike the first blow at the Ukrainian party organization, having thought up a number of such measures. I assume that he worked out this plan with the aim of involving me in the case and discrediting me. He got together the materials he needed through the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russian initials, MVD), and he began to draw the MVD chiefs of the Ukrainian provinces into the preparation of the case. The local head of the MVD in Lvov was Strokach.<sup>7</sup> Today he's already gone. He was an honest Communist and a good military man. Before the war he was a colonel and commanded border troops. During the war he was chief of staff of the Ukrainian partisans and reported to me regularly on the state of affairs in territory under enemy occupation. I saw that he was an honest and decent man. After the war he was appointed to be the authorized representative of the MVD for Lvov province, where Bandera's supporters were active.<sup>8</sup>

Later we found out that when the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs got in touch with him and demanded that he turn over whatever might be compromising against party officials, Strokach said that was not his job; they could address themselves to the secretary of the party's province committee.

Then Beria himself called up Strokach and said that if he was going to start “wising off,” they would make “prison camp dust” out of him. But in 1953 we didn’t know at first, although we sensed it, that an offensive was under way against the party and that it was being subordinated to the MVD. We discussed Beria’s memorandum about the leading cadres in Ukraine at the CPSU Central Committee. As a result a decision was made to relieve Melnikov of his duties as secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party and to elect Kirichenko.<sup>9</sup> Beria’s idea was that local cadres of the national minorities were not being allowed into the leadership, that they were not being promoted, and he proposed that Korneichuk be added to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. And that was done at the plenum. After Beria’s arrest, the comrades told me how that plenum had actually been conducted. Korneichuk had not understood correctly why his candidacy was being proposed,<sup>10</sup> and he began saying all sorts of things in favor of Beria. It didn’t occur to him why Beria was really doing this.

Beria’s next memorandum dealt with the Baltic republics and then Belorussia. But it was all moving in the same direction. His proposals could by no means be considered incorrect in every respect. We made the decision that a local person should hold the post of first secretary of the Central Committee in each of the union republics instead of some Russian sent from Moscow. In general Beria was pursuing an anti-Russian trend. He was promoting the idea that Russian domination held sway in the local areas and that we should put a stop to that. That’s how everyone understood things, and they began thundering not only against Russians but also against national cadres who wouldn’t fight against Russian “domination.” This happened in many party organizations in the national republics.

I said more than once to Malenkov: “Don’t you see what all this is leading to? We’re heading for disaster. Beria is getting his knives ready for us.”

Malenkov said to me: “Well, what can we do? I see, but what steps can we take?”

I told him: “We have to resist, but the form it would take would be as follows: you can see that the questions he raises often go in an antiparty direction. We should not accept them; we should oppose them.”

He said: “You want me to be left out there on my own? I’m not going to do that.”

I said: “Why do you think you’d be left on your own if you began to oppose him? You and I make two. Bulganin, I’m sure, is thinking along the same lines, because I’ve exchanged opinions with him more than once. The others will also follow us if we present our arguments well and object on

party grounds to Beria's proposals. You yourself aren't giving anyone a chance to say anything. As soon as Beria makes a proposal, you immediately are in a big hurry to support him, saying, 'That's right, this is a correct proposal; I'm in favor, who's opposed?' and immediately you vote. But you should give the others a chance to express their views; hold back a little, don't jump and rush, and you'll see that it's not just one person who thinks differently. I'm convinced that there are many who disagree with Beria on a number of questions."

I also made this suggestion: "You and I draw up the agenda. Let's pose some sharp questions, pointing out instances in which Beria has made incorrect proposals from our point of view, and let's start to oppose him. I'm convinced that by doing that we'll mobilize other members of the Presidium, and Beria's resolutions will not be adopted."

Malenkov finally agreed. To tell the truth, I was surprised and overjoyed. We drew up the next agenda for a Presidium meeting. I don't remember now what questions were on the agenda. Too many years have gone by. At the meeting we presented our solidly based objections on every question. Others supported us as well, and Beria's ideas were not adopted. This happened at several meetings in a row. Only after that did Malenkov find hope that it was after all possible to fight against Beria by strictly party methods, to assert our own influence on how questions were decided, and to reject Beria's proposals, which, from our point of view, were not useful for the party and the country.

We saw that Beria was trying to force the pace of events. He already felt himself to be above the other members of the Presidium, strutted about self-importantly, and even made an outward display of his primacy over the others. We were living through a very dangerous time. In my view it was necessary to act quickly, and I told Malenkov that we needed to talk with the other members of the Presidium about this. Obviously this wouldn't work if it was done at a Presidium meeting. We needed to talk one on one with each member and find out his opinion on the basic question of his attitude toward Beria. I had spoken with Bulganin earlier on this question and I knew his opinion. He took the correct position and understood correctly the danger that Beria represented for the party and for all of us. Malenkov also agreed: "Yes, it's time to act." We agreed that first of all I should talk with Voroshilov and go to see him. There was some sort of commission that both Voroshilov and I belonged to. I decided to make use of that circumstance. I called Kliment Yefremovich [Voroshilov] and said I wanted to meet with him to talk over a certain question. Voroshilov replied that he would immediately come to see me at the Central Committee offices. I said: "No, I'm

asking to come visit you. I will come to your place.” But he insisted that he would come. Finally I got my way. Malenkov and I agreed that after I had spoken with Voroshilov (this was before dinnertime) I would come home and then go over to Malenkov’s and we would have dinner together. Malenkov and I were both living in the same building at that time, at Number Three Granovsky Street,<sup>11</sup> and we used the same entrance to that part of the apartment building, only I was on the fifth floor and he was one floor lower.

I went to Voroshilov’s office at the Supreme Soviet, but things didn’t work out for me the way I had hoped. As soon as I opened the door and crossed the threshold of his office, he began very loudly to praise Beria: “What a remarkable man we have among us, Comrade Khrushchev. Lavrenty Pavlovich [Beria]! What an exceptional person!”

I said to him: “Maybe you’re overstating things. Maybe you’re exaggerating his qualities?”

But I couldn’t talk with him about Beria as I had planned to. My evaluation of Beria was quite the opposite of what he was saying, and if I expressed my opinion, it would put Voroshilov in an awkward position. He might not agree with me simply out of pride, since the minute I had walked in he had started praising Beria, and it would look awkward if he suddenly came over to my position, which in essence boiled down to the necessity of removing Beria. But I exchanged a few words with him on the question that we had officially agreed to discuss over the phone. It was some trifling matter, and then I immediately returned to have dinner with Malenkov, as we had agreed.

I told Malenkov that things had not worked out, that I had not been able to talk with Voroshilov as I had intended. I assumed that Voroshilov might be talking that way because he thought his conversations were being monitored and he said what he said only “for the ears of Beria.” On the other hand he also considered me a person who was close to Beria because he often saw the three of us walking together—Beria, Malenkov, and me. This also meant he was saying things just for Beria’s sake, which was an indication of the bad situation we were in, one that forced people to behave in this way and to take sin upon their souls, to say things against their own consciences.

Malenkov and I came to an agreement that I would next talk with Molotov. Molotov was then head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He had phoned me several times and said he wanted to meet with me at the Central Committee offices to talk about some questions concerning cadres at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I took advantage of one of these phone calls and said: “Do you want to meet with me? I’m willing. If you can, come to my place, and we’ll have a talk about cadres.” When he arrived, I said to him: “Let’s talk

about cadres, but not those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” And then I began outlining my view of Beria’s role. I told him what a terrible danger was now threatening the party if we didn’t stop the process that had already begun, a process aimed at undermining the party’s leading role. Molotov evidently had thought quite a bit on the same subject. I cannot assume otherwise, because he too knew everything that was going on and had seen such things under Stalin. Back when Molotov still enjoyed Stalin’s confidence, I personally heard him express harsh opinions against Beria, not in Stalin’s presence, but after he had left Stalin’s place, and he mentioned Beria’s provocative methods. If Beria made some proposal and Stalin spoke against it, then Beria would immediately address some other person among those who were sitting there and say: “Well now, why did you propose that? It just won’t do!” He did that to Molotov more than once, and Molotov reacted against it very sharply.

So then, as soon as I started to talk with Molotov he agreed with me completely: “Yes, you’re right. But I would like to ask what position does Malenkov take on this?”

“I’m talking with you now on behalf of both Malenkov and Bulganin. Malenkov, Bulganin, and I have already exchanged opinions on this question.”

He said: “You are right to raise this question. I completely agree and I support you. But what are you going to do next, and where will this lead?”

I said: “First of all we’ve got to relieve Beria of his duties as a member of the Central Committee Presidium, as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and as minister of internal affairs.”

But Molotov said that wouldn’t be enough: “Beria is very dangerous, and I think we need to take more extreme measures.”

I said: “Perhaps we should detain him for investigation?” I used the word “detain” because we had no direct criminal charges to make against him. I might have the opinion that he had been an agent of the Musavat,<sup>12</sup> as Kaminsky had said, but such charges had not been checked into, and I had not heard of any investigation of that matter ever taking place. Whether it was true or not, I tended to believe Kaminsky, because he was a decent man totally devoted to the party. But in regard to Beria’s provocative behavior, everything we had against him was based on intuition, and you can’t arrest a person just on the basis of intuition. Therefore I said that he should be “detained” for investigation. That kind of thing could be done.

Thus we came to an agreement with Molotov, and then I related everything to Malenkov and Bulganin. We also agreed that we should force the pace of events, because someone might overhear us or someone might incautiously



or unintentionally let something slip, and word of what we were up to might reach Beria. Then Beria would simply have us all arrested. We agreed that I should talk to Saburov,<sup>13</sup> who was also a member of the Presidium. Saburov replied to me very quickly: "I agree completely." He also asked: "What about Malenkov?" Everyone I talked to asked that question. Kaganovich was not in Moscow at that time. He was out seeing to deliveries of timber to the state, checking up on how that work was going. When Kaganovich returned I asked him to come see me at the Central Committee. He came in the evening, and we sat together for a long time. He told me in detail about Siberia and the deliveries of timber. I didn't stop him, although my mind was occupied with totally different matters. I was courteous and tactful toward him, and I waited until he had exhausted his subject.

When I saw that he had come to the end, I said: "Everything that you have told about is very interesting. Now I want to tell you what's been happening with us while you were away."

Kaganovich immediately pricked up his ears: "Well, who's in favor?" He asked this question in order to find out what the balance of forces was.

I said that Malenkov, Bulganin, Molotov, and Saburov were in agreement, so that strictly speaking we already had a majority without Kaganovich.

Then Kaganovich stated: "I too am in favor, of course I'm in favor. I was just asking."

But I understood him correctly, and he understood me.

Then he asked: "What about Voroshilov?"

I told him the awkward situation that had arisen between me and Voroshilov.

He said: "So he told you that?"

I said: "Yes, he began praising Beria."

Kaganovich cursed Voroshilov, but not maliciously: "The old fogey, he lied to you. He himself has told me that it's simply impossible to live with Beria any longer, that he's very dangerous, that he's capable of anything, and that he could destroy us all."

I said: "Then we need to have a talk with him again. Maybe Malenkov should talk with him. I'd rather not resume the conversation with him because I don't want to put him in an embarrassing position." And we agreed to that.

Kaganovich asked: "What about Mikoyan?"

I said: "I haven't yet spoken with Mikoyan on this subject. It's a complicated matter." We all knew that there were the best of relations between these two men from the Caucasus, Mikoyan and Beria. They always took the position of one for all and all for one. I said that it seemed better to talk with



Mikoyan later. I informed Malenkov of this latest conversation, and he also agreed that in the given situation it would be better if he spoke with Voroshilov. Now there remained only Pervukhin.<sup>14</sup>

Malenkov said: "I'd like to have a talk with Pervukhin myself."

I said: "Keep in mind that Pervukhin is a complex person. I know him."

He said: "I know him, too."

So I said: "Well then, please go ahead!"

He invited Pervukhin to come see him, and then he called me: "I asked Pervukhin over, I told him everything, and Pervukhin's answer was that he would think about it. That's very dangerous. I'm letting you know, so you can call him up as quickly as possible. Who knows how this may end?"

I called Pervukhin. He came to see me and I told him everything quite openly.

Mikhail Georgyevich [Pervukhin] replied: "If Malenkov had told me everything as you have, no questions would have arisen in my mind. I completely agree and see no other way out." I don't know what Malenkov actually said to him, but that is how things came out.

Thus we had talked things over with all members of the Presidium except for Voroshilov and Mikoyan. Malenkov and I decided we should begin to take action on the day when the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had its session. I always attended the session of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. It was recorded in the minutes that I was supposed to attend and take part in these sessions. Voroshilov did not attend these sessions. Therefore we decided we would invite Voroshilov to a session of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. When everyone had gathered, we would announce that instead of a session of the Council of Ministers we would be holding a session of the Presidium of the Central Committee. It was also arranged that just before the session I would have a talk with Mikoyan, and Malenkov would have a talk with Voroshilov.

On the morning of that day I was at my dacha. I called Mikoyan from there and invited him to stop in at my place, so that we could go to the Presidium meeting together. Mikoyan came and I began my conversation with him. It was quite a lengthy conversation. As I recall we talked for about two hours; we went over everything in detail, and then several times we returned to what we had already talked about. Mikoyan's position was as follows: "Beria certainly has negative qualities, but he is not hopeless; he might be able to work as a member of the collective." This was quite a unique position, one that none of the rest of us held. It was time to put an end to the conversation. Only a little time was left to go to the Presidium meeting. We got into the

same car and went to the Kremlin. We arrived. Before the beginning of the session, Mikoyan went to his own office and I hurried over to see Malenkov. I filled him in on my conversation with Mikoyan and expressed doubts and concern in regard to his reply.

By then Malenkov had already spoken with Voroshilov.

I asked: "Well, how did it go? Did he praise Beria like he did before?"

He said: "The minute I gave the slightest indication of our intentions, Klim embraced me, kissed me, and began to cry." Whether that really was so, I don't know. But I don't think Malenkov had any reason to make things up.

The question that came next was: Who exactly would detain Beria? Our guards were personally subordinate to him. During the Presidium session the guards would be sitting in the next room. As soon as we brought up this question, Beria could order his guards to arrest us. Then we agreed to call in some generals. We agreed that I would take it on myself to invite these generals. And that is what I did. I invited Moskalenko and others, about five people all together. Malenkov and Bulganin, on the eve of the session, expanded this number and also invited Zhukov.<sup>15</sup> As a result about ten people, various marshals and generals, were assembled. Bulganin was supposed to travel with them so that they would come into the Kremlin with their weapons. At that time military personnel had to surrender their weapons to the Kremlin commandant's office when they entered the Kremlin. We arranged that they would wait until they were summoned, and when Malenkov let them know, they would come into the office where the Presidium session was under way and arrest Beria.

The meeting began. As the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Voroshilov naturally did not ordinarily attend sessions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Therefore his presence needed explanation. Malenkov opened the session and immediately raised the question: "Let us discuss party matters. There are issues that need to be discussed immediately by all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee." Everyone agreed. As we had arranged in advance, I asked for the floor. I asked Malenkov, who was chairing, to give me the floor, and I proposed that the question of Beria should be discussed. Beria was sitting on my right. He shuddered, grabbed me by the arm, stared at me, and said: "What are you doing, Nikita? What are you up to?"

I told him: "You just listen. That's just what I'm about to tell."

This is what I told about: "At a prewar plenum of the Central Committee when the state of affairs in the party was being discussed and everyone was being criticized, Kaminsky, head of the People's Commissariat of Health of

the USSR, asked for the floor. He went to the speaker's stand and made a statement approximately as follows: 'At this plenum Comrade Stalin has called on us to tell the full truth about one another and to criticize one another. I would like to say that when I worked in Baku there were persistent rumors among the Communists that Beria was working for Musavat counter-intelligence. I want to tell about this so it will be known within our party and will be checked into.' The meeting was then closed, and no one said anything further on that question. Beria himself did not make any statement, although he was present. A break was announced and everyone went to lunch. After lunch the plenum continued, but Kaminsky did not return to the meeting. And no one knew why. That kind of thing happened regularly back then. Many members of the Central Committee in attendance at one session would not come to the next one. They had been snatched up as so-called enemies of the people and arrested. The same fate befell Kaminsky.

"I knew Kaminsky when I began to work as a secretary of the party's Bauman district committee and later of its Krasnaya Presnya district committee,<sup>16</sup> and I became especially close with him when I was elected secretary of the Moscow city committee in early 1932. Kaminsky was a friend of Misha Katselenbogen (Mikhailov).<sup>17</sup> He was a very good man and a forward-looking person. I had great respect for him and became a close friend of his, too. Naturally through him I became friends with Kaminsky. That's why I am convinced Grisha [Kaminsky] was a decent man. He was a particularly pure and moral man. Nevertheless, no one at the plenum gave any explanation about his fate; he disappeared into thin air. It was not only Kaminsky who disappeared that way. People disappeared by the dozens, the hundreds, the thousands. Later it was declared that they were enemies of the people, but they didn't say that about everyone. Nothing at all was said about some. For a long time the thought has remained in my mind: Why didn't anyone give any explanations when Kaminsky made that statement? Was he right or not in what he said? It remained unknown whether it was so or not."

Then I told about recent steps taken by Beria after Stalin's death in regard to a number of party organizations—the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and others. Beria had submitted memorandums (and they are in the archives) in which he had raised the question of internal relations in the leaderships of the national republics, especially in the leaderships of the state security organizations, and proposed that national cadres be promoted. That was correct. The party had always adhered to that line. But he had raised this question from the angle of a sharply anti-Russian tendency in nurturing, promoting, and selecting cadres. He wanted to solidify the ranks of the national minorities and unite

them against the Russians. All enemies of the Communist Party had always hoped to encourage conflict among the Soviet nationalities, and Beria was starting from the same point.

Then I told about his recent proposal to abandon the building of socialism in East Germany and about his proposal concerning people who had been sentenced and were serving their terms. He had proposed that they not be allowed to return to their former places of residence but that the Ministry of Internal Affairs be given the right to determine where they would live; that is, that right would go to Beria himself. This would legalize arbitrary rule! I also told about his proposal, which, instead of radically correcting the impermissible practice according to which people had been arrested and tried under Stalin, to simply reduce the maximum sentence given to such people by the MVD from twenty years to ten. At first glance this seemed to be a liberal proposal, but in fact it was legalizing the existing practice. Whether people were condemned to twenty years or ten, the situation still had not changed. Ten years would go by, and if necessary, Beria would add another ten years, and then another ten until the undesirable person's life was over. I ended with the following words: "As a result of my observations of Beria's actions, I have formed the impression that in general he is not a Communist but a careerist who wormed his way into the party with selfish motives. He is conducting himself in a provocative and impermissible manner. It is unbelievable that an honest person would behave this way."

After me Bulganin took the floor. He and I had had the same opinion about Beria even while Stalin was still alive. He spoke along the same lines that I had. The others, too, took a principled position, with the sole exception of Mikoyan. Mikoyan spoke last. He made the following declaration (although I don't remember the details of his speech). He repeated what he had said to me when I talked with him before the Presidium meeting. He stated that Beria was capable of taking into account the criticism made of him, that he was not hopeless, and that he could be useful working within the collective. When everyone had expressed his opinion, Malenkov, as the chairman, was supposed to sum up and formulate a resolution. But he lost his head, and after the last speaker the meeting failed to proceed. There was a lengthy silence.

I saw the kind of situation that was shaping up and asked Malenkov to let me have the floor to make a proposal. As we had arranged, I proposed that we present to the next plenum of the Central Committee the question of relieving Beria of all his posts. (This was something the Presidium of the Central Committee could do.) Malenkov continued in a state of confusion and failed to call for a vote on my proposal. Instead he suddenly pressed the

secret button and in that way summoned the military men waiting in the next room. Zhukov was the first to come in, and after him came Moskalenko and the others. Zhukov was then the assistant minister of defense of the USSR. We had a favorable attitude toward Zhukov then, although he was not one of the military men we had named at first to help us deal with Beria.

About ten men or more came into the room, and Malenkov said in a soft voice, addressing Zhukov: "I propose as chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR that you detain Beria." Zhukov commanded Beria to put his hands up. Moskalenko and the others bared their weapons, thinking that Beria might resort to some desperate move. Beria quickly reached for his briefcase, which was lying on the windowsill behind him. I grabbed Beria's arm to prevent him from getting hold of a weapon that might be in his briefcase. Later after checking they found that there was no weapon in the briefcase or in his pockets. The move he made had simply been a reflex action.

Beria was placed under guard and put in a room in the Council of Ministers building next to Malenkov's office, and we decided right then and there to convene a plenum of the party's Central Committee as soon as possible, either on the next day or the day after, where the question of Beria would be taken up. At the same time we decided to relieve the procurator general of the USSR of the post he held, because he did not inspire any confidence in us; we doubted whether he could objectively carry out an investigation. The new procurator general we confirmed was Rudenko,<sup>18</sup> and we assigned him to investigate the case of Beria. So then, we had arrested Beria. But where to put him? We could not trust the Ministry of Internal Affairs to guard him, because that was his department and those were his people. His deputies then were Kruglov and, as I recall, Serov.<sup>19</sup> I didn't know much about Kruglov; I knew Serov better and trusted him. I thought then and I still think now that Serov was an honorable man. If there were some things that could be held against him, as with all security officials, it was because he had been a victim of the overall policy followed by Stalin. Therefore I proposed that Serov be entrusted with guarding Beria. But the other comrades expressed the view that it was necessary to be more cautious than that. None of us trusted Kruglov. And we agreed that it would be best to assign this task to the commander of the anti-aircraft troops of the Moscow Military District, and that was Moskalenko. Moskalenko took Beria, surrounded him with his people, and transferred Beria to the command post of the military district in a bomb shelter.<sup>20</sup> I could see that he was doing what was necessary. With that the meeting ended.

As soon as it ended Bulganin came over to me: "Listen to what the head of my bodyguard has to say."

This man also came over to me. He said: "I heard that you just arrested Beria, and I want to report that Beria raped my stepdaughter, a school girl in the seventh grade. A year ago or a little more her grandmother died, and her mother was in the hospital from a heart attack. The girl was left at home alone. One evening she ran past Beria's house on her way to get some bread. She met an elderly man who looked at her very intently. She got frightened. Then some Chekists called her and took her into Beria's house. Beria sat her down to have supper with him and proposed a toast to Stalin. She refused, but he insisted that they had to drink to Stalin. She had a drink and then fell fast asleep and he raped her."

My reply to this man was as follows: "Everything that you have related will be taken into account by the prosecutor in the course of the investigation."

Later we were given a list with the names of more than a hundred women. Beria's men had brought them to him. And the reception they all got was the same. Whatever females ended up in his house he first treated to dinner and then proposed they drink a toast to Stalin. He put a soporific in the wine, and then he had his way with them. After Beria had been placed in isolation he asked for pen and paper. We consulted together (and some of us had our doubts), but we decided to give him what he asked. Perhaps he was feeling an urge to tell what he knew about the charges against him. He began to write. First he sent a note to Malenkov: "Yegor, such-and-such, after all you know me, after all we're friends, why have you listened to Khrushchev? He's leading you astray." And so on. He also sent me a note in which he wrote that he was an honest man. Thus he sent out several notes. Malenkov was very disturbed when he read these notes. Then he began saying that he and Beria together had proposed the idea of putting an end to the building of socialism in East Germany and he was afraid this whole affair aimed against Beria could be turned against himself as well. But we told him that that was not the question under discussion now. The question of Beria was much more profound than the question of Germany.

When Rudenko began the interrogation of Beria, a monstrous person was revealed before our eyes, a dreadful beast for whom nothing was sacred. His moral profile was not only not that of a Communist but not even that of a human being in general. And what could you say about his crimes? How many honest people he had destroyed!<sup>21</sup>

A little while after the arrest of Beria, the question of Merkulov<sup>22</sup> came up. He was the head of the Ministry of State Control of the USSR. I must admit that I had previously had an attitude of respect toward Merkulov and considered him a party person. He was a decent man and in general I liked

him. And therefore I said to the comrades: “The fact that Merkulov was an assistant of Beria’s in Georgia is still not evidence that he was an accomplice of Beria’s. Perhaps it’s not so after all. Beria held a very high position and chose the people that would serve under him and not the other way around. People believed in him and worked for him. Therefore all those who worked under him should not necessarily be regarded as accomplices in his crimes. Let’s call Merkulov in to see us and have a talk with him. It may be that he can even help us carry out a better investigation of Beria.”

We agreed that I would summon him to the party’s Central Committee. I called Merkulov in and informed him that we had arrested Beria and that an investigation was under way. I said: “You worked with him for many years. Perhaps you can help the Central Committee.”

He said: “With pleasure! I’ll do everything I can.”

I suggested to him: “Put down in writing everything you consider necessary and appropriate.”

A few days went by, and he wrote a lengthy text, which of course is still in the archives. This memorandum was not helpful to us at all. It contained general impressions and observations, like some exercise in creative writing. Merkulov did some kind of writing, including plays, and was familiar with the art of literary composition. When I sent what he had written to Rudenko, the latter told me bluntly that Merkulov should be arrested, because the investigation of Beria without the arrest of Merkulov would be more difficult and would end up incomplete. The Central Committee decided to arrest Merkulov. To my chagrin it turned out that I was wrong to trust him. Merkulov was linked with Beria in his crimes to such an extent that he was placed on the bench where the accused sat and ended up bearing equal responsibility with Beria. In his final statement when the sentence had already been handed down by the court, Merkulov cursed the day and hour that he had met Beria. He said that it was Beria who had brought him to this day of judgment.

1. The text from this point on was dictated in 1968–69. [SK]

2. The first plenum after the Nineteenth Party Congress took place on October 15, 1952. Officially, the first decisions of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee after Stalin’s death were sanctioned by the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that took place on March 14, 1953. It was at this plenum that the new Secretariat of the party Central Committee was elected. However, the major decisions pertaining to the post-Stalin succession had already been taken at a plenum of the

CPSU Central Committee held on March 5, 1953, when it was clear that Stalin would soon die. [SK]

3. The original meaning of “troika” was a carriage drawn by three horses abreast. [SS] In Russian the term *troika* is also used in general to refer to any “threesome.” [GS]

4. Sukhumi is the capital city of the autonomous region of Abkhazia in Georgia, on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. [SS]

5. The Rublyovskoye Road was a highway, about six miles long, on the western outskirts of Moscow. It is now within the city limits. [SK]



6. The southern coast of the Black Sea, which on a fine day may be visible from Sukhumi, is Turkish territory. [SS]
7. Timofei Amvrosyevich Strokach. See Biographies. Lvov is the main city in western Ukraine. [SS]
8. Stepan Bandera (1908–59) was the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which conducted guerrilla warfare against the Soviet regime in western Ukraine after the war. See Biographies. [SS]
9. Leonid Grigoryevich Melnikov and Aleksei Illarionovich Kirichenko. See Biographies.
10. Aleksandr Korneichuk was no doubt surprised that a mere playwright like himself should be given such a high party position. [SS]
11. Granovsky Street (now renamed Romanov Alley) was between Gertsen Street (now Bolshaya Nikitskaya Street) and Kalinin Street (now Vozdvizhenka Street), behind the old building of Moscow State University. Khrushchev and Malenkov were living in a pre-revolutionary five-story building with large apartments for the wealthy. [SK]
12. On the Musavat, see note 9 to the preceding chapter “Once Again on Beria.” [SS]
13. Maksim Zakharovich Saburov (1900–1977) was chairman of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan). See Biographies.
14. At this time Mikhail Georgyevich Pervukhin (1904–78) was deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. See Biographies.
15. Marshals Kirill Semyonovich Moskalenko and Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. At this time Zhukov was first deputy minister of defense. See Biographies.
16. Both these districts were in Moscow. [SS]
17. M. Ye. Mikhailov (Katselenbogen) (1903–38) was a manual worker. He joined the party in 1919. At the time of his arrest he was first secretary of the Voronezh province party committee.
18. Roman Andreyevich Rudenko. See Biographies.
19. Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov and Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov at this time were colonel generals. See Biographies.
20. The person directly responsible for standing guard over Beria after his arrest was General Pavel Fyodorovich Batitsky. See Biographies.
21. On December 23, 1953, a special session of the USSR Supreme Court sentenced Beria, Stepan Solomonovich Mamulov, Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov, Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov, Sergei Aksentyevich Goglidze, Pavel Yakovlevich Meshik, Lavrenty Fomich Tsanova (Dzhanddzhgava), and Lev Yemelyanovich Vlodzimirsky, all of whom worked formerly in the NKVD—MGB—MVD (successive names for the secret police), to be shot.
22. Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov. See Biographies.

## FROM THE NINETEENTH PARTY CONGRESS TO THE TWENTIETH

At the end of the Nineteenth Party Congress, as I have said, Stalin established a new body, the Presidium, to replace the former Politburo of the Central Committee. From among the members of the Presidium he set up several commissions with broad powers on a number of questions. In practice these commissions turned out to be incapable of functioning, although I think that if they had had appropriate leadership and had been assigned specific tasks and, most important, if they had been granted certain powers, they could have played a positive role. But they couldn't play such a role because they were simply left to themselves; there was no plan for providing them direction, and no questions were drawn up to be placed before them. Things for them to do were thought up as they went along. In short, each



commission was playing its own instrument and would start in when it wanted to. There was no leadership directing the orchestra.<sup>1</sup>

Then Stalin died. I suffered very severely over his death. I can tell you sincerely that I suffered, not because I was especially strongly attached to Stalin, although I was of course attached to him. The simple fact was that he was getting old and death inevitably was walking at his side all the time. I understood that this was a natural thing, that there was no alternative. Everything is born and everything dies. We have to accept that. Stalin was at an age when one must take a measured approach toward the inevitability of death. What concerned me most of all then was the composition of the Presidium that would remain after Stalin's death and the special position Beria held there, one that he wanted to keep secure for himself. His role, as I saw it, promised great complications in our work, and big surprises, I would even say catastrophic consequences. Therefore I mourned the loss of Stalin as the only real force holding us together—even though that force was often used in a very chaotic way, and not always in the right direction. Nevertheless, Stalin's efforts were directed toward strengthening and developing the cause of socialism and strengthening the gains of the October revolution. I had no doubt of that. He allowed barbaric methods to be used, but I didn't yet know the full extent to which his actions were unjustified in relation to those who were arrested and executed for no good reason.

Of course doubts crept into my mind, as they would with anyone: "How could this be? Of those who were arrested or imprisoned, hardly anyone returned, and hardly anyone was cleared of the charges against them. That kind of thing ought not to happen in normal life." Doubts arose as to whether everything had a basis in fact, as it should according to the standards of legality. But Stalin was Stalin. His authority was enormous. And the thought did not occur to me that this man was capable, in principle, of abusing power deliberately. When Stalin died Beria literally began to beam. He was a reborn man. He seemed younger, and, to put it bluntly, he was wisecracking as he stood next to Stalin's corpse—before it had even been laid in the grave. Beria thought that his day had come, that now there would be no power that could restrain him or that he would have to take into account. Now he could do whatever he wanted.

But what about Malenkov? Malenkov never held a position of his own, never played an independent role. He was always running errands for others. In conversations in Stalin's inner circle, Stalin gave a rather vivid description of Malenkov: "He's a clerk. He can get a resolution written quickly. He

doesn't always do it himself, but he organizes his people to do it. He does this quicker and better than others, but he's incapable of any independent thought or independent initiative." In my opinion Malenkov didn't even aspire to independence.

About five years before Stalin's death, Malenkov and I were in Sochi, after being summoned there by Stalin. One day I spoke to Malenkov, sharply calling his attention to the fact that he never took a position of his own and displayed spinelessness toward Beria, while Beria was making a mockery of him. Malenkov said to me then that he knew this, but he didn't see any possibility of correcting matters and getting free of Beria's influence. As he saw it, being linked with Beria was to his personal advantage. And that's really the way things were. He supported Beria, and Beria supported Malenkov. Thus Malenkov was highly praised for his record, although Stalin had a very critical attitude toward his personal abilities as a leader.

What about Bulganin? Bulganin had a restrained attitude toward Beria, and when I spoke with him on this question and expressed my negative attitude toward Beria he agreed with me.

These were the kinds of thoughts I had as I stood next to Stalin's corpse. I have already told about the actions we took after Stalin's death and about Beria's arrest, and I won't repeat that now. After Beria's arrest and the investigation into his case, the secret means were revealed to us by which so many abuses of power had occurred, causing the deaths of so many honest people. A particularly strong impression was made on me by the case of M. S. Kedrov,<sup>2</sup> the father of the academician and philosopher B. M. Kedrov.<sup>3</sup> I didn't know the elder Kedrov personally. He was a major political figure, one of the leaders of Soviet troops in the north during the Civil War. He helped organize our troops there against the foreign interventionist forces.<sup>4</sup> I felt the need to raise the curtain and find out how the investigation had been conducted, what arrests had been made, how many people all together had been arrested, what materials had provided the basis for the arrest, and what the investigations after the arrests had revealed. I brought up these questions at a meeting of the Presidium and suggested they be investigated in detail. These questions were of especially great concern to me because we were already thinking of holding the Twentieth Party Congress.

Of course neither Voroshilov nor Kaganovich nor Malenkov was in any hurry to explore the secret sources of these events. I can't remember specifically what position Mikoyan took. As I recall, Mikoyan didn't pursue an active policy, but he didn't try to hold back the process of exposing injustice.

In short, everyone came to agree, gradually, that it was necessary to carry out an investigation into this whole matter. A commission was established, and Pospelov<sup>5</sup> was appointed to head it.

Even before this I had invited Rudenko,<sup>6</sup> the new procurator general, to come see me. (As procurator he looked into many such cases himself.) I asked him: “Comrade Rudenko, in the show trials of the 1930s, how real were the grounds for the accusations brought against Bukharin, Rykov, Syrtsov, Lominadze, Krestinsky,<sup>7</sup> and many other people who were well known to the Central Committee and to members of the Orgburo and Politburo? To what extent was all that well founded?” Rudenko said that from the point of view of ordinary legal standards there had been no evidence for condemning these people. Everything was based solely on their personal confessions obtained through physical and moral torture. Confessions could not serve as a basis for condemning anyone.<sup>8</sup>

I was then confronted with the question: How could all this have happened? Everyone knew about Stalin’s important role as an individual, his revolutionary qualities, his services to the country, and the other qualities for which he was celebrated in the party. He had full justification for aspiring to a special position, because he really did stand out from those around him, both by his ability to organize and by his intelligence. He stood head and shoulders above the others. And even today, despite my irreconcilable feelings toward his methods of operation and his abuse of power, I will acknowledge this. However, if he were still alive today, for example, and a vote were held on the question of his responsibility for what was done, I would take the position that he should be put on trial. Nevertheless we should grant him his due. He was not just a man who came to us with a sword and won over our hearts and minds by force. No, he showed his superiority in life itself, his ability to lead the country, his ability to subordinate others to himself, to promote people, and other qualities necessary for a leader on the grand scale.

In all matters relating to Stalin’s personality we encounter both good and correct things and savage things that don’t fit into any framework. All aspects of his complex personality should be examined. Here I am talking more about the dark side of his personality simply because he has been praised enough. The main thing is to draw correct conclusions and not allow such actions to be repeated in the future. That is the purpose of my memoirs. Any study of the past ought to serve the present and the future.

There is a certain parallel that suggests itself.<sup>9</sup> People of my age group remember how the praise and glorification of Stalin gradually increased more and more, and everyone knows how that ended up. Stalin was all-wise!

Stalin was a genius! I won't even mention other epithets such as "our dear father" and so on. In all of this we see a great deal of similarity with what is being said and written about Mao today in China. Watch any film from China. I have seen them on television often. To a very large extent Mao has copied all his techniques from Stalin. Shut your eyes and listen to what the Chinese are saying about Mao Zedong.<sup>10</sup> If you substitute Stalin for Mao, you will get an exact idea of what happened in our past. Literally that was how the big, impressive rallies and corresponding "spectacles" were organized among us. At that time I thought it was just a weakness of Stalin's. But evidently it is not just a matter of weakness. Apparently people like Stalin and Mao are very similar to one another in principle on such questions. They consider this kind of thing necessary to maintain their authority at the highest level and not only to subordinate people to themselves but to hold them in fear.

Still, the question remains: "Why did this happen?" I have met many people who ask: "How could Stalin, an intelligent man, do this kind of thing?" I have returned to this question many times, seeking an answer for myself. And there's only one answer I can come up with, and I think it is the correct one. To understand the roots of Stalin's abuses of power, his unjust executions, and his tyranny we need to go back to Lenin's testament. When he dictated his testament, Lenin clearly foresaw where Stalin might lead the party if he remained in the leadership and continued to hold the post of general secretary of the Central Committee. Lenin wrote that it was necessary to remove him from that post, even though Stalin possessed qualities that were required in a leader. But Lenin said he was too rude and capable of abusing power and therefore should not be kept in that post. He proposed that Stalin be replaced by someone else who was more accessible, more attentive, and more patient and tolerant toward other comrades in the party, one who would not abuse his high position.<sup>11</sup> I think this was an accurate description. Life has fully confirmed Lenin's thought. The Central Committee of the party didn't listen to Lenin's words, didn't draw the necessary conclusions, and consequently suffered terrible devastation. But it was not only the Central Committee that suffered; the entire party was punished by Stalin's abuses of power, and activists who were members of the party as well as those who were not were destroyed. An element of mental derangement could be noted in these actions of Stalin's.

Since I already knew the opinion of the procurator general, that there was no substance to the alleged crimes for which people were tried in the show trials of the 1930s, and since I had spoken about that at a meeting of the

Central Committee Presidium, we decided to establish a special commission, and I proposed that we confirm Comrade Pospelov, a secretary of the Central Committee, as the chairman of that commission. I was guided by the thought that he had worked for many years as editor of *Pravda* and was considered a man close to Stalin. If Stalin's attitude had not been favorable toward him, he could not have been editor of *Pravda*. Pospelov was a man who was extremely devoted to Stalin. I would say his devotion to Stalin was even more than slavish. When we reported that Stalin had died, Pospelov was more upset than anyone, and he literally sobbed. Even Beria shouted at him: "What's the matter with you? Stop it!" In short, we had no doubt of his favorable attitude toward Stalin, and we thought that would inspire confidence in the material that his commission would prepare.

The members of the commission carried out an investigation, dug up documents, summoned a great many people, and questioned them (both people who had been arrested and those who had done the investigating and interrogating). They examined the materials on the basis of which people had been sent to prison or internal exile. The commission presented a document in which it stated as a conclusion that it had encountered unbelievable abuses of power. Stalin had done things that none of us could have imagined or supposed.

For many of us the materials of the Pospelov commission were a complete surprise. I'm talking about myself and, to a certain extent, Malenkov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, and others. At the same time I think that Mikoyan was inwardly prepared more than others for the possibility of these kinds of facts being revealed, the kind that were brought to light in Pospelov's memorandum. I cannot assert that he knew everything! Still, he had been closer to Stalin than all of us for a long time, and many people who had worked alongside Mikoyan, people he trusted and respected, had been destroyed. Knowing Anastas Ivanovich [Mikoyan], his penetrating mind, and his capacity for generalizing from the facts, I think that if he didn't know everything, he guessed it and presumed that there was very little basis for the arrests and especially the executions that had been carried out during the time of Stalin's rule.

Why did we establish the Pospelov commission? My reasoning was as follows: We would soon be having a party congress, the first congress since the death of Stalin. At that congress we would have to take upon ourselves the obligations involved in leading the party and the country. In order to do that, we had to know exactly what had gone on before and on what basis Stalin's decisions had been made on one or another question. This was especially a

concern in regard to people who had been arrested. The question came up as to why they had been imprisoned and what should be done with them from then on. There were several million people in the prison camps then. Three years had already gone by since Stalin's death. During those years we had not been able to break with the past, couldn't get up the courage, didn't find it an inner necessity to lift the edge of the curtain and take a peek at what had really gone on behind the scenes. What was hidden in the background behind everything that had gone on under Stalin? What was the meaning of the endless arrests, trials, arbitrary actions, and executions? We ourselves were constrained by our years of activity under Stalin's leadership, and we hadn't yet freed ourselves from the posthumous pressure of his influence, although we also couldn't have imagined that all those executions would turn out to be unjustified, that in legal language they amounted to one massive crime. Yet that's the way things were!

Stalin had committed criminal violations of the law that would have been punished in any country—except for countries not governed by law at all. And so we ended up with an ambiguous situation. Stalin had died and we had buried him, but his innocent victims were still in prison and in internal exile. So then, was everything as it should be? The same old policies were being followed, and everything that had been done under Stalin was being approved. Was that right? Even the unjustified arrests and executions? No one even thought of exonerating the people who had died after being branded “enemies of the people.”

In my opinion those who were best informed about the real extent and causes of repression under Stalin were Molotov, Voroshilov, and Kaganovich. I assume that Stalin exchanged opinions with them on that subject—although Kaganovich probably didn't know all the intricacies. Stalin would hardly have shared openly with him. A bootlicker like Kaganovich would have cut his own father's throat if Stalin had merely blinked and said it was necessary in the interests of some purpose favored by Stalin. Stalin didn't even have to draw Kaganovich along. Kaganovich shouted louder than anyone—when that was called for and even when it wasn't. He turned himself inside out to be of service to Stalin, arresting people right and left and exposing “enemies of the people.” When he became head of the People's Commissariat of Railways,<sup>12</sup> he really went all out, to the fullest extent.

Now we were coming right up to the time when we would hold another party congress. I declined to give the main report. I thought that since we had announced that there would be a collective leadership, it should not be unfailingly necessary for the first secretary of the Central Committee to

give the report. And so at the next regular session of the Central Committee Presidium I proposed that we decide who would. Everyone, including Molotov (and as the oldest among us he had more grounds than anyone to aspire to the role of main reporter)—everyone unanimously expressed the opinion that I should give the report. Evidently the formal consideration that the first secretary of the Central Committee was supposed to give the report played a role in this. Also, if we decided to have someone else give the report, there could turn out to be many aspirants, which would lead to complications. After Stalin's death there was no one person among us who was considered the acknowledged leader. There were aspirants to that position, but there was no one leader recognized by all. Thus I was assigned to give the report.

I prepared the report, and it was discussed at a Central Committee plenum and approved. The report was the fruit of collective effort. Major forces from within the Central Committee itself had been drawn into the work of compiling it, as well as people from research institutes and a number of other bodies, as well as others who were usually involved in drafting Central Committee reports. The congress began [on February 14, 1956].<sup>13</sup> I gave the report. Discussion began. The congress went along smoothly. For us of course this was a new experience, and we wondered how the first congress after Stalin's death would go. But everyone who spoke [that is, every delegate at the congress] approved the line of the Central Committee; no opposition made itself evident, and events proceeded with no foreboding of any storm. But I was feeling troubled the whole time, despite the fact that the congress was going smoothly and my report had been approved by everyone who took the floor.

I didn't feel satisfied. I was tormented by the following thought: "The congress will soon end, and a resolution will be adopted, but all of this is just formalities. What will happen next? There will remain on our conscience hundreds of thousands of innocent people who were shot, including two-thirds of the membership of the Central Committee elected at the Seventeenth Party Congress. Very few people survived. Virtually the entire active party membership was shot or arrested. It was a rare thing that anyone was lucky enough to come through all that and remain alive. What will happen now?"

The memorandum of the Pospelov commission was nagging at my mind. Finally I got up my courage, and during one of the breaks, when only the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee were in the room reserved for the Presidium [of the congress], I brought up the question: "Comrades, what are we going to do about the Pospelov memorandum?"



What about the executions and arrests of the past? Is the congress going to close and all of us go home without saying what we need to say? After all, we already know that the people who were victims of repression were innocent and were not ‘enemies of the people.’ They were honorable people, devoted to the party, to the revolution, and to the Leninist cause of building socialism in the USSR. Many will return from exile. We can’t keep holding them. We have to think about how they should be returned.” At that time we had not yet made the decision to reexamine the cases and return wrongly imprisoned people to their normal lives.

As soon as I finished speaking everyone came down on me at once. Especially Voroshilov, who protested: “What are you saying? How can you talk like that? Do you really think it’s possible to tell this to the congress? How would it affect the authority of our party and our country? It couldn’t be kept secret. And then claims would be made against us. What would we say about our own role?” Kaganovich also objected very strongly from the same point of view. The position they were taking was not based on any profound adherence to party principles; they were looking out for their own skins. A desire to avoid responsibility was being expressed. If a crime had occurred, just sweep it under the rug and cover it up.

I said to them: “That’s impossible, even reasoning from your point of view. It can’t be covered up. People will come out of prison, return to their native places, tell their relatives and friends and acquaintances what actually happened, and it will become known to the entire country and to the entire party that those who remained alive had been innocent victims of repression. People have served terms of as much as fifteen years, some even more, and for absolutely nothing. All the charges were fabrications. It’s impossible to keep quiet about that. Here is something else I would ask you to think about. We are holding the first congress since Stalin’s death. I think that it’s precisely at such a congress that we must honestly and openly tell the full truth about the life and activity of our party and the Central Committee during the period that we are reporting on. We are reporting on the period after the death of Stalin, but as Central Committee members we are also obliged to talk about the Stalin era. After all we were in the leadership of the country together with Stalin. When the party learns the truth from former prisoners, the membership will say to us: ‘Please, how is this possible? The Twentieth Congress was held and nothing was said to us there.’ And we won’t have any reply. To say that we didn’t know anything would be a lie. After all, we know the truth about everything now, about the repression that was carried out on no basis whatsoever and about Stalin’s arbitrary rule in general.”



In reply to this there was again a stormy reaction. Voroshilov and Kaganovich kept endlessly repeating: "We'll be called to account. The party will assume the right to call us to account. We were part of the leadership, and if we didn't know the whole truth, so much the worse for us, but we'll be held responsible for it all."

I said to them: "If you regard our party as one founded on democratic centralism, then we, its leaders, did not have the right not to know. But I and many others found ourselves in positions where there was a lot we didn't know, because a system had been established in which you were only supposed to know what was assigned to you. You weren't told about the rest, and you weren't supposed to stick your nose outside of your own business. And we didn't stick our noses out. Nevertheless, not all of us were in that kind of position. Some of us knew, and some even took part in deciding these matters. Therefore the degree of responsibility here varies. I am personally prepared as a member of the Central Committee since the Seventeenth Party Congress and as a member of the Politburo since the Eighteenth Congress to bear my share of the responsibility, if the party finds it necessary to call to account those who were in the leadership in Stalin's times when arbitrary actions were committed."

Again people disagreed with me. They objected: "Do you understand what will happen?" Voroshilov and Molotov reacted by shouting especially loudly. Voroshilov argued that in general this should not be done. He kept repeating: "Who's asking us to do this?"

Again I said: "Were crimes committed? We ourselves need to say what they were without waiting for someone else to ask us. When they do start asking us, then there will be a trial, and we will be the defendants. I don't want that to happen, and I won't take that kind of responsibility on myself."

But there was no agreement, and I saw that I would be unable to obtain a correct decision from the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. We had not yet raised this question at the presiding committee of the congress; we had not yet agreed to do that within the Presidium of the Central Committee. Then I made the following proposal: "The party congress is under way. During the congress the internal discipline that requires leadership unity among the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee is no longer in effect. Because the congress is the highest body of the party. The main report has been given, and now each member of the Central Committee and of its Presidium has the right to speak at the congress and present his own point of view, even if it is not in keeping with the main report."

I didn't say that I would present information on the Pospelov commission's memorandum. But apparently those who objected understood that I could do that and thus present my own point of view concerning the arrests and executions. I don't remember now which individuals supported me after that. I think they were Bulganin, Pervukhin, and Saburov. I'm not certain, but I think it's possible that Malenkov also supported me. He had been secretary of the Central Committee for cadres and had played a fairly active role in this whole business. He had personally assisted Stalin in promoting cadres and then destroying them. I am not claiming that he displayed any initiative of his own in the repression. Hardly. But in the provinces and territories where Stalin sent Malenkov to "restore order," thousands of people suffered from repression, and many of them were executed. Nevertheless Malenkov was capable of supporting me at this point.

Someone made a display of initiative: "If the question is going to be posed in this way, then obviously it would be better to make an additional report." Everyone grudgingly agreed that it was necessary to do that.

I said to them: "Even in the case of people who have committed crimes, a moment comes in life when they can confess, and that brings them, if not acquittal, at least a reduction in sentence. Even if we look at the question from that point of view, presenting a report about the abuses of power committed by Stalin can only be done now at the Twentieth Congress. At the Twenty-First Congress it will be too late, if in general we manage to live until that time, and if we are not made to answer for these crimes earlier. Therefore the best thing to do is to give a second report now."

Then the question came up: Who should give the report? I proposed that it be Pospelov, and in support of my proposal I argued that he had studied this question as chairman of the commission and had drawn up the memorandum that we ourselves were making use of. Therefore he would not need to prepare. He could simply rework the memorandum into a report and read it to the congress. Others (I don't remember exactly who) began to object and proposed that I should give the report. I didn't feel comfortable with that. After all, in the main report I hadn't said a single word about these matters, and here I would be giving a second report. And so I declined. But they objected: "If it's not you who speaks now, but Pospelov, even though he's one of the secretaries of the Central Committee, the question will come up: 'Why didn't Khrushchev say anything about this in his main report? Why, instead, is Pospelov speaking on this important question in the course of the debate? Khrushchev must have known about Pospelov's memorandum and

could not have failed to realize the importance of the question. Does this mean that there are disagreements in the leadership on this question? And that Pospelov is just presenting his personal view?" This argument persuaded me and I agreed. It was decided that I would present a report on the subject of the Pospelov commission's memorandum. We organized a closed session, and there I gave the second report.

The congress listened to me in silence. As the saying goes, you could have heard a pin drop. It was all so sudden and unexpected. Of course it must be understood that the delegates were thunderstruck by this account of the atrocities that had been committed against worthy people, against Old Bolsheviks and Young Communists. How many honest people had perished, people who had been promoted to work in various sectors! It was a tragedy for the party and for the congress delegates. And that is how the report to the Twentieth Party Congress about Stalin's abuses of power came into being.<sup>14</sup>

In my opinion, the question was presented in absolutely the right way and at the right time. Not only do I not repent of having done this, as some people might suppose, but I'm glad I seized the moment correctly and insisted the report be made. After all, everything could have turned out differently. We were all still in shock, and people were being held in prisons and camps, as before. In 1953, to express it crudely, we had created a version of history concerning Beria, saying that supposedly Beria was responsible for the abuses of power that had been committed under Stalin. That, too, was a result of the state of shock we were in. We were not as yet able to free ourselves from the idea that Stalin was the father of the people, a genius, and so forth. We couldn't immediately admit to ourselves the notion that Stalin had been a murderer and a monster. Thus, after the trial of Beria we found ourselves prisoners of this version that we had created in the interests of clearing Stalin's name. It was not God who was to blame but the lower-ranking "saints" who reported to God. They didn't report accurately, and therefore God sent down hailstorms, thunder and lightning, and other calamities. The people had suffered not because God wanted that to happen but because "Saint Nicholas," "Elijah the Prophet," Beria, and others had been bad.<sup>15</sup> We tried to whitewash Stalin, to clean him up. We acted contrary to the Russian proverb that says: "You can't keep washing a black cat till it turns white." There's no doubt he was a black cat, but still we were trying to wash him white.

There was no logic in this version of events, because Beria had come along after the "meat grinder" had already done its main work. That is, Stalin had done everything using Yagoda and Yezhov as his instruments.

Beria continued the “work” of destroying people, if you can call that work. I have already told about the big internal struggle over presenting the report at the congress. My main opponents were Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov. Voroshilov has since been buried with honors, and the name Voroshilovgrad has been restored to the city of Lugansk.<sup>16</sup>

How many people perished as a result of this man’s work, and how many millions were killed during the war, with People’s Commissar of War Voroshilov being to blame and having complicity in these crimes? The title of “first marshal” has also been restored to him now.<sup>17</sup>

Those kinds of things are happening. In my opinion this is another result of the fact that we have not yet freed ourselves from tremors of fear in the face of Stalin. We haven’t gotten up the courage to call things by their real names. In general crimes cannot be forgiven, and in particular crimes carried out by Stalin and his right-hand men, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov. Forgiveness here would be like giving a blessing. If you forgive some criminals, then you are giving a blessing to other criminals to commit new crimes.

Even today I sometimes meet people who ask the question: “Maybe everything shouldn’t have been told about Stalin?” These are not accomplices in Stalin’s crimes but simple-minded people. They’ve grown used to the habit of praying to Stalin, getting down on their knees before him, and things are hard for them now. It’s usually older people who ask me these questions. They’re accustomed to the way things were in the past, and they find it hard to give up their previous conceptions and the kind of logic that prevailed in the Stalin era. This is also one of the shortcomings in the training of party members. Stalin adapted all methods of training in the party to his own purposes: unquestioning subordination and absolute trust in what he said. Of course during wartime it’s a good thing that people are willing to go to their deaths without questioning, but that can always boomerang, because people who believe in you without thinking, when they find out that their confidence has been misplaced, can become your worst enemies. This is very dangerous. I have always stood for truthfulness, absolute truthfulness toward the party, the Young Communist League, and the people as a whole. And I hold to that position more than ever. This is the only inexhaustible source of strength for the party; only in this way can we win the confidence of the people.

After the long years of hysteria in the hunt for “enemies of the people,” we were not capable of immediately throwing off the burden of the pre-1956 period. For a long time we continued to believe the version of events that Stalin had made up. We believed that in our own country we were surrounded by “enemies of the people” and that we had to fight them to defend the

revolution. As before, we held to the position that the class struggle was bound to intensify as we drew closer to socialism, an idea that Stalin had propounded theoretically and had put into practice. When we finally came to the decision to establish a commission to look into the crimes of the past and when it had presented its materials, these materials were kept secret. Then on the basis of these materials I gave my report at the Twentieth Party Congress. Copies of the report were sent out to party organizations, but measures were taken to make sure that the documents being circulated would not remain in the local areas. It was required that they be returned to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

We gave copies of the report to the fraternal Communist parties as well, for their information. Among others the Polish United Workers Party received them.<sup>18</sup>

The leader of that party in Poland had just died. His name was [Boleslaw] Bierut.<sup>19</sup> After his death some disturbances broke out in Poland, and the above-mentioned document fell into the hands of Poles whose attitude toward the Soviet Union was not friendly. They made use of this document for their own purposes and reproduced it in numerous copies. I was even told that the Poles were selling it cheaply. Khrushchev's report at the closed session of the Twentieth Party Congress was not considered very valuable. It could be bought at the local market, to put it colorfully, by anyone who wanted to, including intelligence agents from around the world. Thus the Polish comrades "helped" us. This document became known to the world. But officially we would not confirm its existence. I remember the journalists asking me at the time what I could say on this question. My answer was that I knew of no such document and that they could ask the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to answer this question. I said: "Ask Mr. Allen Dulles" [then the head of the CIA].

Nowadays I listen to the radio a lot. The radio is my companion when I go for walks. I get a lot of information from it and it gives me pleasure. I love folk music and the songs of the people. I also like some modern popular music. But I admit that a man of my age tends more to enjoy what he was raised on in his youth. The singing of Lyudmila Zykina puts me in an especially good mood. She is my favorite singer.<sup>20</sup> I listen to other broadcasts as well. There are a great many, most of them good, but sometimes you run across trash that's really befouling the airwaves.

One day I heard someone read one of the last chapters of a novel by Sholokhov, *They Fought for Their Country*.<sup>21</sup>

Mikhail Aleksandrovich [Sholokhov] remains true to his creative methods: he presents the history of the period of Stalin's abuses of power and his reprisals against loyal and honest cadres trained by Lenin in the form of a conversation between two fishermen. They are sitting there, talking, and one asks the other: "How are we to understand Comrade Stalin? They say that he failed to see the crimes being done. But how many people were punished, how many executed! How could Stalin have allowed that, not have seen that?"

The other fisherman answers: "Yes, it's hard to understand."

Then the first fisherman asks again: "Isn't Beria really the one to blame here? After all, didn't he report everything to Stalin?"

The answer is: "Yes, the whole thing has to do with Beria."

Mikhail Aleksandrovich [Sholokhov] is an intelligent man and a good writer. But the fact that he is pawning off such a false conception of the tragedy the party and people suffered, when so many people perished at Stalin's hands, of course does not redound to this author's credit. The elementary fact here is that it was not Beria who created Stalin but Stalin who created Beria. Stalin brought Beria into existence the same way he had previously created Yezhov and before that, Yagoda. They all departed from the scene, one after the other. One of these "heroes" created by Stalin would replace the other, and this was also logical from Stalin's point of view. Stalin destroyed honorable people, using others to do the job, and he knew that the records of his victims were clean in the eyes of the people and of the party. These people died only because he was afraid of them and didn't trust them. And so he had to gradually get rid of some of those who killed on his orders and replace them with others. And thus we get three waves of executioners: first Yagoda, then Yezhov, and finally Beria.

With Beria this came to an end. To put it more exactly, it was not because of Beria himself but as a result of the death of Stalin. Beria was brought before the court of the people as a criminal. But we were still held captive by the memory of the dead Stalin, and even when we knew a great many things after the trial of Beria we gave incorrect explanations to the party and the people and tried to dump all the blame on Beria. He seemed to us a convenient figure for that purpose. We did that in order to protect Stalin, although we were protecting a criminal and a murderer because we had not yet freed ourselves from our habit of worshipping Stalin and bowing down before him.

I first sensed the falseness of our position when I went to Yugoslavia and talked with Tito and the other Yugoslav comrades [in May 1955]. When we

touched on this question and referred to Beria, they began to smile and make ironic comments. This made us angry, and we defended Stalin and got into a big argument, which almost became an ugly scene. Later I spoke publicly in defense of Stalin and against the Yugoslav point of view. Today it's clear to everyone that I was wrong. I was in the position of a person who had not yet realized the necessity for exposing Stalin's crimes all the way, so that such methods would never again be repeated by our party. Whoever really wants Leninist norms to be established in our party in place of Stalinist ones should bend every effort to expose Stalin and condemn Stalinist methods. It is necessary to rehabilitate and exonerate all the honest people, many of whom have not yet been exonerated, and to expose the illegalities that were committed, so that even a ghost of such methods cannot rise from the grave.

I am surprised at some prominent military leaders for trying to white-wash Stalin in their memoirs and present him as "the father of the people," to claim that if it were not for him, we would have lost the war and would have ended up under the heel of the fascists. These are foolish arguments and a slavish way of thinking. Now that Stalin is dead, are we, after all, coming under German, British, or American influence? No, never. The people put forward new leaders and will know how to stand up for themselves, as they have always been able to do. No special effort is needed to demonstrate the absurdity of these military men's reasoning.

I remember one of our military leaders speaking at some meeting, saying good things about Stalin and at the same time praising Blyukher<sup>22</sup> as well. And others, while speaking well of Stalin, also extolled Tukhachevsky. Comrades, you have to put two and two together! You can't put the murderer and his victims on the same pedestal. Who was Blyukher? A hero of the Civil War, a man without military education but who had natural talents, a machinist who developed into a major military leader. He was the first to receive the Order of the Red Banner.<sup>23</sup> That alone tells us who and what Blyukher really was. Later, as one of our best Soviet commanders, he was sent to China to be a military adviser to Sun Yatsen.<sup>24</sup> And suddenly he was shot! You can't talk about Stalin and Blyukher in the same breath while keeping quiet about the reasons for Blyukher's death. There's no use closing your eyes, thinking that no one else can see anything. That kind of behavior only results in a loss of confidence.

When I was in Bulgaria on one occasion, I quoted some words from Pushkin in one of my speeches, from Pushkin's play when Mozart and Salieri are talking together. Never suspecting that Salieri was getting ready to poison him, Mozart said that "genius and evildoing are incompatible."

That's right! That's how it was with Stalin. A genius and a murderer cannot be combined in the same person.<sup>25</sup> Thousands of victims should not be placed together with their murderer, leaving unexplained what Stalin really did. You can't put two statues on one pedestal. Stalin was an evildoer! What his motives were is another question. Some argue that he didn't have self-seeking personal motives in doing this, but that he was concerned about the people. What savagery! If you're concerned about the people, do you go killing the best sons of the people? This is a rather thickheaded argument. But then it's always hard to find good arguments to justify murderers.

In my report to the Twentieth Party Congress, nothing was said about the show trials of the 1930s, where representatives of the fraternal Communist parties were present.<sup>26</sup>

Rykov, Bukharin, and other leaders of the people were on trial then. They deserve to be called leaders. Let's take Rykov, for example. After Lenin's death he replaced Lenin as chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars. He performed great services to the party and the people and was a worthy representative of Soviet power. But he was tried and shot. And what about Bukharin, who was one of the favorites of the party? The older generation of members of the AUCP(B) learned the wisdom of Marxism-Leninism from his books. For many years Bukharin worked as editor of *Pravda*. Lenin affectionately called him "our Bukharchik." As for Zinoviev and Kamenev, it's true that they have on their record the mistake they made in October 1917. Everyone knows that, but there's something else that's also well known. Lenin brought Zinoviev and Kamenev into the work of the Politburo, and they were leaders of that body along with others. When the Soviet government moved to Moscow, Zinoviev remained in Petrograd. He was entrusted with the leadership of the cradle of the revolution, the city that had raised the banner of insurrection in October 1917. Moscow was entrusted to Kamenev. He was in fact chairman of the Moscow Soviet. That's how Lenin treated them even after the mistake they made.<sup>27</sup>

Sometimes on the radio I hear in one or another connection that Lenin entrusted such-and-such a task to Lomov.<sup>28</sup> Where is this Lomov? I knew Lomov well. I often met with him when I worked in the Donbas after the Civil War. He was in charge of coal production in the Donbas. I was often at meetings or conferences he attended either in Stalino [Donetsk] or in Kharkov, where the administration offices were located. He was a man highly respected in the party, with experience in the pre-revolutionary underground. And where is Lomov now? He was shot. Lomov is no more. I have already spoken about Kedrov, Tukhachevsky, Yegorov, Blyukher, and others. An entire book



could be compiled with just the names of the prominent military, party, government, Young Communist League, and economic management leaders, diplomats, and scientists. All of them were honorable people. They were victims of Stalin, victims of arbitrary action without any proof of guilt on their part. Without any grounds or justification.

Our ambivalent behavior was also evident on the question of the show trials of the 1930s. Once again we were afraid to speak the full truth, although there was no doubt that these people had been innocent, that they were victims of arbitrary action. Leaders of the fraternal Communist parties had attended those show trials, and later they had testified in their own countries that these sentences were justified. We didn't want to discredit them and the statements they had made, and so we postponed the rehabilitation of Bukharin, Zinoviev, Rykov, and the other comrades to the indefinite future. I think it would have been more correct to speak the full truth. The truth cannot be concealed. Murder will out!<sup>29</sup>

The main achievement of the Twentieth Party Congress was that it began the process of cleansing the party and restoring the kind of normal life for which Lenin and the others, who were the best sons of our country, had fought.

Some people who had been incorrectly sentenced were released as soon as Stalin died. Beria brought up this question at that time, worked up the information, and made the appropriate proposals, and we agreed with him. But it turned out that the people he released were mainly criminals: murderers, robbers, and all sorts of scoundrels and foul people. When they returned to their former places of residence, they resumed their activity of robbing and murdering. It was whispered among the people that thieves and murderers had been released and they were doing their dirty deeds. By that time Beria had already been exposed and condemned. Therefore it was up to us to give explanations to the people. We ourselves saw that what had been done was incorrect, and although it was Beria who made the proposal, it was the government and the Central Committee that had made the decision, so we all bore responsibility for it. How many of those criminal types were released I'm afraid to say, but at any rate it was a huge army of them.

As for the political prisoners and internal exiles, they remained where they were. Beria also raised the question of passing a law that would give the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that is, Beria himself, the right to decide where they could go after being released, as he saw fit. I have already told about how I categorically protested and everyone supported me on that question. And as a result Beria withdrew his proposal. As for the further fate of the

political prisoners, when Procurator General Rudenko reported to me about the absence of any real guilt in these cases, I asked him: “How could that be? I myself heard them confess to crimes of which they had been accused.”

Rudenko smiled: “The artistry of those who conducted the investigation and organized the trial is evident here. They brought these people to such a state that the only way they could put an end to their sufferings and the mockery and insult they were undergoing was to confess, and the next step was death.”

Stalin had made a decision at that time about the use of torture. I remember Kaganovich asking me once: “Try to find the resolution that was passed in regard to torture. It has to be annulled. I remember a scrap of paper with Stalin’s handwriting on it saying that people who were arrested should be subjected to beatings. It said something like: ‘When we ourselves were in prison, they beat us, and we should have no mercy on our enemies. Otherwise they won’t confess.’ And we all signed that scrap of paper.”

Later I hunted for that scrap of paper in the Central Committee Secretariat and among other confidential documents, but we couldn’t find any such document. Apparently Stalin had destroyed it earlier. I reassured Kaganovich that there was no such document. When I had been a member of the Politburo I had never seen a document like that. Apparently it was drafted and adopted when I was not yet a member of the Politburo. Moreover, not all Politburo members participated in the voting on one or another question under Stalin. Also, the Politburo did not meet regularly. All the voting was by phone, with people being polled individually and separately. Stalin himself decided who would vote on what document and who wouldn’t. Therefore, not only did I not vote for that document; I never even saw it and didn’t know about it until after Stalin’s death. I found out about it, as I have said, from Kaganovich.<sup>30</sup>

1. After the Nineteenth Party Congress, Stalin established several commissions of the CPSU Central Committee (CC), headed by newly elected members of the CC Presidium, resulting in a change of leadership over various aspects of life in the USSR. These included commissions on ideology, agriculture, and industry. Heading up the new ideological commission, for example, was the newly elected CC Presidium member, Mikhail Suslov. His deputy was Dmitry Shepilov. See Biographies. [SK]

2. Mikhail Sergeyevich Kedrov. See Biographies.

3. Bonifaty Mikhailovich Kedrov (1903–85) was a philosopher, chemist, and historian. He became

a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1966. See Biographies.

4. The reference is to the British, French, and American forces that occupied Murmansk in March 1918 and later Arkhangelsk. The last of these forces were evacuated in November 1919. Fighting on this northern front did not play a major role in the Civil War as a whole. [SS]

5. Pyotr Nikolayevich Pospelov. See Biographies.

6. Roman Andreyevich Rudenko (1907–81) was the chief prosecutor for the USSR at the Nuremberg trial of the main German war criminals. He became chief prosecutor of the USSR in 1953.

7. Nikolai Nikolayevich Krestinsky. See Biographies.

8. The Moscow show trials of 1936–38 were three highly publicized trials of more than fifty prominent Old Bolsheviks, staged by the secret police (NKVD) under Stalin's direction. (During the same period there were also many closed, unpublicized trials.) Stalin's purpose was finally to eliminate his erstwhile opponents, who had been leaders of the Russian Communist Party in Lenin's time. They publicly confessed to conspiring to overthrow the very Soviet government they had helped to found and lead.

The first of these three big show trials was held in August 1936, and featured sixteen Bolshevik leaders, with Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev as the chief defendants. On August 24, 1936, they were sentenced to be shot.

The second trial was in January 1937, with seventeen defendants, including Georgy Pyatakov and Karl Radek. These defendants, like those of August 1936, were alleged to be followers of the exiled Leon Trotsky.

The third trial, in March 1938, featured Nikolai Bukharin and Aleksei Rykov among the twenty-one defendants. These defendants were linked to the "Right" opposition to Stalin. On March 13, 1938, Rykov and Bukharin were sentenced to be shot.

The outrageous charges and absurd "confessions" stirred public opinion in much of the world. In the United States, for example, the philosopher John Dewey headed an independent commission of inquiry, which found the charges against the defendants unwarranted. (See *Not Guilty* [New York: Harper, 1938].) During his trial, Bukharin created a stir by deviating from the prepared script to declare that the use of confessions by the accused was "a medieval method of jurisprudence." [GS/SS]

9. This paragraph was dictated in 1970. [SK]

10. At the time that Khrushchev dictated this passage, the "Cultural Revolution" (1966–76) was in full swing in China and the cult of Mao's personality was at its height. The Stalin and Mao cults had a great deal in common, although Mao's cult was in some ways even more extreme. [SS]

11. On Lenin's "testament," see note 6 to the chapter "Stalin's Last Years." [SS]

12. Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich (1893–1991) became people's commissar of railroads of the USSR in 1935. See Biographies.

13. The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU took place from February 14 to 25, 1956.

14. In all likelihood, two stormy discussions took place. One occurred before the Central Committee plenum at which the text of the secret report based on Pospelov's memorandum was approved. There the basic question of principle was decided. A second discussion may have occurred before the speech itself, when the members of the Central Committee Presidium were acquainted with the

new expanded text, which had been written during the congress and which painfully affected the interests of some of them, above all of Voroshilov and Kaganovich. [SK]

15. This version resembled the traditional myth of the "good tsar" that was characteristic of popular monarchism in pre-revolutionary Russia. Even such a bloodthirsty ruler as Ivan the Terrible was perceived by the common people as a good and just sovereign surrounded by evil and corrupt courtiers and officials. See Maureen Perrie, *The Image of Ivan the Terrible in Russian Folklore* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). [SS]

16. In 1957, on Khrushchev's initiative, a decision was made no longer to name cities, towns, settlements, enterprises, and collective farms after living people. At that time the original name Lugansk was restored to the city in the Donbas, in Ukraine, where Voroshilov had been born and which had been renamed Voroshilovgrad in 1935. After Voroshilov's death in 1970 the city was again named Voroshilovgrad, as Khrushchev mentions here. After the counterrevolution of 1991 and Ukraine's withdrawal from the USSR, the city was renamed Lugansk once again. [SK]

17. In the late 1930s, after the execution of the Soviet Union's most talented military leaders (Marshals Tukhachevsky, Blyukher, Yegorov, Yakir, and others), Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov moved to the forefront. As early as the Civil War (1918–20) Voroshilov had been a close associate of Stalin's, whereas the executed marshals had been rather critical of Stalin's role in the Civil War. The Soviet propaganda machine carried out a big promotion campaign around Voroshilov, calling him the country's "first marshal"—that is, its best military leader. A popular patriotic song about a future war, for example, contained the line: "And the first marshal / Will lead us into battle" (*I pervy marshal / v boi nas povedyot*). [SK]

18. That was the name of the pro-Soviet ruling party in Poland at the time. It was formed by merging the former Polish Socialist Party with the Communist-controlled Party. [GS]

19. Boleslaw Bierut (1892–1956) had led the Polish United Workers Party since 1948. He died on March 12, 1956. See Biographies. [SS]

20. In the Soviet Union, Lyudmila Zykina (born 1929) was one of the best-known singers of Russian folk songs. See Biographies. [SK]

21. Mikhail Sholokhov (1905–84) is perhaps best known to English readers for his two panoramic novels about the Don Cossacks in war and revolution, *And Quite Flows the Don* and *The Don Flows Home to the Sea*. See Biographies. [GS]

22. Vasily Konstantinovich Blyukher (1890–1938) was a hero of the Civil War and commander of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army from 1929 to 1938. He became a Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1935.

23. The Order of the Red Banner was one of the highest Soviet military awards. [SK]

24. Sun Yatsen (1866–1925) is considered the father of modern China. Following the overthrow of the Qing (Ching) dynasty in 1911–12, he became the first president of the Republic of China. He was also the first leader of the ruling party of the Republic of China, the National People's Party of China (Kuomintang). At this period the Kuomintang regime maintained close ties with the USSR; Blyukher served as its military adviser from 1924 to 1927. [SS]

25. "Genius and evildoing are incompatible" (*geniy i zlodeistvo nesovmestimy*). With this reference to Stalin, Khrushchev is paraphrasing a line in the short play *Mozart and Salieri* by Aleksandr Pushkin (1799–1837), who is often called the Shakespeare of Russia. Pushkin was the first great writer in the Russian language and left his mark on much of the later literature of his country.

Written in blank verse, *Mozart and Salieri* is one of four "little tragedies" that Pushkin composed in 1830. The play repeats the legend that Antonio Salieri (1750–1825), the court musician in Vienna, hated and envied Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756–91) because of the latter's great talent. Despite Salieri's lifelong efforts, so the legend goes, he himself could never rise above mediocrity and, in his bitterness and frustration, decided to poison his effortlessly gifted rival.

This legend was revived and attracted much attention in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century thanks to the prize-winning film *Amadeus* by the Czech director Milos Forman. The screenplay of *Amadeus* owes much to Pushkin's *Mozart and Salieri*.

In Pushkin's play, just before Salieri drops poison in Mozart's wine, Mozart comments on the rumor that the French writer Beaumarchais had poisoned someone. But no, says Mozart, he could not have done that, for he was a genius, like you and me, Salieri, and then he makes the statement about the incompatibility of genius and evil, a phrase repeated later in the play by Salieri himself, thus stressing a central theme of the play.

The actual wording in Pushkin's play is slightly different from the wording used by Khrushchev. It says: "Genius and evildoing are two things that cannot go together" (*geniy i zlodeistvo—dve veshchi nesovmestnye*). An English rendering of the play,

translation by A. F. B. Clark, may be found in the selection *Poems, Prose, and Plays of Pushkin*, ed. Avraham Yarmolinsky (New York: Modern Library, 1936). [GS]

26. Among the foreign Communist leaders who attended the show trials were Palmiro Togliatti, head of the Italian Communist Party, and Maurice Thorez, head of the French Communist Party. They both proclaimed to their parties and to Western public opinion that the trials had been genuine, denying the reality that they were stage-managed frame-ups. [GS]

27. Zinoviev and Kamenev were close associates of Lenin in the Bolshevik party leadership (see Biographies). Their "mistake" was their disagreement with the decision, at Lenin's urging, of the majority of the Bolshevik leadership to carry out an insurrection in October 1917. Zinoviev and Kamenev made public their disagreement in an article published in Maxim Gorky's newspaper *Novaya zhizn* (New Life). Their article also revealed the date that had been set for the insurrection (October 25, Old Style; November 7 in the Western calendar). Lenin denounced their action as "strike-breaking," and Zinoviev and Kamenev were expelled from the leadership. Later, after the insurrection was successful and Soviet government power had been established, Lenin pardoned Zinoviev and Kamenev and, as Khrushchev indicates, brought them back into the Bolshevik leadership, assigning them major responsibilities. [GS]

28. Georgy Ippolitovich Lomov (Oppokov). See Biographies.

29. In Russian the proverb states literally: "You can't hide an awl in a sack" (*shilo v meshke ne utayish*)—that is, you can't hide a sharp-pointed tool by shoving it in a bag; it will work its way out and show through. [GS]

30. Physical torture, though not uncommon in practice, was contrary to official regulations until 1936. The NKVD was first specifically authorized by the party Central Committee to use "physical pressure" in early 1937. The Central Committee confirmed this authorization on January 20, 1939, in a coded telegram to secretaries of province party committees, secretaries of the Central Committees of republic-level Communist parties, and heads of NKVD organizations (Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1990], 121–22). [SS]

## AFTER THE TWENTIETH PARTY CONGRESS

Immediately after the Twentieth Party Congress all the Communist parties began to experience difficulties, especially the French and Italian. This is understandable because large, mass-based working-class parties existed in those countries, and their leaders Thorez and Togliatti<sup>1</sup> had attended the trials of the so-called enemies of the people and had then testified in their own countries that the charges against those defendants had been proved. And now everything turned out to be the opposite! This circumstance also obliged us not to publish the materials about the show trials of the 1930s, although no crimes had actually been committed by the defendants in those trials, and the sentences had been arbitrary. They were not based on evidence proving the alleged crimes to which the defendants “confessed.”

Storm clouds began rising up quickly in Poland. And after Poland came Hungary. After the death of the Polish leader Bierut [in March 1956], I went to Warsaw as an authorized representative of the CPSU Central Committee, while the plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) was under way.<sup>2</sup>

I did not attend the plenum myself, so that the USSR would not be accused of interfering in the internal affairs of a fraternal party. The sessions of the plenum proceeded amid great turbulence. Members of the PUWP Central Committee expressed dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union. I was told about this by people in the Polish Central Committee who were closer to us. Of course that brought us no joy, but in our view this was a manifestation of democracy—a positive thing. But a little while later the events that unfolded in Poland began to trouble us greatly.

At the plenum of which I have been speaking, Ochab<sup>3</sup> was elected first secretary of the PUWP Central Committee. Ochab and I were on good terms. I respected him and he fully deserved that. He was a veteran Communist, who had gone through the school of the Polish prisons. And at first we thought he was worthy of confidence. After he had been elected first secretary, we had a talk with him, and I raised the question: “Why is Gomulka in prison<sup>4</sup> in your country?” (When I had talked with Bierut about it earlier, he had told me that he himself didn’t know why Gomulka was in prison or what crimes he was accused of.) “Have you perhaps thought about releasing him?” Ochab then began arguing with me, trying to prove to me that it was impossible to release Gomulka. Gomulka was not the only one in prison in Poland. There was also [Marian] Spychalski, [Ignacy] Loga-Sowinski, and [Zenon] Kliszko.<sup>5</sup> There were a lot of people in prison. This

troubled me, and there was no way that I could understand why they were being kept in prison. I talked with almost all the members of the PUWP leadership, and they all argued that nothing could be done, that these people could not be released.

A while after that, Ochab and a delegation from Poland traveled to China for some occasion.<sup>6</sup> On their way back from China, when they were passing through Moscow, I again had a talk with Ochab. By then Gomulka had already been released from prison, and I asked Ochab if he would object to our inviting Gomulka to come to the Soviet Union for a vacation on the Black Sea coast, the Crimea or the Caucasus, where there were more favorable climatic conditions for a good rest than in Poland. He muttered something indistinct and left for Warsaw. That made me uneasy and I felt even a little bit troubled. And literally a few days later, we learned from our ambassador that turbulent events were unfolding in Poland, that the Poles were denouncing the USSR, and that a coup d'état was virtually in the works, as a result of which anti-Soviet-minded people would come to power. A threat arose against our lines of communication, which passed through Poland to [our troops in] East Germany. Events in Poland [in October 1956] disturbed us greatly for a number of other reasons as well, and we decided to take measures to ensure that we would have free access to East Germany through Poland, to safeguard our lines of communication with Soviet forces in East Germany.

We assigned a delegation to make a trip to Poland, and before it departed we called up the Polish leaders. The situation there was still heating up. In the Polish press there was widespread criticism of the USSR, which was accused of robbing Poland, of buying coal from Poland at reduced prices and selling iron ore to Poland at inflated prices. Such things did occur under Stalin when we were trading with the countries of "people's democracy" on the basis of arbitrarily established prices, not world-market prices. The Polish leaders advised us not to come right then. But that worried us even more—the fact that the Poles were showing clearly that they didn't want to meet with us. We decided to go there immediately with a representative delegation consisting of Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Bulganin, and someone else.<sup>7</sup>

We flew into Warsaw and were met by Ochab, Gomulka, and others. The reception was very cold. Great anxiety was evident on Ochab's face. We all traveled together to the official government residence, the palace at Lazenki,<sup>8</sup> where a harsh-toned discussion began, with raised voices. We expressed our alarm about the growth of anti-Soviet sentiment in Poland and stated that we were fully determined to protect our lines of communication with Soviet forces in East Germany. From our side we were applying pressure

openly. Ochab flared up: "Why are you complaining to me? I'm no longer secretary of the Central Committee. Ask others." And he pointed to Gomulka. Unconcealed displeasure seethed in every word Ochab said. The impression this gave us about the situation in the Polish leadership was troubling. We didn't really know what the situation was, and we were afraid that people who would pursue an anti-Soviet policy would come to power. We didn't want relations between Poland and us to develop the way they had before the war, a situation that was still fresh in our memory.<sup>9</sup>

Gomulka tried to ease our suspicions. He agreed that the situation in Poland was complex and difficult, and that it was made worse by the growth of anti-Soviet attitudes, but he assured us that friendship with the USSR was vitally necessary for Poland and that the friendly ties between us were unbreakable. He assured us that in a short time the wave of discontent would subside and the situation would be normalized. Then similar events began to develop in Hungary. We had to deal with two distinct Communist parties at that time, in my view, where the situation in their leaderships was not favorable. In the Stalin era a lot of people had also been arrested in Hungary, and today I don't think that was as much on the initiative of Rakosi as it was on the initiative of Stalin.<sup>10</sup> Arrest and repression were carried out through the intermediary role of our advisers, whom Stalin imposed on both Poland and Hungary, and on other fraternal countries. Through them he operated in those countries by the same methods he used in our country.

After our talks in Warsaw, we returned to Moscow, impressed by Gomulka's somewhat nervous, but apparently sincere statement that Poland needed friendship with the Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union needed friendship with Poland. Didn't we think they understood their situation? After all, without the USSR they could not hold onto their western borders. Gomulka said: "We are now reexamining internal matters in our country, but our relations with the Soviet Union will remain friendly and on an allied basis without fail." Although he said this in a very strained tone, it was difficult not to believe him, and I did believe him. I had confidence in him and said to my comrades: "I don't think we have any reason not to believe Comrade Gomulka. He has been elected first secretary of the PUWP Central Committee. The majority of Polish comrades trust him. It seems to me that Gomulka's declaration will be supported by the others. After all, he made this declaration to us publicly, speaking at a meeting of the Polish leadership. Everyone heard what he said. We must assume that since no one objected, all of them were in agreement." Nevertheless, for a long time the situation in Poland remained tense and was a source of great concern for us.



Other aspects of relations with our neighbors also confronted us. At present the most serious question is the quality of our production. Unfortunately we are not able in any way to catch up with the capitalist countries. And in order to compete successfully with them and to make socialism attractive to people, everything that we produce should be the best. And yet we are forced to bow our heads to the capitalists. This is shameful. And regrettable. Take for example our radios, tape recorders, and cars. What are they like? We just celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the October revolution [in 1967] with the purchase of a Fiat auto plant from Italy, from the “decaying capitalist system.”<sup>11</sup> Automobile plants like the one we bought have probably become outdated, and the capitalists are no fools. They will sell us a model that they have already taken out of production. They’ve already installed a new and better one for themselves. Unfortunately we still don’t know how to work as we should; we’re just not able to. People will say that, after all, we were a backward country before. But I say that the backward people who lived once in Russia have died long ago. Compare the situation with Japan. It was completely destroyed after the war, and now it occupies a leading place in the world. West Germany is also competing with the United States in areas of high technology, and it too is still partly lying in ruins.

It’s true that in some areas of science and technology we are in the lead. For example, we invented a continuous process for casting steel. We even sold a license for this process to the United States.<sup>12</sup> But these are isolated incidents in comparison to the things we buy from the United States. When we began to apply ourselves to the development of oil production, we needed drilling equipment. We make good drilling equipment, but ours can’t compete with the American equipment. The United States has far outstripped the Soviet Union in that sphere. They make good drilling equipment in Romania. I asked Gheorghiu-Dej.<sup>13</sup> He laughed and said: “We’re in touch with a certain Romanian in the United States, a capitalist in the oil industry. He helped us steal the designs for this equipment from the Americans.” So the Romanian drilling equipment was based on American models. We wanted to buy the designs from Romania. I said to Gheorghiu-Dej: “Give us the blueprints—the designs for that equipment.” He said: “Take them.” But there’s a big difference between the Romanian words for “take them” and “you will receive them.”

In general the Romanians are fine fellows. They began developing their industry quickly and established state farms and collective farms just as quickly, and good ones at that. Earlier Romania had a lower cultural level than the other countries of Eastern Europe. For example, there were more illiterate peasants in that country. In spite of that, it has risen quickly. Of



course the Romanians have more favorable natural conditions than some of the other socialist countries. In particular they have a lot of petroleum, natural gas, forests, and grain. The other socialist countries are not always able to feed themselves, while the Romanians export grain. Sometimes in our country people feel offended by the fact that the Romanians sell grain to the capitalist world and don't give it to the other socialist countries. But if the Poles, for example, had a surplus of grain they would surely behave in an even more clever and profit-wise way than the Romanians. They might sell grain to East Germany for foreign currency. And every government wants to have foreign-currency reserves to use on the world market. So there's no reason to feel offended by the Romanians.

I remember, in this connection, that Gomulka came to visit us once and asked us to sell him some wheat over and above the planned amount, and at that time we ourselves had barely enough grain to meet our needs. I saw that he was playing some crafty game and wasn't telling the full truth, so I made this comment: "You want to buy grain, but I know that Poland has been provided with all the grain it needs to feed its people. You want to buy grain so you can feed your hogs and sell bacon to America."

He stopped in mid-sentence, hesitated, and then answered: "Yes."

I said: "And you think the Poles are the only ones who know how to do that and the Russians are fools, don't you? Go buy your grain from Canada. They have as much as you could want. Turn it into bacon and sell it."

He said: "But for that we'd have to pay out of our foreign-currency reserves."

There you have it. That's the heart of the matter. Relations between socialist countries can also be very complicated and difficult and for various reasons. After that conversation with Gomulka, we gave him grain anyhow. And do you think that's the only instance when the USSR took from its own resources in order to support its friends?

How many times did it happen that we would coordinate our economic plans and then Gomulka or someone else would call up and say: "Comrade Khrushchev, I ask that I be allowed to come see you. Some drastic problems have arisen." He would arrive and say: "Comrade Khrushchev, you gave us such-and-such a quantity of ore with a certain content of iron, but we're not able to fulfill the plan. Help us please by giving us some better quality ore with higher iron content." And what did that mean? We'd give them that ore and then we ourselves would have to process ore with a lower iron content. Or take the example of Bulgarian tomatoes. We were receiving garbage from them. The Bulgarians had got used to the idea that Russians would eat any kind of crap, excuse the expression, and they would pick the tomatoes when

they were still green and let them turn red during transport. This really was trash and garbage! They also export tomatoes to West Germany, but not of that kind, because in West Germany they wouldn't buy them; they have competition there. But in our country no matter what you sell, the consumer will buy it and eat it. It's true, by the way, that the Bulgarians have marvelous tomatoes. The Bulgarians are the best gardeners in the world. But tomatoes are only good when you pick them off the vine in the evening and have them on your table in the morning.

Many different problems arise in relations among socialist countries. If they are not confronted and resolved, we might even end up at loggerheads with one another. [For example,] it's offensive to us that the other socialist countries regard the Soviet Union as an enormous milk cow. Yet we live worse than most of the other countries that we are helping. The standard of living is determined by per capita consumption. Let's take meat consumption, for example. In 1964 East Germany had a per capita meat consumption of 75 kilograms, while for the Czechs the figure was 65 kilograms, and for the Poles it was 50 kilograms, with the Hungarians coming next, and only then the Soviet Union, while for the Bulgarians and Romanians meat consumption was only 26 kilograms per capita. On one occasion I said to Ulbricht<sup>14</sup>: "Walter, I'm not asking for a crude egalitarian type of leveling, but please try to understand our situation. We are the victors. We defeated Nazi Germany, and here we are giving East Germany grain and products purchased with hard currency, so that you can sell them abroad, buy meat, and ensure an annual consumption of 75 kilograms per capita for your population. But what kind of concern are you showing for us?" Of course political considerations, especially in the case of East Germany, have an essential influence on such questions. The standard of living must remain high there in comparison to West Germany. Only in that case would it be possible to win all the German people over to our side. But so far that has not happened.

The problem of reparations is interesting in light of all this. The Western countries canceled the reparations that West Germany was paying to them,<sup>15</sup> but East Germany continued to pay us what it could. When Stalin died we took a new look at this question. If we wanted East Germany to be able to compete with the West German standard of living, we had to give East Germany the possibility of raising its economic level sharply. If East Germany had continued to pay reparations and to pay the cost of maintaining our troops on its territory, it would have been impossible to raise its economic level, and so at that time we, too, canceled the reparations and we assumed

the cost of maintaining our troops on East German territory ourselves.<sup>16</sup> The Poles were pleased by this, and they too began to skin us unmercifully and make what they could by charging us more for the maintenance of our troops in Poland, even though our troops were stationed on Polish territory in the interests of Poland itself.

Many complex problems also existed in relations among the “people’s democracies,” as they were called after the war. Poland has coking-quality coal. The Czechs asked the Poles to provide them such coal. The Poles refused and instead sold coking coal to France. We were forced to give Czechoslovakia coal of this quality from our own reserves, because otherwise the metallurgical industry in Czechoslovakia would have come to a standstill. The Poles also asked us to deliver them additional quantities of petroleum, and for this we set a certain condition. We said: “If you will provide Czechoslovakia with coking coal, we will give you petroleum to the equivalent value. If you don’t give it, we’ll give our oil to Czechoslovakia so it can sell that on the world market and buy coking coal for itself.” The Poles literally had the Czechs by the throat at that time. If we had joined in and done the same kind of thing, the lack of petroleum would have strangled the Poles and their industry would have come to a standstill. They would no longer have been able to go out onto the world market and compete with the capitalists. Their standard of living would have declined immediately, and that would have led to an outburst of popular discontent.

Recalling the Czechs brings to mind the fact that they had a highly developed industry. When we were still toddling around under the table without pants on, the Czechs were producing goods whose quality amazed the world. For example, the antiaircraft guns that we used throughout the war came from Czechoslovakia. The famous Czech arms manufacturer Skoda<sup>17</sup> sold us the plans for those weapons before the war. We mastered the production and were manufacturing them right up through 1945. In 1948 Klement Gottwald<sup>18</sup> was vacationing in the Crimea with Stalin. Stalin called me up and said: “Gottwald is here. Come join us.” The next day I flew there. We gathered at Stalin’s place for dinner.

Gottwald had drunk a great deal (he had that weakness) and began to say: “Comrade Stalin, why are your people stealing our patents? Just tell us and we’ll give them to you for nothing. When your people steal them and we see it, we feel offended. We can give you more than just patents. Take us in as part of the Soviet Union. We’d be happy to join the Soviet Union and then everything we have will be common property.” Stalin refused to take them in, and he got angry over the thieving. But that was only in words,

because we continued to steal, sometimes just out of old habit, like the gypsy who was asked: "If you were king, what would you do?" He answered: "I'd steal me a herd of horses and disappear."

Here's another complicated and difficult question: arms spending within the socialist camp. It would seem fair to spread out such spending equally, to calculate how much something costs and distribute it among the countries according to a per capita average, and let each country pay its share. I think in such a case we could cut military spending in half for the Soviet Union. But how do things stand in reality? Within the framework of the Warsaw Pact we have agreed on which country should undertake what task to strengthen our overall defense capability. Romania is supposed to supply a certain number of tanks, and it was supposed to build a certain number of ships on the Black Sea. Then our minister of defense reported to me that the Romanians weren't doing anything; they weren't fulfilling their obligations. The Czechs also complained to us, saying they had made tanks for the Romanians, but the Romanians wouldn't buy them, claiming they didn't have the money. We asked them: "Well, who has extra money lying around that they can spend on defense? No one has. It's a necessity that we're forced to pay." Obviously the Romanians had a very simple idea. They thought: "The Soviet Union will defend us. No one's going to attack us separately. It's the USSR they're afraid of. Let the Russians spend their money on defense, and meanwhile we'll raise our standard of living." But that's the wrong approach. That's sheer nationalism. Unfortunately, that too exists in relations among socialist countries.

I remember the following typical incident. It was 1943, and we were fighting outside Stalingrad. We had surrounded Paulus's army,<sup>19</sup> and Ulbricht was using a loudspeaker to appeal to the surrounded German troops to surrender. He would crawl around at night for a long time, and when he came in we would have dinner with him, and I would report how many Germans had surrendered.

Sometimes I joked with him: "You don't get any dinner tonight."

"Why?"

"No German soldiers surrendered today."

On one occasion he arrived and announced: "I've earned my dinner tonight."

I answered him: "Yeah, you've earned it. One soldier surrendered and he was a Pole."

I had personally interrogated that Pole.<sup>20</sup> He said he had surrendered because he didn't want to fight.

I made a suggestion to him: "A Polish army is being formed on our territory. Will you join it?"

He said: "No, I'll go to a prisoner of war camp."

"But then how is Poland going to be liberated?"

"The Russians will liberate it." He said that in such a calm way.

I gave the order: "Take him away to the devil's grandmother; get him the hell out of here."

It's always, "Let the Russians do it." This kind of attitude of letting yourself be maintained at someone else's expense; if it continues to develop further, if everyone relies on the expectation that the Russians will do it, that the Russians will provide, that the Russians will defend them, this can all end sadly for the socialist camp.

Here's another stumbling block: border problems. Today, in light of our border conflict with China,<sup>21</sup> the question of borders between socialist countries has come to the forefront again. These problems have always existed. But an international conflict has arisen for the first time in Soviet history in the dispute between the People's Republic of China and our country. We have almost always succeeded in solving such problems through mutual concessions and straightening out the borderline. At the beginning of the conflict with China, when we tried to find a solution to the problem, we also thought in terms of conceding some territory to them in exchange for an equal amount of Chinese territory in some area suitable to both sides. We drew up a list of claims being made by the Chinese. Malinovsky, Gromyko,<sup>22</sup> and I held a meeting. We thought we could solve this problem right away. I took a pencil and drew a line going right down the middle, dividing these claims in half, and the resulting borderline ended up straighter, more equalized.

We didn't expect any special complications because most of the disputed areas were uninhabited. Neither our people nor the Chinese lived there. Sometimes hunters or herdsmen might pass through those areas. In short, it was a dispute over trifles. But what the Chinese really wanted was to create a conflict. They refused to take part in negotiations and made absurd demands on the USSR, claiming they had a "right" to Vladivostok, the Pamir region, and other areas. Today, five years later, we have met with them again. The deputy minister of foreign affairs, Vasily Kuznetsov,<sup>23</sup> has gone to Peking. Perhaps in another five years we'll be able to come to agreement with the Chinese. The real conflict here is not over borders. It's really about "high politics" in the international arena, and so it's necessary to be patient. If the question was only one of borders, the problem could be straightened out more easily.

We did not have a firmly established border with Iran from the time of tsarist rule. It was not until 1955 that we settled the border dispute there, conceding some areas to Iran, areas where nothing was to be found; it was nothing but desert. Previously there had been a real dispute! Only one major problem arose with the Iranians. The fate of the village of Firyuza in Turkmenia. When the tsar had established a border with Iran, Firyuza was supposed to go to the Iranians. I don't know why the tsar changed his mind and failed to surrender Firyuza at that time. In the Soviet era the Turkmen comrades built a lot of vacation homes there. And now when the Iranians raised the questions of Firyuza, we said to them: "Let's try to resolve this in a fraternal way. It would be hard for us to give up Firyuza because a lot of our vacation facilities are located there. We have developed this place a lot compared to the times when this question first arose. If you wish, we will concede some other area to you instead of Firyuza." They agreed, signed a treaty, and we no longer have any disputes with them.<sup>24</sup>

We now have no border disputes with any of our neighbors except for China. And what is China demanding? In Peking they're saying: "We demand that it be written in any border treaty that the previous borders were established on the basis of agreements with tsarist Russia imposed on an unequal basis." No sensible person would sign this kind of statement. What does it mean to say that a treaty was not signed on the basis of equal rights? If I signed a document containing such words, that would mean I would have to renounce anything that I owned on the basis of such a treaty. But all of the socialist countries' borders came from former kings, emperors, and tsars. If we tried to build relations among our countries on such foundations, who knows where it all would end?!

Generally speaking, there are many aspects to border problems that can be interpreted in various ways, especially in Europe. We have no border disputes with the Hungarians, but 120,000 Hungarians live in Soviet Transcarpathia.<sup>25</sup> Janos Kadar<sup>26</sup> makes no claim to their land. Why? At one time the Hungarians took advantage of the fact that Transcarpathian Ukraine was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and pressed the local Ukrainian population<sup>27</sup> back into the mountains, taking the best land along the Tisza River for themselves. How could Kadar now start demanding that those lands become part of Hungary?

On the other hand, the Hungarians have a serious border dispute with the Yugoslavs. Two million Hungarians live in Yugoslavia.<sup>28</sup> The Hungarians are also in a dispute with the Romanians over Transylvania.<sup>29</sup> Frothing at the mouth, the Romanians argue that Transylvania was a Romanian province

since ancient times, but the Hungarians say that Transylvania has always been Hungarian, that the Magyar language and Hungarian culture predominate there. The Romanians have turned everything upside down in an attempt to eradicate anything Hungarian that remains in the region. There is also a major border dispute between Albania and Yugoslavia. I think that there are even more Albanians living in Yugoslavia than live in Albania.<sup>30</sup> But Enver Hoxha<sup>31</sup> is very much afraid of Yugoslavia. And the Albanians who live in Yugoslavia are not looking to Albania at all; they don't want to go live there. Their life is better in Yugoslavia. And Tito is pursuing a more intelligent policy.

That damn Enver Hoxha is simply a gangster. Can you really call him a politician? He knows only one method: to put a noose around your neck and pull. It's a typically Stalinist kind of politics. He has his own secret killers who cut the throats of oppositionists. They catch them traveling on the road and cut their throats. Or they break into their homes and slaughter them. What about Mehmet Shehu?<sup>32</sup> Formerly there was a secretary of the party's Central Committee in Albania, a very intelligent man from a working-class background. He was the founder of the Communist Party of Albania,<sup>33</sup> and Shehu personally did away with him. Why? He took the position that Albania should unite with Yugoslavia. Incidentally this had been an idea of Stalin's. At one time it may have been a sensible idea, but later it ceased to be. But even if someone is offended by this idea, why kill over it?

Many other problems arise besides border disputes. For example, what kind of socialism is it if you keep the people inside it in chains? What kind of just system is that? What kind of paradise? Everyone wants to go to paradise. But it's no paradise if people inside it want to escape and the door is locked. If, as the saying goes, God had granted me the chance to continue my activity, I would have opened all the doors; I would have thrown them wide open and the windows, too. And what would have happened? Do you think that all of a sudden everyone would have left? After all, Lenin opened the Soviet borders after the Civil War. And some people did leave. Such famous people as Chaliapin, Andreyev, and Kuprin.<sup>34</sup> Later some of them returned, and others spent a long time begging us to let them return. After all, can the entire population really leave the country? On the other hand, how many foreigners have come here and not wanted to go back to their own countries! Why should we be afraid of all this?

Take Poland, for example. Everyone there who wanted to leave the country left. And what happened? Later many of them returned. Our ambassador in Israel once sent us a telegram saying that some people who had gone



there from the USSR were asking permission to return. I will tell about an acquaintance of mine—an unfortunate woman who twice spent time in prison under Stalin, whose husband was shot, whose brother was shot, and whose sister’s husband was shot, and during the war the Germans burned her mother and father alive. What could be worse than that? Yet she told me that one of her relatives went to Israel as a guest, looked around at how people lived there, and reported that in general the Jews were living fairly well, but the old people whose formative years had been spent under Soviet power were homesick. She, too, wanted to make a trip to visit Israel, but she didn’t want to live there, not for anything. The younger people, it was true, didn’t want to return to the USSR. What was the reason? The explanation they gave was this: “We’re sick and tired of hearing people call us *zhidy*.”<sup>35</sup> What can you say to them in reply to that?

In general our relations with Israel have been difficult. The Israelis have made many attempts to improve them, but we couldn’t go along because of our friendship with the Arabs. How many times the Israeli ambassador asked that I receive him. I myself wanted to receive him, but I couldn’t do it, because it would have infuriated the Arabs. At that time Israel was already playing its role in support of American imperialism in the Middle East, and we didn’t want to alienate the Arabs. We wanted to win them to our side, and so we kept Israel at a distance. If we examine the political profile of the Israeli state, we see it not only as no worse, but in fact better than other capitalist states, and it should be possible to establish normal relations with it. Agriculture is no less collectivized there than in Poland.<sup>36</sup> In Poland they don’t have collective farms, but associations that are only the first step toward collectivization. The land in Poland still belongs to private owners, and in these Polish agricultural associations one’s earnings are based on the amount of land one has put into the association.

I have never been an anti-Semite. In Yuzovka I lived and worked with Jews. I had many friends among the Jews. When I was just a kid, I worked at a factory with a Jewish man named Yakov Isaakovich Kutikov—a fine fellow. He was a metalworker, doing maintenance and repair on machinery, and earned two rubles a day. I was his helper, fetching and carrying for him, and I earned twenty-five kopecks a day. There are [good people like that, and there are] scoundrels, in every nationality, whether Russian or Jewish or what have you.

There’s no comparing the Israelis with the Arabs. People in Israel live much better. In agriculture they’ve developed hydroponics, the most progressive method of cultivation. Very bad relations have developed between the Arabs



and the Israelis. If this continues, it will end badly for Israel. It has constantly been disturbing the Arab countries, and from physics we know that for every action there is a reaction. The same thing can be seen in politics. The Six-Day War in 1967<sup>37</sup> should have taught the Arabs a lot. I remember Peter the Great. When the Swedes gave his rear end a whipping at the battle of Narva, he said, “Thank you for teaching me a lesson,” and later he defeated them at Poltava.<sup>38</sup>

Time will pass, and if the Israelis don’t smarten up, the Arabs will crush them, too. Incidentally, those who organize themselves well are not beaten; they defeat others. That’s the heart of the matter. Two and a half million Jews organized themselves so well that in six days they defeated tens of millions in Egypt, Syria, and other countries allied with Egypt. The Israeli military leader, Moshe Dayan, had been an officer in the British army.<sup>39</sup> And how many people in Israel had actually served in the Soviet army? That’s another source of their strength. The Arabs didn’t especially have any experience of fighting. Mainly they’ve been riding on camels. But the Jews have fought in all [recent] wars. How did Israel come into existence? It was an idea of the Zionists. About two years ago the man who founded the Zionist party died as an old man.<sup>40</sup> England, which then controlled that part of the Middle East, agreed to set aside an area for Israel and to remove the Arabs.<sup>41</sup> We abstained in the voting in the United Nations on this question for a while, but later we, too, agreed to the establishment of Israel.<sup>42</sup> Golda Meir is now the prime minister there.<sup>43</sup> Earlier she was the first Israeli ambassador to the USSR. She herself was born in Odessa, and when she was six years old her parents took her to America. She knows Russian well. When she came here as ambassador, she started working very busily among the Soviet Jews, and Stalin expelled her. That’s when our relations began to go sour.

1. Maurice Thorez and Palmiro Togliatti (Ercoli). See Biographies.

2. Boleslaw Bierut (1892–1956) was the head of the Polish United Workers Party, which had been created in 1948 by having the Polish Socialist Party (Polish initials, PPS) merge with the Polish Communist Party (officially called the Polish Workers Party). Bierut attended the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, February 14–25, 1956, at which Khrushchev gave his “secret speech” denouncing Stalin’s crimes. While in Moscow Bierut fell ill and was taken to the Kremlin hospital, where he died on March 12 of a heart attack (myocardial infarction). A plenum of the PUWP Central Committee was held on March 19–20, 1956, at which Edward Ochab

was elected to take Bierut’s place as party leader (first secretary). A Soviet delegation was in Poland for Bierut’s funeral, from March 15 to March 21. The delegation consisted of Khrushchev, Mikhail Alekseyevich Yasnov, Nikifor Timofeyevich Kalchenko, Vasily Ivanovich Kozlov, Yustas Ignovich Paletskis, Marshal Ivan Stepanovich Konev, Nikolai Ivanovich Bobrovnikov, and the writer Wanda Wasilewska. (See Biographies.) Khrushchev remained in Poland for the election of the new first secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP. [SK]

3. Edward Ochab. See Biographies.

4. Wladyslaw Gomulka (party name, Wieslaw). See Biographies. [MN]

Some sources say that Gomulka was not in prison, but under “house arrest.” However, it seems that the “house” in which he was confined was not his own home, but a secret police villa, and the conditions of his confinement were the equivalent of prison—although he was not held in a large institution with many other inmates.

In fall 1949 Gomulka and his political allies, Marian Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, and Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, were publicly expelled from the Central Committee of the ruling Polish Workers Party—and secretly expelled from the party, then arrested, though not all at once.

Gomulka himself was not arrested until August 1951, after or during a public “show trial” in which his political ally Marian Spychalski, who had been tortured at a prison in Warsaw, was forced to give false testimony against Gomulka. The latter was then taken by secret police officials to a villa outside Warsaw, in Miedzeszyn. This villa, and an adjacent one, in which Gomulka’s wife was confined, belonged to the secret police. He was held there in a room with barred windows, with guards outside his locked door, keeping him under observation around the clock.

Gomulka was held there for more than three years. He was released as the post-Stalin “thaw” gained momentum in both the USSR and Poland, either in late 1954 or the first half of 1955, but his release was kept secret. Four different sources give four different dates for his release, ranging from September 1954 to April 1955.

Not until April 1956 was it officially stated that Gomulka had been released. This happened after Edward Ochab succeeded Boleslaw Bierut as leader of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). As Khrushchev indicates, Bierut died in Moscow in March 1956, right after Khrushchev’s “secret speech” exposing Stalin’s crimes. Ochab made it public that Gomulka had been released, and that he had been wrongly imprisoned. But Ochab still asserted that Gomulka’s political views were erroneous and had to be fought.

At first, after April 1956, Gomulka and his political allies, Kliszko and Loga-Sowinski, as well as Spychalski, were not allowed to rejoin the PUWP, nor were their views or activities given publicity. But that quickly changed as post-Stalin ferment and protest increased in Poland, especially after the events in Poznan in June 1956, when masses of workers demonstrated against the low standard of living; violent clashes with police and troops ensued, with about sixty workers being killed. At the October 1956 plenum of the PUWP Central Committee, Gomulka and his allies were restored to the PUWP Central Committee, and Gomulka was elected first secretary.

The information in this note comes from Nicholas Bethell’s *Gomulka: His Poland, His Com-*

*munism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969); and Peter Raina, *Gomulka: Politische Biographie* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970). [GS]

5. For more on Marian Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, and Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, see Biographies.

6. Ochab went to China to attend a congress of the Chinese Communist Party on September 15–27, 1956. He stopped in Moscow on his way home from Beijing to Warsaw. [SK]

7. The delegation that went to Poland on October 19–20, 1956, consisted of Kaganovich, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Molotov. [SK]

8. This was the former royal palace in Lazenki Park in Warsaw. It is now open to tourists and contains many artistic treasures. [SS] Khrushchev’s recollection seems to be inaccurate in this case. Other sources—and Khrushchev himself, later in this edition of his memoirs, in his long chapter about “Poland” in Volume 3 (forthcoming)—say that the meeting took place at the Belvedere Palace. [GS]

9. Khrushchev is referring to the extremely hostile relations that existed between Poland and the Soviet Union from the time of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 up to the outbreak of World War II in September 1939. [SK]

10. Matyas Rakosi was the top leader of the Hungarian Communists after World War II, until 1956. [GS]

11. Khrushchev is referring to the Volga Automobile Plant (Russian initials VAZ, for Volzhsky Avtomobilny Zavod), which was built in the town of Togliatti (previous name, Stavropol-rayonny), across the Volga River from the city of Kuibyshev (now Samara). Construction of the first phase was completed in 1971, geared for production of 220,000 passenger cars per year. The auto plant and the production license were purchased from the Italian automobile manufacturer Fiat in 1967. [GS/SK]

12. In the 1930s, continuous metal casting began to be developed in various countries. In 1939 in Germany S. Junghans used this method to obtain steel components. Work to master the method was started in the USSR in 1944. The first industrial installation for the continuous casting of steel was put into operation in 1955 at the Red Sormovo factory in Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod). Then a new version of the process was introduced, entailing formation of an ingot in an electromagnetic field. The license for this process was sold right away in the United States.

13. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1901–65) was the Communist Party leader of Romania and its premier and head of state from 1952 to 1965. See Biographies. [GS]

14. Khrushchev is referring to the time after 1953, when Walter Ulbricht (1893–1973), general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist

Unity Party of Germany, became first secretary of its Central Committee.

15. The Western powers stopped collecting reparations from West Germany in 1952. [SS]

16. This change occurred on January 1, 1954.

17. The Skoda (pronounced Shkoda) joint stock company (of the former agricultural supplies factories established by E. Skoda in 1869) became from 1899 onward the largest firm of the metals, engineering, and defense industry of Austro-Hungary, and then of Czechoslovakia, where it was owned by the French concern Schneider-Cr sot and the Prague-based Bank Zivnostenski. Skoda had branches in Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The anti-aircraft weapons to which reference is made here were produced at the factory in Plzen. The agreement to purchase them became possible after the Treaty on Mutual Assistance between Czechoslovakia and the USSR was signed on May 16, 1935.

18. Klement Gottwald (1896–1953) was a founder of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and its general secretary from 1927. He fled to the USSR in 1938 and returned to Czechoslovakia in 1945. He became prime minister of Czechoslovakia in 1946 and president of the country in 1948. [GS/SS]

19. Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus (1890–1957) was in command of the German troops at the battle of Stalingrad. See Biographies. [SS]

20. A soldier in the German army might have claimed to be a Pole on various grounds. Pre-1945 Germany had a large minority of ethnic Poles, mainly in Silesia (now part of Poland), and the man may have been one of these Poles conscripted as a German citizen. Or he may have been an ethnic Pole conscripted in German-occupied Poland after September 1939. Alternatively, he may have been a *Volksdeutscher*—that is, an ethnic German who had been a citizen of Poland before its conquest in 1939. It is also quite possible that the man was simply lying in the hope of better treatment as a prisoner of war. [SK/SS]

21. Khrushchev dictated this passage shortly after the outbreak in March 1969 of the Sino-Soviet armed conflict over Damansky Island on the River Amur. However, systematic violations of the Soviet-Chinese border had begun as early as 1960.

22. At this time Marshal Rodion Malinovsky was minister of defense and Andrei Gromyko minister of foreign affairs. See Biographies. [SS]

23. Vasily Vasilyevich Kuznetsov. See Biographies.

24. When the question of the Russian-Iranian border in the area of the Ashkhabad district of the recently created Transcaspian province was resolved in 1893, by mutual agreement the settlement of Feruza (Firyuza) went to Russia while Iran received Khisar in exchange. The vacation facilities that are referred to here were built starting from 1930 around the spa on the slopes of the Kopet-Dag Mountains. A Soviet-Iranian agreement to settle

border and financial issues was signed on December 2, 1954.

25. Transcarpathia is situated in the extreme southwest of Ukraine, near the Soviet-Hungarian border. [SS]

26. Janos Kadar (1912–89) became Hungary’s minister of internal affairs in 1946. He was arrested as a suspected Titoist in 1950. On his release in 1953, he was put in charge of the party committee in an industrial district of Budapest. He was appointed general secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party during the uprising of October 1956 and remained in that post until 1988. [GS/SS]

27. Whether the local population in this area is ethnically Ukrainian is a matter of dispute. Many of the local inhabitants, who speak an East Slavic language distinct from both Ukrainian and Russian, regard themselves as Rusyns (Ruthenians). [SS]

28. The Hungarians in Yugoslavia lived mainly in the province of Vojvodina in northern Serbia, which borders on Hungary. However, they are not concentrated along the border. [SS]

29. Transylvania is in western Romania and has a mixed Romanian-Hungarian population. Before World War I it belonged to the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. [SS]

30. The Albanians in Yugoslavia lived mainly in the provinces of Kosovo and Macedonia. They did indeed outnumber by a narrow margin the Albanians living in Albania itself. [SS]

31. Enver Hoxha (1908–85) was first secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party (later the Party of Labor) from its foundation in 1941. He was prime minister of Albania between 1944 and 1954. [GS/SS]

32. Mehmet Shehu was one of the top Albanian Communist leaders, head of the Albanian government, and an ally of Hoxha. [GS]

33. This is an allusion to Koci Xoxe (pronounced “Kochi Dzodze”), one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania.

34. Fyodor Chaliapin (best known by that French-based spelling, although a standard transliteration would give “Shalyapin”; 1873–1938) was a world-famous opera singer, especially known for his performances as Boris Godunov in the opera of the same name by Mussorgsky and as Mephistopheles in Gounod’s “Faust.” He sang the part of Boris, for example, in a production organized by Sergei Diaghilev in Paris in 1908 and “instantly became the most famous basso in the world,” as Susanne Massie writes in her book about the fine arts of Russia, *Land of the Firebird*. In 1914 Chaliapin performed the part of Boris Godunov at the Metropolitan Opera in New York, with Toscanini conducting. (“His dramatic delivery and personality became a standard that deeply affected operatic styles,” writes Massie.) Chaliapin usually sang bass

parts, in the upper registers, but also sang as a baritone, for example, the part of Eugene Onegin in Tchaikovsky's opera of the same name (according to the Soviet Encyclopedia). He was friends with Maxim Gorky and others in revolutionary circles and supported the Soviet revolution, singing for audiences of ordinary workers and Red Army soldiers in the first years after 1917. He was given the honorary title "People's Artist" by the Soviet government. In 1922 he emigrated and lived the rest of his life in Paris, although he denied holding anti-Soviet views and continued to perform and promote the national music and dramatic art of Russia.

Leonid Andreyev (1871–1919) was a Russian writer, a man of democratic views, critical of the tsarist government and social order. His short stories and philosophical plays won him some fame in the West. A close friend of Maxim Gorky from 1899 to 1912, he then turned from social issues toward Symbolism. Khrushchev seems to be in error when he mentions Andreyev among those allowed by Lenin to emigrate after the 1917 revolution. Andreyev died in Oryol in 1919, according to the main Soviet Encyclopedia.

Perhaps Khrushchev was confusing Andreyev with Ivan Bunin (1870–1953), also a short-story writer of democratic views who had been friends with Gorky. Bunin emigrated to Paris in 1919 or 1920. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1933.

Aleksandr Kuprin (1870–1938) was a short-story writer and novelist who had also been a friend of Maxim Gorky and had won fame in the West; he was perhaps best known for his protest novel of 1905, *Poyedinok* (The Duel). He emigrated in 1919 but returned to Russia in 1937. [GS]

35. In Russian, *zhidy* is an offensive term for Jews, similar in connotation to the English *Yid*. [GS/SS]

36. Presumably Khrushchev has in mind the Israeli *kibbutzim*, which are fully collectivized, and *moshavim*, which are collectivized in the sphere of production but not in that of everyday life. [SS]

37. In the Six-Day War of June 5–10, 1967, Israel fought against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The air forces of these three Arab countries were smashed and substantial parts of their territory were occupied: Gaza and Sinai (Egypt), the West Bank (Jordan), and the Golan Heights (Syria). The partial Arab victory in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 showed that "the Arabs" did indeed learn something from their defeat in 1967. [SS]

38. The Swedish army under King Charles XII defeated a much larger Russian army under Peter the Great at the battle of Narva (in what is now Estonia) in 1700, the first great battle of the so-called Northern War (1700–1721). A few years later, in 1709, a reorganized, rearmed, and retrained

Russian army dealt the Swedes a resounding defeat at the battle of Poltava in Ukraine. The Swedes had invaded Ukraine from Poland, which Charles XII, an ambitious, expansionist ruler, had also conquered. [GS]

39. Moshe Dayan (1915–81) was Israel's minister of defense from 1967 to 1973. During World War II he fought with the British army in Syria. It was there that he lost his left eye. [SS]

40. It is possible that Khrushchev has in mind here the publicist Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880–1940), who from 1905 was one of the main propagandists of Zionism. [MN] Vladimir Jabotinsky—later he changed his first name to Ze'ev—was the founder and spiritual leader of the right-wing expansionist branch of Zionism known as Revisionist Zionism. In 1937 he became supreme commander of the terrorist organization Irgun Zeva'i Le'umi. He was also a novelist, poet, and playwright. [SS] From a juridical point of view, the origin of Zionism as a movement is usually dated to 1897, when the first Zionist congress was held in Basel. [MN]

41. After World War I, the peace conference at Versailles gave Britain control of Palestine. In 1920, at the San Remo conference, the newly formed League of Nations assigned Britain a mandate over Palestine and Transjordan. Transjordan remained under British control until 1946, Palestine until 1948.

It is not true that Britain "agreed to remove the Arabs." In the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, the British government had stated that it "view[s] with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use [its] . . . best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." During its mandate over Palestine, Britain made strenuous efforts to limit Jewish immigration and thereby protect the Palestinian Arabs from displacement. Most Palestinian Arabs in the areas that in the war of 1948 became the State of Israel fled the hostilities to neighboring countries or were forcibly expelled by Zionist forces; in neither case were they ever allowed to return to their homes. [SS]

42. In November 1947 the USSR was among the states voting in favor of Resolution 181 of the United Nations General Assembly, which called for the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. The USSR also recognized Israel following its declaration of independence in May 1948. Arms deliveries from Czechoslovakia played a crucial role in Israel's victory in the war of 1948; presumably they were sent with Stalin's approval. [SS]

43. Golda Meir (Meyerson). See Biographies.

## A FEW WORDS ABOUT GOVERNMENT POWER, ZHUKOV, AND OTHERS

After Stalin's death (and I constantly emphasize that date as a major dividing line), all sorts of concerns about the security of our country and the need to modernize our army crashed down on us. All this came down on what were, from the standpoint of the interests of state, our unprepared shoulders. We had in fact no previous experience in working on the defense of our country. Bulganin was supposed to know something as minister of defense. I knew Bulganin inside out, and I knew we couldn't rely on him fully. (An example of this was his incorrect evaluation of creative proposals made by Chelomei.) And as time went on, Bulganin got worse.<sup>1</sup>

When it became necessary to replace Malenkov, Molotov, and their whole group, those who revolted against the Central Committee of the party, opposing the anti-Stalin direction of our policy, a policy direction I stood at the head of, we were also forced to relieve Bulganin of his post as chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.<sup>2</sup> They persuaded me to take that post. I sincerely say that they had to persuade me. I was very reluctant and resisted the idea of combining the posts of chairman of the Council of Ministers and first secretary of the Central Committee in one person. I thought Aleksei Nikolayevich Kosygin should be chairman of the government. At an international conference of representatives of Communist parties in 1957, I even introduced him to Mao Zedong as the most likely candidate for that post.<sup>3</sup>

But the situation was such at the time that they literally put heavy pressure on me, saying that that was how the question should be decided and that it would be the most correct thing to do. I saw that it was not beneficial, but in fact harmful, to combine these posts, and I even cited the following argument: "Imagine the position I would be in. I've criticized Stalin for combining two such important posts in his person as the head of the party and of the government, and now I myself would be . . ."

I leave this question to the judgment of historians. Weakness on my part was displayed here, and perhaps something was gnawing at me inwardly, weakening my resistance. Even before I became chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Bulganin had made the proposal that since I was first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, I should also be named commander in chief of the armed forces. This was especially necessary, he said, because in the Presidium of the Central Committee military questions, the army, and the question of arms and equipment were included in my jurisdiction. This was

done without its being published in the press, and the decision was made strictly on an internal, confidential basis in the event of war. The top command staff within the armed forces was notified of this decision.

In fall 1957 we were forced to part ways with Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.<sup>4</sup> For me this was a very painful decision. I would even say that this decision was heartrending for me. My feelings were at war with my intellect. My feelings were on Zhukov's side. I had worked together with him for many, many years, and I had great respect for Zhukov. Of all the military men, I was closest to Zhukov and to Timoshenko.<sup>5</sup> Both of them at one time had commanded the Kiev military district, and we met often, both in the course of duty and in comradely surroundings, when we talked things over in a relaxed atmosphere. I also valued Zhukov highly as a military man. After Molotov, Malenkov, and the others were removed from the leadership—they had wanted a return to the old order under Stalin—Zhukov became part of the political leadership, a member of the Central Committee Presidium. He and the military as a whole played an active role in putting down the attempted revolt by the Molotov-Malenkov group. But when Zhukov joined the Central Committee Presidium, he started accumulating so much power that the leadership of the country began to feel alarmed. Members of the Central Committee Presidium expressed their opinion to me more than once that Zhukov was heading in the direction of a military coup and the seizure of power. We received such reports from a number of military men, who spoke of Zhukov's Bonapartist tendencies.<sup>6</sup> Gradually the facts added up and could no longer be ignored without subjecting our country to a military coup of the kind that happens in Latin America. We were forced to take the step of removing Zhukov from his posts. It was with difficulty that I arrived at this decision, but there was no alternative.

In place of Zhukov we appointed Malinovsky minister of defense.<sup>7</sup> The process of putting through this appointment was also painful. In the party leadership there were no objections to Malinovsky. Of course his authority on a world scale and throughout the Soviet Union was less than Zhukov's. On the other hand, Marshal Malinovsky had an outstanding record during the war to recommend him, and he was by no means an accidental figure in the realm of military affairs. On a personal plane he didn't have Zhukov's energy and drive; he was calm and somewhat slow-moving by nature. But he was no less thoughtful than Zhukov. I gave preference to Malinovsky over another celebrated marshal, Konev,<sup>8</sup> although I also valued Konev's military abilities highly. But I thought that Konev was capable of conducting himself less than candidly in relation to the party leadership and the government.



When the question of a successor to replace Zhukov as minister of defense was being decided, Zhukov himself raised the question in a pointblank way, true to his soldierly nature: "Who are you going to appoint in my place?"

I felt obliged to answer him, although I didn't want to discuss this question with him. I said: "We are appointing Malinovsky."

"I would prefer Konev," he snapped back. Konev was present at the time, and I didn't want to insult him. Konev's merits are no less than Malinovsky's. But Malinovsky's knowledge of military affairs was no smaller than Konev's and perhaps greater. And in their personalities these two men were quite different.

That's the way things shaped up. Even today I respect Zhukov greatly, although in his memoirs he referred to me unkindly. I don't take offense against him for that. I attribute those lines not to him but to those who made use of his material to produce the kind of book they wanted. This book cannot really be Zhukov's. Zhukov could not have written what is printed there. He is a proud and decent man, incapable of eulogizing Stalin. Zhukov, an honest man, could not have whitewashed Stalin when his murders and the harm he did to our people were so well known.<sup>9</sup>

How many party members Stalin destroyed! He destroyed all our cadres in economic management and engineering. He destroyed thousands. No historical justification can be found for him, as some people are now trying to do. That means to justify future adventurers who are capable of repeating the same kind of thing. Stalin's actions cannot be justified even by citing alleged "noble" motives for the sake of strengthening the state. Stalin used such arguments to justify the executions carried out by Ivan the Terrible, and he himself took the same path of destroying people. Those of us who were close to Stalin, when we read the historical novel *Prince Serebryany* by Aleksei Konstaninovich Tolstoy, were able to confirm that all the foul deeds committed by Ivan the Terrible were literally the same as those later copied by Stalin.<sup>10</sup>

With great pain in my heart I was obliged to part ways with Zhukov. But the interests of our country and our party required that. I remember a sensible suggestion Zhukov made [when he was still in the leadership]. Zhukov's aim was not to allow people who were too advanced in years to be in the leadership of the army. What age would be too old? This didn't have to be an ironclad rule, but it was also not a great tragedy to have an upper limit set on the permissible age for a military leader. No such age had been set in our country. Zhukov proposed that no one older than fifty-five could be a commander of a military district. His motivation for this was that if a war began, the leadership

would have to be in good physical condition. I agreed with him. It was necessary for a commander to be physically healthy and in a sober and sound state of mind, with his brain functioning well. A great deal of stress and the exertion of much effort would be required in the event of war. Cadres would have to be assigned and correct determinations would have to be made as to their capacity for work. On the basis of that proposal we carried out a major reshuffling in the command staffs of the army and navy.

Then Marshal Sokolovsky became ill. He was chief of the General Staff.<sup>11</sup> As a staff officer I valued him more highly than others. He was a sober-minded man with the capacity to make theoretical generalizations, and he had energetically devoted his time to building up our army. But he was now not well, and he needed to be replaced. Marshal Konev was next in line, but he too was suffering from a severe illness and had been since the time of the war. It's true that he's still working somewhere, or more exactly, he's still alive, not working. As the saying goes, he's still scraping along.<sup>12</sup> [Matvei] Zakharov was appointed chief of the General Staff.<sup>13</sup> He was suited to that position both by the level of his training and his qualities as an individual, but unfortunately in my view he also fell into the category of the people Zhukov had been talking about. He had grown old before his time. He would drowse while attending military conferences and fall asleep at sessions of the USSR Council of Ministers. Malinovsky and I decided that we couldn't keep a man who was constantly snoozing as chief of the General Staff. It was better to choose someone whose mind would be fresher. Biryuzov<sup>14</sup> was put forward for this post. Later he died in an airplane accident, and Zakharov was returned to his former post. I personally have nothing—absolutely nothing—against Zakharov. I simply see that he's old, not so much in years as in physical condition.

Perhaps it was the physical condition of Zakharov and several other Soviet military leaders that helps explain Egypt's failure in the Six-Day War with Israel in 1967, because our military had a decisive voice on Egypt's side. Instead of restraining Nasser, they apparently convinced our leadership that Nasser was right [to go to war].

To this day I can't understand how we could have allowed this complete rout of the Egyptians. The Soviet Union bears its share of the responsibility for what happened, a very large share. We could have restrained Nasser from a war for which he was not prepared, and we could have assessed the situation more correctly [than was done], even after the beginning of military operations. Generally speaking, the elimination of Israel's existence as a state should not have been the main aim, and the winning of equal rights for the Arabs of Palestine should have been sought by other means. Israel's



strength was also underestimated. The blame for this lies with our intelligence people and our diplomats, but in addition and above all, it lies with our military, because they had the last word.

What I find most aggravating is that the backwardness of Soviet conventional weapons was demonstratively displayed. Everyone knows about the power of our nuclear arms and missile technology. But the means of waging war that enable us to do battle without using nuclear weapons turned out not to be at the level they should have been. Thus the MacNamara doctrine<sup>15</sup> was vindicated. The Israeli army used American conventional weapons and demonstrated their effectiveness. As for us, if I can put it this way, in effect we suffered a defeat. That was the embarrassing situation we ended up in.

Evidently our conventional weapons, especially our aircraft, were inadequate, because we couldn't ensure supremacy in the air. If the opposite had been the case, the Arabs could have struck more effective blows against the Israeli troops, and events would have taken a different course. Several years have gone by, and the Arabs haven't been able to break out of this situation. Israel retains air supremacy, and its planes are flying with impunity over Egyptian territory.<sup>16</sup>

1. In a later chapter of this volume, "Airplanes and Missiles," Khrushchev gives a detailed account (compare Russian version, 4:199–200) of a three-way interaction (in 1954) involving then-Defense Minister Bulganin, the aeronautical designer Chelomei, and Khrushchev himself, who defended and promoted Chelomei in opposition to Bulganin. An extensive note about Chelomei by Sergei Khrushchev, who worked under that scientist, is also appended to that later chapter. [GS]

2. The June 1957 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee removed Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Shepilov, and others from the Central Committee and its Presidium for factional activity. Bulganin was given a strict reprimand with warning, and in 1958 he was removed from the post of head of the government.

3. Aleksei Kosygin (1904–80) did become chairman of the Council of Ministers (government) after Khrushchev's removal from power in 1964 and remained in that post until 1980 (see Biographies). Thus the practice of separating the posts of party first secretary and chairman of the Council of Ministers was finally established. [SS]

4. In 1956, Georgy Zhukov (1896–1974) was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the fourth time. Also in 1956 he became a candidate member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee; in 1957 he became a full member. From

February 1955 until his retirement in October 1957 he was minister of defense. See Biographies.

5. Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko. See Biographies.

6. The reference is to the overthrow in 1799 of the republic that had been established in France by the revolution of 1789 and the seizure of power by General Napoléon Bonaparte (1769–1821). [SS]

7. Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky (1898–1967) was minister of defense from 1957 to 1967. See Biographies.

8. Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich Konev (1897–1973) was commander in chief of the combined armed forces of the countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty (the Warsaw Pact) from 1955 to 1961 and then commander in chief of Soviet forces in [East] Germany in 1961–62. See Biographies.

9. The Russian edition of Zhukov's memoirs, *Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya* (Reminiscences and Reflections), was published in 1969 by the Novosti press agency. The text that Zhukov submitted in 1966 suffered substantial editorial rewriting at the insistence of ideologists from the party's Central Committee and military officials in the Soviet Defense Ministry. In addition to passages glorifying Stalin, references to Brezhnev's role in the war were added to the book. This was a condition of publication. Ivan Udaltsov, who was

then the director of *Novosti*, later recalled that it was “very difficult” to work with Zhukov, because he “didn’t understand how his ‘memoirs’ needed to be written.” Much effort was exerted to make Zhukov’s book come out “correctly.”

The references to Colonel Brezhnev in Zhukov’s memoirs became a subject for jokes among Muscovites, who wryly observed that Marshal Zhukov, before making any major decisions in the war, seems to have found it necessary—in every case—to consult with Colonel Brezhnev.

Aleksandr Yakovlev, who became chief party ideologist under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s (see *Biographies*), was part of the editorial team from the Communist Party Central Committee that reworked Zhukov’s memoirs. Yakovlev, in his own memoirs, *Omut pamyati* (*The Deep Pool of Memory* [Moscow: VAGRIUS, 2001], 133–36), describes the process by which Zhukov’s memoirs were rewritten, including the “correction” of passages portraying Stalin as uninformed about the basic laws of military strategy and tactics and passages blaming the political leadership for the country’s lack of preparedness for Hitler’s invasion. Yakovlev states also that a chapter about political commissars (whom Zhukov disliked) was added by ghostwriters, and one of Zhukov’s original chapters was deleted because of objections by military officials. [GS/SK]

10. The outstanding Russian poet, writer, and dramatist Count Aleksei Konstantinovich Tolstoy (1817–75) was corresponding member of the Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences from 1873. He was also a distant relative of the great novelist Leo Tolstoy. The historical novel Khrushchev mentions was published in 1863; an English translation appeared in 1927 under the title *A Prince of Outlaws*. Aleksei Tolstoy is still popular in Russia, especially for his trilogy of historical plays, *The*

*Death of Ivan the Terrible* (1866), *Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich* (1868, about Ivan the Terrible’s feeble-minded son Fyodor), and *Tsar Boris* (1870, about Boris Godunov, successor to Ivan the Terrible).

Aleksei Tolstoy is also known for a fictional figure he created in collaboration with his two cousins, the Zhemchuzhnikov brothers—“Kozma Prutkov,” author of proudly platitudinous aphorisms, maxims, and morality tales. The fictional Prutkov was a government clerk and “the incarnation of self-centered and arrogantly naïve complacency.” The silly, pseudo-profound sayings of Kozma Prutkov have become a popular part of Russian culture, and Khrushchev occasionally quotes them in his memoirs. [SK/GS]

11. Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky (1897–1968) was chief of the General Staff from 1952 to 1960. See *Biographies*.

12. From 1960 Sokolovsky had been a member of the Group of General Inspectors of the Defense Ministry. This position, which did not involve a great deal of work, served as a semihonorary position for former top military officers who were nearing retirement. [SS]

13. Marshal of the Soviet Union Matvei Vasilyevich Zakharov (1898–1972) was chief of the General Staff from 1960 to 1963 and from 1964 to 1971. See *Biographies*.

14. Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Semyonovich Biryuzov (1904–64) was chief of the General Staff from 1963 to 1964. See *Biographies*.

15. Robert S. MacNamara (born 1916) was U.S. secretary of defense from 1961 to 1968. His strategic doctrine emphasized flexible and rapid response to local wars involving only conventional weapons rather than preparation for global nuclear war.

16. This was dictated before the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which changed the situation somewhat in favor of Egypt. [SS]

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# *How to Make Life Better*

## **BUILD MORE — AND WITH HIGH QUALITY**

**I**n my early years I was not involved with any kind of construction work. In general the skilled metalworkers of Russia tended rather to look down on it. This attitude resulted apparently from the primitive level of construction technology before the revolution. The chief materials and tools of construction at that time were cement, clay, bricks, the spade, and the ax. Metalworkers were much further advanced in the level of their technical skills. Construction work fell to the lot of people from the villages. Former villagers became bricklayers, carpenters, and joiners. Among construction workers, the work of the joiner was considered the most highly skilled. Those who built houses—laying the bricks for walls and doing the carpentry work—were considered, as before, “country bumpkins.”

Class consciousness among these workers was also not on a high level. They were often the butt of ridicule on the part of skilled workers. They rarely took part—in fact, almost never took part—in strikes and had no understanding of why strikes were necessary. When construction workers finally started going on strike, the following joke began to make the rounds.

Some construction workers come to their employer and say: “Boss, we’re going on strike.”

“Why?”

“Because we’re not going to work.”

“But what the heck do you want?”

“We’re demanding either that you lengthen the working day or decrease our wages.” That is, they had heard that the skilled workers were fighting over the length of the workday and wages, but because of their ignorance they got it all backward.

The boss answers: “Boys, I can’t lengthen the working day. That depends on God. He has fixed the length of the day and night. But on the other hand, I can reduce your wages.”

“Thank you, Boss!”

This kind of anecdote was told about the country boys who came into town to earn some money. As a rule they were seasonal workers, and the construction work they did was seasonal. Here’s another joke that circulated far and wide at one time.

One construction worker is laying bricks up above, and another is laying them down below. The one up above shouts: “Vanka,<sup>1</sup> let me have some more material!”

“What material?”

“A bucket of water.”

“There ain’t no more. The cow came and drank it.”

In the proletarian circles in which I spent my youth, the skilled metalworkers enjoyed the highest authority—lathe operators, machinists, metallurgical workers. I chose the trade of machinist. I became acquainted to some extent with construction work only after the Civil War when I worked as secretary of a party district committee and later headed the organizational department of an okrug committee. Work on restoring the economy had begun in Soviet Russia. I didn’t go deeply into matters involving the construction trade, because I considered it primitive. The materials and the technology remained the same as before. In the construction trade, the technical and cultural level was rising, but only at a slow pace.

When I was a student at the Industrial Academy I entered the department of ferrous metallurgy. Later an industrial-construction department was established, headed by the Old Bolshevik Kaminsky.<sup>2</sup> His wife recently called me and wished me happy birthday, and at the same time she reminded me about the years I spent at the Industrial Academy. In comparison to ourselves, we considered Kaminsky an old man back then. Later he shared the fate of many Old Bolsheviks. He was destroyed. His wife was in a prison camp for many years for no reason whatsoever, simply because she was the wife of an “enemy of the people.” I had great respect for her husband, and when I was elected secretary of the party organization at the Industrial Academy, I had frequent occasion to meet with him on Academy business. This also had to do with the question of specialization, because after the industrial-construction department was organized, the party’s Central Committee passed a resolution to transfer students to that department from other departments, including the industrial, metallurgical, and textile departments. At first they asked: “Who wants to transfer voluntarily?” In our department I don’t remember any who wanted to transfer, and that was true at the other departments as well. It became necessary to transfer people by assigning them through

party channels and to announce an additional recruitment effort [among Academy students].

That was the attitude people still had then toward construction matters, including myself. In fact it was the same attitude as before. In this case I was displaying a failure to understand its importance. Only in 1932, when I became second secretary of the party's Moscow city committee, and from then on, until the end of my party and government work, by the will of fate I became closely linked with construction work. Housing and factories had to be put up, municipal services had to be set running smoothly, roads had to be built, and we built the Moscow subway system—all of this turned out to be so crucial in our lives that it drew me in and began to absorb me completely. It was not construction work itself that fascinated me, but the fact that it was an activity of a new kind. After all, building factories and organizing municipal services—these are concrete expressions of the Leninist idea of building socialism. It is not a matter of just studying theory. Socialism is attractive because it provides material improvements for working people. Socialism is a social system that places the interests of working people in the forefront. Without material goods there cannot be socialism. That's why the working class is the chief moving force in the struggle against the old society for a new, socialist system. My association with construction work consisted specifically at that time of solving organizational problems in the construction of factories, housing, municipal services, schools, hospitals—everything that everyone needed.

This aspect of my activity became more complicated as I became, in turn, second secretary of the party's Moscow city committee, then second secretary of the party's Moscow province committee, and then first secretary of both the city committee and the province committee. At the Seventeenth Party Congress I was elected a member of the party's Central Committee. Taking part in the industrialization of the country became a passion for me, including the specific tasks I engaged in. I loved this work and I gave myself to it completely, without holding anything back. I had no other life besides party work. I was busy forming party organizations and orienting them toward solving the tasks of socialist construction.

Yet construction remained on a fairly primitive technological level. If today we have tower cranes operating, back then we used a device that we called a goat.<sup>3</sup> The "goat" was placed on your shoulders, and [after you hunched over] the flat surface on your back was filled with construction materials. It ended up being a heavy load to carry. A man bent over holding a "goat" by the handles would clamor up the gangways, as though on shipboard, from

one floor to the next, and that's how the bricks, mortar, and cement were transported. That was how we lifted materials in those days—those were our hoisting devices. Later we began using simple mechanical hoists. We would lift a load to the upper floors with such elementary devices as the winch.

In spite of that, the work in itself was fascinating because you could immediately see the result when a new house had been built and living quarters had been provided for people. It's true that the new housing was immediately overcrowded with residents because not much housing was being built. Our money was being spent mainly in putting up industrial enterprises. Without that, the system brought into being by the October revolution would not have been able to consolidate itself while trapped in capitalist encirclement. In Moscow we began to build a huge motor-vehicle factory where previously just a workshop had stood. We also built a ball-bearing plant, an oil and gas complex, a plant that produced milling machines,<sup>4</sup> an airplane factory, and the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute [Russian initials, TsAGI]. I can't even list all the installations that we put up then. People lived in primitive conditions, but they took part in this work of construction with enthusiasm. Later we began to build the Moscow subway system. That work enthralled me completely. I would go home from work through the mineshafts and tunnels of the subway system, and on my way to work I passed through them, too. I was put in charge of this construction work.

In fact I became the organizational-political leader of the subway construction project<sup>5</sup> without having an official title to that effect. After the first phase of the subway was completed in 1935, I was given an award for the first time in my life—the Order of Lenin No. 110, the highest award existing at that time. This order had been established in 1930, and in the five years since then only 109 such awards had been given out. That's how sparingly people were decorated with that particular order back then. And the award was considered all the more honorable for that reason. Later the Order of Lenin was given more and more frequently, which reduced its value. That doesn't mean it became worthless. No, even today it is valued highly, but when the chances of receiving it are greater, it no longer shines as brightly for those to whom it is awarded or for those looking on.

I remember how we set about constructing bakeries for bread in Moscow on a large industrial scale. There were many small bakeries operating in the city. As a rule they were in the rather filthy lower floors of buildings, with cockroaches and other “delights.” People kneaded the dough by hand, which resulted in an unhygienic situation and God knows what else. If people saw

how bread was being made, they would have lost their appetites. We were entranced with the idea of large industrial bakeries, and from Great Britain we purchased several such units for Moscow. Later an engineer named Marsakov designed our own industrial bakery, similar to the British model.<sup>6</sup> He had previously worked in the Krasnya Presnya district, where the equipment for the industrial bakeries was being set up. Equipment for Industrial Bakery No. 5 was designed according to his plan. It seems that it is still functioning to this day.<sup>7</sup> Later my name was attached to this facility, and it bore my name until the time when we passed a resolution to stop naming places and things after leaders of the country or other social or political figures while they were still alive: cities, towns, factories, collective farms, and so forth. I was the author of that proposal.

We were all enthralled back then by what we saw at Industrial Bakery No. 5. All the processes there were carried out automatically: the proper amounts of flour, water, and salt were apportioned, and they were mixed, the dough was heated, then divided into units, and the individual items were shaped. Delivery into the oven, removal of the baked loaves, and their transfer to places of storage—all these processes were mechanized. We achieved a high level of mechanization for that time, surpassing the level achieved in the industrial bakeries purchased in Britain. Not long before that, Maxim Gorky had finally relocated to the Soviet Union from Italy.<sup>8</sup> He became acquainted with the construction processes going on in Moscow. Kaganovich and I accompanied him, traveling together to construction sites, factories, and plants. Gorky, who had formerly worked as a baker, also visited our industrial bakeries. At No. 5 he watched for a long time as the automatic system “shot out” readymade loaves of bread. Tears rolled down his cheeks, tears of joy, remembering what he had known before and seeing how working conditions had changed.

Those were good times, although for us they remained difficult in terms of material provisions. People lived in semi-starvation, but still they worked at a frenzied pace. That’s not a very melodious phrase—“worked at a frenzied pace”—but in those days it was understood in a good sense: we were working selflessly, disregarding our personal well-being, seeking to build, build, build for our society, without paying attention to how the builders were provided for materially. Everything was being done in the name of socialism, for the working class, for the future! And for the time being we led a Spartan existence.

I don’t want to contrast the living conditions of the workers before the revolution and after it. I didn’t need to make that comparison, even though I knew that I had been better provided for in the pre-revolutionary era



when I worked as an ordinary machinist. I earned forty-five rubles a month when the price for black bread was two kopecks and for white bread, four kopecks.<sup>9</sup> For a pound of lard it was twenty-two kopecks and an egg cost one kopeck, and as for shoes, the very best from the Skorokhod factory cost as much as seven rubles. What's the point of making comparisons here? When I was engaged in party work in Moscow I didn't have even half that much, although I held a fairly high post in social and political respects. Other people were provided for less well than I was. But we were looking to the future, and there was no limit to what we could imagine about that. The prospect inspired us and impelled us to move forward in the struggle to reorganize the life of our society. Those were noble aims, to which we devoted ourselves entirely and with enthusiasm, and we had almost no private life of our own.

Gradually I acquired a more profound knowledge of construction and began to be recognized by those engaged in construction as one of theirs, not an outsider, because I had made a fairly serious study of the trade. I even made some new contributions of my own as a result of native Russian inventiveness (*smekalka*) and my mastery of the more sophisticated skills of the machinist's trade. I made friends with the engineers, architects, designers, and work-brigade leaders. I was especially fascinated by bridge construction. As we completed the building of bridges across the Moscow River,<sup>10</sup> we were also solving the transportation problem on a level that left nothing to be desired. Even today when I travel over those bridges I am reminded that a bit of my effort is built into them. I remember well the sessions of the Central Committee plenums that were devoted to the question of reconstructing Moscow. I became one of those who turned the resolutions adopted by those plenums into reality.

Providing water for Moscow and building the Moscow subway were two projects initiated at that time. Moscow did not have enough water. There was also a need to make a transportation artery of the Moscow River, which runs through the city, and to clean up the river. Literally everything was being dumped into the Moscow River, all the impurities from the city. Together with Bulganin, chairman of the Moscow Soviet, I made a survey of the river in a police launch. We traveled the length of the river where it runs through the city. After that we had to send our overalls to the laundry because they had been ruined by the fumes given off by the waste matter floating on the surface. In his book about the Russo-Japanese War, Novikov-Priboi described the sinking of a battleship in the harbor at Port Arthur. The celebrated Admiral

Makarov perished with his ship, but Grand Duke Cyril, the tsar's plenipotentiary, was saved.<sup>11</sup> The sailors' bitter comment was that gold sinks and crap floats. That's precisely what the Moscow River was full of.

We set about building the first reservoir for Moscow—the Istra Reservoir.<sup>12</sup> This was considered industrial construction for those days, but it was done by manual labor. It was mainly Belorussian peasants who came there with their horses, shovels, and “excavation carts” in the form of a basket on wheels, the basket consisting of woven branches. They would fill the wheeled basket with dirt. That was all the equipment we had for moving dirt from one place to another. In present-day conditions this kind of work is done with the help of a conveyor belt or a self-propelled “walking” excavator. But back then we used hand barrows and dray carts. Then we undertook the building of the Moscow-Volga canal, a colossal project for those days. Fundamentally we used the same primitive methods, and the construction workers were mainly prisoners. Even though they were criminals, they were treated humanely to some degree. People sympathized with them for having ended up in such a situation, being prisoners in a socialist country. They were regarded as a product of capitalist society, and the thinking was that they should be treated as people who were mentally retarded or seriously ill, who needed to engage in labor as a form of treatment. Labor was used as a means of treating them, re-educating them, forging them into something new.<sup>13</sup> During the work on this canal I became acquainted with the work of the remarkable engineer Kholid. He has not been among the living for a long time; he was considerably older than me. Kholid was already using some industrial elements in construction work, which pleased me greatly. He introduced the method of “hydro-transportation” (*gidrotransport*).<sup>14</sup> Later that method was used rather widely, and even today it's used wherever it's expedient and cost-effective.

The chief architect in Moscow back then was Chernyshev,<sup>15</sup> a good, intelligent, gentle, educated man. It may even be said that he was too gentle, soft as wax. I remember several other architects: Alabyan, Mordvinov, Shchusev, and Zholtovsky. I respected Mordvinov greatly as a good worker and a good comrade. He joined the party out of ideological considerations, not in pursuit of some material advantage or wanting to occupy a post out of vanity. Shchusev and Zholtovsky made a strong impression on me. They were considered the two “whales” of Soviet architecture. Some people preferred Zholtovsky. And I, too, valued Zholtovsky's talent very highly, but I preferred Aleksei Viktorov Shchusev, with whom I established close relations. Later he

came to Kiev many times at my invitation, and we had useful conversations about the reconstruction of the Ukrainian capital. He was a sharp-witted man with a good sense of humor. When we looked over the architects' and artists' designs for the first subway stations, he was quite free in his criticism of them, since he himself was not taking part in the competition. His authority was very great. Zholtofsky was also brought in as a consultant. He, too, was not taking part in the competition, in which plans and designs for the first section of the Moscow subway were submitted.

I remember there was a discussion about a design submitted by the celebrated Fomin.<sup>16</sup> He was a learned man from Leningrad, an elderly, venerable, respected architect. At that point two leading lights of the world of architecture clashed—Fomin and Shchusev. Shchusev walked up onto the stand where Fomin's canvases were on display and began to comment along the following lines: "What can be said about this design? It has been produced by a great master, but the impression it gives is like a chunk of beef." It was as though Fomin had been scalded by boiling water. He got all worked up and objected vehemently. Everyone who uses the Moscow subway today knows that the Krasnye Vorota (Red Gates) subway station is trimmed with marble with a dusky shade of red, the color of beef that's a little old, no longer fresh. Fomin designed that station and chose marble of a kind called *Shrosh*, which is quarried at a place called Shrosha. The other stations are trimmed with marble of a pleasant gray color from the Ufolei<sup>17</sup> quarry, or a white marble with slightly yellowish tints. Other types of marble from various parts of the country were also brought in. This material seemed attractive to us, especially for those days. All of it was quarried by hand, which was very costly, but after all, the subway system seemed to us like a treasure of historic proportions. The decorations in the subway were in general rather extravagant.

I remember after the war I invited some architects to Kiev to take part in a competition for the reconstruction of the main street in Kiev, the Kreshchatik, which had been destroyed by the Germans. Shchusev was called in as a consultant. None of the designs submitted were adopted, and this served as an impulse toward choosing a new and different variant for solving the problem of reconstructing the street. The Kreshchatik is a historic street, an elegant and magnificent avenue. It runs along the base of a steep cliff and was once called the Kreshchaty Yar (Ravine of the Christening). It is said that the ancient Russian Prince Vladimir drove the inhabitants of Kiev with clubs toward the Dnieper River down this ravine so that they could be baptized in the river. That's why the street is called the Kreshchatik.<sup>18</sup> After a

conference some architects from Moscow and Kiev—gathered in a small, intimate group—asked Shchusev about Kiev. Aleksei Viktorovich [Shchusev] related many interesting things at that time. His remarks were recorded, but today I have misplaced the tape, which I greatly regret. Shchusev was literally in love with Kiev, and what he related then was like a poetic distillation of this, his great passion. Kiev deserves such praise. It wins people over with its mild climate, flowering horse chestnuts, white acacias, elegant new buildings, and its “traditions from the deepest past.” I will go into the reconstruction of the Kreshchatik a bit more, later on.

Whenever Aleksei Viktorovich [Shchusev] came to Kiev, he always visited me at the Central Committee offices. He used to say: “Well, here I have arrived to have a little talk and have a little rest. I took a walk along the Kreshchatik, went down to the market, and bought some pirozhki. The pirozhki are so *tasty*.”<sup>19</sup> I enjoyed listening to him. I usually asked him about various projects. He would explain himself like this: “Nikita Sergeyeovich, it’s all a matter of time. People get upset over any new project and criticize it. When the Kiev opera house was built, so many unkind things were written about it. So much ink was spilled about it, uselessly and destructively, but today the attitude toward the building is different. It’s an attractive building; it really has no repulsive features. Time goes by, people get used to something, and the architect’s conception finally penetrates the consciousness of onlookers.” I agreed with him.

The same can be said about the building of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR on Okhotny Ryad (Hunters’ Row) across from the Moskva Hotel. The plan for this building was the work of the architect Langman. He worked for Yagoda in the NKVD, the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs.<sup>20</sup> When the design was finished, Molotov called me, since he would be the future master of the building [as chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars]. He suggested I come to the Kremlin because Langman was going to give a report on the construction scheduled on Okhotny Ryad. Molotov wanted me to take part in the discussion because I already had accumulated some experience in construction work. I found out that he had also invited Zholtovsky. I considered it superfluous to take part as a “specialist,” but it was a pleasure for me to go observe and listen. The basic design and its details were displayed on huge frames. Molotov first of all asked Zholtovsky to comment. He looked the project over. (He always had a calm, impassive, pious look on his face, and his face was very wrinkled. Behind his back we called him the Roman Pope.) He said the design was acceptable but not very expressive. He then demonstrated immediately what

he meant by this term. He took one of the frames and turned it upside down, then asked: “Could the building be built this way? Yes, it could. It would lose nothing. No one would even notice. So the design doesn’t have a physiognomy of its own; it lacks architectural expressiveness.”

You can imagine how upset the author of the design was, how he began to snap and defend his work, but it was not easy to oppose Zholtovsky. If Zholtovsky or Shchusev criticized someone, things went badly for that person. The review of the project ended at that point. Zholtovsky and Langman left; Molotov and I remained. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich [Molotov] said: “I think the design should be accepted in spite of everything.” I didn’t object. Zholtovsky was really right in his comments, but after all, every design corresponds to a particular purpose. Let’s say, for example, that a certain sculpture is going to be placed on a particular building and someone comes up with idea of decorating the façade with some scrolls or flourishes or curlicues or some other thing. Well, what of it? The building was erected according to the original architect’s plan, and it didn’t make any passers-by suffer from negative emotions. On the contrary, many liked it.

Some other architects I remember well were the Vesnin brothers.<sup>21</sup> They designed commercial, cultural, and industrial buildings.

As for Fomin, he was again invited from Leningrad for the building of the Khimki river terminal [on the Moscow River].<sup>22</sup>

People were guided by the thought that architects from Leningrad might bring something new to Moscow. The river terminal building that we know today has a distant resemblance to the Admiralty building in Leningrad. After construction was completed, the architects, engineers, and workers had a feast all night long in the main room of this “five-seas river terminal.”

I also had a high regard for the architect Aleksandr Vasilyevich Vlasov, who considered himself a student of Zholtovsky’s and had completed his education in our Soviet era while he was still working in production. Toward the end of the Great Patriotic War I invited him to be chief architect in Kiev.<sup>23</sup> I had made his acquaintance once in a historic spot in the city of Uman<sup>24</sup> in the botanical garden, or arboretum, called the Sofiyevka. This park was designed in a very original way in olden times and built by the labor of serfs. A Polish nobleman, Count Potocki, was the owner of the Sofiyevka. Vlasov fell in love with that park and made a number of sketches there; later he did a painting based on those sketches and gave it to me as a gift. For me this painting is a reminder of the past and a personal memento from Vlasov. Of course I can’t remember all the names of architects and city

planners and engineers that I had occasion to work with and learn from on construction projects.

When I was given the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Stalin warned me: “I know your weakness for construction work and matters involving the municipal economy. That is good and useful with regard to the city of Moscow. But I want to give you the proper orientation for the future. You yourself are from the Donbas; you have a passion for coal, metallurgy, and the chemical industry, and you’re bound to pay more attention to those branches of the economy. They’re important, but right now the main thing for the Soviet Union is agriculture, the agriculture of Ukraine. You will have to set aside what’s familiar to you and pay more attention to organizing collective farms and state farms so that we can obtain bread, milk, and meat, especially since the population of Ukraine loves to do this kind of work. Of course you must also pay attention to the industrial sectors. Ukraine represents a huge industrial complex, but the main thing for you now will be agriculture. Coal, metallurgy, and the chemical industry are branches of production that have already been organized. We have well-trained engineers and managerial cadres in those sectors, and they are properly subordinated to the central leadership, but agriculture is still fairly fragmented and loosely dispersed. More attention needs to be paid to it.”

In essence I agreed with Stalin and accepted his instructions as fitting and proper. For me at that time, Stalin’s authority was everything! That’s why in Ukraine I was less occupied with construction matters. I had fewer dealings with the world of architecture and construction in the cities of Ukraine. Also there was not a lot of construction in Kiev at that time. Moscow received the lion’s share of capital investments. There had been a government decision regarding the overall reconstruction of Moscow, and it received the necessary material resources not by way of the Russian Federation, but directly from the central government. The State Planning Commission assigned these resources separately. After all it was the capital of the Soviet Union! Of our scarce resources at that time, as much as possible was torn away to be assigned to Moscow, and the main emphasis was placed on building heavy industry. What would strengthen the power of the USSR is what we developed first of all, and our everyday domestic needs were not given much attention, which was the reason for the unbelievably difficult housing conditions even in Moscow. Not to mention the other cities of our country.

Then the war broke out. What we inherited from the war was ruins in the cities and industrial centers. In Kiev the worst destruction was on the

Kreshchatik. The best buildings, which had stood there since time immemorial, had been destroyed, although some prewar structures remained intact (for example, the building of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR). It's true that before the war it had been proposed that this building be placed at the disposal of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (the NKVD). And so it was the NKVD that actually put up the building. It was designed by Fomin, who I have mentioned before.<sup>25</sup>

During the last year of my government activity [1964], when I was in Leningrad, I met another architect named Fomin and asked him: "Are you related to the older architect Fomin?"

"Yes, that's my father."

"It's a great pleasure to meet the son of such a worthy and famous father. I knew him well."<sup>26</sup>

Before the war a new building had also been built for the command staff of the Kiev Special Military District. Later the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party was located in that building. These buildings were among the few that remained intact after the war. The only damage was that on some floors of these buildings the parquet floor had been burned.

During preparations for the campaign to liberate Kiev from the Germans I had proposed that special units be established whose assignment would be, as soon as our troops broke into the city, to immediately search certain key buildings. The job of these army-engineer units would be to defuse explosives and put out fires. When I arrived in Kiev I went around to the districts that had concerned me the most. It was pleasing for me to see that we had achieved our aims; most of the buildings were still intact. Those we quickly restored to their normal condition, but not all the buildings were intact. On the Kreshchatik and Bogdan Khmel'nitsky Square a huge fire was raging. Buildings that the Germans had blown up or set on fire were still burning, including Kiev University, named after Taras Shevchenko. I felt especially bad about the university building because the university library with its very rich collection was burning up. The Kreshchatik had been destroyed earlier, soon after the Germans arrived in 1941. I never could make out who it was that blew up those buildings. The Germans explained to the population that Soviet partisans had blown them up.<sup>27</sup> According to my information, no such assignments had been given to the partisans, but then, who knows? It's hard to say. In spite of everything I think it was the work of the Gestapo. They were not interested in the city and certainly not in the fate of the people, who would be doomed to live under harsh circumstances.



They were just diverting the anger of the people toward the partisans to try to make some of them more inclined to collaborate with the Germans.

The Kreshchatik, the heart of Kiev, was especially dear to me. Every day, when I drove down it, I looked at the ruins. Thus my energy was drawn once again toward construction work. By restoring Kiev we could set an example for other Ukrainian cities that had also suffered great destruction, especially in the Donbas. The central government ministries were concerned about the restoration of the metallurgical industry and the coal industry. Problems of the municipal economy rested on the shoulders of the local leadership, which had to pay more attention to these problems than before the war. We had no possibilities then for undertaking new capital construction. All our efforts were directed toward providing elementary living conditions for people in the cities and villages. We searched for ways to build more economically, and we popularized more rational methods for building walls by using fewer bricks. We had neither cement nor lime [used for mortar], and therefore I was particularly interested in the recommendations of engineers who said in construction we should use materials with filler in them, and that we shouldn't put up solid walls, but walls with gaps or openings in them. We began trying to find ways to build more housing while using fewer bricks. With that kind of construction you can't go higher than four stories, more often only two stories, and then only on the outskirts of the city. To restore the Kreshchatik we would need to use solid construction methods. We could not historically justify the use of substitute materials in putting up the walls there, and so we put off more important things like that to the future, when we would be wealthier and would have the material possibilities for fundamental, thoroughgoing reconstruction.

When Vlasov became the chief architect for Kiev, I brought in another man for road building, Stramentov, an energetic organizer of such work, a prominent road-building engineer who in the 1930s had been director of a road-building trust when the embankments along the Moscow River were being built. He proposed that alongside the Kreshchatik a brick-lined tunnel or channel be built through which the pipes for municipal services would run, so that the street would not have to be dug up when anything went wrong with the pipes. In Moscow we had got sick and tired of the streets being dug up. While one organization was building, another would be digging up the street to open up the pipes, and so on, and then cover them up again. This always made a bad impression on people. The population criticized the government and was right to do so. And so we set to work. I think Kiev was



the only city where the main municipal service pipes were grouped together in one channel. Work was done on the Kreshchatik on Sundays by local inhabitants, and later we brought German prisoners of war to take part in this work. Our antiaircraft defense troops, mainly young women, did a lot of work there, too. While on duty they neaten up the Kreshchatik's appearance, clearing away the ruins of buildings that had been blown up. The Kreshchatik was also made wider than it had been before the war.

It was impossible to accept any longer the conditions people were living in. Even before the war their conditions had been poor, and the destruction caused by the war made the way people had to live completely intolerable. I was concerned mainly about two problems: mechanization of labor and [the materials to be used in] roofing and flooring. At first we were not up to doing things according to the usual architectural standards. During reconstruction in Moscow we had managed by using lumber for roofs and floors, but in Kiev, where the lumber we received was wet, we couldn't even do that. There was no place and no time for drying out the wood. And so there was mold in the roofs and floors that we put up. Consequently, after a few years they had to be replaced. Once again the population was confronted with hellish living conditions. We had to find some solution, so that the floors and roofs would be solid and long-lasting. In Poland even then they were making beams and girders out of ceramic blocks with metal reinforcement. The ceramic material in these girders could bear heavy loads and was for all practical purposes permanent. The manufacture of these girders was a difficult job, involving much hand labor, but we started using this material because there was no other solution. We first applied this method in Kiev. Moscow was not yet familiar with it at that time.

A remarkable engineer by the name of Abramovich lived in Kiev. Where is he now? He was a mechanical engineer who had a passion for ceramics. He also worked at a ceramics factory. Abramovich showed me what beautiful objects can be made out of ceramics. We found common ground and became fast friends, as the saying goes. I was fascinated and I often went to visit his factory. He demonstrated unheard-of possibilities for me: making ceramic tiles covered by glaze to finish off bathrooms and toilets and paneling for decorating the facades of buildings.<sup>28</sup> A new idea came to us. Clay is a highly malleable material, and I asked him: "Couldn't we make matrixes or molds from which clay tiles could be produced bearing a desired architectural design or pattern and then use those tiles to cover the faces of buildings?" He answered: "Of course we can." The basic patterns were designed, and a factory was built for firing the clay and baking the glaze. In this process we

made use of appropriate experience from Czechoslovakia and East Germany, and after that we began restoring the Kreshchatik. Vlasov remained the chief figure in this work.<sup>29</sup> Whenever I drove in Kiev after that or walked down the Kreshchatik, taking delight in its magnificent appearance, I felt great satisfaction that a bit of my effort as well was embodied in it.

Since I held a high post, I made decisions about many things then. After all, quite a bit depends on the person who gives the orders. There were many plans and proposals, and it was necessary to choose the one that would correspond best to the spirit of the times and the intended purpose. I was happy because in my opinion beautiful buildings resulted from our work. Some people know that I, too, was part of this effort. It used to be that in Kiev people would say: “How attractive the design and appearance of the Kreshchatik is.” But I also heard criticism. Some critics said that the architects just fiddled around, that there wasn’t a strictness or firmness in the design decisions, and this detracted from the artistic appearance of the buildings. But I remember Shchusev’s words, that it’s hard to gain recognition from one’s contemporaries. People get set in their ways, once their inner personality has been formed, and the tastes they have acquired are expressed in their opinions [in this case about architecture].

When we widened the Kreshchatik we gave more space to the section where traffic passes through. We moved the pedestrian areas back, especially those that go from the Dnieper westward to the left of the lanes for traffic. In the pedestrian areas we put in pathways, benches, patches of flowers, and later we planted some horse chestnuts and mountain ash, or rowan. The latter is a marvelous tree. It can become an excellent decorative tree if appropriate specimens are selected. In the fall when the leaves drop off, the clusters of rowanberries give off a red glow and make an elegant impression.

We encountered great difficulties trying to restore the coal mines of the Donbas, and the iron ore mines. There was a shortage of support timbers and of transport to deliver them. There was sufficient timber in Ukraine, but it was located far away. People who have some conception of the work of reinforcing mineshafts with support timbers know how quickly the wood rots in the mines [from the dampness]. Wet wood, or wood that has not been properly cured and dried, is quickly ruined by mold and fungus growth, literally before your eyes. At that point I remembered my old Moscow acquaintance, Professor Mikhailov,<sup>30</sup> and his ideas of improving reinforced concrete structures. He was then working on a type of pre-stressed reinforced concrete. Inviting him to Kiev, I told him my thinking about making reinforced concrete structures to prop up and reinforce the

shafts in coal mining. Mikhailov confirmed that this was entirely possible. Why did I ask him in particular? Because even before the war he had been working on prestressed reinforced concrete. The difficulty was to keep the reinforced concrete structures from being too heavy, so that one or two could do the work of propping up, reinforcing, and shoring up the mineshafts—that is, could handle the weight. We didn't have any machinery for that kind of work back then. We could only count on manpower for the necessary lifting and carrying.

Mikhailov began to work along these lines and we achieved success. We began to experiment in the Donbas with the new methods of shoring up mineshafts. The head of the administration responsible for such things was Zasyadko,<sup>31</sup> but he hadn't been able to solve the problem. I appealed to Stalin in a personal letter with a request that the State Planning Commission be ordered to include these methods in its planning. There turned out to be a great deal of resistance in Moscow. Many thought that metal was better than concrete. I don't deny that metal would be more convenient because the supports and ceiling coverings could be made thinner. But the problem was that there was a severe shortage of metal. That [insisting that only metal be used] would have meant that the new idea was doomed, because they wouldn't give us metal. I managed to demonstrate this convincingly to Stalin, and he supported me. We began using reinforced concrete in shoring up the mineshafts. Later when the miners made the transition to long-wall mining with movable buttresses, they began to use metal because the buttresses had to be lightweight, so they could be used in one location for a short period and then moved to another. These supports were used many times over, and therefore it was more convenient to have them made of metal. But during the time that I'm describing, at the main mining faces (*shtreki*) and at other work sites, reinforced concrete was used. I went down into the mines more than once at that time. They had begun to look different, something like subway tunnels.

Then we introduced another innovation. One of the engineers brought up the idea of making the transition from wooden railroad ties to reinforced concrete ties.<sup>32</sup> I seized on this idea. In the [Moscow] subway in the first phase we made concrete foundations and at first we even placed the rails on concrete. Welding was done along the entire length of the tie without any joints. Later the conservatives proved that joints were necessary. We took the old rails out and put in new ones with joints, but the bumping that resulted caused wear to the rolling stock [making it wear out too quickly]. A few years went by and once again the familiar arguments were heard that the

rolling stock should be used more economically and that longer lengths of rail should be welded into one unit. That way the rolling stock wouldn't get worn out so quickly. Once again reinforced concrete came to the fore! How many new opponents showed up; how much arguing was necessary to demonstrate the point! Nevertheless we tested out the decision to lay reinforced concrete on the sections of track near the stations, where the speed of the trains was not so great. People tried to demonstrate to us that in general you couldn't base a railway system on reinforced concrete ties. With such ties, the rolling stock would not have sufficient shock absorption—and this would cause accidents.

To my surprise and pleasure I found out a few years later that in Czechoslovakia they made railroad ties of exactly this kind and made them much better than we did. Documentary films nowadays often show railroad tracks being laid on reinforced concrete ties. I put this idea forward immediately after the war. I am saying this to show how much of an interest I took in construction questions all along. I always searched for new and progressive methods that would be more economical. Previously we had laid the railroad tracks on wooden ties, and the ties were worn down quickly. But the reinforced concrete ties were a different matter. I tried to convince people: "If need be, let's use shock-absorption pads. We can start laying the tracks on such pads, but the weight will be borne by the reinforced concrete. That will increase the length of service, reduce our costs on maintaining the tracks, and free us from unnecessary destruction of timber, which is needed for other purposes, in areas where we can't get by without using wood." Many opponents rose up against me, but in the end the use of reinforced concrete ties forced its way into existence in our country, too.

In Moscow [in 1950 and after] I had a difficult fight during several ongoing stages of subway construction. A transition had been made then to building the subway lines using tunneling machines [*(gorno) prokhodcheskiye shchity*] and shoring up the tunnels with cast-iron tubing, a method copied from the British. This tubing lent itself easily to mechanization and was easy to install, but still it was metal, which was expensive and moreover did not last that long underground. Rust would corrode it, and after a certain time everything had to be replaced. This was where reinforced concrete won its rightful place. I proposed that the tubing for the subway work be made of reinforced concrete, because I believed in that material. An unholy uproar was raised. The workers and engineers had got used to the old method of shoring up the subway shafts [with cast-iron tubing]. Everything had been adapted to that method: the workshops where the iron was forged, the lathe

work, connecting the tubing together, drilling holes, and so forth. Finally I succeeded in having tubing made from reinforced concrete. Reinforced concrete can be cast in forms just like iron. A casting or foundry process is also involved. Later people learned how to prestress the reinforced concrete. Relatively refined, convenient, and more long-lasting tubing was the result. A great economizing of iron was achieved. The mechanization of the work processes and the speed of those processes remained the same, because the form of the reinforced concrete tubing was the same as that of the cast-iron tubing.

Toward the end of 1949 Stalin summoned me to Moscow. He called me in Lvov, where I was holding a meeting with students at the Forestry Technical Institute after the assassination of the Ukrainian writer Yaroslav Galan.<sup>33</sup> He had done a great deal for Soviet Ukraine in the struggle against Bandera's supporters and the Uniate church.<sup>34</sup> That's why he was killed. The gunman was tipped off by local priests and nationalists. The assassin turned out to be a student at the above-named institute. He confessed that others had urged him to do this. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was a powerful movement in western Ukraine at that time, especially among students in Lvov. We held a public meeting, and I went there although I was warned that all sorts of surprises were possible, up to and including acts of terrorism. These supporters of OUN did not shrink even from suicidal acts in the name of achieving their goals, but it was necessary for me to go! We were fighting our enemies not only by arresting them and putting them on trial but by explaining the destructiveness of the course they were following. In those days the Carpathian Mountains were virtually inaccessible for us. Behind every bush you could encounter a terrorist.

During my speech at the public meeting, I was handed a note that said Stalin was urgently asking me to call him. When I finished my speech I went to the apartment I was temporarily occupying in Lvov and established a connection with Moscow. Stalin asked me: "When can you come here?" I said: "If it's urgent, I can come tomorrow." It was a very brief conversation, and that made me uneasy. It was a difficult time for me. After the bad harvest of 1946 in Ukraine I was out of Stalin's favor.<sup>35</sup> And now came a phone call like this! The devil only knew what was up. It's true that another phone call to me from Malenkov was fairly encouraging. He said: "Don't be concerned. You're being summoned for good reasons. You'll find out the details when you arrive, but don't worry." I arrived at the Kremlin. Stalin proposed that I transfer to Moscow, saying that treason had been exposed in Leningrad and an investigation was under way, that a trial was in preparation, and that things were not good in Moscow either. Therefore he wanted me to head

up the Moscow party organization, to become secretary of the Moscow province committee and city committee once again and simultaneously to be a secretary of the Central Committee. I had held the Moscow committee posts before the war, but I had not been a secretary of the Central Committee. Stalin asked what my attitude was toward this proposal and added: “You’ve worked in Ukraine long enough. If you stay there, you’ll turn completely into a Ukrainian agronomist.” I thanked him and replied that I would be glad to transfer to Moscow. I had been working in Ukraine long enough, and it was time to return to the capital of our country, to Moscow.

And so I found myself in Moscow once again. I replaced Popov,<sup>36</sup> who had been promoted at one time by Malenkov. The man who had replaced me in 1938, a good and intelligent man whom I respected greatly, had been Aleksandr Ivanovich Ugarov,<sup>37</sup> but he was hit by the repression while he was secretary of the party’s Moscow committee. He had been promoted by Zhdanov as a former Leningrader. After Ugarov’s arrest Stalin urgently summoned me and temporarily made me the authorized representative of the party’s Central Committee for Moscow. Then Shcherbakov<sup>38</sup> was made first secretary of the Moscow party committee. He turned out to be not a decent man at all. There was testimony against Shcherbakov, and it had existed a long time, so that Stalin gave Malenkov and me the following assignment: “Pick someone as a second secretary who can keep track of Shcherbakov and report to us in case anything comes up.” Popov was the one promoted to be second secretary. Previously he had been one of Malenkov’s assistants in the cadres department of the Central Committee. Subsequently Shcherbakov, whom Stalin did not trust at first, turned things around. He was a total bootlicker as well as a trained attack dog. He began to snap and bite other people and literally moved ahead in his career over the backs of his victims, thus winning a position of authority in Stalin’s eyes. He was a vile person, if you look closely at what he did at that time. But Stalin thought of him as a worthy builder of the Red Army and appointed him head of the Political Directorate of the army. Shcherbakov ingratiated himself with Stalin, functioning only as a “pseudo-leader” of the Political Directorate. He drank too much and soon after the war he died. Popov was left by himself—an unintelligent man and a crude administrator. He turned many people against himself, but that would not have been grounds for Stalin to drive him out. The problem was that an anonymous denunciation had appeared, depicting Popov as a conspirator. Of course he was no such thing.

I took charge of affairs in Moscow, occupying the three posts mentioned above. The election process by which I became a secretary of the Central

Committee, was, to put it mildly, an original one. Stalin simply appointed me, and I have no idea whether any kind of voting or polling process took place among the members of the Central Committee. Actually, how could any voting have taken place when for a very long time no party congresses or Central Committee plenums had been held? Any kind of party democracy in the Central Committee had long since been eliminated. As for the chairman of the Moscow Soviet, the man who now holds that post, Promyslov,<sup>39</sup> was head of the construction administration for our capital city back then, and before that he had been one of Popov's assistants.

Once again I was drawn into construction matters. After the war Moscow was in need of construction more than before. There was terrible overcrowding in Moscow's apartments. I remember very well the last year of Popov's work and the leadership that was then being provided by Promyslov at the construction sites in the capital. By the end of the year [1949] four hundred thousand square meters of living space had been provided. In those days that was considered a large figure, because everything was done by hand. Construction moved ahead slowly, and not a large quantity resulted. Five-story buildings were going up, but there were also a lot of one-story buildings of the barracks type, built entirely of brick and unseasoned lumber. When I went to the construction sites I saw that the floors between stories were being made of wood.<sup>40</sup> Only rarely was any material other than wood being used, but the support structures or girders (or as they call them in the Russian countryside, *matitsy*) were made of metal. This surprised me. There was a severe shortage of metal, and besides in housing construction, when temperatures changed and dampness got in, metal structures were highly susceptible to rust. In Kiev we were already making extensive use of reinforced-concrete supports and girders, and the wood flooring rested on those. Reinforced-ceramic materials were also being used for flooring. We had adopted this method from Lvov. A partly destroyed building that had been used for some technical purpose had survived there. When I saw the cross-section of that building and thus became aware of this kind of construction technique, I brought in a group of specialists, and we began to build flooring in Kiev using the same method [that is, using reinforced-ceramic components].

For construction there were great possibilities in Moscow. It was easier to extract what you needed from the State Planning Commission. And in order to reduce the amount of metal used in housing construction we made the transition to reinforced concrete. To quicken the pace of innovation I invited an engineer from Kiev named Sadovsky. He was a highly qualified



engineer, who knew the business well, who loved to work with new materials, who followed the foreign literature, and who was closely linked with scientists working in the field of reinforced concrete. His only shortcoming as an administrator was that he was sluggish. But he made up for that by his profound knowledge of his field and his understanding of the tasks before him. Even now [in 1970] he sometimes calls me, tells me about himself, and it brings me joy to have a chance to hear his voice and to swap comments about the past, reminiscing about the times when we worked together in Moscow and, before that, on the restoration of Kiev after it had been destroyed by the war.

There was another knowledgeable engineer whom at one time I invited from Moscow to Kiev. His name was Proskuryakov, also a specialist in construction materials. Unfortunately he was soon sent to take charge of the postwar rebuilding of Sevastopol.<sup>41</sup> There he united under his command all people engaged in construction regardless of what ministry, department, or agency they were subordinate to.

The idea for doing this originated with Stalin. When he was on vacation in Yalta, at one point he made a trip to Sevastopol. He saw the ruins there and he had the idea of creating a unified organization for the reconstruction of this “hero city.” A little while after I transferred to Moscow [at the end of 1949], Proskuryakov returned there from Sevastopol. He had carried out the main part of his work. I was happy to greet him, happy to see this thoughtful man who loved innovation. He was always showing initiative in the use of all kinds of construction material for housing. He also calls me on the phone now and then these days, and I derive an elixir of good cheer from his phone calls.

Sadovsky initiated the transition to prefabricated components made of reinforced concrete. When we had the idea of introducing this material, we decided to try putting a house together the way a motor vehicle is manufactured. Before the war Bulganin and I had tried to do something similar in Moscow. We tried to apply this method to a school being constructed in the Zamoskvorechye district. That was our first attempt at block construction. We manufactured large concrete blocks and tried to make the building out of them instead of bricks. But given the level of construction technology at that time, we were unable to cope with the task. This might not seem to be a difficult problem, but when the school had been built we saw holes in the walls. I was very angry that people had not been able to cope with this simple task. Apparently they had been unable to calculate accurately the size of the blocks. The holes were large enough for a dog to pass through. All these holes had to be stopped up and sealed. And so this idea of assembling a



house by putting together various components, as is done in a machinery factory or watch factory, did not work out.

Now I began to consult with engineers about using prefabricated components of reinforced concrete in order to reach a higher level of construction not only of residential buildings but also of factory buildings, but I encountered active opposition to this idea, above all from Gosstroï [State Committee for Construction].<sup>42</sup> The man who headed Gosstroï, Sokolov,<sup>43</sup> was also a good specialist. Today he is retired and I have made the acquaintance of his son,<sup>44</sup> who has come downriver by boat twice to visit me [at Petrovo-Dalneye], together with his wife. They and the older Sokolov live farther up the Moscow River than I do. The younger Sokolov is also an architect, but his passion is painting, and together with the cosmonaut Leonov<sup>45</sup> he has painted a number of science-fiction-type paintings on themes relating to outer space. I went to the exhibit where these paintings were on display, and he kindly presented me with a bound volume of the exhibit catalogue as a gift. I made the acquaintance of the older Sokolov during the time when we were building the Moscow subway [in the 1930s]. Back then he was absorbed with the idea of producing a device that would pump liquid concrete, and with his fellow engineer, Sokolovsky,<sup>46</sup> they did design such a pump. Later such a device for pumping liquid concrete was introduced into housing construction. I have maintained contact with Sokolov and Sokolovsky ever since. The older Sokolov, whom I met on my return to Moscow, was already by then an eminent engineer who had acquired a great deal of experience and authority.

Beria had supervisory responsibility for the State Committee for Construction [Gosstroï].<sup>47</sup> This complicated the situation. The leaders of the various departments in Gosstroï had no high regard for representatives of other government agencies. For them the only authority was Beria. They invariably followed his lead. Since they were sure of his support, they felt free to do as they pleased. They stubbornly stuck to their guns and wouldn't budge.

When I met with Sokolov, I presented my arguments and was convinced that he would understand and support me, but suddenly I encountered opposition. No matter how hard I tried to influence him, he demonstrated unmistakably that he was unapproachable on this question. Then I understood that he had consulted Beria, who had expressed opposition to the idea. Beria always took the opposing position if any member of the Politburo suggested some new and interesting idea. Beria would object, and then after a while he himself would make the same proposal to Stalin, thus accumulating moral capital for himself at the expense of others. The arguments Sokolov

made were that it was difficult, not rational, and not progressive. He had just returned from the United States and had not seen prefabricated components of reinforced concrete being used anywhere. The only thing he had seen in use was just plain solid concrete. I didn't agree with him, and I reestablished contact with [Vsevolod Mikhailovich] Keldysh,<sup>48</sup> father of the future president of the USSR Academy of Sciences [Mstislav Vsevolodovich Keldysh]. He was a preeminent authority on matters having to do with concrete. But he did not support me either. Sadovsky was my only supporter, and all the luminaries in the field of construction and prominent administrators spoke out against my idea.

Then I asked Sadovsky to write a memorandum in my name with all the engineering calculations refuting the old and outdated methods. The memorandum was drawn up convincingly and it had a substantial impact. I decided at that point to speak with Stalin, but first I needed to dig in well and establish my positions. I knew that Beria would immediately get involved, and then Sokolov and Keldysh would be asked for their opinions and my proposal would fail. Therefore I considered it necessary to have the memorandum written precisely by an engineer who would indicate all the processes for preparing the construction materials, the assembling processes, the costs of the materials, and the advantage in time savings, and so forth. Attaching a covering memorandum from me personally, I sent everything to Stalin. There were calculations regarding the experimental construction of two factories for producing prefabricated components made of precast, reinforced concrete—their [annual] productivity varying from 80,000 to 120,000 cubic meters, which for those days was a fantastically large amount. The proposal was to construct one of these factories in the Krasnaya Presnya district of Moscow, near the Moscow River, and the other in Lyubertsy.<sup>49</sup> Stalin got annoyed when opponents would object to innovations, arguing that such things didn't exist outside our country. I knew that aspect of Stalin's character, and I decided to make use of it, emphasizing the main point that Gosstroi would object to. The engineers always said: "It means nothing to Gosstroi either way—to make way for something new or to let it fail." And so I wrote that Gosstroi's main argument was that since reinforced concrete wasn't being used outside our country, we shouldn't stick our necks out. The Gosstroi people stood for the old method—for plain, solid concrete, which was being used in our country and in other countries and consequently, as they saw it, would continue to be used in the future. After a while when I met with Stalin, I asked him: "Comrade Stalin, I sent you a memorandum." And I told him about the crux of the matter.

He replied: "I read your memorandum."

"And did you read the attached report by Sadovsky?"

"I looked through it in full."

"What is your opinion?"

"A very interesting memorandum. I consider the calculations to be correct, and I support you."

For me that was sufficient. After that kind of support all obstacles were swept aside. Stalin soon sent my memorandum to the State Planning Commission. The commission made calculations as to what materials were needed for the designated factories, and we set about the construction of these major facilities for the production of precast reinforced concrete components.

There was no unified management body in charge of construction at that time. The deputy chairman of the Moscow Soviet was the person concerned with construction matters. There were many separate construction organizations and trusts, including the Administration for Construction Organizations, which was not subordinated to the Moscow Soviet. This consisted of the construction organizations of major factories or ministries. The Moscow Soviet was pursuing a policy of seeking to draw major resources into housing construction, and therefore any initiative shown by the various ministries in regard to housing construction for their employees was welcomed. There was no other possibility in those days for alleviating the housing shortage. Even today the housing problem has not been solved, and many of our citizens are still huddling in cellars or in impossibly crowded apartments.

The main aim was to organize housing construction with a regular flow, as on an assembly line. How could we break down the elements of housing construction into component parts? We ourselves didn't know. No constructive solution to this problem existed. Again we began to search our way. We didn't have any foreign models to follow. Neither in America nor in Europe had such methods yet been used. We had to think them up ourselves, and the majority of our construction engineers were not trained or prepared to do that. I decided to bring in mechanical engineers who already had accumulated an enormous amount of experience in designing machines that required great accuracy. Very precise and accurate measurements were also required in working with prefabricated concrete units. I appealed to the Red Proletarian Factory. They enthusiastically set about solving the problem, and I felt that at last I had solid ground under my feet. My thinking was that probably the new design would be far from perfect at first. It would turn out to be something like the first steam engine, but gradually it would be

improved as changes were made. Any new undertaking begins that way. I wasn't afraid of it. We had to get to work producing the components we needed, and pretty soon new and better solutions would become evident. That's the way things always go in the practical work of engineering.

I remember my first conversation with the design engineers at the Red Proletarian Factory. They had never been involved with anything like this before. The general idea had to be outlined to them; then we had to explain what we wanted from them in the way of engineering design. None of them had previously worked in the field of components for prefabricated construction. Everyone was accustomed to the methods of laying bricks or blocks, but no one had any idea about larger components, and they hadn't worked with reinforced concrete before. I imagined the design of such a building in the form of a skeletal frame with architectural piers being added, that is, separating walls, as well as outside walls, made out of slabs or blocks of reinforced concrete. That is, we were talking about a transitional stage from the old method to the method of assembling prefabricated concrete components. Later we came to the conclusion that we had to make large, room-size components. These would be hung from or fastened to the skeletal frame, and a fully prefabricated building would be the result. The engineers from the Red Proletarian Factory had to work out appropriate kinds of support columns, so that later on reinforced concrete slabs with openings for windows and doors could be attached and then sealed up, with any gaps being filled in, so that there would be no drafts and moisture would be kept out. This was very important.

We then encountered difficulties that were not of a design nature. They had to do with how the finishing work was being done. The gaps between the prefabricated components were not being sealed carefully. Complaints came in that the apartments were freezing and full of drafts. It was not up to the apartment dweller to analyze why water was coming in or why there were drafts. More careful inspection had to be established before buildings were accepted for use. In the end the Red Proletarian Factory produced a machine that would automatically manufacture metal frames that would be filled later with liquid concrete and then sent to be steamed. Now supports for the frame could be produced that were already prefabricated. Previously they had been wired together, and later the thicker components had been welded together. The new automatic process extruded the appropriate amount of wire, and when it was all evenly in place it was welded right then and there. The frame for the support column or for other elements of the

prefabricated building was also revolved automatically during the process of welding. The finished product immediately went to a warehouse and later was delivered to the appropriate construction site.

In the process of creating the machines that would produce metal frames that would have concrete poured over them, the right solution was found by the construction engineer Lagutenko, who recently died. When I learned of his death from the newspaper, I was reminded of how much time I had spent working together with this remarkable innovator, who skillfully promoted mechanization in the production of prefabricated building components of reinforced concrete. I had always searched for people like him. Lagutenko proposed erecting a building without a frame, using support walls of reinforced concrete. Assembling the prefabricated building would prove simpler using this method. The walls would not only bear the weight above them but also provide protection against the elements (rain, snow, wind, extreme heat, or cold). I had more confidence in a frame: so that the building wouldn't collapse! If reinforced concrete walls were hung from the building frame, less metal was required, because they were only providing protection [not serving as support structures]. They could be made of lightweight concrete or cellular concrete with a lightweight filling material. But the attractive thing about Lagutenko's idea was the simplicity of assembling the building. It could really be built by just putting prefabricated panels in place. We decided to test his idea in practice and then decide which method would find its way into practical use: frame construction or panel construction.

Incidentally, Lagutenko played the role of the first swallow flying in after a cold winter, because he was the first practicing engineer who came to us with his ideas. I was quite pleased, expecting that a second, third, fourth, and so on would show up. They would bring their additions, improvements, and changes, and in the end a finished technological process for producing prefabricated components of reinforced concrete would be worked out. The beginning is always the hardest. Not everything turned out right for us, not by far. Retrograde elements, advocates of brick construction and solid concrete, kept close track of all our failures. Any miscalculation was subjected to ridicule, but we believed in the job we had started.

To construct buildings using prefabricated, reinforced concrete components, both forms and tools were needed. To make the panel stable, vibrating machines were needed so that the concrete would fill the forms fully without gaps or other flaws occurring. The next step was to place the form, full of wet concrete, in a steam room. After the form was subjected to

hot steam, the next stage came—the setting of the concrete. All this added up to a lengthy process.

In the steam room a particular temperature and humidity had to be maintained. It was also necessary to mechanize the process of delivering the form to the steam room. We used a roller conveyer. Previously when girders were made, a troughlike cement form (*opalubka-koryto*) made of boards was used. The metal frame [that would become the reinforcement] was placed inside that, the form was filled with concrete, and a natural setting process began. Then the boards were smashed and removed. A lot of valuable wood was lost in this process. In the mass-production process we switched to the use of metal forms that could be assembled and disassembled. Lubricants were developed so that as the cement hardened it would not adhere to the metal.

What we were ultimately aiming for was a solid unit in which the concrete and metal worked together in bearing external stresses and would expand or contract to the same extent during changes of temperature. If the metal expands to one magnitude and the concrete to another, separation can occur. Instead of [the metal and concrete working together as] a single solid unit, each material would be working separately, which would result in the breakdown of the structural component. We worked out the technology in practice, in the process of producing these components.

When we thought of the idea of making walls that could be hung from the building frame, we brought in a research institute from the machine-building industry to design a machine that would produce the metal reinforcement. I went to the institute many times or called its specialists to come to my office at the party's city committee. Later they began to come see me of their own accord, to tell me about their difficulties and successes. Previously these people had never worked in the field of housing construction. They found it a perplexing problem to create a metal frame for a reinforced-concrete panel that would form the wall of a house. When they finally had a machine ready, I was invited to the Red Proletarian Factory [where the machine was built]. The unique thing about this machine was that its operation reminded you of a textile machine. A length of fairly thick cable was stretched out along rollers onto spindles that were spaced apart at set distances, and at specific points the cable was welded, thus maintaining a specified degree of tension in the metal as part of the unit of construction [the precast wall panel]. This idea had been known earlier—that is, reinforced concrete with tension maintained in its metal component. Girders for roofing and flooring were usually made in this way. But this technological process was still at a

cottage-industry level, and we needed to organize continuous mass production of thousands and thousands of construction components. A strict rhythm had to be maintained on the assembly line. One of the clever solutions in organizing continuous production was this machine that extruded the cable onto the frame. You ended up with a frame having the necessary tensile strength and the precise dimensions required.

All this was recorded on film by a movie camera, and those films have been preserved somewhere in the archives. The party organization and the Moscow Soviet exerted every effort to obtain materials more quickly from the factories that had been assigned to us by the State Planning Commission, primarily metal rods of the specified diameter and quality and the right type of cement.

In those days a distorted notion of the true nature of cement had developed. Kaganovich, who headed the Ministry of Construction Materials, in order to look better in Stalin's eyes, strove to achieve quantitative rather than qualitative results. He was not a bad organizer, but he had even more brazenness [than organizing skill], and to show that under his leadership all expectations for the production of cement would be exceeded, he fouled up many of the established grades of cement. Masonry cement was being produced, and the total amount produced was impressive, but it was only useful for laying bricks. The kind of mortar we had inherited from our forefathers was considerably better than this so-called masonry cement. We needed a different kind of cement to achieve durability in the components we were producing as required by the specifications. We saw to it that high-quality cement was supplied to us, from particular factories and of the particular grade required. And when we received this cement, we immediately tested it: we made sample blocks of the cement and then crushed them to see how much pressure they could withstand.

The construction of factories producing reinforced concrete was under way, designs for producing construction components were worked out, and the components that would be used to build homes were refined. Professor Mikhailov energetically joined in on the work of producing reinforced-concrete components. The goal he set was to produce a reinforced-concrete panel that would be light and thin with square-shaped interior spaces, or cells. Such a panel would be able to cover the floor or ceiling of an entire room. His idea was to produce such panels by using vibrating machines. Mikhailov devoted himself entirely to this task. By then the production of reinforced-concrete ceiling panels that were one meter wide, with horizontal openings, had been organized in Moscow. The machine that produced them



came from Germany. When we occupied part of Germany, that's where we learned the technological process for producing reinforced-concrete panels for the floors between the stories of buildings. The good thing about them was that they were hollow inside [making them lighter].

The technological process for producing such panels had been worked out by the Germans, and we immediately began to introduce this method. Mikhailov worked on his own panel, and we began to produce such hollow reinforced-concrete flooring panels on a wide scale. Comrade Ginzburg<sup>50</sup> organized their production. He was a very experienced builder and had been around a long time. I had dealings with him many times, and I was always happy to meet him and hear what he had to say on questions of construction. Ginzburg was an infallible authority both as an organizer and as an engineer. It was he who borrowed this new method from the Germans and introduced it. These panels served us well for a long time. They turned out to be quite a successful design.

When I was still working in Kiev after the war, on one occasion I arrived in Moscow and went to a construction exhibition. I wanted to see what direction the thinking of construction engineers was taking. There I encountered a new type of divider wall for separating one room from the next. Such walls had been a stumbling block for us. We knew how to lay brick walls quickly. But when we had to put in the dividing walls between rooms, usually made of lumber, the planks had to be smeared over and plastered with mortar or cement, and then they needed time to dry. We were experiencing a tremendous housing shortage, and people wouldn't wait for the building to dry out, but would move right in. And our builders were not at their highest level in this regard. After a damp building dries out, cracks start to appear; the floors start to split, and everything has to be done over. An expression became current: that a new building was where repairs had to be done first of all. That's because the work was done without high-quality materials.

Suddenly, on that day, I saw a panel the size of a complete wall that could be used as a divider between rooms. Unlike room dividers, the walls between apartments were solid structural components, made of brick. As far as transmitting sound goes, there are no primary walls that will not transmit sound. Even in prisons, in the big old fortresses of the tsarist era, prisoners used to communicate through the thick walls by tapping, but of course the sound in that case was indeed muffled. The designer of this new kind of room-divider panel was an engineer named Kozlov, who died before his time at the age of sixty. I walked around his model wall, patted it and rubbed my hand across it, and was delighted by this new design. Because it solved



everything. Panels like this could be produced, put in a steam room to have them set more quickly, then let them dry out, put the wallpaper on them (if only they could be set in place carefully and accurately so as not to damage the wallpaper), and there a ready-made wall would be in place. I hastened to meet with Kozlov to tell him many pleasant things, such as that he had found a “true pearl” for the construction industry. At the same time I expressed a heartfelt desire of mine: that these room-divider panels should have a frame that was made, not of wood, as in his model, but of lightweight reinforced concrete. The wall panel he had designed was made of plaster. This sets quickly, but the shortcoming is that components made of this material can serve only on the inside as dividers between rooms in a building where a certain temperature is maintained. If damp air reaches a panel made of plaster, the whole wall becomes damp. I asked him to take this into account and produce a reinforced-concrete frame of the appropriate thickness, using cement rather than plaster, and to keep in mind the standards for muffling sound.

Kozlov listened to me and replied: “I’m sure I can find a solution to the problem.” He was a designer with a fertile mind, and I soon learned that he had produced the required type of partition. I went to see him at his factory and admired the panels he had produced. Thus a great event had occurred in our construction industry. Someone is going to say: “Again Khrushchev is being carried away by trifles.” No, this is no trifling matter. It’s a decisive question in residential construction. Only builders know how much time used to go into finishing the walls. For unskilled plaster work, we mainly employed people from the villages who had come to work in construction.

There is a well-known story about Columbus. His contemporaries were racking their brains trying to make a boiled egg on a smooth table stand up on its flatter end. Columbus cut the bottom off the egg and set it on the table. That was the simple kind of device that Kozlov had produced. His panel was suitable for industrial production, a container full of them could be delivered to the construction site, and (when cranes appeared in our country) they could be set in place by a crane. That meant that no plastering was needed, but only the finishing work had to be done—spackling and wallpapering.

Then I expressed some additional desires to Kozlov: “Please think about whether you could make an external wall based on cement. It would be desirable if it were more lightweight and had ribs, between which fiber insulation could be placed.” We had been searching for a way to insulate the panels by using slag fiber filled with certain bonding materials so that it

would retain its shape.<sup>51</sup> Again, Kozlov undertook the task. Mikhailov had thus far been unable to solve the problem. It was difficult to make a panel with slender ribs and the necessary depth. Reinforced concrete that had granite or other crushed stone as a filler was neither metal nor clay; it was not flexible enough. Kozlov made wet cement using sand as a filler. The sand had to be washed well to make sure that it set firmly. The result was a panel that contained small apertures and hollow spaces as specified. I was ready to kiss Kozlov out of gratitude. He also invented an assembly line! An automated assembly line that rolled out reinforced-concrete components that had been packed down by means of vibration! The plastic mass of wet concrete was solidified on a preliminary basis by the use of vibrating machines and, after moving along farther, came to rest on rubber matting. Protected by this layer of rubber, the component passed under metal devices that pressed it tighter, as in a rolling mill in the metallurgical industry, giving the component a bit of additional solidity. The finished component headed down the rolling belt to the steam room. The components came off the line in an unbroken stream. From the other end of the steam room, with a steady rhythm maintained, the panels were removed. They were placed in storage by cranes.

I breathed a great sigh of relief: the technological process that I had dreamed of had come true, allowing us to build on an unlimited scale. There would no longer have to be the great bother of dealing with wet cement at the construction site. Here we had the finished components ready to go to make the frame of the building, the walls, and the flooring. Some experience had already been accumulated in making prefabricated housing. Cranes were the crucial link. The problem of producing tower cranes and bridge cranes was solved successfully. Tower cranes became especially widespread because they were more mobile. Once we received tower cranes, we were in seventh heaven. Now came the question of architecture. What outward appearance should we give to the buildings produced by assembly-line methods? At this point you might say that the handicraftsmen and the industrialists crossed swords.

The architects essentially reflected the point of view of the master craftsman, because that approach allowed wide possibilities in the choice of materials, forms, and the details that enriched each component and made it more attractive, not to mention making the whole building more attractive. The goal of designing buildings artistically has emerged and is being carried out in practice. This is very valuable, and in principle I am in favor of it. Still, not to the point of infinity. One also needs to know how to restrain

oneself. In order to end up with a building that makes the street and the city more attractive, a lot of effort must be expended. Whereas things produced by continuous mass production remain just that—items of mass production. Various sizes and shapes can be produced with various types of ornamentation, even when dealing with concrete, but the artistic details that our venerable architects like Zholtovsky had got used to (he loved Greek columns and capitals)—it was impossible to mass-produce those. We jokingly said that things like that belonged to the “old order,” when architects did their building not for the people but for the lords, the aristocracy.

It’s true that the architects themselves might object to what I’m saying. They might argue that I’ve forgotten about the type of building that ancient Rus was famous for. The kind of unique beauty that distinguishes the churches of Kizhi.<sup>52</sup> The artistic work of our carpenters, who without a single nail, using the hand ax alone, plus the planing tool and the chisel, built not only good solid structures but very beautiful ones. I know all this. I remember Kizhi, and the ornamental designs carved in peasant homes, and the other decorations of carved wood. After all, in my childhood I saw a great deal of this in my native Kursk gubernia, including in my home village of Kalinovka. It was a typical village with adobe brick houses and with four-cornered window frames, and of course all the window frames were carved and decorated. Around the windows and doors instead of flat boards there was decoration with the use of bluing and carved patterns. In other parts of Russia, homes were decorated in different ways. But when you’re involved in mass production can you really preserve that kind of individuality?

The architects did not welcome the arrival of reinforced concrete. Every standardized production process limits individuality. May the architects forgive me. I worked with them a lot, listened to them a lot, learned a lot from them, and often supported them. But you can’t get away from it. What’s past is past. Most of the architects took up arms against the mass production of construction components and prefabricated housing. Earlier practically every building had its own architect; it was not faceless or impersonal. The architect regarded the building as a monument of his time; he inserted all sorts of special features not only in the way the doors and windows were finished but also in the capitals of the columns and the outward appearance of the façade—everything that enriches architecture. But my argument in those days was this: “Please understand that we are facing the problem of providing housing to people as quickly as possible. Only mass production can give us housing quickly and cheaply. The production of components and details must be made uniform. That allows production to be set up on

an assembly-line basis. The precision with which these components are made, along with skilled workers to assemble the components, will ensure that the final product is done faultlessly.”

Automobile and tractor production can serve as an example. After developing a particular model or type of automobile and mass-producing it, we filled the streets of all the cities of our country with such models. Despite the uniformity, these cars were well received because they had not been designed badly. “So let’s follow the example of the builders of these machines,” I said. “They have achieved such good results. Let’s also build houses on the assembly line and enjoy having apartments at accessible prices.” If the price of an automobile produced on the assembly line is high, that does not reflect a high cost of production. The selling price is set by the government and is not always based on what was spent to produce it. There are other economic considerations besides those expenditures. That is a different question. However, if each automobile was made by hand, only kings would have access to cars. Even less [than in the case of cars] did we have the right to make overly expensive housing for millions of ordinary citizens.

It was painful for me to come into conflict with the architects, whom I valued and respected. Some of them soon grasped the need to take the road of mass production for housing. Later an institute for designing standard types of housing, working with some studio or specialized workshop, came up with standard types of facades that would more or less give a street its “face.” We tried to find forms of architecture that would somehow vary the appearance of the houses and keep the appearance of the streets from being boring. We wanted to make each neighborhood distinctive, but it was very difficult to achieve this. Some inventive architects accomplished something in this regard in spite of it all. Later a lot of jokes sprang up about people coming home slightly “under the weather” and not being able to find which neighborhood or which building was theirs. Well, after all, someone who is not sober can lose his way between three pine trees. There’s more than one folk proverb to that effect. On the other hand, in a short time we provided housing for our people, who had suffered so much, and they were able to abandon their former attics and cellars.

More than once I spoke to Muscovites at public meetings giving reports on housing construction. I spoke heatedly and with passion, declaring that we were going to start putting homes together like we do trucks at the factory named in honor of Likhachev [a major auto plant in Moscow engaged in mass production of trucks]. Some people smiled to themselves, thinking that I was talking pure fantasy. How can you assemble houses? Can you

really do that? I remember the time when I first heard that tractors were being built on an assembly line. That was something new for me, which I also could not fully grasp, although I had known for a long time how machinery was assembled at the plant where I worked as a machinist. But there each machine was produced according to blueprints, and then the finishing work was done on particular parts. When some ingenious engineers proposed mass production of machinery of a particular type, that became a major turning point in the machine-building industry.

Now we were approaching such a major turning point in housing construction, and it's a pleasant thing now for me to recall. We were blazing a trail that all countries of the world later followed. When we were searching for new architectural devices to make newly constructed areas look attractive, I proposed that ornamental parts for doors and windows be produced. After all, we could stamp out any pattern in concrete and reinforced concrete and paint it or embellish it later. It's hard to change the overall shape of a house, and assembly-line production was dictating its laws in this area as well. Housing must be designed rationally. A person's character or nobility, level of culture and education, and so forth—those things make up a person's inner content. But a person's outward appearance is largely conditioned by his or her clothing. But of course sometimes a rather lovely face and brightly colored, attractive clothing conceal some inner content that is rather foul. It's the same with housing. I've often run into housing that from the outside looks quite fine, but the layout on the inside has created unbelievably difficult conditions for the housewife. The furniture can't be sensibly arranged, and it's difficult to create suitable conditions for everyday convenience in such a home.

Architects often disregard the inner layout of the rooms, but to make up for it they eagerly design bay windows, alcoves, and all sorts of rounded elements. Just try to place standard furniture against an oval wall. When regular corners are replaced by oval shapes, an apartment becomes irrational. All the available square meters cannot be used properly, and the residents pay for every square meter of unused space.<sup>53</sup> The government also loses money in constructing such apartment buildings, but many architects ignore this fact.

People will object that I am biased on this question. Excuse me, dear artists and architects, my respect for you remains unchanged. Together we have done many useful things. But we have also had our bitter moments. I know I have caused you some bitterness, but it's also true that you have not always made me happy. The truth is reached through argument, and disputes don't always leave everyone satisfied. If an argument is conducted on a rational basis, the common cause benefits. I would suggest that in the dispute I had

with the architects the common cause did win out. We made the transition to housing construction on a mass basis, and now things are produced easily that used to seem an impossible dream before the assembly-line production of housing components. If the work of the assemblers and finishers is done conscientiously, people end up with good and comfortable apartments.

As a result of the transition to concrete with prestressed reinforcement, the amount of metal used per cubic meter of concrete was reduced. It turned out not only that construction was made cheaper but also that the economizing on metal allowed more metal to be used later to construct additional housing. The cost per square meter is of great significance, and by cutting down on this cost, we were able to increase the amount of housing being built for working people. In those days the supply of metal was particularly limited. Given that shortage, there was no way we could increase housing construction. At first, before the war, in Moscow we built no more than 100,000 square meters of housing annually. This is a miserly amount, but it must be kept in mind that everything was being done by hand, and the chief building materials were bricks, mortar, and lumber. There was a shortage of lumber. Industrial enterprises had first priority in receiving any that was available, while housing was left in second place. It took approximately two years to build a five-story house of bricks. And of course both housing and industrial construction were seasonal, with just about everything coming to a halt in the winter. It was thought that bricklaying was impossible in the winter, because the mortar would freeze and therefore wouldn't set properly between the bricks. There were cases in which buildings fell down as a result. At present, in our day, we have searched out ways of making construction possible year-round.

In former times, buildings higher than five stories were rare. Buildings of the barracks type were built in very large numbers. Construction workers, coming from the countryside, were housed in barracks-type dormitories with bunks and accessories attached to them, which did not provide the necessary everyday conveniences and were aggravating to the working people after an exhausting day of toil. At the time of my return to Moscow from Ukraine, in 1949, as many as 400,000 square meters of housing had been built in the capital city during that year. The man in charge of construction was Promyslov, who oversaw everything and assisted wherever he could. There were hundreds of construction offices and departments as well as ministries, factories, and plants of all possible kinds that did the actual work of construction. Construction work, widely dispersed and fragmented, proceeded slowly. A huge number of older buildings were becoming dilapidated, including

buildings made of brick that had been built even after the revolution. Almost all the flooring was infected with fungus growths where unseasoned wood had been used. During the Great Patriotic War, Moscow was not well heated, and the dampness caused even more damage to housing. An unbelievable housing shortage arose. It has become less of a problem now, although the shortage can still be felt. People's expectations have risen, and therefore the shortage of housing is felt more acutely.

It was around 1950 when we began to speed up the pace of housing construction, but still very slowly. We didn't have enough labor power, and there was no place to house additional workers. There was also a shortage of building materials. After the war all resources were allocated to restoring and expanding industry, so as to build up our economic potential and provide for the needs of the armed forces. The Cold War had begun. There was a danger that imperialism would impose a new hot war on us. The lion's share of our national resources was required for the needs of defense. Once again housing had to take a back seat. People's most elementary needs—food, housing, clothing, and cultural needs—were poorly met. After Stalin's death an emancipated population<sup>54</sup> began to express its demands more sharply. Citizens felt themselves more free and easy, having gained the opportunity to express their thoughts and their dissatisfaction. And that is people's inalienable right.

The intolerable living conditions made everyone especially indignant. On one occasion, Molotov, at a session of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, began talking about this, and a note of panic could be sensed in what he was saying. I looked at him then as at a newborn child. What was this? Was he only now realizing that there was no housing and that people were living in bug-infested hovels? That countless ugly scenes of everyday life were being enacted in communal apartments? A man named Yasnov<sup>55</sup> became chairman of the Moscow Soviet at that time. I had had dealings with him in Moscow before the war. Back then he had been working as a construction engineer; he took part in building the embankments along the Moscow River and developed into a widely recognized administrator with a good understanding of the construction industry. I thought construction in Moscow was in good hands. Everyone has shortcomings, and Yasnov was not lacking in those. We received reports that he was harsh and abusive, but there was one thing about him you couldn't deny: he had the firm administrative hand of an authoritative individual and knew the construction business well.

In 1953 an idea ripened in my mind—to centralize the management of construction. In Moscow, housing was built by various government departments



and distributed by those same departments, and this was not always done in the way that the Moscow Soviet would have liked, not by far. Invalids and pensioners were not taken into account at all. The Moscow Soviet represented the government in Moscow, but it directly received very little in the way of resources and constructed very little housing. A bottleneck had developed, permitting no solution to the problem. I proposed that all the tiny little building-materials plants, and construction offices and departments [in Moscow] be abolished, and two main government departments be established: one would be in charge of organizing construction, and the other, the production of building materials and components. It was a very stormy session [where this question was discussed]. Molotov literally flew into a rage: “How can we do that when there’s such a housing shortage! Will one new administrative body really cope with the problem better than the already existing bodies?” At first it seemed that he had right on his side. But after everyone who wished to speak had had his say, the majority supported me, as did Molotov himself, subsequently, after he withdrew his objections. The decision was made to centralize construction in Moscow.

At that time there were already two factories producing precast reinforced-concrete components. In addition to them, Moscow had a great number of construction enterprises. When they were unified, their operations were reorganized so that particular factories specialized in the production of particular components. The transition to mass production of specialized components became possible. This immediately increased output. Then we ordered construction of other factories to produce components for housing. The production of doors, window frames, parquet flooring, and linoleum was placed on a mass-production basis. Where mass production could not be organized, the need for specialization was recognized as a result of the sharp increase in output. The quality of production also increased wherever the factory management took a conscientious attitude toward its duties.

Many prominent specialists and organizers were brought in to assist with the work. If the two qualities did not always exist in one person, nevertheless organizers and innovative scientists were to be found somewhere. The organizers were brought in to do the administrative work, and people with scientific knowledge took their places in experimental workshops and research organizations. Nevertheless, the construction of housing from prefabricated reinforced-concrete components did not begin to flow smoothly all at once. We encountered the question of how these components should be installed: should they be welded or screwed in place? An especially large number of problems arose in regard to establishing uniform standards, so as to ensure



the necessary stability and durability of construction. Complaints were often heard about lack of conscientious work in construction, construction workers leaving gaps so that after a house was supposedly finished the paw marks of a sorry excuse for a finisher were evident. A poor worker left the mark of his family name, from which the residents soon learned that a sloppy, unconscientious person had been at work here.

I remember a peasant story about knowing how to do things right. Peasants in my home village of Kalinovka planted rye, while the big landowners planted wheat. No matter how carefully the landowners' crops were guarded, the peasants managed at times to steal a little for themselves. One peasant stole some wheat, ground it up, and asked his wife to bake some bread. (His family was starving, and didn't even have rye flour.) He said: "Be careful. If you bake the bread from white wheat flour, the children will go running out into the street with it, and soon the whole village will know that I stole wheat from the landlord." She reassured him: "Don't worry. I'll bake it so no one can tell what kind of flour it was made of." She was a "master" at her job.

It's the same in any kind of work, including housing construction. Out of the very same materials one person can make a fine toy, and another will foul things up so that it's repulsive even to look at. Meanwhile the government is being criticized. And it's right for people to do that, but who should be the object of their criticism? The government should monitor the course of the work, be concerned, keep close track of what's going on, be sure that the skills and qualifications of the workers are raised, and seek to ensure that everything done for the people will be done so that it is solid and long-lasting. And not only long-lasting, but convenient and attractive, so that a residence or an object used by the resident of the house does not make those living in the house feel worse, but will bring them happiness. But there's nothing you can do. Good wishes and words by themselves are not enough. Life is like that. There is no decision or threat or punishment that can help to immediately achieve what is desired. A general level of culture is required. People must learn to build well and become aware of the necessity for building well. People must master their trades. The complaints of the population were directed toward the Moscow Soviet and those who initiated the new work of mass construction. I too was given a thorough going-over at the time. But if you've been promoted to a high post and you're trying to serve your country, you have to tolerate criticism. You sometimes have to take your lumps; you don't always get the plums. Often there are more lumps than plums.

Because of the incredible shortage of housing, we were forced to reexamine our plans and get rid of everything superfluous so as to satisfy more quickly

a greater number of those in need. First of all, a question arose concerning the number of stories in a building and the height of the rooms—both factors could work to the detriment of other conveniences. Everything was subjected to analysis by the construction engineers—the size of the apartment, of the toilet, of the bathroom, and of the kitchen. Experimental housing was put up, which we then reviewed after asking people to occupy this housing and taking their comments into account. We limited ourselves to the task of creating minimally acceptable conditions in the lives of the residents. We made this decision consciously. If we had tried to achieve the maximum on a broad basis, then almost 40 percent of those needing housing would have had to wait several more years before they could obtain it. This would also have had a negative effect on the birthrate: a large number of new families would not have been formed [because of the lack of decent housing].

I first got married as a young man, in 1914, when I was twenty years old. As soon as I was married I obtained an apartment. That means that under capitalist conditions, when I was working as an ordinary machinist, the boss was able to meet our needs for apartments. It was painful for me as a former worker that under capitalism I had had better housing conditions than my brothers and sisters did now. Back then I had had a bedroom and a combination kitchen and dining room; the structure was decent and attractive, with a wooden floor and a hallway, and there was a root cellar underneath where we could store food. Every housewife canned and salted and pickled food for the winter. The assortment of vegetables in the Donbas was richer than what people in Moscow enjoyed in the 1950s. In addition, there was a shed alongside the house for storing wood and coal. If workers wanted to, they could keep a cow, a hog, chickens, and so on, in such a shed, and many of them did. But are things like that now?

We could not disregard the needs of young married couples—not just for a separate apartment but even for a place in a dormitory. Where were we heading? People wanted freedom in order to live better and have their needs met. Our citizens were saying: “What is this? Are you promising us a happy life beyond the grave? Give us a little bit of earthly happiness now, if you please.” We had to hurry to satisfy elementary human needs and desires. We made a special study of the experience and practice of housing construction in foreign countries. The height of a room in our country had previously been as high as three and a half meters. In other countries, many people who built their own homes or had housing built at their expense set the height of the ceiling at two meters and seventy centimeters. From a hygienic point of view the necessary conditions for good air circulation should be

created. The more cubic meters you have, the better such conditions become; there is no dispute about that. In Finland I was shown a house under construction, whose owner, an engineer, explained the construction himself. I asked him about the height of the ceiling.

I heard him say: "Two and a half meters."

"How low!" I said, expressing surprise.

He replied: "I prefer that the number of cubic meters be increased at the expense of the height so that I can have more expanse. That increases the possibility of creating comfort and convenience in the layout of the rooms for my family."

If you ask any housewife which is better—a high ceiling or more floor space—many will favor the latter, because it will mean a more convenient layout for furniture and for the family.

Elevators were another problem. We decided to go without them in multi-story buildings. Do you think we didn't understand that it's easier for people to go up in an elevator, especially the elderly? Yes, of course, it's difficult to live without an elevator, but it's even more difficult to live without an apartment. If you asked a bachelor or a young married couple, they would agree to take an apartment on the fourth floor without an elevator but with other conveniences. We wanted to build one-room and two-room apartments connected by corridors for young married couples and single people. If the housing space in a building was distributed rationally, elderly people could be placed on the first and second floors, and younger people on the third, fourth, and fifth floors. We tried to economize in everything. At first not all apartments, unfortunately, had their own bathroom; some only had a shower, and no tub. Of course many people remained dissatisfied. But is it really better to promise life in paradise beyond the grave? Some people believed in that and accepted sorrow, misery, and suffering, but the number of such "foolish people" is becoming smaller and smaller. Under our conditions it's too early to promise that a time will come when people will enjoy all the good things of life that they require—that each will work according to ability and receive according to need. That is a good idea, very alluring, and we believe in it; we believe that such a time will come. But that will be the time of full communism. It's hard to say now when that will be. What we have to do now is provide a warm, well-lighted apartment, one that will not be a beehive in which thousands of bees live. Sometimes a one-room apartment can turn into a beehive [if too many people are living in it].

That's why, in considering architectural plans, we sometimes disregarded certain personal conveniences, keeping in mind that a great many people in

the cities did not know what a warm toilet was. The peasantry in general made use of cold toilets. At the mines in the old days they didn't know what indoor plumbing was. I remember the following incident. In 1920, after defeating Denikin's army, we reached Novorossiysk. The 74th regiment of our Ninth Infantry Division took Taman.<sup>56</sup> In May I and my friend Pyotr Kabinet were sent to take courses at Krasnodar, sponsored by the political department of the Ninth Army. We were from the mining towns and the villages, and we didn't have any concept that an apartment could have a toilet in it. In the villages, that would have been considered indecent; you should go over near the barn or behind the barn. A number of outhouses were built at the mines. Of course, they were outdoors and unheated. Some of them you could only go in on stilts; otherwise you were taking a chance. In Krasnodar we were housed in a school for daughters of the nobility, which had a park, beautiful hallways and rooms, separate bedrooms, and a bedside table beside each bed. The soldiers who occupied this building were fighters, but not all that noble. Within two days you couldn't even enter the toilet, because the men didn't know how to use it. First they messed that up, and then they went out in the park. Within a month it was not even safe to walk in the park. That was our level of culture back then. But in the middle of the twentieth century why should we tolerate not having a decent toilet?

The layout of apartments also suffered from the need to economize. Demands that we made on architects and builders were later made on us by the residents. Slowly and inadequately, built-in units were introduced, so that people didn't have to lug chests of drawers and clutter up the small apartments. Built-in cabinets and the like were widely used in other countries. When I would stop in to inspect an apartment that had been prepared for occupancy, it often made me angry to see blotches on the wallpaper and walls of poor quality. Detectives in the department of criminal investigation would have had no difficulty in finding the guilty party by tracing the footprints left behind by the one who had done such lousy work. Mikoyan and I went to see a building once where higher demands than usual had been made on those doing the finishing work. An Armenian who had come from France was working there. He had covered the walls with tiny mosaic tiles. He was an artist in his own right. Unfortunately, we had only isolated individuals like that. If the floor was covered with a mosaic of tiles, cement would have been dropped on the tiles, so that it would be impossible later to scrape it away; the floor would remain with cement blotches on it.

I think that such "decorations," traces of the "cultural level" of our construction work, unfortunately, can be found in every building. We are very

negligent in finishing work. Often a very nice building ended up looking terrible after it had been finished, which of course spoiled the mood of the person who had received a permit to occupy that apartment. Before receiving this document of authorization, he had agreed to everything because he had no choice; he had to take what was given. Later such a person would begin to feel annoyed and would start to grumble, expressing dissatisfaction fairly loudly. And this is a valid dissatisfaction. It has to be dealt with. When people are provided with apartments, they should not have their mood spoiled by the apartment.

Not so long ago I saw a television show called “Our Neighbors”: people were moving into a new apartment and the builders were extorting bribes from them. This is a crime on the part of those who extorted the bribes and on the part of those who encouraged this bribery [by paying the bribes]. But I blame those who do the extorting more than those who go along with it. A person might have been waiting for a quarter of his entire life, living in a dormitory. He or she has already suffered enough, living under such conditions, and wants to get settled as quickly as possible, and that’s why they sometimes agree to such criminal arrangements. Alas, that’s a characteristic feature of our era, connected with the fact that apartments are handed over in deformed conditions.

I console myself with the thought that in 1964 in Moscow, as a result of our shifting over to construction with prefabricated reinforced-concrete components, we were already building 3.8 million square meters of living space annually. This was a figure that made you dizzy compared to earlier times. Pre-revolutionary Moscow built 11 million square meters of living space during the eight hundred years of its history. We gave people the same amount of living space in a matter of a few years. On top of that we gave such housing not to rich people, but to working people, and these were not dormitories or communal apartments but individual apartments.

For example, even in the 1930s the workers at the Trekhgornaya factory still lived in barracks and dormitories. They slept in double-decker or triple-decker bunks, one bunk above the other. You can imagine the atmosphere a person lived in. I personally am familiar with that.

Once when I was working at the Bosse factory, I went to repair some mining equipment—hoists and conveyers—and walked into a dormitory with double-decker bunks. I’ll never forget what I saw: some workers were urinating directly from the upper bunks. From that time on I have hated dormitories.

Before we began major construction in 1931, Moscow did not have a generally accessible sewer system or water supply. Standing pipes with spigots for dispensing water—that's what people made do with. Even in the center of the city not all the roads were paved, not even with cobblestones. And what about other elementary living conditions? At the mines you could run to the outhouse, but in the city where could you go? In the new Moscow entire blocks were planned, with all the necessary communications and utilities built in, telephone lines, lighting, sewage, water supply, paved roadways, sidewalks, and green spaces. Such construction was equipped with utilities and services on a much more substantial basis than before the revolution.

Now [in the 1960s] we were posing the task of removing people from barracks, eliminating them and tearing them down so that [the wooden housing of Moscow] would remain only as a memory in imaginative literature. Unfortunately, however, it was not such a simple task. When the Moscow City Soviet and the Soviets of the city's districts began to distribute housing, we began receiving reports that the people who were getting the new housing were not those living in the barracks or bug-infested hovels, but people who already had separate apartments. They were just improving their living conditions. The distribution of apartments is of course a political question, and I encountered great difficulties in this area. We punished people who had committed such actions and subsequently proposed to the trade unions that they distribute apartments, issuing authorizations in advance to workers so that the workers themselves would oversee the meeting of deadlines and the quality of construction. In spite of that, not much resulted. Even under the conditions of a socialist state, people with greater influence were improving their living conditions; they had the opportunity to exert pressure and to find petitioners and defenders for themselves, while those who were still huddling in the barracks had to be content with being in a third-rate position. What is the solution? To build more and better. That is the best way of satisfying the need for housing. We stunned and amazed the world back then with the number of square meters of new construction. No other country built as much housing as we did. The world press admitted this. I was proud of it and am proud of it today.

During the recent elections to the Moscow Soviet a meeting [with candidates appearing] before the voters was broadcast on television. Promyslov presented a report on housing construction and said: "Comrades, nowadays we are building only high-rise buildings. Earlier we built five-story buildings as a result of orders 'from the top,' but now we're starting to build high-rise

apartment buildings.” It was a bitter thing for me to listen to this nonsense from a responsible official who at one time I had promoted and considered intelligent. What did he mean by “from the top”? He himself had been chairman of the Moscow Soviet! Had he held a different opinion back then? I never heard any such opinion from him. Besides, in 1949 he was in charge of construction in Moscow before me. I hope he remembers how many stories the buildings had that he put up back then, and how many had communal apartments. If by the expression “from the top” he had Khrushchev in mind, I take responsibility with pride, and I’m convinced that intelligent people will make an objective assessment of what was accomplished.

A high-ranking clergyman was once making a tour of his parishes. He didn’t hear the church bell ringing in one village, and he gave the priest a lecture: “You’re violating customary procedure.” The priest began to explain: “I have eleven reasons for this,” and he began with the first reason. The eleventh reason was that there was no church bell. His superior said to him: “Why are you trying to pull the wool over my eyes? You should have started with the eleventh reason.” I would say the same thing to unprincipled politicians who present their arguments without taking concrete reality into account. We had no possibility of building quickly or with much comfort back then. We didn’t have church bells. If we had built buildings having all the conveniences, which I have always advocated, we would have substantially reduced the volume of construction and prolonged the suffering of people who had no housing at all. We had to choose between the lesser of two evils. I think this was justified.

The housing crisis forced us to seek new ways of more quickly satisfying the needs of the people for housing. Everything was subordinated to that. For this purpose, and with the aim of economizing resources, we even dropped the project of extending the subways in Baku and Tbilisi, which had already been started, and we reduced the amount allocated for extending the subway system in Kiev. We needed to support housing construction first of all. Did we do right in this instance, or not? We were absolutely right. In some cities building a subway is not a matter of prime importance. I admit that this is the most convenient and safest form of transportation, and if a new war started, a subway system could be a bomb shelter, as the Moscow subway system was during the Great Patriotic War. But it must be kept in mind that a subway system is a very expensive pleasure. Where we can, we have to make do with vehicular transport above ground, especially streetcars, which have not outlived their usefulness, while we are engaged in an extended housing construction program. In my day Moscow and Leningrad were not able to



get along without a subway system, and that is why we spent the resources we did on building them.

Baku was spread out over a great distance, but there was no highly concentrated housing in that city. It was better to allocate the resources to build housing rather than extend the subway. The same situation existed in Tbilisi. Besides, in the case of Tbilisi this was a temporary decision. Something that today is impossibly expensive can become possible tomorrow. When I read the newspapers today, I run across all sorts of projects. Such-and-such a city has decided to build a subway. This is good, but you also can burn your fingers on such projects. You could waste resources needed for housing construction, and all the while, given intelligent planning, you could have made do with surface transport, which is cheaper. It's also more convenient from the point of view of [more frequent] locations for passengers to disembark. If you make streetcars fast-moving and noiseless, they can serve as an entirely acceptable form of urban transport. I am a strong advocate of an electric trolleybus system. In the suburbs high-speed elevated electric trains can be used, as they do in France.

Some architects and engineers advocate raising all urban transport systems to the level of the roofs of five-story buildings. They argue that the noise from such elevated transportation systems could be eliminated, and that the noise would not reach the buildings [where people live and work]. I don't know to what extent that's really possible. It could create great inconvenience for the residents of nearby buildings. But that is a question of long-term prospects and I won't go into it. New ideas arise and will continue to arise. Over the long term, with the rapid growth of cities, more and more emphasis will be placed on questions of transportation. Even now in New York, at the height of rush hour, a pedestrian can cover a distance quicker than an automobile. I have always been an advocate of establishing sensible regulations pertaining to the size of cities. Overpopulation should not be permitted. Urban growth should be based on scientific principles.

I am also opposed to allowing an excessive increase in the number of educational institutions in our capital cities and other major cities. Technical schools on the secondary level and higher educational institutions should be decentralized and dispersed among various cities. That would have a favorable impact on raising the general cultural level of the population. Any higher educational institution ennobles a city. We should, without fail, see to the dispersal of educational institutions like medical schools and teacher-training colleges and those related to the food industry and consumer services.<sup>57</sup>



I don't know how many thousands of students there are now in Moscow. Is this number justified by practical considerations? That's hard to prove. It was my opinion, and back then we all adhered to this line, that the number of higher-educational institutions in the capital [Moscow] should not be increased, but that they should be built in other cities, closer to the types of production they provide training for. Future specialists, as needed, would engage in practical work on the spot and work on their subject not only in theory.

In those years our policy on the construction of public buildings was characterized, I would say, by asceticism. All our resources were going to build five-story housing. We put the squeeze on construction of even such necessary facilities for the proper upbringing of our young people as sport facilities and cultural centers. Gradually we did open the sluices for this type of construction, but cautiously; otherwise, too much in the way of financial and material resources might be pumped over and taken away from the housing construction fund. At the present time that is exactly what is happening—residential construction is marking time, and resources are being assigned for buildings that are by no means of prime necessity. Recently I read an article in the paper that an enclosed soccer stadium was being built in Minsk. Is this good or bad? It's very good, but how much is it going to cost? We have to build cheaper open stadiums as much as possible, so that a larger number of people who want to engage in sports and watch sporting events will have the opportunity to do so. The Council of Ministers of the USSR, in its resolutions, does not speak sharply or specifically about superfluous expenditures. This kind of bashfulness about speaking up is harmful to the cause, because resources needed for housing are being diverted. Can a rational justification be found for the fact that in Kiev some sort of imitation of Moscow's Palace of Congresses has been built? They say that in the finishing work it's even superior to its model. How many millions of rubles did that structure cost? I'm afraid to guess. And all the while, Kiev has theater buildings and cultural centers with underutilized capacity. In Kiev there is a public building (I myself took part in a conference held there) that holds approximately five thousand people. The association of industrial cooperatives<sup>58</sup> later built a similar structure, which holds three thousand people. In short, there are quite enough buildings in Kiev of this kind for concerts, meetings, public rallies, and so forth. But no, they went ahead and built a Palace of Congresses! Now here, now there, resources are being diverted to build structures for which there is no burning need. I say "burning need." A thing like this can always be justified; you can always drag people

along, as they say. But of all the needs we have, the most burning ones must be selected, and that means housing. That is still true today. It's true that we have reduced the acuteness of the need. Hundreds of thousands of people have received millions of square meters of living space, but we still can't say that the problem has been solved. We still have to work on it a lot and for a long time.

A resident of Kiev asked me once: "Is it true that you were opposed to building an underground restaurant at Kalinin Square? [Pyotr] Shelest gave a speech to the active party members of the city, saying that Khrushchev was against it and he added: 'Yet it's a very beautiful structure.'"<sup>59</sup> If you give them money, architects can build not only such beautiful structures but even fancier ones. But what does Kiev need an underground restaurant for? Building it cost as much as five restaurants above ground. There's no point saying it was done in the name of beauty when it was just a demonstration of stupidity. The question is, is it rational? If you calculate the resources spent on this restaurant and what could have been done with those resources for the residents of the city, this inevitably forces you to think.

Let me say something about high-rise construction. What is the most rational height for a building? Here too there is much that is subjective. Theory can be made to fit the needs of practice, but the opposite is also possible—to justify one or another measure. In my day the goal that was set above all was to build as much housing as possible with the least expenditure of monetary and material resources. That was our policy on this question. Another reason for building five-story buildings was a military consideration. I must admit that the war had a substantial effect on me in this regard. I saw the sufferings of people in countless ruined buildings, and to this day I have not freed myself from memories of scenes of ruined cities. The higher the buildings, the greater the destruction and the number of casualties as a result of bombing.

After the war Britain, under the impact of its wartime experience, made a decision not to build higher than five stories. Besides, that is the most rational type of construction, with the least expenditure. If the disaster of war breaks out again, the explosive force produced by a bomb, which spreads upward in a whirlwind pattern, will destroy less. Some people might say that, given hydrogen bombs, this is of no importance. I don't agree. The destruction such bombs cause is on a much greater scale, but the same laws of physics apply.

I would argue that as long as peace is not solidly assured in the world, this consideration cannot be left out of account. In general why do we have to build upward at all? We are not Japan or Holland, where people are forced to push back the sea to gain more territory. We don't have that necessity. For

residents of a building you cannot say that the higher you go the better it is; in fact it's worse and more expensive. To exaggerate a little, how much does it cost the residents of a 25-story building to use the toilet? What does it cost to pump the water up there? People will say, "What about America?" Well, even there skyscrapers are a minority among the buildings in that country. Besides, under capitalist conditions high-rise buildings are justified by the fact that the land on which they are built is very expensive, and that's why they tend to build upward. This is justified on an economic basis, while the interests of the people living there are ignored. Back in the mid-1930s, when we adopted a resolution to reconstruct Moscow, the specialists explained why our preference should be for five-story or seven-story buildings, and they were critical of high-rise buildings, and their criticism was rational and intelligent. In the United States the rich people don't live in those high-rise buildings. They build them for commercial purposes. If you want to be in the center of the city, then pay. This kind of approach is justified on an economic basis.

We have a different approach, and for us economic expediency consists of something else altogether. At least for the time being. I don't know how things will be if the population of Soviet cities sharply increases. Economic calculations will decide everything.

After the war several high-rise buildings went up in Moscow: Moscow University, the Foreign Ministry building on Smolensk Square, an apartment building on Kotelnicheskaya Embankment, and some others. When they were built, a report was given to Stalin on how much each apartment would cost so that the construction would justify itself economically. It turned out that most Muscovites could not afford such apartments. Stalin proposed that these apartments be given to people with large salaries—artists, prominent scientists, and well-known writers. In short, the cream of society. But it was necessary to reduce the price of the apartments even for them, and what they paid did not cover the cost of constructing the buildings. No capitalist would build buildings like that under such conditions. If it's not profitable for a capitalist, why does such wastefulness seem attractive to us?

I remember how the idea of putting up tall buildings came to Stalin. We had ended the war victoriously, and we were the acknowledged victors. He said that foreigners were starting to come to our country and would travel around Moscow and see no tall buildings. They would compare Moscow with the capital cities of the capitalist countries. We would be damaged morally by the comparison. His motivation was based on the desire to make an impression. But after all, these were buildings, not temples. When they put up churches, they wanted to diminish the significance of human beings, as it were,

subordinating them to the great designs of God. Of course I don't hold the point of view that tall buildings are not necessary at all. That would be foolish. I'm simply advocating rationality in all our work. In confirmation of my view let me cite the building of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, located near Kutuzov Bridge. All the countries belonging to this economic association of socialist countries participated in the construction of the building, and our government confirmed the plan. Today when I drive past that bridge I admire that building: it's very well proportioned. A tall building like that is justified, because it's economically advantageous and beautiful.

Here's another example. If I had had any influence on the decision to build a skyscraper for Moscow University, I would have been opposed. The university had a huge number of students and classrooms, and therefore unnecessary vertical transportation should have been avoided. In Leningrad the former Smolny Institute is a very rational construction of three stories. People were housed in a very expedient and useful way in that building, whose architects left behind a good memory of themselves. I'm not saying that everything should be three stories. There should be rationality, with consideration of the purpose of the building. The height of the Moscow University building, which was constructed in an open field, was not economically justified. That was an example of Stalin's arbitrary will.

I would like to end my comments on the construction of high-rise buildings with the following remarks: the number of stories is a matter of taste, also a question of the times people are living in, and above all of economic expediency. Every building that is erected should correspond to its purpose. In housing construction the standard should be convenience for the people who will live there and the cost per square meter of living space.

In seeking to overcome the incredible shortage of housing, we subordinated convenience to cost. Good individual bathrooms and toilets needed to be built. But we should not have built the bathrooms the way we did, with only a shower or a small tub you could sit in; we should have built good full-measure bathtubs, so that a person could stretch out at full length and luxuriate in the warm water. Unfortunately, we could not do that then. We didn't have the means. We could have built a certain number of luxurious apartments instead of what we did, but that would have been at the expense of quantity, which would have gone against the needs of those who lacked housing. We would have given luxurious apartments to some, while others remained in attics and cellars. That would have been a cruel thing to do.

Toward the end of my political and governmental activity the Soviet government was preparing to build housing with more conveniences.<sup>60</sup> When

we discussed this with the main architect of Moscow, Posokhin, he presented architectural plans that corresponded fully with this intention. I asked him to design nine-story, fourteen-story, and sixteen-story buildings. I asked Comrade [Nikolai Yakovlevich] Kozlov to design components for these residential buildings at his facilities that produced vibration-rolled concrete.

I asked Comrade Posokhin to provide for new and different standards in these new buildings: in terms of living space, especially the entrance hallway, the kitchen, the toilet, and the bathroom. Individual toilets, bathrooms, and built-in furniture were obligatory. Posokhin reminded me that this would exceed the standards set at that time by the government.

I replied that this was residential housing—the next stage to which we should ascend; we should start building with more conveniences. Of course there should be elevators with noiseless couplings, so that when the elevators were in use and the doors were opening and closing it would not cause the building to shake. The elevators should be soundless, the kind the Finns know how to make.

We built the first nine-story building. I went out and inspected it. Then we began the next stage—construction of a sixteen-story building using the same components. We were vigorously preparing for a new stage in housing construction. It was becoming clear that building four-story and five-story buildings was not to our advantage. Economically the most justifiable height in housing construction had shifted to anywhere between nine stories and twelve stories. We were preparing to make that shift. The cost of housing per square meter includes not only the direct expenditures on erecting a residential building but also other expenses: putting in roads, sidewalks, and utilities and services such as gas, telephone, electricity, and everything connected nowadays with a residential neighborhood. When housing four or five stories high is put up, it takes up more space than housing of nine to twelve floors. As the volume of construction increases, the center of gravity increasingly shifts from the costs of the buildings themselves to the costs of preparing the ground [and providing municipal services] for the new residential neighborhood.

And so we were changing our approach. It now turned out that the higher a building, the cheaper it was, but not literally: there was a certain limit. Above that limit, adding more stories would again impose extra expenses, increasing the cost per square meter of living space. Such are the dialectics of construction, and it is important to grasp the right moment when one should shift from an outdated strategy. In the first stage of housing construction we relied on five-story buildings, but now it became rational to

make the shift to buildings having between nine and twelve stories, while the cost per square meter of living space remained the same. The cost per square meter for a five-story building reached 110 rubles.

In New York the economic justification for high-rise buildings is different. There the builders buy up an entire block or neighborhood, tear down the previously existing structures, which were only a few stories high, and put up high-rise buildings. That is more profitable for them. Under socialist conditions our approach must be different. We can't tear down five-story buildings. We have to preserve them, while carrying out major repairs, reorganizing them internally, and improving them. If we give a new appearance to these older buildings, install elevators, and improve living conditions in them generally, a person will not always want to move out of them into a high-rise building.<sup>61</sup>

The increase in the number of floors can be viewed as a natural evolution in construction. After Stalin's death housing in the outlying parts of our country was usually built with only one or two stories. One may ask why. There was no policy about this. Muscovites had a passion for skyscrapers, while in the outlying areas one-story or two-story buildings prevailed. But neither the one nor the other was economically advantageous. They were extremes. Clearing the land and putting in all sorts of public utilities and municipal services is incredibly expensive when you're building only one-story houses. I've already spoken about the changing heights of buildings. At one stage the construction of three-story, four-story, and five-story buildings was significantly cheaper, as was the provision of municipal services, to those living in small settlements like factory towns. But now the most rational height for a building is between nine and sixteen floors. What will tomorrow bring? I don't know.

To sum up what I have recorded on the subject of construction, I am happy and proud that we mastered the task of housing construction on such a colossal scale. All this was thanks to prefabricated, reinforced-concrete components. We were the first in the world to take initiative in this field. But I must say one thing: While we were arguing about using this kind of prefabrication in construction, mastering the use of it, and introducing this method, the West managed to come to its senses and began to stride forward in this field, wearing Seven-League Boots. Now we ourselves must stride forward—without forgetting what has been achieved.

When an earthquake destroyed the city of Skoplje<sup>62</sup> in Yugoslavia, and shortly after that, when I visited Yugoslavia [in August–September 1963] and saw all the destruction, we sent our army engineers there to offer fraternal

assistance. They inspected the buildings, to see which could be saved and restored, and worked to clear away the damage to the city. We presented Yugoslavia with the gift of a factory to produce prefabricated components of reinforced concrete for housing construction. I think this factory played its part in rebuilding the city. We gave a similar factory to the government of Afghanistan.

You could say that prefabricated, reinforced concrete has won a name for itself on the international arena.

1. Vanka is short for Ivan. [SS]
2. Grigory Naumovich Kaminsky. See Biographies. An Old Bolshevik was a person who had joined the Bolshevik Party before 1917. [SS]
3. This was a flat container, like an open box, placed on a worker's back, then filled with building materials; it had handles sticking out at the upper end. The handles somewhat resembled "goat horns" and were used to steady the load and keep it from tipping. [SK]
4. Khrushchev refers to the oil and gas complex by its Russian name, Neftegaz, and to the plant that produced milling machines as the Frezer Plant. [SS]
5. Khrushchev refers to the Moscow subway construction project by its Russian acronym, Metrostroï. [SS]
6. G. P. Marsakov was the inventor of the rigid ring-shaped conveyor belt.
7. The factory is situated on Khodynsky Street and is now named in honor of V. P. Zotov.
8. The famous Russian writer Maxim Gorky (1868–1936; see Biographies) lived abroad from 1905 to 1914 and from 1921 to 1928, when he accepted an invitation from Stalin to return to the Soviet Union to celebrate his sixtieth birthday. He arrived on May 20, 1928. [SS]
9. In Russia and the Soviet Union, "white bread," made from processed wheat flour, was more expensive and was eaten mainly by wealthier people. "Black bread," or dark bread made from rye flour, was the bread of the poor. [SK]
10. Khrushchev refers here to the construction of four bridges: the Krymsky (Crimean) Bridge, the Moskvoret'sky (Moscow River) Bridge, the Ustinsky Bridge, and the Krasnokholm'sky (Red Hill) Bridge.
11. In the book to which Khrushchev refers, entitled *Tsushima*, Aleksei Silych Novikov-Priboi (1877–1944) tells the story of the destruction of the Russian navy at Tsushima in spring 1904, at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5. Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov (1849–1904) drowned together with more than 680 of his officers and men when his flagship the *Petropavlovsk* struck one or two newly laid Japanese mines and exploded three kilometers outside Port Arthur on the night of April 12–13, 1904. Only his overcoat was recovered. Grand Duke Cyril (Kirill Vladimirovich) was an officer on Admiral Makarov's staff. [SS]
12. The Istra Reservoir is fed by the Istra River, which is near Moscow, to the west. [GS]
13. The Moscow-Volga Canal was built between 1932 and 1937. It connected the Moscow River with the Volga River at Ivankovo, a distance of 129 kilometers (about 80 miles). The conditions under which prisoners worked on the canal are described by Alexander Solzhenitsyn in *The Gulag Archipelago*. The goal of "reforging" prisoners was later abandoned. [SS]
14. This refers to a method of using a flow of water to help move rock, crushed stone, or other construction material. [SK/GS]
15. From 1931 to 1935, Sergei Yevgenyevich Chernyshev (1881–1963) was one of those who took part in working out the plan for the reconstruction of Moscow. See Biographies.
16. The prominent Leningrad architect Ivan Aleksandrovich Fomin (1872–1936) put forward a program of "classical reconstruction"—that is, he aimed to combine the traditions of classical Russian architecture with contemporary construction methods. See Biographies.
17. Shrosha is the name of a quarry and of a nearby railroad station in Georgia. Ufolei—more precisely, Verkhny (Upper) Ufolei—is a small town in Chelyabinsk province in the Urals. The quarry is in its suburbs. [AH]
18. The verb from which Kreshchatik is derived is *krestitsya*, meaning "to be baptized, or christened; to accept the cross." The Russian word for "the cross" is *krest*. A Russian peasant is a *krestyanin*, literally "baptized person; person of the cross." [GS]
19. *Pirozhki* are a kind of dumpling, usually filled with meat, cheese, or cabbage. [SS]
20. A. Ya. Langman also prepared the design for the new building of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD, secret police).
21. The three brothers Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Vesnin (1883–1959), Leonid Aleksandrovich Vesnin (1880–1933), and Viktor Aleksandrovich Vesnin (1882–1950) headed the constructivist tendency in Soviet architecture. See Biographies.



22. In 1933, Fomin became director of a school and studio associated with the Moscow municipal government (Moscow Soviet), but he died in 1936. The Khimki river-terminal project was completed by the architects A. M. Rukhlyadev and Vladimir Fyodorovich Krinsky (see Biographies). Khimki is an outlying district in the northwest of Moscow, where the Khimki River flows into the Moscow River. The Khimki river terminal was completed in the same year as the completion of the Moscow-Volga canal, which connected the Moscow River with a nationwide network of canals. Thus, passenger ships and boats from many different places could dock at the pier of the Khimki terminal (also called the “northern river terminal,” because there is another river terminal in the southern part of Moscow). The Khimki river terminal was connected by canal to the Volga and thence to the Baltic, the White Sea, and the Caspian, and also through the Volga-Don Canal to the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea; hence the name, “five-seas river terminal.” [SK/GS]

23. He worked there in this capacity from 1944 to 1950.

24. Uman is in southern Ukraine, about 160 kilometers south of Kiev. [SS]

25. Pavel Vasilyevich Abrosimov also took part in designing it. See Biographies.

26. Ignaty Ivanovich Fomin (1904–89) was a Soviet architect. In 1971 he was awarded the title “People’s Architect of the USSR” and in 1979 became a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Arts. See Biographies.

27. Rumors that the explosions on the Kreshchatik were the work of the NKVD, aimed at provoking greater Nazi repression and thereby strengthening anti-German feeling among the Ukrainian population, have been given credence by a number of writers. See, for instance, the uncensored version (published abroad) of the documentary novel *Babi Yar* by the Russian writer Anatoly Kuznetsov. However, no evidence has been provided in support of this claim. It is highly implausible that partisans would have been able to carry out such a large operation, requiring a huge quantity of explosives, under conditions of German occupation. [SK/SS]

28. Mikhail Dmitriyevich Abramovich worked as an engineer at the Kiev Ceramic Blocks Factory. He was a specialist in the use of small ceramic tiles to finish off interior surfaces. He was involved in the restoration of Shevchenko Boulevard in Kiev, but not in that of the Kreshchatik. He died soon after defending his dissertation for the degree of Candidate of Technical Sciences in 1958. The larger “MK” tiles for decorating the facades of buildings were produced at another Kiev ceramic tile factory. [SK]

29. He was assisted by Anatoly Vladimirovich Dobrovolsky (see Biographies), Viktor Dmitriyevich

Yelizarov (the chairman of the State Committee for Construction of Ukraine; see Biographies), Boris Ivanovich Priimak (see Biographies), and Aleksandr Ivanovich Malinovsky.

30. Konstantin Vasilyevich Mikhailov (born 1913) was director of the Moscow Scientific Research Institute of Concrete and Reinforced Concrete from 1965 to 1988. See Biographies.

31. At that time Aleksandr Fyodorovich Zasyadko (1910–63) was deputy people’s commissar of the coal industry of the USSR. Later he became deputy minister for the construction of fuel enterprises. See Biographies.

32. Reinforced concrete ties first appeared as early as 1896 in Austria. In the 1920s and 1930s, composite ties consisting of a pair of reinforced-concrete blocks came into use abroad. In the USSR, reinforced-concrete ties up to 270 centimeters in length came into large-scale use after World War II.

33. This assassination took place on October 24, 1949.

34. Stepan Bandera (1908–59; see Biographies) was the leading figure in the Ukrainian nationalist insurgency in western Ukraine at this time. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was founded in 1929; during and after the war the OUN split into two factions, one led by Bandera and the other by Andrew Melnyk.

The Ukrainian Uniate Church was established in 1596. It recognized the authority of the Pope but used eastern rites. It was proscribed by the Soviet regime in 1946. [SS]

35. See the first chapter of this volume, entitled “The First Postwar Years.” [GS]

36. Georgy Mikhailovich Popov. See Biographies.

37. Aleksandr Ivanovich Ugarov. See Biographies.

38. Aleksandr Sergeyeovich Shcherbakov. See Biographies.

39. Vladimir Fyodorovich Promyslov. See Biographies.

40. Khrushchev mentions that the planks or boards of these wooden floors were laid down using the “rolling method” (*nakatnym porjadkom*). In earlier times, logs were rolled (*nakatili*) one next to the other to form a floor, the chinks or spaces between them being filled with caulking. Later, when planks were used instead of logs, the term *nakat* remained, meaning a floor made by placing one plank next to another; today *nakat* means “a layer of boards; a board floor or sub-flooring” as well as a “layer of logs” (as over an earthen dugout). [SK/GS]

41. Sevastopol is a historic naval port in the Crimea. [SS]

42. Gosstroj was short for Gosudarstvenny komitet Soveta Ministrov SSSR po delam stroitelstva—State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Construction Affairs, usually translated as State Committee for Construction, or just State Construction Committee. [GS/SK]



43. Konstantin Mikhailovich Sokolov (1903–83) was head of the USSR State Construction Committee from 1949 to 1958.

44. Andrei Konstantinovich Sokolov (see Biographies) made Leonov's acquaintance in 1965. Previously they had exhibited their pictures separately.

45. The cosmonaut Aleksei Leonov (born 1934) began to draw such pictures in the 1950s and first exhibited them in 1958 in the Exhibition Hall of the USSR Artists Union in Moscow, on Gorky Street (now Tver Street). In 1967, Khrushchev visited the first joint exhibition of Leonov and Sokolov and, according to eyewitnesses, gave them a bottle of birch sap from the trees by his dacha as a souvenir. [MN] Birch sap, which is tapped in the spring, is a popular beverage in Russia. It somewhat resembles maple syrup in taste, but is much less sweet. [SK]

Leonov was the first man to "walk" in space, on March 18, 1965. In addition to painting churches, snowy landscapes, and other traditional motifs, he made "space art" based on color sketches that he made on his two space flights. See Biographies and William K. Hartmann, *In the Stream of Stars: The Soviet-American Space Art Book*. [SS]

46. D. I. Sokolovsky.

47. That is, as a member of the Politburo (later the Presidium) of the party Central Committee. [GS]

48. Major General of the Engineering-Technical Service Vsevolod Mikhailovich Keldysh (1878–1965) took part in the building of the Moscow–Volga Canal, the Moscow subway, and other projects. See Biographies.

49. These factories are now called the Lyubertsy Combine of Building Materials and Structures and the Krasnopresnensky Factory of Reinforced Concrete Structures (Building Construction Combine No. 1). [MN] Lyubertsy is a satellite town on Moscow's southeastern outskirts. [SS]

50. Semyon Zakharovich Ginzburg. See Biographies.

51. Slag-fiber (also called "slag wool" or "mineral wool") insulation is similar to the fiberglass insulation commonly used in the United States, but it is cheaper. [SK]

52. Kizhi is an island in Lake Onega in Karelia, northeast of Saint Petersburg (Leningrad). It is

renowned for its tent-roof wooden churches, which were built between the fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries. [SS]

53. The number of square meters of living space per person to which a family was entitled was strictly limited, so that it was important to make good use of every square meter. [SS]

54. The Russian word for "emancipated" here (*raskrepostchennoye*) has the literal meaning of "de-enserfed." Khrushchev implies a parallel between de-Stalinization and the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 by Tsar Alexander I. [SS]

55. Mikhail Alekseyevich Yasnov was chairman of the Moscow Soviet from 1950 to 1956. During this period the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the decree of August 23, 1955, "On Measures to Further Industrialize Construction, Improve Its Quality, and Reduce Its Cost," which dealt with developing the production of reinforced-concrete component structures and parts. On July 31, 1957, the related decree "On the Development of Residential Construction in the USSR" was adopted.

56. Novorossiysk and Taman are on the north-eastern coast of the Black Sea in southern Russia. [SS]

57. This refers to services such as hairdressing, small-appliance repair, dry cleaning, and so on. [GS]

58. In the USSR, artisans working in small workshops were organized into "industrial cooperatives." Like consumer cooperatives, these cooperatives were supervised by official associations or unions at the level of the region, the Union Republic, and the USSR as a whole. [SS]

59. At the time to which Khrushchev is referring, Pyotr Shelest (1908–96) was first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He remained in this position until 1972. See Biographies.

60. This occurred in 1963.

61. These ideas were reflected in the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of August 21, 1963, "On Improving Design Work in the Field of Civil Construction and City Planning and Development."

62. Skoplje (also known as Skopje) is the capital of Macedonia in the former Yugoslavia. An earthquake devastated the city on July 26, 1963, killing 1,066 people. [GS/SS]

## MY WORK IN AGRICULTURE

I am often asked my views on the development of agriculture<sup>1</sup> by people I know and people I don't know, even people I encounter accidentally. It's hard for me to say anything about the situation today, because for the past five and a half years my only source of information has been newspaper articles and radio reports. I can therefore tell about the past, but about the present situation I can only express some personal opinions.

Here, then, are my observations about agriculture.

In our country, after the revolution, agriculture was a difficult problem. It was hard to bring it under efficient management because of the small size of most farms and the small amount of marketable surpluses produced. There was no farm machinery, only the iron plow and the wooden plow (although it's true that the wooden plow had already become a rarity). Peasant horses were mostly small and weak, ponies really, and the small, one-horse iron plow (*pluzhok*) was designed for them. The peasant horse could not have pulled a plow that tilled deeply. As a rule the peasants plowed the earth with this small iron plow pulled by one horse; that is, they operated with one horsepower. There was no mineral fertilizer and in fact no notion of such a thing.<sup>2</sup>

As I have said, the peasants in my home region of Kursk gubernia mostly grew wheat for sale on the market and oats for a neighboring horse farm. Production on that farm was at a very high level, although even the owners of large landed estates had no tractors then. They plowed deeply and used a lot of manure. They apparently practiced high-grade seed selection, because they obtained yields that were simply inconceivable to the peasants of that time: 30–35 centners of wheat [per desyatina] and 330 centners or more of sugar beets.<sup>3</sup>

As a boy I heard the peasants sighing with envy. They were getting yields of only 40–45 poods,<sup>4</sup> while the large landowners were harvesting vast quantities of grain! Five times as much! When I was chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, I sent one of my assistants to interview the former manager of that large landowner's farm to find out exactly how big those harvests had been.

As a child I lived in the countryside part of the time and came to love the peasant way of life. But I spent most of my childhood years in mining towns with my father, who worked in the coal mines. I remember best the time when he worked at the Uspenskaya mine, four versts<sup>5</sup> south of Yuzovka [today Donetsk]. In my youth I worked in a plant that produced machinery,

then I worked in the mines, then I served in the Red Army. In that part of Ukraine [the Donets Basin, or Donbas], workers were well provided for as far as food went. While in Saint Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities there were waiting lines because of food shortages, we had no such thing. The Donbas was well supplied with grain from the nearby Don and Kuban regions. Waiting lines did begin to appear in our region after the October revolution, when sabotage occurred and many merchants fled; then the Civil War began. There was an uprising among the Cossacks in the Don region, led by Kaledin.<sup>6</sup> We also lost access to grain from the Kuban [which came under control of anti-Soviet White armies]. Thus, the difficulties that arose in our area were not the result of food shortages but of disorganization and civil war.

It should be stated that before the revolution consumer spending in the domestic market was not very great. First, the number of blue-collar and white-collar workers was small; the peasants made up the bulk of the population in our country, and they obtained their food from their own farms, not from the market. The type of nourishment available to the peasants of Russia was very primitive; not all of them were able to provide themselves even with grain. As for meat, there's no point even mentioning it. And they had no money. At bazaars [farmers' markets] in the Donbas you could buy any food you wanted cheaply, but that kind of abundance was not true for the whole country. There was abundance for this particular working-class region because the wages the workers were paid could be used to buy meat and vegetable oil. The bulk of our country's population lacked such opportunities. Sometimes people had to sell the last things they owned in order to buy some kerosene. Some villages in those days didn't even use kerosene [for lamps]; they made do by burning sticks of wood as torches. Such was the primitive existence of the peasant poor, the "*bednyaks*."<sup>7</sup> Agriculture did not produce a large enough supply of food to meet the demands of our country. The means of production remained as they had been: the iron plow, the wooden plow, and the weak, exhausted peasant pony.

In early 1922 I returned to the Donbas from service in the Red Army. As a member of a Communist Party mobilization team I traveled out to the rural areas, to the villages, to help carry out a spring sowing campaign. We went to the villages of the Maryinsky region. People had lived quite well there earlier, but in the famine after 1921 many died, and instances of cannibalism occurred. Our entire work consisted of this: we gathered the peasants together and appealed to them to sow their crops well and on time, and better yet, to do the sowing much earlier than usual. We ourselves didn't understand very

well what we were saying. The speeches I gave were fairly primitive, as were the speeches of the other comrades. After all, I had never really done agricultural work, and my whole knowledge was based on what I had seen as a child living with my grandfather in Kursk gubernia.

Agriculture in the Donbas differed greatly from the central zone of Russia. In the Donbas it was on a high level and the peasants' standard of living was higher. In most of Ukraine two horses were used in plowing, and in some cases those who were wealthier would harness a pair of oxen to the plow. The wealthiest of all would use two pairs of oxen. The landowners on the large estates in Kursk gubernia did that, too.

In the same year that I returned to the Donbas, in 1922, I began studying at a workers' school. When I graduated from that school, in 1925, the opportunity to go to a higher educational institution wasn't available to me.<sup>8</sup> Instead I became secretary of the party committee for Petrovo-Maryinsky county [*uyezd*]. In that capacity I had to be concerned with everything, including agriculture. My functions in relation to agriculture consisted, not of trying to increase production, but of extracting as much as possible in the way of agricultural products from the peasant farms.

In 1926 I was elected to head the organizational department of the party committee for our district [the Yuzovka district, or *okrug*, consisting then of several *uyezds*]. Our party committee also had to be concerned with agriculture.

At that time agriculture was rising like yeast-filled dough. Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), which encouraged the private initiative of the peasant farmers, was the driving force behind this boom. Agriculture was quickly restored to the pre-revolutionary level and even surpassed it in some respects. In 1925 we had as much food and farm products as you could want, and at cheap prices. After the terrible times of famine and cannibalism in 1922, here came a time of abundance. It was simply miraculous! At the beginning of the spring sowing campaign in 1922, I had organized meetings in the village of Maryinka and had seen with my own eyes what condition the peasants were in then. They literally swayed in the breeze. They didn't walk to the meetings; they crawled. When I arrived there later, as secretary of the party's district committee, it was hard to recognize them. It was simply a miracle the way these people had come up in the world.

Well-to-do persons were allowed to employ hired labor. The kulaks took advantage of this. They rented agricultural enterprises, such as flour mills. In short, a fairly large degree of private initiative was permitted, and agriculture revived very quickly. It fully supplied all the demands of the market.

Our chief task as Communists was to compete with the private trader. The cooperative store in Maryinka had to be supplied with goods, and we had to see to it that it served the population better and sold more.

The chairman of the workers' cooperative then was Vanya Kosinsky, a splendid comrade. We called him "the Partisan."<sup>9</sup> I was always picking on him. As soon as I would come in, he would greet me with the words: "Back again to curse me out?" On my way to his store I had walked through the market and had seen how the private traders who sold meat were doing and how business was going at our booths. The private trader was always out-doing us. He was a better businessman. He packaged his meat better, more attractively, although his price and ours was the same—there was only one price, 15 kopecks per pound. The same price as before the war in that area. Sometimes the private trader would maneuver around and lower his price to 14 kopecks, or 14 and a half.

Under NEP many temptations arose. It had a corrupting effect on party officials and those doing government work in economic management. Some leaders let their moral standards slide, despite the fact that standards were very high in those days.

We were concerned with agriculture strictly from the standpoint of issuing orders; we didn't understand or deal with any of the subtleties of this sector of the economy. As a former industrial worker, I knew my job as a machinist and fitter, and I had some understanding of metallurgy, especially coke-oven processes. But in order to feed the cities and the army, we had to delve into agricultural questions. By that time the large landed estates had been dismantled, their livestock had been slaughtered, and the manors of the former landowners had been torn down, brick by brick, or turned into homes for children without families, the "street kids" known as *besprizornye*.<sup>10</sup>

In some places the former estates were turned into communes. The land formerly belonging to the landed nobility was divided up among the peasants. In my opinion, Lenin was right to adopt the program of the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), whose demand for "land to the peasants" is what attracted peasant support to the SR Party. He took away their ace in the hole.<sup>11</sup>

Agricultural production proceeded of its own accord, with the NEP continuing to serve as the economic stimulus. There were no collective farms then. Some *tozy*<sup>12</sup> existed. And there were some communes. But those were only isolated instances.

In Petrovo-Maryinsky county there was a commune in the large village of Maksimilianovka that worked well. I have already mentioned its chairman, Kolos, and deputy chairman, Gomlya, a very interesting and intelligent "tiller

of the soil.”<sup>13</sup> The people on that commune worked together harmoniously, but they were using the same primitive means of production that prevailed everywhere in our agriculture at that time. I don’t know what crops that commune was oriented toward producing, but most communes back then survived thanks to government subsidies. Poor peasants joined them, many being “horseless” [i.e., having no draft animals], and the level of production remained not very high. The commune did not even provide enough food for its own needs.<sup>14</sup>

During the NEP years we even exported wheat. I remember that in 1929 the markets in Kiev were fully provided with food products—bread, meat, vegetables, and so forth.

That was before I was given permission by the Ukrainian party leadership to move to Moscow to attend the Industrial Academy. I must say that, in general, the record of my service in party and government posts shows that I had very little to do with agriculture, except as a consumer.

After the “all-out” collectivization of agriculture, after Stalin’s “victory” in establishing the collective farms—that is to say, after the “all-out” distortion and violation of Lenin’s teachings [on relations between the workers’ government and its peasant allies]—a time of semi-starvation began for the Soviet Union, and in some areas there was full-fledged famine. There was no food. We couldn’t even ensure provisions for Moscow. What in the world had happened? Stalin’s forcible imposition of collective farms, his use of “the big stick,” was a failure. After a while he realized this himself, and so he came up with his famous letter to *Pravda* entitled “Dizzy with Success.”<sup>15</sup> Of course, there had been no “success” whatsoever; in fact, Stalin’s methods of forcing the peasants into cooperatives had failed completely. Lenin understood that producers’ cooperatives were the only way out for the peasants. What Lenin proposed is what should have been done, but that was forgotten, even though Lenin expressed himself on the subject quite vividly, in terms that were easily understood. He said that if we had 100,000 tractors, along with trained personnel who knew how to operate those tractors, the peasant would say, “I am for the commune.”<sup>16</sup>

Lenin worked out a plan for promoting cooperatives, but he didn’t think it was possible to make this plan a reality until the government had established a solid material and organizational basis. Stalin was not a Leninist, although he called himself one. He actually had a very, very critical attitude toward Lenin. I know that [from firsthand experience]. During the last years of Stalin’s life, when he was losing the “nerve centers” that make self-restraint possible, he allowed himself to use completely impermissible expressions in

regard to Lenin. It was Stalin's unintelligent approach to the peasantry that resulted in famine [in the early 1930s]. It was impossible to get either potatoes or vegetables. But the workers remembered the old days under the tsar when potatoes and cabbage were extremely cheap and always available. (This was especially true for me as a worker from the Donbas.) Now suddenly, long after the revolution, these food products had become such rare and special items that you couldn't get them anywhere. Of course some food was trucked into Moscow and other big cities, but the quantity was insufficient. In the government stores there were no potatoes or cabbages. The peasants couldn't bring their produce into the cities, because private trading had been abolished. The blue-collar and white-collar workers of such big cities as Moscow and Leningrad were condemned to a sorry existence.

The Soviet government was forced to resort to rationing, to introduce ration cards for food. In effect we had returned to "war communism," when the policy of forced requisitioning of food from the peasants had prevailed. Strictly speaking, a form of requisitioning [the "tax in kind," or *prodnalog*] had continued [in the mid-1920s and up to 1929], but on a provisional basis [that is, it was not enforced; in effect it was suspended].

As for the new collective farms [in 1929 and after], it was beyond their capabilities to meet the government's needs for agricultural products: grain, milk, meat, and vegetables. A new system was introduced—the practice of supposedly "overfulfilling" the plan. What did that mean? The secretary of the party's district committee would come to the collective farm and make some calculation to determine how many grams [of grain] were to be paid to each collective farmer per "workday."<sup>17</sup> Everything remaining after that was to be delivered to the state. The leaders didn't even abide by this principle in all cases. For each province and district a system of obligatory deliveries was introduced under which the peasants were obliged, before all else, to fulfill the plan for delivery of agricultural products to the state. This meant they had to deliver everything they produced, leaving nothing to be paid to the collective farmers for their "workdays." The peasant received nothing in return for his labor, and so he lost all interest in working for the collective farm and switched over to subsistence farming, growing only whatever would provide for his own subsistence. The only thing the peasant was allowed to dispose of privately was what he could grow on his household plot.

The peasant would not go out to work on the collective-farmland. Or if he did, he was not paid for his "workdays" on that land. The reason collectivization had such sorry results was not because the kulaks led some organized opposition to it. The main problem was that the peasants in



general—including the poor peasants and the middle-income peasants—did not understand this “all-out” transition to a completely different way of farming. The necessary material, technical, and political preparations for this change had not been made. Of course we were all saying that if the means of production in agriculture were all brought together, if the peasants combined to form a cooperative or collective farm, it would be to their advantage. That was true, but you couldn’t get very far by just making that bald assertion. The task was not to put all the plows and rakes together in one pile and bring all the horses into one corral. Above all it was necessary, before everything else, to train competent organizers of collective-farm production, including chairmen of collective farms, work-brigade leaders, and team leaders. Not to mention agronomists. We had very few trained agronomists at that time, and in the collective farms there were none at all.

Agriculture went into decline, and we were left without bread and without sugar. In Ukraine army units were sent out to weed the sugar beets. This wasn’t reported in the press; I found out about it from people I knew. Anyone who knows the slightest thing about growing sugar beets would know that after the fields had been cultivated by soldiers<sup>18</sup> there would be no sugar. This is a crop that requires a great deal of knowledge and careful attention.

In the final analysis, after a great many bruises resulting from the “big stick” method used by Stalin to organize the collective farms, we did manage to construct some sort of agricultural system. If you take what was published in our press during those years, anyone who wants to can find sufficient objective material and can draw the appropriate conclusion: the collective farms were organized by coercion. The ones who suffered from this above all were the peasant and the consumer. There was no need whatsoever to carry out this task by coercion. We suffered nothing but loss from this—economically, politically, and militarily.

We can compare the policy followed by Stalin in agriculture with the policy followed by Lenin. The Civil War had ended, the foreign interventionists had been driven out of our country, and we switched over to the task of restoring our economy, which had been ruined by the world war and civil war. Lenin saw that it would be difficult to restore agriculture, which had been robbed and ruined and which was based on smallholdings and the use of primitive means of production. As a result of bad harvests in 1921 and 1922 famine stalked the land, especially in the Volga region. The terrible famine that raged there became known to the whole world. Lenin agreed to accept aid from Western governments. Nansen<sup>19</sup> headed an international committee for famine relief. I don’t know what we received from which

governments, but I know that we received flour from America. The Donbas received a mixture of wheat flour and corn flour. The quality was not so hot, but in those days it was not a question of quality but of survival. After that Lenin undertook what seemed to be a risky policy, the New Economic Policy (NEP); that is, he decided to allow the development of private initiative and to allow the capitalist and kulak elements to employ hired labor. The leasing of land was also allowed. According to our understanding of things at that time, this was a retreat.

Lenin came in for a lot of criticism then, especially from party leaders who did not understand that NEP was necessary. But within two or three years a miracle had occurred. We began to be able to fully meet our needs [for agricultural products]. I know what the situation was for the villages in the Donbas then, and what Lenin accomplished with his wise policy. By 1925 I had graduated from the workers' school, and I was sent to be secretary of the party committee for Petrovo-Maryinsky county. I had seen the villages there in 1922, and now I saw them again in fall 1925. It was a miracle. There was a complete abundance, not only of grain for bread but also of vegetables, red meat, and poultry. The party organizations now faced a different problem: how to compete with the private trader, how to engage in trade, primarily through the system of cooperatives. We reported to the party committee above us [the committee in charge of the larger district, or *okrug*, consisting of several *uyezds*]. We reported how much red meat, lard, or poultry had been sold by the cooperative stores and how much by private traders. But we couldn't come close to what the private traders were doing. There was a complete absence of any administrative interference. There was a struggle going on, but it was strictly economic. A new slogan was advanced: "Learn how to trade!" That is, we had to learn from the private trader how to fashion this complete economic chain: from the producer to the consumer. We wanted to bring the whole trading process into government hands, primarily through the network of cooperatives.

Now at the end of my days, I hold the opinion that collective-farm production, that is, the formation of cooperatives for agricultural production, as proposed by Lenin, is an exceptionally interesting and very correct idea, but it was carried out by barbarous methods. As a result, a lot of wood was chopped [and a lot of chips flew]<sup>20</sup>—that is, a lot of completely innocent people perished who would have followed the party's lead, who would have joined collective farms and would have been good collective farmers. Because of the peculiar makeup that fate allotted to Stalin, distortions and

violations were committed that led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands and maybe even millions of people. I find it hard to give an exact figure because no real accounting was made, but people perished back then in very large numbers. Yet even today some of our theoreticians and writers take a pro-Stalin position, viewing this process through Stalin's eyes. In their opinion, this was a historic breakthrough from small-scale agrarian production on a private capitalist basis to large-scale cooperative production, that is, to socialist economic production. Supposedly this kind of breakthrough inevitably entails sacrifices, which are brought to the altar for the building of socialism in the countryside and which are historically justified. This is really just an apology for a murderer and for the violation of Lenin's policy toward the countryside. Unfortunately, this point of view is solidly established in our historical literature and in our imaginative literature. The path we have traveled is still viewed from this angle by many authors.

I have probably digressed too much. I could get bogged down completely, discussing the history of collectivization. It's an extremely interesting subject, and clearly some day economists [and historians] will be able to do objective research on how those events transpired.<sup>21</sup>

When I became secretary of the party's Bauman district committee in Moscow in 1931 and, later, of the party's Krasnaya Presnya district committee, and then in 1932, when I became second secretary of the party's Moscow city committee, I was concerned with industry and the municipal economy, but not agriculture. In 1935 I was elected first secretary of the party's Moscow city committee and of its Moscow province committee. In that capacity responsibility for agriculture in Moscow province was indeed dumped on my shoulders.

The relative importance of Moscow province in the overall production of agricultural goods was not very great. The level of agriculture in a province at that time was measured mainly by the amount of grain produced. And Moscow province did not produce much grain. As is true now, it produced a miserly quantity. The amount of arable land in the province was not large, and yield was generally very low. It's true that the province produced a lot of potatoes and vegetables, such as cabbage, beets, and carrots, but it didn't fully meet the needs of the capital city for those kinds of produce. The provision of vegetables depended entirely on the initiative of the local authorities: the chairmen of the executive committees of the city and town Soviets, and the secretaries of the various city committees of the party. Whether the cities and towns were supplied with vegetables or lived a life of

semi-starvation depended on their organizational abilities and initiative. I know this from my own personal experience of working in Moscow. At that time, sadly enough, even carrots were considered a delicacy.

The level at which the cities and industrial regions were supplied with vegetables was measured in terms of three items: potatoes, cabbage, and beets. This narrow range of choice, I think, is connected with the cultural level of the producer. I remember the days when a network of consumer cooperatives was functioning in our country. That was back when I was second secretary of the party's Moscow city committee. The first secretary was Kaganovich. Badayev<sup>22</sup> was the chairman of the cooperatives of working class Moscow. He was in charge of vegetables and potatoes. The deputy chairman working under him was a remarkable man, Comrade Lukashov, a man of great worth, a very energetic man, and a good organizer. The possibilities available to us were fewer then, compared to the postwar years, but the city never went without vegetables. Our collective-farm agriculture is much more organized now. There is also great potential for raising vegetables under controlled conditions: in large hotbeds or greenhouses, with steam or "bio-fuel"<sup>23</sup> as the artificial source of heat. Back then [in the 1930s] we hardly had any such thing. Vegetables were mainly grown [out in the open. The number of greenhouses or hotbeds, even those using "bio-fuel," was extremely limited.

As a result of the purposeful, single-minded labors of Comrade Lukashov, Moscow was very well supplied with vegetables, especially potatoes. They were trucked in from Belorussia, Ryazan, Oryol, and Bryansk. (At that time Bryansk was part of Oryol province, and the potatoes there were very good.) Lukashov also made trips to Ukraine, where entire districts grew vegetables to meet the orders he placed. Poltava grew carrots for us; we ordered pickles from Nezhin,<sup>24</sup> and so forth. We obtained vegetables in the necessary quantity and variety thanks to—and let me emphasize this—thanks to the orders placed by the consumer cooperatives of Moscow.

Unfortunately, we survived only by constant "campaigning," with the expenditure of enormous effort. That testifies to the fact that we didn't have systematically organized operations for the production, storage, and distribution of vegetables, as they do in the West. Even today, to judge from the information available to me and from my conversations with people, we don't have the most necessary things in this regard.

In early 1938, when I was assigned to Ukraine, I was obliged to pay much more attention to agriculture. As I have related previously, Stalin made a special point of warning me not to give in to my weakness, not to be taken

up so much with the work of the mines and factories, but to be more concerned with agriculture.

Ukraine held a special place as the “breadbasket” of our country, the major source of grain and sugar. Its relative importance in providing food for our country was very great. All the land in Ukraine had been brought under cultivation long before. People who came there from Russia and saw the conditions in which Ukrainians lived were very surprised. Many villages had no pastureland for livestock. The peasants kept their cows tied at rope’s length and let them graze in the boundary strips between fields. In the Russian Republic there were big meadows and woodlands where it was possible for individual owners to let their cattle graze.

By 1938 collectivization had receded into the past, but in practice we had to pay no less attention to agriculture; in fact, it required more attention than in the days before the collective farms existed. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, agriculture had grown stronger, and the countryside had begun to receive tractors and other equipment in larger quantities, although not to the degree required for the proper organization of agricultural production. As before, Ukraine supplied the country with wheat and other food products, such as milk, meat, and sugar. It also produced vegetables and industrial crops, such as flax and hemp. When a need arose for castor oil, or ricinus oil, for airplanes, we began growing castor plants.<sup>25</sup> It was in Ukraine that I first ran across the term *Ricinus* and became acquainted with the proper techniques for growing *ritsinka*, as the Ukrainians called it.

We were producing more bread [in Ukraine] than we were consuming. I remember the frequent phone calls from Moscow, from Minister of Finance [Arseny Grigoryevich] Zverev.<sup>26</sup> As I have related previously, the sale of baked goods, especially pastries, added to the government’s coffers. Those goods could be sold at higher prices, and the government’s resources were thus increased. Zverev kept urging us to increase production of rolls and pastries.

In general, we were very much dependent on the weather. We had hardly any grain reserves. We couldn’t create any because of our country’s great need for foreign currency. If we accumulated any quantity of surplus grain, it was immediately rushed to the European market, and the foreign currency this earned was used to buy industrial equipment. The main policy course we were following was to industrialize our country, and we were far from being able to produce everything we needed for that purpose. Therefore we searched everywhere we could for something to sell abroad to obtain foreign currency. Mainly we sold agricultural products, because our industrial goods were not of high quality and were not of interest to the capitalist market,

which is quite understandable. We were still just learning how to really do business, and so we “went abroad” to sell our agricultural goods and at the same time had to “pull in our tummies” and “tighten our belts.” Up until 1935 we made no secret of any of this, and sometimes the leadership even stated with some pride that we were living modestly now for the sake of a brighter future and that we were intentionally and consciously making sacrifices for the victory of the socialist cause.

Then the war came. Our people have not forgotten the hunger they experienced during the war and after it. When Ukraine was liberated from German occupation, industry and agriculture were in a state of ruin. The republic had borne an enormous loss of human life and was deprived of highly capable cadres who had knowledge and experience. Everything had to be rebuilt from scratch. It was an exceptionally difficult time, a time of poverty, rationing, hunger, and prices that exceeded all bounds.

It’s hard to grasp how our people actually survived. But they did survive! And went on to work with enthusiasm.

As I have said, the year 1947 was terribly grim. Ukraine suffered a severe drought in 1946, especially in the south. There was no rain; the economy had been ruined by the war; the collective farmers had no equipment, not even draft animals. The Germans had destroyed the machine and tractor stations (MTS’s), and the war had done away with the horse herd. There had not been that many horses even before the war. By then our farming was already based on mechanization of such tasks as hauling, towing, and pulling. If we had had draft animals or tractors in 1946, even with the unfavorable climatic conditions, we still could have had a reasonable harvest. But as things were. . . .

An economic plan was handed down to us [by the central government in Moscow], but it was beyond our powers [although fulfillment of the plan was obligatory under the law]. Despite my efforts to prove this to Stalin [that it was beyond our powers], he demanded in a coarse and crude way that the plan’s quotas be met. There is documentary evidence of this. I wrote a special memorandum in which I explained the situation that had taken shape and the impossibility of fulfilling the plan. Stalin demanded that everything be done to meet the quotas. We did everything—and the plan was fulfilled. It was impossible to fulfill, but grain was taken anyway, all of it was taken, according to the “first commandment” [that obligatory deliveries to the state must be made before everything else], the commandment whose author was “the father and the benefactor of the people.”

In the winter of 1946–47 there were instances of cannibalism in some areas, including Kiev province. I'm not even talking about the southern provinces of Odessa and Kherson, where conditions were the worst. When spring came and it was time to do the spring sowing, we had no seed. Only then did they start to ship some in. Wheat was brought from whatever regions might still have some. No records were kept of where the seed came from, in which regions it had been grown. There was no scientific approach, nor could there have been. Emergency measures had to be taken to save people's lives. As first secretary of the CP(B)U Central Committee, I took part in this effort.

In the local areas and in the union republics, the party organizations felt somewhat freer than those in Moscow and Leningrad, if we keep in mind the “norms” of party life that Stalin had established (which were really “anti-norms,” the opposite of “normal”). The CP(B)U held congresses and province-wide party conferences; elections were regularly held in the party organizations, and the party rules were more or less correctly observed. In Moscow, on the other hand, no Central Committee plenums were held, or even sessions of the Politburo. They were replaced by the dinners with Stalin at which all questions were decided.

In early 1947, however, Stalin announced that a plenum of the AUCP(B) Central Committee would be convened to take up the topic, “Raising agricultural production.”<sup>27</sup>

After the 1947 plenum we experienced the same shortages of agricultural products as before, although industrial production was restored at a rapid pace. The people worked with exceptional diligence, but what could you do in the rural areas, where there was not enough equipment and not enough hands to do the work? Our resources for development were invested mainly in industry. The maximum amount of grain procured by the government in those years was 2.2 billion poods [35.2 million tons], and usually the amount brought in was 1.8 billion [28.8 million tons]. Stalin stuck to the old system, from before the revolution, in which grain deliveries were measured in poods rather than tons. We were all used to that system and could envision the size of the harvest more concretely in those terms, more easily comparing past years to what was obtained in the current year. The amount of grain we used, including for livestock feed, was about the same, between 1.8 and 2 billion poods [between 28.8 and 32 million tons]. Although we had gradually come to provide enough bread for ourselves, no reserves remained—the same problem as before. And you can't get along without reserves. Agricultural production is a capricious sector of the economy. Nature introduces its



corrections [into human plans] every year, now allowing you to accumulate, ever so slightly, some reserves of grain, now creating such difficulties that bread rationing is necessary. And so we ran on our treadmill, like a squirrel in a cage.

Why, with its limitless expanses, has the Soviet Union experienced a shortage of agricultural goods? Our country had only a small amount of farm machinery and a very small quantity of mineral fertilizer. Besides, the mineral fertilizer that we did have was not of very high quality, with a rather slim proportion of useful substances. Sometimes it contained only 10 percent of what was needed, and the rest was ballast. In tonnage, a lot of it was produced, but it only did half a kopeck's worth of good. Even the minimal amount of mineral fertilizer that was delivered to railroad stations to be picked up by collective farms was unloaded and left out under the open sky, beside the railroad tracks. Often the fertilizer lay there for two or three years, and part of it was ruined. In the winter, kids rode sleds down the little hills formed by these piles. The fertilizer solidified and became hard as a rock. If someone wanted this fertilizer, a whole new approach had to be taken to these piles, to figure out how to use them. Usually rain had leached out all the useful substances. This attitude toward fertilizer testifies to the low cultural level in agriculture at that time. Both the collective-farm members and the managers had a higher regard for manure and didn't want to waste effort transporting the fertilizer. Only in some isolated instances did the more advanced state farms and collective farms make use of the fertilizer, trucking it from the railroad stations more than was customary. Those farms had good harvests. The collective farms that raised industrial crops, such as flax, hemp, and cotton, took a different attitude toward mineral fertilizer. On those farms the peasants not only valued mineral fertilizer but also fought to have it supplied to them.

By 1953 Ukraine was producing approximately 500 million poods [8 million tons] of marketable grain for the state granaries. Chernigov province, which bordered on Belorussia and Russia, delivered about 19 million poods [0.3 million tons], whereas Belorussia as a whole, whose grain-growing area was several times larger, delivered 15 million poods [0.24 million tons]. In general we continued to have very low yields by comparison with Western Europe.

From ancient times there had existed in our country the possibility of expanding the area sown to crops by plowing up virgin and unused lands, but that was not done, and I don't know why. Stalin was categorically opposed, and he forbade the plowing of any additional land, forbade bringing such land under cultivation. It's possible that he wanted to concentrate attention on the cultural level of agriculture, to increase grain production through

higher yields, through more intensive farming. This is the right road to take, but it is difficult and labor-intensive and requires a long time. The necessary knowledge needs to be accumulated, and the agronomists and livestock experts, along with the peasants themselves, have to learn to apply advanced methods in practice. On the other hand, different, more advanced equipment is needed, and a lot of mineral fertilizer. Speeches, orders, and resolutions alone will not achieve higher yield. If the material base and the necessary know-how did not exist, one would have to wait a very long time for higher yields. Stalin didn't understand—and didn't want to understand—that merely wanting to make the transition from extensive to intensive agriculture was not enough.

He thought it was enough to create an artificial deficit of arable land, and the peasants would start looking for a solution, that they would create conditions in which more agricultural products could be obtained from the same amount of land.

Stalin died in 1953. The new leadership redistributed assignments. I was assigned to take charge of agriculture. By this time I enjoyed some recognition in this area because in Ukraine the work of the state farms and collective farms was better organized than elsewhere. Here I want to qualify my remarks. I do not by any means attribute this to my own leadership. Much of this is explained by historical factors. In Ukraine the cultural level of agriculture is higher than in other parts of our country, and it was easier to be a leader there, because the people had already accumulated knowledge and experience. Besides, Ukraine had good black earth and a good climate. It's true that inadequate precipitation sometimes caused great damage. We were all completely dependent on the rainfall. If you were to be judged by the harvests in the southern part of our country [that is, in Ukraine], you could be touted as a genius one year and be dismissed the next as a complete idiot. If the rainfall was good, the wheat harvest could be as high as 30 centners per hectare, which was then considered a high "indicator." If the winter wheat was affected by drought in the autumn or in April, the harvest would be only 5–10 centners per hectare. That's how dependent on the weather we were. Only if the land is cultivated at a very high level can such variations in yield be reduced.

Industry worked in a more organized way than agriculture. Its managers and workers were better trained, and the factory machinery corresponded to the needs of the time. But agriculture was limping along badly. We were forced to try to draw on any potential to increase the production of grain, meat, milk, wool, and sugar. The situation in regard to industrial crops was

not so tragic—although the yield for sugar beets (up to 150 centners per hectare) was low by comparison with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Czechs got as much as 350 centners, and in Poland the yield was no less than 250.

Our country continued to have an extremely low milk yield from dairy cows. I'm not even talking about fat content, which on the average reached only as high as 3 percent, while the annual milk yield per cow was around 1,100 liters. This was a figure that simply did not compare with the yield in Holland and Denmark.

Our potato harvests were also poor. This is a crop that responds well to proper cultivation of the soil and proper handling of seed. In Moscow province the average yield was 60 centners per hectare: an incredibly low yield for potatoes! This testifies to neglectful management and poor organization of production.

In pre-revolutionary times the peasants of Kursk, Oryol, and Chernigov provinces obtained much higher yields, and the potatoes there were of excellent size and taste. Another explanation for the situation in regard to potatoes can be found in the decline of work discipline connected with the absence of any material stake for the peasant collective farmer, especially in view of the low price paid by the government for potatoes. Stalin dictated that the collective farms be paid no more than 3 kopecks per kilogram for product delivered. The mere cost of transporting the product to the government procurement stations was more than 3 kopecks per kilogram. One could not justify putting any labor into the raising of potatoes. The collective farmers had no material interest in the work, especially since they were paid only one kopeck for each "workday." There was a saying among the villagers: "I work for a *palochka* [a little mark made in the record book]." In the government offices a mark was made to indicate that a "workday" had been completed and the peasant had earned a kopeck. Some collective farms were paid nothing at all for "workdays"—and there were quite a few such farms. And so the peasants avoided working on the collective farmland. They lived off what they could produce on their little household plots, or they found other means to earn the wherewithal to continue their pitiful existence.

We were obliged to revise the prices paid by the government and to change the whole system of government procurement. In the state farms the workers still had some guaranteed wages, but in the collective farms payment was made according to "workdays." It's true that even then our possibilities were limited; we were poor. But the main thing was that Stalin had instilled in us the habit of viewing the peasant disrespectfully, as a mere beast of burden, placing no value on the peasant or his labor. Stalin knew only one

way of working with the village—putting on the pressure, wringing the products of agriculture out of the peasants. The prices paid for farm goods were lower than the cost of production. Only a very few collective farms back then—those engaged in farming at a higher cultural level—were able to provide for themselves somehow. The absolute majority of collective farms were just dragging out a miserable, poverty-stricken existence.

Potatoes are a labor-intensive product. Back then, they required an especially large amount of labor—before we introduced the square-cluster method of planting, so that tractors could cultivate the potatoes on all four sides, both lengthways and sideways. With such innovations potato production increased and labor inputs were reduced, but the price paid by the government procurement system remained the same—3 kopecks per kilogram. After Stalin’s death we made an upward revision in the procurement prices for potatoes and vegetables. It’s true that even the new prices provided no great stimulus to production. But at least they improved the economic situation for collective farms where potato farming was being done properly. Sensible farm managers, who knew what they were doing, could now bring in better earnings.

1. This part of the memoirs was dictated in 1969. Other chapters on agriculture date from 1970 and 1971. [SK]

2. At this point many of the author’s experiences with agriculture and related matters, from earlier in his life, are restated. We have abridged these repetitions of earlier parts of his memoirs and refer the reader to appropriate passages in Volume I of the present edition. [GS]

3. In Russia, a centner is equal to 100 kilograms; a desyatina is the equivalent of 2.7 acres. [GS]

4. A pood was equal to 16 kilograms; thus, 40–45 poods would have been 6.4–7.2 centners. [GS]

5. The verst is an old Russian measure of distance, equivalent to 3,500 feet or slightly more than a kilometer. [SS]

6. Aleksei Maksimovich Kaledin. See Biographies.

7. In contrast to the wealthy peasants, the “kulaks,” and those of middle income, the “serednyaks.” [GS]

8. The main purpose of the workers’ schools (*rabfaki*) was to prepare young people of working-class background with inadequate formal education for entry into higher educational institutions. Therefore Khrushchev was disappointed when, on account of his party duties, this opportunity did not materialize for him. [SS]

9. That is, “Guerrilla Fighter,” because he had been a guerrilla fighter in the Civil War. [GS]

10. Millions of homeless children, orphaned by war, disease, and famine, roamed Russia in the 1920s. [SS]

11. The Second Congress of Soviets, among whose delegates the Bolsheviks had a majority, took full power into its hands at the time of the Bolshevik-led insurrection, October 25–26, 1917 (Old Style). This Congress of Soviets enacted in its entirety the land program drawn up by the SRs. The SR program was based on extensive direct consultation with peasants all over Russia and contained the demands made by the peasants themselves, including the main one: “land to those who work it.” [GS]

12. TOZ (plural, *TOZy* or *tozy*) is an abbreviation for *tovarishchestvo po obrabotke zemli*—literally, “association for cultivating the land,” a type of agricultural cooperative. [GS]

13. See Volume 1, “A Few Words About the NEP.” [GS]

14. In Volume 1, Khrushchev states that the commune in Maksimilianovka, unlike most communes, paid for itself, was able to survive on the basis of its own resources (*eta kommuna kak raz zhila na sobstvennyye sredstva*). Here he suggests that this commune and communes in general did not even provide enough food for their own needs

(*Kommuna i sebya ne obespechivala produktami*). [GS]

15. On March 2, 1930, *Pravda* published a letter from Stalin entitled “Dizzy with Success: Concerning Questions of the Collective Farm Movement,” in which he warned against the perils of carrying out total collectivization at too rapid a pace and urged consolidation of the gains already achieved. [SS]

16. In his article “On Cooperation,” Lenin argued that the peasants had to be persuaded of the virtues of collective farming by example. [GS]

17. The “workday” (*trudoden*) was the unit in which labor for the collective farm was measured for purposes of payment. A day’s labor of a skilled collective farmer might count for more than one workday. [SS]

18. This means that the soldiers had removed weeds and broken up the surface soil around the beets to prevent crusting and preserve moisture. The soldiers had not planted the beets. [SK]

19. Fridtjof Nansen (1861–1930) was a world-renowned Norwegian explorer, statesman, and humanitarian. [GS] The International Committee for Russian Relief, also known as the Nansen committee, was set up in August 1921 on the initiative of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies. It carried out relief work initially in the Volga region and in 1922 was allowed to extend its operations to Ukraine. Also active in the relief effort were the American Relief Administration, the Jewish Joint

Distribution Committee, and the Czechoslovakian Red Cross. [SS]

20. A saying that was frequently used to explain and justify the Stalinist repressions was: “When you chop wood, chips fly.” [SS]

21. The history of collectivization was indeed one of the main topics taken up by Soviet historians when conditions for objective research improved under Gorbachev in the late 1980s. [SS]

22. Aleksei Yegorovich Badayev. See Biographies.

23. The term “bio-fuel” refers to the practice of placing a large amount of manure, straw, and small branches and twigs under the hotbed or greenhouse. Heat would rise from a natural process as this organic material moldered and decayed. [SK]

24. Nezhin was famous in Russia for its cucumbers. [SK]

25. The scientific name for this plant is *Ricinus communis*; in Russian it is called *kleshchevina*, or *kastornik*. [GS]

26. Arseny Grigoryevich Zverev (1900–1969) was people’s commissar (minister) of finance of the USSR from 1938 to 1960 (except for a period in 1948, when he was a deputy minister). See Biographies.

27. At this point, for the length of about three pages, Khrushchev gives a variation on his earlier account of the plenum of February 21–26, 1947, on agriculture and the aftermath of that plenum. Rather than repeat it here, we refer the reader to “The First Postwar Years,” the first chapter of this volume.

## THE VIRGIN LANDS

I would like to record my recollections about the great work carried out at the time when I was part of the leadership of the country. I am referring to the virgin lands. The virgin lands program was one vast epic. It always makes me happy to remember it. When I would arrive in the virgin lands, I would travel all around Kazakhstan, the Orenburg and Altai steppe lands, and the farms in Krasnoyarsk territory.<sup>1</sup> The virgin lands of Kazakhstan made a powerful impression. Mountains of wheat were there, and it must be said it was good wheat.

Let me start from the beginning. The question was raised of increasing grain production. Without that we couldn’t move forward, couldn’t provide

enough grain for our needs. That was when the question of the virgin lands arose. I had begun to think about this as early as 1953 after Stalin's death, when the new leadership took on its shoulders all the concerns facing our country. Under Stalin we had found it difficult to make ends meet; there had not been enough grain, and some solution had to be found. I don't know why, but Stalin forbade bringing new land under cultivation. I have already discussed this question. After the war, the cultivated area in our country was reduced because of land lost or land no longer in the crop-rotation system as a result of damage by military operations, and so by comparison with the prewar period we had less cultivated land. There were not enough people working on the land, since many had been lost in the war, and there were not enough tools, tractors, and horses. The areas damaged by war and no longer cultivable were quite large, especially in the provinces of Leningrad, Kalinin, and Moscow, and in Belorussia. These areas had fallen out of use; they were overgrown with bushes, and it was difficult even to try to plow them. We began looking for new ways to increase production of agricultural goods, especially grain.<sup>2</sup> Only one solution to the problem was indicated—to bring additional areas under cultivation by plowing virgin and unused lands. It turned out that we had a great deal of such land in our country, and even today some still remains. To be sure, what remains now is mostly land overgrown with bushes or marshland, which can only be brought under cultivation after a process of land reclamation.

The Presidium of the Central Committee assigned me to oversee agriculture. At the first Central Committee plenum after Stalin's death the comrades proposed that I give a report on agriculture. Malenkov put especially heavy pressure on me. But I hadn't been provided with the preparatory material for this, and I refused. My response was that I didn't want to give a speech without specific proposals reinforced by convincing arguments. It was simply not proper to give a speech before the assembled delegates on such an important question as the production of agricultural goods without substantial preparation. We then came to an agreement that in September of that same year I would give a report at a special plenum devoted to agricultural problems.<sup>3</sup> For a long time afterward, that September plenum of 1953 was considered a turning point in the development of agricultural production.<sup>4</sup> By that time we had already eliminated the so-called first commandment, and now every farm was allowed to keep seed for its own purposes and needs.<sup>5</sup>

We also decided the question of the private plots the peasants had around their homes; also, collective farmers who had fruit trees were relieved of taxes on those trees. Stalin had dreamed up a law under which every fruit

tree on a private household plot was taxed. I had told Stalin that after visiting my own home village I visited my female cousin in the village of Dubovitsy. She said that in the autumn they were going to cut down their apple trees. There were some very lovely apple trees right in front of her window. “But these are wonderful apple trees.” I said regretfully. Her answer was: “Yes, but I’m paying a high tax on them and the kids are stealing the apples. In the autumn I’m going to cut them all down.” Stalin toyed with the idea of making it obligatory for every collective farmer to plant a certain number of fruit trees, and yet here people were getting ready to cut them down. He looked at me with a very foul expression, but made no reply, and of course the taxes were not lifted. Stalin regarded the collective farms and the household plots as places where you could shear the wool off the backs of the peasants as you would from sheep. His thinking was that after the fleece was removed, a new coat would grow. When we abolished this tax it was as though we had opened a floodgate. Later all the taxes on household plots were eliminated as well as obligatory deliveries to the state of products from those household plots.<sup>6</sup> Previously those who cultivated their household plots delivered milk, eggs, meat, and so forth to the state.

One day when Malenkov and I were on vacation in the Crimea, I proposed to him that we visit some of the Crimean collective farms, not those on the southern shore where vineyards flourished, but in the steppes, where grain was grown and orchards were cultivated. He agreed. We arrived at some collective farm and began a conversation. One collective farmer began praising the decision made by the Central Committee plenum, but later he said this: “You were too late in making your decision. If only you had made that decision earlier.” I didn’t understand and I asked him: “What do you mean?” “Well, right before the plenum I cut down all the fruit trees on my household plot. The taxes were choking us. Now that the tax has been removed I could make some earnings from those trees. Oh well, I’ll plant new ones.” He was talking about peach trees, which were very profitable.

After the plenum I received the secretaries of local party committees. I also talked with people from Kazakhstan, the secretaries of province committees. From them I learned that in their republic there were huge reserves of uncultivated land. It was good land. In years when there was good weather they yielded up to 20 and sometimes 30 centners of grain per hectare, and they had a lot of such land. They couldn’t say specifically, because the land had not been surveyed and measured accurately. Then I had a talk with the secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party, whose name was Shayakhmetov.<sup>7</sup> Before serving on the Central Committee



he had worked in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Being a Kazakh himself, he undoubtedly knew his native land quite well. I asked him how much land was under cultivation, what amount of land was suitable for cultivation but had not yet been plowed, and what the yields of the harvests were. I also asked him what long-term potential he thought there would be for newly cultivated land. From the conversation with him I came to understand that he was not speaking sincerely. He belittled the possibilities [in Kazakhstan] and argued that there was very little land suitable for cultivation there, even that there was none at all, that everything had already been plowed and brought under cultivation and there were no long-term prospects. Of course he said that some areas could be newly cultivated but not nearly as much as the country needed. I don't remember what figure he gave; it was something on the order of 3 million hectares. Of course even that is a large amount, but not as much as we needed. Still, I was glad even of that. If we could sow wheat on those 3 million hectares with a yield of even 5 centners per hectares, there would already be 1.5 million tons of marketable grain. If we could even harvest a million tons, that would be approximately the equivalent of 16 million poods. For those days that would have been a fairly substantial addition to our country's granaries. Of course that was leaving out the amount needed to feed the people who would be bringing these new fields under cultivation.

I took a critical attitude toward his opinion and gave greater credence to the opinions of the secretaries of province committees. Not because I knew for certain that Shayakhmetov was wrong. It was just that we had an urgent need to expand the amount of land under cultivation, and I was searching for every possible way of doing that. And the province-committee secretaries did give me hints as to how this was possible. I gave greater credence to them and relied more on their opinions because they knew the state of affairs in detail and convinced me that this possibility did exist in Kazakhstan. Of course there was a certain risk involved. It is especially true in Kazakhstan that harvests depend on weather conditions, on the amount of precipitation—both in the winter in the form of snow and in the summer in the form of rain. In fact the harvest there depends to a greater degree on the summer precipitation. Still, the risk was worth taking, since the grain harvested in good years would make up for any losses from drought.

Later on, officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and the State Planning Commission presented us with information about potential expansion in other parts of the country. In the Altai region, in Orenburg province, and in other regions there were large areas being utilized as pastureland, which had never been plowed. Statistical material was compiled that gave us reason to

hope. At the September 1953 Central Committee plenum the question of virgin and unused lands was not the only one raised.<sup>8</sup> Other urgent questions confronting the rural part of our country were also discussed then—state procurement of agricultural goods, state prices for such goods, and so on. After Stalin's death people had the possibility of stating their opinions more freely, and it became easier to search for opportunities to provide economic incentives for increased production. We agreed on an increase in payments for labor in the agricultural sector in order to provide material incentives for people.

Shortly after this plenum, we adopted a resolution on the first phase of the virgin lands project, which would involve bringing 8 million hectares under cultivation. We came up with this figure with the help of the province-committee secretaries, although Shayakhmetov continued to defend a lower figure. Later I analyzed the position he took and understood that he knew perfectly well about all of Kazakhstan's potential. Why then, I wondered, were the province-committee secretaries taking a different position? I formed the impression that there were political motives—or more exactly, nationalist motives—at work here. Shayakhmetov understood that if the amount of land sown to grain was increased, the Kazakhs by themselves could not do the work. Many people of other nationalities lived in Kazakhstan, mainly Ukrainians and Russians. He understood—and no one was concealing this—that we would have to call for volunteers to help bring the virgin lands under cultivation. For our part, we were confident that the necessary number of people would be found, but he didn't want that to happen, because then the relative weight of the native population of Kazakhstan would decline even further and more drastically. As for the province-committee secretaries, they as Communists viewed this question from a more correct political position. They didn't separate the interests of the Kazakh people from the interests of the Soviet people as a whole.

When the process of opening up the virgin lands began, it became necessary to replace Shayakhmetov. In 1954 a plenum of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party promoted Ponomarenko<sup>9</sup> to replace him. Ponomarenko had a great deal of experience as a party and government official in Belorussia as well as on a nationwide level. Not only did Ponomarenko have a good knowledge of agriculture; he also had a broad political outlook. The person promoted to be second secretary of the Kazakhstan Central Committee was Brezhnev,<sup>10</sup> who had previously worked as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia. Thus we

strengthened the leadership in Kazakhstan, based on the fact that we confronted a major task there. We needed to promote people with the necessary experience and capacity for initiative. After all, Kazakhstan is a very large republic, and incidentally, its potential is far from having been exhausted even today.

A new question arose: How could we attract people to work on the virgin lands? The Stolypin government under the tsar had had some experience along these lines.<sup>11</sup> The Stolypin government had also concerned itself with bringing settlers into uncultivated lands in Siberia and Kazakhstan. The settlers were given tax exemptions, but they had to pay their travel expenses themselves. In our era there could be no question of such a thing. People could not be expected to pick up and move, together with their families, especially at their own expense. In the eyes of the peasants the land had long since lost its value. There was no private ownership of land; it was the property of the nation as a whole. Naturally, people are not going to go to work on such land at their own expense. To remove yourself from where you feel at home, to leave your familiar territory behind, and to travel off to who knows where—we didn't nurse any hopes that the peasants would do that. We considered that an unrealistic perspective. The only possibility was to relocate people at government expense.

The next question was: What kind of farms should we organize on the virgin lands, collective farms or state farms? At first we wanted to do both. Later we decided to have state farms only. They represent a more progressive form [of property ownership] than collective farms<sup>12</sup> and one that is subject to greater influence by the state. Also, grain production on the state farms is several times less expensive than on collective farms. But we thought about that in detail later. At first we simply began the undertaking to cultivate the virgin lands. At first collective farms were in the forefront. We began to organize new ones and to expand those already in existence, enlarging their membership with newly arriving agricultural workers.

However, the most fundamental question was: How many years would it take for the newly cultivated land to produce the desired results? The answer to that question had the following significance: it would decide whether we summoned people immediately, beginning in 1954, or whether we would begin the process of opening up the virgin lands by building housing and other things. Of course the answer was that we first had to create some normal living conditions; we could begin transferring people only after providing all the necessities for them. But who would do the building? No one was living on

those lands. That meant we had to mobilize construction workers. Yet we had an immediate need for grain. We found ourselves trapped in a vicious circle.

I made the following proposal: “Comrades, let’s appeal to Soviet youth, to the Young Communist League. Let them undertake the opening up of the virgin lands.<sup>13</sup> We will ask them to take a socially conscious attitude toward the needs of the country. I am convinced that we will meet with a warm response and bring hundreds of thousands of people into action. Let us recall earlier times [such as World War II] when people were forced to live not only in tents but in trenches, sacrificing their very lives. Despite the difficult conditions our country faced during the first years of the war, the people mobilized and found ways to overcome all difficulties. As for the opening up of the virgin lands, that is labor that will be paid for, and on top of that people will have the moral satisfaction of bringing new land under cultivation and increasing the wealth of our country. I’m convinced that we’ll find people who’ll do this out of enthusiasm for the cause.”

Debates flared up in the Presidium of the Central Committee around the question of the virgin lands. Doubts were expressed, especially by such conservative people as Molotov. He had no understanding whatsoever of agricultural production. I don’t remember who else, but it’s likely there were others who echoed his objections. It always happens that way. The naysayers always make their appearance. At first Molotov didn’t openly object to the virgin lands project but merely began “blowing bubbles.” He kept endlessly raising this or that question that seemed incomprehensible to him and that required explanation. And all these questions boiled down to one objection: this thing was being done on too large a scale, the time was not yet right for it, or perhaps it was wrong altogether and the expenditures would not be justified. One of the arguments against the virgin lands project was: “Where are we heading? What for? We already have huge stretches of territory under cultivation, and it would be better to concentrate on increasing the yield from already cultivated land. That is, we should take a different direction altogether.”

The arguments Molotov presented were mainly based on making the utilization of existing agricultural land more intensive. In undertaking the virgin-lands project we were dooming ourselves to extensive agriculture, relying only on what nature provided. Our opponents insisted on intensive agriculture, which required large investments of money, increased use of mineral fertilizers, and other material resources necessary to achieve greater agricultural output. What can you say? This is absolutely the truth; it is understandable to everyone, including myself. Of course it’s better to engage

in intensive agriculture, that is, to obtain a larger yield per hectare. We, on the other hand, chose the path of expanding the area under crops in order to obtain a greater quantity of agricultural goods. The first way of doing things [that is, intensive agriculture] is not something that we invented. That approach is already being widely applied in the West.

Why did we decline to take that road? Because that possibility was not available to us. The choice of what agricultural method to use, intensive or extensive, depends on one's material possibilities, the cultural level of the leadership, and above all that of specific officials. Let me repeat: agricultural work on an intensive basis requires not only a higher level of culture, but also a greater expenditure of material resources. What exactly is intensive agriculture? As I understand it, it is the ability to obtain the maximum possible yield from an area of cultivated land. If, for example, we take an average yield of 8 or 9 centners per hectare, applying intensive agricultural methods we would hope to obtain 35 centners per hectare. What's needed for this are mineral fertilizers, high-quality seed, herbicides, and other means of improving the working of the land and preserving the harvested crops. Perhaps in some places work needs to be carried out during the summer, adding lime to the soil if it is too salty. In order to make the soil more fertile and productive and to obtain the maximum yield possible at this stage of the development of agricultural science, the work we would have had to carry out required large expenditures, but we had nothing like that at the time. You cannot suddenly leap over an entire stage simply because you have the desire to change from extensive agriculture to intensive. It's a fairly slow process of transition, accomplished by accumulating material resources, knowledge, and experience.

We had some concept of introducing intensive agriculture, but we had no really exact idea of the total sum of the material resources necessary to achieve an agriculture based on intensive methods. At that time some individual work brigades or teams on the collective farms and state farms were obtaining as much as 40 centners per hectare, but you couldn't take that as a starting point for claiming that we had already made the transition to intensive agriculture.

It's not the same [in our country] as it is in the West. For example, the British, French, Germans, Dutch, Swedes, and Norwegians on the average obtain a yield of between 30 and 35 centners of grain per hectare. Even if we had decided to allocate several billion rubles to making the transition to intensive methods, we would have achieved only a lot of sound and fury. It's not enough to simply invest money and make a voluntaristic decision. It's

necessary to know how to spend our resources rationally. It's necessary to have enough time to build the factories to produce mineral fertilizers, the nitrogen, potassium, phosphorus, and other substances that plants need.

To build a large production plant requires a minimum of two to three years. In addition, cadres have to be trained, both agronomists and experts in animal husbandry. An understanding of how to engage in agriculture using intensive methods has to be instilled in the mass of collective farmers, and that is a fairly lengthy process. Therefore all the talk about us expanding cultivated areas and thereby not taking the road that was being followed in the West is abstractly true, but still it is nothing but empty talk. It shows that a person is capable of making judgments but has no understanding of what intensive agriculture is. It's more than just words. It means the material and spiritual preparation of the country. It's necessary to change the whole way in which we conduct agriculture, and that can't be done in one year and not even in one decade.

Let's take Smolensk province for example. This land has been part of Russia from ancient times, as is true also of the provinces of Moscow, Tula, Oryol, Kursk, Ryazan, and Kalinin.<sup>14</sup> The amount of arable land there is not very great. Even if the yield from that land is increased, still the additional amount of grain obtained would not be sufficient to meet the needs of our country. Besides, not only would we have to spend resources; we would need time. We would have to clear away overgrown areas that were difficult to access, carry out land reclamation, build chemical factories, and most difficult of all—teach people to use mineral fertilizers. The cultural level at which agriculture is carried out would have to be raised, and yet that kind of thing is imbibed with one's mother's milk. And we still have to train and educate the "mothers." All of this takes time.

I understand that all this can be speeded up. Lectures and training courses can be organized. All that can be done, but still it's necessary for each individual to begin to feel urgently, with his or her entire being, that agriculture must be conducted on a scientific basis.

Actually we didn't have a choice of what method of agriculture we would use. We needed grain, and we didn't need it at some future time; we needed it right then and there, that very day. Expanding the cultivated areas gave us the possibility of quickly increasing the grain harvest, of having a larger yield of grain that very autumn. This was a problem we were facing right then, and a concrete solution was needed.<sup>15</sup> All land suitable for cultivation had to be used without any great or special expenditure. As they used to say

in the old days: you plow and you sow and then you get what God gives you. In short, the only possibility that remained to us was to increase the amount of arable land, to engage in extensive agriculture, as had been done since time immemorial. And we had great potential in that area. I consider the path we chose absolutely correct. And as a result we solved our grain problem, although we did encounter droughts. But then, that's part of life.

Even this year [1971] I don't know how the harvest is going to come out. It has been a difficult spring so far. There has been no rain in the trans-Volga region, and conditions have been dry even in Moscow province. I myself, as a local gardener, have already been suffering from the lack of rain. Of course I'm joking, but for our country as a whole, drought is no joke. I'm proud that when I held a high position in the party and government it fell to my lot to carry out this policy. At that time it was the only path we could take. The possibilities opened up for us by the virgin-lands program were no laughing matter. [To understand this] all you need is some knowledge of the condition of grain farming in those years, our actual shortage of grain.

Today everyone sees that the virgin-lands program has paid for itself in the years since it began. But back then we were far from being convinced that it would work. We posed the problem rather modestly because we understood that something had to be done. Nevertheless, the decision to undertake the virgin-lands project was made only at the last minute at the Central Committee plenum [of February 23–March 2, 1954].<sup>16</sup> Molotov voted for it together with everyone else.

We had a talk with the leaders of the Young Communist League, told them about our aims in the virgin-lands project, and consulted with them about methods of attracting young people. As always, the Young Communist League responded ardently to the call for help. At first we called for surveyors who would go out and designate the specific areas that were to be plowed. They would also carry out preliminary work. Then team leaders, engineers, and agronomists were mobilized to organize the new state farms and collective farms. Agitational work among experienced tractor drivers was begun, and lists of people who had expressed willingness to go to the virgin lands were drawn up. I think that good memories persist about that time in our history, and about those who renounced their own comfort in the places they were used to, who traveled out to unknown areas to live under poor conditions and endure all the discomforts that are inevitable in a place that doesn't have all the modern conveniences. People went there for the good of the country. It was truly an act of self-sacrifice. People went out to the virgin



lands on the basis of their personal convictions, seeking to do everything they could to ensure that our people would have the agricultural products they needed. And that's how things turned out.

I gave a speech to young volunteers who had gathered at the Kremlin, in the auditorium where the Supreme Soviet held its sessions. I gave a brief call to arms and explained the tasks before us.<sup>17</sup> I told them that the party placed great hopes in them. That meeting then called on young people all over the country to respond to the new project. The meeting proceeded in an interesting way. The young people spoke with great enthusiasm. Some of the individuals and speeches remain in my memory to this day. I can still see them and hear them. Those young people were literally all aglow; their eyes were shining. I had profound faith in the youth. Young people are more flexible and capable of accomplishing great feats.

There arose a question about technical equipment. Where would we get the equipment? After all, we couldn't suddenly increase the production of tractors and other agricultural machinery. That was impossible. New factories would have to be built for that. We had to find some other way of doing this. Then we decided to hold back on the allocation of tractors, combines, and other agricultural equipment to the already well-established regions, to reduce the allocation of such things to those regions for two or three years and send that equipment instead to Kazakhstan.

Today I look back over the path we have traveled, and I think that that was the only possibility. In the already inhabited regions, cadres already existed. Therefore you could still work with an old tractor as long as spare parts were provided, given the existence of well-trained tractor drivers and a knowledgeable leadership in the machine and tractor stations.<sup>18</sup> You could keep working with an old tractor for another year and perhaps even two years. During that time we would try to increase the number of tractors produced annually so as to satisfy the need for both the previously existing collective farms and state farms and the new ones on the virgin lands. And that's what we did. We sent the new equipment to Kazakhstan, and we sent teams of people, work brigades. The military cooperated and provided us with tents. We tried to create passable living conditions for the young people. And the project moved forward.

The first volunteers arrived in the virgin lands when snow was still lying on the steppes. Tractors pulled sleds with the supplies and materials that would be needed first of all, and the people came on foot alongside the tractors. Then spring came and the grand epic of opening up the virgin lands began. The plowing was begun, and people were still living in tents.

I had a tremendous urge to take a look at the virgin lands and see how the young people were doing, to see them, not in the surroundings of the Kremlin, but in the conditions where they were working and living. These were the most primitive of conditions, out in the fields, almost the same as had existed during the war. The only difference was that there were no shells exploding or machine guns chattering. Instead there was the roar of the tractors. Also the sun in Kazakhstan was warming things up well. Besides all that, there was the fact that although I had been the initiator of this project, I didn't have a detailed picture of conditions in the Kazakh steppe land. I wanted to see everything with my own eyes. The Presidium of the Central Committee approved my visit to the virgin lands, and I flew to Kazakhstan. This was the first time I had ever been there. Before that I had only known about life to the east of the Ural Mountains<sup>19</sup> from literature and stories I had heard. And now I myself arrived in the virgin lands and had the opportunity to get a first-hand taste of what was going on. I flew to Kazakhstan, but I don't remember exactly which part of that republic I landed in. The impression I got from what I saw was simply incredible. I was overjoyed, and, as they say, my soul sang. I saw that the land was good, although there was not enough moisture. From my experience of working in Ukraine, I had a good idea of the possibilities of this black earth. But only on the condition that there is precipitation. Without precipitation in both winter and summer this land is very harsh and yields only a miserly harvest. Only when I saw these endless steppes with my own eyes did I fully realize what great possibilities were concealed here for expanding our arable lands and increasing our grain yield.

It gave me pleasure to look into the eyes of these new settlers. It was not only courageous people who had gathered together there, but also people with interesting personalities. The expanses of Kazakhstan are vast, and I flew from place to place by airplane. At first all I could see from up there was unplowed prairie, and then suddenly a mass of white tents appeared. As we flew closer, I could see that furrows had already been plowed. I had an insatiable desire to see how a tractor made its way across the steppe. This flat plain seemed to have no end and no limit. There was a saying then among those working on the virgin-lands project, that a tractor driver had his breakfast at one end of the field, his lunch when he reached the other end, and his supper when he got back. Although it was difficult for the new settlers to get accustomed to the relatively isolated conditions of life, they approached the task with pride and dignity, along with a profusion of jokes and humorous sayings such as always seem to accompany existence when you're living in tents. At one particular work brigade that I visited, I encountered only one

young woman. All the rest were ardent young fellows. One joker among them said: "Comrade Khrushchev, it's boring to live here like this. There's only one young woman among us, and we're all courting her, but she rejects every one of us. We beg you to send some more girls out here." But his words reflected a real situation. When I returned to Moscow, I related my impressions and advised the Young Communist League leaders to appeal to young women to go to the virgin lands, where they could find both work and prospective husbands. It would be a very good thing if new families were formed in the newly opened lands, if homes and children made their appearance, so that a settled local population would come into existence and later on become established residents. The Young Communist League did make an appeal to young women, and quite a few went out to the virgin lands.

It is true that for some families this was a tragedy. Especially for mothers. How could they let their daughters go out from under their wings into an unknown land? All kinds of things can happen in life. What would these girls encounter? Would these girls be able to settle down to a married life? All of these questions were important, and we understood them, but we had no alternative. As it turned out, most of the young women found good arrangements and established their family hearths successfully.

The second time I went to Kazakhstan was during the harvest. I had a burning desire to see what crops had been grown there and what the future of the newly plowed lands would be. The soil in these virgin lands contained many nutritive elements. What they sowed there was spring wheat. We had good harvests during the first few years, with a yield of up to 20 centners per hectare, although of course everything depended on specific local conditions: soil, rainfall, and the skill and capacity of the new settlers for the necessary work. Many unknown factors were encountered at first until we got into some sort of work rhythm and learned what the best conditions were for raising wheat in that region. There were not enough local varieties of wheat, and none at all had been specifically bred for this region, and so these varieties needed to be created. Seed was brought from other areas, but those non-native varieties didn't always adapt successfully.

We also encountered difficulties in the harvesting.<sup>20</sup> Additional people had to be sent. We had to make an appeal to the combine operators of Ukraine and the RFSFR, mainly in Rostov province and the northern Caucasus. The crops are harvested rather early in those areas, and if the work was well organized, after completion of the harvest there, the combines and their operators could be loaded onto transport, to arrive in Kazakhstan

before the wheat had ripened there. That's what we did. We also sent all newly manufactured combines to that area. Even that proved to be insufficient, however, and we had to transfer additional combines from other settled parts of the country.

Almost every year I came to the virgin lands at harvest time. It made me happy. You'd travel through the fields and no longer see tents there, as before, but neat and tidy little whitewashed houses. The first new young trees were growing alongside the houses. On these lands the people had started to settle in, to create for themselves cozy little shelters with the initial comforts of home.

For me, the steppes of Kazakhstan revived memories of my childhood. When I was still a youngster my parents took me to a mining settlement in the Donbas, and we lived there in barracks. The Uspenskaya mine, where my father worked, was in the westernmost part of the land that had been opened up for the extraction of coal in the Donbas. If you popped out of the quarters where we were living, all around you would be the Ukrainian steppe stretching off into the distance. No trees or buildings or other structures were visible if you looked to the south, but if you turned your head toward the north there was a solid mass of smokestacks. In Kazakhstan the expanses were even wider, and the flat steppe even more limitless. Even now when I recall that time I experience joyful emotions.

We continued to expand plowland and began to bring Siberia, Orenburg, and the steppes near the Volga River under cultivation. A great nationwide effort developed around this project; everyone was hunting for unused lands or virgin lands. The party secretaries of the district committees and province committees would travel around their regions, and the local inhabitants would give them tips and advise them where unplowed lands were hidden away.

Of course in opening up these new lands not everything went smoothly. There were people who showed up in the virgin lands just looking to "make a quick ruble." Others simply wanted to change their circumstances of life because they had poor reputations where they had lived before. Bad characters also showed up, people who couldn't get along with others. But they couldn't make a go of it in Kazakhstan either, and they fled from there. But what of it? People are different, and they always will be, everywhere and for all time. For the most part, those who came to the virgin lands were outstanding Soviet citizens, people who wanted to do good work.

Various problems having to do with transport arose: both rail and road. Nothing like this had ever existed before. When I traveled around the virgin

lands, I saw a lot of things that I would rather not have seen. When the grain was harvested, it was poured right out on the ground, and much was lost in shipment. There were no storehouses or granaries, and simple things like canvas or burlap tarpaulins were in short supply; also, there were no threshing floors. The grain lying on the ground was covered haphazardly and most often, unfortunately, was not covered at all. There was a shortage of labor, and as a result the losses were colossal.

People began to sound the alarm, to write letters to the party Central Committee and to the newspapers. And they were right to do that. At first it was very painful to read these letters. People were showing concern for the good of the country in regard to conserving the harvested grain, but there was almost nothing more that we could do; we could only issue appeals for a more conscientious attitude. There were not enough bags to put the grain in. The wheat was simply poured wholesale into the backs of trucks and not even covered with tarpaulins. Grain went flying at every turn in the road and at every pothole, and the roads were covered with a fine film of wheat. The birds were in seventh heaven. You could see them growing fat before your eyes. But in spite of all the losses, we benefited from the wheat that was obtained.

The main problem was to build housing. The government delivered lumber, and the virgin-lands pioneers did the building themselves. Of course it was primitive, but nevertheless they constructed some sort of shelters for themselves. At the mines the workers usually put up some sort of auxiliary structures outside their living quarters, little sheds or storage buildings. Many virgin-lands workers lived in such small barns or sheds. Later we encountered other problems as well. The workers themselves told us about many of them. During one of my visits to the virgin lands I had a talk with a local MTS (machine and tractor station) agronomist by the name of Savchenko, an experienced and intelligent official who had come to that area before the virgin-lands project began. The MTS provided services to new and old collective farms and state farms. Savchenko said: "Comrade Khrushchev, our MTS provides services mainly to collective farms. But I want to ask: 'Why are we giving grain to the collective farmers that is harvested from the virgin lands?'" I was surprised: "What do you mean why? Because they work." He smiled and said: "No, the story that there are collective farmers working on the virgin lands is a complete fabrication. The government has brought tractors and other machinery here, the MTS plows, sows, and if necessary provides mineral fertilizers as well, although there is not much fertilizer here. When the crops ripen, we harvest them, and then we hunt for the

collective farmers in order to distribute grain to them from house to house based on the number of 'workdays' they put in."<sup>21</sup>

This was not some abstract schema, but the reality. The crops usually grown on the collective farms required large inputs of manual labor, and people were needed to do the work. But on the virgin lands agriculture was almost entirely devoted to grain growing, and that was almost entirely mechanized. The people who did the work in the fields were from the machine and tractor stations and not from the collective farms. What were the collective farmers doing? As far as the newly plowed lands were concerned, virtually nothing. This agronomist had opened my eyes to an obvious truth. We had been thinking in schematic terms, assessing the activity of collective farmers from the standpoint of what went on in the central regions of Russia, and then transposing that model schematically to the virgin lands. I agreed with Savchenko that the collective farms on the virgin lands should be reorganized as state farms. The government pays the state-farm workers a certain share of the grain, but the government itself receives more grain. This agronomist had proved to be a reliable man who kept the interests of the state in mind.

After returning to Moscow, I shared my impressions of my latest trip, and the leadership of the USSR, along with all the officials on a unionwide level and the local officials of Kazakhstan, came to the conclusion that what was needed in Kazakhstan was state farms. Besides, it was more difficult to set up collective farms than state farms. What did you need for state farms? Land, buildings, equipment, and people. We had enough people there; by then people were going out to the virgin lands willingly. Consequently all we had to do was bring together tractor drivers, combine operators, and repairmen for agricultural equipment. It was easier to get the work done because it was not unskilled collective farmers but trained specialists who were doing the work. Also, the cost to the government of state-farm grain was considerably lower than the collective-farm cost.

The virgin-lands project gave rise to many questions to which we didn't know the answers. One question that came up was this: What time should the sowing begin? Should it begin in the early spring, as we were used to doing in the European part of the USSR, or should we wait a little longer? The older residents [who had lived there before the virgin-lands campaign] could tell us [based on their experience] when was the most favorable time for sowing. We believed them and at the same time were afraid of making a mistake. Why was the timing so important? The rainfall in the virgin lands was scanty and only came at a certain time. You had to make a guess as to

when conditions would be most favorable for sowing. If you happened to sow just before the rain came, you would have sprouts of wheat, but if you made a mistake . . . [you were in trouble]. Actually I can't remember exactly all the considerations spelled out by those who were knowledgeable about the local agricultural conditions.

Then another question came up: How should we go about the plowing and the sowing? Dust storms were common in Kazakhstan. When we had already plowed a great number of hectares of virgin land, terrible dust storms occurred. Huge clouds of dirt rose in the air as the topsoil was eroded by the wind. On one occasion [in May 1963] dust storms destroyed a substantial part of the crops that had been sown. Certain means for combating erosion have been known for a long time and have been tested and proved in practice, including the planting of rows of trees to act as windbreakers. This was a difficult and expensive task, but it paid for itself. There are other agricultural techniques that can be used. People need to take weather conditions and other factors into account and adapt themselves accordingly, to counter the savagery of nature with the inventiveness of the human mind. The Canadians work under similar weather conditions, and they call their arid zone a "high-risk area" for agriculture.

In order to investigate further the particular aspects of cultivating the soil in the virgin lands, we sent special delegations to Canada. Our agronomists, engineers, and designers of agricultural machinery knew about Canadian agricultural methods and equipment only from the literature. The Canadians used shallow-tilling devices (*ploskorezy*), which did not turn over the soil like a plow, but cut it up and loosened it with disk harrows. We were not familiar with such methods for tilling the soil. Before the virgin-lands project this particular technology had not been of interest to our specialists or to officials in the leadership. Besides, most of those who came to the virgin lands were from older, long-settled regions such as Ukraine, Belorussia, and the northern Caucasus. They were accustomed to their own way of doing agriculture, to their own climatic and soil conditions, and naturally they applied their own experience to Kazakhstan and only gradually adapted themselves to the new conditions. This kind of thing doesn't happen overnight; experience has to be accumulated. Book knowledge alone is insufficient. Previously the vast lands of Kazakhstan had been used for grazing sheep, horses, and camels. And now the prospect was to engage in agriculture, plow the land, and grow grain. None of the leadership had any experience in this matter, neither book knowledge nor practical knowledge.



There were some experienced local specialists in the virgin lands, including experts in seed selection and the breeding of special varieties of grain. I encountered one experienced scientist in this field, a man from Leningrad who had been sent into internal exile there at one point. His name was Barayev.<sup>22</sup> He had settled down and become acclimatized there. He liked the steppes of Kazakhstan. He had a passion for his work and produced great results. I respected him highly. His knowledge, plus the experience he had acquired in internal exile, turned out to be very useful. Every time I went to Kazakhstan I met with him and listened to his advice. By then all the prohibitions had been lifted, and he could have returned to Leningrad or any other city he might have wished to, but he declined: "I've already grown accustomed to this place and put down roots here. I've gained experience and adapted my scientific methods to this geographic zone, and so I'm not leaving." As the saying goes, things wouldn't have worked out so well if bad luck hadn't helped. Stalin had done us a "service," so to speak, in the task of opening up the virgin lands. He had exiled an innocent scientist, who got to know the local conditions and whose knowledge turned out to be very useful in the virgin-lands project.

No matter how things worked out, and despite all the difficulties, the grain produced on the virgin lands continued to be our least expensively produced grain. One explanation for this is that we were able to use our most powerful machinery there. Our old DT-54 machine [diesel tractor with 54 horsepower], whose production I had defended against Stalin [who wanted to replace it with production of a less powerful tractor], had by now long since become obsolete. The factories were now producing the DT-75 [diesel tractor with 75 horsepower]. But even the DT-75 wasn't good enough. We needed a variety of tractors of different horsepower, but above all for the vast expanses of the virgin lands we needed the most powerful possible tractor.

Toward the end of my activity in the leadership, the Kirov factory in Leningrad was producing the tractor called the K-700 [Kirov factory tractor with 700 horsepower]. With the introduction of this tractor the productivity of labor rose sharply, and the payment for labor rose accordingly. In grain production, the more powerful the machinery, the more productive it is; and the more productive it is, the cheaper the product. Of course the powerful K-700 was of no use on farms with small acreage. But for large-scale industrial crops an entirely different kind of agricultural equipment was needed.

The opening up of the virgin lands was a glorious page in the history of the Soviet state. For many years the tsarist government's attention had been

attracted by the virgin lands. It too had wanted to settle those lands and make use of them. That was the goal being pursued by the tsarist government when it resettled people from regions where the peasants had only very small holdings. This was not just an economic question for the tsarist government. It was also political. In 1905 the Khomutovka district, including my own village of Kalinovka, took part in an uprising. The estates of the local landlords were attacked and laid waste. Our village attacked and pillaged the estate of General Shoutis. It was right next to our village. Another estate, that of the landowning family Vasilchenko, was located farther away, on the other side of woods. But it too was attacked and pillaged. About sixty people were jailed for this. And that kind of thing went on everywhere.

And so the tsarist government decided to defuse the political situation by offering the peasants a chance to move to areas that had not yet been settled, thus providing more land for those who remained behind. When the peasants left, they sold the land, and of course the poor peasants could not buy it, although they were the ones that needed the land. The kulaks (wealthy peasants) and *serednyaks* (peasants of middle income, not impoverished) were the ones who bought it. Some relatives of mine from a neighboring village near Kalinovka went to Siberia in 1908. That village had two names. The people called it Suchkino [meaning something like “Bitchville”],<sup>23</sup> but in the written records it was Kleven. Kleven was a large village. My aunt lived there, my mother’s older sister. She too went off with her very large family to Kokchetav province [in Kazakhstan], or as it was called then Kokchetav gubernia.

I remember my aunt’s family going off to those strange and distant lands. In 1908 my mother and father were hired to work on the large and wealthy estate of the landlord Vasilchenko. I was already an adolescent by then. I was fourteen years old and I worked as a driver of oxen during the plowing season. It was heavy work for someone of my age, and as I have said before, you had to lift a heavy yoke to place on the oxen’s necks and harness them to the plow. We were working near the village of Suchkino. At one point there was a break in our agricultural work and we were assigned to clear out the forest. Our job was to cut down the bushes. My job as a youngster was to drag away the branches and make a pile of them. It was not hard work and it was even fun. Suddenly we noticed that there was a fire in Kleven. Everyone ran to see, and I did too. The entire village was burning, including my aunt’s house. Later it was said that this fire was set by the peasants themselves, the ones going off to Kazakhstan. (Back then no one knew the word “Kazakhstan”;

they just said Siberia.) The day when they were supposed to leave, half the village burned down.

That resettlement process was a painful one. Emissaries were chosen. Among them was my aunt's husband. They went out on a preliminary basis and looked over the land and the conditions the new settlers would have to live in. They liked what they saw. As far as the eye could see there was land, and you could take as much of it as you wanted, as much as you could cope with. Many other peasants went out to settle those lands from other villages of Kursk gubernia. Things were hard for the peasants in the tsarist era, with their wooden plows and small iron plows. Not everyone made a go of it in Kazakhstan, because great physical strength and resources were required, but most who made the trip were poor people. Although the tsar encouraged settlement, nothing much came of it. The tsarist government did not provide the necessary aid. Some people, after they moved to Kazakhstan, were successful in farming and became kulaks [that is, they made their way into the category of wealthy peasants], but others were ruined and became agricultural laborers. Many returned, but not to their own villages, because their land had been sold, as well as their homes, and the farms they had owned no longer existed. There were no opportunities for returning to their home villages. These peasants either became agricultural laborers or went to work at the factories, giving up farming altogether.

In the Soviet era, the situation had changed completely. The technical possibilities had changed, making it possible for the virgin lands to be brought under cultivation at an accelerated pace. The government allocated tens of thousands of agricultural machines and helped the volunteers get settled in their new location, providing them with necessities. Therefore the results were quite different. But the appetite grows by what it feeds on. During the process of opening up the virgin lands, the appetites of party and government leaders grew apace. By 1960 newly cultivated lands added up to more than 60 million hectares. The unionwide harvest of grain had increased. But this required large capital investments in housing, in establishing machine and tractor stations, and in organizing state farms. This money was recouped with plenty to spare, even when you take into account the alternating years of good harvest, poor harvest, and no harvest at all in that region. Even in years of bad harvest the grain from the virgin lands was no more expensive than that grown in the older, long-settled regions [the European part of the country]. On the whole, the carrying through of this colossal project turned out to be economically advantageous. We understood

that you could not do everything at once. And the people also understood that they weren't just going to their aunt's to have pancakes, but that they would have to work and work hard before they were able to settle in and establish ordinary human living conditions. The accelerated pace at which these lands were brought under cultivation and new settlements established literally made your head spin. It was pleasant to see this sight, but it was not so simple or easy to bring it about. The main problem was that there were no roads. Where could you get roads from if no one had been living there? The nomadic tending of livestock did not require roads. On the contrary, roads simply reduced the amount of pasture.<sup>24</sup>

Grain growing has to be done by a settled population, not nomads. For communication among such people, and primarily for economic purposes, good roads are needed. This is an important aspect of things. We began with dirt roads. Then we developed railroads and paved roads and built elevators for storing the grain and processing it; we also began to mechanize the milling operations.

More and more virgin land was brought under cultivation. Along with the huge potential for bringing in more grain, our expenses for opening up the new lands increased. The leadership of the older, long-settled regions of our republics, provinces, and territories began to show something like dissatisfaction over the opening up of the new lands; they complained about reduced attention to their needs, first of all their need for machinery and equipment. The majority supported me, especially because we considered it possible to reduce the procurement of agricultural goods from other regions as a result of the opening up of the virgin lands. We were using an old way of measuring the harvest at that time. When we began receiving well beyond 2.5 billion poods [40 million tons] of marketable grain, that is, grain that had already been stored in the elevators; that seemed to us a very large amount. Under Stalin, as I have already said, we stored 1.8 billion poods [28.8 million tons]. Now we were approaching 3 billion poods [48 million tons] and thought we could satisfy all our needs. We were proceeding not on the basis of reality, but on the basis of conditions in which we had lived previously. Life itself showed that this was incorrect.

It seemed to us that we could reduce procurements [obligatory deliveries of agricultural products to the state] in the older, long-settled parts of the country. We reduced procurement requirements for many republics, even for Ukraine, whose relative weight in the creation of the grain surplus was very great at that time. In spite of that, we reduced the planned procurements

from Ukraine a little bit. And we released Belorussia almost entirely from the obligation of delivering grain.

Soon we realized that we had been too hasty. It turned out that we didn't have enough grain. Why? Because as society developed, and with the development of industry and a higher level of culture, the needs of the people increased. That has to be taken into account. The people began to murmur and complain. After Stalin's death the locks had come off people's tongues. They now had the opportunity to express a critical opinion without looking over their shoulder, for fear of being jailed. I would say that for the first time it became possible to speak more freely about one's own needs. I am saying more freely, because people still were not speaking in their true voices. The Stalinist past still hung over everyone's heads. There was the threat that if you said something, you'd be jailed. If you asked a question, you could be jailed. Or if you weren't jailed, you'd have some restrictions imposed on you or be demoted at your workplace. And such incidents occurred. Sometimes people were still jailed. Unfortunately that's the way things were. But up in the top circles the impression had been formed that everything was running smoothly and quietly. We were enjoying "God's blessings." The people were living and prospering.

To put it briefly, we again began to experience a shortage of grain. The socialist countries had additional requirements—Poland, first of all. As for East Germany and Czechoslovakia, we had to take it upon ourselves to meet their requirements for grain totally. And we continued to provide substantial assistance to the Hungarian Republic and Bulgaria. We took this heap of troubles on our shoulders. Even though we felt we weren't up to it, we couldn't refuse. The explanation for this lay in political considerations, the desire to strengthen friendly relations. Besides, every time we were forced to deal with this problem, we hoped that the next year we would open up sufficient new lands and reap a larger harvest so that finally we could fully satisfy all requirements.

We did satisfy our requirements for grain, speaking in terms of grain as food for human beings. But grain is not only used on the dining room table; it is also used as feed for livestock and poultry. That means meat and eggs. We had a big shortage of grain that could be used for feed.

Aid to our friends exhausted our reserves, but you can't live without reserve supplies of agricultural products, especially grain. In my opinion we needed to have at least one year's reserve supply, and perhaps even more. Agriculture is dependent on variations in natural conditions. That's how it was in the past, still is today, and will continue to be in the future. Certainly

the harvest depends in part on machinery and equipment and one's level of skill and know-how in tilling the soil and knowing how to select more productive varieties of crops, and it depends on many other things as well. Nevertheless, rain is rain. That's why the peasant always kept an eye on the priest and bowed deeply when approaching him, asking him to bring out the icon and say some prayers for rain.

We understood that praying would not help us, but we too were dependent on the weather, that is, on favorable climatic conditions coming together in one year or another and in one region or another. Ours is a huge country, and inevitably in some places there will be a lot of rain and in other places dry spells. Thus we were unable to build up a good reserve supply. In order to do that, we would have had to renounce giving aid to the socialist countries.

I want to be understood correctly. Sometimes the aid we provided was not understood correctly. As though we were giving alms to beggars. No, we supplied them with grain and were paid back. We were not paid back in foreign currency or gold, but in the overall exchange of products an accounting was kept of what they needed to pay back to us. As repayment for the grain they received from us they delivered goods to us that they could not sell on Western markets. We suffered some loss in this exchange, even though the products they delivered were good and of high quality. The point is that although we needed these goods, we could have got along without them. Our need to build up grain reserves was greater than our need for these products. Aside from all that, the main problem was that demand had increased in our own country, the total amount of wages being paid out was greater, and therefore demand had increased.

Why had demand increased in our country? We took the opportunity to increase pension payments [as well as wages]. In the case of pensioners, widows, and others who were unable to work and had no breadwinners—because they had been killed in the war—it could no longer be tolerated that such people be kept on short rations and paid a miserly pension. And there were a great many such people. After we had increased pension payments, I remember I made a trip to Rostov and was walking down the street, and the older people, the people of retirement age, literally shouted out their words of thanks. In our country some people liked to organize clagues to shout out things that would be pleasing to the top leadership. There were actually people who signed up to shout such things.<sup>25</sup> But in this case, the shouting was sincere. People were shouting: “Comrade Khrushchev, thank you for the pension, thank you for the pension.” Doctors and teachers, whose salaries we had increased, also thanked us.

Once people began receiving more money, they began spending more, mainly on primary necessities—that is, food. The demand for bread increased, along with the demand for “bakery products,” to use the bureaucratic terminology, and other basic food necessities, such as fat, butter, beef. I’m not even talking about vegetables.

At one time there arose for us some difficulties of the following kind: the amount of meat procured by the government had increased, but there were no refrigerating units for storing the increased quantity. In response to this problem I made a kind of joke, even doing so in public on one occasion. I said:

“We have vast unused potential for storing meat. And that is the human stomach. So then, in order to avoid the danger of an excessive quantity of meat, all we have to do is increase wages and the size of the human stomach will immediately increase.”

Meat consumption remained at a very low level in our country, and even today I think it is close to zero. Even among the socialist countries we held virtually last place; only in Bulgaria and Romania was meat consumption lower than in our country. All the other socialist countries consumed more meat per capita than we did. I think the situation is still the same today [in 1971], although there is no information about that in the press. We never give out that kind of information; it’s kept under wraps. An open information policy would interfere with our boasting about our successes.

Of course we did achieve incredible successes after the October revolution. That is obvious even to the dullest person. Even our enemies cannot deny that. But we have to look at things soberly ourselves. We have huge shortages in production in a whole number of areas. The most basic necessities in consumer goods and food are lacking. Our economy was backward, and even today we still lag behind the West. Granted that we lag behind to a lesser degree, but the gap has not been eliminated. Our lagging behind the West can be explained by the low yield of our harvests even now. Our harvests are too small.

The main problem was that we didn’t have the resources. After Stalin’s death we still feared an attack by the capitalist countries. America was following an arrogant policy, constantly displaying its superiority in a demonstrative way. It surrounded the socialist countries with military bases and even had the audacity to fly over the territory of the socialist countries with its warplanes. We were forced to allocate huge resources for defense in order to avoid a repetition of what happened in World War II. Vast resources had to be invested in science and directly in the production of weapons for defense. Above all this



meant missiles, planes, nuclear warheads, a submarine fleet, and other means of waging war. This was fairly costly for us; it drained our budget, bled us white. The options available to us were reduced by all this.

But let me return to the main subject, the opening up of the virgin lands. I think that opening them up was a saving grace for us, and it was also an economic necessity. At that time, it proved to be the only quick way of increasing grain yield in the Soviet Union. But not every year brought us joy. As we were bringing these lands under cultivation, we knew that periods of good harvest would alternate with bad years, but we had to take the risk. The worst harvest in the virgin lands came in 1963. It turned out that we had a very bad harvest, not only in the virgin lands but throughout the Soviet Union.

Difficult times arrived. The problem was that we had no reserves. We were even forced to buy grain from abroad: in Canada, Australia, and the United States. The United States wanted to crush us, but capitalist greed knows no bounds, and they sold us grain in spite of their desire to crush us. They needed customers, and we ourselves were forced to turn to America as a source to buy grain from. No negotiations were conducted at the government level. Everything was decided on a commercial basis. Even in the bad harvest year of 1963, however, we did get enough grain from the virgin lands to pay the cost of working those lands that year. But what if we had not plowed up those lands and had not obtained this additional acreage sown to grain crops, what kind of situation would we have been in then? It would have been simply catastrophic! That year the virgin lands helped us out greatly. As I recall, grain procurements from the virgin lands were approximately 400 million poods [6.4 million tons].

I loved to travel to the virgin lands when the harvest was being brought in. You ride in your automobile and as far as the eye can see there are endless fields of grain. After the spikes of wheat have formed, the vast expanses sown to wheat are like waves on the ocean, especially when the wind blows, rippling the sea of grain. Here and there working machines stick up like islands. The most favorable year, with the best harvest, of all the years of the virgin-lands project, was 1964. After the previous “year of famine” I was simply bursting to get out to see the virgin lands. I use the expression “year of famine” in quotation marks because there was no actual famine; we were bringing in enough grain to feed ourselves, and anything we lacked we were able to purchase abroad. We even had some grain left over for the following year. When I say “year of famine,” it’s because we didn’t harvest the amount we had been hoping for, and that of course forced us to economize, to use our

grain sparingly, so as to spend as little as possible of our foreign currency buying grain abroad.

The preliminary reports about the harvest in 1964 were very positive. I waited impatiently for the harvest to begin. I told the Central Committee Presidium that I wanted to make a trip to the virgin lands to see how things were going. Not only did no one object, but, as I recall, the desire I expressed met with approval. And I flew out to Kazakhstan.

As soon as we landed I immediately went out in the fields in my vehicle. I know no greater satisfaction than driving through farmlands. I never felt such great emotion as during that last year of mine. That was my last year after many years of activity as a party and government official. The grain was like a solid wall, thick as a hairbrush. It was a remarkable harvest! I say that it was remarkable and full of great promise, keeping in mind the specific conditions of Kazakhstan.

I was riding in an open vehicle, looking down at the wheat fields from above. As the wind blew there was a play of waves as the stalks swayed back and forth. It really was a surging sea of wheat. I've been told that if you open up a tarpaulin and spread it out on top of the wheat when the wind is blowing like that it will actually float along over the ears of grain as though it were floating on the waves. Even today when I recall the past, it makes me happy and I feel strong emotion at the pleasant memories of that time. Then I got on a train and traveled a short distance by rail. I wanted to have a look at different regions, see things for myself, and to talk with people, especially those who worked on the state farms. By then the collective farms were rare items, and those we had established at the beginning of the virgin lands project had been turned into state farms.

Everywhere you looked there was grain, grain, grain. Everywhere you traveled, combines were at work. People were sweating but smiling, a pleasant kind of tiredness. They knew that they were working for their own country, and above all they could taste in advance the good pay they had coming to them.

Out there on the steppes I experienced a high point of personal happiness. I traveled great distances by car, and also by train, and then I got into a car again and kept traveling and traveling across the plains. I saw a beautiful harvest, the biggest harvest in all the years of the virgin-lands project during my time in the leadership.

Settlements had grown up in the steppes by that time. They were not houses, but "houselets," standing in rows along the streets. In the front gardens behind the picket fences were flowers; and occasionally you encountered

fruit trees. A lot of Ukrainians were living out there, and wherever fate takes them, Ukrainians invariably plant apple trees and pear trees, and hollyhocks in front of their windows. They can't get along without such things. And little children had already made their appearance. In short, people were making homes for themselves out there on the land. The steppes had been plowed, families had been formed, and they were having children. People had put down roots, as it were. All this was very pleasing to me. I traveled around out there a lot and talked with a lot of people. Then a large meeting was held in Tselinograd.<sup>26</sup> Representatives of all the provinces came to this meeting.

In one district I was told that a Mr. Thomson wanted to meet with me. He was a well-known British publisher, the owner of 120 newspapers.<sup>27</sup> I was glad to meet with him. To me this meeting was pleasant and profitable. Such an "objective and impartial" publisher of bourgeois newspapers as Thomson could now see our success in the virgin lands with his own eyes. A lot was said abroad about the virgin-lands project, and they didn't always tell the truth; they lied a lot. Unfortunately, that is the essence of class relations. The capitalist press sees through a glass darkly when it comes to anything that was done or is done in the Soviet Union.

I invited Thomson to accompany me and we traveled together by train through several districts. He attended our conferences. The doors were not closed to him. "Please," we said, "you can listen in." What he had to say was pleasant for me to hear, and he really couldn't say anything different. What he had seen would have been obvious to anyone. I don't know what he wrote because this happened during the last year of my active part in the leadership, and that was my farewell trip. Soon after that I was retired on a pension.

Naturally I was following closely how the grain deliveries were proceeding. I traveled around the districts, and questioned specialists, agronomists, state farm directors, and party officials.

Record grain deliveries for our country were coming in at that time. At every state farm I was interested in the yield per hectare. The figures varied from 12 to 16 centners per hectare. For areas of high-risk agriculture, this is an excellent indicator, and it held true for the entire length and breadth of this cultivated area.<sup>28</sup> It had been estimated that with a high level of mechanization in working these fields we were guaranteed a profit from anything above 5 centners per hectare. These new lands turned out to be simply a treasure chest for us.

The so-called Virgin Lands Territory (Tselinny Krai), with its capital at Tselinograd (the Russian word *tselina* meaning "virgin lands"), was established

in Kazakhstan. We allocated everything we could to this territory, providing material resources and capital investments to the best of our ability. At first, when we really could not disperse our resources, there was no other way of doing things. The unionwide government directly financed the opening up of the virgin lands. If the financing had gone through the republic of Kazakhstan, the interests of the new Virgin Lands Territory would have been neglected in favor of other provinces. For our part we tried to protect the virgin-lands project not only from the Kazakhstan republic's planning commission, but also from the unionwide State Planning Commission, so that the resources that had been allocated would not be diverted to some other use. Within the various planning commissions, there is always the temptation to satisfy urgent needs at the expense of one's neighbor. We blocked such diversion of resources by deliberately and purposefully assigning them to the virgin-lands project.

How did things go in other places? In Orenburg, Siberia, and the Volga region plans for expanding the area under crops were carried out. It's true that not all the land turned out to be suitable. Here and there pieces of land with soil that was not very deep or productive were plowed, but these areas should not in general have been included, so obviously some blunders were made. Pieces of land like that should have been excluded from the listing of arable lands, and richer, more fertile areas should have been sought instead. We were also obliged to search for new ways of working the land.

Our scientists, agronomists, and technicians created new designs for implements and machinery to till the soil, adapting them to conditions in the virgin lands. Special combines were required, more complex ones with attachments having a wide reach. Later we understood that the separate, two-stage method should be used for harvesting these crops.<sup>29</sup> We should not have done as we did at first, when the combines rolled directly over the fields of ripe wheat and a lot of grain was lost.

From time immemorial the peasant learned to adjust himself to the challenge of growing grain. He cut down the wheat with a sickle or scythe, bound the ears of wheat into sheaves, allowed the harvested wheat to dry in the open air, and then piled it into stacks. Even in winter, wheat could be taken from those stacks for threshing and grinding, and it would be better, dry grain. Often special barns for drying were used, where the sheaves were stored before they were threshed. We applied this experience to the virgin lands. When they began to cut down the wheat and then gathered the newly mown wheat into rows for later threshing by the combine, the quality of the grain would change drastically. The grain dried out quickly, and that

facilitated the fight against weevils, which are a terrible curse in grain farming. The grain was threshed after it dried out, after it had lain in rows for some time. And then the weevil disappeared of its own accord. Serious demands were placed on the designers of machinery for tilling the soil and harvesting the grain.

The problem of developing new strains of wheat was sharply posed; it had to be confronted by the agronomists and breeders, those who worked on seed selection. These people coped brilliantly with the problem, producing varieties adapted to local conditions and yielding better harvests compared to those produced by the seeds brought in from other regions.

A fundamental shortcoming for agriculture, not only on the virgin lands but throughout Siberia, could be seen in the difficulties encountered with spring wheat. If wheat could have been sown in the autumn—that is, if we had had winter wheat—the harvesting conditions would have been different. Unfortunately, we didn't have crop varieties that could withstand the freezing weather of Siberia. Winter wheat ripens earlier than spring wheat, and thus the burden placed on equipment can be distributed more evenly if all the crops don't have to be harvested at the same time. So then, what options do we have? Only the future can tell. Given the conditions everywhere in our country, spring wheat produces lower yields than winter wheat.

Up to 1964 we acquired some experience at growing different types of crops in the virgin lands. The Kazakhs had managed to sow millet since ancient times and obtained a high yield from that crop. During my time in the leadership, millet was also grown in the virgin lands, but not over a very wide area. The people there learned how to sow buckwheat, peas, and sugar beets as well, and the harvests they brought in were not bad. I'm not even talking about barley and oats. In general in the virgin lands we preferred to sow wheat and peas as the most valuable crops for those conditions. Besides, peas have a short growing season, and like all legumes they enrich the soil. Their root systems have nodules that accumulate nitrogen-rich substances. We learned how to plant orchards and rows of windbreaking trees in the virgin lands, and we accumulated some experience with growing oil flax, the kind of flax that is not used to make linen but from which we obtain linseed oil.

Experiments were also made in growing corn for silage, which opened up the possibility of raising livestock for meat and dairy purposes. The time had come to expand agriculture in the virgin lands across a wide front, not limiting ourselves to monoculture and also increasing the earnings from agriculture. The prospects seemed good to me, confirming the hopes that had inspired us when we undertook the virgin-lands project. The virgin-land

districts promised, as time went by, to become well-settled and economically profitable regions.

After large areas of Kazakhstan had come under cultivation it acquired new importance for the USSR. Before the opening of the virgin lands Belorussia had held third place in the Soviet Union in size of population; now Kazakhstan has crowded it out. Today Kazakhstan holds second place in our country for production of marketable grain. The RFSFR remains in first place, but that really doesn't count because, after all, a big ship leaves a broad wake.<sup>30</sup> There had been a time when Ukraine delivered approximately 600 million poods [9.6 million tons] of grain to the state. Kazakhstan began delivering as much as 700 million poods [11.2 million tons] and was approaching one billion poods [16 million tons]. That had been our dream all along. I don't know what the count was for 1964. It was made after my retirement. I only know that by October of that year approximately 900 million poods [14.4 million tons] had already been delivered and we were approaching the desired one billion mark. This is a fantastic figure, especially for people who know what difficulties arise in the process of grain procurement. And the grain obtained there was the cheapest. Kazakhstan pushed Ukraine into third place as a supplier of grain. It was my estimate at that time that we had the possibility of procuring from the country as a whole approximately 5 billion poods of grain [80 million tons].

And once again there comes to mind my last trip to the virgin lands during the harvest of 1964. It was my farewell trip. How glad I was of our success. What joy I took in the labor of our people, the efforts they put in. Involuntarily I recall a remarkable poem by Nikolai Nekrasov, in which he expressed his thoughts on human labor.<sup>31</sup>

A miracle, Sasha, I've witnessed:  
A handful of Russians were banished  
To some far-off place, God forsaken—  
Given land and then left on their own.

A year, hardly noticed, sped by.  
Came officials to check on these exiles.  
Look what stood there—already a village!  
With storage sheds, warehouses, barns!

A hammer rings out in the smithy.  
And a mill will go up very soon.  
Bit by bit, half a century later  
[Note this detail, "half a century!"—N. S. Khrushchev]  
A vast open town has arisen.

Just by this—human freedom and labor—  
Truly miracles can be achieved.

Nekrasov rejoiced at the successes achieved by Russian people who had been banished to Siberia and who had labored there for half a century. What would he have said if he could have seen the way we stormed the virgin lands in Kazakhstan and other parts of the Soviet Union? In just three, four, or five years “wide open towns” of unprecedented number and size arose, and huge agricultural areas were opened up. And not only could you hear the “hammer ring out in the smithy”; there was the roar of machinery, the rumbling of tractors and combines, their clanking and crashing; entire settlements of an urban type, with hospitals, schools, and everything, had been built. Only Soviet citizens, who consciously undertook to storm these heights, could have accomplished this. To their aid came students during summer vacations to help build the settlements and bring in the harvests. And they still go out there now, every year. Thus the project of bringing virgin and unused lands under cultivation is continuing. That good work and worthy cause that we undertook in the early 1950s continues.

An even greater return on investment will be received from the virgin lands in the future. Previously those lands were not plowed, but they did serve human needs. Huge flocks of sheep and other livestock used to be pastured there and that provided a certain amount of benefit for human beings. But when people begin to work the land more directly, to plow, to sow, and to reap, a more intensive kind of land utilization begins. The wealth obtained from the land increased many times over.

I consider the present period only a beginning. As the cultural level of our agricultural work rises, along with that of the people who have come to the virgin lands and settled there, those lands will make their greatest contribution in the future. More than once I conducted conferences in Tselinograd devoted to summing up the results for the previous year or preparing for the spring sowing. I heard speeches by Kazakhs, Russians, Ukrainians, and representatives of many other nationalities taking part in the virgin-lands project. I also met with herdsmen of Kazakh nationality and I remember many pleasant minutes conversing with them. The growing communities of people who had settled on the virgin lands also gladdened my eye.

At first the most primitive kinds of houses were built, made of adobe and clay. Later, small prefabricated houses went up, structures made from prefabricated panels, the so-called Finnish design. In 1964 I visited settlements whose appearance was much more elegant and appealing. The planning of



these settlements was not bad at all. Small trees were growing in the front gardens; all in all, they made a good impression and gave a sense of warmth and comfort. I even saw fruit orchards.

So then, the virgin lands have begun to make themselves heard louder and louder. These lands have become different from what they were. The level of technology is better and more advanced. The cadres are different, and the living conditions are different, and I am glad of this. People's cultural level and the level of municipal services have risen. Hospitals and facilities for children have been built, as well as cultural centers at the collective farms and state farms. And yet at that time we were economizing greatly; we were more than just economizing; we were simply clamping down on all spending of our resources. Some people may say that Khrushchev underestimated the importance of everyday life and its needs. Not true. I did think about those things, but first of all, the people had to be fed, and then we had to seek out the resources to build the facilities necessary for a more cultured life. Cultural centers, community centers, and other such facilities are indispensable. People spend their spare time at such places, to the benefit of Soviet socialist society.

Unfortunately, even today it remains true that there are many houses that look like the old peasant huts in the villages, although of course they are more comfortable than the hut with earthen walls in which I was born and where I spent my childhood in Kursk gubernia. In our hut there was an area where the livestock were brought in [in the winter, for protection against the cold and to add body heat] and an oven without a chimney. When the fire was burning and the food was being cooked, you couldn't stay inside; the smoke went out the door. In rural settlements today different conditions are being created, although they still have a long way to go to reach the level people enjoy in the cities.

If we compare what was built in the virgin lands with the part of Uzbekistan that is called the Golodnaya Steppe, again the difference is like night and day.<sup>32</sup> In the Golodnaya Steppe we built productive and residential facilities at a much higher industrial level, applying advanced technology and drawing on the French experience of irrigation with reinforced concrete troughs. During my visit to France [in March 1960], de Gaulle advised me to take a look at new agricultural devices being used in one of the regions in France. We flew to that region. They showed us a pumping station and a unique irrigation method, although it's true that it served only a relatively small area. The water flowed down reinforced-concrete troughs. In Central Asia, to water the cotton fields, large irrigation canals are used, with branching channels or distributive trenches called *aryki*. The French equipment pleased me greatly.

It was simple but sensible. Less expenditure was required for leveling the land, the land was clogged up less, and there was better conservation of the water going directly to the plants for irrigation. In short, the benefits were colossal. In the French system the leveling is accomplished by adjusting the height of the supports under the concrete troughs, whereas when you run a canal through the ground getting it level is more difficult. You have to build up a quantity of soil to a certain height, so that the water will flow of its own accord, by gravity. I don't know whose idea it was to create those reinforced-concrete troughs, but I must give de Gaulle the credit he deserves. The system he introduced us to proved to be very effective. After returning home I proposed that we make the transition to that kind of system, and I think that system is still in operation.

The leaders of Uzbekistan at first also followed the old ways. They began to establish collective farms, as we had at first on the virgin lands, resettling Uzbek people from the mountains. Later, they switched over to state farms. Besides, the people from the mountains had no experience of raising cotton, and that of course made the situation worse. I visited the Golodnaya Steppe several times. Those visits were always accompanied by a feeling of joy at seeing this beautiful land producing miracles. High yields of cotton were achieved there. Orchards were also planted for the cultivation of peaches, apples, and other fruit.

I proposed that urban-type settlements be constructed, with buildings of three and four stories, and all the conveniences: a public water supply, sewage system, gas lines to the houses, radios, a telephone system, paved roads, and sidewalks. Bakeries, restaurants, kindergartens, and child care centers began to go up. All the domestic facilities necessary to serve human beings were put in place right away. People arriving in these state farms found municipal services of the kind that people need in the modern world: schools, hospitals, cultural centers, movie theaters, and so forth. We had not succeeded in doing this in the virgin-lands project, not because we didn't understand the need for such things, but because of our limited material resources. In the Golodnaya Steppe project we already had greater possibilities for allocating resources to construction. In addition, we had an incredibly high return on capital investment there. The statisticians reported that with a cotton yield of 30 centners per hectare, the capital investments made in a state farm could be recouped after two harvests or at the most after three. Of course I am not talking about the value of the raw cotton that we paid the state farms for, but the profit obtained by the state from the sale of the finished product. My trips to Turkmenia, Tadzhikistan, and Kirgizia also made a strong impression on me, because similar state farms were established there as well.

I would like to say a few more words about cotton. At one time we thought that synthetic fibers would replace cotton, but later we were forced to recognize our mistake. The chemical industry cannot replace cotton. The quality of synthetic fibers cannot compete with cotton. It was reported to me back then that Japanese scientists had invented a synthetic fiber that was indistinguishable from cotton in its characteristics, but I never saw a cloth made out of that kind of synthetic fiber. Evidently scientists will produce that kind of fabric some day because the chemical industry has unlimited possibilities. Our scientists are literally like wizards the way they produce the necessary materials in the necessary quantity for human beings.

In earlier days I had no dealings with cotton whatsoever and had not even seen under what conditions it grew. The first time I visited Uzbekistan the leader of that republic was Yusupov.<sup>33</sup> He was from a working-class background, and a very intelligent man, but his personality was such that he was not free of erroneous views. He had his own point of view regarding cotton cultivation.

Many remnants from the past remained in Yusupov's personality. As a man of Muslim background, he regarded women as slaves [whose job was to pick cotton] and he refused to acknowledge the existence of cotton-harvesting machinery. In his country the *ketmen* [a kind of chopping tool used in Central Asia] still ruled. The planting of the cotton to be sure was mechanized, but the harvesting was done by chopping cotton with the *ketmen*, used to knock the cotton boll into the apron or basket hanging from the neck of a woman. This labor was left exclusively to women. It was onerous toil. The *ketmen* is a very heavy tool. I was later told that the negative results of this labor with the *ketmen* were reflected in the health of the women. It also affected their ability to give birth to children. We raised the question of mechanizing the entire process of cotton cultivation. We decided the cotton should be planted in square clusters to facilitate cultivation and harvesting. We initiated the growing of cotton in square beds approximately 45 by 45 centimeters, as I recall. Difficulties arose at first in regard to the tending of these beds of cotton. Nevertheless, a high yield was obtained. We promoted this method, but life itself showed that it was possible to mechanize cotton cultivation even without the use of square clusters. To put it briefly, we set ourselves the task of removing the *ketmen* from the women's hands and throwing it away, the goal of achieving total mechanization of the work. And we accomplished that.

The question of cotton-harvesting machinery was posed sharply. Our designers at first produced double-row cotton-harvesting combines, and later those combines covered four rows at a time. I traveled to Uzbekistan

several times in connection with this project and became familiar with the scientific-research institutions there and with the designers of the machinery, and I also went out in the fields when the machinery was being tested. The young women of Uzbekistan were now sitting at the wheels of the tractors and cotton-harvesting combines. This was a battle not just for cotton but also for a higher level of culture in the work process, alleviating the burden for women workers in the cotton fields.

1. The total area of the virgin lands rose to a peak of about 33 million hectares. Between one half and two thirds of this area—7 million hectares at the start, later rising to some 20 million hectares—were situated in central and northern Kazakhstan. The other areas that Khrushchev mentions here are in an adjacent belt of southern Siberia, stretching from the southern Urals to the steppes beyond Lake Baikal in southeastern Siberia (Dauria). [SK]

2. In the main, the new possibilities were reflected in the resolution of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of September 7, 1953, "On Measures for the Further Development of Agriculture in the USSR."

3. It took place in Moscow from September 3 to 7, 1953.

4. State procurement prices for livestock and poultry were raised more than fivefold, for potatoes by 150 percent, for milk and butter by 100 percent, and for vegetables by up to 40 percent. Purchase prices for products in excess of compulsory deliveries were also raised. The collective farms began to be paid monetary advances in order to introduce guaranteed payment of labor. Then, on March 6, 1956, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the decree "On Monthly Advances to Collective Farmers and Additional Payment of Labor in Collective Farms."

5. Stalin's "first commandment" meant that farms might be required to give up to the state grain needed as seed for the following year. See the chapter "The First Postwar Years." [SS]

6. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of July 4, 1957, "On the Abolition of Compulsory Deliveries of Agricultural Products to the State by the Households of Collective Farmers, Workers, and Employees."

7. At that time, Zhumabai Shayakhmetov (1902–66) was first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. See Biographies.

8. In fact, the question of the virgin lands was not raised until later. After the September 1953 plenum Khrushchev met with Shayakhmetov and other local officials, and on January 22, 1954, he

prepared a memorandum on the question that was discussed and approved by the Presidium of the Central Committee on January 30, 1954. The question was then discussed at the February 1954 plenum of the Central Committee. [SK]

9. Before this, Panteleimon Kondratyevich Ponomarenko (1902–84) was a secretary of the party Central Committee from 1948 and a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers from 1952. See Biographies.

10. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. See Biographies.

11. Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin (1863–1911) was prime minister of Russia in the aftermath of the 1905 revolution. His policies combined repression against revolutionaries, especially in 1906–7, with an attempt to create a stratum of prosperous small farmers who would serve as a social support for the tsarist regime. To that end Stolypin encouraged peasants in central Russia to resettle to Siberia, where they could obtain land. [GS]

12. State farms were regarded as the property of the whole people, while collective farms were in theory owned jointly by their members. [SS]

13. A resolution concerning the cultivation of new lands was adopted at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of March 2, 1954: "On the Further Increase in the Production of Grain in the Country and on the Cultivation of Virgin and Fallow Lands."

14. These are all provinces in central Russia. Smolensk province is to the west of Moscow, adjoining Belarus (Belorussia). [SS]

15. In 1953, 31 million tons of grain were produced, while more than 32 million tons were used up.

16. This plenum of the CPSU Central Committee took place from February 23 to March 2, 1954.

17. This was on February 22, 1954, when representatives of youth from the capital and Moscow province gathered in the Great Kremlin Palace (Moscow) to see off the first group of Komsomol volunteers going to the virgin lands.

18. The machine and tractor stations (MTS) were facilities set up in the early 1930s in rural areas to assist in the mechanization of agriculture. They were abolished by decision of the Central Committee plenum of February 25, 1958. [SK]

19. Although the Ural Mountains are not very high, they mark the boundary between Europe and Asia. [SS]

20. Between 1954 and 1956, about 36 million hectares in the virgin lands were plowed up for sowing. About 20 million of these hectares were in Kazakhstan, and about 15 million in the RSFSR.

21. The point here seems to be that the collective farmers had not actually put in any “workdays,” that the MTS had done all the work. [GS]

22. Aleksandr Ivanovich Barayev (1908–85) was an agronomist and author of works on soil-preserving systems of crop cultivation in areas exposed to wind erosion. See Biographies.

23. The Russian word *suka*, from which the name Suchkino is derived, has the same derogatory connotations as its English equivalent, “bitch.” [SS]

24. Traditionally the Kazakhs were nomadic herders of cattle, sheep, goats, horses, and camels. The nomadic way of life was undermined by the influx of Slavic settlers in the late tsarist period, and what remained of it virtually disappeared as a result of forcible collectivization and the accompanying famine and mass migration. [SS]

25. The Russian phrase is *podpisochnye krikuny*—literally, “people who sign up to be shouters.” [GS]

26. Up to 1961, the city had been called Akmolinsk, which means “white grave” in Kazakh. It remained the administrative center of the virgin lands territory until 1965, when it returned to the status of a

province center. It is now the capital of Kazakhstan, called Astana. [SK/SS]

27. On August 14, 1964, *Pravda* reported that on the previous day Khrushchev had met with the British publisher Roy Thomson, along with a British journalist. [SK]

28. According to official data for 1960, Kazakhstan harvested 18.7 million tons of grain, of which 10.5 million tons (694 million poods) were purchased by the state.

29. The method of harvesting the wheat in separate stages (*razdelnaya uborka*) was as follows: first the wheat was mowed and piled in rows, where it was allowed to ripen and dry; and then the threshing was done, but only after the grain had ripened and dried out. Previously, combines were mowing and threshing simultaneously. [SK]

30. This Russian saying is also rendered as, “Great ships need deep waters.” [GS]

31. Nikolai Alekseyevich Nekrasov (1821–78) was a Russian poet whose sympathies lay with the Narodnik (Populist) movement that began in the 1860s, a pro-democracy movement that advocated agrarian reform. [GS]

32. Khrushchev is referring to the plain on the left bank of the Syr Darya River as it leaves the Fergana Valley. Thirty new state farms were established there in the 1960s.

33. Usman Yusupovich Yusupov. See Biographies.

## WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED THE ABUNDANCE WE DESIRE

By bringing the virgin lands into circulation, we created great possibilities for obtaining marketable grain, but we still did not achieve the abundance we desired. By this I mean satisfying the needs not only of Soviet citizens but also of our friends in the other socialist countries. Another possibility that did not work out for us was to enter the world market with the aim of selling grain to the West and thus earning foreign currency that we needed. If we had been able to enter the world market, that would have been proof that our agriculture had grown to a striking degree. Unfortunately, our agriculture has been and remains on too low a level. We are obtaining only one-third of what our land could produce. This applies also to the older areas that have been settled for a long time. The virgin lands produced a high rate of return on investment, but that, too, proved to be insufficient. We didn’t have enough

experience, equipment, mineral fertilizers, pesticides, or herbicides, and the work of breeding and selection was not done well enough. Back then we were barely beginning to raise dairy cattle and beef cattle on the virgin lands. Large herds of sheep had previously been pastured there to obtain wool and mutton, and herds of horses had roamed freely there, providing horsemeat. But that kind of meat is not used very widely in our country. In Turkmenia and Kazakhstan unutilized possibilities still remain for raising camels. But the ship of the desert has somehow slipped out of the party's range of vision. I called attention to this neglected opportunity at a conference of local leaders once. They warmly supported my proposals and passed a resolution to rebuild the camel herd as quickly as possible. The camel feeds on thorns and produces a beautiful coat of wool, and its meat and milk are good, and of course it can go a long distance, far from any source of water. What came of these promises? I don't know.

In 1964 I estimated that, taking the country as a whole, we could "lay in" as much as five billion poods [80 million tons] of marketable grain in the government granaries. Kazakhstan alone by mid-autumn had approached one billion poods [16 million tons].

Now I'm retired, and I don't know how much grain the government is procuring. Sometimes the figures are published for the districts and provinces and for the national republics, and I practice my arithmetic, adding up the numbers. It turns out that in the six years that I have been living on a pension, not once has the Soviet Union brought in as much grain as we did in 1964. Evidently that was the largest harvest and the largest amount of grain delivered to the state, but at this point it's necessary to keep in mind certain specifics of terminology. The harvest standing in the fields, the harvest after it has been brought in, and the harvest in terms of grain deliveries to the state—those are three different things. After Stalin's death, with the elimination of the machine and tractor stations, and other measures taken to simplify the management of agriculture, we made a decision at a plenum of the Central Committee to estimate the harvest not according to the number of ears of grain counted by inspectors in the fields but by the actual deliveries, what was actually stored in the government's granaries. This was not just marketable grain, but it was marketable in the purest sense of the word [from the government's point of view], because in addition to the grain delivered to the state, marketable grain remained in the possession of the collective farms, and they also bring their grain to the market. What I am talking about is the grain the government has directly at its disposal. Grain, after all, is not easy to come by. A lot of sweat goes into producing a harvest of grain.

It was estimated back then that two billion poods [36 million tons] were needed to meet our needs. A new possibility had emerged: the production of grain reserves sufficient to cover half a year. That prognosis was not based on the so-called biological yield, the grain standing in the fields, but on the grain deliveries that had already been made to the government in fall 1964. A statistical handbook recently came out, and I tried to learn from it exactly how much grain had been delivered that year. The book had no such information! Everything was calculated according to the five-year plan; it wasn't broken down year by year, and so the data for 1964 were "hidden." Basing myself on the present condition of existing government shops, the so-called commercial network, I have come to the conclusion that grain production today does not meet our needs. There is also a shortage of meat, eggs, and dairy products. There are waiting lines for these goods. People hunt for any and every possible means of somehow obtaining the products they need. People travel to Moscow from the provinces to buy food. Even Kiev, which always was a kind of mirror reflecting the state of agriculture in our country, reflects the present reality, and not in an attractive way at all.

When you read newspaper reports about the work of our agricultural agencies, you are informed of success and progress everywhere. They say that grain production and the production of other agricultural goods have increased. But the market does not confirm these claims.

So then, grain production is not meeting our needs. I am somewhat surprised by this fact. I cannot understand certain disparities. One figure in a government statistical report especially caught my attention. It indicated that during the last four or five years, grain yield had increased by 5 centners, and in 1970 it had reached 15.4 centners per hectare.<sup>1</sup> This is a very good yield. It should gladden the heart of every Soviet citizen. But I fail to understand the figure. The high yield that is claimed does not correspond to the situation on the market. I know that ten years ago the United States had an average yield of 16 centners of wheat per hectare. All forty-eight states were producing corn as well as wheat; therefore, on the average, they were getting more than 16 centners per hectare. I think if we really were getting 15.4 centners, the situation on our markets with meat, meat products, eggs, and so forth would be quite different. I began to think about this and calculated how much the alleged increase in production would amount to. I multiplied 5 centners of grain [the supposed increase in grain yield in the preceding five years] by the millions of hectares we have in our country where grain is grown, and the number I arrived at was huge. This means we would be obtaining a very large amount of grain, which would be a splendid addition



to the marketable grain that our country had been producing earlier. It would mean the possibility of meeting all our needs not only for grain used for bread and bakery products but also for grain used as feed for livestock.

I am not prepared to give an exact figure right now. It seems that we sow grain on some 130 million hectares or more. Probably more. You can imagine what a huge quantity of grain we would obtain in addition to what we used to obtain earlier. The increased yield adds up to an astronomical figure.<sup>2</sup> I would even say this is a catastrophic figure because we don't have the storage space to hold such a vast quantity of grain. If the grain yield was really that high, given the size of the areas devoted to growing grain, we should be fully able to meet our needs for bread and for livestock feed, as well as our needs for milk and eggs. In fact we should have large surpluses. We should have the possibility not only of meeting our own needs but of going out onto the world market—that is, offering our grain and other agricultural products for sale abroad! The actual state of affairs on the market does not confirm the claim that such high yields are being obtained.

I am expressing my doubts about the claimed figure! What is going on here? I remember that Stalin used to play such tricks. We would supposedly have a certain yield capacity in agriculture, and then that quantity would be arbitrarily increased. Payment for labor to the machine and tractor stations (MTS's) depended on yield per hectare, and the government had an interest in claiming a higher yield per hectare [because then the government-owned MTS's were paid more]. The collective farms, to the contrary, had an interest in lowering the estimated yield per hectare. The lower the yield, the less the collective farm had to pay to the MTS. The method the government used to determine yield capacity was flexible. Whatever you wanted, that's what you got. They used a method based on the "*metrovka*" [estimating yield based on a "typical square meter of agricultural land"]. A calculation would be made of how many stalks grew on a square meter of land, how many ears of grain were on each stalk, and how many grains were in each ear, and then from these basic elements an estimate of the yield capacity would be made. Abuses were always possible in this system. If larger-sized ears only were counted, of course there would be a higher estimate of grains per ear. Everything depended on the desires and aims of the one doing the counting. Subsequently all this data was added up, and as a result an overall yield capacity was arrived at for each union republic and for the Soviet Union as a whole.

The yield capacity was ultimately determined in Moscow by Stalin. There was a man named Savelyev, who must be a very old man by now. He was an official of the Committee for Determining Yield Capacity.<sup>3</sup> All of us literally

prayed to Savelyev. How much grain each republic had to deliver to the government depended literally on him. He would report to Stalin that, for example, the yield capacity of Ukraine was such-and-such. Consequently Ukraine had to deliver such-and-such a quantity of grain. The taxation system did not depend on yield capacity. However, the higher the yield capacity, the larger the amount that had to be paid to the MTS's. When the reported yield capacity did not correspond to what Stalin desired—or more exactly, when he wanted Ukraine to deliver more grain—Stalin would look at Savelyev like a boa constrictor looks at a rabbit.

“You no-good so-and- so, why are you pandering to the collective farms?” Stalin would bark. “You’re setting the figures too low. I know what rich black earth they have there.” He would curse and pat his “breadbasket” with the palm of his hand. Then Stalin would set the figure for the yield capacity. It didn’t correspond to reality in any way; it merely reflected Stalin’s desires. This was sheer fakery, stuff made up out of whole cloth. This was also the reason why sometimes everything was taken from the peasants and nothing left behind. They would announce, “The yield capacity is such-and-such.” But it really wasn’t even close to that.

So I was not only skeptical; I simply didn’t believe these official determinations of “yield capacity.” It never corresponded to reality and it led the government astray. You couldn’t take this as a basis for making economic forecasts. Even if the counting were done honestly, it would represent only biological yield, not marketable grain. This is a suitable method for making preliminary estimates. But the grain still has to be harvested, then it has to be delivered to government granaries, and only then is it something you can count on. There is a vast difference between determining the biological yield and having marketable grain. An element of political consideration gets mixed in. If people want to “shine,” to stand out for supposedly achieving a high yield capacity, they do it! And so our leaders today are “shining like stars” with all sorts of impressive figures, but meanwhile the shelves in the stores are empty.

That’s why I think the figure of 15.4 centners per hectare is a bureaucratic invention created by people anxious to please. The statisticians want to please the top officials. For the bureaucrat such statistics are like oil to keep the machinery running smoothly.

People see what they find most pleasant to see. If yield capacity increases, people are praised—which is more pleasant than being criticized for merely marking time, staying stuck in one place, or even sliding backward in regard to yield capacity. I have no confidence in this published figure. It doesn’t

correspond, as I have said, to the real situation in the stores. If this figure were real, and not a bureaucratic invention, that would be reflected in the consumer-goods situation, and an era of abundance would literally set in.

That is my opinion. It is based on my extensive experience in life. I have seen what kind of swindling has been done in the past.

I know that in the past few years the production of mineral fertilizers has increased substantially. In my day we took up the task of producing concentrated mineral fertilizers so that there would be less ballast and more useful material in the fertilizer. There was a demand for fertilizer in the form of granules. Nowadays for the garden at my dacha I use granulated nitrogen-phosphorus-potassium fertilizer. The same kind of fertilizer is used on the neighboring collective farm, which spreads this fertilizer when the wheat is planted. Thus we have advanced both quantitatively and qualitatively in the production of mineral fertilizers. But I sense that we're not getting an appropriate return on this investment. That means the fertilizer isn't being used properly. If a centner of fertilizer was used intelligently, and if the seed was good, there could be an increased yield of as much as 5 centners per hectare. With intelligent use of fertilizer we could on the whole obtain millions of centners of additional agricultural output in our country. But this isn't happening. The problem comes down to the cultural level in the use of the fertilizer and in the organization of the work, which even today remains primitive on many collective farms and state farms. The only item in adequate supply in the stores is bread. But of course man does not live by bread alone, and that is not only in the spiritual sense. A dry spoon tears the mouth. Just plain bread, without something to cook and eat with it, becomes a mockery—that is, when there is not a wide assortment of food products in the stores. Sometimes when I meet with people they express their concern and tell me gloomy anecdotes. For example:

“Do you think a camel could walk from Moscow to Vladivostok?” I was asked this question once by a man I happened to be talking with.

I gathered that it was a trick question. My answer was: “I think that if conditions were right and the camel was well taken care of, it could of course walk from Moscow to Vladivostok. It has the strength to do that.”

“No,” he laughed, “It wouldn't make it.”

“Why?” I asked.

“At the most it would get as far as Sverdlovsk.”<sup>4</sup>

“Why?” By then I couldn't understand any of this.

“It would be eaten.”

The man I was talking with laughed uproariously, amazed at my naïveté. This anecdote reflects the unfavorable conditions in our country. Our towns and villages are sitting there without adequate food products. I meet people from Ryazan, Kaluga, Kalinin, and Bryansk.<sup>5</sup> It's very hard to talk with them. They all repeat in loud voices that they don't have meat, they don't have eggs, they don't have other food products, and they can't get them. And therefore many people from towns located close to Moscow make special trips, setting aside some particular day to go into Moscow to buy food.

The virgin lands have been brought under cultivation, the cultural level in agricultural work will rise, harvests will increase, and new techniques of agricultural production will be introduced. To put it briefly, the tens of millions of hectares of good land that we have will be put to the use of human beings. A great many people have settled on these lands, which have been transformed from uninhabited steppes into settled territory. I think that orchards and gardens are flowering and flourishing there now, and you can hear people singing. And the sound of machinery at work has long since overflowed the virgin lands.

But what next? The virgin lands have been brought into use, and yet a joke appears about a camel that cannot get as far as Vladivostok. Meat is a prime necessity. You can't live without it. You could get along with clothing that is not so thick or ample. You could even wear clothes that are very brief, like some of the women do nowadays. But you can't "shorten" the need for bread and meat. Famine could begin. We must think about how we are to proceed in the future, how we can truly achieve complete abundance in food products for our Soviet population. Given the vast expanses of land in our country, there is no excuse for not doing that.

When I was working in an official capacity I thought about this question. It was impossible not to think about it. The leadership of our country must take up this question urgently. I was constantly racking my brains: how could we more quickly reach the broad road of production of all necessary food products? There are vast expanses of marshland, as well as land overgrown with brush, that remain unutilized in our country. Of course I'm not talking about forests; we can't lay waste to our forests. The riches of our forests must be utilized on a rational basis, so that the trees that are cut down are constantly replenished; and in some regions the planting of new trees should be done in advance [i.e., before existing trees are cut]. Here I am talking about something else altogether. There is a lot of land that needs to be put into proper shape, land that has to be reclaimed and brought into

the crop-rotation system. Many plots of land are covered with peat moss and the soil is too acidic. Unless the soil is treated with lime and other soil improvement measures are taken, nothing will grow on it. Here everything comes up against the problem of capital investments and technology. When I was still working I expressed such ideas, but not widely. At that time the main task was to open up the virgin lands, and we couldn't disperse our resources. Only after you've completed one task is it time to go on to the next.

We also have large land areas that need irrigation. The return on investment from irrigated lands is very high. In addition, irrigation allows for stability in agricultural production. The harvests cease to depend on the weather. Human beings themselves are in command. We have sufficient means to provide for irrigation: hydroelectric power plants and thermal power plants, with their reservoirs for cooling purposes, are located throughout our country; our machine industry is capable of providing pumps to distribute the water; and we have a great deal of experience in setting up irrigation systems for the proper distribution of water. Also, we have several rivers that flow through relatively arid regions, such as the Volga, the Dnieper, and the Southern Bug.<sup>6</sup>

During the last year of my activity I expressed some views concerning irrigation in my speeches on agriculture. By that time we had already carried out irrigation work in the northern Caucasus, Volgograd province, and other places. We had begun construction on the North Crimean Canal<sup>7</sup> and were working on the question of irrigation projects on the Danube. We wanted to irrigate the plains around the Danube with water from that river, so as not to have to depend on the Lord God and to ensure regular harvests. The possibility of using water from the Danube, the Dniester, and the Kagul [a tributary of the Danube] had arisen. The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant is being built [in southern Siberia]. It is intended to help solve the need for more energy, but its construction provides the opportunity for using the waters of the Yenisei River to irrigate adjacent lands. I have never been there, but I have heard from specialists that it is quite warm there in the summer and the conditions are favorable for growing agricultural crops. Even watermelons grow there.<sup>8</sup>

I am not even talking about the future, when we will learn how to desalinate seawater on a large scale in order to use it for economic purposes. Very attractive prospects are opening up in that regard. Back in my day all such things were put off until the future. Our government has only now reached the point where the next step can be taken in increasing the agricultural harvest. We are beginning to make the transition from expanding cultivated lands to increasing the yield capacity of existing cropland. This is the road

of more intensive agriculture. Of course all the possibilities for a more rational utilization of the land have not been exhausted.

Today the main task in our agriculture is to raise the productivity of land that has long since been under cultivation. The yield had always been very low there, no more than 10 centners per hectare of grain. This is too little, given the existing culture and technology of agriculture, and given modern-day biological, agronomic, chemical, and bacteriological science. Thus the old lands that have been under cultivation are a kind of virgin territory in themselves, particularly when it comes to raising the level of culture in agricultural work. These lands are our reserves.

Things that were not expedient because of our backwardness in the realm of fertilizer production in 1954, when the virgin-lands project began, have now come to the forefront. Dialectic is like that.

In Western Europe the yield for wheat is between 30 and 40 centers per hectare. That is another one of our dreams. Can we raise our yields to that level? Undoubtedly we can—if we do our farming skillfully. Our climatic conditions allow this to be done. What is necessary to accomplish this? First, a high level of skills, good equipment, mineral fertilizers, and good, productive seed in the necessary quantity. We can even say that we have some districts producing this level of yield, but it would be more correct to call them microdistricts. Even if we raised our average yield to 20 centners per hectare, we would create abundance. The only difficulties that would arise would be in storing and marketing such a quantity of grain, but it's easier to deal with problems of abundance than with famine. We would no longer be able to make use of such a large quantity of grain and the question of removing less productive land from cultivation would arise. We would begin to withdraw from high-risk agricultural zones. Corrections could then be made in the way we utilize the virgin lands as well. We do recoup our expenditures there, but sometimes the profit obtained is not sufficient. That land could return to serving as pasture or be used for orchards.

I am certain that we will reach this point. But when, I do not know.

Now to take up the second point. What do we have to do to ensure a higher level of yield on the lands that have been under cultivation? For this we need equipment, technology, knowledge, and proper organization. Do we have these things? Well, we are at a stage where we can meet all our needs, organizational, material, spiritual, and scientific. The problem of an abrupt increase in the productivity of agriculture in the older cultivated lands must be correctly evaluated, and we must approach the matter of solving this problem with full seriousness. A “great leap” must be carried out, and we

must introduce intensive methods of farming. Thus far we have remained on too low a level.

Material resources of course are necessary. Does our country have such possibilities? Undoubtedly it does. We can do everything if we hunt for the resources. I say "hunt," because in the various sectors of industry and branches of the economy the desires of the ministries and other government departments are simply to grab capital investments for themselves. These desires are unlimited. Firmness in choosing a goal is required of the government, as well as courage and persistence in concentrating on the main thing and setting aside secondary things. The government needs to operate like a surgeon removing a tumor and thereby freeing the organism from diseased tissue and giving it the chance to develop normally. Surgical intervention into the field of finance is required for the purpose of raising agricultural production, in order to obtain the resources necessary to raise our rural areas to a higher level.

This surgical operation must be undertaken. The question of materially providing for the lives of our people is at the same time the question of raising the cultural level of our people. And increasing our country's political prestige and the prestige of our political system. Fifty years have gone by since the October revolution. Our people have followed a glorious path and achieved a great deal, but there are still problems without whose solution socialist society cannot move forward and cannot become an attractive force. Who is going to follow our example if we can't even satisfy the most basic needs of our people? Decisiveness on the top government level in reconstructing our entire agricultural policy is necessary so that a camel can indeed go from Moscow to Vladivostok while remaining intact and unharmed.

How many times I return to the subject of mineral fertilizers. A great deal of mineral fertilizer is necessary, and of high quality, with a high coefficient of useful substances and without ballast, so that the fertilizer will be dissolved completely and taken up by the plants. That is the ideal. I don't know to what extent it's possible, generally speaking, but I take as a standard of measurement such highly advanced capitalist countries as the United States, Holland, West Germany, and England. If we could ensure the introduction of fertilizers following the norms and standards they follow, I'm sure we could achieve the same productivity and yield capacity they have. Incentives are needed for increasing productivity in the raising of livestock and in poultry farming as well. The main condition for this is the development of the chemical industry. It is not necessary to think up or invent anything new in this area. All of it was well known in the West even during the period of my activity in the government and party.



I'm not closing my eyes to the facts. I understand that we face not only the task of producing mineral fertilizers. Knowing how to use them properly is no less important. How should they be used, in what quantity, and for what crops? Which mineral fertilizers are most useful, and which can be harmful? These are big questions. We have an entire host of problems here. Despite our high level of culture and technology, our flights into outer space, we have not yet freed ourselves from barbaric attitudes regarding chemical fertilizers. Even the fertilizers that we have are often used irrationally, and sometimes they are used destructively. Therefore it's necessary to train people engaged in agricultural production so that they master the knowledge and learn to use the blessings created by human minds and hands—that is, mineral fertilizers. Without that knowledge, the material resources alone remain a dead letter. During the last years of my activity, the question of developing the chemical industry in the Soviet Union was posed two times, including the development of production of mineral fertilizers. That was not the only question raised. The question of polyethylene and other chemical products was also raised. But time is needed to accomplish such things, a lot of time, because we have lagged very far behind. The mineral fertilizers that we have developed and distributed to the collective farms and state farms sometimes sit in the warehouses for two to three years. What are the storage conditions? They are simply left in piles beside the railroad tracks. The farms don't come and carry them away. The rain and snow leach through them, and they lose their fertilizing qualities. What is left is merely dolomite.<sup>9</sup> Whole mountains of it are left lying around.

This shows that the collective-farm and state-farm leaderships have not sufficiently appreciated and understood the value of fertilizers. The piles of mineral fertilizer have hardened into solid lumps and they simply cannot be moved any longer. We've had to literally resort to the use of jackhammers. We didn't have the equipment to break up these piles. We have lagged behind the West, where even back in my day they had developed granular fertilizers containing two or three kinds of useful substances, so-called complex fertilizers. Meanwhile we were producing fertilizers with only one chemical component. Nowadays we can do all of this.

And so what next? Can we make a breakthrough? Undoubtedly. Pottery is not made by some strange gods. Human beings have the means and the wherewithal to do these things. We need to show persistence and master the knowledge. Not just the theory, but the practical application. Young people and older people need to be sat down at school desks and taught the subtleties of the matter. It is a complicated business. Here it is not necessary so much

to learn something new as it is to be reeducated, and any retraining process encounters internal resistance. Farmers have accumulated a great deal of experience in using organic fertilizers, and they look at the future with the eyes of the past. Sometimes when I talk with people, I encounter complete lack of understanding. They say, “Well, there’s manure. That’s good stuff.”

That’s how tightly held we are in the grip of the old way of thinking. Those are the views of our grandfathers. I don’t want to counterpose the use of mineral fertilizers to the use of manure, but the Americans use mineral fertilizers. I base myself on conversations with the Iowa farmer Roswell Garst.<sup>10</sup> He is a farmer who knows his work and knows agriculture and makes use of everything new. For me Garst is a benchmark. If Garst does something, that’s because it’s profitable, and if he doesn’t do something, we should stop and think about it. He is engaged in capitalist agriculture, but he makes a profit—and that is a question of life and death. If he can’t keep pace with the times, then in the world of capitalism a farmer like him is doomed to failure. “Mr. Khrushchev, I no longer put manure on my fields,” he told me during my visit to the United States in 1959. “I use mineral fertilizers. I burn the manure. It’s not profitable to spread it on the fields, to haul it out there, and to plow it under. That’s expensive.” I can’t claim that Garst is absolutely right in all his arguments. Manure can still be of service and is useful, for example, in improving soil structure. This is a question for scientists as well as a question of practical work. But I can say one thing: if Garst does something, it’s because it helps him make a profit from his farming, and that allows him to survive under competitive conditions. And if something is useful for capitalist agriculture, it must consequently be advantageous for socialist agriculture as well. It is not a question of the social system; it is not a question of who owns the means of production.

The Americans limit the amount of land sown to wheat and corn so as not to flood the market, to prevent prices from falling, so that farmers will not be ruined. They pay subsidies to the farmers to reduce the area under crops. Their grain reserves are sufficient for more than one year.

It’s true that geographically America is positioned more favorably for growing crops than the Soviet Union. But we also have everything we need, so as not to be outdone by America, but to outdo it with respect to the crops that grow best in our conditions.

Our chemical industry can produce all chemical substances needed for farming at a high level. We can produce them in sufficient quantity, just as the West can. We have enough educated people with secondary and higher education in agricultural production. We are gradually increasing the number

of specialists in our institutes and technical schools for crop growing, live-stock raising, and poultry farming.

If we have everything, what's holding us back? What is it that prevents us from reaching the level that Western Europe has now reached? I'm not even talking about America. America doesn't hold first place by any means in the level of yield in grain production. The capitalist countries of Western Europe get twice as much grain per hectare as in America with its 16 centners per hectare.

Again and again I ask myself, why do we lag behind the Western capitalist countries in agricultural production? The answer to the question lies in the poor organization of our work. When I was active in the party and government, I saw that our main shortcoming was in this area, and I tried to find the necessary organizational forms for carrying on our economic work. Our agricultural organizations often are just idling along. Some ministry at the union level dictates what to sow and when to sow. The need to submit bureaucratic reports devours masses of time and labor. During the almost thirteen years I worked in Ukraine, I never once had the need to turn to a union-level ministry for consultation. But we constantly received orders from those ministries, although they sometimes contradicted good sense. The republics and the provinces have sufficient potential on their own to conduct their business, and there is no need for detailed instructions from the center, but the bureaucratic apparatus simply needs to justify its existence, and so they bang away on their typewriters, they write, they call on the phone, they send telegrams, they send authorized personnel; the paperwork proliferates.

Mikoyan, as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, had responsibility for overseeing the sugar industry. Ukraine was the main producer of sugar. There was an agronomist named Storozhuk, a knowledgeable specialist on sugar beets, who sat in the ministry of food industry. He would come to visit us in regard to this question whenever it occurred to him. I am convinced that the telegrams Mikoyan signed that were sent to Ukraine regarding sugar beets were composed by Storozhuk. We would receive a very long telegram with orders on how to carry out the work, but the work had already been done. These directives were all in good order, but what sort of thing did they say? Things like, "Don't drink unboiled water!" But we had to spend time answering every one of these directives. And when Storozhuk himself would arrive, we had to receive him and spend time talking with him. He would expound his ideas in a heavy-handed, didactic manner; then he would leave. Millions of Storozhuks were traveling around the country, and the government paid them billions of rubles.

I repeat that Storozhuk was a knowledgeable and intelligent man. The question is, why did he come? What was the money spent for? Why was his official post even established? No one knows. The main thing is that the less important the post, the more activity displayed by the person who holds it. One government post brings into life other posts that must carry on correspondence with the first one. That's how the bureaucratic machinery grows, and it keeps turning over mindlessly and produces nothing.

I'm not criticizing Mikoyan. He is a very intelligent and businesslike man. He is a victim of the system that we all created. I tried to take some measures. I suggested that the unionwide Ministry of Agriculture in the form in which it existed was not serving any purpose but was merely devouring our nation's resources. People from the local areas sent letters to the ministry only for the sake of trying to obtain tractors, machinery, plows, mineral fertilizers, and so on. This had nothing to do with agricultural production, but only with the technical means of assuring that production. A real ministry of agriculture would have a small apparatus that would indicate the main lines of development, keep track of innovations in other countries, and place orders to be sure that what was needed by agriculture was produced.

1. Average grain yield was 7.8 centners per hectare in 1953, 10.9 centners per hectare in 1960, and 11.4 centners per hectare in 1964. Thus, the Soviet authorities were claiming an additional yield of 4 centners per hectare in 1970 by comparison with 1964. [SK]

2. The supposed increased yield of 5 centners per hectare, multiplied by 130 million hectares, would mean 65 million additional tons of grain. [SK]

3. This committee formed part of the Ministry of Agriculture. [SK]

4. The distance from Moscow to Vladivostok in the Russian Far East is approximately 7,500 kilometers (4,700 miles). Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) is in the Urals, about one fifth of the way from Moscow to Vladivostok. [SS]

5. These are all provincial towns in central Russia. [SS]

6. The Volga flows through arid desert and semidesert regions northwest of the Caspian Sea. The Dnieper and the Southern Bug flow through some relatively arid lands in southern and western Ukraine, respectively. [SS]

7. The North Crimean Canal runs 402 kilometers north to south across the steppes of the Crimea. It is the peninsula's main source of water for irrigation and also supplies water to towns. [SS]

8. The Yenisei River rises in the Sayan Mountains of southcentral Siberia, west of Lake Baikal, and drains into the Arctic Ocean. The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant is situated on the Yenisei River in this mountainous area, at Cheremushki in the Republic of Khakassia. Summers can be very warm in the southern parts of Siberia. [SS]

9. Dolomite is a kind of rock found in some mountainous areas, such as the Austrian Tyrol. It consists of a double carbonate of lime and magnesium. [SS]

10. Roswell Garst was an American farmer from Iowa with whom Khrushchev struck up a friendship in 1955 while Garst was visiting the USSR. Khrushchev visited Garst's farm during his trip to the United States in September 1959. [SS]

## AGRICULTURE AND SCIENCE

The science of seed selection and plant breeding needs many innovations. But even under the [difficult] conditions we have experienced in the grain-growing sector of agriculture, some fairly good experts in seed selection and the breeding of new varieties have come to the fore. In fact today our agriculture still relies on such experts. Even before the revolution excellent varieties of wheat had been developed. For example, the variety called Ukrainka was famous not only in Ukraine but also in Canada.

This variety, or strain, has excellent qualities that show up in the bread-baking process. Vasily Fyodorovich Starchenko,<sup>1</sup> an excellent agronomist and a fine human being, used to tell me that before the revolution the big landowners promoted the Ukrainka variety of wheat with the following ditty: “Want to have a buxom wife? Plant Ukrainka and see her thrive.”

Many excellent varieties have been produced since the revolution, especially in recent years. An expert from Krasnodar, [Pavel Panteleimonovich] Lukyanenko, gave our country the strain of wheat called Bezostaya-1, which has superior bread-baking qualities and a high yield capacity. The seed selection and plant-breeding expert [Vasily Stepanovich] Remeslo, who worked at the Mironovka experimental station [near Kiev], also bred good varieties of wheat.<sup>2</sup>

I recently read an article in either *Pravda* or *Izvestia* about an anniversary celebration for Comrade Lukyanenko. It was signed by [Mstislav] Keldysh [head of the USSR Academy of Sciences], along with Matskevich and Lobanov.<sup>3</sup> It was a pleasure for me to read about the merits of the remarkable plant breeder Lukyanenko, as recounted in this article, although his merits were already known to me. He has accomplished some of his work since my retirement. He is inexhaustible and very prolific in his scientific work. I join with all honest people in paying tribute to this remarkable scientist, this remarkable expert in plant breeding and selection, Comrade Lukyanenko. I wish him success and good health.

I don't want to minimize Lukyanenko's role, but our Soviet land is very rich in good scientists and experts in the field of plant breeding, who have produced remarkable varieties in their particular regions. The variety Bezostaya-1 has to be used very selectively. The Krasnodar territory is the main area in which it can be successfully sown. It is not winter-resistant. Even in the neighboring province of Rostov it cannot be grown with good results. According to the newspaper article, it seems that Lukyanenko had produced a new variety, making it possible to expand the region where this strain of

wheat he developed can be grown. He made use of a variety developed by Remeslo and crossed it with the Bezostaya-1 to produce a new, more winter-resistant variety. I don't want to dwell on this too much. The information presented in the article is quite extensive.

With every passing year my memory grows weaker. Unfortunately I can no longer remember the names of some of the people I met with frequently. It's a natural process. I remember only what they look like. I have a vivid mental picture of a woman from Saratov province, also an expert in plant breeding and seed selection. I can see before my eyes similar experts from the virgin-lands project as well. I visited their research institutes in the virgin-lands region and met and discussed with them. They were remarkable people. And how many of them there were!

[Let me comment on] seed selection and the breeding of new varieties as regards corn, a crop sown over large areas in our country. The Odessa plant-breeding institute named after Lysenko concerned itself with corn. I don't know what the name of that institute is now. The selection and breeding expert [A. S.] Musiyko was in charge of it. He developed good strains of corn. The Odessa-10 variety especially sticks in my memory. Why? When I made the acquaintance of the American farmer Roswell Garst he demonstrated to me the advantages of corn. He was an intelligent man who knew his business well. I urged him to make a trip to Odessa and see the varieties we had developed there. I wanted to meet him again after that and see what he had to say. Garst went to Odessa and looked at those varieties. Later I was told that when they gave him an ear of corn of the Odessa-10 variety he kissed it and said: "An excellent ear!" At our next encounter Garst told me: "Mister Khrushchev, I've seen the varieties you've developed, and in my opinion you don't need to buy seeds in America. You already have your own highly productive varieties." Good varieties of corn were also developed at the Voronezh experimental station, and there were excellent varieties at Dnepropetrovsk also. I knew [Boris Pavlovich] Sokolov, the man who developed these varieties, and had great respect for him.

In short, we had specialists, but we didn't have an overall system. We lacked farms that cultivated seeds in the necessary quantities, sorting, calibrating, and preserving them. I first heard the term "calibration" applied to corn seeds by Roswell Garst in the mid-1950s. As a metalworker, I linked this word with a particular concept in my mind. When a machinist calibrates a piece of metal he turns it on the lathe to achieve a particular dimension. But calibrating corn seeds means to sort them according to size. We bought several calibrating units in America and later began making them ourselves,

mainly in Ukraine and the northern Caucasus. Before that, seed production and seed selection were just “limping along” in our country. Each sandal maker wove his sandals for the size of his own foot, as they say. But in America there were already specialized farms that provided farmers with high-quality hybrid-seed material. Corn farming could not be conducted at a high level without that. We borrowed from the experience of the Americans and immediately achieved good results and organized our own hybrid-seed production.

When I met with Garst I felt no embarrassment about our seed-selection experts in the Soviet Union, neither in regard to grain nor in regard to industrial crops. There was the remarkable expert in seed selection [Fyodor Grigoryevich] Kirichenko from the Odessa Seed Selection Institute, who developed a new strain of hardy winter wheat. There was [Vasily Nikolayevich] Pustovoi, who developed the best sunflower strain in the world. There were plant breeders working on flax, cotton, and other industrial crops. There was Professor [Vitaly Ivanovich] Edelshtein, who had a reputation as an outstanding expert in cultivating excellent varieties of vegetables. I am only naming those I met in person.

Our scientists also achieved great successes in the cultivation of orchards and vineyards. That was something I followed closely back then, and even today from the press I can see that the place we hold, just as before, is not a bad one. We lag behind the West, especially behind America, in the breeding of livestock, poultry, and hogs. The Americans have achieved exceptional results in these areas. We probably use twice as many units of fodder to feed our hogs as they do in America, if not two and a half times as much, compared to the capitalist farms in the United States. What I saw in America and what I was told about the level of poultry breeding in England—it all seemed like something unattainable for us back then.

I remember an exhibition of poultry farming and poultry products from England at an agricultural fair in Moscow, where I saw things that were absolutely amazing. The Americans had bred a strain of chickens that put on an added kilogram of weight for every two and a half kilograms of feed. This is an amazing achievement. A representative of an agricultural firm with whom I had a conversation told me that they had advanced further and were getting 1,000 grams of meat for every 1,200 grams of feed with a particular breed of chicken. They wanted to reach a one-to-one level, where they would get an additional unit in quantity of meat for every additional unit of feed. In the United States we purchased technical specifications for producing the meat of chickens at a certain level. We built a facility in the Crimea, a state farm that I visited [in 1964]. Our efforts there were defeated.



Where the Americans obtained one kilogram of additional weight for two and a half kilograms of feed, we had to use five kilograms of feed. Why? To our misfortune, we don't even know how to borrow and adapt for our use what exists in capitalist agriculture.

Excellent results have been achieved around the world in the egg-laying capacities of hens. When I was in Hungary in 1964, Janos Kadar<sup>4</sup> told me that hens raised from eggs they had purchased in West Germany laid 262 eggs per year. I read in a statistical report covering the year 1969 that on the average it seems that our hens lay about 130 eggs per year. I have been told that in America a strain of hens has been developed that lays approximately 300 eggs per year. That is hard to believe. It is highly unlikely that a hen would lay an egg almost every day.

But why are our socialist hens lagging behind the capitalist ones? Does the hen favor capitalism over socialism? No, of course not! People in our country boast a great deal about everything new that has been developed in our research institutes. How many professors do we have who are "chicken experts," along with holders of candidates' degrees and doctoral degrees,<sup>5</sup> but still our hens lag significantly behind the capitalist ones. This is an important question. It is a question that has to do with science, but not only science. I will go into this question at greater length, later on.

I was surprised once by a film sent to me by a German farmer about his duck farm. He obtained one kilogram of added weight in duck meat for each two and a half or three kilograms of feed expended. In our opinion you can't raise ducks without water, but on his duck farm he kept them in cages. The only water they were given was for drinking. That changes the situation. It provides more advantages in adding weight to the bird and organizing its proper care and feeding. The Ukrainians sent specialists to study at this man's farm. They studied everything. The Germans gave all the necessary recommendations in good conscience. I don't know how much that cost, but the Ukrainians established their own duck farm. It still exists today, apparently, on Lake Supoi at Yagotin near Kiev.<sup>6</sup> The Ukrainians were bragging at a certain conference on livestock and poultry farming that the Yagotin duck farm was producing such-and-such an amount of meat and that they were spending only five kilograms of feed for every kilogram of added weight. Everyone applauded. By our standards this was great progress.

"Excuse me," I said, "you went to West Germany and bought the duck farm there. The German agricultural firm provides you with consultation and assistance. How much feed do they use to obtain one kilogram of added weight?"

The speaker was embarrassed, but he said: "Three kilograms."

I said: "Excuse me, how is it possible that they use three kilograms and you use five? You are working approximately twice as poorly as they are!"

All this is a question of science, of the level of culture in production, and the question of how feed is prepared, how the necessary elements are selected that will produce added weight. It is a question of the material used in the feed, and it is a question of breeding and selection. Hybridization has produced excellent results both in the cultivation of crops and in the raising of livestock, including poultry and hog farming. We are lagging behind in these matters. We are lagging behind to an incredible extent.

If our science could rise to the level that has been achieved by Germany and the United States, I think with the quantity of feed that we are now using we could double our output of livestock and poultry products, such items as meat, eggs, and beef. The highest yield for milk comes from dairy cattle in Holland and Denmark. (I single out these two countries in particular.) Most important, it is milk with a high fat content, on the average of 5 percent, whereas we barely achieve 2.5–3 percent. For each liter of milk that they produce, we have to milk twice as many cows.

Here's another example. Some Dutch farmers came to our country, and they visited my home village of Kalinovka in Kursk province. They asked how the collective farmers went about cultivating potatoes. The farmers of Kalinovka, by comparison with their neighbors, were at a fairly decent level. They obtained approximately 200 centners of potatoes per hectare, and sometimes more. The Dutch farmers were curious: "What quantity of seed potatoes do you plant?" The answer was: "We put in between two and two and a half tons of seed potatoes per hectare." They were surprised. To the Dutch farmers this seemed incredible. They said they use only 500 kilograms of seed potatoes per hectare, and the harvest they get is 300 centners or more per hectare. When I found out about that I was simply sick with envy. It all has to do with science and know-how! It has to do with system! That's how highly developed the skill of seed selection and seed production turns out to be in that capitalist country.

When I visited Egypt, President Nasser said they bought seed potatoes in Holland, then grew young potatoes and sold them to West Germany and other countries, where people were eager to buy them.

The science of seed selection and the breeding of better varieties of potatoes are organized on a superb level in Holland. Special farms are exclusively engaged in this work, and they provide the other Dutch farmers with the nodules for growing potatoes of a particular kind or size. That's why a large

harvest with large-sized tubers results. We also have good potato varieties, especially the Lorkh and the May Rose, with excellent qualities as far as taste goes. In this connection I would like to put in a good word for Professor Lorkh.<sup>7</sup> I met with him many times. He developed a variety of potato that has spread throughout the country.

The Leningraders developed a strain of potato that was resistant to cankers and other blights. Today, unfortunately, the potatoes I buy in the government stores are afflicted with such infections as phytophthora,<sup>8</sup> black rot, and so on. Evidently we haven't worked hard enough at developing strains that are resistant to such diseases.

We have large farms for growing potatoes containing a high proportion of starch. They are used to produce alcohol. This variety of potato is suitable only for processing at plants that produce alcoholic beverages. But all this is not organized on the level that it should be, as in the West. It is sufficient to recall the fact that in Moscow province the yield for potatoes is only as high as 70 centners per hectare.

In our country there is no overall system for seed production and development. The collective farms and state farms don't properly value seeds. If they do make use of special seed material, it doesn't change year after year. Only a few isolated farms renew or refresh their seed banks within the necessary time frames, as recommended by science.

When I returned from Ukraine to Moscow, I decided to visit a potato research institute in the Ramenskoye district [near Moscow]. The researchers there reported their successes to me with great pride and passion. I asked a question: "But what yield do you get at your farm?" The woman responsible for potato cultivation said: "Sixty centners per hectare." This figure simply floored me. I couldn't restrain myself. I said: "Listen, Comrades, how in the world can the work of such an institute be tolerated any longer when the average yield from its fields amounts to only 60 centners, while the neighboring collective farms are getting up to 120 centners? Who is going to take this kind of institute as an example to follow? It's setting a terrible example!" The woman in charge, poor thing, was not expecting my sharp comments. She was dismayed and began to cry: "We were looking forward to your visit; we were so happy you were coming, and you say such things to us!" I said: "But what am I supposed to say? I can't go against my own conscience. This kind of low yield is a blight on the agriculture of our country, especially in Moscow province, which devotes a huge amount of farmland to growing potatoes." This happened in 1950.

Despite all the subsequent efforts by the party and government, the yield for potatoes has not advanced very far from the miserable figure of 70 centners per hectare. Of course some individual records were set. As early as 1938 in Kiev province there was one woman, a collective farmer, who obtained a yield of 500 centners of potatoes per hectare and received the Order of Lenin for that work. But what effort it cost her! Regardless of the awards and honors given out, such examples were very few. They were the exception and were obtained as a result of extraordinarily hard work and the application of large quantities of manure to the soil. Or else the record-setting results were obtained only on a very small plot of land. For example, there was the woman collective farmer Utkina in Novosibirsk province who obtained a yield of approximately 1,000 centners per hectare, but it was from a relatively small area. I know that sometimes when such records were set, in the background there was cheating, juggling of the figures. A high yield would be obtained from one row of plantings, and this result would be converted in terms of an entire hectare [where no such yield had been obtained].

Why, after all, are we lagging behind the West? Because work is poorly organized in our country. The research institutes are maintained at government expense, and that's why they work poorly, because their budgets are assured regardless of the results achieved. The opponents of socialism draw the conclusion that if life is transformed along socialist lines, the result will be lack of responsibility and a reduced efficiency and productivity of labor. That is why the Soviet Union cannot extricate itself from the morass it is mired in. My assistant Shevchenko had a conversation once with the seed selection expert [Vasily Yakovlevich] Yuryev, a very prominent plant breeder who headed a research station located near Kharkov.<sup>9</sup> When Shevchenko dropped in to see him at his office, Yuryev was sitting there lost in thought. Shevchenko said: "Apparently you've got some problem on your mind?" Yuryev answered sadly: "I have a Doctor of Agricultural Sciences working for me, but he's an absolute do-nothing. I'm thinking about how I can get rid of him, but I can't come up with anything because the laws protect him." Our laws provide for the protection of working people against bad administrators. Dishonest people turn these laws against our system. A job at a research institute often serves merely as a feeding trough for drones. These elements "swarm" all over the institutes, devouring a huge quantity of government resources, with no return on the investment. And then there are always superpatriots who, instead of trying to find the real cause of a situation like this, instead of clearing the way for genuine scientific work, freeing

ourselves from unnecessary ballast, and promoting genuine scientists to top positions instead of a bunch of hangers-on—these superpatriots try to defend the indefensible and shout out loud about our supremacy in all areas. Things cannot be done this way!

I think that sensible people will understand me correctly. When I talk about these shortcomings, which I always fought against, and fight against even now, I refer to them with great sadness and even anger. I bow my head to the outstanding experts in seed selection and plant breeding, to the scientists of the Soviet Union such as Pustovoit, Remeslo, and others. There are not just a dozen of them. There may even be hundreds. I always took pride, and I still do, in the work of these remarkable scientists who have been extremely productive in their efforts to raise the level of Soviet agriculture.

1. Vasily Fyodorovich Starchenko. See Biographies.

2. Academician Vasily Stepanovich Remeslo (1907–83) worked out methods of creating high-yielding varieties of wheat and developed seventeen new varieties of winter wheat. Academician Boris Pavlovich Sokolov (1897–1984) was the first [in the Soviet Union] to make use of heterozygotic hybrids in the selection of corn specimens for breeding. Academician Vasily Nikolayevich Pustovoit (1886–1972) worked out a highly effective system for breeding sunflowers and developed twenty high-oil, blight-resistant varieties. See Biographies.

Fyodor Grigoryevich Kirichenko (1904–88) created new hardy varieties of winter wheat for the steppes (see Biographies).

Aleksandr Samsonovich Musiyko (1903–80) bred specific varieties of corn for different regions.

3. Vladimir Vladimirovich Matskevich (1909–98) was a prominent party leader who from 1965 to 1973 headed the USSR Ministry of Agriculture; Pavel Pavlovich Lobanov (1902–84), a party leader specializing in agriculture, had been minister of agriculture for the RSFSR from 1953 to 1955 and later was president of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (Russian initials, VASKhNIL). See Biographies. [GS]

4. Janos Kadar (1912–89) was Hungarian party and state leader from 1956 to 1988. [SS]

5. The degree of Candidate of Sciences (*kandidat nauk*)—or Candidate of Agricultural Sciences, Candidate of Medical Sciences, etc.—was roughly equivalent to a Ph.D. in the West. The degree of Doctor of Sciences (*doktor nauk*) was the highest academic degree in the Soviet Union and had no Western equivalent. [SS]

6. In the 1940s and 1950s, Khrushchev often hunted wild ducks at Lake Supoi. Later he established this duck farm on that large lake. [SK]

7. Aleksandr Georgiyevich Lorkh (1889–1980) was one of the founders of potato breeding in the Soviet Union. He lectured at the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy in Moscow, one of the country's main higher educational institutions for agriculture. See Biographies. [GS]

8. *Phytophthora cinnamomi* is a microscopic soil-borne organism that causes root rot in a wide variety of plant species. [SS]

9. Vasily Yakovlevich Yuryev (1879–1962) was director of the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Plant Growing, Breeding, and Genetics from 1956. He bred many new varieties of winter and spring wheat, rye, barley, oats, millet, and corn. See Biographies.

## ACADEMICIAN VILYAMS AND HIS GRASS-FIELD CROP-ROTATION SYSTEM

I had great respect for this man [Academician Vilyams] and I admired him.<sup>1</sup> How many speeches I have made praising him! I also knew him personally. Among members of the Academy of Sciences he was probably one of the first to become a Communist. He was not only a man I was close to personally; he was one of *our* people, one of our very own *Soviet* scientists. Unfortunately it turned out that his theory was not sustainable. I don't want to act as a judge. This is a specialized subject and it requires analysis in depth. Evidently his theory does find application, but it's not applicable to all regions of our vast country, the Soviet Union. But what are things like in our country? If one person shouts "Hooray," then others join in shouting loudly. And that's what we did. We all shouted, "Hooray for the theory of Vilyams! Hooray for the *travopolye* system!" It was introduced in many districts, provinces, territories, and republics, but it didn't produce the desired results. And we had big losses.

I want to recall the history of this question. Both before the revolution and immediately after it, it was not possible for us to engage in agriculture at the level that we should have. We didn't have machinery, seeds, mineral fertilizers, and other necessary elements. We relied on whatever nature provided. We had the most primitive type of extensive agriculture—the three-field crop-rotation system.

Later, to replace the three-field system we began to introduce a multfield system, but that system didn't produce much, either, because of the lack of mineral fertilizers. We didn't know this system very well. A discussion began about the best methods of farming. Vilyams proposed his *travopolye* theory. On the other hand, Academician Pryanishnikov argued for the use of mineral fertilizers.<sup>2</sup>

These two "giants" in their field lived at the same time. Pryanishnikov tried to convince us that it was time to build factories that would produce mineral fertilizers. He didn't reject the cultivation of clover and other grasses that would improve the structure of the soil, but mineral fertilizers held the main place in his theory. He argued that only through the use of such fertilizers could agriculture be raised to the appropriate level. Vilyams's theory was attractive because it required hardly any capital investment. It was based on a crop-rotation system in which a field that had been sown with clover or other grasses would be sure to produce high yields. The high yields obtained

through the grass-field rotation system gave promise of even higher yields in the future. What could be more attractive than that—especially when our country didn't have the available capital [for production of mineral fertilizers], didn't have a chemical industry or highly developed industry in general?

Vilyams proposed a crop-rotation system in which two or three fields would be under grasses, as I have said, and the others would be sown to crops. In the fields sown to grasses (clover or alfalfa, depending on the region, depending on where one type of grass or another grew better), these plants accumulate nitrogen in their root systems and improve the soil structure: instead of being dispersed, the soil tends to clump together where these grasses grow. The penetration of oxygen into the soil is improved, and that creates better conditions for growing crops. The problem of increasing the yield capacity of a field could thus be solved without the use of a large quantity of mineral fertilizers, as advocated by Academician Pryanishnikov.

Vilyams won this argument. All of us were on his side back then. The party came down with all its authority in favor of introducing the *travopolye* system, or grass-field crop-rotation system. This system was introduced most widely and systematically in Ukraine. Nevertheless, we continued to have low yields and were still dependent on the weather. In southern Ukraine nothing whatsoever came of this crop-rotation system. The economic benefits that should have come from fields sown to alfalfa didn't make themselves evident. The harvests we had were poor. And if you have a poor yield of alfalfa, this means that not much nitrogen fertilizer has been added to the soil and not much fodder has been obtained.

We didn't listen to the warnings of Academician Pryanishnikov, who actually viewed matters more soberly. He stuck to his position stubbornly, calling for the production of fertilizers and for the manufacture of machinery that would till the soil without destroying the soil structure; he advocated lightweight plows and harrows for shallow tilling of the soil—in other words, all the things we lacked when we began the virgin-lands project.

Vilyams denied the usefulness of harrows for working the soil. According to Vilyams, the harrow is a “harmful” instrument of production. He rejected shallow tilling in principle, and that was wrong. It depends on the conditions whether you should plow deeply or make use of instruments for shallow tilling. In Ukraine, in the arid zones out on the steppes, the so-called *bukker* (drill plow) was used. This was a multiple-furrow plow used for shallow tilling. There was a prominent professor at the Saratov Institute who stubbornly defended the use of the drill plow. As I recall, he was arrested for that, sentenced, and shot as a “wrecker.” And he was not the only one.



The theory of Vilyams held sway for a fairly long time. A special government decree was even adopted, and everyone sided with Vilyams. Pryanishnikov, fortunately, in the deadly time of the Stalin era, was not subjected to repression, and after the war he died of natural causes. His theory was not accepted during his lifetime, although he was suggesting a realistic path for increasing agricultural production. Were there farms from which we got good returns by using the method of Vilyams? In some regions, under special conditions, high yields were obtained, but for the most part his system didn't produce good results. Consequently great harm (and I use that term deliberately) was done to agriculture by the near-universal adoption of the *travopolye* system of Academician Vilyams. Despite the fact that I praised and promoted his theory for a long time, I also assumed the responsibility for repudiating that theory. Life itself required that we re-examine our mistaken decision. I must make the qualification, once again, that for some regions it may be that Vilyams's system is indeed suitable.

We subjected Vilyams's theory to criticism and reoriented ourselves toward Pryanishnikov.

From the archives we retrieved documents written by Academician Pryanishnikov, who by then was the late Academician Pryanishnikov, a remarkable man. He proposed more solid and realistic methods for increasing agricultural yields. In his theory both manure and grasses, both alfalfa and clover, were included, but at the foundation of his whole system was fertilizer, especially mineral fertilizer. Without that it was simply impossible to move forward. What is manure, after all? It actually is these same mineral fertilizers. A plant is nourished not by the manure itself, but by the substances it contains, which are accessible to the root system. Chemistry can provide these substances in their pure form. At first these may not be of the very best quality. But not everyone understands that. Recently I met with some people vacationing at a nearby resort. From them I heard the following philistine point of view: "Mineral fertilizers are worse than manure. You get vegetables that smell bad when you use them." This point of view is of no use whatsoever. What actually is manure? It is human waste or animal waste. But when you eat a radish or cabbage, or eat cabbage soup, you don't detect that familiar odor known to us all since the day of our birth.

1. Academician Vasily Robertovich Vilyams (1863–1939) was a Soviet soil scientist and leading figure in the scientific research establishment of Soviet agriculture. See Biographies. Vilyams is the Russian spelling of Williams; he was evidently

descended from an ancestor with an English surname; his father was a construction engineer named Robert Williams, or Vilyams. In Russian the system Vilyams advocated is called the *travopolnaya* system (from the noun *travopolye*,

literally “grass field”). In this crop-rotation system, part of the arable land is periodically left under “grass” crops, such as clover and alfalfa, which restore the soil and add to its fertility. An English term for such a system is “ley farming” (the word “ley,” or “lea,” meaning “a field of grass,” as in the famous line of English poetry, “The lowing herd winds slowly over the lea”). [GS]

2. Academician Dmitry Nikolayevich Pryanishnikov (1865–1948) was a Soviet agrochemist, biochemist, and plant physiologist. He was the author of a widely used textbook, *Agrokhimiya* (Agrochemistry). His works dealt mainly with plant nutrition and the utilization of fertilizers. [GS]

### THE AGRICULTURAL FIELD AS A CHESSBOARD

I want to return to the method of sowing crops in square seedbeds, also known as square-cluster planting. This idea first occurred to one of our agricultural inspectors who had come to Ukraine in the late 1940s. He shared his idea with me. I called in some agronomists and engineers, and we began to devise a planting machine that would sow seeds in special clusters arranged strictly in squares. This made it possible subsequently to cultivate the clusters not only lengthways but also sideways. The planted field began to look like a chessboard, with plants growing in the corners of each square. We were prompted to take up this method because of the poor quality of crop cultivation and the poor timing of such work. Yet a good harvest depended on proper cultivation.

All this took place at the end of my activity in the leadership in Ukraine. When I transferred to work in Moscow [in 1949], after a certain time I returned to this project. A couple of engineers were hunted up for me, men who worked at an enterprise in Lyubertsy.<sup>1</sup> They began to design a planting machine for me. In Ukraine we had been concerned with both corn and potatoes, but here potatoes were the main crop. Losses during the harvesting of potatoes in the areas around Moscow caused a big problem. The main reason for these losses was the failure to cultivate the soil at the proper time, and sometimes the potatoes weren’t cultivated at all. The soil needed to be formed into small hillocks. Potatoes love these little hillocks to be piled over them twice a season. That’s the minimum. Otherwise you won’t get a good harvest. The only solution to the problem, as I saw it, was to mechanize the

process. It hardly needs to be said that this was labor-intensive work. Making such hillocks with the use of a tractor was usually done only in one direction, along the length of the rows. The engineers adapted an already existing machine to meet our requirements. Then we learned that the same kind of machine [for planting in square clusters] had already been built in America and was used there in the cultivation of corn plantings. A square-cluster arrangement of plantings resulted [from the use of the American machine]. Our machine also gave good results.

Experiments were carried out at a collective farm in the Ramenskoye district.<sup>2</sup> The man who was the chairman of that farm turned out to be very perceptive. Two good team leaders were chosen. At that time teams had been established for the farming of crops on plowland. One team leader was no longer a young man; he had been a member of the party since 1917. His intelligence and common sense pleased me. The planting of seed potatoes was carried out and the sprouts appeared, forming a perfect square. I invited the minister of agriculture, Comrade Benediktov,<sup>3</sup> to come out and see this experimental field. Kozlov<sup>4</sup> came with us, too. He was in charge of the agriculture department of the CPSU Central Committee. At the collective farm I was already like one of the locals. I don't know how many times I went to visit that farm.

I asked the new arrivals: "What do you think? In which direction were these potatoes planted?" I was very pleased by the fact that they couldn't figure it out. Both lengthways and sideways the rows in the field were equally straight; it even looked as though they had been measured off by a ruler.

A harvest twice the usual size was obtained on these experimental fields. This immediately gave wings to the supporters of this method. They began to devise machines for planting corn. The method of planting potatoes is quite different from that of planting corn, but the size of the square is exactly the same—a square 70 centimeters by 70 centimeters. The corn grew extremely well in a square of that size. It got good sunlight and good air. Plants with tall stalks, like corn, don't do well if planted too closely together. An excellent harvest of cornstalk fodder was also obtained in the Ramenskoye district. This experimental field attracted the attention not only of specialists in agriculture but also of people who were simply passing on the road. They would stop alongside the cornfield and stare at this miraculous sight. Corn was not being planted on such a large scale in Moscow province at that time. Of course in private gardens it had been familiar for a long time.

Now the designers of agricultural machinery went to work with a will. They copied the design of the American machines. The design had been worked out

in the United States much earlier. Our press began to promote this square-cluster method of planting corn and potatoes. Later, as an experiment, we decided to test the square-cluster method in planting cotton. An experimental test was even done on planting sugar beets by this method. Where the planting was done well, and the crops were cultivated in two directions—lengthways and sideways—harvests larger than usual were obtained, although it's true that the density of plants was sharply reduced. When the usual method is used there is a gap of about 44.5 centimeters between rows of sugar beets, and within the row the distance between plants is 15–20 centimeters. A farm that harvested up to 100,000 beets per hectare was considered a good one, and if they brought in 110,000 beets per hectare, that was considered very good.

When the square-cluster method was used, we couldn't produce that many beets per hectare. Otherwise the tractors would not have been able to make sideways trips across the planted area. What we got was between 50,000 and 55,000 beets per hectare. But because of the well-timed cultivating of the beets, each one weighed more, and the sum total of their weight not only was no less; it was greater than the harvest obtained by traditional methods. The square-cluster method exceeded all expectations. But we never went beyond merely experimenting. The Americans followed the same course. They took up the square-cluster method for corn and cotton but later abandoned it. In raising cotton the Americans left approximately a meter between rows, so that the machinery could get through easily. After abandoning the square-cluster method, they switched over to combating weeds with herbicides. At that time we knew nothing about herbicides, and therefore we had to combat the weeds with the only methods we had—weeding by hand and “earthing over,” or piling up those little hillocks. The Americans did this “hilling” lengthways with machinery, and within these long rows the weeds were destroyed by herbicides. Unless the fields are overgrown with weeds, there turned out to be no need for the sideways cultivation by tractors. Well-run farms obtained high yields even without the square-cluster method of cultivation.

Gradually against the general background of a higher level of crop cultivation we began to lose interest in the square-cluster method. If we plowed lengthwise only, and cultivated the long rows two or three times, we would get a good harvest. The farms began to abandon the square-cluster method and the extra worries that it entailed. Nowadays I see that our newspapers show no interest in new methods of working the land. There's nothing but barefaced propaganda.

1. In the 1970s, Lyubertsy was a suburb about ten miles southeast of Moscow, with a population of approximately 150,000. A research institute for agricultural machinery was located there. It designed machines for sowing crops, as well as other complex agricultural machines. [SK/GS]

2. Near Moscow, to the southeast. [GS]

3. Ivan Aleksandrovich Benediktov. See Biographies.

4. Aleksei Ivanovich Kozlov. See Biographies.

### A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATIONS — AND ABOUT SPECIALIZATION

At the suggestion of Molotov, Stalin established the Ministry of Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS's), but it was not a wise suggestion. The creation of this ministry deprived agriculture of machinery. The people responsible for growing the products of agriculture no longer had machines directly at their disposal. This “innovation” was eliminated even while Stalin was alive. Later, after his death, we turned the MTS machinery over to the collective farms.<sup>1</sup> Molotov nearly went out of his mind over this; he claimed we were adopting anti-Marxist methods and eradicating one of the achievements of socialism. That was nonsense of course. Nowhere, not in any program or theoretical work, is it said that machine and tractor stations are indispensable elements of the socialist economy.

The MTS's were originally created [in the late 1920s] at the suggestion of an agronomist from one of the collective farms in Odessa province.<sup>2</sup> Comrade Shlikhter<sup>3</sup> gave a report about this initiative at a unionwide congress (or perhaps it was a Ukrainian congress). Then this model was extended to the entire country. For those times it was a progressive phenomenon. But our cadres had developed and the time had come to rise to the next level in agricultural work. Our machinery and equipment were artificially separated from the land and from those who were working the land. This gap was doing us great harm. We eliminated the MTS's. Today I don't think there is a single sensible person, well informed on questions of agricultural economics, who would consider this action to have been incorrect.<sup>4</sup> It was done in the interests of raising agricultural production, but it was not enough.

Today, at the present stage of development of our country and governmental system, the economy is the main thing. It is my opinion, and it was my opinion previously (so that these are not just the random thoughts of a pensioner with nothing else to do), that specialization should be introduced into agriculture. I began to approach this question even in Stalin's time and continued after his death, but I was unable to find the appropriate lever that would enable us to move things forward, to deepen specialization, and bring skilled and qualified people into the leadership. I proposed to the Central Committee the task of shifting over to a more specialized form of party and government leadership. The Central Committee [in early 1964] sent a draft of the proposed resolution to all the party's province committees and district committees for discussion. The main idea of this document was that specialization was necessary both in industrial production and in the production of agricultural goods, and that those who become leaders should have profound knowledge of their fields. It was my opinion that for this purpose it was necessary to organize administrative bodies to oversee production. The name itself defines the intention—"production administration" was the name proposed for such a body—and in the party there would be territorial and province committees for agricultural and industrial production, respectively. In no way did this contradict Marxism, unless considerations of practicality and efficiency are to be dispensed with.

I am absolutely certain that the future will favor such structures. It was impossible for the party to direct agriculture without knowing the subject. That's the way things were in our country previously, and today we have returned to that situation. It is primarily urban cadres rather than rural ones who are promoted to be secretaries of the party's province committees and territory committees. I know the names of people who were promoted in my time and who gradually acquired knowledge and the ability to direct agriculture. But mainly the party secretaries came from the industrial sphere. These people know machines well and they know economics [in relation to industry], but they have a poor knowledge of agriculture. And for the direction of agriculture today very specific knowledge and ability are required.

Sometimes a leader doesn't really know his field, but he presents himself as a specialist and issues orders, and very specific ones at that. But a very specific order without knowledge of the subject will do no good. That's why I think the party organization should be divided up on an industrial-agricultural basis, and not just on a geographical basis, as has been done so far.<sup>5</sup> Then it would be easier to select specialists and bring them into party and government work.

People will say that, previously, we never had an administrative division of labor based on the industrial principle. And that's true. But previously was previously. The key political question, the question of the victory of Soviet power, has already been decided. Now we need to strengthen Soviet power, strengthen the Soviet state system, and strengthen the socialist elements, and here everything will be decided by boosting the economy, raising the standard of living, raising the cultural level, the educational level, and so forth. People must be provided with everything they need, not just so that they can survive, but so that they can enjoy life. For this, comfort and abundance must be created. By looking into that mirror we can distinguish between a socialist state and a capitalist one. Today, unfortunately, our people chase after every trifle that comes from outside the country. They pay much too much for such things and admire them much too much, and that doesn't speak in our favor. We must overcome such phenomena and place socialist production on a higher level than capitalist production. The things that we make, whether for industry or for everyday use, should be distinguished by high quality, based on the latest technology. They should also be distinguished by their usefulness and should satisfy the aesthetic sense of the consumer.

In recent years [since November 1964] we've gone back to the old way; we've switched back to a general administrative division of labor. A faceless, impersonal leadership has reappeared both in industry and agriculture. The result is that the consumer suffers most of all. The country doesn't get the products it needs in sufficient quantity or quality. Not only does agriculture suffer; so does industry. Industry also needs specialization of party leadership. A party leader may be a specialist in agriculture, but as Kozma Prutkov said, "You cannot encompass the unencompassable."<sup>6</sup>

What I mean is that a specialist in agriculture can't know the fine points of industry. People might object with the argument that, after all, factory directors exist [in addition to party officials]. That's true, but with the way things are arranged in our country the party organizations dictate all the specifics, and given the absence of necessary qualifications and skills, this kind of dictating can lead to undesirable results. That's why it's not enough to promote worthy people and keep self-willed petty tyrants out of the leadership; it's also necessary to find people who have a profound knowledge of their field.

Of course agriculture and industry are in turn divided into thousands of specialized areas, and it's hard for one person to know them all. At any rate, it's better if agriculture is led by someone who has special agricultural education. I think that today we've shifted over to the old system of economic



management based on other considerations not having to do with the immediate business at hand.

At one time the Zinoviev<sup>7</sup> opposition raised the slogan, “A horse for every horseless peasant household.” This was obviously a foolish slogan. There *were* no horses, aside from those that the peasantry already had. And the number of horseless peasant households was huge. Where were they to get horses from? Sometimes alluring slogans are proclaimed for political reasons; only much later does it become clear that there is no basis to them.

In opposition to Zinoviev, Stalin proposed a transition to the seven-hour workday. Our economy wasn’t ready for such a transition and suffered substantial losses as a result. Then Stalin switched our country back to the eight-hour day. Of course he did that after the opposition had already been removed. Unfortunately, examples of such things did occur in the history of our party and government.

We must be guided by the interests of our people. We must stand on Leninist principles. We must choose what is useful for strengthening and developing our country, ensuring a better organization of production under socialism both in industry and in agriculture. I am certain that as time passes we will return to a restructuring of the administration of our economy. Different organizational forms of administration are possible. Perhaps a more correct solution, corresponding to the interests of both agriculture and industry, will be found. I am convinced that it will. Life itself demands this, and it will inevitably break down the bureaucratic superstructures that now interfere with development. Unfortunately, this takes time. And our cause has suffered because of the time we have lost.

1. The MTS’s were eliminated in 1958, and their machinery was sold to the collective farms. [GS]

2. The first machine and tractor station was established on an experimental basis at the Shevchenko state farm near Odessa by the agronomist Markevich in 1927 (see Moshe Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power* [New York: Norton, 1975], 363). [GS]

3. Aleksandr Grigoryevich Shlikhter. See Biographies.

4. Andrei Stepanovich Shevchenko, Khrushchev’s assistant for agricultural matters (see Biographies), considered this decision incorrect; see Anatoly Strel’yany, “The Last Romantic,” in Appendixes to this volume. [SS]

5. Such a division of party committees into separate committees for industry and agriculture was introduced toward the end of Khrushchev’s

period in office. The change was extremely unpopular among party officials and was reversed as soon as Khrushchev was ousted. [SS]

6. Kozma Prutkov, source of one of Khrushchev’s favorite sayings: “You cannot encompass the unencompassable,” was a fictional character, a satirical representation of the poet-bureaucrat, a tsarist official who wrote “proudly platitudinous” fables, aphorisms, and verse. Kozma Prutkov is “the incarnation of self-centered and arrogantly naïve complacency,” D. S. Mirsky observes in *History of Russian Literature*.

Kozma Prutkov, who “flourished” from 1853 to 1863, was the creation of three Russian writers: Aleksei Konstantinovich Tolstoy (1817–75), a distant cousin of Leo Tolstoy; and two other cousins, Aleksei Mikhailovich Zhemchuzhnikov (1821–1908) and Vladimir Mikhailovich Zhemchuzhnikov (no

dates available). According to his creators, Prutkov was born in 1803. A notice in *Moskovskiy Novosti* (Moscow News) for April 22–28, 2003, celebrates the 200th anniversary of this “inexhaustible fount of wisdom.” [GS]

7. Grigory Zinoviev, one of the main leaders of the left opposition in the Bolshevik party in the late 1920s. See Biographies.

### **WE SUFFER FROM THE IMPERFECTION OF OUR ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM**

In evaluating labor productivity, we should take as our example the capitalist economy. There, the cost of production and the output per worker are placed in the forefront. That is the main thing. But in our country there is not even a peep about this. In his day Lenin instilled it into the consciousness of the Soviet people that we had to learn from the capitalists how to trade, and how to organize production, that we had to make use of everything, including the best things that had been developed in the capitalist world. In my opinion, these recommendations of Lenin’s are still timely today. Socialism of course has its own advantages, and it has demonstrated these, but unfortunately our output per worker is lower than in the capitalist countries. It’s generally thought that the capitalists “squeeze every drop” out of a worker, and that’s how they achieve a high labor output. And that point of view is correct. Under socialist conditions there’s no need to “squeeze every drop” out of a worker, but on the other hand, we shouldn’t allow so much “down time,” when the worker or the machine is standing idle. It would be better, as output increases, to follow the line of reducing the length of the workday. If people have come to do their work, the machinery shouldn’t stand idle, and time shouldn’t be wasted, especially in agriculture.

Unfortunately, nowadays there is a kind of primitive propaganda being promoted over the radio in regard to the so-called most advanced models in agricultural production. An example is a broadcast I heard yesterday. The radio station Mayak<sup>1</sup> announced that in Belorussia, in Gomel province, a large state farm is being organized on reclaimed marshland. They report that houses are being built, along with hospitals and a cultural center; in short, conditions are being created that will make people happy. But I heard nothing about the main thing. And the main thing is the quantity, quality,

and production cost of the goods to be produced at that state farm. A great many people are employed in agriculture in our country, but the output is very low, especially in comparison to the Western European countries and the United States. But we shouldn't be producing less than they do. Today we have everything: the technological resources and the machinery. If there's something we don't have, we can make it or buy models and copy them.

The main condition for the victory of socialism is to increase the productivity of labor. We cannot achieve victory by force, but only by a higher productivity of labor, greater output per worker. In order to live better than people under capitalist conditions, we must produce more per worker, not less. The country that produces more has the opportunity to give more. You cannot give more than you produce. To create better conditions of life and a higher standard of living, satisfying the material and spiritual needs of the people, a better utilization of machinery, technology, and science must be assured. That is the only way we can be sure of moving forward. Capitalism has accumulated an enormous amount of productive experience. Making use of this, it is always possible to seek out a rational kernel, of course keeping the particular features of the socialist system in mind.

I had a conversation with the president of an American company once. We had purchased a poultry farm from his company. This was set up in the Crimea. The American company guaranteed production of chicken meat under certain conditions. They guaranteed that 2.5 kilograms of feed would produce one kilogram of meat. I've already referred to this example when I was talking about seed selection and breeding. This is the scientific approach. A balance of all the necessary elements in the feed is required. Only in this way can it be assured that the baby chicks will develop normally and gain the maximum amount of weight. Science requires strict discipline. We bought this design for a poultry factory. We bought the equipment and the license for producing chicken meat in large quantities, and we ended up using 5 kilograms of feed for each kilogram of added weight, where the Americans were using only 2.5 kilograms. It was not a matter of breeding the proper strains of chickens; it was a matter of organization. What kind of competition can there be if, apart from inventing or discovering anything new, we can't master the techniques of scientific production to obtain more meat from chickens? I felt simply ashamed to talk with the president of this company. I asked him why our results had been like that. He answered: "You didn't let our specialists come to set up the factory. You said it was a top secret area and that foreigners weren't permitted there."

There are no forbidden zones and no military secrets on the territory of the Crimea, with the exception of the submarine bases there. And actually those submarines are of precious little importance.<sup>2</sup> In our strategic conception no significant role is assigned to the Black Sea. The military refers to it contemptuously as a “puddle.” Missiles shoot over it and airplanes criss-cross it from all directions, and therefore it would be virtually impossible for ships to survive there. The refusal to let the people from the American company come in and set up the factory was the result of a bureaucratic attitude toward our work. It was a “regurgitation” of the Stalin era, a throwback to that time. As a result the equipment at the poultry factory wasn’t set up correctly, and not everything was used as it was intended. As the saying goes, people had “never set eyes” on such things and had no idea about them. After this conversation I asked the president of the company to send his specialists. They arrived at the state farm and were dumbfounded. The type of mixed feed that was being given to the baby chicks was not properly balanced, and it was of low quality. That was the reason an excessive amount of feed was being used. Mineral supplements and other necessary elements were also being wasted right before your eyes. They were pouring out the mineral supplements and other elements just by “eyeballing,” not using any measuring devices. The result was that they used too much.

Specialization is necessary, and a profound specialization at that. Without it we can’t raise the level of production, especially of livestock and poultry. Today I feel simply ashamed and it pains me to hear that France, which is a relatively small country in the size of its territory, exports chickens to our country. Holland, which is even smaller, also exports chickens. I found this out when I was in the hospital. The doctors and other medical personnel were rushing off to the lunch counter, where chickens were being sold. They were buying Dutch chickens, and the next day they were all wrinkling up their noses. It turned out these chickens had a very strong fishy smell. The situation was obvious to me. The Dutch catch fish, and they use the small fry and the waste products from processing the fish as chicken feed. They give this fish meal to the chickens as a food supplement. Hence the fishy odor.

There you have an example of industrial production based on specialization, using scientific data to run your business. So far we don’t have anything like it. We have factories producing mixed feed, but they’re primitive. They’re not really factories; I don’t know what to call them. Wet, mildewed, and rotten grain and other remnants not suitable for use in baking bread are ground up and turned into poultry feed. At other times supplements are

given that don't improve quality or ensure the suitable amount of added weight per minimum expenditure of feed; they simply increase the overall quantity of mixed feed. Not every kind of mixed feed meets the needs of the organism, nor does it always produce the added weight that it should.

The president of the American company told me about their long-term perspectives. They were working on the development of a strain of chickens that would produce additional weight on a one-to-one basis. That is, you would get a kilogram of chicken meat for each kilogram of feed. For us this is simply a fairy tale. I don't know how this could be done. I just can't say. But he said that at research institutes they had already achieved one kilogram of added weight from 1.2 kilograms of feed. I take my hat off to anyone who can create such possibilities for thrifty, specialized production of such a fine product as chicken meat.

If the production of feed could be reorganized and placed on its feet instead of standing on its head, we would have the possibility of increasing the production of chicken meat and eggs by 30–40 percent. There's an example of how to increase output per worker. There's productivity for you. There's an example of reducing costs and consequently lowering prices, by which we can only make the consumer happier. But for this, strict specialization is required, people need to be trained, and production needs to be properly prepared and organized on a completely scientific basis.

Unfortunately, this hasn't existed in our country and doesn't now exist. The research institutions in this field remain backward and apparently don't want to learn anything. As a result we're suffering great losses. The same company president I've mentioned proposed back then that we organize the production of bacon on a specialized basis. He proposed to sell us a farming system for 250,000 hogs that could be tended by a workforce totaling 125 people. He guaranteed that we would need to spend only 3.5 kilograms of feed per kilogram of added weight. "In our country," he explained, "we use only 3 kilograms, but in the initial stages we will guarantee you 3.5, and later you can make a transition to 3 or even lower." He approached the problem of producing bacon in the same way as producing chicken meat, and he offered us a discount because of our lack of knowledge of this business. Nowadays we use 7 kilograms of feed per unit of added weight in hog farming. On our very best farms, the most ideal farms, we use 5 kilograms. There you have the equation: 7 kilograms for us versus 3.5 kilograms for them. Using virtually the same amount of feed, they are able to produce twice as much pork and to increase the production of chicken meat by 40 percent. This all comes about as a result of specialization.

In my day I made reports to the Central Committee Presidium proposing that we buy licenses, and not only licenses but also the equipment and technical specifications, for the kind of meat-production facilities I have described. All this would of course pay for itself. We were losing huge amounts of money on feed due to lack of specialization and low labor productivity. With organization like that the production of meat from hogs and chickens and egg production were absolutely unprofitable. I think it would have been more profitable and economically advantageous, and the results would have been felt by the population, if we had bought the equipment and the licenses for feeding livestock and poultry on an industrial basis instead of producing the Fiat automobile.<sup>3</sup> Thousands of people buy the Fiat, but if we bought a license and organized the proper feeding of livestock on an industrial basis, we would be feeding millions. The results would have been not only economic but political as well. It is no secret to anyone that after fifty years of Soviet power we still experience shortages of the most ordinary things, even meat and eggs. That would have been a more rational thing to do, but unfortunately the leadership decided otherwise. Apparently they had a different assessment of the food situation in our country and perhaps they didn't know the real state of affairs.

Of course, not all problems are solved by buying a license. By buying a license you are buying the product of another person's mental activity and accumulated experience. But the thing to do is to develop such knowledge ourselves. In competing against capitalism we simply can't continue lagging behind in food production. Our backwardness in this area serves to some extent as a confirmation of the superiority of the capitalist mode of production over the socialist. That gives the enemies of socialism the chance to "throw pebbles in our garden"—that is, to make fun of us, make snide remarks about us. And they have grounds for that, because we actually are lagging behind.

You don't have to go far to find examples. That is exactly why the uprising in Gdansk happened.<sup>4</sup> This conflict, or more exactly rebellion, occurred because of the lack of food products and other consumer items. A rise in prices is what set it off.

Concealed price rises, hidden inflation, are actually occurring in our country, too. Of course this causes discontent. When I meet people they ask me questions that are difficult to answer. Why has vodka become more expensive? Older brands of vodka, they say, have stayed at the same price, but they aren't being produced any more. This is in fact hidden inflation. Of course some people explain this as part of the fight against drunkenness.

And I held such positions, too, in my day. In my time we also raised prices on vodka, but vodka consumption didn't decline as a result. The only thing that happened was that drinkers' budgets were stretched thinner, and their families began to allocate fewer resources for the purchase of basic necessities.

The Polish question is not so much an economic one as a political one. The leaders there have become isolated from the masses; they have lost touch with the people and lost their sense of proportion. When you raise prices so sharply you have to expect the kind of events that occurred. I have nothing bad to say about the people who were in the leadership in Poland back when I was active, but those who have come into the leadership now are people I generally know little about. I had and have great respect for [Edward] Gierek.<sup>5</sup> I consider him a good Communist and a highly honorable man. The same for Comrade Lukaszewicz.<sup>6</sup> But Gomulka was no less devoted to the ideas of communism than they, and the same was true of others such as [Ignacy] Loga-Sowinski,<sup>7</sup> [Marian] Spychalski,<sup>8</sup> and that entire group that was ousted. They were not accidental people. They had gone through hard times and been tempered in the struggle. They went through a process of natural selection in the fight against Hitler's invasion of Poland. Yet they allowed something like this to happen! But I'm getting off the subject.

The main thing we suffer from is inadequate management of agriculture. In this area we find ourselves, as before, in a situation where only propaganda is being used. Nothing but appeals [for greater productivity] are heard—in the press, over the radio, on television, at meetings, and when reports are given. This of course is also necessary. But only the more advanced people are going to respond to appeals. In order for the labor of those employed in agriculture to become more productive, it has to be conducted on a higher scientific level; the technical resources need to be provided, and work must be organized precisely. Such things don't exist in our country. Our party organizations and agricultural administrative bodies do nothing but lay out the plans and issue appeals [for the plans to be met].

Recently over the radio I heard a broadcast summing up a conference on agriculture held in Moscow province. Comrade Konotop<sup>9</sup> gave the report. I have known him for a long time as an intelligent man. I remember him from the time when he worked as an engineer at a factory in Kolomna.<sup>10</sup> Later he became the secretary of that factory's party organization, then secretary of the party's Kolomna district committee, and that's how he advanced up the ladder. As a political leader his abilities were in keeping with the posts he held. But when I listened to his report I was convinced once again that the



organizational structure of our nomenklatura is solid. After all Konotop is an engineer [yet here he was speaking about agriculture]. Can you imagine that a report on the development of the coal industry would be assigned to a party-committee secretary who had no training in that branch of production? How could he talk about the progress of work in the mines? Only if you've mastered knowledge of the field can you manage the economy at the required level and achieve success. A party secretary of a design bureau, even one who has an engineering degree, cannot give a report on rocket engineering. No! He works as a party secretary, but he doesn't hold a leading position in that field of science. Knowledge in depth is required here. Specialists like Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov and [Mikhail Kuzmich] Yangel<sup>11</sup> did have such knowledge, and with their profound knowledge of their fields they brought glory to their homeland.

Agriculture, like any other sector of the economy, requires professional knowledge. That's why I proposed that territorial production administrations be established in agriculture as well as industry. These would be led by outstanding specialists who would be responsible for the overall level of agricultural work as well as for each state farm and collective farm specifically. They would oversee how the equipment was being used, how agricultural knowledge was being applied, whether mineral and organic fertilizers were being introduced, and whether various means of protecting plants were being applied. Agricultural production should be dealt with in the same way as industrial production. When I traveled to outlying areas of our country I always took an interest in agriculture. Wherever I went, a local party leader would report to me on agriculture, but other leaders remained in the shadows, such as the chairman of the local Executive Committee of the Soviets for that province or district. First-hand specialists in various sectors or branches [of agriculture] also remained in the shadows. People turned to them only for technical information. Yes, it's true that in our system the party holds the leading position. But its leadership should be political, while specialists should be in charge of the work.

Western journalists, especially Americans, used to attack me, asking: "What is your output per worker? How many people are employed in agriculture in your country? What percentage of the population provides for your country's needs for agricultural goods?"

Of course such figures were not in our favor. The American farmer had a much higher output and productivity of labor. The explanation for this was not only that he was better trained. I think that even today the American farmer is better trained, but he is also better equipped. We were perhaps at

the same level in agricultural equipment, only perhaps a little lower, but we obviously didn't have enough knowledge and skill. It's necessary for skilled hands to be applied to technical equipment.

Another aspect of the problem is that in our country outstanding achievements by particularly highly skilled people do not become common knowledge. A great uproar is made about them and then they are forgotten. Here's an example. The American farmer Roswell Garst, whom I respected for his profound knowledge of the agricultural business, made the following proposal to me.

"Mr. Khrushchev, send two of your tractor drivers to my farm. I will teach them how to cultivate up to a hundred hectares of planted corn without using manual labor." I continue to have great respect for Mr. Garst, for his intelligence, for his practical ability, and I would even say for his honesty. People might say, "Look, in his declining years Khrushchev is eulogizing a capitalist." I am not eulogizing him, but I admire a man who knows his business. Also, Garst did not shut himself off from us, but sincerely wanted to help us and was willing to share all his experience. Such productivity of labor seemed unbelievable to us. We sent Comrade [Aleksandr Vasilyevich] Gitalov<sup>12</sup> and another specialist. They worked with Garst for one season. After he returned, Gitalov cultivated, as I recall, 120 or 140 hectares on his tractor all by himself. We began a propaganda campaign when Gitalov demonstrated his great success as a tractor driver: "We must come up to the level of Comrade Gitalov. Everyone should work as Gitalov does!" Speaking at one meeting, Gitalov himself called on everyone to work "as Comrade Gitalov does." I think he did this because of his youthful enthusiasm, but it sounded too self-promoting.<sup>13</sup> Well now, what do you think happened? Do you think all the tractor drivers cultivating corn crops began to work at his level of productivity? Nothing of the kind. The propaganda appeal remained simply that, a propaganda appeal.

A guiding administrative unit in agriculture would be precisely one that was concerned day by day with introducing new things. Its job would not be to engage in propaganda and agitation (let the party do that), but to provide material incentives for people to work well.

Here is another example. In my day the name of the tractor driver Svetlichny,<sup>14</sup> who worked near Krasnodar, frequently illuminated the pages of our newspapers. I became familiar with his work there on the spot. He and his workmate achieved incredible results in the sugar-beet fields, demonstrating for the first time in the USSR that sugar beets can also be cultivated without the use of manual labor. Svetlichny studied the sowing

process, as well as the cultivating and harvesting of sugar beets, and devised appropriate means for mechanizing these processes. He harvested approximately 430 beets per hectare. He used a planting device mounted on his tractor and then cultivated the beets with his tractor without thinning out the plants by hand. In the initial stages it's generally necessary to sort through the clusters and reduce the number of shoots, using manual labor. He would use his tractor in a lengthways and sideways direction to eliminate unwanted sugar beet shoots; then the remaining shoots were weeded out by hand, leaving the necessary number of plants in place. Later scientists developed seeds that would only produce one sprout each, and he was able then to renounce manual labor entirely. He planted these new types of seeds and then used his tractor to cultivate the clusters lengthways and sideways. Even in years of unfavorable weather the yield he obtained never went lower than 250 centners per hectare. In the process the production cost for sugar beets was sharply reduced. The amount spent was only a few kopecks.

If we grew sugar beets everywhere using the methods of Comrade Svetlichny, we would earn billions of additional rubles from sugar-beet production. I have praised him many times in my speeches and urged that his methods be used. Courses were organized for training people in those methods. And what was the result? There were some who followed his example, but only one of them achieved the same results. If Svetlichny could bring in such yields, given the same conditions and the same machinery, anyone else could have achieved the same. It all depends on selecting and training people. Here, too, an administrative body is needed that can choose people for training, not by issuing general appeals but by choosing them specifically. They would be armed with the appropriate technology and scientific knowledge about the crop and given the appropriate seeds, so that they could do their farming on a level no lower than the one already achieved by exemplary workers. But we don't have such an administrative body!

Many such examples could be cited. I recall Comrade Kavun,<sup>15</sup> chairman of a collective farm in Vinnitsa province. The farm bore the name "Twenty-Second Congress," but previously it had been named after Stalin. When Comrade Kavun brought in a buckwheat harvest of unbelievable size for our country, his name rolled like thunder across the whole Soviet Union. He ran his farm very steadily and evenly and brought in good harvests year after year. Buckwheat had a bad reputation in our country. The opinion was that it was a crop that did not submit very well to techniques of agronomy. Since ancient times peasants have sowed it at different phases of the sowing season. They would guess, or try to guess, during the spring of the year what

time would be most suitable in order to obtain a fair or at least a reasonable harvest. But year after year Kavun brought in around 23 centners per hectare [without having to guess at the best time to sow]. Buckwheat is the rice of our northern lands, and beyond that, it is an important nectar-bearing plant. Here one aspect complemented the other. The beekeepers got honey from the flowering buckwheat, while the bees helped ensure a rich buckwheat harvest by busily arranging for pollination to occur, which of course increased the harvest. In short, this crop should be widely introduced to become part of our country's food resources. Unfortunately, despite an increase in procurement prices, we weren't able to obtain decent yields of buckwheat, and we still aren't able to today. But Kavun brought in good harvests and he still does. I proposed that Kavun's method be studied and introduced at farms that had climatic conditions similar to those of Vinnitsa province. Our buckwheat-growing regions are well known. They cover the northern parts of Ukraine, plus Kursk, Oryol, and Moscow provinces and extend as far as Leningrad. In the south buckwheat did not recommend itself so highly, but even there, in the southern parts of the Russian Federation, some collective farms did obtain high yields. In Kursk province one collective farm had good yields and even began to compete with Comrade Kavun.

One of the reasons for the deplorable situation we find ourselves in is that extortionate payments are made for labor that is not real labor. No sooner had we made the transition to collective farms and state farms in the countryside than the cultivation of peas virtually came to an end in our country. It is a difficult crop to harvest. It doesn't lend itself to mechanized forms of harvesting. It needs to be cut down by hand [with a scythe]. At Kavun's farm people cut down peas in the old way, but they did it willingly because they were given the appropriate material incentives. Peas should be planted more widely. This is a crop that has great merit. Besides, it improves the soil, because the nodules in its roots accumulate nitrogen from the atmosphere. In short, it is a crop that is very useful and advantageous both as food and as a means of improving the soil. It also helps clear fields of weeds. But we didn't know how to harvest it. A fixed idea had arisen that peas could only be cut down by hand, using scythes. You can't cut it down with a harvesting machine, as you can with crops that have single stalks, such as wheat, oats, barley, and rye. Kavun came up with a principle of his own for harvesting peas, and our designers created a harvesting machine accordingly. These machines turned out to be not complicated at all. The peas, after they had been cut down, were heaped into piles and rolled along

on conveyors. I went out to visit and feasted my eyes in admiration at these harvesting machines, such a simple but original invention.

The diamonds of popular initiative glisten in every sector of the economy, including in agriculture, but they can quickly become tarnished. Who will undertake the work of spreading news and information about the experience and example of outstanding workers? Should this be expected to happen of its own accord? To publicize the work of one who has accomplished exemplary feats and to put his portrait in the newspapers and give him an award—that is not very much, because while some people may follow his example, others need to be prompted more strongly and required to do so. An energetic effort should be made to distribute widely the best technical processes, to organize people through material incentives, but also to encourage them and single out those who do best. But the main thing is to demand results, to require good performance, especially from the organizers, from the directors of the state farms, the chairmen of the collective farms, the administrative boards of the collective farms, and from the heads of the work brigades. Who should undertake this task? Regional administrative bodies for agricultural and industrial production.<sup>16</sup> What is being proposed here is not just administrative pressure, but other forms: material incentives, public encouragement, and so forth. Neither a rally nor a meeting nor a conference nor the press will help. All those things are necessary, but without a specialized [regional] administrative body, which would be concerned with specific questions, which would give assignments and check up on how they were carried out—without that, no headway will be made.

1. Mayak (meaning “Beacon”) was a popular Moscow station that offered news and music. It started broadcasting on August 1, 1964. [SK]

2. The colorful Russian phrase literally says, “Their importance is enough to make a cat weep.” [GS]

3. In 1967 the Soviet Union bought a license to produce Fiats, and over the next five years a factory for Fiat production was built in the city of Togliatti (formerly Stavropol; the city was renamed in 1964 in honor of the pro-Moscow Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti) across the Volga River from the city of Samara (then Kuibyshev). [GS/SK]

4. This is a reference to protests in 1970 by Polish workers (in Gdansk and other cities on the Baltic coast) against price rises introduced in Poland. [GS]

5. Edward Gierek and his team replaced Wladyslaw Gomulka and his group as the leadership of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP)

in 1970 in the wake of the widespread workers’ protests against price rises that Khrushchev mentions. See Biographies. [GS]

6. Jerzy Lukaszewicz was a Polish Communist political leader and an ally of Edward Gierek. In the 1970s, when Gierek was first secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, Lukaszewicz was a member of its Politburo and head of its department for the press, radio, and television. In the latter capacity Lukaszewicz took a particularly hard line against the striking shipyard workers of Gdansk in August 1980, and during the negotiations to settle the strike he was removed from the party leadership as a concession to the strikers. Like many of the discredited leaders of the 1970s, including Gierek himself, he was jailed when the Polish military under General Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law in December 1981. [GS]

7. Ignacy Loga-Sowinski. See Biographies.

8. Marian Spychalski. See Biographies.

9. At this time, Vasily Ivanovich Konotop was first secretary of the Moscow province committee of the CPSU. [MN] In March 1959 he was appointed chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Moscow province. [SS]

10. Kolomna is a town in Moscow province, about 100 kilometers southeast of Moscow. [SS]

11. On Korolyov and Yangel, see Biographies; also see the chapter below entitled "Airplanes and Missiles." [GS]

12. Aleksandr Vasilyevich Gitalov. See Biographies.

13. Someone wrote this speech for Gitalov. [SK]

14. Vladimir Andreyevich Svetlichny was a field-

team leader at the Kuban Scientific Research Institute for the Testing of Tractors and Agricultural Machines. He was an Honored Mechanizer of the RSFSR and a Hero of Socialist Labor.

15. From 1958 to 1970 Vasily Mikhailovich Kavun was chairman of the collective farm named after the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, and thereafter he was a Soviet and party official. He was a Hero of Socialist Labor. [MN] Vinnitsa province is in southwestern Ukraine. [SS]

16. This idea, which Khrushchev proposed in 1964, was abandoned after his ouster in October of that year. [SK]

## CORN — A CROP I GAVE MUCH ATTENTION TO

Unless fodder is produced, livestock cannot be fed and the provision of meat products cannot be assured. In this connection it is very important to select a basic crop. I think the Americans were absolutely right to have chosen corn at some time in their past. This crop is a powerful product of nature. All we need is to master the knowledge of how to grow it. Unfortunately, our climatic conditions are significantly different from those in the United States. Our conditions are less suitable for growing corn. But growing corn for silage [in the USSR] was our discovery (and I'm not embarrassed to use the word "discovery"). Many parts of central Russia turned out to be suitable for growing such corn. Some were nonarid zones, and others even had a fairly humid climate and were rather warm. I initiated the expansion of areas where corn was planted, and even today I advocate such expansion. Sometimes in conversations I encounter a lack of understanding or even objections on this question. I attribute this to the fact that people are arguing without knowledge of the subject. Corn [for silage] can be grown in all parts of the Soviet Union except for the most northerly regions. In some parts of central Russia soil conditions don't allow for successful cultivation of this crop.

I will present a "sketch from real life." When I meet with people and we talk about current affairs nowadays, I am often asked how I occupy my time. My answer is that in the summer I fill up the vacuum in which I now find myself after a stormy political life by working in my garden.

They ask: "And what do you grow?"

I answer: "Scallop squash."

They ask: "What in the world is that?"

I explain.

They start to ooh and ah. They hadn't heard of this kind of squash. "Do those really grow around here?"

I explain that they do grow and they grow very well. To tell the truth, I made this discovery only recently, and this is only the third time I've planted this vegetable. Before that I myself didn't know it could grow in Moscow province. I've been growing scallop squash for two years, before this year, and as a result I have a fine delicacy for my table. Scallop squash does better in the areas around Moscow than cucumbers do. But this kind of squash is not generally grown in Moscow province. The collective farms and state farms have no interest in it, and therefore it's impossible to obtain in the stores.

I remember when I was in the hospital, the doctors ran off to the lunch counter to buy some food products that were on sale there. Pickled Bulgarian scallop squash had come in. Some people bought one jar, some bought two, some three, some five. I heard some muttering that while some people got five jars, others couldn't even get one.

I was asked another question: "What else are you growing in your garden?" My answer was: "Corn." There would be various reactions to this. People would smile because they know I have the reputation of being an inveterate corn promoter, a *kukuruznik*.<sup>1</sup> And as I warm to my subject, I say: "Yes, it grows in Moscow province, but not everyone can grow it. A smart person can, but a dumbbell can't. Corn won't tolerate being treated stupidly. But it gives rich rewards to those who know how to raise it." The only plague I have to fight against is the blackbirds. These robbers love to peck the kernels of corn from the ears and pull the new shoots out of the ground with their beaks. They break off the young shoots and toss them around.

How did I come to believe in corn? For a long time I've planted corn of the American variety "Sterling" at my dacha outside Moscow. Once the plant is full-grown it provides very tasty ears of corn. I invited [I. A.] Benediktov,<sup>2</sup> the minister of agriculture, and [A. I.] Kozlov,<sup>3</sup> who was in charge of the Central Committee agriculture department, to visit me. Kozlov is an energetic and practical man. I respect him and value him, but I don't agree with him on all things. We went out into the garden to look at the corn plants, and he raised his head toward the sky. That's how high the corn was, and I saw that this sight had a powerful effect on him.

"Why, this is silage! This is splendid silage!" he said. He's an expert on animal husbandry himself, and he was immediately making estimates of



how much beef, milk, or pork you could get per hectare. Kozlov's enthusiasm served me as an inspiration, and I presented the question of raising corn to the government, although, to tell the truth, I proposed it not be done very widely at first.<sup>4</sup> I suggested that, by way of experiment, we plant corn at Usovo, a collective farm next to my dacha. It was a weak and poor collective farm, which had had its ups and downs. It didn't pay anything to its members for their workday units; it was barely surviving, hanging by a thread. I myself planted some rows of corn at that farm. The corn grew to its full height and it grew remarkably well. The next year I asked the board of the collective farm to plant corn in a field next to a livestock farm along the road. The size of that field was probably two hectares or one and a half. Again an excellent crop of corn came up. I remember we went there with members of the Central Committee Presidium during some plenary session. The chairman of the collective farm gave an effective presentation on the raising of this crop. He rode out into the cornfield on horseback, and we lost sight of him. We didn't see him again till he came out on the road. That's how high the corn was!

This collective farm became successful because of its corn crop. It got out of debt and became profitable, and its members began to receive high wages. People began coming back to the farm from the city. One day I stopped at the farm and saw a new woman collective farmer. I asked the chief milkmaid, Sidorova: "Who's the new woman on the farm?" She answered: "She came back from a factory; she's working here now, milking the cows. She's earning much more than she did at the factory." That's what was done by a corn crop. I began recommending that other farms take up the raising of corn. What can be more convincing than practical experience? Practical experience showed that high yields of corn could be obtained in Estonia, in Siberia, in Chuvashia, and in Moscow and Leningrad provinces. It's true that in Moscow province the yield was very poor in some places, but what does that tell us?—not that corn won't grow there, but that the work was done poorly.

In various parts of Moscow province, as much as 1,000 centners per hectare of silage and more were obtained, and the average harvest was between 500 and 800 centners. I remember a dairy farm, a state farm with the name Gorki-II.<sup>5</sup> Year after year the Gorki-II farm would harvest approximately 700–800 centners per hectare. It's all right even if the yield is lower, just 500 centners. The question is, "What crop in Moscow province can provide more fodder units per hectare than corn?" The growing season isn't long enough to produce mature ears of corn, although the kernels do ripen to the early, "milky-waxy" stage. But it's not the kernels of corn that we

need. We don't need this crop to make cornmeal; we need it for silage. I favor growing corn for silage because I don't see any more economical fodder crop for livestock. It's for dairy cattle above all. This corn crop means milk, beef, and hides.

After my retirement, I observed that for three years in a row that same state farm, Gorki-II, was planting the "Sterling" variety of corn. It was across the river from my residence [at Petrovo-Dalneye].<sup>6</sup> I even went there for a visit and was photographed with this corn growing in the field around me. It had grown up like a forest. And I found it pleasant that the new director of the state farm continued along the same lines. I was told that Semyonov, the former director, had died. He too was a proponent of growing corn, and the state farm set a good example in making silage out of the corn crop. During the past three years [this was dictated in 1970] I haven't seen this crop; it has disappeared. They moved the cornfield a little farther away toward the bridge that crosses the Moscow River near Ilyinskoye.<sup>7</sup> I don't know if they're going to sow the crop on the other side of the river this year. Last year they planted potatoes there. I didn't go out into the field to take a look because it was a long way around to get there. It's on the other side of the river. Besides, using binoculars, I could see that soldiers, high school students from the upper grades, and university students were being chased out there to harvest the potatoes.

A question arises: What is more advantageous economically—to sow corn in order to ultimately obtain meat products, or to plant potatoes? The state farm can't cope with the task of harvesting potatoes by itself. That is, it has to invite people who have no personal interest in the results of their work. Looking through the binoculars, I could see that for every person who was bent over working, a dozen were chewing the fat, wagging their tongues. This is quite understandable. Neither student youth nor soldiers are farm workers.

On the other hand, the corn crop was brought in by a combine for harvesting silage. It was done on time without any special expenditure of money or effort.

In summer 1966 I went to the Smolensk region to pick mushrooms—out of boredom. When you have nothing to do you want to howl like a wolf. So as not to do that, I went to pick mushrooms. Before I was retired on a pension I was never interested in mushrooms. Along the way, and it was a long trip, I saw individual fields with good corn crops, and next to them were fields of sunflowers, also intended for silage. The sunflowers grew sparsely; they looked unhealthy and stunted. This meant that there was a need for silage and the farms were looking for crops to meet this need. But

what intelligent livestock breeder, knowing the merits of corn, would raise sunflowers for silage? The reference books have the statistical data. Sunflowers are not a productive crop. In regard to this crop, no one does any special monitoring to see how much the collective-farm chairman has brought in. The main thing is to sow your crops on time and harvest them on time. No one is interested in the relative economic gain or loss per hectare. External indicators—deadlines [for sowing and harvesting]—have become the main thing for collective-farm chairmen and district leaders. They are evaluated according to whether they meet the deadlines. But what is the level of economic efficiency? What does this fodder cost? How many units of feed have been obtained? No accounting is made of that. That's why people aren't conscientious and don't have the proper attitude toward their work. And this does harm to our socialist system. Not only economically but also politically. If I were the director of a state farm or the chairman of a collective farm, I would prefer corn to this mess of sunflowers. But if I did take up sunflowers, I would at least grow a good crop of them. Sunflowers grow well in Moscow province, but they don't have much value as fodder.

Why do the collective farms and state farms grow crops that are not always economically expedient? Because management in agriculture has been left to its own devices. People may object to what I'm saying with the argument that after all this is democracy. But it would be a good thing if the local leadership understood its tasks correctly, based on economic and geographical expediency. For example, in the area around Moscow, especially in the floodplains of the rivers, it's profitable to grow vegetables, which require irrigation, but instead people are growing barley or wheat there. What can you say? A good crop of wheat is always obtained on well-watered land. And that's fine. But it's not beneficial to grow wheat in the suburbs of Moscow. It doesn't do anyone any good. This is really too much. Why is this done? Because it's less trouble. You sow wheat and you harvest it. There's no big expense. If you planted tomatoes or summer squash or scallop squash, those would require a lot of tending. They have to be picked within a day or two of ripening. But it's precisely vegetables that the population needs. You can't make a good meal without them. They can't be found in the stores, and if some are delivered, there's a long waiting line for them.

The same thing happens with corn. In general around the country today the merits of corn are being downgraded, and in regions where the growing season isn't long enough for the ears to ripen people have stopped planting it for silage.<sup>8</sup> In Kursk gubernia, where I lived as a child, corn had been grown for a very long time in kitchen gardens [not in the fields]. My grandmother

fed me stewed corn, which was considered a delicacy. A variety of corn that ripened early [and produced ears of corn with full kernels] was grown in the gardens of Moscow province after World War II. I raised the question of making corn our basic crop for silage. There is no crop that equals it in our agricultural zones in the number of units of feed produced. Experts in seed selection and plant breeding, as time goes by, will learn how to develop varieties that can mature to produce ears with full kernels. The strains of corn that are now available to Soviet agriculture are not suitable for most parts of the USSR: they ripen, but they don't dry out. Drying-out facilities are needed for the corn to reach the condition in which the dried grains can be preserved [for making cornmeal or for feeding livestock]. But what do we need that for? To provide feed for our livestock, it's sufficient to harvest 600 centners of silage per hectare and to learn how to add supplements to make it into usable silage. Corn fodder in bulk does have certain inadequacies. It doesn't have enough protein. If other crops are mixed in with it, and mineral supplements are added, and silage is made out of that mixture, then the total volume of silage that has to be used to feed livestock turns out to be less. This is a powerful lever for increasing our output in the raising of livestock for meat.

I have never hidden the fact that I was and remain an ardent patriot and advocate of this crop. It is the crop of the future. I have read in the newspapers that even now this crop is being planted and is producing high yields in Siberia and the Far East. A great many such examples may be found. A remarkable woman farmer in Uzbekistan by the name of Lyuba Li<sup>9</sup> has raised corn for silage, producing approximately 2,000 centners per hectare. I was at her collective farm and admired the crops there. I feasted my eyes on those crops. They were literally a treasure for the larder of every Soviet citizen, because this kind of corn, grown for silage, means beef; it means milk, and it means creamery butter. Lyuba's example is worthy of imitation.

Unfortunately the names of the best people working at the collective farms have gone from my memory. I do remember that in Oryol province I was shown corn grown by a young fellow who had just returned from the army [but I can't recall his name]. He was getting about 1,000 centners per hectare of green corn in bulk, with ripe ears beginning to form, adding their milky and waxy substance to the silage. In these big harvests I saw the preliminary basis for achieving abundance in milk, beef, and butter. As I recall, I visited one collective farm in either Kabardino-Balkaria or Ossetia [in the northern Caucasus] and was amazed by the corn being grown on irrigated land. Some smart alecks will comment: "Aha, using irrigated land. . . ." Yes, irrigated land. But even on such land unskilled hands may not fully utilize

the potential. That collective farm, as I recall, was also bringing in a harvest of corn silage of as much as 1,900 centners per hectare, which was close to the record set by Lyuba Li.

On one occasion I flew to Kherson province in southern Ukraine. Corn was being grown there for silage, also on irrigated land. I mention that it was grown for silage because that's the most efficient use of this crop in any climate zone. Besides silage, they brought in a grain harvest, as I recall, of 80 centners per hectare. That's an incredible quantity of grain! If we got a harvest of half that much from all the areas where corn is raised, our livestock situation would be something quite different.

What is corn actually? A foundation for raising livestock. If the planting of corn is backed up by irrigation, it's the same as building a meat factory. I was and remain a strong advocate of growing this crop wherever doing so proves advantageous. Crucial decisions here should be made with pencil, slide rule, and calculator. At one time some technical experts in animal husbandry gave me some figures converting the corn harvest into units of milk production. Corn represents an enormous quantity of milk, meat, and butter. It should be kept in mind that with a harvest of 1,200 to 1,500 centners per hectare of silage in bulk, there is an additional yield from the unripened ears of corn of a minimum of 50 centners per hectare. If all of this is processed and made into silage, it's truly a delicacy for the cattle!

With the proper organization of irrigated land and the cultivation of corn crops on them, it is necessary immediately to build a meat-processing complex nearby. Then the camel from the anecdote would indeed be able to walk freely across the length of the Soviet Union.

This crop can be used as feed for ruminants, above all for dairy and beef cattle. It can produce big economic results. But knowledge is necessary for this, along with an organization that is concerned with training people and instilling this knowledge. I am against just letting things run of their own accord. [The Russian term is *samotyok*, literally "self-flowing."] That of course is the easiest way. Something can always be written [i.e., instructions], and if you want to read what's written, you can, and if you don't want to, you don't have to. If you want to spread knowledge, you can, and if you don't want to, you don't have to. It's all up to you. In our Soviet socialist conditions this kind of method results in losses to the economy. Why? When the economy is run on a private-property basis, the lever that motivates the farmer is profit. When the farmer hears that his neighbor is doing something new, he goes over, finds out how his neighbor is getting these large harvests, and asks for some of the seed, because his neighbor is earning

more by having introduced this innovation in his work. We don't have those kinds of incentives. In our country everything is determined by "workday units." The collective farmer receives a share in kind during the distribution of what remains after part of the harvest has been delivered to the government. If you have done your share of the work, you get a share of the output, in addition to wage payments. But this reduces the producer's interest in efficient output. Of course each collective farm has its governing board, but the range of its interests is quite narrow.

Some clever commentators may ask: "Aren't you minimizing the importance of people's consciousness?" At my age I no longer give in to illusions. We need to think in concrete terms. Sometimes intelligent people are in charge of a farm, but the direction they take in their work may not correspond to the economic potential of their region, and as a result the earnings of the collective farm go down. Why? If for no other reason it's because the administrative board of the collective farm, the chairman, and the agronomist receive a set salary—that is, their earnings are assured. Of course their earnings may increase if they manage the farm more productively, but the difference turns out not to be very great. And they weigh the matter and consider whether it's worth the trouble. It's better to live quietly. Just follow the principle: "I planted, I harvested, and I made my report." Among us, no economic analysis is made of the results, no comparisons are drawn, and it ends up that all cats are gray in the dark. The only people who are singled out for distinction are those who look best on paper as far as so-called work in the fields goes.

There's one example of this kind of attitude toward work that I will never forget to the day I die. On one occasion, after I had returned [in 1949, from Ukraine] to work in Moscow province, I visited a collective farm in the Yegoryevsk district. The secretary of the party's district committee there was a former schoolteacher. I asked her to take me to the poorest collective farm. We went there. A man from the city had been promoted as chairman of the farm's administrative board, but he had no special education or training. He was just someone who had been promoted.

I asked him: "What crop is the most profitable for planting at your collective farm?"

He answered: "Oats."

Along the way I had noticed that the soil was sandy, which is not suitable for oats. I asked him further: "Do you really get a good harvest of oats in your region?"

He answered: "No, Comrade Khrushchev, the yield we get is very low, but oats are easy to harvest."

Such cynicism! This reply was being given by a Communist, a man who had been promoted to boost production at the collective farm. Unfortunately, this is not an exception among us. It's actually a fairly common thing.

How does the Soviet government contribute to getting the work done? Nearly always it interferes. In Siberia once I made a visit, together with the secretary of the party's territory committee, to a successful state farm that raised livestock. As we approached the farm, some recently harvested fields caught my attention. After I had arrived I was handed a note from workers at the farm saying that a crop of rye had been mowed from these fields just before I came. The grain had already ripened, but it was mowed for use as silage. Now there would be no grain, and it would not be worth much as silage because the plants had passed their prime.

I asked the director of the farm: "Why did you mow the rye?"

"I needed silage in bulk. We raise livestock on this farm."

I said: "But if you had mowed earlier you would have got better silage. Besides, rye is not the best crop for making silage."

This was all in vain. So I approached the question from another angle: "What crop do you consider most useful for producing silage in your conditions?"

He said: "*Mogar*."<sup>10</sup> I said: "Why? It's not a bad fodder crop, but why do you consider it better than any other?"

He said: "Actually it's not better, but if we plant other crops, for example, rye, the government takes the harvest for itself. But the government doesn't take *mogar*. It considers that just some kind of grass, and so all of it remains for the state farm."

Thus, it seems that our government doesn't contribute to work in the countryside from the standpoint of economic advantage; rather, it plays the role of extortionist. Some people will object to what I'm saying with the argument: "This is inherent in the socialist economy because profit is not its main interest." But in that case, no good will come of it all. It follows that we have to make up for this shortcoming somehow.

Lenin said that socialism was accounting—and control can be added to that.<sup>11</sup> These functions [accounting and control] must be carried out by the government and its agencies. Our great leader Lenin constantly reiterated this to us. Nowadays, in fact, there is no control, no monitoring. We do have the Commission of State Control. But it is a punitive agency. We need an agency that can supervise and manage production and monitor the economy. Regional administrative bodies in charge of agriculture should have performed that function. Unfortunately such administrative units have been eliminated. Now we have returned to the old bureaucratic system in which



there is no direct responsibility. Now we have the Ministry of Agriculture. People may say that each person should consciously fulfill his or her duty as a citizen. That is true. However, in our conditions, under our socialist government, thieves and scoundrels and murderers and people who are not conscientious about their duties—all of these exist. Therefore accounting and control are necessary, and there must be responsibility for the fulfillment of one's duties, not only economic control but also administrative, up to and including judicial [that is, the use of legal penalties].

Let me return to the subject of corn. It can result in high yields of milk for our country. Before we began using corn silage as fodder, we had on the average a milk yield per cow up to approximately 1,100 liters per year. When we switched over to corn silage mixed with other crops we began to obtain 4,000 liters at the better farms! These high milk yields simply boggled people's minds—that is, people who dealt with agriculture. Yields like that had been our dream. It was with envy that we had read and heard about such yields in Holland, Denmark, and other Western countries. Everything was blamed on the poor type of cows we had, a breed that was not considered to give a very high milk yield, as though our cows were not capable of producing high yields of milk. It's true that the breed of cow makes a difference. But even our “dear little cows,” as the women workers on the collective farms, especially women who have their own cows, affectionately call them, are also capable of performing miracles. All you have to do is feed them properly. In earlier days the peasants kept their cows half starving. In the springtime, in order to keep the cows from perishing, the straw would be taken off the roofs of the barns, and they would be fed this rotten fodder. Where could you get milk from if all you had left in the springtime was a skeleton wrapped in hide?

If we hadn't undertaken to raise crops for silage in the proper way, we wouldn't have any meat. I say “in the proper way,” because silage was being produced earlier, but there are different kinds of silage. When you travel through the fields and see how choked up with weeds they are, it becomes clear that there will not be much silage.

To give a particular example I was traveling through Nikolayev province<sup>12</sup> once. The secretary of the party's province committee there was Kirilenko.<sup>13</sup> When I met with him I asked: “Why are your cornfields so covered with weeds?”

He said: “Comrade Khrushchev, that's just corn for silage.”

People had the concept that anything would serve as silage. It's true that weeds too can be included in silage. But without careful cultivation and weeding of the corn crop you can't obtain high yields. We didn't understand

that earlier, as we should have. And it wasn't only Kirilenko; it was the agronomists as well. Much later we began to cultivate the corn grown for fodder just as we did the corn grown for grain.

Silage plays a tremendous role in livestock raising, but unfortunately corn grown for silage, a crop which until recently was "queen of the fields" [before Khrushchev's ouster], no longer holds the position it should. The problem of raising more livestock cannot be solved without solving the problem of fodder. Here again in my opinion there is no more effective fodder crop than corn. This crop should not have been abandoned. In areas where "it didn't do well," as they say—that is, where for some reason it didn't produce good harvests—people need to be educated. They literally have to be coached and "dragged along." I know that in the very same region, one collective farm will have high yields of corn and another will not. Why? Because one of those farms doesn't understand the crop and isn't doing everything necessary to produce a high yield. The soil has to be prepared, it has to be fertilized, the right seeds have to be selected, the sowing has to be done on time, and the corn plants should not be too close together. If corn grows together too thickly, it won't produce good results. And then the crop has to be weeded and cultivated on time. Nowadays there are mechanized ways of cultivating corn. You can throw the old hoe or weed chopper over the fence, as they say. The shortest path to abundance in livestock products, such as beef and milk, as I have said many times, is through corn.

While I think that someday both Soviet consumers and Soviet leaders will properly appreciate the merits of this crop, I don't deny the value of other fodder crops, including oats, vetch, and peas, which are especially necessary for adding protein. Some people are now shouting that I saw the question of fodder crops and the raising of livestock exclusively through "corn-tinted glasses." Not at all! I became a strong advocate of corn because there was no better crop, and I would swear by whatever crop would give the best results in return for labor expended. Although I gave preference to corn, I said then and I say now that we must take pencil in hand to calculate which crop will produce the best results and use that as the basis for deciding which crop to sow where and for what and in order to meet what economic needs. Such decisions should depend on economic specialization, and they should depend on the selection of crops that will be most effective in economic respects.

In some regions where it is warm and there is a lot of moisture, soybeans can compete with corn. It is a highly nutritive protein product, but it requires a great deal of moisture and warmth. When Stalin was still alive we tried sowing soybeans in Ukraine, but the yields were very low. This is a

warm climate zone, but arid. Soybeans were grown in Bessarabia.<sup>14</sup> Back before the war, when we liberated Bessarabia and made it part of the Soviet Union [in 1940], we discovered that large areas had been sown to soybeans. It turned out that the Bessarabian peasants were growing soybeans under contract to the Germans.

Bessarabia is not the most favorable region for growing soybeans. All of us hunted for a good place to grow them. They grew best in Krasnodar territory, and they also grew well in the Far East, especially in the area around Khabarovsk. But here too, the appropriate knowledge, which had not existed, was required, and the relevant land areas had to be put in proper order. There is a lot of land there [in the Far East], but it isn't productive. It has to be made suitable for cultivation. Land improvement and land reclamation measures need to be taken.

Here's another example. Some parts of Krasnodar territory have moved ahead very quickly in their yield capacity for cereal grains. Wheat crops produce 50 centners of grain per hectare there. The yield for corn crops is essentially 25 centners of grain per hectare, although of course it's possible to obtain 50 or even 70 centners. We did obtain such yields in Ukraine. Nevertheless, if I were director of a state farm or chairman of a collective farm, I would prefer wheat. Less cultivation is necessary, there are fewer worries and concerns, and you get approximately the same yield in terms of weight, but with better quality for baking bread or making flour. If the government has a surplus of grain, wheat can also be used to make mixed feed for livestock, and therefore wheat wins out in this case. Everything should be done according to the proper measure, as they say, with due respect for time and place.

I recall the following incident. Marshal Grechko<sup>15</sup> told me about a meeting with his brother who worked as the director of a state farm near Kharkov. His brother complained that the local leaders were overburdening the state farm with demands for the planting of corn. Economically it was more justified to reduce the area planted to corn and increase the area planted to wheat, which produced a harvest that was not smaller; in fact it was larger.

I was indignant. I said: "Your brother's objections are entirely justified. I would do the same in his place. I would do what good economics suggests, not what the bureaucrats recommend."

The secretary of the party's Kharkov province committee at that time was Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny.<sup>16</sup> I said to him when I met him (after asking for information to verify that Grechko's brother was correct): "Comrade Podgorny, Marshal Grechko's brother, the director of a state farm, complains that the province is overburdening him with demands for sowing corn. It

isn't possible to properly cultivate such a large area sown to corn, and as a result the yield is less. Why are you doing this? Why don't you leave it up to the collective farms and state farms themselves, according to their own calculations? Let them sow the crops that can best be justified in terms of the farm's economics."

Podgorny replied: "What are we going to feed the livestock with? After all, we need silage."

"That's true." I countered. "You don't have to convince me about corn as a silage crop. But the state-farm director is saying something different. You need to listen to what he's saying. Apparently he's being required to plant more than is needed, thus turning a good thing into a bad one."

Here's another example—taken from my home village of Kalinovka. (I acted more or less as patron of that village.)<sup>17</sup> They planted a lot of clover there, as well as hemp, and obtained a harvest of approximately 30 centners of grain per hectare of wheat. They also raised corn as a grain crop and obtained approximately 50 centners of grain per hectare, and they raised it as a fodder crop, obtaining as much as 700 centners of silage per hectare. Dairy farming was raised to a higher level on this basis. What this means is that the nature of the climate zone and the ability to choose the crop that is most expedient economically—those are the considerations that decide everything.

Unfortunately, success has not accompanied us everywhere. Moscow province provides a typical example. Some farms had great success with corn, but it's unpleasant to remember some of the other farms. When I would travel along the roads of Moscow province it made me angry to look out the car window and see fields planted with a sickly crop of corn overgrown with weeds. Corn can't tolerate too many weeds. That was the reason for the poor results those farms obtained. In such cases it's more profitable to plant a mixture of oats and vetch. On farms where people didn't know how to raise corn properly, the mixture of oats and vetch would justify itself economically. But no, one and the same demand was being imposed on everyone, destroying local initiative at its very root. I criticized Konotop.<sup>18</sup> He was a conscientious person, but he got carried away with sowing corn on as much acreage as possible—to show how devoted he was.

I told Comrade Konotop many times: "It's better to reduce the area sown to corn." The poor corn harvest at some collective farms and state farms only served to discredit corn as a crop. People might say that here I am admitting that corn is not a crop for Moscow province. Nothing of the sort. Unfortunately, under Soviet conditions, the recommendations of someone who holds a high post sometimes have results opposite to those intended.

That goes for Moscow province, too. Corn was often planted mindlessly. Just to please the boss. They were appealing to everyone in the press and over the radio to sow more of this crop for silage, and people who didn't know how to raise it properly also planted it just so they could report that they had done so. In this way they discredited corn as a crop, and above all they discredited me as a person who sincerely recommended it and believed in it. They seemed to think that they were conforming to the needs of the time, but it seemed as though no one was asking them what kind of yield they were getting from this crop. If there had been a [central or regional] production administration that could keep track of how crops were being grown according to climate zone and keep track of the economic results, people would have seen immediately when someone was not farming the crop correctly. That person would either have to be trained or convinced that this particular crop was not suitable for the region in question and that he should switch over to another economically more advantageous crop. Unfortunately, this kind of thing didn't exist. The need to give reports that sounded good prevailed over everything else. They would report that such-and-such a republic had completed its planting season, that such-and-such a province had finished its harvesting, that so-and-so many hectares had been harvested, and that the yield per combine was such-and-such.

However, no two hectares are alike! To bring in a harvest of 10 centners per hectare using a combine is one thing, while bringing in 50 centners is something else altogether. As in the old days, we remain on a low level of organization in agriculture, and we haven't freed ourselves from the notion that anyone can administer agriculture. And yet this is the most complex type of production, more complex than industry, because it has too many subdivisions subject to too many different factors. Here people are dealing with living organisms, and here man is still largely dependent on nature and the weather. Specialized knowledge is required for this type of production.

In the United States there is an administrative body that promotes new advances in agricultural science and production. This body is made up of prominent specialists, who keep track of everything new that appears and promote it. In the capitalist system of production, no one can impose anything on the individual farmer; they can only recommend and provide information. The farmer himself will turn to this organization or to some other with a request that a specialist be sent who can help apply an innovation, and the farmer pays for this consulting service.

In our country you sometimes hear a commentator on the radio, a learned agronomist (I won't name any names), but he's just "chewing his

culd,” rehashing the same old thing, promoting worn-out truisms. This kind of irresponsible balderdash isn’t worth the time spent listening to the radio. Of course if you want to listen, go ahead, and if you don’t want to, don’t. That’s what is meant by the expression *samotyok*, letting everything run of its own accord. I am categorically opposed to this way of managing the economy; I object to it with every fiber of my being. It is our consumer who suffers most of all as a result of this *samotyok*.

We need to create [central and regional] production administrations that will manage agriculture—bodies consisting of knowledgeable people who can make timely suggestions to help our peasant farmers achieve better economic results.

1. The Russian word for corn is *kukuruza*. [SS]
2. Ivan Aleksandrovich Benediktov. See Biographies.
3. Aleksei Ivanovich Kozlov. See Biographies.
4. This was in the early 1950s. [SK]
5. This farm is on Uspensky Road west of Moscow, near the government residence at Novo-Ogarevo. [SK]
6. The Russian text here reads “across the Moscow River,” but this was a mistake on Khrushchev’s part. There is another river (the Istra) that flows into the Moscow River from the north at Petrovo-Dalneye, and the cornfield was across that river from his dacha. [SK]
7. A village west of Moscow. [GS]
8. This section of the memoirs was recorded in 1970. [SK]
9. Judging by the name, an ethnic Korean. The Koreans make up quite a substantial minority in Central Asia. [SS]
10. This is a variety, or subspecies, of Italian millet (*Setaria italica mogharicum*; in Russian, *mogar*). It is raised especially for hay or silage in Ukraine, Moldavia, the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan, western Siberia, and Central Asia. A different subspecies of Italian millet (*Setaria italica maxima*; in Russian, *chumiza*) is grown in many countries, especially in Asia, as a food for human beings and a fodder crop. (Italian millet is also called foxtail millet. It is a coarse, drought-resistant, but frost-sensitive annual grass, several varieties of which are cultivated in different parts of the world.) [SK/GS]
11. One of Lenin’s first important essays after the Bolshevik revolution was “Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” written in March–April 1918, in which he placed primary emphasis on “accounting and control” as the basis for building a socialist economy. (See Lenin, *Collected Works*, 27:237–317). Khrushchev goes on to discuss the control aspect in particular. In Russian, the term *kontrol* has the connotation, aside from direct, physical control, of “monitoring; checking; verification; supervision; oversight.” [GS]
12. Nikolayev province is in southern Ukraine. [SS]
13. Andrei Pavlovich Kirilenko. See Biographies.
14. Bessarabia is the old name for the area southwest of Ukraine that corresponds roughly to present-day Moldova (Soviet Moldavia). [SS]
15. Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko. See Biographies.
16. Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny. See Biographies.
17. Kalinovka is in the far west of Kursk province in southwestern Russia. The relations between Khrushchev and his home village are discussed at greater length in Anatoly Strelyanov, “The Last Romantic,” in Appendixes to this volume. [SS]
18. At this time, Vasily Ivanovich Konotop was first secretary of the party’s Moscow province committee. In March 1959 he was appointed chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Moscow province. [SS]

## THE SHELVES IN OUR STORES ARE EMPTY

Yesterday was May 28, 1970.<sup>1</sup> I met with some people who were vacationing at a nearby resort, a *dom otdykha*.<sup>2</sup> One of these people was saying that in Ryazan<sup>3</sup> things were very difficult; there was no meat. No radio or television commentator is going to tell the reasons for the lack of meat or who is to blame for this outrage or how we are to overcome these difficulties. And of course it's not enough to talk about it on radio or television. Decisive measures need to be taken. Feed and fodder are needed. Livestock must be raised. And someone has to be concerned with all this and must supervise and manage it, but the necessary administrative bodies [both central and regional] don't exist in our country, unfortunately. There is a statistical board that draws up balance sheets and reports the results. A statistical board is an organization that turns "whichever way the wind blows." Masters at statistical manipulation sit on such a board; they can tell tall tales, really piling it on.<sup>4</sup> They can muddle up the essence of the matter in their reports in such a way that everything looks more or less decent and proper. Unfortunately, our official statistical agency works in accordance with current politics. Only when it's absolutely impossible to conceal the truth, when some sort of calamity occurs in agriculture, will that be reported. Our Soviet statistics reflect reality like a distorting mirror. The stores and our people's stomachs give better testimony than the statistical agency about the real state of affairs. When there are not enough food products and when they are of poor quality, the real state of affairs is reflected in the mood of the housewife. The people from the neighboring vacation resort, who were getting ready to return home, sighed regretfully that at the resort everything was wonderful. The food was tasty and abundant. But when they got home again, they would have to rush around to stores whose shelves were empty.

Many of the people I meet start conversations on such everyday subjects. And I don't avoid any subject. I was asked on one occasion: "What was the need for the monetary reform [the change in the nominal value of the currency, which Khrushchev explains below]? Did the government do that to conceal a rise in prices?"

This made me angry. I said: "Listen, how can you talk like that? The government had no such intention."

"Well, who made this proposal?" they continued to ask me.

I said: "What difference does it make who proposed it? The minister of finance, the late Comrade Zverev,<sup>5</sup> took the initiative. And Kosygin<sup>6</sup> was directly involved in it, my deputy in charge of the Ministry of Finance and



the State Bank. He oversaw those departments. We proceeded from the fact that the economy had grown, and we were operating with astronomical figures,” I explained. “This made the work of accountants and bookkeepers more difficult. We decided to change the value of the ruble, to increase its value by a factor of ten. So that something that had cost ten kopecks now would cost one kopeck, and something that had cost a ruble would now cost ten kopecks. All the price changes in the stores were checked so that no prices were increased as a result of this monetary reform. This is just some sort of misunderstanding.”

The people I was talking with didn’t agree. They said: “No, what are you talking about? All the prices went up.” I stood my ground. I said: “Please, matches used to cost ten kopecks and now they cost one kopeck.”

But they gave some examples of goods whose prices had changed.

I tried to sort this out. I said: “Please, you’re probably talking about goods produced after the monetary reform. New prices were set for the new products. In my day we caught many people doing this, especially in local industry.<sup>7</sup> They would change the color or make some other insignificant change and then raise the price. They were trying to increase income for local budgets. We punished local leaders for doing this. This is an abuse of power. It discredits the Soviet government. And at times outright swindling happens in the stores. Swindlers, thieves, and murderers have been inherited by our socialist society as a legacy from the capitalist system. Unfortunately, they have persisted stubbornly. The Soviet system is already more than fifty years old, but we still have drunkards and swindlers and hooligans and people who break discipline. Any increase in prices has nothing to do with the change in the nominal value of the ruble. Your arguments are incorrect.”

They disagreed with me and said: “Go into a store and you’ll see that you can’t buy carrots or parsley. You have to go to the private farmers’ market, and there you’ll find some old lady sitting and saying: ‘I don’t understand your monetary reform. Parsley used to cost ten kopecks, and if you want some, you can have it now for ten kopecks.’ In the government store [where supposedly you could get it for one kopeck] it doesn’t exist, and so the consumer still has to pay ten kopecks, which is ten times the value of the new monetary denomination.”

“Unfortunately, it’s possible that that does happen.” I agreed. “But that is a different question. It has nothing to do with the monetary reform.”

Once again I wish to connect this with the absence of specialized organization. The government doesn’t provide city dwellers with green vegetables of good quality in sufficient quantity. Thus buyers are forced to turn to private

farmers and pay prices that are no longer three times as high but ten times as high as in the government stores. But what can you do? Is it all that difficult to fill our government stores with these small items in sufficient quantity and with the necessary quality? No, it's not that difficult. It's a minor problem, but how many years have gone by without its being solved!

I remember in my childhood and youth in the Donbas, there was no problem getting vegetables in the mining towns. They were provided by Bulgarian gardeners who rented land locally and raised vegetables on it. I consider the Bulgarians the best gardeners in the world. It used to be that early in the morning a Bulgarian would come through the mining town and call out to the housewives. The women would surround his cart and buy radishes, celery, carrots, and dill for a kopeck, two kopecks, three kopecks. If someone had no money, he would give credit because he knew all his customers by sight. He made good earnings, and the people were satisfied because the goods they obtained were of decent quality.

Is it really true that we can't grow carrots, dill, celery, and parsley ourselves? Dill was a crop you simply grew offhand. I remember the farmers from my childhood would plant it among the potatoes. When they pulled out the weeds they would leave the dill standing. But now the people who want to buy dill can't do that. If they find it in the stores, it's no longer fresh dill, but a dried-up little brush. If you're going to pickle something, you can use it, although even that doesn't go well. But to add flavor to a meal, you need fresh dill. Only the private seller at the peasants' market has it. And of course the private seller "fleeces" the consumer, because he knows that you can't get this product in the government stores.

All this is just a trifle, but no one is responsible for such trifles. No one keeps track of such things. Everything is left in chaos and anarchy. Such trifles poison the mood of the housewives above all, but they also affect everyone. As I see it, this organizational shortcoming has political consequences.

Garden corn, whose ripe kernels have a milky and waxy quality, is also a splendid product. A great many people use it for food, especially Ukrainians, Moldavians, and Russians living in the south. I won't even mention Georgians and Armenians, for whom garden corn is an indispensable type of food. Stewed corn of this type can be called a delicacy. But you can't get it. Now and then we do buy corn for our family. It's brought in by private sellers, but it's field corn; it's crude, not tender like garden corn. They use it to feed hogs.

Our agronomists know that there are types of corn usable as a garden vegetable. These varieties are sweet, tender, and tasty. The ears have to be picked at the right time, when the tender, milky kernels are ripe. This kind

of corn can be grown around Moscow, as much as one would wish. I grow a certain amount for myself, and if some kind visitor drops in for lunch or dinner, he has the pleasure of making the acquaintance of our local suburban Moscow corn.

Unfortunately, you can't get it in the stores, but Muscovites would devour thousands of tons if they could. Here is a way of satisfying the market by improving the variety of food products. It's a commodity that can be circulated to attract the unused currency in people's hands, which creates a pressure on the government. Instead of this, there's a blatant rise in prices. People I meet are constantly asking questions about this. The label on the product has changed and the price has changed. Actually it's the same product, but since the price is different, they've also given it a different name, as though it were a different item. Why is this happening? People aren't willing to pay money for this new "item." Obviously there's a shortage of food products, and this is how various "possibilities" are being tried out.

In the autumn the bragging in the newspapers was simply too much. They wrote about what a huge amount of potatoes had been delivered to the state. We could now fully satisfy our needs. This was empty boasting. The person writing such an article obviously didn't himself understand what he was writing, or if he understood, he was deliberately lying. It must be known that the potatoes sold in the government stores, because of the poor storage, are of low quality, and even retired people, who receive miserly pensions, try to buy potatoes at the peasant market, where they cost two or three times more than in the government stores. A huge number of people with low wages nevertheless are forced to buy at the peasant markets.

I asked some pensioners I know: "Where do you buy potatoes?" One of them answered: "I go to the bazaar [where individual farmers and private traders sell their goods]. They have established new rules there now. The prices they sell at are no more than twice as high as the prices in the government stores. Buying from a private trader is more to your advantage because they have good potatoes, clean ones, whereas in the government stores you can buy them twice as cheaply, but you have to throw out three times as much." In my day, I required the government stores to sell potatoes that had been washed clean, and housewives could get potatoes in clean condition, as you can in other countries. For a certain time, this decision was carried out, but then everything went to pieces. It would seem that there is a simple truth here. We have to buy the pick of the potato crop from the collective farms and pay a higher price for them. In my opinion, the government should take the difference in price on its own shoulders, so as not to raise

prices for consumers. Then the potatoes would be good, and the consumer would be satisfied, and agriculture wouldn't end up being the loser. I'm talking about potatoes, but this can be applied to an even greater extent to other types of vegetables.

Last fall I met some people who told me that a lot of cabbage was left out in the fields unharvested and unshipped. These people had been planning to pickle some cabbage for the winter, but there was none in the stores. Some people will say, "Khrushchev is babbling about trifles in his old age." But trifles like these have an influence on high politics. They affect the moods and attitudes of people. If a button pops off your trousers at the wrong time, this kind of thing can ruin a person's life. A small matter can grow into a big problem. There are two possible paths for us to take in solving such problems: either to reexamine the way all products are produced [by the government], or to open the gates for private owners and private producers. That would mean taking things in a completely different direction. I met with some old friends of mine who are Polish. They live in Poland, but when they come to Moscow they drop in to see me and we talk; sometimes we argue. They say: "Your collective farms and state farms don't function well. You don't even have potatoes. In our country we don't have collective farms, but at our farmers' markets there's plenty of everything. You can buy everything at reasonable prices. The Soviet Union buys potatoes from Poland!"

I don't know if that's true, but if it is, it reflects great shame on our collective-farm system. What is the problem? Is our land worse than the land in Poland? Don't our collective-farm peasants and state-farm workers know how to raise crops? The Poles have less arable land than we do, but they export potatoes, including to the Soviet Union! Again this is a question of organization. We don't have an administrative body responsible for these matters. Everyone talks, but nobody does anything about it. The people who are concerned with supplying food to the cities should take their orders for particular types of agricultural products to the collective farms and state farms. The appropriate crops should be grown on those farms and delivered to the network of government stores. The people sitting on these administrative bodies should concern themselves with distributing these orders. That is the only way we can provide abundance on the shelves of our government stores. But the bureaucratic machine just keeps chugging and clunking along.

The most effective lever [for getting things done] is the economic one, but evidently economic incentives are not sufficient under our Soviet conditions. The salaries paid to directors of state farms, chairmen of collective farms, and agronomists don't depend very much on the earnings of the

farm. Everything is reduced, for the most part, to whether the crops have been planted on time and harvested on time [based on deadlines handed down from above, as part of the centralized economic plan]. The main concern is for the farm not to fall behind schedule. But this is a poor way of measuring economic performance. I don't know how to improve it, but we must search for a way. In each agricultural zone those crops should be grown that are most expedient for society as a whole. For example, around Moscow milk and vegetables must be provided. Thus we should evaluate how well a farm is being run based on whether it is supplying these products. Of course such evaluation should be based not only on the types of products supplied but also on other economic indicators. I think that in the Moscow region the government should pay subsidies for some vegetable crops. That would be beneficial, because then the prices wouldn't be a burden on the consumer. The quality should be good and the prices should be affordable. This would be to the government's benefit. After all, it's no accident that many capitalist countries subsidize their farmers to keep prices from rising. Managing agriculture in this way requires a specially trained leadership. Issuing general directives and orders is not good enough in this case. Each farm or type of production needs to be taken up concretely. Success depends mainly on selecting cadres and training them. The most important thing is to give people a stake in what they are doing, and then they will work. In this area administrative measures,<sup>8</sup> or as we roughly call them "police measures," won't produce results. What's needed is persistent effort. It's possible that such an effort is being made, but if you judge by the shelves in the stores, it's a very weak effort. In the press and on the radio all we hear are empty generalizations and monotonous repetition, the "chewing of the cud."

I repeat once again that a highly organized farm economy cannot help but be a specialized one, because we are talking about a socialist economy. A different mode of production, the capitalist mode, creates incentive by squeezing the last drop out of the worker. If instead of collective farms we had individual farming and private ownership of the land, kulaks [an upper layer of wealthy farmers] would immediately arise. Do you know what kind of harvests they had [in the NEP era] and how they squeezed earnings out of every square meter? People of my age know that in the outskirts of Moscow there were many prosperous kulak farms. The kulaks knew how to grow vegetables; they made good earnings, and they fed the cities. Our socialist economy doesn't have that kind of incentive. People don't have a

direct material interest in what they're doing. Consequently there should be a strong organizational principle. Social consciousness is of course an important factor, but as practice has shown, you can't get far on consciousness alone. By itself it's not enough. There are people still who respond to appeals, but they also have to be organized and given material incentives.

Today a new system of planning and of economic incentives has been introduced.<sup>9</sup> I asked some managers I met: "Please explain this to me. Reveal the secrets of this new form [of planning and incentives]. How does it express itself?" These intelligent people replied: "It's simply economic accounting."

This is not very instructive. You can't understand anything from the lectures you hear on the radio or read in newspaper articles. How does this new system work? I think that aside from a lot of noise in the newspapers this innovation actually is not producing any results.

People will ask: "What do you recommend then?"

There should be specialization in the management and organization of the work that is done in agriculture, given our socialist form of engaging in agriculture. This [specialized management and organization] is as vitally needed as air itself. In spite of all the shortcomings that we have in our socialist economy, it has demonstrated its superiority over capitalism. Therefore every effort must be exerted to make it more efficient and more economical. I attribute exceptional importance to the organizational factor. Under socialism, strictly speaking, the fundamental activity of our administrative bodies comes down to this. In privately owned capitalist society profit serves as the main driving force. We don't have private ownership, and so we have to replace profit with the intelligent organization of production, rational accounting, and rational distribution.

People will be found who consider all this mere trifles. Let these critics try to prepare soup without vegetables or seasoning. What you would end up with is a kind of broth or skilly of the kind that Russian peasants used to live on. It's made with water, potatoes, salt, and nothing else. I remember that kind of weak broth very well. The entire peasantry lived off it, along with cabbage soup. But we are living in different times today, and we have different possibilities, and therefore we should provide people with all the conveniences of life.

Some of the old-timers might say that Khrushchev is now proposing to revive the earlier practice [under Stalin] in which the government ran the collective farms. But that was a bureaucratic organization, which stripped collective-farm chairmen of all initiative. Everything, however, depends on

your point of view. Without the proper administration, and that means without estimating demand and organizing production [to meet that demand], we cannot provide the people with all necessities. Barriers can be put up against bureaucracy, but in order to do so, local initiative on the state farms and collective farms must be developed. I would think it would be necessary to have some sort of consultative body attached to the agricultural administration, a kind of council of producers of agricultural goods, consisting of workers from the state farms and collective farmers. Representatives from the state farms and collective farms should be part of this administrative body that would be in charge of agricultural production. Then it would not only be giving them orders, but would make decisions together with them. This administrative body would serve to communicate the needs of the cities, and it would be up to the collective-farm and state-farm producers to meet those needs. And as long as there's a shortage of all these trifles, without which life cannot become joyful, it would be the same as if we were to deprive young women of cosmetics, hairdressing establishments, and fashionable items for the dressing table. Their life would become very dreary, their attitude would not be good, and that would be reflected in production and in everyday life, in the life of our society. We are trying to satisfy their demands and organize production of cosmetics and toiletry articles for the ladies.

Today many things have changed. Sometimes when you watch television (and that's my main window on the world), you see such dandies that if they had appeared on the streets during the first years after the revolution, I don't know what people would have thrown at them, but first of all they would have thrown a lot of ridicule. Today the times are different. Young people like that sort of thing. And after all, the sale of commodities does follow the lead of fashion. The main thing is that we have to meet the needs of human beings. It was no accident that during the Civil War, when the top brass would ask: "Well, Red Army men, how are you feeling?" We would answer: "Go ask the cook." If the borscht he was making was good, then we would be feeling good.

So then, celery, radishes, and dill are small things—but they affect our lives. And I'm not even talking about tomatoes, lettuce, and potatoes. I'm talking about what the housewife needs and what every consumer needs.

Our country was the first to send a man into space. So the question is, "Can we grow the agricultural products that will meet the people's needs?" Of course we can! Ours is a rich land and our people know how to work. What is it that we lack? We lack proper organization. Who should be responsible for this? Government bodies above all. If we are to speak specifically about



Moscow, then the chairman of the Moscow Soviet should be responsible. The Moscow City Soviet [that is, the Moscow municipal government] should be given the orders for what is needed, and the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Moscow province should see to it that those agricultural products are provided. They should have the food grown and delivered to the stores. And it would be better if it were delivered directly to the consumers, as the Bulgarian peddlers used to do in the old days. Wagons could be driven to each city square and a signal bell rung. They say distribution is done that way in France. The trucks or wagons full of vegetables drive up, they give their signal, and the customers come out of their apartments and buy the products. It's all a question of organization. A great many different organizational forms could be found along these lines. First of all we have to think about the human being, the individual. We have all the material possibilities. The only thing we are lacking is organization and attention to the consumer.

I can't just pass over these trifles. Here's another instance: literally yesterday some people passing by told me that a woman from Voronezh had come to the local peasants' market [in the Moscow area] with a sack of radishes. Her method of transporting them was barely legal,<sup>10</sup> and the product proved to be not as fresh as it should be. The woman sold the radishes for three times the price charged in the government stores, but the people bought them willingly. Why? To say it once again, there are no radishes anywhere! And what are our organizers doing? What are the government bodies doing? Why haven't they organized the growing of radishes at the state farms and collective farms?

The same thing can be said about the importation of tomatoes. We import them from Bulgaria. The Bulgarians are the best gardeners, but the tomatoes that our consumers get are not very tasty. They know how to grow vegetables well, but the quality of tomatoes depends not so much on the variety that is grown as on where the tomato ripens—on the vine or in a railroad freight car traveling from Sofia to Moscow.<sup>11</sup>

We have greater potential for growing vegetables than Bulgaria. Spring comes early in Turkmenia, Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It's now the end of May, but they're already bringing in the harvest in those regions. They're cutting down the barley. Farms need to be organized there that will produce the food items that are needed—tomatoes, radishes, fruit, and so on.

Transportation costs are high, but we should come to the aid of our consumer. Part of the cost and maybe even the entire cost should be paid out of government funds.

As I have said, in the capitalist countries, the government pays subsidies to farmers to encourage the production of certain agricultural goods. Why can't we do the same?

Agricultural technology is being perfected, labor is being made easier for collective farmers and workers on state farms, and this makes it possible to raise the productivity of labor. Weeds don't have to be pulled out by hand now. Chemical substances [herbicides] exist for that purpose. Of course the scientists are warning us that some of them are not without danger. If food products are raised with the use of these chemicals, the chemicals will enter the organism and have a bad effect. So the use of herbicides must be approached selectively. Labor must be made easier, but we should take into account all the relevant circumstances and not poison a product with chemicals. In our country the producer and the consumer are people of the same class; they are all members of a single socialist society. It's not a capitalist society. Over there the capitalist, the producer, approaches matters from a commercial point of view. The only thing he cares about is selling his product, and what happens with it afterward is not his affair. As long as he isn't taken to court. We have a different approach. Each member of our society fulfills his or her social function and does his or her social duty. In our country the interests of the producers of agricultural goods and the interests of the consumers are one and the same. Under such conditions the productivity of labor will grow quickly in the future.

I don't know what kind of robots might be developed for use in increasing the output of agricultural products. At any rate, more difficulties would be encountered here than in the production of ordinary machinery, because we're dealing with nature and the living organism, of course. A robot is only a robot, as they say, whereas human hands and their sensitivity are needed for cultivating and harvesting such delicate products. It seems that the agricultural worker will have to be paid more out of the state budget so that the workers' material interest in the output of agricultural products will not be stifled. Procurement prices will have to be kept at a level advantageous to the producer without charging higher prices in the stores. In order not to destroy this balance and not to lower the standard of living for consumers, the government will have to subsidize the collective farms and state farms.

A great deal is said nowadays about flowers. What festive occasion can go by without them—whether a government event, a social gathering, a family get-together, or a private celebration [such as a birthday party]? People want to beautify their living spaces with flowers. Flowers are brought to birthday celebrations, funerals, and other events. It's only when a divorce happens

that you see no flowers. (Unfortunately marriages are not that stable anymore.) To get flowers people have to go to the private markets. The government flower stores have a limited variety. Consumer demand for flowers is not satisfied by the government stores, not by far.

Everyone loves a rose. But it isn't cheap. I don't know the price. I'd say offhand that one rose costs a ruble or perhaps more. I haven't been buying any but I have received roses as gifts. When someone gives you flowers it isn't polite to ask how much they cost, but I ask anyway. They're very expensive, not only roses, but other flowers as well. I don't know if it's right to call sellers of flowers speculators, although of course an element of speculation exists here, since the private merchant is taking advantage of the situation of the moment on the market. On the private market the buyer is certainly paying more than three times the price, to be sure. Georgians bring flowers, tangerines, and bay leaf to the market. The very word "Georgian" nowadays has a negative connotation, the same as "speculator." I try as often as I can to explain that it's not a question of a person's nationality but of the social conditions. It's not Georgia that is making a fortune, but individual Georgians who have adapted themselves to the conditions, engaging in speculative trade, taking advantage of the laws of the market—the law of supply and demand. When supply is lower than demand, it's possible to raise prices.

Well, why can't we organize the growing of flowers? That should also be a function of the Moscow Soviet. We need to put up greenhouses. Thirty, forty, fifty years ago we were not concerned with flowers. We were thinking about how to provide heat for residential housing. We didn't have enough firewood, coal, or home heating oil. We don't have a fuel shortage nowadays, and it's possible to organize greenhouses that would be mechanized, to grow flowers there in abundance and sell them. The price should be based on the labor input, the production cost, without any markup. Let people's lives be beautified by flowers, without the government making money from it. Without making a profit, without setting aside for the government budget some earnings from the production and sale of all types of commodities, it would be impossible to develop the economy, but exceptions can be made for some items. The growing of flowers could be organized in Georgia itself, but based on public ownership.

These are no longer the days of the Russian Civil War. We're living in different times. We can no longer justify shortages in the production of vegetables, the production of delicacies, the production of any item that is not a prime necessity. This applies to perfume and facial powder and flowers. Shortages in these areas discredit our system. They make it possible for people

to say that we oversimplify the lives of human beings and don't provide the opportunities they would have in a capitalist society. The comparison turns out to be not in our favor, not in favor of socialism, not in favor of communism. You can't prove anything by giving lectures about the superiority of the socialist system. Lectures and books aren't good enough in this case. Concrete examples are necessary. Some people make their choice on the basis of studying history and philosophy, but others study and compare what's in the stores in the Soviet Union and in the capitalist countries. This is something we can't ignore.

Can we fully satisfy people's needs today? I think we can! We can allocate greater resources for this purpose because we have now produced what we need for the defense of our country, weapons of a kind that never existed before. And so nowadays we can cut down spending in that area and allocate more resources to satisfying the needs of human beings. We have spent large amounts in building up our armed forces and equipping them with the latest weapons. This is a question of life or death for our society and our socialist system, but we can't hide behind that as an excuse for not satisfying the needs of human beings. Their everyday needs are a matter of great importance; it's the little things that embellish life. When a person is alive he or she wants to live fully and enjoy life. We don't share the views of Mao Zedong, who doesn't want to see anything except struggle and revolution. People make a revolution not for the sake of the revolution itself, but in order to live better.

We achieved victory more than fifty years ago, and our people have the right not only to desire but also to demand satisfaction of their needs. You can't put ideas in when you're making soup. The ideas of socialism and communism as worked out by Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and Vladimir Lenin are correct. But an idea is just an idea, and meanwhile people have to be fed well. The governmental system established on the basis of scientific socialism must provide for the needs of people. After all, as long as people are alive and working, they will inevitably want to satisfy their material and spiritual needs. If capitalism meets these needs better than socialism, it will be hard for us to promote our system, and we will fail. The productivity of labor makes it possible to satisfy demands. All we have to do is spend our resources intelligently. And the main thing is to properly organize production of items that people need, even if they are not basic necessities but items that beautify and embellish life. That includes flowers. Without flowers life is drab.

There is a joke about a gypsy who wanted to join the party. He was told that he could join, but there were certain conditions. “What are they?” the gypsy asked.

The answer was: “First of all, you have to work. Second, you can’t steal.” (The reputation of gypsies as thieves is well known.) “Third, you can’t drink.”

“All right,” the gypsy agreed.

“And you can’t go chasing women and girls,” the list of conditions continued.

Finally the gypsy got angry and said: “If all these things are forbidden, what am I supposed to be living for anyhow?”

I don’t want to oversimplify things, like the protagonist of this anecdote, but the question of fully satisfying human needs is very important. It is not by bread alone that life is made beautiful.

Those are all the opinions I have on this subject. Maybe I will remember something else later on; it is quite a vast subject. It is one that has always concerned me. I want people to live in the best possible conditions under socialism. When I was first working in Moscow [in the early 1930s], I felt far removed from village life, and I was completely caught up in problems of industry and the municipal economy. Without boasting, I think I can say that I knew my way around on those questions. I knew how to listen to engineers and skilled and experienced workers. I knew how to listen to scientists. It seems to me that I understood the long-term perspective and properly evaluated our possibilities. I always tried to bring engineers, designers, and scientists who were innovators into the work, so that all forms of production could be renewed and replenished and the economy could move forward.

How many talented people I met: scientists, engineers, agronomists, experts in raising livestock, and ordinary workers at collective farms and state farms. Unfortunately I also met a lot of thick-headed people. But you can’t get by without that. It takes all kinds to make a world. The world of humanity is varied and diverse—in development, in understanding, and in culture. I’m not talking about the kind of culture a person acquires at an institute or other educational establishment, but about culture in general. That is more important, because it is the common possession of a much wider circle of people, and the general level of culture is decisive in making it possible for our people to increase the pace as they develop and move forward.

With this I want to end the dictation of my memoirs in regard to the development of agriculture. I’m hardly able to stop, because in my day I was

completely absorbed in this interesting and useful work. Today [in 1971] I'm already 77 years old. When I was a young man this age seemed to me not only the outer limit but completely impossible. My fate has taken shape in such a way that this is the seventh year that I've been retired on a pension. I drag out the dreary existence of a pensioner. I'm what you might call a "free Cossack"—not employed in any way.<sup>12</sup>

The lot of a pensioner is to live out his time. This is especially difficult for someone who has been involved in turbulent social and political activity, as happened with me. I am condemned to a kind of moral suffering because the possibility of doing useful work has been denied me. Work gives a certain pleasure as a reward. A man can truly be happy only as a result of his work. But nowadays I'm just sitting on the rocks in low water; I've run aground. Mind you, I'm not complaining. Everyone's fate is like this. Regardless of the position one may hold, everyone ages, has to give things up; power is taken away, and one is forced to retire. I'm still better off than some of my contemporaries. Many of them have grown old in such a way that their mouths hang open like fish out of water, and their eyes have grown dim; their speech falters, and their memories absolutely refuse to work. I'm not going to point any fingers. This is not a groan or a complaint. I still have the opportunity of looking around and expressing my opinion about how our society could be better organized.

1. This chapter was dictated partly in 1970 and partly in 1971. [SK]

2. In the Soviet Union, a resort hotel, lodging, vacation-camp complex, or the like, called a *dom otdykha* (literally, "house of rest" or "vacation house") was a special facility, often sponsored by a trade union for its members, where ordinary people could go for an inexpensive vacation. Usually meals were provided as well as rooms, along with sports and other recreational programs. There was an entire network of these facilities, mostly sponsored by trade unions for their members and paid for out of trade-union budgets. Some of them were located in the suburbs of industrial cities or adjacent rural areas. At the time of the revolution, in 1917, and the years immediately following, a *dom otdykha* was often established when a country house, estate, school, or similar property, belonging to a noble family or other wealthy owners, was taken over and made available for use by ordinary people—and for use by Soviet government and Communist Party officials. [GS]

3. Ryazan is a city about 200 kilometers south-east of Moscow. [SS]

4. The Russian phrase *iz govna pulyu otlit* literally means "cast bullets out of shit." [GS]

5. Arseny Zverev was minister of finance. See Biographies.

6. Aleksei Kosygin was to become chairman of the Council of Ministers following Khrushchev's removal from power. See Biographies.

7. "Local industry" refers to small enterprises of minor significance to the national economy that were controlled by local government, not by central ministries or regional economic councils. [SS]

8. "Administrative measures" here refers to penalties for poor performance such as reprimand, demotion, or expulsion from the party. [SS]

9. Here Khrushchev refers to the reform of the system of economic planning and management that was undertaken after his ouster on the initiative of the prime minister, Aleksei Kosygin. Kosygin wished to simplify and rationalize economic incentives for plan fulfillment. [SS]

10. She could have been forbidden to take a sack full of radishes on the train from Voronezh to Moscow. [SK]

11. The tomatoes are picked green. They turn red (but don't actually ripen) because of a chemical added to the air in the freight car in which they are shipped. They remain hard and sour, like green tomatoes. Many tomatoes sold in U.S. supermarkets are turned red by a similar method. Ripe tomatoes

cannot of course be shipped long distances, because they will rot. [SK]

12. The original "free Cossacks" were those Cossacks who refused to enter into the employment of the tsarist (or any other) state. [SS]



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# *The Postwar Defense of the USSR*

## Structuring the Soviet Armed Forces

### STALIN'S LEGACY

I now want to dictate my memoirs about my work aimed at ensuring that our country would remain an impregnable fortress.<sup>1</sup> For the USSR this is the question of all questions. We say now that the chain of capitalist encirclement has been broken, and we are right to say that. There is no longer just one socialist country, but several. One-third of worldwide production comes from the socialist camp. This gladdens and inspires those who are sincerely fighting for socialism. But capitalism is still strong. It won't give us a chance to rest on our laurels and forget all dangers. It's still capable of baring its imperialist fangs. Therefore we can't let our attention flag where defense is concerned. This is true even now, but it was especially true at the time of Stalin's death.

Stalin kept a very close watch over the state of our defenses. I think he even exaggerated our adversary's strength and intention to unleash a war. He himself tried to probe the capitalist world with the bayonet. By this I am referring first of all to the blockade of West Berlin, which forced us to realize that we could not expect success by resorting to such measures. Stalin had to retreat and agree to negotiate. When he tried to blockade West Berlin, he did it without assessing our real possibilities. He didn't think the problem through well. I don't know who his advisers might have been. I was already a member of the Politburo, but we didn't discuss the matter there. I don't know who Stalin might have discussed it with, but if he did, I think it would have been only with Molotov, no one else. Voroshilov played no political role at that time whatsoever.

Then there was the war in Korea. The North Koreans started it, with Kim Il Sung taking the initiative, but Stalin supported him, as did Mao Zedong. It was an action agreed to by all of them. In this matter, if I am to speak about myself, I would also have agreed with Kim Il Sung, but Kim overestimated his possibilities. He thought all he had to do was give a shove, and

the internal forces within South Korea would do the rest. Of course the South Korean army proved to be the weaker one, and it was crushed, but the Americans intervened in the war and forced the North Koreans to retreat, which meant Stalin was forced to retreat. He behaved in a cowardly manner and refused to provide decisive aid to North Korea. He said: "Well, what of it? We didn't send our troops in there, and so now the Americans will be our neighbors on our Far Eastern border, that's all." It was only intervention by China that saved North Korea. That was our second big military setback after the Great Patriotic War.

That was the kind of legacy we inherited. Stalin was keeping his head down at that time; he was afraid of America. I remember one night when we were sitting at Stalin's dacha, as always. He was influenced by reports not known to the Central Committee, and he suddenly sounded the alarm. He said that war clouds were gathering over Bulgaria, that the Americans were getting ready to attack it, using the Turks as intermediaries, and he immediately dictated an order for the Bulgarian leadership to come to Moscow. The Bulgarian leader Chervenkov<sup>2</sup> arrived along with his minister of defense, Lukanov,<sup>3</sup> a veteran Communist, who took part in the antifascist war in Spain, a fighting man who had been tempered in battle. Stalin personally gave them orders on how to strengthen the Bulgarian borders. What this came down to was that they were to dig antitank trenches and put up earthworks. He dictated very elementary measures that the Bulgarians could have carried out without his instructions. Stalin considered it a prewar situation and created an intensely overheated political atmosphere accordingly.

In contrast, the events of February 1948 in Czechoslovakia, when the working class came to power, frightened Britain, France, and the United States. West Germany at that time had no influence on world politics, being an occupied country subject to the dictates of the occupiers, who were pursuing an aggressive policy. Their reconnaissance planes flew almost uninterruptedly over East Germany and Czechoslovakia, especially in the border areas. Such flights continued even after Stalin's death. Then they began to fly over the territory of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, violating our borders along the Black Sea coast and other seacoasts, and strengthening their positions in Turkey, because under Stalin the USSR had ruined its relations with Turkey by making claims to its territory.<sup>4</sup> Beria egged Stalin on over the Turkish question. He proposed that we officially approach Turkey and present our territorial claims. This policy drove the Turks into the arms of the United States. American spies began operating right along the border of Soviet Transcaucasia. They used one expedition, which was

supposedly hunting for traces of Noah's Ark, to reconnoiter the approaches to Armenia around Mount Ararat.<sup>5</sup> That was the kind of situation that had taken shape, which Stalin, especially after the defeat in Korea, evaluated as a prewar situation.

In addition, the United States got Iran to do its bidding. U.S. bases were also established there. Iran feared us no less than Turkey because Stalin had taken measures to destabilize Iranian Azerbaijan. (More Azerbaijanis lived in Iran than in Soviet Azerbaijan. Stalin's aim was that southern Azerbaijan, which did not belong to us, would somehow be united with the northern, Soviet, part of Azerbaijan.)<sup>6</sup> From Iranian airfields American planes could hit the USSR at any time. The United States also penetrated Afghanistan and Pakistan. They had supremacy on the seas with their navy—their submarine fleet as well as their surface fleet. The most powerful battleships then were the aircraft carriers. It was the Yankee aircraft carriers that had smashed the Japanese in the Pacific. Besides trying to intimidate us on land and sea and in the air, the United States also put economic pressure on the Soviet Union. They demanded that we repay them for lend-lease aid. They refused to trade with us themselves and wouldn't allow others to do so.

All of this frightened Stalin more than ever. I think he was correct to force the pace of our atomic-bomb program. And we produced an atomic bomb. The Politburo member who had overall charge of this project was Beria, and its immediate director was Vannikov.<sup>7</sup> His Ministry [of Medium Machine Building] handled all matters concerning atomic energy. Our scientists successfully coped with the challenge of producing atomic bombs. In addition, we received some assistance through our foreign-intelligence network. Soviet intelligence got in touch with foreign scientists who sympathized with us and decided to give us assistance, with the aim of creating a counter to the United States, which was gradually becoming the gendarme of the world.

That does not diminish the merits and achievements of our country and our scientists. But the aid given to us by our friends cannot be left out of account. For the time being I will not name them. But those friends are known to most people who followed the events of that time. They suffered a great deal and underwent punishment, but may a favorable memory of those people remain after them. May our gratitude toward them become that favorable memory. They did not spare their own lives in providing aid to the Soviet Union.

We had produced an atomic bomb. But we couldn't conclude that now we were on an even footing even with the United States, as though we both had grabbed God by the beard—the United States on one side and the Soviet

Union on the other—and were holding on for dear life. No, not at all! We didn't have any real way to deliver the bomb. Our bombers were a sorry sight. They were much weaker than those of the United States, which had virtually invulnerable flying fortresses. They flew great distances and were able to bomb not only at night but also during the day. We, unfortunately, didn't have such bombers. And as for the number of atom bombs, there was nothing to be said about that. The Americans already had the atom bomb in 1945; we didn't have it until 1949. This disparity of five years was not huge in the sense of how long it took us to master the secret of producing such a bomb, but it was an enormous amount of time in the sense that it allowed the United States to accumulate a large number of these bombs. We had only exploded one atom bomb, and we had exploded it on the ground, not in the air. It was only a model [a first try]. But the United States had exploded two bombs in the sky over two Japanese cities and had accumulated a hundred or perhaps several hundred atom bombs since then. That is why a direct military conflict, an open war with the Americans, promised nothing good.

Our army was no weaker than the Americans', and its morale was high. But high morale dissipates quickly without good weapons. And so the situation had to be evaluated soberly. Stalin drew his conclusions. He evidently weighed the balance of forces correctly, but he feared a war with America to the point of cowardice. That's why he was in such a hurry to produce an atom bomb, which we did by tightening our belts to an extreme degree. Otherwise we simply would not have survived. We would have been forced to submit to the dictates of the reactionary forces in the West, the United States in particular. So those expenditures were justified.

But why did Stalin decide to give the navy high priority? Building up the navy required very heavy spending and exhausted our country. He chose the wrong direction for the investment of our material resources in defense. He chose a type of armed power that was not the most important for our country. This reduced our ability to develop other types of weapons, in which we had traditionally been strong and which were more reliable and necessary for us. As Stalin saw it, our main adversaries would be America and Britain, and they were naval powers. Without a surface fleet we would not be able to fight them. Evidently that's the kind of conclusion Stalin came to. He didn't say anything to us about it; he was a very closed-off person. He kept everything locked up inside himself. He would pump someone for information, extract what he needed from this one or that one, and draw his own conclusions. Stalin set the goal of building a surface fleet, first of all, a large number of cruisers. He didn't talk about building aircraft carriers at that time. I don't

know why. By that time a navy without aircraft carriers didn't count for much. Apparently aircraft carriers were beyond our technological capabilities then, the main problem being that we didn't have sufficient funds. Stalin decided to build cruisers, destroyers, and a certain number of submarines. The program he outlined was quite extensive in terms of the resources we had at that time.

In those days he often repeated some words attributed to Tsar Peter I (Peter the Great). I don't know if Peter the Great really said this or whether these words were put in his mouth by the director of the film *Peter I*: "A land army is a sword in one hand. A navy is a sword in the other. We have to defend ourselves with both hands." It was something like that; I don't remember exactly.<sup>8</sup> To pursue the policy of building a surface fleet meant to drain our country's resources to no good purpose. There was no justification for it. It didn't increase our military power. The types of vessels we built were outdated. Even during World War II they hadn't displayed any military effectiveness. At the same time America had waged its naval war on quite a different level of technology, using aircraft carriers mainly, with their submarine fleet as an auxiliary force.

Intensive training of cadres for the navy began. University graduates or students in the upper grades were called up to serve in the navy. They were sent to naval academies and training schools. Specialists of all categories needed for the navy were trained. Our naval leaders argued that without a powerful navy we wouldn't be able to stand up to the United States in a future war. I didn't have any specific information about the measures being taken along those lines at the time, even though I was a member of the Politburo. Nor did I take the risk of asking questions on this subject. Stalin kept such matters to himself. The condition of the armed forces was not something he allowed most of the people in his inner circle to be involved with. He considered himself to have exclusive privileges in this realm, and any interest shown by one of us in some type of armament aroused his suspicion. Stalin was quite capable of considering any of us an enemy agent and declaring that we had been recruited by the imperialists,

Toward the end of his life, surveillance and wire-tapping flourished. There was a proliferation of millions of secret agents. One agent would spy on another; everyone informed on everyone. It was all recorded in official documents. These were all mouths that had to be fed. These people had to be paid. Once an agent existed, he had to justify his official title. He would submit denunciations, and on the basis of these people were arrested and imprisoned. The prisons were jammed full. In recalling those days now on

June 1, 1971, I am forced to honestly state that with Stalin's death we inherited a painful and burdensome legacy. The country was ruined and exhausted. The leadership of the country that had taken shape under Stalin, if I may put it this way, was not a good one. A group of highly disparate people had been lumped together. There was Molotov, a man incapable of innovation, and Beria, who was dangerous to everyone, and Malenkov, a rolling stone [a man of no substance], and Kaganovich, who blindly did Stalin's bidding, no matter what. There were 10 million people in the prison camps, and the jails were overflowing. There was even a special jail for active party members, which was established by Malenkov on Stalin's special orders. There was not a glimmer of light or hope in the international situation; the Cold War was going on at full tilt. The burden on the Soviet people, because of the priority placed on military production, was unbelievable.

Our aircraft also didn't correspond to the new tasks of the day. We didn't have any strategic bombers. The Americans had the B-29, the best airplane of World War II. We copied it and came up with the TU-4. But that was already an obsolete model, and the Americans had moved much further ahead. It's true that we had begun production of jet fighters, the MIG-9 and MIG-15, as well as the LA-15, and a lightweight front-line bomber, the IL-28.<sup>9</sup> But these were used for defense. We had no way of making long-range air strikes, no planes that could threaten the territory of the United States. We couldn't even really threaten the hostile bases located around the borders of the Soviet Union. The Korean War showed that the MIG-15 was not as fast as the American jet fighter. Our people, exhausted by the war and hungry, needed to be fed and clothed, to have their day-to-day needs met. Unfortunately, the industrial potential of the USSR was less than America's, and after all, that is the main thing in war. Modern warfare is a war of motors, electronic technology, and the minds of scientists. It depends on who can produce new types of weapons better and faster. For the time being we had to yield to our adversary's greater potential.

Stalin was trembling, he was frightened, and therefore he kept the country in a state of military preparedness. Outside Moscow 100-millimeter anti-aircraft guns were stationed. We had bought these guns before the war from the Skoda firm in Czechoslovakia. The caliber of these guns back then was 85 millimeters. A very good weapon, it proved itself as an anti-tank gun as well as an anti-aircraft gun. Then our designers enlarged it to 100 millimeters. The gun was also mounted on large tanks. Moscow was ringed by these guns. People were on duty making artillery calculations around the clock, and the guns



had live ammunition. It was a state of full military alert. That was the situation in our country at the time of Stalin's death.

The leading military cadres, who were gathered then around Bulganin,<sup>10</sup> the minister of the armed forces, did not understand everything as they should have. For all practical purposes Bulganin was not a military man. Stalin had simply awarded him the title of marshal—I don't know what for. Bulganin didn't inspire me, for example, with any confidence in his ability in that post, but Stalin intended him to hold the post of head of government in the future. (This is somewhat of a digression from my main topic.) I remember Stalin thinking out loud about this problem in our presence. He said: "Who will be appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR after me? Beria? No, he's not a Russian, but a Georgian. Khrushchev? No, he's a worker; someone more from the intelligentsia is needed. Malenkov? No, the only thing he knows is how to do someone else's bidding. Kaganovich? No, he's not a Russian, but a Jew. Molotov? No, he's already too old; he wouldn't be up to it. Voroshilov? No, he's old and weak, not up to scale (*po masshtabu slab*). Saburov? Pervukhin?"<sup>11</sup> They're only suitable for secondary roles. The only one left is Bulganin." Naturally no one intervened as he thought out loud like that. Everyone kept quiet, but each of us felt in his heart that this was not the best choice. No one had even thought such a thing could happen. Later, after Malenkov, Bulganin was chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers for a short time. His appointment proved that he was not suitable for such a post, although personally Bulganin was unquestionably a devoted party member and an honest man. He simply was not prepared for such a job and proved not to be up to it in moral respects.<sup>12</sup>

Meanwhile our country had reached the limit of its endurance because of the unending capital investments in defense. Our military industry had expanded greatly in depth and extent. The army, with its huge numbers of people, was a heavy weight on the budget. It cost us enormous material resources. Vast human resources were diverted, which might have been used to develop a peacetime economy. In the West they could see this, and they ratcheted up the arms race even more intensively, so that the "racehorse" of the Soviet economy would not be able to keep up the pace and would collapse of its own accord. The West was also hoping to arouse discontent among our people, which would lead to internal weakening of the socialist system. They devoted all their efforts toward the aim of breaking the Soviet Union away from socialism, if possible, and putting Russia back on the track of capitalism.

We were in a very “shaky” condition for a while. The party essentially had lost its ability to function, and besides, we couldn’t count on the sympathies of the people as much as we would have liked. We had to find new ways on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist policy. It had to be a Marxist-Leninist policy precisely in order to free ourselves from the encrustations and distortions of Stalinism. We needed to shine the light back again on the ideas of Lenin.

We were troubled above all by the army. Complications were piling up from two different directions. By force of necessity, the army kept growing larger. In East Germany alone, in that extreme forward position of the socialist world, we had about a million people in the service. Later, when we reduced the size of our armed forces we brought the number in East Germany down to half a million. We didn’t dare risk reducing the numbers further, because of the presence of American, British, and French troops in West Germany.

In general, in the period immediately after Stalin’s death we didn’t get into military matters right away. We couldn’t really deal with them as yet. We were up to our ears in worries about the domestic situation. We were concerned above all about the condition of agriculture. We didn’t have enough bread and meat, and simply no butter at all. Also, we couldn’t ignore the development of industry. After all, without the further industrialization of the country we would be dooming ourselves to backwardness both economically and militarily. Fortunately, the working people of the Soviet Union understood the situation and supported the domestic and foreign policies of the CPSU.

1. This part of the memoirs was recorded in June and July 1971.

2. Vylko Velov Chervenkov was chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria from February 1950 to April 1956.

3. Chervenkov’s minister of defense was in fact Petyr Panchevski, who occupied the position from 1950 to 1958. Khrushchev must be confusing him with Karlo Todorov Lukanov, who was Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs from 1956 to 1962. [SS]

4. In late 1945, Stalin proposed to Turkey that the Black Sea Straits be placed under joint Soviet-Turkish administration. He also laid claim to the Turkish districts of Ardahan and Kars, which had belonged to tsarist Russia between 1878 and 1917. [SS]

5. Mount Ararat, which is situated in Turkish Armenia, is a symbol of special spiritual significance to the Armenians. According to legend, Noah’s Ark landed on top of Mount Ararat after the flood. [SS]

6. According to data for 1959, about three million Azerbaijanis were living in the Azerbaijan SSR and about four million in Iran.

7. Boris Lvovich Vannikov. See Biographies.

8. The film *Peter I* was based on the novel of the same name by the Soviet writer Aleksei Nikolayevich Tolstoy (1882/83–1945). Stalin personally ordered the novel to be written (in the 1930s) and the film produced. In the same way he ordered the film director Sergei Eisenstein to make the movie *Ivan the Terrible* (Part I appearing in 1944 to official Soviet acclaim). Stalin wanted both these tsars of old Russia, Peter I and Ivan IV, who had greatly strengthened the Russian state and expanded its domains, to be portrayed as national heroes and, in a sense, as forerunners of Stalin himself. [SK/GS]

9. The initials in these planes’ names came from the aircraft designers. The “MI” in “MIG” came from (Artyom) Mikoyan, and the final “G” from his colleague (M. I.) Gurevich. “TU” came from Tupolev, “LA” from Lavochkin, “IL” from

Ilyushin, and “MI” from Mil. For more on these men, see Biographies. [SK]

10. Nikolai Bulganin was minister of the armed forces of the USSR from 1947 to 1949. See Biographies.

11. Maksim Zakharovich Saburov, Mikhail Georgiyevich Pervukhin. See Biographies.

12. Bulganin drank a lot and had countless love affairs. [SK]

## THE SOVIET NAVY

My first real involvement in military affairs dates from 1954, when on my return from a trip to China [in October], our delegation stopped to visit Vladivostok.<sup>1</sup> Along the way we had visited Port Arthur.<sup>2</sup> We were simply drawn to Port Arthur. Perhaps something of a philistine note was struck here. At one time back in our childhood, we had heard so much about the war with Japan [in 1904–5], the loss of Port Arthur to the Japanese, and the resistance put up by our troops. Of course we wanted to see the place with our own eyes. We told Mao Zedong about our desire to visit Port Arthur and Mao immediately agreed. Port Arthur made an impression on me that was not at all like the one I had formed on the basis of literature I had read. I didn’t see any special fortifications there. Maybe the times had changed and the fortifications had lost their significance. I don’t know. I felt somewhat disillusioned. Of course we took a look at the bay at Port Arthur where the Russian fleet had been destroyed during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. It was called Far Eastern Naval Squadron No. 1. Japanese destroyers [in February 1904] made a surprise breakthrough into the outer harbor of Port Arthur and sank the Russian fleet. The mooring of our ships at Port Arthur was entirely in keeping with standard practice at the beginning of the century, and it was entirely possible to defend the entrances to the harbor. And so the defeat was the result of lack of preparedness, people standing around gaping. A military engineer and naval leader of major stature, Makarov, perished in that battle.<sup>3</sup>

As I recall, we arrived at Port Arthur by train. We wanted to see as much of Port Arthur as possible, if only from the windows of a railroad car. We traveled part of the way by car, then took seats in a train, then got out, and again rode by car. And we kept stopping along the way. In short, we wanted to get as much of an impression of Manchuria as we could.

After that we arrived in Vladivostok. We wanted to familiarize ourselves with the condition of our Pacific Fleet<sup>4</sup> and hear what the commander of the Far Eastern Military District had to say about the defense preparedness of Vladivostok, in case military operations might break out there some day. Malinovsky was commander of the Far Eastern district at that time. We put in a call to Moscow so that Admiral [N. G.] Kuznetsov,<sup>5</sup> the deputy minister of defense of the USSR, would also come to Vladivostok. He had been restored to favor after being in disgrace. He had been punished by Stalin and reduced in rank. We considered that unjust. Kuznetsov had suffered because of Stalin's arbitrariness. Kuznetsov proposed a program of inspection for us and prepared some small-scale military exercises at sea. We rode out to a specific area on the cruiser *Kalinin* and watched a naval battle take its course, with submarines and torpedo boats participating, along with coastal defense forces. We didn't go far out into the ocean, but cruised along the coast. This was the first time I had seen what a naval battle actually looked like. The "Blues" (the opponent side) attacked our cruiser. At first we were attacked by submarines, whose positions we supposedly didn't know. Evidently the commander of the cruiser really didn't know, but Kuznetsov knew, because he himself had approved the plan of battle. The submarines fired off their torpedoes. They missed the target, except for one, which "hit" our cruiser and "sank" us. Then the torpedo boats attacked us. The impression they made on me was rather depressing: there was a lot of smoke and a lot of noise, but none of the torpedoes hit its target, although the attack was carried out from a close distance. In a real battle the torpedo boats would have suffered greater losses. The naval officers were, however, in ecstasy over the "success" of these exercises. Toward the end we sailed past a cruiser lying on its side, left over from the war (or from a storm), and we fired at it. Evidently we hit it, but the operation didn't make a very big impression on me.

Military exercises had gone better at Port Arthur, where they had given us a demonstration of firing [by coastal artillery]. The guns of the fortress had fired at floating targets. We watched through binoculars and saw the shells hitting their targets.

In principle I had no doubt that our naval personnel had good skills and had mastered their weapons. The main thing was that the weapons should be up to date. In general there was an air of antiquity about this whole operation. By that time I had already seen a film about tests of the "Comet," a type of cruise missile. These missiles, fired from an airplane, flew toward their targets, which were ships of our Black Sea fleet; they hit their targets exactly and made

a very strong impression on us, especially the force of their explosions. The target was sunk by the very first missile. Evidently something hadn't been foreseen correctly, and the target—an old cruiser—actually sank. Now when they were firing from cannon and launching torpedoes, I understood the total inadequacy of these older types of weapons, although I give them whatever credit was due. Planes armed with missiles, on the other hand, could operate at sea and protect our coastline better than artillery could—they were something else altogether.

We drew our own conclusions also from inspecting the location where naval vessels were moored at Vladivostok, in the Golden Horn Bay. People in Vladivostok still had the impression that this harbor was an ideal mooring place for naval vessels, or for any kind of vessel, because it was well protected from storms.

Right there and then I said to the military comrades, to Malinovsky,<sup>6</sup> Bulganin (who was there with us), and Kuznetsov: "It's absolutely impermissible to keep naval vessels here in this harbor now, although it's a suitable harbor for nonmilitary purposes. In earlier times the navy didn't have the kind of dangerous adversary that modern aircraft represent. It used to be easy to defend such a harbor against an enemy. Today, however, it's indefensible from the air and, in fact, would turn into a trap for the vessels harbored here. They could expect no better fate than Pearl Harbor.<sup>7</sup> These ships must be removed from here immediately and a mooring found for them somewhere on the islands, so that the ships will have room for maneuver, because right here they're trapped. They couldn't escape from this harbor if a war suddenly began."

We made a trip to the islands off the coast. We watched some more military maneuvers and firing by the coastal defense forces. We liked the people a lot. The young people knew what they were doing and their aim was good. As for where the fleet would be based, the plan was to remove it from Vladivostok and station it somewhere else. The choice was left to Kuznetsov. The ships began to get ready to relocate. This required a lot of work to ensure proper anchorage and mooring at the new location and to fix up suitable housing. Major expenses were also required, but they were necessary. It was unthinkable to try to defend Vladivostok in the old-fashioned way. At this point Admiral Kuznetsov first began to lose some of his authority in my eyes, because he had somehow failed to grasp the requirements of the new age we were living in, although he was not yet an old man. Before that Kuznetsov stood very high in our estimation, but when we saw such miscalculations, which were

evident even to us civilians—and he too agreed with our critical observations—[we concluded that] he was looking at things from the standpoint of an earlier time, which was now obsolete.

From Vladivostok we went to Nikolayevsk, where the Amur River flows into the Pacific. A proposal had been made to build a naval shipyard here. Doubts began to form in my mind. In Nikolayevsk? In such a more or less uninhabited region? To place a shipyard there that during a war could easily be put out of commission? It would be hard to defend. Besides, large capital investments would be needed, and a railroad would have to be built to reach the location. Materials and metal had already been shipped to Nikolayevsk for construction. Stalin had already made the decision to build this new shipyard. After discussing the details of the project, we decided it would be better to build the new ships we needed in a more inhabited place.

From there we set out in a destroyer for southern Sakhalin, crossing a very stormy sea. It was a bad storm; the ship was tossing heavily, and one sailor was even swept overboard by a wave. I can withstand rough seas fairly well and my reaction to these carryings-on by the king of the sea was fairly calm. The city of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk pleased me with its warm and gentle sunshine, although they told us this was sheer coincidence. We inspected the base of the fishing fleet. It was in deplorable condition. We didn't have the capacity to process the catch out at sea. Everything was brought ashore, unloaded, and sent to be processed there. In the meantime, the fish had spoiled and were thrown back into the sea or fed to hogs. The meat of those hogs later smelled strongly of fish. All the roads and approaches to the harbor were terrible. We barely made it through in our vehicles. And the equipment there was inadequate. But who was to blame? Our reach didn't extend as far as Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, because our country remained still very deeply wounded as a result of the war.

We also reviewed the troops of the Far Eastern Military District. We stayed with General Trufanov, head of the department for combat training and physical fitness, a man I knew well from the battle of Stalingrad.<sup>8</sup> From there we went to an agricultural research station at the district center. We were interested in how local agricultural production could be organized better to provide items that we currently had to ship to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk; we were especially interested in the possibility of growing potatoes. Potatoes and vegetables were then being shipped to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk from the continent, even though the natural conditions on Sakhalin Island were excellent. Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk seemed to me similar to Ukraine: the sun was bright, the soil was fertile, and the place was rich in local vegetation growing

wild. You only had to set your hand to it, bring in some people, provide them with material incentives that would give them an interest in the work, and then life on Sakhalin would be no worse than in many other parts of the Soviet Union. We returned to Vladivostok by plane. Mikoyan<sup>9</sup> remained in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. The problems of trade and commerce were under his jurisdiction at that time, and he said: "I want to look into things a little more here to see what can be done and how to do it—to better provide the population with food." On the whole our visit to the Far East prompted the thought that the defense of our country was not entirely in the condition we would like. We needed to think about improving the defense capability of the USSR. At the same time the confidence the leadership had had in Admiral Kuznetsov changed abruptly. As it turned out, we reevaluated him. Certain apprehensions arose in my mind, and after a little while they grew and finally undermined our confidence in the admiral, especially since the question had arisen of creating a defense system on an entirely new level.

A little while later, in summer 1955, Kuznetsov submitted a memorandum to the Central Committee with specific proposals for a continued buildup of the navy. The sum required came to 110–130 billion rubles over a ten-year period. For those days this was a colossal sum. We had to give this a good thinking over, so as to decide the question without making mistakes. At that time our shipbuilding industry had in fact stopped producing commercial cargo vessels. Stalin had shifted it over to forced-pace production of military vessels, mainly cruisers, destroyers, and battleships (dreadnoughts). A certain number of submarines were also being built, but the concentration was mainly on the surface fleet, on vessels armed with artillery.

The memorandum was distributed to the appropriate recipients, and we brought up the question at the Central Committee Presidium. We invited Kuznetsov and other military men to attend. Continued production of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines was being proposed. I don't remember if there was a proposal to build aircraft carriers. Cruisers constituted the main type of ship to be produced, and in general preference was being given to the surface fleet, as I have said. We tossed some remarks back and forth, but hadn't begun to discuss the subject in detail, when I proposed: "Let's not decide this question today. Let's table it to our next session (we were meeting once a week), so that the members of the Presidium can acquaint themselves with the proposal more fully." Since this was such a major question, other questions were put off until even later. After leaving my office I went down the corridor, hoping to meet others who had come to the session. Those who had been invited usually gathered at the other end of the building.



Kuznetsov came out of a meeting room. He was heading in the same direction, and we walked along, side by side. At that time my attitude toward Kuznetsov was still one of great confidence. Not long before that, he had been cleared of all charges against him on my initiative.

He behaved very irritably and addressed me with a rather rude remark: "How long is this attitude toward the navy going to continue?"

I said to him: "I don't understand. I consider our attitude a good one."

"Why hasn't the question been decided?"

"We haven't rejected it; we've merely postponed consideration. We want to study the proposal more closely to arrive at a correct decision."

He began making harsh remarks in an excited manner. Then we parted. We got into separate cars and headed off, each going about his own business. But I was troubled by the high-strung, irritable state he was in and by what I would call his dictatorial approach to the matter. Apparently he thought that whatever he considered to be true should be accepted in advance. Was there really nothing to discuss? Was the only option for the leadership to simply approve what he proposed? That would be absolutely impermissible. An encroachment on the rights of the government and the powers of the Central Committee Presidium was evident here. Nevertheless, before I got into my car I said to him: "Be patient for a week. We're going to discuss the question in detail again; we'll get down to the heart of the matter and sort it all out."

A week later, at the next session, we returned to this question. The way Kuznetsov had posed the question seemed to me incorrect. The overall problems of the defense of our country were not dealt with, but on the other hand the expenditure of colossal resources was being demanded. I addressed the admiral: "Comrade Kuznetsov, let's look beyond the current situation for the moment. If we were able to present you today with all the ships you are asking for, what position would the USSR hold in terms of naval power compared to our probable adversaries? In comparison, for example, with the United States and Britain? Could we stand up to their combined forces at sea?"

"No," he answered, "our forces would be substantially inferior to theirs." He answered honestly.

I asked him: "Then what is the purpose of spending all these resources? Ten years from now you will have all the ships you've ordered, but even if we had them now, our navy would be weaker than the navies of our potential adversaries. And ten years from now that means we'd be even weaker. After all, the United States and Britain are expanding their navies, and they have greater potential than we have in both materials and money. As a result we'll

be wasting our resources and we won't be solving the problem of the defense of our country."

Everyone began expressing his opinion in turn. When the time came to bring the discussion to an end, the leadership concluded that the proposed direction of development was incorrect. We needed to overcome our relative backwardness in a very short time. The USSR was surrounded by U.S. military bases, and U.S. bombers could reach all parts of our territory. Our adversary had supremacy over us in both the quantity and quality of his weaponry. For us the navy was not decisive, unlike the case of Britain. It's an island country, and without a navy it can't defend itself or launch an attack. It's entirely dependent on importing raw materials from elsewhere, and it has to ensure its maritime lines of communication. As for the United States, without a surface fleet it couldn't maintain its troops on the European continent. Human resources, ammunition, food supplies, and so on had to be shipped there. So for the United States a navy was vital. They had built a mighty transport fleet. During the war they had even leased cargo ships to us under the lend-lease program. Then [after the war] they took their ships back from us and sank them right in front of our eyes. It was a bitter thing to watch because we had such great need for every available freighter, but to them the ships were unnecessary. They sank them in front of their allies' eyes, the allies who had suffered the biggest losses in defeating fascist Germany! Their actions deeply offended our sensibilities. But there was nothing we could do. The ships were their property, and they could dispose of them as they wished. And that's how they did dispose of them.

I have digressed. When it came time to draw the balance sheet on our discussion I proposed for a second time: "Let's postpone the decision again regarding the buildup of the navy and think about it some more. Evidently the thing we need to decide first of all is the problem of our air force, of producing planes that will be equal to those of our likely adversary." At that time we weren't really able, as yet, to rely on missiles, and therefore we looked to the air force as our main weapon. Everyone agreed. Kuznetsov began to seethe. After that session he began to wage a propaganda war against that decision [to place the emphasis on the air force], and he sought to discredit the new leadership of the USSR. In spite of everything, he wanted to support Stalin's line concerning the primacy of building up the navy, although Stalin had adopted that program without consulting Kuznetsov; at that time Kuznetsov had been removed from command. Probably a narrow departmental commitment to his branch of the services was blinding the admiral's vision and preventing him from seeing the situation clearly. Later

it turned out that Stalin's program actually had been inspired by Kuznetsov, back when he had still enjoyed great confidence. The man had been removed, but his line continued to be followed. I don't know what the reasons were for his falling out of favor with Stalin, but I think it was because of his obstinate character, which was now being revealed to an even greater extent.

We had the impression that Kuznetsov had decided that since Stalin no longer existed, the present leadership didn't need to be taken seriously. This made us angry. We were obliged to make the decision to relieve him of his duties as commander in chief of the navy and strip him of his high military title.<sup>10</sup> Later Malinovsky told me that the military men felt pained on behalf of Kuznetsov, because he had earned his rank of admiral long before and had been an active participant in the war against Nazi Germany and Japan. I liked Kuznetsov personally, and I respected him for his brave and daring attitude when he reported to Stalin and for his realistic outlook [except in this case]. Even today I will confess that another consideration existed in my mind: I thought of him as a charming, fascinating man. Kuznetsov had made a good impression on me against the background of the other admirals I knew. I had the best impression of him, but when life itself pushed us into a confrontation the interests of the cause had to be placed higher than feelings of friendship. Even today, after quite a few years have gone by, I would propose that our decision at that time was inevitable, both in essence (in the interest of the country) and in form (in order that several other obstinate military men would become aware that Bonapartist inclinations were not permissible).

Later Kuznetsov wrote his memoirs about the war. His book has been lying around my house, but I haven't started reading it because, after acquainting myself with many such memoirs, I have come to the conclusion that I would have to argue against most of these military memoirs. They make a painful impression on me, and I suffer severely because of my disagreement, especially when I encounter fibs and tall tales and don't have the possibility of refuting them. Especially in cases where the military men behave like toadies and bootlickers; they even worship Stalin's underpants as though they were sacred relics.<sup>11</sup>

In the end we rejected the program presented by Kuznetsov, but continued to carry out the program adopted earlier by Stalin. We hadn't yet studied the question sufficiently to finally admit that this was the wrong direction to take.

At the end of 1955, when we were facing the question of relieving Admiral Kuznetsov of his duties as commander of the navy, another question came up—that is, who to appoint in his place. Gorshkov<sup>12</sup> was proposed. I didn't

know him very well, but I had heard good things about him both as a man and as a specialist who knew naval affairs. I had got to know Gorshkov only in the final stage of the war, when he took command of our naval flotilla on the Danube River. I liked Gorshkov, and I supported him, and in my opinion his abilities corresponded to the post to which he was assigned.

Solving the naval-armaments problem was difficult. It troubled me greatly, and arriving at a solution was especially painful. The admirals voted in favor of a surface fleet. In rejecting the program for building a large surface fleet, all of us experienced pain over making that decision, including myself. Perhaps it was I who suffered more than all the others. After all, our adversaries had an enormous navy, primarily aircraft carriers. By refusing to compete with them on the oceans we might be putting ourselves in a subordinate position, which could not be allowed. That's why the search for a correct decision was especially painful.

Let's take World War II, for example. I won't touch on the fighting between the United States and Japan. In Europe the outcome of the war was decided not by the navy, but by land forces: infantry, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. But the next war is rarely similar to the previous one, especially in our age of great discoveries in science and technology. Besides, you always hope to be able to use any newly created weapon for quite a long time. But it may turn out that the weapons you produce become obsolete quickly, and after a short time you have to send them to be melted down. Again, enormous resources have to be spent in order not to fall behind. For example, in the last period of Stalin's life, when he increased the production of cruisers armed only with the usual artillery, that was government money spent for nothing, thrown to the wind.

In October 1955 we returned to a discussion of the problem of the navy, but this time it was not in Moscow, but at the main Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol. Only a few months had passed since the discussion in the Central Committee Presidium of Admiral Kuznetsov's program. Now we wanted to hear what the officers of the line had to say, to get to know the situation right there on the spot. Besides Zhukov<sup>13</sup> and myself, among those who came to Sevastopol were Bulganin, Malenkov, and some other members of the Central Committee Presidium. We acquainted ourselves with the ships of the Black Sea fleet, both submarines and surface vessels. The fleet there was relatively small and the surface vessels rather old. Among them was the *Novorossiysk*, a captured Italian battleship, the former *Giulio Cesare*. Soon after the end of our conference, on October 29 of that same year, it suddenly blew up while riding at anchor in Sevastopol Bay, and it sank. Since it was

close to shore, most of the people on board were saved, but still a lot of people died, about 600. When the reasons for the explosion were investigated, sabotage was suggested. Later specialists came to the conclusion that a German mine left over from the war had been lying on the bottom, the ship's anchor touched it, and it exploded.

And so [to return to the subject] the conference began. We were introduced to the cadres and told about the current state of the fleet. Then naval exercises were organized on the staff level. I remember the commander of a cruiser [in these exercises]. After "war began" he took command of the "Southern" side. According to the scenario he was supposed to attack. Cheerfully, even with a devil-may-care attitude, he reported to us that our navy had sunk the enemy and had already sailed through the Dardanelles, entered the Mediterranean, and advanced to Africa, where it had taken the northern coastal regions. When he listed the forces in operation, I felt sad. I saw that this man knew nothing about the new means of warfare at the disposal of the Soviet Union. And I calculated that if we had such weapons, our opponents must have them, too. It just doesn't happen that you can deal with the enemy so unceremoniously if he has the same means of destruction that you have. If you think this way, you can run into a lot of unpleasantness. But this captain (first rank)<sup>14</sup> thought he had crushed the foe without even suspecting the existence of coastal rockets or missiles and missile-bearing aircraft.

I stopped him and said: "Here you are telling us with great self-assurance that you have dealt with the enemy and completely routed him. But if I can indicate what could happen in reality, at the beginning of a war, you would have long since been lying on the bottom of the ocean." He looked at me with surprise. I continued: "Listen, how can you be a commander and not even be using our latest weapons and not even assuming that the enemy has them, too? For example, missiles with homing devices [that is, cruise missiles with guidance systems]. We have them. And you always have to respect your enemy. The most dangerous thing is to underestimate his potential and exaggerate your own."

He then spoke with concern: "Comrade Khrushchev, this is the first time I've heard of such missiles."

I agreed with him: "That's right. And we're to blame for this. Everything, as it turns out, is being kept secret, much too secret." We interrupted the conference. I made the proposal: "Comrades, let's take the navy men with us and go to the military base here in the Crimea and acquaint ourselves with the [land-based] cruise missiles and missile-bearing planes being used by the

coastal defense forces, and then let's continue our conference. And let the navy men make the necessary corrections in their assessment of the enemy."

A little while later the conference resumed. But the exercises that had been interrupted were not resumed. Instead people began to discuss the essence of the problem of further buildup of the navy. They decided that we couldn't continue in the same direction as before, that everything shouldn't be kept "top secret," that if people weren't informed of the achievements and the advances of our own forces working in defense, and that included the top command staff, things would not go well. We changed direction in regard to the naval buildup, and we oriented ourselves mainly toward the ideas of a major specialist on the submarine fleet who was working in the General Staff. He had his own point of view, which had no support. The supporters of the submarine fleet were whispering in my ear, as they say, that we should summon so-and-so. Unfortunately his name has evaporated from my memory.

We summoned him. He proved to be an interesting person. After hearing his arguments we made the decision that in building up the navy we would make submarines the primary focus. For a long time we had become accustomed to the idea of a surface fleet, and we had regarded the submarine as a kind of auxiliary weapon. I posed the question to the navy men: "What exactly is a cruiser?"

They said: "A floating artillery base."

I said: "How close does a cruiser have to come to the shore to carry out an artillery bombardment in preparation for a landing?" I don't remember now exactly what the answer was. The military men [must have] said approximately 45 kilometers, no more. And the explosive power of an artillery shell was not very great compared to a missile with a nuclear warhead. And yet this cruiser had as many as 1,200 people serving on it, and they had to be maintained and paid for. Outwardly the cruiser looked very effective; it was a beautiful sight, especially when the crew was decked out in parade uniforms. To put it briefly, the top command had a soft spot in its heart for cruisers. When the crew lines up on the deck to greet an admiral and the "at ease" order is given, it makes a great impression! Or when it sails into a harbor to make a friendship visit! It's very costly to maintain a cruiser, but its military significance was lost long ago. At one time Britannia ruled the waves. Britain had an enormous fleet with heavy battleships as its nucleus. But those times have passed. Now airplanes, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles have made their appearance, along with nuclear warheads. Nowadays it would be hard for a surface navy to survive in the event of war.

Approximately half a year after that conference, in April 1956, Bulganin and I went on an official visit to Britain [at the invitation of Prime Minister Anthony Eden].<sup>15</sup> During our visit we were invited by the First Lord of the Admiralty for a reception at the naval college in Greenwich on the Thames.

The officers gathered there were the flower of Britain's navy. I gave a speech in which I expressed myself categorically in favor of nuclear-missile forces, emphasizing the advantages of missiles and missile-bearing aircraft as compared with a surface fleet. Not that I was against it, I said, but a surface fleet had lost its importance. I used the expression "floating graveyards." A different time had come, and the decisive force in combat against a surface fleet was aircraft armed with missiles as well as ships armed with missiles.

Today I don't know what advances have been made on this question or what practical results have been achieved, but theoretically it's possible to do battle against ships on the ocean by using missiles launched from dry land. In my day the designer Chelomei<sup>16</sup> and his collaborators gave reports about such concepts. Given our geographic position, when an adversary approaches our coastlines, we could defend our coastal borders by relying on missiles positioned on our own territory. We could also use aircraft armed with missiles to prevent enemy ships from approaching our borders, that is, enemy ships armed with conventional weapons. I use the term "conventional" because each country can launch missiles from its own territory. We understood that then, and today everyone understands it.

I said in my speech [at the British naval college] that although bombers had lost their significance, antiaircraft weapons and fighter planes had changed qualitatively, so that the penetration of one country's air forces across the borders of another country had become impossible. Certainly the wars in Israel and Vietnam have introduced corrections into this perspective. Missile technology has not proved to be reliable in combating aircraft at low heights. The target moves too fast, and there isn't time enough to use the surface-to-air missile to hit the target. But I'm sure that, in the future, science will find a means of hitting a target at any height.

But I was talking about a "classical" war involving countries with a similar level of industrial development and armaments. In that case the advantage of nuclear missiles and submarine fleets was indisputable.

As I recall, the reception at the Lord of the Admiralty's took place on a Saturday. On Sunday we went to visit Anthony Eden at his estate called Chequers.<sup>17</sup> I liked Eden and his sober mind. When we arrived he asked: "Why have you been frightening our military men with the speech you gave there?" (I don't remember what he said word for word.)



“So, my point of view has been reported to you?”

“Yes,” he said, “It was reported to me.”

“Well, and what’s your view?”

“I agree with you,” Eden went on. “Today the navy has lost its former significance. Since the means of waging war have changed, the navy of course doesn’t represent the power it used to. But I can’t say that openly, because for us the navy is our only means of defense. I also can’t speak openly against bombers, although they, too, have outlived their time. But we have no other weapons. (They didn’t have missiles and nuclear weapons then.) Therefore, for the time being, we rely on these weapons, and I can’t undermine the morale of our military men.” This wasn’t a detailed analysis of military concepts. We were merely tossing remarks back and forth and joking a little. But I think that Eden understood us correctly, and we understood him. Of course we were deliberately exaggerating our missile strength then, but we were doing all we could to build up that kind of weaponry, although just then we didn’t have a sufficient quantity. Therefore, at that time, it was still true that the advantage in terms of armed forces, especially air forces, remained on the side of our likely future adversary, that is, the United States and its allies.

But let me return to the discussion of the problems of the Soviet navy.

Until recently the heavy cruiser was the “backbone” of our navy. It couldn’t operate as a separate unit. It had to be part of a squadron; otherwise it would be sunk. But submarines could operate either singly or in groups. They didn’t need to be covered by other ships. If you pitted the firepower of a cruiser against a submarine armed with missiles, the latter would win. It can cruise the necessary distance and open fire not only on ships but also on the shoreline; it can also strike targets in the hinterland of a country. For example, the American Polaris submarine in my day had a range of 2,000 kilometers, and today missiles can cover even greater distances. Thus, the submarine, which costs many times less than a cruiser, and which has a much smaller crew, disposes of much greater firepower and has the possibility, besides, of concealed movement through the vast stretches of the oceans.

A submarine fleet is less vulnerable. I say less, because submarines, too, can be sunk; there are weapons that can be used against them. There already exist devices for locating submarines underwater, and weapons for the precision bombing of submarines have been developed. The improvement of one type of weapon always results in development of a counterweapon. Artillery shells always competed with armor. The thicker the armor on a ship, the more powerful the artillery shell became in order to pierce that armor. Our artillery men reported to me that armor had really lost its significance.

There was no armor that could withstand either a nuclear strike or a strike by a missile with a conventional warhead. Today the heavier the armor on a ship, the greater the weight the ship will take to the bottom of the sea. Heavy armor nowadays just means added weight.

I don't know the extent to which sonar technology [for locating objects under water] has developed nowadays, or how deeply they have succeeded in penetrating the oceans with listening and viewing devices in order to find submarines. This information is unknown to me, but obviously scientists are working in this field. Fishing ships are able to locate schools of fish from a great distance away. And so it was kept in mind even back then that submarines were not absolutely invulnerable. But they were much less vulnerable than surface ships.

We decided to place the construction of submarines literally on an assembly-line basis, to create a powerful submarine fleet that could threaten the enemy on all the oceans and seas. Our main opponent was a naval power. That was the United States. It had to overcome a great distance in order to reach Europe, land its troops, and provide weapons and supplies to its troops. Consequently it had to sail on the oceans; it couldn't avoid that. And that's exactly why a submarine fleet was especially important for us.

Having established regular assembly-line production of submarines, we paid special attention to the development of nuclear engines, to provide the submarines with the capability of cruising autonomously, under their own power [without requiring refueling], and we achieved our first results. Nuclear-powered submarines were put into production. No small role in this was played by scientists who were working on nuclear engines. Although I met with them several times and knew them well, the only one whose name I can remember now is Academician [Anatoly Petrovich] Aleksandrov.<sup>18</sup> It was our age-old dream to have nuclear engines for our submarines. With nuclear power the submarine fleet had access to all the oceans. We didn't have overseas naval bases. Once our navy left its home ports it was forced to return to them after plowing the seas. Only engines with nuclear power could ensure the possibility of remaining underwater for a long time. Without them the submarine fleet we were building would not be a threat in every ocean and every sea. When I say a threat I mean of course to our adversaries. Modern navigational instruments make it possible for submarines to orient themselves well even underwater, as was demonstrated by the submarines that sailed successfully under the ice of the Arctic Ocean. Our submarine would surface in an area free of ice and then submerge again and calmly return to its base. In July 1962, when I made a trip through the Soviet North, I met the

men of that submarine. The commander and I had a talk and I inspected the ship. We were delighted with this ship's capabilities compared to earlier types.<sup>19</sup>

Nowadays, being a pensioner, I read the papers and follow reports of military exercises. I read that our submarines, armed with nuclear weapons, completed a round-the-world cruise. I learned from the press that in the last few years we have achieved good results in this area. As I see it, this has happened as a result of the correct decisions we made back then. Of course it's difficult to carry out a preliminary artillery bombardment for an amphibious landing from submarines. Such landings, under contemporary conditions, encounter great difficulties in general, although there are methods making it possible to get through a contaminated area after an atomic explosion. Nevertheless this is a rather difficult and dangerous thing for our troops, but there's nothing to be done about it. Methods have to be developed that will allow us to pass through contaminated areas after the explosion of an atom bomb or a hydrogen bomb.

Back in those days we had to decide our attitude toward aircraft carriers. This is the most powerful type of ship in the surface fleet. It of course has aircraft on its deck that can operate over a fairly wide range. They conduct reconnaissance and can direct their fire at surface ships. It would have been nice to have such ships, but that turned out to be beyond our means. It was better not to dissipate our resources. We could have had aircraft carriers in the single numbers, but our opponents had dozens of them. Besides, we were essentially a continental power, which could not forget about its infantry, rocket artillery, and strategic aircraft, as well as intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads.

I will not try to hide the fact that it fell on my shoulders to carry the main burden of the struggle in support of younger forces in the navy against those who were living in the old days and putting up resistance. I confess that later, after we had made the decision, I still felt the pain of it in the pit of my stomach. But, as the saying goes, don't stretch your legs longer than the clothing that covers them.<sup>20</sup> We did have to maintain a surface fleet to defend our coastal areas. But this problem could be solved by having coastal defense ships, torpedo boats, and missile boats whose range of fire can cover dozens of kilometers [up to 100 kilometers]. They would serve as a counter to enemy submarines.

People might ask: "What about offensive operations?" But with our policy of peace there was no reason to duplicate the means of waging war that the United States had. We are opposed to imperialist wars. We favor the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence. The question of internal arrangements

[i.e., the sociopolitical system of a given country] is the internal affair of the people of that country, above all of its working class, which has now grown to be a mighty force in the modern world. The working class has taken upon its shoulders the burden of struggle for progress in developing the life of society in every country. The United States is an aggressive imperialist power. It has developed aircraft carriers and a surface navy because it wages wars thousands of kilometers from its borders. There's no way it could do that without aircraft carriers. Submarines don't give you the possibility of making large-scale amphibious landings, as the aggressive policy of America requires. It's true that they could use aircraft to replace surface transport vessels. Nowadays airplanes can carry hundreds of people, so that large forces can be concentrated in a fairly short time if one is successful in taking control of a landing area. But we didn't set ourselves the goal of making landings in other countries. We concentrated on defense and the possibility of striking a blow at the enemy with strategic missiles, assuming that thereby we were guaranteeing our security against any rational adversary. What do I mean by rational adversary? One who understands that if it attacks the USSR or one of our allies, it will suffer a crushing blow from our nuclear missiles. This strategy justified itself in my day and is the main factor that has restrained the aggressors.

When we were discussing the program for building up the navy, another question arose: "What should we do with the cruisers that we already had in our arsenal?"

I must say that to our shame we still had quite a few cruisers then, including some that were hopelessly antiquated. They were literally "old galoshes," as the navy men called them. Some of them were left over from World War I. Slow-moving vessels that could play virtually no role in combat. But before Stalin's death, new ships had been added to our arsenal. Virtually all of our industrial capacity was taken up with building these. We needed to make a decision about these ships, which had cost our nation huge sums while their combat significance was virtually nil. They were only good for naval displays at Leningrad, Sevastopol, and Vladivostok. A lovely and impressive spectacle. But money is not spent on the navy so that it can take part in spectacles.

The Western countries, the United States and Britain first of all, after the end of World War II junked a substantial number of their surface ships. Their newer ships were placed in dry dock, which is also a fairly expensive indulgence: maintaining them in a condition that would allow them to be used again when necessary. For our part we decided to destroy some of our older ships, but we had a few cruisers that were in production and close to

completion. There were only two or three. If they had been commissioned for duty, they would hardly have stirred the waters of the oceans nor would they have frightened our adversaries. On the other hand, they would have been a good means for emptying our Soviet pockets. I didn't want to assume sole responsibility for the decision about them, and I didn't want to use administrative measures to suppress the opinion of military specialists. So I proposed that the leaders of our defense ministry discuss the problem among themselves. The discussion went on for a long time. Marshal Sokolovsky,<sup>21</sup> chief of the General Staff, reported to me on the results: "We have come to the only correct conclusion—it is not worth doing the finishing work on these ships. Although the amount remaining to be spent is not large in order to put them into commission, there is the additional consideration of the resources required to maintain them. This would put a heavy burden on the budget, and these expenditures would produce no results. In the event of war these ships would not play any significant role."

Lord, how difficult it was to make that decision. How many millions we had spent on them, and now we were going to destroy them.

I asked the minister of defense, the ministers of inland water transport and maritime transport, and the managers of our fishing fleet to think about whether they could somehow use these ships. Perhaps they could be rebuilt as passenger ships? They rejected this idea: it wouldn't be worthwhile economically and it wouldn't be effective for the required task. "Couldn't they be used for fishing?" I wasn't satisfied with their negative response. They studied the question and again rejected the proposal. It turned out it would be cheaper to build new ones. "Maybe they could serve as floating hotels for tourists?" All sorts of variants were explored, but the result remained as before. We had to make the painful decision to destroy these valuable products of our own creation. That's how we began our definitive turn toward the building of a powerful submarine fleet. That's how the main question of modernizing our navy was decided, and I think the decision we made was correct. Looking back now over the path we have traveled, it seems to me that no other choice really was possible. The decision proved to be the most rational and the most advantageous, not only from the point of view of budget expenditures, but above all for ensuring the combat capabilities of the navy. One cruiser cost as much as several submarines. But the firepower of each submarine was several times greater than that of a surface ship such as a cruiser.

I consider our decision correct. The Americans also soon changed their attitude toward their submarine fleet. Today submarines serve as launching

sites, making it possible to launch missiles from underwater positions. It's hard to knock them out of commission because the submarine is a mobile ballistic-missile site; it has that advantage even over missile silos. Land-based missile silos can't be hidden; the entire surface of the earth can now be photographed from space. It's very difficult to keep anything secret now—for example, where your missile sites are located. Evidently our adversaries know where ours are and we know where theirs are. Submarines are a different story. You can find out where their bases, or home ports, are, but what is their position when they have been deployed for combat in preparation for an attack on an enemy? That is hard to determine. Greater difficulties confront the enemy in trying to destroy mobile underwater launching sites. In addition, submarines can do battle against a surface fleet. Armed with cruise missiles, they can operate at a great distance from the enemy, a greater distance than the old submarines armed only with torpedoes.

Of course some of our existing cruisers were refitted, having their classical artillery removed and missile batteries installed in their place. But this too turned out to be irrational because these ships lacked some necessary features. We began to sell off these older vessels on an extensive basis: cruisers, destroyers, and patrol boats.

For example, the cruiser *Ordzhonikidze* was sold to Indonesia.<sup>22</sup> That island country needed such armaments. It was a good cruiser. In April 1956 Bulganin and I made our visit to Britain on that cruiser. It was new for that time and met all the latest requirements. British naval officials were very interested in it back then.

It was also painful for us to change our naval doctrine. In our new naval strategy we assigned great importance to bombers armed with air-to-surface missiles that could hit ships. This is also a type of coastal defense weapon, but operating over a very great range. I say that it's able to operate over a great [but not unlimited] distance because, no matter what, an airplane does have a limited range. Missile-carrying aircraft and bombers cannot travel great distances from our borders without the possibility of being refueled in the air (and at that time we didn't have that possibility). The speed and altitude at which they fly leave no hope that they could break through a solid curtain of anti-aircraft fire. The Arctic Ocean was within our reach, but it was dangerous to venture over the North Sea, let alone the Atlantic. We could also operate in the Pacific, but only in the coastal zone.

I will tell how we made a concession to ourselves by deciding, after all, to build a few modern cruisers that would be armed with missiles: both offensive and defensive ones, that is, anti-aircraft missiles. In making concessions to

the navy men, who were suffering so desperately over being deprived of cruisers, I expressed the opinion that we should complete construction on several cruisers for the eventuality that if representatives of the USSR needed to make a trip abroad on a naval vessel, they could use them. But I suggested that such ships meet all the requirements of modern science and technology. With this end in mind some large missile-carrying destroyers, which had been commissioned earlier, were renamed as cruisers. They were tested in the White Sea.

I went with [then Defense Minister] Malinovsky, Gorshkov [commander of the Soviet navy], and some other specialists to the White Sea to observe these tests. This was in July 1962. The prototype for this type of ship was the *Grozny*. It made a good impression with its mobility and the quality of its armaments, but it had no armor plate. The navy men unanimously rejected the use of armor because it was no longer effective against powerful shells and only weighed the ship down, reducing its speed and making it less maneuverable. But what was its worth in battle? The weather was beautiful then, and the personnel on the ship were in an exultant mood. Infected by their mood, I asked Gorshkov: "What's your assessment of this vessel? We can make as many of these as are needed. Of course it would take time. You can't just spoon them out of the kettle. It's not buckwheat porridge we're talking about. But if the enemy had the same kind of ship, would we encounter difficulties?"

Gorshkov answered: "No, we would sink him to the bottom in an instant. We'd sink him by using our missile-bearing ships or submarines. Or if he broke through to our coastlines, we'd put our missile-bearing cutters into action."

What that meant was that the ships themselves were of no use in battle. Of course there's no one weapon that's absolutely reliable. Whatever the weapon, you can find a way to destroy it. Even intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads can be knocked down by antimissile missiles. Even earth satellites can be destroyed. But eliminating a ship like this would constitute no difficulty for a country that had contemporary offensive and defensive weapons. We had four ships like this. But we said to the navy men: "Let's just use them to greet important visitors or escort them on departure—or to make visits ourselves, traveling by sea. It's a lovely thing to go out to sea on a cruiser, and we can do a little showing off in front of the foreigners." A submarine couldn't make that kind of impression. There aren't many people on it and it looks like a floating cigar. We sent one cruiser to the Baltic Fleet, another to the Black Sea Fleet, a third to [the Far



Eastern Fleet in] Vladivostok, and a fourth to the Northern Fleet. Of course this was an expensive indulgence. But a big country has to lay out some resources for the sake of prestige. Nowadays, when I read the papers about our military delegations making friendly visits to various countries, I encounter the names of the very ships I've been talking about.

According to information in the press (and I don't know to what extent it can be trusted) other countries also have ships of this kind. Possibly they are used for the same purposes or possibly for training naval designers. That is also necessary, so that skills will not be lost when suddenly a need may arise, and so that science can come up with useful solutions in making surface vessels.

Toward the end of my work in the leadership a new question arose: "Had the time not arrived when we should create a navy with aircraft carriers, destroyers, and mother ships on which missile-bearing cutters could be based?" The military men didn't support building such mother ships, but I favored building them.

It might be thought that an aircraft carrier, which has fighters and bombers on board, is similar to the kind of ship I'm talking about, but instead of having planes on board it would have boats armed with guided missiles. The purpose of the planes on an aircraft carrier is to attack enemy ships from the air; the same would be true of missile boats; only they attack from the sea.

During the crisis in the Congo in 1960 the problem of the presence of foreign ships or fleets near "hot spots" off the shores of various continents arose. The Americans kept their Sixth Fleet and Seventh Fleet constantly off the shores of Africa and Asia. Shouldn't we also send a fleet of ours there to restrain the aggressive forces? We gave the general staff the assignment of estimating the possible makeup of such a fleet and determining its cost. Later Malinovsky spoke out against this idea. It turned out that the expenses of forming such a fleet were not justified. If we took the road of trying to compete with the United States in this sphere, we would have to spend many billions virtually to no purpose. Better to spend them on other things that corresponded more to the needs of our people.

And what about now? Is this doctrine, if we can call it that, still being maintained? I think that the same general law is still being observed today. It's not a question of personalities, but of the times we live in and the development of science and technology. I don't see any more rational means of providing for our defense at sea.

I don't know whether aircraft carriers are now being built or not. If so, it's hard for me to understand the expediency of capital investments in this type of naval weapon. Even today it would be very hard for us to try to build such ships to compete with the other side (which we should now perhaps refer to as "the NATO countries"). We would have to invest large amounts of capital. And the effectiveness [or lack of it] would be the same as in my day, when we rejected the idea of having a surface fleet.

If the military men aren't kept under control, if they're allowed to charge off in whatever direction they please, they'll drive our country into a budgetary grave. They always have to be reined in, and they shouldn't be allowed to pull the wool over the government's eyes in order to get what they want. They try to frighten the government with reports of the enemy's strength. And it's not only in our country that this happens. In the United States and other Western countries the same spectacle can be observed.

1. Vladivostok is a port city in Primorye [Maritime] territory in the Russian Far East. The literal meaning of the name is "Rule the East" or "Lord of the East." [SS/GS]

2. Port Arthur (Chinese name, Lushun)—a naval base and warm-water port at the tip of China's Liaodong peninsula. (The peninsula extends southward into the Yellow Sea just west of the Chinese-Korean border.) Port Arthur was leased from China by tsarist Russia in 1898 (together with the nearby city of Dalny—whose Chinese name is Dalian; also called Dairen). The leased territory was linked by rail to Harbin in northern Manchuria, where tsarist Russia had established a dominant presence and sphere of influence by building the Chinese Eastern Railroad (1897–1903). This line ran through northern Manchuria, including Harbin, to connect Vladivostok with the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Russia's naval base at Port Arthur was taken by the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5, and Japan retained effective control of the area (the Kwantung leased territory, southern half of the Liaodong peninsula) through World War II. Port Arthur was liberated from the Japanese by Soviet troops on August 23, 1945. Under a Sino-Soviet agreement of 1945 the Port Arthur Naval Base District was jointly administered by the USSR and China. This agreement was renewed in 1950, after the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (October 1949). The agreement was further renewed in 1952. In 1955 the USSR withdrew its forces from the Port

Arthur base and turned over its holdings entirely to the Chinese. [GS]

3. Vice Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov (1848–1904), also noted as an oceanographer, polar explorer, ship designer, and naval tactician, was killed while commanding the defense of Port Arthur when his battleship struck a mine. [GS]

4. The commander of the Pacific Fleet at that time was Admiral Yuri Aleksandrovich Panteleyev (1901–83). See Biographies.

5. Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov (1902–74) was minister of the navy from 1951 to 1953, then until 1956 first deputy minister of defense of the USSR and commander in chief of naval forces. See Biographies.

6. Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky. See Biographies.

7. Khrushchev has in mind the Japanese air attack of December 7, 1941, on the American fleet at the naval base of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.

8. Nikolai Ivanovich Trufanov. See Biographies.

9. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan. See Biographies.

10. N. G. Kuznetsov became a fleet admiral of the Soviet Union in 1955. In 1956 his rank was reduced to rear admiral. He was restored to his previous rank posthumously in 1988.

11. Elsewhere in these memoirs, Khrushchev ridicules those who in the late 1960s and early 1970s continued the cult of Stalin or sought to revive it. He said they would even make sacred relics out of Stalin's soiled underpants. [GS]

12. Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov. See Biographies.

13. Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. See Biographies.

14. This rank is equivalent to that of a captain in the U.S. navy. [SK]

15. See the chapter "Visit to Great Britain" in Volume 3 of the memoirs (forthcoming). [SS]

16. See the extended note on Chelomei by Sergei Khrushchev in the following chapter, "Airplanes and Missiles." [GS]

17. Although Chequers is the official country residence of the British prime minister, it belongs to the British government. It is a large sixteenth-century country house set in an estate that occupies 1,250 acres of land in Buckinghamshire, northwest of London. It is used for ministerial conferences and for receiving important foreign guests. [SS]

18. Academician Anatoly Petrovich Aleksandrov (1903–94) was director of the Institute of Atomic

Energy and one of the founders of the Soviet atomic-energy program. See Biographies.

19. In summer 1962, a Soviet submarine under the command of Captain Second Rank (Commander) Lev Mikhailovich Zhiltsov sailed to the North Pole under the Arctic ice. Khrushchev awarded Zhiltsov a Hero of the Soviet Union star and gave other decorations to members of the submarine's crew. [SK]

20. The Russian saying is the equivalent of "You have to live within your means." [GS]

21. Marshal Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky. See Biographies.

22. The cruiser *Ordzhonikidze* was sold to Indonesia in 1960 after Khrushchev's visit to that country. See the chapter on Indonesia in Volume 3 of the memoirs (forthcoming). [SS]

## AIRPLANES AND MISSILES

We paid more and more attention to the air force, especially to bombers. Ilyushin designed a twin-engine jet bomber [the Il-28]—not a strategic bomber, but a front-line bomber—and Artyom Mikoyan and Mikhail Gurevich produced the MIG-15 jet fighter.<sup>1</sup> We made use of the MIG-15 as our best post-war fighter plane, and in the initial phase of the Korean War it demonstrated its superiority over the American fighters, but that superiority was not maintained for long. The Americans soon went into production with planes of greater speed<sup>2</sup> and began shooting down our jet fighters and penetrating the air space of North Korea with impunity. Later there appeared the MIG-17, MIG-19, and the supersonic MIG-21.

At the same time the question of defending our territory against attack by air was being decided. Lavochkin's stationary anti-aircraft missiles were installed in an anti-aircraft defense ring around Moscow.<sup>3</sup> This project was headed by talented designers from the design bureau [KB-1] where Beria's son Sergei was working.<sup>4</sup> Very large resources were spent on defending Moscow with a belt of missiles to prevent enemy aircraft from breaking through and attacking our capital city. Later instead of stationary missiles, which required a lot of time to prepare for launching, we organized mobile missile batteries that were easy to disperse, so that enemy intelligence would find it harder to

determine their whereabouts. The construction of the [stationary] anti-aircraft belt around Moscow immediately became known to everyone. Foreigners flying in on passenger planes could see everything from the air, although we camouflaged it as well as we could. And when I was flying I often observed those installations from the air as well as the roads leading to them.

Later we made the decision to establish a similar defense belt around Leningrad. When mobile launchers for anti-aircraft missiles were designed, we abandoned the idea of building the defense ring around Leningrad.

The most difficult task was the problem of delivering nuclear bombs to targets located at great distances from our territory. For this purpose Tupolev<sup>5</sup> designed a bomber, the TU-4—or more exactly, he copied it from the American B-29. Later he designed a jet bomber, the TU-16. Even later a long-distance turboprop bomber, the TU-95, appeared.

We often discussed the problems of designing long-range bombers with Andrei Nikolayevich [Tupolev]. I had great confidence in him and profound respect for him. He said he couldn't design the kind of plane we needed because aeronautical science hadn't yet reached that level. I should add that when Stalin demanded of Tupolev that he build a bomber that would accomplish the task of bombing the territory of the United States, Tupolev refused outright: "An airplane like that can't be built." It does him honor that even though he had been imprisoned [by Stalin] earlier, during the war, he still refused to undertake the impossible.

Stalin assigned another designer to this work—Myasishchev,<sup>6</sup> one of Tupolev's students and a very talented engineer.

He designed a bomber called the M-3, followed by a modified version, the 3M. But this bomber proved unsuitable for our purposes, just as Tupolev had warned. It could fly as far as the United States, but it couldn't get back. Myasishchev proposed the idea that, after dropping its bombs on the United States, it could land in Mexico. We answered jokingly: "But Mexico isn't our mother-in-law. [That is, we can't just drop in any time we please.] Landing there, in the best of cases, would mean losing our plane." This idea turned out to be "all wet." If we built this bomber, there was no certainty of success and big spending would be required. Tests did begin on an experimental model. But they went poorly, several pilots were killed, and flight personnel in general developed a lack of confidence in this plane. A search for a different solution was required, but what?

Of course the construction of rockets and missiles had already begun.<sup>7</sup> Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov,<sup>8</sup> who was not yet famous, was involved in this work. I will always remember Korolyov as the man who brought our country

out onto the highroad, the conquest of outer space. When it became clear that it would not be possible to use Myasishchev's bomber to strike a retaliatory blow against the United States, the only hope that remained was rockets and missiles.

To reach England, we had Korolyov's R-5 missile. But how were we to reach America? I had great respect for Myasishchev. But he couldn't accomplish the impossible. The talented Lavochkin<sup>9</sup> responded with a proposal involving a long-range [intercontinental] cruise missile. During the war, pilots had fallen in love with Lavochkin's fighter planes. Shortly after the war he took up work on the cruise missile. It proved to be a complex device: the cruise missile was essentially a pilotless aircraft that was launched by a booster rocket until it reached a set altitude; then it separated from the rocket and became self-propelled, powered by a ram-jet engine. The idea was given the code name "Burya" [meaning "Tempest"].

But the problem remained: what were we going to do? During Stalin's lifetime I didn't know Korolyov personally. I made Korolyov's acquaintance when his intercontinental missile was about to be produced. Ustinov<sup>10</sup> reported to me that the designer Korolyov was inviting us to come look at his ballistic missile. We decided to go as a body, virtually the entire Presidium of the Central Committee. At the factory they showed us the missile. To tell the truth, the leadership of our country looked at the missile back then the way a ram will look at a new gate that's been put in. The ram stares blankly at the gate. We couldn't get it into our heads that this huge cigar-shaped tube could fly somewhere and blow someone up. Korolyov explained to us how it flew and what it could do. But we walked around it like peasants at a bazaar getting ready to buy some calico, poking at it and tugging to test its strength. You might say, "Look what a bunch of technological idiots had gathered." We weren't the only ones who were such ignoramuses in those days. Anyone dealing with rocket technology for the first time was just as ignorant.

The leadership was soon filled with confidence in Korolyov. He said his missile had a range of approximately 7,000 kilometers [4,300 miles]. We found that suitable, because a substantial part of U.S. territory came within that range. Of course once we had such a missile, that didn't mean we were going to start a war. We only wanted to threaten the use of our missile in retaliation if the United States took it into its head to attack us. At that time the United States was pursuing an extremely aggressive policy. Korolyov test-fired his missile. It was called the R-7, or Semyorka [Russian nickname for the number seven]. The missile flew well, although the first test model didn't reach its destination; its engine blew up. It was not a rare thing in those days

for accidents to occur, both on the ground and in flight, but fortunately there were no casualties. What would be rare is for a new technology to come into use without accidents. Sometimes it's necessary to accept an inevitable risk. In the end Korolyov coped with his task very well. The missile began to function reliably, and in 1957 we launched the first artificial satellite into outer space to orbit the earth, Sputnik. The whole world was startled. Some people greeted our space flights with joy and admiration, but some people were terrified that we had reached such a high technological level.

Among our rocket and missile designers, Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov stood in the very forefront. I met many times with this interesting and passionate man. Here was someone who could not be numbered among the “non-resisters of evil!”<sup>11</sup> [That is, he was anything but a passive person.] Korolyov knew how to push forward what needed to be pushed forward, and he passionately defended his ideas. That's a good thing. When I listened to him, I was delighted. Who was it that paved the road to outer space? The road to the moon? Korolyov! You had to see him when he was giving a report, to feel his passion and ardor and get a sense of the clarity of his mind. A remarkable scientist and designer!

I also want to mention his comrade, Glushko.<sup>12</sup> Glushko played a very big role in the production of rockets and missiles. He was the one who created the engines for Korolyov's rockets. That is no less a contribution to the cause than Korolyov's! Glushko's engine, figuratively speaking, shook the entire world. Without the engine, of course, we couldn't have launched the rocket. It would be wrong to minimize the role of those who worked on the engines. I remember something said before the war by a pilot—the famous pilot Lakeyev, if I recall correctly: “With a good engine I could even fly a coffin.” Of course there's no need to engage in such oversimplifications, as though you could fly a broom if you had the right engine. Both components—rocket and engine—must work together.

Later Korolyov and Glushko argued and had a parting of the ways.<sup>13</sup> That was a great shame. Why couldn't they come to a permanent meeting of the minds? They had disagreements that began to eat away at them; it proved difficult for them to work together. I tried to reconcile them. I invited both of them with their wives to visit me at my dacha. I wanted them both to devote all their energies to the cause for the benefit of our country and not waste their strength on petty quarrels. But nothing came of it. Korolyov eventually broke off all working relations with Glushko and chose [Nikolai Dmitriyevich] Kuznetsov, who was still relatively young but a very talented designer of jet aircraft engines.<sup>14</sup> Regardless of that, it is Korolyov who will

remain in the memory of his fellow citizens as the man who first dared to break free of the earth, the first to send a man into space.

Unfortunately, we didn't succeed in sending one of our people to the moon, but we did send scientific instruments of Soviet manufacture there. It was Korolyov who did all that. He was a major scientist and a very interesting man. This extraordinary human being and outstanding specialist combined a profound knowledge of his subject, excellent organizational skills, and unlimited willpower and driving force. With these strengths he successfully moved the work forward. He was torn from life by a senseless death. I knew that he was going into the hospital, and I knew that an operation was in the works. I heard from the doctors that the operation was not a complicated one. The surgeons had already washed their hands and were assuming that everything had gone successfully when suddenly his body went into shock, and Korolyov was no more. But he was at the height of his creative powers, and how much more he could have done for humankind!<sup>15</sup>

Let me return to that memorable year, 1957. Our missiles had made the United States tremble. The USSR had shown it was capable of delivering a nuclear warhead across the ocean with a missile, which at that time was invulnerable. Even today I think that such a missile is virtually invulnerable, although theoretically missiles can be knocked down. Science does make it possible to do that. In my day, in my speeches, I used to say that we had produced an antimissile missile that could hit a fly.<sup>16</sup> That was just fancy talk. I resorted to that polemical device to try to sober up our adversaries and convince them that we were well armed with missiles both as a means of defense and a means of attack. The interception of missiles is theoretically possible. After all, the meeting and docking of space rockets does occur, and therefore the meeting-up of one missile with another can occur, and if one missile were armed with a warhead, it could destroy the other. But this is a difficult problem, and in those days long-distance guided missiles had not yet been developed and people had not yet thought about ways of destroying them.

The launching of the missile designed by Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov allowed the government of the USSR to breathe a sigh of relief. Of course the problem of the defense of our country had not been solved at one stroke. We didn't have enough missiles and they were extremely expensive. We were making them one by one under laboratory conditions in special workshops. Serial production had not been organized. Besides, getting a missile ready for launching under combat conditions required a lot of time. That's why Korolyov's "Semyorka" did not become a combat missile. The launching process was complicated by



the fact that before the missile could be launched certain devices had to be set up that would guide it toward its target. To ensure accuracy in hitting the target, two stationary radio installations, functioning as missile-guidance systems, had to be set up at a distance of 500 kilometers from the launch site.<sup>17</sup>

The “Semyorka” was launched, after being fueled and after the appropriate preparations, from a rectangular launching pad [plainly visible from the air]. I presented a problem to Korolyov: “If the critical moment comes and we have to use the missile, the enemy isn’t going to leave us time to all make these preparations. Can’t something be done so that the missile is in a constant state of combat-readiness?”

He replied: “No, so far we can’t do that.”

The key to the problem was the type of fuel the missile used. Our missiles used liquid components (kerosene as a fuel and liquid oxygen as an oxidizer), but the Americans used solid fuel for their combat missiles. For their space-probe rockets they used liquid hydrogen [as a fuel] plus liquid oxygen as an oxidizer. Specialists take various attitudes toward hydrogen, but its heat-generating capacity is greater and therefore would seem to be better. However, our technology had not yet reached the point where liquid hydrogen with the necessary qualities had been developed.

I spoke to some other designers about my idea of keeping the missiles at constant combat-readiness. They went through Ustinov to reach another rocket scientist, Yangel.<sup>18</sup> Yangel was not yet at the “very top” then. After a little while Ustinov reported that Yangel had undertaken to produce a missile that could be operative on a moment’s notice, using acid as an oxidizer. The missile would be, as it were, “cocked and ready to fire” (*na boyevom vzvode*).<sup>19</sup>

I seized on this proposal. It was exactly what we needed. Without it we couldn’t ensure the defense of our country! It’s true that the acid would corrode the fuel tanks, so that the missile couldn’t stand in place with its oxidizer tanks full for a long time. Preparing a missile to fire [with the Soviet technology then in use] took time, and the enemy wouldn’t give us that time. I said: “We’ll have to accept the cost of replacing the tanks. How long can the missile be in place before the acid corrodes the metal? We’ll start disposing of the old tanks and installing new ones. It will be worth the extra expense.” When Yangel reported that he thought it possible to solve the problem of permanently combat-ready missiles, Korolyov found out about it. He considered himself the leading figure in rocket and missile construction. And suddenly here was a relatively unknown designer undertaking to solve a problem that Korolyov himself had given up on. Korolyov met with me and said: “I ask you to let me have this missile. I will improve on it, using

an acid oxidizer, and it will remain on a ready-to-fire basis without the supplementary missile-guidance radio stations that have to be set up 500 kilometers from the launching site.”

My answer was: “Very well, do it. Only make it a liquid-oxygen missile, that is, an improved version of your present missile. If I were to turn over to you the acid-oxidizer missile that Yangel has proposed, that would be an insult to him. You declined the project. Yangel undertook it, and now you want to take everything into your hands. That’s impossible. After all, the idea was developed at his design bureau, so let him keep working on the problem. Let a competition begin. You try to develop a liquid-oxygen missile that can be launched on a moment’s notice, and he’ll keep working on an acid-oxidizer missile.” Korolyov was a man of strong will, as I have said, and it was evident from the expression on his face that he was very much displeased with my words. But he was an intelligent man, and he understood that what I was saying was right, and so he agreed. Thus we began to solve the problem of producing long-range military missiles, that is, intercontinental ones. But for the time being, it was only Korolyov who had missiles. All that Yangel had were ideas.

At the same time at Lavochkin’s design bureau things had been moving forward. He reported that his complex missile “Burya” was ready for testing. Then we found out that the United States was taking the same approach.<sup>20</sup> Evidently the same idea was worked out on the basis of scientific knowledge available to all scientists and engineers. I don’t think it was the result of espionage. The tests began. Today I don’t remember exactly whether the first missile test was successful or, as often happens, “the first pancake came out as a lump,” and the missile exploded. The main thing is that Lavochkin also encouraged us with his report. Unfortunately, Lavochkin’s missile was inferior in its military capabilities to Korolyov’s. Then Myasishchev also offered his services. His cruise missile was called the “Buran.”<sup>21</sup> Of course he made his proposal when we already had placed our confidence in Korolyov’s missile and considered it to be our future intercontinental ballistic missile. In so doing we rejected the idea of producing the long-range M-3 bomber and proposed to stop work on those bombers, the number already produced being sufficient. The few that had been produced took part in our air shows. In the West this plane was christened “The Bison.” Alas, “The Bison” was not very satisfactory for us.

Why did so many different intercontinental missile projects come into being? We had decided to let three or four different design bureaus work on the problem: If one didn’t succeed, perhaps another would, and we would

also have the opportunity to choose the most successful solution and then organize our production accordingly.

Korolyov had solved the problem of producing a powerful rocket, although for the time being it was used only for the space program. But he gave us the chance to make a strong showing on the international scene, to demonstrate that in principle we had the means of delivering a nuclear warhead and that now U.S. territory was vulnerable to our missile forces. This put our minds more at ease, as one might say.

The bureaus for designing such projects are extremely voracious. They require huge quantities of our country's resources. Any experiment costs billions. We thought this question over and decided to search for the possibility of reducing expenses on parallel projects without harming the defense of our country. We closed down Lavochkin's project for developing a missile and we decided to shut down—or more exactly, not to start—the “Buran” project. We also shut down a number of other projects that were only in the beginning stages, but at the same time we supported Yangel.

Myasishchev suffered greatly over this. First his long-range bomber had been a failure, and now we were shutting down his missile project. It's possible that he would have produced a good missile, but it made no sense for us to waste time and resources when we already had Korolyov's missile and were expecting Yangel's shortly.

Alas, we sometimes lost not only resources but something much more valuable. Lavochkin died before his time. He was a designer of genius whose services to his country have not yet been given full treatment in our literature.<sup>22</sup>

At the same time the design bureaus of Korolyov and Yangel continued their work. Korolyov was concerned with problems of conquering outer space, although in passing his design bureau was producing missiles [the R-9] that could be made combat ready more quickly [than the R-7]. The task of defending our country and equipping our armed forces with missiles fell mainly on Yangel's shoulders. He was a gifted man who produced excellent missiles that could go into action at a moment's notice and that could be used for various purposes. His first missile [the R-12] flew 2,000 kilometers. We called this a short-range strategic missile.<sup>23</sup> Then he produced a missile [the R-14] with a range of 4,000 kilometers.<sup>24</sup> This was also a strategic missile, but of medium range. Finally his bureau designed an intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM; the R-16] that could carry a nuclear warhead to any point on the earth's surface.<sup>25</sup>

This transformed us immediately into a nuclear power, one armed with nuclear missiles. We felt that we were ready to launch a counterstrike against

any aggressor. We began to make political use of the fact that we were the first to produce such missiles and to launch satellites into outer space. We sought to put pressure on the foreign militarists. This matter proceeded successfully for us.

Marshal [Mitrofan Ivanovich] Nedelin<sup>26</sup> was a remarkable man, a man of great intelligence, who died prematurely. He contributed a great deal of energy and knowledge to the development of our missiles. He was an experienced artillery expert who worked on our missiles and nuclear weapons from the very beginning, when the idea of such weapons was first put forward, and of all our artillery men he knew those new weapons the best. Some of our military men, who were honorable people and good Communists, took an unenthusiastic attitude toward missiles. When they were at the test sites, they would watch the launching of the missiles, scrunch up their eyes, and gossip to one another: "It's a cacophony, not music. Whereas artillery is a symphony. When our long-barreled artillery opens fire it's a pleasure to hear. But here, the devil only knows; there's a lot of smoke and uproar, but what's the point?" Not everyone evaluated these new types of weapons correctly. Some had the negative impression that this was a lot of meaningless nonsense. It's true that when the missiles were launched a huge amount of dust arose. These people were afraid this would reveal the position of the launch site. But, first, when a missile is launched from a silo there is no dust, because everything is made of concrete and metal. Second, the dust is a side issue. When you fire cannon on the battlefield you run the risk of revealing your position. But for a ballistic missile this is not of special importance, because it is being launched a distance of thousands of kilometers.

Of course there are satellites now orbiting the earth, photographing everything, and they can establish the coordinates of any sign of human activity. Today's technology makes it possible to observe the entire territory of an enemy. Well, what of it? The missiles will fly anyhow.

I have been shown photographs of airplanes taken from orbit by satellites. You can tell exactly what type of planes they are. That's how distinctly they appear in the photographs, as do the airfields and the positions of the planes on the fields. The Americans also make such photographs. I've seen their photographs. They are more precise than ours.

During the testing of Yangel's intercontinental missile [the R-16], an accident occurred, causing the deaths of several dozen people. Yangel himself barely escaped being killed. We lost Marshal Nedelin. When the new missile was being tested, premature mixing of fuel and oxidizer occurred, and the engine went into launch mode while work crews were still swarming

all over the missile. Nedelin was sitting nearby waiting for the work to be completed. The missile rose in the air and then fell, and the acid poured out and burned everyone who was in the vicinity. Yangel was saved by a miracle, having stepped into a specially protected area to have a smoke.<sup>27</sup>

Western newspapers complain that we conceal catastrophic accidents that happen in our country when we are testing missiles. But that was the only such catastrophe during my time. Of course several missiles did fall from the sky and explode, but that happened without any casualties. We suffered only material losses and a loss of time in those cases. We suffered no casualties among the cosmonauts who went into outer space.

Our country is now recognized as a power in space and as a nuclear power. The USSR gained special recognition after Gagarin's flight into space in 1961. His flight showed that we could do more than just launch a satellite. After we launched the first satellite, you know, one not very intelligent American general, when he was asked his opinion of the launching of Sputnik, said: "Well, what's so special about it? So they put a chunk of metal in the sky." The general made a laughingstock of himself, showing that either he was deliberately trying to belittle our achievement or didn't really understand its importance for the subsequent exploration of outer space. The space era, which opened [with Gagarin's flight] in 1961, put an end forever to the desire of Western critics to underrate the outstanding Soviet successes in this field.

When Yangel's design bureau joined in on the production of strategic missiles of short, medium, and long range we began reorganizing industry for assembly-line production of these items. For propaganda purposes we even publicized the Soviet achievement throughout the world, stating that we were now producing missiles virtually on an automated basis, turning them out like sausages. That was only approximately true because we had learned how to organize not exactly "assembly-line production," but piece-by-piece assembly on a production line without the use of a conveyer belt. This wasn't the kind of production line you use when you're assembling tractors, with a conveyer belt carrying the parts steadily along while the assemblers simply attach the appropriate parts and the tractors come out at the end fully assembled, a new one every few minutes.

I paid a great deal of attention and put in a lot of time and energy to updating and modernizing our armed forces. Of course I did this as an organizer, not a specialist. It's important for the leadership to listen to others on a timely basis—to hear what needs to be heard, to support good solid thinking, and to orient people correctly.

Let me give the following example. At first our ballistic missiles stood aboveground, sticking up like candles, waiting for the moment when they would go into action. But the enemy might strike the first blow. If one warhead fell on the area where our missile forces were deployed (our missiles were deployed in groups), the blast of the explosion might destroy everything or put it out of commission, rendering us incapable of retaliation. I knew well the conditions under which missiles would be launched. When Stalin was still alive I saw films several times showing atomic-weapons tests and all the horrors they bring with them. Of course they contaminated various animals, dogs and sheep, positioned in trenches at varying distances from the center of the blast. It was a dreadful sight! It was painful to look at those poor animals. I'm not even talking about the material destruction. Tanks, airplanes, and various structures were positioned so as to test the effects of the explosion at various distances and up to what distance it continued to have an impact.

As a worker in the mines and a participant in the construction of subways, I had a specific knowledge of mining operations. The idea occurred to me of placing the missiles in vertical shafts. If we dug shafts, lined them with concrete, and put the missiles and appropriate equipment in them, they could be kept in sealed structures with a cover over them. That way they could be better preserved under all weather conditions. If an enemy blow fell in the area, only a direct hit would effectively destroy our missile, and that was not very likely.

I asked the designers to think about this idea. Then they reported to me that such a thing was impossible. I was surprised. It seemed to me that the idea was not only realizable but should be of interest to them. I was not completely sure they had decided correctly.

When Yangel stated that he could make a missile using an acid oxidizer instead of liquid oxygen, I was on vacation in the South. He and I met on the shores of the Black Sea while we were both on vacation. In relaxed surroundings he reported to me in detail and expanded on the ideas he was thinking about for making this missile. I presented my arguments to him at that point: "Comrade Yangel, the specialists think it's impractical to put a missile in a vertical shaft. But I ask you to think about it as an engineer. Let the specialists in your design bureau answer the question of whether a metal sleeve, or cylinder, couldn't be placed in a shaft of a particular diameter with a clearance around it so that a missile could be placed in that cylinder. A gap would be left between the cylinder and the wall so that the gas from the launching of the missile, after hitting the bottom of the shaft, could pass

through the gap surrounding the cylinder and escape to the surface.” I picked up two glasses of different diameter and said to him: “Look, we put one inside the other, deliberately leaving a gap so that the gas won’t destroy the missile and will have a way of escaping to the surface by going around the cylinder that holds the missile.” Yangel immediately said: “I don’t understand why my colleagues rejected the idea. I like it.”

It’s true that this was not his technical field. Barmin<sup>28</sup> was in charge of that area. Barmin continues his useful work to this day [1971], but at that time he rejected my idea. My son Sergei, an engineer who had some dealings with missiles and who had been at some missile tests as part of his work, heard about this idea from me. He and I often discussed the question. He followed American specialized literature on the subject and told me about a journal in the United States that described a cluster of shafts, or silos, for launching ballistic missiles. I was glad at such a coincidence of views, but also saddened. We had lost time in vain. I had made the right suggestion, but the specialists hadn’t taken it up. Now I summoned the appropriate people and said: “Look how things have turned out. I was told my idea was impossible. But the Americans have already taken this road and are building these missile silos.” I demanded that work on the project begin immediately.

I asked our people in the mining industry to make devices that could drill the kind of vertical shafts we needed. They did this work sensibly. Zasyadko<sup>29</sup> had reported to me earlier that drilling devices of the kind we needed were being used around Mushketovo.<sup>30</sup> I referred to Zasyadko’s report and said: “Take machinery of this kind and adapt it for use in drilling shafts of the necessary depth and diameter.” When I had worked at Mine No. 21 in the Donbas, the mineshafts there had already reached a depth of 250 *sazhens* [about 530 meters].<sup>31</sup> So I had a specific idea of the subject under discussion. The engineers finally admitted that I was right. Unfortunately, they admitted this only on the basis of the American experience. After my retirement, this machinery was used to drill such shafts. After they were drilled, reinforcement structures were installed. I was glad that we had been able to place our nuclear missiles in a position of greater security, to have them ready to fire, to be sent into action at any moment. Even after an attack on us a certain number would survive, and we would be able to retaliate.

A new man appeared on the horizon of our work on missiles and rockets. [After Stalin’s death in 1953] a designer named Chelomei,<sup>32</sup> a man previously unknown to me and still a young man, asked to be received by me. He showed me a model of a missile that he was carrying in his pocket and told me he could make a short-range cruise missile, with an engine using



kerosene as fuel, similar to the German V-1, except that it was designed differently.<sup>33</sup> The wings could be retracted; the missile could be placed in a launching container, a kind of firing tube; then the propellant could be inserted and the jet engine ignited. When the missile flew out of the container, the wings opened into position. We needed such missiles for coastal defense and as a long-range anti-aircraft weapon.<sup>34</sup> Its design showed original thinking. It turned out to be a mobile weapon; its components were well put together, and the method of launching from a tubelike container showed intelligent thinking. It was as though the missile were fired from the barrel of a huge cannon. Later, in our military parades, many people saw these huge barrel-shaped objects being carried by trucks across Red Square past the Kremlin. Those were Chelomei's missiles. They are no longer a secret, because a new generation has been produced to replace them.

I consider it necessary to tell about this first meeting because Chelomei played an important role, and continues to play such a role now, in providing missile defenses for our country. I told Chelomei that I liked his idea and that we would discuss it in the leadership; then I would report to him about the decision reached. I asked him if he was known to anyone else among the political leaders. He said that he had been received by Bulganin. (Chelomei had approached him because Bulganin then was minister of defense.) I told Bulganin that the designer and engineer Chelomei, whom he knew, had made an interesting proposal for missiles that differed from the ideas of Yangel and Korolyov but did not compete with those ideas. I said that such missiles would be very useful for arming our troops. But Bulganin reacted negatively. He said: "Yes, I know him." And then he expressed himself quite coarsely in regard to Chelomei as an unreliable person who was only blowing hot air, and he advised me: "Throw him out on his ear! That's what Stalin did. He's come around with his ideas before. He was given a chance to show what he could do, but he didn't accomplish anything."

That answer grated on me. I said: "Nikolai Aleksandrovich [Bulganin], your reference to the fact that Stalin threw this man out on his ear doesn't tell me anything. Stalin's authority on technical matters is not very high. Let's listen to what Chelomei has to say. Let's put this point on the agenda at a meeting of the Central Committee Presidium and let him report to us. You're basing your attitude toward him only on what Stalin said, but Chelomei has shown me a model of his missile. That is, the specifics of his idea have already been worked out. The model works, and he's close to producing an actual missile."

That's what we did. Chelomei was invited to the next meeting of the Central Committee Presidium, and again he presented his model. Many Presidium

members had a poor knowledge of questions having to do with weapons, and so no one expressed great enthusiasm, but there were also no objections. I supported Chelomei, and that had considerable significance because problems of defense technology had been assigned to me when the various duties had been distributed among members of the Presidium. I proposed that we give Chelomei a workshop, industrial workers, engineers, and technicians, and return to him a library that he had asked about at the Presidium session. He had said: "I owned a library of technical books at the design bureau where I worked. When I was fired [under Stalin] and deprived of a material base where I could work, my library was given to Artyom Ivanovich Mikoyan." The library was returned, but the workshop he was given at first was not a very luxurious one. Still, he was happy enough to have it. Then Chelomei went to work with great intensity and was soon "overgrown" with people and equipment. The missile he had proposed was produced. His calculations proved to be correct. [That is, the missile worked according to his design.] And now we had one more design bureau to provide weapons for our armed forces.

The buildup of our missile strength began to go at a furious pace. Korolyov, Yangel, Chelomei—all of them were working on long-range missiles with enormous payloads and powerful warheads. Several different types of such missiles were produced. Other talented designers developed antiaircraft missiles and short-range missiles, as well as antitank missiles. Chelomei literally showered us with new proposals: global missiles, intercontinental missiles, ship-to-shore and shore-to-ship missiles. He was able to produce the intercontinental missile UR-100, which by using special "ampules" could be launched at a moment's notice.<sup>35</sup> We added the UR-100 to our arsenal in place of several of Yangel's proposed missiles.

At one of our conferences Chelomei was like a peddler displaying wares, dragging calico, beads, and so on out of a box, but in Chelomei's case he was spreading all his projects out in front of us. I remember Korolyov muttering then: "Chelomei this, Chelomei that, Chelomei is taking over everything." Chelomei's proposals really were universal, and at the same time they were most beneficial, both from the point of view of fully developing our defense capability and from the point of view of being economical. He was also the person who later proposed the heavy missile UR-500, the so-called Proton, which could carry a heavier load into space than Korolyov's rocket. The Proton is still at work. Korolyov immediately proposed a new rocket, the super-powerful N-1. Chelomei had already begun to insist that his own design was more realistic. The creative competition continued.

How it ended I don't know. I'm retired now, on a pension. I grow carrots and scallop squash, and I get my news from the papers. But they're unreliable as a source. You can't tell from the papers which type of rocket or missile is now being produced or launched. I can't tell now who is foremost in the world of rocket engineering, whose ideas are prevailing, or who is doing what. But even now it's pleasant for me to think that I did the right thing by supporting Chelomei in my day and giving him the opportunity to develop and prove himself.

I would also like to tell about the following incident in the search for ways of ensuring the defense of the USSR. At one time Stalin had made a decision to have an underground factory built to produce atomic bombs. Then the proposal was made to switch it over to the assembling of missiles, although properly speaking those didn't yet exist, aside from the R-5. Construction was under way in Siberia, near Krasnoyarsk, and the underground factory was halfway completed. I asked permission from the Central Committee Presidium to fly to Siberia and acquaint myself with the progress of the work right on the spot. During the war I had been a strong supporter of underground factories, and when I was working in Ukraine I wrote a memorandum to Stalin to that effect, proposing that in plans for new coalmines, where there were thick seams of coal, we ought to provide for the possibility, in passing, that after the coal was removed, underground factories could be established. In particular, this could be done at mines like the Svetlitsa, located in the Moscow Coal Basin.<sup>36</sup> It seemed to me that the conditions for an underground factory at the Svetlitsa mine were ideal. There were other locations as well, where after useful minerals had been removed, the tunnels could be reinforced with concrete and the place could be turned into a military workshop.

Hitler also used underground factories, and did so rather extensively. We took the German experience into account. When I arrived in Siberia I inspected the underground installation together with local leaders. It had been dug into granite, and it was good and solid. But it was not big enough for modern production. In fact, it could not have been otherwise. How could you dig room enough for an entire factory out of granite! But the main thing I saw was that the problem could not be solved this way. How were people thinking it was going to be used? To produce missiles during a war? I said: "This idea is totally insupportable. If a war of nuclear missiles begins, it will be a war of instantaneous action. How can we count on the lengthy time that would be needed to produce missiles? All the factories in our country providing parts and components would have been destroyed. The only thing provided for here is final assembly. [To build missiles,] we

need many different parts and components, thousands of them. The transportation system would be knocked out of commission, and you would be doomed. A future war can be lost literally in a matter of days. Even if the war continued in the form of guerrilla operations, still, this factory would be unable to function.”

Even during World War II the “flying fortresses” made in the United States ruled the skies over Germany, bombing night and day. Although they did suffer losses, those losses were justified by the results. They destroyed whatever industrial targets they chose. What about missiles? Missiles provide more possibilities. They can be aimed at their targets without any people on board. The United States is a wealthy country. It can make missiles in as large a quantity as is necessary to destroy its adversary in the very first days or perhaps even the very first hours.

The idea of underground factories is not justifiable. It contributes to the exhaustion of our resources, but doesn’t solve the problem. We would squander our resources on them in vain. We would have no assurance that we were providing for the defense of our country. I asked: “How many missiles per year could this factory produce?” They named a figure. Then I went on: “We need much more than that. Even hundreds of missiles won’t solve the problem. This problem is becoming unsolvable. We’ll have to search for some other solution.”

Vannikov was in charge of construction of this factory as head of the Ministry for Medium Machine-Building. That was the name of the ministry that produced atomic bombs.

Half of the sum set aside for this purpose had already been spent. Approximately 3 billion rubles out of 6 billion (in the old currency).<sup>37</sup> “That money has been thrown to the winds,” I said. “What do you think about all this, Comrade Vannikov?”

Vannikov was an intelligent man. He glanced at me in a cunning sort of way, and there was the suggestion of a smile in his eyes. He agreed without any objections.

I was taken aback. I asked: “Then why in the world were you doing this?”

He answered: “We weren’t trying to get into this business. It was Stalin’s idea.”

Then I made a proposal: “Let’s use several factories that are now making fighter planes (they’re closest of all to the production process for the body of a missile). We’ll convert them to missile production. We’ll also assign existing factories to make parts for them, and we’ll do this quickly. The defense of our country won’t tolerate delays. We can’t be standing around with our mouths hanging open like we did on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.”

We discussed the question in the party's Central Committee, and no one objected. Assignments were made to work out specific proposals. Some very large enterprises, airplane factories building fighters and bombers, were assigned to this new task.

Now the production of missiles and the launching of missiles were being perfected more and more. We grew more confident that missiles were the only correct path to take for a reliable defense of the USSR, together, of course, with hydrogen bombs, which were being accumulated.

Experimental tests gave us the possibility of reducing the cost of the warhead, and such possibilities increased with every new test. This in turn made it possible to produce more new warheads from the same amount of fissionable material. The scientists achieved explosions of great power. We were able to produce warheads of varying explosive force: at first it was less than a megaton, later more than a megaton, then two megatons, then two and a half. The further we moved forward, the more our industry and our scientists were able to ensure the necessary strengthening of our arsenal.

By this time we were completely convinced that the chief type of weapon was the nuclear missile. In the early 1960s a new deployment of forces was confirmed organizationally; we established a new branch of the armed forces—the Strategic Missile Forces. No other country at that time had established such a branch of the armed forces. In this respect we were ahead of the United States.

Today is June 14, 1971. Going by the old calendar<sup>38</sup> (and people of my generation still use the old calendar to designate the time of year), it's the beginning of summer [June 1]. According to the new calendar, thirteen days of summer have already gone by. Summer has been changed, as some people say. I have always preferred spring and summer. I don't agree with the poets who sing the praises of autumn. Autumn is nice, it's tasty; the gifts of nature are piled high on the table of abundance, and people enjoy the fruits of their summertime labors. Still and all, I find spring more pleasant.

Let me return to the subject of missiles. Immediately after we established the Strategic Missile Forces, we began to place our long-range strategic missiles with nuclear warheads on constant alert [that is, ready to fire in a matter of minutes]. This took place in the final stage of my political and governmental work. We had firmly taken the road of giving preference to nuclear missiles over bombers. We also produced bombers, but now they had been reduced to an auxiliary role. Other types of weapons were also developed. During my time in power, over the course of six years, atomic warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and for air-to-ship and air-to-land missiles

were being produced. But we preferred strategic missiles to all those others, because at that time the USSR did not have enough nuclear material for all those atomic and hydrogen warheads.

For the Americans, back then, the long-range bomber was considered the main weapon for delivering nuclear bombs. However, they had apprehensions about their bases around the USSR, where their planes were deployed. But after all, that was the territory of their allies, and evidently they worried less about their allies than they did about their own country. The territory of the United States remained invulnerable. But when we created our nuclear missiles we drew even with the United States in military potential. Not yet in quantity, but we did have the same potential. By placing the emphasis on designing missiles at a forced pace, testing them successfully, and expanding their production at former airplane factories, we no longer had to yield to the United States in any respect. In addition, we had reduced our spending on aircraft production. We continued to make fighters and bombers, but our priority had shifted to missiles. They were now performing the function of bombers.

Having no cover from the air, bombers are doomed to destruction in the event of war. But people will say: "What about hedgehopping, flying at very low levels?" Such planes are also vulnerable. We have produced anti-aircraft weapons that can hit targets at a very low altitude. Besides, planes can't fly very far when they're hedgehopping because they use a great deal of fuel. That's why we mainly assigned missile-bearing planes to defend our borders.

It's possible that, in the future, science will discover a way to make long-range bombers invulnerable. I'm speaking from the point of view of present-day technical capabilities. Life introduces its own corrections. For the time being we decided not to try to develop bombers any further. And after anti-aircraft missiles came into existence we reduced our production of fighters. Anti-aircraft artillery met the same fate. It's true that, as it turned out, we over-estimated anti-aircraft missiles somewhat. So did the Americans to some extent. It turned out that at low altitudes, front-line bombers and fighters could break through the cover provided by anti-aircraft missiles. The war in Vietnam and the war between Israel and Egypt confirmed this. For the time being, the technology of anti-aircraft missiles has not been perfected sufficiently. At low altitudes and at high speeds the radars don't find the target quickly enough, so that not enough time remains to put the anti-aircraft missiles into action, and after the missile is launched it doesn't have time to get up to speed and maneuver properly. While this problem is being worked on, both we and the Americans have returned to rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns. During

my time, when I was still working, the opinion was that anti-aircraft artillery had outlived its day. Now it has turned out that, temporarily, it's the only weapon that can be used against low-flying enemy planes.

And so, as I have said, life introduces its corrections. And later there are corrections to those corrections. And yet in principle, missiles with homing systems are still more effective than anti-aircraft artillery—that is, missiles capable of homing in on their targets. In the future, missiles will be produced that are capable of hitting planes flying at low altitudes. But of course the best solution to the problem is to achieve a disarmament agreement among all countries, and in general to reach all agreements through negotiations. Let there be an end to war! That is the ancient dream of humankind. It is an ideal that lives on in the minds of people, but thus far we haven't found the road that leads there. We don't have enough mutual trust.

As long as different sociopolitical systems exist, along with class antagonisms, the insane arms race will continue, and the best forces of our nations and governments will be spent on producing the means of mutual destruction.

1. On the aircraft designer Sergei Vladimirovich Ilyushin, see Biographies. Also see Biographies for Artyom Ivanovich Mikoyan and Mikhail Yosi-fovich Gurevich. The designation “MiG,” or more properly “MiG,” is derived from the last names of these two aircraft designers, the “Mi” from Mikoyan, and the “G” from Gurevich. [GS]

For a history of the early period of aircraft design in the Soviet Union, see V. B. Shavrov, *Istoriya konstruktivnykh samoletov v SSSR (1938–1950 gg.)* (History of Aircraft Design in the USSR [1938–50]) (Moscow: Mashinostroyeniye, 1994). [SK]

2. This refers in particular to the F-86 Saber. [GS]

3. On the aircraft designer Semyon Alekseyevich Lavochkin, see Biographies. The anti-aircraft missile referred to was the S-25. [SK]

4. Sergo (Sergei) Lavrentyevich Beria (1924–2003) was also known by his mother's last name as Sergei Alekseyevich Gegechkori. At this time he was working as chief engineer at design bureau KB-1. See Biographies. He tells his own story in Sergo Beria, *Moi otets—Lavrenty Beriya* (My Father Lavrenty Beria), (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1994). The English translation was published as *Beria My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin* (London: Duckworth Publishers, 2003). [SK]

5. On the aircraft designer Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev, see Biographies. Also, Khrushchev speaks of Tupolev at length elsewhere in his memoirs, in both this volume and the next. [GS]

6. Vladimir Mikhailovich Myasishchev (1902–78) was the designer of several attack and transporta-

tion aircraft, including the 201-M and 103-M. See Biographies.

7. In Russian the word *raketa* means both “rocket” and “missile.” In English, when such a device is used to launch objects into space, it is usually called a “rocket,” but when the object it launches is a projectile armed with explosives it is usually called a “missile.” [GS]

8. Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov. See Biographies.

9. Semyon Alekseyevich Lavochkin (1900–1960) created the fighter aircraft LaGG-3, LA-5, and LA-7, the jets LA-15, LA-176, and other models. See Biographies.

10. At that time (1953–57), Dmitry Ustinov was minister of defense industry of the USSR. See Biographies.

11. This reference to the philosophy of non-resistance to evil (“turning the other cheek”), as promoted by the Tolstoyans, entered into the Russian language, especially in the Soviet era, and came to mean any pacifistic or passive person. See also Khrushchev's discussion of “nonresistance to evil” in connection with Gandhi and Nehru as well as Count Leo Tolstoy in his chapter on “India” in the forthcoming Volume 3 of these memoirs. Also, see his discussion of pacifism later in this volume, in the chapter on Kurchatov and others. [SK/GS]

12. Valentin Petrovich Glushko (1908–89) was the founding father of fluid rocket-engine construction and the designer of the engines installed in many space rockets. See Biographies.

13. For a more detailed account of relations between Korolyov and Glushko, see Sergei Khrush-



chev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*. [SK]

14. Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kuznetsov (1911–95; see Biographies) had a design bureau in the city of Kuibyshev (Samara). He also designed the engine for Korolyov's N-1 lunar rocket. In the 1990s the United States wanted to purchase leftover N-1 rocket engines for use in the U.S. space program (probably for the Atlas). [SK]

15. In January 1966 Korolyov underwent an operation for the removal of a polyp from the large intestine. Surgery revealed, however, that it was not just a polyp, but a late-stage sarcoma. Unsure how to proceed, the surgeons held a consultation, but in the meantime Korolyov's body went into shock and he died on the operating table. [SK]

16. The first successful test of a Soviet antimissile missile was in 1960. [SK]

17. There were two radio stations behind the missile's line of flight, one to the left and one to the right, each 500 kilometers (about 300 miles) from the launch site. They could send radio signals to keep the missile on its trajectory. [SK]

18. Mikhail Kuzmich Yangel (1911–71). During the Cold War, there were widely published reports in the West that Yangel was actually German and had been part of Germany's rocket development program during World War II (a kind of Soviet equivalent to Werner von Braun, who helped develop Hitler's V-1 and V-2 rockets, then worked on missiles and space vehicles for the U.S. government). According to Soviet accounts, Yangel was born in Irkutsk province and graduated in 1937 from the Ordzhonikidze Aviation Institute in Moscow. During the war (1941–44) he worked at the design bureau of Nikolai Nikolayevich Polikarpov on various types of Soviet fighter planes. In 1944 he began work at the design bureau headed by Artyom Ivanovich Mikoyan and Vladimir Mikhailovich Myasishchev. In 1950 he graduated from the Aviation Industry Institute and from 1952 to 1954 directed a research institute. In 1954 he became chief designer at his own design bureau in Dnepropetrovsk, in Ukraine. [GS] See Biographies.

19. The fuel was asymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine and the oxidizer was nitrogen tetroxide. [SK]

20. Khrushchev is referring to the U.S. intercontinental cruise missiles Snark and Navaho. [SK]

21. *Buran* means blizzard, a snowstorm on the plains. [GS]

22. Lavochkin died in 1960 at the Sary Shagan test site near Lake Balkhash during tests (that were unsuccessful) of his Dal antiaircraft missile. Although he was suffering from heart trouble, he nevertheless traveled to the test site in very hot weather and died there from a heart attack. [SK]

23. In U.S. terminology this was a medium-range ballistic missile, or MRBM. For U.S. equivalents of Soviet missile codes, see page xi. [SK]

24. This was an intermediate-range ballistic missile, or IRBM, in U.S. terminology. It was known in the West as the SS-5. [SK]

25. The missiles installed in Cuba in 1962 were Yangel's R-12s and R-14s. He also produced the R-36 missile (known in the West as the SS-18, or Satan missile). [SK]

26. Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin (1902–60) was a chief marshal of artillery and became commander in chief of Strategic Missile Forces in 1959. See Biographies.

27. The disaster to which Khrushchev here refers occurred on October 24, 1960, at the Tyura-Tam test range in Kazakhstan. Testing of the missile had begun on September 26 and continued despite the emergence of serious technical problems. On October 26, the Soviet newspapers published a communiqué from the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers announcing that Marshal Nedelin had died in an airplane crash. The true story was first revealed in 1989 in the magazine *Ogonyok*. [SS] I provide an account of the circumstances of the catastrophe at Tyura-Tam in my book *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania University State Press, 2000), 416–25. [SK]

28. Vladimir Pavlovich Barmin (1909–93) was the creator of missile launch complexes. See Biographies.

29. Aleksandr Fyodorovich Zasyadko (1910–63) was at that time a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. [MN] After the war he was engaged in restoring the mines of the Donbas. [SK] See Biographies.

30. At that time Mushketovo was a small mining town just southeast of Donetsk; today it is part of Donetsk. It may have been named after the prominent Russian geologist Ivan Vasilyevich Mushketov (1850–1902). [SK/AH/GS]

31. The *sazhen* is an old Russian unit of length, equivalent to 2.134 meters. [GS]

32. Vladimir Nikolayevich Chelomei (1914–84), Soviet rocket scientist, specialist in the field of vibration theory, principal designer of rockets, missiles, and spacecraft, member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (from 1962 on), twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

After graduating from the Kiev Aviation Institute in 1937, he worked at the Central Institute for Aircraft Engine Construction in Moscow. During the war against Germany, in 1942, Chelomei invented a pulse-jet engine. (He did not know then that such an engine was being developed in Germany and was used to power the German V-1 rockets.) When perfected, such an engine would be suitable for powering this type of rocket (the forerunner, or early prototype, of today's cruise missile). Such a weapon could be used to bombard Germany at a time when Germany was itself bombarding Britain with such rockets.

In 1944 Chelomei was made head of a design bureau to develop and produce such missiles. Flight tests of the missiles began in March 1944, but they were not used in World War II. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Chelomei's design bureau produced a series of cruise missiles (the so-called exes)—10X, 14X, 16X, etc. The Soviet air force tested them by launching them from TU-2 and PE-8 bombers.

For some reason (perhaps bureaucratic intrigue) the products of Chelomei's design bureau were judged inadequate; it was said that cruise missiles with pulse-jet engines had no future. In early 1953, under an order bearing Stalin's signature, Chelomei's design bureau was dissolved, and the physical plant was turned over to another designer of cruise missiles and aircraft, Artyom Ivanovich Mikoyan (brother of the party leader Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan).

Chelomei became a professor at the Bauman Higher Technical School in Moscow. In 1954, as Khrushchev here describes, he proposed the revolutionary idea of launching a cruise missile from a round tube in such a way that the wings opened out just after the missile was launched. Until time for its use, the missile could be maintained in good condition in its tube. Present-day rocket engineering throughout the world is now founded on this concept (a missile with folding wings that open after launch).

As Khrushchev also recounts, Chelomei sought support for this idea from Minister of Defense Bulganin, but Bulganin turned him away. Chelomei then showed his invention to Khrushchev, who supported him.

Chelomei's missile with retractable wings proved suitable for installation in submarines, in special tubes, and could be fired from underwater as well as from surface positions. At that time the United States had the submarine-based Regulus cruise missile, but could fit only two such missiles to a submarine. With Chelomei's design, the Soviet navy could fit *eight or more* cruise missiles to a submarine. Influential officers of the Soviet navy lobbied for government financing of experimental work on these missiles.

On October 29, 1955, a design bureau (OKB-52) under Chelomei's direction was established at the Reutov mechanical works (Reutovsky Mekhanicheskyy Zavod). Reutov is a town in Moscow province, 14 kilometers east of Moscow; in the 1970s, it had a population of more than 50,000. (The original village was called Reutovo, and that form of the name is still used colloquially.)

Delighted with the achievements of Soviet rocket engineering and space science, and with the successes of the Reutov design bureau, Khrushchev assigned two other design bureaus to Chelomei—NII-642 in Moscow and OKB-23 in Fili (where the Khrunichev Space Center is now located).

In 2006, a "direct descendant" of Chelomei's design bureau continued to exist in the form of the state-owned enterprise NPO Mashinostroyeniya (which means "research-production association for machine building").

By 1959 the first Soviet submarine had been equipped with Chelomei's missile, the P-5. Chelomei's design bureau went on to provide a wide array of cruise missiles for the Soviet navy, for surface vessels as well as submarines—the P-6, P-35, Granit, Bazalt, Yakhont, etc.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s Chelomei expanded his projects to include ballistic missiles and space rocketry for military purposes. He developed a family of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that were the most massive in the Soviet arsenal—the UR-100 family (known in the United States as SS-11). (UR stands for "universal rocket.") The UR-100 was first tested in August 1964 and was added to the Soviet arsenal in 1966. It was the ancestor of several generations of ballistic missiles. Their descendants are still on duty as part of Russia's arsenal of strategic missiles. It is estimated that the majority of Soviet ICBMs—970 out of 1,567—were the "handiwork" of Chelomei; that is, products of his design bureau.

After graduating from an electric power institute, I (Sergei Khrushchev) began work at Chelomei's design bureau in Reutov in March 1958, specializing in control systems. What I told my father about Chelomei's work may have caused him to view the scientist even more favorably than he already did. There is no question that in the late 1950s and early 1960s the contributions of Chelomei's design bureau were decisive in achieving parity in the space race between the Soviet Union and the United States.

In 1963 a maneuverable satellite was launched—Chelomei's Polyot, which could change its own orbit. Later the Polyot was developed into an interceptor satellite, one that could destroy enemy satellites.

The height of Chelomei's achievement was the two-stage space launcher UR-500 (Proton). Later he designed a three-stage version of this space launcher, which was the most powerful Soviet space vehicle, capable of placing 24 tons in orbit. It was used, among other things, to launch modules for the International Space Station.

Chelomei proposed and developed a radar satellite for naval reconnaissance and target designation, with a small nuclear electric power plant on board. (It was called a US, meaning "universal satellite.")

In 1964 Chelomei proposed his own variant for placing a man on the moon, but for some reason his proposal was rejected.

In 1965 Chelomei began designing a manned space station to remain in orbit for space reconnaissance. It would be the first in the world and

was called the Almaz. Modules from this design, by order of the influential party official Dmitry Fyodorovich Ustinov (former minister of defense industry, who in 1976 became Soviet defense minister), were transferred to Korolyov's design bureau and were used in creating the first manned space station. When Chelomei was finally able to launch his Almaz, it orbited under the name Salyut. [SK]

33. This is the V-1 rocket, with which the Germans bombarded London and other Allied-held areas near the end of World War II, mainly June–September 1944. [GS]

34. The anti-aircraft missile was similar to the Bomarc missile in the United States. [SK]

35. We present here an explanatory note on Chelomei's "ampules." This was a period when the Soviet Union lagged behind the United States in the production of solid fuel for missiles. At that time Soviet missile engines used kerosene as a fuel (or some other more efficient liquid fuel—more efficient, that is, in terms of the heat-generating capacity of the chemical compound), and as an oxidizer the missile engines used nitric acid or some even more corrosive acid. After a missile was loaded with fuel and oxidizer, the oxidizer began to corrode the valves, pumps, etc. Thus the missile could be kept ready to fire only for a few days, and if it was not launched, the oxidizer and fuel had to be removed (poured off into storage tanks at the launch site) and then the missile had to be sent back to the factory for replacement of parts that had been damaged by the acid oxidizer.

Soviet missiles, then, were maintained without fuel and oxidizer. Several hours were usually required—for the loading of fuel and oxidizer—before the missile could be launched. But in the event of an enemy missile attack, a counterstrike had to be launched much more quickly. It was calculated that no more than three minutes could be allowed between the order to fire and the launching of the missile. Minuteman missiles in the United States could be launched on three minutes' notice.

Chelomei proposed that the oxidizer tank be coated with a special material that would not be

affected by the acid and could withstand contact with it for a period of 10–20 years. The pipe (or pipes) leading from the tank was also sealed with a special membrane of the same material.

In his UR-100, Chelomei used a highly corrosive (and poisonous) acid as the oxidizer. Until the time came for its use—that is, for the missile engine to be fired and the missile launched—the acid oxidizer was kept hermetically sealed in these special corrosion-resistant tanks, which he called "ampules" (in Russian, *ampuli*). When the time came for the missile to be launched, the membrane at the "throat," or exit vent, of the "ampule" was cut by specially installed knife blades activated by pyrocartridges. With the breaking of this seal, the oxidizer in the "ampule" flowed into the rocket engine's combustion chamber, where, mixing with the fuel, it ignited the rapid burn that produced the thrust for liftoff. The designing of this corrosion-resistant tank was one of Chelomei's great engineering achievements, and all Soviet liquid-fuel missiles were subsequently based on this principle. He chose the term "ampule" by analogy with an ampule of medicine that can be kept sealed for a long time and is opened only when about to be used, as for an injection. [SK]

36. This coal basin in the southern part of Moscow province, not far from the city of Tula, is a source of brown coal. [SK/GS]

37. A revaluation of the ruble was carried out in the Khrushchev era, its face value being reduced by nine-tenths. Thus, one "new ruble" was worth ten rubles in the "old currency." See Khrushchev's discussion of this monetary reform earlier in this volume. [GS]

38. Much of Western Europe changed to the Gregorian calendar in the sixteenth century, because the Julian calendar kept lagging more and more behind the natural changes of the seasons. Russia, however, continued to use the Julian calendar until 1918. By the twentieth century the difference between the two calendars had grown to thirteen days. [SK/GS]

## ANTIMISSILE DEFENSES

No sooner had we established our missile forces, headed by Nedelin, than we began to be concerned with the problem of antimissile defenses. After the death of Nedelin he was replaced by Moskalenko, who was in turn succeeded by Krylov.<sup>1</sup> Since our adversaries had also added missiles to their arsenal, there automatically arose the need for us to create the means of destroying them—that is, antimissile missiles. This is an expensive indulgence, and a complicated one. But we were forced to undertake the task, and we organized the appropriate design bureau, headed by [Grigory] Kisunko.<sup>2</sup> He was a good, talented designer, and he found a solution to the problem. His bureau developed a technology for countering enemy missiles. Strictly speaking, the antimissile missile itself was developed by another remarkable designer—Pyotr Dimitryevich Grushin.<sup>3</sup> It was Grushin's missile that knocked down the Americans' U-2 spy plane.<sup>4</sup>

To encourage our own people and to frighten our adversaries, I stated publicly back then that we had the capability of hitting a fly in outer space with our antimissile weapons. Of course I was exaggerating somewhat, but we really had achieved the capability of hitting missiles with atomic warheads. Kisunko told me about this in detail when I met with him. But the problem turned out to be very complicated. The destruction of absolutely all warheads, once they are launched, is not yet possible, especially if many of them appear at once. There were other ways of solving the problem, and we provided the financing for those as well, and even made the decision to establish special antimissile forces.<sup>5</sup>

Among those working on the problem was Chelomei. He was a designer whom I liked very much. Even today I have no regrets about having supported him. He justified the hopes we placed in him. But he too was unable to create antimissile weapons that would allow us to sleep peacefully. During my time in office we didn't acquire such weapons.

The goal of reaching an agreement among the nuclear powers to stop work on antimissile technology was dictated by a desire to spare our country from the threat of a new military disaster and at the same time not to exhaust our material resources. Even if we spent an unlimited amount, in my opinion, we could never succeed in defending ourselves absolutely. Scientists told me about long-range plans—research on lasers and cosmic rays.<sup>6</sup>

I don't know what the state of that work is at present, but I would propose that the most sensible and prudent thing would be for all countries to agree to stop any work on antimissile weapons. In the mid-1960s President

Johnson refused to go to extremes and withheld authorization for resources to be spent on such research. When Nixon entered the White House [in 1969] he announced that he would undertake construction of an antimissile system. That spurred the Soviet Union on, and a new stage of the arms race unfolded, with senseless expenditures of human energy and effort, which exhausted our economy and overburdened our budget.

1. On Nedelin, see the preceding chapter. Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Semyonovich Moskalenko (1902–85) was commander in chief of strategic missile forces from 1960 to 1962; see Biographies. On Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Ivanovich Krylov, see Biographies. [GS]

2. Grigory Vasilyevich Kisunko (1918–98) was a specialist in radio electronics and head of a design bureau. See Mikhail Pervov, *Sistemy Raketno-kosmicheskoi oborony sozdavalis tak* (This Is How Missile-Aerospace Defense Systems Were Created) (Moscow: VAGRIUS XXI, 2003); see also Grigory Kisunko, *Sekretnaya zona: Ispoved generalnogo konstruktora* (Secret Zone [i.e., high-security restricted area]: Confession of a General Designer) (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1996). Kisunko developed the antimissile defense system of which Grushin's missile was a part. Pyotr Dmitriyevich Grushin (1906–93) was a specialist in aviation technology and a graduate and faculty dean of the Moscow Aviation Institute. For further information on Kisunko and Grushin, see Biographies. [SK/GS]

3. Complex S-75 (SA-2), designed by P. D. Grushin.

4. This took place on May 1, 1960. For Khrushchev's account of the incident, see the chapter "Four-Power Summit Meeting in Paris" in Volume 3 (forthcoming) of this edition of the memoirs. [SS/GS]

5. In the USSR, a separate branch of the armed forces was established, the Antimissile and Space Defense Forces (Sily Protivoraketnoi i Protivokosmicheskoi Oborony). In the 1990s several structural changes were made. These forces were merged with Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, then separated again, then merged again, and so on. [SK]

6. What Khrushchev meant here is not exactly cosmic rays, but "soft" radiation from an atomic explosion, which has a distant similarity to cosmic rays. Such radiation can destroy the heat insulation in ballistic warheads. [SK]

## TANKS AND CANNON

I want to talk about conventional weapons, or as they are sometimes called, classical weapons. First of all, this means tanks and antitank guns. After missiles, and after a submarine fleet, our main strength as a land power lay in our infantry, artillery, and armored units.

What can be said about our tank forces—about our armor in general and about tanks as weapons? I would say that in my last years [before October 1964] nothing new was introduced, with the exception of a new technology for smelting steel, which makes it possible to produce tanks with better armor and better mobility. At an artillery range for tanks at Kubinka in September

1964, just before my retirement, I watched some practice firing with artillery and antitank missiles.<sup>1</sup>

It's hard to imagine how tanks could survive in contemporary warfare. Gunfire has become so accurate, and I'm not even talking about the armor-piercing capabilities of our antitank guided missiles. The very first shot hits the target and destroys the tank.

I had an inner conflict in this connection. What should we do? Continue to develop tank units when antitank shells could chew them up like so many nuts? But to abandon them would mean to rely only on the armor our mothers gave us—the human skin. Even today I can't decide my own point of view, and back then, when many things depended on me, I spoke in favor of continuing to develop our tank forces. We replaced virtually all of our artillery with missiles, including field guns for close combat, artillery that accompanied the troops. This approach is still being followed today, with the exception of weapons for shooting down aerial targets. As I've said, we've returned to rapid-fire antiaircraft artillery. Perhaps that's the right thing to do. No other solution has been discovered so far, and there's no need to be stubborn. We've had to return to the old antiaircraft weapons, although they too are very unreliable. Still, they offer some hope of hitting low-flying planes.

Here is another aspect, having to do with imitation of the Americans by our artillery people. The Americans were making a big fuss, back then, about artillery that fired atomic shells, carrying on like a child with a new toy. Our military men persuaded the government to order the same type of artillery, and mortars as well, arguing that this would enable us to hit the enemy's infantry with high-precision fire.

I had my doubts. This kind of artillery would be very heavy and would be difficult to transport. A nuclear-tipped artillery shell turned out to be an incredibly complicated item in technical respects. It required the use of a great deal of atomic fuel. Scientists said that the smaller the size of an atomic warhead, the greater the quantity of nuclear fuel needed to achieve a given explosive force. In principle, [using the same amount of nuclear fuel,] it would have been possible to produce, instead of the artillery shell, a warhead [for a missile] that would have had an explosive force several times greater. Nevertheless, this atomic artillery was designed and produced. We displayed this artillery during a parade on Red Square. The size of the artillery pieces made a big impression on the public. But our specialists weren't overjoyed with these big cannons. Instead they were worried and uneasy about them: they were hard to camouflage, they could only fire a relatively short

distance, and they were not really suited to the purpose. Test firing, and the actual use of this artillery, showed that it was not practical. It was easier to use missiles to cover the range they covered. Missiles are less accurate, but for an atomic warhead, great accuracy is not a major requirement.

I decided to consult with Vannikov,<sup>2</sup> who had an enormous amount of experience in producing artillery and rifles, and in recent years he had accumulated knowledge in the realm of atomic energy as well. In the end the artillery men themselves admitted that this weapon didn't justify the expense. And we stopped its production, although some individual artillery men continued to sigh and groan sorrowfully. They weren't grieving over atomic cannon; they were grieving about artillery in general, which was gradually being replaced by missiles. An abrupt upward turn was evident in missile production. New types of weapons were being produced: inter-continental missiles, and missiles for other purposes, both strategic and for front-line use, with a wide assortment of warheads and varying degrees of explosive force.

Here too we didn't get by without unpleasant incidents. Marshal Grechko<sup>3</sup> stubbornly insisted on having missiles with small atomic warheads to accompany the troops. I understood that it would be a good thing if the troops felt more confident due to the presence of such missiles as their division was going on the offensive. But there was no need to demand that each battalion have its own nuclear warheads. We didn't have enough atomic fuel. It seemed to us then that tactical nuclear missiles and artillery with small nuclear warheads were beyond our pocketbook, more than we could afford. Besides, we didn't want to disperse our resources, and we wanted to threaten the enemy, not on the open field of battle, but at the heart of his existence: his cities, industry, and territory as a whole. And we stuck to that. Of course the military spoke in favor of upgrading and modernizing our arsenal. But there, too, problems arose.

I recall a good man whom I respected a great deal and valued highly for his service during the war as an artillery man, the chief marshal of our artillery, Sergei Sergeyevich Varentsov.<sup>4</sup> He died not so long ago. He played a major role in defeating Hitler's forces, commanding the artillery of our Voronezh Front and later the First Ukrainian Front. As an artillery man who knew his job well, he was used to cannon and suffered painfully over the transition to missiles. It was to him that the celebrated phrase belonged: "The sounds of cannon make a symphony; the sounds of missiles are a cacophony." He also said: "When cannon fire, they maintain their camouflage; they don't reveal themselves except for the sound of their firing. They don't



produce a huge cloud of dust.” This was an outdated point of view. Varentsov was not the only artillery man who held that view. Others, too, had approximately the same opinion. All that had to be overcome. The new could not live side by side with the old, nor will it be able to in the future. One had to replace the other.

1. In addition to a proving ground for tanks, there is a military airfield at Kubinka, a town 60 kilometers west of Moscow on the road to Minsk. Kubinka is also one of the centers of Moscow’s antimissile defense system. [SK]

2. Boris Lvovich Vannikov (1897–1962) was a high-ranking defense industry official. See Biographies.

3. Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko. See Biographies.

4. Marshal Sergei Sergeevich Varentsov. See Biographies.

### THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPORT: WHEELS OR TANK TREADS?

Other questions arose in connection with the development of transport for missiles, above all, tactical missiles. They are fairly heavy. The military men argued for a long time over which type of transport was necessary for missiles: tank treads or wheels? It isn’t an idle question. A number of factors combine in the consideration of this question: cost, the distance one is able to travel, length of service, and rapidity of movement. The scientists and designers made the right decision in choosing multi-axled wheeled vehicles as the necessary type of transport. People also began talking about the means of transport for infantry. What we needed was not just trucks but a means of transport that would have armored covering. Armor provides protection, although it also makes the means of transport heavier. By way of compensation, it provides better physical conditions and hence better morale for the troops. There was no disagreement about the need for such transport, but debates did recur over the use of wheels over tank treads. We decided on a multiple-axle type of wheeled transport with high cross-country capability.

Then we faced the problem of providing air transport on a massive scale with great lifting capacity. The emphasis was placed on helicopters. The problem was solved by the designer [Mikhail Leontyevich] Mil,<sup>1</sup> who is now

deceased. He produced a family of helicopters of remarkable solidity, reliability, and great lifting capacity. In discussions with him, I tried to orient his design bureau toward the creation of helicopters for peaceful purposes [that is, for use in nonmilitary industries], especially for laying gas pipelines and oil pipelines when mountains, swamps, and other hard-to-reach areas were involved. Other helicopters, driven by screw propellers, were earmarked for the transportation of ammunition, weapons, and supplies for troops.

Working in this field, in addition to Mil, was [Nikolai Ilyich] Kamov,<sup>2</sup> an old and experienced designer whose specialty was agricultural transportation. He had produced a number of special-purpose helicopters. When I was a guest of President Eisenhower in the United States [in 1959]<sup>3</sup> and flew with him from Washington to Camp David, I asked Eisenhower to help us purchase two helicopters for the Soviet government. I had my doubts whether the helicopter companies would sell them.<sup>4</sup> I wanted Eisenhower to put on some pressure. He promised to do that. Later we negotiated with the companies and with some difficulty were able to buy the two helicopters. We already had helicopters of this type, but I wanted our scientists and designers to look them over, evaluate them, and borrow the best features of the U.S. technology. The United States had good helicopters. I have often flown in helicopters of our own native manufacture. But my security people [of the KGB] advised against extensive use of this means of transportation, because sometimes we had accidents. I'm not about to compare different countries' helicopters in purely technical respects. However, when we offered some of ours for sale to India they did some testing of various types of helicopters—American, Soviet, and others. Ours took first place, and those were precisely the ones that India began to buy.<sup>5</sup> Later in the Crimea and in the Caucasus we organized an airline using these “flying buses” to transport passengers to health resorts. During my years in the leadership there was not a single accident involving civilian-passenger helicopters in the USSR. Both the pilots and the technical service personnel were on a high level.

1. Mikhail Leontyevich Mil (1909–70) worked on the design of gyroplanes and helicopters from 1929 until his death in 1970. His helicopters have been produced at a plant in Moscow since 1947. Today there exist over 30,000 helicopters of Mil design, or every fourth helicopter in the world. Mil helicopters have won more than sixty world air-flight records. See Biographies. [SS]

2. Nikolai Ilyich Kamov (1902–73) was the creator of snow hovercrafts, the first Soviet autogiro *Krasny inzhener* (Red Engineer), the combat

autogiro A-7, the high-speed helicopters KA-8, KA-10, KA-15, and KA-18, the two-turbine KA-25, the two-engine KA-26, and the rotary-wing aircraft KA-22. See Biographies.

3. Khrushchev describes his visit to the United States in September 1959 in Volume 3 of the memoirs (forthcoming). [SS]

4. The two helicopter models in question were made, respectively, by Boeing and by Sikorsky. [SK]

5. In all, India purchased from the Soviet Union sixty MI-4 military helicopters. [SS]

# Scientists and Defense Technology

## ANDREI SAKHAROV AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Although I have discussed various aspects of military work in the Stalin era and after Stalin, I have not yet exhausted the subject.<sup>1</sup> I now want to dictate my recollections about how Sakharov<sup>2</sup> created the Soviet hydrogen bomb. A talented man and still a very young man for such a major job, he showed his abilities and displayed great profundity of thought at an early age. Back then the idea of a hydrogen bomb was new. Neither the Americans nor the British had such bombs, but Sakharov succeeded in developing one.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet government took all possible measures to provide support for Sakharov's work and to prepare Soviet industry to carry out his ideas, which were made a reality in the early 1950s by Soviet engineers, technicians, and workers.

At that time we were already beginning to work on a treaty with the United States and its allies about stopping the arms race,<sup>4</sup> and we also proposed an end to nuclear testing to stop polluting the atmosphere, but we received no reply [to that proposal]. We then decided to make a unilateral announcement [in 1958] that we would stop testing nuclear weapons and called on other countries to follow our example, carrying out an action that would have favorable results for the whole human race. After all, the earth's atmosphere is not the property of any one nation or government, but is a resource, a form of wealth, for all human beings.

And so we suspended our nuclear tests. But the Americans continued their test explosions, refining and enlarging their arsenal of atomic and hydrogen weapons. At the same time our scientists were working on perfecting our nuclear warheads and made major advances, increasing the power of the explosion with a warhead of reduced tonnage. Without experimental explosions, and without testing the nuclear devices in practice, we could not switch over to a warhead of new design. When we unilaterally abandoned the testing of such weapons we hoped that public opinion would support us and put

pressure on other governments that were still carrying out tests and polluting the atmosphere. But the U.S. government remained deaf to public opinion.

A question then arose for us: Should we stick to our position of renouncing nuclear testing? When we met with no reciprocity or support for our initiative, we saw that we were dooming ourselves, condemning ourselves to lag behind the countries that were perfecting their nuclear weapons. Thus we were forced to declare that if our idea was not supported by the other countries making nuclear weapons and building up their nuclear stockpiles, and if they continued to carry out their experimental tests, we too would resume nuclear testing.

Our military and scientific personnel working in the defense sector were putting pressure on the government, saying that in order to move ahead, we had to test the atomic and hydrogen bombs that had already been designed. We announced [in summer 1961] that we would indeed conduct such tests. A day or so before that announcement Academician Sakharov came to see me to make an appeal. I was already acquainted with him, and he had made a very good impression on me. And not only on me. Among our other scientists he shone like a rare and precious jewel, as one might say. Sakharov appealed to me as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with the request that we renounce any further testing of the hydrogen bomb. "Knowing what terrible harm these tests do to human beings, I cannot agree that they should continue. It was on the basis of my scientific research that the thermonuclear bomb was created, but as a scientist I am speaking out now in opposition to any further testing." He went on at length, seeking to persuade me. Undoubtedly he was guided by humane considerations and the best of motives. As a man devoted to science and the noble idea of peace he had no desire for the destruction of human life, and he did not want the atmosphere to be contaminated.

I replied to him: "Comrade Sakharov, in view of my position as party and government leader I do not have the right to renounce such tests at this time. This is certainly not my personal desire. A decision of the entire leadership of the USSR is being carried out here. You know that we made an attempt to put an end to testing and appealed to our likely adversaries, who are building up a nuclear arsenal. But they refused to listen to us. You know perfectly well that they are continuing their nuclear testing." Since he continued to insist and since I wanted to remain on honest terms with Sakharov, I said to him: "Despite all my sympathy for your views and your request, I, as the person responsible for our country's defenses, do not have the right to abandon testing. It would be a crime against our country and

our people. You yourself know what suffering World War II brought to the Soviet people. We might expose ourselves to a similar risk again if we refused to build up a modern arsenal at the same time that our probable adversaries are unrestrainedly pursuing the arms race and producing new weapons of mass destruction. Please understand me correctly. To agree with you would be to doom our country to possible destruction. We would end up being weaker than the United States and its allies.” My arguments did not convince him, nor did he convince me. Sakharov’s request was discussed by the collective leadership of our country, and we decided we could not agree with him.<sup>5</sup> The next bomb that was ready was tested.

One of those bombs was especially powerful. It was designed to have an estimated explosive power of 50 million tons of TNT, but in reality it achieved a power equivalent to 57 million tons.<sup>6</sup> This was something colossal. We had never achieved such explosive power before. The scientists reported that if this device was developed further as a “dirty bomb,”<sup>7</sup> the shock wave of its blast plus the radiation released could reach a force equivalent to 100 million tons of TNT! I asked: “Where could we use such a bomb? And how can we envision the effects of such an explosion?”

In reply I was told: “If war was imposed on us and we were forced to respond with nuclear weapons, we could not explode a nuclear device with the equivalent of 57 million tons in the area of West Germany. The prevailing winds in that area would carry the fallout from the hydrogen bomb and its atmospheric contamination over the territory of East Germany. Not only would its population suffer but so would our armed forces stationed in that country. But such a bomb could be dropped, without especially dangerous consequences for the USSR and our allies, if it were dropped on England, Spain, France, or of course the United States.”

That’s what I was told about this frightful new weapon. But it allowed us to put moral pressure on those who were preparing war against the USSR. And of course the main danger came from the United States.

1. This part of the memoirs was taped in June and July 1971.

2. Academician Andrei Dmitriyevich Sakharov. See Biographies.

3. The Soviet thermonuclear [hydrogen] bomb was first tested on August 12, 1953. In the United States a thermonuclear device was first exploded on November 1, 1952, while an aircraft-delivered bomb with a thermonuclear explosive device was tested in 1954.

4. For an account of these negotiations, see Glenn T. Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1981). [SS]

5. This discussion took place in July 1961. [SK]

6. In October 1961 a fifty-megaton bomb was tested on the island of Novaya Zemlya (New Land) in the Arctic Ocean. In fact, the bomb had been designed to possess an explosive power of 100 megatons, but its power was reduced so that

Norway would not be affected by the force of the explosion or by radioactive fallout. [SK]

7. A “clean bomb” is a nuclear bomb that is designed to minimize radioactive fallout, thereby reducing its explosive power. The “dirty bomb” to which Khrushchev here refers is a bomb with a

more primitive and powerful design, like the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Other types of “dirty bombs” are the neutron bomb, which kills living beings but does not destroy buildings, and the conventional bomb exploded in a place where it will disperse radioactive substances. [SK]

## COOPERATION ON OUTER SPACE

The question was often raised in the foreign press and by journalists from other countries at press conferences at which I spoke: “Might the Soviet Union undertake some sort of joint effort with the United States for a space flight to the moon or in regard to space exploration generally?” I liked the idea. In the 1960s we astonished the world with the spacecraft we placed in orbit or sent to the moon and with the first launching of human beings into outer space. Yuri Gagarin<sup>1</sup> was the first to open this new path. Others followed in Gagarin’s wake. We were ahead of the United States in those days. It was no accident that the idea was then being suggested that we combine our efforts in conquering outer space, that the USSR should share its expertise in building rockets and rocket engines. I’m not talking about any official communication from the government bodies of other countries, but sometimes journalists carry out assignments or raise questions on behalf of their governments. Their governments don’t have to take any responsibility for the ideas proposed, but nevertheless they carefully weigh and analyze what reception such ideas are given by the other side.

Were there any specific proposals for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in regard to outer space or joint expeditions to the moon? There were no direct communications on this subject, but some kind of communications did come through toward the end of my activity in the leadership. The official government bodies of the United States, including President Kennedy, expressed the desire to cooperate with us in this sphere, but were there any initial proposals from their side? I don’t recall that there were. I distinctly remember that there were no such initiatives from our side.

Two distinct periods can be specified in this connection. First there was our meeting with President Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961. At that time Kennedy proposed that we combine our efforts in space exploration. I declined.

I will now state the considerations guiding the leadership of the Soviet Union at that time in refusing to cooperate in this sphere. America was behind us in this regard. We were making a successful breakthrough into outer space, and our space rockets had already won general recognition and admiration. The Americans were jealous of our successes and criticized their own government. America possibly was in favor of cooperation with the Soviet Union at that time. Cooperation would have undoubtedly been beneficial for the United States as well as for the Soviet Union, but at that time we could not accept it. Why?

Because we were weaker than the United States in nuclear weapons. They had established military bases all around the borders of our country. They had planes that could deliver nuclear weapons. They could reach the entire territory of the Soviet Union, all our vital economic and administrative centers. We, on the other hand, had an insignificant number of missiles, and they had not yet been perfected. They were no threat to the territory of the United States. Strictly speaking, we only had the R-7 rocket, the “Semyorka” designed by the late Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov, our number-one man. We were ecstatic over his successes in science and industry. We idolized Korolyov and he deserved it. If we had agreed to cooperation, we would have had to reveal the design of Korolyov’s rockets and engines. The engine designer was Glushko, a highly respected scientist and a talented engineer. Korolyov made the rockets, and Glushko, his friend, made the engines. Later they had a parting of the ways. I regretted that very much and did everything I could to bring them back together, but my efforts proved insufficient. Nevertheless they continued to work together; the government made that obligatory for them. The interests of the Soviet state required it.

Thus, if we had begun to cooperate [with the United States on outer space], it would have become apparent where our strengths and weaknesses lay. Our weakness was that we did not have a sufficient number of rockets for defense and attack. The “Semyorka” was not suitable for both these tasks. Other rockets and missiles made their appearance at a later stage, but back then we still needed time to produce them in sufficient quantity and master their use.

At that time the Americans were especially interested in cooperation, because they didn’t have rocket engines as powerful as ours. They wanted to gain access to our rocket engines and discover the secrets of their design. America is a country with a high potential in industry and science. They would encounter no special difficulties in copying our rockets and engines or making their own, based on our designs, and they could do so at an



accelerated pace. That would have been a threat to our security. That's why we didn't agree to cooperation at that time. I regarded the decision we made as correct, and I still do. Later on, by the mid-1960s, when we were firmly on our feet and had assured the security of our country—and we did this by creating an arsenal of missiles with nuclear warheads—a new stage began.

At that stage we could have begun cooperation. That would have been in the interests of both America and the Soviet Union. Thus far outer space is not accessible to other countries. It is quite possible to stay in the forefront in this area and to maintain that primacy forever. We were preeminent then in regard to outer space. But every country that has the appropriate economic potential will be able, if not today then tomorrow, to build rockets and send them into outer space as we are doing now.

What about the rocket engine? Well what about it! I understood that our preeminence in this regard was temporary. It's impossible to permanently stay ahead of everyone else because the basis for creating spacecraft and space-related devices is one and the same everywhere—that is, science and technology. In general, these are universal phenomena. If for a certain length of time in one sphere or another we were ahead of other countries, they might later make special efforts, allocate material resources on a large scale, and then become the leading country and move ahead of us. That's why I would now propose that it would be desirable to have an agreement with the United States and other countries to establish an international organization for space exploration, so that everyone could share not only the glory but the material burdens. At a certain moment, we should have agreed to joint efforts, but I had already been retired.

Unfortunately no agreement has been reached on this question [at the time this was dictated in summer 1971]. We let the moment slip. We should have come to an agreement on cooperation before the Americans landed a man on the moon. President Kennedy made some remarks indicating a desire to move in the direction of cooperation. But soon he was gone. At that time, in 1963, I had already considered it possible to come to an agreement with the United States and other countries, to establish a new organization for space exploration. The overall project would have benefited from that. Resources would have been distributed more evenly, and the participating countries would not have been drained or exhausted. A space program is a very expensive pleasure even for countries like the United States and the Soviet Union. It costs millions to launch one rocket. I can't say exactly how many million right now, not because it's top secret, but simply because I don't know, but I know it's an enormous sum. Such expenditures can exhaust a

country. Therefore it would be more intelligent and expedient to seek an opportunity to combine the efforts of several countries and continue space exploration on an international basis, to make flights not only to the moon but also to other planets.<sup>2</sup>

In retirement I only have access to newspaper reports, which are very scanty, so it's difficult for me to make out what the real state of affairs is in this sphere. But for me one thing is indisputable: the Americans have already carried out the program that President Kennedy approved. The task he set for scientists and engineers was to make up for lost time, to design rockets that would take a man to the moon, and they accomplished that. Their astronauts have already been on the moon. But our press and television continue, as before, to try and convince people that we are still ahead in the space race. This is not a serious way of doing things. Of course [the Soviet moon probes] Luna-16 and Luna-17 have recently been in operation, providing information to the earth. That is a tremendous achievement of our scientists. Nevertheless, having a man on the moon is incomparably better than any intelligent robot, because the latter remains a creation of human beings, but the fact is that the creator himself has landed on the moon. Having been there and seen everything, he understands this new world better than any technical devices can. My dream was that our Ivan would be the first on the moon, but things didn't work out that way. John beat us to it.

Today America has made the first landing on the moon. It sent people there and brought them back. That has given their country great national satisfaction.<sup>3</sup> The Americans also sent a second flight to the moon. After that any talk of joint efforts would not have been understood, because America had demonstrated its capabilities while the Soviet Union was unable to do anything to counter their achievement. It became clear to our people and to other countries that the United States had moved ahead of us.

I don't know and therefore I can't say exactly at what moment we lost the advantage. Perhaps there was no one moment. Perhaps no such thing existed in reality. If I had been able to influence policy decisions after 1964, I would have displayed initiative and tried to come to an agreement with the United States in this area. Today the Americans are confident that they are in the lead. But that confidence is illusory. The Soviet Union and other countries are capable of creating the same kind of spacecraft or even better ones. In the interests of humanity as a whole it would be better to combine our efforts. That would contribute to the progress of science and technology. It would reduce international tensions. I would suggest that it is necessary to move

ahead more boldly in this sphere. I think that in the end, at some stage, people will arrive at the point of effective international cooperation. If we had come to such an agreement at the stage when the first moon flight was still in preparation, then our resources along with those of the United States could have been more equally shared among various countries or both countries [that is, the USSR and United States], and each country would have had the moral satisfaction of knowing its efforts had contributed to developing spacecraft capable of taking people to the moon and back. Unfortunately, that didn't happen.

In the process of trying to conquer outer space, to fly to the moon and other planets, it should be possible to establish a research institute on an international basis and carry out this work even more successfully. Each country that wanted to could make a contribution in the form of capital and technical resources and carry on work in this field of conquering outer space on an international basis. Such an organization could be established under the aegis of the United Nations and have some sort of intergovernmental status.

A space program requires the diversion of resources on a drastic scale. It exhausts the government treasury. Therefore resources have to be expended intelligently, especially when it's a question of satisfying some ambition. Undeniably there is a certain justification for our taking part in this [effort to conquer outer space]. We gain new information and broaden our knowledge. But that is of greater importance for the future. Today we need to eat, to clothe ourselves. Today we need to build housing for people and to be concerned with the satisfaction of human needs. Therefore we have to live within our means.<sup>4</sup> If space exploration was done on an international basis, it would be easier for us economically, and we would still have the moral satisfaction of participating. That's how things will be in the future. I'm convinced of it. I'm certain that in the last analysis our countries will arrive at such an agreement.

Today is July 9, 1971, if I remember right. I'm trying to continue taping my memoirs. I broke off when I heard about the death of our three cosmonauts: Volkov, Dobrovolsky, and Patsayev.<sup>5</sup> During the past few days I've met people who feel terrible about what happened, but they spread out their hands in amazement as if to ask, "How this could be?" When people ask my opinion I'm obliged to answer like this: "What can I say? I'm isolated now from any information that would allow me to analyze such events accurately, not to mention finding out the true causes of the disaster. I think those causes should have been made known to the public already. But nothing has been published!"

I think this spacecraft must have suffered some technical failure during its descent, as it was getting ready to land. The radio reports said that the braking rockets had begun to fire [preparing for reentry into the atmosphere] and that, until then, communications with the men in the spacecraft had been good and they had been responding. After reentry, communications ceased. When the spacecraft landed and the hatches were opened, the men were found dead. What could have happened? Was there some sort of accident that ruptured the hermetic seal of the cabin causing the death of these people? Or did something of a more complicated biological nature occur during the transition from weightlessness to the earth's gravitational pull, the effects of this transition taking these people's lives?

Enough time has gone by. It would seem that the information should now be made public. It seems that the cabin was in good working order [that is, the hermetic seal was not broken]; does that mean the cause was biological? My opinion is that the cabin was probably not in good working order, and that the catastrophe came from a break in the hermetic seal. In either case, an explanation should be given. This would calm people down, and to some extent it would console people. Any consolation is of course relative, but still if you know the cause of death, you can console yourself with the thought that something like this would not be repeated in the future. Information is necessary both for world public opinion and for science. Scientists should know the circumstances under which this disaster occurred so that they can take them into account in the future, especially scientists engaged in the space program.

America should also be given truthful information. If they don't receive that directly from us, they will obtain it on their own. I cannot judge, let alone condemn, the people who were responsible for the space program. No one is to blame for such things when test flights are involved. Anything is possible, and risks must be taken. Without risks science can't move forward. I don't know to what extent I can judge accurately today, but it seems to me that we should not place so much emphasis on lunar exploration, using such high-technology devices as the lunar modules Luna-16 and Luna-17. The argument is that this is more progressive than sending people, that in this way we can avoid putting human lives directly at risk, but if we've decided to fly to the moon, it's better to send human beings. It's hard to study the moon through mechanical devices alone. Let's take for example the study of the soil on the moon's surface. Mechanical devices are relatively blind so far. They will take

into their containers whatever happens to be there. Man, however, is a thinking being and makes choices. He will pick up and take one stone and discard another.

I think that sooner or later the Soviet Union will have to send a man to the moon both for scientific reasons and for considerations of prestige. To speak frankly, it's better to use robots for earth-orbiting space flights. These satellites circle the planet, make observations, record and transmit information to command central. I think that by now we have well-developed robotic devices and the appropriate tasks can be carried out by such mechanical means. I don't know how observational processes are carried out, such as taking photographs and measuring radiation. In my opinion, automatic devices can cope with such tasks quite well and in the future they will be able to do so even better than now. But it's very difficult to judge about such things. Maybe it's also correct to send people into orbit, but I think it's regrettable. Possibly this thought has occurred to me because of my regrets over the loss of these people's lives. Science forges its path by means of sacrifices. There is nothing you can do about it. Sacrifices are inevitable, and to hesitate or stop at the prospect of sacrifices would be to place a brake on the space program. Therefore I accept it as inevitable. Humanity pays for progress even when the price is as dear as a human life.

Here's a further comment on the space program. I remember the great uproar that arose in 1960 when the United States sent a U-2 spy plane over our country and we shot it down [on May 1, 1960]. We were indignant that our territorial sovereignty had been violated. Times have changed. Today we don't regard our sovereignty as being violated even though U.S. spy satellites are constantly orbiting the earth, photographing anything they want. They are also engaged in spying, and they do a better job of it than the U-2 did, but we don't protest. We have the same kind of satellites flying over the United States, photographing and reporting everything to our military establishment. America doesn't protest either, because at the present time there is no way of combating these spy satellites and no point in protesting. Besides, the opportunity is mutual. Each country has the opportunity [to gather information using earth satellites] as long as there is no agreement on questions of sovereignty in regard to outer space. Evidently it has not been possible to establish any legal basis for such an agreement, and in practice it would be impossible to enforce any such laws. Nowadays no one is concerned about the launching of spy satellites, or if they are concerned, they keep it to themselves.

1. Yuri Gagarin (1934–68) went into space on board the spaceship Vostok (East) on April 12, 1961. See Biographies. [SS]

2. Luna was a series of Soviet automated interplanetary stations with a maximum mass on moon landing of 1,880 kilograms. Luna-1, launched in 1959, missed the moon and became the first artificial planet (sun satellite). Luna-2 was the first spaceship to reach the moon, while the first soft landing on the moon was accomplished in 1966 by the stationary Luna-9. The first artificial satellite of the moon was Luna-10. In 1970, Luna-16 delivered moon soil to earth; then Luna-17 became a self-propelling moon vehicle (Lunokhod-1). By 1976, twenty-four stations belonging to the Luna series had been launched into space.

3. In order to observe the places on the moon where the Apollo spacecraft and the Surveyor automatic interplanetary stations had landed, the United States launched in 1966–67 five artificial moon satellites called Lunar Orbiter. In 1969 the

American Apollo-11 became the first inhabited stationary station on the moon, and in 1971 the first guided self-propelled moon vehicle Rover made its appearance. By 1972, Apollo-15, -16, and -17 had been to the moon, along with three Rovers to transport the astronauts.

4. The Russian saying that Khrushchev uses here has the literal meaning “Don’t stretch your legs farther than the clothing that covers them” (*protyagivat nozhki po odyozhke*). [GS]

5. The pilot-cosmonaut and twice Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel Vladimir Mikhailovich Komarov (1927–67) perished at the final stage of the flight of the Soyuz-1 spaceship. The cosmonauts Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel Georgy Timofeyevich Dobrovolsky (1928–71), Hero of the Soviet Union Viktor Ivanovich Patsayev (1933–71), and twice Hero of the Soviet Union Vladimir Nikolayevich Volkov (1935–71) perished as they returned to earth from the Salyut orbital station.

### **KURCHATOV, KELDYSH, SAKHAROV, TUPOLEV, LAVRENTYEV, KAPITSA, AND OTHERS**

Fate made Igor Kurchatov the “driving force” among Soviet scientists in the development of our nuclear weapons and atomic science. A remarkable scientist and a remarkable man, he held first place in that work. There’s no point in my talking about his merits, which are recognized throughout the world. I want to state my opinion about him as an individual. I had occasion to meet with him many times and to listen to him, not only on the subject of nuclear physics. He came to see me about other matters as well. Knowing that I was favorably disposed toward him, his colleagues often asked him to put in a word for them in support of one or another project or scientific trend. I always listened to Kurchatov attentively, had great confidence in him, and considered him a thoroughly decent person. Scientists, like other people, sometimes take a very egoistic approach to problems, trying to grab off something for their own particular sphere to the detriment of the common good. Kurchatov was not like that. Even though he was devoted to his particular scientific field, thought about it first of all, and promoted it, he also

gave assistance to other fields of science when he felt a matter of principle was involved.

In allocating our resources we had to choose the most indispensable things, those connected to the overall development of science and technology, culture, the economy, and above all, the defense of the country. Kurchatov distinguished himself in this respect from other scientists by his correct understanding of the necessity for resources to be allocated to the main thing, without which the invulnerability of the USSR could not be ensured, and that meant nuclear weapons above all. Not long before he died he came to see me with some new ideas<sup>1</sup> and at the end of our conversation he said: "I think it would be useful if I was officially confirmed as your adviser on questions of science, that is, adviser to the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers." I expressed my support and said that would please me. It was an idea that deserved consideration. I said: "We will consult among ourselves [in the Central Committee Presidium], and I will let you know our opinion next time we meet." Alas, we were not fated to meet again. A few days later I learned of the sudden death of this great scientist and remarkable man.<sup>2</sup>

When Kurchatov offered his services as my adviser, I understood that this was precisely the kind of person I needed, someone I trusted absolutely. He was ideally suited for establishing closer contacts between our government and the scientific world. It would be useful both for science and for the defense of our country. He could have helped the leadership correctly evaluate the course of events and allocate resources at the necessary time to whatever was necessary for the progress of one or another scientific trend. Of course I often listened to what other scientists said also.

I was literally stunned by the achievements of Sakharov in creating the hydrogen bomb. His scientific calculations were confirmed in full. As is generally known, a disagreement arose later between the Soviet leadership and Sakharov on the further testing of the hydrogen bomb. This disagreement also left its mark on Sakharov and put me on my guard. I have already referred to this sad episode. In this case, unlike Kurchatov, Sakharov displayed an insufficient understanding of the interests of our state. We were not exploding the hydrogen bomb as part of some preparation for attacking another country; it was only for defense purposes. Sakharov did not disagree on the essence of the matter, and I ask that my position be understood correctly when as a political leader, part of the leadership of our country, I was obliged to utilize all available means to strengthen our defense capacity. I hope that some day, if not now, Comrade Sakharov will understand me correctly.



I will not now try to discuss the other scientists and designers involved in the nuclear-weapons program, although it's impossible to leave unmentioned such figures as Zeldovich, Khariton, and Budker.<sup>3</sup> Zeldovich worked on technical aspects of designing the hydrogen bomb. It was thanks to the efforts of these men that we were able to achieve parity with the United States in nuclear weapons. In some cases, it seemed as though the Americans were even forced to go on the defensive [relative to our nuclear strength].

Did any foreigners help us in this effort, including by clandestine means? I have already answered this question in the affirmative in an earlier part of my memoirs. Unfortunately, all of those who helped us cannot be named. The time has not yet arrived. In this connection let me refer only to Ethel and Julius Rosenberg.<sup>4</sup> When Stalin was alive he commented on them very warmly. I cannot say what their assistance to us consisted in specifically, but I heard from Stalin and Molotov (and Molotov knew a lot) that the Rosenbergs rendered us very essential assistance in speeding up our development of an atomic bomb.<sup>5</sup> Some day it will be possible to tell about all this openly, to express our attitude, and to show our appreciation for these people somehow. They gave their lives to help our proletarian state, the Soviet Union, build an atomic bomb, and in so doing they stood up against the aggressive imperialist world, above all, the United States.

When we listened to reports by scientists concerning outer space, missiles, and nuclear weapons, it was often Academician [Mstislav] Keldysh who presented the report.<sup>6</sup> As we understood it, Keldysh and Kurchatov were inseparably connected as the men who were working on the designing of missiles and rockets, as well as the nuclear warheads to be carried by them. That's why we had especially great respect for Keldysh. We invited the president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, [Aleksandr Nikolayevich] Nesmeyanov,<sup>7</sup> to one of the sessions of the Council of Ministers. As he was a very delicate person, but also one of calm disposition, he proposed the following in response to some critical remarks directed at him: "Perhaps you should appoint Keldysh as president of the Academy of Sciences, to replace me." We supported this proposal: "We will talk it over and think about it." We soon came to the conclusion that it really would be useful to promote Keldysh to the presidency. Nesmeyanov submitted his resignation, and the members of the Academy supported Keldysh by electing him as their new president.

Rumors now reach me that not all scientists are pleased with Keldysh. This should be no surprise to anyone. It's difficult for the occupant of such a post to please everyone. In science generally the individual aspect stands out to a large extent. Every scientist has his own personality, his own understanding

of things, and his own needs. It's impossible to expect that everyone would have the same attitude or opinion about the president. For my part, I think the promotion of Keldysh was a very fortunate decision.

I have great respect also for the vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, [Mikhail Alekseyevich] Lavrentyev.<sup>8</sup> I first made his acquaintance when he was working at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, where he was also vice president. I liked his simplicity, his scientific genius, and his persistence in carrying out programs that had been decided on. He also did a great deal for the defense of our country and was brought in as a consultant on a number of questions in that connection. As I recall, [during the war] he was the one who came up with the idea of producing ammunition with cumulative charges, so that the explosion would be concentrated in a particular direction. Cumulative charges proved to be highly effective against tank armor. After the war this type of ammunition was perfected. On one occasion [in Kiev] Lavrentyev suggested I come observe a test. He said: "I'll show you a shell with a special type of explosive. When we place it on a sheet of iron and set it off, it penetrates the sheet of iron." And that's what happened. Lavrentyev explained that the shell didn't pierce the armor but burned its way through. He did great work during the war for the benefit of our country.

In the 1950s I supported his proposal to establish a new branch of the Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk.<sup>9</sup> It was called Akademgorodok (meaning "Academy Town"). As an illustration of his simplicity as a person, I will never forget how this important man lived in a tent and walked around in felt boots during the time the academy buildings were under construction in Siberia. But the main thing is not how a person is dressed or whether he's wearing fancy leather boots. Those are private matters. Lavrentyev's sober-mindedness and forcefulness are the features that endeared him to me. I remember how convincingly he argued the need to establish a branch of the Academy in Siberia. He said that ours was a huge country but only one main scientific center existed, in Moscow, and that this was irrational and wrong. As a first step he thought it would be useful to establish this scientific settlement, Akademgorodok, as a suburb of Novosibirsk, and later open similar scientific centers in other parts of the Soviet Union.

I asked him: "Who are the scientists that will go there? After all this is Siberia, a fearsome place even now. At the time of Stalin's death, millions of political prisoners and former prisoners-of-war were serving their sentences there."

He said: "There are people who will go." And he showed me a long list: "Here, these are people who are ready to go to Siberia, especially the young ones. And it's precisely the young ones who are needed out there."

We brought up this question at the Central Committee Presidium and supported Lavrentyev's proposal, providing the necessary resources. A great deal of money was required, especially for the organizations that would do the construction work, so that at least the main part of this new branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences could be built quickly. The construction of scientific facilities is an unending process, just like the development of science itself. The necessary laboratories have to be equipped, and conditions have to be created in which scientists can live and work. Lavrentyev himself became the guiding spirit of this new project. I visited Akademgorodok several times when I was in Siberia and I saw for myself how the construction was going. Lavrentyev had brought his family there and lived quite modestly at first in a small house, one that was called the Finnish type because we bought them from Finland.<sup>10</sup> I had dinner there once and saw where he was living. He had renounced the comforts of Moscow, everything the capital city has to offer, and had gone off into the Siberian taiga.

Today our entire country takes pride in him and his brainchild at Novosibirsk, which is something indeed to take pride in! Later he proposed a similar center in the Far East, but the time had not yet come. That was beyond the reach of our material resources then, and so I said: "Let's not hurry for the time being. Our country has too many other needs. Let's concentrate our attention on the scientific center at Novosibirsk, and when we're richer we'll discuss how to set up an additional branch of the Academy of Sciences."

Let me say a few words about [Pyotr Leonidovich] Kapitsa.<sup>11</sup> After my death I would like my views to be understood regarding this major scientist, who at one time in our country was considered almost an odious figure. In the Stalin era the general attitude toward Kapitsa was not good. Even after Stalin's death a reserved attitude continued to be displayed toward Kapitsa.<sup>12</sup> Were there solid grounds for displaying lack of confidence or for even hinting indirectly that he was a spy? There was no basis for that whatsoever, and I personally had no doubts of his honesty and loyalty as a citizen. By chance I happened to be a witness when the question was decided that he would be kept in the USSR. I had never heard anything about him previously. I was in Stalin's office when he summoned the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, Valery Mezhlauk.<sup>13</sup> I respected Valery greatly, and it is an enormous regret to me that he perished tragically as a victim of Stalin's repression, like so many other innocent people. When Mezhlauk became president of the USSR State Planning Commission, I had dealings with him fairly often, and he made a good impression on me both as a government official who knew his work extremely well and simply as a human being.

Some sort of scientific conference was going on in our country at that time [in September 1934]. Kapitsa had come to attend the conference. He was then working in England, but he still held Soviet citizenship. Stalin assigned Mezhlauk to have some talks with Kapitsa, and Mezhlauk later reported to Stalin that Kapitsa did not wish to remain in the USSR. He argued that in order to make effective use of his knowledge, the appropriate conditions were necessary: the equipment, scientific instruments and so forth, without which a scientist cannot work successfully, as he had been doing with the British scientist Rutherford,<sup>14</sup> and under Rutherford's direction. He had all the necessary conditions in England. Stalin told Mezhlauk: "Let Kapitsa know that we will do everything necessary to create desirable conditions. We'll build a special institute for him, but explain to him firmly that he cannot return to Britain. We won't let him leave the country." Mezhlauk acted accordingly, and Kapitsa remained.

I was not closely acquainted with him personally.<sup>15</sup> Some members of the Politburo, and some government officials, who were allowed to receive summaries of the foreign press, knew that Kapitsa was very highly regarded abroad. I assumed that Stalin had acted correctly in the interests of our country. After all, we had to utilize every possibility to raise our defense capacity and bring scientists into the work of creating weapons for our defense. What problems was Kapitsa specifically working on then? I don't know. In my presence Mezhlauk reported to Stalin as follows: "He was upset and bitter, but Kapitsa has agreed to remain." At that point Stalin proposed that an institute be built for Kapitsa in the Vorobyov Hills area of Moscow.<sup>16</sup> Previously this piece of land had been earmarked for the construction of an embassy for the United States. Bullitt<sup>17</sup> was then the U.S. ambassador to the USSR. At first he won Stalin's confidence and proposed the idea of building a U.S. embassy in the Vorobyov Hills. The appropriate site was marked off. But when Bullitt turned out not to be the kind of person we wanted, Stalin got angry and proposed: "Let's build an institute for Kapitsa on the land marked off for building a U.S. embassy," and that's where it was built. When I would visit Moscow I loved to go for walks in the Vorobyov Hills. I saw the institute after construction was finished and was glad of it. I thought to myself: "There are scientific wizards under Kapitsa's leadership who are creating something quite extraordinary."

I didn't know what they were working on and I didn't ask. Under Stalin the rule was that if you weren't told, you didn't ask. It was none of your concern. Toward the end of the Great Patriotic War, Stalin began to express dissatisfaction with Kapitsa. He got angry and said that Kapitsa wasn't producing what

he was capable of and wasn't justifying the hopes we had placed in him. I can't judge how much basis there was for these complaints, but I believed Stalin at the time. If Stalin said something, that meant it was so. That's what I thought back then. When the first American atomic bombs exploded, it became clear that we were lagging behind. Our close ties as allies gave way. A fissure emerged between us, and soon the Cold War began. Then, when we exploded our atomic bomb, the capitalist press emitted a heartrending wail. They said the Russians had gotten this bomb from Kapitsa, that he was a no-good so-and-so, that he was the most prominent scientist living in our country, and that only he could have produced the bomb. Stalin was indignant: "Kapitsa had absolutely nothing to do with it. He wasn't involved in this at all."

After Stalin's death I continued to have an ambivalent attitude toward Kapitsa. On the one hand he was a scientist recognized throughout the world, and on the other hand he had not helped us develop the bomb before the Americans did, and subsequently, even after the American bomb, he didn't want to help develop a Soviet bomb. That's why my attitude toward him was quite reserved. On one occasion Kapitsa asked that I receive him. I listened to him very closely. He spoke about an important project he wanted to work on and asked me to help him because he had been removed from the work at his institute. I asked two other scientists about him, one of them being Kurchatov, and they gave me little reason to hope. They explained that the project Kapitsa wanted to work on was not the most urgent from the point of view of our state. In those days we measured the urgency of a scientific project from the angle of whether it would increase our defense capability, and we considered military projects most important.<sup>18</sup>

A little while later Kapitsa asked that I receive him again. When I did so I asked: "Comrade Kapitsa, why don't you take up projects that have importance for defense? We have a very great need for that."

He explained at length his attitude toward military projects in general: "I don't like to be involved in such things. I am a scientist, and scientists are like artists: they like it when people talk about their work, write about it, make movies about it, but military subjects are top secret. If I got involved in that work, I would isolate myself. I would bury myself behind the walls of an institute and my name would disappear from the press. I want to be visible, so the public will know about my work."

These comments made an impression on me that was not favorable to Kapitsa. I responded: "We are forced to concern ourselves with military problems as long as antagonistic systems exist. In order to survive, we have to be concerned with these matters. Otherwise we will be crushed and destroyed."

He would not agree. He said: “No, I don’t want to be involved with military projects.”

Kapitsa told me that he had accomplished a great work; he had developed a new method for obtaining oxygen. This was very important for the economy of our country, and that was good, but we wanted more. We wanted the capitalist scientists to say in their press that our atomic bomb had been built by Academician Kapitsa. I don’t know whether he would have been capable of doing that or not. It’s hard for me to judge. This is a field for specialists and scientists. At any rate, he never set his hand to this work. He explained that out of pacifist considerations he did not wish to be involved with it.

If we make a comparison between Kapitsa and Sakharov, we can say that Sakharov also asked us [out of pacifist considerations] not to carry out a test explosion of a nuclear bomb [in September 1962]. Yet it was he who had produced the hydrogen bomb for us. He was a patriot, and his contribution toward our defense was enormous.

Back then I tried to explain to Sakharov. I said: “How can we get by without a test explosion? A weapon that we place in our arsenal must be tested. Otherwise we can’t be sure that at the appropriate time it will function reliably.” Comrade Sakharov wavered on this question. He had a kind of inner division. He was of two minds on the subject. On the one hand, he understood the need for our country to develop the most powerful weapons against possible aggressors, but on the other hand, he feared the actual use of these weapons. Evidently he feared that his own name would be connected with their use. Various explanations can be given for this kind of thing. I don’t know Sakharov well. He is a person of pacifist bent. I too would favor pacifism if the conditions arose in which wars were ruled out. But for the time being, we are living in a world where you have to look facts in the face. It’s dangerous to give in to a pacifist mood that is one-sided. It’s dangerous because the imperialists could gobble us up. We have to keep both eyes open.

It was hard for me to understand how Kapitsa, a Soviet citizen who had seen the sufferings of our people as a result of Hitler’s war, could think the way he did. We were devoting all our efforts to be sure that such a war would not be repeated, and we were doing everything we could to raise the level of our economy, science, and culture. It’s obvious that without science we couldn’t build up our defensive power. And here an extremely prominent scientist with a worldwide reputation was refusing to help us. His remarks had a bad effect on me.

I decided to do some double-checking, and the next time I met with Lavrentyev I asked him: “What’s your assessment of Kapitsa?”

Lavrentyev gave him an extremely high evaluation. Meanwhile in a second conversation with me, Kapitsa had said that he wanted to go abroad. I told Lavrentyev: “Kapitsa wants to go abroad. What’s your attitude toward that?”

He said: “What would be wrong with it? You should let him go.”

“You think he’s an honest man?”

Lavrentyev said: “I’m absolutely sure of it. He’s an exceptionally decent person, and so are his children. Kapitsa is a patriot, and one of his sons is an outstanding geographer, a patriot completely loyal to his country.”<sup>19</sup>

These words reassured me somewhat, but I continued to have my doubts. I asked Lavrentyev further: “What about his attitude toward military projects?”

Lavrentyev’s reply was this: “He is an eccentric person, and he really does take the view he expressed to you about military projects.”

I began to lean toward letting Kapitsa go abroad and, as it were, get some fresh air. I said to Lavrentyev: “Well, all right, suppose we let him go abroad, does he know about military projects that other scientists are working on?”

“Of course. He knows everything. After all, academicians communicate with one another and discuss scientific problems, and they read specialized literature. Besides, he is a scientist of colossal stature, and there are no secrets that can be kept from him.”

This put me on my guard again. I asked: “Might he not blurt out something that we wouldn’t want him to?”

“It’s hard for me to vouch for him entirely on that point, but in my opinion, he’s a fine scientist and a great patriot who would never become a traitor.”

But I wasn’t convinced. It’s one thing to be a traitor and something else again to blurt out something by mistake. These are two different things. We discussed the matter at the Central Committee Presidium and decided after all to refrain from him giving him permission. After all, in the mid-1950s, the USSR was still on a low level as far as its atomic weapons were concerned, and we didn’t want our adversaries to find out anything about us even indirectly or accidentally. We weren’t completely sure that Kapitsa wouldn’t say more than he should while talking with foreign scientists, and he knew a great many of them. With regret we were forced to deny him permission to go abroad.

Later, a year or two ago [in May 1966], he did make a trip abroad after all. He made a trip to England with great fanfare—and not only to England. He received the recognition he deserved and was made an honorary member of scientific academies in a number of different countries, and so forth. I’m happy for him and pleased that he finally has the worldwide recognition that he deserves. Today I’m feeling a little jealous perhaps that it was not I



who decided the matter in his favor. But now that we have become an acknowledged nuclear power, the things we feared at an earlier time have ceased to be as much of an obstacle as they were. Today we can send almost anyone abroad, even if we're not completely sure of him. After all, what secrets are there now?! In the realm of science there are virtually no secrets anymore, with some particular exceptions. But my duty as chairman of the Council of Ministers required caution on my part, and I acted accordingly. But people may ask, "Wasn't that a throwback to the Stalin era?" Possibly it was. After all, I had worked under Stalin's leadership for so many years. You can't free yourself all at once from such layers of moral encrustation, even those that you yourself have condemned. I don't deny that. Time is necessary to become fully aware and to renounce unnecessary things.

What was my view about keeping our country under lock and key, not letting people travel abroad and not letting in foreigners who wanted to visit the Soviet Union? After Stalin's death, when a few years had gone by, we opened the gates rather wide for trips in both directions. People went pouring out and in—people with different ways of thinking, different political convictions. Things cannot be otherwise. Every nation consists of individuals who hold varying views. You have to take this into account and live with people who have different views. Some people who left the USSR chose not to return. There were theatrical groups that made trips abroad, and some members of those groups stayed there. Of course this caused me some chagrin, but it didn't bother me that much. There were cases in which someone refused to return, but then after a while he would begin pleading tearfully for us to let him come back to his homeland. There were cases in which I did take risks, not to mention endangering state secrets. Could it be that we miscalculated? Certainly. But if we had approached the matter differently, we would have had to take Stalin's position that every Soviet citizen was suspect, that he or she might be recruited by foreign governments, and that therefore it was better to keep everyone in the country under lock and key, keep them under surveillance by police agents. That's why such difficult conditions arose in the lives of many of our people, especially scientists and those prominent in the performing arts, such as music, theater, and ballet.

I remember the time of the Civil War when I was working in the political department of the Ninth Kuban Army and temporarily lived in the home of a bourgeois family. One of its members, a woman with a sharp tongue, made a display of daring by arguing with us Communists. She said: "So you've come to power. Well, you're just going to trample everything into the ground. Can you really be expected to appreciate such a delicate art as the

ballet?" And she was right. At that time we understood nothing about the art of ballet. If we saw postcards with photographs of ballerinas, we thought the women had been photographed in indecent poses. Often there were Communists who had spiteful things to say about Lunacharsky,<sup>20</sup> a man who spent a lot of effort and energy trying to maintain the old theaters. This was assumed to be a weakness, a deviation from Communist standards. Of course we were workers from the factories and mines, and peasants from the fields, and we were far removed at that time from the higher arts. Today if I met that woman, I would say this to her: "Do you remember our conversation in 1920? And your prediction that Soviet power would trample on this kind of art? Now look how high the art of ballet has been raised in the Soviet era." People might ask why I didn't allow similarly indulgent treatment in relation to Kapitsa. It's because defense matters are not the same as ballet. I didn't have the right to take that risk.

May Academician Kapitsa forgive me. My attitude toward him as a scientist was one of the greatest respect. But of course attitudes vary from one situation to another. When we were invited by Eden to visit Great Britain as representatives of the Soviet government, I proposed that Kurchatov<sup>21</sup> be included in the delegation. [This was in April 1956.] Imagine, in the Stalin era, sending a person like Kurchatov abroad. He knew literally everything about our missile weaponry and especially about our nuclear weapons. He was the heart and soul of the Soviet nuclear-arms program.

Nevertheless when the question of this trip came up I proposed: "Let's include Kurchatov in the delegation. That will raise the prestige of our delegation and serve as a demonstrative display for the intelligentsia." We thought that such a step might somehow serve to inspire greater confidence in our desire to achieve disarmament. We included in the delegation this major scientist who was concerned with nuclear physics and was a top theoretician in that field, and we took him with us when we went abroad. That means we trusted him. While there, he traveled alone when he met with other scientists and visited laboratories. In short, we displayed complete confidence, complete confidence!

And I was proud that Kurchatov justified this confidence. Somehow it's awkward and unpleasant for me to pronounce this word "confidence." To some extent it discredits the memory of this remarkable man and Soviet patriot. I would say this about Academician Kurchatov: "He is one of the great scientists of the Soviet era."

I could cite other examples. Sometimes we declined to allow people to travel abroad not only because of distrust of them personally but because a

general distrust of the bourgeois world had become deeply rooted in us. We considered it possible that people might be kidnapped, and such incidents had happened in history, when intelligence agencies would do that to obtain information. Was that a possibility? Yes, it was. Such things happened. And therefore, for the purpose of preventing any such thing and taking proper precautions, we persuaded some people not to travel abroad. If it was necessary for us to have representatives at a conference, we would not send the key people, but people who worked more on the fringes of a project. They knew the problem well, but they themselves had no direct part in weapons development.

There you have my confession and statement of repentance, if I can put it that way. Someone will say: “Khrushchev was not really sensitive in his treatment of scientists like Kapitsa.” Yes, it’s possible that I made a mistake, something every mortal is capable of. But Kapitsa also made a mistake when he refused to take part in our weapons-development programs. So we’re even, as we used to say in childhood.

All sorts of things happen in life. We classified as “top secret” a great many things back then. Including the names of people engaged in weapons research. When rockets were launched into outer space no one knew who had designed them, except those who were supposed to know. No one knew about Korolyov or Glushko.<sup>22</sup> And what about the other anonymous heroes? Who knows the names of the designers of our submarines? No one knows. Is that right? Evidently it is. It was too dangerous, because foreign intelligence agencies stop at nothing. If you reveal people’s names and addresses, you facilitate foreign intelligence agencies’ ability to carry on their subversive work in the Soviet Union.

Among the engineers and designers in the Soviet air force the one I knew best was Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev.<sup>23</sup> We became acquainted back in 1931 when I was elected secretary of the party’s Bauman district committee in Moscow. Tupolev was head of the TsAGI [the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute—Tsentralny Aero-Gidrodinamichesky Institut], the only institution in our country where aeronautics was really being studied. He stood out sharply among the other engineers. He was still a relatively young scientist and designer, but enjoyed special recognition. Later Stalin had him arrested and imprisoned. While he was in prison, a special design bureau was organized for Tupolev [by Beria, on Stalin’s orders]. I knew Tupolev was in prison, but Stalin said nothing about it, and asking Stalin about such things was something you simply didn’t do. Besides, it was widely known that even in prison Tupolev had placed all his knowledge at the service of his country.

On one occasion [at a later time] Tupolev was reporting regularly to me on a particular project. When everyone else left the room he stayed behind and said: "I want to ask you a question, Comrade Khrushchev. Why is my prison record still following me around? I would ask that my role be properly evaluated and that I be cleared of all the charges against me. Otherwise a shadow still hangs over me, and not only me but my children as well."

I said: "Of course, Comrade Tupolev. You may go ahead and work in peace. I give you my word that we will discuss this, and I will order that all documents against you be destroyed, so that you won't ever have to write down on any questionnaire that you had been arrested."

In my reminiscences I am going back now to the 1930s. I remember a very large passenger plane designed by Tupolev at that time, called the Maxim Gorky.<sup>24</sup> It could carry more than 50 people [apparently a large number for that time]. Unfortunately, it crashed, but that was not the designer's fault. It was the result of the daredevil behavior of a fighter pilot who was escorting the passenger plane in a fast little fighter, the I-153. The fighter was allowed to fly alongside as a contrast in size to the giant airplane. The tragic event has been etched into my memory. It was a spring day in May. I was at my dacha in the country when I received word that the Maxim Gorky had crashed. There had been a lot of publicity in the press about the plane. People had been happy that we had a plane able to carry such large loads. Our calculation then was that every passenger plane could also be used as a bomber or military transport plane. And here this daredevil pilot tried to execute a loop-the-loop around [one wing of] the Maxim Gorky. He miscalculated and caused his own death and the death of all the passengers, who were making a flight on a holiday above Moscow. The idea was to show the spectators two planes side by side: the giant Maxim Gorky and the tiny little fly, the fighter plane. Tupolev's plane was a good one. People were happy to have a chance to fly over Moscow. It was a beautiful sunny day, a very lovely day. And it ended so tragically for these people. They were all prominent figures in Soviet industrial production.

As first secretary of the party's Moscow committee I was in charge of organizing the funeral. Stalin was very angry and took out his anger on me and Bulganin, who was then chairman of the Moscow Soviet. Funeral services were held at a crematorium. The corpses were brought there to be cremated, and the urns with the ashes were taken to the Hall of Columns at the House of Trade Unions, where final honors were given to those who had perished. The ceremony was open to all who wished to attend. The funeral procession stretched half the length of Moscow. Stalin, as though to punish us for

allowing this disaster to happen, said: “Let Khrushchev and Bulganin carry the urns the whole way.” I considered it an honor to take part in that funeral procession, yet for some reason the whole way to the crematorium, I kept thinking about the bright red color of that unfortunate fighter plane. It had been painted brightly to heighten the contrast.

I met with Tupolev often and listened to what he had to say concerning the development of bombers and civilian aircraft. This great scientist also had a good grasp of practical matters. When the TU-95, which he designed, proved incapable of carrying out the functions of a bomber, since it could not get past the antiaircraft defenses of the United States, the proposal was made that it be taken out of production.<sup>25</sup> Tupolev came to see me and said: “I understand the military men who have proposed to stop production of the TU-95. But right now we don’t have any other bomber, and it can still serve our country’s needs. Besides, it can be rebuilt and turned into a passenger plane.” I liked this idea. I raised the question at a Central Committee Presidium meeting, and we accepted Tupolev’s proposal. He then designed the long-range passenger plane, the TU-114, which was a remarkable machine for those days. When I flew in it to the United States in response to an invitation from President Eisenhower, making a nonstop flight from Moscow to Washington, it made a powerful impression, to the benefit of the Soviet state. Tupolev designed other bombers and missile-bearing planes. As a designer he was very prolific and produced a huge number of excellent machines.

On one occasion Tupolev and I were sitting on the shore of the Black Sea in the Crimea. He was leafing through his drawings for future projects, and among them was a depiction of his TU-144, a beautiful plane, a supersonic passenger plane. He told me about its features. We had no doubts because when a plane had the stamp of Tupolev on it, it was valued very highly. As a scientist and designer he knew how to weigh his possibilities and evaluate them very soberly. We had confidence in Tupolev and accepted his proposal to build a supersonic plane. It has now finished going through the testing process. Thus far there are only two such planes in the world—the Anglo-French Concorde<sup>26</sup> and ours, which will soon be in production. The Concorde is not a bad plane. The British are past masters at designing planes and other machines. But so far the Americans don’t have such a plane. Hardly anyone in our country can compete with Tupolev. His TU-134 and TU-154 are still flying even today and are considered our best airplanes.

In saying this about Tupolev, I don’t intend in any way to belittle the merits of another remarkable scientist, Ilyushin.<sup>27</sup> He made a huge contribution to our victory in the war by producing the *shturmovik*. This attack plane, used

for ground support, is wrapped in a halo of unfading glory. [In World War II] our heavily-armored *shтурмовик* staggered the enemy.<sup>28</sup> Later Ilyushin produced several types of excellent passenger planes. The IL-62 is one that I haven't had a chance to try out as a passenger. When I was still working, this plane was going through the testing process, but its release for use by our passenger airlines was delayed for several years.<sup>29</sup> Today it is evident from the press that Sergei Vladimirovich [Ilyushin] has achieved what he wanted after all. Now, in the early 1970s, his plane has become the best long-range passenger plane in terms of both speed and carrying capacity.

Of course there are other designers as well who have worked to produce our bombers, fighters, passenger planes, and agricultural aircraft. [Oleg Konstantinovich] Antonov<sup>30</sup> designed a powerful cargo plane [the AN-22], capable of carrying enormous weights and having a very long range. He also turned out useful planes for agriculture and for use in the harshest conditions in the North.

I cannot list everyone, but I want to express my gratitude to these people with whom I had occasion to work and who did a great deal to strengthen our country both in regard to defense and with respect to the economy in general, and I would also say, in raising the level of prestige of our technology.

I think today is June 28. It's a Sunday, clear and sunny. The papers haven't arrived yet. Nowadays I find out what day it is by looking at the papers.<sup>31</sup>

I will continue my reminiscences about my meetings with Tupolev and his proposal to build a nuclear-powered bomber. When I was on vacation at a dacha near Livadia [in the Crimea], Tupolev, who was on vacation nearby, frequently came to see me: it was only a seven-minute walk from my place to his sanatorium, which had the name "Nizhnyaya Oreanda" [meaning Lower Oreanda]. Most often he arrived carrying a folder and wanted to show me something. On this one occasion he made the following proposal: "I want to present my arguments about the possibility of building a bomber with a nuclear engine." He began work on the plane, and he chose the designer Kuznetsov.<sup>32</sup> Kuznetsov successfully produced the nuclear engine for the bomber. For those days Kuznetsov was a relatively young man for such a job, but he was very talented. This was the same Kuznetsov who made a big name for himself designing rocket engines as well as airplane engines. What Tupolev was saying sounded very tempting. He was proposing an airplane with unlimited flight range. One of our dreams had been a plane with a flight range of around 20,000 kilometers. The TU-95 achieved a range of 18,000 kilometers, but that seemed too little to us.

It was a problem not just of distance but of speed, altitude, and load capacity. I asked Tupolev: "What will those be?"

He said: "The flight range will be almost unlimited, and it will fly at the same altitude and speed as the TU-95, that is, it will be a subsonic plane."

I objected: "But Andrei Nikolayevich, this plane's altitude and speed aren't suitable. With this altitude and speed it won't be able to overcome the air defenses of our likely adversaries."

He replied: "For the time being science and technology do not provide us with any greater possibilities."

I was surprised. I asked: "Then what's the point of building this plane now?"

"Well, that's up to you to decide. I'm just reporting that we have the technological capability of producing a bomber with a nuclear engine."

I tried to express my disagreement more gently, but it didn't come off very well. I asked: "Could you perhaps design a passenger plane with a nuclear engine?"

He said: "No, no!" and waved his hands. "There can be no talk of such a passenger plane. Nuclear engines haven't been perfected yet. Passengers can't be fully protected against radiation. So far, with great difficulty, we've been able to protect the bomber crew, but for passengers a plane of enormous weight would be required. And that's impossible. Besides, a plane like that would contaminate the airport."

"Well, it's impossible and we have to reject it."

I don't remember now how much such a plane would have cost. The amount Tupolev stated was enormous. A huge amount of scientific and experimental work would have been required, which would also have cost a pretty penny. And all that would have taken a long time. Andrei Nikolayevich didn't display his usual passionate nature. He was simply presenting the item to the consumer, as if to say, "Let the buyer himself decide whether the goods are suitable."

We agreed to postpone consideration of this question. For the time being, there was no point thinking about the construction of a passenger plane with a nuclear engine, and a bomber with these characteristics would not have been suitable. We were not about to spend money for nothing. Of course, the project might have offered some future benefits. But for the present, such a huge expenditure would exhaust the budget. I said: "Let's limit ourselves to theoretical development, so that we allocate resources only for research work. That can be continued, but there's no need to do it



at a forced pace. It's possible that something that cannot be done today will become a reality tomorrow."

In those days Arkhip Mikhailovich Lyulka<sup>33</sup> also undertook the building of a nuclear engine. His model proved to be so heavy that it couldn't get off the ground. Yet Lyulka is a good designer and a good scientist! So we put off trying to build that kind of plane.

We were not especially distressed about this, because we had already made a decision to concentrate on building missiles and the necessary work was being done.

Andrei Nikolayevich [Tupolev] didn't insist on his ideas. Not only was he a great scientist, but he had a good sense of proportion and took into consideration how much the government could spend. In short, he was a statesman. He had the consciousness of a government leader and a profound understanding of the aircraft industry. It was always pleasant to converse with Andrei Nikolayevich. Sometimes when you're dealing with a designer, it will happen that when you don't accept his ideas you immediately sense some coolness or sulkiness on his part. I never sensed anything like that with Tupolev. As far as the conversation I mentioned was concerned, I had the impression that he simply wanted to exchange opinions on the matter. His new idea had not fully ripened in his own mind. He was expressing the thoughts and considerations he had as a scientist and designer and then listened attentively to my response. We understood each other and made the right decision.

After returning to Moscow, I reported to the leadership of the country about this conversation. But then I always tried to see that such decisions were made collectively. One's individuality should be expressed in the taking of initiative, but major decisions of government importance should without fail be made on a collective basis. When I led the CPSU Central Committee no decisions of this kind were made by one person alone. It would have been impossible to make decisions any other way under the new social circumstances, which I had helped to create and which I sought to strengthen.

I have told about one meeting with Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev. I had many meetings with him. Nowadays when I read the papers or see an airplane with the designation TU or ANT, I remember the remote past, the year 1931, when I first made Tupolev's acquaintance. Back then his airplanes "ruled the skies" in our country. Subsequently Andrei Nikolayevich developed even greater strength as a designer and displayed his skills in the airplanes he produced. I don't want to offend any of our other designers with what I'm saying. I didn't know the others very well in the 1930s, and everything was kept

secret. Therefore it's possible that the opinion I'm expressing is inaccurate. I would like to call Tupolev the father of Soviet aviation, but Zhukovsky<sup>34</sup> has already been given that title. At any rate, Tupolev was one of the designers who helped give birth to the Soviet aircraft industry, not only military but also civilian aircraft. As I see it, Tupolev stood out sharply against the background of other designers, although it's very difficult to compare such people of talent.

A beautiful sunny day is ending, to the joy of Muscovites, but yesterday, Saturday, was rainy. On my porch I have flowers planted in boxes. Here is something surprising: at a distance of just three meters apart there was one place hit by hail and another that was not touched; some of the flowers were smashed by the hail and the others, right alongside, were perfectly fine. It was as though a clean cut had been made by a knife. A burst of very large hail had fallen from the sky.

That's the way it is in nature. That's why the crops suffer less from hail than from drought. Hail never spreads over a very large area, but drought can bring the country to the point of starvation.

Well, that was just a minor episode I wanted to record in passing.

1. Khrushchev received Kurchatov on January 3, 1960, at 3 P.M. and conversed with him for 40 minutes (*Uchet lits prinyatykh predsedatelem Soveta ministrov t. Khrushchevym*, N. S. [Record of Persons Received by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Comrade N. S. Khrushchev], cited in *Zhurnal istochnik* No. 4 [2003]: 68). [SK]

2. For more on Igor Kurchatov, see Biographies. In early February 1960, Kurchatov was having a rest cure at a sanatorium in Barvikha, a small settlement in a wooded area about four miles west of Moscow. On February 7, he was visited at the sanatorium by Yuly Khariton (see note 3 below). They went for a walk in the winter woods. Kurchatov suddenly felt unwell. They sat down on a bench, and a few minutes later, as they were sitting, Kurchatov had a heart attack and died. [SK]

3. Yakov Borisovich Zeldovich (1914–87) was the author of fundamental works on nuclear physics, the physics of elementary particles, astrophysics, and relativistic cosmology. He became an Academician in 1958 and was thrice Hero of Socialist Labor. In 1939, together with Khariton, he carried out the first calculation of the chain reaction caused by splitting uranium atoms.

Yuly Borisovich Khariton (1904–97) was the Soviet Union's chief designer of nuclear warheads, scientific leader of the Federal Nuclear Center of Russia, and the author of fundamental works on the physics of combustion and explosion. He

became an Academician in 1953 and was thrice Hero of Socialist Labor.

Gersh Itskovich Budker (1918–77) was the author of fundamental works on nuclear reactors, accelerators, and the physics of plasmas and high-energy particles and the creator of accelerators based on the use of pencils of rays converging from opposite directions. He was the founder and from 1957 the director of the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He became an Academician in 1964.

4. In 1950, the FBI arrested the co-owner of a repair workshop, Julius Rosenberg (1917–53), and his wife, Ethel Greenglass-Rosenberg (1916–53), then abducted in Mexico their friend, the engineer Morton Sobell, and in 1951 put all three on trial. In 1953 the Rosenbergs were executed for giving atomic secrets to the USSR; Sobell was sentenced to eighteen years at hard labor. Ethel's brother, David Greenglass, who worked at the Los Alamos atomic laboratory and provided the Rosenbergs with information about the atomic bomb, was sent to prison for fifteen years.

5. In 1947, Molotov was placed in charge of a new intelligence agency, the Committee of Information, formed by merging NKVD intelligence with the Chief Administration for Intelligence of the General Staff (GRU). [SK]

6. Academician Mstislav Vsevolodovich Keldysh (1911–78) was the author of fundamental works on

mechanics and mathematics and the scientific leader of many Soviet space programs. He was president of the USSR Academy of Sciences from 1961 to 1975. See Biographies.

7. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Nesmeyanov (1899–1980) was the author of fundamental works on organic chemistry. He became a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1943 and was its president from 1951 to 1961. He was twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

8. Academician Mikhail Alekseyevich Lavrentyev (1900–80) was the author of fundamental works on mathematics and mechanics and the organizer and the first chairman (from 1957 to 1975) of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences. See Biographies.

9. This proposal was made in 1957. [SK]

10. Khrushchev discusses such prefabricated houses, made of wooden panels, elsewhere in his memoirs. [GS]

11. Academician Pyotr Leonidovich Kapitsa (1894–1984) made major discoveries in the fields of low-temperature physics and the physics of strong magnetic fields. He was the organizer and director (from 1935 to 1946 and from 1955) of the Institute of Physics Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences. See Biographies.

12. When the work of developing a Soviet atomic bomb was going on, Kapitsa made some critical comments about Beria, who was in charge of the project. He said that Beria was ignorant (*bezgramoten*) and that he was interfering with the work. Kapitsa was removed as director of the Institute of Theoretical Physics, but Stalin refused to authorize his arrest. Kapitsa lived at a dacha at Nikolina Gora, where he conducted experiments in a barn. (Nicolina Gora is in the countryside west of Moscow, not far from Petrovo-Dalneye, where later Khrushchev lived in retirement.) After Stalin's death, Kapitsa again became director of the Institute of Theoretical Physics. [SK]

13. Valery Ivanovich (in Latvian: Martin) Mezhlauk. See Biographies.

14. Ernest Rutherford (1871–1937) discovered alpha and beta rays, developed (together with Frederick Soddy) the theory of radioactivity, proposed the planetary model of the atom, and predicted the existence of the neutron. He became director of the Cavendish Physics Laboratory in Cambridge, England, in 1919. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1908 and was made an honorary member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1925.

15. Kapitsa's sphere of operations, and his field of science, theoretical physics, were far removed from Khrushchev's concerns in the mid-1930s. [SK]

16. This is near what is now Gagarin Square. The Vorobyov Hills, forming a high bank of the Moscow River in southwestern Moscow, were

renamed the Lenin Hills in 1935. After World War II they became the new location of Moscow University, with its main building a giant skyscraper. [GS]

17. William C. Bullitt (1891–1967) was the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union (1933–36) and a trusted friend and adviser of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. See Biographies.

18. Kapitsa was trying to produce a beam of light that could destroy an object from a distance, but he was unsuccessful. In his thinking he did not arrive at the idea of a laser beam. Instead, the Soviet physicists Nikolai Gennadiyevich Basov and Aleksandr Mikhailovich Prokhorov developed the laser. [SK]

19. Andrei Petrovich Kapitsa (born 1931) is the author of works on geomorphology and the Antarctic icecap. He has been a participant in four Antarctic expeditions and in 1967–69 led the geophysical expedition of the USSR Academy of Sciences to East Africa. He became a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1970 and is currently a deputy chief scientific secretary of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

20. Anatoly Vasilyevich Lunacharsky. See Biographies.

21. Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov. See Biographies.

22. These two leading Soviet rocket scientists were discussed in a previous chapter, "Airplanes and Missiles." [GS]

23. Colonel General of Engineering Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev (1888–1972) was the creator of more than a hundred models of heavy civil and military aircraft, seventy of which were put into series production. His models included the first Soviet fully metallic ANT-2, the ANT-25, TB, SB, TU-2, TU-12, TU-16, TU-95, TU-104, TU-110, TU-114, TU-124, TU-134, and TU-154, and the supersonic TU-144. Twenty-eight unprecedented flights were made and seventy-eight world records set by his airplanes. He also designed hovercraft and the motor torpedo boats G-4 and G-5. See Biographies.

24. The ANT-20 (also named the Maxim Gorky) had a catastrophic accident on May 18, 1935.

25. In the NATO classification, the TU-95 is called the Bear. [SK]

26. In 1962, the British and French governments made an agreement to develop jointly a supersonic jet plane. The first experimental Concorde made its test flight in 1969. In all, fourteen Concordes have flown commercially for the national airlines British Airways and Air France. The Concorde flies at a speed of 2,160 kilometers per hour (1,350 miles per hour). [SS]

27. Colonel General of the Engineering-Technical Service Sergei Vladimirovich Ilyushin (1894–1977) was the creator of many models of aircraft, including the IL-4 and IL-28 bombers, the IL-2, IL-10, and IL-40 attack aircraft, and the IL-12, IL-14, IL-18, and IL-62 passenger aircraft. See Biographies.

28. The *shturmovik* (sometimes rendered in English as “*stormovik*”)—Soviet ground-attack aircraft, in particular, the IL-2, designed and armed to fly at low altitudes to attack enemy ground forces (tanks, troops, fortifications, etc.), providing close support to Soviet ground forces. Soviet soldiers sometimes referred to Ilyushin’s “*stormoviks*” as “flying tanks.” [GS]

29. There were a number of reasons for the delay, including problems in the testing process. [SK]

30. Oleg Konstantinovich Antonov (1906–84) was the author of works on aeronautics and economics and the creator of a number of transportation and passenger aircraft in the AN series, including the Antei (AN-22) and the Ruslan (AN-124). He also designed gliders. See Biographies.

31. Actually, it was June 27, 1971. As Khrushchev says, he relied on the papers to know what day it was. The paper had not arrived for that day. [SK]

32. Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kuznetsov (1911–95) designed jet engines for many aircraft, including the AN-22, TU-144, TU-154, IL-62, and IL-86. He headed the Scientific Council of the Academy of

Sciences on the problem “Reliability and Resources in Machine-Building.” In 1964 Korolyov asked him to design a rocket engine for his lunar N-1 rocket launcher. [SK] For more on this request by Korolyov to Kuznetsov, see the chapter above entitled “Airplanes and Missiles,” p. 457; see also Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 475–76. [GS]

33. Arkhip Mikhailovich Lyulka (1908–84) was the creator of various aircraft engines, including the first two-contour turbojet engine in the world. He also carried out research into new energy sources. See Biographies.

34. Nikolai Yegorovich Zhukovsky (1847–1921) was a professor at the Moscow Higher Technical School (Moskovskoye Vyssheye Tekhnicheskoye Uchilishche, or MVTU) and one of the founders of the sciences of aeronautics and aerodynamics: he was known as the “father of Russian aviation.” He helped establish the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (Russian initials, TsAGI) in Moscow in 1918. Tupolev studied under him at the MVTU and later worked at the TsAGI. See Biographies. [SK/GS]

# Issues of Peace and War

## REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET ARMY

As is generally known, we carried out a substantial reduction of personnel in the Soviet armed forces.<sup>1</sup> This was also one of our more painful problems. While Stalin was still alive he thought we were on the verge of a possible attack by the United States on the Soviet Union. Everything was placed in a state of combat readiness. We were maintaining an enormous army of more than 5 million people. It's very expensive to have such an army in peacetime. With an army of such size the economy of a country can be undermined without any war, and in this way we unwittingly accomplished exactly what the enemy wanted. The enemy was achieving his aim without a war. On the other hand, to campaign for disarmament or at least an arms reduction, when you yourself have a huge army, will not work. No one will simply take your word for it [that you will disarm]. And it's impossible to conceal such a huge army. The intelligence services knew back then and they still know today how large the armies are on either side. In general, the Americans didn't keep the basic size of their armed forces a secret; they published the figures in the press. We concealed our figures, but the result was the same. When I used to read summaries of the foreign press or materials of a confidential nature, I saw that the Americans knew exactly the size of our army and what armaments we had, including new types of weapons. I once asked Malinovsky: "What is this? Do they have agents on our General Staff? How does the enemy know so quickly about all our innovations?" Malinovsky shrugged his shoulders: "Evidently the credit for that goes to their aerial reconnaissance and the other advanced technology that they have."

We honestly wanted to convince our former allies that it was necessary [for all of us] to renounce war as a means of applying political pressure and to renounce intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. We called on them to agree to a reduction of all our armed forces and eventually to

achieve total and complete disarmament.<sup>2</sup> We decided to make a demonstration of our peaceful intentions by eliminating our naval base in Finland<sup>3</sup> and by withdrawing our troops from China. Then we began thinking about reducing the troop strength of our armed forces. We had accumulated a certain quantity of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and our firepower had increased many times over. And after all, the strength of an army nowadays is determined not by the number of soldiers one has; it is one's firepower that determines the possibility of defeating the adversary. We felt, therefore, that we were not taking any risk. On the contrary, by reducing the size of our army we would "enrich" our budget and thus have an opportunity to transfer resources to the development of the means of production and the means of consumption with the aim of raising our citizens' standard of living. The housing problem was particularly severe. Major resources were required for the construction industry in order to eliminate the extreme housing shortage, the so-called housing famine, and the inhuman conditions our people were living in.

Having come to the conclusion that we could reduce our armed forces, we also reduced the size of our military forces in East Germany. At that time the East Germans had only a small army. All in all, we reduced our army's numbers by 2.5 million. The size of the U.S. army was approximately the same then, and the armed forces of West Germany were also very small to start with, although later they expanded their armed services and now they have all forms of weaponry, with the exception of nuclear weapons. Despite our good example our former allies did not follow our lead and refused to come to an honorable agreement.

The Americans insisted that, parallel to disarmament, there would have to be aerial monitoring that would encompass our entire country. We could not agree to that at the time, because we were weaker than the United States and its allies in terms of armaments and we did not want to reveal that. To allow aerial monitoring of our country would mean to allow a potential enemy to carry out reconnaissance to find out what weapons we had and to weigh the balance of forces of the two sides, which might prompt the aggressors to start a war. We agreed only to some minor concessions, allowing monitors on a limited part of our territory along the border. If monitoring were introduced to a certain depth along the borders [between 500 and 700 kilometers], that would eliminate the danger of surprise attack by regular armed forces. At any rate if such monitoring were present, any sudden attack on the territory of a neighboring state would be ruled out. The only exception

was intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). ICBMs could destroy an entire country, but that is not the main goal in a war. In the past the seizure of territory has been considered the main aim of war, and it still is today.

We were willing to agree to the establishment of monitoring of each other's airfields where troops might be concentrated for rapid deployment in some specified direction. But that proposal met with no understanding, and no agreement was reached.

For us there remained only one solution: to continue strengthening our defense capability and continue our arms buildup, but to carry out this buildup in a rational way, not giving in to panic or intimidation. Often the intelligence agencies of the opposing side try to induce panic, with the aim of forcing you to spend resources unnecessarily. Armaments and weapons systems become obsolete quickly; soon they must be disposed of and new spending is required. And so it goes on endlessly. The unending arms race can exhaust a country and has a ruinous effect on the living standards of the population.

I still hold to the position that we should not rise to the enemy's bait. Our starting point should be our own firepower. And in my opinion the Soviet Union has sufficient firepower. We have the main thing—ICBMs and other strategic long-range missiles, plus a submarine fleet armed with both nuclear and nonnuclear warheads. If I still had influence on decision making today, I would reduce the size of the army still further.

There is no need to spend money for no good purpose. We must not let our opponents frighten us, forcing us to spend more on defense than is necessary. We must take a rational approach to the question of defense. That would be an ace in the hole in all our political work. We could demonstrate our good intentions and not be threatening anybody. That would be convincing to the working class in the capitalist countries and would give supporters of the peace movement the opportunity to work more successfully among the people and to bring more pressure to bear on the governments and the aggressive pro-war forces who insist on continuing the Cold War and who are ready at any moment to make the break from Cold War to hot war. During my time in power a great many questions arose in connection with the tasks I proposed for rearming our country and reducing the size of our army. When it came to the question of upgrading and modernizing our armed forces the military men were always in favor. The task of the political leadership is to set rational limits on the constant tendency to increase military spending.



1. In 1955, by a joint decree of the USSR Council of Ministers and CPSU Central Committee, the numerical strength of the Soviet armed forces was reduced by 640,000. Reductions of personnel had been carried out even before that. Between January 1, 1953, and January 1, 1956, the size of the armed forces was reduced by a total of 1,116,216, according to *Voyennye arkhivy Rossii* (Military Archives of Russia), 1:194, 283–84, 305–7. The same source states that on January 1, 1953, the armed forces numbered 5,394,038. In January 1960 the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a law reducing the armed forces by another 1.2 million. After this reduction, troop strength was to remain at 2,423,000. Between 1956 and 1960, an attempt to reduce the armed forces by 1.2 million was not carried out in full. Only about half a million additional personnel were dropped from the ranks. [SK] Between 1955

and 1958 the armed forces of other socialist countries in Europe were reduced by 456,000. [MN]

2. In 1955 the USSR put forward a proposal for a comprehensive program of disarmament and in 1959 a proposal for general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

3. For Khrushchev's more detailed account of the Soviet government decision to close its base in Finland in 1955, see Volume 3 (forthcoming), the end of the chapter entitled "The Four-Power Summit Meeting in Geneva (July 1955)." Porkkala-Udd had been leased to the Soviet Union for fifty years for use as a naval base by the terms of the truce agreement with Finland of September 19, 1944. Soviet forces based in Port Arthur, China, were also withdrawn in 1955. For more on Port Arthur, see the notes to the chapter "The Soviet Navy." [GS]

## ON PEACE AND WAR

A contest is under way to see which side will be better prepared to destroy its opponent's armed forces. This in our enlightened age, a century that has seen such a high flight of human thought, science, culture, literature, and art! To a greater degree than ever before humanity is spending its energy on its own destruction. Each side is preparing to destroy the other. Such is the class essence of society—as long as states with differing social and political systems exist. Antagonistic forces are at work in society, and we are unable to reach an agreement on peaceful coexistence. We need to agree that questions of the social and political system in any country should be resolved without war by the people of that country as they see fit. Each side should make a commitment—and carry it out—not to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. Revolution should not be exported. But neither should counterrevolution be exported.

Of course it would be foolish to conclude from all this that we favor peaceful coexistence on questions of ideology. That is a question of influencing people's minds. Here it is not possible to come to agreement, and I laughed at the Western journalists when they asked:

“Mr. Khrushchev, isn’t it possible to extend peaceful coexistence to questions of ideology?”

“No, that’s impossible.”

But I think, and Lenin thought, that peaceful coexistence is necessary between states with differing social and political systems. At this time I’m not going to discuss whether this is possible or not. Thus far life has confirmed that it is possible. Since 1945 we have lived under conditions of peaceful coexistence, although local wars have been fought for quite a few years now. Immediately after the end of World War II armed conflicts broke out in various parts of the globe. In this case, too, people should have adhered to the doctrine that counterrevolution cannot be exported, just as revolution cannot. Thus, nonintervention and noninterference should be the obligatory position of every government. Every nation, whether small or large, should be given the chance to decide internal questions of its social and political structure as the people of that nation themselves decide.

Under the present circumstances of international tension a very great temptation arises for the military. If they were not kept under control, if they were allowed to decide what resources would be used for national security, their inordinate demands could bring our country to ruin despite their being Communists and patriots. And I won’t even mention that military men, including some of the best, can sometimes be infected with irresponsible fantasizing and boastful swaggering. The government must always keep the military under restraint and not give them a blank check for spending on national security. A process of squandering the people’s wealth could begin, resulting in the completely unjustified draining of the government budget. And this whole burden would be placed on the backs of our people.

Defense against the danger of war is one thing. Our people, who have lived through such a [terrible] war, will give everything unstintingly so that the necessary means of defense will exist. But it is not uncommon to encounter speculation in this sphere.<sup>1</sup> The correct choice for us today is missiles, nuclear weapons, and a submarine fleet. Our approach toward other means of waging war must be very restrained, and we have to think very deeply to justify expenditures on other things. What aim is being pursued and how are these objectives being served by the other types of weapons that we are spending money on?

This is a very important question. It’s difficult to decide. It’s difficult because, for example, the navy men have now become more subtle and clever. They refer to the strength of the enemy in order to try to frighten our government. They say, look, the United States has so many aircraft carriers,

and Britain has so many, and France also has aircraft carriers, and so on and so forth. Why don't we, a great power, have them? We need them! The navy men can throw dust in your eyes and befog your mind. They can prove the opposite of what is true and walk off with the government's money.

Yes, they will say, we need everything. But why exactly do we need all these things? Is this what's most important? Are they defending our country and deterring our adversaries from attacking the Soviet Union and its allies, the socialist countries? No. The main thing that is holding the aggressors back is our nuclear arsenal.

In this connection I once again recall Eisenhower's words—and he was no fool. I believed what he said—that he feared war, that is, a real, full-scale war. He said to me in a private conversation: “Mr. Khrushchev, I am very afraid of a war and I do not want one.”

He was not trying to lull me into dropping my guard. No, he was a military man who knew war. He had seen World War II with his own eyes, having served as commander in chief of the armed forces of our allies. He had a very specific picture of what a future war, a third world war, would look like. He was right to fear such a war and wanted to reach an agreement with us.

People will say: “You're praising Eisenhower, but you yourself negotiated with him. You sincerely wanted to come to an agreement, but no agreement was reached.”

That's true. We didn't reach agreement, although we wanted to and he wanted to. But each side had different positions. The time had not yet ripened. I had a conversation with Eisenhower when I was in America. We were having a one-on-one conversation at Camp David [in September 1959]. Of course we weren't literally alone together. As I recall, I was never completely on a one-to-one basis with him. I always had Comrade Gromyko<sup>2</sup> with me, a man I respect, whose abilities were in keeping with the importance of his assignment. He was a good minister of foreign affairs, and I respected him for his modesty, restraint, and sober-mindedness.

At that time Eisenhower said, with a smile on his face: “I would like to ask you how you solve questions of military spending. But before you answer I'll tell you how it happens in our country. How the military men extract money from the government for armaments in the United States. The military men come in and say: ‘We need so much money to carry out such-and-such measures.’ I say to them: ‘We don't have the money. All our money's been allocated and there's none to spare.’ And they say: ‘If you don't give us the money, the Russians are working on this problem and they'll solve it before we do. Then the Russians will have a weapon that we don't have.’ Then I

agree and give them the money.” Of course he was saying “I” when he meant the government of the United States.

Eisenhower again asked me: “How are these questions decided in your country?”

I said: “Mr. President, it’s exactly the same. In our country too the military men come and demand money for new weapons systems. We say we don’t have the money. And our military men also repeat to us what your military men say to you: ‘If you don’t give us the money, they’re working on this problem in America and they’re close to solving the problem, and if we don’t get the money, we’ll end up in a worse position.’ And so we too give them the money. There’s no alternative.”

The president joked: “Then it would be a good thing if you and I could come to an agreement.”

I said: “That is exactly what I came here for. It is our age-old dream to come to an agreement with you.”

Our discussions proceeded for a long time, but we weren’t able to reach agreement after all. The Americans weren’t ready then to accept peaceful coexistence on an equal basis. They wanted to impose the preservation of the old regime [that is, the existing social order] on the rest of the world. I said to Eisenhower then, and later to Kennedy too, that times had changed. It was no longer possible to have a Holy Alliance<sup>3</sup> of the kind that had once been created to preserve monarchical regimes and maintain the status quo. I said that it was impossible to repeat that kind of thing in our day and age. That was our position, but they had a different opinion and stuck to it. The wealthy [in the advanced capitalist countries] are spending vast resources without any control by the majority of the people; they are fleecing the people with taxes and pursuing their aggressive policies.

In spite of everything we did come to an agreement on some questions. We came to agreement—and this was later of course, with Kennedy [in 1963]—on putting an end to nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space, on the earth’s surface, and underwater.<sup>4</sup> But we reached no agreement on underground nuclear testing or other questions. The balance of forces had a major impact here. Quantitatively we had fewer nuclear weapons. This apparently spurred the Americans on, arousing the desire to extract better terms in any agreement on disarmament and thus obtain an advantage. We understood our situation, weighed our chances correctly, and decided to accept a limited agreement. The conditions did not exist for an agreement that would satisfy both sides. As I’ve said, the time for that had not yet ripened.

1. By “speculation” here Khrushchev apparently means activity by some groups in the military to promote their own narrow departmental interests. [GS]

2. Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko. See Biographies.

3. The original “Holy Alliance” was created in the first half of the nineteenth century, in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars and the upheavals begun by the French revolution, when the monarchical powers of Europe, particularly Russia, Austria, and Prussia, agreed to act in concert to suppress revolutionary and nationalist movements all over the continent of Europe. This alliance was called “holy” because the rulers claimed

to act in accordance with “Christian principles.” Reactionary (antiliberal as well as antirevolutionary) policies, guided especially by the Austrian diplomat Metternich, including strict censorship and police surveillance, were carried out in the name of the Holy Alliance. These policies dominated much of European life in the period 1815–48. In Volume 3 of these memoirs (forthcoming), in the chapter on Kennedy and Berlin, Khrushchev has further discussion about the ultimate failure of the Holy Alliance’s attempt to prevent revolutions. [GS]

4. For an account of this agreement, see Glenn T. Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1981). [SS]

## NUCLEAR WAR AND CONVENTIONAL WAR

Some hold the opinion that it is still possible to wage war without using nuclear weapons. This opinion is confirmed by practical experience. A war was going on in Korea. America “intruded” in this war, interfering in the internal affairs of the Korean people. Despite the fact that the U.S. forces suffered defeat at the hands of the North Koreans—or more exactly, the Chinese—America’s military bosses decided not to take the risk of using nuclear weapons, although voices were heard saying they should be used.

And in Vietnam, how many years has war been going on there! There is also a war going on with no end in sight in the Middle East. The war of Israel against Egypt. Here the two sides had no nuclear weapons, although their allies had them. We had no military alliance with Egypt, but our sympathies were always on the side of the Egyptian people and the state of Egypt. Israel also had an ally to back it up with nuclear weapons of every caliber—the United States. Nevertheless nuclear weapons have not been used in that conflict so far. Of course certain qualifications should be added here: Israel didn’t need to use nuclear weapons; it managed to defeat the Egyptian army and the armies of Egypt’s allies, Syria and Jordan, with the classical type of conventional weapons.

But would a world war be possible without the use of nuclear weapons? This was the question we constantly asked ourselves when I still held responsible

posts in the Soviet government. I didn't think it possible. Let's suppose that a war starts even without a nuclear attack, but with only conventional weapons being used. Then a shift in the balance of forces occurs, and one of the sides, possessing nuclear weapons, begins to lose its strength. Wouldn't that losing side use nuclear weapons against its adversary? I believe it would! I don't believe that could be avoided. A drowning man will clutch at any straw, as the saying goes. And of course there would be a military catastrophe. I'm convinced that the buttons would be pushed and that such a war would end with nuclear explosions. That's why everything possible must be done to prevent war, to prevent the catastrophe that would inevitably happen if a world war began and nuclear weapons were put to use.

We experienced such a moment of white-hot tension when we found ourselves on the verge of using nuclear weapons during the Caribbean crisis. I have already expressed my views on this matter both publicly and in my memoirs.<sup>1</sup> Fortunately, we were able to come to an agreement. Why? We feared a nuclear exchange. President Kennedy made a public statement in Vienna in June 1961, when he and I met, that the United States had the capacity to destroy the Soviet Union twice over but that the Soviet Union had only the capacity to destroy the United States once. That statement was highly noteworthy in connection with what I am discussing. It might have seemed that the United States was stronger than the Soviet Union. But that is only an arithmetical calculation. Any sensible person would understand that if someone has been destroyed once there is no need to destroy them again. The main point in Kennedy's statement was its recognition of the strength the Soviet Union did have, and that was sufficient for us.

The journalists asked me: "What is your view of the president's remarks?"

I answered: "We are not bloodthirsty. Once someone has been destroyed, we are not going to kill him a second time."

Yes, this was an acknowledgment of the equal destructive potential [of the two sides] in the event of war. This was a historic admission on the part of such a mighty power as the United States of America, an acknowledgment of the power of the first socialist country in the world, the Soviet state. And we continue to exist by relying on our own strength, the strength of our arms.

1. Volume 3 (forthcoming) will contain a separate chapter on the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Although it appears in the final volume of this edition, the Cuban missile crisis was actually the first topic Khrushchev addressed when he

began recording his memoirs in 1966–67. See Sergei Khrushchev's "The History of the Creation and Publication of the Khrushchev Memoirs," in the Appendixes to Volume 1 of this edition. [GS]

**ARMS RACE OR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE?**

Today is May 8, 1970.<sup>1</sup> Tomorrow our country observes Victory Day. Our victory was won with arms in hand. Nowadays people I meet often ask me about the arms race that has developed between the two rival powers. It devours enormous resources. If we could manage to cut back on the arms race, we would save vast amounts. For now, however, the people are required to spend those resources for arms. To redirect those resources is the dream of the political leadership of the USSR. It would seem that we have now reached the point where we could stop [what we have been doing] and direct our resources toward satisfying the needs of the people. But actually that is an illusion. In practice things turn out to be different. Science keeps advancing, and technology becomes more and more refined; ever new types of weapons make their appearance, superior to what we saw yesterday. All countries of the world take advantage of such "blessings of progress" to an equal degree. This is a scourge that drives the competing sides onward and constantly feeds the desire to achieve supremacy. And once again vast resources are spent on arms.

The meeting I once had with President Eisenhower [in September 1959], at which we both expressed our views in favor of disarmament, ended up accomplishing nothing. This proved to be unproductive precisely because we could not agree to limit the arms race. Is there some glimmer of hope today? Has the possibility arisen that all countries might understand the need to stop the arms race? In my opinion there is some light at the end of the tunnel. Without showing any cowardice or allowing itself to be intimidated, the political leadership of our country is obliged to maintain a sober view regarding the balance of forces in the world, so as to move more boldly down the path toward disarmament, while making a realistic prognosis for the future. If our government allows itself to be drawn into an unending arms race and fails to do everything in its power to stop the arms race, that kind of policy would lead to the exhaustion of our country's resources. It would be a hopeless policy.

What do I mean by a sober analysis of the situation? How can we, while moving toward disarmament, keep the USSR in a state of readiness to repel any aggression? The main thing is that the great powers have arms with a global reach of such strength and in such quantity that the entire world could be destroyed quickly and easily. If we are to assess the balance of forces correctly, given the quantity of nuclear arms that have been accumulated,



we do have the possibility of limiting defense spending. At one time I said the following: “Even with the existence of an agreement not to use nuclear missiles, if a war breaks out with conventional weapons, and if later the arrow starts to point toward victory for one side, at the last minute, when no other solution remains, the side that faces defeat will take the risk of using thermonuclear weapons.” That is the basis on which we must proceed. It’s not good, of course, because the danger of nuclear war will continue to hang over the head of humanity. But this danger can also play a positive role, if sober-minded leaders in various countries refuse to allow themselves to be drawn into a mutually destructive war.

Some people will say that life itself has refuted this point of view. The U.S. war in Vietnam keeps dragging on. Strictly speaking, the war between Vietnam and the United States is a punitive police expedition by the United States against a country that not only has no nuclear weapons or missiles but does not even have major industry or major economic potential. A guerrilla war is being waged there, for how many years now? Thus far the war has not only failed to bring success to the United States; it has now become clear to everyone that the Americans are being defeated. If the Vietnamese people have enough courage and persistence—and the leaders and the people of Vietnam have shown that they do possess these qualities—the U.S. aggression is sure to be defeated completely.

Outbreaks of aggression are occurring in various parts of the world. The powers on whom the preservation of peace directly depends are constantly taking steps that bring them to the brink of major war. But if the opposing sides can keep war from developing into thermonuclear catastrophe, it will be possible to prevent an ultimate disaster. The Cuban crisis was precisely such an experience; it ended with a rational agreement.

Equilibrium in the basic strength of the two opposing sides has been achieved—in other words, a “balance of fear,” as John Foster Dulles put it in his day. He often went to the brink of war, but he had a very clear grasp of where that brink was, and until his death he pursued policies that never went over the brink. I said jokingly back then that we would look back and remember Dulles with kind words some day, because he was no fool. In fact he was quite an intelligent man, speaking of course from the point of view of his class. He was a loyal “attack dog” for capitalism, and he pursued policies that were in the interests of the United States. He was an opponent who always had to be taken into account, but an opponent who had the gift of understanding that it was also necessary to take into account the growing

strength of the socialist camp, above all the Soviet Union. When Dulles died [in May 1959] Gromyko didn't want to go to his funeral. I had to argue with him that he was not acting correctly. A conference of foreign ministers of various countries was under way in Geneva. All the participants immediately left for the funeral; Gromyko alone stayed behind. We advised him to go as well. It can even be pleasant to attend the funeral of your enemy.

What are we to do in the future? The balance of forces between the two competing camps in the world today is approximately equal. It is not a question of simple arithmetic. Once again I recall President Kennedy's words: "We, the United States, have enough thermonuclear weapons to destroy the Soviet Union twice over. But the Soviet Union also has thermonuclear weapons, which could destroy the United States." This was an acknowledgment of our strength. I joked [in reply] that we were not bloodthirsty: it was enough for us to kill the opponent once; there was no need to do it a second time.

Even when one finds oneself on the brink of war it is best to define that boundary line quite clearly, so as not to cross over the line and be destroyed. Such acknowledgment allows the Soviet Union to display not only sober-mindedness but also firmness in pursuing a policy aimed at limiting the size of armies and the number of weapons in the world.

Conventional weapons are not the decisive factor in determining basic policy when we're talking, not about local conflicts, but a worldwide confrontation. Of what significance is it nowadays to have superior numbers of infantry, for example—or as some would put it, a greater quantity of cannon fodder? These are no longer the days when the number of soldiers one has or even the skill of one's military leaders is decisive for the success of one's cause. Today everything depends on skill in handling thermonuclear weapons. And from this it follows that the USSR, without dictating terms to anyone, is in a position to insist on a policy of disarmament.

Why do I think this? By 1964 we had reduced our armed forces to almost half the size they had been in 1953. Well, and what of it? Did we become weaker? Has our fear of war become greater? Nothing of the sort. What this means is that we were able to calmly proceed in reducing the quantity of traditional conventional weapons. Also, we closed the base we had in Finland. Did this really weaken our position? No, the contrary is true. Our position was not weakened, and the international climate improved.

I have always been and remain an advocate of reducing the size of our armed forces, withdrawing all of our nation's troops from the territories of other countries, and closing our bases in other countries. This is beneficial for

everyone! Given the international conditions that exist today, the USSR has the full possibility of pursuing an independent policy on questions of armament. We should not follow the lead of the militarists; we should not allow ourselves to be provoked. The capitalist countries will always try to tempt us with the idea of competing in the realm of armaments, thus imposing a bigger military budget on us and causing us to exhaust our strength, not allowing the people of the socialist countries to utilize their resources, develop their economic potential, and satisfy the growing material and cultural needs of their people. The capitalists have already imposed this “competition” on us.

Military spending is a bottomless pit into which our resources disappear in vain. Of course the best thing would be to come to an agreement with the capitalist countries on stopping the arms race and achieving disarmament. But for this to be accomplished, absolute mutual trust is required. I would suggest that today absolute trust between antagonistic social systems is impossible. But it is within the power of the two sides to come to agreement on specific measures. We were able to come to an agreement on stopping nuclear tests in 1963 in three areas—in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. The United States refused to include underground nuclear testing in this agreement. This agreement does not reduce the military potential of either side, nor does it prevent either side from increasing its potential. On the other hand, the agreement does not require monitoring on the territory of the opposing side. Sufficiently sensitive automatic monitoring devices exist today, capable of registering explosions in the atmosphere, underwater, and even underground. The capitalists accepted this agreement, without limiting their military spending in any way.

Similarly, no limits are placed on arms spending by the agreement among nuclear powers not to spread nuclear weapons to other countries. The non-proliferation treaty is aimed at restricting the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately this agreement does not even guarantee that countries not now possessing nuclear weapons will not be able to acquire them. No. Any independent country that pursues its own policies, if the desire arises within it, and such intentions do occur here and there, can develop its own means for producing nuclear weapons. All the necessary data now exist, both scientific and technical. All one needs are the resources and the desire. So then, that agreement is no guarantee against the occurrence of thermonuclear war, although to some degree it reduces the likelihood of such a war.

Yes, it's true that the arms race is profitable for the capitalist countries. For our part, in accepting the arms race, we seem to give them justification

for pursuing that policy. Or the opposite could be argued as well—that if we stopped taking part in the arms race and producing the means of waging war, that would soon mean our subordination to the policies of other countries. Nothing of the kind! Our thermonuclear missiles, which can be stored and held in readiness over the long term, will restrain any adversary from attacking us. Firmness and foresight are required of the leaders of the USSR in carrying out our own policy line. What is needed is the good sense not to be drawn into competition over who can squander more of their national income on the means of destruction. At the same time we must have everything we need to defend the country. We should fashion our defense budget in such a way that we do not subordinate ourselves to any influence from militaristic circles, whether from without or from within.

I have spoken about the forces inside the capitalist countries, militaristic circles and manufacturers of weapons of mass destruction, who work to promote war. Is it possible that in the socialist countries there exist similar forces that pressure the government to increase arms spending? From the point of view of the class approach we could say that no such classes exist in our country! We do not have private owners of factories and we do not have capitalist private property. Therefore no such forces should exist in our country. But do people exist who have an interest or could have an interest in such policies? Yes, they exist. They can pressure the government in the wrong direction.

Above all these are military men. But there are various kinds of military men. Of course there is no comparison between the military in the capitalist countries and those in the socialist countries. Undeniably they are different, but in some aspects of their understanding of the world a similarity exists between them. Both there and here the military men want more armaments; both there and here they want to have command over numerous armies. They go all out to demonstrate to the government that the opposing side has such and such a weapon, let's say, but we don't have it and yet it's a vital necessity for us to have it. The military should not be idealized. Among them there are people who have acquired a way of thinking peculiar to a special caste. That kind of thinking is present in the armed forces of the socialist countries. One should not give in to their influence. The government itself should determine military policy.

People who have an interest in expanding the army and increasing arms production cannot take a rational political approach to the question of our real defense capabilities. They cannot place a rational limit on the expenditure of resources. This is what is called the military-industrial complex. Rationality

does not consist in taking part in competition over arms spending or the maintenance of huge armies. It is enough to have an army capable of repelling an attack by a likely enemy.

There is a third group of the following kind: part of society that is taken in by demagogic propaganda and then begins to pressure the government along such lines. In such cases responsible leaders should not be afraid to enter into conflict, just as I was not afraid of having a conflict with Admiral Kuznetsov,<sup>3</sup> who was insisting on an unnecessary program of building a huge surface fleet. People should not be idealized. One should not think that just because they are Communists they will take the right position. Nonsense! Stalin was also a Communist, but that didn't prevent him from becoming a monster and a butcher. Mao, too, was a Communist, but that didn't prevent him from attacking a fellow socialist country—Vietnam.

It is very harmful and dangerous for the socialist countries to allow an increase in the influence of the military. The danger exists that the military could subject the socialist countries to a policy of militarization. That is also a kind of policy, but it could result in the exhaustion of the country, the exhaustion of our people, the reduction of our potential. The larger the armed forces and the more weapons we have, the worse our people will live. It is indispensable that we upgrade and modernize our weapons. That must be done, but it must be done rationally, within reasonable limits. Such a rational approach means allocating as few resources as possible to armaments while keeping in mind the need to maintain our defense capability and being sure that our country remains impregnable.

In discussing this question it is possible to go to extremes and fall into absurdities. It's a very delicate question. I proceed from a rational point of view, a reasonable approach, the correct estimate of the balance of forces and the specific conditions in which we live. Given the present-day balance of forces in the world, the capitalist countries will hardly decide in favor of an armed conflict with the USSR, although they will continue to pursue a policy of attempting to undermine us. But I consider that normal, because class antagonisms normally produce that kind of policy. We also do not renounce our ideological positions, or all the measures that logically ensue, with the exception of those, however, that might lead to disaster.

A correct understanding is necessary here. There cannot be ideological peace, and no treaties can help in this area. There's no point even thinking about it. What would that be? How could there be an agreement to make peace ideologically? It would be an admission of the correctness of capitalist

ideology. It would mean putting a stop to the struggle against capitalism. That would mean that we would cease to be Communists, and such a thing could not be permitted. On the other hand, the capitalists also cannot reconcile themselves to the existence of our ideology. They will wage a struggle against it as long as they have the strength.

In the ideological realm, in my opinion, the struggle is bound to end with the victory of the Communist worldview. But this kind of conflict and confrontation in the ideological realm does not contradict having contacts that are mutually advantageous in the realms of economics, culture, and so forth.

When we had negotiations about the possibilities of reaching an agreement on stopping the arms race, the Western side placed the question of monitoring at the top of the agenda. I think they insisted on the primacy of monitoring because they thought we would never agree. As soon as we began trying to reach some agreement on the details of such monitoring, what the exact conditions would be, the West immediately lost its enthusiasm for the project. We are also in favor of monitoring, but what exactly should it consist of?

In the immediate postwar period the Western countries were stronger than we were. In the present world, economics decides the outcome of war. Whoever has the strongest economy has the possibility of accumulating larger resources for arms spending. If we compare the material resources of the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries, it can be seen that we are lagging behind and produce less in the way of armaments. In spite of that, however, the level that we have achieved does allow us to compete in the arms race. We do not lag so far behind that we cannot compete. If today I had some influence on bilateral or multilateral negotiations, I would move decisively toward seeking an agreement to establish arms control. Total mutual arms control is not something for us to be afraid of today.

Back at an earlier time, when I held posts in our government, we worked out a specific proposal that we presented to the West. We agreed to monitoring and inspections then, but only in the border areas. We also agreed to monitoring and inspection of our armed forces deployed in the German Democratic Republic and considered it possible that such monitoring could be established in other Warsaw Pact countries.

We stipulated that inspectors could enter our territory to the depth of approximately 700 kilometers or something like that.

We also agreed to reconnaissance flights over our border areas to a fairly great depth, including in the North. The Americans were especially concerned

about the northern part of the Soviet Union, from which we could strike the United States with our missiles. The geographic conditions have not of course changed, and even today the same desire exists, as before, for them to secure themselves with monitoring and inspections.

The Americans conducted spy flights over our territory for a long time, arbitrarily and unilaterally. Everyone knows the story of the U-2 plane flown by the pilot Gary Powers. We shot down that plane [on May 1, 1960], took the pilot prisoner, and put him on trial. Later we turned him over to the American authorities as part of an exchange. After that, spy flights over our territory ended. There is no need any longer for spy planes. Reconnaissance satellites are being launched now that can photograph our entire territory. The United States photographs our territory with its reconnaissance satellites, and we too have the possibility of photographing any point on the surface of the earth.

I have seen our reconnaissance photos, and I have seen American ones that fell into our hands. From their satellites they photograph our airfields. They could not only count the number of our planes but could tell what models they were. I will repeat again that we didn't agree to extensive monitoring and international inspections back then because we were weaker than the Americans as far as armaments went. If monitoring and inspections had been established, we too could have found out more about the American armed forces, but that would not have brought us any joy. That knowledge would have further underlined our weakness and the military superiority of the United States. The aggressive forces might have been tempted to attack the Soviet Union while it was still weak.

Today these considerations no longer apply. We have thermonuclear weapons and missile technology sufficient to destroy America and our other adversaries in the aggressive NATO bloc.

I would consider it possible to move toward broader inspection on a mutual basis. It must be kept in mind that while we fear the enemy, the enemy also fears us. Therefore monitoring and inspections are necessary today. It is possible to come to an agreement on this matter. I think the opposing side also wants to ensure its safety. It will go along with a rational agreement, or at any rate there are forces in the United States that would do so. I would include President Eisenhower among those forces. I think that President Kennedy could also have been included in that number. I cannot judge about the other presidents. I especially have my doubts about Nixon, because in my opinion he's a very unstable individual. I don't know if he



holds any views apart from ideological hatred for Communism and for everything progressive.

The West insists on monitoring and inspections on the ground. I think it would also be useful for us to have inspectors in American military units, although neither side would have the right to detailed inspection of the other's military technology or aircraft. The purpose of the monitoring and inspections is to rule out a secret concentration of forces to make a first strike. People might say: "They'll spy on us." Yes, they will. And our representatives in the NATO countries will do the same thing. We must offer equal opportunities to our probable future adversaries if of course we want to come to an agreement. We have to do that. Thus far we have reached no mutual agreement on total and universal disarmament. The only thing left is to carry out inspections. That would prevent the possibility of secret preparations for a major attack. That could have great importance. It would ensure the safety of our countries and prevent military clashes. It *could* prevent them. Inspections would not absolutely rule out the possibility of a conflict, but they could serve as a partial guarantee, though not a very reliable one.

It could be mutually advantageous to establish monitoring and inspections throughout the territory of the opposing countries. If the depth of the monitoring is limited, given contemporary or modern technology, it would be possible to have relatively small forces along the borders while the main forces were being concentrated in the interior of the country. With a well-developed fleet of transport planes it would be possible to hastily transfer units by air and thus carry out a surprise attack. To be sure, that would not be very easy, even with the latest advances in high technology, but nevertheless such a possibility cannot be excluded.

In order to gain greater trust from our counterparts, we could agree to monitoring and inspections throughout our territory. Again the question of spying arises. Yes! I agree that espionage could happen or would happen. But all of us would gain the opportunity to engage in espionage. We all have engaged in espionage since ancient times. It's obvious that for the time being, or as long as differing governmental systems exist in the world, such "professionals" will never be out of work. Especially if the inspections are mutual.

So then, the conditions for monitoring and inspections could be accepted. But still better would be to work out the details and present our own proposals. Let the opposing side reject them or postpone the decision. We could publish our proposals, and they could appear quite attractive to the educated and

enlightened sectors of public opinion (the intelligentsia) not only in the United States but throughout the world as well.<sup>4</sup>

Today I think that inspections at military factories might even be possible. The question is sure to come up: "What is this? Our designs for new weapons will become known to the enemy side." Yes, but we would know the same thing about the opposing side that they found out about us. Besides, in the initial period we could agree that inspectors could observe the production under way behind closed gates, but would not be allowed to view it in "anatomical" detail. The number of weapons? Yes, for sure. The location of their production? Yes, for sure. But no more than that.

What about establishing monitoring and inspection of missiles and thermonuclear weapons? Even today I hesitate on that point. It seems to me—if I were making the decision, under contemporary circumstances—I would not yet go so far as to establish mutual monitoring and inspection of missile sites or warheads. Why? What kinds of weapons are these? Offensive or defensive? They are weapons of mass destruction! In the initial stages, as long as there is not the necessary mutual trust, it would be difficult to establish mutual monitoring or inspections of these weapons. I don't know whether this kind of mutual trust is possible under the existing situation, where two opposing military blocs exist. The main thing in a war is to occupy territory. For that, an army is needed, infantry are needed—or as they call it now, armored infantry (*bronepekhota*)<sup>5</sup>—along with artillery and tanks. Monitoring and inspections are necessary. Thermonuclear weapons are located at established sites and are always ready to be fired. Today's technology allows them to be launched at a moment's notice. These missiles are like armed guards standing at their posts.

In the initial phases mutual trust may not be the most important thing. The important thing is that an aggressor not be able to destroy an entire country. The idea [of having such a capability] is a dream that may occur to some madmen under present-day conditions. But a person who has even a drop of common sense would hardly decide to do this. The other side also has nuclear weapons and can deal the same kind of crushing blow. Therefore missile technology and thermonuclear warheads continue to exist without monitoring or inspections. They serve as regulators through mutual fear, and the result is a certain equilibrium. It seems to me that this is not the place to begin. Missiles and warheads can be left, so to speak, as after-dinner snacks. They can be left to the time when the peoples of the world have gained a taste for disarmament, when an understanding of the need for mutual trust and peaceful coexistence has arisen. When the question of total and complete

disarmament has become a point on the agenda, then I would take up the question of monitoring and inspection of nuclear missiles.

But above all, the thing is not to allow ourselves to be intimidated. Who might have an interest in frightening the leaders of our country? The military. I've already spoken about their role, and I repeat it again. I don't condemn them. They are just doing what they've been assigned to. They are the people who will be the first to go into combat; they have been in training all their lives to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their country. But if you look at the world through the eyes of military men, you get a rather gloomy picture—one in which all resources must be spent on armaments, while you yourself are left with no trousers to wear. This is irrational. Politicians, economists, and public opinion as a whole should understand these questions correctly and seek a solution. We must keep our country safe and provide guarantees to the other side. The same guarantees and the same assurances we want to receive for ourselves. Mutuality is necessary. That's the only thing that would make it possible for us to enjoy the fruits of a nonaggression pact, the establishment of inspections, and the prevention of any surprise attack.

In my day I discussed these problems with Marshal Zhukov when he was minister of defense. He and I were on the best of terms up until the time when, as a result of his unintelligent actions, he forced us to remove him from his post as defense minister. One thing I liked about him when we were discussing the possibility of achieving a specific agreement with the United States concerning disarmament, including allowing inspections on our territory, was that he, unlike many military men, displayed no hard-headed narrow focus on his own department, such as is sometimes found among people who wear uniforms. Another man who knew how to reason well was Marshal Sokolovsky.<sup>6</sup> When I dealt with him as chief of staff we always found a common language after a brief exchange of views.

It is clear that for this kind of thing to happen, the appropriate level of thinking is required, the ability to move beyond a narrowly-held departmental point of view, to have a broad view of the world in general. It's not enough to shout: "We'll blow them all to bits." One must have a specific conception of what it means to "blow them to bits," how that is to be achieved, what the consequences can be for the one who "blows them to bits," because in thermonuclear war there would be no winners or losers. It would be a war of universal destruction. History has known no such war, and no calculator or computer will help us estimate the inestimable, the devastating losses for all sides and for humanity as a result of such a war. I'm not trying to sow panic. I'm 76 years old. I wasn't born yesterday, and I didn't

just fall off the turnip truck. It's been a long time since I was on the turnip truck, and I don't know how many more years fate is going to grant me.<sup>7</sup> So I'm talking about the future for our descendants. Better not to allow a war to happen than to expend all our energies in trying to achieve victory, because it's not hard to see how such a war would turn out.

How many atomic bombs are needed to destroy our industry and our political centers? Does the enemy have that number? Unquestionably he does—with plenty to spare. And we have those weapons, too, in sufficient number.

The supposed means of protection in the event of thermonuclear war—very deep bomb shelters, special command posts, and so on—would simply become vaults in which people would be buried alive. The people who invented these means of destruction would also be destroyed. The only way to save humanity is to reach agreement on the basis of mutual trust. There is no point in trying to outwit the enemy or trying to get around the opposing side. The counterpart with whom we are negotiating is just as intelligent as we are. In particular, any attempt to deceive public opinion cannot succeed. Therefore we need to undertake negotiations in an honest way, so that both sides obtain equal opportunities in all areas and consequently gain assurance of their security. Today I would stop at nothing in order to reach such agreement! This doesn't mean surrender; it means mutual agreement. What we give to the opposing side they would also have to give to us. If each side conducts itself honestly, greater trust will develop and it will be possible to reach a general agreement on disarmament. Or at any rate, a reduction in armaments.

Meanwhile, what about the dream of communism throughout the world? We Communists believe in our ideas, in progress, in the inexorable development of society along the road to a just social and economic system. We are confident that, over time, conditions in the capitalist countries will change, and the people of those countries, sooner or later (right now I can't say when), will find a way to establish a system that pleases them, in which neither exploiter nor exploited will remain. For now we have to maintain peaceful coexistence, having proclaimed that as the main goal for humankind. We must limit the expenditure of human energy on creating the means of destruction and instead direct our resources toward the production of consumer goods and the expansion of our means of production.

Of course I don't claim that my ideas represent the only truth. Many years have gone by, and I have been completely cut off from the world. I live according to old concepts and am basing myself on old concepts when I

reflect on peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and other measures that could prevent war.

It may be that technology has advanced much further today and has created new conditions unknown to me, so that perhaps some other solution exists. But that is hardly likely. My line of argument is not evidence that I am underestimating our possibilities. I am talking about the actual consequences that would result from a future war, if it broke out, the consequences both for us and for the opposing side. That is why we must do everything possible so that war does not break out. It seems to me that my arguments are solidly grounded, and that they are correct. That, then, is my point of view. But again, I don't claim to be the possessor of the ultimate truth.

1. This chapter was dictated a year earlier than other chapters on related subjects. The next chapter, for example, is dated June 1971. [SK]

2. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force on March 5, 1970, following nearly ten years of effort within the United Nations. By the terms of the treaty, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and the People's Republic of China were recognized as the only legitimate nuclear powers; at the same time they undertook the obligation to pursue the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. [SS]

3. Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov. See Biographies.

4. While Khrushchev simply uses the term "intelligentsia" here, I have translated it to indicate the part of society in the United States and else-

where in the world that he was orienting toward. [GS] In Russia, "the intelligentsia" traditionally refers not merely to educated people as a statistical category but to a spiritual community of enlightened individuals committed to humanitarian ideals. [SS]

5. "Armored infantry" (*bronepekhota*) means infantry who are carried in armored personnel carriers. [SK]

6. Marshals Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov and Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky. See Biographies.

7. The Russian expression is "*Ya ne na yarmarku yedu, a davno uzhe s yarmarki?*"—literally, "I'm not on my way to the fair (for the first time in my life); I've been back from the fair long since." [GS]

## GOVERNMENT SPENDING

Today is June 25, 1971. Thirty years have passed since the Great Patriotic War began [June 22, 1941]. As I observe from the sidelines the development of events in the USSR and the world, I also reflect on where the resources are going that are produced by the labor of our people. A prudent and economical attitude toward these resources will ensure a proper distribution of our accumulated wealth among the various sectors of industry and the cultural

sectors, as well as fair payment to those who participate in the labor process. Unfortunately, a lot of injustices exist in this area. There are large gaps between the earnings of people employed in different categories. Besides that, resources are being wasted on unnecessary construction, the establishment of unnecessary departments and institutions. New channels are being opened, and the wealth of the people is flowing out through those channels.

At the same time this decreases the possibility of raising wages for those who are the direct producers of material and spiritual values, especially those who are paid the least. It would be foolish to think that the only creators of value are the workers who are directly involved in construction or the manufacture of one or another type of machinery or other product. At the present stage of science and technology the people who, as they used to say, wear holes in their trousers sitting in offices and laboratories are of great significance. It is impossible to develop any form of production without them. We live in the age of cybernetics and automation. Progress today emerges not only from the workbench and the machine tool but also from the [engineer's] desk and the experimental laboratory. Our research institutes have moved to the forefront. Unless the staffs of these institutes keep upgrading their skills and are provided with the necessary resources, it will not be possible to progress further and improve the lives of people in our society.

To economize rationally, to spend our resources rationally, was the most important question in the past, is the most important question today, and will remain just as important in the future.

The most unproductive expenditures continue to be in the realm of arms spending. Such spending cannot be eliminated altogether but reasonable reductions can be made. That is the first commandment for government leaders. Unfortunately, out-and-out *rvachestvo*—the self-seeking spirit of “grab what you can”—exists in all the armies of the world, including the Soviet army. These self-seekers wear a noble disguise. They cry out that if you limit their spending today, you'll have to pay for this false economy tomorrow in terms of great bloodshed. Of course, such arguments may be correct, but still the government needs to keep these people firmly under control.

The government needs to define the necessary level at which the armed forces must be maintained, and not spend anything in excess of that. At the same time it must ensure that the country is not exposed to danger. This is a very challenging task. I understand that we are living in special times. Previously such questions were decided quite simply: “How much and what on? How many bayonets and how many rifles?” Times are quite different

now. The number of bayonets you have is no longer decisive. The quality and strength of your missiles determine everything today.

When they read my memoirs some people may incorrectly interpret my desire to reduce the size of the Soviet armed forces. People may say: "The imperialist camp dreams of destroying the socialist countries, and the Soviet Union is the leading deterrent force against these potential aggressors. Under such circumstances is it right to reduce the size of the armed forces?" In my opinion, the people who think along these lines are found mainly among the military. We arrived at the decision to reduce the armed forces when Zhukov was still minister of defense, but for the most part this process took place under Malinovsky.<sup>1</sup> I should give credit where it is due. Zhukov showed great understanding of the need to reduce arms spending in terms of both monetary resources and material resources. He even took the initiative in reducing the size of the command staffs and proposed a reduction in salaries for some categories of military personnel.

Later, after my departure from the posts that I held, I heard echoes of dissatisfaction over this decision. I don't deny that this took place under me, but the proposal was made by Marshal Zhukov. There's no question that I supported him. There was a lot of excessive spending of resources, and the self-seeking, grab-what-you-can attitude was widespread. That same attitude still exists to no less an extent and probably to a greater extent. Unfortunately our socialist system encourages this. The heads of one or another government department or ministry are very often the chief initiators of such attitudes or such practices. Each one tries to grab as much as possible for his ministry or department.

This means that when the government budget is drawn up choices should be made about the sectors to which spending will mainly be allocated. In my day we literally had to economize on everything. We held back on building subways in Kiev and Baku, for example, so that we could redirect the resources saved in that way to producing defensive weapons, to producing nuclear missiles. That was the correct thing to do at the time; otherwise we might not have survived. Fortunately, the West let the time slip past when it could have struck a blow against the USSR, because the West had military superiority then, but once we had acquired rockets and launched them into outer space, and once we had tested thermonuclear devices, this had a sobering effect on the aggressors. But today government spending should be allocated in a different way. Above all, the size of the army must be reduced without delay, along with conventional weapons, while maintaining our powerful arsenal of



nuclear weapons. Even when I was still in office, and was approving the government spending plans, conditions were created in which all military needs were met, so that the security of the socialist countries was guaranteed with plenty to spare. Even then, according to the calculations of military theorists, we had the nuclear capability to “grind all our opponents into the dust and mix their blood with the mud.”

Six years have passed since then and our nuclear potential has increased to an even greater degree. I hope, in the future, that the armed forces will be reduced, that more people will be sent back to work in production so that they can produce consumer goods rather than use them up. The larger the size of the armed forces, the greater the demand for armaments and the greater the demand placed on all types of material resources.

The reduction of our armed forces would serve as a good starting point in the struggle by all progressive forces for peaceful coexistence. If one side increases the size of its armed forces, especially the “living forces,” that incites the other side to do likewise.<sup>2</sup> It creates an opportunity for fascist and profascist forces to say, “Look, our potential enemy has armed forces of such-and-such a size, and therefore we need more.” And the same thing happens on our side. People who are not capable of thinking and analyzing deeply rely on similar arguments. They say things like this: “The imperialist countries have accumulated such-and-such a quantity of military resources, and have such-and-such a number of people under arms, and therefore we need to maintain forces no fewer in number.” But you have to ask: “Where is all this going to end?” The end of course would be a confrontation between these two sets of armed forces, each one swollen to the limit both quantitatively and qualitatively.

When I was still in office my view was that we needed not so much to increase the number of nuclear missiles as to upgrade them and modernize them in a rational way. But even in that process the economy could be rendered impotent and the people left half-starving. An outdated missile is still capable of doing its job if the need arises, and it’s possible to wait a while for a new, better, more refined missile. A new weapon is no cheaper than the old one, and money has to be spent to produce it.

I was an especially strong advocate of reducing our naval strength, and even today I hold to that point of view. When I analyze the path we have traveled I conclude that this was a correct position. We placed all our bets at that time on building a nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Submarines nowadays are not limited in their range or in the length of time they can remain in operation. They can cruise anywhere and everywhere, carrying

with them weapons that can be used against the enemy's surface fleet as well as nuclear warheads that can strike at the enemy's territory and coastal defenses.

A surface fleet is also needed, but one of reasonable size. It is especially needed near our shores to drive away enemy submarines. Of course nowadays this tactic is not particularly effective because the range of nuclear missiles is so great that submarines don't have to come close to the enemy's shores, as they used to in the old days. Today a nuclear strike can be launched from a submarine over a distance of hundreds or thousands of kilometers. Therefore rationality is especially required today in this sphere, so that our country doesn't waste its resources but maintains an arsenal sufficient to deter the enemy.

One can only imagine what could happen if we allowed ourselves to be provoked under pressure from the imperialists. Without going to war, they want us to try and compete with them in an arms buildup that would exhaust the socialist countries. And such a thing is possible if our leadership fails to maintain soberness of mind, limiting itself to the minimum amount of arms necessary to destroy the enemy in the event of an attack.

We must not allow ourselves to be provoked. We don't need to be afraid, even if the "living forces" of the adversary may be somewhat larger in number than ours. In no case can we allow it to happen that our nuclear-missile strength falls below the necessary level. When I say the "necessary level" I don't mean the quantity or even the quality of the weapons. I'm talking about "reasonable sufficiency" (*razumnaya dostatochnost*).<sup>3</sup> We have to keep in mind the nature of the imperialist states, their social and political structure, and the dominant position of the capitalist owners of private property, the monopolists and militarists who have an interest in maintaining and intensifying an atmosphere of hostility and fear in international relations, so that they can enrich themselves as a result.

If we start trying to compete with them—and there is no limit to such competition—of course we will exhaust ourselves without a war, and we won't be able to raise the living standards of our people, although that's vitally necessary and we have the possibility of doing that.

We don't have to set ourselves the goal of outstripping America, of doing it one better. It is a rich country and has greater possibilities than we do. If we get drawn into competition with the United States, we will only be creating favorable conditions for aggressive-minded people in that country who, while relying on their great potential, seek to overburden our budget. An arms buildup on our part only serves as a breeding ground for aggressive forces in the capitalist countries in their struggle against the socialist countries. We don't have to be afraid if in some category we have fewer weapons. All we

need is to have a sufficient quantity to destroy the adversary in the event that a war breaks out.

I think that when I was in the leadership we already had an entirely sufficient quantity of nuclear devices to destroy the main cities of the United States. And I'm not even talking about our potential adversaries in Europe.

We need rationality, and again rationality, and firmness in exercising rationality, so as not to allow our enemy to drain our country's resources even without a war. We must use our resources for the good of the people. We should not keep our country in a state of fear all the time and exhaust it by spending on the means of destruction rather than the means of consumption. The people live, and they work in order to live and to live better. That's how it has always been.

Today we have two systems in the world, the socialist system and the capitalist system. We have these irreconcilably antagonistic forces. They will not be reconciled until a single socialist system is victorious throughout the world. In the historical conditions in which we are living we have to display reason in economizing and not spending our resources. We need to allocate them mainly to the production of consumer goods of all types. I'm not talking only about producing more britches and meat and potatoes. The means of consumption are not only those that directly support the human organism but also those that satisfy human spiritual needs. This includes schools, research institutes, theaters, everything necessary to support the spiritual needs of the population. I think we have the means to accomplish that now.

Reducing our armies will prove to be an advantage for the socialist countries and for their populations and above all for the Soviet Union. We carry the main burden on our shoulders because, strange as it may seem, the wealthiest socialist country, the Soviet Union, consumes less than many of the countries of the socialist camp to which the Soviet Union provides aid. I have in mind meat consumption and the consumption of fats and other food products, not to mention clothing.

When resources are being distributed among the various branches of the armed forces each commander finds sufficient rational arguments, it would seem, to justify what he's asking for. Unfortunately, very often such commanders don't take as their starting point the overall potential of our country or the need to ensure the living standards of our people. They simply seek to obtain as much as possible. The more resources he has and the larger the armed forces under his command, the better he feels; but the life of our country is poorer as a result of the excessive strain on the budget from non-productive expenditures. It must be admitted that people who hold high

positions in the army of course live not only better than the average person in the Soviet Union but better than many others. This must also be kept in mind. They aren't being rational enough; they don't know how to analyze things properly or even to just take a look at how they live compared to how others live.

Since my retirement I have had more interaction with ordinary people. Some people who were vacationing at a nearby resort came to visit me once. We got into a conversation. I asked one of the women, "How much did you pay for your vacation?"

"Six rubles."

"So little?"

"The trade union paid for the rest."

"And how much do you earn?"

"Sixty rubles a month."

Well, how about that? Only 60 rubles under our present conditions and prices!? That's a pittance! What would be the point of quoting from our published statistics on the so-called average wage earned by workers? The real picture can be skillfully concealed by manipulating the figures. The mass of the people live below the average level; they live in poverty and want. And this is true fifty and more years after the October revolution.

People will say to me: "It was the same under you." Yes, it was, but under Lenin it was even worse. And yet how long can people wait? The possibilities that existed under Lenin were one thing, those in the middle of the twentieth century were another, and those that exist today are something else again. Our economic potential increases every year. Conditions now make it possible for us to take giant steps in improving the living conditions of the people. But what improvements are they seeing? Here was this woman who earned 60 rubles a month. She was still young and could have a family. But imagine if she had three or four children. How difficult the conditions of life are for such people!

We have the possibility of improving the lives of our people. At the Twenty-Second Party Congress [in 1961] I stated my understanding of things. It was necessary for the government to take on its shoulders the maintenance of the younger generation, the children: free breakfasts and lunches, free clothing and footwear. This would provide a broad base of support and would tend to even out the material situation for people, creating more democratic conditions in our life. If children have to buy lunch at school, and one takes black bread while another takes white bread and another takes bread with butter or caviar, what kind of socialism or communism are

we talking about?<sup>4</sup> If they all get a nutritious meal with sensible ingredients, not luxurious, but not miserly or impoverished either, that would be in keeping with the socialist character of our society. Today the child is fed and clothed depending on how much papa earns or how much mama earns. This is the question of questions, the reason why the working class, the peasants, and the working intelligentsia followed Lenin and made a revolution. Some people will say that I am thinking in too oversimplified a fashion. But yes, it really was for the sake of a crust of bread that the revolutionary-minded sectors of the working class were fighting, those who were poorest in the tsarist era.

After Stalin's death it was my view—in terms of wages and salaries—that we had to hold down the higher peaks and give raises to the people in the lower categories. Today we have much greater possibilities than in those days, when we were left alone in the leadership without Stalin. We did manage to do something then. We didn't do a great deal, but the possibilities were not great either. Relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries were severely strained at the time. The possibility could not be excluded that the imperialists might attack us, and consequently we had to urgently seek out resources to increase our army's combat capabilities. Today the situation is entirely different. We have the possibility at last of raising the lower categories of people to the level where they will be provided for as they should be.

There was another couple from that same vacation place that I talked to—a husband and wife, young people who already had two children. One of their children, they said, was thirteen and the other was eleven. “How much do you earn and what do you do?” I asked.

The woman replied: “I'm an orderly at a hospital. I earn 70 rubles a month, plus another 10 for other work, a total of 80 rubles. It's not much.”

“What about you?” I asked the husband. The husband turned out to have a candidate's degree in the technical sciences.<sup>5</sup>

“I earn 130 rubles a month.”

Well, of course, 130 rubles for an engineer who has a candidate's degree in the technical sciences—that's not a whole lot, especially when many categories of blue-collar workers earn as much or even more.

The question of wages is generally confused and fouled up in our country. It has been and still is. But this is the question of questions. In order to achieve monolithic unity in our society and strengthen that unity, the problem of distribution of the goods produced by society is decisive. I was always opposed to extreme egalitarianism, or “leveling,”<sup>6</sup> as it is called, but there must be a reasonable distribution of goods, so that there will not be extreme

leveling but also so that certain categories of working people in Soviet society will not be subject to discrimination.

Today more than fifty years have gone by [since the October 1917 revolution], and still not one of the industrial capitalist countries has experienced a socialist revolution. This means that capitalism has bought its way out of the revolutionary pressure from below and has mitigated that pressure. This is a fact, a historical fact. How long capitalism will successfully continue to buy its way out of revolution is another question. The more quickly we are able to increase our production of material resources directed toward satisfying the immediate needs of those who live and work in our system, the better they are provided for with food and other consumer goods, the more attractive the land of socialism becomes.

When I was in Yugoslavia [in August 1963] I had a conversation with Comrade Tito.<sup>7</sup> I asked him: "Do many of your people go to work and earn money in West Germany?"

He answered: "Yes, they do. They say, 'I'm for socialism, but I'm going to go to West Germany so I can earn enough money to buy a car, because I can't do that here.'"

And they really do come back from West Germany driving cars. Unfortunately, we can't yet allow ourselves that. But it must be kept in mind that with every passing year our explanations seem less and less well founded, and fewer and fewer ears will listen to those explanations. More people will start to curse us. That's why we need to look now for ways of spending our resources more rationally. The resources freed as a result of reduction in military spending can be directed toward satisfying the immediate needs of the broadest layers of the population, above all the lowest-paid workers, because if a person is highly paid, as the saying goes, grant them good health on top of that and everything is fine

Under the conditions in which two opposing systems exist, a great deal depends on running the economy rationally. If we pursue a wise military policy, we can achieve superiority on a unilateral basis. How? If we have enough weapons of mass destruction to hold back our adversaries, we can then reduce our military spending drastically. And what if our adversary doesn't respond accordingly? If our opponents continue to inflate their military budgets, as before, spending their resources irrationally, they will thereby reduce their own potential and lower the living standards of their people. That will give the Communists and other progressive forces the opportunity to come forward decisively and effectively against the reactionary forces of monopoly capital.

That is my point of view on this question. I think it's rational. It's true that I can't influence the events now under way in our country. I have already lived my time, and all that is left for me now is to share my experience, if there are ears that want to hear what I have to say. Of course it's too late for me to expect to take any effective action now. My time has gone by. And with that I will end [this part of the dictation].

1. Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky. See Biographies.

2. In Russian military terminology a distinction is made between "living forces" (that is, personnel) and other forces such as weapons, equipment, and materiel. [GS]

3. This term was again used in the second half of the 1980s in connection with Soviet disarmament initiatives under Gorbachev. [SS]

4. In Russia and the Soviet Union, "white bread," made from processed wheat flour, was more expensive and was mainly eaten by wealthier people. "Black bread," or dark bread made from rye flour, was the bread of the poor. [SK]

5. See note 5 in the chapter "Agriculture and Science" above an explanation of the candidate's degree in the Russian educational system. (It is nearly equivalent to a Ph.D. in the United States.) [GS/SS]

6. The belief in full equality of material reward was predominant in the first few years after the revolution. Stalin denounced it as "leveling" (*uravnilovka*). [SS]

7. Marshal Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) was leader of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1944 until his death in 1980. See Biographies.





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# *Relations with the Intelligentsia*

## I AM NOT A JUDGE<sup>1</sup>

I don't know what's going on with me or how things will turn out [*Ne znayu, chto u menya poluchitsa*]. . . .<sup>2</sup>

I wanted to say something about the [official] attitude in the USSR toward the intelligentsia. I will hardly be able to encompass all the areas of Soviet life in which our intellectuals are at work. But first of all, when they have an ideological impact on society the intellectuals are accomplishing a task that the Communist Party wishes to see accomplished.

In the case of the technical intelligentsia matters are somewhat simpler.<sup>3</sup> Our party organizations have simpler relations with the technical intelligentsia, because these people apply their energy and intellect mainly to specific objects that are of service to society. In their immediate day-to-day activity they do not become directly involved in the sphere of spiritual-intellectual life and the problems of ideology. Their work is encouraged because of the usefulness of their research work, which may result in some branch of industry being raised to a new and higher level. Our attitude toward a particular individual or group of individuals [among the intelligentsia] is determined accordingly.

The sector where relations are most strained and the ground is most slippery is in dealing with the "creative intelligentsia." Some people will ask, "What do you mean by 'creative'? After all, is there an intelligentsia that is not creative? Is there an intelligentsia that does not engage in creative activity?" That is true. The entire intelligentsia is creative. Every person who engages in useful and productive labor creates values of some sort for society. But when we speak of the "creative intelligentsia," we mean the philosophers, writers, artists, sculptors, musicians, and other people of that sort. They don't create the material values needed by the human organism to survive. On the other hand, they do inspire society in its labors and in all other spheres of human life. The work of the "creative intelligentsia" also intrudes

into the sphere of politics, and it enriches people in general with outstanding models, works of literature and art, and in other realms of the humanities. Since the Communist Party seeks to retain a monopoly position in the realm of ideology, it has an interest in winning the “creative intelligentsia” to its side. That requires no explanation.

In this respect literature plays the leading role. Music is also *very* important. It is capable of shaping people’s moods, as they say. It does not speak directly with the human tongue, and therefore it’s not easy to distinguish between good and bad. Highly varied attitudes are possible in this respect. One’s attitude toward a musical work depends both on the author and on the listener. There is much here that is extremely subjective. Let’s say for example that a party official in a responsible post turns on the radio to listen to some music, and he doesn’t like what he hears, or he’s in a foul mood, and he shuts off the radio. Then it turns out that the author of the composition was Tchaikovsky or Prokofiev.<sup>4</sup> What attitude should be taken toward this creative work? There are a number of significant factors here: the general circumstances, the inner “richness of content” of the listener, his level of education, and many other things. As it turns out, decisions are handed down on the basis of such concepts as “I like it,” “I don’t like it much,” or “I don’t like it at all.” The resulting decision has an effect both on the fate of the author and on the whole of society, which may—without anyone intending it—be deprived of a beautiful work of art. How can arbitrary decisions based on individual “taste” be avoided—especially bearing in mind that one and the same work may have a different effect at different times?

Matters are somewhat easier in dealing with the creative work of a writer. Here we have a laborer who, like a bricklayer or even a lathe operator, polishes the product from various angles. He or she automatically enters into all spheres of social life by expressing the attitude of the characters in the work toward those spheres of life, and as a result in literature everything can be made clear even to a person who’s not very intelligent. It’s more difficult to evaluate the work of a composer or a visual artist.

The main question here is the degree of tolerance toward works that one may or may not like personally.

Without tolerance toward works of art the artist cannot live. If one individual or group of individuals begins to set the limits on what is good or bad in matters of art, we already have a bad situation. It’s especially bad if this kind of thing is aimed at an entire genre. There is a great deal that is purely subjective in this area. For example, how a sound or a melody is perceived in music. To pass judgment or to condemn means to express a subjective attitude.

Subjectivism freezes everything in place. It doesn't allow development. It doesn't allow the writer or the artist to show what he or she can do.

I want to return to the question of how Stalin related to all forms of intellectual labor. He understood their social importance. But the main question is, "To what extent was he indulgent, tolerant, and respectful in any specific case?" Stalin was totally suffused with subjectivism. Moreover, the future of any individual could depend entirely on one word from Stalin. His subjectivism sometimes contributed to the development of certain creative tendencies or trends, while at other times it froze them in place and did not allow them to develop and show their worth. Sometimes his subjectivism resulted in the deaths of people and the destruction of their creative work. Could we say that there were any writers who did not feel this oppressive weight? Were there any who did their work without feeling limitations from within or without? It's difficult for me to speak in their behalf. Let them speak for themselves. I hardly think they will say they felt free from repression and limitation. After all, Stalin was a despot, and his will was the determining factor behind every government policy. Despots have always taken a good attitude toward writers only on the condition that they write well about the despot and his era.

I will cite a well-known example. Why did Tsar Nicholas I torment Pushkin the way he did?<sup>5</sup> After all, was Pushkin a bad writer? Did he really write poorly? He was a marvelous writer. He devoted himself heart and soul to the people. And he is highly honored among the people. His prophetic words have come true:

A monument I've built myself  
Not made by human hand  
And never overgrown will be  
The path to it, the people's path

*Ya pamyatnik sebe vozdvig  
Nerukotvorny  
K nemu ne zarastyot  
Narodnaya tropa*

Pushkin spent the greater part of his life in internal exile: in the South, in Moldavia and Odessa, and then on his own estate in the Pskov region. Tsar Nicholas I wanted Pushkin to sing the praises of his era and to glorify his royal person. In mankind's past thousands of such examples can be found.

And what about the present time? Under Stalin, for a fairly long time, Voroshilov was responsible for the political line taken in relation to Soviet art.

He was beside himself with admiration for the artist Aleksandr Gerasimov.<sup>6</sup> I agree that Gerasimov was a good artist. But Voroshilov liked him above all because Gerasimov glorified Voroshilov in his paintings. The same can be said about the songwriters Voroshilov liked.

Which Soviet composer did Voroshilov like the most? Probably Pokrass. I had a lot of respect for Pokrass and I respect him still. He did indeed produce many remarkable musical compositions. Pokrass wrote songs about the Red Cavalry, about Budyonny, and about Voroshilov.<sup>7</sup> And Pokrass wrote well. I don't think anyone wrote better. His songs have a militant quality, they're easy to sing, and at the same time individual personalities "stick out" in his songs. Of course artists, poets, and composers like that are valued highly—especially by the people they glorify. Usually such intellectuals are called court poets. And there always were court musicians and court artists. Despots have always tried to encourage such people and bring them closer to the court. And I'm not just talking about encouragement by material means. In that respect of course government coffers have always been wide open.

Let's consider the example of the writer [Aleksandr] Fadeyev.<sup>8</sup> A talented man. His novel *The Rout*, about Soviet guerrilla fighters in the Far East [during the Russian Civil War] and about their commander Levinson, made a powerful impression on me when I read it. Another outstanding novel by Fadeyev was *The Young Guard*.<sup>9</sup> However, we had plenty of talented writers, even writers of genius. In the postwar period why did Stalin bless none other than Fadeyev with his special favor? Because at a time when repression was being carried out Fadeyev headed the Soviet Writers' Union. Fadeyev supported the line of repression against writers, and people's heads flew—the heads of writers who were guilty of nothing. All a person had to do was write that poor-quality potatoes were being sold in the stores and he would be branded anti-Soviet.

The tragedy of Fadeyev as an individual can be seen in his suicide [in May 1956]. He remained an intelligent man with a sensitive soul. After Stalin was exposed [in February 1956] and it was revealed that the thousands of his victims had not been criminals at all, Fadeyev was unable to forgive himself for his own departures from the truth. After all, many of the "creative intelligentsia" had perished along with others. But Fadeyev had given false testimony that this one or that one in the ranks of the creative intelligentsia had betrayed his homeland. I am ready to think that Fadeyev acted sincerely, believing in the necessity of what he was doing. Nevertheless, in relation to the "creative intelligentsia" he played the role of Stalin's prosecutor. And when he saw that things had come full circle he

cut his own life short. Of course we need to keep in mind the fact that Fadeyev was drinking too much at the time and therefore had lost many of the positive features of his former self.

There was a time when Stalin was putting together a Committee for the Stalin Prize. (To think that we lived in a time when this man himself was deciding to whom prizes should be given in his name!) Fadeyev gave the report awarding the prizes. When everything was finished Stalin said this about Fadeyev: “He’s barely able to keep on his feet; he’s completely drunk.” Everyone saw this, and everyone knew about it. More than once, the leadership had to alert the police and the Chekists to go hunt for Fadeyev in some den of iniquity. Tormented by pangs of conscience, Fadeyev got himself into such a state. He knew that his time was past, and besides, he feared the possibility of face-to-face encounters with writers he had helped Stalin send off to the prison camps, because some of them did return. As an honest man he couldn’t endure this kind of thing and he ended his life. This example is only one of many of the kind of mistakes that can be made in dealing with the “creative intelligentsia.”

Let’s take Tvardovsky for another example. His poems are on the lips of millions of people—soldiers who fought against Hitler’s hordes and working people on the home front during the war. His long narrative poem *Vasily Tyorkin* [about a simple Red Army soldier who always kept a sense of humor] is an immortal work of art. Just as the poet Demyan Bedny<sup>10</sup> was known to all of us during the Civil War, in the same way virtually everyone knew Tvardovsky during the Great Patriotic War. Later on, entire books were written about his narrative poems, and his heroes were depicted in paintings. Stalin was deeply moved by a painting depicting Vasily Tyorkin. When he first saw it he immediately proposed: “Let’s hang this in the Kremlin.” It was hung there at the entrance to the Catherine Hall. If you turned to the left when you came out of the hall, where sessions of the Supreme Soviet were held, you could see Tyorkin standing in a circle of his fellow fighters after a battle. In the painting, each Red Army man is busy with his own affairs: one is eating out of a kettle, another is busy doing something, but the attention of all of them is turned toward Tyorkin [who always kept them laughing with his light-hearted humor.] The painting is so well done that you feel all of this immediately.<sup>11</sup>

And now [in 1971] life’s path is coming to an end for Aleksandr Trofimovich Tvardovsky. An end without honor. He was forced to resign from his magazine, *Novy Mir* [in 1970]. But the fact that he is persona non grata to some people today is not the point. It’s impossible not to recognize his great contribution



as a creative artist. The people have recognized him in spite of everything.<sup>12</sup> It seems that once again we are in the presence of subjectivism on the part of one or another official in the leadership.

Relations with the “creative intelligentsia” are a very complicated business, very complicated.

I will say a few words about Pasternak.<sup>13</sup> I’m not about to try to pass judgment on his creative work as a poet. I can only draw on the opinions expressed by poets who value very highly what Pasternak created, especially his translations from foreign languages. Among other things he wrote the novel *Doctor Zhivago*. How many years have gone by!? This [heated controversy over the novel] happened after Stalin’s death. How was the question of this novel decided? Suslov reported to me about it. He was in charge of our department of agitation and propaganda [in the party’s Central Committee].<sup>14</sup> On questions like that you couldn’t get around Suslov’s intervention. He reported that the work in question was a poor one, that it was not firm, mature, and seasoned in the proper Soviet spirit. I don’t remember his arguments in detail and I don’t want to make anything up. In short, he said it was a work of no merit and should not be published. And that’s the decision we made. I suppose that at that stage of events none of us responsible officials had read the novel other than Suslov. I doubt even that Suslov read it. Probably he was given a summary of the contents, perhaps three pages long. Of course it’s impermissible to judge a creative work that way, to hand down a sentence against a work of art and its creator!

People will ask me, where were you yourself in all this? My answer is: Today this is something I regret, now that I am ending my own path in life as a pensioner in exile outside Moscow in a dacha at Petrovo-Dalneye. I regret that during the years when I had the possibility of influencing decisions—to print or not to print, to accept or not to accept the point of view of a person reporting to us—I regret that I didn’t read the book myself. Without reading the book, I believed what was reported to me and took administrative measures, which are most harmful when carried out in relation to creative people.

So the novel was banned. We banned it. . . .

Of course a terrible uproar and commotion arose about this abroad. The manuscript turned up in the West and was published there. I don’t know to what extent this work really met the criteria of the Nobel Prize committee, but they awarded the prize to Pasternak [in 1958]. An even greater commotion and uproar resulted, and the Soviet government refused to allow the writer to accept his prize. I proposed to my colleagues: “Let’s announce publicly that Pasternak, if he wishes, can go abroad to receive his prize.” But as a result of

certain circumstances he replied through the newspapers that he was not going to bring up the question of his going abroad for that purpose.

Even today I cannot be a judge of this work. I still have not read it. But people I meet and talk with tell me it is not of high quality, in either ideological or artistic respects.

This is a special question. It is not for everyone to judge an author or judge a work of art. For my part, I regret that this novel was not published. You can't impose sentences on creative people using police methods. What in particular would have happened if we had published *Doctor Zhivago* then? Nothing, I am convinced of it! People will object: "It's rather late for you to wake up like this." Yes, it's late, but better late than never. I should not have supported Suslov on such questions. Let the recognition of an author depend on the reader. But things worked out differently. The author performed his labors, he was recognized throughout the world, but in the USSR he was banned by administrative measures.

I am proud that in my day I supported publication of one of the first works by the writer . . . I've forgotten his name.<sup>15</sup> (That's what it means to get old; I can't remember!) Tvardovsky sent that work to us then, and in his covering letter he described its contents and expressed the opinion: "I consider the work in question extremely powerful and I regard its author as a future great writer. Various attitudes may be taken toward the subject that he treats. Read the work yourselves. But I ask you not to prevent us from printing this short novel in our magazine *Novy Mir*."

I have just heard the news over the radio that three of our cosmonauts have perished: Volkov, Dobrovolsky, and Patsayev.<sup>16</sup> I'm going to stop dictating. I'm not in the frame of mind to continue.

(I now resume the tape recording of my memoirs.)

I've remembered the name of the author—Solzhenitsyn. I don't remember his life story now. It was reported to me, back then, that he had been in the prison camps for a long time. In the work I mentioned above, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*,<sup>17</sup> he based himself on his own personal observations, and it may be that in that work he, the author, is represented by the protagonist.

I read that short novel. It's a painful book, but in my opinion the life of Ivan Denisovich and his surroundings is portrayed well and accurately. It is a powerful work. It acts powerfully on the emotions. And that is the main thing required from a work of literature. It arouses in the reader feelings of

repugnance against what was done under Stalin in the prison camps of the Gulag, against the conditions people like Ivan Denisovich and his friends had to live under in those camps.

I am not a judge. The merits and defects of a work of art are matters for critics and writers to discuss. In my opinion readers themselves should act as the judges of any work of literature. A work of literature is written for the readers. I think that readers would jump at the chance to read this book. I read it with pleasure. The author is seeking some explanation for how Ivan Denisovich, an honest man, ended up in such circumstances in our socialist era and in our socialist state! That alone deserves high praise for the position taken by the author, who awakened many people to new consciousness.

After I had been retired on pension I read the memoirs of General Gorbato<sup>18</sup>. He also served time in the prison camps. I knew Gorbato during the war. After he was released at the end of 1941 he came to our Front near Kharkov. It was either the end of October or maybe November. More likely October because by November we had abandoned Kharkov and retreated to Valuiki. As a member of the Military Council I had a talk with him. He didn't relate any details about the camps but spoke only about the Soviet generals who, although innocent, still remained in prison. He named them by name. Timoshenko listened to him with special interest because he knew those people well. We petitioned in behalf of two of them. We wrote to Stalin asking that they be released and sent to our Front. And now I have learned in detail how insolently they treated an honorable Soviet commander, Gorbato. And do you think there were only a few such cases?

I met another general who had been arrested groundlessly even earlier. We were retreating toward Kiev, and the headquarters of the Kiev Military District were in Brovary. General Podlas came to our Front, returning from prison. He had been in prison for a long time. He had been arrested by Mekhlis back at the time of the battle of Lake Khasan [in 1938].<sup>19</sup> Mekhlis said that he had gone there [to the Soviet Far East] and found "such-and-such awful kinds of people, and there was one scoundrel in particular—his name was even Podlas" [which sounds like *podlets*, a Russian word for scoundrel]. I remembered the harsh things Mekhlis had told me. I had temporarily forgotten about that conversation.<sup>20</sup> Only when the general introduced himself as Podlas did I remember that he was the same man that Mekhlis had spoken about. I liked Podlas. During the first phase of his work with us Podlas served as a general to be assigned as needed, attached to the headquarters of our Front. Later we appointed him commander of the 57th Army. During the unsuccessful operation that ended in catastrophe in the Barvenkovo region

in 1942 he ended up in enemy encirclement and, not wishing to surrender, shot himself. We learned from the German press that he had shot himself. The Germans published the fact that the Russian general commanding the 57th Army had committed suicide in order to avoid being taken prisoner of war. The Germans buried him with all the military honors due to a general of his rank.

If I start recalling all the heroes who died, I find a great many of them, of varying rank. Two-thirds of the delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress [of 1934] were shot. Those people were called the Leninist Old Guard, back then. These were people who had worked with Lenin, and evidently that very fact inspired Stalin's distrust of them. After all, it was at the Seventeenth Congress that too large a number of votes [for Stalin's taste] were cast against him. I have proceeded from the consideration that the evil done to the Communist Party, to the Soviet people, to the workers, peasants, and intellectuals must be condemned, and the best condemnation is to demonstrate the innocence of these people and arouse the public's anger against their executioners, and to brand this whole business as shameful. To brand it as shameful so that it will not be repeated. I was guided by these considerations when I spoke in favor of publishing not only Solzhenitsyn's work but other works like it.

During the discussion at that time, various voices were heard. Or more exactly one voice: that of Suslov. He alone made a squeak of protest, opposing publication. He was sticking to the police point of view: "Arrest this work of art and don't let it go. Don't let it be published." His view was that it shouldn't be done, and that's all there was to it! Why? He didn't trust the people. He was afraid of how the people might take it. But the people responded to it correctly. The people always respond correctly. The people always distinguish between good and bad; they are capable of sorting things out! In order to prevent crimes from being repeated the crimes must be denounced, and that includes denouncing them in literature.

As for Solzhenitsyn, he continues to write, but his works are not printed in our country, only abroad. In our country he finds himself "placed in special circumstances." However, a section of our intelligentsia sympathizes with him and even takes risks in doing so. They say that Solzhenitsyn is living at the dacha of Mstislav Rostropovich,<sup>21</sup> an excellent musician and an outstanding cellist. Having decided to take this step, Rostropovich has placed himself in a disadvantageous position, to say the least. This testifies to the human dignity and strong spirit of Rostropovich. Solzhenitsyn has not committed any crime. He expresses his opinion, writes about his experiences, and gives his personal assessment of the conditions in which he spent his days in the

prison camps. And on the whole his opinion is absolutely correct. Stalin was a criminal, and criminals should be condemned, even if only on the moral plane. The most powerful court in which such criminals can be tried is to brand them with shame in a work of art. Why is it that Solzhenitsyn is considered a criminal instead of Stalin? If he writes badly, people will not read him. If he commits slander, he can be taken to court, but there have to be legal grounds for that. Evidently there are no grounds for taking him to court. But the leadership is afraid of the truth. The artistic side of the matter is not at issue here. The author has the right to exercise freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are written into our Soviet constitution, a right that every Soviet citizen has.

Now to speak about Tvardovsky's evaluation of Solzhenitsyn as an artist. Here I cannot judge—this is not my field of specialization. When Solzhenitsyn wrote a second book, *Matryona's Courtyard*,<sup>22</sup> I didn't like the book. This too is a matter of taste, and a case of the mood of the reader, that is, this is subjective; it depends on the state of mind of the individual when he's reading or listening to a given work of art. We have to take a more tolerant attitude and not interfere or put up obstacles. Let people read, let the people judge. The main judge should be the reader, that is, the people.

The people is something rather faceless. If we say working class or working peasantry that sounds more specific. But the people is made up precisely of the working class and the working peasantry and the working intelligentsia. We don't have any other classes besides those, aside from thieves, speculators, and hoodlums. Our society has become more homogeneous because of this. It's true that in the way worldly goods are divided up, the goods created and produced by the people, there is a great deal of variety still. I would say that something needs to be done in this area, not so much a process of leveling everything down, but to reduce the "peaks" somewhat. There's too large a category of people who receive very low wages, and there's a large number of people who dispose rather shamelessly of substantial resources. They receive more than they should, more than is needed for a free and easy existence. I'm not going to go into this now, but it's something that will make itself felt if the leadership doesn't intervene in this matter in a timely way. When the people themselves begin to talk about this, explanations will have to be made and there will be great difficulties in correcting the situation.

In general the category of the Soviet population that now suffers the most is the intelligentsia. In material respects, it is provided for better than other categories, but I am speaking about the spiritual aspect. Creative people in their works depict the relations between people, their spiritual experiences,

and their encounters with authority and with the society around them. The writer often falls into a difficult situation when depicting such things. Officials start to interfere with his or her work, trying to control what's being written, introducing censorship. They say we have no censorship. That's nonsense! Fairy tales meant for children! Not only do we have real censorship; I would even say it's an extremely cruel type of censorship.

[For example,] I remember the fate of the book by Emmanuil Kazakevich, *The Blue Notebook*.<sup>23</sup> It was an interesting book. A movie was made of it later, and I saw it twice on television. It's true that Zinoviev is depicted in this work in a minor capacity. At the time in which this novel is laid, Zinoviev was with Lenin after the July events of 1917 in Petrograd. They were hiding in a hunter's shack.<sup>24</sup> The author of the book sent me a short letter accompanying the manuscript, which he asked me to read. This manuscript was not accepted for publication. I read it and liked it. I didn't notice anything in it that could be grounds for refusing its publication.

I was vacationing in the Caucasus at the time, and Mikoyan<sup>25</sup> was vacationing not far from where I was. I called him up and said: "Anastas Ivanovich, I'm going to send you a manuscript. I ask you to read it, and then let's meet and have an exchange of opinions." When we met I asked him: "What's your opinion?"

He answered: "In my opinion this man has written a good book. I don't understand why the censorship won't allow it to be printed."

I said: "All right, when we return to Moscow let's bring up this question for discussion in the Presidium of the Central Committee."

We distributed the book to all members of the Presidium and the question was included on the agenda for the next session. I asked: "Who has any objections? Why shouldn't this book be printed?"

Suslov stuck his neck out. He looked around uncertainly: "Well, Comrade Khrushchev, how can this book be printed? The author has Zinoviev saying: 'Comrade Lenin' to Lenin. And he has Lenin saying: 'Comrade Zinoviev' to Zinoviev. But after all, Zinoviev was an enemy of the people."

I was astounded by his words. Is it really possible to distort reality and present historical facts other than the way they were in fact? Even if we set aside the question of whether Zinoviev really was an enemy of the people, still the fact remains indisputable: Lenin and Zinoviev were hiding in that hunter's shack together. How did they address each other? How did they discuss current affairs or simply chat over a cup of tea in the hunter's shack? Obviously they did call each other "Comrade." I think Lenin even called Zinoviev by his first name, Grigory. After all, there were close comradesly

relations between them at that time. During the first months after the February revolution they held one and the same opinion.

And so I commented: “But listen, they really were friends and were living in the same hunter’s shack. They were linked by many years of common struggle against the autocracy. How else could they have addressed each other? What of it if, later, one of them was condemned? Zinoviev at that earlier time was a comrade-in-arms of Lenin. The forms of address used by the author are normal and natural. At the most, one could place a footnote referring to Zinoviev’s subsequent fate. But such a footnote would be a concession in the direction of stupidity. Intelligent people don’t need any kind of footnote like that.” The other members of the Presidium supported me, and the decision was made not to interfere with publication of the book. Does this book today give any grounds for doubt or suspicion? Perhaps there are critics who are dissatisfied with it. But that is another question entirely. Criticism exists in order to express encouragement or condemnation and thereby to help raise the standard of literary composition. But here we were dealing with police measures: to arrest the book and not let it go.

Suslov performed these functions of a police officer previously, and even today he carries out this function as our “gendarme in chief.” Of course, he is an honest man devoted to Communist ideas. But his limited policeman’s outlook does great harm. Many people might say to me: “Why did you put up with this when you were in the leadership of the country side by side with Suslov?” They’re right. I made a mistake. Many are the mistakes a man makes in the course of his life. I simply thought that if Suslov was working as part of our collective leadership group, we would be able to influence him and he would start to function in a useful way. That’s why I didn’t raise the question of replacing him—although many people did warn me that Suslov was playing a negative role and that the intelligentsia had a negative attitude toward him.

Recalling the fate of *Doctor Zhivago* again, I cannot forgive myself for the fact that the book was banned in our country. I am to blame for the fact that I didn’t raise the question of this book the same way I did in the case of *The Blue Notebook*. The difference was, and this is no justification, that I had read *The Blue Notebook*, and I had seen with my own eyes the stupidity of the censors in that case. I asked them to present their explanations to the Presidium of the Central Committee. These proved to be groundless and even laughable, and without any special effort we dealt with this “ever watchful police mentality.” But I had not read *Doctor Zhivago*, nor had anyone in the leadership. We banned the book trusting those whose duty it was to oversee



works of art. The banning of that book did a lot of harm to the Soviet Union. The intelligentsia abroad spoke out against us, including people who were not in principle hostile to socialism but who stood on the position that there should be freedom of opinion.

And now about [Ilya] Ehrenburg.<sup>26</sup> I met him more than once. He was a good writer and he had talent. It's true that his talent was not overly great. He remained a medium talent in literature. But he had in him a certain conciliatory attitude toward Stalinist methods of administration. Maybe I'm being too severe toward Ehrenburg. The conditions of life were such that, without adapting, he might not have survived. He didn't have sufficient firmness in defending his own understanding of events and his own point of view. It was not always that way. Sometimes he did display firmness. I remember once when Stalin needed a public statement to the effect that there was no anti-Semitism in the USSR. Stalin decided to involve Ehrenburg and Kaganovich in drawing up this statement—or to be more exact, in signing it. (Stalin had no shortage of people to serve as authors of such a document.) Kaganovich literally turned inside out when Stalin spoke with him on the subject. You could sense that he didn't want to do it. But he did it anyway, whatever Stalin said. Then someone was assigned to talk with Ehrenburg about it. Ehrenburg categorically refused to sign the text. I'm afraid of being inaccurate in relying on my memory here. Now and then it leads me astray, although so far my memory is not too bad. It's true that at times I can't picture one or another event quite clearly; it's become blurry in my memory. It seems to me that Ehrenburg didn't sign. That testifies to the fact that he had some character and decided to oppose Stalin's will, though Stalin didn't speak with him in person about this matter.

It was Ehrenburg who put into circulation the term "The Thaw." In his view, after Stalin's death a thaw began in the lives of our people. At that time I didn't greet this expression with favor. Undoubtedly things had become more relaxed. If we are to speak in the language of politics, we relaxed the controls, and people felt freer. But there were two conflicting feelings fighting inside us. On the one hand, this relaxation of controls reflected our inner state of mind; that's what we were striving for. On the other hand, there were people among us who didn't want a thaw at all, and they reproached us: "If Stalin was alive, he would never have allowed this." Voices opposing any thaw could be heard quite distinctly. Ehrenburg in his writings had the ability to capture very aptly the trends of the time and to describe current developments. I think that this phrase, which he put into circulation, did reflect reality, although at that time we criticized the term.



Deciding that a thaw should come and consciously moving in that direction, the leaders of the USSR, including myself, were at the same time afraid of it: What if a flood resulted from the thaw, one that would overwhelm us and that we would find it difficult to cope with? Such a development of events is possible in all political affairs. That's why we held back the thaw, as it were.

What do I mean that it might overwhelm us? We were afraid to lose control of the country. We tried to restrain any rise in sentiments that were undesirable from the point of view of the leadership. We didn't want some tidal wave to come along that would sweep us away as we were proceeding along our path. There were fears that the leadership would not be able to cope with its functions and would not be able to direct the process of change down channels that would remain Soviet. We wanted to unleash the creative powers of the people, but in such a way that the new creativity would contribute to the strengthening of socialism. It was like the kind of saying that exists among the people: "You want to and you're itching to, but Mama don't allow." That's the way things were.

At one point the Central Committee of the party had a meeting with the "creative intelligentsia." Ehrenburg was also invited. I don't remember if Konstantin Simonov<sup>27</sup> attended, but I remember that Tvardovsky, Yevtushenko,<sup>28</sup> and Ernst Neizvestny<sup>29</sup> were there. In particular, a discussion was going on about the sculptural works of Neizvestny. Galina Serebryakova<sup>30</sup> was also present at the conference. She spoke out very harshly against Ehrenburg. As he listened to her Ehrenburg was literally jumping around like a cat on a hot tin roof.<sup>31</sup> She kept lighting in to him and virtually called him a bootlicker of Stalin's, and accused him of supporting Stalin's policies toward the "creative intelligentsia" with his speeches at the time when Stalin was chopping off heads and sending writers off into internal exile. Ehrenburg flew into a rage and hotly rebutted her remarks. I understood Serebryakova.<sup>32</sup> They say she's a talented writer. She wrote a trilogy about Marx and Engels, and they tell me it was well written. I didn't read it myself. She did a great deal of work, read a lot, and gathered a lot of material together. Galina Serebryakova has disappeared from the literary horizon today [1971]. I have heard nothing about her for a long time, and I haven't seen her name on the spines of any books.<sup>33</sup> I must confess I don't know what's happened to her or what may have befallen her. I don't even know if she's alive or dead. But if she were dead, some sort of announcement would have appeared. Possibly she's in a situation where her works are not receiving any recognition on the part of the authorities and consequently are not seeing the light of day.

Today I have regrets about many things that I said at that meeting. In criticizing Neizvestny I was rude to him when I said that he had adopted his last name with some ulterior purpose.<sup>34</sup> For some reason his last name annoyed me. At any rate, I did speak rudely, and if I met him today, I would ask for his forgiveness. Especially since at that time I held a high government position and had the obligation to restrain myself. Yevtushenko spoke with great ardor in defense of Neizvestny. Abstractionism is not a new tendency in art. It has existed for a long time, and a section of the intelligentsia has fought against it for just as long a time. Abstract art was especially well known outside our country, although at one time abstract artists and tendencies of a similar nature, such as the Futurists, existed in our country as well. As a young man the Futurist Mayakovsky<sup>35</sup> used to go around wearing a bright yellow jacket. In my inner nature I was and remain an opponent of such tendencies, both in literature and in painting and sculpture. But that doesn't say anything really. To use administrative and police measures to combat trends that arise among the "creative intelligentsia" is something we must not do, neither in art nor in sculpture nor in music nor in anything else!

Yevtushenko at that time cited appropriate examples and gave specific facts and names. He said that in Cuba the abstract artists and the realists stood together, with the people as a whole, in defense of the gains of the revolution, and that is true! Nevertheless, in spite of the sensible arguments Yevtushenko made, we criticized Neizvestny very strongly. Later he sent me a message through officials of our [party Central Committee's] department for agitation and propaganda or through the Central Committee of the Komsomol, saying that he had shifted over to a position of realism in his art. I, of course, was pleased. After all, Neizvestny is a talented man. Today the press reports that he has produced a number of high-quality works. I can only be glad about that. To what extent did our criticism help him? Maybe it served as an impetus for him. But it may also be that in his creative work he adopted a position of realism of his own accord.<sup>36</sup>

While I repent today about the form in which I criticized Neizvestny, I remain essentially an opponent of abstract art. I simply don't understand it and therefore am against it. I find the realistic tendency more suitable to my soul, more to my liking. I remember when I was in England I had a talk with Anthony Eden<sup>37</sup> at the [government] country house called Chequers. Among other things he asked me: "Mister Khrushchev, what is your attitude toward abstract art and other fashionable trends in modern art?"

I answered: "I don't understand them, Mister Eden. I stand firmly in support of realistic art."

He said: "I don't understand them either, and I'm also in favor of realism."

Then he smiled and added: "But what about Picasso? He's your man, Picasso."<sup>38</sup>

I said to him: "Yes, Picasso is an outstanding artist, creator of the famous 'Dove of Peace,' which has become a symbol of the peace movement." I had no reason to take on the role of critic or of defender of Picasso. He is a figure who is capable of defending himself through the creative work he has produced. He has made a path for himself with his works, no matter what trend in the arts he may belong to.

I had and have enormous respect for Shostakovich.<sup>39</sup> I don't remember now exactly what Zhdanov's criticisms were of Shostakovich's works,<sup>40</sup> but I cannot say that in general during the Stalin era Shostakovich was being persecuted. He produced many beautiful works, including during the war—his masterpiece, the symphony about the defense of Leningrad.<sup>41</sup> He deserved the prominent place he held among composers and is one of our leading musical masters. There was a time when the leadership of the USSR did not understand Shostakovich's support for jazz.<sup>42</sup> Speaking candidly, he was right to support jazz. You can't fight against any type of music by administrative means, and that goes for jazz, too. Let the people themselves express their attitude toward this music. Utyosov<sup>43</sup> was also criticized harshly in the same connection. When I was still a young man, when literally everyone was humming Utyosov's songs to themselves, the newspaper *Pravda* gave him a going over, up one side and down the other.<sup>44</sup> I had a friend from Odessa named Lev Rimsky, a man who's long been dead, a Communist of crystal purity. He was always singing Utyosov's song "Boubliki, Hot Boubliki."<sup>45</sup> He told me that his friends who worked at the printing press that produced *Pravda*, and who were setting the type for the critical article blasting Utyosov, were themselves—the whole time they were setting the type—singing the song "Boubliki." That's what it means when the people themselves judge a work of art! It's not in my power to sort out the various aspects of Utyosov's creative work, including his earlier "underworld" songs [from the subculture of Russian criminals]. But I am very pleased that records with Utyosov's songs are again available for sale, and from time to time I listen to them.

But sometimes the opposite happens. There are jazz performances of a kind that make me turn off the radio. They play music that has a bad effect on my nerves. It's not music but some sort of cacophony. I don't understand such composers or the people who like their music. But in this case I'm just talking about myself. There are people of course who listen to these things and applaud them and jump for joy. That means they enjoy it, doesn't it?

Therefore administrative measures should not in any way be taken against creative work. The reader, the listener, the spectator, should have their say. Besides that, I'm already an old man, and I was raised on different kinds of musical art. I like folk singing, folk dances, folk music. Of course I also like classical music. But still I don't like jazz. Here I am making a sort of confession, expressing my repentance, but not absolutely. I acknowledge that I made mistakes in my day in the form in which I expressed myself when I had the possibility of administratively supporting or prohibiting certain creative trends. Inwardly even today I'm opposed to some of them. But I must simply emphasize once again that we cannot and must not fight against such things just because we don't like them.

There was a time when young women went around in short skirts. Then long dresses reappeared. Fashions change in music as well, and in everything else. We need to take a more tolerant attitude toward such changes. People might ask, but don't such changes have a weakening effect on Communist ideology? In my opinion, not at all. Here Yevtushenko is right. We criticized Mayakovsky at one time, but Mayakovsky left to our country a body of work that to this day serves as a weapon in the struggle for a better future.<sup>46</sup> For example, no other poet has written so expressively and beautifully about Lenin [in the poem *Vladimir Ilyich Lenin*]. Still, Mayakovsky is very difficult for me to read, both in the style he uses in his verse and the way he puts words together. When I undertake to read him his verse affects me differently than when I hear it read. When his verse is declaimed it sounds serious and acts as an invocation, a call to duty. When I say this I'm confirming that Yevtushenko was correct on this question.

And do Yevtushenko's poems themselves please me? Yes, I like them. However, I can't say that about all his poems. I haven't read them all. I know that the words of some of his poems have become known to everyone. For example, "Do the Russians Want a War?" Some people have expressed a critical attitude toward the words of that song as much as to say that in this poem Yevtushenko is rejecting war in general and that this undermines the morale of our soldiers. These people are wrong. His words express the essence of the struggle against militarism, and at the same time they warn that if a war is imposed on us, Russia will respond in a worthy way. I think that Yevtushenko is a very capable poet, although his personality is unruly. But then again, the concept "unruliness" depends on each individual's point of view.

It's simply that a person like this cannot always be forced into a mold imposed by the censors, that is, those who would like to clean up and smooth over everyone and everything. But if everyone wrote the same way,

used the same arguments, and proceeded from one and the same understanding of things, no creative work would emerge, and the living word would never develop. In the last analysis everything would be reduced to chewing the same cud over and over; only one person would chew in one direction and another in a different direction. Works of art like that would simply turn the stomachs of readers, viewers, and listeners. We simply must be bolder in providing an opportunity for the “creative intelligentsia” to express themselves, to be active, to create. To create!

1. This section of the memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, recorded in the first days of September 1971, proved to be the last. On September 5, he had a third heart attack. On September 11, he was no longer with us. The author was not pleased with this last section, which we have entitled “I Am Not a Judge.” After listening to the tape, he asked me to erase it so that he could dictate it over again. But fate decreed otherwise. This chapter provides testimony that the author was evaluating and reevaluating some past events and that at times he disagreed with his own former views.

In Volume 2 of the present edition, the publisher decided to include dictated materials relating mainly to Soviet domestic affairs after World War II. Materials relating mainly to foreign affairs in that same period, especially after Stalin’s death in 1953, will appear in Volume 3. As a result, this chapter, although it was the very last item recorded by Khrushchev, ends up in the middle volume of this three-volume English edition. [SK]

2. This is apparently a reference to the fact that the author felt his health was failing when he began to record this section. [GS]

3. Further on in this chapter, Khrushchev observes that, in contrast to relations with the “technical intelligentsia,” relations with the so-called creative intelligentsia were “a very complicated business, very complicated.” [GS]

4. Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky (1840–93) composed several operas, the music for three ballets (including *Swan Lake*), four symphonies, three concertos, romances, and other musical works. He also taught at the Moscow Conservatory.

Sergei Sergeevich Prokofiev (1891–1953) was a composer, pianist, and conductor. He composed six operas, the music for three ballets, seven symphonies, an oratorio, a cantata, sonatas, songs, and music for films. He won the Lenin Prize and the State Prize and was made a People’s Artist of Russia in 1947. He lived abroad from 1918 to 1933. [SS]

5. Relations between Tsar Nicholas I and Alexander Pushkin (1799–1837) were complicated. The government censorship blocked the pub-

lication of many of Pushkin’s poems, and the tsar, understanding that Pushkin was a great poet, decided to assume the role of Pushkin’s censor himself. There were rumors that Nicholas had an affair with Pushkin’s wife, Natalya, and that he deliberately failed to stop the duel in which Pushkin died. These rumors, however, have never been substantiated. After Pushkin’s death the tsar paid all his debts (about 150,000 rubles). [SK]

6. The artist Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gerasimov (1881–1963) painted parades, scenes from the revolution of 1917, portraits, landscapes, and still lifes. He won the State Prize, was made a People’s Artist of the USSR in 1943, and was president of the Academy of Arts from 1947 to 1957. He should not be confused with his namesake, the artist Sergei Vasilyevich Gerasimov (1885–1964). [SS]

7. The Soviet songwriter Dmitry Yakovlevich Pokrass (1899–1978) actually served in the First Cavalry Army. His 1920 song “Budyonny’s March” is said to have been one of the first Soviet songs to become popular throughout Soviet Russia. He also wrote a song often quoted by Khrushchev in Volume 1 of these memoirs, “If Tomorrow There’s War” (1938). During the Civil War, the First Cavalry Army was commanded by Semyon Budyonny, with Kliment Voroshilov as political commissar. A Second Cavalry Army also existed for a short time in 1920, but it was disbanded and its commander shot. The one and only Cavalry Army that remained famous in Soviet song and story was the one headed by Budyonny and Voroshilov. See also Isaac Babel’s stories, with the English-language title *Red Cavalry*. In Russian, the title of Babel’s book on this subject is *Konarmiya* (“Cavalry Army”). [SK/GS]

8. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Fadeyev. See Biographies.

9. This novel was about patriotic Soviet youth engaged in underground resistance to the German occupation forces in the Donbas during World War II. [SK]

10. Demyan Bedny was the pen name of Yefim Aleksandrovich Pridvorov (1883–1945). His satirical verses, feuilletons, fables, and songs, published in

the Bolshevik newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*, were popular during the Civil War. He also wrote two epic poems. [SS]

11. Khrushchev is referring to the painting entitled “Rest After Battle” (*Otdykh posle boya*, 1951) by the artist Yuri Mikhailovich Neprintsev (1909–96).

Neprintsev was also known for his series of dramatic etchings *Leningradtsy* (The Leningraders, 1960–67). He was made a People’s Artist of the USSR in 1965 and a member of the Academy of Arts in 1970. [SS]

12. Aleksandr Trifonovich Tvardovsky (1910–71), as Khrushchev indicates, was immensely popular, especially because of his long narrative poem *Vasily Tyorkin* (1941–45), about an ordinary Soviet soldier in World War II. A man of generous and liberal views, never one to clap his hands for authoritarianism and repression, Tvardovsky served as editor of the influential monthly magazine *Novy Mir* from 1950 to 1954 and again from 1958 to 1970. When, under Brezhnev, Soviet authorities moved toward new acts of repression, tightening up ideological controls and partially reviving the cult of Stalin, Tvardovsky was removed from the editorship of *Novy Mir*.

A poet of peasant origin, Tvardovsky first attracted attention with the narrative poem *Strana Muraviya* (Land of Muraviya, 1936). This is an imaginary name, derived from *murava*, an archaic-poetic word for “grass.” An English equivalent might be “Land of Greenswardia.” The poem told of an individual peasant who refuses to join a collective farm and goes off in search of the legendary “land of Muravia,” where neither communes nor collective farms exist. In the end he does join a collective farm and finds that it actually is the land of Muravia he had so long searched for. (See Vera Alexandrova, *History of Soviet Literature* [New York: Doubleday, 1963], 284–87.)

Tvardovsky is also known for the narrative poems *The House by the Roadside* (*Dom u dorogi*, 1946), *Horizon After Horizon* (*Za dalyu—dal*, 1953–60), *Tyorkin in the Other World* (*Tyorkin na tom svete*, 1963), and *By Right of Memory* (*Po pravu pamyati*, published posthumously, 1987 [see excerpts translated by George Saunders in *An End to Silence* [New York: Norton, 1982], 62–69 and 186–88]). Tvardovsky also wrote lyrical verse and prose, including literary criticism. [SK/MN/GS]

13. Among the works of the outstanding Russian poet Boris Leonidovich Pasternak (1890–1960) were a number of verse cycles in the early 1920s; three narrative poems about the 1905 revolution, *Noble Malady* (*Vysokaya bolezni*; 1924), 1905 (published 1926), and *Lieutenant Schmidt* (1927); an autobiography, *Safe Conduct* (*Okhrannaya gramota*; 1931); and a partly autobiographical verse novel *Spektorsky* (about a protagonist of the same name;

1931); translations from English (including Shakespeare), French, German, Spanish, and Georgian; and the novel *Doctor Zhivago* (1957). See Biographies and the chapter on Pasternak in Vera Alexandrova, *A History of Soviet Literature* (New York: Doubleday, 1963). [MN/SS/GS]

14. Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov. See Biographies.

15. The writer whom Khrushchev has in mind is Alexander Solzhenitsyn. See Biographies. [GS]

16. Pilot-cosmonaut and twice Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel Vladimir Mikhailovich Komarov (1927–67) perished during the final stage of the flight of the Soyuz-1 spaceship. On Volkov, Dobrovolsky, and Patsayev, see note 5 to the chapter “Cooperation on Outer Space.”

17. *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* (*Odin den Ivana Denisovicha*), published with Khrushchev’s approval in 1962, was the first literary work on the prison-camp theme—and also the first work by Solzhenitsyn—to appear in the Soviet Union. It describes an ordinary day in a prison camp in the form of a monologue by an ordinary prisoner, who should not necessarily be identified fully with the author. The story’s publication created a great stir in Soviet society. [SS]

18. Army general and Hero of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Vasilevich Gorbatov (1891–1973) was arrested without just cause in 1937 and released in 1940. Khrushchev is referring to Gorbatov’s book of memoirs *Gody i voiny* (published in the USSR in 1965 and in English the same year as *Years off My Life*). See Biographies. [MN/SS/GS]

19. Lake Khasan was the site of a major battle between Japanese and Soviet forces in July–August 1938. It is located in the Soviet Primorye (Maritime) Territory about 130 kilometers (roughly 70 miles) southwest of Vladivostok, the capital of the territory. The lake is just to the east of the Tumen River, which forms the border between the USSR and Korea and flows into the Sea of Japan. The border between the USSR and China (Manchuria) is immediately adjacent, extending north from the Korean-Soviet border. Japanese troops from Manchuria and Korea made an incursion into Soviet-held territory between the Tumen River and Lake Khasan, but were driven out by Soviet troops. The battle of Lake Khasan was the first major clash between the Soviet armed forces and the armed forces of a capitalist power since the end of the Russian Civil War (or since the Japanese withdrew from the Soviet Far Eastern territory in 1922). Many thousands of troops were engaged on either side, and important lessons were learned in the use of tanks, planes, and artillery. The Japanese defeat here and at Khalkin Gol in Mongolia in 1939 helped discourage Japan from attacking the Soviet Union during World War II. [GS]

20. Kuzma Petrovich Podlas. See Biographies. Khrushchev gave the same account about Mekhlis and Podlas in Volume 1 of these memoirs. [GS]



21. Mstislav Rostropovich (born 1927) is regarded as the world's greatest living cellist. He is also a pianist and a conductor. He studied at the Central Music School and the Moscow Conservatory, where he taught from 1960 to 1974. He then left for the United States, where he directed the Washington Symphony Orchestra from 1977 to 1994. In 1978 he was deprived of Soviet citizenship for his human-rights activity; his citizenship was restored in 1990. He was made a People's Artist of the USSR in 1966. He has won the Lenin Prize, the State Prize of the USSR, and the State Prize of the Russian Federation. [SS]

22. Solzhenitsyn's short story "Matryona's Courtyard" (*Matryonin dvor*) was one of three stories by him published in Soviet magazines in 1963. The title is sometimes rendered in English as *Matryona's House*, *Matryona's Home*, or *Matryona's Homestead*. According to *The Literary Encyclopedia*, the story "champions the simple, stoic values of a peasant woman." [SS]

23. The short novel (*povest*) *The Blue Notebook* (*Sinyaya tetrad*) was written by Emmanuil Gengerikhovich Kazakevich (1913–62) in 1961. Among his other works are a number of short stories; the short novels *Star* (*Zvezda*; 1947) and *Two in the Steppe* (*Dvoye v stepi*; 1948); and the full-length novel *Spring on the Oder* (*Vesna na Odere*; 1949). He was awarded the State Prize in 1948 and 1950. [MN/SS/GS]

24. In July 1917, Petrograd workers marched in a demonstration of half a million against Russia's continued participation in World War I, especially against a disastrous offensive ordered in June 1917 by Kerensky, then head of Russia's Provisional Government. The Kerensky government countered with repressive action, claiming to have proof that the Bolshevik leaders of the antiwar demonstration were "German agents." Bolshevik newspapers were shut down and some Bolshevik leaders were arrested and imprisoned, including Leon Trotsky. To avoid arrest, Lenin and Zinoviev went into hiding, ending up in the famous "hunter's shack" in Finland—a primitive shelter, like a tent made of leafy branches, similar to a duck blind. [SK/GS]

25. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan. See Biographies.

26. Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg (1891–1967) published his story *The Thaw* (*Ottepel*) in 1956. [MN] Ehrenburg was one of the internationally most visible Soviet figures from the 1930s to the 1960s. He wrote poetry, short stories, travel books, essays, memoirs, and several novels, winning the Stalin Prize in 1942 and 1948 and the International Lenin Peace Prize in 1952. Though not a party member, he occupied important cultural positions. He was vice president of the World Peace Council from 1950 to 1967 and a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet from 1950. [SS]

27. Konstantin (Kirill) Mikhailovich Simonov. See Biographies.

28. Yevgeny Aleksandrovich Yevtushenko (born 1933) was perhaps the most famous of the young, nonconformist or rebel poets who emerged in the USSR in the era of "de-Stalinization" after 1956. (Others include Andrei Voznesensky, Robert Rozhdestvensky, and Bella Akhmadullina.) Among Yevtushenko's best-known poems are "The Heirs of Stalin," a warning against those who sought to bring Stalin back to life, and "Baby Yar," his successful protest at the absence of a monument to the mostly Jewish victims of Nazi killings at the ravine of this name outside Kiev. Today he teaches literature at the University of Oklahoma in Norman. [GS]

In the mid-1960s, I chose to receive a volume of Yevtushenko's poetry as a school prize; he was the first contemporary Russian poet I ever read. He has a rather staccato style, reminiscent of the famous poet of the 1920s Vladimir Mayakovsky, whom he admires (see Biographies). [SS]

By the time of this meeting, Yevtushenko was already the author of many verses and collections, including: *Scouts of the Future* (*Razvedchiki gryadushchego*; 1952), *Enthusiasts' Highway* (*Shosse Entuziastov*; 1956), *The Promise* (*Obeshchanie*; 1957), *Verses from Various Years* (*Stikhi raznykh let*; 1959), and *A Wave of the Hand* (*Vzmkh ruki*; 1962). [MN] He has also translated Georgian poetry and written two novels and two film scripts. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1984. [SS]

29. By the beginning of the 1960s, Ernst Neizvestny (born 1925) had managed to exhibit a number of expressive drawings and monumental works of sculpture. In 1974, he erected the memorial over Khrushchev's grave at the Novo-Devichy Cemetery in Moscow. Since 1976 he has lived abroad. In 1995 he won the State Prize of the Russian Federation.

30. By this time Galina Serebryakova (1905–80) was known for her collection of essays *Women of the Epoch of the French Revolution* (*Zhenshchiny epokhi Frantsuzskoi revolyutsii*; 1929) and for the trilogy *Prometheus* (*Prometei*; 1933–62). She also wrote memoirs.

31. The saying in Russian is "like a carp on a hot frying pan." [GS]

32. Khrushchev is alluding to the fact that Serebryakova had been arrested and spent many years in labor camps under Stalin. [SK]

33. In 1963, she released the memoirs *Wanderings Through Past Years* (*Stranstviya po minuvshim godam*). She also wrote film scripts and the collection of essays *Concerning Others and Concerning Myself* (*O drugikh i o sebe*; 1968).

34. "Neizvestny" means "unknown." [GS]

35. Futurism was an international art movement founded in Italy in 1909, when the word was first used in a manifesto issued by the artist Filippo Marinetti. The futurists celebrated the dynamism, speed, and power of the automobile and other

machines. Many historians consider that their aesthetics prepared the ground for the rise of fascism. A Communist version of futurism was popular among Soviet intellectuals in the early revolutionary years and influenced architecture and poetry as well as art in the narrow sense. [SS]

36. Ironically, it was the sculptor Ernst Neizvestny who designed the monument that now stands at Nikita Khrushchev's grave in the Novo-Devichy cemetery in Moscow. [GS]

37. Anthony Eden (1897–1977) was a British Conservative Party politician. He was foreign secretary from 1935 to 1938, from 1940 to 1945, and from 1951 to 1955, and prime minister from April 1955 to January 1957. Khrushchev visited Britain in April 1956. Volume 3 of these memoirs contains a chapter about this visit. [SS]

38. Pablo Picasso (1881–1973) drew *Doves of Peace* in 1947.

39. Dmitry Dmitriyevich Shostakovich. See Biographies.

40. Khrushchev is referring to the resolution of the party Central Committee "Concerning V. Muradeli's Opera *The Great Friendship* (1948)," in which a number of composers were subjected to devastating criticism. [MN] Vano Ilyich Muradeli (1908–70) also composed one other opera, two operettas, two symphonies, cantatas, and songs. He won the State Prize and in 1968 was made a People's Artist of the USSR. [SS]

41. Shostakovich composed the Seventh Leningrad Symphony in 1942.

42. In 1962 and 1963 Shostakovich organized several jazz concerts in Moscow. One of these concerts took place on April 2, 1962, following the Third All-Union Congress of Composers. In a speech delivered later that year, Khrushchev mentioned that on Shostakovich's invitation he

had gone to this concert but that the jazz was "not altogether pleasant to listen to" (*ne sovsem priyatno slushat*). [SK]

43. Leonid Osipovich Utyosov (1895–1982) was a theatrical performer, singer, and musician from Odessa. He gave his first stage performance in 1911. In 1929 he organized and sang as soloist in the first Soviet jazz band, called Tea-Jazz; later, in 1947, it was renamed the State Variety Orchestra of the RSFSR. He appeared in a film with his orchestra in 1934—*The Merry Fellows* (*Vesyolye Rebyata*). In 1965 he was made a People's Artist of the USSR. [GS]

44. Here is an official characterization of jazz music typical of the USSR at that time: jazz "expresses the musical conception of a bourgeois class deprived of positive historical tasks and agitated by the war and the subsequent socio-political upheavals" (*Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], 1st ed. [Moscow 1931], 21:729).

45. *Boubliki* are thick, ring-shaped bread rolls, like bagels. [GS/SK]

46. The chief role in this criticism of Mayakovsky was played by the literary critic Vladimir Vladimirovich Yermilov (1904–65), who since 1928 had been a leader of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (Russian initials, RAPP). His views were reflected in the book *For the Living Person in Literature* (*Za zhivogo cheloveka v literature*; 1928) and in the booklet *Our Literary Disagreements* (*Nashi tvorcheskkiye raznoglasiya*; 1930). The general secretary of the RAPP, L. L. Averbakh, and its journal *On Literary Guard* (*Na Literaturnom Postu*) set the theoretical and methodological lines of this criticism. [MN] See Edward J. Brown, *The Proletarian Episode in Russian Literature, 1928–1932* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). [GS]





## **APPENDIXES**



## The Last Romantic

EDITORS' NOTES. *Anatoly Ivanovich Strelyany (born 1939) is a well-known writer, scriptwriter, and print and radio journalist. [SS]*

*Much of the value of this article lies in the author's quotations from his unique interviews with Andrei Stepanovich Shevchenko, who for many years was Nikita Khrushchev's assistant in the field of agriculture. Shevchenko was not merely an assistant but a person close to Khrushchev, whom he sincerely loved and revered. One may accept or reject Strelyany's arguments, but the quotations from Shevchenko that are scattered through the text are historical material of the greatest interest, all the more so in view of the fact that Shevchenko left behind no written legacy of his own. [SK]*

*For more on both Strelyany and Shevchenko, see Biographies.*

### *"This Is Politics!"*

NIKITA SERGEYEVICH KHRUSHCHEV became [chief] secretary of the CPSU Central Committee<sup>1</sup> in March 1953, and by September of that year he had already come forward with a plan for reviving the countryside that would have done honor (at least as a first step) to any politician of the time.

This step was prepared in the usual bureaucratic manner: without special publicity and by a very narrow circle of people, the choice of whom was not a matter of politics or the result of any kind of struggle and may have seemed arbitrary—Khrushchev's assistants Andrei Shevchenko and Grigory Shuisky, the leading *Pravda* editors Dmitry Shepilov and Vasily Polyakov, Academician [Ivan Danilovich] Laptev of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (since 1948),<sup>2</sup> and some others. In the course of their deliberations they made contact with the organizations and government departments from which they needed help, ordering various reports and estimates. And then they summoned the head of the Central Statistical Administration, [Vladimir Nikonovich] Starovsky.<sup>3</sup> A little red-faced man ran in, ready at the first hint to make something out of nothing.

"Vladimir Nikonovich!" the scrupulous Shevchenko, who was new to Moscow, reproached him, "that's the fourth time you've corrected this figure today."

The corpulent Starovsky turned even redder. "But I'm changing it for the better!"

“We’re not trying to boast of our achievements. We ourselves need to know everything precisely.”

“I understand!” The state’s top statistician receded in tiny steps to the door, in order to run in the next day with a new and even higher figure.

They [the members of this team selected by Khrushchev] worked in the Central Committee building at Staraya Ploshchad (Old Square), on the fifth floor, where Khrushchev’s office was situated. As a result of the reduction in the number of Central Committee secretaries that took place immediately after Stalin’s death, many offices were left empty. Nothing in them was changed except that the telephones were cut off. They [the members of this team] worked without regard to the time of day. Shevchenko tells how Marshal [Semyon Mikhailovich] Budyonny once turned up at his office at six in the morning.

“Semyon Mikhailovich, why are you here so early?”

“I get up early.”

“I might not have been here. It’s a good thing I hadn’t left yet.”

“I know you’re always here.”

The marshal had come to defend his horse farms, which Khrushchev wanted to close down, saying that they were a burden on the state: they did not produce their own feed.<sup>4</sup>

First of all, Khrushchev had to make sense of what he had inherited from Stalin. Since the time of collectivization agriculture had not given returns even on those ephemeral investments that it had managed to obtain. By the beginning of the 1950s more agricultural machinery was in use than before World War II, while output was lower than before World War I. The collective farmers were receiving almost nothing for their labor. They lived off their private plots. The country too lived off the milk and meat from those plots. The peasantry had to pay the state tribute in kind, extracted by about a million procurement officials. What was left over, the collective farmer took to market, for he needed money to pay taxes and make compulsory contributions to the state loan. To collect taxes a second, financial, bureaucracy was maintained. In my village the employees of this bureaucracy were called *finagenty*.<sup>5</sup>

Besides the procurement and tax officials, the peasants—still clad in the same homespun clothing they had worn a hundred years before—had to feed their bosses: the collective farm chairman, his relatives and favorites, his patrons in the county and province administrations, the work-brigade leaders,<sup>6</sup> storekeepers, and patrolmen. The peasant carried on his back all the laziest, most corrupt, and rapacious officials, all those who had sat out

the war in the rear, not to mention those who had served the Germans during the occupation. Many villages had fallen into real bondage to these “crooks with party cards,” as the writer Valentin Ovechkin<sup>7</sup> called them in his *Life as Usual in the County* (*Rayonnye budni*, 1952)—a book with which Khrushchev was familiar and of which he thought highly: Shevchenko used to read it to him in the evenings.

Given the fact that after the war the private plots were the main source of food, one might have expected them to be held in especially high regard by the state. In reality things were otherwise. So recklessly were the screws tightened that the highest considerations must have been at stake. The dimensions of the plots were strictly limited, the collective farmer was not allowed to keep more than one cow, and every fruit tree was liable to tax. “You have a good orchard,” Khrushchev told his cousin, a collective farmer, on a visit after the war to his native district near Kursk. “I’ll chop the trees down in the fall,” she replied. “I have no way of paying for the apples.”

Something had to be done with this agricultural setup. Something had to be decided about these collective farms. Disband them? Such an idea was not unusual at that time. Many people went through the war with that idea. The partisans came out of the forest with it—with the hope that the collective farms would now be disbanded. As a child in my home village, I myself heard soldiers who had come back from the Front say that Stalin had made this promise to the Allies in return for their help in crushing Hitler. These rumors were also spread about the villages by wandering tramps and wounded beggars. Verses exposing Stalin’s collective farms were composed by village poets. I met one such “God’s fool” in 1958 when I was working as a correspondent in Northern Kazakhstan. He drove me by sledge from the district center of Yermentau to the Turgai state farm, and the whole way he declaimed in the style of a *kobzar*<sup>8</sup> doggerel that he had made up in Ukrainian about the sufferings of the common country people under the yoke of the parasites and tyrants, Stalin foremost among them. The idea of disbanding the collective farms was so commonplace that it found reflection in the first honest postwar work of Russian literature about the countryside, Valentin Ovechkin’s *Life as Usual in the County*. There was a demobilized officer who spoke up once, during a meal, in favor of distributing the land among the peasants and was challenged to a duel by a fellow officer who was a convinced collectivist. Khrushchev would have done the same. So, for that matter, would have the former communitard<sup>9</sup> Ovechkin. Khrushchev was not thinking about how to disband the collective farms bequeathed him by Stalin, but about how to strengthen them.

The measures that he proposed were simple and easy for anyone to understand: pay collective farms and collective farmers more, give them at least a little freedom, and reduce taxes. When Khrushchev took the helm, his first public utterance was about material incentives. This alone was enough to shake the country: the Stalinist foundations were tottering, and a heresy previously tucked away in the innermost recesses of people's minds had captured the throne. If the country needed bread, then the collective farmers had to be paid. Not the height of wisdom, but in it was the start of a new life. That the authorities did not create incentives and never would create incentives, that the authorities only drove people on and took away from people and always would only drive them on and take away from them—this, after all, was what everyone, from the top of society to the bottom, had hitherto regarded as self-evident. Khrushchev was the first to say what everyone knew but was not even allowed to think: that people in the villages lived a bad, poor, and humiliating life, worse and more humiliating than in the cities, that they were tormented by tithes and taxes, that they did not want to live and work in the collective farms, that they evaded work and ran away, despite the fact that they were deprived of passports<sup>10</sup> and therefore under orders to stay where they were. He began to plead for making laws and regulations less harsh and to trouble himself about making people's lives easier. From him came not new oppressions but the first indulgences. He promised not punishments but mercies. In the eyes of many of his well-wishers, all else is eclipsed by 1956, when he exposed Stalin. Even now some think that this was the first and only occasion on which he distinguished himself. No, the first occasion on which he distinguished himself was when he told the truth about the miserable plight of the countryside and rushed to its aid.

The results of Khrushchev's new rural policy were immediately evident. By 1956 agriculture had acquired unprecedented dynamism. Before Khrushchev increases in milk yields per cow were measured in kilograms: ten kilograms a year was considered a success. Under Khrushchev in many places the increase was counted in hundreds of kilograms. In Ukraine milk yields in winter 1955–56 were twice as high as in the preceding winter; in the country as a whole they were 65 percent higher. Such growth had not been seen in all the years of Soviet power. Khrushchev was overjoyed. In the course of these three years thousands of collective and state farms had doubled, and many had tripled, their output of milk and meat. A good beginning, comrades!

With a feeling of vindication he recalled his recent battles with such people as Molotov and Malenkov. Strong and dangerous by virtue of their names alone, they did not even want to hear about democratization, including economic



democratization, thinking that any relaxation of pressure would lead to a fall in discipline, and consequently also in output. His plans seemed to them hare-brained schemes. For example, he proposed to increase milk yields by more than 600 liters in six years, and they objected. This was before the January 1954 plenum of the Central Committee, at which he planned to deliver the report. “We had arguments. . . . Some people warned me at that time, out of friendship: ‘Six hundred—that is a lot. You could get into a mess. Better to make it less. So many years have gone by without any increase in the yield.’” The 600-liter increase was achieved not in six years but in three. “What was I to tell those friends now? Who got into a mess? It was they who got into a mess.” His pride in those first years, his best years, was ingenuous and attractive. “I admit,” he said in January 1957 at a meeting to award Moscow province the Order of Lenin, “that I have a certain weakness for agriculture. I am a worker myself, but life has forced me . . . to get involved in agriculture. And I am proud that it has not been in vain, that your successes owe a little to my efforts as well.”

In the first five years of his presence in the country’s leadership, procurements of meat from the collective and state farms rose by 162 percent, milk by 205 percent, grain by 189 percent.

It seemed to him that things would get even better, that even more could be achieved. For that it was necessary first of all to introduce corn everywhere. As far back as 1939, he had been told by Mikoyan, just back from his first trip to America: they use a lot of corn, they feed their livestock with it, and they eat it themselves. They carry corn seeds in their pockets and rattle them. The grains are opened out to make what they call corn flakes. Ten years later, corn had saved Ukraine from catastrophe, and at the same time it had saved Khrushchev himself, who was Central Committee first secretary there. Convinced that wheat would be a complete failure (it had all burned up almost straight after sowing), he had taken the advice of clever peasants and tried corn. He had ordered that two million hectares,<sup>11</sup> no less, be sown with it. It was to be planted only in squares, with each square broken up into quadrants by plowed strips in both directions.<sup>12</sup> All else had been forgotten and set aside. Day and night the collective-farm carpentry workshops had made manual corn-planters, while the work-brigade leaders had whipped along their horses, rushing from hut to hut and driving every living thing out into the field. The harvest had been 40 centners<sup>13</sup> per hectare; the grain plan was fulfilled.

In the resolution of the January 1959 Central Committee plenum the following point was inserted: to consider the dissemination of corn one of the party’s most important tasks. It was then that Khrushchev for the first

time shook a threatening finger at those who applauded his hymns to corn but sowed little of it, as a blind, as if to say: “Don’t you dare lag behind us!” And he began stubbornly and methodically—but quickly, quickly!—to move the border of the corn zone northward from the old Kiev–Sumy–Kharkov–Rostov line. First to Oryol (how furious he was when in Oryol province—a whole province, with half a million hectares of arable land—they responded to his call by planting a mere 200 hectares with corn!), and then to Moscow and beyond. “This year we shall grow corn in Yakutia without fail, perhaps even in Chukotka. They grow potatoes there? Let them grow potatoes. I think that corn will grow there too.” When the corn belt, in accordance with his will, had encompassed even the land of white nights,<sup>14</sup> Nikita Sergeevich decided that all was now in order with the cattle-feed base, and turned his gaze toward America.

Not long before, the Soviet minister of agriculture Vladimir Matskevich had returned from America. He had gone there at the head of a delegation of twelve. They had spent forty days in the United States, including twelve days in the state of Iowa. Matskevich had kept a detailed diary in which he noted down every step they took: where they had been, what they had seen, with whom they had spoken. On his return to Moscow, he used these notes to compile a thorough report to Khrushchev, on the basis of which he wrote a book. The bus that took Matskevich and his eleven fellow travelers around America for forty days was a cauldron in which almost everything that Khrushchev was later to come up with was cooked up. He had selected the delegates, sent them on their way, and obtained memoranda and findings from them. The field of vision, concepts, and views of Matskevich and his team became, on the whole, Khrushchev’s field of vision, concepts, and views.

What was it that they had seen in America? How did the Soviet minister of agriculture explain the successes of American agriculture?

In first place he pointed to “good natural and climatic conditions.” In second place he pointed out that “for almost a hundred years there has been no war on the territory of the USA.” In third place he mentioned that the rural population of America consists of “energetic and enterprising people from many countries.” These people had “not been afraid of difficulties”; they had “enriched America with the best achievements of their countries.” In fourth place he observed that “the agriculture of a number of regions of the USA has been free from the bonds of serfdom,” which had slowed down the development of other countries, including Russia.

“Such conditions,” he wrote, “are, so to say, of a natural historical order.”

However, Matskevich wanted to draw special attention to conditions of another order, to those conditions that depend on people. That meant, first of all, specialization and continual enlargement of the scale of production. Many machines were produced, and farms were well supplied with material and technical inputs; the results, signs, and psychology of specialization struck him at every step. On the evening of July 24, a farmer and his wife went to town, where the housewife bought products, including potatoes and onions: that was more convenient for her than going to the trouble of growing them herself. And what potatoes and onions! “It is hard to find a farmer with at least one or two milch cows among his 800–900 head of cattle. He prefers to buy even for himself two or three liters of milk, rather than spend time milking a single cow by hand.”

Second, Matskevich drew attention to the rational system of agronomic service. Agricultural methods were worked out not in Washington or New York under the vigilant supervision of the top political leadership but in the depths of the countryside, mainly at colleges and experimental stations. Third, broad mechanization. The decisive factor—“economy of labor”—he mentioned last (although he did use the word “decisive”), and right away declared that in the face of “the insuperable contradictions of the capitalist economy” he had come to an even better realization of “the enormous advantage” of the socialist economy. In short, “what took the Americans decades we can do, and shall do, in a few years.”

At that time one would often encounter the phrases “in a few years” or “within a short time.” They were pronounced not only as ritual verbiage. Short time limits were incorporated into plans. The ideology and practice of great leaps were still a living active force. When it was said that we are going to America to learn, it was understood to mean: to learn in order soon to compete with America as equals. And to compete with no one but America, with no one smaller or weaker. We and America, that’s all. The call to catch up with America in three years did not emerge out of delirium or in an empty place. In making this call, Khrushchev stood no higher or lower than his entourage. A single way of thinking, a single psychology. Whatever marvels you may have seen in the West, don’t get despondent. Full mechanization? Well, after all, “in our large-scale socialist agriculture there is the opportunity to make better use of tractors, combines, and other machines than in the USA. Output per tractor at our Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS’s)<sup>15</sup> and on our state farms is significantly greater than on American farms. . . .”

Khrushchev's first declaration about America—"We have entered into competition with the richest capitalist country in the world. . . . We must work hard. . . . We must . . ."—was received by the Soviet public with its customary understanding: he was the top leader, it was his job to inspire the people, to praise socialism and belittle capitalism. The public read it and forgot it.

The West paid a little more attention to the words of the man who had just dethroned Stalin. There they evoked light-hearted misunderstanding; in the newspapers there was something about "the hare-brained schemes of the Reds," but there too hardly anyone realized that Khrushchev's declaration was not propaganda, that before the eyes of the world there was beginning the great mid-century Soviet economic and political drama.

The West's fleeting mockery did not go unnoticed. Khrushchev took offense. He was very sensitive to anything that seemed to him to show lack of respect for the Soviet state or for him personally, and tried not to provide occasion for mockery. He found it unpleasant that Soviet people should dress worse than the French; he made frequent mention of this in his speeches, assuring his audience that it was a temporary phenomenon. He was disturbed by those aspects of our life which were most vulnerable to criticism and for which excuses had to be made. Dictating his memoirs in retirement, he recounted how he had struggled "in the collective with which I worked" so that Soviet citizens should be able to travel freely abroad ("I think it's hard to believe that after fifty years we should keep paradise under lock and key"); how pleased he was when he went to meet the pianist Vladimir Ashkenazi, who had married an Englishwoman and wanted to stay in London ("I say OK, give him a passport so that he can always come to the Soviet Union and leave again whenever he wants to."); how proud he felt when he let Maya Plisetskaya and Svyatoslav Rikhter<sup>16</sup> go abroad (some overcautious officials had prophesied that Rikhter would not return, as he had a mother in West Germany); and how he regarded it as to his special credit that he had not been afraid to send the super-secret Academician Kurchatov<sup>17</sup> to England.

Offended by the mockery of the "capitalists," he decided to make sure just in case, and ordered his economists to estimate when the declared goal might be reached. The economists replied: in 1975. It was precisely in that year that the USSR, moving ahead at the current rate, would increase the output of meat by 3.2 times and draw abreast of the Americans. It was taken as an obvious assumption that the USA would be standing still.

1957 was approaching. In 1956, finally realizing that they would not manage to get out of it and would just have to sow corn, the county and province party

committees<sup>18</sup> seriously got down to business. Their reports of the progress of sowing were like reports of combat operations; their reports of the construction of perfect squares for sowing corn were like reports of the capture of towns. From Udmurtia<sup>19</sup> came Vorobyov, first secretary of the province party committee, bringing with him a sheaf of corn taller than himself, which he dragged into Khrushchev's office with his own hands under the anxious and disapproving glances of the guards. Khrushchev warmly greeted his guest, then summoned his assistant to dictate to him a new passage about the example set by Udmurtia for inclusion in his forthcoming speech. The majority of Khrushchev's speeches, by the way, really were *his* speeches: he himself would make a preliminary recording, and if there was not time to compose a complete text he would take the stand with prompt cards in his hand—thesis, example, conclusion.

"I tried to restrain him," recalls Shevchenko. "I advised him not to talk about Udmurtia.

"He interjected: 'Have you been there?'

"'No,' I said, 'but I know what kind of zone this is. It isn't warm enough.'

"He got angry: 'You haven't been there, but Vorobyov is secretary of the province committee in Udmurtia. He brought me a sample.'"

Chita and Ulan-Ude, Arkhangelsk and Vologda<sup>20</sup> responded to the affair by likewise delivering samples to Moscow. One close associate brought back a remarkable piece of news from a mission to Ivanovo province.<sup>21</sup> Beaming, he told us: "Do you know what ordinary people are already calling corn? Kukuruzna Nikitychna!"<sup>22</sup> All of this promised mountains of cattle feed, and Khrushchev decided to throw down a historical challenge to his cautious economists. They talked about 1975; in response, he pronounced words that struck terror in the hearts of the handful of people in the country who understood: "Within the next few years."

Under no circumstances could he leave his statements unsubstantiated! He made calculations. So far there had been such-and-such rates of growth, remarkable rates, rates in which the Molotovs and Malenkovs had not believed. Growth could be accelerated by such-and-such an increase in the production of feeds, among which the leading place had to belong to corn for grain and silage. Making his calculations public (the output of meat, of course, had to be increased very significantly, but all the same not by a factor of tens), he exclaimed: "Can we get past this barrier? In my opinion, we can and we shall get past it—yes, and move even further ahead!"

Here he could have stopped and said: "OK, let people work." But as a man of deeds he had to launch the great task at once along practical lines. He

could not be a mere chatterbox. “I think that it is not now worth our while to name a year by which we must complete this task. Let the leaders of republics and provinces, collective farmers and those working at state farms make the calculation themselves . . .”—and here he could still have stopped . . .—“ . . . and declare through the press by what date they will be able to complete this task.” He had started a campaign! “There is no doubt that this movement will receive the support of the whole people. But right now we must help people a little to get moving, we must make them excited.”

By way of helping his audience, he prompted them by talking about people who had “submitted papers and affixed their seal” to the effect that there could be no question of catching up with the Americans before 1975. As soon as he mentioned this year laughter swept the hall. The hall—several hundred of the best specialists, gathered in Leningrad for a zonal conference, the cream of the Russian northwest—was as sure as he that there was something to laugh about. To carry out collectivization in two or three years, industrialization in a decade, more or less—and now we needed two decades to catch up with America in meat?! These economists were probably just illiterates. . . . No, Khrushchev objected, “from the point of view of arithmetic they have made no mistake. It has all been demonstrated.” He was the soberest person in that laughing hall—let us not forget this, so that we may better understand in what soil he grew! “But, comrades, we have to understand what kind of powers have now accumulated in our people. . . . You see that many collective farms in literally two or three years have increased their output several-fold. What kind of arithmetical calculations can take all this into account? *This is politics, this is a political phenomenon* (emphasis mine—A. S.). . . . The strength of the collective-farm system, the patriotism of Soviet people, and socialist competition<sup>23</sup> will enable us to complete this task within the next few years.”

Having no intention of blowing up the West in the way that, it seems, the West at times seriously feared, Nikita Sergeevich did not conceal his hopes of achieving the same goal in another way: “If we catch up with the USA in per capita output of meat, butter, and milk, then we shall set the most powerful torpedo under the foundations of the capitalist system.”

In the hall, where the laughter at the expense of the defeatist economists had yet to die away, applause rang out.

Khrushchev knew to whom he was addressing himself in the first instance—the secretaries of the party province and county committees. Better than anyone else they saw the traps that he was laying for them. First, they would not get away with keeping their silence. Second, learning the lesson of those

unfortunate economists, they should not show false modesty but commit themselves to the hilt, for the matter was regarded as having political significance: the rapid and final victory over capitalism was being placed on the agenda. This was no time for niggling over petty details!

Stormy applause in the hall and rejoicing in the whole country met his announcement that he had decided to abolish without delay, as of January 1, 1958, compulsory procurements of products from collective farmers' garden plots, and to disband the almost-a-million-strong army of parasitical procurement agents. The amount of products they collected, he explained, was small; in some places they ate up more than they collected; and the fuss over these products was a big embarrassment in the face of the West, where the sterile collective-farm system was an object of mockery. "We shall now knock this wedge out of the hands of our adversaries. Thereby, comrades, we shall demonstrate the strength of our party, the power of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism." Whatever ideas it may or may not have demonstrated, this decision brought big and direct changes to the life of the village family. Removal from its shoulders of the burden of tribute in kind immediately gave it the freedom to make its own economic decisions. Now, at least on his own garden plot, a person became more or less his own master.

*He Got Them Moving!*

Having tried out his calculations on the people of the poor Northwest and received such support, Khrushchev boldly presented them at the jubilee session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held to mark the fortieth anniversary of Soviet power. Catching up with the USA within the next few years thereby became an officially proclaimed economic and political goal of the country. Straight after the holiday, speaking in Kiev, he said: "It is up to you, comrade Ukrainians, not just to catch up with but to surpass the United States by a significant margin in the output of livestock products. Perhaps to reach twice the American level, and perhaps even more."

And in this hall too, stormy applause broke out.

The West, preoccupied with its own crises, shrugged its shoulders.

In the jubilee year there was probably not a single collective or state farm that did not declare its intention (accompanied, of course, by calculations) to catch up with or surpass America. That fall I started work at a newspaper (a county newspaper in the virgin lands),<sup>24</sup> and my main job—not, I must admit, a very demanding one—was to make the rounds of the state farms and bring back in my notebook "articles" by the farm directors about how



long, according to their calculations, it would take them to catch up with that accursed America. Khrushchev, reading similar articles in *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Selskaya Zhizn* (Rural Life)—and in which newspapers did he, the first and most zealous consumer of such literature in the country, *not* read them?—was so pleased with the creative energy of the masses that he once even grumbled: “Another official has landed in the swamp and can’t pull himself out, but he shouts that he too is catching up with America.”

That’s how well he got them moving!

He took special care to see to it that the people who were resolved upon catching up with America should not go short of good patriotic malice. Without further ado he created an enemy image, using the usual tints, heightened only by the claim that Uncle Sam was terribly worried. “Now the imperialists are thinking about what they need to do in order to prevent the Soviet Union from overtaking the USA. There is nothing you can do, my dear fellows. . . . Communism will prevail throughout the world.”

At the end of 1959, Khrushchev announced at a Central Committee plenum that state procurements of meat from the collective and state farms had increased by 36 percent. But that was something! “We have overtaken the USA in per capita output of butter.” Did he know that the Americans had deliberately, on their physicians’ advice, cut back on butter and switched to margarine? Had anybody told him that the first successes in the race had a lot to do with the fact that the collective and state farms had bought up the population’s livestock, and had also—giving no thought to the morrow—slaughtered their underfatted calves? It cannot be excluded that he knew and that somebody had told him, but what importance did that have? The people needed victories. Not a single day could be allowed to go by without a victory. Only victories unite the people, as we writers were told thirty years later by one party official, just a little lower in rank than Khrushchev, who had gathered us together to ask how much longer we were going to write about purchases of grain from the Americans: “When are you going to stop instilling in the people a low opinion of itself?” Only victories unite, nothing but victories, and Khrushchev took note of them all. He spoke of “the great labor feat of the agricultural workers of Ryazan province,” who had sold the state 100,000 tons of meat instead of the planned 50,000 and assumed the obligation to fulfill the next year’s plan three times over. He spoke of the agricultural feats of Tula province and of Lipetsk province.<sup>25</sup> He already found it possible to refer even to the Americans in a kindlier and more peaceable if condescending tone: “I think that the Americans do not have the right to take offense at this (our successes—A. S.). After all, they won’t get any



scratches or bruises from the fact that we are overtaking and surpassing them in the output of livestock products. . . .”

This was, besides, partly bluff, because by no means everywhere were things going as well as they were in Ryazan province. Bryansk province,<sup>26</sup> for example, had assumed the obligation to sell the state 51,000 tons but sold only 21,000, which—an alarming fact—was less than the 24,000 tons it had sold the previous year. And there were not a few such provinces. If everyone did that badly, he warned, then “not only shall we fail to supply the country with food products, but we shall eat up what we have.” He read out letters from the Far East, where meat had appeared in the stores in time for his arrival but then disappeared again after his departure. He spoke of the deterioration in the supply of milk and meat in Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Gomel, Rostov, and Chelyabinsk provinces, in Georgia and Kazakhstan. We had surpassed the Americans in butter, but from Omsk<sup>27</sup> people wrote and told him there was no butter in the stores, no.

Now for the first time, not very loudly, he called on people not to take figures for the obligations they assumed out of thin air.

The tone in which he talked about corn changed, became uneven. Khrushchev already knew that one thing was important for the province and county party committees: that corn be sown. They reported the squares, while in reality they sowed in any old way and the fields grew over with weeds. Vast experience in eyewash plus peasant ingenuity had found an outlet: the corn that had perished among the weeds began to show up in reports as corn used for pasture. Awarding Ryazan province the Order of Lenin, he still compared it with a tank: “Corn, comrades, is a tank in the fighters’ hands, I mean the collective farmers. . . .” But in Rostov he had already declared straight out that corn had to yield 200–250 centners of green mass per hectare; otherwise sowing it was unprofitable. It would be better “first to learn how to grow it, and in the meantime sow other feed crops which the collective farms have mastered well. . . . Some people may say: well, well, so you are sounding the retreat. . . . No, comrades, this is no retreat. I regarded and still regard corn as the queen of the fields. . . . But if someone doesn’t know how, as they say, to catch the firebird, let him hold on to the bedraggled wet hen, and that will do his household some good. . . . As the popular saying goes: ‘If you’re forced to dig the well, you won’t be able to drink the water.’”

More and more frequently he gave the time-servers, tricksters, and idlers the two-finger salute, but as before there was not enough grain in the country and the expected growth in the gross yield of the harvest did not take place. Where and how could he get grain? He convened a meeting of the leaders of

the European socialist countries. He was embarrassed, but frank and firm. The Soviet Union almost never refused grain to those who asked for it, and everyone asked for it, even some countries that not long ago had themselves exported grain. But now, in view of the large increases expected in the USSR from corn and the virgin lands, these friends apparently reckoned that soon we would have nowhere left to put our harvests and had decided to help us. Khrushchev made no mention of a shortage, but talked about reserves: "We need large reserves." It would, he said, be highly desirable for the fraternal countries to "take our situation into account, not be so insistent and unyielding as you sometimes are, and not make demands that are burdensome for us to meet." He promised to continue providing food grain, but as regards grain for fodder—that is, corn—he asked them to excuse him, to understand that "the reserves of the Soviet Union are not only our reserves; they are also, as experience has shown, your reserves." And without any ambiguity he offered them "a piece of friendly advice—you should create some reserves of your own, because it is not easy for you to live without reserves and rely only on our reserves: that causes great difficulties both for us and for you."

While refusing to give them fodder, he gave them something else, the most valuable thing of all—advice: to mount the same horse as that which the Soviet collective and state farms, following the Americans' example, had straddled. "Corn is the strongest and most powerful means for raising the level of livestock rearing." He had one very interesting illustration. Once, while visiting East Germany, he had met with the leader of the Christian-Democratic Party, Otto Nuschke, and learned with interest that this East German believer had a farm of his own. Naturally, he immediately began to impress upon him the benefits of sowing corn. Averting his gaze, the German replied: "We do sow it." But that was not enough for Khrushchev. "No, let us sow on your farm the way we do it at home." And he extracted a promise—no less than five hectares. On his return to Moscow, he summoned his assistant and told him to get ready for a sowing trip to Germany. When the conscientious Shevchenko showed up at his farmstead with Russian seeds, the German had second thoughts and gave him only half a hectare for his childish game, the worst plot on the farm. Shevchenko knew what he was doing and successfully handled this mission of international importance: in his squares the corn grew to a height of three meters. The highly placed farmer was delighted and rushed to telephone Khrushchev: couldn't he throw in seeds for next year too? "For how many hectares?" asked the exultant Khrushchev. "Send as much as you can, Mr. Khrushchev. It isn't only I who

need seeds. The neighbors also want to sow them.” Such things made life worth living. . . . He boldly appealed to his listeners not to stand on ceremony with the peasants: “We relied mainly on persuasion, showing people the advantages of this crop by means of concrete examples. But when the interests of the cause required it, then we might force someone to grow corn.”

Persistently, perhaps now nervously, he sought out reserves for the production of feed. There was Ukraine. It sowed ten million hectares with corn. What if we could find three million hectares in places where there was more precipitation, and set the goal of harvesting no less than 50 centners per hectare? That would come to 900 million poods!<sup>28</sup> Then Ukraine could fulfill its current plans for the sale of grain to the state with just those three million hectares. Yes, that was the way out. Although . . . The devil alone knew why: they sowed more and more corn, but grain collection in the country not only failed to increase but was starting to decline. Something more had to be done. But what? “It would be a good idea to issue an appeal in the name of the party and government to collective farmers and workers at state farms, to machine operators and specialists on this matter, so that the best people will take on the responsibility of growing corn.”

Yes, the best people—now, as always, he placed all his hopes on them alone. (In the United States corn yielded 50 centners of grain per hectare, and from this grain they produced a centner of meat per capita. So many of the best people, it seems, were over there, we journalists would joke as we read his speeches.) For seven years he had been promoting corn, but that was a method he had overlooked up to now. An appeal, neither more nor less. The appeal and the initiative—two mutually complementary and authentically socialist methods. What could be achieved by these methods would be shown by the opening up of the virgin lands. Everyone would do his bit—even, it would seem, enemies. Under our system, with our remarkable people, you had to be bold in organizing patriotic appeals and initiatives. That saved a lot of money and time. . . . Having issued an appeal, you had to make sure that special farming groups were formed everywhere to respond to it, and that there were as many party and Komsomol members as possible in those groups.<sup>29</sup> Some of them might even be called that—Komsomol or Komsomol-youth groups.

And another point: you had to remember that some material incentive will do no harm even to the best person. Special payment had to be made for exact squares. He had already made some mention of these matters. Somewhere, as I recall, he had suggested paying sowers in accordance with the density of growth at the time of harvesting. Somewhere too he had

drawn attention to the importance of material responsibility: “If a machine operator has sown corn badly, count the empty patches and withhold the corresponding portion of his pay, to teach a lesson to other bunglers.” (Some sowed; others counted the empty patches and decided how much should be withheld from whom. It would be interesting to know who counts the empty patches in the USA, we would maliciously remark.)

Then he turned his attention to fallow land in the humid zone. That was six million hectares. Nobody looked after them in the way that fallow land was supposed to be looked after. If they were plowed up, it was like plowing virgin land. Plowed up in order to sow corn, of course. In the east, 36 million hectares of virgin land had already been brought under the plow. Terenty Maltsev and Alexander Barayev<sup>30</sup> were advising that at least one-fifth of this area should be kept fallow; otherwise, they said, moisture would not be accumulated and the crushing strain of work in the fields would not be alleviated. But Khrushchev kept on drumming the same old song into their heads: that was another six million hectares, and if these were sown with a mixture of vetch and oats or with corn then “an enormous amount of feed for livestock [could] be obtained.”

Quick, simple, and reliable decisions. There they were, our reserves. He had found them—and the sky was again cloudless, he was again ready to believe—“We are confidently moving toward the victory of communism, and nobody will manage to hold back our advance”; again ready to take pleasure in the achievements of the most advanced workers—“His name is Chizh,<sup>31</sup> but he flies like an eagle!” and again he called on people to strive ever higher and higher. “Organize things in such a way that collective and state farms with poor indicators quickly move ahead and improve their performance,” he decisively commanded the province and county party committees.

And the party committees struck hard.

Starting in 1959, to some extent in 1958, and especially in 1960, officials of the province and county party committees behaved in the collective and state farms like foreign conquerors who have been ordered to leave scorched earth behind them. They grabbed and drove to the slaughterhouse everything that moved on four legs: young cows that had yet to mate, sows in farrow, calves and piglets that still had far to grow. By coercive “voluntary” means of the kind that the people and Khrushchev himself recalled so well from those accursed Stalinist times, the collective farmers were deprived of anything that had bones, whether or not there was any meat on those bones. All was dispatched to help meet obligations undertaken. The brigandage of feudal times sprang back to life: one province would trade on the territory of

another. By the standards of free commodity relations, why not trade? But such relations were forbidden, and the borders between provinces should have been strictly respected, and here even this holy of holies of the planned economy was violated. . . . Some farms secretly bought up butter from the state at urban food stores in order to sell it back to the same beloved state.

And nonetheless, of all the years since 1953, 1960 brought the heaviest blow to Khrushchev's plans. In a number of republics, not only was there no rise in the output of meat but output actually fell. In October, Khrushchev wrote a memorandum to the Central Committee Presidium. He warned that "if we do not take the necessary measures then we may slip back to the situation that we had in 1953." Among the ordinary people there was discontent with the supply of products. . . . How only yesterday he had praised the farmers of Ryazan province! How he had expected them to fulfill the plan threefold! How enthused he had been with First Secretary of the Ryazan province party committee Larionov, awarding him the Gold Star<sup>32</sup> and summoning him to Moscow to work with him at the Central Committee! (Larionov had refused, declaring that he had not yet done all he could in his beloved Meshcher territory.)<sup>33</sup> But even before that, "voices [had been] raised claiming that not everything was clean there," that threefold fulfillment of the plan was pure delirium, and that in his attempt to make good on his promise the prince of Ryazan was overtaxing the province and resorting to eyewash. (Eventually Larionov was to gulp down a glass of cognac with a handful of sleeping tablets or, according to another version of the story, shoot a bullet into his forehead and be buried with honors. This, it is true, the scoffers had not foreseen.) Khrushchev considered it necessary to check out complaints about Larionov and his affairs and "condemn decisively the phenomenon of some officials assuming quite unreasonable obligations, trumpeting everywhere. . . ." In anguish he exclaimed: "Why bring back the worst from our past?" Things were not going too well in the virgin lands either, or in Kazakhstan as a whole: the number of cattle was not growing, nor were they getting any fatter; the beys<sup>34</sup> made the excuse that there was not enough feed. Kunayev<sup>35</sup> had come to Moscow. The mountain had given birth to a mouse: Kunayev had proposed that provinces should be broken up, that a new province should be created, as if this would produce additional silage and not just another horde of spongers.

All through the fall he dictated, dictated. . . . He ended up with a whole brochure of theses for his report to the Central Committee plenum that was supposed to take place in January 1961. He had nothing to say to reassure either himself or others. There had been no miracle. There had been a massive decline

in the number of sheep. In many collective and state farms sheep were perishing literally before one's very eyes. . . . A shameful phenomenon! Georgia had lost every tenth sheep. The output of milk was falling, people were giving up their cows to produce more meat, and "calves [were] being rapaciously slaughtered."

He called round the province party committees and summoned their secretaries. No longer did he stand up to greet each one as he arrived—he wasn't in the right mood, he didn't feel like it. They were unable to tell him anything intelligible, anything that would have given him grounds for serious hope. The number of livestock was not increasing as quickly as they would like. They didn't fatten on thin air. They asked him for more feed. As if he grew it himself, the devil take it! "The leaders of republics, territories, and provinces give their explanations for the unsatisfactory fulfillment of obligations assumed. Explanations can be found for a bureaucrat, but for the people they cannot be found." He refused to recognize extraneous causes. The fact that they were starting to say with increasing boldness that the tasks set were impossible to fulfill aroused his concern and indignation almost more than did their failures. They had given up heart! They had stopped trying, stopped looking for solutions. . . . Defeatism had to be cut off at the root. "If someone tries to prove that we do not have the capacity for a rapid expansion of livestock rearing, for a sharp improvement in the supply of food products to the population, . . . then he reveals himself as an incompetent leader." In the struggle against defeatism one must not shrink from extreme measures, from surgical intervention! "With our natural conditions, with our expanses of land, and above all with our economic potential, only political bankrupts can say that it is unrealistic to set the task of fully meeting the country's needs for agricultural products." These bankrupts had to be replaced. They had "too limited an understanding of the construction of communism"! Get out! The party was strong: there were other people. "Young leaders will demonstrate their abilities."

And he would help these young leaders with his ideas, with his practical and forceful leadership. He still had ideas and willpower enough: neither our bankrupts nor those across the ocean should place their hopes on him running out of them. Only recently, for example, he had turned his attention to beets. Now there was a real marvel! Grachev in Kalinovka<sup>36</sup> had said that it's easier to grow 400 centners of sugar beets than 200 centners of potatoes. And what did it mean to have 400 centners of beets per hectare? That was 14,400 units of feed, while 200 centners of potatoes was only 6,000 units. . . . And so forth about how to irrigate beets and keep them watered. And what about peas, peas! Those same peas that the young Ukrainian collective farm

chairman Vasily Kavun<sup>37</sup> had introduced into the collective and state farms. They could be sown early, they didn't mind light frosts, and they grew fast.

The following is a word-for-word transcript from a recorded account by Khrushchev's assistant Andrei Shevchenko:

It was I who gave him the idea for peas. And it was also I who found Kavun, the young collective-farm chairman from Vinnitsa province, to serve as an example. For some reason Podgorny<sup>38</sup> was displeased: "We could have found better." Both peas and Kavun were very much to Khrushchev's liking. I sowed for him a quarter-hectare of good peas at his dacha in Ilyinskoye,<sup>39</sup> where he had one and a half hectares of land. It turned out beautifully, but weeds got in. Khrushchev took fright and on his way to work dropped in at the Institute of the Non-Black Earth Zone in Nemchinovka,<sup>40</sup> where Varenitsa was director. Varenitsa advised him to spray the sown area with Simazine.<sup>41</sup>

I said: "Nikita Sergeyeovich, why do you need to do that? The peas will grow and cover over the gaps. This isn't your corn. They're sown thickly. Weeds don't bother them."

He agreed, but the next day he said again: "All the same, we have to spray."

"In that case," I said, "go there with Varenitsa and do the spraying yourselves. I won't go: I don't want to see such barbarism."

They prepared a barrel and took a horse and spray equipment from the Gorki-2 state farm. Varenitsa sprayed thoroughly. Well, I waited to see what would happen next, though I knew what would happen: the peas would wilt. Simazine is a herbicide that destroys everything in the vicinity, except for corn.

During the night it rained, and in the morning the commandant of the dacha called me: "Andrei Stepanovich, misfortune has struck, the peas are turning yellow."

"I understand, I'll come over today."

I arrived and saw for myself. Around the edges of the plot, where they had sprayed a double dose as they turned, everything was already dead. In the rest of the area the leaves were twisting back upon themselves. I went back to work. A telephone call from Khrushchev.

His voice was subdued, as though he had just been at a relative's funeral: "Go and visit Ilyinskoye. There's something the matter with the peas there."

"I've been already."

"Well?"

"The Simazine has done its work. The peas will all die."

He didn't believe me. He told the KGB men to find Lysenko. The authority on agriculture.<sup>42</sup> So there we were, the three of us, at the plot: Khrushchev, Lysenko, and myself.

Khrushchev said: "Shevchenko claims that the peas died from the Simazine."

Lysenko replied: "Apparently that is so, but you don't need to get upset. You should thank God they died here, and not on millions of hectares."

Khrushchev stood there with head bent, thought a bit, and said: "Let's plow it over, let it lie fallow. And in the fall we'll sow spring wheat."

I said: "Nikita Sergeyeovich, wheat won't grow."

"How come it won't grow?"

"It won't. For two years now we haven't been able to sow wheat."

He got terribly upset: "So what shall we do?"

"Sow corn," I said. "Only corn can take Simazine and remain unscathed."



. . . The main thing was that at the collective and state farms they should sow peas in the way that Kavun did it. Kavun sowed thickly; then the peapods did not lie flat but supported one another and could be harvested perfectly well by mowing machine. Knowing about such achievements and discoveries, how could he not get angry with all those Benediktovs and Matskeviches who took their turns sitting in the office of the minister of agriculture? “They were held in high regard and considered businesslike officials, but in reality they lacked a creative approach. They relied on bureaucratic methods, and were divorced from life, from what was going on at the collective and state farms. They tolerated a situation which led in effect to the ruin of leguminous crops.” Can you imagine it? Abroad legumes for feeding livestock occupied a prominent place, they were virtually flooded with them over there, while in our country they had scraped together by the spring in the storehouses of the Procurements Committee all of 34 tons. It was this committee that would now be given responsibility, and not minister Matskevich! Khrushchev was becoming increasingly disillusioned with this minister. Once, before setting off for some zonal conference, he even ordered that Matskevich’s two carriages be detached from the special train, so that he would not spoil people’s moods by his presence.

And milk all cows together! There was no need to split hairs, to make a distinction between meat cows and milch cows. A cow is a cow. If she has an udder, that means she should give milk. “If, for example, in Moscow province they start dividing cows into meat cows and milch cows, then they’ll be milking one cow while another stands by wondering why she is being treated so disrespectfully.” In general, if milk production were taken out of the hands of political bankrupts and entrusted to real young patriots who believed in the coming victory of communism, then very big changes might occur. Trofim Denisovich [Lysenko] for his part had already “worked out how to increase the fat content of milk.” If anyone didn’t believe the Academician or even tried to criticize him, let him go and visit him at Gorki and see with his own eyes: there at his farm “the two daughters of Divnaya (Marvel) by a Jersey bull, Dikaya (The Wild One) and Dobraya (The Kind One), are giving milk with a fat content of 5.5 percent, while the milk of their grandmother Dorozhnaya (Traveler) had a fat content of only 2.9 percent.”

He would also do something to alleviate the financial situation of agriculture. He would lower prices for spare parts, gasoline, and motor vehicles. He would grant a deferment to those who had not yet paid for equipment bought from the MTS’s. He would reduce taxes and make credit cheaper. But the main thing was to strengthen ties with the masses and on that basis



promote an all-people's movement to increase the output of grain, meat, milk, and other products.

The "memorandum" and then the "theses" took up a lot of Khrushchev's time and strength. The energy spent on them would have sufficed for a congress. So he approached the plenum somewhat out of breath, with the inner pressure of his anger and anxiety a little reduced. The resulting report was toned down, and in the course of reading it Nikita Sergeyevich further diluted it with lyrical and satirical remarks, like the remark that from the kind of food that the bureaucrats promise the people "you won't wear out your arse, but you will stretch your legs." This time the hall was especially animated, and laughter broke out frequently. This emboldened Nikita Sergeyevich, and he remembered about America. We had to catch up with America all the same. We would catch up, regardless of all difficulties and obstacles! Nor was he able to refrain from mentioning the subject at the plenum of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Kiev, to which he went after the Moscow plenum. Sensing there the bewilderment of his audience, he did not avoid direct explanations: "Some of you may be asking yourselves why we are talking today about the possibility of catching up with America in per capita output of meat when we have yet to fulfill the seven-year plan!" Someone would say, and he admitted it himself, "that for two years we have allowed ourselves to lag behind in the production of some goods, and now he fantasizes about catching up with the United States of America. . . . No, comrades, we have to talk about this. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, our whole people are confident that we shall not only catch up with America but also surpass it." They were confident—that was one thing. The second thing was that between the Moscow and the Kiev plenums he had reread the book of the famous English writer H. G. Wells, *Russia in the Shadows*, and had been inspired anew by the image of "the Kremlin dreamer."<sup>43</sup> But the main thing was something else. Having thought the whole problem through once more, he had finally realized that we had allowed ourselves to lag behind "not because we lack the potential, but because some leaders have given themselves airs. And giving oneself airs is a great evil." Not to mention "deceivers, generators of eyewash, irresponsible chatterboxes—those are the most malicious of enemies." In order to oppose these enemies it was necessary to promote friends—friends of all that was new and advanced, those who stood in the avant-garde of the struggle for more meat and milk. Perhaps we should establish a "Golden Book" or "Book of Nationwide Honor" in which the names would be inscribed of those who had caught up with the United States. . . .

To give these friends more confidence in themselves, he informed them that even our enemies were increasingly coming to believe in them. If formerly they had asked whether the Soviet Union really intended to catch up with the USA, now they asked another question: when would it catch up? “They have ceased doubting that the Soviet Union will catch up with the USA. Now what worries them is a single question: when? I answered them: you can write it down in your notebook: in 1970 we shall catch up with you in per capita industrial output; we shall catch up and surpass you.”

The whole of that year he took no days off, even on holidays. He worked as he had done during the war. And, just as he had done during the war, he kept sending urgent dispatches and reports to headquarters—the Central Committee Presidium.

In the winter he was going to the next zonal conference in Voronezh.<sup>44</sup> When they learned of the forthcoming visit of their eminent guest, they began, as was their custom, to take measures. Before he set off from Moscow, he received a letter telling him what kind of measures they were. The letter came from a railroad worker. It turned out that in the area around the site where an atomic power plant was under construction there remained a lot of unharvested corn. The manager of a section of one state farm, together with the chief of the railroad station, had taken a rail, chained it to a tractor, and used it to flatten the field so that the corn would not be visible from the road leading to the atomic power plant. The letter was verified and the fact confirmed. “What is this about?” Khrushchev asked First Secretary of the province party committee Khitrov on his arrival. “That is a method of harvesting that we have here,” Khitrov explained.

They had not previously lied to him so insolently.

“Can we really not find people who will correctly resolve the matter?” he had exclaimed several years before at some meeting, despondent at the continued dislike of corn in the country. “Whoever disagrees, let him take the rostrum and explain his point of view.” Neither then nor later did anyone take the rostrum in his presence, but all the same one voice did soon ring out. When Khrushchev spoke with especial indignation about the neglect of corn in parts of the country where conditions were the most favorable—on the Don, in the North Caucasus, in Ukraine—someone had cried out: “They’re afraid of inter-tilled crops!” This was a remark that he should have been in no hurry to answer. . . .

There was not a person in the hall who would not have understood the bitter truth of these words. Inter-tilled crops—that means beets, sunflower, corn. Unlike cereals, these are crops that all summer long have to be weeded

and plowed. Otherwise there will be no harvest. The weeding can be done either by machine or by hand, with choppers. But there were no machines, and you can't weed millions of hectares with choppers. As regards corn in particular, in many places there was no way to sow it, and it was difficult to harvest given that combines were in short supply. Inter-tilled crops under such conditions were a risk. They were a big headache for the collective farm chairman, who would get no sleep throughout the spring and summer. They were a meadow on which plenipotentiaries would browse all summer long, collecting information for the party bureau. They meant that the collective-farm chairman, poor man, would have to go and get reprimanded and put up with a lot of unpleasantness. They were, in short, the sort of business that only an outstanding person with material resources at his disposal was likely to go in for. Or else the masses of rank-and-file collective farmers had to be given a very strong personal material interest in the matter. The measures that Khrushchev had taken in 1953 had created such an interest, but not to the degree required. Under these conditions, understood by no one in the world, with various official agencies for some reason showing more concern than the tillers themselves for keeping the fields well-kept, the ordinary chairman of an ordinary collective farm would not of his own free will assume such a burden.

If only he had been in less of a hurry, if only he had benevolently invited the possessor of that voice to the rostrum, asked him some questions, assigned someone the job of exploring without prejudice what lay behind his words. . . . But no, Khrushchev replied straight off, and in such a way that nobody dared raise his voice thereafter. He said that only bad Communists, those who thought of themselves and not of the needs of the country, were afraid of inter-tilled crops. After that, Khitrov wanted to be a good Communist—and in a fertile and populous territory entire seas of ripe corn were buried under the snow! Not under emergency conditions, not in war, but in peacetime. . . . How much of that corn must have been sown if they couldn't manage to harvest it!

On his return to Moscow, he ordered the preparation of a number of detailed memoranda. First, about how matters really stood, not on paper but in the fields. Second, about the real situation with regard to machinery. He vaguely recalled that a few years previously he had in passing asked someone from the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) about that. They had reassured him (the bastards!). The supply of agricultural machinery, they had said, was quite adequate. Well, that being the case, he had not thought of objecting when one by one they began to close factories producing

agricultural machinery. The Zaporozhye<sup>45</sup> plant, for example, had been converted from the production of combines to the production of motor vehicles. Its name had been changed. There had been the Kommunar combine (a glorious one!); it turned into the Zaporozhets automobile (which looked like a food tin!).

In Moscow, overcoming the natural inclination of advancing age—already making itself felt—to avoid unpleasant news, he immediately fell upon the memoranda. They threw him into a rage. In 1957, 55,000 corn-harvesting combines had been produced. In 1960, output was only 13,000. He had not demanded, he had not checked—and they had done nothing. They had done what was demanded of them, and no more. It had been demanded of them that they increase the sown area—and, with great ado, they increased it. Until now he had been confident that he personally was the leader in agriculture. Perhaps not in other fields, but in agriculture surely. After all, he loved agriculture and was familiar with it. His authority in the field was recognized, his advice highly valued—it sufficed to look at the experience of the best people who had taken that advice. He had introduced, one might say, a new popular custom—the zonal agricultural conferences. The country, so it was reported to him, awaited these conferences on account of his speeches. It had become used to his constant and salient presence on the pages of newspapers and on the television screen. That kept the people in good spirits and disciplined the officials. He had been told that more than once both by Voronov and Polyansky and by Podgorny and Brezhnev,<sup>46</sup> and in this, of course, they had not been deceiving him. And now it turned out, judging from the memoranda, that all these years everyone had been doing whatever he wanted.

In Kostroma province<sup>47</sup> 54 percent of the total sown area was still occupied by oats and grasses, while corn took up less than 2 percent. He had thought that sabotage had come to an end long ago, that now they were sowing no less than they could harvest—in all likelihood more, like Khitrov. As it turned out, no, in such a big country there could always be found—more precisely, lost in its expanses—deceptive daredevils prepared to flout anyone's authority. Who was the first secretary of the province party committee out there in Kostroma province? Florentyev, a Candidate of Sciences<sup>48</sup> among other things—you'd have thought he would have understood. . . . But never mind about Kostroma! Right under his nose, in Moscow province, which he knew inside out and where he spent his days off—even here they did whatever they wanted! In 1958, when he had great hopes for grain from the virgin lands, he had freed the whole Non-Black Earth Zone<sup>49</sup> from the obligation to supply grain to the state. He had thought: let them keep their grain,

they'll use it to feed their livestock. Like hell! Right away (he had not warned, he had not checked up . . .) they had stopped cultivating grain crops, as if those crops had never been theirs but rather his, Khrushchev's, an alien imposition. He had placed his hopes on their consciousness, supposing that they felt themselves responsible masters of the land. The area sown with grain crops in Moscow province had fallen by 42 percent since 1953. Buckwheat was no longer grown. And what was it they were cultivating instead of grain crops, instead of buckwheat? What required no work or care, what they all, the idlers, dreamed of both by day and at night in their sleep—annual grass crops. The area sown with grass had increased fourfold; they were bringing in 9 centners of hay per hectare—it was shameful to look at such a figure.

It turned out that even he, Khrushchev, was taken notice of only by those who wished to do so, and that however you might look at it agriculture was being managed neither by him nor by Minister Matskevich nor by anyone else. Nor, if you thought about it, was agriculture in Belorussia being managed by Mazurov.<sup>50</sup> The sabotage of first-class crops—corn, wheat, buckwheat—happened all by itself. No plan for them was sent down from above, so they got no attention either.

The memoranda tormented him. It turned out that almost immediately after the celebrated September 1953 decisions to increase investment in agriculture they had begun surreptitiously and bit by bit to cut and withhold that investment. They had increased the prices paid by rural consumers for industrial goods. They had ordered the collective farms to repay in a very short period their debt to the state for the machinery transferred to them from the abolished MTS's. He himself had ordered them to do so, and in a crude and irritable manner. There was no reason to drag it out: collective farms should follow the example set by the inhabitants of Kalinovka, who had decided to pay the money back in one go! People recalled how at celebrations in Rostov he loudly demanded: "So what are you waiting for? For me to remind you about it? It is in the interest of the state, of the whole Soviet people, that the collective farms should more quickly pay off the cost of the machinery they bought." So they had paid—he himself had reported the fact to the whole Soviet people. They had put down everything that they had in payment, and this had undermined their financial position so badly that not all of them were back on their feet even ten years later.

He started even more persistently to call people and invite them to come and talk. Well, what's up? Well, how are things going? All the same, what's the problem? Who had been leading him by the nose? What had they brought for him to see? They had brought the advanced agricultural workers,

their obligations and reports, and he had listened in open-mouthed credulity, indiscriminately congratulated them on their obligations and reports, and said how important he thought what they were doing was: under our conditions the moral factor was of enormous significance. The failures of two successive years had noticeably sobered the previously self-assured leaders of the republics and provinces. They were learning to keep their mouths shut: no longer did they come up with ambitious figures for obligations in order to please him. The plan that he had launched in 1961, in which arrears<sup>51</sup>—in some cases for one year, in others for two years—were incorporated, had disconcerted them. Each of them now understood that whatever trials he might go through he would never get home safe and dry: only confusion, shame, and retirement lay ahead. “It turns out that they have not thought of taking reserves and possibilities into account when making such calculations,” he raged at the whole country, recounting his conversation with the leaders of the Black Earth provinces,<sup>52</sup> whom he had expected to put before him a real schedule for the race with America like the one that Podgorny and Shcherbitsky<sup>53</sup> had recently put before him in Kiev. “I ask the comrades: How are things going? They reply: We have never had such a plan before. And I see that someone’s legs are shaking. If the comrade hadn’t been sitting on a chair, he might for all I know have fallen down.” Yesterday strutting about in their medals and avidly grabbing from his hands, today hoping only to avoid the lash of his tongue, they evoked in him a growing feeling of revulsion: “Whoever fails to understand that we must struggle not to maintain the existing level of production but to raise it in every conceivable way, . . . that person understands nothing of the policy of our party.”

On his way to take his vacation in Gagra,<sup>54</sup> he met with the leaders of the territories traversed by his train: the provinces of Tula and Oryol, Kursk and Belgorod, Kharkov and Rostov, then the Krasnodar and Stavropol territories. This time as in the past, he was pleased with Podgorny and Shcherbitsky, who flew in from Kiev to meet him at Kharkov. They responded instantly to his idea of moving the Ministry of Agriculture out of the city into the countryside. He only had to mention that the union ministry would most likely be relocated to Lenin Hillocks, and immediately they came up with an analogous proposal concerning the Ukrainian ministry—to move it onto the grounds of the Terezino experimental station outside Kiev. . . .<sup>55</sup>

During this trip he discovered by chance that collective farmers were no longer being given supplementary payment in kind, which as he recalled used to be a significant work incentive. Money is money, but when a pig-tender, for instance, had been able to get several piglets for her good work, and milkmaids

had been allocated milk for high yields, that had been much more dramatic and effective. “Under no circumstances,” he wrote to the Central Committee Presidium, “should one talk collective farmers into giving up supplementary payment in kind in exchange for money. One should behave honestly and win the collective farmers’ trust. We must live not only for today. . . .” Nobody had talked them into anything. Payment in kind had been terminated as a result of the pressure to fulfill plans, which by that time had finally become impossible to fulfill. With one hand seeming to revive incentives in kind, Khrushchev (Stalin’s school of hypocrisy!) revoked his good deed with the other hand: “Of course, if collective farmers choose of their own free will to receive their supplementary payment in money, then they must be paid in money.” So up to then they had freely chosen to receive pieces of paper instead of products, and go to town for products. . . .

### *Retreat*

He was torn between the possible and the desirable, between the needs of the economy and those of politics. On the one hand, he was tormented by the fact that with his connivance the supply of machinery to agriculture had unexpectedly been undermined. “If we only call on people to grow corn and sugar beets, and go over to the ‘spruce tree’ system of milking cows,<sup>56</sup> but fail to ensure the production of corn-harvesting and beet-harvesting combines, milking machines, and other equipment, then we shall be nothing more than chatterboxes. One cannot call for high labor productivity and at the same time chop corn down with axes.” People who in the customary frenzied and servile manner promised to keep on expanding the areas sown with corn no longer delighted but rather worried him: “One can have no objection to such an endeavor, but I would like to offer a piece of advice—first of all learn to obtain a larger harvest from each hectare.”

On the other hand, he found it intolerable that after eight years of unremitting persuasion and coercion to grow corn people throughout the country continued to prefer grasses. This, he decided, was the combined effect of peasant conservatism and scientific dogmatism. The peasants’ worship of the old ways made him bitter: “We hear: flax on clover, clover on flax, makes you clever.<sup>57</sup> But who will feed people meat?” People did not understand that this piece of wisdom had its origin in times when there had been no livestock rearing in the country, when the peasant could not even have imagined going to market to sell milk and meat, when cattle had been kept for manure. “A peasant in Kursk province declared that a cow under our conditions is a source not of milk but of manure.” What could one learn



from such a peasant if one wanted to make a cow the source of something very different from manure—milk and meat?

Contradictory as he was in so many ways, Khrushchev was straightforward in one respect. He had a lively interest in everything new and technological, everything that had once dazzled his eyes as a young lad fresh from the village who had only just plunged into the cauldron of town and factory life. And—the lack of interest of his healthy common people’s nature in the old ways, in the three-field grassland system,<sup>58</sup> in shadoofs<sup>59</sup> over the wells. (The grassland system of V. R. Vilyams was a slipshod imitation of some systems of cultivation that had been in extensive use almost since medieval times. This point was made, in particular, by N. M. Tulaikov,<sup>60</sup> grievously anxious for the first generation of collective-farm agronomists who had been inducted into the grassland faith: “Our new generation of young people studying in institutions of higher agricultural education,” he wrote, “do not belong even to the beginning of the current century.” Those who today “defend Vilyams” are poorly acquainted with his “system” and confuse it with competent grass cultivation.) Khrushchev felt in his bones that the ancient farming lore could do little to help and was more likely to hinder a country that had to join the world leaders in the output of meat. How well Garst<sup>61</sup> and he had spoken about that! How graphically Garst himself, his farm, had demonstrated it! The American farmer, who feeds half the world, is offended when he is called a peasant. The peasant is a holy man, but basically he is able to feed only himself. When the majority of the population was rural, the towns were able to live well enough on what fell (or what the tax collector grabbed) from the peasant’s table. But when a country became urban, the agriculturalist was no longer able to feed it by his own efforts. It required the joint efforts of town and countryside. Without urban science and technology the agriculturalist was helpless. Urban science and technology in their turn were helpless without the agriculturalist—without such men as Garst, who like our minister employed a personal secretary, had a thorough knowledge of hybridization, and was able to design and build (with his own money, of course) a seed factory.

The kind of scholarly dogmatism that leans on the old ways, the worship of Vilyams, aroused in Khrushchev the righteous anger of a man who had direct experience of the dire effects of this cult. As is well known, Vilyams had demanded that one-half of arable land be placed under perennial grasses, and that only spring crops be sown. But Khrushchev had worked for thirteen years in Ukraine, and there from time immemorial spring crops



had grown worse than winter crops. He had nothing against Vilyams (he referred to him as “one of our people”), but he needed grain, large and stable gross yields. In explaining his approach, he cited the Ukrainian saying: “We are poor people, we are ignorant people, just so long as we get our penny.” Stalin and Malenkov had forced him, in accordance with the dictates of science, to sow spring crops—that was ruinous, he had had to use cunning, wage a dangerous struggle; his memories of it were most unpleasant. Even then he had stood up for the rights of winter wheat, but the cult of the grassland system itself still remained beyond criticism.

... All the options were bad ones. It was bad to sow corn and then chop it down with axes or smother it with weeds, and it was bad not to sow corn and allow nearly half the land to lie fallow or covered by stunted grasses, when cattle feed was needed, when there was a shortage of meat in the country, when America was still far ahead. The desire to catch up with America won out.

On return from leave, Khrushchev applied himself to the task of extirpating the grasses he so hated. To do this he had to disturb Vilyams’s ghost. His assistants dug up the literature and prepared summaries for him. He himself had not expected that the ghost rising up before him would be such a gloomy one. It turned out that the best scientists [of the 1920s and 1930s]—Doyarenko, Pryanishnikov, Tulaikov—had been unanimous in regarding Vilyams’s views and recommendations as completely baseless. Academician Vilyams, it was discovered, had made no calculations and conducted no experiments. His system had been the product of speculation alone, something close to a fixed idea. He had condemned the harrow on the grounds that it destroyed the fine-grained structure of the soil created by perennial leguminous grasses. Not to speak of the tractor, which he had rejected in fury. The non-party leading light had, it is true, been invited right away to a party gathering at the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy. “So Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, in your opinion, was mistaken when he dreamt of giving the peasants 100,000 tractors?” Although he had hitherto paid the best scientists no attention, here Vilyams had immediately admitted his error, and inasmuch as he was no longer able to get by without an enemy he had quickly found one—the horse. He started to say that the tractor was a very good thing, it did not destroy the soil, but what was very bad was the horse. It was the horse that destroyed the soil, the bastard: it must be chased out of the field. Who knows how the affair would have turned out had the scientists spoken with him not in the language of academic reviews but in the language typical

of political meetings in those days? It was precisely in that language that Vilyams had betrayed his academic adversaries into the hands of the executioners. "In this frank enough and insolently mocking thesis one sees quite clearly the hand of the enemy who pushed socialist agriculture, especially our only just organized grain state farms, onto the road of rejecting sowing rotation, onto the road of monoculture," he had written with reference to A. G. Doyarenko's extremely valuable quest for "that degree of monoculture for which we shall have the largest area under a given crop and the smallest year-to-year reduction in its yield."

An ideological campaign was unleashed to discredit the grassland system. The newspapers, radio and television, the stage and the cinema were all pressed into service. Within a few weeks it seemed that complete and final success had been attained. The word "grasslander" had become an insult. The struggle could now be taken out into the fields. In theory irreconcilably hostile to any grass, Khrushchev suddenly demonstrated a caution contrary to his nature. It was impermissible, he said, thoughtlessly to plow up all grasses. In order to put fallow and grass-sown land to proper use, it would be necessary "to supply collective and state farms with additional machines for sowing, tending, and collecting the harvest. . . ." Where on earth were you before with such judgments?! But now it was too late. Officials had accumulated experience and understood: whatever reservations he might make, when it came to executing his wishes it was better to overdo things than fall short. Egged on by the raging newspapers, they applied themselves to the extirpation of grasses with the same zeal that not long before they had devoted to the milking of cows with calves. He did not stop them. He had strength enough to issue warnings, but no longer could he follow through.

But when could he have done so? And who could have?

It seemed to some people, himself included, that he wanted to replace grasses by corn and raise more livestock. And that meant nothing other than an attempt to create a new and previously unknown agriculture, to replace one civilization, the civilization of grasses and fallow land, by another immeasurably higher civilization, the civilization of corn and inter-tilled crops—moreover, to do so almost from scratch, without the necessary machines, fertilizers, and herbicides, without roads, without reliable storage and packing facilities, without a mixed fodder industry, and above all to do it by command, through conscious execution of orders by secretaries of the province and county party committees.

As he came to understand more and more clearly what a great and complex construction he wished to build in his spare moments, almost as a personal

avocation, he spared himself less and less. Notes of cruel self-criticism, even though he said not *I* but *we*, sounded from speech to speech throughout the years of the 1960s in which he remained in office. As is well known, he had not quite four of those years. At last he reconsidered his attitude toward mineral fertilizers. An important matter, as it turns out! The West Germans laid on almost a ton of them per hectare, the Americans over one and a half centners, while we scattered a mere handful, and we did it wrong, we missed the mark. And he taught his people that mineral fertilizers were expensive and would take a long time, “*therefore* (italics mine—A. S.) we must rely on expanding the area sown with corn.” He put together a fantastic chain of economic reasoning. Instead of mineral fertilizers—corn. On corn the number of head of cattle would increase rapidly. And “as the number of head of cattle in public ownership grows, so too will the accumulation of manure. And this way of increasing the output of fertilizer is much easier and cheaper than building new factories to produce mineral fertilizers. What is more, nitrogenous and other mineral fertilizers can *in no way* (italics mine—A. S.) replace organic fertilizers.” Garst at that time no longer paid attention to manure—it was a lot of bother, and the payoff by comparison with mineral fertilizers was small. When they told him that Khrushchev intended to introduce corn without fertilizers, he refused point-blank to believe it. Even when he saw with his own eyes in the Kuban<sup>62</sup> how corn was being sown without fertilizers, he did not believe that it was being done with Khrushchev’s knowledge. “What are you doing?” he cried out to the whole field, trying to halt the sowing machines. “I shall complain to Khrushchev! Corn must not be sown without fertilizers.” This escapade made an impression on poor Nikita Sergeyeovich. He paused for thought and began to explain how he had always understood the role of fertilizers, but the country lacked the means to build chemical factories. . . .

Having run into so many bumps, Khrushchev came to the realization that it was beyond his ability to control agriculture on his own. (That it is beyond anyone’s ability—this realization will most likely not be reached in our country in the twentieth century.) He still believed that corn for silage could give high yields in literally all regions of the country, but his words to this effect had lost their previous fire. He no longer came up with apt comparisons, reminiscences, or humorous catchphrases. He felt dejected and humiliated by the grand scale on which lying was now taking place. The more he traveled around the country, the more ambitious the goals with which he tried to enthruse the people and the officials, the more he found himself surrounded by lies and servility. And this forced him now—gradually, unwillingly, and with a heavy sigh—to turn away from his beloved agronomy toward politics,

to step onto this fragile soil where a single wrong step threatened catastrophe.

Returning to politics meant taking a look at the party. It was Communists, leading Communists, who lied the most. That Khitrov from Voronezh who had pressed down the corn with a rail. What shamelessness! The condition of a party in which such people occupied key posts aroused great anxiety in him. "We must bear in mind that our party is now a mass party, and among the millions of honest Communists there are also people who carry a party card but suffer from a lack of principles in their work." It had to be borne in mind, but how? In March 1962 [at the Central Committee plenum held between November 12 and 23] Khrushchev came out with a program of administrative reorganization. In and of itself trivial, with no deep bearing on the people's life, the program so unnerved and upset the bureaucrats that for a long time they were unable to forgive Khrushchev for it, with the pomposity of triumphant imbecility taking his quite harmless experiments for an attack on the foundations of the system.

His starting point was still the same: communism (yes, the goal was already communism, for the new party program had only just been adopted)<sup>63</sup> could not be built without meat and milk. Nor did the thought of America leave him for a single second. In order to catch up with America, it was necessary to produce 75 tons of meat for every hundred hectares of plowed land and 16 tons for every hundred hectares of arable land.<sup>64</sup> (He had worked it out for himself. I saw it with my own eyes, in the early spring of 1961, in the virgin lands, in the club of the Kantemirovsky state farm, where he supposedly spoke before the workers. In reality, the hall was packed with managers and officials, security men, and us newspapermen. Some were thrilled by the fact that he spoke without papers and fluently multiplied and subtracted out loud. At first I kept note of the course of his calculations, then gave up in defeat and just jotted down a verbal portrait of him in my notebook. The main thing that struck me was how very pale Khrushchev was. The latest sputnik had been launched into space shortly before, and at the end of his speech Nikita Sergeyevich, his pleased face regaining a little of its color, gave away a secret, revealing that the sputnik had carried "a dummy of a human being."<sup>65</sup> I was struck by the thought that it would have been better to call it "a scarecrow." In the hall it was very hot. For a whole week it had been heated up by the bodies of people nominated by the party organization and checked by the security police.)

He had found the reason why the country was lagging behind. One of the main reasons, he said at the March 1962 plenum, was the absence of concrete administration of production based on practical knowledge. It turned out

that “we have no agency to ensure the fulfillment of assigned tasks, and we limit ourselves to shouting out the war cry: forward, comrades! But who went forward and how? Did all the detachments move? Was everything prepared for producing the necessary quantity of goods? Nobody knows about that, nobody is called to account, and indeed there is nobody to call to account.” Administration had to be of the most direct day-to-day kind, like that practiced by work-brigade leaders on collective farms—there was his discovery. His new goal was to set up such administration. “The time will come when we shall have trained managers like Comrades V. M. Kavun, G. Ye. Burkatskaya, and I. M. Semyonov at all collective and state farms. Then the functions of administration will change radically. Administration will evidently be reduced to working out general guidelines and placing orders for those products . . . that the country needs, that our people need. For the time being we do not have such a situation. At present, you look at one person and are pleased, while another person you have to help along every step of the way.” The main figure in this agency was to be the inspector (it sounded good, like in the military), but the matter needed a little more thought. Perhaps a more suitable name would be found—for example, “organizer.” (They would agree on “inspector-organizer.”) The main thing was that this office would not be “an agency inside county party organizations; it will act as an agency endowed with important prerogatives by province, territory or republic organizations.” Attached to this agency—it would be called a production administration—there would be a small party committee. The territory covered by it would as a rule be larger than a present-day county. The counties would therefore have to be aggregated into larger units. And the county party committees would be eliminated. And the road to communism would be open.

At that time the Twenty-Second Party Congress [of October 1961] was approaching—an event that, it seems, could well have been used at least to forget about the competition with America. But those who were boldly to forget such things would come after Khrushchev. As for Khrushchev, he remembered them and reminded everyone else by throwing down a challenge. “American journalists are present here;”—he found a place for them in his report—“they love to mock this slogan of ours. But you should know, my good Sirs, that if we say it then it will without fail be done by our people. (Applause.) When the party puts forward a slogan, our people support it and turn it into reality. That is how it will be!” (Applause.)

After the congress he convened a separate meeting of delegates engaged in agriculture. “As early as 1962,” he hectored them, “the Soviet people must feel

the real fruits of the agricultural measures specified by the Twenty-Second Party Congress.” Then he set off again on a trip around the country. In Tselinograd he got involved in the argument between Barayev and Nalivaiko,<sup>66</sup> although he did make the reservation that scholars and specialists should study everything thoroughly and argue it out. . . . Barayev was in favor of allowing land to lie fallow. At the Institute of Grain Farming in Shortandy,<sup>67</sup> of which he was the director, more than 30 percent of the arable land lay fallow. Khrushchev considered this a wasteful use of land. He said that such an arrangement could not compete successfully with an American farm. Nalivaiko was against allowing land to lie fallow. At the Altai Institute, of which he was the director, all the arable land was sown with wheat or inter-tilled crops. Khrushchev was more than pleased at this: the inter-tilled system of land cultivation was his last hope. He saw no other way to increase the output of cattle feed and thereby of meat. His speech to the people in Tselinograd was not good—he was unduly familiar, and his jokes this time were particularly crude. To Barayev he said: “You will have to learn from Nalivaiko and from Comrade Kan De Khan, chairman of the 18 Years of Kazakhstan collective farm. He is a splendid collective farm chairman. They—if I may say so, Comrade Barayev—won’t let a single flea get under your shirt. (Laughter in hall. Applause.) And that isn’t bad, because it will keep you lively, so you don’t doze off. (Laughter in hall.) The future lies with the inter-tilled system.”

Meanwhile the population was flooding the Central Committee with letters: there was no meat or butter in the stores. People thought that it was because trade was poorly organized, that Khrushchev did not know what was going on. “That, of course, is not so. . . . We simply do not have enough meat,” he declared soon after the Twenty-Second Party Congress. The plan for 1961 provided for almost twelve million tons of meat; less than nine million tons were produced. And the goal for 1980 was 30–32 million tons! He was calculating, always calculating—at work, in the train, on the airplane, in the car. “How much of which crops must be sown on 100 hectares of arable land in order to get 150 centners of meat? . . . Eight hectares of corn yield at harvest 500 centners of silage; three hectares of sugar beets yield at harvest 250 centners; two hectares of peas yield at harvest 30 centners; two hectares of beans for cattle feed yield at harvest 200 centners.”

He was vexed and offended at the West. When prices for meat had to be raised, over there “they croaked like crows: you see, they said, Khrushchev himself has admitted that they don’t have enough meat.” But when the latest statistics showed that the Soviet Union had surpassed the USA in the forging

of steel (the Americans had just switched over to new materials), not a single crow croaked. Where was justice? But never mind, the time would certainly come “when our adversaries will say: How can we keep up with them? That is socialism, after all, that is communism—it is natural that they should move forward.” Correctly guessing the boss’s mood, the top statistician and his Central Statistical Administration cooked the figures with all their might. All this fuss did not remain a secret and only heightened the world’s interest in the situation of the Soviet economy. Even the CIA could not fail to notice eventually that the situation was dismal. It had published a forgery saying that Soviet growth rates were lower than American ones and in the last two years had been below 2.5 percent per annum. “That doesn’t affect us one way or the other,” commented Nikita Sergeyeovich, trying to keep his spirits up by attributing his own state of mind to them. “Uncertainty gives rise to fear in our adversaries, but fear is a poor counselor.”

A year later there had still taken place no noticeable improvement. A year, by Khrushchev’s scale of measurement, was no trifle. “A year,” he reminded his audience, “is a long time. It is 365 days. It is one-twentieth of the time allocated by the party program for building communism in our country.”

. . . All the same, fear is not always a poor counselor. Khrushchev brought greater clarity to his ideas about corn and without false pride hastened to inform people of his corrections, for it was a matter of supreme importance. It had turned out that corn takes a long time to grow, and in the southern regions the period at which it ripens coincides with hot dry winds. “Under such circumstances winter wheat or winter barley gives a higher yield. And that is quite understandable. . . .” Now, in 1963, it was understandable. . . . “In arid regions of southern Ukraine and of some other republics it is necessary to determine carefully which grain is more advantageous to cultivate—winter wheat or corn.” Ah, if only he had had just one collective farm for his experiments all these years, and not one-sixth of the earth!<sup>68</sup> “Some people may think: What has happened? Why does Khrushchev, who so strongly advocates the introduction of corn, now seem to be starting to beat the retreat? That, comrades, is not the case. We still insist that corn is a mighty crop, capable under favorable conditions of giving the highest yields in many zones. . . .” (At one time he had said: in all zones, including Yakutia and Chukotka. “Do potatoes grow there?”—A. S.) “However, it must be emphasized that we do not swear eternal allegiance to any one crop. We do not intend to worship any one crop. . . . First place must be assigned to that crop which, under the conditions of a particular zone, gives the highest yield and best repays the



labor invested in it.” The hall responded with prolonged, relieved, and magnanimous applause. Those who gave thought to the past averted their eyes. (And they gave it thought. Just a little under a year had passed.)

Now it was necessary somehow to bring the spinning flywheel of bureaucratic coercion to rest. The province party committees had been subdivided;<sup>69</sup> the county party committees had disappeared; the production administrations with their inspector-organizers had come into existence—and still the flywheel turned, the flywheel that he himself had put in motion. Not long ago he had shared his experience with his friends from Eastern Europe: “We relied mainly on persuasion. . . . But when the interests of the cause required it, then we might force someone. . . .” Now, in the interests of one and the same cause, he gloomily read out desperate letters from the provinces: “To this day we sow as dictated by the province and county organizations.” He cited cases in which collective farms had been forced to sow such large areas that it took them a month or more to finish the job. In farms in Kotelnichesky county of Kirov province<sup>70</sup> corn had been sown at the end of June: “And in a month we shall plow over these areas and prepare them for the sowing of winter crops,” the head of the production administration explained to the collective farmers—one of those same administrations that Khrushchev had intended should provide direct and competent management of agricultural production.

What could he tell his listeners? What could he promise them? Nothing—except that the umpteenth resolution of the party Central Committee and the government was being drafted to “condemn administrative methods and distortions of previously adopted decisions concerning the planning of agricultural production.” This was at the very time when on his orders all grain was being removed from collective-farm granaries with the dust still on it, when in the Kuban horses were being killed to feed the pigs. One Kuban farm manager told newspapermen in secret how he had tried to prevent this:

“They had sent down a horrifying plan, and the obligation that they had extracted was even more horrifying. I saw with my own eyes that we wouldn’t manage to fulfill any of it. We’d only overstrain ourselves. What should I do? I had to get through to Nikita. I called once, I called again, but I couldn’t get through. Then I realized that on such-and-such a date he was going on leave, and during the night he’d pass through my territory. The only way out was to intercept him on the road. So there I was on the road, hanging about in the dark by my car, waiting. At two in the morning I spotted headlights, and a minute later the cars carrying the advance guards flew up.

“‘Who’s that?’



“I’m so-and-so. Convey to Nikita Sergeyevich my request for a brief talk.’

“‘He’s resting.’

“‘It’s a matter of state importance. Convey my request.’

“Then Khrushchev’s car rushed up. He opened the door and stuck out his feet. He had socks on [but no shoes]. I saw that he was stirring his feet to refresh them with fresh air.

“‘Well, so what’s the gripe that won’t let you sleep?’

“‘The plan,’ I said. ‘They gave us a plan that we can’t fulfill, Nikita Sergeyevich.’

“Again he stirred his foot a little, took a heavy breath, then closed the door and continued on his way.”

### *The Smell of Hay Wafts over the Meadows*

On February 10, 1955, there appeared in *The Des Moines Register*, the leading newspaper of Iowa, an op-ed proposing to the Soviet Union an exchange of agricultural delegations. It was short, like most op-eds in American newspapers, but well written. In 1987 I happened to meet the author of this op-ed. Although long since retired and no longer on the newspaper’s staff, he ran for a minute into the editorial office while I was there. I told him how struck I, a youngster just setting out on a journalistic career, had been then by his businesslike, democratic style, so different—as heaven from earth—from the pompous bureaucratic style of our newspapers. “We have no diplomatic prerogatives, but we shall send an invitation to any delegation,” Lauren Soth wrote. “All that we, the people of Iowa, know about corn and other feeds, grain, forage crops, livestock, and also dairy farming and poultry rearing we shall share with the Russians.”

Now I see the trick unintentionally embedded in these words. The trick lay in the Americans’ idea of what is needed for success in agriculture: good equipment and knowledge and skill on the part of the farmer. But what if Soth had written: “All that we know about how to provide people with incentives, how to administer agriculture without detriment to its independence, how to develop relations between the farmer and his partners. . . .”? Would we still have gone? The Americans planned to show off their equipment, their good organization, and their prosperity, and this was precisely what Khrushchev’s emissaries planned to look at: how they worked on the land, in the cowsheds and poultry sheds, what kind of machines and devices they had—and not what made the farmer rise at the crack of dawn and how he came to terms with the authorities. It didn’t enter the Americans’ heads

that this needed to be shown, and it didn't enter the heads of the Soviet visitors that this needed to be looked at.

In the first and best of his reports—the one that he delivered to the September plenum in 1953<sup>71</sup>—Khrushchev had already demonstrated his unfortunate ability to mix the wheat up with the chaff. In this report, where he named, more clearly and frankly than at any other time, the causes of the decline of agriculture—unpaid labor and economic servitude—he began for some reason to talk enraptured about one good collective farm that he knew, ending thus: “If all the collective farms in our country could reach such a level, and this is within the capacity of any collective farm, then the problem of creating a sufficiency of agricultural products would be solved.” Corn might be a mighty crop, but it grows “only at the hands of good husbandmen.” He said it—and then went on saying it right up to the moment he retired. Others were obliged to imitate him and come up with the same idea. “Even in northern regions,” Matskevich wrote, “if the appropriate tending of it (corn—A. S.) is organized, it gives high yields.” This “if” was the stone over which they stumbled, not understanding what was happening to them. They did not see in this “if” the basic problems of economics and politics, of the social order as a whole. It was self-evident to them that the “appropriate tending,” which needed to be “organized,” did not depend on the system, that this was not the crucial question. This “if” could be and had to be fulfilled simply by strengthening the will, by the collective-farm chairman's desire to perform his duties conscientiously.

As early as 1958 Khrushchev had to admit that the wool was being pulled over his eyes: “In a number of republics and provinces, information on feed stocks has proved incorrect, overstated.” But he did not call upon his colleagues to ponder what kind of life this was with country people overstating information on feed stocks or what the authorities—or anyone else except milkmaids and a few researchers specializing in feed production—might need such information for anyway. You could have understood it if the peasant, required the devil knew why to submit reports about feed to the government, instead of boasting had pretended to be poorer than he was, in the hope of being tossed down something on the cheap. . . . No, Khrushchev continued without embarrassment to feel himself the boss of a big collective farm covering a whole sixth of the world's land surface or, rather, the director of a single immense factory, to whom everyone was obliged to report about his work, stocks, and intentions. Only, unlike his predecessor, he swore a lot and punished little and leniently.

The methods by which his instructions and suggestions were transmitted to the masses were the usual ones, well known since the time of “war communism”:<sup>72</sup> plenipotentiaries were sent out and agitational campaigns were conducted. This weakness was felt everywhere: no one was accused of wrecking<sup>73</sup> or put in prison—just a lot of noise, and personnel changes. In understanding the harmlessness of these noisy methods intelligent people unintentionally found themselves in the company of the most irresponsible people, desperately irresponsible. In Dnepropetrovsk province,<sup>74</sup> Khrushchev complained to the whole world, those sent out as “plenipotentiaries for corn” were the first people to turn up, often quite minor bureaucrats. One supplier by the name of Osipov had arrived at a collective farm and ordered the cutting down of corn that had not yet reached the milk-wax stage of ripeness<sup>75</sup>—and there really was such a man. Asked what he was doing, he explained calmly: “At the province party committee I was told to go to a collective farm and make them cut down the corn for the silos. I’m carrying out those instructions.”

Examples such as this demonstrated to Khrushchev that the whole problem was a matter of personnel. Nothing especially needed to be changed—some had to be driven harder, others promoted and inspired more boldly. The heart of his every speech, report, and memorandum was a story about advanced production units and advanced people, about their work experience. The whole problem, he thought, was to see that people, local leaders first of all, knew what to do and how to do it. That was how the majority of people in the country thought. Everything depended on the local leaders. “It’s all done by the local bosses,” my mother always used to say. The only trouble was that they did “whatever they want.”

In general, Khrushchev was closer to the people than some of his friends and enemies would like to think. Flesh of their flesh, without any exaggeration. For example, it was self-evident to him that to make one’s way in the world means to break away from the milieu in which you were born and reared, to acquire an important profession, to occupy a position in which you do not have to work with your hands, and to become a boss—the bigger the better. He judged a person’s success in life not, let us say, by his income, as in countries with a developed market economy, but by which profession he had mastered and by what social position he occupied. Moreover, together with the masses Khrushchev was certain that the state must assist a person to advance in the world—that was what made it a people’s state, what gave it its democratic character. “The son of an ordinary collective farmer

became a general,” he enthused. “We have the truest democracy.” He cited himself as an example: “I myself used to be a shepherd, and now the people and party have placed me in the post of first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Evidently there are pretty good people among shepherds, too.” (Shevchenko: “I told him that it was undesirable for him to keep repeating that he had been a shepherd. If you’ve said it once that will do. But Podgorny, who was present on this occasion, came down on me right away: ‘Why do you say it’s undesirable? Repetition is the mother of learning.’ Khrushchev was, I think, a leader of broad sweep, exceptionally decisive and determined. He sincerely wanted to change our life for the better, but the trouble was that everyone tried to please him.”) The higher you stand, the more you are worth<sup>76</sup>—he did not entertain the idea that this does not, so to say, contain the whole truth, that there is indeed nothing of truth or of socialism in it at all.

Nothing, perhaps, aroused such sympathy among the common people as his attitude to science—to all those scientific research institutes of bee-keeping around Moscow (“Poor bees!” he exclaimed), to the agricultural research centers on city asphalt, to the studies on which honored Doctors of Science and Academicians labored for many years only to come up with such irrefutable findings as the discovery of one leading light from Kharkov that the length of a horse’s stride depends on the length of the horse’s leg. The common people, of course, did not read these works (often the authors themselves did not read them), but they knew the main thing: namely, that where there is science parasites are especially numerous. After all, it was none other but they themselves, the common people, the workers and peasants, who bent over backward to get their children places at this feeding trough. Over ten years Khrushchev cited in his speeches and reports so many examples of “scientific” idiocy and hackwork that you could have compiled out of them a whole volume of satire in the spirit of Saltykov-Shchedrin.<sup>77</sup> At times he was shaken: “I can’t talk calmly about the methods for rearing cows that scientists have palmed off on the collective and state farms. Ordinary people would never think up such things. . . . They even showed in the cinema how calves drink and then they wipe his mouth with a napkin. That is supposedly the ‘cultured’ way to do it.” He was driven to fury by plans for absurdly expensive livestock-rearing facilities: “Why, you may ask, build mansions with cupolas and columns for pigs? The pigs won’t appreciate them.” “Listening to you,” he upbraided President of the Ukrainian Academy of Agricultural Sciences Vlasjuk in Kiev, “it turns out that it was the

party that invented the grasslands system and that the scientists gave their support to the party in the matter. No, it was exactly the other way round. It was the scientists who proposed this system and pushed the collective and state farms to introduce it everywhere.” All systems were the brainchildren of the scientists, who fought among themselves for the favor of the people at the top. The scientist, the inventor always needed one thing—that all the power and resources of the state, if not immediately of the entire planet, should be mobilized to implement his system and no one else’s. There were no tricks to which the obsessed inventor would not resort to bring his invention to fruition. The picture of this everlasting scuffle under lordly protection, in which everything was decided by fists and blind chance, sickened Khrushchev. He came close to discerning the nature of this scuffle: “Must I really be a high authority on questions of agricultural science?”—but he did not quite grasp that state-funded science is not science but precisely a feeding trough with pig swill for parasites. The measures that Khrushchev proposed and in part even carried out were also in the spirit of the common people: simple, extreme, and—useless. “Scientists must be brought closer to production. Then they will be of greater use.” He understood “bringing closer” literally: he demanded that a “transfer plan” be worked out to move scientists to the countryside.

“Everything depends on personnel and only on personnel. We must send chief engineers and agronomists with higher education to the Machine and Tractor Stations” (1954). And not only to the MTS’s. Perhaps it was even more important to send them to the collective farms: “Take 30,000 people with higher or secondary education (it will be hard to find enough people with higher education, there are after all a lot of collective farms and he is a realist—A. S.) who know how to lead the masses and send them to the collective farms.” At one time commissars and agitators had been sent;<sup>78</sup> now it was necessary to send engineers and agronomists, people who could be collective-farm chairmen. At least he set a criterion that could guide the apparatus in selecting recruits—education. Most often Khrushchev did not bother with such concrete details but said simply: “The main thing is to select good people” (and what is interesting is that everyone understood what he meant!).

It was necessary to send good people not to manage the farms but to lead the masses. Khrushchev’s language was always precise. He said what he thought. Thus he understood the work of the manager—to lead the masses, to get them to follow in your footsteps. As in battle, on a campaign, or in the

wake of natural disasters that force the masses temporarily to give up normal life and the relations most appropriate to human nature and the nature of the economy—relations of exchange, enterprise, and business cooperation.

The model that he offered to agriculture was that of the good factory or, in fact, of the good military unit. Hearing of the disorder in the virgin lands, of the barbarous way that equipment was being treated, he without hesitation or embarrassment sketched out a plan for a sort of semi-military phalanstery<sup>79</sup>: “Equipment and land must be assigned to the brigades. . . . The whole system of work in the brigade, the agricultural techniques to be used, must be worked out by the agronomist with the participation of the brigade. Once it has been established, the system of work in the brigade must be LAW. No one is allowed to contravene that system. With matters so organized a good harvest can be ensured.” At the end of 1961, exhausted by eight years of heroic but mostly fruitless effort, his lips already scorched by the bitter taste of the crushing defeat that was now near, he persisted with the same ideas: “You know, when an offensive is being prepared, the first priority is to instruct people. The generals and officers thoroughly instruct the soldiers how to carry out the set task. . . . When the battle begins, its outcome is decided by the soldiers who engage the enemy at close quarters. That’s how it is in agriculture, too.”

Indeed, he, the first person in the state, made it his direct obligation to instruct personnel in methods of raising crops and rearing domestic livestock. Once the party-state apparatus had taken upon itself the direct organization of production, then who but he, at the head of this apparatus, was to organize the professional-technical training of personnel as well? Khrushchev became an expert on agronomic innovations, talked about them for hours from the rostrum, and compelled the mass press to concern itself with the technical aspects of tilling the soil and rearing livestock. He saw nothing out of the ordinary in the fact that newspapers with print runs of millions year after year wrote about the single insignificant technical device of the square-cluster method of cultivation.

He would usually formulate goals and means of attaining them in a vague but decisive and very clear fashion. Things would get moving “as soon as we shake up the managers, and that we shall certainly do,” because we could not fail to do so; in the collective farms there were “few swine but a lot of swinish tricks.” He did not judge on the basis of others’ words. He knew many excellent collective-farm chairmen—Posmitny, Dubkovetsky, Tsybenko, Burkatskaya, Malinina. He loved them; in his relations with them his kind heart and expansive childlike nature revealed themselves in the most touching way; in their company he relaxed, recovered his powers, and strengthened his faith

in socialism. He himself would select good people and see how the situation changed, how in literally two or three years a farm would become unrecognizable. He would frequently help these people with businesslike advice, and the things that he told them made good sense. He took no less pride in this sensible advice than he did in political successes and diplomatic victories; he was pleurably aware of his ability to raise up not only agriculture as a whole but also an individual collective or state farm. At one big conference in spring 1955, he enthusiastically asked to be sent to “the most difficult county” that everyone else had given up on. “Give me this county. Before all honest people I declare . . . I put my signature . . . I realize what this declaration means and don’t want to make a mess of the job. I don’t want to be a chatterbox, to talk and then to avoid responsibility.”

It was self-evident to him that someone had to be responsible for each task and that that was how it had to be. If no one were responsible, then someone had to be made responsible, so that there should be someone on whom demands could be made, someone to “throw hedgehogs” at. (That was one of his favorite expressions; it meant “to criticize.”) His main task was to arrange the ladder of responsibility as well as possible. First he decided that everything would quickly sort itself out if in each county “we have at each MTS a group of officials headed by the secretary of the county party committee; he called this reconstruction of the work of the rural county party committees. Moving farther down the path of reconstruction, he pondered: “In agricultural bodies, perhaps, we should have inspectors for different crops—for instance, for potatoes or vegetables. These inspectors would be obliged to answer for the correct organization of work in the collective and state farms of a county or province.”

He never explained how they would answer; this question did not exist for him. It seemed to him that responsible officials were capable of creating everything out of nothing; therefore they could be made to answer for everything. He seemed all-powerful to them, and they seemed all-powerful to him. At the end of spring 1954, he learned that in large areas of Belorussia they had been sowing rye by scattering the seed from bast-baskets. How did he react? Did he bow down before the exhausted people? Did he thank them for this heavy labor? Did he remind himself to keep in mind what primitive methods still prevailed in his beloved agriculture? Did he compare this reality with his own grandiose plans? No, he was sorry for the people, but after his own fashion: he attacked the bosses who were obliged to do all they could to ease the people’s plight, in the same way that commanders were obliged to care for their soldiers. He dressed down the province and county



party committees: the so-and-so's, they have permitted (and in Lithuania, too) crude violations of agricultural technique. The whole problem, it turned out, lay in this. Such was his faith in man, man as boss, in his capabilities.

In 1961, when his irate gaze fell on the Ministry of Agriculture, his first step was to replace the irresponsible bureaucrat Matskevich by the highly responsible manager Volovchenko.<sup>80</sup> The latter had been the director of an advanced state farm; he knew everything, he knew how to do everything; now he would take the ministry from Moscow to Lenin Hillocks,<sup>81</sup> from the asphalt to the soil. Nikita Sergeyevich placed almost as much hope on him as he had once on corn. With pride he spoke of him to U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Freeman<sup>82</sup>: "He talks not about what he wants but about what he has done and how he did it." Allegedly we had never had ministers of this kind before. With hidden irony, the American willingly admitted that he was indeed far inferior to our Volovchenko: in no way did he "claim to be a technical specialist or engineer." Khrushchev continued to sing his favorite's praises: "He can grab a bad farm manager by the ears, pull him up short, and say: that's not how to do it, that's how to do it!" The American minister and the people accompanying him laughed. They didn't measure up to us! No one in their country, even the president, could grab Garst by the ears!

Sometimes he had a confused feeling that he was not saying quite the right thing; he guessed that people were irritated by his endless references to advanced individuals, that they were amused by his confidence that "within two years any backward collective farm can join the ranks of the advanced." In such instances he explained himself in his usual direct and accessible way: "But what do you want, comrades county and province leaders? We Communists have a principle: if one person has achieved high indicators, then others can do the same." Was he capable of understanding that this was far from being the case? For that Khrushchev would have had to doubt and worry, at least once, whether what he regarded as white and God-given might really be black and devilish. But how could he doubt and worry when—

—when he had Kalinovka!

"If Kalinovka can do it, then why can't others?" he would exclaim with that deep sincerity which does not leave children even when they are being cunning. "They can!"

It was God who gave him his clever Nina Petrovna, but from where on earth did he get poor blameless Kalinovka? Only an adored fool of a wife can bring her husband-boss as much happiness and harm as his home village was to bring Khrushchev. What could be more normal than to love your village, to which you are drawn more than across any ocean, where on seeing



the hay harvested you suddenly recall verses that you once learned there at school? What could be more touching or inoffensive than to recite those verses to the whole country as you address your fellow villagers?

The smell of hay wafts over the meadows,  
 Gladdening the soul with song.  
 Peasant women in rows with rakes  
 Turn the hay as they go.

He would visit Kalinovka on his way to the Crimea on vacation, or on his way back from the Crimea, and each time he would make some suggestion: that they “pay more attention to introducing peas” or corn, or: “Why don’t you try sowing kidney beans? That’s a high-calorie leguminous plant. Kidney beans are good for both soup and pies.” (One time they obediently sowed kidney beans but then stopped: they had to be picked by hand. When he learned of this, he ordered the designers to create a bean-harvesting machine, and they promised to do so.) He advised the villagers to “mow round the roads, ditches, and other places where weeds grow” and in placing silos to “make use of features of the landscape, hills for instance. If you dig a trench along a hillside, then it will provide natural protection for the silo against the frost.”

It was only with his knowledge that he helped Kalinovka, but just imagine: the people did not like the way he went there all the time; they thought he was showering his native village with gold at the expense of other places.

There is someone who can testify that that was not the case—Khrushchev’s assistant Andrei Stepanovich Shevchenko.

“It was Stalin who created the link between Khrushchev and Kalinovka. On one occasion, in 1945, Stalin asked him: ‘Where are you from?’

“‘From Kalinovka,’ he replied.

“‘Is it a long time since you were there?’

“‘Yes, a long time, not since the Civil War.’

“‘That is not to your credit,’ Stalin said. ‘All the same you should go there.’

“And so Khrushchev arrived, and his Kalinovka did not even think of improving itself. Everything was abandoned and in ruins; people were hungry.

“He asked them: ‘What is it that you need?’

“‘We have no horses,’ they replied.

“‘You shall have horses!’

“And so he called Marshal Grechko, who was then in command of our forces in Germany: ‘Give my fellow villagers horses.’ Grechko sent horses,

but what kind of horses? The German horse is a big strong dray-horse; it's impossible to keep him fed. When Khrushchev came back the following year, he expected to see the collective farm already on the up and up. But no, people still sat around hungry; nothing was getting done. He started to criticize.

“Well, what's going on around here? I sent you horses, didn't I?”

“We no longer have them,’ they replied.

“What?!”

“If we hadn't sold them, they'd have eaten us out of hearth and home.”

Then he decided to approach the problem from a different angle. He started looking for a sensible person to be their collective-farm chairman. He chose one man from Sumy province,<sup>83</sup> but he was unable to cope with the job. Then he sent Storozhuk, head of the department of agriculture in the [Ukrainian] government, from Kiev. Storozhuk tried to make a go of it. He even carried spare parts from Sevsk<sup>84</sup> to Kalinovka on his own shoulders, but under him people still didn't work; things remained at a standstill. Then Khrushchev started sending me. The first time I went, I took with me a certain engineer. It was cold winter weather, and he was only half-dressed. I took a sheepskin coat from the collective-farm chairman and put it on this engineer. Before our departure the chairman began to get worried: ‘Is he going to give me back my sheepskin coat?’ The people were sunk deep in poverty. We were held up there at some railroad station. There was a samovar<sup>85</sup> at the station, quite a large one, but there was no water boiling inside it.

“Why?” I asked.

“There's no water.”

“Is there a bucket?”

“There is.”

And so I took the bucket, fetched water, and poured it into the samovar. When it came to the boil, I immediately filled five glasses for myself, five glasses for our driver, five glasses for the engineer. At this the other waiting passengers protested to the stationmaster.

“And what about us?”

“He fetched the water for himself,’ he replied.

“We drank our tea and went to the MTS: there was an MTS at Fatezh.<sup>86</sup> The director took us to some peasant log hut to spend the night. The host said: ‘I'll let them in, only I have nothing to feed them with, and they'll have to sleep on the earth floor.’ That's how we spent the night: the engineer lay down, the driver lay down, I lay down. During the night a calf broke loose from its tether in the hut and had a chew of the engineer's hair. . . . I took a liking to this MTS director. His name was Grachev. After much thought I recommended that

he should be sent to Kalinovka to be its collective farm chairman. He and I started working together, he on the spot, I on my flying visits.

“Where did we begin? The farm had no money. Khrushchev was by nature a terribly stingy man. If anyone thinks he might have tossed anything down to his Kalinovka over and above the standard allocations, then he is mistaken. I’m not talking about German dray-horses, I’m talking about money. Here I had an idea that worked. We gathered the collective farmers together. I told them: ‘This year you’ll plant your potatoes in the field belonging to the collective farm. We’ll mark out temporary plots there for your gardens. And we’ll merge your old plots into a single field where the collective farm will sow hemp, because there is no fertilizer on the collective farm, while your plots have been fertilized for ages.’ Highly irregular, of course, but they agreed. The hemp we got was fantastic. Here I had another idea that worked. If, like everyone around us, we delivered it dry we’d get one price. But if we could deliver it as fiber we’d get three times that price. I invited specialists from a local [agricultural] institute.

“Let’s organize processing of the hemp on the spot, on the collective farm. Help us.’ That’s how we got hold of our first money. And the only thing that was done for Kalinovka as a privilege with Khrushchev’s knowledge was a track to the Kiev road, and it was a poor track; it quickly got destroyed. The few other little tricks came from me. Khrushchev didn’t even know about them. For instance, I proposed that an agricultural college should be transferred to Kalinovka. The purpose of that,” Shevchenko concluded, “was to get at least something built in the village at the expense of the state budget.”<sup>87</sup>

In Kalinovka Khrushchev had an especially sharp and fresh feeling of himself as a communist, a collectivist, a builder of a new life in accordance with the precepts of the founders. Here he had an especially keen eye for any wrongdoings, discrepancies, and remnants of the old way of life: both the fact that everyone had his own cowshed, cow, and private garden plot and the fact that people wanted to build themselves separate dwellings and, by all accounts, in general preferred the village to which they were accustomed and not the agro-town.<sup>88</sup>

“In Khomutovka,”<sup>89</sup> Shevchenko recalls, “he had an unmarried cousin. Once she wrote him: ‘Help me, cousin, my house is falling down.’ Khrushchev summoned me and showed me this letter. He used to hand over the whole of his salary to Nina Petrovna, but he got a hundred rubles [a month] as a [Supreme Soviet] deputy, and this money he used to put in a safe in his office. He opened this safe and said:

“I’m giving you five hundred rubles. Help my cousin build a hut.”

“I said: ‘Nikita Sergeyevich, you can’t build a hut for five hundred rubles. You have no idea of what things cost. Let me go there and look into the matter, then we’ll decide.’

“I arrived in Khomutovka and found my way to the address. The house really was dilapidated; the ceiling had fallen down on top of the cupboard. But Grachev was just building an apartment block for specialists in the central settlement of the collective farm.

“I asked her: ‘How about us giving you a room, two rooms if you like, in Kalinovka? Then you won’t need to build for yourself.’

“She replied: ‘I’m not going to that building.’

“‘Why?’

“‘And where on earth will I plant beets and cucumbers?’

“I said: ‘At the collective farm you’ll get both beets and cucumbers.’

“‘They haven’t planted,’ she said, ‘either beets or cucumbers yet, but in my garden they’re already growing. And where,’ she continued, ‘will I keep my piglet?’

“‘Well, you’ll get some kind of barn there.’

“‘No I won’t,’ she disagreed. ‘They’ll say my barn makes a stink. They’ll chase me out, and without a piglet and a chicken I can’t live.’

“And so I returned and told Nikita Sergeyevich: ‘I suggested that she should move into an urban-type building, but she doesn’t want to.’

“He asked: ‘Well, what the devil does she want?’

“I said: ‘You don’t understand the peasant’s psychology. He wants a garden plot, a barn—in a word, a farm. That’s the whole tragedy.’

“In reply, he cursed out both me and her. ‘The devil take you,’ he said. ‘What garden plot, what farm? Lenin taught us, it was Lenin’s bequest to us: no private farming, but you and she have got bogged down in it ideologically and physically and can’t extricate yourselves.’”

He loved agriculture and was sorry for his fellow villagers, but he didn’t listen to the voice of the peasant as such. He was an industrial worker, the bearer of all that was new and advanced; it was they who had to listen to *him* and learn what he had brought *them*. Not only many lower officials but also entire central government departments and bureaucracies were infected with tolerance and the spirit of conciliation; some laws and regulations reeked of the smoke of the peasant hut.<sup>90</sup> The most obvious things had to be explained: for example, that it was necessary “to pass over from building little houses to building multistory buildings, but no higher than five stories.” Then “the peasant will no longer need to worry about heating, water, and many other things.” He explained and chewed over how this

could be done more surreptitiously: “stop handing out state credits for individual hut construction.”

Everywhere he went he was so struck by the disadvantageous and unacceptable nature of all private ownership that he was simply astonished at how people tolerated it and failed to draw practical conclusions. . . . A cow in Kalinovka that belonged to the collective farm gave 4,000 liters of milk, while a privately owned cow, they said, gave 1,500. What conclusion did that suggest to him? “If these cows are taken into the collective dairy farm and fed well, they too will give 4,000 kilograms of milk.” True, there was the question of how to feed them well in the collective dairy farm, but he had long had the answer to that: give them corn, sugar beets, and beans. Behind this answer lay another question. Where were these foodstuffs to come from? Was the collective farm capable under existing conditions of growing enough of them to yield milk that would suffice both for the state and for the collective farmers? But that was a malevolent question. If each person could look after her own cow separately, then why couldn’t they all look after the same cows together?

It was distressing for him to look at their large garden plots, and right after advising them to sell their cows to the collective farm and go over to collective milking he suggested that they should merge their plots into a single common plot and grow corn on it to feed the small animals and poultry that they would continue to own privately. He had a sharp sense of how time was flying and strongly suspected that the implanting of new communist shoots could not be further delayed or the lagging behind capitalism tolerated: the people would get fed up and disillusioned. The contradiction was so acute when it came to private farming not only because it satisfied the need of the peasant soul for private possessions—that could be accepted for a while longer—but also because it was feeding the country.

His faith was firm: the individual was nothing, the collective was everything. To possess everything in common—there lay truth and salvation. The main thing he wanted was a better life for the people, genuine collectivism, in which one is for all and all for one. Could this principle, firmly upheld, really make less sense than the principle according to which each is openly for himself and God alone is for all? If that is so, then for what do we live and toil? The collective farmer and field-team leader from Zhitomir province<sup>91</sup> Nadezhda Grigoryevna Zaglada spoke to young people somehow in a vivid style, appealing to them to love the land, love labor, and devote their lives to the common cause. He took her words to heart: “I understand Comrade Zaglada when she speaks of the joy of labor. The older you get, the

less time there remains for you to live, the more your desire and striving to labor is aroused, to labor in order to manage to get even more done, while your heart still beats in your chest.” (But youngsters at school, forced to write essays based on pompous articles signed in the name of an old peasant woman who was in no way to blame, let out a yawn.)

The fact that even forty years after the revolution these miserable cowsheds and scraps of land continued to be the basis of life in the country of victorious socialism was for him a calamity, a burning reproach. This sector of the economy should have disappeared long ago, but despite everything, even despite the doctrine, it still existed. So long as this discrepancy remained he could not feel that either his system or the theory itself was secure; he could not deceive himself with the claim that our superiority had already been proved to the whole world. Only a bad Communist could fail to be disturbed at the thought of a socialist country full of these cowsheds, marked out in strips of land on which bent-over women and children holding choppers inadvertently demonstrated to the entire planet the advantages of the private interest that was so hateful to him. He reminded his fellow villagers for what they had fought, what had been planned, why “the question of the liberation of collective farmers, and especially of the women among them, from low productivity household labor is not only of economic but also of political significance.” He read Lenin to them, the Lenin who had proven irrefutably that cooking and small-scale housework “suppresses, suffocates, stupefies, and humiliates” woman. For how long, indeed, would she stoop over the stove? For how long would the smoke of the hearth eat away at her eyes? “We must show more concern for the woman collective farmer. If she gets her milk from the dairy and her bread from the public bakery, if her children are cared for in the kindergarten, then the woman and mother will breathe more freely and start to work at full strength. She will have the chance to read a book, to visit the cinema, to attend a lecture, to broaden her field of vision, to raise her cultural level.”

His advice was taken up quickly and assiduously, and the province and county party committees monitored the effort. In summer 1957, a barn was quickly put up, and in autumn of the same year “each person brought her cow” there, as Khrushchev reported in December, speaking in Kiev. The liberation of country people from their cows was one of his special concerns; he did it in an energetic but politic fashion. He emphasized over and over again that everything must be done on a voluntary basis: “This must not be done by means of compulsion; on no account must this matter be forced through.” But he knew his officials: if they got carried away, you wouldn’t be

able to make out where things have been done voluntarily and where under compulsion. But things could not be allowed to take their course! Promising even to punish those guilty of excesses, he gave to understand that it would not be necessary to wait years for the peasants' consent, merely months. At the December 1958 plenum,<sup>92</sup> a deadline was set for state farms: it was decreed that state farms had to buy up the livestock of their workers and employees within two to three years. The state farms were to move ahead, and the collective farms would follow their example. Concessions to private ownership were especially intolerable on state farms, for they represented a higher form of ownership<sup>93</sup> and had been introduced to serve as models. "Lenin foresaw that if the workers and employees of state farms had their own livestock and garden plots they might find themselves tempted to infringe on state discipline and use products grown on the state farm for the purpose of personal enrichment, to feed their cows, pigs, poultry, and other animals if they have them." Lenin had been especially concerned to prevent events developing in such a way. On his insistence, an article was included into the law on state farms (1919) that prohibited private garden plots—the worker, even if a rural worker, had to be a worker, a proletarian, and not a property owner. "Why was this article included in the law?" Vladimir Ilyich had explained. "In order to create common labor on a farm held in common. And if we again have separate plots, separate animals, poultry, and so on, then probably everything will go back to small-scale farming as it has existed up to now."

A true Leninist, Nikita Sergeyeovich specially monitored the ideological purity of the state farms (although he failed to notice that this law had been written by Ilyich in 1919, before the New Economic Policy).<sup>94</sup> He was simply beside himself when he learned that in the virgin lands, on state farms created by young patriots on empty land, not infected by the private-property mentality, in settlements that had grown up under conditions of real proletarian collectivism, workers and employees—even secretaries of party organizations, school principals, teachers—were keeping livestock, a lot of livestock, several head a person or even more. That is what had come of socialist farms, mostly bearing such glorious names, which in themselves created an obligation!

He did not forget his Kalinovka even at the most difficult moments, when it would have appeared too much for him to keep it in mind. Summer 1963 was terrible.<sup>95</sup> The failure of his ten years of effort and calculation was clear and complete. For a decade he had assiduously selected the best personnel, who in their turn had selected the best subordinates for themselves, and so forth—and it had all turned out to be for nothing. In public he heaped

contempt on the professional liars from Washington who were casting doubt on “our successes,”<sup>96</sup> but then he immediately dictated an official memorandum to the Central Committee Presidium that was full of despair. This was a year of despairing memoranda. He admitted the discouraging fact that in all these ten years many farms had made no progress. What was the problem? “The main thing is that party organizations have not taken the trouble to study the personnel situation and replace unsuitable, backward leaders. These people are now sucking the collective and state farms dry. . . . Everything depends on people, on leaders. Take as an example the collective farm in the village of Kalinovka. . . .” Soon after came the plenum—the last plenum that he was to conduct,<sup>97</sup> at which he set ambitious goals for the creation of a chemical-fertilizer industry—and there too he reminded people of his Kalinovka—of how it had been raised up by Grachev. He appealed to them: “Let us select Davydovs<sup>98</sup> and Grachevs. I am sure that within a year or two economically weak collective farms will be transformed.” The audience responded with applause, but the people—just imagine it!—laughed and said he carried his Kalinovka around with him like a child with a new toy. He wanted to build in Kalinovka the best phalanstery in the country so that other villages would follow its example, but the people got upset and wept. They complained that their cows had been taken away while they never got the milk they had been promised: it had all been shipped off to fulfill the plan. A large marketable surplus was demanded; if the marketable surplus was small they would harass the collective-farm chairman and eventually expel him from the party.<sup>99</sup>

He took an incautious pride in things “in our life” that he should have treated with a good deal of circumspection, but at the same time he always defined the essence of the matter precisely. Of all his contemporaries, perhaps, Nikita Sergeevich was the best expert on administrative socialism, a system under which money meant catastrophically less than by its nature it should. “In our country, if a person does not have an apartment, then he writes about it and demands that he be provided with an apartment. Some bureaucrats are angered by this, but I see in it how the Soviet person has grown in self-awareness. He rightly thinks: ‘I am a citizen of the Soviet Union. I am without an apartment. You whose job it is to decide when I shall get an apartment, first in line or second, decide!’ That’s how Soviet people pose the question! And they are right. Under capitalist conditions, such a question is decided in a simple fashion—there they have ‘freedom’: you don’t have an apartment, so live under the open sky. There is no one to ask for an apartment; no one will give you your apartment. In our country,



such a concept of ‘freedom’ has been eliminated, and here lies the great advantage of the Soviet socialist system!”

As with regard to apartments, Khrushchev recognized and valued very highly the right of the Soviet person to demand food, first bread, and now meat as well—once again, from those whose job it was to decide, that is, in the first instance from himself, Khrushchev. In recognizing this right of the Soviet person, in dividing the people into those who stood in line (first or second), demanding housing and food, and those who put all this into the plan and then distributed it, Khrushchev sealed his own fate.

Once he asked some collective-farm chairman which crop on his farm was most advantageous. The answer was oats: it involved the least trouble; you just sowed it and then you harvested it, and the state was not very intent on getting hold of it. A few years later, Khrushchev put the same question to the director of a state farm on the Barabinsk steppe.<sup>100</sup> This man immediately named *mogar*<sup>101</sup> as the crop that was most advantageous under his conditions.

“Why *mogar*?”

“Comrade Khrushchev, it’s a grass. The state doesn’t take grass away from me. If I sow grain crops, I have to sell the grain to the state.”

Thus did life bring Nikita Sergeevich to the threshold of a discovery that might have been the greatest in his life and of almost world-historical significance. . . . And it had all already been not only masticated but also placed in his mouth—all he had to do was swallow it. Think about it. What on earth was going on when there existed what seemed to be a commodity-producing farm and it was disadvantageous to it to do the very thing for the sake of which it should have existed and from which it should have earned its keep—to sell grain? Could it be called a commodity producer? And if it was not a commodity producer, then who needed it? It was like a storekeeper who finds it disadvantageous to trade, like a fish to which it is disadvantageous to swim in the water—what kind of water was that? Think how to make it suitable for swimming! No, Khrushchev was not to be deflected; he was thinking about something else: “One encounters such Communists as this. And the fewer such Communists there will be in the party, the better for the party.”

Once he descended on the director of the Kuban state farm, Maksimov, one of the best economic managers in the North Caucasus. He talked with him in the office, toured the fields, remained content, and so the visit might have concluded, but near the end he suddenly remembered to inquire about the structural composition of sown areas. Maksimov could have told a fib, but whether on principle or out of carelessness he told the truth. At that

moment, 30 percent of his feed crops consisted of grasses. Corn, with a yield of 48 centners per hectare, occupied 16 percent of the area under cultivation. In an instant all was forgotten; Maksimov (and the country) was face to face with the old Khrushchev on his high horse, with whom everyone was already fed up. “Could you really compete with Garst?” he thundered. “What prices would your products fetch on the market? Garst would trample you underfoot like an elephant. He plants not grasses but corn. When I was in the United States, I saw his farm.” Khrushchev made a lot of noise and did not allow himself to surmise that the way out might have been to change the subjunctive to the indicative mood, so that his question—what prices Maksimov’s products would have fetched on the market—would have ceased to be a hypothetical one. When the market determined their value directly, only then could one say precisely whether those 30 percent of feed crops consisting of grasses were too much or too little.

It would seem that the phrase “food requisitioning” should have been close to such a man’s heart. By no means. He used this phrase to assess the relations between agriculture and the state that had taken shape in Stalin’s time, and his assessment was unambiguously critical. Grain procurement in the country was of the nature of food requisitioning—he said this right away, as soon as he came to power. Food requisitioning was the forcible extraction of products without any inducements to the tiller and without thought to the future needs of production. Khrushchev dreamt of the tax in kind.<sup>102</sup> Even more did he dream of voluntary procurement, with the entire tormented soul of an old member of a food-requisitioning detachment who had not managed to accustom himself to the sight of tears, blood, and devastation. In our clandestine conversations we [ordinary people] were still trying to guess what the famine of 1933 was, but Khrushchev knew all along. It was exactly at that time that there began the return to compulsory grain deliveries to the state. The famine was not organized; evil plotters did not stand behind it. It was worse than that. Having sent down plans that turned out to be incapable of fulfillment, the authorities continued to demand that they should be fulfilled at any price. That was all. The famine was a triumph of the new, unprecedented state discipline—a new kind of discipline. Stalin’s apparatus showed that it was fully prepared also for other, no less serious measures that required implicit obedience.

Khrushchev had always dreamt of voluntary procurement. He gave free play to these dreams in his most heartfelt speeches, all of which, naturally, were about Kalinovka. There in 1958 he complained to his fellow villagers that “many people still conceive of economic relations between the state and

the collective farms in the old way and still cannot get out of the habit of taxes and compulsory deliveries” and shared with them his hope that in the course of time “the collective farmers themselves will ask the state to buy more of their grain.” In his best years he literally took to flight with this idea. “The principle of the voluntary sale of products will gradually be extended to all branches of the economy. Where shall we buy grain then? Where it is the cheapest”—that is, in Siberia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the North Caucasus. He even took a step in this direction: as we recall, he freed the Non-Black Earth Zone of compulsory procurement. . . .

He thought that free trade would become possible in the country when abundance had been achieved. The view of free trade as the result of the development of production, as the crowning glory of all our efforts, as the final and most convincing demonstration of socialist successes was in itself very interesting. How could a communist—an enemy of uncontrolled spontaneity, a person who believes in organization and planning, in the subordination of all strivings to a common goal, in the advantages of consciously modeling the whole country on a single factory—dream of free buying and selling? Khrushchev and his collective had no inkling of the fact that free trade is not a consequence of economic development but a means of such development, its most reliable motor. The Non-Black Earth Zone, as if by the wave of a magic wand freed of compulsory deliveries, reduced its output of grain. To ask the tillers themselves why this had happened, what needed to be done to make grain cultivation advantageous—this would have been to approach the problem in the spirit of free trade. Khrushchev acted otherwise. Considering that the abolition of compulsory procurement had been premature, he reverted with Stalinist touchiness to the old ways.

“We admit our mistake. We placed too much hope in your consciousness, in your communist understanding of your duty, your obligations,” he declared to the activists of the Non-Black Earth Zone assembled in Moscow in winter 1961. “Now we shall put matters right: the government has already raised this year’s plan for grain purchases in your zone, and next year’s plan will be even higher, so that you will have no choice but to think about and work at producing larger amounts of grain and all other agricultural products every year.” Having conveyed this news, he fell silent. A heavy silence reigned in the hall. That was another occasion for him to make comparisons—to compare this silence with what would have transpired in this hall had it been filled, for example, with farmers from Saskatchewan and had they suddenly heard that the government intended to make a sharp increase in its purchases of their grain! But the Non-Black Earth Zone held its oppressed silence.

“Why don’t you applaud?” Khrushchev asked in a hostile tone. The hall remained silent.

When an idea occurred to him for one or another sufficiently large-scale organizational innovation, he was interested in all seriousness to know whether it contradicted the doctrine. In 1956 Academician Rumyantsev<sup>103</sup> sent him a memorandum in which he argued that there should not be two masters on the land—the MTS and the collective farm; there should be a single master, preferably the collective farm. Khrushchev read through this memorandum and set it aside, but a year later he retrieved it from the archives and referred to it when he got down to dictating his own ideas about the abolition of the MTS’s. This was in Nalchik.<sup>104</sup>

Shevchenko recalls: “I said to him: ‘Nikita Sergeevich, they shouldn’t be abolished immediately in all places. In those places where the collective farms are still poor they should be retained; otherwise we’ll lose our tractor drivers, we’ll lose technical supervision.’

“‘That’s a special issue,’ he said.

“‘We know,’ I then said, ‘that the MTS is state property, while the collective farm is cooperative property. State property is more advanced than cooperative property. You’re destroying state property and strengthening cooperative property, and that contradicts such-and-such and such-and-such!’

“He made no reply. When we got back to Moscow, he invited in some chief editor or other and some academician or other and said: ‘Look, Shevchenko has thrown me a hedgehog. He says I’m destroying state property and strengthening cooperative property. Help me get out of this situation.’”

In his time he had studied at the Industrial Academy and lived in the stormy atmosphere of disputes over paths to socialism and clashes with oppositions and deviations. For him this was a serious and familiar business—checking points against “holy writ” and consulting with “sextons.”<sup>105</sup> Having already overturned the First Marxist,<sup>106</sup> he timidly waited to hear what the chief editor of some ideological journal or some academician [expert in Marxist political economy] would tell him, whether they would allow the collective farms to have tractors. They, of course, tried to impress upon him that Marxism-Leninism had its own special view concerning where tractors should be parked—in the courtyard of the state-owned MTS or in the courtyard of the collective farm, which in essence was no less state-owned. Then they went off to think. “They sat for two days considering the matter, then they returned. ‘Nikita Sergeevich,’ they said, ‘there is nothing terrible about it. There will be neither state nor cooperative property; there will be only all-people’s property.’”<sup>107</sup>

While he was happy to take decisions on practical matters, he did not resolve to assume the task of creating theories, of moving the doctrine forward; he delegated this task to special people. It was another matter when one of them—that same academician, for instance—would say that he, Khrushchev, without realizing it had made such-and-such a contribution to the doctrinal treasure-house—to this he made no objection. All the same, an academician had clearer vision. The main thing was that he should confirm that the present generation of Soviet people would live under communism. Not a timid man, Khrushchev was submissively aware of ideological bounds and limits. When he happened to cross them, he tried to stay in the vicinity, carefully keeping close to the fence. Outside those bounds, far beyond the limits of socialism, was the worker's private garden plot. It contravened Lenin's direct instructions, and here Khrushchev did not long hesitate. . . . He had firmly mastered the rule that within the limits of socialism retail prices for food and goods of mass consumption must not be increased, and here, on the contrary, he fretted for a long time before deciding to "meet the wishes of the working people" and raise meat prices. And afterward he tried to justify himself for a long time: this, he said, was a temporary retreat from our ideals, for "the socialist path is that of developing production and reducing prices."

It pleased some people and astonished and irritated others (over the years these others grew more and more numerous) that he spent a lot of time on his trips around the country. His trips were surrounded by too much fuss and bustle, both in Moscow and in the provinces. A glossy show was put on; people were prepared in advance to greet him and make speeches; and everything he asked about, whatever got through to him past the crowd of curious, agitated, or frightened people he could have learned more easily in Moscow without ever leaving his office, from briefings and statistical summaries. "I ask: 'How are things with you regarding the sale of milk?'" he recounted in Rostov<sup>108</sup> in October 1958. "'Fine,' they reply, 'we have enough milk.'—'And how about meat?' My interlocutors faltered. 'Yes,' they say, 'there is meat.'—'Always?' I ask. 'No, Comrade Khrushchev, not always.'" And it would have been even better, simpler, and more reliable not to wield the stick of censorship over the pages of newspapers and magazines—and the whole picture of life in our country in all its details would have lain before him every morning as though on the palm of his hand. He lacked the habit of consulting statistics and objective information independently, of investigating one or another issue on the basis of statistical summaries and selections of various kinds of material; he did not know the satisfaction of

sitting alone in his office over papers and books. He was what in China used to be called a “cadre” and in our country a “party worker,” whose entire life was spent in direct contact with people, with the masses as a leader, in organizing and conducting meetings, conferences, various campaigns, and—before the revolution—strikes. On one occasion he recalled how difficult it had been for him to get used to the new scale of work when he was elected secretary of the Moscow city party committee. Before that he had been secretary of the Bauman district<sup>109</sup> party committee. Someone asked him how he felt in his new post. “Bad, bored,” he replied. “When I was secretary of a district committee, I knew all my cell secretaries.<sup>110</sup> There was a mutual understanding between us. But now there are too many cells and I can’t be everywhere.” There is no reason to think that he was attributing this taste for low-level agitational work to himself in retrospect. His district-committee mettle cost the country too dear.

#### *The Great Amateur*

A specialist is distinguished from an amateur by the fact that he knows the history of an issue, holds all aspects of his subject in his field of vision, and understands how these aspects are connected to one another. Khrushchev was an amateur down to the marrow of his bones. Usually the history of an issue did not exist for him; usually he saw only one, at most two, aspects of a subject—quite random aspects, but ones that somehow appealed to him; he had no inkling of the tangle of connections as a whole. It was this that allowed him to refer to American agriculture, the greatest achievement in the history of mankind, in the following terms: “There is no special American wisdom. They lay on a lot of fertilizer.” It was not that he was uncouth. There have been and are extremely uncouth people among real specialists. Khrushchev, with his intelligence, talent, and energy, could probably have mastered everything that a solid agronomic specialist (if we take agronomy) is required to know. But his excessively enthusiastic and impatient nature made an amateur of him. How can you pay equal attention to all the aspects of a subject when this particular aspect is so interesting, so appealing, simply a miracle!?

All the time he was forgetting and overlooking something that it seems impossible to forget and overlook; all the time he was exaggerating or understating things whose true dimensions were obvious. Once he understood that the issue of creating a chemical-fertilizer industry could not be avoided, he posed it “in all its sharpness” and in no other manner, and right away set about ecstatically dividing up the future abundance.

“When we expand the production of mineral fertilizers and harvest more grain, then we shall have a minimum of one year’s reserve,” he boasted in conversation with U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Freeman.<sup>111</sup>

“That seems to us a little more than necessary,” Freeman remarked, hiding a smile.

“The additional expenditure,” Khrushchev continued, “is only the cost of the mineral fertilizers, and that is not great (now already not great—A. S.). All this will enable us to save a lot of budgetary resources. Then we’ll be able to reduce prices for agricultural products.”

Freeman nodded his head: “We shall await with impatience the results of the competition between us.”

Khrushchev belonged to that type of person who seems to have been created by emergency situations and for emergency situations in which everything needs to be mobilized for a single purpose. These are people made to accomplish large-scale one-off projects, to solve particular problems by emergency methods. Abandon everything, forget everything, wave everything away, calculate nothing, measure nothing—just bring the weight of the whole world to bear upon a single aspect and pull it out. . . . This worker-revolutionary, with his limited set of the crudest but diamond-hard concepts of what socialism is, was completely unable to absorb that saving distrust of overhasty forward movement for which Lenin called toward the end of his life. Khrushchev might have been helped by popular common sense, which he did not need to call upon in matters far removed from ideology and politics. But that was the point—they were far removed. Then he *would* not have been a revolutionary, divorced from life in the way that only a person can be who has grown up in an ideological atmosphere, in which lines and platforms are more important than individuals and facts. Could a person (people) of any other type and biography, solely out of reverence for theory, really have suddenly decided “to develop to the utmost the state-farm system, because it has more perfect forms of the socialist organization of labor,” to convert tens of thousands of collective farms, which had at least a tiny bit of freedom, into state farms, which were completely without rights, only to ask a few years later in surprise and anger: Why are they operating at a loss? Why are they not recouping the expenses of converting them from a lower into a higher form?<sup>112</sup> The chief agricultural expert, who traveled the length and breadth of the country and ended up in Bugulma<sup>113</sup> (Shevchenko: “We spent the night somehow at the airport. In the night I heard him knocking softly on the wall. I entered: ‘What’s the



matter, Nikita Sergeevich?’—‘I’m frozen. You don’t have a blanket to spare, do you?’—‘I do.’ I didn’t really have a spare blanket—I brought him my own and tucked him in on all sides”), he had a vague idea even of how people lived in his native Kalinovka.

“We arrived in Kalinovka,” Shevchenko recalls. “Grachev said to him: ‘Nikita Sergeevich, give me ten thousand cubic meters of timber.’ But Khrushchev and Yefremov, secretary of the Kursk province party committee, planned to put up buildings of the urban type there. I told him: ‘Nikita Sergeevich, you’ll have to transport bricks from Kursk, but there are no bridges. You’ll have to pull down all the little footbridges. Is it really possible to bring in the bricks? We must build our own kiln and make bricks on the spot.’ But Grachev had the idea that he wanted to build ordinary rural huts, farmsteads with their own garden plots. That’s why he asked him for ten thousand cubic meters of timber. Khrushchev didn’t react; he made no reply. But in the morning—we were traveling by train and were just approaching Moscow—he invited us to breakfast with him. Shelepin,<sup>114</sup> myself, Mylarshchikov,<sup>115</sup> . . . Churayev,<sup>116</sup> I think, was also with us, and Vasily Ivanovich Polyakov.

“Over breakfast he asked me: ‘What was that Grachev was saying yesterday about timber? What does he need timber for?’

“‘He wants to build houses for the collective farmers,’ I said.

“‘Come off it! We’re going to put up urban-type buildings!’

“‘With what money are they going to do that?’ I asked. ‘Where are the materials?’

“‘What, do they live badly there?’

“‘What do you think?’ I said. ‘Yesterday they showed you a dairy where the milkmaids wore white robes. You think those were *their* robes? And what they told you, that they get two hundred rubles a month, do they really get them?’

“‘What, do they live worse than workers?’

“‘There’s no comparison, Nikita Sergeevich! The worker has a warm state apartment, all the conveniences of city life. . . .’

“‘The collective farmer,’ he cut in, ‘has a pig, a goose.’

“I said that all the same the collective farmers lived much, much worse; they were still way behind the working class.

“Then he said: ‘So what are you trying to do? Do you want to destroy the alliance between the working class and the peasantry?’ And with what force he struck his hand on the table!



“‘I don’t want to destroy the alliance,’ I said. ‘I want you to understand that the collective farmers still live badly, that they are not yet able to put up buildings of urban type. The collective farm, if you want to know, even had to pay from its undivided funds<sup>17</sup> for the equipment from the MTS, and only half of that equipment works; the rest is broken.’

“When I said that, he immediately flew into a rage. He didn’t eat but got up from the table and sat down on the divan. ‘Well,’ he says, ‘breakfast is over.’”

How he hurried them up, how he himself hurried! Everything had to be done fast, like a soldier in battle. Among his concepts there was no concept of the gradual accumulation of quantity and quality, of resources, experience, and knowledge. He was allergic to any evolution; he recognized only revolution, only leaps and turning points, driving “the present generation of Soviet people” on to live under communism. For him nothing was ordinary, everything was extraordinary—an extraordinary historical situation, extraordinary potential. (“The Soviet system has boundless potential.”) He did not want to invest resources in the Non-Black Earth Zone: he would have to wait a long time to get a return on the investment—indeed, who knew whether he would *ever* get a return? He needed a dead cert—so he put all his bets on the virgin lands; from there he’d get quick and cheap grain. As for the other zones, their farms, he was sure, “will soon ask for their grain to be bought, will seek where to sell it. . . .” In January 1954 he had specified the area of virgin lands that had to be opened up as twelve million hectares. In July 1957 he raised the issue of opening up an additional fifteen million hectares. He was displeased: the secretaries of the province and county party committees gave miserly promises and made the excuse that the best lands had already been opened up and the lands that remained were poor, saline, full of salt. “You yourselves are full of salt!” He had already calculated that if each of thirty million hectares yielded on average at least sixty poods of grain then that would enable us . . . and then those bloody salt-filled bureaucrats came and upset these calculations. “That’s where your sausage and lard are buried. Plow, sow, harvest—and there is your sausage and your lard.”

Only by constantly getting carried away with something to the point of total oblivion to all else, only by diverting one’s attention from daily life with its vexing details is it possible to believe in the quick and easy achievement of such goals as those he set for the country. Only by thinking up miraculous means of attaining those goals—such as selecting good people or planting corn instead of using fertilizers and then pretty much the other

way round: using fertilizers instead of planting corn—is it possible to maintain some kind of equilibrium. Faith, the Russian faith in the idea that a big harvest can be obtained in no other way than under someone’s wise leadership and not by virtue of primordial motives and circumstances, doomed Khrushchev to all his schemes.

Did he see other ways of feeding the people besides those that he himself applied and whose entire wisdom was contained in a few slogans: “Everything depends on personnel!” “Everything depends on organization!” “Everything depends on the system of tilling!” “Everything depends on technology!”? Did he know that there exist other and—let’s put it this way—no less effective incentives to labor and creativity besides those on which he himself relied and whose entire wisdom can without great oversimplification be reduced to the appeal: “Long live collectivism! One for all and all for one!”?

Strange as it may seem, he did know, and at times he was able to talk boldly and well about them. In 1956 he awarded the Order of Lenin to Moscow province, which had come first in the country in the output of milk. The province had made a big leap forward by comparison with 1953, but the milk yields themselves were unimpressive—an average of 2,712 kilograms per cow. “Take the Finns, the Danes, the Dutch,” Khrushchev suddenly said. “They’ve been getting such milk yields for a long time, and they don’t get any medals for it.”

His thinking turned constantly to the question of what they get instead of medals, how it is all done, and what kind of results it brings: Matskevich and Shevchenko had told him in detail about their trip to the United States. He immediately identified and mastered the main point: low labor outlays, zeal. . . . “In poultry farming, for example, one person over there looks after several thousand turkeys. That is simply inexplicable in terms of our concepts.” Intentionally, but more often unintentionally, he sowed the seeds of great doubts and aroused in people that torment which begins with the naive question: “Well, OK, they are rich and we are poor, and that seems to be all there is to it. But who forces us, who are poor, to use up three times as much raw material and energy per unit of output as they, who are rich? How does it turn out that way?”

How it turned out over there Khrushchev knew very well: “In the capitalist countries, where merciless competition reigns, life itself forces you to concern yourself with the economics of your farm; otherwise you won’t survive, you’ll perish. That is a law of capitalism.” He said this in 1956. A year later, again talking about American agriculture, he repeated: “American farmers

run their farms on a purely capitalist basis. . . .” Be in no doubt: he knew what that basis was; in any case, he understood it (“competition, exploitation, destruction of the weak by the strong . . .”) better than “some chief editor and some academician” understood the purely socialist basis.

There was perhaps nothing that he used to explain so clearly and cogently to his rural listeners as the relations over there between agriculture and industry. He had an example that invariably made an enormous impression on people, an example that demolished our virtually inborn certainty that life by the laws of the “single pocket” and the “single factory” is best. Some farmer bought feed from some firm, but his cattle did not fatten at the rate that he had been promised.<sup>118</sup> He took the matter to court; the feed was tested—it did not contain the substances indicated in the advertised recipe. In accordance with the court judgment, the firm compensated the farmer for his losses. “That’s how they fight in the capitalist countries to get the maximum profit from every kilogram of feed,” said Khrushchev, fascinated by the force, simplicity, and effectiveness of their incentives. “If a farmer fails to make a certain profit, he will be ruined. In this respect the capitalist system is merciless. One entrepreneur can drive another into his grave for the sake of a dollar.”

Learning from none other than him, Nikita Sergeyevich, that in the United States a centner of meat is produced per capita of the population, his listener grasped the point: be that as it may about driving people into their graves, but all the same the rich are probably unable to eat up such a mountain of meat on their own. . . .

So he knew and understood everything of importance about those arrangements, those methods and incentives. . . .

But—he did not accept them.

He believed in his own, in our own arrangements, methods, and incentives. “In our country, under conditions of socialist economy, other laws operate, other methods are applied. . . . Our collective farms organize their production on a completely different basis.”

What was this different basis? What were these other laws and methods? What was this other discipline? He talked about this frequently, enthusiastically, and sincerely. In our country, “each person labors in the interests of all, and all labor in the interests of each. The greater the gross output of a collective farm, the more income it receives and the greater the wellbeing of the collective farmers.” He never said anything more concrete on this question not only in his ten years in the country’s highest posts but in his entire life. “The capitalists have a law ‘Man is wolf to man’ and so one strangles

another, steps over a child, and if he doesn't manage to step over the child he steps on the child. But we live by human laws: 'One for all and all for one. . . .' In our country, under the conditions of socialism, the toilers of agriculture work for themselves and for society; their labor is rewarded in accordance with its quantity and quality. At the same time, the moral factor also operates in our country."

And so on in the same spirit. "In our contest with America, comrades, there is no doubt that victory will be ours. Because our economy is built on the basis of the doctrine created by Marx and Lenin and develops without capitalists, without landlords, without the exploitation of man by man. The most reasonable, the most rational, the most correct economy."

He simply repeated the slogans of his early youth—the slogans that enticed him into socialist construction and that he used to entice others. Nikita Sergeyevich was a modest man. He thought that the basic and important work had been done long ago and that there remained only trivial tasks for him to carry out—there was not, in essence, even anything for him to finish off. He believed that this system could function more successfully than that one on its own fuel and its own principles, and one of these principles was the special role played by the top leader, who has to be the boss. All the fundamental issues had been decided; at the solid foundation of the structure lay Marxism-Leninism (that was what "some academician" said), so that "it is necessary not to philosophize" but to work better. "The whole problem is to obtain final results more quickly. And that depends on us." He felt himself to be not a builder, not a re-builder, but a conscious and disciplined executive, the head of personnel in the readymade single factory. . . . It cannot be said that he wished to substitute his appeals to learn how to calculate and economize for the need to know how to calculate and economize. He was convinced that his appeals merely reinforced the mighty action of quite different foundations. "We have a different order, a different system. It is built in such a way that people should help one another, learn. . . . But we cannot allow slackness and passivity." That was his job: he nagged and encouraged the personnel under his leadership. . . .

When I was preparing to write this article, I was concerned most of all with two questions. Why did he never once blame any of his crushing failures on the recent war or on bad weather? And why did he never once recall the New Economic Policy (NEP)? It is now, apparently, possible to answer these questions. He did not blame anything on the war or on the weather because from his first day to his last at the head of the country he was convinced that there were no objective causes of the backwardness of

agriculture, causes that depended on no one and were given by history and nature. Anyone who thinks that he said this only as a means to mobilize the masses forgets that Khrushchev's consciousness was utopian through and through, and nothing is so foreign to utopian consciousness as the idea that there exist constraints on the building of heaven on earth that are not subject to its own will. The will and labor of man can do wonders! Everything is within man's strength; with the necessary knowledge, skill, fervor, organization, and leadership he can do anything. The philosophers have only interpreted the world; our task is to transform it.<sup>119</sup> There was something ancient, open-hearted, and magnificent in this energetic faith of the uncouth Khrushchev, but—God!—how he used to irritate us, how he used to bore us!

And what about the NEP, that attempt to rely on more or less free trade, to allow, at least within limits, state, cooperative, and private enterprise? Why was there no room for the NEP in his thoughts? After all, when he dreamed of free procurements he came close, very close. . . . But why did he pass, as though blindfolded, by the very place where it was hot, where it was already burning, and turn back? Why did nothing entice him even once to try anew—at a new, so to say, historical stage, given a new, so to say, condition of the productive forces (and whatever else our theoreticians might have thought up by way of explanation)—to combine this with that, plan with market, socialism with capitalism, as Lenin described this policy?

Khrushchev, let us recall, was a member of the team that Stalin selected and trained specially for the purpose of destroying the NEP and building barracks and labor-camp socialism. He was not created for trade. What kind of NEP could have been expected from a man who took no interest in what cost what in his country, who thought that a house could be built in the countryside for five hundred rubles? He who is born to soar up into the clouds is not going to trade. If at the end of the 1920s the leadership had called not for the suppression of the NEP but for its consolidation, Khrushchev would not have been carried aloft—more correctly, he would certainly not have been carried aloft to the place where he actually ended up. He would have remained a metalworker. (Reminiscing nostalgically in his exurban dacha-prison, he recalled how he continued to keep his metalworker's toolbox at the ready even when he was secretary of the Moscow city party committee; his salary as secretary, by the way, was less than what he had earned as a metalworker.) Perhaps he would have opened a workshop of his own. But most likely he would have been a trade-union agitator and spoken up in opposition to the revisionist government. "The traders are leading them by the nose," he would have cried out. "They are betraying our ideals!"

He was too naive and straightforward to play up to people and to himself, calmly and without a trace of shame to sit on two stools and declare that the laws of commodity economy are not capitalist or socialist phenomena but something in the nature of a language of economic communication that does not depend on time and place. He was not as strong in dialectics as are some of our academicians, who promise us all the advantages of full self-financing without permitting a market in capital or labor power<sup>120</sup>—supposedly we could both have our cake and eat it. A chaste man, Khrushchev had a strong suspicion that while there were all kinds of possibilities *that* was something that couldn't be managed.

I remember how we used to talk, as though he could hear us: “What is it that you are after, granddad, searching for good people, fraying your nerves and other people's, too? Give the collective farmers a third of the harvest of your wonder crop—and you can lie on your stove<sup>121</sup> and spit at the ceiling and the country will be flooded with corn in all its forms! Give! What will it cost you? After all, you yourself curse the local lords<sup>122</sup> for abolishing such a powerful incentive as payment in kind. Give them a quarter at least, not just of corn but of everything—meat, milk, wool, eggs. Give—and tomorrow you yourself will be astonished. Where did it all come from? How did they ever get such big harvests, cattle that fattened so quickly,<sup>123</sup> such quantities of milk, such abundant wool clippings, so many eggs?” But how could he, a conscious proletarian and collectivist at the head of the state, have given away the people's wealth? It would have meant unleashing petty bourgeois spontaneity<sup>124</sup> at a single stroke! The collective farmer would have begun to use the corn in any way he liked—he'd have fed it to his livestock, he'd have sold it, wherever he liked; that's market spontaneity for you! But just you start to order him, the collective farmer, about and show him what he must do with his produce (in some places, in order to ensure a good crop, he'll have to be given as much as a half), and in reality you'll quickly and inevitably end up requisitioning and stop giving altogether.

Khrushchev sensed more clearly than we did that this contradiction could not be resolved without repudiating collectivism. Unlike us, he had no illusions because he never could have had any. For Khrushchev this would have meant burning everything that he had worshiped and worshipping everything that he had burnt; he would not have had enough time left for him to do it. . . . So only at first glance does it seem strange that he should have pulled the countryside out of Stalin's pit by means of economic methods that smelled of the NEP but then, instead of continuing to make use of them with increasing boldness, rejected them and become obsessed with

trifles, with spreading knowledge about better farming methods and with “bureau-ism” (*kontorizm*), as his bureaucratic reorganizations were dubbed by the late Innokenty Ivanovich Barakov, a well-known rebel of the 1960s and head of the Georgiyevsk agricultural administration in Stavropol territory.<sup>125</sup> After all, the same thing was to happen later under Brezhnev. They pulled the countryside out of Khrushchev’s pit by means of methods that smelled even more strongly of the NEP, but instead of continuing to make use of them. . . . In short, the tale of the white bull-calf.<sup>126</sup> Khrushchev’s recoil was attributed to his subjectivism and his voluntarism (only not, of course, to his romanticism, which would have been at least a tiny bit closer if not to the truth then at least to Nikita’s nature). Brezhnev’s recoil was attributed to. . . . To what, by the way, did we attribute it? To bureaucratic intrigues, it seems, as though bureaucracy were its own boss and not just an instrument in someone’s hands. And what if we were to ask Khrushchev himself, Brezhnev himself? One would reply in his own words, stammering and shaking his fists, while the other would read out a prepared text from a sheet of paper, but the two replies would boil down to the same thing: “We must not go too far down the road of the NEP because we must never go too far down the road of the NEP.”

Khrushchev believed in his system. He did not doubt that the potential of this system was truly boundless, that the right goals had been chosen, and that we had to pursue those goals and those goals alone: not to wander, not to deviate, not to permit concessions to anything that was not ours, that was private. He did not resort to cunning tricks or think up obfuscating expressions like “individual labor activity”<sup>127</sup> but called things by their proper names.

Khrushchev was neither a bureaucrat like Malenkov nor a philistine like Brezhnev. He had a very acute sense of personal responsibility for the promises that his party had made to the people in 1917. In one of his first speeches after Stalin’s death, he sternly reminded party members: “Before the revolution we were not responsible for the state, but now, after the party has led the country for thirty-eight years, it is insufficient just to criticize the capitalist economic system and talk about the need to build the economy on the basis of the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. . . . The people say to us: ‘I believe you, I fought for this in the Civil War, I fought the Germans and crushed fascism, but tell me all the same. Will there be meat or not? Will there be milk or not? Will there be good pants?’ That, of course, is not ideology. But we can’t have everyone possessing the correct ideology but going around without pants.”

Ten years after the war—not forty years, not fifty, but ten!—he regarded such popular demands as legitimate and demonstrated that their satisfaction



could no longer be put off, that there was no other way forward. He felt, he was convinced that there was no longer any other way that he could justify himself in an honest fashion, without lies and demagoguery, all the intrigues of world imperialism notwithstanding. And supplying the people with meat and pants was not the only duty that the Communists urgently owed them. No, the account that he presented to his party in the people's name was far bigger: "If we do not provide our people with a standard of living higher than that in the developed capitalist countries, then, it may be asked, what kind of communists are we? For communism is not something out of this world. We are not priests, who say that the earthly kingdom is our temporary abode but the heavenly kingdom is life everlasting and must be earned through suffering in this life. We," he reminded them courageously, "got rid of the bourgeoisie not only in order to take power but also in order to reconstruct the economy and provide our people with the highest standard of living."

Once you've set off on a journey, don't stop halfway. Having taken on the government of the country, set itself great tasks, and made grandiose promises, the party had to bear a responsibility that was no smaller. Who else so decisively acknowledged the essence of the matter? Who else so selflessly cut off the path of his retreat? Having received the sobering calculations of the economists, Khrushchev could, had he so wished, have swallowed his pride and chased after America [in per capita output of meat, milk, and butter] no longer. It is not hard to cover up yesterday's noise with today's; people would soon have forgotten the old slogans. True, then he would have had to look for another great task for the people, because that is what a leader is for—to urge the masses on to accomplish great feats. He would have found a task and urged them on. But he could not deceive himself. While his country continued to produce only one-third as much meat [per capita] as the United States, he could not feel sure about the authority of socialism in the world. He looked at the root of the matter. For all his daydreaming, he did not for a second lose sight of that merciless essence of the matter: the absence of exploitation and unemployment could not by themselves prove the worth and superiority of socialism, but had to be combined with the presence of a good piece of meat. As a worker-revolutionary he had no other way out. For if the potential of socialism were not boundless, if no miracle were to occur, the whole cause of building socialism would fail. The world, and the Soviet people themselves, would come to the conclusion that the other system was the better one and regard everything that had taken place in our country as a misunderstanding. That was how his generation of revolutionaries looked at things. And looking at things in that way, they



could count only on a miracle, on great leaps forward, on assaults by storm, on military methods and military force. It is no coincidence that the main words in their vocabulary were combat, offensive, frontlines, headquarters. . . .

Khrushchev was an acknowledged master at imbuing quite ordinary events and achievements, such as the opening up of virgin and fallow lands to cultivation, with the most elevated meaning. In a few days he filled the air that young people breathed with such electricity that you can still hear it crackling. For putting the first man in space they called him in the West, without a trace of ridicule and often even with gratitude, a brilliant propagandist. It was precisely he who landed Americans on the moon. Without him they would have occupied themselves for another twenty years or so with other, more practical matters. But this brilliant propagandist knew where and for what propaganda is powerless. You can't replace a piece of meat or a pair of pants with a slogan. To have believed the economists' calculations would have meant admitting that his ideas of what socialism was capable of were mistaken. For Khrushchev, accepting that it would take a couple of decades to reach America's shores meant one thing: "giving the ideologists of the capitalist world the chance to chatter on for a long time yet against the socialist system, against the collective-farm system." The prospect of wrangling with them for another twenty years on an empty stomach did not suit him.<sup>128</sup>

You can call Khrushchev a utopian or whatever else you like, because he was a muddled man, but one thing you can't call him is an adventurer. He simply resolved to test Stalin's brainchild on a big task and demanded of the system those capabilities that were declared in its passport.<sup>129</sup> He believed those who had filled in this passport—all those Strumilins, Kronrods, and Ostrovityanovs, with goatees and clean-shaven, in traditional peasant blouses and wearing ties<sup>130</sup>—the dashing victors of the fight against "defeatists" and "deviationists" of various kinds.<sup>131</sup> And so he set up the test. (God knows, he did it unintentionally—the results must be considered all the more reliable.) The beginning of the 1960s resounded with such paeans in his praise that our Nikita Sergeevich, it seemed, would never lose faith in his own infallibility. But he managed to rise to self-criticism, and that was connected, apparently, not only with his nature but also with his frame of mind. Had he not discovered big mistakes in his previous activity, had he not blamed failures on himself, he would have had no other recourse but to admit that the system was at fault. And that he could not, still could not bring himself to admit. He needed to believe that communism was close at hand. By admitting his own errors he strengthened this faith and continued to strive forward at full tilt.

Specialists, experts on world farming, say that it is already to Khrushchev's honor and credit that he placed the creation of up-to-date livestock husbandry on the agenda; without this romantic, they say, corn would have reached us all the same, but ten years or so later. It was precisely his clumsy rush to catch up with and surpass America that hastened its inevitable arrival. This is probably true, but what a fate for our homeland! By what savage paths, in what barbarous guises progress comes to us! Introducing new industries and lines of production, new materials and technologies, new crops and breeds, new forms of organization by means of decrees and appeals—what could be more savage? And yet we have got used to it and even praise ourselves: we are supposedly exploiting the advantages of social property, centralized planning, and devil knows what else.

In the midst of his titanic labors to introduce the square-cluster method of cultivating corn, Khrushchev recalled how in 1951, as secretary of the Moscow party committee, he had forced Dugin, chairman of a collective farm in Ramenskoye county,<sup>132</sup> to plant potatoes in squares. They were standing in the field, rain and snow were falling, and the women collective farmers were looking at him sullenly. "I started to joke," he recounted, "but there was no response. However, they did plant the potatoes in squares and from then on things went better: instead of harvesting four or five tons per hectare they began to bring in fifteen." What could be more perverted and hopeless than this picture: Khrushchev standing by his black limousine, the rain pouring down and the snow piling up on him, persuading some Dugin or other and his sullen people to plant potatoes not this way but that? Brezhnev too would recall how he had introduced something somewhere. There is no boss, big or small, who has not introduced something useful somewhere. But what can we expect from a system under which a fat city boss needs squares, indeed the collective farm itself, more than the villagers do? The closer a person to the land, the fewer his rights to the product of the land and of his own labor. The further a person from the land, the greater his rights to the product of the land and of others' labor. And they call it—on the basis of social property—in the interests of the whole people, and, yet again—in accordance with a single damned plan.

As he approached his seventieth year he got tired. "Devilishly!"—he admitted to his aide [Shevchenko]. In 1964 he thought up yet another reorganization. This time it was a top-down scheme that captured his imagination: a single Moscow office together with its [regional] branches would administer grain cultivation throughout the country. (At the head of this office he wanted to put Kulakov;<sup>133</sup> he even managed to talk it over with

him.) Another office would administer pig farming, a third dairy livestock, and so on.<sup>134</sup> (Toward the end of Brezhnev's period of stagnation,<sup>135</sup> this idea, born of "subjectivism" and "voluntarism,"<sup>136</sup> also began to be implemented: a ministry of vegetables was established—enough to make a cat laugh, and the world as well. It is simply impossible for those on the treadmill of bureaucratic concepts of economic life to think up anything else, and each thing they think up will be a greater marvel than the thing before; just look at Agroprom.)<sup>137</sup> A resolution about the new reorganization was to be adopted by a Central Committee plenum [in November 1964]. Before the plenum Khrushchev traveled around the country. His relations with the colleagues with whom he worked were already extremely tense; moreover, there was nothing particularly fundamental or ideological-political about the causes that underlay the tension. Shevchenko recalls:

"Podgorny was on vacation. Khrushchev called him: 'There you are enjoying yourself while I'm working!' He strained his relations with them all to an incredible extent. He offended everyone around him and remained alone. He himself, of course, got tired, terribly tired. In Krasnodar territory [in 1963] he looked at how the cattle were being fattened up, then he went on to Ordzhonikidze, and then flew on to Kazan.<sup>138</sup>

"They called him from Moscow during the night, they wanted to talk with him.

"'He's already asleep,' I said.

"'Wake him up!'

"'I can't do that,' I said. 'It's very late, there's a two-hour time difference.'

"'No, wake him up!'

"I went into the room where he was sleeping and called out: 'Nikita Sergeyevich!' He remained asleep. I pressed him on the shoulder.

"'What is it?' he asked. 'War?'

"'Yes,' I said.

"'Who attacked who?'

"'Some fighting has broken out in Cyprus.'

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to clear the text of our declaration on the matter with Khrushchev. I told them: 'It was you who got us into this business. Why can't you make the declaration yourselves?'

"In the morning Khrushchev went to Bugulma, after Bugulma on to Ufa, to Tselinograd, then to Kokchetav, and from there to Frunze. From Frunze he was supposed to fly to Norilsk.<sup>139</sup> He summoned me: 'What's going on in the world?' This and that. 'I'm tired,' he says, 'devilishly tired. I'm going to sleep. Don't wake me even if it's war.'

“In February [1964], as I recall, he was in Kiev and met with a lot of people. We returned to Moscow. The train had only just left Kiev when he summoned me to drink a glass of tea with him and said: ‘I’m devilishly tired! I’ll be seventy in April. I’ll either have to give up all my posts or leave myself just some little job.’ But then when he reached seventy and the doctors told him that he was in good health, he decided to stay on. And Brezhnev told him: ‘Stay on.’ But he really was intending to resign and really might have resigned, because he was at the limit of his strength. And he quarreled bitterly with everyone. He fell out with Voronov over beef cattle. A nonsensical quarrel. Voronov and Polyansky didn’t get on with each other; Khrushchev supported now one of them, now the other, and then fell out with them both. He fell out with Suslov,<sup>140</sup> too. So no special effort was needed to kick him out; they were all ready for it; they were all against him, and he was already terribly tired. And he had no one left except his [youngest] grandsons Vanya and Nikita. That’s all.”

Other people among those closest to Khrushchev confirm that he was thinking of retiring. They say that in spring 1964 he gathered together on some pretext about five hundred leading officials, before whom he delivered a heartrendingly self-critical speech. He said that he and they had not managed to fulfill the promises that he had made to the people, that they had achieved nothing, and that it was, apparently, necessary to make way for others and let them have a try. Some well-informed insiders are of the opinion that it was precisely this outburst by Khrushchev and the seriousness of his intention to resign that hastened his political end. The Stalinists and the philistines, the iron Shuriks<sup>141</sup> and obliging Ilyiches<sup>142</sup> alike (the former dreamed of imposing real order without him, while the latter dreamed of eating and drinking their fill and in general enjoying themselves), did not want Khrushchev to set an example for the future. A country in which the leader can leave his post only as a result of death or a plot—that is one country, that is their country. A country in which a person acknowledges defeat, cedes his place in a dignified fashion to someone else and, surrounded by due respect and attention, continues so far as his strength permits to take part in public life—that is a different country altogether, worse for them than a foreign land.

A day before Khrushchev’s departure on vacation, in the middle of the night, a member of his family who lived separately was supposedly approached by a sturdy middle-aged man with tightly compressed lips. He identified himself as attached to (that is, a bodyguard of) Comrade N., a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.<sup>143</sup> According to what he said, N. had spent the entire summer traveling around the country, meeting with

the first secretaries of province party committees, and discussing with them, openly and in the crudest fashion, the question of Comrade Khrushchev's removal. "My coming to you," the late-night guest supposedly said, "is a crime on my part. But I learned that tomorrow Nikita Sergeevich is going on vacation. He must not go. In any case, he should bear my information in mind."

Before departing Khrushchev apparently gathered his colleagues together and said that information had reached him concerning which question they had been discussing recently and menacingly promised to take up this matter after his vacation.

The comrades understood that they must not delay.

When he was removed, there were celebrations in the editorial offices of the newspaper where I was working. Tamara G. (now a sedate lady, a boss and a grandmother) danced on the table. We amiably and confidently expected a turn for the better. A few days before this, his latest and—as it turned out—last memorandum to the Central Committee Presidium was sent out to newspaper editorial offices; it set out his scheme for the top-down reorganization of agriculture that I have already mentioned. A friend who worked for *Izvestia* called me.

"Have you read it?" he asked.

"I have." Before me there really lay a slim booklet in a red cover.

"Well, old buddy, what do you think of it? I think it's a dead end. In a matter of days, mark my words, they'll chase him out."

He took it hard. In the corridors of the editorial offices,<sup>144</sup> the words of his little grandson reached us: "Grandfather does nothing. He just sits in the armchair all day and cries." Toward the spring he began to rouse himself, go over to the dacha, and wander about the garden plot. Without great surprise he discovered that the dacha was surrounded. "I don't know whether they're guarding me or guarding against me, but they're good lads," he remarked later, when he started to dictate his memoirs. He dug up his old metalworker's tools and set about arranging a hydroponics-based system in the greenhouse. He had a hard time of it; the tools kept slipping out of his hands. He found it hard to make the transition from one kind of life, in which he not only felt involved in everything—that would remain with him until the end—but was also responsible for everything, in which he not only poked his nose into everything but was able to share, tirelessly, everything that he had managed to find out with the people, to suggest and advise (to sow flax<sup>145</sup> and sweet lupines; not to neglect carrots, as for feeding pigs it is even better than sugar beets and potatoes; to respect watermelons: Makar Posmitny<sup>146</sup> in Odessa province feeds his cows with them, while Trofim

Lysenko's father in Karlovka in Poltava province<sup>147</sup> feeds his cows both musk-melons and watermelons. Turkmen plant breeders should concern themselves with camel's thorn so that instead of growing wild it is cultivated as a valuable feed crop. "Here comrades may say that Khrushchev has started throwing thorns at us," he joked, speaking in Ashkhabad.<sup>148</sup> A good speech, a successful trip, glorious weather . . .)—to make the transition from that kind of life to another, to live out the rest of his days.

It was precisely the impossibility of taking initiatives and not simply the loss of power that tormented him. Now he more and more believed that the sole privilege that he had enjoyed at the top rung of power was the privilege of creative initiative. So it perhaps was in 1953, at the very beginning of his power; it is above all to that time that the words about his role as the country's top leader, as he entrusted them to the tape recorder, apply. The role of such a person, he said, "must manifest itself in initiative. . . . In my time I never took any decisions on my own, as an individual. Indeed, under the conditions in which I worked it was impossible to do so. But it was I myself who created and tried to strengthen those conditions of collective leadership."

He started to dictate his memoirs in 1967. He tried to record first of all the events in which he had himself taken part or that he had himself witnessed. He told the story of the Ukrainian famine of 1947. He reported to Moscow concerning the approaching calamity, so it turns out, as early as autumn 1946. Ukraine had given up to the state all that it had grown, he emphasized, requesting permission to organize public feeding of the collective farmers, "because they are unable to work." Kosygin, who was in Moldavia at that time,<sup>149</sup> reported the same thing: they are starving, they are suffering from dystrophy, they are unable to work. Stalin called Khrushchev's report libelous; he shouted at Kosygin, and thereafter, until the day he died, whenever he met with Kosygin, who was distinguished by unusual thinness, he liked to joke "Ah, here's my dystrophic friend!"—and he sent Ukraine's meager grain to Poland. Wanda Wasilewska,<sup>150</sup> after a trip back to her homeland, told Khrushchev that people in Warsaw were displeased with the Soviet government because it was sending them not only white but also black bread.<sup>151</sup> They did not know, she sighed, that "the Ukrainians, whose bread is being sent to Poland, are at this moment swelling up with hunger and resorting to cannibalism." Khrushchev bore witness that there certainly had been cases of cannibalism: "I knew it, Stalin knew it, others to whom I spoke knew it." He took scrupulous care that his account should not put the Poles in a bad light or harm Polish-Soviet friendship: when they cursed the Soviets for the black bread, they really did not know what was going on in

Ukraine. The Polish government had asked for aid and Stalin had given aid: it was their business to ask and his to give or not to give. He gave it, so it seemed to Khrushchev, because he felt guilty before the Poles. Public feeding during work in the fields was organized only in spring 1947, when people were already being blown over by the wind. (I was eight years old at the time. My mother used to send me into the fields, where I could get some *zatirka* from the common cauldron to gulp down. *Zatirka* was a soup that contained little pieces of dough.<sup>152</sup> It had a bad effect on the stomach, and mother would give me a pickled cucumber to take with me so that it would hurt less.)

Khrushchev made a record not only of the past, but sometimes also of events in his current life. He tells how once hail suddenly descended and struck the open veranda where a long narrow box with flowers stood. And look, half of the flowers were struck down, but the other half didn't suffer in any way and even did surprisingly well. To him this was yet another demonstration of the fact that crops suffer less from hail than they do from drought, "because hail never falls over large areas, while drought can doom whole countries to famine."

His work with the tape recorder revived him: his interest in hydroponics returned, and every morning he would hurry to the greenhouse to look at the cucumbers. One morning he went in there and fainted: all of a sudden they had begun to waste away. He rushed off to call his former assistant. "Don't worry," the faithful Shevchenko said cheerfully. "Don't come to any hasty conclusions. Most likely the sprayers are clogged up." And he was right: the sprayers only needed to be cleaned, and the cucumbers revived.

They had worked together for about a quarter of a century. Khrushchev had taken a vacation almost every year; Shevchenko had not had a single vacation for the past fifteen years. Khrushchev entrusted many matters to his assistant, who always remained in the shadows.

Once, when he gave him his instructions for the day, he said: "Today we shall take Beria."<sup>153</sup> Shevchenko had a concern of his own: "Nikita Sergeyeovich, I have with me Grandmother Khobta; she is asking for you."

This was Yelena Semyonovna Khobta, an elderly collective-farm field-team leader from Kiev province. Khrushchev knew her well. "What kind of irthirity (that's how she pronounced the word "authority"—A. S.) will I have," she asked, "if I return to my village without seeing Khrushchev?! Let me at least take a peek at him through a chink in the wall."

Khrushchev didn't have a second for her: it was time to set off for the Kremlin. He took her with him into the car. The ride from the Central Committee building on Staraya Ploshchad (Old Square) to the Kremlin took only



a minute; all they managed was to tell each other about their health. Khrushchev went in to take Beria, while Grandmother Khobta and Shevchenko rode back in the same car. At the exit [from the Kremlin] through the Spassky Tower they were detained. The new army guard<sup>154</sup> did not want to know about any Shevchenko or any Grandmother Khobta, especially as the old woman had forgotten to bring with her the identification slip that served as a substitute for a passport<sup>155</sup> and left it in her bundle in Shevchenko's office. They released them only when they received an order to that effect from the Commandant of the Kremlin himself, General Vedenin.<sup>156</sup> Three days later there appeared in the newspaper *Pravda Ukrainy* a news item informing the reader that the distinguished Ukrainian field-team leader Yelena Khobta had visited Moscow, where she had a conversation with Khrushchev "about questions of collective farm development."

On November 10, 1982, I spent the whole day behind the wheel on the Simferopol Road,<sup>157</sup> driving to Moscow from my native village. On the road I listened to neither Soviet nor hostile radio voices.<sup>158</sup> Only a call from an old friend inviting me round right away brought me back to myself.

On the luxuriously spread table, among the plates and bottles, there stuck out for some reason a turned-on [portable] Spidola radio.

"You really know nothing about it?! Brezhnev is dead."

"It can't be," I said in an indifferent tone. "He's immortal."

Other guests arrived and a hubbub began that lasted until dawn. There was one person sitting at the table who did not share the general conviction that the deceased leader was incapable of talking in his own words. At the beginning of the 1970s, this man, who was engaged in diplomatic work of a very modest kind, almost by chance found himself serving as interpreter during a long, confidential, extraordinarily important and tense talk between Brezhnev and the ambassador of some great power. The subject under discussion was so serious, so much in the world depended on the results of the meeting that the ambassador's knees were shaking, strong man and seasoned diplomat though he was—shaking not out of fear but in agitation for his country. "Such conversations are not conducted on the basis of prepared texts. And you should have heard how Brezhnev spoke!"<sup>159</sup>—this guest at our feast recalled as he drank and ate together with the rest of us.

The wiser for experience, we did not await a turn for the better and only for the better. Peering into the future, we enumerated various scenarios. One of us wrote these forecasts down in a booklet. Someone said that they would tighten the screws. (And this forecast appeared to be confirmed by the way in which the censorship grew fiercer under Andropov and the police, accompanied by



volunteers, roamed the public baths and barbershops searching for people who were steaming themselves or getting shaved or having their hair cut during working time—not to mention other, more sinister signs.) Someone else hoped for democratization. A third person thought that nothing would change, that everything would go on as before, “until it reaches the point of complete decay,” and then, supposedly, some iron Shurik would be found, and so on and so on. One of us, a not very self-confident person but a clever one, vainly making sure that his words were being taken down accurately, said that none of these three scenarios would come to pass. There would be a fantastic, absurd, unprecedented, and purely Russian mixture of all three—of however many we might think of—scenarios and through this mishmash, slowly and imperceptibly, the real scenario preordained for us would break through, and as for what that scenario would be like—who knows?

— Anatoly Strelyany

1. The Central Committee of the CPSU had several secretaries, each of whom bore responsibility for the oversight of a particular sphere of activity (industry, agriculture, ideology, etc.). Khrushchev at this time was already “chief secretary,” in charge of all the other secretaries, and in addition he was directly responsible for agriculture. In September 1953 he was officially appointed first secretary. [SS]

2. Dmitry Shepilov was chief editor of *Pravda*. Vasily Polyakov was head of the newspaper’s agriculture department. See Biographies.

Ivan Danilovich Laptev was a specialist in the economics of agriculture. He obtained the degree of Candidate of Economic Sciences in 1948. Subsequently he became a professor. Information about his membership in the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences is lacking. [SK]

3. Vladimir Nikonovich Starovsky (1905–75). See Biographies. [SS]

4. Marshal Budyonny felt an emotional attachment to the cavalry, which—as Khrushchev was doubtless well aware—had become an outdated arm of service. [SS]

5. A Russian acronym for “financial agents.” [SS]

6. A work brigade leader was the head of a work brigade, one of the main subdivisions of a collective farm, usually corresponding to a single village. [SS]

7. Valentin Vladimirovich Ovechkin (1904–68). See Biographies.

8. A *kobzar* was a traditional Ukrainian folk minstrel who sang to the accompaniment of a kind of lute called a *kobza*. [SS]

9. The reference is to the rural communes of the early 1920s, where living accommodation as well as property was shared and all proceeds were divided equally among the members. [SK]

10. The reference is to the internal passport that a Soviet citizen was required to present when registering for residence at a new place. [SS]

11. One hectare is about 2.4 acres. [SK]

12. This was called the square-cluster method of cultivation. See the chapter “The Agricultural Field as a Chessboard.” [SS]

13. One centner is 100 kilograms. [SS]

14. The reference is to the regions in Russia’s far north beyond the Arctic Circle, including Chukotka in northeastern Siberia, where in the summer it remains light throughout the night. [SS]

15. The Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS) were facilities set up in the early 1930s in rural areas to assist in the mechanization of agriculture. They were abolished in 1958. [SK]

16. Maya Plisetskaya was one of the most famous Soviet ballerinas. Svyatoslav Rikhter was a famous pianist. See the chapter “Stalin’s Family, and His Daughter Svetlana” and notes 21 and 22 to that chapter. [SK]

17. Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov (1902–60) was a nuclear physicist and a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and of its presidium. From 1943 to 1960 he was director of the Institute of Atomic Energy of the USSR Academy of Sciences, also known as Laboratory No. 2, which was responsible for the Soviet atomic-bomb project. See Biographies. [SS]

18. The Communist Party committees at the province and rural county levels were responsible

for administering the collective and state farms. [SS]

19. The Republic of Udmurtia is situated on the River Volga just west of the Urals. Its latitude is a little to the north of that of Moscow. [SS]

20. Chita and Ulan-Ude are in eastern Siberia, Arkhangelsk and Vologda in the north of European Russia. [SS]

21. Ivanovo is about 300 kilometers to the northeast of Moscow. [SS]

22. *Kukuruz* is Russian for “corn.” In this jocular expression, it is given the patronymic Nikitichna as though it were a person and a daughter of Nikita Khrushchev. [SS]

23. “Socialist competition” was a system of organized rivalry between enterprises, collective and state farms, and territorial units in which those who reached the highest production targets were rewarded with special honors and acclaim. [SS]

24. Khrushchev initiated a campaign to bring a large area of previously uncultivated steppe in northern Kazakhstan and southern Siberia under cultivation. This area was called the virgin lands. [SS]

25. Ryazan is situated about 150 kilometers to the southeast of Moscow. Tula is about 150 kilometers, and Lipetsk about 300 kilometers, south of Moscow. [SS]

26. Bryansk is situated about 400 kilometers to the southwest of Moscow. [SS]

27. Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk are in eastern Ukraine. Gomel is in Belorussia. Rostov is in the south of European Russia, and Chelyabinsk is in the Urals. Omsk is a city in western Siberia. [SS]

28. The pood is an old Russian measure of weight, equal to 36 pounds (16 kilograms). A ton corresponds to about 60 poods. [SS]

29. The farming groups in question were “field-teams” or “links” (*zvenya*), consisting of 10–15 collective farmers. A brigade, the basic subdivision of a collective farm, contained 4–6 field-teams. The Komsomol was the Young Communist League, the youth adjunct of the Communist Party. [SK]

30. Terenty Maltsev and Aleksandr Barayev were agronomists. Maltsev was director of the Agricultural Research Institute in Siberia. Barayev (1908–85) was a member of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the author of works on methods of cultivation that protect soil from wind erosion. [SK]

31. *Chizh* is the Russian word for “siskin,” an olive-green songbird belonging to the finch family. *Chizh*, a former army major demobilized in connection with Khrushchev’s reduction of the armed forces, achieved great success as a pig breeder. Khrushchev often mentioned *Chizh* in his speeches as a model worthy of emulation. [SK]

32. The Gold Star was one of the highest civilian medals, awarded to Heroes of Socialist Labor. [SK]

33. The Meshcher territory (Meshchersky Krai) is a part of Ryazan province near the Oka River,

noted for its fertile land and beautiful scenery. It is the homeland of the Meshcheryaks, an ethnic group of mixed Russian and Volga Finn ancestry. [SK]

34. The *beys* were the rulers of the Kazakh nomads in the days before their lands were incorporated into the Russian empire. Here the term is used ironically to refer to Kazakh party and state officials. [SS]

35. Dinmukhamed Akhmedovich Kunayev (1912–1993) was first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan from 1960 to 1962 and from 1964 to 1986. [SS]

36. Kalinovka was Khrushchev’s native village, situated in the far west of Kursk province in southwestern Russia. Grachev was chairman of the Kalinovka collective farm. [SS]

37. Vasily Kavun was chairman of the collective farm named after the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, situated in Vinnitsa province in western Ukraine, from 1958 to 1970. Later he became a local government and party official. [SK]

38. Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny began his career as an engineer, later becoming deputy commissar of food industry of Ukraine. He was a member of the party Central Committee from 1956 and of its Presidium from 1960. In 1965, after Khrushchev was ousted, he was appointed chairman of the Central Committee Presidium. He was removed from the Politburo by Brezhnev in 1977. See Biographies. [SS]

39. Later this dacha was the residence of President Boris Yeltsin. Its name has now been changed from Dacha No. 9 to Gorky-9. Ilinskoye is a different place down the Moscow River. [SK]

40. The Non-Black Earth Zone is the less fertile part of central Russia. Nemchinovka is situated near Moscow. [SS]

41. Simazine is a synthetic chemical widely used as a herbicide. It was first registered in 1957 by Ciba Plant Protection (now Novartis Crop Protection, Inc.). In addition to being fatal to all but the hardiest forms of plant life, Simazine has been found to be carcinogenic. [SS]

42. Trofim Denisovich Lysenko (1898–1976) was an agronomist from Ukraine who gained the political backing of both Stalin and Khrushchev and the status of academician despite his inadequate understanding of scientific method. He opposed genetics and believed that acquired characteristics could be inherited. For accounts of Lysenko’s theories and career, see <http://www.comms.dcu.ie/sheehan/lysenko.htm> or Zhores Medvedev, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko*, trans. I. Michael Lerner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). [SS]

43. Herbert George Wells, *Russia in the Shadows* (New York: George H. Doran Co., c. 1921). Wells’s “Kremlin dreamer” is Lenin. [SS]

44. Voronezh is situated in southwestern Russia. [SS]

45. Zaporozhye is a large industrial city in eastern Ukraine. [SS]

46. Gennady Ivanovich Voronov was a member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the CPSU Central Committee from 1961 to 1973. He was chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR in 1962–71 and chairman of the Committee of People's Control of the USSR in 1971–73. See Biographies.

Dmitry Stepanovich Polyansky was a member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the CPSU Central Committee from 1960 to 1976. In 1962–65 he was deputy chairman and in 1965–73 first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and minister of agriculture of the USSR in 1973–76. See Biographies.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was a member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the CPSU Central Committee from 1957 to 1982. He was first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in 1964–82. See Biographies.

For Podgorny, see note 38. [SS]

47. Kostroma province is situated in north-western Russia. [SS]

48. The Candidate of Sciences is an advanced academic degree, roughly equivalent to an American Ph.D. [SS]

49. See note 40. Moscow province belongs to the Non-Black Earth Zone. [SS]

50. Kirill Trofimovich Mazurov was a member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the CPSU Central Committee from 1965 to 1978. He was first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia in 1956–65 and first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1965–78. See Biographies. [SS]

51. "Arrears" in this context means that in addition to achieving increases in output planned for future years they were expected to make up for shortfalls in the fulfillment of plans for past years. [SS]

52. The Black Earth provinces are the provinces located in the Black Earth Zone, the highly fertile lands of southern Russia and central and eastern Ukraine. [SS]

53. For Podgorny see note 38. At that time he was first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Vladimir Vasilyevich Shcherbitsky (1918–90) occupied leading party and state positions in Ukraine from 1957 to 1989. From 1961 to 1963 and again from 1965 he was chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, and from 1972 he was first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian party. [SS]

54. Gagra is a resort on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, in northern Abkhazia. [SS]

55. There were ministries of agriculture both for the Soviet Union as a whole (the union ministry) and for each of the union republics. Lenin Hillocks (Gorki Leninskiye) was a state farm to the south of Moscow, where Lenin died in 1924. They should not be confused with the Lenin Hills (Leninskiye

Gory), an elevated part of Moscow where Moscow State University is situated. [SK]

56. Khrushchev actively promoted the mechanized milking of cows. The "spruce tree" system was a system of mechanized milking borrowed from the United States. To prevent the cows breaking away from the milking machines, they are milked in semi-enclosed spaces arranged on either side of the milk duct like the branches of a spruce tree around its trunk. [SK]

57. This proverb makes a rhyme in Russian, with "flax" (*lyon*) rhyming with "clever" (*umyon*). It refers to the traditional practice of sowing flax and clover in alternate years. The clover serves to fix nitrogen from the air, thereby restoring soil fertility for the succeeding year's flax crop. [SK]

58. The three-field grassland system was designed to restore soil fertility without the need for chemical or other fertilizers. In the successive years of a three-year cycle, a field was sown with wheat, sown with grass (clover, lucerne, etc.), and left to lie fallow. Thus in any one year only one field out of three was sown with wheat. The system was advocated in the 1930s by V. R. Vilyams, who was supported by Stalin. It was opposed by Academician Pryanishnikov. [SK]

59. A shadoof is a pole with bucket and counterpoise traditionally used for raising water from a well in Russia as well as some other countries (such as Egypt). [SS]

60. Nikolai Maksimovich Tulaikov (1875–1938) was a well-known Russian agronomist and soil scientist. His works were devoted to plant physiology, agrochemistry, and soil management—in particular, the problems of cultivation in dry soils. He worked at the Saratov Agricultural Institute. He was awarded the Lenin Prize in 1929 and became a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1932 and of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences in 1935. A victim of the Stalin-era repression, he was rehabilitated posthumously. [SK/SS]

61. Roswell Garst was an American farmer from Iowa with whom Khrushchev struck up a friendship in 1955 while Garst was visiting the USSR. Khrushchev visited Garst's farm during his trip to the United States in September 1959. [SS] See the chapter "From New York to Iowa" in Volume 3 (forthcoming) of the present edition of the memoirs. [GS]

62. The Kuban is another name for Krasnodar territory in southern European Russia, part of the fertile Black Earth Zone. [SS]

63. The new party program adopted in 1961 proclaimed that the Soviet people would now undertake "the full-scale construction of communism." [SS]

64. "Arable land" included meadows and other farmland in addition to plowed land. [SK]

65. Sputniks, literally "fellow travelers," was the name given to Soviet artificial earth satellites. The dummy was sent into orbit in winter 1960–61 as

part of the preparation for the manned space flight of Yuri Gagarin on April 12, 1961. [SK]

66. In 1961, Tselinograd (Virgin Lands City) in northern Kazakhstan was made the capital of the Virgin Lands Territory—that is, the administrative center of the virgin lands campaign. The original name of the city, which grew up around a Russian fortress erected in 1824, was Akmolinsk. When Kazakhstan gained independence in 1991, the city was renamed Aqmola (or Akmola). In 1994 it was made the capital of Kazakhstan, and in 1997 it was renamed Astana.

Nalivaiko was another agronomist with different views concerning soil management. [SK]

67. Shortandy is situated in southern Siberia near the border with Kazakhstan. [SS]

68. Soviet propaganda took great pride in the fact that the Soviet Union occupied one sixth of the Earth's land surface. [SS]

69. At the Central Committee plenum of November 19–23, 1962, Khrushchev subdivided the province party committees into separate committees for industry and for agriculture. This reform was reversed immediately after his removal from power. [SS]

70. Kirov province has now been given back its old name of Vyatka province. It is in the north of European Russia. [SS]

71. The reference is to the September 1953 Central Committee plenum on agriculture, at which it was decided to ensure the growth of agricultural output, lower taxes on the rural population, and raise the prices at which the state purchased agricultural products. [SK]

72. The name later given to the economic system in force in 1918–21, roughly corresponding to the period of the Civil War between the Bolsheviks and their opponents. An attempt was made at this time to suppress the operation of market mechanisms and subject the whole economy to detailed control by central agencies. [SS]

73. Under Stalin, failure to reach economic-plan targets as well as industrial accidents, shortages of consumer goods, and other real and imaginary negative phenomena were often attributed to the deliberate sabotage of particular managers, engineers, and officials. Such “wreckers” were arrested and sentenced to prison terms or even to death. [SS]

74. In eastern Ukraine. [SS]

75. Milk-wax is a stage in the ripening of corn-stalks at which they are already full but not yet dry. At this stage they can be chopped up and stored for use as feed during the winter—a North American practice that Khrushchev urged be adopted in Russia. [SK]

76. In Russian this saying involves a play on words. *Stoish'* [you stand] and *stóish'* [you are worth] differ only in the syllable that is stressed. [SS]

77. Mikhail Yevgrafovich Saltykov-Shchedrin (1826–89) is best known for his satirical short stories

(and one novel) about government officials (one of whom he was himself) and members of the nobility. From 1868 to 1884 he was editor of the magazine *Otechestvennye Zapiski* (Fatherland Notes). [SS]

78. For example, 25,000 industrial workers were sent to the countryside to help carry out the forcible collectivization of agriculture at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s. [SS]

79. A collectivistic community of about 1,800 persons proposed by the French “utopian” socialist Charles Fourier (1772–1837). [SS]

80. Ivan Platonovich Volovchenko (1916–98) was an agronomist with managerial experience at an MTS and then on various state farms. He was minister of agriculture from March 1963 to February 1965. See Biographies. [SS]

81. The ministry of agriculture had previously been located in the center of Moscow on the Garden Ring Road (Sadovoye Koltso). [SK]

82. Orville L. Freeman (1918–2003), a former governor of Minnesota, was U.S. secretary of agriculture from 1961 to 1969. [SS]

83. Sumy province is in northeastern Ukraine. [SS]

84. The town of Sevsk is situated in the southeast of Bryansk province, some twenty kilometers from Kalinovka. [SS]

85. A samovar is a vessel in which water is heated. A fire is lit in a vertical pipe in the middle of the vessel and heats the surrounding water. The samovar originated in China and was brought to Russia by the Mongols. [SK]

86. Fatezh is situated in the north of Kursk province, northwest of Kursk and due east of Sevsk. [SS]

87. The college had previously been located in the city of Kursk. New accommodation was built for it in Kalinovka at state expense—that is, the collective farm did not have to pay out of its own pocket. The students had to work in the collective-farm fields as part of their studies. Such transfers were a common practice under Khrushchev, who thought that agricultural institutes and colleges should be located not in cities but closer to the soil in agricultural areas, as they are in the United States. [SK]

88. The “agro-town” (*agrorod*) was a new type of rural-urban settlement introduced by Khrushchev. It was supposed to combine the advantages of rural and urban life. [SS]

89. Khomutovka is a small town in the west of Kursk province, south of Sevsk. It belonged to the same collective farm that had its center at Kalinovka, while Kalinovka is situated in the county that has its center at Khomutovka. [SK/SS]

90. The reference is to a primitive type of peasant hut, heated by burning wood in a stove but without a chimney through which the smoke could escape. [SS]

91. Zhitomir province is in centralwestern Ukraine, to the west of Kiev. [SS]

92. In Khrushchev's time, a Central Committee plenum was held in December of each year to assess the results of the year's work. Discussion focused mainly on agriculture, because things went much better in industry. [SK]

93. The formal legal status of state farms differed fundamentally from that of collective farms. State farms were state property, while collective farms were owned collectively by their members. A state farm was headed by a "director" appointed by the state; a collective farm had a "chairman" elected by its members. (Formally state and party leaders could not appoint a collective-farm chairman but only recommend a candidate for election, even though it hardly ever happened that the members would refuse to act on such a recommendation.) Peasants on state farms were formally classified as "workers" and "employees"; peasants on collective farms were "collective farmers." From the ideological point of view, state farms were regarded as more advanced—that is, closer to communism—than collective farms. [SS]

94. The New Economic Policy, or NEP for short, was introduced by the Bolshevik regime in March 1921. It gave considerable latitude to private enterprise and private trade, bringing to an end the period of "war communism" (see note 72). [SS]

95. In summer 1963 there were dust storms and drought in the virgin lands and drought in Ukraine, the Volga region, and the North Caucasus. Such a drought had not been seen for fifty years. The USSR bought grain that year in Canada and the United States. [SK]

96. Khrushchev was referring to American predictions of a poor Soviet harvest that year. [SK]

97. The author refers here to the Central Committee plenum of December 1963, at which the decision was taken to invest resources in the production of chemical fertilizers in order to initiate a shift from extensive to intensive methods in agriculture. However, he is mistaken when he says that this was the last plenum that Khrushchev was to conduct. The last plenum conducted by Khrushchev was in July 1964. [SK]

98. The Davydov to whom Khrushchev here refers is the hero of the novel *Virgin Soil Upturned* (*Podnyataya tselina*) by the Nobel Prize-winning Soviet writer Mikhail Aleksandrovich Sholokhov (1905–84; see Biographies). In the novel, which deals with the collectivization of agriculture under Stalin, Davydov is an industrial worker who is sent in 1930 to take charge of a collective farm in the Don region of southern Russia. He achieves great success and wins the respect of the Cossack collective farmers. The novel was awarded the Lenin Prize in 1960. [SK/SS]

99. Under Stalin expulsion from the party was generally a prelude to arrest. Under Khrushchev

and his successors it did not usually lead to arrest, but it did severely limit career prospects. A person who had been expelled from the party was, in fact, in a much worse position than a person who had never joined it. [SS]

100. Barabinsk is situated in the western part of Novosibirsk province in southwestern Siberia. [SS]

101. *Mogar* (*Setaria Italica*, subspecies *Mocharicum*) is an annual bristly grass crop belonging to the cereals family. It is grown on pastureland and for use as hay and green feed in Ukraine, Moldova, the North Caucasus, western Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. Another variety of this plant with small seeds, known in Russian as *chumiza* (*Setaria Italica*, subspecies *Maxima*), is grown in the United States, China, and other countries as livestock feed and for human consumption (in porridge). [SK]

102. When the New Economic Policy (see notes 72 and 94) was introduced in 1921, the "tax in kind" (*prodnalog*) replaced requisitioning as the means used by the state to obtain food from the peasantry. [SS]

103. Aleksei Matveyevich Rummyantsev (1905–93) became an academician in 1966. His main works were in the fields of economics and political economy. [SS]

104. Nalchik is the capital of the republic of Kabardino-Balkaria in the North Caucasus. [SS]

105. "Holy writ" and "sextons" were jocular expressions used by Khrushchev himself. He called Marxist philosophical scholars "sextons" because their lectures were no less dismal and boring than the church sermons of sextons. [SK]

106. That is, Stalin. [SS]

107. The concept of "all-people's property" was derivative from that of the "all-people's state." Soon after Khrushchev came to power, it was declared that as antagonistic classes no longer existed in the USSR Stalin's definition of the Soviet state as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was no longer valid and that the Soviet state should now be regarded as a "state of all the people" or "all-people's state." State property was accordingly equated with "all-people's property." [SK]

108. Rostov on the Don, a major city in southern Russia. [SS]

109. A district of Moscow. [SS]

110. The party cell was the lowest-level unit in the organization of the Communist Party. Although most party cells were based in workplaces, they were subordinate to higher-level party committees organized on a territorial basis. [SS]

111. This conversation between Freeman and Khrushchev took place on July 30, 1963. The verbatim record of the conversation was published in N. S. Khrushchev, *Stroitelstvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitiye selskogo khozyaistva* (The Building of Communism in the USSR and the Development of

Agriculture) (Moscow: Izd-vo politicheskoi literatury, 1964), 8:44–61.

112. Workers on state farms, like workers at state industrial enterprises, received stable and predictable wages. Collective farmers received only a share of the net income of their collective farm each year, depending on the number of “labor-days” they had worked on the collective farm that year. Pay was especially meager and unpredictable on economically weak collective farms, and these collective farms strove to be converted into state farms that could provide their members with a more stable livelihood. However, conversion into state farms often failed to lead to higher labor productivity and improved performance, and in such cases the payment of guaranteed wages generated a loss that had to be covered by the state budget. As the poor results of converting collective farms into state farms became evident, Khrushchev withdrew his earlier support for the idea. [SK]

113. Bugulma is situated in the far southeast of the Republic of Tatarstan (then the Tatar ASSR) in the Volga region. [SS]

114. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin (1918–94) was one of the leaders of the Young Communist League from 1952 to 1958, then chairman of the KGB from 1958 to 1961. He was a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee from 1961 to 1967. See Biographies. [SS]

115. Vladimir Pavlovich Mylarshchikov (1911–77) was a secretary of the Moscow party committee from 1951 to 1954 and head of the agricultural department of the CPSU Central Committee for the RSFSR from 1954 to 1959. [SS]

116. Viktor Mikhaylovich Churayev (1904–82) was head of the department of the CPSU Central Committee for party bodies in the RSFSR from 1955 to 1959 and head of the department of the CPSU Central Committee for party bodies in the union republics from 1959 to 1961. See Biographies. [SS]

117. Each year a collective farm used to divide its net income into two parts: one part for payment into its “undivided funds” (or “undistributed funds”) and the other part for distribution among the collective farmers in accordance with labor-days worked (see note 112). The ratio between these two parts was decided at a general meeting of members. The undivided funds were used to pay for construction, purchase of machinery, and other general needs of the collective farm. [SK]

118. Literally: “He did not get the additional weight that he had been promised.” The term “additional weight” (*privesy*) means the difference between the increase in the weight of an animal in a day, week, or month and the weight of feed consumed by it in the same period. [SK]

119. Here the author evidently has in mind the well-known statement of Karl Marx that appears in the eleventh of his *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845): “The philosophers have only interpreted the

world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” [SS]

120. The author is referring to the debates on economic reform that were going on in the USSR at the time that he was writing the article—that is, at the peak of Gorbachev’s perestroika. (The article was completed in 1988.) In the outlook that was then predominant, the goal of economic reform was some kind of market socialism drawing on Chinese, Hungarian, and/or Yugoslav experience and based on an optimal combination of plan and market. Self-financing (*khozraschet*)—that is, the financial independence of enterprises and regions—was typically a component of such models. The author shares the view of neoliberal and Stalinist dogmatists who consider any halfway house between capitalism and socialism self-contradictory and infeasible. [SS]

121. In the traditional type of Russian peasant hut, the stove was also used as a bed. [SS]

122. The primary meaning of the word used here (*bariny*) is “lords of the manor”—that is, the great landowners of pre-revolutionary Russia. Here it refers to the local party bosses. [SS]

123. Literally: “How did they ever get such additional weights (*privesy*)?” See note 120. [SK]

124. The fear of “petty bourgeois spontaneity” that the author attributes here to Khrushchev has its origins in Lenin. In the Bolsheviks’ class analysis, small peasant producers were classified as “petty bourgeois” (that is, petty capitalists). The Russian word that I translate as “spontaneity” (*stikhiya*) can also mean chance, chaos, or the natural elements—in general, any process that is not susceptible to conscious planning. [SS]

125. The town of Georgiyevsk is in the southern part of Stavropol territory in the North Caucasus. The local agricultural administrations were state bodies created by Khrushchev in 1962 to replace county party committees (*raikomy*) in rural areas. Thereby he hoped to replace party control of agriculture on the basis of ideology by professional management. The same motive subsequently prompted him to divide the province party committees (*obkomy*) into separate committees for industry and agriculture. [SK]

126. “The tale of the white bull-calf” is an allegorical expression meaning endless, fruitless, and tiresome repetition. It refers to a tale in Russian folklore in which one character asks another: “Shall I tell you the tale of the white bull-calf?” and the other character replies: “Yes, tell it to me!” but the first character merely repeats the same question over and over again. [SK]

127. “Individual labor activity” was a term later applied to permitted forms of self-employment. The author believes that the term was invented with a view to avoiding the admission that what was involved was in fact a form of private enterprise. [SS]



128. In 1957 Khrushchev proclaimed the slogan of catching up with the United States in per capita output of meat, milk, and butter. Economists and the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) presented him with calculations according to which this could be achieved by the mid-1970s—that is, within twenty years. Khrushchev declared that these calculations did not suit him. In fact, the forecasts did have a flimsy basis: they were derived by means of linear extrapolation of existing trends into the future and took no account of scientific and technological progress. Khrushchev issued a call to catch up with the United States in three years. He understood that this was not a realistic timescale, but it would arouse the enthusiasm of the masses and make it possible to reach the goal in more than three but much less than twenty years. It is this call that the author condemns. [SK]

129. In this metaphor, the author draws an analogy between the socioeconomic system created by Stalin and the Soviet document known as the “technical passport,” which showed the extent to which a batch of industrial products met various technical specifications on being released from the factory. [SS]

130. The traditional Russian peasant blouse (*kosovorotka*) fastened at the sides so it could not be worn with a tie. [SS]

131. The author refers here to prominent Bolshevik theorists who supported Stalin in his struggle against the intraparty oppositions in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

Stanislav Gustavovich Strumilin (1877–1974) was an economist, statistician, and demographer. The first system of material balances in the world was worked out under his leadership. He became a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1931.

Yakov Abramovich Kronrod (1912–84) was an economist. He was a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a prominent associate of its Institute of Economics.

Konstantin Vasilyevich Ostrovityanov (1892–1969) was an economist. He became a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1953 and was one of its vice presidents from 1953 to 1962. [SS]

132. In Moscow province, a few kilometers south-east of the city. It is now a satellite town. [SS]

133. Fyodor Davydovich Kulakov (1918–78) was a deputy minister of agriculture and minister of grain products of the RSFSR from 1955 to 1960. He was first secretary of the Stavropol territory party committee from 1960 to 1964. He became a member of the Central Committee in 1961, head of a Central Committee department in 1964, a secretary of the Central Committee in 1965, and a member of the Politburo in 1971. [SS]

134. In fact, Khrushchev’s ideas concerning concentration and specialization in dairy farming and livestock rearing were derived largely from current Western practice, with which he was familiar

through his contacts with Western businessmen and specialists. He knew, for instance, that in the United States chickens were no longer raised on millions of small farms but by a relatively small number of large companies.

Two such contacts in spring 1964 had an especially great impact on Khrushchev’s thinking on this subject. On April 22, he received at his Kremlin office Mr. Fenle, president of an American pig-raising firm (“*Posetiteli Kremlyovskogo kabineta Khrushcheva*” [Visitors to Khrushchev’s Kremlin Office], *Istochnik* [2003, no. 6]: 107). Fenle told Khrushchev that pig raising had become an engineering task. Then on May 28, Khrushchev visited the British Agricultural Exhibition being held in Moscow. There he discussed recent developments in chicken farming with Dr. Clayton, a professor at Edinburgh University and a consultant to the Copps Corporation. A few weeks later, Khrushchev circulated to members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee a memorandum setting out his ideas on the management of “intensified” agriculture (N. Khrushchev, *Zapiska* No. P1104, “*O rukovodstve selskim khozyaistvom v svyazi s perekodom na put intensifikatsii*” [Memorandum No. P1104, “On Agricultural Management in Connection with the Transition to Intensification”], July 18, 1964; Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, fond 3, opis 30, delo 260, lists 6–68). [SK]

135. Under Gorbachev, “the period of stagnation” or simply “the stagnation” (*zastoi*) became the standard term for referring to the Brezhnev period. [SS]

136. Under Brezhnev, “subjectivism” and “voluntarism” were used as code words to condemn Khrushchev’s approach to policy without mentioning his name. The author’s point is that the contrast between Khrushchev and Brezhnev was actually much smaller than widely believed. [SS]

137. Agroprom (or Gosagroprom) stands for the State Committee for Agro-Industry. It was a superagency with regional branches, created in November 1985 (soon after Gorbachev came to power) with a view to providing integrated management of the whole Soviet food economy. It incorporated several ministries and other organizations connected to agriculture, land improvement, and food processing that had previously been separate. [SS]

138. Ordzhonikidze was the capital of the North Ossetian ASSR in the North Caucasus. It is now again known by its pre-revolutionary name of Vladikavkaz (literally, Rule the Caucasus). Kazan was the capital of the Tatar ASSR (now the Republic of Tatarstan). [SS]

139. Bugulma was in the Tatar ASSR in the Volga region (see note 113). Ufa was the capital of the Bashkir ASSR (now the Republic of Bashkortostan), to the east of the Tatar ASSR. Tselinograd (now Astana, capital of Kazakhstan) was the center of the

virgin lands in northern Kazakhstan (see note 66). Kokchetav is also in northern Kazakhstan. Frunze (now Bishkek) was the capital of the Kyrgyz SSR (now Kyrgyzstan) in Central Asia. Norilsk is in northern Siberia. In other words, Khrushchev was flying many thousands of kilometers within a short period. [SS]

140. Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov (1902–82) was a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee from 1947 until his death and a member of the Presidium (Politburo) from 1955 until his death. His primary responsibility was for matters of ideology. See Biographies. [SS]

141. “Iron Shurik” was a nickname of Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin (1918–94), a former top leader of the Young Communist League (1943–58) and chairman of the KGB (1958–61) (“Shurik” being a nickname derived from the first name “Aleksandr”). He was a prominent member of the top leadership in the mid-1960s. See Biographies. [SS]

142. “Ilyich” here refers to Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, whose complaisant and obliging character won him popularity among senior party and state officials. [SS]

143. Comrade N. was Nikolai Grigoryevich Ignatov (1901–66). In fact, at this time he was chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and not a member of the Central Committee Presidium (later renamed the Politburo), although he had been a member between 1957 and 1961. The name of Ignatov’s bodyguard was Vasily Ivanovich Galyukov. The member of the Khrushchev family whom Galyukov approached was myself. The author draws here on my account of my father’s ouster, which was first published in October 1988 in the magazine *Ogonyok* (nos. 40–43), then appeared in English translation in the November 14, 1988, issue of *Time*, and was republished in Sergei Khrushchev, *Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the Man and his Era* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990). [SK]

144. In Soviet institutions, the frankest and most informal conversations typically took place in the corridors during “smoking breaks.” [SS]

145. Khrushchev was referring to a specific kind of flax that in Russian is called *lyon-kudryash*. This is a cultivated variety the seeds of which are pressed to produce linseed oil. Unlike other kinds of flax, it is not used as a source of fibers for the production of linen. Linseed oil, also known as flaxseed oil or flax oil, is used in the manufacture of paints and varnishes (to enhance drying), linoleum, oilcloth, cosmetics, printing inks, and high-grade and special-purpose paper, and also to feed animals, especially horses. In Eastern Europe to a much greater extent than in Western countries, it is also used for human consumption. [SK/SS]

146. Makar Posmitny was a well-known Ukrainian collective-farm chairman, a Hero of Socialist Labor, and a friend of Khrushchev’s. [SK]

147. In eastern Ukraine, southwest of Kharkov. [SS]

148. Capital of the Turkmen SSR in Central Asia (now Turkmenistan). [SS]

149. Aleksei Nikolayevich Kosygin (1904–80) at this time was minister of trade and a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. He was responsible for administering the ration-card system. Stalin sent him to Moldavia to report on the situation there. He was to become chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers after Khrushchev’s ouster. [SK/SS]

150. Wanda Wasilewska (1905–64; see Biographies) was a writer of Polish origin who worked in Soviet Ukraine during the war and postwar years. She was a political officer in the Soviet army, editor of a pro-Soviet Polish newspaper, and head of the Union of Polish Patriots, organized in the USSR as the forerunner of the pro-Soviet Polish government that was set up at Lublin in 1944. She was on friendly terms with Khrushchev. For Khrushchev’s detailed accounts of her activities, see Volume 1 of the present edition, and also Volume 3 (forthcoming). [SS]

151. The white bread was made from wheat and the black bread from rye. In Russia and Poland, unlike the United States and some other countries, rye bread is much cheaper than wheat bread because rye can be cultivated at more northerly latitudes. It has traditionally been considered an inferior food and a symbol of poverty. [SK/SS]

152. The Russian word here is *klyotska*, which means a kind of dumpling consisting of small pieces of dough made out of semolina or wheat flour and boiled in soup or milk. [SS]

153. Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria (1899–1953) was minister of internal affairs—that is, head of the security police—in the later part of Stalin’s reign. Following Stalin’s death, Khrushchev and other members of the post-Stalin collective leadership were afraid that Beria would seize power and eliminate his rivals. On Khrushchev’s initiative and with the assistance of the high military command, Beria and his closest associates were arrested on June 24, 1953. Beria was executed on December 23, 1953. See Biographies. [SS]

154. Before moving against Beria, Khrushchev had replaced the old Kremlin guard, which belonged to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and was therefore subordinate to Beria, by a new guard drawn from the army. [SK]

155. At this time (1953) the peasants did not have passports. In order to travel outside his village, a peasant had to obtain from the village soviet an identification slip (*spravka*) showing his place of residence. Under Khrushchev the peasants were to receive passports. [SK]



156. Lieutenant General Aleksandr Yakovlevich Vedenin (1900–?) was Commandant of the Kremlin from 1953 to 1967. Between 1954 and 1967 he was also head or deputy head of various administrations in the KGB. [SK]

157. The Simferopol Road is the main road between Moscow and Simferopol, capital of the Crimea. It passes through Ukraine and at that time was the only road connecting Ukraine with Moscow. [SK/SS]

158. “Hostile radio voices” refers to foreign radio stations, such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, which beamed anti-Soviet propaganda into the USSR during the Cold War. Their broadcasts were jammed, but it was possible to receive them at times. [SS]

159. In fact, there was no inconsistency between this story and the image of Brezhnev’s incapacity. They relate to different periods. At the beginning of the 1970s, when the conversation in question took place, Brezhnev was still in good health. Later his capacities declined as his health deteriorated, especially after he suffered a heart attack in December 1974. The sharp contrast between the Brezhnev of the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s and the Brezhnev of the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s has been emphasized by such historians as Roy Medvedev in his book *Lichnost i epokha: politichesky portret L. I. Brezhneva: Kniga 1* (Personality and Epoch: A Political Portrait of L. I. Brezhnev) (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), 1:317–18. [SK/SS]

## Memorandum of N. S. Khrushchev on Military Reform

TO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATE MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDIUUM OF  
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU<sup>1</sup>

December 8, 1959

I would like to set out some ideas concerning our next steps in the struggle to relax international tension and how to resolve the problem of arms reductions and disarmament.

The Soviet Union has now won good positions in the international arena. My visit to the United States of America<sup>2</sup> and the proposal we made at the United Nations for universal disarmament<sup>3</sup> have been favorably received throughout the whole world. They cannot simply be rejected and ignored even by the reactionary circles of various countries. Even those who do not want to relax tension, let alone disarm, do not say so openly, because of this mood among broad circles of the population and the desire for détente and arms reductions. Apparently they will seek, under the guise of postponement, arguments for rejecting our proposals, with a view to either torpedoing a decision or dragging the matter out.

I think that now we should not rest content with what we have won, but rather exploit the favorable conjuncture, the recognition and strong international position that we have achieved, our leading role, and the initiative that we have already kept up for several years.

It seems to me that now we should carry out further reductions in our country's armaments, even without making them conditional upon reciprocity on the part of other states, and a substantial reduction in the personnel of the armed forces. I think it would be possible to reduce personnel by perhaps one million or one and a half million men—but we need to consult with the Ministry of Defense and study this question with them. I think such a substantial reduction would not undermine our defense capability. But announcing and implementing such a decision would have a very great positive influence on the international situation. Our prestige would be immeasurably enhanced in the eyes of all the peoples of the world. It would be an irresistible blow to the enemies of peace and the inciters and supporters of the Cold War.

Why do I think it is now possible and safe to do this? My judgment is based on two facts: first, the good results we have achieved in developing the Soviet economy; and second, our splendid position in the sphere of missile-building. As a matter of fact, we now have an assortment of missiles for the solution of any military problem in either long-range or short-range combat: land-to-land missiles, air-to-land missiles, air-to-air missiles, atomic submarines, and so on. We also have a good assortment in terms of explosive power. Besides that, we have established good series production of these missiles. I shall not enumerate all these missiles in this memorandum. Those whom it concerns know about them, and when we come to discuss the question I shall set it out in more specific terms.<sup>4</sup> We now have a wide assortment, and in quantity great enough literally to shake the whole world.

I ask why do we need to have such awesome weapons, atomic and missile weapons, and on top of that such a big army as we have? It does not make sense. After all, we start from the assumption that we do not want war and do not ourselves prepare for attack, but for defense. If that is our assumption, as it is, that our army should be able to defend the country, and repulse enemies that may try to attack our homeland or our allies, then we have such powerful weapons as missiles that serve this purpose. For how dare any country or group of countries in Europe attack us when we are able literally to wipe these countries off the face of the earth with our atomic and hydrogen bombs, which our missiles can deliver to any point on the globe?

Consequently, if we do not now take steps toward the reduction of our armed forces, but defer the whole question, as has already been done, for the Committee of Ten<sup>5</sup> to decide, despite our good and active positions, that would mean wasting our opportunities. For our proposals will now be fed into the labyrinths of the commission, there will be a lot of talk, speeches, and verbiage, and in that way our initiative will be dissipated.

If, for instance, we now decide to reduce our armed forces by one million or one and a half million men, and publicize our reasons for doing so, that will be a significant step forward. I think conditions have fully ripened for us to speak of this. Indeed, we have already spoken of it, both in my report<sup>6</sup> and in our other declarations.<sup>7</sup> We have already said more than once that our ideological disputes with the capitalist world will be resolved not by war but by economic competition. Consequently, our proposals and measures further to reduce our armed forces would put our adversaries, the imperialist countries, under even greater pressure.

Some comrades may object that we shall reduce our armaments, but the adversary will not do likewise. But that leads to another question. Will it

make sense for him to act in that way? Let us reduce our armed forces, and say why we are doing so—because our hydrogen bombs and missiles enable us to maintain combat capability at the necessary level, because we do not want war, because we do not intend to attack or conquer anyone. The Soviet Union never had any such goal, nor did the other socialist countries. Why then should we maintain such an enormous army? To maintain such a big army means lowering our economic potential. It is possible for us to reduce it. And if our adversaries do not follow our lead, that should not be regarded as causing us damage. On the contrary, given the current position of the socialist countries—their economic potential and, above all, our possession of powerful thermonuclear and missile armaments—it is those countries that continue to maintain large armies which will suffer the damage. Their large armies will suck their budgets dry and exhaust their economies. Their armies will to some extent, viewed from the perspective of the struggle between communism and capitalism, be our allies, because they will eat up the budgets and hold back the economic development of these countries, thereby assisting the growth of the advantages of our system.

I have given this question much thought. I decided to send a memorandum before returning to Moscow,<sup>8</sup> in order that members and candidate members of the Presidium of the Central Committee should acquaint themselves with it. Then, when I arrive, we shall discuss it. And if comrades are in agreement with me, the necessary proposals could be adopted. I think we can do it this way. We can convene a session of the Supreme Soviet. For instance, the session could be convened either at the end of January or in February—choose a good time, but do not put it off—before the beginning of the session of the Commission of Ten that is to be convened in February to consider our proposals. So before the work of the commission begins we shall convene a session of the Supreme Soviet, appoint the opening speaker, place the matter before the Supreme Soviet, discuss it, and adopt a decision. We shall adopt an appeal in which we say that, irrespective of how other countries may react to our decision and whether or not they follow our example, we shall be guided by the decision of the Supreme Soviet.

I am certain this would be a very strong, a sensational step. And besides that, it will not cause any damage to our defense, while it will give us great political, moral, and economic benefits. So if we fail now to take this opportunity, that would mean, to speak in the language of an economist, not making full use of the accumulated capital of our socialist policy and socialist economy. After all, our economy is flourishing and developing. Our science is making such great strides that it has secured us advantages in creating means of defense for our

country. Not only have we made scientific discoveries, but we have put them skillfully to use for practical purposes.

I think it would now make no sense to have atomic and hydrogen bombs and missiles, and at the same time to maintain a large army.

Besides that, we need to bear in mind that by having such powerful and up-to-date armaments, against which there so far exists no defense, and maintaining the largest army in the world, we really do scare our adversaries. We scare even those honest people among them who perhaps would like to pursue honest disarmament, but are afraid that our proposals may be just a tactical ploy. They think to themselves: the Soviet Union puts forward proposals for a new reduction in armed forces, but does not carry out any such reduction in its own armed forces. That may scare some honest people among them who want disarmament. Of course, the reactionary, aggressive, and militaristic forces, who do not want a relaxation of international tension, exploit such fears for their own purposes.

If, on the other hand, we make a further reduction in our armed forces, then we would strengthen those liberal bourgeois circles in capitalist countries who want to improve the international situation and live according to the principles of peaceful coexistence. We would strengthen them, and undermine the arguments of the aggressive, militaristic circles who make use of our might to scare other countries.

As for the details of how we should do it, we need to exchange opinions on that. We shall give instructions to the minister of defense and the General Staff to prepare specific proposals.

Such a substantial reduction would need to be spread out over one, or one and a half, or two years. During this period we would adopt a decision and begin gradually to reduce the army, because if we are to release so many people from the army we have to find them appropriate new jobs in civilian life. The main problem will be to find new jobs for the officers and the military bureaucrats; it will be easy to find new jobs for the ordinary soldiers. And then we would see in which direction the compass needle turns, because we shall not make the reductions all at once. It would be done over a year, or a year and a half, or two years—but not more than two years. That would be logical. If at the session of the General Assembly we proposed to carry out universal and complete disarmament in four years, then we should carry out a partial unilateral reduction in two years or less. That would also be logical, convincing, and not dangerous.

I have given these proposals careful thought. I think that we shall give them a good all-round discussion at the Presidium, and weigh up all the

arguments for and against. It may be that I have not foreseen everything. But it seems to me that my proposals, if put into effect, will not only bring our country no harm and not endanger its defense capability in the face of hostile forces, but will help us strengthen even further our country and its international position.

There are some details that I shall not set out in this memorandum. When we have our discussion, I shall explain my arguments in greater detail. For example, in the course of reducing the armed forces, perhaps we should go over to the system of territorial militia formations. That is, regiments and divisions would be formed according to the territorial principle, with citizens called up to serve in them without being withdrawn from productive work. Of course, such regiments and units would need to be appropriately staffed with officers, and to have storage facilities somewhere for their armaments. We need transport aviation, because in the event of the necessity arising we shall have to move units rapidly from one place to another. For example, should we need to move several divisions to Germany, we must do this literally within several days. The weaponry for such territorial units must be stored in an appropriate rational assortment near to those places where the units themselves are situated. And the divisions—for instance, the Moscow, the Leningrad, the Kiev, and the Kharkov divisions—would gather at once, at a signal, at the assembly point, board aircraft, and be sent on their way.

There are some other points that need to be taken into account so that the security of our country is not weakened but strengthened. The burden of maintaining the army would be reduced. Our political position both inside and outside the country would be enhanced, because we would free up resources that are being swallowed up by the maintenance of an enormous army and armament. And we would win an even better position in the international arena in the struggle for peace. The prestige of our country would rise even higher. And all this, taken together, would work in favor of our Marxist-Leninist ideas, our teaching, our struggle for peace, because not only workers, but also peasants and petty-bourgeois elements would with every year increasingly sympathize with us. First they would lose their fear of us and take up neutral positions, and then they would start to feel sympathy for our country. That, I think, is quite natural, and that is what we must bring about.

When I say that perhaps we should have not only a standing army, but also territorial militia forces, we are in fact to some extent repeating what Lenin did after the October Revolution,<sup>9</sup> but under other conditions and in a somewhat different context, because at that time we had no other choice;

we had no army, while today we have both resources and armaments, we have an army. And today as well we cannot and do not want to be without an army. But we must make this army a rational army, an army without superfluity, a combat-capable army that meets the requirements of guaranteeing our country's security.

It will, of course, be necessary to reconsider also the system of institutions for training officers, the number of such institutions and their profile. Perhaps, if we go over to a new system, we should also organize institutions for training people as officers without withdrawing them from productive work. That is also very important.

All these measures will undoubtedly lighten the load on the country's budget. We have every opportunity to implement the proposals I have made for the unilateral reduction of our armed forces.

A couple more words about military training institutions. When we created our numerous military training institutions, we did not have a sufficient number of trained people in the country. Now all our young people receive an education, so we shall be able to recruit the number of people needed and train them as officers for all branches of the armed forces. They will be commanders of a kind even more closely connected to the people, free of the so-called caste feeling that has its origin in the better material provision of students at military training institutions. It would make sense, and their upkeep would be cheaper.

Such are the questions that I think it necessary to place before the Presidium of the Central Committee.

*CPCD-RARH (f. 2, op. 1, d. 416, ll. 3–11. Typewritten).*<sup>10</sup>

1. On December 8, 1959, Khrushchev sent the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU a memorandum devoted to measures that the Soviet government might take to relax international tension. It was a logical outgrowth of the Declaration of the Soviet Government Concerning Universal and Complete Disarmament that the first secretary had delivered at the session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959. At the same time, in his memorandum of December 8, 1959, the first secretary went further and proposed a unilateral reduction in armed-forces personnel of 1–1.5 million men, who would be transferred to formations organized in accordance with the territorial principle.

What, to all appearances, provided Khrushchev the opportunity to present his memorandum was the fact that on December 14, 1959, a session of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU was due to be held, the agenda of which included discussion of the new program of the CPSU for completion of the foundations for building a communist society within 15–20 years. It was presupposed that with the full victory of communism the need for armed forces would fall away. In this connection, already in the pre-revolutionary period and the first years of Soviet power ideas were worked out pertaining to “the replacement of standing forces by the general arming of the people,” as had been envisaged in the program of



the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) adopted in 1903, but in view of the difficult domestic and external political situation of the country the transition to a territorial militia had had to be postponed until such time as more favorable conditions would prevail. Such conditions, in Khrushchev's opinion, took shape at the end of the 1950s, when nuclear-missile weaponry was created that could successfully replace the regular army.

Khrushchev's memorandum was considered on December 14, 1959, at the session of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Ministry of Defense, headed by Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky, was assigned the task of making specific proposals on the question under consideration. On December 18, 1959, a conference of military commanders was convened in the Central Committee of the CPSU to discuss practical measures relating to the army. A decision was also adopted to place proposals before a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

On December 22, 1959, a plenum of the Central Committee was convened, devoted to the development of agriculture. The agenda set for the plenum included no questions of an international character, and its proceedings were due to end on December 26. But although a resolution on agriculture was adopted on December 25, 1959, the work of the plenum did not end there. On the next day, a number of additional matters were considered, including Khrushchev's memorandum. The first secretary made a presentation, on the basis of which a resolution was adopted that partly approved his initiative.

On January 15, 1960, a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a law "On a New Significant Reduction in the Armed Forces of the USSR," making provision for a reduction of 1.2 million men (as a result of which the armed forces would have been brought down to 2,423,000 men) and a corresponding cut in military expenditure.

The head of the party did not, on the whole, manage to bring about the practical realization of his designs. Khrushchev's main idea concerning territorial forces did not win support, while the reduction in the armed forces aroused the discontent of a number of military men. In 1960, as a mark of protest against the reduction of the army, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, and the Commander in Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, Marshal I. S. Konev, tendered their resignations. Besides that, the reduction of the army was halted in 1961 in view of the difficult international situation.

Khrushchev's memorandum of December 8, 1959, is one of the few documents accessible to researchers that allow one to judge how far-reaching were the reformist intentions of the first secretary in regard to the army. Analyzing the style of the

document, it may be concluded that its text—as was characteristic of Khrushchev, who did not like to write—was dictated. The document is located among the materials relating to the December 1959 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the archives of the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (CPCD).

2. The reference is to the official friendly visit of Khrushchev to the United States from September 15 to September 27, 1959.

3. On September 18, 1959, speaking at a session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Khrushchev presented a proposal for universal and complete disarmament and made public the declaration of the Soviet government on disarmament. (See: *Face to Face with America: The Story of N. S. Khrushchov's Visit to the U.S.A., September 15–27, 1959* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), 185–204.)

4. To all appearances, reference is being made to the Kometa, P-5, P-6, P-15, and P-35 cruise missiles, the R-5, R-11, R-12, and R-14 medium-range ballistic missiles, and the R-7, R-9, and R-16 intercontinental ballistic missiles. See Soviet Missile Codes table, page xi.

5. The Committee of Ten was the Committee of the United Nations for Disarmament, on which were represented the United States Great Britain, France, Canada, Italy, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. In 1961, they were joined by the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico, and Sweden, turning the Committee of Ten into the Committee of Sixteen.

6. The reference is to the report delivered by Khrushchev at the session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959.

7. Khrushchev often spoke of his plans to reduce the army during his trip to the United States in fall 1959—for example, at the reception in Khrushchev's honor in Los Angeles, and in his television address on September 27, 1959. (See: *Face to Face with America: The Story of N. S. Khrushchov's Visit to the U.S.A., September 15–27, 1959*, 234, 431.)

8. Khrushchev was on a trip to western Ukraine.

9. At the Eighth Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1919, mention was made of the necessity, under favorable domestic and external political conditions, of going over to a Workers' and Peasants' Militia. At the Ninth Congress in 1920, a resolution was adopted, "On Going Over to the Militia System." A year later, at the Tenth Congress, it was again decided that going over to building the army in accordance with the territorial principle depended wholly on the international situation. For a more detailed presentation of Lenin's views, see: V. I. Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochinenii* (Complete Collected Works), 32:47; 35:40. [MN]

The idea that a territorial militia is more democratic than a standing army, being closer to the people and consequently more difficult to use

against the people, was commonplace in the socialist and radical republican thought of the nineteenth century. [SS]

10. As of January 1999, the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation

(CPCD) was renamed the Russian Archive of Recent History (RARH). The abbreviations stand for *fond* (collection), *opis* (list, listing, inventory, or catalogue), *delo* (folder), and *listy* (sheets), respectively. [GS]

## Memorandum of KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov to the CPSU Central Committee

ON LIMITING THE RECEIPT OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE BY N.  
S. KHRUSHCHEV

3502-A Special folder  
Top secret

December 25, 1970

N. S. Khrushchev has recently received a large quantity of correspondence of various kinds from private persons in capitalist countries.

A large proportion of the correspondence consists of postcards with Christmas and new year greetings. Some of them contain expressions of a religious nature, comparing N. S. Khrushchev with biblical "heroes."

The authors of letters addressed to N. S. Khrushchev praise him as "a fighter for peace and an opponent of anti-Semitism" and express sympathy in connection with his illness. Some authors voice their approval of the appearance of his "memoirs" in the West. Others ask him to give his opinion of one or another former Western statesman. N. S. Khrushchev has also been sent magazines containing photographs of him and articles referring to him.

Taking into consideration the tendentious nature of such correspondence and the possibility that it may be inspired by foreign subversive centers, we suggest that it would be expedient to limit its receipt by N. S. Khrushchev.

We request consent.

Chairman of the Committee of State Security     ANDROPOV

A memorandum is attached giving the consent of CPSU Central Committee Secretaries M. Suslov and I. Kapitonov. A marginal note reads: "Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov (KGB) has been informed of the consent of CC secretaries. 12/31/70."

## Announcement of the Death of N. S. Khrushchev

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers report with sorrow that on September 11, 1971, following severe and prolonged illness, the former first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the personal pensioner Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, died in his seventy-eighth year.

Central Committee of the CPSU  
USSR Council of Ministers

*Sources: Pravda, September 13, 1971; Izvestia, September 14, 1971.*

## The Sendoff

ONLY ON THE DAY of his funeral did there appear in the newspapers the official communiqué announcing the death of this “pensioner of Union significance,”<sup>1</sup> former first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Nikita Sergeyeovich Khrushchev.

On a gloomy September morning in 1971, my wife and I set off for the Novo-Devichy Cemetery<sup>2</sup> to attend Khrushchev’s funeral. No official announcement had been published of the day, time, and place of the funeral, but we had found out when and where it would be. As we came closer to the Novo-Devichy Cemetery, long before we reached the approaches to it, we were astonished by the enormous number of troops. Around the cemetery stood ten or so trucks, covered with tarpaulins and packed full of soldiers, who were visible from the rear. Officers were running about and shouting into their walkie-talkies: “Thirteenth, do you hear me? This is first speaking. Over and out,” and so on. One had the impression either that this district of Moscow had been occupied by certain military units or that some troops were preparing an attack. And further on it was as if troops and police had been deployed in several cordons around the cemetery. Here were various high-ranking police officials, and closest of all to the cemetery stood police officers in plainclothes. Among them were also a certain number of officers in military uniforms of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with dark-blue piping.

On the outer fringe of the police cordon, clusters of people who had not been let through to the cemetery made a pitiful sight. From time to time, one of these people made a vain attempt to get through, but was quite rudely pushed back. I approached the cordon and asked the nearest police officer: “Which of you here is in charge?” He pointed out to me a no longer young police colonel. I approached this colonel, and said to him: “Comrade, my wife and I are acquainted with Rada Nikitychna, daughter of the deceased, and it would be strange if on such a day we were not there near her. Let us pass, please.” He asked me: “Are you really acquainted with her?” I replied: “Yes, really.” He shrugged his shoulders and said: “Well, OK, pass!” We passed, and what is more—an unexpected good fortune—passed several

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These reminiscences of Khrushchev’s funeral by Georgy Fyodorov, Doctor of Historical Sciences, were published in the magazine *Ogonyok* on August 18, 1988.

cordons in one go. I decided to use this already proven method at the last barrier as well. I addressed the closest of the people standing in this cordon. He was in a raincoat of the “Bologna” style, about thirty years old, and I said to him: “Let me pass, please.” He immediately cut me short and shot back: “No, I won’t.” I got angry: “Well, how come? You don’t know who I am or why I need to pass. You didn’t even hear me out,” to which he replied: “I don’t care about that. I won’t let you through in any case.” I said: “Well, there you are! You don’t know who I am, but I now have a distinct idea who you are!” Unexpectedly he smiled and growled out: “Well, OK, pass.”

We passed, only to find ourselves before the tightly shut iron gates of the cemetery. Not only the main gates, but also the side gate was closed. It turned out that here too our way was blocked. To the right, there hung on the wall a little paper, on which was written in red pencil: “Cemetery closed. Sanitation Day.”<sup>3</sup> From time to time, some foreign correspondent would knock on the iron side gate and shout out which newspaper or magazine he was from. The side gate opened, he was let through, and the side gate slammed shut again. In front of the gates were about fifteen people who, like my wife and myself, had got through all the cordons. As for the guards, they were all on the other side of the gates. I suggested: “Let’s not let these correspondents through. Why, do they need to be there more than our own people?” We really stopped letting them through; we didn’t even let them approach the side gate. They shouted and made a noise, but we didn’t let them through. Suddenly some general ran up and asked what the matter was, what the noise was about. One of us said: “What do you mean, what’s the matter? We’ve come for the funeral, and they’re not letting us through.” The general knocked on the side gate and called out his name. The side gate opened, and he ordered: “Let them all pass without delay.”

We went through. There were not very many people. About sixty correspondents, only foreign ones it appeared. Like correspondents the world over, they were concerned only to get hold of as much information as they could, to get as many movie shots and photos as they could, and to take tape recordings. Movie cameras whirred, camera shutters clicked, and there resounded a din in various languages and voices that was strange for a cemetery. Besides the correspondents, there were about two hundred other people. Many had gray hair. We caught sight of several of our friends and acquaintances in the crowd. On the faces of many of the people one could see the marks of much suffering. I assumed these were people who had suffered under the repression [of the Stalin era]. Among them we noticed, for example, Bella Emmanuilovna, sister of the army commander Yakir.<sup>4</sup>

The 77-year-old Nikita Sergeyeovich [Khrushchev] lay in his coffin on a mound surrounded by wreaths and flowers. By his feet were little red pillows with his medals and the three stars of a Hero of Socialist Labor.<sup>5</sup> His face looked meaningful—meaningful and tranquil in a way that I had not had the occasion to see in images of him that had appeared on the pages of newspapers and magazines or on the cinema and television screen. A high and powerful forehead, strong-willed cheekbones. It seemed that on his face was imprinted some important thought that was destined to remain a secret. Close by stood members of his family, Khrushchev's wife, Nina Petrovna. She wore a gray overcoat with a black lace mantlet. Her face—very simple, open, guileless, somehow very attractive—was bathed in tears. By her stood Rada Nikitychna [Khrushchev's daughter] with a sort of remote gaze. She seemed very cold. Next to her was a tall man. He looked very much like both his father and his mother, and he was clearly Sergei Nikitych Khrushchev. By him stood Aleksei Adzhubei<sup>6</sup> with a handsome, rather swollen and closed face.

Someone was holding forth. Because of the whirring of the movie cameras, which the reporters were holding up over their heads, and because of their disrespectful talking, I could not make out the speaker's words. I tried to get closer and to some degree managed to do so. Then Sergei Nikitych spoke. Because of the general noise—he was speaking without a microphone—I was able to hear his speech only in fragments. He said that his father had for a long period occupied high party and state positions. It was up to the court of history to deliver the verdict on his activity. As for himself, he was able to say that Nikita Sergeyeovich had wished people well, and had been a very good and loving husband and father.

Then an elderly woman spoke. Although she spoke very quietly, her words were for some reason clearly audible. She said: "I worked with Nikita Sergeyeovich from 1926 onward, and it was very good to work with him. In 1937, I was arrested and put in prison and then in a labor camp, and only after the Twentieth Congress [in 1956] was I released and rehabilitated. In the name of the millions of innocent people tormented in camps and prisons whose good name you, Nikita Sergeyeovich, restored, in the name of their near ones and their friends, from the hundreds of thousands whom you freed from terrible places of confinement, accept our gratitude and our low bow to you. I understand how much courage, boldness, and longing for the restoration of justice your act required. We shall remember this until the end of our lives. We shall speak of it to our children and grandchildren." After this, a man in charge of the funeral, in plainclothes but with a clearly military bearing, said: "I ask you to say farewell to the deceased. Only do it



quickly, comrades, don't linger over it." The mourners filed past the coffin, hurried on at the urging of the plainclothes guardians of order lined up around them. Among the wreaths and flowers, I caught sight of a wreath with the inscription: "To Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev from A. I. Mikoyan." Then we were again pushed aside by the correspondents.

— *Georgy Fyodorov*

1. "Pensioner of Union significance" was the official title for the highest category of pensioner in the USSR.

2. Novo-Devichy means "New Virgin." The cemetery is named after the adjacent monastery, to which it used to belong before the revolution.

3. A sanitation day was a day on which a Soviet institution was closed to the public so that the premises could be cleaned.

4. The victims of repression were people who had been arrested on political charges under

Stalin and spent long periods in prison and labor camp. Army Commander Iona Emanuilovich Yakir, commander of the Kiev Military District, was arrested, tried for treason, and shot in 1937. A moving account of the case is provided in the book by his son Pyotr Yakir, *A Childhood in Prison* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1973).

5. Hero of Socialist Labor was the highest Soviet civilian decoration.

6. Khrushchev's son-in-law.

## Sanitation Day (Notes of a Contemporary on the Funeral of N. S. Khrushchev)

SEPTEMBER 11, 1971. I was listening to the radio in Peredelkino<sup>1</sup> together with N. Eidelman. He has a good receiver.<sup>2</sup> We caught an announcer in the middle of a broadcast, talking about de-Stalinization. And suddenly words flash by about Khrushchev. “Since 1964 he had lived at his dacha. . . .” Alarmed, we searched all wavelengths. And everywhere on the ether we encountered his name—*mort, gestorben, died*.

Khrushchev had died. A whole epoch, which had come in the middle of our lives, was over. In fact, the epoch had ended earlier: on October 14, 1964, when Khrushchev had been removed from power. But now it had finally receded into history.

However, everyone is interested in knowing how he will be buried. So far our Genghis Khans keep their silence. Tomorrow in the newspapers there will appear a short obituary, signed by “a group of comrades.” Then if they give him a spot in the Novo-Devichy Cemetery—that’s good, we may count the deceased very lucky.

Khrushchev failed because he did things by halves. The whole of Russian history is a product of our indecisiveness, our inclination to do things by halves. Ever since the troops came out and stood on Senate Square on December 14,<sup>3</sup> we’ve been tugging at the rubber band. But it’s a tough rubber band; it doesn’t break.

September 12, Sunday. Moscow is silent. An obtuse silence. In the morning someone arrived from the city.

“Have you heard about Khrushchev? What are people saying in Moscow?”

“Various things.”

“Where did you hear these things?”

“On the train,<sup>4</sup> of course. An old-age pensioner was talking. He was asking whether Khrushchev had died or not.”

I try combing through *Pravda*, but find not a single line, sound, or gleam of light. That means there will be a secret funeral. The most terrible variant. Incompetence at the highest level, that of running the country. What could be more awful? Just the thought of it made my skin crawl.

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This article by the writer Anatoly Zlobin was not published until March 1993, in the magazine *Novoye Vremya* (New Times), nearly 22 years after the funeral.

In the evening I call my acquaintances. Nobody knows anything. In response to my news I hear exclamations of astonishment. That means our country has no past, no history, and its future is equally shrouded in darkness.

September 13. They are implementing a diabolical plan, one could say a cunning plan, fully in the spirit of palace intrigue. *Pravda* has provided a corner, half outlined in black, from which we discover that we did, after all, have a former secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers.

So what now?

Boris Yampolsky<sup>5</sup> calls from Peredelkino:

“If you want to get that bargain we talked about, be at the *Beryozka* store<sup>6</sup> opposite the Novo-Devichy Cemetery at 10.45.”

“Really? How did you find out?”

“Sery [familiar form of Sergei] told me.”

That means there will now be a funeral of a private person, and tomorrow they will be able to publish a full obituary. In our country they have great love of the deceased, but they prefer to rid themselves of them. Afterward all kinds of exhumations begin. Then when he is buried deeper, it will be possible to say: “The deceased was not a bad man, but we didn’t want the people to jeer at the corpse. That’s why we did it. We were protecting the interests of the deceased. We are, after all, great humanists.”<sup>7</sup>

I hurriedly jotted it down. It was already 10 A.M. Time to go. We catch a cab.

“Where to?”

“To the Novo-Devichy Cemetery,” I say. “We’re going to bury Khrushchev.”

Zina (the writer’s wife [SS]) jabs me in the side, and the cab driver says:

“I just passed by the funeral hall at the Kuntsevo Hospital.<sup>8</sup> Everything is cordoned off there. There are buses, cars, troops.”

We start to guess. Perhaps we too should go to the Kuntsevo Hospital and start from there? Zina is against the idea. And indeed all is quiet along the way; there is no sign of beefed-up duty details: they will be bringing him along the same road. But then by the monastery<sup>9</sup> everything is cordoned off.

“There’s the *Beryozka*,” says the cab driver. But a police major is already signaling impatiently to us to proceed.

On the bridge of the ring railroad,<sup>10</sup> idlers are hanging about to gape. We turn left. Here we can get out of the taxi.

Before us is a public garden, deserted except for patrols along the footpaths. Can it really be true that everything is cordoned off and we won’t be able to reach the *Beryozka* where we arranged to meet up with Yampolsky? We foresaw no such turn of events. We walk around the building in the

hope of passing through the inner courtyards. No way through! Everywhere there are trucks with tarpaulin frames. It had been just like that at Stalin's funeral.

The monastery is surrounded on all sides. By the trucks stand soldiers. The officer has a walkie-talkie on his belly. On their shoulder straps are the letters VV.<sup>11</sup>

We return to the public garden. Before us we see the moving backs of four foreigners. They are letting them through. A common-looking fellow with a movie camera is filming the patrols and buses against the background of the monastery wall. It will be a good shot. He'll be able to sell it for foreign currency.

We are approaching a sergeant.

"Stop! It's forbidden."

"We need to get to the cemetery," I say.

"Today is a sanitation day.<sup>12</sup> The cemetery is closed."

"And these vehicles are also for the cleaning work, is that so? Don't addle our brains, sergeant! We've been invited by Rada Sergejevna." Here I made the slip of not saying straight out as I should have: "Rada Nikitychna invited us."<sup>13</sup>

"And where is the invitation?" The very fact that he had entered into dialogue with me was a good sign.

"We are friends of hers. She said on the telephone that we should be at the Beryozka by eleven. Could she really have known that there would be a cordon?" And I show him my writer's ticket.<sup>14</sup>

A sergeant major hurries to the sergeant's aid. I appeal to him.

The sergeant major thinks about it, but gives no answer.

Fifteen meters further on we are stopped on the same footpath by a plain-clothes official in a raincoat. I present my identity document and repeat my story. The official makes a silent gesture for us to proceed. The same procedure gets us through two more cordons.

Right on the lawn stands a brown Volga car. We place ourselves near it, as though we are its passengers.

Now we are able to take a look around us. The gapers have already been driven off the bridge. A patrol is now walking back and forth there. On the far side of the bridge, trucks are standing on the road. The gates to the cemetery are shut tight. Near us stands a bus with the stamp UVD.<sup>15</sup> Over the bus rises a mast with many nodes. Next to it stands a second bus with a mast and antenna. That's the second mark of the besiegers—VV. From the bus there trails along the grass the wire of a field telephone. But everything is quiet and

tranquil. The walkie-talkies are out of action. Colonels and generals walk about in plainclothes. The monastery is under siege.

But where are the besieged? From time to time, old women with little bouquets of flowers infiltrate the cordon. They are checked, and cross to the far side of the street, to the gates, where they are absorbed by the thinned-out crowd.

The besieged monastery looks as peaceful as can be. One can see the onions of the Cathedral of the Smolensk Mother of God. The cathedral's six-tiered bell tower is embraced by the peaceful wooden scaffolding that has been put up for restoration work.

Boris Yampolsky has got through to us from the direction of the Beryozka. It starts to drizzle. We suggest that Zina take shelter in the Volga. She does so, after asking permission from the chauffeur. Now we have even stronger cover.

On the street there is movement. Black Volgas are passing by. A bus drives up, and musicians with trumpets get out. Clearly an orchestra fit for a cemetery.

And there is an open truck with wreaths, followed by a bus with curtained-off windows. The vehicles pass on to the territory of the cemetery, and at once, as though automatically, the gates close again. We also set off for the far side of the street. In the side gate there has opened up a narrow chink, but we are already pressing hard.

Someone shouts out:

“Open up, there aren't many of us!”

A general in a civilian raincoat sternly orders:

“Lisichkin, open up! Quickly!”

The soldiers are still taking their time pulling back the bar to open the main gates, but I am already through the side gate and can see the red lid of the coffin.

And so we have broken through the defenses. It's a miracle! We hurry down the main alley.

Yampolsky manages to whisper to me: “We are the most dangerous ones here.”

I overtake him, rushing toward the bus. The coffin is already being taken out. I see the white lusterless forehead buried in the pillow. I grasp at the foot of the coffin, and immediately find myself somehow crowded away. I manage only to seize hold of a wreath, and do not let it out of my hands. The procession has passed on. I stand still.

I read the inscription on the wreath: “From the Council of Ministers.” That is what I have inherited.

The coffin has been set upon a mound of earth. It is submerged in the crowd, and I can no longer see it. Zina has ended up closer to it than I have. She is standing right alongside the relatives. Behind her there is a line of plainclothes agents.

Someone standing to the side orders: "Link arms. Don't let them through."

Even here they continue to man the defenses. The funeral ceremony begins. It is presided over by a man in a black suit, a not especially tall man, with a worn look on his face. He speaks with dignity and bitterness. It is Sergei Nikitych Khrushchev, son of the deceased.

A drizzle of fine rain came down. Over the coffin they held up a black umbrella, which for some time they were unable to open. As for us, we didn't matter, but the makeup on the face of the deceased might be ruined. Then a Bolshevik woman from the Donbas spoke: empty words about party loyalty, Bolshevik attachment to principle, revolutionary fire, and all the rest of the stuff we hear at party gatherings.

Then Vadim Vasilyev<sup>16</sup> spoke. He was noticeably agitated and kept repeating the phrase "so to say:"

"He spoke out about 1937. He restored the honor of my father and my grandfather, so to say. We shall be grateful to him for that, so to say."

And I reflected that Khrushchev had freed not only ten million people imprisoned in the camps, but all of us. He had freed me, too, although I had been, as it were, at liberty. That is why I am now standing by his coffin.

The orators held forth, standing on a clump of earth. Sergei Nikitych invited each in turn to speak, emphasizing before each speaker that this was a family funeral.

Again there played the invisible cemetery orchestra. The mourners began to approach the coffin to say farewell. The deceased was yellow and thin, his nose sharpened, his mouth collapsed, a dry parchment yellowness.

"Pass by, pass by," they urge me on.

By the foot of the coffin, a man holds a red pillow: four Gold Stars, twenty orders, many medals—quite a respectable family funeral. I wanted to remain by the foot of the coffin, but I was again crowded away by plainclothes agents. They were scattered everywhere among us and did their job of protecting the coffin pretty well. But everything was filmed and tape-recorded all the same. There was even a microphone hanging over a clump of earth.

The relatives display fortitude. Someone—probably it was Yuliya (Khrushchev's granddaughter [SK])—broke into sobs. Right away Rada called her to order:

“Control yourself. They’re speaking to you. We agreed, didn’t we?”

Across the grave lies a crowbar. The ropes have been put in place. The next grave is that of Sergei Sadovsky. It’s been all trampled underfoot. Sergei Sadovsky—who on earth is he? They hammer in the nails.

“Alyosha, pull!”

We continue with our games. But little time is left. They have pulled the coffin up and set it on the crowbar. It’s a good coffin, one of those costing 154 rubles. Yura (brother of the writer [SK]) and I had dreamt of buying such a coffin for our father, but we couldn’t afford it. By the grave five gravediggers are at work. How many of them are plainclothes agents?

And again: “Alyosha, pull out the crowbar!”

The hole was deep, and it took a long time to lower the coffin. Then they began to throw in earth. Getting into the spirit of the occasion, I too flung in a few handfuls. That was when I felt my throat squeezing up.

Meanwhile the gravediggers are already hard at work with their shovels. Those of them who were plainclothes agents got out of breath right away, while the real laborers showed no sign of tiring. It was immediately clear who was who. And see, instead of the hole and over it there has grown up a hillock, as if the coffin had pushed it out of the earth in accordance with the Law of Archimedes. The lads patted down the hillock with their shovels, and everything was made smooth.

Nina Petrovna (Khrushchev’s wife [SK]) approached and set down a big red rose. In general, she bore herself splendidly, and so did all the other relatives. Only Alyosha Adzhubei (Khrushchev’s son-in-law [SS]) kept his distance the whole time, as if he were trying to dissolve himself in the drizzle.

I pulled a camomile out of the bouquet from the Council of Ministers. It hardly had any fragrance left. Everything finished quickly, almost in a rush. The operation to defend the monastery walls had been conducted with consummate tranquility. The family funeral under state protection with five divisions of troops could not have gone better.

An old woman behind my back says: “We live badly, but we all come to the same end.”

We are still standing around, although we no longer have anything to do. We try to converse, but a plainclothes agent appears next to us. All the pathways are full of them. They shoot through us with their eyes, but we no longer give a damn about them.

I look about me. How many of us were here? About four hundred people in all, but those who came of their own free will were clearly in the minority.

The rest were plainclothes agents. Not a single official from the Volga had approached the grave. That was not permitted them. Their job was only not to let others through, and by no means to go there themselves.

We leave through the gates. An announcement hangs there. It says that on Monday September 13 the cemetery is out of operation. It's a sanitation day. An attendant removes the announcement. The sanitation day is over.

Rudny (a writer [SS]) appeared: "You see, everything went off quietly. And they warned me there would be a *Khodynka*."<sup>17</sup>

That's what the "progressives" expected. So they didn't go, hoping others would go in their place.

Feeling jaded and drained, I set off for the city. I had to meet Zingerman (a literary critic and member of the Writers' Union [SK]). Hardly have I entered the literature institute when Zingerman asks me: "And did Yevtushenko recite his verses?"

I have only just managed to get off the trolley bus, but rumor has gone ahead of me. Three hours later I met Yevtushenko in the writers' club.

"So why weren't you at the funeral?"

"I was there before you were," he declares. "I was at the morgue."

Very well calculated. He now finds it disadvantageous to make an appearance at the graveside, with his verses all the more so. But at the morgue, in a closed space—by all means, he'll go.

Hardly had I got home, toward evening, than I scribbled a report of the siege of the monastery. Today, in Peredelkino, I'm writing this all up, somewhat returning to my usual self and in a condition to think about what happened. Khrushchev has died, but Khrushchev's specter has appeared. The obituary that I forecast for today has not been published in the central press. That means they don't even have any cunning, only stupidity and fear. All the socialist countries have published photos and obituaries. East Germany alone is silent. Albania has declared that the ringleader of the clique of revisionists is dead.

So in our country it turns out that nothing happened—neither the Twentieth Congress nor the Twenty-Second Congress, neither Stalin's crimes nor Khrushchev's thaw. What stupidity! Stupidity that yields to no programming. Stupidity and lies, born of fear. And that is already fascism. I shall not go to bury Brezhnev, and he will come to an even worse end. That is already decided, albeit not yet signed. On this note I could conclude my cemetery reportage. However, new information continues to arrive.

The cemetery was closed for another six hours after the funeral. People were not let in to lay flowers on the grave. The cordoned-off area began at



the Sportivnaya subway station. Thousands of people gathered there, but all streets were blocked. Anatoly Agranovsky (another writer [SS]) told me about it. There's your family funeral—with the armed forces taking part! A secret funeral, a forbidden funeral—all epithets here are possible and insufficient. It cannot be more stupid, but in this case the saying applies: "The worse, the better." Our Genghis Khans have yet again shown everyone that they are incapable of anything, do not know how to do anything, and are not prepared for anything. But there must be here some kind of hidden meaning, not yet very clear, but nonetheless very important. Something more that we shall find out in the very near future. Such cemetery stories do not end so simply. One is not frightened of the dead without some special reason.

September 15. In the morning, hardly have I entered the canteen in the literature institute when Yampolsky calls me over and takes me into a storage area in front of the men's room.

"Please don't tell anybody that I was at the funeral. And don't mention my name in your diaries, because I know that you're writing. I've disappeared. I don't exist. I don't want them to concern themselves with me. I don't exist."

"I haven't told anybody. Where did you get that idea?"

"In any case, please don't tell anybody in the future. I don't exist and nobody should concern himself with me. I want to live out the time left to me in tranquility, so I don't exist."

"OK, Boris, I haven't told anybody, and I won't tell anybody. Just don't die from your own courage."

"I'll repeat it for you. I'm not afraid of anybody. It's just that I don't exist. I know what it means when they start to concern themselves with you, and I don't want it."

"Ah, Boris, and it was you who said that we were the most dangerous ones there. How can you be dangerous if you don't exist?"

"That is precisely why I am dangerous."

I went to Moscow to see to some business. Everywhere I have to tell people about the funeral. In exchange I myself obtain additional information. The cemetery is already filled with flowers. All the socialist countries have sent Nina Petrovna telegrams with words of condolence. That, after all, is an elementary act of politeness for any well brought-up person. But not for our Genghis Khans. As Heine put it, they are such fools that they don't even know their own fool's trade. From the editorial offices of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Soviet Russia) I went to those of *Novy Mir* (New World), and then on to *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Literary Gazette).

If only I could hand them my reportage about the funeral of Nikita Khrushchev, the great reformer and seducer.

“Take the manuscript and sign off that you’ve received it.”

And they would run and jump for joy. “Yes, yes, into print! Without delay.”

Or I bring it to *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, to Syr (Vitaly Syrokomy, at that time first deputy chief editor of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* [SK]). He reads it, and tells me the bloody truth: “This should be published in *The New York Times*. On the front page. But I don’t handle material for them.”

Alas, such thoughts don’t even enter my head. My reportage is written in the Russian language, but it can’t be published in the Russian script, and I myself don’t want it to appear in the Latin alphabet.

It turns out that I too do not exist. Boris Yampolsky is right.

It remains to pose the last question: When will this be published in the Russian script?

—Anatoly Zlobin

1. Peredelkino was a settlement outside Moscow where many writers and cultural figures had dachas. [SS]

2. Natan Eidelman was a Russian writer, historian, and publicist. A good receiver was needed to pick up the Russian-language broadcasts of foreign radio stations that the authorities tried to jam. [SS]

3. It was on December 14, 1825, that the Decembrists—Russian officers who had been influenced by liberal ideas while serving in Western Europe in the war against Napoleon—marched troops to Senate Square in Saint Petersburg and stood them in front of the Senate building. They hoped thereby to force the Senate to sign a manifesto proclaiming the deposition of the autocracy, the abolition of serfdom, and other democratic reforms. The Decembrist rising was quickly crushed. It is regarded as the first attempt to introduce a liberal system of government in Russia. [SS]

4. One of the electric commuter trains that connects Moscow with settlements on its outskirts. [SS]

5. The writer Boris Samoilovich Yampolsky (1912–72). See Biographies. [SS]

6. The Beryozka (meaning “Birch Tree”) stores sold products for foreign currency. [SS]

7. These remarks of the author are intended ironically. [SS]

8. The Kremlin Kuntsevo Hospital belonged to the Fourth Administration of the Soviet Ministry of Health, which served the political elite. Attached

to it was a funeral hall and the morgue in which lay Khrushchev’s body. [SS]

9. The Novo-Devichy Cemetery is next to the Novo-Devichy Monastery, to which it used to belong. [SS]

10. A railroad that encircles central Moscow. [SS]

11. VV stands for *vnutrennyye voiska*—that is, “internal troops.” The mission of the internal troops was (and remains) the suppression of disturbances inside the country. The internal troops were part of the armed forces until they were transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1989. [SS]

12. See Note 3 to the preceding piece, “The Sendoff.”

13. Rada Nikitychna is Nikita Khrushchev’s daughter. His calling her Rada Sergeyevna is a slip of the tongue. [SS]

14. “Writer’s ticket” refers to the card showing membership in the Writers’ Union. [SS]

15. UVD stands for *upravlenie vnutrennykh del*, meaning “Administration of Internal Affairs”—that is, the Moscow branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. [SS]

16. Vadim Nikolayevich Vasilyev, a friend and former fellow student of Sergei Khrushchev. See Biographies. [SS]

17. At the coronation of Nicholas II, many people were crushed to death in the dense crowd that gathered on the Khodynka field. [SS]

## Mama's Notebooks, 1971–1984

EDITOR'S NOTE. *After Father's death I repeatedly urged my mother to write or tape-record her reminiscences. I was sure that her recollections would add to what Father had dictated and describe those times somewhat differently. I brought her a tape recorder at the dacha that the Council of Ministers had allocated to her after Father's death. She ignored it. After her death, however, while my sister Rada and I were hurriedly sorting out and packing her things—the new occupant was impatient to move in—we discovered that she had made notes of her life, not on tape but by hand in a school notebook. Rada took the notebook, as she too had tried to persuade Mother to write down her reminiscences. A year later she gave it to me, together with a whole basket of letters. Mother had corresponded with many people: she considered it a duty to reply to everyone who wrote her, whether she knew them or not.*

*Later on a second notebook was discovered among Mama's things. It was an ordinary thick notebook in a brown cover that had gone discolored from age. In it Mama wrote about Father's last days, his funeral, and her life as a widow.*

*I present Mother's notes in full.<sup>1</sup> [SK]*

### *The First Notebook*

To my children and grandchildren

Nina Petrovna Kukharchuk (Khrushcheva):

I was born on April 14, 1900, in the village of Vasilyov, Poturzinsk *gmina*, Tomashovsky county, Chelm province, in the former Kingdom of Poland.<sup>2</sup> My brother Ivan was born three years later. The population of Chelm province was Ukrainian, and people spoke Ukrainian in the villages, but the administration in the village, the *gmina*, and above was Russian. In school children were taught in Russian, although they did not speak Russian at home. From history it is known that the government of the Kingdom pursued a policy of Russification of the population. I remember that in the first grade of my village primary school, the teacher hit pupils across the palms of their hands with a ruler when they made a mistake, even when it was because they didn't understand the teacher's explanations in Russian. (The children didn't know Russian.) This was called "getting a paw."

Mama—Yekaterina Grigoryevna Kukharchuk (maiden name Bondarchuk)—was married at sixteen and as a dowry was given one *morg* of land,<sup>3</sup> several oak trees in the forest, and a chest for clothes and bedding. In the village such a dowry was considered very generous. Soon after the wedding my father was

called up for military service. Mama had two married brothers: Pavel, with a wife and their three children, and Anton, with a wife and four children. The only one of Anton's children still alive is Vasily Antonovich Bondarchuk, who lives in the town of Lutsk. Uncle Anton and his daughter were tortured to death by Banderites<sup>4</sup> in 1946; one of his sons, Petro, was killed by bandits in Poland, and his son Ivan died of tuberculosis after the war. Pavel's sons went to work in Canada and were not heard from again. His daughter Nina now lives on a collective farm in Volynsk province.

Father—Pyotr Vasilyevich Kukharchuk—came from a poorer family than my mother. The family consisted of his parents, four brothers, and three sisters. It owned an indivisible allotment of 2.5 *morgs*, an old house, and a small orchard. They had no horses.

My father was the oldest in the family. When his mother, Grandmother Domna, died, Father inherited the land and should have paid his sisters and brothers one hundred rubles each (a large sum in those days). I think that the war that began in 1914 interfered with paying that sum.

I didn't know my grandfathers, Grigory and Vasily. They died before I was born.

Our village, Vasilyov, was poor, and most people worked for the landowner for wages. At that time he paid women ten kopecks for a whole day (from sunup to sundown) harvesting beets, while the men got twenty to thirty kopecks for mowing. I don't remember much from that time. I was supposed to prepare nettles and cut them up with a large knife for the pigs, which were being fattened for Easter or Christmas. The knife often hit my fingers instead of the nettles, and it left scars on my left index finger that didn't fade for a long time.

I still remember the garden, which was small and overgrown with grass and nettles. It had large plum trees, one cherry tree, and small young pear trees. I broke a small pear tree. Uncle Anton asked why I did that, and I replied: "Don't feel bad. Look how many you have left."

Mama—Yekaterina Grigoryevna—and I lived with her family at the time. Father was then away on military service in Bessarabia and later, in 1904, fought against Japan. Grandmother Ksenia's house was larger. Everyone sat on a wide bench, not at a table, and ate from the same dish. Mother's younger children were held, but there wasn't enough room for the older children and me, so we had to reach between the grownups' shoulders for the food. If you spilled anything, you got a spoon across the forehead. For some reason Uncle Anton always kidded me, saying that I would marry into a family with lots of

children; the children would be snotty-nosed and I would have to eat with them out of one dish, reach for food over their heads, etc., etc.

In 1912 Father put me, a sack of potatoes, and a chunk of a hog on a cart and drove us to the city of Lublin, where his brother, Kondraty Vasilyevich, was a conductor on freight trains. Uncle Kondraty arranged for me to study at the Lublin gymnasium (a four-year school). I had already studied for three years before that at the village school. The village teacher had convinced my father that I was good at science and should study in a town, and my father had listened.

I studied for a year in Lublin. The next year Uncle began working as a senior watchman in the Chelm Fiscal Office and transferred me to the same type of school in the town of Chelm.

When the First World War broke out, I was in the village of Vasilyov on vacation from the Chelm gymnasium, where I was a student in the second class.

Autumn 1914. Austrian troops slipped into our village and began to make trouble, stealing things and abducting girls. Mama put me behind the stove, ordered me to stay there, and told the soldiers that I had typhus. Of course, they lost no time in leaving. Soon the Austrians were ousted by Russian troops, and we were ordered to evacuate the village—how and to where, we were not told. We had no horses, so we took what we could carry and left home carrying bags. We walked in the same direction as everyone else. I remember Mother carried a primus stove for a long time—it was her pride and joy—but there was no kerosene, so we had to abandon the primus. We walked for a long and difficult time ahead of the advancing Austrian troops. At a station we came across Father, who was serving in a militia unit. They were auxiliary troops. Because of his age, Father was no longer considered fit for combat service.

Father told his commander about meeting his family, and the commander allowed us to remain with the unit. Mama began working as a cook at the unit's command post, and my brother and I went around on Father's wagon and helped him out as much as we could. I was fourteen and Vanya was eleven.

During a lull at the front the commander summoned Father, gave him a letter to Bishop Yevlogy of Chelm, and ordered him to take me to Kiev. Bishop Yevlogy headed some sort of refugee relief organization there. He arranged for me to study at government expense at the Chelm Maryinsky Girls' School, which had been evacuated from Chelm to Odessa. This was a seven-grade boarding school for girls. I studied there for four years and finished it in 1919. My parents spent those four years in evacuation in Saratov province.

A few words about Bishop Yevlogy and the school. In Poland, Bishop Yevlogy of Chelm was an important supporter of the autocracy and a fervent advocate of the policy of Russification. He trained Russified cadres from among children of the local population, from West Ukrainian villages. If he had not intervened, I would never have been able to study at government expense at that school, which did not accept the children of peasants. Specially selected daughters of priests and officials were the school's students. I chanced to be there because of the special circumstances of wartime, as I have described.

After the war, in 1918, my parents and my brother Ivan returned home from Saratov province through Odessa. Father came to visit me at the apartment where we students were living and looked over the place. The large hall caught his fancy and he said: "We could live here." But the administration only allowed him to spend the night, and that only reluctantly. Then my parents and brother left for home, in Poland, and I remained in Odessa to finish my schooling.

After graduating from the school I worked for a time in its office, writing out certificates and copying various papers—the school had no typewriter.

At the beginning of 1920, I joined the underground of the Bolshevik Party and began to work at the party's orders in Odessa and in the villages of Odessa province. Communists were mobilized in June of 1920, and I was sent to the Polish front.<sup>5</sup> Since I knew the Ukrainian language and local conditions, I was initially chosen to be an agitator attached to a military unit, and I traveled around the villages and talked about Soviet rule. A Red Army soldier, also an agitator, went with me. When the Central Committee of the West Ukrainian Communist Party was formed, I was appointed to head the section for work among women. We were then in the town of Ternopol. As is well known, we had to leave Poland in autumn 1920. My army service ended at the same time. Together with the Party Central Committee Secretary Comrade Krasnokutsky and others, I arrived in Moscow and was assigned to attend the Yakov M. Sverdlov Communist University and to take the six-month courses recently organized by the Bolshevik Party Central Committee.

In summer 1921, I was sent to the Donetsk Basin, to the town of Bakhmut (now Artyomovsk), to teach the history of the revolutionary movement and political economy at the province party school. Until my future students arrived, I was assigned by the province party committee to work as secretary of the province committee to purge party ranks. There I went through my second purge, the first having occurred at the front, in Ternopol.<sup>6</sup>

As is well known, the requisitioning of farm products stopped after the Tenth Party Congress and markets began to appear.<sup>7</sup> They had various commodities for sale—if you had the money to buy them. Once I went with two other teachers to a market to buy some bread, and we were all infected with typhus. One of us (Abugova) died, while the other teacher and I were sick for a long time and then suffered a relapse. However, our youth helped us to overcome the disease and we recovered. We were not hospitalized, but were taken care of at the school. We were fed by Serafima Ilyinichna Gopner, who was then head of the Donetsk province party committee's agitation and propaganda section. She obtained miners' rations for us through the Central Administration of the Coal Industry, which was under Pyatakov, the future Trotskyite.<sup>8</sup> In summer 1922, Serafima Ilyinichna arranged for me to work in the province's program of courses for teachers in Taganrog, on the shore of the Sea of Azov. I recuperated there from typhus.

In autumn 1922, I was sent to Yuzovka (now Donetsk) to teach political economy at the district party school. There I met Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, who was studying at the workers' faculty in Yuzovka.

In 1924, we were married and began working together at the Petrovka mine, near Yuzovka. Our district was called Petrovo-Maryinsky. It combined the Petrovka mine with the agricultural fields of Maryinka and its neighboring villages. The district executive committee of the soviet of workers' and peasants' deputies was located in the village of Maryinka, while the district party committee was in Petrovka. The district committee secretary lived in Petrovka and the chairman of the district executive committee lived in Maryinka.

Earlier, I had spent a year taking courses for retraining teachers for soviet and party schools (administered by the Krupskaya Academy of Communist Education). Then, at the end of 1923, I was sent as propagandist of the district party committee to the Rutchenkovo mine. That was where Nikita Sergeevich's parents and children (by his deceased first wife) and his sister and her family lived.<sup>9</sup> He had worked there as deputy director of the mine administration and left from there to study at the workers' faculty in Yuzovka.

I conducted political literacy classes for the miners, delivered lectures on political subjects in the club, and carried out various orders from the district committee. I moved into a house for new arrivals (something like a hotel of the mine administration), which was across the road from the club. After a heavy rain it was very hard to cross the road, since my boots would stick in the mud and my feet would "walk out" of them. You had to tie on the boots

a special way. People frightened me, talking about the mud before I went to Rutchenkovka, and since I had no boots I had to find a private cobbler to make them. Many women came when I delivered lectures at the club. It turned out that they were interested in seeing the wife that their friend Nikita Khrushchev had found somewhere else, not at the mine.

When N. S.<sup>10</sup> finished his studies, the workers' faculty of the high school sent him to be the secretary of the Petrovo-Maryinsky district party committee, and I was transferred from Rutchenkovka to Petrovka, again as propagandist of the district party committee. An interesting detail: At the time propagandists were paid out of funds from the center, while district committee secretaries were paid from local funds. At one time I was paid more than N. S.

There was still unemployment then, even among communist miners. After classes at the mine's political school my listeners accompanied me home and sometimes reproached me for the fact that I was working and my husband was working, while they had no work and had big families at home. But life gradually calmed down and the unemployed disappeared from the area of the mine.

Lenin died in January of 1924. N. S. went to Moscow for the funeral as a member of the Donetsk delegation. Following an appeal by the Central Committee, many workers joined the party. That was called the Lenin levy. Propagandists had more work; we had to teach semiliterate workers the fundamentals of political theory, and that was difficult. Moscow sent new propagandists, who were mobilized by the Central Committee from among graduates of various universities.

At the end of 1926, N. S. was transferred to work at the [Yuzovka] province party committee, where he began to head the organizational department, while I went to Moscow to raise my qualifications at the Krupskaya Communist Academy. I studied in the department of political economy there until the end of 1927. After completing my courses I was sent to the Kiev Interregional Party School to teach political economy. I had to conduct courses in the Ukrainian language, since the students were members of the underground from Western Ukraine.

During the year I was studying in Moscow, N. S. succeeded in working for a time in Kharkov at the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik) and by autumn 1927 was already chairman of the organizational department of the party's Kiev province committee. I was also sent to Kiev, even though a comrade from the Central Committee department that assigned personnel strongly insisted that I be sent to Tyumen. I was



helped in this matter by the Kiev province committee secretary, Comrade N. Demchenko, who was later unjustifiably repressed.

In Kiev I taught political economy at the interregional party school, where members of the underground from Western Ukraine and Poland studied. That was from 1927 to 1929.

Rada was born in Kiev in 1929. That year N. S. left for the Industrial Academy in Moscow, and in summer 1930 we joined him and moved into the academy's dormitory on the Petrovka, at No. 40. We had two rooms at opposite ends of the corridor. We slept in one, with little Rada. Yuliya, Lenya, and the nanny, Matryosha (whom N. S. found before we arrived), slept in the other.

I was sent to work in the party committee at the Elektrozavod [Electrical Equipment Factory]. At first I organized and led the soviet party school. A year later I was elected to the party committee and began to head the agitation and propaganda department of the plant's party committee.

About three thousand Communists belonged to the factory's party organization. The plant worked in three shifts, and I had a great deal of work. I left home at 8 A.M. and returned after 10 P.M. As ill luck would have it, Radochka [diminutive for Rada] came down with scarlet fever and was put in the hospital next to the plant. In the evening I would run over to look through the window and see what the child was doing. I saw the nurse give her a bowl of kasha [porridge] and a large spoon and then run off to gossip with her friends. Rada was small, not much more than a year old. I saw her standing with her feet in the bowl and crying, but the nurse ignored her and I couldn't do anything. We signed for the child and took her away early; she barely recovered.

I worked at the Elektrozavod until the middle of 1935, when Seryozha [diminutive of Sergei] was born. I completed the five-year plan in two and a half years and received a certificate of honor from the factory organization. I went through my third regular party purge while at the factory. I became acquainted with a large circle of famous Muscovites, with writers, Old Bolsheviks, former [tsarist-era] political convicts sent by their organizations to visit the factory, and collective farmers sponsored by our factory. I consider those to have been the most active years of my political and public life.

In 1935, after maternity leave, the district party committee sent me as the senior party official to the social organization VSNITO (the All-Union Council of Scientific and Engineering-Technical Associations), where I worked until Lena was born in 1937.

N. S. was not allowed to complete the Industrial Academy but was transferred to party work, first as secretary of the Bauman district party committee and then of the Krasnaya Presnya district party committee. At that time the party was engaged in a brutal struggle with the Right Opposition. In 1927 N. S. was a delegate to the Fifteenth Party Congress from the Donetsk party organization, and in 1930 he was a delegate to the Sixteenth Party Congress from the Moscow party organization. By 1932 he was already working as a secretary of the Moscow city committee and after that as a secretary of the Moscow province party committee. In 1934 he was a delegate to the Seventeenth Party Congress and was elected to the party Central Committee. In 1935 L. M. Kaganovich, who had been first secretary of the Moscow city committee, left to become people's commissar for transportation, and they elected Khrushchev first secretary of the Moscow city party organization. He worked there until the beginning of 1938, when he was sent to Ukraine as a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine.<sup>11</sup>

In Moscow N. S. devoted much of his effort to the construction of the first subway line and the Moscow River embankments, as well as to the creation of a bread-baking industry (by adapting old circular buildings, as the technology demanded). It was necessary to organize the city infrastructure, baths, public toilets, and electric power for the enterprises of Moscow, and especially for those of the province. New floors were added to low-rise buildings to increase living space, and a great deal else was accomplished.

During this period we already had an apartment in the so-called Government House near the Kamenny Bridge<sup>12</sup> (four rooms), and N. S.'s parents moved in with us. At that time food was distributed by ration card. My distribution center was located near the plant, while N. S.'s was located in what is today Komsomolsky Lane. Sergei Nikanorovich, N. S.'s father, traveled to those distribution centers for potatoes and other food products and carried them on his back—there was no other possibility. One time he had a heavy load and jumped off a moving streetcar in the opposite direction [to its motion]. It was lucky he wasn't killed. He also used to carry Rada to the day nursery on the second floor of our building when the elevator wasn't working. Rada loved her grandfather very much.

Grandmother Kseniya Ivanovna spent most of her time in her room or sitting on a stool on the street near our entrance. There were always people standing around her, and she would talk with them. N. S. didn't approve of her sitting there,<sup>13</sup> but his mother wouldn't listen to him.

We left for Kiev in the early spring of 1938, and I had to leave my job; everything I had done up until then was on a voluntary basis on instructions

from the district party committee. During our Kiev period I taught party history in the district party school (under the Molotov district committee in the city of Kiev), gave lectures, and took evening courses in the English language. I took care of the three children, who were small and often sick.

In 1938, in Kiev, I registered with the party organization of the Institute of Traumatology and Orthopedics in the Lenin district. There I made the acquaintance of Professor Anna Yefremovna Frumina, who, beginning in spring 1941, treated Seryozha for tuberculosis of the hip and supervised his treatment until he was fully recovered. Seryozha was placed in a small bed made of plaster (one leg, his arms, and the upper part of his chest were left free), in which he spent more than two years.<sup>14</sup> It was only in 1943 that he began to walk with crutches, and then in a “tutor”—a corset specially adapted for walking.

A curious digression: I don't remember the date, unfortunately. A dacha was built for V. M. Molotov<sup>15</sup> according to a special design, with large rooms for the reception of foreign guests. One day it was announced that there would be a government reception for people's commissars (ministers) and Moscow party leaders (Father among them [SK]) at that dacha. Officials were invited along with their wives, so I was also at the reception. The women were invited to the living room. I sat down near the door and listened to conversations among the Moscow guests. All the women had their own professions, and they chatted about their work and children.

Then we were invited to the dining room, where tables were arranged in a U-shape. We were seated according to a prearranged order. I sat next to Valeriya Alekseyeva Golubtsova-Malenkova.<sup>16</sup> The wife of Stanislav Kosior, who had just been transferred to work at the USSR Council of People's Commissars,<sup>17</sup> was seated across from me. It was already known that Khrushchev would replace him as secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. During dinner I started to ask Kosior's wife what kitchenware I should take with me. She was quite astonished by my questions and said that the house we would live in had everything and we didn't need to take anything with us. Indeed, it turned out that the cook and her staff had more fine kitchenware at their disposal than I had ever seen. The same was true in the dining room. We began to live with things supplied by the government: furniture, dishes, and beds. Food was delivered from a government warehouse, and we were billed once a month.

To return to the reception: I found everything very curious. After the guests were seated, J. V. Stalin entered from the buffet room, followed by members of the Politburo, and they all sat down at the head table. Of course,

they were greeted with applause for a long time. I don't remember exactly, but I think it was Stalin himself who said that many new people's commissariats had been formed recently, that new leaders had been appointed, and that the Politburo had decided it would be useful to bring everyone together in such a friendly setting, to talk and get to know one another better.

After that many people spoke, giving their affiliation and describing what they thought of their work. Women were asked to speak. Valeriya Alekseyeva Golubtsova-Malenkova talked about her scientific research, which provoked the women to criticize her. In contrast, the young wife of Kaftanov, the people's commissar for higher education, said that she would do everything to help her husband work better in his new and responsible position. This met with general approval.

During the dinner I learned that Comrade Kosior had two sons. Kosior's wife made a very pleasant impression on me. I often thought of her when I found out years later that she had been unjustly sent into exile and shot, and that the instructions to shoot her had been signed personally by V. M. Molotov. N. S. told me this under the following circumstances: One day [in the early 1960s] Polina Semyonovna Molotova [also known as Zhemchuzhina] met me in the courtyard of the house on Granovsky Street and asked me to pass on to N. S. her request to be received at the Central Committee on the subject of accepting V. M. Molotov back into the party—he had been expelled several years before. N. S. received Polina Semyonovna and showed her the document with Molotov's instructions to shoot the wives of Kosior, Postyshev, and other ranking officials of Ukraine. He then asked her whether, in her opinion, it was possible to talk about restoring Molotov's party membership or whether he should be put on trial. N. S. told me this when I asked whether Polina Semyonovna had visited him and what the result of the conversation was.

In 1935–36 enterprises worked an uninterrupted week: people worked for five days, with the sixth day off, on a sliding scale. For me it was a very inconvenient schedule. N. S. had a regular day off, so we were never free on the same day. The purpose of the uninterrupted working week was a good one: equipment was fully utilized, so labor productivity rose and people were less tired. But the system was not popular, and later we shifted to a six-day working week, with Sundays off.

I remember that in those years Yevgeniya Kogan, Kuibyshev's former wife, was the secretary for propaganda of the Moscow city committee, and I remember her daughter, Galya Kuibysheva.<sup>18</sup> I remember how disappointed I was when Comrade Kogan arranged for her comrades to visit theaters,

which happened often. But I couldn't go with them because I worked at the factory on Sundays. And all cultural events in which N. S. participated were unavailable to me because of the "uninterrupted" week.

The secretary of the party committee at the Elektroavod was Comrade Yurov, a very energetic comrade. People in those days called one another by their last names and didn't take any particular interest in family matters. Yurov didn't know or care who my husband was. Late one evening he called our apartment. I answered and he asked brusquely: "Who is speaking?" Automatically I replied: "Kukharchuk." "But what are you doing there? I'm calling Comrade Khrushchev's apartment." He was very surprised to discover that I was, so it turned out, Khrushchev's wife. He was calling on an urgent matter: the meadows of a collective farm supported by our factory were about to be trampled by an army cavalry unit, and it was imperative that the Moscow city party committee intervene before morning.<sup>19</sup> The next day he questioned me about how I managed to conceal my family connection with the secretary of the Moscow city committee. I replied that I had not concealed it, but that I hadn't thought it necessary to inform my comrades at the factory in the absence of questions from them. Incidentally, with the assistance of the Moscow city committee, the meadows were protected from the cavalry. Later on Comrade Yurov was subjected to unjust repression and perished.

Members of the factory's party committee worked very hard. As I've already mentioned, I left home at eight in the morning and returned no earlier than ten in the evening. I traveled by streetcar from our apartment building to Elektroavodskaya [Electrical Factory] Street, which took at least an hour.

On the way to and from work I read new books. I remember reading *How the Steel Was Tempered* for the first time on the streetcar.<sup>20</sup> The factory worked in three shifts, and the party, trade union, and Komsomol [Young Communist League] organizations (committees) had to work during all three shifts: we held meetings, political classes, etc.

During the 1950s I kept in touch with the factory's workers through Varya Syrkova, who invited me to her home, where I saw former comrades. But after she died, and later Comrade Tsvetkov (former director of the lamp factory) died, personal contacts ended, though Tamara Tamarina, who had worked at the Elektroavod since 1916, would call on the telephone and pass on greetings.

This is how my parents got to know Nikita Sergeevich:

In 1939, the Germans occupied Poland and were approaching my native village, Vasilyov. As is well known, our forces were moving west at that time

and occupied regions of western Ukraine, the city of Lvov, and western Belorussia. N. S. called me in Kiev and said that my village, Vasilyov, and the surrounding area would be handed over to the Germans and that if I wanted to I could take the opportunity to go to Lvov, and from there I would be taken to Vasilyov and could pick up my parents. N. S. added that Comrade Burmistenko, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, would be organizing my trip. Comrade Burmistenko told me that two women were traveling to Lvov on orders of the Central Committee, and that I could go with them. One young Komsomol member was going to work with youth, and the other, a party official, was supposed to work with women in Lvov. We were ordered to put on uniforms and carry revolvers. They said that the change of dress was for convenience, so that military patrols would not stop us so often along the road.

Vanya Podosinov, an excellent driver from the Central Committee garage, took the wheel of our ZIS-101 car.

Our trip was more or less uneventful until as we approached Lvov we were almost run over by an oncoming truck. The truck driver hadn't slept for three nights and had fallen asleep at the wheel. To avoid a collision, Vanya Podosinov turned the wheel sharply to the right and the car struck a telegraph pole. The only person hurt was the Komsomol member, who hit her nose on the window. An officer who happened to pass by (he checked our documents) gave us a lift in his car, and sent the girl off to the hospital for treatment, and the two of us were given accommodation in Lvov, in an apartment belonging to the command staff. Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko, commander of the Kiev military district, was commanding the troops. Khrushchev was there too, in his capacity as a member of the military council. When N. S. and Timoshenko returned and saw us in military uniform with revolvers they first started to laugh, but then N. S. got very angry and ordered us to change into dresses immediately. He continued indignantly: "What on earth were you thinking of? You want to persuade the local population to be in favor of the Soviet government and you come here with revolvers? Who is going to trust you? They've been taught for years that we're aggressors, and you'll confirm that slander with your revolvers."

I changed clothes and went to Vasilyov for my parents. I was accompanied by Vasily Mitrofanovich Bozhko, one of the officers from N. S.'s bodyguard. Our trip was uneventful and we arrived at my parents' house. Father and Mother were at home. A lot of people came running to see me and to ask for news. No one wanted to believe that the village would be handed over to the

Germans; not even the junior commanders of units had yet been told that. But Comrade Timoshenko had given me permission to say why I was coming for my parents. That night they moved a tank into Father's courtyard. All night long soldiers crowded into the house to get warm; Mama fed them, and V. M. Bozhko sat down with them as well. Toward morning representatives from the local government (still Soviet) came to arrest me as a spy and provocateur. Bozhko and the tank crew had a hard time persuading them that they were making a mistake. In the morning, my parents and my brother with his family loaded their belongings onto the truck and got in, and we headed for Lvov. A representative of the local government came with us as far as the first military command post. He wanted to get more precise information, but at the post they had not been told what territory would go to the Germans according to the treaty.

I brought my relatives to Lvov, to the *voevoda's* [governor's] palace, where N. S. was staying. They started to walk around the rooms, marveling at everything they saw. For instance, Father turned on the bathroom faucet and called to Mother: "Come see, water's flowing out of a pipe!" Everyone ran in, looked, and exclaimed. Only my brother, Ivan Petrovich, said that he'd seen indoor plumbing during his army service.

When Comrade Timoshenko and N. S. walked into the room, Father pointed to Timoshenko and asked: "Is this our son-in-law?" But he didn't seem disappointed when he learned that N. S. was his son-in-law. . . .

The outbreak of war, in June 1941, found us in Kiev.<sup>21</sup>

In spring 1947, N. S. caught a cold in the Irpenskaya water meadows near Kiev, where he went to organize the cultivation of vegetables on peat bogs to feed city residents. He fell gravely ill with pneumonia. We feared for his life. He lay at home, looked after by a doctor and a nurse, and two professors from Moscow gave consultations (Zelenin and someone else).<sup>22</sup>

In Moscow we lived at first on Granovsky Street,<sup>23</sup> and later in a detached house (Nos. 36 and 40) on the Vorobyov Highway. Much time was taken up by various diplomatic trips and receptions. The children grew up without special attention from us. They did well at school. We thought that everything was all right.

Later we lived in a dacha at "Ogaryovo."<sup>24</sup> There were nannies, good medical provision. Bringing up the children was easy.

Rada (born 1929) graduated from the faculty of journalism of Moscow University and went to work at the magazine *Nauka i Zhizn* (Science and



Life). She discovered that she needed deeper scientific knowledge and went to study at the evening faculty of biology of Moscow University. During this period she gave birth to three sons: Nikita, Alyosha, and Vanya.

[Rada's husband] Aleksei Ivanovich Adzhubei worked as editor of *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and then of *Izvestia* up until 1964.<sup>25</sup> He was renowned as a capable journalist and organizer. He was a member of the Central Committee and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet.

Sergei Nikitych (born 1935) graduated from the Electric Power Institute and married Galina Mikhailovna Shumova,<sup>26</sup> a student at the same institute. A noisy wedding was arranged for them at Ogaryovo, to which came the Voroshilovs and other comrades of N. S. from the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. All the relatives on Galya's side also gathered.

They began to work according to their fields of specialization at closed enterprises (post office boxes).<sup>27</sup> In 1959 a son Nikita was born to them, and on November 1, 1975, another son Seryozha. On April 5, 1977, Seryozha [that is, Sergei Nikitych] divorced Galina Mikhailovna.

Lena (born 1937) graduated from the faculty of law of Moscow University. She worked for one year in the criminal investigations office of the city of Moscow, then entered a scientific research institute (for the study of the economy of the USA). She did postgraduate study but did not defend her dissertation. She married Viktor Viktorovich Yevreinov<sup>28</sup> and five years later (on July 14, 1972) died of lupus.<sup>29</sup>

N. Khrushchev's daughter [by his first wife] Yuliya (born January 1916). After school she became a student of the faculty of geography at Moscow University but left in her second year because she fell ill with a severe form of tuberculosis. After an operation on her lungs, they performed a pneumothorax, in which condition she was evacuated in 1941 to Alma-Ata, where her husband Viktor Petrovich Gontar was then working.<sup>30</sup> After the war she lived in Kiev (her husband was director of the Theater of Russian Drama and then of the Operatic Theater), took courses for economic personnel, and worked in the laboratory of the Bogomolets<sup>31</sup> Institute [of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine] until 1970. She had no children. When the rest of the family moved to Moscow in 1950, Yuliya Nikitych remained with her husband in Kiev.

Yulochka<sup>32</sup> (born January 22, 1940), daughter of Leonid Nikitych who perished in the war, grew up with us. Her mother Lyubov Illarionovna Sizykh was



unjustly repressed in 1942 and remained in the Stalinist camps until the middle of the 1950s. After school Yulochka went to the faculty of journalism of Moscow University, worked in the Novosti Press Agency, then headed the literary department of the Vakhtangov Theater. In her second year at university, when she was eighteen, she had an unsuccessful marriage to Nikolai Shmelyov.<sup>33</sup> She divorced [Shmelyov] and married Lev Sergeevich Petrov, a journalist at Novosti.<sup>34</sup> She gave birth to two daughters, Nina and Kseniya. Unfortunately, her husband Lyova [diminutive for Lev] died early from kidney disease (in 1970).

*The Second Notebook*

SEPTEMBER 28, 1971

This was the seventeenth day since N. S. passed away. I wanted to record various trifles before they vanish from my failing memory. N. S. died on September 11, on Saturday morning a few minutes before eleven o'clock, in the hospital to which Vladimir Grigoryevich Bezzubik<sup>35</sup> and I had taken him on Tuesday, September 7. At home the night before he had a heart attack, from two until five in the morning. At first he recovered by himself, walked about the house, and awoke me after four A.M. The pain in his heart went away after he lay down and took a nitroglycerine pill. When he began to doze off I wanted to put out the light of the table lamp by his bed, but he didn't let me. He said that for some reason he was afraid in the dark. I said that I would sit in the armchair; I sat there for about an hour. N. S. fell asleep, then after a while he woke up, put out the light, and told me to go and get some sleep. He said that it was all over: he too would sleep. It was already light, six o'clock in the morning. I left the room, asked him whether I should leave the door open. He replied: "As you like." (For some time before that—one and a half or two weeks—he himself had been leaving the door open, despite the light in the next room, the sound of my steps, the rustling of newspapers, and various other noises. The heating had not yet been turned on, but the rains had started; it was cold. Perhaps already then he had begun to be afraid of the dark, but didn't want to say so?)

I got up at eight o'clock. For a long time I didn't look in to check that he was all right because I was afraid of interrupting his sleep. Eventually, at 10.30, I went into the room. He woke up, asked the time, cheerful, said that he'd had a good sleep, went to wash himself. When he returned from the bathroom he again had a pain in his heart. I asked him to lie down in bed and gave him nitroglycerine, but the pain didn't immediately go away. I

called the doctor. Vladimir Grigoryevich [Bezzubik] said that he must be put in the hospital, that he would come with a nurse and take him. I told the doctor that N. S. must be asked, so that he is not disturbed unexpectedly. Vladimir Grigoryevich agreed and waited on the telephone while I went to ask. N. S. said that it was probably worth going into the hospital, although he didn't feel like it—the last good days of fall, but “what shall we do with you (with me) if I again get an attack at night?”

SEPTEMBER 30, 1971

Vladimir Grigoryevich Bezzubik (the personal physician in charge of the case) came [on September 7] in an ordinary Volga<sup>36</sup> (not an ambulance) with a treatment nurse (also not an ambulance nurse). N. S. had asked to go in a sitting position, not lying down. While the doctor was on his way N. S. had breakfast in bed, but insisted on sitting up to eat rather than being fed lying down. He told me what to put in his suitcase. He said not to pack any dressing gowns: they had good dressing gowns at the hospital. The three volumes of Galsworthy's *End of the Chapter* were lying on the windowsill; he told me to take them, although he doubted that they would interest him.<sup>37</sup>

They dressed him, again his heart hurt; they gave him one pill of nitroglycerine, after a short while a second pill; the pain began to ease off. Before departure the nurse gave him an injection of promedol<sup>38</sup> and the pain stopped.

The four of us went in the Volga (it was a new model): in front with the driver N. S., behind him Vladimir Grigoryevich [Bezzubik], in the middle the nurse, and on the left myself. Before leaving the house N. S. said goodbye to Lena and to Anya Dyshkant<sup>39</sup> (afterwards she wept, regretting that she had not kissed him). By the car stood Leonid Sergeyeovich, the gardener, who wished N. S. a quick recovery and waved goodbye from afar. The [KGB] duty officer Vladimir Yosifovich Ladygin followed behind in our car; he took the suitcase with N. S.'s things.

The trip went calmly. N. S. joked with the driver, asked where he was from, reminisced about I. A. Likhachev.<sup>40</sup> When we crossed the bridge across the Moscow River, he looked at the collective-farm corn and began to get worked up about the wrong way it had been sown: if they had sown less densely they would have ended up with more, there would have been full ears of corn, and so forth. He calmed down after the doctor and I asked him not to get agitated. He said: “That's my character, I can't talk calmly of such things. . . .” We reached the hospital without any problems. He praised the horse chestnut trees on Kalinin Prospect and recounted how the Moscow

landscape planners<sup>41</sup> had resisted when N. S. as secretary of the Central Committee and the Moscow city committee in the 1950s had insisted on planting horse chestnut trees on the streets of Moscow. (I recall how he would go to the Kursk Railroad Station to watch a big horse chestnut tree growing in the courtyard of some building—proof that horse chestnut trees COULD grow in Moscow. He rejoiced when he saw three big horse chestnut trees next to one apartment block in Kuntsevo.<sup>42</sup> He advised the landscape planners to set up a nursery for horse chestnut trees, and they did so. At our dacha in Ogaryovo horse chestnut trees were planted by the gates, and they grew well, flowered, and bore fruit.)

We entered the hospital through the courtyard and made for the elevator. There we were met by Petya, an attendant whom we knew. He took us up in the elevator to the third floor and wished N. S. a quick recovery. N. S. walked to ward No. 8 (at the end of the corridor) on his own, without even support under the arm, with his usual gait. In the ward he chatted animatedly with the nurse, the attendant, and the waitress, whom he knew from his last stay in the same ward. He sat by the table until I asked him to take off his pants and lie down in his bed. I helped him with his pants and he lay down. Vladimir Grigoryevich remained at his bedside. The treatment physician, Sofia Anatolyevna, arrived, and so did the deputy head of the hospital department, Yevgenia Mikhailovna Martynushkina.

I went to the second floor to get my hands treated (they go numb) while the treatment nurse was still there. It was already three in the afternoon.

N. S. said that I need not return to his ward because he would be busy with the doctors, the lab assistant, lunch, and so on.

I went back to the dacha. I didn't feel any special anxiety. I called him in the ward at 8.30 in the evening. He picked up the receiver himself and said that he was not in pain, he felt great, he had been watching a TV program but he hadn't liked it and had turned off the TV; he was going to get an early night and suggested I do the same. This was Tuesday September 7, 1971.

The next morning at eight I called the night nurse to find out how the night had gone and learned that doctors had been with him the whole night (the attending physician Nina Lavrentyevna Korniyenko and a resuscitation specialist), that he had had a prolonged heart attack, and that he was now sleeping.

By the time I had got hold of a car and reached the ward it was already noon. N. S. was sleeping; he opened his eyes for a few moments, and went back to sleep. Doctor Sofia Anatolyevna said that his condition was grave, that

she suspected a heart attack (the third already!), and that she would consult with specialists about the latest ECG. She added: "How fortunate that yesterday I didn't take him to get his lungs X-rayed." (He had wheezing in his lungs after a cold; cupping glasses had been tried twice but didn't help.)<sup>43</sup> "It would have bothered him. I would never have forgiven myself for that."

But Sofia Anatolyevna spoke of this attack with alarm, enumerating the areas of the heart that she suspected had been damaged. She said that if a lesion developed on the ventricles then nothing could be done.

OCTOBER 1, 1971

I am under the impression of a conversation I have just had with Valentina Lukinichna, the masseuse. She had spoken with the nurse who took the ECG on Monday, September 6. N. S. was feeling unwell and at my request Doctor Vladimir Grigoryevich [Bezzubik] had come to the dacha not in the evening, as he had previously wanted, but in the morning and had taken an ECG. There were no drastic changes from the previous ECG, but there was one jag that he didn't like. . . . Valentina Lukinichna said: "The doctor should have insisted that N. S. be brought in lying down and not walk to the ward along the corridor. Why didn't he insist? After all, the heart attack began to develop in the hospital. . . ."

But Doctor Leonid Romanovich Abramov<sup>44</sup> said that this process was developing all the time, and that catastrophe could have come either earlier or later.

OCTOBER 2, 1971

Professor Lukomsky<sup>45</sup> has been giving a consultation every day. On Wednesday, September 8, I met him on the staircase in the vestibule. He was in a hurry but stopped and said that his [N. S.'s] condition was very grave. I asked: "Hopeless?" He replied: "We don't say that, but very grave."

On Wednesday afternoon all the children gathered. Lena brought her father gladiolas. He said: "Well, what do I need flowers for? Better you keep them." Soon Doctor Martyshkina came by, and he called her up close for a secret conversation and said: "Lena very much wants you to have these flowers. Please take them; it will make it easier for me. Don't forget." Yevgeniya Mikhailovna [Martyshkina] promised to come for the flowers when it was time for her to go home.

Seryozha [diminutive for Khrushchev's son Sergei] sat by his father's bedside almost the whole time. In the afternoon I went to the dacha to eat

and to fetch Lena's light rug. (It was hard to keep the quilt on the bed.) By Wednesday he was already lying on a Finnish surgical bed; it was easy for him to change position on it.

At six in the evening, when the doctor asked whether he was tired, N. S. replied that he was tired of visitors. A lot of people really had gathered in the ward: three doctors (Vladimir Grigoryevich, Sofia Anatolyevna, and the attending physician), the attending nurse and the surgical nurse, Sergei, Rada, Yuliya [Sr.], and myself. (Lena was sent home with a high temperature and was not allowed to come visit him, so she didn't see him alive again.) Vladimir Grigoryevich demanded that we take turns to visit and we agreed.

That day I was with him until late in the evening. So was Seryozha and, I think, Yuliya [Jr.] as well. We stayed in town overnight so that we could catch Professor Lukomsky in the ward with N. S. at 8.40 in the morning.

On Thursday, September 9, Rada, Yuliya [Sr.], and I arrived at 8.40. Seryozha too came tearing along. We learned that he had had another very hard night, tormented by heart pains. Doctor Abramov was on duty—N. S.'s "buddy" from his previous two stays in the hospital. He told us that after my departure the day before the two of them had chatted and even turned on the TV, but not for long, and the night had been very hard.

I sat down by the bed and kissed the palm of his left hand. He stroked my cheek. He didn't speak. When he was awake, he answered questions by nodding or shaking his head. At 12.30, I left. Yuliya [Sr.] remained on her own. Seryozha and Rada also left.

When I returned at five, Yuliya [Sr.] told me that N. S. had slept the whole time. Only once he asked her whether she had come alone or with Viktor Petrovich. He asked about me. He began to feel better—he told me so himself, and the monitor also showed a small improvement.

I sent Yuliya [Sr.] to the dacha with Lena and Vitya [diminutive for Viktor] (Yuliya needed to get some sleep). I myself stayed in town overnight so that I could come for Professor Lukomsky's consultation. Rada also came with me. Again—his condition was extremely grave. He said that as yet there was no way he could reassure us.

On Friday, September 10, we all took turns sitting in the ward. I was there the whole day until late in the evening, when the attending doctor told me to go. He seemed to have improved. In the evening Yuliya [Sr.] and Vitya went to the dacha and Seryozha went home. I too should have gone to the dacha, but then stayed so that I could come to the hospital by nine the next morning. I called them and said that Father was sleeping, that the doctor

had been reassuring, and that the monitor showed an improvement in his condition. We all calmed down a bit.

On Saturday, September 11, Rada arrived with me toward nine o'clock. Professor Lukomsky said that although the situation was grave there was a small improvement: he had slept well through the night, and toward midnight the ECG had improved noticeably, and also some other indicators. Vladimir Grigoryevich too sounded less grim somehow when he spoke with us: he was not out of danger, but there were some gleams of hope. I called Seryozha and Yuliya [Sr.] at the dacha to tell them.

Rada and I went into the ward. N. S. was not asleep and waved at us. Again I kissed his palm and he stroked my cheek: the sensation of his hand on my cheek stayed with me. He asked for pickled cucumber, the kind prepared by Yevgeniya Ivanovna, a former pilot who lived next door to Rada's dacha. He also asked for beer, and they brought it for him from the canteen. He drank a little and said that the beer was bad. Rada went and bought some pickled cucumbers. He ate some and praised them. Then he ate a little omelet made from egg whites, and five minutes later threw it all up.

When he settled down, he said that he would sleep. He shared with Vladimir Grigoryevich some anecdote from Manuilsky's<sup>46</sup> collection and waved him goodbye "until evening." He sent me off to the second floor to get my treatment for numbing of the hands. Rada and the attending nurse remained in the ward.

When I returned twenty-five minutes later, Rada was sitting in the corridor. She had been asked to leave the ward. The attending nurse ran in with a bottle of saline solution. Yevgeniya Mikhailovna and the head of the special section Professor Gasilin (a heart specialist) quickly passed by.

I went into the ward; the door was open. A drip was attached to his leg and the resuscitation apparatus was by his head. The doctor asked him to breathe more deeply into the funnel. Then they asked me to leave. I went out and called Seryozha and then Yuliya [Sr.] Nikitychna at the dacha and asked her to come to the hospital with Vitya. After a short while Yevgeniya Mikhailovna came out.

I asked: "Bad?"

"Bad."

"Worse than Thursday?"

She replied: "Dead."

That is how we lost HIM. After some time they let us into the ward. He was lying under a bedsheet. His forehead was cold, the back of his head had

turned blue, the fingers of his hands had gone cold, his feet too, but his shoulders, chest, and upper legs remained warm for a long time. (Even now I can feel that warmth on my palms.) I asked the children to touch the warm parts of their father, so that they would retain the memory of warmth and not of icy cold.

Even Sergei did not catch him alive because I had reassured him with the doctors' words and asked him to come at two when Rada and I would be leaving, so that we wouldn't crowd the ward.

Seryozha told Yulochka [Jr.]; she too came tearing along. (On Wednesday or Thursday she had asked to visit Father, but he told her not to come; he said there was such a lot of people, let her come later on, when he gets better. . . .)

Yuliya [Sr.] arrived, and Lena with Vitya. When they came into the ward they were already crying. (Yevgeniya Mikhailovna had met them in the corridor.) We sat with HIM probably for about an hour, while the car was on its way from the morgue; then we sat a little longer with the doctors in the duty room, and then we went home to the dacha. And we discovered immediately that N. S.'s bedroom was sealed. The connecting door was locked from the inside, and on the veranda there stood a sentry, so that nobody could go in.

Vladimir Yosifovich Ladygin (the [KGB] duty officer) explained that this had been done on the orders of the Central Committee, that it had been like this with K. Ye. Voroshilov and Shvernik, not only with us. A commission from the Central Committee would come, and as soon as I asked would explain and remove the seals. I requested that they do that as soon as possible. In an hour two of them arrived: the deputy head of the Administrative Department of the Central Committee, Comrade Kuvshinov, and the deputy head of the General [that is, Secret] Department of the Central Committee—I don't remember his name.

I addressed Kuvshinov at once: "Why, Comrade Major, you've been in such a hurry. You could have waited for me and done everything in my presence. . . ."

But he replied: "My condolences. I'm not a major but a Central Committee official," and he gave his name. Then I looked more closely and recognized him—it was the one who helped us move to the apartment on Old Stables [Starokonyushenny] Lane.<sup>47</sup> He explained that "for history's sake" they wanted to make sure that N. S.'s documents reached them untouched.

They removed the seals, the sentry too. I opened the safe for them. Bogolyubov<sup>48</sup> took out four tapes (very old ones), looked through the folders,

and took the message of congratulations to N. S. on his seventieth birthday signed by all members and candidate members of the Central Committee Presidium. He wanted to take the decree signed by M. I. Kalinin awarding N. S. the medal *For Victory over Fascist Germany*, but then left it. From the tape recorder he removed a tape for physical exercises and some diagrams for using the tape recorder. He also took a poem written by Mandelshtam before the war, which Artsimovich had given N. S. a year and a half earlier.<sup>49</sup> Kuvshinov asked me whether I had any questions. He said that everything that was of no interest “for history” would be returned. He said that a colleague by the name of Mariya Nikiforovna would come to handle matters pertaining to the funeral (the announcement of his death, the grave, his clothes, the morgue, the wreaths, buses, and food, because on Sunday nothing could be bought in the usual way: everything would be closed). He said that the body would be put on display in the morgue in Kuntsevo (at the Central Clinical Hospital) on Monday at ten in the morning, that the coffin would be put on the bus at eleven, and that burial would take place at noon at the Novo-Devichy Cemetery. He added that the obituary would be published on Monday.

For the rest of the weekend we all sat at the dacha like lost, orphaned grown-up people. I busied myself as well as I could with household tasks: I collected N. S.’s medals and made a record of them, put together his clothes, made out a rough order for the food (together with Comrade Mariya Nikiforovna), and then worked out when it should be delivered. . . . I showed Yuliya [Sr.] our greenhouses, did something else, as though I was made of stone.

On Monday, September 13, they brought the newspaper—a four-line announcement on the first page of *Pravda* and no obituary. On Tuesday the announcement was republished in *Izvestia*:

“The Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers report with sorrow that on September 11, 1971, following severe and prolonged illness, the former first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the personal pensioner Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, died in his seventy-eighth year.”

The editors did not even highlight the name in any way.

Toward ten we went to the morgue. I went with Lena, Yuliya, and Nina (my niece who had arrived with Viktor Petrovich the day before from Kiev). Vasily Mikhailovich Kondrashov (the duty officer), and Viktor Petrovich and Tikhon Yosifovich Kukharchuk [a cousin of Mama’s] (they too arrived the day before) went in the second car. Galya [Sergei’s wife Galina] and Nika [Sergei’s son Nikita] went with Sergei.



At the turn off the road we saw a mass of cars and police officers. By the morgue premises stood people who had come in Central Committee buses and friends of our children who had come in their own cars.

A small hall. They didn't let people file past. A guard of honor had not been arranged. We stood and cried by the coffin to the sound of mournful music. Sergei Ivanovich Stepanov [Galya's stepfather] and Pyotr Mikhailovich Krimerman [a family friend] took photos. At eleven we boarded the bus with the coffin. Torrential rain was falling and accompanied us all the way to the Novo-Devichy Cemetery. The bus drove fast: a comparison with Pushkin's funeral involuntarily came to mind.<sup>50</sup>

OCTOBER 5, 1971

The bus didn't halt on the square in the middle of the cemetery, as it usually does, but rushed on to the end of the lane, to the wall on the right, where the grave had been prepared. There stood a platform made of planks, on which the coffin had been placed. The rain poured down. Someone was holding an umbrella over N. S.'s head. A small group of relatives and friends were let through to the grave—150 to 200 people. A sanitation day had been declared at the cemetery, so ordinary visitors were not allowed in.

I expected that the funeral meeting would be opened at least by the secretary of the party organization at which N. S. had been registered. I looked around me: Seryozha was rushing about at a loss. After some time Seryozha stood at the edge of the grave and addressed those present with a good speech. I convey his words in accordance with Robert G. Kaiser's report as it appeared in the Paris edition of *The Herald Tribune* for September 14, 1971:

"We simply want to say a few words about the man whom we are burying and whom we mourn," Sergei began. He paused in order to get hold of himself; his lips were trembling. "Heaven also weeps with us," he added. (A fine rain was falling.)

"I shall not speak of the great statesman. In the last few days the whole of the world press, with rare exceptions, and all the radio stations have been speaking of this. I shall not assess the contribution that was made by Nikita Sergeevich, my father. I do not have the right to do that. History will do that. The only thing that I can say is that he left no one whom he met indifferent. Some loved him, others hated him, but no one could pass him by without a glance. A human being has departed from us who had the right to be called a human being. Unfortunately, such people are few. . . ."

The journalist reproduced Seryozha's speech more or less correctly, albeit in shortened form. Then Sergei invited Nadya [Nadezhda Gilyevna]

Dimanshtein<sup>51</sup> to speak. She spoke of N. S. in the period of her work with him in the Donbas, in Yuzovka: of his principledness, his persistence in carrying out assigned tasks, his ability to work with people, to inspire them to great deeds, and many more kind words. “He was an example to the young.” (That is the real truth.)

Then Seryozha invited his colleague from the institute Vadim Vasilyev<sup>52</sup> to speak. He said that N. S. restored (posthumously) the good name of his father, who perished in one of Beria’s camps, and made it possible for him (Vadim) and his children to study and work freely and to take pride in his late father.

After Vadim, Seryozha again stood on the hillock and closed this sad meeting. We took leave of Father and let the coffin down into the grave. Before this those present filed past the coffin. Seryozha calmly controlled the flow while all the time the official in charge tried not to let people past, in order to get the proceedings finished sooner. Seryozha approached him and asked him to let people past, and he gave way.

When the grave was filled in, the wreaths were laid—four altogether: from the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, ours, from friends, and from Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan. However, the signatures on the ribbons were smudged by the rain (the wreaths had been brought on an open truck) and only on Anastas Ivanovich’s wreath was the signature clearly visible.

A big mountain of fresh flowers lay on the grave. A photo was put on display. (It was taken from the dining room, a photo that was within easy reach.) Later on Seryozha replaced it with another photograph. (I don’t like it.)

Three weeks and three days have already passed since we were orphaned. I can’t accept this as a real fact. Probably to the end of my few remaining years I won’t reconcile myself to it.

OCTOBER 6, 1971

We live at the dacha as we did when N. S. was alive (I, Lena; Vitya comes every day). Seryozha comes in the evenings when he is free after work. Yuliya [Sr.] and Viktor Petrovich went away for a time on Saturday, October 2. They’ll come to help us move. Groceries are delivered on order. I visit the polyclinic for my treatment. No one says anything.

Many telegrams and letters have arrived, including some from foreign statesmen, but not a single former work colleague of N. S., not a single one of their wives has called or sent a note of condolence. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan is an exception. He sent a wreath, and a letter of condolence from him was delivered on September 13, the day of the funeral.

OCTOBER 9, 1971

Today is Saturday. A month has already passed without N. S., and we live and everything around us goes on as though nothing has happened. And the children get on with their lives, and so they should.

Zinaida Sergeevna Gruzdeva<sup>53</sup> called to tell me that she paid a visit to HIM today. She brought a basket of flowers, but there was no one to attach it to the grave: she can hardly move by herself. Thanks be, her friend's son turned up, "quite young, he's been retired only a year." It was he who attached her basket to N. S.'s grave. It greatly heartened her that the whole grave was covered with fresh flowers; there was hardly anywhere to put her basket.

I replied to several more letters of condolence. Among them there was one from Penza. It came from Ivan Semyonovich Alyonkin. He and his wife are pensioners. They visited N. S.'s grave twice (on September 21 and 24), returned home, and wrote an emotional letter to express their sympathy. It reached me, fortunately. Rada gave me a second letter. It had been brought to the editorial office [of her magazine] by the Leningrad poet Shumilin together with a poem *To the Memory of N. S. Khrushchev*:

I read this strange "obituary."  
 I read and don't believe my eyes:  
 Just five stingy soiled lines,  
 There could at least have been a snap.  
 An ordinary newspaper sketch.  
 After all, he thundered,  
     boiled,  
     and fretted,  
 And suddenly departed so modestly, imperceptibly.  
 The world grew quiet, anxiously awaits the winter.  
 The leaves flutter, the wind begins to blow.  
 Let the one whom he forced against his will to think  
 Fall silent and remove his hat.  
 Let melancholy knock gently at the door  
 Of the one whose shoulders he straightened against his will.  
 And at this rainy hour there is no purpose  
 In pompous funereal speeches.  
 The world awaits,  
     desires,  
     thirsts for  
     change—  
 Whom to raise up, whom to cast down  
     and defame?

Let the world be cruel, and full of dust and decay,  
And all the same we must leave a trace therein!

He was passing through Moscow, dropped in at the editorial office, and gave Rada the letter ready to deliver. A human being. I sent him too my thanks.

And in general, besides replying to the letters and telegrams of condolence, it is necessary for me to manage to analyze them.

OCTOBER 10, 1971

What an injustice of nature: we live, walk, read, and do all kinds of things, but HE is not there. Everything stands untouched; it seems that he is just about to come in and say something, but no. . . .

Granya Pisareva [the sister of N. S.'s first wife] has died. She lay two days in the apartment, and I could not join them, simply could not. The sisters gathered, they cry, some others as well, but I could not. I cannot go through the cemetery when someone is being buried. All the time a funeral march plays in my head; I can't get it to stop. This, I suppose, is not good.

OCTOBER 15, 1971

Every day I write replies to those who have sent me condolences. So far I have managed to reply to statesmen and public figures abroad. (I sent some replies through embassies, others by registered mail or telegrams.) The president of the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) sent a long telegram from Tananarive in French. I looked for an embassy or consulate—there isn't one in Moscow. We decided collectively that we should reply by telegram in French. But none of us knows French sufficiently well, so we had to ask them to translate my reply into French.

I have sent replies to the following:

On September 21—

- (1) to Comrade Tito and [his wife] Jovanka,
- (2) to Comrade Edvard Kardelj [Tito's deputy, chairman of the Yugoslav parliament],
- (3) to Comrade Koca Popovic [foreign minister of Yugoslavia] and [his wife] Lepa;
- (4) to Comrade Veljko Micunovic [ambassador of Yugoslavia in Moscow 1956–58 and again under Brezhnev, friend of N. S.]<sup>54</sup> and [his wife] Budislava,
- (5) to Comrade Cvietin Mijatovic [ambassador of Yugoslavia in Moscow preceding Micunovic],

- (6) to Comrade Pregrad Josanovic (Zagreb),  
 (7) to the Krajacic family (Zagreb) (through the Yugoslav embassy).  
 On September 22—  
 (8) to Anti Karjalainen [prime minister of Finland], and  
 (9) to Urho Kekkonen [president of Finland] (through the Finnish embassy),  
 (10) to Mohammad Daud [prime minister of Afghanistan, the king's uncle, later to overthrow the king] (through the embassy of Afghanistan),  
 (11) to Luigi Longo [general secretary of the Communist Party of Italy following Togliatti's death in 1964], Rome 00185, Via del Tanzini 19, L'Unità,  
 (12) to Comrade János Kádár [Hungarian prime minister and party leader], Budapest, Central Committee,  
 (13) telegram to Peres Dias, chairman of the Congress of Venezuela, Caracas,  
 (14) telegram to [W.] Averell Harriman [American financier, diplomat, and government official, ambassador to USSR 1943–46], Washington, D.C., USA,  
 (15) telegram to Takeo Miki, chairman of the Chamber of Representatives of Japan, Tokyo,  
 (16) to Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu [Romanian party leader], Bucharest, Central Committee,  
 (17) to Elena and Ionu Maurer [prime minister of Romania], Bucharest, Council of Ministers,  
 (18) to Edward Heath, prime minister of Great Britain and (19) to Douglas Home, minister of foreign affairs of Great Britain (through the embassy),  
 (20) to Sirima R. D. Bandaranaike, prime minister of Ceylon (through the embassy),  
 (21) to the Indian ambassador A. K. Damodaran and (22) [Indian prime minister] Indira Gandhi (through the Indian embassy),  
 (23) to the French ambassador Roger Sédou, Dimitrov Street, 43,  
 (24) to the Canadian ambassador R. A. D. Ford,  
 (25) to Sékou Touré, president of the Republic of Guinea (through the embassy),  
 (26) to Anwar Sadat, president of the Arab Republic of Egypt (through the embassy),  
 (27) to Adam Malik, minister of foreign affairs of Indonesia (through the embassy, Novokuznetskaya, 12),  
 (28) to the Austrian ambassador Heinrich Heimerle (Starokonyushenny, No. 1),  
 (29) to Bruno Kreisky, the federal chancellor of Austria (through the embassy).

On October 7—

(30) to Lapiro [mayor of Florence], Florence, Italy,

(31) to Devika Rani and Svyatoslav Roerich [Russian artist and mystical philosopher living in India],<sup>55</sup> c/o The Indian Bank, Ltd., Lady Curzon Road, Cantonment, Bangalore, Mysore State, South India,

(32) to Anna and Cyrus Eton [a Canadian-American steel tycoon], Cleveland, USA,

(33) to Olaf Palme, prime minister of Sweden (through the embassy).

On October 10—

(34) to former ambassador to the USSR Llewelyn Thompson, State Department, Washington, D.C. for his wife Jane [who sent condolences].

On October 11—

(35) to Hans Küntler, Georgenstr. 73, St. Gallen, Switzerland,

(36) to Helmut Martens, Wandsbekroligallee 233, Hamburg, FRG,

(37) to Heinz Schewe, Düpenthal 10c, Hamburg, FRG.

On October 12—

(38) to Amintore Fanfani, chairman of the Italian Senate,

(39) to Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis [widow of President J. F. Kennedy], Athens, then New York.

On October 14—

(40) to Lucy Jarvis,<sup>56</sup> NBC, New York,

(41) to M. Jonipasse, Toronto, Canada,

(42) to [Roswell] Garst [American farmer, friend of N. S.],<sup>57</sup> Coon Rapids, Iowa, USA.

All the envelopes addressed to embassies were handed to an employee of the registered letters' office. I fear that they were not delivered. She gave me a single receipt for all the envelopes.

Today in the corridor of the polyclinic I met Nina Ivanovna Korolyova.<sup>58</sup> She always comes up to me, embraces and kisses me, and says: "Have courage." When I was at Nyura Pisareva's [sister of N. S.'s first wife] place, someone asked me whether the cosmonauts had sent condolences. Today when I met Nina Ivanovna I realized for the first time that she was the only person from that milieu who sent a telegram of sympathy.

I had a call from Aleksandr Vasilyevich Osipov, former head of the Stalino district party organization. He expressed his sympathy. I had not expected the call—he had never called before, but today he got the telephone number from Polya.<sup>59</sup>

Konstantin Simonov<sup>60</sup> sent a letter of condolence with fond reminiscences of the front and of the Twentieth CPSU Congress.

OCTOBER 24, 1971

I've been occupied with various unrewarding jobs like sorting through letters, and time flies by.

I want to record something that Vitya told me. A researcher from the Institute [of Physical Chemistry of the USSR Academy of Sciences] was riding in a taxi and asked the driver where he was taking such beautiful flowers. He replied that he was going to the cemetery, to Khrushchev's grave. When the woman expressed surprise, the driver asked: "Don't you like that?" She replied that she was going there herself. Then the driver relaxed and began to talk about how N. S. had done a lot for the people and people remember that.

In the letters that I've been sorting through the whole day—they were written to congratulate N. S. on the occasion of his birthday, April 17, and on the occasion of Mayday, May 1, 1965—there are many statements similar to those of the taxi driver.

NOVEMBER 14, 1971

Sorting through autographed books received before October 1964, I find many disturbing inscriptions that describe N. S. in his varied activity. It would be interesting to know how these people (if they are still alive)—for instance, M. Bazhan<sup>61</sup>—would write now if they were afraid to send their condolences.

In 1959, Yefim Permitin inscribed in his book *Spring Streams (Ruchi vesenniye)*: "To the worthy successor of Lenin—N. S. Khrushchev, in admiration of and homage to your energy, fearless directness, and sincerity. January 14, 1959, tel. 130-25-19."

Pilipenko<sup>62</sup> returned from Donetsk. He saw there many friends of N. S. and of us both and conveyed their greetings and sympathy. He told us that the Young Communists of the Mechanical Factory (formerly the Bosse factory), at which N. S. worked in his youth, wanted to send a delegation to N. S.'s funeral. (The naïve kids!)

And one Italian from Saragossa<sup>63</sup> wrote a letter dated September 18 on a scrap of paper without an address, signing himself "Erabajo": "To Señora, the widow of Nikita Khrushchev. I am an ordinary person. I send you and your whole family my heartfelt condolences. Your husband was able to direct his country's efforts to work for the good of humanity. Let the soul of

this great toiler, who gave his all to his country, rest in peace.” How true the judgment of an unknown person!

NOVEMBER 24, 1971

N. S. said to me: “When I die and you remain behind, it will be bad for you.” He guessed right. I never imagined that in my own home anyone would insult me and my children. And for the sake of what? For the sake of various old junk that I’m giving one person rather than another when I move. Aleksei Ivanovich [Adzhubei, Rada’s husband] began the row at his place. He wanted to throw on the trash heap the things I’d sent them, including a gift that N. S. received on his seventieth birthday from the Polish comrades: a radio-gramophone with playing records. It ended up with [the chauffeur] Boris Ivanovich, who had brought them the things, taking it himself.

Yesterday Viktor Petrovich [Gontar, Yuliya Sr.’s husband] permitted himself an unworthy tone in conversation with me. From that time my heart has not stopped throbbing—despite medicines.

On November 22 I was at the cemetery. I brought roses.<sup>64</sup> I saw a group of young people without flowers running past (in order to get out before the gate was closed). Two women approached me. They said that they often come to the grave to say a word of thanks, and that a lot of people come to the grave. The husband of one of them perished in one of Stalin’s camps.

MAY 8, 1972

For half a year now I haven’t laid hands on the notebook. I’ve had to live through, suffer through a lot. I still can’t forget Viktor Petrovich with his demand that I give him a share of N. S.’s legacy and he will “give it away” to a children’s home. Yuliya Nikitychna said that I shouldn’t take it so hard, what can we do with such a man? It all ended with Yuliya Nikitychna coming a second time in February in order to get the Fiat car from Sergei to placate Viktor Petrovich. From Seryozha she took a large sum of money, from me a silver tea service—a gift on N. S.’s seventieth birthday from the RSFSR<sup>65</sup> government—and two sets of Polish goblets engraved with his name (sixteen pieces), and with those Yuliya left. For company she brought along Rada for goblets too. Rada got six sets (forty-eight pieces). When I approach N. S.’s grave, it seems to me that he winks ironically from his portrait: “How do you like it?”

I have an aching feeling that no one needs me any more, that someone is waiting for my death. A heavy feeling.

But a lot of people come to visit N. S.. Fresh flowers lay on the grave the whole winter long.



April 17, 1972. We all gathered by the grave, Seryozha's friends too. We brought many flowers. Even Lena came, although she felt ill. Then we went to Seryozha's place and stayed there for two hours reminiscing about Father and Grandfather, and N. S. the statesman, with kind words.

At that time I was getting massage treatment after a fall. Valentina Lukinichna [the masseuse] recalled various things about N. S. For example, she recounted this episode that took place at Pitsunda.<sup>66</sup> N. S. came for treatment very punctually. Valentina Lukinichna had arrived earlier to prepare the massage couch and discovered that it was very stuffy in the cubicle. She suggested to Doctors Bezzubik and Litovchenko that the couch be moved to the swimming pool, where there was a breeze. They didn't agree. N. S. arrived and at once asked: "How is Valentina Lukinichna going to work in such a stuffy atmosphere? Didn't they think of that?" He went to the pool and found the same place as the one Valentina Lukinichna had in mind.

N. S. didn't like being talked to in a tone of command or anything of that kind. Valentina Lukinichna would ask: "When can N. S. come for treatment?" He named a time, and everything was in order. She recounted this to emphasize that other patients make her wait a long time, even though they choose the time of the appointment themselves.

At the beginning of May, we placed on the grave a photo of N. S. in a black jacket and with his stars. Many people had called and asked why the previous photograph showed N. S. not even wearing a tie? (Seryozha had chosen and placed that photo.)

The sculptor Neizvestny showed us his design for the memorial. I did not especially like it. Sergei and his friends liked it.

JUNE 26, 1972

For many weeks I have been tormented by the question whether N. S. felt he was dying. One day at the hospital, in the morning, when I was sitting at his bedside, he said: "It turned out so badly for Lena. . . ." Was this a continuation of his thoughts about his own severe condition, after a difficult night? For every night he was tormented by bouts of pain in the heart.

Today I'm going into town [Moscow] (from the dacha). Lena has a temperature of 38° C. [100.4° F.] and heart pains. Tomorrow they'll take her to the hospital on Granovsky Street. Special permission was required from the head of the Fourth Administration, Chazov, because only persons belonging to a certain category are admitted there on his orders. (A month ago the Department of Hospitalization was refused permission.)<sup>67</sup>

I haven't been to the grave for a long time. I feel giddy. Sergei and Galya laid some kind of flowers; I must go and see how they look.

JULY 10, 1972

Alyonushka [diminutive for Lena] feels very bad. It's her second week in the hospital on Granovsky Street but there is little improvement. The next bout affected her heart, both her lungs are inflamed, she has stomach pain, she is out of breath and very weak. They managed to halt the decline in her leukocyte count, her temperature has fallen, her subjective condition has improved, but objectively, the doctor says, there is hardly any improvement worth talking about.

What did N. S. have in mind when he mentioned Lena then, in the hospital? Was he really able to foresee the future?

AUGUST 3, 1972

The end! Lena died on July 14. She was cremated on July 18 and the urn was buried on August 1 in the grave of her grandmother, my mama, in the Novo-Devichy Cemetery. This required the permission of the Moscow Soviet.

Vitya is quite exhausted. He has grown thin; his light has gone out somehow. He doesn't want to stay overnight with us or his mother; he is living in the apartment by himself. Vera Fyodorovna, Vitya's mother, was staying with me at the dacha. Now Anna Osipovna Tarasova<sup>68</sup> is staying with me. Galya and Seryozha come on a Friday and leave on Sunday evening.

Rada took Lena's death very badly: she has grown thin and dark. Before my eyes I see how she clutched to her breast the urn with Lena's ashes as they prepared the place in the grave, then handed it to Vitya, and he lowered the urn into place. The foreman cemented it in; we threw clumps of soil on top and stood while they filled the grave up with earth. Lena's girlfriends—Lyalya [Yelena] from Baghdad<sup>69</sup> and the Moscow Lyalya<sup>70</sup>—laid flowers, sowed grass, and washed the tombstone, and Vitya set a marble plaque with Lena's name.

Then we all went to N. S.'s grave, arranged the flowers there, and sprinkled soil. Vitya's and Seryozha's friends and Galya's parents<sup>71</sup> arrived and stayed with us until the end.

Yuliya Nikitychna didn't come. She feels ill; we and the doctor had advised her not to go out in the 30° C. [86° F.] heat in such a state.

My heart aches for Lena and I don't believe that she will never come again. And N. S. too. I shall cherish them in my thoughts. Now it's my turn.

AUGUST 19, 1972

Tonight I dreamed about N. S. He looked tired, the way he looked during the last months of 1971. He lay in bed in an unfamiliar room; he was tired. When I called him to another place, he made a gesture of displeasure and said: "I'm lying down, I won't come." At that point I woke up. It's surprising that I didn't forget the dream.

Vitya goes to the cemetery every day: to Lena, then to N. S.; he sprinkles grass, flowers. Yesterday a cemetery worker named Lyosha told him that the day before toward evening two lieutenants came and sprinkled N. S.'s grave. It is good that N. S. is buried at the cemetery; people come to him, whoever wants to, and a lot of people do come; there are fresh flowers on the grave all the time.<sup>72</sup>

Since the spring I've been living at Zhukovka with various people: Nika, Seryozha and Galya, Anna Osipovna, and Vitya's mother [Vera Fyodorovna]. While I am here I feel more or less all right. In Moscow I feel bad, probably because of the heat. I go to Moscow only to visit the polyclinic.

"What we have we do not guard, when we lose it we weep. . . ." (? Shota Rustaveli)<sup>73</sup>

"To become an optimist it is necessary to suffer despair and conquer it" (the composer Skryabin).<sup>74</sup>

SEPTEMBER 29, 1972

Yesterday Vera Gostinskaya<sup>75</sup> departed. She had stayed with me at Zhukovka for twenty-five days. Out of the best of intentions she "entertained" me with talk and constant laughter, and I grew so tired that I was glad when she left. That's how it turns out.

From an article by Aleksandr Krivitsky, *Italian Silhouettes (Italyanskiye siluety)* in the September 27, 1972, issue of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Literary Gazette): "Neofascism is two-faced like a refined politician, coldly ferocious like a hired executioner, cowardly and neurasthenic like a professional criminal. . . . Antihuman politics calls on the aid of biology, pulling into its orbit—indeed, deliberately cultivating—depraved characters. . . . *Morte al popolo!*—Death to the people!—proclaims a slogan on the façade of an old building on the Piazza della Reppublica."

OCTOBER 6, 1972

I got to the cemetery at two in the afternoon without stopping at home. I laid tulips on Lena's grave, cleaned N. S.'s grave, and laid carnations there. As

I walked along the wall of the old cemetery I ran into an elderly couple. As he passed by me, he looked at the side path and called: "Ira, let's go to Nikita Sergeevich too." She replied from behind some memorial: "Let's go, let's go to our dear one."

While I was fussing around N. S.'s grave, a group of people came up. I was cutting flowers and didn't raise my head. Suddenly a man's voice rings out over my head: "Nina Petrovna, what should I pass on to your acquaintances in Istra?<sup>76</sup> I often speak with them." Another man echoed him: "People here are from all ends of the earth. We're from the Far East." A woman says: "N. S. did much good for my family."

OCTOBER 21, AT ZHUKOVKA

While I'm at the dacha I feel well, I busy myself in the kitchen, I walk easily, I don't get tired. But in Moscow I get tired very quickly; I hardly manage to drag myself home from the polyclinic (four blocks).

My hands worry me a lot; they go numb. I must go to the polyclinic; otherwise I would just sit around at Zhukovka, even alone. In Moscow I also sit alone in the apartment. Truer to say that I stomp around. Perhaps that's what makes me tired.

I went with Seryozha and Rada to visit the sculptor Ernst Neizvestny. We looked at a miniature model of the memorial to N. S. The latest version is better than the first. It turned out that there are no monolithic slabs and the sculptor has to think up a new version out of pieces of granite and marble. This takes a long time.

Galina Ivanovna Burmistenko<sup>77</sup> stayed with me at the dacha for a few days. It's very easy to be with her. We recalled the years before and after the war in Mezhhigorye.<sup>78</sup> Years of our (relative) youth—much has remained in the memory. Precious memories.

MARCH 18, 1973, ZHUKOVKA

I won't write for long. I'm living in Moscow; the notebook is at the dacha. Today a lot of people were here. Besides myself, Seryozha, Galya, Nika, Yuliya [Jr.], and Ksana.<sup>79</sup> The Klimashevskys—father and son<sup>80</sup>—came with skis. It was noisy. The children played, crawled under the table, giggled, and so on. Everything was eaten up, a lot of dishes. They all left; I remained alone by the TV set and suddenly decided: for me all this is no longer a life but only a fragment of it. As when a mirror is broken, its fragment still reflects surrounding objects, but no longer is it a mirror. In the same way, I

try to do something for the children, but for all my efforts they don't need me, no one does. Life has passed by; what has remained is a fragment.

MARCH 26, 1973

Yesterday they came with Nika for the school vacation. The temperature of the air suddenly rose to 14° C. [57° F.], the snow is melting fast. Today I met Nelya Artsimovich—just widowed;<sup>81</sup> she came to the dacha. Painful memories flooded back; she cried and so did I. A pity for the young academician; we made each other's acquaintance last summer. He suffered for the sake of science, like Kurchatov.<sup>82</sup>

The spring is affecting me (and my age, no doubt); it's hard to walk and work. I sit on the porch on the folding stool.

On TV they're transmitting a performance by the Slavutich Ensemble from Dnepropetrovsk. I don't appreciate it as I used to; it leaves me indifferent.

APRIL 13, 1973, FRIDAY (IN MOSCOW)

Two encounters. In the morning I was passing through the entrance courtyard to the polyclinic and was greeted by an elderly man. Then he walked for some way beside me and said: "You have a sorrow—your daughter died. I have a sorrow—my son was killed in an airplane accident, a pilot, a colonel. My wife, his mother, is out of her mind; it's as if she's gone crazy. My son's wife is distraught, but not in the same way as his mother. A wife is a wife. . . . And how are you feeling?"

In the polyclinic I was sitting in an armchair in the vestibule after a painful injection, facing the exit. A gray-haired man approaches, I thought: "How he resembles Serdyuk."<sup>83</sup> As it turned out, that's who it was. He returned yesterday from Siberia (Abakan); he went there on instructions from the Central Committee of the Komsomol. He sat down, told me a little about it, full of energy and delight from his trip. The main thing was that he had not suffered from his exertions and speeches, from traveling on bad roads and staying at bad hotels. I envied him.

APRIL 16, 1973, MONDAY

I went with Rada to the cemetery to clean up N. S.'s grave. She told me a story she had heard from an acquaintance of hers, some sports official who had got hold of tickets to a hockey competition for her [son] Nikita. Someone had pointed to Nikita and asked about him. This someone was a foreign member of the group of referees. Learning that Nikita was N. S.'s grandson,

the foreigner said: “We have great respect and love for N. S. When you show us Moscow, please take us to the cemetery. I’d like to lay flowers on N. S.’s grave.”

APRIL 17, 1973

Today N. S. would have been seventy-nine. A lot of people came to the cemetery after work: relatives and friends of Seryozha and Vitya. Rada came only with Aleksei Ivanovich [Adzhubei], and Galya took Nika.<sup>84</sup> We left after seven o’clock. We brought lots of flowers, mainly roses. Sergei’s friends went back to his place, and I set off for home, very tired.

APRIL 19, 1973

Kamenskaya<sup>85</sup> called. She said that she had been ill for a long time. She promised to visit N. S.’s grave as soon as she felt better, but she is already about eighty years old.

One acquaintance told me that she had been to N. S.’s grave and seen there an old man who got down on his knees in front of the grave, bowed his head, and laid flowers.

JUNE 4, 1973

We laid flowers on N. S.’s grave and removed eighteen painted eggs that had been brought during Easter. Millet and crumbled egg lay on the grave<sup>86</sup>—for the birds, as Varvara Dmitriyevna<sup>87</sup> explained to me.

SEPTEMBER 30, 1973, SUNDAY

Summer flew by, autumn is coming on. Yesterday I came to Zhukovka alone; the weather improved, the sun shone. I felt it would be a pity to waste such a day in Moscow. I’m not going into town today. Yesterday Nelya Artsimovich came by; we had a long walk together; she told me about her problems, her worries about her son. Today I slept late and did my physical exercises slowly. Yesterday my heart hurt; the pain didn’t go away until I lay down in bed and took a tablet of nitroglycerine.

Today I called Seryozha and told him that I didn’t want to go to them at the dacha (without explaining why). He didn’t get upset; they have a lot of people there.

On September 11, 1973, at six o’clock in the evening, we went to the cemetery to N. S.’s grave. This time Rada brought Vanya. Together with Galya and Lyalya Vlasenko, she put in order the flowers that visitors had laid on the grave. They made two enormous bouquets of roses and carnations. They

placed the roses at the head of the grave and the carnations at the foot, in big green vases that Seryozha had brought in the spring.

Anna Osipovna Tarasova came with me. Already waiting for us were friends of Sergei, an architect, an acquaintance of N. S., Yuliya [Jr.] with her daughters and Masha,<sup>88</sup> and Galya with Nika. There were also people I didn't know. After some time Igor [Itskov]<sup>89</sup> and Lyudmila Zykina<sup>90</sup> arrived; she had brought artificial flowers. It appeared that they worked together at the film studio, and when Igor was getting ready to go to the cemetery she too wanted to come. I even wept, recalling how N. S. would listen to her singing on TV and on records.

Yura and Masha<sup>91</sup> didn't come, I don't know why.

Seryozha, with Maria Dmitriyevna and Sergei Ivanovich, drove us back to Zhukovka. From there they went to Trudovaya.<sup>92</sup>

Rada brought an enormous bouquet of carnations to the cemetery, Seryozha one of red roses. The daughters [Rada and Yuliya] arranged them all in vases. We arrived after six o'clock, when visitors had left. But on September 12 at nine o'clock in the morning, neither Lena's grave nor that of N. S. any longer had roses or carnations. Vitya saw.

I spent the summer at Zhukovka with Vera Fyodorovna, Vera Gostinskaya, and Anna Osipovna Tarasova. When the storms and rains began (in July), my stenocardia returned; it went away after treatment, toward the end of September.

They have still not built any monument to N. S.; I haven't received all the necessary papers.<sup>93</sup> I have the impression that Sergei is hiding something from me.

Over a year has already gone by since Lena passed away. In the apartment everything remains as it was when she was here. Vitya is living with me. He has calmed down and gone off on vacation. He doesn't hurry home after work. It's time for him to remarry. He tends Lena's flowers and aquarium himself. He needs an apartment of his own.

OCTOBER 15, 1973

From a song:

My memories live in me.  
 So long as I remember, I live."  
 "Don't be surprised that you will die,  
 Be surprised that you are alive.

JANUARY 9, 1974, WEDNESDAY

Today is the fiftieth birthday of Aleksei Ivanovich Adzhubei. What a date! Yesterday I read in the diaries of Lev Kassil:<sup>94</sup> “Sometimes, when everything goes wrong and feels wearisome, you catch yourself in the shamefully petty thought: ‘I wish this day were over!’ What immoral wastefulness! Are we given many days? Can we voluntarily give up even a single one, however hard and unbearable it may be? Is this how we should call on the mercy of time, which in any case is in a hurry to finish with us? No, we must subordinate time to ourselves, filling it to the brim, not allowing it to escape in vain through the sieve of empty hours” (Lev Kassil, “We Must Live Life to the Full” (*Zhit nado vo ves rost*), *Znamya*, 1973, no. 3, p. 186).

“Lack of talent is not forgiven even beyond the grave” (from some poem that appeared in 1971).

JANUARY 13, 1974

“People continue to revere the memory of your spouse. This manifests itself, in particular, in the way they give their children his name. In Moscow a Doctor of Geological Sciences (the son of the former tsarist banker A. Khrushchev, whose signature appeared on the first Soviet ten-ruble banknote [*chervonets*]) named his grandson Nikita, and in Yerevan the academician Sergei Mergelyan gave his son this name. They are acquaintances of ours, and it is absolutely true” (from a new year’s greeting from the Vanyushin couple in Yerevan, December 24, 1973).

Various comrades call and ask why there is no tombstone on N. S.’s grave, and I myself don’t clearly know the reasons. Sergei is keeping something secret. Even Professor Zhukovsky said that he had been at the grave recently and had heard how indignant people were at this fact.

“There is no other means of protecting the heart from destructive agitation than that of rising above misfortune. This is hard to achieve. If you yourself do not stifle life’s misfortunes with a firm will, then they will stifle you” (Pirogov).<sup>95</sup>

FEBRUARY 9, 1974

I went to the cemetery with Taisya Matveyevna Pavkina. (She is my correspondent of many years from Omsk, a mother of fourteen children, herself on crutches because of tuberculosis of the knee. Her husband was legless, died from tuberculosis three years ago. She was stopping in Moscow on her way back from seeing her brother in Leningrad and wanted to meet me and



visit my graves.) As we stood by N. S.'s grave, we heard everyone who approached saying: "And there is still no memorial."

There is also still no tombstone on Professor Votchal's<sup>96</sup> grave; his portrait is standing there.

My giddiness has not gone away completely. I don't feel very well.

APRIL 3, 1974

I went to the cemetery with Rada. The graves had not yet thawed out. By N. S.'s grave a lot of fresh flowers were lying on the earth and carnations and narcissuses were standing in vases. There were so many people that I was unable to get right up to the grave; I stood off to the side. Rada rearranged the flowers a little. Flowers were also standing by Lena's grave; we lay ours on the earth.

APRIL 16, 1974

I begin to read *Khrushchev Remembers*, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston and Toronto). It was given to me by a woman I know slightly. A great deal of it resembles N. S.'s tape recordings, but my general impression is that it's a compilation of various utterances put to skillful use by a capable journalist.

"'What does a man have apart from a wife?' asked Homburg (a physicist and Nobel Prize laureate). 'Parents always depart too early and children too late, when relations with them have already been hopelessly spoiled. Friends? But they are such a rarity! A discovery is intimately close to you so long as it lives in your head; then it becomes a sluice accessible to everyone. All that remains is your wife, growing older and weaker, wearisome, cantankerous, stupid, but all the same unique and eternal. Only in her is there proof that you are a personality, or at least an individual'" (Yuri Nagibin, "Peak of Success: A Contemporary Fairy Tale" (*"Pik udachi [sovremennaya skazka]"*), *Znamya*, 1970, no. 9, p. 81).<sup>97</sup>

SEPTEMBER 14, 1974

They gave permission for the monument after I called A. N. Kosygin.<sup>98</sup> I told him that the administrative department of the Council of Ministers was refusing to give consent to the monument design. After a call from Kosygin everything was done in a single day.

At last, by the third anniversary of N. S.'s death, they erected a memorial. The sculptor's name is Ernst Neizvestny. A bust and a slab with an inscription—

made of bronze. The rest consists of blocks of white and black polished granite. All of us and the majority of our acquaintances liked the monument, but there are some who do not approve of it (Anya Tarasova).

By six o'clock on September 11, 1974, many people had gathered, friends and strangers. Yevtushenko and Grigoryev (a singer)<sup>99</sup> were waiting by the gates. Everyone was soaked; it rained for two hours, the whole time that people were gathering and standing by the grave. Someone said that foreigners had been there; photographers took shots. Rada and Lyalya [Vlasenko] (Lena's girlfriend) stayed behind to arrange the mass of flowers that people had brought. They got soaked right through; water poured out of their boots. Fortunately they didn't catch colds.

Yevtushenko loudly proclaimed that the sculptor had made a living face, that N. S. is with us, and so on.

The mayor of Florence, Lapiro, sent a telegram: "The monument will always remind us of the fight for peace and a fighter for peace."

When I travel around Moscow, there leap to my eyes the places and things for which N. S. fought, sparing neither strength nor health. The banks of the Moscow River are clothed in stone—it was he who organized that, even before the war. The broadening of the Dorogomilovsky Bridge [across the Moscow River]—N. S. got that done after the war. The lindens and other trees planted full-grown along Moscow's streets—once again, it was he who sought out Pavel Spiridonovich Lesnichy, who discovered how to replant trees in winter. His method was applied on a broad scale; Moscow quickly turned green. Areas of grass in the city center. How often he impressed on the landscape planners that grass must be sown, that grass is cheaper and more accessible than flowers. . . . Now horse chestnut trees grow all over Moscow, and it was N. S. who traveled around Moscow specially to seek out a place where horse chestnut trees were growing. He found them, proved that horse chestnut trees could grow in Moscow, and after that they began to grow horse chestnut trees to plant in the city. The rowan trees are glowing on Kalinin Prospect—it was he who put them there. Beautiful. . . . The virgin lands. When they were broadcasting about triumphs in the virgin lands, some people called me and asked me to explain why they didn't mention N. S.'s name, because most people remember the "inventor" of the virgin lands. What could I reply?

And very many people come to visit his grave in both summer and winter. I can't get used to it; all the time I'm expecting him to turn up from somewhere. . . .

SEPTEMBER 20, 1974

ALONE I listen to the radio. They're broadcasting the voice of the singer Anastasia Dmitriyevna Vyaltseva. A composer recounted how when they buried her the whole path to the grave was strewn with flowers; many students gathered, all kinds of people.

When they buried N. S. a lot of people gathered, despite the rain, but the police didn't let them through. And the vehicle with the coffin was driven past at great speed. Each time I recall it, I think of Pushkin's funeral.

When they buried my brother Ivan Petrovich Kukharchuk in Kiev, the women from the factory where he was director in the same way strewed lilacs underfoot from the cemetery gates to the grave. And comrades from the factory take constant care of his family.

OCTOBER 15, 1974

What a good October we're having this year! Everything is turning yellow and red, the birch trees are transparent, the oak trees are brown, only the pine trees are dark green. I came [from Moscow] to [the dacha at] Zhukovka today by myself; the weather is very warm (19° C. [66° F.]); it's a pity to sit around in a city apartment.

OCTOBER 16, 1974

How I spent my out-of-town leisure this morning: got up at 7.30 A.M. (as always), therapeutic physical exercises, breakfast, cleaned the bedroom, the dining room, the porch. They deliver milk at 10.30 A.M.; before then I decided to dig up a little patch and put some peat on the flowers. That took up half an hour, and I got very tired. I rested on the sofa, sat on the porch. I brought in some milk (and some for Galya) and decided to clean the sink, the stove, the washstand, the kettle, the pots and pans, and even Margarita Georgiyevna's shovel. Galya had given me some Nivera paste for cleaning off rust and fatty spots. Good paste. All this I did and I'm very glad that I didn't cause myself any pain with these labors. Until three o'clock I read *Milestones of Love* (*Versty lyubvi*), a novel by Anatoly Ananyev. The author is one with whom I'm unfamiliar, he writes in an original way about the contemporary countryside. From 3.30 P.M. onward, I cut up the remains of the Shary flowers, a little raspberry cane, and dog-rose and took it all to the dung heap. At five o'clock I'll go for a walk, then I'll read, and so the day will end. Tomorrow

I'll go to Moscow. At ten o'clock I finished *Milestones of Love*—160 pages. Tomorrow, October 17, I'll read a little from *Khrushchev Remembers*.

JANUARY 4, 1975

And so the new year has arrived. The old year 1974 came to an end unnoticed in various troubles. Many events have taken place recently: statesmen's visits and talks [in the Kremlin], a session of the Supreme Soviet, the election of the [local] party bureau, lectures, a visit to Comrade Zorina, who has just returned from Paris. The most important news is that on November 1, 1974, Galya gave birth to Seryozha. By November 7 she had already been discharged from the maternity home (overfull); the ordeal began. The baby cries an awful lot; he has difficulty adapting himself to life. I want to help with the diapers at least a bit. Galya's mama Mariya Dmitriyevna comes round, and Zoya Pavlovna Kukharchuk, the wife of Grisha, my late cousin, came on her days off. We have to help; Nikita's nanny Grusha can't cope on her own, and what is more she has announced that she is leaving. So far she has stayed.

Yuliya [Sr.] N. came in December. At first she lived with her [Viktor] Petrovich at Rada's, and after he went into a sanatorium she came to stay with me. She left at the end of December so that she could get back home before he returned from the sanatorium. Once only she and I went to the cemetery, and it was very windy, I even came down with radiculitis.<sup>100</sup>

With her came Irma Kobyak,<sup>101</sup> who said that she hadn't seen Rona<sup>102</sup> for two years. She [Irma] is working somewhere as an engineer.

The school vacations arrived. Nika brought home twos in algebra and geometry.<sup>103</sup> Now he's at Trudovaya with Sergei Ivanovich; he went off for three days. I saw in the new year at Seryozha's place; I stayed until three in the morning with Galya's parents. No one else was there. I spent new year's day with Galya and on January 2 I came to Zhukovka to sleep it off in the company of Katerina Osipovna Simochkina.<sup>104</sup> She had been here for two weeks all alone, the poor dear. She hadn't wanted to go home even on new year's eve.

Before the new year Lyova's parents—Sergei Ivanovich and Tatyana Solomonovna Petrov—died one after the other, both from cancer. Now they are at rest. . . .

I am beginning to feel the approach of my seventy-fifth year; I am thinking that there is nothing more to do with my life. Unworthy thoughts, but I have them.

There's a lot I'd like to read—new works and old ones I haven't read yet. But I have little strength.

I get calls from admirers of N. S. Recently Kamenskaya told me how she “fell” on her knees before the monument even though a lot of people were standing there. Now they are not letting people into the cemetery (it’s undergoing reconstruction),<sup>105</sup> but there are plenty of flowers at N. S.’s grave just the same. They are brought by people who come to visit the graves of their relatives. I write rarely; I’m living in Moscow and I keep the notebook at Zhukovka. A disconnection. I’m reading the second volume of *Khrushchev Remembers*.

JANUARY 25, 1975

I suddenly decided to get my things together and come to Zhukovka. In Moscow I felt a longing for silence and fresh air. I walked and read and had a good sleep. Perhaps I’ll go back to Moscow.

Rada showed me a photo of N. S. with [writer Konstantin] Simonov at the front. Simonov gave it her. A very nice photograph. N. S. is still wearing his old overcoat with the stars;<sup>106</sup> he’s smiling.

Yulochka was thirty-five on January 21. Rada and Aleksei Ivanovich, Seryozha, and Yura went to see her. I didn’t go, I didn’t feel up to it. Yuliya Nikitychna called on January 22 to congratulate Yuliya [Jr.] on her birthday.

The cemetery is still closed. Rada went; she said that flowers are lying on N. S.’s grave.

Somehow life is passing quickly and imperceptibly. I read, I busy myself around the kitchen, I go to help Galya, occasionally I take a stroll, and time flies. . . . I should write something, but I don’t. . . . It’s good that N. S. dictated his memoirs, a pity they haven’t been published in our country. They’re very interesting.

MAY 8, 1975, WEDNESDAY

Three o’clock in the afternoon. I’m sitting by the TV set at Zhukovka (alone). I’m watching the session in celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the Victory over fascist Germany. The hall of the Palace of Congresses immediately reminded me of N. S., who put a lot of effort into getting this palace built in time for the Twenty-Second Party Congress.

On the way to Zhukovka I looked at the flowering apple trees and the marvelous larches along the roadside and was again reminded of N. S. It was he who arranged this after the war, to line the roads around Moscow with these beautiful trees. Now they’re in full bloom, but I don’t know who remembers the person who had them planted. In Moscow the horse chestnut trees are flowering—splendid flowers. And N. S. put in a lot of effort to

convince the Moscow officials that horse chestnut trees would grow and flower in Moscow. I remember how he would go round the Moscow courtyards looking for horse chestnut trees that were already growing. Then they started growing them in botanical tree gardens and planted them on Kalinin Prospect, on the boulevards. Yesterday I myself admired the “matches” and the rowan trees in flower.

The gathering proceeds in triumph, as it should. Speeches by Heroes of the Soviet Union<sup>107</sup>—a worker from the Likhachev factory,<sup>108</sup> the former tank soldier whose wife Anna served as a turret gunner on his tank, Comrade A. Fyodorov, a partisan commander in Ukraine, a worker from Chelyabinsk, a collective-farm chairman from Kostroma—their speeches were all heartfelt and moving. Especially moving were the greetings of military and Komsomol youth; the children’s speeches were moving to the point of tears. Many of the people in the hall, Brezhnev among them, were wiping their eyes. Brezhnev delivered the report in his usual tone of voice, barely getting out the words. Probably his speech is getting worse and worse.

Podgorny<sup>109</sup> produced a very unpleasant impression; he drooped his lips like an old man. He was talking [during speeches] at the table, mainly with Brezhnev. That wasn’t right. Kirilenko’s<sup>110</sup> face looks very unpleasant on the screen, in contrast Suslov’s<sup>111</sup> face looks good, the most tranquil, the smartest.

Valya Tereshkova<sup>112</sup> was sitting in military uniform, I didn’t recognize any of the other cosmonauts. The hall was full of people in military and civilian dress, their chests bursting with orders and medals. The cameras showed only the packed hall and the speakers, so it was hard to spot familiar faces.

In honor of the eighty-first anniversary of N. S.’s birth, Rada and Sergei planted saplings around his grave: snowball bushes, a weeping willow, a birch. At the base of the monument Sergei made a little enclosure into which they poured soil, sowed grass, and planted five dwarf pines. Lyalya Vlasenko had brought them from Tallinn; she got hold of them in the botanical garden. It was in fact she who planted them. I’m afraid they’ll perish from lack of care. Sergei will be away for almost a month; I’m not able to water them, and the cemetery worker does little to tend them.

P.S. They just announced on the radio that Podgorny has awarded Brezhnev a marshal’s star.<sup>113</sup> Well, well! What next?

MAY 9, 1975

I’ve been sitting by the TV set all day long. In the morning there was a [Victory Day] demonstration of Komsomol members on Red Square, very impressive.

Marvelous young people gathered there. My acquaintance the artist Olga Prokofyevna called, congratulated me on the holiday, and told me how she and her husband had been walking in Aleksandrovsky Garden [near the Kremlin] and along the streets around the Arbat and Kalinin Prospect. She said that she had met some young people, not the usual kind: serious and joyful, and there had been no “guitar-players” and the like.

After lunch they showed the film *Belorussian Station (Belorussky vokzal)*.<sup>114</sup> I hadn't seen it before. And all the time during the intervals they show meetings of veterans. In [the news program] *Novosti* they broadcast a reception in the Kremlin. Podgorny made a speech. I can imagine. . . .

MAY 10, 1975

In the broadcast *Film Travelers' Club (Klub kinoputeshestvii)* they showed Volgograd. I was struck by the large number of four- and five-story apartment blocks, of various and pleasant designs. I thought about how people cursed N. S. for putting up this type of building. But Stalingrad and other cities were rebuilt thanks *precisely* to these *cheap* and *quickly* constructed buildings. How many millions of people obtained housing after the war thanks to the fact that N. S. set up an industry to make building materials for the rapid serial construction of cheap housing. He (N. S.) was concerned all the time that as few people as possible should suffer from possible bombing raids—for the cold war continued. He well understood the danger of a new war. It would be good for recent leaders, who had almost everything made ready for them, to compare the achievements of the last decade with those of the preceding one. For some reason people forget that THAT time was a time of postwar devastation, while THIS decade benefits from previously accumulated resources. It is good to spend money that others have earned previously!

I recalled how N. S. put off “*til later*” the construction of halls and palaces so that more money would remain to build housing, although palaces of culture were needed, too. After his retirement, administrative buildings and palaces began to grow like mushrooms after rain. Due to insufficient consciousness they boasted of this.

MAY 14, 1975

It's very hot,  $t = 25\text{--}28^\circ\text{C}$ . [ $77\text{--}82^\circ\text{F}$ ]. I escaped to Zhukovka alone and am passing the time here in silence until someone calls on the telephone. I sew a quilt, listen to the radio, water the flowerbeds, take a stroll in the shade.

Today in the Hall of Columns there was a gathering to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact. A. A. Gromyko gave the report and [Marshal] Moskalenko<sup>115</sup> made a speech. Gromyko kept on repeating *dógovor* with the wrong stress [*dogovor*, meaning “pact” or “treaty,” should be stressed on the final syllable], which was awkward for a member of the Politburo and foreign minister. I did not expect a substantive speech from Moskalenko.

Vitya said that at the cemetery he was approached by the widow of the singer Mikhailov<sup>116</sup> with a request to replant the willow planted by N. S.’s grave as it prevented her from walking around the [adjacent] grave of her husband. She isn’t right; I checked it myself.

. . . I don’t feel like doing anything. My eyes look at nature coming to life and cannot look enough. In my youth I never looked in that way, always in passing, always in a rush. . . .

MAY 28, 1975

Again I’m alone at Zhukovka, but now it’s cold: 7–9° C. [45–48° F.], a cold north wind; in the house it’s warm 20° C. [68° F.]. Along the road here I look each time at the roadside lindens and conifers and recall that they were planted at the beginning of the 1950s, when N. S. came to work in Moscow and concerned himself with these things. How many years have passed, what luxurious lindens have grown out of those little sticks! It seemed that nothing would ever grow out of them.

JUNE 22, 1975

A lot of things have happened in the last month. I came down again with radiculitis of the neck and head. In the hottest weather I went around in a downy headscarf to keep warm my aching head and neck. It still hasn’t gone away; the right side of my neck hurts.

On June 17, I was at the cemetery. Besides me and Vitya, Seryozha, Rada, [Vitya’s mother] Vera Fyodorovna, and Lyalya [Vlasenko] came. Yuri’s wife Masha came. Lyalya and Rada arranged beautiful baskets at Lena’s grave, washed the stone, then went to N. S.’s grave and cleaned up there as well. Seryozha and Vitya hosed down the gravestone, wiped it dry, and watered the trees and grass around the grave. We had come after the cemetery was closed, but people came up to us all the time.

Last Friday, June 20, I went to see Galya at the dacha [in Trudovaya] and brought baby’s milk, bilberries, and tomatoes. I stayed until evening, until Seryozha came with Nikita and drove me back to Moscow.



Little Seryozha has grown a lot, but he has no teeth yet and does not sit up by himself. He looked at me for a long time before smiling. I want to live with them; I asked Seryozha to bring my bed to Trudovaya.

Yelena Mikhailovna Bulganina<sup>117</sup> stayed over at my place last night. The Council of Ministers didn't give them a dacha. Together with [her daughter] Verochka and the baby she rented a room in Zhukovka, but she has nowhere to sleep there. She caters completely to Vera's family and dreams of peace and quiet.

Vitya has begun to transfer his mama's things to his [newly built] apartment.

AUGUST 6, 1975

I'm in a strange mood—I don't feel like doing anything, either eating or writing or even reading. I'm sleepy all the time. Isn't this really a sign of the complete extinction of the life activity of the organism? Or else I get fed up and allow myself to do things out of keeping with my age, for example, a ride from Moscow to Trudovaya and then right on to Zhukovka in the heat of the day. Perhaps it's an effect of the weather: rain, high humidity, a sudden change in atmospheric pressure? *Some kind of life spark has gone out of me*, although I continue doing everything that I did before.

Yesterday I was waiting for the car in our alley [in Moscow]. A woman, still young, came up to me. She said that she works nearby, in the courtyard, that she often sees me, and that I look better than I did in years past. She started to ask whether the current leaders or the former friends of N. S. and myself keep up friendly ties with me. When I answered no, she was surprised. She asked a lot more questions and I answered them, but then I regretted doing so. She admitted that she was going on vacation the next day and in honor of the occasion had been drinking wine with her colleagues. That was what had given her the courage to approach and talk to me.

Sergei isn't around; he went on vacation with Nikita. Vitya will return from his vacation no earlier than August 15. I invited Vera Fyodorovna to stay with me at Zhukovka; she refused, she is afraid of leaving her new apartment.

Rada goes to her dacha every day; I don't see her and rarely hear from her. I'm fed up.

The other day I dreamed of N. S.: he was lolling about across the bed and showing me something—I don't remember what. His face was as it was not in the last years of his life, but in the 1950s. A strange dream. N. S. never lolled about, even on the sofa, and here he was lolling about on the bed.

I recalled how he used to go with Lena, Vitya, and Seryozha to pick mushrooms along the Smolensk road—150 kilometers.

MARCH 29, 1976

I've written nothing for over half a year. During that time I had a heart attack, lay in the hospital from August 19 until the end of October 1975, and then spent a month at the Herzen Sanatorium.<sup>118</sup> In December I recuperated at home, in the apartment. Toward the end of December, Yuliya Nikitychna came to help me (when her Viktor Petrovich went off to a sanatorium).

We saw in the new year 1976 at Sergei's place. We stayed a long time but didn't get very tired. And then on January 2, 1976, both of us came down together with a severe flu. We lay at home. (Rada, Vitya, Zoya Pavlovna, and Sergei looked after us.) Then we were in the hospital until the middle of February. We were out of luck. . . . Yuliya has still not fully recovered; she complains of weakness. This time, it seems, I had a narrow escape.

While she was in the hospital, on January 22, 1976, Yuliya reached the age of sixty. Rada and Aleksei Ivanovich brought her flowers, Asya Kolchinskaya<sup>119</sup> a doll (a Ukrainian Cossack). At home I invited her to choose a few things from my "treasure trove." She chose a little Chinese stone vase (a gift from Liu Hsiao)<sup>120</sup> and a beautiful green Chinese stone (I don't know what it's called).

Now I'm at Zhukovka with Nika; he's off school for the spring break until April 1. It's good here when it's warm in the house. Of course, I need to live here to breathe the fresh air. I feel quite differently, better, than I do in town.

Radochka didn't get any leave in 1975. She doesn't feel very well after her flu. She's gone to her dacha for a week with Vanya.

MAY 15, 1976, SATURDAY

I came [to Zhukovka] yesterday in the middle of the day, the rain has stopped; it's so clean and fresh here, easy to breathe. . . . I suddenly decided to leave my fifth floor [apartment]; it's all the same where I lie and wait for my heart to stop hurting. (Bouts of stenocardia started two weeks ago.)

Yesterday I read over my notes and stumbled upon the lines about Brezhnev being awarded a marshal's star. "What next?" I wrote. In the last few days there's been talk of awarding him the title of "Marshal of the Soviet Union" and of erecting a bust of him in Dneprodzerzhinsk. All to the accompaniment of a real "show." What does he need this for? "If God wants to punish someone, He first drives him insane." Doesn't this popular saying apply to Brezhnev?

I rushed to Zhukovka in order to get closer to N. S. I recalled how in the apartment he said once that he felt at home only at the dacha and in the apartment he didn't have that feeling.

Were it not for difficulties with buying food and in the winter with heating, I'd prefer to live at Zhukovka; it's easier to breathe here. I've really aged—it's not only a matter of weakness, my psyche has also changed; I don't feel like communicating with other people (having them stay with me, going to visit them, and so on).

On April 17 this year<sup>121</sup> fewer of us went to the cemetery, but all the same several people did come—Mikhail Aleksandrovich Zhukovsky, Yulochka's friend Sveta [Svetlana],<sup>122</sup> Masha, some mates of Seryozha and Yuliya. Rada was on her own; she came with Lyalya [Vlasenko] (Lena's friend); there was also the sculptor Lena [Yelagina]<sup>123</sup> who made the inscription on Lena's gravestone. Galina's parents came (April 17 was a Saturday), but she herself stayed home with little Sergei. Yura came on his own without [his wife] Masha; she was sick.

And our former "friends" pretend that there was no N. S. Khrushchev in Kiev, that it was not he who liberated and rebuilt the city, that there had been no such person in Ukraine, in Moscow. . . . But people remember and no doubt tell their children and grandchildren about it.

For some reason I recalled an episode with L. I. Brezhnev. N. S. recounted it to me at home, in great agitation. Brezhnev wanted to leave his position in Kazakhstan, in the virgin lands, and came to N. S. to tell him so, and burst into tears. So he was recalled from Kazakhstan.<sup>124</sup> N. S. valued Brezhnev. I heard a rebuke that N. S. gave my friend Vera Gostinskaya (from Warsaw) when she carelessly said that no one knew where he (Brezhnev) had come from. N. S. told her that Brezhnev had character and was devoted to the party, that he was respected by the people with whom he worked. For example, when they were rebuilding the Dzerzhinka<sup>125</sup> in Dneprodzerzhinsk, Brezhnev even moved his bed into his office so as not to waste time going home. And now what?

MAY 27, 1976

The birch trees, rowan trees, shrubs, and raspberry cane have burst into leaf; the grass has come up. But the foliage is still transparent, touchingly tender in color; everything glitters in the sunshine. Yesterday I saw the horse chestnut trees in flower by the Borodinsky Bridge<sup>126</sup>—it was N. S. who insisted that they grow and plant them in Moscow.

I seem to have no strength left now.

JUNE 25, 1976, NOON

I just learned from Galya that today is the court hearing, that she didn't go, that yesterday Sergei told her that he isn't going to withdraw his application

for a divorce. In other words, all my appeals were in vain. Surely I won't survive the shame of the court proceedings and the children's unhappiness. I don't understand why he needs this. He told me that he doesn't have another woman. . . . So who is rushing him to commit this treachery, to Nika first of all? I'm already starting to feel a pain in my throat; will I manage to control my agitation short of a heart attack? Father would not have approved of Sergei's behavior.

JULY 20, 1976

A month has passed without me laying hands on the notebook. As though there were nothing special to write about.

At his first examination (in mathematics) for admission to the biology faculty of Moscow State University Nika got a two and was dropped from the entry competition. Yesterday he began to prepare himself for the psychology faculty, anything just to get into Moscow State University. I'm against such a practice, but Galya decided to let him have a try; he can always withdraw. Galya took unpaid leave and sits with Nika in the apartment, working on math exercises with him.

Vanya [Adzhubei] finishes his examinations [for admission to the biology faculty of Moscow State University] on July 25 and then has a month off.

I'm staying at Zhukovka for the second month, paying no attention to the torrential rain. In the house it's warm, and on the street there are sheltered places where I can stroll. Today I sat on the little stool and gathered bilberries. I recalled how my mama would tell me how in July they used to harness the horses, load washtubs and buckets onto the cart, and set off for the Tomashovsky Woods<sup>127</sup> to pick bilberries. They didn't pick one berry at a time, as I do, but combed through the bushes thoroughly with their open hands, and the berries fell off right away in bunches. . . .

I'm rereading the first volume of *Khrushchev Remembers* with a dictionary. It's slow going; I've forgotten many words.

AUGUST 8, 1976, SUNDAY

Yesterday Nika took his history exam and got a five, but in math (the first exam) he got a three. In three days' time he has his essay. It would be good if he does well. It's the second Sunday that Seryozha [Sr.] hasn't come under various pretexts. Today he repaired the car and drove Svetlana (a friend of Yuliya's) to Voskresensk.<sup>128</sup> For some reason he's become so obliging; I hadn't previously noticed him paying any special attention to Svetlana.

Vanya and Alyosha are taking a break at their dacha. Rada visits them at least twice a week and plans to go on vacation in the fall. Last year she and Aleksei Ivanovich didn't take a vacation.

On Thursday I went to Trudovaya and enjoyed myself thoroughly with Seryozha [Jr.]. I didn't get tired at all.

It's been a cold summer. Only now is the raspberry cane starting to bear fruit. Last year the berries were gathered by this time. On August 19, 1975, I had a heart attack, but before that I managed to cut off most of the raspberry cane that had borne fruit.

If only I don't fall ill now. . . .

OCTOBER 18, 1976

See how rarely I write now. . . . I spent a good summer at Zhukovka with Yekaterina Yosifovna Simochkina. I don't know about her, but for me the summer went well, but at the end of September I started having trouble with my heart again. This time there is something new: it's as though my heart leaps out of my breast at the slightest movement. For almost three weeks I was under treatment in town; it seemed that the trouble had passed, but then at night I'm indisposed in various ways. I've grown old, my heart is worn out, ischemic disease, there's nothing to be surprised at. . . . Only I don't want to die yet, although it seems that my life serves little purpose. . . . What morbid thoughts the illness has aroused in me! Somehow I take a lighthearted attitude to my illness; it seems to me that I have many years of life ahead of me, but I should be thinking about the end. . . . Only I don't have the strength to think.

Yuliya [Sr.] called the other day. She doesn't feel very well. Is the old trouble with her stomach really going to start again? . . . And Rada and Aleksei Ivanovich are having a dip in the Black Sea at Pitsunda; they went on a voucher.<sup>129</sup> I'm very glad for them. Far from home, from all cares, after two years they'll get a rest.

And Seryozha [Sr.] returned from his leave two weeks ago and was complaining the other day that he already feels tired.

I miss Seryozha [Jr.]; I can't go visit him at Trudovaya.

With all my troubles I remembered Galina Ivanovna Burmistenko. I learned from a relative of hers that she plans to come to Moscow [from Kiev] in December. It appears that there's something wrong with her legs; she can't walk. And only in 1972 she traveled to the Volga and was promising to come to Moscow more often. To my invitations to sit down while she was

peeling potatoes Galina Ivanovna would answer with a laugh: “My legs are still holding up!”

NOVEMBER 13, 1976, SATURDAY

For the third day I’m at Zhukovka all on my own. I put the light out at midnight or one A.M. and get up at nine or ten in the morning, and no one checks up on me or tells me off. Yesterday the whole day went by without anyone calling; at five in the afternoon I tried to get hold of Rada but couldn’t find her. Seryozha [Sr.] is in Tashkent; he called on Thursday and I’m grateful for that.

Yesterday I called Yura and discovered that he’s in the military hospital and they’ve done an operation on him—they removed stones from his gall bladder. He’s very upset, but not by the operation, rather by the possibility that he won’t be allowed to fly again.

We’re propagandizing the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee<sup>130</sup> and the tasks of agriculture—one of the chief tasks for its development will be to expand the areas sown with winter grains and corn. That’s what Brezhnev said. And what was N. S. talking about in the last years of his work? About the same thing! He literally made a breakthrough. . . . We have lost ten years, until we remembered or worked it out ourselves. . . .

I’m reading N. S.’s memoirs in English with a dictionary and I’m astonished at how much he did and thought and I for some reason didn’t know about it. Probably he didn’t find it interesting to tell me about it or he told me what was necessary and not what was preoccupying him. . . . Before the war I used to know of all his plans and experiences.

FEBRUARY 28, 1977

It’s been sunny since morning. How delightful! The winter has passed imperceptibly because I didn’t come down with flu. I haven’t gone anywhere, only to my own gatherings and to those of Seryozha [Jr.]. I haven’t been at Rada’s place for ages. I thought that after his leave Sergei [Sr.] would come to his senses and stop the divorce case. It turned out that during the school vacation he and Galya went to court but the case was deferred at Sergei’s request as he didn’t have ready his plan for dividing up the dacha. Nikita was here with me and told me all about it. I asked him with whom he wanted to live after his parents’ divorce. He replied: with Mama, of course, Seryozha [Jr.] has to grow up. That was how the seventeen-year-old boy made up his mind, but his father doesn’t want to think what evil he’s bringing into the family. What I find least comprehensible is that he doesn’t mention the true reason for his action. I’ll probably die of suffering after his divorce.

And I still want so much to live, to do something more, if there will be peace [in the world].

I read and listen to the latest decisions of the Central Committee and the government. All these issues were raised by N. S. and now they are passed off as Brezhnev's initiatives.

My heart has started to throb again. Even the slightest agitation sets it off.

My vision has changed; I write without glasses. I sewed a quilt cover with a big needle without wearing glasses and passed the thread through the big eye.

MARCH 1, 1977

I remembered Serafima Ilyinichna Gopner. She's still too sick to get out of bed. I visited her on N. S.'s return from China in 1959. When I told Serafima Ilyinichna about the disagreements with Mao Zedong she got very upset, almost to the point of tears. "How bad that will be for our party! It's hard even to predict how bad!"

JULY 16, 1977

I haven't been writing for a long time. Many events have taken place during this time both in our family and in the country. Sergei and Galya finalized their divorce (April 4). I didn't die, although I took it badly. Sergei has declared that there is a woman he loves; she lives in Dushanbe, she has two children and parents.<sup>131</sup> It seems that their move to Moscow (one step at a time) is being arranged. Sergei is now living with me in my apartment. Will he bring his new family to live here, too? For the time being he's gone on vacation to Riga; that's where "she" is at the moment. I don't have the heart for these new relatives, I don't even know how I should behave; I can't betray Galya and the children. I think that to recognize this "love" of Sergei's would be to betray them, but how can I avoid doing so? I won't live through it.

The Administrative Department of the Central Committee has not yet given permission for Galya and the children to keep their apartment [after the divorce] and it isn't clear how Sergei's [Moscow] residence permit will be affected if he lives with me. Nikita avoids coming to Zhukovka when Sergei is here. He hasn't come, and he didn't even call his father on Saturday, July 2, although I urged him to.<sup>132</sup>

It's all in the natural course of things. The misfortunes and troubles are only beginning; it's hard to imagine the future.

I live at the dacha alone; I don't really want to invite anyone to visit me. The summer will be over soon. I rush back and forth between the dacha and Moscow; it's often raining; we don't manage to feel the heat of the summer.

I've become powerless in everything, including family relationships. It's hard to be aware and feel, but what can I do about it?

Be more circumspect when you shoot out your word in a quarrel,  
 Don't forget, dear man:  
 The wound from a bullet soon heals,  
 The wound from a word burns for an age.

—Gamzat Tsadasa<sup>133</sup> (Avar poet, on his centenary)

JUNE 14, 1978

I've been reading *For Those Who Drift* by V. Sanin<sup>134</sup> (*Znamya*, 1978, no. 4). I found there an idea for which I have always had sympathy. I'll write it out from page 60: "Andrei loved to daydream, but in difficult situations he was cold and sober. The one, by the way, does not exclude the other. Just as sentimentality goes together with cruelty. Andrei shunned sentimental people; he didn't believe in the tears that are called forth by sweet music or a broken flower."

I became sure of this idea during the war: the sentimental Germans turned out to be the cruelest of people. A man could play sentimental arias on the violin, kiss a photo of his wife, and then go straight off and kill our children.

I haven't written for a long time, there's never time, time no longer passes, it doesn't run, it gallops by. Zinaida Sergeyevna Gruzdeva has been buried,<sup>135</sup> as well as two members of our party organization—and that's just in the month of May.

The next spring (my seventy-eighth) arrived; summer is here, a cold summer. The grass has grown, the oaks have already broken into leaf, the lilies-of-the-valley in my flowerbed have blossomed, but the other flowers I planted have not. I put in lettuce and fennel but they're growing poorly, not enough sun. At Galya's place [the dacha in Trudovaya] they sowed lettuce on May 2 and it's already ready to eat. Her strawberries are in luxuriant blossom. Seryozha [Jr.] says: "When the berries turn red, I'll snatch them from the bed."

Yuliya N. [Sr.] is ill; she didn't visit us this year. Rada went to see her in Kiev, spent ten days there. She's very pleased with the trip.

I live alone at the dacha; I'm even content to be alone. I called Anna Tarasova, but she has bouts of liver trouble and can't come to visit for the time being. Katya Simochkina would come, but Anna Tarasova invited her first. On Saturday and Sunday Seryozha comes round. He plans to go on a car trip with Olya and her children. What does he need this for?



JUNE 26, 1978, MONDAY

What you hide away is lost,  
 What you gave away is yours. (Rustaveli)  
 Shake off accidental features—  
 And you'll see: the world is splendid. (Blok)<sup>136</sup>  
 Face to face you won't see the faces.  
 The great is seen from a distance. (S. Yesenin)<sup>137</sup>  
 It is no ossified sound,  
 Not just some kind of material—  
 No, the WORD is also a deed,  
 As Lenin often repeated. (Aleksandr Tvardovsky)<sup>138</sup>

Nikita S. [Sergei's son] came on Friday, June 23. Of course, he ran off “for a walk”—to visit his numerous friends in the vicinity. And yesterday (Sunday) he left at eleven in the morning and returned at ten in the evening, spending half the day with the Sergeev family (Lolita's father, the granddaughters of Ibarruri).<sup>139</sup> I don't want to think that Nika is avoiding contact with his father. And with me too?

I'm taking injections of adenosine triphosphate; perhaps my incredible sleepiness will pass? The second day of decent weather—maybe the strawberries will start to grow. The lilies-of-the-valley have blossomed, the Chinese globe flowers have blossomed, now the aquilegia, forget-me-nots, and all kinds of buttercups are blossoming. My grafts on the apple tree and plum tree haven't taken. The grass is flourishing. Summer is coming into its own. There is a new trait in my character—tranquillity and even indifference toward undesirable phenomena. In Belorussia Brezhnev has awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to the city of Minsk.

Yesterday Yuliya [Jr.] came with [her daughter] Nina; they brought me flowers. I gave them a black currant jelly that I made last year. On August 1, Nina is sixteen; from July 29, she'll be in a sanatorium. She left the address, wants to get a letter from me. I feel sorry for Yuliya's children; the family is not at all what it was when Lyova and his parents were alive. I told Yuliya about the forthcoming “wedding.” She expressed pity for Sergei, said that he's been *caught* and there's nothing you can do about it; he needs time to see what is already clear to others. I feel sorry for Seryozha if he comes to recall life with Galya as happy days—and he will.

During the interruption in my entries, two groups of cosmonauts have flown into space and lived there. In the first group there was a Czech cosmonaut, in

the second a Pole named Jermaszewski. Yesterday they showed him on TV with our Klimuk, his commander on the Soyuz-30. Our main group, consisting of Kovalyonok and Aleksandr Ivanchenkov, continues to work on the space station. I forget names so quickly! I have to write them down in time. Klimuk and Sevastyanov shot an excellent film about the details of the flight and daily life in space. They showed it the other day; I watched it with pleasure.

I read Marietta Shaginyan's last autobiographical little book *Chelovek i vremya* (Man and Time).<sup>140</sup> What an astonishing head this ninety-year-old writer has on her shoulders!

At the same time I've been reading Konstantin Simonov's *Raznye dni voiny* (Various Days of the War) in two volumes. The author has presented his frontline diaries very effectively.

On TV they showed how reinforced-concrete towers are being used (instead of metal ones) along the Omsk—Petrovsk electricity-transmission line. It was N. S. who introduced these supports, especially after his trip to Austria [in 1960], and made a lot of trouble for those who opposed this. And now they present them as something new.

I want to describe an interesting fact: on June 18 the Polish woman captain Krystyna Chojnowska-Liskiewicz returned from a voyage round the world on the yacht *Mazurek*. She had spent more than two years at sea alone and had sailed more than 30,000 miles. She is a ship designer and builder in Gdansk. Today they showed reportage of her return home on TV.

JULY 31, 1978, MONDAY

Today is the third anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the conference of thirty-five countries in Helsinki in 1975. Now the United States is doing all it can to annul the significance of this document.

In the last few days the weather has been relatively warm, but the nights have been cool (8–14° C. [46–57° F.]). Plants are developing slowly; the raspberries are not ripening. By this time last year all the berries had ripened, but this year the cherries didn't give their first harvest until July 28, and the berries were completely ruined by the rain. I record this to aid my memory. I'm interested in the growth and wellbeing of plants: in my window box the cucumbers have grown only four leaves; the tomato plant has thrown out a shoot that will blossom later; the strawberries in the flowerbed have no shoots yet (there is less light there).

[Rada's son] Alyosha has graduated from the medical institute and been appointed to work at the Institute of Microbiology of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He spent two weeks at a vacation center near Riga and has already

returned. [Rada's youngest son] Vanya has finished his practicals, but Nikita S. [Sergei's son] is still working on the embankment in the Moscow State University building corps. Yesterday he was visiting his friends in Zhukovka all day long; he left after ten o'clock at night.

I have a lot of pain in my legs; I can't walk, but how are they to be treated if electrical procedures are contraindicated?

August 2, 1978. "Fathers die suddenly, mothers gradually. For fathers have to look strong, . . . and that saps them, saps them from within."

—Vardges Petrosyan<sup>141</sup> from Armenia

AUGUST 27, 1978, SUNDAY

I want to write about the cosmonauts. Kovalyonok and Ivanchenkov are still at work on the space station, and yesterday they were sent a new pair for a week: the commander Valery Bykovsky and a researcher from East Germany, Sigmund Jen. Today they were shown on TV with their families.

I recalled how N. S. worried when Gagarin was in orbit, how he praised the emotional qualities of his [Gagarin's] wife Valya.

N. S. considered it wrong that Valya Tereshkova should have been drafted into military service before the flight and demanded that she appear before the people in civilian dress. For some reason I recalled her wedding with Nikolayev in the House of Receptions of the Council of Ministers on the Lenin [Vorobyov] Hills. Who did I give the photo album [on the wedding] to?

AUGUST 29, 1978

August 19, 1978. Seryozha registered his marital union with Olya at the registry office. Besides them were present Olya's children Gleb (thirteen years old) and Lena (eight years old), and Semyon and Valya Alperovich<sup>142</sup> and Slava from Dushanbe<sup>143</sup> as witnesses. The seven of them came to Zhukovka for lunch. I had nothing prepared in advance; Seryozha hadn't asked me to. Olya, helped by Gleb, fried meat dumplings on the go. Eggplant paste and peppers were prepared in town. We drank one and a half bottles of champagne and half a bottle of vodka but didn't sing any songs or dance; Valya, Semyon, and Slava made congratulatory speeches. Valya washed the dishes. Then together with the children we went to a community center and to the cinema. As was the wedding, so, I fear, will be their family life. A very sad prospect for me, I fear for Seryozha, too. But what can be done about it now?

My right leg (the knee) hurts a lot; I can hardly walk. The "blockade" of methyl ether and bandages has so far been of little avail. My spirits are falling really low.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

I'm sitting at Zhukovka on my own, but there's no time to keep my diary on schedule. Yesterday Yuliya [Jr.] came with her daughters; they brought a lot of apples (*grushovka*). Today I've been busy with them all day long, but a lot of them are still left. I promised Yuliya to process them [for preserves]; I didn't realize how hard the work would be.

Anna Osipovna stayed with me for four days last week, but she doesn't want to come again: it was rainy and cold the whole time.

Katya Simochkina called. She just came out of the hospital after an operation on her gall bladder. She's been ill for a long time; now she has heart trouble. She said: "It would have been better if I'd died in the hospital."

Seryozha went to Tashkent at the beginning of September. He called twice. He doesn't know when his conference will end. He doesn't talk with me about his family plans. I don't know what comes next.

My neighbor Aleksandr Petrovich [Volkov]<sup>144</sup> has gone off to a rest home in the Crimea. My other neighbors have also left their dachas: I don't even have anyone to talk to.

Rada is in the hospital, with what I don't know, she doesn't say; she was lying at home for a good ten days with a high temperature.

Vitya went on vacation to the Northern Sea. He sailed with [Vitya's friend] Ilya on a kayak in cold rainy weather. He brought back cloudberry (I'd never seen any before!), but at the end of August the bilberries still hadn't ripened.

But our raspberries disappeared a week and a half ago; before Sergei left on his work trip I treated him to raspberries.

The strawberry seedlings that I planted in July have hardly grown at all. In my window box I sowed strawberry seeds with earth; they took hold but they aren't growing. The sunflower seeds, on the other hand, are growing.

Nikita Adzhubei went to Warsaw. He stayed for two weeks in the apartment of Vera Aleksandrovna [Gostinskaya]. The other day when I was at Nikita's and Masha's [Nikita's wife] place I happened to see a visitor of theirs from Warsaw—it was Olya, Vera Aleksandrovna's granddaughter. She was en route to Tashkent; she knows people there.

Vanya Adzhubei had an operation on his second eye,<sup>145</sup> so he didn't go to dig potatoes.

The soldiers are collecting the grain harvest, the students are collecting the potatoes, probably the staff of the scientific research institutes too.

Lyonya [Puchkov]<sup>146</sup> called in passing from Siberia, where he was harvesting grain with the soldiers. The soldiers went on to another province, but Lyonya went home.

Yuliya [Sr.] Nikitychna called from Kiev. She wants to come to Moscow after the harvest [at her dacha] is collected. She doesn't feel very well.

Today I realized that the Markovs<sup>147</sup> haven't paid me a single visit this year, although they came to the cinema.

I can't calm myself. Perepyolkov, the youngest member of our party organization,<sup>148</sup> has died.

SEPTEMBER 20, 1978, WEDNESDAY

My leg hurts, I sit and lie here for days on end, I can't walk. I went as far as the community center [in Zhukovka] to cut stinging nettles; its leaves are needed for the herb mixture recommended by the endocrinologist, and they don't have any at the pharmacy. After that stroll I lay down; my leg started to hurt. . . .

At six P.M. they showed Brezhnev's arrival in Baku on TV (to award medals<sup>149</sup> and take part in the holiday). Children and adults dancing in the streets, shouts of "Hurray!" a big crowd of people, and, of course, a fat general<sup>150</sup> next to Leonid Ilyich. Since yesterday radio and television have been broadcasting reportage of encounters on the road, at railroad stations, of conversations and "instructions." What are young people learning from these examples? I find it hard to take part in this bootlicking.

Seryozha called from Dushanbe to say that he'll be back between the 24th and 26th of September, depending on when he can get hold of a ticket. Nika called from the Crimea; Rada hasn't yet come out of the hospital. Tomorrow I'll go to town.

I've read Konstantin Simonov's *My ne uvidimsya s toboi* (I Won't Be Seeing You). The end of the war, the work and experiences of *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star)<sup>151</sup> correspondents, their families, encounters. I love reading Simonov's books. I read everything that V. Lipatov<sup>152</sup> has written, although some people don't like him.

They broadcast a splendid evening of the poetry of Yu. Drunina<sup>153</sup> from the Concert Hall at Ostankino.<sup>154</sup> In the hall there were young people, very many young girls with eyes burning with interest and mutual sympathy. I would never have read as many of her verses as I heard this evening (on TV)—verses about the war.

OCTOBER 18, 1978, TUESDAY, 10 P.M.

On TV they're broadcasting an evening of the poetry of Andrei Voznesensky.<sup>155</sup> He's reciting his verses himself. I don't like his manner of recitation: any impression you get from the essence of the verses is lost.

Radochka has come out of the hospital. She's leaving for the Pitsunda rest home on October 19. She has gall bladder stone disease; her blood pressure is too high.

Yuliya [Sr.] N. has been admitted to the Yepifaniya Hospital [in Kiev] with a minor heart attack. Asya Kolchinskaya called (en route): she visited Yuliya in the hospital; she said that Yuliya is starting to recover. On her way back from Bulgaria Asya will bring Yuliya pancreatin. Yuliya says that medicines here [in Moscow] are better than in Kiev.

We have an unexpected spell of warm weather. It's the third day without rain, the sun is shining, and I have remained at Zhukovka. I decided that it will do me more good to enjoy such weather than to walk along the corridors of the polyclinic.

And the cosmonauts Kovalyonok and Ivanchenkov are still in orbit. . . . I already feel sorry for them.

The more you tear out of yourself,  
The more remains to you. . . . (Andrei Voznesensky)

A man needs little,  
So long as someone waits for him at home. . . . (Robert Rozhdestvensky)<sup>156</sup>

OCTOBER 22, 1978, SUNDAY

Seryozha's gone [from Zhukovka] into Moscow; I'm sitting by the TV set. The Tajik ballet dancers Malika Sabirova (People's Artist of the USSR) and Muzaffar Burkhanov (People's Artist of the Tajik SSR) are performing with great success in Tchaikovsky Hall. Quite right! Let the whole world see the achievements of the formerly backward peoples.

They just completed the sixth episode of the TV serial *How the Steel Was Tempered*,<sup>157</sup> a production of the Dovzhenko Kiev Film Studio. A well-made film despite the poor reputation of the studio. I even cried.

Seryozha called to tell me that Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan has died. The bell tolls yet again. I'm sorry for Anastas Ivanovich, and especially for his sons and grandsons.

OCTOBER 23, 1978

My heart hurts. I can't calm myself at all. It's a reaction to the death of Anastas Ivanovich. I told Seryozha that I won't go to the funeral in order not to agitate my heart, but it's become agitated at home.

I watched and listened to the concluding concert of Armenian art in the RSFSR. The large number of state ensembles and the large number of people taking part in them are astonishing. N. S. would say: "And what proportion of them work in production, if there are so many of them on the stage and at state expense?"

There is in the radiance of autumn evenings  
A sweet and mysterious charm. . . (Tyutchev)<sup>158</sup>

NOVEMBER 4, 1978

I've come to Zhukovka with A. O. Tarasova for the holidays. Here I breathe more freely; the ten days I spent in town were in vain, it was all petty household matters.

The cosmonauts Kovalyonok and Ivanchenkov have made a successful landing. I feel like adding: "thank God." On TV they didn't look too well.

Seryozha has gone on a work trip to Garm [in Tajikistan]. There was an earthquake there, and it's a long time since he called. Worrying. . .

Today they conducted a celebratory session in the Palace of Congresses.<sup>159</sup> The report (an hour and twenty minutes) was delivered by Kosygin. A good report, well read; it was pleasant to listen to it.

APRIL 17, 1979, MORNING

How long it is since I've written anything, but life goes on, time rushes by. . . Lyakhov and Ryumin have been in space on the space station Salyut-6 since February 25. On April 11, 1979, Nikolai Rukavishnikov and Georgy Ivanov (a Bulgarian) were launched into space on board the spacecraft Soyuz-33. Their goal was to dock with Salyut-6, but something went wrong with their engine and after two days the cosmonauts returned to earth. It's a good thing they've returned! Before the flight a big show was put on in Bulgaria and the USSR; they took off on the eve of Cosmonautics Day. When they failed to dock, Seryozha said that Father (N. S.) would not have allowed them to take off on the eve of a holiday. And I recall that N. S. was very agitated when the spacecraft with the cosmonauts perished because the takeoff had

been “dedicated” to some holiday.<sup>160</sup> Things shouldn’t be rushed: you have to make careful, serious preparations and only then take off.

My legs are hurting, my heart is hurting, no one needs me, the only thing left for me to do is complain about my fate.

N. S. would have been 85 years old today. Seryozha was giving a lecture at the institute<sup>161</sup> at five o’clock and didn’t go with us to the cemetery. His friends, of course, didn’t come either. Vitya brought a basket of carnations and left without waiting for me to arrive. Yuliya with Lyuba and Masha didn’t wait either. I came with Rada, Aleksei Ivanovich, Nyura Pisareva [sister of N. S.’s first wife], and Irma [niece of N. S., daughter of Irina Sergeevna]. Irma came to tell me about her excursion to Kiev. She saw Yuliya [Sr.].

MAY 1, 1979

The May Day demonstration of working people on Red Square lasted from ten o’clock until noon. Despite the rain, the procession was cheerful and masses of artificial flowers were on display: it looked very impressive. The demonstrators carried hardly any portraits of members of the Politburo and only the occasional portrait of Lenin; portraits of Marx and Engels appeared only in the column of the Timiryazev district. But you could see Brezhnev’s portrait in every column. Many balloons were held aloft, in ones and in bunches. In the evening they showed sequences from the demonstrations in other union republics; there you could see neither portraits nor flowers, only banners and balloons. Curious. . . . And it was hard for the aging leaders on the viewing stand yet again to raise their arms in greeting or just to smile at people as they passed by. In the whole two hours I saw a single smile, on Kosygin’s face! Brezhnev and Kirilenko looked especially gloomy.

I remembered N. S.’s lively behavior on the rostrum of the Mausoleum. He wasn’t embarrassed to doff his hat and wave it to the people passing by.

Even the slogans were proclaimed in a boring tone, without enthusiasm, and the responding “Hoorays” were weak and brief. Such were my impressions sitting alone by the TV set. . . .

MAY 22, 1979

How time flies! On May 3 it was hot (25° C. [77° F.]); I lay down and sunbathed, a breeze was blowing—and as a result I had a cold for ten days, collapsed on the divan in Moscow. I missed the beginning of spring and didn’t see the birch trees bursting into leaf.

After the cold weather hot days have come and everything has begun to grow. There are hardly any flowers: the buttercups have come out and now



also some forget-me-nots, but very few, like the white woodland flowers (I call them “little stars”). I haven’t seen any lungworts. Almost all the apple trees have frozen; the plum tree has frozen, but the raspberries have only slightly frozen; they’re already breaking into leaf and throwing out buds. This year the black currants have blossomed. Perhaps that’s because for the past two years I’ve nipped the buds with pincers at just the right time? The strawberries are alive, but there are no flower buds; they’ve frozen, too. The bilberries have frozen.<sup>162</sup>

At home there are many events, but I don’t feel like writing about them. Let’s see what happens next.

Yesterday I read in *Druzhba Narodov* (Friendship of Peoples)<sup>163</sup> (1979, no. 2) a discussion between the magazine’s editorial board and collective farm chairmen, leaders of Yadrinsky county, and the secretary of the party province committee of Chuvashia, “The Non-Black-Earth Zone, Five Years Later.”<sup>164</sup> The discussion focused on agro-industrial tilling of the land, [agro-industrial] complexes, and other painful issues. Highly qualified people who understand state and collective-farm interests and know WHAT needs to be done and HOW it needs to be done. But one collective-farm chairman couldn’t understand why Gosplan<sup>165</sup> had abandoned such a convenient form of plan target as meat, milk, grain, etc., produced per 100 hectares of arable land. Perhaps because THAT was thought up by N. S.?

MAY 31, 1979, THURSDAY

Summer is coming on fast. The days are hot—up to 30° C. [86° F.]), there’s no rain, so far everything is growing rapidly. The nettles are flowering; the lilies-of-the-valley, the forget-me-nots, and some of the other woodland flowers are all in bloom. One apple tree has put out leaves, but the other one has not. The plum tree also hasn’t come to life.

The other day they broadcast on TV a session of the Committee for the Year of the Child, which is chaired by Tereshkova. Lykova (deputy chair of the RSFSR Council of Ministers) and Dementyeva (secretary of the Moscow party city committee) made speeches. I looked at them and thought: by means of active work they preserve their physical agility, to some degree their “youthfulness.”

JUNE 12, 1979, TUESDAY

On the initiative of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*,<sup>166</sup> seven young Communists have *skied* about two thousand kilometers to the North Pole. They returned in good shape and spoke on TV. It seems that they were training for this

expedition for ten years. The journalist Peskov talked about their training on the radio. Undoubtedly people of heroic character. Lev Oshanin<sup>167</sup> wrote a poem in their honor: “At the Pole!” (*Na polyuse!*).

In the age of technology, a motorboat on every pond.  
 And suddenly, with a stock of body heat,  
 The desperate seven on skis  
 Across the ice fields reached the pole!  
 So it can be done!  
 The epic song of the seven bogatyrs<sup>168</sup>  
 Is not buried and forgotten!  
 And human daring  
 Only for a while stood at anchor.  
 Thanks to you, lads!  
 That’s the way!  
 And the whole world is proud of you today.  
 May your Olympiad expedition  
 Go down as the most stunning record!

This was published in the June 6, 1979, issue (no. 23) of *Literary Gazette*. I decided to make a note of this event; life rushes by, memory fades, but I’d like to recall such an impressive event.

I’m watching on TV the twenty-episode film of Roman Karmen, *The Great Fatherland War*.<sup>169</sup> In the episode on the Battle of Stalingrad they showed two shots with N. S., but they go by so fast that it’s hard to notice the fact. I feel offended on behalf of N. S. and especially on behalf of [General] Andrei Ivanovich Yeremenko<sup>170</sup>—his role gets hardly a mention, while Stalin, Zhukov, and Vasilevsky<sup>171</sup> are shown frequently.

AUGUST 9, 1979, THURSDAY

I’ve quite stopped writing, there’s no time. Sometimes I’m too weak to feel like writing, and in July and August I’ve had pain in my right arm—the humeral joints, and the whole arm doesn’t want to work. Right away, so as not to forget, I want to write about the impressive recital of the Kalmyk poet David Kugultinov<sup>172</sup> in the Ostankino concert studio on the evening of August 8, 1979. The poet himself produces an excellent impression: he’s sharp-witted and educated and reads well in pure Russian. And the verses on various themes, especially the lyrical verses, are good. The young audience gave him his due.

I’m living now at Zhukovka on my own, I’m resting. At the end of June and in July, Nikita S. [Jr.] and Nina (Yuliya’s [Jr.] daughter) stayed with me.

Pleasant company, but I got very tired from constant household cares, so now I'm resting, although I have to go to the store for food; when they were here they used to go. . . . Nina is taking her exams for the philology faculty at Moscow State University. Nikita should have gone with his mother [on vacation] to Ukraine, but the brakes in the car were damaged and he had to stay here. They'd have liked to go to Tallinn if accommodation could have been arranged.

Katya Simochkina has died. Her liver trouble had been cured, but she died of an inflamed pancreas. Her sufferings are over. I ponder my own prospects; there's little of joy to look forward to. I've reached the firm conclusion that I'm of no use to my younger relatives: if I live they'll call me on the phone; if I die they'll recall me once a year, or perhaps they won't. . . . Only Nika S. pays any heartfelt attention to me, Rada too after a fashion.

In July Olya came with her children and settled herself into my apartment. I'll have to get used to an unaccustomed living routine: never yet have I lived in a communal apartment;<sup>173</sup> in my youth there was the student hostel.

Sergei has gone with them to Karelia to Vadik's place on the lake;<sup>174</sup> they'll be there until the middle of August. That's good; I'll be able to get used to the idea of life in a new family.

And the strawberries have blossomed and are bearing fruit! The raspberry too has given a small harvest.

AUGUST 31, 1979, FRIDAY

Konstantin Simonov was buried today. The urn will be placed in the wall of the Novo-Devichy Cemetery (at the place where his mother and stepfather are buried, in accordance with Simonov's request).<sup>175</sup> For the second day I can't calm myself, so sorry am I for him. Only the other day I read his reminiscences of various writers. Nature is unjust: the relatively young die full of the energy of life, all their capabilities intact, while the old and useless live on, though they don't live—they survive.

Nina (Yuliya's [Jr.] daughter) was admitted to the philology faculty of Moscow State University. Nika stayed with his mother in Tallinn; they had a good time—the weather was good. Tomorrow he starts at the university. He roamed around in the forest here, looking for suitable pieces of wood to carve.<sup>176</sup>

Alyosha [Adzhubei] called. He said he was thinking of coming to Zhukovka when his parents go on vacation.

Nyura Pisareva has returned from Kiev. She told me about Yuliya [Sr.] N. and passed on her greetings.

The September 5, 1979, issue (no. 36) of *Literary Gazette* has devoted a whole page to the memory of Konstantin Simonov: “The Writer-Communist” by [poet] Aleksei Surkov; “A World Seen Not from the Sidelines” by [Georgian writer] Irakly Abashidze; “A Unique Personality of a Unique Era” by [poet] Stepan Shchipachov; “He Lived Gloriously” by [writer and journalist] Aleksandr Krivitsky; and “He Was a Strong, Beautiful, Noble Man” by [celebrated Lithuanian poet] Eduardas Mezhelaitis, whose article contains these lines: “Konstantin Simonov was one of those writers whose pen can be equated with a weapon of combat. Life for him was a battlefield in whose trenches the battle goes on from day to day between good and evil, between the advanced and the backward, between the new and the old.”

SEPTEMBER 7, 1979, FRIDAY

Zoya Pavlovna [Kukharchuk] stayed with me for a couple of days. Yesterday I took her with me on the way to the city to buy food. I took a package that the chauffeur had brought for me, unsealed it at Galya’s place,<sup>177</sup> and went straight out to the dacha. I didn’t go into my apartment: Olya brought out the newspapers and I handed her some food. It worked out very well. I managed to talk with Nika, but didn’t see Vanya: he arrived later than me.

Yuliya [Sr.] N. called from Kiev. I was very glad to hear her voice. She promised to come to Moscow in a month’s time.

Today Brezhnev awarded the cosmonauts Ryumin and Lyakhov decorations for their 175-day flight in space.

Yuliya [Jr.] told me on the phone that in October she’ll be registering her marriage to Boris Zhutovsky (an artist).<sup>178</sup> I hope it will calm her a little.

Rada and Aleksei Ivanovich are going on vacation to Pitsunda; they’re setting off by car on September 9. They don’t want to suffer at the airport on the way back. It’s a pity that it’s grown colder.

SEPTEMBER 24, 1979, MONDAY

We’ve been lucky with the weather. For three days it hasn’t rained; the sun’s been shining; on two days the temperature rose to 24° C. [75° F.]; today it’s 16° C. [61° F.], but that’s warm all the same. I worked in my coat and got hot. Nikita and Seryozha were kind enough to cut the ripe raspberries and I checked them and tied them up. I cut several of the plants in the flowerbed, collected fallen birch tree leaves in a bucket, and emptied them onto the pile by the nut tree. I collected a handful of strawberries.

Autumn has brought color to the trees and bushes all around me: red and yellow against a green background.

Vera Fyodorovna called and told me how Vitya is wasting his free time on the yacht. He'll be lucky not to get a cough.

Rada called home from Pitsunda: everything's going well for them there so far.

Yuliya [Jr.] fainted yesterday. The doctor said that it's a consequence of the flu affecting her legs.

I have to record that last week Nika was returning from the university at 9.30 P.M. when he was attacked by a robber, a young fellow. He wanted to take Nika's pants (jeans), but managed to take his watch and injure his lip. They reported it to the police station, but there "by way of consolation" they told them about several other similar cases. If a woman hadn't spotted them and cried out that she was going to call the police at once, Nika would probably have lost both his watch and his jeans.

I'm becoming very forgetful. For example, I packed up some plates to take them to the dacha [from the apartment in Moscow], cut some aloe leaves to take them as well, and put them on the kitchen table. I was distracted by watering the flowers and for two days completely forgot the things I had left on the table. I overfilled bottles with milk, took them away to the fridge, and forgot the pan in the sink until the next time I went into the kitchen. And the same sort of thing many times over.

Isolated from other souls  
Our own soul grows shallow. . . .  
Colorful autumn, evening of the year,  
Smiles brightly at me. . . . (S. Marshak)<sup>179</sup>

OCTOBER 3, 1979, WEDNESDAY

Today it didn't rain. I lit a bonfire on dry twigs of jasmine that Nikita cut when he was here. But in the middle of the day I was surrounded by sleet. It's Nikita's birthday (twenty years old), but he isn't here—he's in Leningrad listening to presentations at a session of a psychology symposium. I'm reading the third volume of *Kuznetsky most* (Kuznetsky Bridge) by Savva Dangulov.<sup>180</sup> At one point the author is describing a visit by Collins (an Englishman) and Beketov (our diplomat from the embassy) to George Bernard Shaw: "In the year that had passed since the last visit of Sergei Petrovich (Beketov) to Eyotte-Saint-Laurence, his (Shaw's) gray hair had grown no brighter. On the contrary, it had grown a duller gray-greenish color like moss, the face was drier, and the eyelids had turned crimson. Evidently a new turn of the aging process." What a "prospect" facing our generation! My eyes have already become small.

Marusya (Maria Ivanovna [Solovei])<sup>181</sup> died in May, but it was only the other day that I learned about it. Rada didn't tell me, my thanks to her. I'm very upset at this death. . . .

On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic, they have published a greeting to the Chinese from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers. On TV yesterday they broadcast a survey of China and figures have been published on the state of China's economy. At the beginning of 1979 China's population was 975 million!

OCTOBER 6, 1979, SATURDAY

Savva Dangulov utters thoughts (in the third volume of *Kuznetsky Bridge*) that I'd like to note down. Galois, a French correspondent of Russian origin, speaks in conversation with Tambiyev (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) about Churchill during the days of the Potsdam conference: "Man is helpless before the power of the event—it raises man up and it casts him down. It creates the personality in its own image and likeness. You will agree that great figures do not emerge outside of great events. If an event is in decline, the people who partake in it also rapidly grow petty, isn't that so? In the face of such people there is something of the last child in a large family—something that nature scraped off the very bottom, put together out of worthless materials, you can't do any better with them! . . . Take a glance at Truman and Attlee and you won't need further explanation: the great event has gone into decline. . . ."

NOVEMBER 12, 1979, MONDAY

I've been meaning for a long time to note down my memory of an experience long ago concerning a letter [received by N. S.]—a plea from an old woman that she be given a room in an apartment with a bathroom. She had worked all her life at a textiles enterprise and had always gone to the bathhouse,<sup>182</sup> but in her old age she no longer had the strength to go there, and the limit of her aspirations was to wash herself in a bathroom, to warm her bones in warm water. . . . I don't know whether the officials in N. S.'s apparatus helped her or not, but I recall this letter now because I myself feel the same way when I wash in warm water. If I wash in cold water, my arm hurts more.

The holidays in commemoration of the sixty-second anniversary of the October Revolution have gone by; another year has passed. I spent the holidays at Zhukovka. Yuliya [Sr.] N. intended to come, but changed her mind at the

last minute. Yuliya [Jr.] came with her family on November 7; she brought marvelous carnations. They stayed a while and then went on to their own dacha. On November 8, Vitya arrived with his mother. Vera Fyodorovna brought baked patties; they too soon left. Vitya planned to visit Sergei; I decided not to go so as not to get in the way in our apartment.

On Saturday, November 10, I met Asya Kolchinskaya at the apartment. She told me about Yuliya N. None of it was reassuring: Yuliya is weak and she has to look after a household of three, as Galina Petrovna<sup>183</sup> is living with them as a guest.

Rada is in the hospital division for infectious cases with viral pneumonia. She's been ill for over a month and so far no improvement can be seen. She can't take antibiotics (she is allergic to them) and other medicines have little effect.

. . . When I came back to Zhukovka from Moscow yesterday, I felt that I was returning to my own home! In the apartment I feel as though I'm in a railroad station, as a temporary chance passerby. Now I understand why N. S. used to say that he was at home at Petrovo-Dalneye, while in the apartment he didn't feel at home. At the dacha I washed, slept, read, watched TV—in short, I was at home.

In *Novyi Mir*, nos. 4, 5, and 6, I'm reading Vsevolod Ovchinnikov's unusual impressions of and reflections about England, *Korni duba* (Roots of the Oak).<sup>184</sup> I find them very interesting. Very interesting notes. But winter is at the threshold, muggy, snow mixed with rain every day. It's horrible even to walk, slippery on the asphalt.

Anya Tarasova buried [her daughter] Paola on November 6, lung cancer! Nature is so unjust! The 83-year-old mother lives while the young daughter is dead. . . .

. . . Little Sergei is five years old today, but his daddy isn't at home. . . . I recalled how when he was about three years old he would run to Sergei with the cry "Our daddy's coming!" I would walk with him in the courtyard on Stanislavsky Street and then I'd say that someone was coming toward us. . . .

DECEMBER 10, 1979

Another year is nearing its end; I'll soon be eighty years old. Just to think of it! And I feel the age: I walk slowly, I stoop, I get tired from any effort. I'm glad when I lie down in my warmed bed (the electric mattress was a gift to N. S. from Ulbricht<sup>185</sup> on his seventieth birthday), and each time I recall the old woman textile worker who wrote in her letter to N. S. about how she

dreamed of warming her bones in a warm bath (but she lived in a communal apartment without a bathroom).

Rada is still in the hospital; she's just beginning to recover. It's been a very severe illness. Yesterday Aleksei Ivanovich and Nikita visited her in the hospital. Nikita [Adzhubei] washed her feet and cut her toenails (for some reason the nurses don't do those jobs).

Yesterday I received a lot of guests: Alyosha, Aleksei Ivanovich, Nikita, Sergei and his family. My leg hurt badly: everyone served himself. It's a good thing that I'd made preparations the day before.

It's as though winter is entrenching itself—there's frost and it's become colder in the house.

DECEMBER 18, 1979

For several days there's been frost, but today it's again 0° C. [32° F.]. I'm ill already for the second week—I caught a cold. I'm treating myself independently, without a doctor. My temperature is normal, I'd feel ashamed to call a doctor. But I've caught something—I sleep for days on end and don't feel up to doing anything, even reading.

Yuliya [Jr.] called. She said she's got severe flu, a high temperature; she feels very bad. . . . Fortunately, she hasn't infected anyone else and they haven't suggested to her that she go into the hospital. She advised me not to go into town.

Yuliya [Sr.] N. has sent me a letter; perhaps she'll call me. . . . Nyura Pisareva said that Viktor Petrovich had called her from Khosta,<sup>186</sup> but Yuliya [Sr.] didn't go to Moscow because she was afraid of an attack of her illness.

They've transferred Rada to another division of the hospital where there's a telephone for general use in the corridor. She feels much better and calls every day. She doesn't go for walks yet, she still wheezes.

My left arm hurts badly; it makes it hard for me even to get dressed. Have I suddenly got what Paola, Anna Osipovna's niece, had? Her disaster started with pain in the arm, and by the summer she was dead. . . . I'm very sleepy, although the injections of papaverin and platifilin should have helped my weak heart. After breakfast I sleep almost until lunchtime. How can a person sleep if she's only just got up? No doubt that is how the organism prepares itself for eternal sleep.

DECEMBER 24, 1979

Today at 9.30 they broadcast *Poetry Notebook* on the radio. When I turned it on, I thought that they were broadcasting revolutionary songs. They were singing



the Varshavyanka of Gleb Maksimilianovich Krzhizhanovsky.<sup>187</sup> When they had finished, the announcer said that he had written another poem (already in his old age) and placed it on the portrait that he had given to Ivan Semyonovich Kozlovsky.<sup>188</sup> Ivan Semyonovich had paid a visit to Gleb Maksimilianovich and received a photo with an inscription in verse as a memento. Kozlovsky sings a very triumphant cantata in commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution and at the end puts words by Gleb Maksimilianovich. They go something like: “Do you remember us, the long departed?”

JANUARY 8, 1980, TUESDAY

It's begun to freeze at night down to  $-28^{\circ}$  C. [ $-18^{\circ}$  F.]; inside the temperature has fallen to  $16^{\circ}$  C. [ $61^{\circ}$  F.]. Do I really have to go into town? I think of it with sadness. Anya Tarasova stayed with me for a week (from December 30 until January 4) and has gone home. She wasn't used to such cold. But I can stand it; only my leg hurts badly. I don't have the time to read the papers. . . .

JANUARY 10, 1980

I want to make a note of it so I don't forget. The January 6 issue of *Pravda* printed an essay “Mother” by Georgy Yakovlev, about Dusya Korolyova, who worked her whole life in the Rutchenkovo mine [in the Donbas] and who recently celebrated her hundredth birthday. That's life!

Today they showed on TV a celebration in honor of the Maly Theater<sup>189</sup> actor Annenkov on his eightieth birthday and the sixtieth anniversary of his starting work at the theater. He was greeted and embraced by Gogoleva,<sup>190</sup> who is already over eighty. A very talented actor—today's jubilee guest.

In the January 7 issue of *Pravda* I read an essay by Leonid Kudrevaty “The Heights Belong to the Eagles.” The author placed in his heading the words that Ivan Alekseyevich Likhachev addressed to his [automobile] factory in 1936 on the fulfillment ahead of schedule of the Second Five Year Plan. Fine words! And the essay enumerates the books that have been devoted to I. A. Likhachev: the novel *Rozhdennyi na rassvete* (Born at the Dawn) by Vasily Grishayev (from the Sovetsky Pisatel [Soviet Writer] Publishing House) and *Likhachev* by Tamara Leontyeva (in the series Lives of Remarkable People from the Molodaya Gvardiya [Young Guard] Publishing House). I'll read them with interest, if I can get hold of them.

JANUARY 16, 1980, WEDNESDAY

Kaisyn Kuliyeu<sup>191</sup> is reciting his verses at an evening gathering at Ostankino. I love him, a good poet. My leg hurts badly; I don't know how I'll get to

Moscow tomorrow. Nyura Pisareva says it's a pain from the wind that's blowing today. Hardly. This is the second day that it hurts.

On Friday Nina<sup>192</sup> from Kiev is coming to visit and Agrafena Georgiyevna, the nanny,<sup>193</sup> is being discharged from the hospital. The car will be needed to go there and back.<sup>194</sup>

Rada is already going for strolls on the street. I'd rather she came out of the hospital. . . .

JANUARY 26, 1980, SATURDAY

Yesterday we were informed that [British prime minister Margaret] Thatcher has not granted Romesh Chandra<sup>195</sup> entry into Britain, where he had planned to attend a gathering of peace activists. Reaction is growing insolent. . . .

In our country: Academician Sakharov has been deprived of all his decorations and titles (except that of academician) and, they say, exiled to Gorky for anti-Soviet activity.

The other day we were informed that Tito has had a leg amputated. I feel great sympathy for him.

Nina Tkach stayed with me for five days; on Wednesday she left. Probably that was the last time we'll see one another. That's how it struck me.

The Vanyushins again sent me a new year postcard: "With sadness we note how the latest newspapers and films make no mention of N. S.'s achievements in settling the virgin lands and liquidating the cult of personality." People still remember N. S. But the young generation will not know of him, I expect. . . .

JANUARY 28, 1980

We were informed today that Romesh Chandra was arrested in London. He was held in jail for eighteen days and then deported from Britain.

The cold has got worse. During the night the temperature inside the dacha fell to 12° C. [54° F.]. I don't feel like going into Moscow.

APRIL 12, 1980, SATURDAY

Today is Cosmonautics Day. The next pair are going into space tomorrow: Leonid Popov and Valery Ryumin. (Recently he returned after 175 days in space.) Today they showed them on TV and they greeted people on the occasion of Cosmonautics Day.

A lot of events have taken place in the last two months, but I never have time to write them down.

Rada has left the hospital but she isn't yet recovered; she's recuperating at home. She stayed with me for a little while, went home, today she came

again to see Yuliya [Sr.] N. Yuliya [Sr.] came at the end of March to consult with doctors in Moscow. At the start of the week she'll go into the hospital of the Institute of Gastroenterology for special observation. She's grown very thin, eats almost nothing (rice, boiled meat, and tea), feels sick.

Rada's sons have outdone themselves: Nikita successfully defended his graduate dissertation [in economics] at Moscow State University, while Alyosha entered a competition for young scholars in his field [biology] and won first prize.

Vanya and Nika are already taking their final exams. Vanya successfully completed military training [at the university] and received the rank of junior lieutenant. For half a day I felt proud of them.

Little Sergei is going to kindergarten, but at home . . .

Summer is over, but I didn't manage to warm myself up. The raspberry still hangs green and even blooms. Only now has the phlox come into bloom and sprouted buds. The remontant strawberry<sup>196</sup> is still flowering and bearing fruit (weakly, there is little heat). The birch tree is fast shedding its leaves.

A bad abscess has developed on the big finger of my right hand. I can do almost nothing. It's a good thing that Nika has gone to Trudovaya: he'll help his granddad plant currants and sea-buckthorn and I don't have to worry about feeding him. He went by train just before eight o'clock in the morning. So unlike him. (He arranged it with Lyalya Vlasenko the day before.)

Over the summer I got used to having company, so today I start thinking that no one needs me. . . . Perhaps that's how it is. . . .

The other day on my way to Moscow I passed through a new district. Everything was green—linden trees, bushes, grass, everything well tended. I recalled again that it was N. S. who improved this district.

OCTOBER 9, 1980, THURSDAY

Nyura [Anna] Pisareva has returned from visiting Yuliya [Sr.] N. in Kiev. She told me that Yuliya [Sr.] has not fully recovered. She eats everything, but the functioning of the intestines is unstable. Her mood is also unstable. It seems that she intends to come to Moscow later, when Viktor Petrovich has gone south to the sanatorium.

They announced on the radio that the cosmonauts are returning to earth tomorrow. They've already broken all records for staying in space.

I was struck by a note in today's issue of *Pravda* that in Cairo the police and state security broke into the premises of the editorial board of *Novoye Vremya* (New Times)<sup>197</sup> and took everything away, while the police put the

staff members and their families on a plane and sent them out of the country. This took place on the orders of the minister of internal affairs.

My leg hurts. Today I was hardly able to hobble over to get the milk and back, and that only thanks to my bag with wheels.

Galya is back from her “wild” trip<sup>198</sup> to Sochi. She’s pleased that she was able to bathe in the sea for two weeks at least, free of all cares. She said the train back was very bad.

Rada has spent two weeks’ leave at her dacha, but is not back to normal. There’s no way of improving her blood pressure of 150/100. That’s the result of the treatment of her allergy with prednizolon,<sup>199</sup> and the allergy was caused by the medicines she received in the hospital.

Seryozha told me on the phone that he’s off on a work trip to Dushanbe for a week. It seemed to me that he is glad to go.

And I don’t feel like anything, I don’t care about anything. I’m reluctant even to cook my meals.

NOVEMBER 20, 1980

Little Sergei has returned from the sanatorium, where he spent two months. He returned with a light cold, but at home he got very sick, and today Galya took him to the hospital suspecting asthma. The little guy is out of luck. . . .

On the way from the city, I looked at the roadsides—how the birch, maple, and fir trees have grown! When we arrived in Moscow in 1950, screens were placed along the roadsides for the winter to block possible snowdrifts. . . . Now a forest strip has grown up by the highway; probably mushrooms are picked there.

Nothing gets my right leg back to normal; now my hip has begun to hurt. I’ll have to go and live in the city in order to get some kind of treatment.

DECEMBER 13, 1980, SATURDAY

If I go on writing as rarely as I do now, the few pages that remain [in the notebook] will last me the rest of my life. During this interval, Brezhnev has flown to India and come back. The visit was prepared in advance at various levels (seminars, meetings, the press, radio, TV . . .). I was terrified for him. Would he withstand such a workload? Negotiations, lunches, meeting at the parliament, meeting with the leadership of the Communist Party, meeting with the Society for Indo-Soviet Friendship, and everywhere speeches. I don’t know how he was in the plane, but he was walking normally in the airports. True, a stout general held himself in readiness nearby.

During this interval, three cosmonauts went up into space on the new spacecraft Soyuz-III, worked on the Salyut-6 station, and returned to earth: Leonid Borisovich Kizim (commander), Oleg Grigoryevich Makarov (flight engineer, twice Hero of the Soviet Union), and Gennady Mikhailovich Strekalov (cosmonaut-researcher). The state decorations have already been announced, but the cosmonauts are still coming to themselves at Baikonur.<sup>200</sup> Today they showed them on TV planting little *karagach*<sup>201</sup> (in accordance with custom). They carried out work on the Salyut-6 station and tested the spacecraft Soyuz-III.

I caught a cold and have been sick for five days already. If the lungs aren't affected (cough), then I should get better. I didn't call the doctor; my temperature is normal, but I feel bad.

Olya's mother arrived from Dushanbe on December 1 and she's already leaving. She brought some enormous lemons (bigger than grapefruit) that had been grown by her husband Boris Mikhailovich. Their like has never been seen before.

Nika Junior is giving me a helping hand. Nikita Senior [Adzhubei] fell and hurt his foot: he's either strained or torn a muscle. And little Sergei hasn't got better. He went to kindergarten once and now he's staying home again; he even has a high temperature. How important it is to stay in bed, or at least at home, until you're really well, not to go out on the street.

No one is staying with me. Anya Tarasova is going to a sanatorium. Nika stayed over last Saturday; perhaps he'll come on Sunday, December 14. He and his mama are the only ones who help me in my disordered everyday life. I've had a very hard time the whole week. Seryozha has started to limp. Why? Hasn't Koch's rod come to life as a result of his present way of life?<sup>202</sup> Today he said that the tuberculosis specialist had found nothing.

In the evening I fell asleep in the armchair and dreamt that we were taking a drive in a dark blue car: N. S. and Sergei had left the car, little Sergei and I were standing alongside, and drops of water were shining on the bonnet. . . .

During this interval, the Polish government and party leadership have fallen. The country has been shaken by strikes; the economy is in disarray. It turns out that they took out loans amounting to \$20 billion from the United States and other countries and they have nothing to pay them back. They built factories, but no one needs their output, even Poland itself; the goods are not in demand and of poor quality. The dissidents obtained the support of the creditors and in 1976 managed to organize a real counterrevolution. There are appeals: "Without the Communists and without the Russians!"

The CIA had time and did its work well, but where were the eyes and ears of the Communists? The party and even the leadership were clogged up with people who alienated the population from the party. How it will all end is not yet clear. Brzezinski<sup>203</sup> is promising to give the dissidents weapons, and they've already received money from the American Federation of Labor and others in the United States.

DECEMBER 23, 1980, TUESDAY

Today Aleksei Nikolayevich Kosygin was buried in the wall on Red Square. The funeral was attended by Politburo members (not all of them), soldiers, and representatives of the working people. Brezhnev's conscience let him bury a member of the Central Committee and deputy of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin wall!<sup>204</sup> . . .

I remembered how N. S. was buried. A representative didn't even come from the party organization in which N. S. was registered. I expect Brezhnev's conscience is bothering him on account of that funeral. He looks in bad shape. How is he going to deliver the report at the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress?

This morning I had a bad pain in my head over the right eye. I thought that I was starting to go the same way as Kosygin. The noise inside my head never stops. I began to fear that if I have a stroke no one will find me: the neighbors don't drop in and the children are a long way away and busy with their own affairs. I might die in the same way as Marianna Georgiyevna (from Section 200):<sup>205</sup> the children went off to work, leaving their mother healthy, and when they returned in the evening she was lying dead in the corridor.

And my neighbor has gone off to a sanatorium.

Tamara Tamarina<sup>206</sup> called, she wept into the telephone receiver. Everyone is sorry for Kosygin.

December is coming to an end and I can't get better at all, I've got a cough. But I have to go out already.

JANUARY 4, 1981

What a bad time we're having: it gets dark early, it gets light late, now rain, now snow. . . . We had frosty days, then it grew warm. We met the new year under a hail of rain. I shook off my cold; I just hope I don't now catch the flu. My sleepiness is incredible. I sleep for half the day after breakfast, and in the evening I stay up until one or two A.M. I lie down to sleep, I don't read in bed, I sleep three or four hours, but then I lie for hours without sleep and only drop off toward the morning. I wonder whether this is really from old age?

Rada called Asya in Kiev and found out about Yuliya [Sr.]. She's in the hospital with heart and intestine trouble. Professor A. M. Markov thinks that her heart pain [angina] is connected with the inflammation in her intestines. Asya says that Yuliya is already feeling better, but she can't eat the hospital food; it has to be brought to her from home. And who does the cooking? Nina Vladimirovna?<sup>207</sup> Asya [Kolchinskaya]? What a hard old age. . . .

Nadya Dimanshtein called from the sanatorium with greetings from Anya T[arasova]. Anya is already coming back this week: that's how fast the period of the vacation voucher goes by!

JANUARY 8, 1981

Rada came down with the flu all the same and has a high temperature. She can't take medicines. Perhaps she'll go into the hospital?

Today I was at the polyclinic to see the general practitioner. Yesterday she took an ECG. There's little change and I don't feel very well. She advised me to wait a bit before taking physiotherapy.

In the vestibule I met V. G. Bezzubik. I asked him about his tachycardia.<sup>208</sup> He was not cured; he had had no attacks but he is in constant discomfort. He still works. He asked about everyone.

MARCH 23, 1981, MONDAY

For some reason I don't feel like writing, probably because I've greatly aged. I wanted to make a note of the news about the flight on March 12, 1981, of the cosmonauts Kovalyonok (commander) and V. P. Savinykh (flight engineer). They successfully crossed over into the space station, unloaded a spacecraft that had arrived earlier, and sent it back to earth, and did a lot of work inside the station. Now they're waiting for the Soyuz-39 to dock. Vladimir Al. Dzhaniybekov (commander) and Zhugdermidiin Gurrachcha, a cosmonaut-researcher from Mongolia, took off on it yesterday.

The night before yesterday I had a fright: I woke up because I had no air to breathe. I coughed for quite a long time. Candies with nitroglycerine and Validol suppressed the spasm. I thought that the next heart attack was coming or even worse. Today I slept it off and feel fine.

Yuliya [Sr.] N. is in the hospital. She's a little better, but there are no signs of recovery. Her intestines are lacking in digestive flora and nothing that she eats does her any good. Viktor Petrovich brings her food every day, and Asya [Kolchinskaya] and Galina Petrovna cook it. A real misfortune.

It's good that Rada has recovered and is working.

In February Nina Ivanovna [Korolyova] stayed with me, but it didn't go well—she came down with a cold. I sympathize with her family troubles,<sup>209</sup> but there's no way I can help.

Today real spring began. The temperature is 9° C. [48° F.] and tomorrow it will go up to 14° C. [57° F.]. It will all be melting at Zhukovka—full of snow.

MARCH 30, 1981

Dzhanibekov and Gurrachcha have made a successful landing. Kovalyonok and Savinykh are already in their fourth week in space.

I don't feel like working. There's a lot to do in the house, but I feel drawn to the settee to sleep. They give me camphor injections, but the breathlessness and the weight on my heart have not yet gone. I don't feel like departing from life in the spring. . . .

APRIL 8, 1981, WEDNESDAY

At long last I'm breathing more or less normally today. Tomorrow the course of camphor injections will end and if nothing happens tonight I plan to go to Moscow.

I watched a very good broadcast from the TV studio Orlyonok (Eaglet): the cosmonaut Yuri Malyshev met with tenth-grade students at a school that has a museum devoted to cosmonautics. In answer to questions, Malyshev talked about his childhood, his space flights, how cosmonauts are selected, and much else.

MAY 23, 1981, SATURDAY

Leonid Popov (commander) and Dumitru Prunariu (a Romanian) returned from space. They had a successful flight and worked on the station for a week with Kovalyonok and Savinykh. How pleasant that it all went well. The main pair are also getting ready to return to earth. They have returned.

DECEMBER 12, 1981

I don't feel like writing, I don't feel like talking with people, I don't feel like doing anything. On July 1 Yuliya Nikitychna died. On July 3 Ivan Semyonovich Senin died.<sup>210</sup> Rada and Nikita [Adzhubei], Sergei and Yuliya went to the funeral. Sergei and Yuliya returned right away; Rada and Nikita stayed in Kiev for three days. It turned out that Yuliya's small intestine wasn't working; that's why she grew so thin and couldn't put on weight despite all the efforts of the doctors and those around her. Viktor Petrovich is very depressed; he wants the urn buried in Moscow, not Kiev. How to do that no one yet knows.



SEPTEMBER 10, 1981, THURSDAY

Yuliya was buried in my mother's grave next to Lena. Rada pled in the Central Committee for permission; it turns out that that's how it has to be done. They are no longer conducting burials at the Novo-Devichy Cemetery and the Moscow Soviet has no control over the matter. And the cemetery is closed; a police officer stands on guard, but people get in somehow, and there are always fresh flowers on N. S.'s grave.

Tomorrow it will be ten years since N. S. died. We'll go to the cemetery. Rada should arrive from Kiev and call me.

The other day I read *The Autumn of the Patriarch* by Márquez.<sup>211</sup> How many horrors he described in the book! And how many old men he must have studied in order to describe this old Latin American dictator. . . .

OCTOBER 8, 1981

The International Congress of Women has opened in Prague. Brezhnev sent them a message of greeting.

On October 6, there was a military parade in Cairo. In the viewing stand were sitting President Anwar Sadat, military commanders, and foreigners. And suddenly, from a distance of twenty meters, came the fire of bazookas, a machinegun. Two officers and four soldiers were firing at the viewing stand. Eight people were killed and thirty-eight injured. Sadat died from his wounds. A state of emergency was declared in the country for a year. The United States moved its naval vessels into the region and brought its rapid reaction forces into battle readiness.

On October 10, Alyosha [Adzhubei, Jr., Rada's son] is going to the registry office and in the evening he is leaving for Leningrad. He doesn't want a wedding.

OCTOBER 28, 1981

Today Zina<sup>212</sup> arrived from Kiev. For the time being she's staying with Yuliya. Tomorrow I'll go to the polyclinic and I'll see her at Galina Mikhailovna's place.

My hands are shaking so much that I can't write. Yesterday I worked with my hands; today I didn't, but they shake all the same. Perhaps this is a stage on the way to a stroke?

Rada is in the hospital on account of her kidneys. Today is the third day.

JANUARY 10, 1982

Much time has passed, many events have taken place. Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov, Aleksandr Mikhailovich Markov, Polya Feldman,<sup>213</sup> and Arseny,

Marusya Pisareva's husband, have all died . . . and all at almost the same time. Sick people (including me) have recovered and are working or studying. Life goes on as it is supposed to.

And I increasingly feel that I should prepare myself more actively for the end. My neighbor scolds me for this.

Every night N. S., Yuliya [Sr.], and Lena appear in my dreams in the most varied circumstances. I'm still waiting impatiently for the spring, as though I'd never seen it before. But I don't feel like doing the housework, apathy. . . .

Rada's dacha has burnt down. Aleksei Ivanovich [Adzhubei] and she barely got out in time. Everything is in ashes. It happened during the night.

Sergei [Sr.] is busy building conveniences at his dacha. He doesn't visit me, he doesn't have the time.

Only Nika and Alyosha [Adzhubei, Jr.] give me a helping hand.

FEBRUARY 12, 1982, FRIDAY

I stayed in Moscow for two days; today I returned "home." In the apartment it's warm, but here it's cold, 15° C. [59° F.]. The radiators are barely warm.

I went to the polyclinic to take an ECG and from the office they took me to the cardiologist—multiple interruptions to the heartbeat. I made some kind of excuse.

And my head is in a muddle: yesterday I took my passport<sup>214</sup> out of my handbag but left my party card there. Today in the polyclinic I became agitated. Everything is changing for the worse.

MARCH 17, 1982

At the Seventeenth Congress of Trade Unions Brezhnev was awarded the gold medal of the World Federation of Trade Unions. It was presented by Gaszpar, chairman of the Hungarian Association of Trade Unions and deputy chairman of the WFTU.

Kamanin,<sup>215</sup> one of the first Heroes of the Soviet Union, has died. I read about it in the correspondence of his fellow student and pilot V. Kokkinaki.

MAY 17, 1982, MONDAY

I want to note down that cosmonauts are in space again. On May 13 at 13.58 hours, the Soyuz T-5 took off into space with the crew: commander Anatoly Nikolayevich Berezovoi and flight engineer Hero of the Soviet Union pilot-cosmonaut Valentin Vitalyevich Lebedev. Their mission—to dock with the space station Salyut-7—was accomplished on the second day and now they are working on the space station. They will be appearing on TV.

Tomorrow, May 18, the Nineteenth Congress of the Young Communist League opens.

I'm being reduced to nothing: I can hardly walk, my legs won't let me, I can hardly write, my hands won't let me. I'm hardly ever in the apartment: it's hard to climb up and down the stairs. I don't have the strength to tend my raspberries and strawberries. This is the first time that it's been this way in the springtime.

On the road to Moscow I once more admire the larches, lindens, and horse chestnut trees planted on N. S.'s initiative.

More and more often I pay attention to TV broadcasts showing past performances of people who have departed from this life. Last night Bernes<sup>216</sup> sang.

JULY 1, 1982

Anatoly Berezovoi, Valentin Lebedev, Vladimir Dzenibekov, Aleksandr Ivanchenkov, and Jean-Louis Chrétien have already been in space for a week. I wish them a good flight and a good landing.

JULY 2, 1982

Dzenibekov, Ivanchenkov, and Jean-Louis Chrétien landed in the target area at 18.25 hours.

AUGUST 20, 1982

Berezovoi and Lebedev have been working in space for three months. On August 19, the spacecraft Soyuz T-7 was sent up to them with the crew: L. I. Popov (commander), A. A. Serebrov, and Svetlana Ye. Savitskaya.

AUGUST 27, 1982

Today the three cosmonauts made a successful landing.

DECEMBER 10, 1982

Berezovoi and Lebedev have landed. They spent 211 days in space, longer than anyone else. They are being praised for the work they have accomplished.

I haven't yet written that Brezhnev died at the beginning of November. He was buried in a grave on Red Square.<sup>217</sup> A district in Moscow and a lot of enterprises have been named in his honor.

A short time later, Georgadze,<sup>218</sup> a secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and former secretary of the Tbilisi city committee of the party, died. He was buried in the Novo-Devichy Cemetery. Both of them died suddenly as they were getting ready to go to work.

Yu. V. Andropov<sup>219</sup> has been elected general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Pilipenko called. He had gone to the Donbas for the holidays, limped around a lot, and made speeches there. Then he went with [his wife] Yuliya to the sanatorium, but came home limping as badly as before he went. Now he is worse, not better, as a result of the treatments. I'm pondering this carefully: I think that going into the hospital won't help me, it isn't worth it.

DECEMBER 12, 1982

Rada, Nikita S[ergeyevich], and Zina (from Kiev) came round, followed in the middle of the day by Aleksei Ivanovich (the father of Alyosha [Adzhubei]'s wife Sveta) and A. I. Adzhubei. The lunch was magnificent. Rada brought ready-cooked dishes after receiving guests on Friday: they covered the tablecloth. Rada did it all herself.

Seryozha [Sr.] doesn't visit me; he's busy with his dacha. He's been going to the dacha by himself since the summer. What's it for?

Svetlana is off on a work trip to East Germany for six months. Alyosha [Adzhubei] plans to join her there for the new year.

NOVEMBER 15, 1983, TUESDAY

Today is the fiftieth anniversary of the trolley bus. From two vehicles to two thousand—such is the result of development. I make a note of it because I remember what N. S. went through when the issue of producing trolley buses was being decided. He had to overcome resistance. . . .

FEBRUARY 10, 1984

On February 8, three people were launched into space on board the spacecraft Soyuz T-10 and they have already docked with the orbital space station Salyut-7:

Leonid Denisovich Kizim—commander of the spacecraft.

Vladimir Alekseyevich Solovyov—flight engineer.

Oleg Yuryevich Atkov—physician.

On the flight the crew are to carry out scientific-technological and medical-biological investigations and experiments.

This is Mama's last diary entry. Her hands were starting to shake badly. The angular handwriting that bore witness to the firmness of her character began

to go to pieces, the letters painfully dragged out by an unsure hand. Writing had become physically difficult for her, almost impossible.

Besides the diary, at the end of the notebook Mama had copied out passages from her reading that pleased her. I reproduce some of them. [SK]

APRIL 26, 1979

From a letter from Pasha Gushchina (Leningrad)

Victory Day! What a marvelous day! We looked forward to it so much, greater joy I have never experienced. People often ask the question—why did Leningrad hold out? Answers vary—it can't be answered in a few words. We didn't have such questions, they were unnatural for us.

1943. The [party] city committee sent us, a few people, to the army where our home guards<sup>220</sup> were, in the Sinyavsky Marshes.<sup>221</sup> We managed to get there with difficulty. We had to carry out the corresponding work (preparation for a breakthrough). We told them about everything. We did our duty and swayed them. While we were with them, they captured a “tongue.” He was a skier from the mountain “Blue Division.” A very propagandized German,<sup>222</sup> he looked at us as though we were apparitions from a “dead city.” They were convinced that the city was dead and that there was no way it could escape from their clutches. They strewed us with leaflets—now gentle in tone, now abusive. In the sky they reigned supreme. As they watched us from the Voronya Hills,<sup>223</sup> it seemed to them that we lay on the palm of their hand. Today they destroyed a building, and tomorrow a plywood structure was already standing—what great guys! They were home guards, they didn't know what heroes they were. We did everything in silence; there was such discipline that I had never come across in my whole life. And the fascists were afraid of our city; after [the battle at] Luga<sup>224</sup> they understood that if we perished they would, too. And so it would have been. Our Dubrovka on the Neva<sup>225</sup> proved it. I'm always joyful on Victory Day. It's my joy that made me reminisce. Like an old soldier I have medals; they too are a trace of my involvement. . . .

#### *Miscellaneous Thoughts*

On power: It's a terrible thing when power goes to your head. For power is stronger than alcohol. After getting drunk, you sleep it off and that's it. But the intoxication of power grows like a snowball rolling down the mountain.

Reflections of the collective farmer Kurvits about the collective farm chairman in *Kaplya dozhdy* (A Drop of Rain) by the Estonian writer Paul Kuusberg<sup>226</sup>

✱

The joy of vision is the joy of life.

Praise deadens common sense.

Konstantin Simonov, *My ne uvidimsya s toboi* ("We Won't Meet Again"), *Roman-Gazeta*, 1978, no. 17, p. 85. [*Roman-Gazeta* was a magazine that printed novels in installments.]

\*

Love removed from children is not real love. Not living love. For what kind of life is this without children?!

Vil Lipatov, *Zhizn Vanyushki Murzina* (The Life of Vanyushka Murzin), *Znamya*, 1976, no. 9, p. 79

\*

If you've never taken a risk, it means you haven't lived but only existed.

—Robert Rozhdestvensky

\*

The water has gone—the sand remains. Love has gone—the home is empty.

—From a film play

\*

—On death: It isn't true, a friend doesn't die, he's just no longer next to you.

—In life . . . what is most obvious is the irreparability of death.

—When someone's life has been part of your life, if this is really so without exaggeration, then that person's death is also part of your death. You are still alive, but something in you has already died and will not return to life. You can only keep up the appearance that you are whole as before. Because a piece of the soul that has been torn away is not an arm and not a leg, and no one can see that it's been torn away.

—Konstantin Simonov, *My ne uvidimsya s toboi* (We Won't Meet Again)

FEBRUARY 9, 1980

While the idea exists everything is tolerable. Thanks to the idea deprivation has meaning. . . .

If generosity is inactive a person has nothing within him.

What else, besides work, can justify a person's life?

Work for Losev<sup>227</sup> was the measure of human worth. Man is, first of all, a working being. He who does not work does not think; without labor man rots. Losev was convinced that labor cures, teaches, compels thought, and makes man better. There will come a time when people will be punished by depriving them of work, by sentencing them to do nothing.

The ancient Chinese thought that reverence appears after the loss of justice.  
In old age fate is merely the history of our stupidities.  
The greatest misfortune is the inability to bear misfortune.

—Daniil Granin,<sup>228</sup> *Kartina* (The Picture)

APRIL 19, 1980

We must meet each day as a good friend.

—Rasul Gamzatov<sup>229</sup>

JUNE 23, 1980

One must not blindly worship and deify authorities. That is the Middle Ages, slavery. Marx mercilessly ridiculed everyone who tried to turn him into a cult. He was organically incapable of tolerating that. He called it slavery in the consciousness.

—Words of Engels in the book *Prolog* (Prologue) by  
[Ukrainian writer] Mikola Oleinik

The bark of the pine tree is merry. Even on a cloudy day it shines, as though it had absorbed the sun at one time and for the rest of its life was giving it back out to the surrounding world.

—A Baltic writer

AUGUST 5, 1980

One must hurry to do good, for otherwise it may remain without a beneficiary.

—A. Aleksin,<sup>230</sup> *V tylu kak v tylu* (On the Home Front,  
Things Are As They Are)

SEPTEMBER 3, 1980

People have to be loved while they are alive. You can never tell whether you'll meet tomorrow the one you see today.

—Vardges Petrosyan

SEPTEMBER 19, 1980

Drunkness is 100 percent egoism and degradation of the personality.

—From a radio broadcast

I wish your house:  
If land, let it be fertile,  
If news, let it be good,

If a tree, let it bear fruit,  
 If rain, let it rain hard,  
 If a daughter, let her be beautiful,  
 If a flower, let it smell sweet,  
 If a son, let him be strong,  
 If a friend, let him be the best of friends.  
 —Fazu Aliyeva<sup>231</sup>

NOVEMBER 9, 1980

It must be that whoever said that living a life is not like crossing a field never had to cross a minefield.

—Maksim Tank<sup>232</sup> (*Literary Gazette*, November 5, 1980, no. 55)

DECEMBER 14, 1980

I love my fatherland, I sing to my fatherland—the hope of humanity and the glory of humanity.

—Aleksandr Andreyevich Prokofyev<sup>233</sup>

JANUARY 17, 1981

Man cannot escape the lure of friendship. . . . Without friends it's possible to exist, but not to live life to the full and be happy."

—Nikolai Gribachev<sup>234</sup>

FEBRUARY 19, 1981

He who wants to do something looks for opportunities. He who doesn't looks for a reason.

—Robert Rozhdestvensky, TV broadcast

#### Meetings

A great word—labor. In it resounds man's eternal fight for life. This word encompasses all man's concepts, all the movements of his reason.

And hence—to labor. This is serious, this is vitally necessary and important. You can work without rolling up your sleeves, but you can't labor without doing so. Because any casual attitude to what you are doing is an insult to labor, and it doesn't tolerate insults and punishes you for them.

Inextricably connected with labor are expertise, patience, effort, honesty—serious words that don't tolerate disrespect or a light-hearted attitude.

—Feodosy Vidrascu (Moldavian writer), *Novyi Mir*, 1981, no. 1, p. 185



A mother stays alive so long as the fire she has lighted in her sons' souls has not been extinguished.

—Rasul Gamzatov, *Ostrov zhenshchin* (Island of Women)

A smile does not need itself. A smile is meant for other people, so that with you they should feel good, joyful, and at ease.

—Vladimir Soloukhin<sup>235</sup>

APRIL 22, 1981

Party work is, first of all, uninterrupted live creativity, a feeling for the tendencies of life, an unreserved natural striving to support the most active and the most progressive, to catch it while it is still in its embryo or—even better—just a premonition. Such is the nature of all true revolutionaries in science, in art, and in the social struggle. (from a letter of Petrov to Bryukhanov)

—Pyotr Proskurin,<sup>236</sup> *Imya tvoyo* (Your Name),  
*Roman-Gazeta* 1978, no. 13, p. 26

AUGUST 10, 1981

Death is a whirlwind that acts like lightning.

—Yuri Trifonov,<sup>237</sup> “*Oprokinuty dom*” (The Toppled House),  
*Novyi Mir*, 1981, no. 7

AUGUST 23, 1981

If you sowed life's field with good,  
Your old age will be full of warmth.  
If you lived as a soldier and were of pure intent,  
Your autumnal decline will be pure and radiant.

—V. Nozdryov, “*Kto Rossii sluzhit*” (Whoever Serves Russia),  
*Vechernyaya Moskva*, August 22, 1981

AUGUST 25, 1981, TUESDAY

For sloth is mother to all: he who knows how will forget and he who doesn't know how won't learn. (From the instruction of Vladimir Monomakh<sup>238</sup> to his children)

—Dmitry Zhukov, “Vladimir Ivanovich,” *Roman-Gazeta*, 1981, no. 14  
Pity makes him whom you pity into an egoist, beloved of himself. For accustomed to take, he refuses to give. (p. 87)

Life can never be over so long as humanity breathes the air. (p. 118)

—Nikolai Yevdokimov,<sup>239</sup> “*Obida*” (Offense), *Znamya*, 1981, no. 4

SEPTEMBER 8, 1981

There is no punishment more humiliating to a person and at the same time more just than betrayal of his own essence, the decrepitude of his own body and memory. (p. 259)

The thirst for power produces only an unquenchable thirst for power. . . . To be satiated with power is impossible not only up to the end of our world but up to the end of all other worlds. (p. 268)

—Gabriel García Márquez, *The Autumn of the Patriarch*

SEPTEMBER 10, 1981

The steppe, like the ocean, gives a feeling of limitlessness. . . . Here we feel the planet. (p. 30)

War is the same arrogance, the same unconstrained egoism, the same love of power, the same furious striving, come what may, to suppress and trample down whoever disagrees with me. (p. 28)

—Oles Gonchar,<sup>240</sup> “*Tvoja zarya*” (Your Dawn), *Roman-Gazeta*, 1981, no. 16

SEPTEMBER 20, 1981

The deed is the mirror of a person’s conduct. It encapsulates his thoughts, feelings, dreams. . . .

Time makes of us old people needed by no one. . . .

Joy as a song is sung. Bitterness does not reach people.

—Oleg Shestinsky,<sup>241</sup> “*U derevyannogo doma*” (By the Wooden House), *Vechernyaya Moskva*, September 19, 1981

SEPTEMBER 26, 1981, SATURDAY

Servitude begins with the forcible narrowing of the space within which a person has the right to move. . . . The greater the degree of servitude, the smaller the space within which you are allowed to move.

—Lev Ginzburg,<sup>242</sup> “*Razbilos lish serdtse moyo*” (It’s Only My Heart That Broke), *Novyi Mir*, 1981, no. 8, p. 94

OCTOBER 6, 1981, TUESDAY

Suffering, alas, retreats before the empty desire to acquire things.

—Pimen Panchenko,<sup>243</sup> *Literary Gazette*, September 30, 1981

OCTOBER 7, 1981

At this age (seventy years) the public figure and writer are only just coming into their own. A politician at forty becomes a statesman at seventy. It is

precisely at this age, when he is too old to be a clerk or a gardener, . . . that he matures for state leadership. . . . No one who has frequented political circles could fail to notice that, judging by results, governing a country does not require special mental abilities . . . (p. 106)

A writer's productivity must be such that if he cannot hold the reader's interest with quality then he can stun him with quantity. (p. 107)

This world would be good for nothing if there were nothing to laugh at. (p. 124)

If a man and a woman . . . acquire one another, then they have fulfilled their biological function. (p. 201)

We grownups do not even suspect how mercilessly and at the same time how accurately children judge us. (p. 223)

—Somerset Maugham,<sup>244</sup> *Pirogi i pivo, ili skelet v shkafu*  
[Pies and Beer, Or the Skeleton in the Cupboard]  
(Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura)

OCTOBER 9, 1981

If you, man, depart so without trace, then what do you live for?

—From a song

NOVEMBER 3, 1981

Life has slipped by like a shadow in the mirror.

—Mushketik<sup>245</sup>

The revolution perishes from lack of vigilance, for all kinds of foulness cling to the light.

—Aleksandr Shuplov, *Znamya*, 1980, no. 9

DECEMBER 23, 1981

It seems that now, with the ebbing of the years,  
The light grows dearer to me than boundless life.

—Gleb Korbovsky (Leningrad)  
*Literary Gazette*, December 16, 1981

JANUARY 10, 1982

Old age and loneliness are inseparable.

MARCH 23, 1982

The splendid cannot but be good.

—Federico Fellini,<sup>246</sup> *Literary Gazette*, March 17, 1982

NOVEMBER 5, 1982

Life is like a matchbox: the further you go, the greater the number of burnt-out matches.

An old person is an overripe apricot: if it doesn't fall today, it'll fall tomorrow.

—Vardges Petrosyan

DECEMBER 25, 1982

To lose wealth is to lose little; to lose honor is to lose a lot; to lose courage is to lose all.

—Goethe

APRIL 4, 1983

Old age is perhaps the final and irreversible departure into loneliness. Or, at least, the habit for it. Even more precisely, the need for it. No doubt this makes it easier for us to prepare for the loneliness of death, to get used to the idea of it.

—Yuliu Ellis, *Novyi Mir*, 1983, no. 5, p. 181

—Nina Petrovna Khrushcheva

1. The first part of this document was translated by Shirley Benson. The second part (from the place indicated by note 19 below) was translated by Stephen Shenfield.

2. The *gmina* was equivalent to the *volost*, the smallest administrative district in tsarist Russia. The Kingdom of Poland was the official name for the part of Poland that belonged to the Russian empire after Poland was partitioned by Prussia, Austria, and Russia. [SK/GS]

3. A *morg* was equivalent to about a quarter of a hectare. [SK]

4. Followers of the Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera, who led a rebellion against Soviet rule in western Ukraine in the second half of the 1940s. [SK/SS]

5. The events described in this paragraph occurred during the war with Poland, which attempted to wrest central Ukraine from the

Bolsheviks in April and May of 1920. The Red Army counterattacked, reconquered Ukraine, and approached Warsaw in August, only to be beaten back by the Poles, leading to the evacuation from Poland, to which western Ukraine then belonged, mentioned here by Mama. [SK]

6. The purges to which Nina Petrovna here refers were conducted periodically after the revolution to rid the party of careerists, thieves, and other scoundrels who had joined the ruling party to improve their positions and material wellbeing. (At this time, in contrast to the Stalin purges of the 1930s, those purged from the party were generally not arrested, imprisoned, or executed.) To get through a purge without being thrown out of the party was like a confirmation of your honesty, so she was proud that she had met the test. However, the purges had little effect, for the positions held by those purged were soon filled by even worse

scoundrels. In 1939 the Eighteenth Party Congress recognized that carrying out purges was pointless. [SK]

7. This refers to the state seizures of grain from the peasants under “war communism” in 1918–21. The party abandoned this system at its Tenth Congress in March 1921, replacing it with the New Economic Policy (NEP), under which small-scale private enterprise and market exchange were permitted. [SK]

8. Georgy Leonidovich Pyatakov was indeed a “Trotskyite”—that is, a supporter of Leon Trotsky—during the factional struggles of 1920–27. He was expelled from the party when Stalin triumphed over the “united opposition” of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev in 1927. But his membership was restored when he supported Stalin’s rapid industrialization drive in 1928, and he went on to hold leading economic posts during the first five-year plan. Pyatakov was the principal defendant in the first show trial of 1937, which ushered in Stalin’s Great Terror, and was subsequently executed. By that time, the party leadership under Stalin had succeeded in distorting Trotsky’s role in the revolution and his actual views, and the designation “Trotskyite” had become an official term of abuse that bore no relation to a person’s real beliefs or activities. [SK]

9. Khrushchev was married for the first time in 1914, to Yefrosinya Ivanovna Pisareva, who was from a worker’s family. They had met three years earlier. Her father had taught young Nikita the difficult craft of metalworking. Yefrosinya Ivanovna had two children: a daughter Yuliya in 1916 and a son Leonid one year later. In 1918, to save his family from the German army, which was occupying Ukraine in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Khrushchev left the Uspenskaya mine in the Donbas and moved his family to his native village of Kalinovka, in Kursk province on Russian territory.

Khrushchev left Kalinovka for the Civil War front. Soon, at the beginning of 1919, Yefrosinya Ivanovna fell gravely ill with typhus. During this period millions died of typhus. Khrushchev, who was fighting on the Southern Front, not very far away, received permission to visit his sick wife, but he did not arrive in time. Yefrosinya had died.

Khrushchev returned to the front right after the funeral. The children—Yuliya, two and a half, and Leonid, eight months—were left with his parents. When the Civil War ended, Khrushchev returned to the Donbas and was soon joined by his parents and the children. [SK]

10. Here and below, “N. S.” refers to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev’s first name and patronymic.

11. The chronology of Khrushchev’s life that Nina Petrovna provides at this point has been omitted. See “A Short Biography” in the Appendixes to Volume 1 of the memoirs. [SK]

12. Literally “Stone Bridge”: it was the first of Moscow’s bridges to be made of stone instead of wood. It crosses the Moscow River near the Kremlin. [SS]

13. Khrushchev was worried that Grandmother Kseniya might say politically risky things and that someone would inform the authorities. Grandmother was unable to adapt to city life and refused to change her village habits. In the village she was used to sitting outside on a *zavalinka* [mound of earth near a peasant home] and spending hours chatting with neighbors, and she continued doing this in Moscow. [SK]

14. Sergei had tuberculosis of the right hip, a form of tuberculosis of the bones and joints, which was a classic childhood disease of the pre-antibiotic era. Treatment by means of prolonged immobilization of the affected parts of the body in a metal splint was first introduced by the Welsh physician Hugh Owen Thomas (1834–91). In the early twentieth century splints were replaced for this purpose by “often immense and elaborate plaster of Paris casts” (Thomas Dormandy, *The White Death: A History of Tuberculosis* [New York: New York University Press, 2000], 23–24, 262). [SS]

15. Actually the dacha was built not for Vyacheslav Molotov but for his predecessor in the Council of People’s Commissars, Aleksei Ivanovich Rykov. Khrushchev lived at this dacha, which was listed in the KGB registry as No. 9, beginning in 1958, when he became chairman of the Council of Ministers. Later it was the residence of Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, the next-to-last head of government of the Soviet Union. The dacha, renamed “Gorky-9,” is now the country residence of the Russian president. [SK]

16. Malenkov’s wife and director of the Moscow Electric Power Institute, an institution of higher education for engineers. [SK]

17. “People’s commissar” was the term used at that time for “minister.” Later Stalin revived the use of “minister.” Thus the Council of People’s Commissars was the predecessor of the Council of Ministers. [SK]

18. Valerian Vladimirovich Kuibyshev, a top economic official under Stalin, died of natural causes in 1935. [SK]

19. An industrial enterprise could conclude a patronage agreement with a state or collective farm. This was a mutually beneficial arrangement. The enterprise would provide the farm with extra labor for sowing, harvesting, and construction as well as other assistance—in this instance, the use of its political influence. In exchange, the farm would provide extra food for the enterprise workforce. See Elena Osokina, *Our Daily Bread: Socialist Distribution and the Art of Survival in Stalin’s Russia* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), 108–9. [SS]

20. *How the Steel Was Tempered* (1934), the best-known work of the novelist Nikolai Alekseyevich

Ostrovsky, was a classic of the “socialist realist” school. It is a semi-autobiographical yarn of a young tough who is eventually transformed into a selfless Communist who triumphs over impossible odds only to die of a terminal illness. [SK]

21. Here the chronological sequence of the notes is broken off. The notes become rather fragmentary. Nina Petrovna comments briefly on Khrushchev’s illness in 1947, then on the family’s life in Moscow after they returned from Kiev in 1949. Then she sets out notes about each of the children. [SS]

22. In fact, more than two professors came to give consultations. I remember Professors Vovsi and Gubergrits, medical luminaries of the time, emerging from Father’s bedroom. Doubting that he would pull through, they just shook their heads in distress. Neither oxygen nor the newly popular penicillin brought any relief. I can still remember Father’s motionless gray face on the pillows, the hoarse whistle of his breathing, and his uncomprehending look. But he had a strong constitution and eventually recovered.

Professor Miron Semyonovich (Moisei Solomonovich) Vovsi (1897–1960) was a general physician and a specialist in kidney disease and the circulatory system. He was chief physician of the Soviet Army, with the rank of lieutenant general. He was arrested in the “doctors’ affair” and rehabilitated after Stalin’s death. He was the brother of the famous actor Solomon Mikhoels.

Professor Gubergrits was a general physician. He lived and worked in Kiev. He was very well known as a doctor even in pre-revolutionary times. He was a very good and kind person.]

The translation from this point onward is by Stephen Shenfield. [SK]

23. Granovsky Street was between Herzen Street (Bolshaya Nikitskaya) and Kalinin Street (Vozdvizhenka Street), not far from the Kremlin. It is now called Romanov Alley. [SK]

24. Ogaryovo is to the west of Moscow. [SK]

25. Adzhubei was Rada’s husband. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* was the newspaper of the Young Communist League, *Izvestia* the newspaper of the government. [SS]

26. I married Galina Mikhailovna Shumova (born 1934) on June 1, 1957, and graduated in February 1958. Galina became an electrical engineer in the field of missile and spacecraft guidance systems. [SK]

27. Secret military enterprises were known as “post office boxes” (*yashchiki*) because mail could be sent to people working there only through post office box addresses. [SS]

28. Viktor Viktorovich Yevreinov, Doctor of Sciences, was a scientific researcher at the Institute of Physical Chemistry of the USSR Academy of Sciences. [SK]

29. *Lupus vulgaris*, “the common wolf,” is tuberculosis of the skin. The Russian term here literally

means “red lupus,” presumably because the pink or brown nodules that appear on the victim’s skin are supposed to resemble red currant jelly when pressed down with a glass slide (Dormandy, *The White Death*, 23). [SS]

30. A pneumothorax is a surgical procedure for the treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis that was introduced by the Italian physician Carlo Forlanini (1847–1920). The infected lung (or the infected parts of one or both lungs) is collapsed, usually by injecting air or other gas into the pleural cavity, in order to facilitate healing of tuberculous ulcers and halt further spread of the infection (Dormandy, *The White Death*, 249–63).

Alma-Ata was the capital of the Kazakh SSR. It is now named Almaty. It is situated in southeast Kazakhstan. [SS]

31. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bogomolets (1881–1946) was a pathologist and one of the founders of the science of gerontology. He was an institute director and a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and of the Academies of Sciences of Ukraine and of Belorussia. From 1930 to 1946 he was president of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. [SK]

32. Yulochka is a diminutive for Yuliya. Its use here helps to distinguish this Yuliya (Yuliya, Jr.) from the other Yuliya (Yuliya, Sr.) mentioned previously. [SS]

33. Nikolai Petrovich Shmelyov (born 1936) is an economist. Later he was to work at the CPSU Central Committee. He became a Doctor of Economic Sciences and a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Currently he is director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also an author of historical novels. [SK]

34. Lev Sergeyevich Petrov (1922–70) was a correspondent of the Novosti Press Agency in Canada and an officer of the Main Intelligence Administration of the General Staff (GRU). Later he worked at the Novosti Press Agency in Moscow. He was an international-affairs journalist and a specialist on the English-speaking countries. He was the husband of Yuliya [Jr.] and father of Nina and Ksana. [SK]

35. Vladimir Grigoryevich Bezzubik was Khrushchev’s personal physician. From the 1950s he was also the chief doctor of the Kremlin Hospital (under the Fourth Administration of the Ministry of Health, which served the political elite) on Kalinin Street (Vozdvizhenka Street). [SS]

36. The Volga was the standard Soviet model of medium-sized car. [SS]

37. John Galsworthy (1867–1933) was an English novelist and playwright, best known for his *Forsyte Saga*. *End of the Chapter* is a collection of three of his last novels that was published posthumously in 1934. [SS]

38. Promedol is an analgesic. [SS]

39. Anna Grigoryevna Dyshkant (born 1920) was a cook. She worked for Khrushchev for many years, beginning in 1948. [SK]

40. Ivan Alekseyevich Likhachev (1896–1956) was a leading manager and official in the Soviet automobile industry. See Biographies. [SS]

41. Literally, greenifiers (*ozeleniteli*)—that is, those responsible for planting gardens, trees, and other greenery. [SS]

42. Kuntsevo is a Moscow suburb. It is situated to the west of the city center. [SK]

43. “Cupping” was an archaic medical procedure by means of which deep-seated infections were supposedly “drawn out.” Using a specially designed pointed scalpel, a small incision was made in the skin over the suspected site. Then a preheated glass cup with slightly rough edges was applied to the area. As the air trapped between the cup and the skin cooled and contracted, the reduced air pressure caused blood, tissue fluid, and sometimes pus to ooze out through the incision. Russian physicians continued to cup long after the practice was abandoned in the West (Dormandy, *The White Death*, 44). A milder form of cupping, without breaking the skin, is used in traditional Chinese medicine. [SS]

44. Leonid Romanovich Abramov was an anesthesiologist at the hospital. He had assisted Khrushchev at the time of his first heart attack in summer 1970. N. S. had given him one of his shotguns. [SK]

45. Pavel Yevgenyevich Lukomsky (1899–1974) was a member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences. He was a general physician and a cardiologist. [SK]

46. Dmitry Zakharovich Manuilsky was a former leading official of the Comintern. He collected anecdotes. See Biographies. [SS]

47. This was in 1964, following Khrushchev’s removal from power. [SK]

48. At this point Nina Petrovna remembers that the name by which the second Central Committee official introduced himself was Bogolyubov. However, she does not realize that this was not his real name, which was Avetisyan. He gave the name of his boss, Klavdy Mikhailovich Bogolyubov, who was at that time head of the General [that is, Secret] Department of the Central Committee. Bogolyubov himself did not come to the dacha. [SK]

49. Osip Emilyevich Mandelstam began writing poetry in 1908. He belonged to the literary movement known as Acmeism. He was arrested, after reciting to friends a hostile poem that he had written about Stalin, and perished in a camp, probably in late 1938. For a bilingual Russian-English edition of a selection of his poems prepared by David McDuff, see *Osip Mandelstam: Selected Poems* (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1983). [SS]

Lev Andreyevich Artsimovich (1909–73) was a prominent nuclear physicist. He made fundamental contributions to the physics of plasmas and the study of controlled thermonuclear reactions and also worked on the atomic and hydrogen bombs. He became a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1953 and secretary of its Division of General Physics and Astronomy in 1957. He and his wife lived in a dacha near the Khrushchevs at Zhukovka and used to come to visit. [SK]

50. The famous Russian poet and writer Alexander Pushkin (1799–1837) had difficult relations with the tsarist government and high society. He was killed in a duel. “As Pushkin lay dying, and after his death, . . . thousands of people of social levels [except court circles] came to Pushkin’s apartment to express sympathy and to mourn. The government obviously feared a political demonstration. To prevent public display, the funeral was shifted from St. Isaac’s Cathedral to the small Royal Stables Church, with admission by ticket only to members of the court and diplomatic society. And then his body was sent away, in secret and at midnight. He was buried beside his mother at dawn on February 6, 1837, at Svyatye Gory Monastery, near Mikhaylovskoe” (<http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/lss/staff/stephy/Bio.html>).

51. Nadya [Nadezhda Gilyevna] Dimanshtein was a veteran party member and an old friend of Khrushchev’s who had worked with him in the Donbas in the 1920s. [SK]

52. Vadim Nikolayevich Vasilyev (born 1934) was an engineer. He graduated from the Electric Power Institute together with Sergei Khrushchev, and works in Moscow at a missile-design bureau. His father fell victim to the Stalin-era repression and perished in the GULAG. [SK]

53. Zinaida Sergeevna Gruzdeva used to work with Nina Petrovna at the Elektroavod (Electrical Equipment Factory) in the 1930s. [SK]

54. Veljko Micunovic recounts his experiences with Khrushchev in his book *Moscow Diary* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1980). [SK]

55. Khrushchev met with Svyatoslav Nikolayevich Roerich on many occasions. [SK] See also the chapter on Khrushchev’s visit to India in Volume 3 (forthcoming) of the present edition of his memoirs. [GS]

56. In 1967, Lucy Jarvis made a documentary film about Khrushchev. Her inclusion of shots taken at Petrovo-Dalneye led to a scandal in the USSR. (See Sergei Khrushchev, *Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the Man and his Era* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990). [SK]

57. Roswell Garst visited the USSR and met with Khrushchev a number of times from 1955 onward. Khrushchev visited his farm in Iowa during his trip to the United States in 1959. See the chapter entitled “From New York to Iowa” in Volume 3 (forthcoming) of the present edition of the Khrushchev



memoirs, as well as Harold Lee, *Roswell Garst: A Biography* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1984).

58. Nina Ivanovna Korolyova was the widow of the prominent missile designer Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov. [SK]

59. Polya was Polina Tikhonovna Feldman, widow of a Moscow party official who had worked with Khrushchev in the 1930s and was later a victim of the Stalin-era repression. [SK]

60. Konstantin Mikhailovich Simonov (1915–79) was a very prominent Soviet novelist, poet, and playwright. At various times he was chief editor of the literary magazines *Znamya* (Banner) and *Novyi Mir* (New World) and of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Literary Gazette). He was awarded the Lenin Prize in 1974. From 1946 he was deputy general secretary of the Soviet Writers' Union. He also occupied various party and state positions: in 1952–56 he was a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and from 1964 was a member of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Cinematography. He was best known for his writing about the war, which he witnessed as military correspondent for the armed forces newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) in 1941–44. See Biographies. [SS]

61. Mikola (Nikolai Platonovich) Bazhan (1903–83) was a Ukrainian poet and (from 1951) a member of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and a secretary of the governing board of the Soviet Writers' Union. He was awarded the Lenin Prize in 1982. He was an old friend of the Khrushchevs. [SK]

62. Gavriil Pilipenko was an old friend of Khrushchev's from the Donbas. Their acquaintanceship went back to pre-revolutionary times. [SK]

63. Nina Petrovna appears to think that Saragossa is in Italy. In fact it is in Spain. [SS]

64. It was a bouquet of very beautiful artificial roses that Nina Petrovna had once been given by some visitors from Germany (before 1964). By late November it was too cold to lay down real flowers; they would have frozen. [SK]

65. Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

66. Khrushchev was staying at the government resort on the Pitsunda peninsula in Abkhazia. [SK]

67. The reference is to the Department of Hospitalization in the Fourth Administration of the Ministry of Health, which decided who should be admitted to the various hospitals subordinate to that administration. The hospital on Granovsky Street was reserved for members of the top leadership, and special permission was required for admission. Prominent patients who did not belong to the top leadership were usually admitted to the Kuntsevo hospital. [SK]

68. Anna Osipovna Tarasova was a friend of Nina Petrovna from the 1930s, when she worked at the Elektrozavod. [SK]

69. She had married an Iraqi and gone to live with him in Baghdad. [SK]

70. Yelena Aleksandrovna Vlasenko was a friend of Lena. She was an economic geographer and a consultant to the timber industry. [SK]

71. Mariya Dmitriyevna and Sergei Ivanovich Stepanov were the mother and stepfather of my first wife Galina (Galya). They worked in a construction administration. [SK]

72. Nina Petrovna means that it is better for Khrushchev to be buried in the cemetery than it would have been for him to be buried in the Kremlin wall, where people would not have felt free to come and pay their respects in the same way. [SS]

73. Shota Rustaveli is considered the national poet of Georgia. He lived during the reign of Queen Tamar in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century. He is best known for his epic poem *The Knight in the Panther's Skin*. [SS]

74. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Skryabin (1872–1915) was an innovative Russian composer of world renown. [SS] In the West his name is often spelled "Scriabin." [GS]

75. Vera Aleksandrovna Gostinskaya, a Pole, shared an apartment on Olginskaya Street in Kiev with the Khrushchevs in 1928–29. Later she was arrested and released from the GULAG in 1956. Since then she has lived in Poland. She was a frequent guest of the Khrushchevs in Moscow. [SK]

76. Istra is a town not far from Moscow. [SK]

77. Galina Ivanovna Burmistenko was the widow of the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who died in 1941 when the Germans were encircling Kiev. She lived in Moscow in the same block of apartments as Nina Petrovna on Old Stables Lane. [SK]

78. Mezhygorye was a state dacha near Kiev. See the chapter "Kiev is Ours Again!" in Volume 1. [SK]

79. Daughter of Yuliya [Jr.]. [SK]

80. Viktor Andreyevich Klimashevsky was a friend of mine, an engineer. He worked at the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). His son Igor was then about six years old. [SK]

81. For information on her late husband, Academician Artsimovich, see note 49.

82. Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov (1902–60) was a nuclear physicist and a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and of its presidium. From 1943 to 1960 he was director of the Institute of Atomic Energy of the USSR Academy of Sciences, also known as Laboratory No. 2, which was responsible for the Soviet atomic bomb project. See Biographies. [SK/SS]

83. Zinoviy Timofeyevich Serdyuk (1903–82) was familiar to Nina Petrovna from his days as a senior party official in Ukraine (1939–41 and 1943–53). He was first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia in 1954–61 and first



deputy chairman of the Party Control Committee in 1961–64. At the time of this encounter he was in retirement. [SS]

84. My son Nikita. [SK]

85. Kamenskaya was a friend of Nina Petrovna from the 1930s. [SK]

86. It is an old Russian custom to place millet on graves at Easter. [SK]

87. Varvara Dmitriyevna Velichkina, a cousin of Nikita Khrushchev. [SK]

88. The nanny of Yuliya's daughters Nina and Ksana. [SK]

89. A director of documentary films and friend of Yuliya [Jr.]. [SK]

90. A famous Russian folk singer. See Biographies [SK]

91. Yuri Leonidovich Khrushchev is a grandson of Nikita Sergeyevich, Yuliya [Jr.]'s brother, a test pilot. Masha is his wife. [SK]

92. A dacha settlement 45 kilometers to the north of Moscow, on the banks of the Ikshinsky reservoir. I had a dacha there. [SK]

93. The papers to which Nina Petrovna refers are permits that were required from the architectural council and the artistic council of the city of Moscow. The story is recounted in more detail in my book *Khrushchev on Khrushchev*. [SK]

94. Lev Abramovich Kassil (1905–70) was a popular writer of novels, short stories, children's literature, poems, songs, and screenplays. The genres in which he worked included those of fantasy, the detective story, and the historical novel. A museum in his memory was opened in Moscow in 1995. [SS]

95. Nikolai Ivanovich Pirogov (1810–81) was a famous Russian surgeon at the time of the Crimean War of 1854–55. He was also a medical scientist. He established a clinic in Moscow. [SK/SS]

96. Boris Yevgeniyevich Votchal was a famous medical practitioner and cardiologist. [SK]

97. Yuri Nagibin was prominent in the 1960s and 1970s as a writer of short stories and novels. Homburg is the protagonist of his "contemporary fairy tale." [SK/GS]

98. Aleksei Nikolayevich Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, one of the top leaders who succeeded Khrushchev. [SS]

99. Yevgeny Aleksandrovich Yevtushenko (born 1933) is a prominent and prolific poet. See note 28 to the chapter "I Am Not a Judge" above. Anton Grigoryev was a singer at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow. [SK/SS]

100. Radiculitis (also known as radiculopathy) is a disease of the spinal nerve roots and spinal nerves. Pain radiates outward from the spine. [SS]

101. Irma Avraamovna Kobyak was a niece of Nikita Khrushchev, the daughter of his sister Irina Sergeyevna, who died in 1961. Irma was deaf as a result of childhood meningitis. [SK]

102. Rona is Irma's sister. [SK]

103. Soviet school students were graded on a scale from one to five, with five the top grade. One and two were fail grades. [SK/SS]

104. Yekaterina (Katerina, Katya) Osipovna (Yosifovna) Simochkina was an old friend of Nina Petrovna from her days at the Elektrozavod in the 1930s. [SK]

105. In fact the "reconstruction" was mythical. The authorities closed the cemetery to prevent people from visiting Khrushchev's grave. The cemetery was not reopened until the 1990s. [SK]

106. Before shoulder straps were introduced, stars indicating military rank were attached to the collars of the overcoat or jacket. [SK]

107. To be made a Hero of the Soviet Union was the highest military honor. Heroes of the Soviet Union held the Golden Star and the Order of Lenin. [SK]

108. The Likhachev Factory is a large factory in Moscow for the production of motor vehicles. For the man in whose honor it is named, see note 40. [SS]

109. Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny was a member of the post-Khrushchev top leadership. He was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine from 1957 to 1963, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee from 1963 to 1965, and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet from 1965 to 1977. See Biographies. [SS]

110. Andrei Pavlovich Kirilenko was a member of the post-Khrushchev top leadership and a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee from 1966 to 1982. See Biographies. [SS]

111. Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov was a prominent member of the post-Khrushchev top leadership. He was the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee with primary responsibility for ideology from 1947 to 1982. See Biographies. [SS]

112. Valentina Vladimirovna Tereshkova (born 1937) spent three days in space orbit in June 1963 aboard the spacecraft Vostok 6. She was the first woman in space. [SS]

113. The marshal's star is awarded together with the title of marshal. It is worn around the neck, under the throat. [SK]

114. A film about a reunion of veterans of the Second World War many years after the war. [SK]

115. Marshal Kirill Semyonovich Moskalenko. Commander of missile troops 1960–62, chief inspector of USSR Ministry of Defense 1962–83, deputy minister of defense 1960–83. See Biographies.

116. Maksim Dermidontovich Mikhailov, a bass singer at the opera. [SK]

117. Yelena Mikhailovna Korovina (Bulganina), recently widowed wife of Bulganin, who had died four months previously, on February 24, 1975. Before retiring she had been an English-language teacher at school No. 175 in Moscow. Vera Nikolayevna, her daughter, was a physician—and a good one. [SK]

118. A sanatorium for the rehabilitation of patients with heart disease, named in honor of the nineteenth-century writer and dissident Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen. [SK]
119. A biologist and a friend of Yuliya [Sr.]. They worked together in the same biology laboratory of the Bogomolets Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. (See the information about Yuliya near the beginning of the first notebook.) [SK]
120. Liu Hsiao was the ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the USSR in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He returned to Beijing in fall 1962. [SS]
121. April 17 was Nikita Khrushchev's birthday. [SK]
122. A professor of Russian language at Moscow State University. [SK]
123. A former assistant to Ernst Neizvestny, who designed and made the memorial to Khrushchev. [SK]
124. In February 1956. [SK]
125. A steel plant named in honor of Feliks Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Cheka (Soviet secret police). [SK]
126. It crosses the Moscow River near the Kiev Railroad Station. [SK]
127. Woods close to the village of Vasilyov, where Nina Petrovna was born. [SK]
128. Svetlana had been a university classmate of Yuliya (Jr.) and was a professor of Russian language at Moscow State University. [SK] Voskresensk is a town about 100 kilometers southeast of Moscow. [SS]
129. The reference is to the vouchers that Soviet trade unions sometimes sold their members at a subsidized price, entitling them to spend a period of between one and four weeks at a vacation center. The vouchers covered food as well as accommodation. [SK]
130. This was the regular plenum held on October 25–26, 1976, to discuss the state budget and plan for 1977. [SK]
131. This was Olga Borisovna Kreidik, a computer software engineer from Dushanbe (Tajikistan), who was to become my second wife. In 1980 she separated from me and then divorced me. She now lives in New York. [SK]
132. July 2 is my birthday. I was born on July 2, 1935. [SK]
133. Gamzat Tsadasa (1877–1951) was an Avar poet and playwright. His work was influenced by Avar folklore. He was made a People's Poet of the Dagestan ASSR in 1934. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1951. [SS]
134. The writer Vladimir Sanin was the author of several works devoted to Soviet polar explorers. The story to which Nina Petrovna refers was the concluding part of a trilogy devoted to (now Academician) Yevgeny Konstantinovich Fyodorov, a member of the four-man expedition led by Ivan Papanin who reached the North Pole in 1937. [SS]
135. She died on April 14, 1978, at the age of 78. [SK]
136. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Blok (1880–1921) was a famous poet, playwright, and publicist. His lyrics were strongly influenced by the Symbolist movement. His best-known work dates from the period of the Russian revolution, with which he initially sympathized. [SS]
137. Sergei Aleksandrovich Yesenin (1895–1925) was another prominent poet of the revolutionary period. His poetry was lyrical and popular in style; much of it was devoted to the Russian countryside. The work of his last years reflects a tragic worldview. He grew increasingly disillusioned and depressed and finally committed suicide. [SS]
138. Aleksandr Trifonovich Tvardovsky (1910–71) was a prominent Soviet poet and literary figure. He was perhaps best known for his war poetry, especially *Vasily Tyorkin* (1941–45), a popular volume of humorous verse about a typical Soviet soldier. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR four times (in 1941, 1946, 1947, and 1971) and the Lenin Prize in 1961. In 1950–54 and again in 1958–70 he was chief editor of the leading "liberal" literary-political journal *Novyi Mir* (New World). In this capacity, and also through his own works directed against Stalinism and bureaucracy, he played a key role in the cultural "thaw" of the Khrushchev period. In particular, it was he who persuaded Khrushchev to approve the publication of two novels by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. He was a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee from 1961 to 1966. [SS]
139. Artyom Sergeyev was the son of the prominent Bolshevik Sergeyev. After his father's death he was adopted by Stalin. He married Ibarruri's daughter. Lolita was their daughter. They lived in Moscow in the same building as Nikita, and their dacha was in Zhukovka. Nikita made friends with Lolita at school, where they were in the same class. [SK]
140. Marietta Sergeyevna Shaginyan (1888–1982) was a well-known Russo-Armenian writer. She became a corresponding member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences in 1950 and received the State Prize of the USSR in 1951. In 1972 she was awarded the Lenin Prize for her four-part novel on Lenin's family, entitled *Semya Ulyanovskh* (The Ulyanov Family). She also wrote memoirs and books about Goethe and Shevchenko. [SS]
141. Vardges Amazaspovich Petrosyan (1932–94) was an Armenian writer and publicist. He wrote novels and short stories. Much of his work was about Armenian family life. He wrote in Armenian, but part of his work was translated into Russian. [SS]
142. Semyon Alperovich was a close friend of mine, a cruise-missile designer from Chelomei's OKB-52 design bureau. His wife, Valentina Pershina, was a physician. [SK]
143. Vyacheslav (Slava) Lomov was a friend of my new wife Olga Kreidik and a professor of agronomy at Dushanbe State University in Tajikistan. [SK]

144. Aleksandr Petrovich Volkov (1910–90) worked for many years in the aviation industry. In 1954–56 he was chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet and from 1956 he was chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Questions of Labor and Wages. From 1956 to 1971 he was a member of the CPSU Central Committee. He retired in 1974. [SS] Nina Petrovna occupied half of the house in Zhukovka; he lived in the other half. [SK]

145. The operation on the lens of his eye to eliminate his shortsightedness was conducted by Rada's friend and neighbor (at her dacha), the famous eye surgeon Dr. Svyatoslav Fyodorov. [SK]

146. Leonid Puchkov was the son of Natasha, Sergei's nanny when he was ill with tuberculosis between 1939 and 1945. In 1978 Leonid was a cadet at the Moscow Infantry Officers' College. [SK]

147. Professor Aleksandr Mikhailovich Markov, head of the Fourth Administration of the Ministry of Health at the time that Khrushchev was in power. He was a good friend of Nina Petrovna's. [SK]

148. This was the party organization for residents of the apartment building at 57 Old Stables Lane in Moscow. [SK]

149. Brezhnev awarded the Republic of Azerbaijan the Order of Lenin. [SK]

150. This was the head of Brezhnev's bodyguard. [SK]

151. The daily newspaper published by the Soviet Army. [SS]

152. Vil Vladimirovich Lipatov (1927–79) wrote novels and short stories about everyday life and in the detective genre. [SS]

153. Yuliya Vladimirovna Drunina (1924–91) was a popular lyric poet. Much of her verse dealt with the war, in which she took part personally. She also wrote an autobiographical novel. She committed suicide. [SS]

154. Ostankino is the tower in Moscow from which radio and television programs are broadcast. [SS]

155. Andrei Andreyevich Voznesensky (born 1933) has written poetry, memoirs, and also a rock opera. He was known in the post-Stalin period as a writer of semidissident inclinations. [SS]

156. Robert Ivanovich Rozhdestvensky (1932–94) wrote poems and popular songs. He was known in the post-Stalin period as a poet of semidissident inclinations. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1979. [SS]

157. The film was based on the famous novel *How the Steel Was Tempered*, written in the 1930s by Nikolai Aleksandrovich Ostrovsky (1904–36). The novel was regarded as a classic of revolutionary romanticism. [SS]

158. Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev (1808–73) was a prominent Russian poet, publicist, and diplomat. In 1857 he became a corresponding member of the Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences. His work

expresses a tragic philosophical outlook on love, nature, and the universe. He was inclined toward Pan-Slavism. [SS]

159. To mark the anniversary of the October Revolution of 1917. [SK]

160. This disaster occurred in July 1971. Three cosmonauts died (Vladimir Nikolayevich Volkov, Georgy Timofeyevich Dobrovolsky, and Viktor Ivanovich Patsayev). [SK]

161. The Bauman Technical School, where I was then teaching. [SK]

162. Winter 1978–79 was very cold. In January the temperature fell to  $-40$ – $-45^{\circ}\text{C}$ . ( $-40$ – $-50^{\circ}\text{F}$ .), and most of the apple and other fruit trees in Moscow froze. Such winters recur every ten to fifteen years. [SK]

163. A thick monthly literary-political journal. [SK]

164. Chuvashia is the republic of the Chuvash people within the RSFSR. It is situated about 600 kilometers east of Moscow. The Non-Black-Earth Zone occupies a large area of central European Russia where the soil is not very fertile (by comparison with the Black Earth Zone of southern European Russia). [SS]

165. Gosplan was the State Planning Commission. [SS]

166. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* was the newspaper of the Komsomol (Young Communist League). [SS]

167. Lev Ivanovich Oshanin (1912–96) was a poet and the author of popular patriotic lyrical songs. He received the State Prize of the USSR in 1950. [SS]

168. The *bogatyr*s were heroic figures in Russian folklore, similar to the medieval knights of Western Europe. The epic of the seven bogatyr's refers to the Tale of the Dead Princess and the Seven Bogatyr's, a Russian fairy tale with a plot that closely resembles that of Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. [SS]

169. Roman Lazarevich Karmen (1906–78) was a filmmaker and film director. He was well known in the USSR for his numerous documentary films on world events. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR four times and the Lenin Prize in 1960; in 1966 he was made a People's Artist of the USSR. [SS] The film that Nina Petrovna watched was produced in 1979 in collaboration with American film producers. Its English-language version was entitled *The Unknown War*. [SK]

170. General Andrei Ivanovich Yeremenko was the commander of the Stalingrad Front and had worked closely with Khrushchev. See Biographies to Volume 1. [SS]

171. See Biographies to Volume 1.

172. David Nikitych Kugultinov (born 1922) is a Kalmyk poet. Most of his work is devoted to Kalmykia (situated northwest of the Caspian Sea) and its people. He was made a People's Poet of

Kalmykia in 1969 and received the State Prize of the USSR in 1976. [SS]

173. A communal apartment was an apartment inhabited by a number of separate households. Each family or single person had a room or a partitioned section of a room, while all residents shared kitchen and bathroom facilities. Under Stalin communal apartments were the norm. The construction of new housing after Stalin made it possible to reduce gradually the proportion of the urban population living in communal apartments, although they never disappeared completely. [SS]

174. Vadim Ivanovich Myagkov, a friend of mine and an electronics specialist. He lived in Leningrad. He had a small hut in Karelia (northwestern Russia), not far from Lake Ladoga. [SK]

175. In fact, Simonov's ashes were scattered at his request from a plane over the battle sites in Belorussia where he had been in summer 1941 as a correspondent of *Krasnaya Zvezda*. [SK]

176. Nikita's hobby was to carve figures, vases, and other beautiful objects from outgrowths that appeared on tree trunks. These outgrowths were diseased and their removal benefited the trees. [SK]

177. It was hard for Nina Petrovna to carry food packages, so they were brought to her by the chauffeur of the car that the government had allocated to her use. She shared the food with Galya. [SK]

178. Boris Zhutovsky was a painter and graphic artist, one of the participants in the scandal at the Manezh art exhibition on December 1, 1962. After Khrushchev retired, Zhutovsky's family often visited him at Zhukovka and became friends with Yuliya (Jr.). Later his wife died in a car accident. [SK]

179. Samuil Yakovlevich Marshak (1887–1964) was a popular poet, known for his epigrams. He also wrote works of literary criticism and verses, stories, and plays for children, and translated Shakespeare's sonnets and the poetry of Robert Burns into Russian. He received the State Prize of the USSR four times and the Lenin Prize in 1963. [SK/SS]

180. Savva Artemyevich Dangulov (1912–89) wrote novels, short stories, and plays. Much of his work was on themes relating to international diplomacy. [SS]

181. Mariya (Marusya) Ivanovna Solovei was a housekeeper who had worked with N. S. since the 1930s in his government residences in Kiev and Moscow. [SK]

182. During the period when most urban residents lived in communal apartments, many people who lacked the facilities to wash and bathe themselves properly at home in warm water used to visit neighborhood bathhouses for the purpose. [SS]

183. Galina Petrovna was the sister of Yuliya's (Sr.) husband, Viktor Petrovich Gontar. [SK]

184. The journalist Vsevolod Ovchinnikov worked as a correspondent in Great Britain. Later he wrote

two interesting books about Britain and Japan, respectively: *Korni duba* (Roots of the Oak) and *Vetka sokury* (Branch of the Cherry Tree). [SK]

185. Walter Ulbricht (1893–1973) was the leading figure of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from 1950 until his death. He was general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany from 1950 and President of the GDR from 1960. [SS] The gift was from him and his wife Lotte. [SK]

186. Khosta is a resort on Russia's Black Sea coast, a few kilometers southeast of Sochi. [SS]

187. Gleb Maksimilianovich Krzhizhanovsky (1872–1959) was an engineer and a Bolshevik revolutionary of Polish origin. As chairman of Gosplan in 1921–30 and of the Chief Administration for Energy of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry in 1930–32, he was closely associated with the state program to electrify Russia. The *Varshavyanka* was a very popular revolutionary song named after the city of Warsaw, where he composed it. [SK]

188. Ivan Semyonovich Kozlovsky (1900–1993) was a famous lyrical singer. He sang as a tenor at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow from 1926 to 1954. He was made a People's Artist of the USSR in 1940 and received the State Prize of the USSR in 1941 and 1949. [SK/SS]

189. The Maly [Small] Theater was renowned in the nineteenth century for staging plays by Aleksandr Sergeyevich Griboyedov, Nikolai Vasilyevich Gogol, and other social and political satirists. [SS]

190. A famous actress. [SK]

191. Kaisyn Shuvayevich Kuliyeu (1917–85) was a Balkar poet. In 1967 he was made a People's Poet of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR (in the North Caucasus). He also wrote short stories. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1974. [SS]

192. Nina Ivanovna Tkach, Nina Petrovna's niece. [SK]

193. Agrafena Georgiyevna was nanny for my sons Nikita and Sergei. [SK]

194. Nina Petrovna is offering them use of the official car (with driver). She had the right to use it for up to thirty hours a month. [SK]

195. Romesh Chandra was a participant in the struggle for Indian independence. He was the founder and general secretary of the All-India Peace Council. He was secretary-general of the World Peace Council from 1966 to 1977 and its president from 1977 to 1990. [SS]

196. A remontant is a plant that blooms more than once during the year. The remontant strawberry is a small strawberry that bears fruit throughout the summer and autumn and not just at a certain period, as most strawberries do. [SK]

197. A popular Soviet weekly news magazine. [SK]

198. A "wild" trip meant a trip to a vacation center undertaken independently by ordinary people not in possession of trade-union vouchers (see note 129). [SS]

199. Prednizolon is a hormonal treatment used also in the West. It has many side effects, some very serious. [SK]
200. The main Soviet space complex, located in Kazakhstan. [SS]
201. The *karagach* is a kind of elm tree native to Central Asia. [SK]
202. Koch's rod is the rod-shaped bacillus responsible for tuberculosis, which was discovered in 1882 by the German scientist Robert Koch. The suggestion that the bacillus might come to life in a person leading a dissolute way of life reflects older ideas about tuberculosis. [SS]
203. Zbigniew Brzezinski (born 1928) was a prominent adviser on foreign and national security affairs to U.S. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter. He had the reputation of a Cold War "hawk." [SS]
204. Nina Petrovna thinks that a former chairman of the Council of Ministers should by right of rank have been buried *by* the wall (rather than have his ashes placed *in* the wall), behind the mausoleum where other members of the Politburo are buried. Brezhnev did not like Kosygin and was unwilling to grant him this honor. [SK]
205. Marianna Georgiyevna, an acquaintance of Nina Petrovna, was head of Section 200 at the GUM department store on Red Square. [SK]
206. Tamara Tamarina was a friend of Nina Petrovna who had worked with her at the Elektrozavod in the 1930s. [SK]
207. Nina Vladimirovna Bazhan, wife of the poet Bazhan (see note 61). [SK]
208. A condition in which the heart beats at an abnormally fast rate. [SS]
209. Natalya Sergeyevna, Korolyov's daughter from his first marriage (that is, before his arrest), had begun a public campaign for the "conquest" of Korolyov's legacy. She tried to discredit Nina Ivanovna and behaved in a very immoral and unpleasant fashion. [SK]
210. He had worked with Khrushchev in the 1920s in Ukraine. [SK]
211. Gabriel José García Márquez (born 1928) is a Columbia-born author and journalist. He won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1982. *A Hundred Years of Solitude*, published in 1967, is generally considered his masterpiece. *The Autumn of the Patriarch* was first published in 1975. [SS]
212. Zinaida (short form Zina) Tikhonovna Kukharchuk, who lived in Kiev, was the daughter of a cousin of Nina Petrovna. [SK]
213. Polina (Polya) Tikhonovna Feldman was a friend of Nina Petrovna who had worked with her at the Elektrozavod in the 1930s. [SK]
214. Nina Petrovna Khrushcheva is referring to her internal passport, the basic identity document that Soviet citizens needed to have with them at all times. [SS]
215. Nikolai Petrovich Kamanin (1909–82) was a military pilot. He was made a Hero of the Soviet Union in 1934 for commanding the air squadron that rescued the crew of the icebound Chelyuskin Arctic expedition. During the war he was an air-force commander. From 1960 to 1971, as assistant to the commander in chief of air forces for outer space, he was in charge of the Soviet cosmonaut team. He was removed from this position in 1972 following the death of the crew of the Soyuz-11 spacecraft. [SS]
216. Mark Naumovich Bernes (1911–69) was a popular actor and vaudeville singer. He performed in a number of war movies. He received the State Prize of the USSR in 1951 and was made a People's Artist of Russia in 1965. [SS]
217. That is, not in the Kremlin wall like Kosygin. [SK]
218. Mikhail Porfir'yevich Georgadze (1912–82) was an agricultural engineer by profession. He was minister of agriculture of the Georgian SSR in 1953–54, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia in 1954–56, and first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR in 1956–57. He became secretary of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in February 1957. He became a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1966. [SS]
219. Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov (1914–84) succeeded Brezhnev as party general secretary in May 1982. He died in February 1984. Previously he was Soviet ambassador to Hungary (1954–57), head of the department of the CPSU Central Committee for liaison with socialist countries (1957–67), secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (1962–82), and head of the KGB (1967–82). See Biographies. [SS]
220. The home guards (*opolchentsy*) were special formations made up of civilian volunteers with little if any military training. They were resorted to as an emergency expedient to defend Moscow and Leningrad from imminent German capture. [SS]
221. The Sinyavsky Marshes are in the vicinity of the Sinyaya River, south of Pskov. [SS]
222. The Blue Division was a Spanish (Francoist) and not a German formation, so the prisoner was probably a Spaniard. Such distinctions were rarely drawn at the time. [SK]
223. The Voronya Hills are a short distance to the west of Saint Petersburg (then Leningrad). [SK]
224. Luga is a town in Leningrad province, about 150 kilometers south of Saint Petersburg (then Leningrad) and 80 kilometers west of Novgorod. Luga is also the name of a river that rises near the town and flows northwest to enter the Baltic Sea at Narva. The Luga operational group was established with its base at Luga on July 6, 1941, and set up a defensive line more than 150 kilometers long that formed the southwestern section of Leningrad's outer defenses. In the battle of the Luga line, which began on July 12, the Soviet forces

managed temporarily to check the German drive on Leningrad from the southwest. However, in late August and early September, following a German breakthrough to the southeast of Leningrad, the Luga line was overrun (John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany* [London: Granada Publishing Ltd., 1985], 1209, 255, 263). [SS]

225. Dubrovka on the Neva (Nevskaya Dubrovka) was a sliver of land, some three kilometers long and one and a half kilometers deep, on the River Neva about eight kilometers east of Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg). It is near the town of Kirovsk and the confluence of the Dubrovka River, a small tributary of the Neva. It was here that the Soviet army put up its last resistance to the German offensive against Leningrad that culminated in September 1941 in the long blockade of the city. It was also, from December 1941 onward, the site of repeated unsuccessful attempts to force the Neva and break the blockade. Only in January 1943, in the course of the operation that finally broke the blockade, did the 67th Army succeed in crossing the river at Dubrovka. The fighting at Dubrovka cost the lives of between 250,000 and 300,000 Soviet soldiers. The father of President Vladimir Putin fought and was wounded at Dubrovka. Information from Russian television broadcast on January 29, 2004, to commemorate the anniversary of the blockade; also see <http://www.base13.glasnet.ru/text/golubew/g21.htm> [SK/SS]

226. Paul Kuusberg (born 1916) was an Estonian writer. He wrote several novels and also literary criticism in Estonian and Russian. He was made a People's Writer of the Estonian SSR in 1972. [SS]

227. Aleksei Fyodorovich Losev (1893–1988) was a Russian Christian Orthodox philosopher of mystical bent. His main work was published in eight books in the late 1920s. He was denounced at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930 and shortly afterward arrested and sentenced to ten years in labor camp. However, he was released in 1933 on the petition of the Political Red Cross, headed by E. P. Peshkova, first wife of the famous writer Maxim Gorky. He was allowed to resume his scholarly work as an expert in ancient philosophy but not to teach or publish. The first English translation of one of his books—*The Dialectics of Myth* (*Dialektika mifa*), originally published in 1930 but then pulped—was published in 2003 by Routledge (translated by Vladimir L. Marchenkov). The Winter 2001–2 issue of *Russian Studies in Philosophy* (40, no. 3, *The Dialectic in A. F. Losev's Thought*) was devoted to his life and thought. [SS]

228. Daniil Aleksandrovich Granin (born 1919) has written a number of novels as well as short stories, essays, and film scripts. Several of his books focus on the lives and problems of scientists. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1976. [SS]

229. Rasul Gamzatovich Gamzatov (1923–2003) was the son of Gamzat Tsadasa (see note 133), an

Avar poet and public figure. Writing in Avar and Russian, he was the author of numerous books of poetry, prose, and literary criticism and also of children's literature. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1952 and the Lenin Prize in 1963. He was made a People's Poet of the Dagestan ASSR in 1959 and came to be regarded as Dagestan's national poet. [SS]

230. Anatoly Georgiyevich Aleksin (born 1924) is a Russian writer of short stories and plays. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1978. [SS]

231. Fazu Gamzatovna Aliyeva (born 1932) is an Avar poet. In 1969 she was made a People's Poet of the Dagestan ASSR. [SS]

232. Maksim Tank (born 1912) is a Belorussian poet, writing in Belorussian and Russian. He was made a People's Poet of the Belorussian SSR in 1968. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1948 and the Lenin Prize in 1978. [SS]

233. Aleksandr Andreyevich Prokofyev (1900–1971) was a poet and literary critic. He took a special interest in the dialect and folklore of northern Russia. In 1946 he became editor of the poetry section of the literary magazine *Zvezda* (Star). He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1946 and the Lenin Prize in 1961. [SS]

234. Nikolai Matveyevich Gribachev (1910–92) was a poet, short-story writer, and public figure. He became chief editor of the magazine *Sovetsky Soyuz* (Soviet Union) in 1950 and was a secretary of the governing board of the Soviet Writers' Union. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1948 and 1949 and the Lenin Prize in 1960. In 1961 he became a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee. [SS]

235. Vladimir Alekseyevich Soloukhin (1924–97) was a poet, short-story writer, essayist, and publicist. Much of his work focused on contemporary rural life. [SS]

236. Pyotr Lukich Proskurin (born 1928) writes short stories and novels. Much of his work focuses on contemporary rural life. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1979. [SS]

237. Yuri Valentinovich Trifonov (1925–81) wrote novels, including historical and documentary novels, short stories, and poetry. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1951. His highly acclaimed novel *Dom na naberezhnoi* (House on the Embankment; 1976) is set in the apartment complex for top state and party officials on the bank of the Moscow River where the Khrushchevs lived in the 1930s. [SS]

238. Vladimir Vsevolodovich Monomakh (1053–1125) was Grand Prince of Kievan Rus from 1113 to 1125. [SS]

239. Nikolai Semyonovich Yevdokimov (born 1922) is the author of several short stories and essays and three novels. Much of his writing focuses on moral problems. [SS]



240. Oles (Aleksandr) Terentyevich Gonchar (born 1918) is a Ukrainian writer and public figure. He writes novels and short stories in Ukrainian and Russian. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1949 for his trilogy of novels about the war, the Lenin Prize in 1964, and the State Prize again in 1982. He became a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1976 and a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1978. [SS]

241. Oleg Nikolayevich Shestinsky (born 1929) has written mainly poetry but also a collection of novellas about the blockade of Leningrad. [SS]

242. Lev Vladimirovich Ginzburg (1921–80) was a writer and translator. He is known for his memoirs, his antifascist writings, and his translations of German poetry. [SS]

243. Pimen Yemelyanovich Panchenko (1917–95) was a Belorussian poet. He wrote in Belorussian

and Russian. He was made a People's Poet of the Belorussian SSR in 1973 and was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1981. [SS]

244. William Somerset Maugham (1874–1965) was an English author. He wrote novels, short stories, essays, and plays. *Of Human Bondage* (1915) is regarded as his masterpiece. I have retranslated the extracts from the Russian. [SS]

245. Yuri Mikhailovich Mushketik (born 1929) is a Ukrainian writer. He has written several novels, including two historical novels, and also short stories devoted to contemporary social and moral problems. He was awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1987. [SS]

246. Federico Fellini (1920–94) was an Italian filmmaker. His films are famous for their surrealist style. [SS]

## Biographies

**Abakumov, Viktor Semyonovich** (1908–54). Joined party in 1930. Worked for the OGPU (secret police) from 1932. Worked in the Guards Department of the GULAG and the Chief Directorate of State Security of the NKVD (secret police) from 1934 to 1938. Head of the NKVD administration of Rostov province from 1938 to 1941. Deputy people’s commissar of internal affairs from 1941. Head of Chief Counterintelligence Directorate “Smersh” (acronym of *Smert shpionam*, meaning “Death to Spies”) from 1943 to 1946. Minister of state security from 1946 to 1951. Expelled from the party in June 1951 and arrested on July 12, 1951, under Stalin. Stalin’s successors had him tried, in connection with exposure of security police crimes in the “Leningrad Affair,” by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court and sentenced on December 19, 1954, to be shot. Five of his subordinates were also arrested and tried.

**Abrosimov, Pavel Vasilyevich** (1900–1961). Architect. Contributed to the design of the House of the Government of Ukraine in Kiev (1934–38) and of the skyscraper of Moscow State University (1949–53). Awarded the State Prize.

**Akopov, Stepan Akopovich** (1899–1958). Soviet state figure. Joined party in 1919. Director of the Urals Machinery Plant (Uralmashzavod) from 1937. First deputy people’s commissar of heavy machine building from 1939. First deputy people’s commissar of medium machine building (i.e., armaments) from 1940 and people’s commissar of medium machine building from 1941 to 1946. Minister of the automobile and tractor industry from 1946. Deputy minister and minister of agricultural machine building from 1950. Supreme Soviet deputy from 1946 to 1950 and in 1954.

**Aleksandrov, Anatoly Petrovich** (1903–94). Academician. Director of the Institute of Atomic Energy. Leader of research on atomic science and technology and one of the founders of the Soviet atomic energy program. Developed atomic reactors for electric power plants, submarines, and icebreakers and

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Some biographies have been adapted from the Russian edition of the memoirs. Others have been compiled with the aid of various sources.

Where not otherwise indicated, “people’s commissar,” “minister,” and similar designations refer to “people’s commissar of the USSR,” “minister of the USSR,” and so on. The same applies to people’s commissariats, ministries, and other government bodies. {SS}



other ships, also anti-mine protection for ships. President of USSR Academy of Sciences from 1975 to 1986. Thrice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Alliluyev, Sergei Yakovlevich** (1866–1945). Joined RSDLP in 1896 while working as a machinist in Tiflis (the capital of Georgia, later renamed Tbilisi). Active in the revolutionary movement in the Transcaucasus (in Tiflis and in Baku, capital of Azerbaijan) for a decade. From 1907 to 1918 worked in Saint Petersburg, where his apartment was a secret meeting place for the Bolsheviks and a hiding place for Lenin in July 1917. He was closely acquainted with many leading Bolsheviks, including Stalin, who married his daughter Nadezhda. His memoirs, *Proidenny put* (The Road Traveled), were published in 1956.

**Alliluyeva, Nadezhda Sergeyevna** (1901–32). Daughter of Sergei Yakovlevich Alliluyev and Olga Yevgenyevna Alliluyeva. Stalin's second wife. In 1917, while still at gymnasium, ran away from home with Joseph Stalin (then named Soso Dzhugashvili) and married him in 1918. Their son Vasily born in 1921, daughter Svetlana in 1926. Engaged in responsible work in Lenin's secretariat until his death in 1924. Became a student at the Industrial Academy in 1929 (the same year that Khrushchev went there) to study viscose production in the Faculty of Chemistry. Spent 1931–32 in Kharkov with her sister Anna. Committed suicide on November 9, 1932.

**Alliluyeva (Stalina), Svetlana Iosifovna** (born 1926). Stalin's youngest child and only daughter by his second wife Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva. In 1943 entered Faculty of History of Moscow State University (MGU) and married fellow student Grigory Morozov. Son Joseph born 1945, divorced 1947. Married Yuri Zhdanov, son of Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, in 1949. Daughter Yekaterina born 1950. Graduated from Faculty of History and then from Faculty of Philology of MGU, entered graduate study at Academy of Social Sciences and wrote dissertation on the historical novel. Divorced Yuri Zhdanov in 1952. After Stalin's death in 1953 adopted mother's maiden name and worked as teacher and translator. In 1963 met Indian Communist Brajesh Singh at sanatorium in Kuntsevo and married him. On his death in 1966 took his ashes back to India and took the opportunity to defect to the United States. In 1970 married American architect William Wesley Peters, had daughter Olga, divorced in 1972. In 1982 went to Britain. In 1984 returned to Soviet Union, reacquired Soviet citizenship, settled in Tbilisi. Returned to United States in 1986 and to Britain in 1992. Has written four books of reminiscences (*Twenty Letters to a Friend*, *Only One Year*, *Distant Music*, and *A Book for My Grandchildren*).

**Andreyev, Andrei Andreyevich** (1895–1971). Peasant background. Worker. Joined RSDLP in 1914. From 1915 to 1917 a member of the Petrograd committee of the RSDLP(B), helped to organize the Petrograd Union of Metalworkers. Active participant in October Revolution. From 1917 to 1919 engaged in party and trade-union work in Urals and Ukraine. From 1920 to 1922 Secretary of All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions. From 1922 to 1927 chairman of CC of Railroad Workers Union, concurrently in 1924–25 a secretary of the party CC. From 1927 to 1930 secretary of North Caucasus territory committee of the party. In 1930–31 people's commissar of workers and peasants inspection and a deputy chairman of Council of People's Commissars. From 1931 to 1935 people's commissar of railroads. From 1935 to 1946 a secretary of the party CC, concurrently from 1939 to 1952 chairman of its Party Control Commission, from 1938 to 1946 chairman of the Soviet of the Union of Supreme Soviet, and from 1943 to 1946 people's commissar of agriculture. From 1946 to 1953 a deputy chairman of Council of Ministers. From 1953 until retirement in 1962 a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. A member of the party CC in 1920–21 and from 1922 to 1961, of its Orgburo from 1922 to 1928 and from 1939 to 1946, and of its Politburo from 1932 to 1952.

**Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich** (1914–84). Trained and worked in shipyards as water transportation engineer. First secretary of Yaroslavl province committee of the Komsomol from 1938 to 1940 and of CC of the Komsomol of the Karelo-Finnish Republic of the RSFSR from 1940 to 1944. Joined party in 1939. Involved in partisan movement during World War II, then worked in Karelian party apparatus. Worked in apparatus of the party CC from 1951 to 1953. Became counselor in the Soviet embassy in Budapest in 1953 and Soviet ambassador to Hungary in 1954. Played an important role in the suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956. From 1957 to 1967 head of the newly created Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries of the party CC. Became a secretary of the party CC in 1962. Chairman of the Committee of State Security (KGB) from 1967 to 1982. Became a member of the Politburo of the party CC in 1973. Succeeded Brezhnev as general secretary of the party CC in November 1982. Concurrently chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from June 1983. Died in February 1984.

**Antonov, Oleg Konstantinovich** (1906–84). Designer of transport and passenger aircraft. In youth belonged to a circle of glider enthusiasts. Graduated from aviation division of Leningrad Polytechnical Institute in 1930, then chief designer of Moscow Glider Plant. In 1938 joined A. S. Yakovlev's design bureau. In 1940 at Plant No. 23 in Leningrad designed a plane that could take off

from and land on a 500-meter runway. From 1941 to 1943 led a group to build gliders to supply partisans (A-7) and for transport and paratroop landings, then rejoined Yakovlev's design bureau as his first deputy. In 1946 given his own design bureau in Novosibirsk (OKB-153) to make a small transport plane, tested in 1948 and named the AN-2. Later designed the AN-6 for meteorological observation at high altitudes, the AN-4 for observing ice and fishing conditions, the AN-8, AN-12, AN-22 ("Antei"), AN-26 and AN-124 ("Ruslan") for military transport and paratroop landings, the AN-10 and AN-24 passenger liners, the AN-14 (which can take off and land on a 60-meter runway), the AN-30 for intelligence and mapmaking, the AN-32 for use in high mountainous areas, and other models. The Antei and the Ruslan are still the largest transport planes in the world. Taught at Kharkov Aviation Institute and Kiev Institute of Civil Aviation. Became a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1981. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Badayev, Aleksei Yegorovich** (1883–1951). Peasant. Joined RSDLP in 1904. Worked as a fitter in Saint Petersburg. Deputy to the fourth State Duma. From 1913 official publisher of the newspaper *Pravda*. From 1917 occupied leading posts in food-supply and cooperative agencies. From 1921 worked in the consumer cooperative movement. Chairman of the Central Union of Consumers' Societies from 1930 and of the Moscow Union of Consumers' Societies from 1931. Deputy Chairman of the Moscow Soviet. A member of the All-Union CEC. From 1935 deputy people's commissar of food industry of the USSR. From 1937 to 1938 people's commissar of food industry of the RSFSR. From 1938 to 1943 chairman of Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, then member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat (Ministry) of Food Industry. A member of the party CC from 1925.

**Bandera, Stepan Andreyevich** (1908–59). During the 1920s took part in the Ukrainian underground military organization created in Poland by E. Konowalcz. From 1929 a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. From 1933 chairman of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in western Ukraine (at that time belonging to Poland). Participated in terrorist attacks on Polish government officials, was imprisoned, and was freed in 1939 during the German-Polish war. After 1941 led the anti-Soviet activity of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army on Ukrainian territory under temporary fascist occupation. In winter 1945 moved to Germany, whence continued to lead anti-Soviet activity. Remained until the end of his life in the Federal Republic of Germany under the pseudonym Stefan Poppel. Killed in Munich by a Soviet agent.

**Barayev, Aleksandr Ivanovich** (1908–85). Agronomist and author of works on soil-preserving systems of crop cultivation in areas exposed to wind erosion. Made a member of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences in 1966. Awarded the Lenin Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Barmin, Vladimir Pavlovich** (1909–93). Military designer. In 1940 appointed chief designer at Moscow plant “Kompressor,” producing Katyusha multiple rocket launchers. From 1946 head and chief designer of the newly formed State Union Design Bureau of Special Machine Building (later renamed Design Bureau for General Machine Building), specializing in control equipment for rocket and missile complexes. Supervised development of launch complexes for ballistic missiles, antimissile missiles, and launchers for space rockets. Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1966. Awarded the Lenin Prize, Stalin Prize, and State Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Batitsky, Pavel Fyodorovich** (1910–84). During World War II infantry division and corps commander. In 1948 graduated from General Staff Academy. From 1948 to 1950 corps commander, chief of staff of antiaircraft defense for Moscow region. From 1950 to 1953 chief of General Staff and deputy commander in chief of air force. In 1953–54 first deputy commander of Moscow Military District. From 1954 to 1965 commander of Moscow Antiaircraft Defense District. In 1965–66 first deputy chief of General Staff. From 1966 to 1978 commander in chief of antiaircraft defense and deputy minister of defense. From 1978 a member of the Group of General Inspectors of Ministry of Defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1968).

**Bazhan, Mikola (Nikolai) Platonovich** (1903–83). “Neo-romantic” poet, translator, and public figure. Son of a serviceman. Joined party in 1940. During World War II (1941–45) editor of the newspaper *Za Radiansku Ukrainu* (For Soviet Ukraine). From 1958 editor in chief of *The Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*. Secretary of the USSR Writers Union from 1967. Made a member of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences in 1951. From 1943 to 1948 deputy chairman of Council of People’s Commissars (Soviet of Ministers) of the Ukrainian SSR.

**Benediktov, Ivan Aleksandrovich** (1902–83). Joined party in 1930. People’s commissar of agriculture of the USSR from 1938 to 1943. First deputy people’s commissar of agriculture of the USSR from 1943 to 1946. Minister of agriculture of the USSR from 1946 to 1953. First deputy minister and then minister of agriculture and procurements of the USSR in 1953–54. Minister for state farms of the USSR from 1955 to 1957. Minister of agriculture of the RSFSR from 1957

to 1959. Soviet Ambassador to India from 1959 to 1967 and to Yugoslavia from 1967 to 1970. Ambassador for special missions from 1970 to 1971, thereafter retired. A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1941 and from 1952 to 1971.

**Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich** (1899–1953). From a peasant background. Joined party in 1917. From 1918 to 1920 a specialist employee of the customs office. From 1921 to 1931 worked in agencies of the Cheka and GPU in the Transcaucasus. From 1931 second secretary of the Transcaucasus territory committee of the party and first secretary of the CC of the CP(B) of Georgia. From 1932 first secretary of the Transcaucasus territory committee of the party. From 1938 first deputy people's commissar, and then until 1953 (with an interval) people's commissar (minister), of internal affairs. From 1941 deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and general commissar of state security. A member and deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee. From 1934 a member of the party CC and from 1946 a member of its Politburo. From 1952 a member of Presidium of the party CC. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1945). In 1953 first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of internal affairs until his arrest in June 1953. Executed in December 1953.

**Beria, Sergo (Sergei) Lavrentyevich** (also known by his mother's name as Sergei Alekseyevich Gegechkori; 1924–2003). Son of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria and Nina Teimurzovna Gegechkori, nephew of the Menshevik leader Gegechkori. In 1941 left school to work at the Central Radiotechnical Laboratory of the MVD. From 1942 to 1947 cadet at Leningrad Military Academy of Communications. Captain engineer. In 1946 presented diploma dissertation on anti-ship cruise missiles, prepared on the basis of German materials. From 1947 to 1953 chief engineer and chief designer at design bureau KB-1 of Ministry of Aviation Industry, working on anti-aircraft defense system for Moscow and the first Soviet anti-ship cruise missile "Kometa." Candidate of Technical Sciences (1948), Doctor of Technical Sciences (1952). Awarded the State Prize. Arrested in July 1953 in connection with his father's case, deprived of his rank of colonel engineer, his prizes, and his academic title. Imprisoned until end of 1954, then exiled to Sverdlovsk to work as senior engineer in a design bureau on control systems for submarine-fired ballistic missiles. In 1962 wrote letter to Khrushchev asking to be transferred to Kiev and was allowed to do so. Worked at "Kvant" ("Quantum") scientific research institute until September 1988 as leading designer, sector head, and department head. Designed electronic systems for naval vessels. Then head of Department of Systems Design in Division of New Physical Problems at

Institute of Mechanics Problems of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences. From 1990 chief designer and from 1993 also director of the “Kometa” scientific research institute of the Ukraine Ministry of Machine Building.

**Bierut, Boleslaw** (1892–1956). Joined Communist Party of Poland in 1918. From 1944 to 1947 chairman of the National People’s Council (the provisional supreme body of power in Poland). Chairman from 1948 to 1954, and first secretary from 1954, of the CC of the Polish United Workers Party.

**Biryuzov, Sergei Semyonovich** (1904–64). Joined Red Army in 1922. During World War II occupied a series of important command and staff positions. From October 1944 until end of war commanded the 37th Army, concurrently serving as chief Soviet military adviser to the Bulgarian army. In 1946–47 deputy commander in chief of land forces for combat training. From 1947 to 1953 commander of the Maritime (Primorye) Military District. In 1953–54 commander in chief of the Central Group of Forces. In 1954–55 first deputy commander in chief of antiaircraft defense. From 1955 to 1962 deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of antiaircraft defense. In 1962–63 commander in chief of Strategic Missile Forces. From 1962 to 1964 chief of the General Staff and first deputy minister of defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union.

**Blyukher, Vasily Konstantinovich** (1890–1938). Metalworker. Junior officer in World War I. In March 1918 chairman of the Chelyabinsk Soviet, then commander in Red Army, making important contributions to victory in Civil War. War minister 1921–22. Under his command the Red Army of the Soviet Republic of the Far East defeated White and Japanese forces. Military adviser to Kuomintang 1924–27. Commander of the Far Eastern Army 1929–38. Commander in chief of Far Eastern Front during its victorious clash with Japanese forces at Lake Khasan in July 1938. Shortly thereafter arrested and executed.

**Bobrovnikov, Nikolai Ivanovich** (1909–92). Joined party in 1931. Worker. Graduated from Moscow Engineering-Construction Institute in 1932 as water-supply and sewerage engineer. From 1932 to 1934 in Red Army. From 1934 to 1947 engineer at water-supply stations. From 1947 chief engineer and deputy head, then in 1948–49 head of water-supply and sewerage administration of Moscow City Executive Committee. From 1949 deputy chairman, from 1950 first deputy chairman, and from 1956 to 1961 chairman of Moscow City Executive Committee. From 1961 to 1963 deputy chairman of the State Scientific-Economic Council of the Council of Ministers. From 1963 until

retirement in 1983 head of Department of Residential and Municipal Services of Gosplan. A member of the party CC from 1956 to 1961.

**Bolshakov, Ivan Grigoryevich** (1902–80). Joined party in 1918. From 1916 to 1922 a manual worker in Tula armaments factories, then engaged in organizational work. From 1931 an official of the Council of People's Commissars (last position—business manager). From 1939 chairman of the Committee for Cinematography and from 1946 minister of cinematography. From 1953 deputy minister of culture.

**Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich** (1906–82). From 1927 to 1930 worked as land-use manager. Joined party in 1931. From 1930 to 1935 studied at the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgy Institute. From 1935 to 1936 served in Red Army. From 1936 to 1937 director of the metallurgy technical college in Dnepropetrovsk. From 1937 to 1938 deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of the Dneprodzerzhinsk City Soviet. From 1938 department head and from 1939 a secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk province party committee. During World War II worked in political departments of various armies and Fronts. From 1946 to 1947 first secretary of the Zaporozhye province and city party committees. From 1947 to 1950 first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk province and city party committees. From 1950 to 1952 first secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Moldavia. A member of the party CC from 1952. From 1952 to 1953 a secretary of the party CC and in 1953 deputy head of Chief Political Directorate of army and navy. From 1954 second secretary and from 1955 to 1956 first secretary of CC of Communist Party of Kazakhstan. From 1956 to 1960 and from 1963 to 1964 a secretary of the party CC and from 1957 a member of its Politburo (Presidium). From 1960 to 1964 chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. From 1964 first secretary (from 1966 general secretary) of the party CC and concurrently from 1977 chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Four times Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Labor. Awarded numerous medals and two Lenin Prizes. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1976).

**Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich** (1888–1938). Son of a teacher. Joined RSDLP in 1906. One of Lenin's closest associates, one of the leaders of the armed uprising in Moscow in October 1917, and a leading party theoretician. From 1918 to 1929 editor of the newspaper *Pravda*. A member of the party CC from 1917 to 1934 and of its Politburo from 1924 to 1929. From 1926 one of the leaders of the Communist International. Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1929. Thereafter repeatedly subject to party and state persecution as a



prominent figure in the “right” opposition to Stalin. From 1929 a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. From 1932 a member of the collegium of the People’s Commissariat for Heavy Industry. From 1934 chief editor of the newspaper *Izvestia*. From 1935 a member of the CEC and of the Constitutional Commission. Author of numerous works on economics, sociology, politics, literary criticism, theory of science, and other subjects. Arrested on false charges in 1937, he was the main defendant at the third and last of the Moscow show trials of 1936–38. Executed after the trial in March 1938. Not cleared of these charges until 1988, under Gorbachev.

**Bulganin, Nikolai Aleksandrovich** (1895–1975). Trained as electrician. Joined party in 1917. From 1918 to 1922 worked in the Cheka. From 1922 to 1927 a member of the board of the Electric Trust (Elektrotrest) of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. From 1927 to 1931 director of Moscow Electrical Equipment Factory (Elektrozavod). From 1931 to 1937 chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet. From 1938 to 1944 deputy chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and concurrently chairman of the board of the State Bank. During World War II a member of the military councils of various Fronts. From 1944 to 1946 deputy people’s commissar of defense. From 1946 first deputy minister and from 1947 to 1949 minister of the armed forces and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of its Committee No. 2 (jet-propulsion technology). From 1950 first deputy chairman and from 1955 to 1958 chairman of the Council of Ministers and concurrently minister of defense from 1953 to 1955. In 1958 again chairman of the board of the State Bank. From 1958 until retirement in 1960 chairman of the Stavropol Council of the National Economy. A member of the party CC from 1937 to 1961 and of its Politburo (Presidium) from 1948 to 1958. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1947–58).

**Bullitt, William Christian** (1891–1967). Scion of a prominent Philadelphia family. In 1916–17 war correspondent. From December 1917 to May 1919 assistant secretary of state and head of the State Department’s Central Europe Information Bureau. Opposed American intervention in the Russian Civil War and advocated recognition of the Soviet regime. In 1919 led a mission to Soviet Russia with the aim of terminating all hostilities there. A staff member of the American commission to negotiate peace with Germany, but resigned from State Department over terms of the Versailles Treaty. Close friend and adviser to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. First U.S. ambassador to the USSR (1933–36), then ambassador to France (1936–40). Thereafter roving ambassador for the president, formally assigned to the Navy Department. In



1943 wrote confidential memoranda warning the president concerning Soviet intentions. Took part in the French resistance movement.

**Chelomei, Vladimir Nikolayevich** (1914–84). Soviet rocket scientist, specialist in the field of vibration theory, principal designer of rockets, missiles, and spacecraft. Graduated from the Kiev Aviation Institute in 1937, then worked at the Central Institute for Aircraft Engine Construction in Moscow. In 1944 appointed chief designer and director of a design bureau to design cruise missiles for aircraft. From October 29, 1955, head of OKB-52 design bureau based at the Reutov Mechanical Engineering Plant. At end of 1950s, OKB-52 absorbed two other design bureaus in Moscow (NII-642 and OKB-23, which designed cruise and ballistic missiles and manned military space stations). OKB-52 is now known as OKB-Salyut and produced Russian part of the international space station. Soviet intercontinental missiles UR-100 (SS-11) and UR-100 UTTX (SS-19) were manufactured to Chelomei's designs. Greatest achievements were design of the two-stage rocket UR-500 (in 1965) and the three-stage Proton, capable of lifting more than twenty tons into orbit. Also lectured for thirty years at the Bauman Higher Technical School in Moscow. Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1962. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Chernyshov, Sergei Yevgenyevich** (1881–1963). Architect. Contributed to developing the plan for the reconstruction of Moscow (1931–35) and to the design of the Moscow University skyscraper (1949–53). Awarded the State Prize.

**Chiaureli, Mikhail Edisherovich** (1894–1974). Georgian actor, artist, film director, and scriptwriter. Graduated from School of Painting and Sculpture in 1912. Acted in theater from 1915 and in cinema from 1921. His films included *Saba* (1929), *Posledny maskarad* (The Last Masquerade, 1934), *Georgy Saakadze* (1943), *Klyatva* (The Vow, 1946), and *Padeniye Berlina* (The Fall of Berlin, 1950). Became People's Artist of the Georgian SSR in 1943 and People's Artist of the USSR in 1948. Awarded five Stalin Prizes.

**Chubar, Vlas Yakovlevich** (1891–1939). Peasant. Joined RSDLP in 1907. From 1911 a worker, participated in the revolutions of 1905, February 1917, and October 1917. From 1918 to 1922 an official of leading economic agencies. From 1923 chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars. From 1934 deputy chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense. From 1937 people's commissar of finance. From 1938 first deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. A member of the party CC from 1922 and of its Politburo from 1935. Executed, rehabilitated posthumously.

**Churayev, Viktor Mikhailovich** (1904–82). Head of the Department for Party Bodies in the RSFSR of the party CC from 1955 to 1959. Head of the Department for Party Bodies in the Union Republics (i.e., outside the RSFSR) of the party CC from 1959 to 1961.

**Dementyev, Pyotr Vasilyevich** (1907–77). Son of a teacher. Joined party in 1938. Worker. Graduated from Zhukovsky Air Force Academy in 1931. From 1931 to 1934 engaged in engineering work at the Scientific Research Institute of the Civil Air Fleet. From 1934 to 1941 engineer, then plant director in aviation industry. From 1941 to 1946 first deputy people's commissar (minister), from 1946 to 1953 deputy minister, and from 1953 to 1957 minister of the aviation industry. From 1957 to 1965 chairman of the State Committee on Aviation Technology, then again minister of the aviation industry. A member of the party CC from 1956. Colonel general engineer. Awarded the State Prize. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Dobrovolsky, Anatoly Vladimirovich** (born 1910). Artist and architect. Contributed to the plan to reconstruct the Kreshchatik (1949–55). Also involved in the design of residential buildings, the Theatrical Institute, the Borispil Airport (1959–65), the Hotel Moskva (1959–61), the Moscow Bridge (1976), the Ukraina cinema (1960–64), the Vitryak restaurant (1950–55), and subway stations in Kiev (1958–65). Chief architect of Kiev from 1950 to 1955. Professor at the Kiev Art Institute from 1965.

**Dovzhenko, Aleksandr Petrovich** (1894–1956). Film director and playwright. A classical figure of Soviet and Ukrainian cinematography. His films were poetic epics on grand historical themes of the Soviet period. Made People's Artist of Russia in 1950. Awarded the Lenin Prize and Stalin Prize. Husband and collaborator of Yuliya Ippolitovna Solntseva.

**Eidinov, Aleksei (Aron) Filippovich** (1908–50). Joined party in 1931. From 1930 worked at the Engineering Stock Company (Russian abbreviation AMO), renamed the Moscow Stalin Automobile Plant in 1934. Aide to the director of the plant, Ivan Alekseyevich Likhachev. Before arrest deputy director of the ATE-2 plant (a branch of the Stalin Plant that supplied it with electrical equipment). Arrested on April 3, 1950, sentenced on November 23, 1950, by Military Collegium of Supreme Court for participation in a counterrevolutionary nationalist organization, and shot the next day. Rehabilitated posthumously.

**Fadeyev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich** (1901–56). His first novel *Razgrom* (The Rout; 1927) reflects his experience in the partisan movement in the Far East during the Civil War. *Posledny iz udege* (The Last of the Udege; 1929–40) is

also about the Civil War. *Molodaya gvardiya* (The Young Guard; 1945–51) celebrates Young Communists fighting underground against the Nazi occupation. From 1926 to 1932 one of the leaders of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers. From 1946 to 1954 general secretary of the Soviet Writers Union. Vice-President of the World Peace Council. A member of the party CC from 1939. Committed suicide after the exposure of Stalin's crimes at the Twentieth Party Congress.

**Fomin, Ignaty Ivanovich** (1904–89). Architect. Contributed to the planning of residential areas in Leningrad (1937–48). In 1971 became a People's Architect of the USSR and in 1979 a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Arts. Son of Ivan Aleksandrovich Fomin.

**Fomin, Ivan Aleksandrovich** (1872–1936). Architect. Put forward a program of “classical reconstruction,” combining the traditions of classical Russian architecture with contemporary construction methods. Designed important buildings in Moscow and Kiev.

**Furmanov, Dmitry Andreyevich** (1891–1926). Writer. In 1919 commissar of the 25th Infantry Division, commanded by Chapayev, who inspired his Civil War novel *Chapayev* (1923), later turned into a film (1934). Also author of other works on Civil War as well as essays and diaries.

**Furtseva, Yekaterina Alekseyevna** (1910–74). Engaged in work with the Kom-somol from 1930. From 1942 to 1950 a secretary, then second secretary, then first secretary of the Frunze district committee of the party (in Moscow). From 1950 second secretary and from 1954 to 1957 first secretary of the Moscow city committee of the party. From 1956 to 1960 a secretary of the party CC. From 1957 to 1961 a member of Presidium of the party CC. From 1960 to 1974 minister of culture.

**Gagarin, Yuri Alekseyevich** (1934–68). Colonel. Pilot and cosmonaut. The first man in space. Grew up on a collective farm near Moscow. On graduation from technical school in 1955 trained at First Chkalov Military Aviation School for Pilots. Served in fighter units from 1957 to 1960, when as senior lieutenant volunteered and was selected as one of six pilots for training as the first cosmonauts. Launched into earth orbit on board the spaceship Vostok (East) on April 12, 1961. His first words from space: “I see earth. It's so beautiful!” On return to earth made Hero of the Soviet Union, later promoted to colonel. Died in accident while piloting a MIG-15 on a training flight on March 27, 1968, soon after graduating from Zhukovsky Air Force Academy. A crater on the far side of the moon is named after him.

**Galan, Yaroslav Aleksandrovich** (Vladimir Rosovich; 1902–49). Lvov publicist. Joined Communist Party of the Western Ukraine in 1924. Author of antifascist and anticlerical pamphlets and plays.

**Gamarnik, Yan Borisovich** (1894–1937). From a white-collar background. Joined RSDLP in 1916. Participant in the revolutions of February and October 1917. Took active part in Civil War in Ukraine, occupied politico-military posts. From 1920 chairman of the Odessa and Kiev province committees of the CP(B)U, and of the Kiev Province Revolutionary Committee and Kiev Province Executive Committee. From 1923 chairman of the Primorye (Maritime) Province Executive Committee and of the Far East Revolutionary Committee and Far Eastern Territory Executive Committee. Secretary of the Far Eastern territory committee of the party. A member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Siberian Military District. From 1928 first secretary of the CC of the CP(B) of Belorussia and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Belorussian Military District. From 1929 head of Chief Political Directorate of army and navy, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council, and editor in chief of the newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star). From 1930 deputy chairman of Revolutionary Military Council, deputy people's commissar of military and naval affairs, first deputy people's commissar of defense, and a member of the Military Council attached to the people's commissar of defense. At time of death a member of the Military Council of the Central Asian Military District. A member of the party CC from 1927 and of its Orgburo from 1929. Army commissar of the first rank from 1935. Committed suicide in 1937 to avoid arrest.

**Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe** (1901–65). Joined Communist Party of Romania in 1930. General secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Romania from 1945 and of the CC of the Romanian Workers Party from 1948 (from 1955 first secretary). Vice premier from 1948 to 1952 and premier from 1952 to 1955. From 1961 chairman of the State Council of Romania.

**Gierek, Edward** (1913–2001). First secretary of Katowice city committee of the Polish United Workers Party from 1957 to 1970. Replaced Gomulka as party first secretary in 1970 in wake of popular unrest. Remained in post until 1980.

**Ginzburg, Semyon Zakharovich** (1897–1993). People's commissar for construction from 1939, then minister for the construction of military and naval enterprises, minister for the building materials industry, deputy to a number of ministers of industrial branches and to the chairman of the State Committee for Construction (Gosstroj). Retired in 1970.

**Gitalov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich** (1915–?). Head of a brigade of tractor drivers on the collective farm named after the Twentieth CPSU Congress in Novo-Ukrainsky district, Kirovograd province, Ukraine. One of the initiators of the all-sided mechanization of crop cultivation. A member of the party CC from 1948 and of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from 1974.

**Glushko, Valentin Petrovich** (1908–89). Scientist, a pioneer of space-rocket technology. Designed the first electrothermal rocket engine in the world (1929–33) and some of the first liquid-fuel rocket engines (1930–31). From 1946 to 1989 worked on the design of rockets and missiles at the design bureaus headed by S. P. Korolyov, M. K. Yangel, and V. N. Chelomei. General designer of international space station “Energiya—Buran.” Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1958. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Gomulka, Wladyslaw** (Wieslaw; 1905–82). Joined Communist Party of Poland in 1926. Political prisoner in Poland from 1932 to 1934 and from 1936 to 1939. A member of the CC of the Polish Workers Party from 1942 and its general secretary from November 1943 to August 1948. Vice-Premier from 1945 to 1949. Expelled from the party in 1949 and imprisoned in 1951. Released in 1954 or 1955. Readmitted to the party in 1956. First secretary of the CC of the Polish United Workers Party from 1956 to 1970.

**Gorbatov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich** (1891–1973). In 1938 aide to commander of a cavalry corps. Arrested on false charges in 1938, released in 1941. He describes this ordeal in his memoirs, published in English as *Years off My Life* (1965). During World War II occupied a series of command posts, inspector of cavalry in the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts, then army commander. In 1945–46 commander of the Fifth Assault Army. From 1946 to 1950 commander of the Eleventh Guards Army. From 1950 to 1954 commander of paratroop formations. From 1954 to 1958 commander of the Baltic Military District, then a member of the Group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense. Army general (1955). Hero of the Soviet Union (1945).

**Gorky, Maxim** (born Aleksei Maksimovich Peshkov; 1868–1936). Famous playwright, novelist, and short-story writer, especially well known for his autobiographical trilogy: *My Childhood* (1914), *In the World* (1916), and *My Universities* (1923). Born in Nizhny Novgorod (later, in 1932, renamed Gorky in his honor), his harsh childhood and youth as a wandering orphan led him to choose the pseudonym Maxim Gorky (*gorky* meaning “bitter”). He was the first Russian writer to portray sympathetically such denizens of the social underworld as tramps and thieves. The first two of his several plays

(*The Smug Citizen* and *The Lower Depths*) were performed at the Moscow Art Theater in 1902. He became involved in the revolutionary movement and was in and out of jail. He went abroad after the failed revolution of 1905 and returned to Russia in 1914. He opposed the war, but also criticized the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 and Lenin's methods (most notably in his book *Thought out of Season*). In 1921 he went abroad again and settled in Italy, returning to the Soviet Union in 1928 on Stalin's invitation. From then until his death, as a leading member of the Soviet literary establishment, he promoted Stalin's brand of "socialist realism."

**Gorshkov, Sergei Georgiyevich** (1910–88). During World War II commander of the Azov Flotilla, deputy commander of the Novorossiysk Defense District, then commander of the Danube Flotilla. From 1945 to 1948 squadron commander in the Black Sea Fleet. From 1948 to 1951 chief of staff, then from 1951 to 1955 commander, of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1955–56 first deputy commander in chief, and from 1956 to 1985 commander in chief of the navy, concurrently first deputy minister of defense. From 1985 a member of the Group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense.

**Govorov, Leonid Aleksandrovich** (1897–1955). During World War II commanded an army in the battle for Moscow, then from 1942 the Leningrad Front and in 1945 the Second Baltic Front. From 1945 to 1948 commander of Leningrad Military District. From 1948 to 1952 commander and in 1954–55 commander in chief of anti-aircraft defense and deputy minister of defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944). Hero of the Soviet Union.

**Grechko, Andrei Antonovich** (1903–76). In Red Army from 1919. During World War II occupied a succession of important command posts. From 1945 to 1953 commander of the Kiev Military District. From 1953 to 1957 commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Troops in Germany. From 1957 to 1967 first deputy minister of defense, from 1957 to 1960 concurrently commander in chief of land forces. From 1960 to 1967 commander in chief of the Unified Warsaw Pact Forces. Appointed minister of defense in 1967. From 1973 to 1976 a member of the Politburo of the party CC. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1955).

**Gromyko, Andrei Andreyevich** (1909–89). Joined party in 1931. Graduated in 1932 from the Economics Institute (Minsk) and in 1936 completed graduate studies at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the Economics of Agriculture. From 1936 to 1939 senior research associate at the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences. In 1939 head of the Department for the Americas in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. From 1939

to 1943 counselor at the Soviet embassy in the United States. From 1943 to 1946 Soviet ambassador to the United States. From 1946 to 1948 permanent representative of the USSR at the United Nations Security Council and concurrently deputy minister of foreign affairs. From 1949 to 1952 first deputy minister of foreign affairs. In 1952–53 Soviet ambassador to Great Britain, then again first deputy minister of foreign affairs. Obtained degree of Doctor of Economic Sciences in 1956. From 1957 to 1985 minister of foreign affairs and concurrently from 1983 to 1985 first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. From 1985 until retirement in 1988 chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. A member of the party CC from 1956 to 1989 and of its Politburo from 1973 to 1988. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Grushin, Pyotr Dmitriyevich** (1906–93). Specialist in aviation technology. In 1932 graduated from Moscow Aviation Institute and from 1933 worked in its design bureau on original aircraft designs, from 1934 to 1940 as chief designer. During World War II worked as designer and engineer at various aircraft and engine-building factories. From 1946 to 1948 an official in Ministry of Aviation Industry. From 1948 to 1951 dean of Faculty of Aircraft Construction and deputy director for scientific work at Moscow Aviation Institute. In 1951 appointed first deputy to S. A. Lavochkin at his design bureau. In 1953 appointed head and chief designer of design bureau OKB-2 of Ministry of Medium Machine Building, where he created the K-5 air-to-air missile system and the S-75 anti-aircraft guided missile system. In 1959 appointed head and general designer of design bureau OKB-2 of State Committee for Aviation Technology. Supervised development of missiles for anti-aircraft defense complexes Angara, Vega, Dubna, and S-300; for land-force complexes Osa and Tor; for naval complexes Volkhov, Volna, Shtorm, Osa-M, Klinok, and Fort; and for antimissile systems S-200, A-35, A-35M, and A-135. From 1991 adviser to Moscow design bureau Fakel. Awarded the Lenin Prize. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Gurevich, Mikhail Yosifovich** (1892/93–1976). Aircraft designer. Together with Artyom Ivanovich Mikoyan, created MIG-1 and MIG-3 fighters and a number of high-speed jet planes. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Ignatyev, Semyon Denisovich** (1904–83). Joined party in 1926. From 1951 to 1953 minister of state security and from 1952 to 1953 a secretary of the party CC. From 1953 to 1957 first secretary of the Bashkir province party committee and from 1957 to 1960 of the Tatar province party committee.



**Ilyushin, Sergei Vladimirovich** (1894–1977). Aircraft designer. From 1910 to 1912 and during World War I worked at Saint Petersburg (later, Petrograd) hippodrome (aerodrome), in 1916 learned to fly. Designed the first Soviet training plane U-1. From 1921 to 1926 at Zhukovsky Air Force Academy, where took part in constructing gliders. Qualified as air force engineer-mechanic. Headed aircraft section of air force Scientific-Technical Committee. In 1930 appointed technical aide to director of air force Scientific-Testing Institute. From 1931 to 1933 deputy director of Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute and head of Central Design Bureau. In 1933 Central Design Bureau attached to Menzhinsky Plant and Ilyushin appointed its director and deputy director of the plant, working on bombers and attack planes. General designer until 1970. Supervised design of bombers, attack planes (the most famous being the IL-2), transport planes, training planes, and passenger planes. Colonel general of the engineering-technical service (1967). Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1968. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Thrice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Ivanov, Andrei Vasilyevich** (1888–1927). Joined RSDLP in 1906. From 1916 worked at “Arsenal” Plant in Kiev. Participant in the “December uprising” in 1918. Died in Odessa. Buried in the Mariinsky Park in Kiev near the presidential palace. Monument erected to him in Kiev.

**Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseyevich** (1893–1991). Shoemaker. A member of the party from 1911 to 1962. Before 1917, participated in underground party activity as a member of the Yekaterinoslav, Kiev, Melitopol, and Yuzovka party committees and as chairman of the illegal leatherworkers’ trade union. From 1918 to 1921 engaged in party and soviet work in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Voronezh, and Tashkent. From 1924 a secretary of the party CC. From 1925 to 1928 general secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine, then worked again in the CC of the AUCP(B). In 1930 elected first secretary of the Moscow committee and Moscow city committee of the party and a member of the Politburo of the party CC. In 1933 headed the Agriculture Department, and in 1934 the Transport Department, of the party CC. From 1935 to 1937 people’s commissar of communications, then people’s commissar of heavy industry. In 1938 deputy chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars. From 1939 to 1949 people’s commissar of oil and fuel industry. From 1942 a member of the State Defense Committee. After World War II occupied a number of leading party and state posts in Ukraine, in the Council of Ministers, and in union ministries. A member of the party



CC from 1924 to 1957. In 1957 belonged to the so-called antiparty group inside the party CC. Thereafter in retirement.

**Kaganovich, Mikhail Moiseyevich** (1888–1941). Brother of Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich. Joined RSDLP in 1905. From 1921 engaged in work in the Soviets. From 1931 deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. From 1932 deputy people's commissar of heavy industry. From 1936 deputy people's commissar and from 1937 people's commissar of defense industry. From 1939 to 1940 people's commissar of the aviation industry. From 1934 a member of the party CC and a candidate member of its Orgburo. Committed suicide.

**Kalchenko, Nikifor Timofeyevich** (1906–89). Joined party in 1932. Graduated from Poltava Agricultural Institute in 1928, then worked as agronomist for various regional associations of collective farms, machine and tractor stations, and other agricultural organizations in Ukraine. From 1938 to 1941 chairman of Odessa Province Executive Committee. During World War II a member of the Military Councils of a number of armies and Fronts. Lieutenant general (1944). In 1946–47 minister of technical crops of the Ukrainian SSR. From 1947 to 1950 minister of state farms of the Ukrainian SSR. From 1950 to 1953 minister of agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR, concurrently from 1952 to 1954 first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. From 1954 to 1961 chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. In 1961–62 deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, concurrently minister of procurements of the Ukrainian SSR. From 1962 until retirement in 1976 first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, concurrently from 1962 to 1965 minister of the production and procurement of agricultural products of the Ukrainian SSR. A member of the party CC from 1956 to 1961. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Kaledin, Aleksei Maksimovich** (1861–1918). From an old Cossack family. Graduated from Saint Petersburg Mikhailov Artillery School (1882) and General Staff Academy (1889). Cavalry commander during World War I. Removed from army command by Provisional Government for refusing to implement decrees to democratize army. Elected Ataman of the Don Cossacks in June 1917. After October Revolution declared martial law and (together with M. V. Alekseyev and L. G. Kornilov) established a regional anti-Bolshevik regime in the Don country. A leader of the White "Volunteer Army" in the Civil War. On January 29, 1918, during successful Red Army offensive in the Don country, renounced his position as Ataman and shot himself.

**Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich** (1875–1946). Born in a poor peasant family. Metalworker at armaments plant and then at Putilov Iron Works in Petrograd. Joined RSDLP in 1898. From November 1917 mayor of Petrograd. From March 1919 to 1938 chairman of the All-Russia (and later of the USSR) CEC. From 1938 to 1946 chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. A member of the party CC from 1919 and of its Politburo from 1926. Retired in 1946 and died shortly after. City of Königsberg in East Prussia renamed Kaliningrad in his honor.

**Kamenev, Lev Borisovich** (Rozenfeld; 1883–1936). Joined RSDLP in 1901. Active participant in the revolutionary movement. One of Lenin's main lieutenants in the Bolshevik wing of the RSDLP. Chairman of the All-Russia CEC in November 1917. Chairman of the Moscow Soviet from 1918 to 1926. Deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars from 1923 to 1926. Chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense from 1924 to 1926. Director of the Lenin Institute from 1923 to 1926. A member of the party CC from 1917 to 1927 and of its Politburo from 1919 to 1926. In 1925–26, together with Zinoviev, Kamenev was a leader of the so-called New Opposition, or Leningrad Opposition, and then in 1926–27, of the United Left Opposition, which opposed Stalin's policies. He was expelled from the party in 1927, and after capitulating to Stalin was readmitted in 1928. Arrested on false charges of conspiring to restore capitalism after the Kirov assassination. Together with Zinoviev, a principal defendant in August 1936 in the first of the Moscow show trials of 1936–38. Executed. Not cleared of these charges until 1988, under Gorbachev.

**Kaminsky, Grigory Naumovich** (1895–1938). In 1920–21 secretary of the CC of the CP(B) of Azerbaijan and chairman of the Baku Soviet. From 1923 to 1929 deputy chairman of the All-Russia Union of Agricultural Cooperatives. In 1928–29 head of the Department for Agitation, Propaganda, and the Press of the party CC, then head of its Department for Agitation and Mass Campaigns. From 1930 to 1932 a secretary of the Moscow Committee of the party and concurrently rector of the Industrial Academy. In 1932–33 chairman of the Moscow Province Executive Committee of the Soviets. From 1934 to 1937 people's commissar of health of the RSFSR, concurrently in 1936–37 people's commissar of health of the USSR. Arrested on June 25, 1937, and executed.

**Kamov, Nikolai Ilyich** (1902–73). Aircraft designer. Graduated from Tomsk Technological Institute in 1923 as engineer-mechanic, then worked at Junkers Plant IVA while studying aerodynamics in the evenings. In 1927 invited to join design bureau of D. P. Grigorovich for experimental shipbuilding. In 1928–29 at design bureau of P. Richard, took part in creation of the first Soviet

gyroplane *Krasny inzhener* (Red Engineer). In 1930–31 leading engineer at design bureau for naval aircraft construction, produced open-sea torpedo-armed hydroplane TOM-1. In 1931 joined sector of special designs of the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI). Designed new ship-based combat gyroplane A-7, which was used in World War II. From 1943 at Bureau of New Technology of TsAGI. In 1946 organized group to design helicopter KA-6. From 1948 chief designer of design bureau for helicopters, transformed in 1949 into Ukhta Helicopter Plant. Also created snow hovercrafts, the high-speed helicopters KA-8, KA-10, KA-15, and KA-18, the twin-turbine KA-25, the twin-engine KA-26 (for geological prospecting), and the rotary-wing plane KA-22. Doctor of Technical Sciences (1962). Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Kapitsa, Pyotr Leonidovich** (1894–1984). Physicist. One of the founders of low-temperature physics and the physics of superstrong magnetic fields. Son of teacher and military engineer. In 1919 graduated from Saint Petersburg Polytechnical Institute as electrical engineer, then lecturer at the same institute and concurrently research associate at State Physics-Technical Institute. Following the deaths from influenza of his wife and two children, went to Western Europe as a member of a commission of the Russian Academy of Sciences and in 1921 became a researcher in E. Rutherford's Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge University in Britain, where he continued research on subatomic particles and superstrong magnetic fields. In 1923 awarded degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Cambridge University. In 1925 appointed deputy director of Cavendish Laboratory and in 1933 director of a new laboratory, but on a visit to the USSR in 1934 not allowed back out of the country. From 1935 to 1945 director of the newly created Institute of Physics Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Concentrated mainly on low-temperature physics; discovered the superfluidity of liquid helium (1938). Protected colleagues from Stalinist repressions. In 1939 made a member of the Academy of Sciences. From 1941 to 1945 a member of the Scientific-Technological Council under the State Defense Committee. In 1943 appointed head of Chief Administration of Oxygen Industry (for production of liquid oxygen) under Council of People's Commissars (Glavkislород). In 1946, as result of intrigues by rivals, removed from positions of institute director and head of Glavkislород and placed under house arrest. Organized small home laboratory to continue research in mechanics, hydrodynamics, electronics, and plasma physics. From 1947 to 1950 head of Department of General Physics in Physics-Technical Faculty of Moscow State University, then senior research associate of Institute of Crystallography of USSR Academy of Sciences. In

1953 appointed head of Physics Laboratory of USSR Academy of Sciences and in 1955 returned to directorship of Institute of Physics Problems, remaining in this position until his death. Chief editor of *Zhurnal Eksperimentalnoi i Teoreticheskoi Fiziki* (Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics). From 1957 to 1984 a member of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. In 1973 refused to sign letter denouncing Academician A. D. Sakharov. From 1980 to 1984 chief editor of the series “Scientific Classics” produced by the Nauka publishing house. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. Awarded the Lomonosov Gold Medal of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Stalin Prize, and Nobel Prize for Physics (1978).

**Kavun, Vasily Mikhailovich** (1928–?) Born in Cherkasy province, Ukraine. Chairman of the Collective Farm named after the Twenty-Second Party Congress. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Kedrov, Bonifaty Mikhailovich** (1903–85). Philosopher, chemist, and historian of science. Author of works on materialist dialectics, philosophy of the natural sciences, the practice of science, and classification of the sciences. Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1966. Son of Mikhail Sergeevich Kedrov.

**Kedrov, Mikhail Sergeevich** (1878–1941). Joined RSDLP in 1901. Head of the book publishing house *Zerno* (Grain). Participant in the three Russian revolutions [1905, February 1917, and October 1917]. From 1919 head of the Special Department of the Cheka. From 1924 occupied important positions in the Council for Labor and Defense, the Supreme Council of the National Economy, the People’s Commissariat of Health, the Supreme Court, the Executive Committee of the Red Sports International, and Gosplan. At the time of his arrest in 1939 he was director of the Military Sanitation Institute. Shot on October 17, 1941.

**Keldysh, Mstislav Vsevolodovich** (1911–78). Mathematician and mechanical engineer. A member of the Academy of Sciences from 1946 and its president from 1961 to 1975. Author of fundamental works on mathematics (theory of functions of a complex variable, functional analysis, etc.), aerohydrodynamics, and the theory of vibrations. Carried out research into many problems of aviation and atomic technology, computational and machine mathematics. Led a number of Soviet space programs, including manned space flights. Awarded the Lenin Prize, State Prize, and Golden Lomonosov Medal of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Thrice Hero of Socialist Labor. Son of Vsevolod Mikhailovich Keldysh.

**Keldysh, Vsevolod Mikhailovich** (1878–1965). Scientist. Major general of the engineering-technical service (1943). Took part in the building of the Moscow Canal, the Moscow–Volga Canal, the Moscow subway, and other large-scale construction projects. Helped to develop a new method for estimating the strength of reinforced-concrete constructions. Made an honorary scientist and technologist of the RSFSR in 1944.

**Kirichenko, Aleksei Illarionovich** (1908–75). Joined party in 1930. Engaged in party work from 1938. From 1953 to 1957 first secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine, then a secretary of the CC of the CPSU. From 1960 first secretary of the Rostov province party committee. Retained his administrative positions up to 1962. A member of the party CC from 1952 to 1961 and of its Presidium from 1955 to 1960.

**Kirichenko, Fyodor Grigoryevich** (1904–88). Plant breeder. For fifty years head of Department of Breeding of the Breeding and Genetics Institute of the Ukraine Academy of Agricultural Sciences and director of the institute from 1950 to 1958. A member of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences from 1956. Created about thirty new hardy high-yield varieties of wheat, which were planted on 78 million hectares of steppe land between the Danube and the Volga Rivers and secured an annual increase in the grain harvest of 23.6 million tons. Founded his own scientific school and trained 25 Candidates of Science and three Doctors of Science. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Kirilenko, Andrei Pavlovich** (1906–90). From 1944 to 1947 second secretary of the Zaporozhye province committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine. From 1947 to 1950 first secretary of the Nikolayev province committee of the CP(B)U. From 1950 to 1955 first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk province committee of the CP(B)U. From 1955 to 1962 first secretary of the Sverdlovsk province committee of the CPSU. From 1962 to 1966 first deputy chairman of the Bureau of the party CC for the RSFSR. From 1966 until retirement in 1982 a secretary of the party CC. A member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the party CC from 1962 to 1982.

**Kirponos, Mikhail Petrovich** (1892–1941). Joined party in 1918. Occupied various command posts. Before Finnish campaign was head of the Kazan Military College. During Finnish campaign commanded the 70th Division in the attack on Vyborg, then commander of the Leningrad and Kiev Special Military Districts. In 1941 commanded the Southwestern Front. Perished in battle.

**Kisunko, Grigory Vasilyevich** (1918–98). Specialist in radio-electronics. Trained as teacher, but at beginning of the war against the Nazi German invasion volunteered for the front. Assigned as cadet to Leningrad Military College for Air Observation, Information, and Communications, then served as radio operator and radar-station engineer. From 1944 to 1950 lectured at Leningrad Military Academy of Communications, then transferred to design bureau KB-1 in Moscow as head of laboratory to develop equipment for radar stations. From 1954 worked on experimental system of antimissile defense A-35 that, in 1960, achieved the first ever interception of a ballistic missile warhead (R-12). In 1961 appointed head of newly formed design bureau OKB-30 (as part of KB-1). From 1963 first deputy head of design bureau KB-1. In 1966 OKB-30 transformed into OKB “Vympel” of Ministry of Radio Industry with Kisunko as director. Worked there until 1975, then scientific consultant to research institute SNII-45 of Ministry of Defense. In 1987 became head of laboratory in Department of Theoretical Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Lieutenant general. A corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences (1958). Awarded the Lenin Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Kliszko, Zenon** (1908–89). Joined Communist Party of Poland in 1931. A member of the CC of the Polish Workers Party (and then Polish United Workers Party) from 1944 to 1948. Expelled from the party as an ally of Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1949 and readmitted along with Gomulka in 1956. Again a member of the CC of the PUWP from 1957 to 1971 and a member of its Politburo from 1957 to 1970. Vice-Marshal of the Sejm (parliament) from 1957 until retirement in 1971.

**Kobulov, Amayak Zakharovich** (1906–55). Deputy head of Department “S” of the NKVD. From 1951 first deputy head of the Chief Camps Directorate (GULAG). Lieutenant general from 1945.

**Kobulov, Bogdan Zakharovich** (1904–53). Joined the Cheka in 1922. Deputy people’s commissar of internal affairs of Georgia from 1938. Deputy people’s commissar of state security in 1941 and from 1943 to 1945. Appointed first deputy minister of internal affairs in 1953. Shot as a state criminal.

**Konev, Ivan Stepanovich** (1897–1973). From a peasant background. Lumberjack. Noncommissioned officer of tsarist army during First World War. Joined party in 1918. Commissar of an armored train during Civil War. Thereafter commissar, regimental and divisional commander. Graduated from Frunze Military Academy in 1934, then divisional and corps commander. From 1938 commander of Second Far Eastern Army and of the Transbaikal and Trans-

caucasus Military Districts. Commander of the Nineteenth Army in the battle for Moscow in 1941, then successively of the Steppe, Second Ukrainian, and First Ukrainian Fronts. After World War II commander in chief of Soviet occupation forces in Austria and Hungary. From 1946 commander in chief of ground forces and deputy minister of defense. From 1952 commander of the Ciscarpathian Military District. From 1955 first deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of Unified Warsaw Pact Forces. From 1961 commander in chief of Soviet occupation forces in Germany. From 1962 Inspector General of the Ministry of Defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union.

**Korneichuk, Aleksandr Yevdokimovich** (1905–72). Prominent Ukrainian playwright, writer, and journalist. Best-known play was *The Front* (1942). A member of the Academy of Sciences from 1943. Chairman of the Ukraine Union of Writers from 1946 to 1953. Second husband of Wanda Wasilewska.

**Korolyov, Sergei Pavlovich** (1906/7–1966). Space scientist and missile designer. Son of a teacher. Worked in construction as roofer and joiner. In 1924 became student at Kiev Polytechnical Institute, but transferred to Aeromechanics Faculty of Moscow Higher Technical School, graduating in 1929. (For his diploma project he designed a light-engine plane under supervision of A. N. Tupolev.) In 1930 graduated from Moscow Glider Pilots School. Decided to devote himself to making rockets after reading the cosmic visionary K. E. Tsiolkovsky. In 1932 became head of Group for the Study of Jet Motion. Designed the first Soviet rocket-powered glider and cruise missile. Under detention from 1938 to 1940 in Kolyma camps, then from 1940 to 1944 in design bureaus in Moscow and Kazan, where tested rocket accelerators for fighter planes. Designed the first Soviet multistage intercontinental rocket, which lifted the first artificial earth satellite (sputnik) into orbit in 1957. Supervised construction of manned spaceships (including the Voskhod and the Vostok, on which Yuri Gagarin made the first manned space flight in 1961), equipment for space walks, sputniks of the Elektron, Molniya-1, and Kosmos series, and the first interplanetary explorers of the Zond series. Sent the first spaceships to the moon, Venus, Mars, and the sun. Supervised design of ballistic missiles and geophysical rockets. Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1958. Awarded the Lenin Prize. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Kosior, Stanislav Vikentyevich** (1889–1939). Worker. Joined RSDLP in 1907. After 1917 a prominent party official, one of the organizers of the CP(B)U. Secretary of the CC of the CP(B)U from 1920. Secretary of the Siberian Bureau of the party CC from 1922, thereafter up to 1938 general secretary of



the CC of the CP(B)U. A member of the party CC from 1924 and of its Politburo from 1930. At time of arrest on false charges in the purges of 1938, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and chairman of the Soviet Control Commission. Executed, posthumously rehabilitated.

**Kosygin, Aleksei Nikolayevich** (1904–80). Joined the party in 1927. Graduated from the Kirov Leningrad Textile Institute in 1935. From 1935 foreman and workshop head and in 1937–38 a plant director in Leningrad. In 1938 head of the Industry and Transport Department of the Leningrad province committee of the party. In 1938–39 chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee. In 1939–40 people's commissar for the textiles industry. From 1940 to 1953 deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of the USSR and concurrently deputy chairman of the Council for Evacuation in 1941, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR from 1943 to 1946, minister of finance in 1948, and minister of light industry from 1948 to 1953. In 1953–54 minister of consumer goods industry. From 1953 to 1956 and from 1957 to 1960 deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 1956–57 first deputy chairman of the State Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers. First deputy chairman and in 1959–60 chairman of Gosplan. From 1960 to 1964 first deputy chairman and from 1964 to 1980 chairman of the Council of Ministers. A member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the party CC from 1948 to 1952 and from 1960 to 1980.

**Kotsyubinsky, Mikhail Mikhailovich** (1864–1913). Outstanding Ukrainian writer. His works, which have been translated into Russian and many other European languages, broke with the tradition of sentimental idealization of Ukrainian life in favor of realism. Renowned especially for his lyrical psychological short stories and novellas. His late work expresses impressionistic aesthetic individualism. Until last few years of his life earned living as local government statistician.

**Kozlov, Aleksei Ivanovich** (1911–82). From 1940 to 1946 deputy head of the Agriculture Department of the party CC. In 1946–47 minister of livestock husbandry. In 1947–48 deputy minister of agriculture. From 1948 to 1953 head of the Agriculture Department of the party CC. From March to September 1953 minister of agriculture and procurements. From 1953 to 1955 minister of state farms.

**Kozlov, Frol Romanovich** (1908–65). From 1940 to 1944 secretary of the Izhevsk city party committee (in Udmurtia). From 1944 to 1947 organizer and inspector for the Personnel Administration of the party CC. From 1947



to 1949 second secretary of the Kuybyshev (Samara) province party committee. In 1949–50 second secretary and from 1950 to 1952 first secretary of the Leningrad city party committee. In 1952–53 second secretary and from 1953 to 1957 first secretary of the Leningrad province party committee. In 1957–58 chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. From 1958 to 1960 first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. A member of the Presidium of the party CC from 1957 to 1964 and a secretary of the party CC from 1960 to 1964. Retired in 1964.

**Kozlov, Vasily Ivanovich** (1903–67). From 1944 to 1948 first secretary of the Minsk province and city committees of the Communist Party of Belorussia. From 1948 to 1967 chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR, concurrently deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. A member of the party CC from 1966.

**Kreizer, Yakov Grigoryevich** (1905–69). Soviet military commander. Joined party in 1925. Commander of armies in the Great Patriotic War. Made Hero of the Soviet Union in 1941. Army general from 1962. Head of the *Vystrel* (Shot) training courses from 1963 to 1969. A member of the Central Inspection Commission of the party from 1961 to 1966. Supreme Soviet deputy from 1962 to 1966.

**Krestinsky, Nikolai Nikolayevich** (1883–1938). Soviet state and party figure. Joined RSDLP in 1903. From 1918 people's commissar of finance of the RSFSR. From 1921 plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany. From 1930 deputy and first deputy people's commissar of foreign affairs. A secretary of the party CC and a member of its Politburo and Orgburo from 1919 to 1921.

**Krinsky, Vladimir Fyodorovich** (1890–1971). Architect. Professor in Faculty of Architecture at Vkhutemas University (in 1927 renamed Vkhutein). Leader of special architectural designing for second-year students and head of a group of young lecturers who had graduated from Vkhutemas. In 1937 designed the Khimki River Terminal in Moscow (together with A.M. Rukhlyadev).

**Kruglov, Sergei Nikiforovich** (1907–77). From 1939 to 1941 deputy people's commissar of internal affairs for personnel. From 1941 to 1945 deputy, then first deputy people's commissar, and from 1945 to 1956 people's commissar (minister) of internal affairs. In 1956–57 deputy minister of construction of electric power plants. From 1957 until retirement in 1958 deputy chairman of the Kirov [Regional] Council of the National Economy (sovnarkhoz).

**Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna** (1869–1939). Daughter of a military officer. Joined the revolutionary movement at an early age. Taught in an evening school for adults. Met Lenin in 1894 and married him in 1898. From November 1917 deputy people's commissar of education and enlightenment. Author of works on Soviet education. Also played a major role in developing the Soviet library system. Published memoirs in 1926.

**Krylov, Nikolai Ivanovich** (1903–72). Joined Red Army in 1919. During World War II chief of staff and commander of several armies. Took part in defense of Odessa and the Crimea, battle of Stalingrad, and offensive operations in Belorussia, East Prussia, and Manchuria. From 1945 to 1947 deputy commander of Maritime (Primorsky) Military District. From 1947 to 1953 commander and from 1953 to 1956 first deputy commander of Far Eastern Military District. In 1956–57 commander of Urals Military District. From 1957 to 1963 commander of Leningrad and Moscow military districts. From 1963 to 1972 commander in chief of Strategic Missile Forces and deputy minister of defense. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1945). Marshal of the Soviet Union (1962).

**Kulik, Grigory Ivanovich** (1890–1950). During Civil War fought in the First Cavalry Army. Thereafter occupied a number of high posts. A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1942. From 1939 head of Chief Artillery Directorate of Red Army and concurrently deputy people's commissar of defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union and Hero of the Soviet Union from 1940. In March 1942 demoted to the rank of major general. From April to September 1943 commanded the Fourth Guards Army. Thereafter was at the disposal of Chief Personnel Directorate of Red Army. Worked as deputy head of Chief Directorate for the Composition of Troop Units. After World War II deputy commander of the Volga Military District. Retired in June 1946. Falsely accused of treason and executed in 1950. In 1957 posthumously restored to the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

**Kurchatov, Igor Vasilyevich.** (1902/3–1960). Leading atomic physicist and head of Soviet nuclear weapons program. Son of a forester. In early 1920s student in Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of Simferopol University in the Crimea, then in Shipbuilding Faculty of Polytechnical Institute in Petrograd (Leningrad, Saint Petersburg). While studying worked as an observer at Pavlov Magnetic-Meteorological Observatory and conducted research on the radioactivity of snow. Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (1932). A member of USSR Academy of Sciences (1943) and of its presidium. Engaged in research on high-voltage isolation, electrical insulation, segneto-

electricity, isomerism, and other newly discovered physical phenomena. Supervised creation of the first Soviet cyclotron (1939) and discovery of spontaneous splitting of the uranium nucleus (1940). During World War II worked on protecting ships against mines. Founder and from 1943 until his death first director of Institute of Atomic Energy of the USSR Academy of Sciences (later named in his honor). His institute created the first atomic reactor in Europe (1946), the first Soviet atomic bomb (1949), the world's first thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb (1953), the first atomic power plant (1954), and the world's first atomic-powered icebreaker. Also wrote poetry and loved music. A member of USSR Academy of Sciences (1943) and of its presidium. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Thrice Hero of Socialist Labor. In 1964 Soviet physicists artificially obtained a heavy (atomic number 104) unstable radioactive element and named it Kurchatovy (Latin name Kurtchatovium) after him. In 1983 a town in Kursk province was named Kurchatov in his honor.

**Kuznetsov, Aleksei Aleksandrovich** (1905–50). Joined party in 1925. Lieutenant general from 1943. From 1938 second secretary and from 1945 first secretary of the Leningrad province and city committees of the party. From 1939 to 1949 a member and from 1946 to 1949 a secretary of the party CC and a member of its Orgburo. Executed in connection with the “Leningrad Affair.”

**Kuznetsov, Nikolai Dmitriyevich** (1911—95). Specialist on jet engines. Co-author of works on gas-turbine and turbojet engines. Joined Red Army in 1933. In 1938 graduated simultaneously from flying school and from Air Force Academy, where he remained to teach in department of aircraft-engine design. First scientific works on resilience of components of reciprocating aircraft engines. In 1941–42 senior engineer in fighter air division in Northwestern Front. At end of 1942 recalled from Front and posted to aviation industry. From 1943 to 1946 deputy chief designer and from 1946 to 1949 chief designer of aircraft engines at V. Ya. Klimov's design bureau. In 1949 placed in charge of a design bureau for engine construction in Kuibyshev (Samara). Supervised research to create cooled high-temperature turbines for gas-turbine aircraft engines, including the world's most powerful turbo-propeller engine NK-12 (used in the TU-95 strategic bomber, the TU-114 airliner, the AN-22 transport plane, etc.). From 1956 until retirement in 1992 general designer of design bureau for aircraft engines. From 1960s to beginning of 1980s supervised development of several successor models in the NK class, used in many different planes. Also created powerful liquid-jet engines for rocket launchers and engines for boats and ships and for

gas-pumping stations. Pioneer in development of aircraft engines using alternative fuels: in 1988–89 test flights of experimental plane TU-155 with engine NK-88 using liquid hydrogen. Became a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1974. Chairman of the Scientific Council of the Academy of Sciences on Reliability and Engine Life in Machine Building. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. Lieutenant general of the engineering-aviation service (1968).

**Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich** (1902–74). Took part in Civil War. Joined party in 1925. Graduated from Frunze Leningrad Naval College in 1926 and from Naval Academy in 1932. From 1933 to 1936 captain of a cruiser. In 1936–37 naval attaché and adviser to Republican Spain. From 1937 deputy commander in chief and from 1938 commander in chief of Pacific Fleet. From 1939 to 1946 people's commissar of the navy. In 1940 promoted to admiral and in 1944 to fleet admiral. Made Hero of the Soviet Union in 1945. In 1946–47 commander in chief of the navy and a deputy minister of the armed forces. In 1948 arrested and demoted to rank of rear admiral on fabricated charges of giving secret documents to the allies during World War II, but these charges were dropped. From 1948 to 1950 deputy commander in chief for naval forces in the Far East. In 1950–51 commander of Fifth Pacific Fleet. From 1951 to 1953 minister of the navy. Restored to rank of fleet admiral in May 1953. From 1953 to 1955 commander in chief of the navy and first deputy minister of defense. Dismissed following explosion on battleship *Novorossiisk* on October 29, 1955, with many casualties. In 1956 again reduced to rank of rear admiral and retired. In 1988 posthumously restored to rank of fleet admiral.

**Kuznetsov, Vasily Vasilyevich** (1901–90). Joined party in 1927. From 1940 to 1943 deputy chairman of Gosplan. From 1944 to 1953 chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, then Soviet ambassador to China, deputy and first deputy minister of foreign affairs. From 1977 to 1986 first deputy chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. A member of the party CC from 1952 to 1989 and of its Presidium from 1952 to 1953, a candidate member of its Politburo from 1977 to 1986.

**Lavochkin, Semyon Alekseyevich** (1900–1960). Aircraft designer. Studied aerodynamics at Moscow Higher Technical School. On graduation in 1927, worked at design bureau of A. N. Tupolev on the first Soviet bomber (ANT-4). In 1929 joined aircraft design bureau of P. E. Richard, then the bureau of new designs of H. Laville, finally the Central Design Bureau. In 1938–39 worked

at Chief Administration of Aviation Industry. From 1939 chief designer of design bureau for aircraft construction. Designed fighters (including LA-5 and LA-7, which played important roles in World War II), fighter-interceptors, jet planes, and missiles. In the 1950s took part in creation of the first Soviet anti-aircraft guided missile and of the intercontinental cruise missile “Burya.” Major general of the engineering-aviation service (1944). A corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences (1958). Awarded the State Prize. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Lavrentyev, Mikhail Alekseyevich** (1900–1980). Mathematician and mechanical engineer. A member of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences (1939) and of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1946). From 1946 to 1948 vice president of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences. From 1949 to 1952 director of Institute of Exact Mechanics and Computer Technology. From 1950 to 1953 and from 1955 to 1957 academic secretary of Division of Physical and Mathematical Sciences of the USSR Academy of Sciences. From 1957 vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences. From 1957 to 1975 chairman of the new Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Leonov, Aleksei Arkhipovich** (born 1934). Cosmonaut. First man to “walk” in space, on March 18, 1965, during flight on spaceship *Voskhod-2*. Took part in experimental flight *Apollo—Soyuz* in July 1975. Painted pictures on traditional themes and also “space art” based on color sketches made on his two space flights. Collaborated with space artist and architect Andrei Konstantinovich Sokolov. Pilot-cosmonaut of the USSR (1965). Air force major general (1975). Awarded the State Prize. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union.

**Levandovsky, Mikhail Karlovich** (1890–1938). Soviet military commander. During the Civil War in command of a troop grouping and armies in the Caucasus. From 1924 to 1925 in command of the Turkestan Front (against the *basmachi* partisans), then in command of a number of military districts. From 1934 to 1937 a member of the Military Council of the People’s Commissariat of Defense. Made army commander of the second rank in 1935. Executed.

**Likhachev, Ivan Alekseyevich** (1896–1956). From peasant family. Metal-worker, then sailor. Joined RSDLP in June 1917. Participated in October 1917 revolution. From December 1917 worked in the Cheka, later commanded a special detachment. From 1921 to 1926 engaged in trade union work, concurrently studied at Mining Academy, then at Moscow Electromechanical Institute. From 1926 to 1939 and from 1940 to 1950 director of Moscow Automobile

Plant. In 1939–40 people's commissar of medium machine building. From 1950 to 1953 director of Moscow Engineering Plant. From 1953 to 1956 minister of automobile transport and highways. A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1941 and from 1956. Awarded the State Prize. Colonel.

**Litvinov, Maxim Maximovich** (Vallakh; 1876–1951). Joined RSDLP in 1898. Participant in the revolutionary movement. From 1918 responsible official in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR. Plenipotentiary representative in Estonia in 1921, then deputy people's commissar and from 1930 to 1939 people's commissar of foreign affairs. From 1941 to 1943 Soviet ambassador to the United States. A member of the party CC from 1934 to 1941. A member of the All-Russia CEC and of the All-Union CEC. Supreme Soviet deputy from 1937 to 1950.

**Lobanov, Pavel Pavlovich** (1902–84). From 1938 to 1946 people's commissar of grain and livestock state farms of the USSR. From 1946 to 1953 deputy, then first deputy minister of agriculture of the USSR. From 1953 to 1955 first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR and concurrently minister of agriculture and procurements of the RSFSR. In 1955–56 deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. From 1956 to 1961 and from 1965 to 1978 president of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences and concurrently chairman of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet from 1956 to 1962 and deputy chairman of Gosplan from 1961 to 1965. Retired in 1978.

**Loga-Sowinski, Ignacy** (1914–?). Joined Communist Party of Poland in 1935. Became a member of the CC of the reformed Polish Workers Party in 1943. Delegate in the Sejm (parliament) from 1947 to 1952 and from 1957 to 1972. As an ally of Wladyslaw Gomulka, he was expelled from the party in 1949. Readmitted to the party, together with Gomulka, in 1956. From 1956 to 1971 leader of the Polish trade unions, deputy chairman of the State Council, and a member of the Politburo of the CC of the Polish United Workers Party, then Polish ambassador to Turkey.

**Lominadze, Vissarion Vissarionovich** (1897–1935). Son of a teacher. Joined party in 1917. Until 1924 occupied leading party posts. From 1925 to 1929 a prominent official of the Communist International, then occupied various party posts. Former supporter of Stalin who created a left opposition group in the party in 1928–29. Accused of cooperating with S. I. Syrtsov to form a "Left-Right" opposition bloc. Committed suicide to avoid arrest. At time of his death was secretary of the Magnitogorsk city committee of the party. A member of the party CC from 1930.

**Lomov, Georgy Ippolitovich** (Oppokov; 1888–1938). Joined RSDLP in 1903. People’s commissar of justice in the first Soviet government, then occupied important positions in the Supreme Council of the National Economy, the Siberian and Urals Bureaus of the party CC, the Urals Economic Council, the Oil Syndicate, the Moscow Soviet, “Donugol” (Don Coal), and Gosplan. At the time of his arrest, he was a member of the Bureau of the Soviet Control Commission.

**Lorkh, Aleksandr Georgiyevich** (1889–1980). One of the founders of potato breeding in the Soviet Union. Created a number of new varieties of potato. Director of an experimental research station in this field in the 1920s. Senior researcher at the Institute of Potato Cultivation from 1931 to 1941 and from 1948 to 1957. From 1945 senior lecturer and professor at the Timiryazev Moscow Agricultural Academy. Retired in 1957. Awarded the State Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Lozovsky, Solomon Abramovich** (Dridzo; 1878–1952). Joined RSDLP in 1901. From 1921 general secretary of the Trade Union International (Profintern). From 1939 to 1946 deputy people’s commissar (deputy minister) of foreign affairs, concurrently from 1941 to 1948 deputy head, then head of the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformburo) [for liaison with foreign communist parties]. Participated in a number of international conferences. From 1940 to 1949 head of department of the history of international relations and Soviet foreign policy at the Higher Party School under the party CC. Doctor of Historical Sciences (1939). Executed, posthumously rehabilitated.

**Lukomsky, Pavel Yevgenyevich** (1899–1976). Prominent nonspecialist physician and professor. Headed departments at a number of medical institutes. In 1966 became chief editor of the journal *Kardiologiya* (Cardiology). Became a member of the Academy of Medical Sciences in 1963, an Honored Scientist of the RSFSR in 1967, and a Hero of Socialist Labor in 1969.

**Lunacharsky, Anatoly Vasilyevich** (1875–1933). Son of a local government official. Studied in Switzerland, returned and joined RSDLP in 1896, then arrested and exiled. Prominent as a Bolshevik orator in 1917. From November 1917 to 1929 people’s commissar of enlightenment (i.e., education). Reformed the education system and promoted subsidization of the arts. Also headed the government campaign against illiteracy. From 1929 to 1933 chairman of the academic committee (*ucheny komitet*) under the All-Union CEC. In 1930, together with Maxim Litvinov (vide), represented the USSR at the League of Nations in Geneva. Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1930. In



1933 appointed Soviet ambassador to Spain but died before he could take up his post. Author of literary sketches and works of Marxist philosophy.

**Lyulka, Arkhip Mikhailovich** (1908–84). Pioneer of Soviet jet-engine construction. Graduated in 1931 from Kiev Polytechnical Institute, then graduate work in thermodynamics at Kharkov Institute of Industrial Energetics. Research on steam-gas-turbine and jet engines at Special Design Bureau No. 1 at Kharkov Turbo-Generator Plant. Taught at Kharkov Aviation Institute from 1933 to 1939. In 1936 began to promote his design of the first turbo-compressor air-jet engine, now in wide use. In 1939 transferred to Special Design Bureau at Kirov Plant in Leningrad. In 1941–42 at tank plant in Chelyabinsk. In 1944 appointed head of department of turbojet engines at new special scientific research institute for design of jet engines (NII-1). In 1945 appointed chief designer at plant for test production of turbojet engine TR-1. From 1946 general designer at design bureau. The TR-1 engine went into production in 1947 and was successfully tested in the first jet planes (SU-11 and IL-22) in 1947–48. Later designed successor models in the TR class. In 1957 became general designer of aviation engines. Also taught at Moscow Aviation Institute in 1950s and 1960s. From 1967 head of Commission of USSR Academy of Sciences on Gas Turbines. Developed ways to use new energy-producing materials. Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1968. Awarded the Lenin Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich** (1902–88). From a white-collar background. Joined party in 1920. Became an official in the apparatus of the party CC in 1925, and in that of the party's Moscow committee in 1930. From 1934 to 1939 head of the Department for Leading Party Bodies of the party CC. From 1939 to 1953 a secretary of the party CC and head of its Personnel Administration. From 1941 to 1945 a member of the State Defense Committee. Became a member of the Politburo of the party CC in 1946. From 1946 to 1953 deputy chairman and from 1953 to 1955 chairman of USSR Council of Ministers. From 1955 to 1957 minister of electric power plants. A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1957. For participating in the so-called antiparty group within the party CC removed in 1957 from his previous posts and appointed director of the Ust-Kamenogorsk hydroelectric power plant, then of the Ekibastuz thermoelectric power plant (both in Kazakhstan). Expelled from party in 1961.

**Malinovsky, Aleksandr Ivanovich** (1915–76). Ukrainian architect. Joined party in 1961. Graduated from Faculty of Architecture of Kiev Engineering-Construction Institute in 1940. Contributed to plan to reconstruct the



Kreshchatik (1949–56) and design of the Borispil Airport (1959–65) and various buildings in Kiev.

**Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich** (1898–1967). Noncommissioned officer in the tsarist army. Joined Red Army in 1919. Before assuming senior command posts was a military adviser in the Spanish civil war and an instructor at the Frunze Military Academy. During World War II commanded the Southern Front, the Don Operational Group (1942), the Second Guards Army in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad (1942–43), various Fronts engaged in offensive operations in Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia (1943–45), and the Transbaikal Front in the war with Japan (1945). Commander in chief of Soviet forces in the Far East from 1947 to 1953. Commander of the Far Eastern Military District from 1953 to 1956. First deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of ground forces in 1956–57. Minister of defense from 1957 to 1967. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944).

**Malinovsky, Roman Vatslavovich** (1876–1918). Activist in the Russian social-democratic movement. In 1907 began to give the tsarist secret police (Okhrana) information about the social-democratic underground and in 1910 officially recruited as an Okhrana agent. From 1912 to 1914 a member of the CC of the RSDLP. Deputy in the Fourth State Duma. Exposed in 1917 and sentenced by Supreme Tribunal of All-Russia CEC to be shot.

**Matskevich, Vladimir Vladimirovich** (1909–98). First deputy minister of agriculture from 1953 to 1955. Minister of agriculture from 1955 to 1960 and from 1965 to 1973. Concurrently deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1956, deputy chairman of the State Economic Commission in 1956–57, and deputy chairman of Gosplan from 1957 to 1961. From 1961 to 1965 chairman of the Virgin Lands Territory Executive Committee of the Kazakh SSR. From 1973 to 1980 Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, then retired.

**Mayakovsky, Vladimir Vladimirovich** (1893–1930). Published first tragic poems before and during World War I (1913–17). Poems include “*Oblako v shtanakh*” (Cloud in Trousers; 1915), “*Voina i mir*” (War and Peace; 1917), “150,000,000” (1921), “Vladimir Ilyich Lenin” (1924), “*Khorosho!*” (Good! 1927), and “*Vo ves golos*” (At the Top of My Voice; 1930). Reformer of poetic language. Influenced by futurist movement. Also wrote plays, the best known of which was *Banya* (The Bathhouse; 1929). Enthusiastic supporter of the revolution but felt that he was not understood. Committed suicide.

**Mazurov, Kirill Trofimovich** (1914–89). From 1942 to 1947 a secretary, then second secretary, then first secretary of the CC of the Komsomol of the

Belarussian SSR. From 1947 to 1950 second secretary, then first secretary of the Minsk city party committee. From 1950 to 1953 first secretary of the Minsk province committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia. From 1953 to 1956 chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian SSR. From 1956 to 1965 first secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Belorussia. From 1965 until retirement in 1978 first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. A member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the party CC from 1965 to 1978.

**Meir, Golda** (Meyerson; 1898–1978). General secretary of the Workers Party of Israel (Mapai) from 1966 to 1968. Prime minister of Israel from 1969 to 1974. Vice-President from 1972 and honorary president of the Socialist International from 1976 to 1978.

**Mekhlis, Lev Zakharovich** (1889–1953). White-collar worker. Joined party in 1918. Occupied leading party and Soviet posts, including work in Stalin's secretariat. From 1930 to 1937 head of the Press Department of the party CC and concurrently editor of the newspaper *Pravda*. From 1937 to 1941 (with an interval) head of Chief Political Directorate of army and navy. From 1941 to 1942 deputy people's commissar of defense. From 1940 deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. From 1942 to 1945 a member of the Military Councils of a number of Fronts (with the rank of colonel general). From 1940 to 1950 people's commissar (minister) of state control. From 1937 a member of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. A member of the party CC and of its Orgburo from 1939.

**Melnikov, Leonid Georgiyevich** (1906–81). Joined party in 1928. From 1942 to 1944 first secretary of the Karaganda province committee of the CP(B) of Kazakhstan. From 1944 to 1947 first secretary of the Stalino province committee of the CP(B) of Ukraine. From 1947 secretary, then second secretary, and from 1949 to 1953 first secretary of the CC of the CP(B) of Ukraine. From 1953 to 1955 Soviet ambassador to Romania. From 1955 to 1961 minister of construction of coal industry enterprises. From 1961 to 1964 chairman of the State Mining Inspectorate of the Kazakh SSR. From 1964 to 1966 chairman of the State Mining Inspectorate of the RSFSR. From 1966 to 1981 chairman of the State Mining Inspectorate of the USSR Council of Ministers. A member of the party CC from 1952 to 1961 and a member of its Presidium in 1952–53. Supreme Soviet deputy from 1941 to 1954.

**Meretskov, Kirill Afanasyevich** (1897–1968). From a peasant background. Worker. Joined party in 1917. Red Guard. Served in the Red Army from 1918.

Fought in the Civil War. Occupied leading staff, political, and command posts. Took part in the civil war in Spain from 1936. In 1939, during the Soviet-Finnish war, commanded the Seventh Army, which broke through the “Mannerheim line” on the Karelian isthmus. Thereafter commander of the Leningrad Military District. From August 1940 to January 1941 Chief of the General Staff, then deputy people’s commissar of defense. From the end of June to the end of August 1941 under investigation. From 1941 to 1945 commanded armies and also the Volkhov, Karelian, and First Far Eastern Front. Until 1955 commander of a number of military districts, then assistant minister of defense for higher military training institutions. A member of the Central Revision Commission from 1956 to 1961. From 1964 general inspector of the Group of General Inspectors of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union from 1944.

**Merkulov, Vsevolod Nikolayevich** (1895–1953). Joined the Cheka in 1921 and the party in 1925. Responsible party official in Georgia from 1931 to 1937. First deputy people’s commissar of internal affairs from 1938. People’s commissar of state security in 1941 and from 1943 to 1946. Head of Chief Administration of Soviet Property Abroad from 1947. Minister of state control from 1950. Shot on December 23, 1953 as a state criminal.

**Mezhlauk, Valery Ivanovich** (original Latvian first name, Martin; 1893–1938). Son of a teacher. A member of the Menshevik party from 1907 to 1913. Joined the Bolsheviks in July 1917. Graduated from Faculty of History and Philology (1914) and Faculty of Law (1917) of Kharkov University. In 1917–18 a member of the Kharkov Military-Revolutionary Committee, then people’s commissar of finance of Donetsk–Krivoi Rog Republic. From 1918 to 1920 in Red Army. Deputy people’s commissar, then people’s commissar for military affairs of Ukrainian SSR. From 1920 to 1922 railroad commissar. From 1922 to 1924 a member of the Collegium of the People’s Commissariat of Railroads. From 1924 to 1931 deputy head, then head of the Chief Metals Administration (Glavmetall), concurrently from 1928 to 1931 deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. From 1931 to 1934 first deputy chairman of Gosplan. From 1934 to 1937 a deputy chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and of the Council for Labor and Defense and chairman of Gosplan. A member of the party CC from 1934. A member of the All-Union CEC. From February to August 1937 people’s commissar of heavy industry. From August to October 1937 people’s commissar of machine building. From October to December 1937 a deputy chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and chairman of Gosplan. A member of the party CC from

1934 to 1937. Arrested in December 1937, sentenced by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, and executed in July 1938. Posthumously rehabilitated. Khrushchev was well acquainted with his brother Ivan Ivanovich Mezhlauk (1891–1938), who in the early 1920s headed Yugostal (South Steel) and was also arrested in December 1937 and executed.

**Mikhailov, Konstantin Vasilyevich** (born 1913). Specialist in construction technology. In 1938 graduated from Construction Faculty of the Georgian Industrial Institute. Fought in war from 1941 to 1943, when recalled to Moscow. From early 1950s a research associate, from 1965 to 1988 director, and thereafter a chief specialist of the Moscow Scientific Research Institute of Concrete and Reinforced Concrete. His own chief area of research was the development and application of new kinds of steel wire and cable reinforcement. Elected vice president of International Federation for Reinforced Concrete. Doctor of Technical Sciences.

**Mikhoels, Solomon Mikhailovich** (Vovsi; 1890–1948). Prominent Jewish actor and theatrical director. Began acting in 1919. Worked in the Moscow State Jewish Theater, from 1929 as its artistic director. Made People's Artist of the USSR in 1939. Among roles played were Lear in Shakespeare's *King Lear* and *Tevye the Milkman* in Shalom Aleichem's play of the same name. Awarded State Prize of the USSR in 1946. During and after the war a leader of the Jewish Antifascist Committee (the Antifascist Committee of the Soviet Jewish Public). Murdered on Stalin's orders by the MGB (secret police).

**Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich** (1895–1978). From 1926 to 1930 people's commissar of domestic and foreign trade. From 1930 to 1934 people's commissar of supply. From 1934 to 1938 people's commissar of food industry. From 1938 to 1949 and again in 1953 people's commissar (minister) of foreign trade and concurrently from 1937 to 1955 a deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers). From 1955 to 1964 first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 1964–65 chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. From 1965 to 1974 a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, then in retirement. A member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the party CC from 1935 to 1966.

**Mikoyan, Artyom Ivanovich** (1905–70). Aircraft designer. Joined party in 1924. Turner, studied at tank school and then at Zhukovsky Air Force Academy, graduating in 1937 as military engineer-mechanic. Worked at N. N. Polikarpov's aircraft plant, first as military representative and then as designer. In 1939 appointed deputy head of design bureau of Plant No. 1. From 1940 chief designer, later general designer of the Design and Test Bureau (OKB) for

Aircraft Construction. In collaboration with M. I. Gurevich designed fighters of the MIG class (including the MIG-15, MIG-21, and MIG-29). Colonel general of the engineering-technical service. Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1968. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. Brother of Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan.

**Mil, Mikhail Leontyevich** (1909–70). Prominent designer of helicopters and gyroplanes. Became student at Siberian Technological Institute in 1926, transferred to Don Polytechnical Institute in 1928. In 1930, while still a student, invited to Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI) to work in a department to develop vertical flight machines. From 1931 engaged in aerodynamics and design of gyroplanes. At end of 1930s became deputy of N. I. Kamov. From 1941 to 1943 engineer of a flotilla of combat gyroplanes. In 1943 appointed head of a group working on controllability and maneuverability of aircraft. After World War II worked at TsAGI in a group to design a helicopter. In 1947 appointed chief designer of a new design bureau for helicopter construction. First helicopter model MI-1 went into series production in 1950. Later developed the MI-4 for transport and paratroop landings, the MI-6 for use in building bridges and industrial enterprises, and the MI-2 for economic applications (e.g., spreading fertilizer), the MI-8 turbine helicopter, and other models. One model of unusual design was the V-12, which in 1969 set a record as the most powerful load-lifting helicopter in the world. Doctor of Technical Sciences. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Mitin, Mark Borisovich** (1901–87). Joined party in 1919. Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1939. Author of philosophical works on the theory of dialectical and historical materialism. One of Stalin's biographers. Awarded the State Prize. A Supreme Soviet deputy from 1950 to 1962.

**Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich** (Skryabin; 1890–1986). Joined RSDLP in 1906. Participated in the revolutionary movement. From 1909 to 1911 in exile in Totma, Solvychevodsk, and Vologda. From 1919 chairman of the Nizhny Novgorod Province Executive Committee, then a secretary of the Donetsk province committee of the party. From 1921 to 1930 a secretary of the party CC. From 1930 to 1941 chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. From 1942 to 1957 first deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers). From 1941 to 1945 deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee. From 1939 to 1949 and from 1953 to 1956 people's commissar of foreign affairs. From 1957 Soviet ambassador to Mongolia. From 1960 to 1962 permanent representative of the USSR at the International Atomic Energy Agency. At various times a member of the party CC, of its

Orgburo and Politburo, and of the All-Russia CEC and All-Union CEC. Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet from 1937 to 1958. In June 1957 removed from party posts for factional activity.

**Moskalenko, Kirill Semyonovich** (1902–85). During World War II occupied a series of important command posts. Commanded the 38th Army from 1945 to 1948, the Moscow antiaircraft defense district from 1948 to 1953, and the Moscow Military District from 1953 to 1960. From 1960 to 1962 commander in chief of Strategic Missile Forces and concurrently deputy minister of defense. From 1962 to 1983 chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense and concurrently deputy minister of defense. From 1983 a member of the Group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1955). Hero of the Soviet Union.

**Musiyko, Aleksandr Samsonovich** (1903–80). Ukrainian plant grower and breeder. Joined party in 1938. Graduated from Poltava Agricultural Institute in 1927. From 1939 to 1941 and after 1945 worked at All-Union Breeding-Genetics Institute in Odessa, from 1958 to 1971 as director. In 1941 discovered new method of raising crop yields by means of supplementary artificial pollination. Author of works on the biology, breeding, and seed cultivation of agricultural crops. Created several hybrid and other varieties of corn, buckwheat, and rye. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize.

**Myasishchev, Vladimir Mikhailovich** (1902–78). Aircraft designer. From 1920 to 1924 studied at Faculty of Mechanics of Moscow Higher Technical School; his teachers included A. N. Tupolev. From 1924 to 1926 worked at Scientific Testing Aerodrome of Air Force, then joined Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI). Worked on the first Soviet bomber (ANT-4). In 1934 appointed head of group designing experimental planes. Designed torpedo-armed fighter ANT-41, bombers, and transport planes. In 1937 placed in charge of design bureau. Arrested in 1938, worked with Tupolev at Special Technical Bureau while still in detention, released in 1940. In evacuation worked on long-range bombers. Major general of the engineering service (1944). In 1946 appointed dean of Faculty of Aircraft Construction of Moscow Aviation Institute. In 1951 appointed chief designer of a new special design bureau (OKB-23) to produce the jet bomber 3M (Bear); finally succeeded in 1957 with model 201M. In 1960, when OKB-23 was absorbed by Chelomei's OKB-52, became director of TsAGI. Doctor of Technical Sciences. Awarded the Lenin Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Mzhavanadze, Vasily Pavlovich** (1902–88). Joined party in 1927. Lieutenant general from 1944. First secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of

Georgia from 1953 to 1972. A candidate member of the Politburo of the party CC from 1957 to 1972.

**Nedelin, Mitrofan Ivanovich** (1902–60). Joined Red Army in 1920. During World War II occupied a series of important positions in command of artillery forces in the North Caucasus, Southwestern, and Third Ukrainian Fronts. Played especially important role in liberation of Hungary. In 1945–46 commander of artillery in the Southern Group of Forces. From 1946 to 1948 chief of staff and deputy commander of Soviet Army artillery. From 1948 to 1950 head of the Chief Artillery Directorate of Red Army. From 1950 to 1952 commander of Soviet Army artillery, in 1952–53 deputy war minister, and from 1953 to 1955 again commander of Soviet Army artillery. From 1955 deputy minister of defense, and concurrently from 1959 until his death commander in chief of Strategic Missile Forces. Died in accidental explosion at the Tyuratam missile test range on October 24, 1960. Hero of the Soviet Union (1945). Chief Marshal of Artillery (1959).

**Novikov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich** (1900–1976). Joined party in 1920. Chief air force marshal from 1944. Commander of Soviet air forces from 1942 to 1946 and of long-range air forces from 1953 to 1955. In confinement from 1946 to 1953.

**Ochab, Edward** (1906–89). Joined Communist Party of Poland in 1929. Served from 1943 in the Polish Kosciusko Division. A member of the CC of the Polish Workers Party (later Polish United Workers Party) from 1944 to 1968 and of its Politburo from 1954 to 1968. From 1950 to 1956 a secretary of the CC of the Polish United Workers Party and from 1959 to 1964 and in 1956 first secretary. Chairman of the State Council of the Polish People's Republic from 1964 to 1968.

**Ordzhonikidze, Grigory Konstantinovich** (1886–1937). From a gentry background. Joined RSDLP in 1903. Participated in the revolutions of 1905, February 1917, and October 1917 and in the Iranian revolution (1909–11). After 1917 occupied a number of leading military-state and political party posts. From 1922 to 1926 first secretary of the Transcaucasus and North Caucasus territory committees of the party. From 1926 to 1930 chairman of the Central Control Commission of the party. People's commissar of workers' and peasants' inspection and deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Council of Labor and Defense. From 1930 chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. From 1932 people's commissar of heavy industry. In 1920 and then (after a gap) from 1921 a member of the party CC and from 1930 a member of its Politburo. Committed suicide.



**Ovechkin, Valentin Vladimirovich** (1904–68). Writer of stories, novels, essays, and plays, including *Gosti v Stukachakh* (Guests in Stukachi; 1940), *S frontovym privetom* (With Greetings from the Front; 1945), and *Rayonnyye budni* (Life as Usual in the County; 1952–56), on the problems of rural life.

**Paletskis, Yustas Ignovich** (1899–1980). Joined party in 1940. In the interwar period worked as teacher, translator, and journalist for left-wing newspapers in Latvia and Lithuania. In July 1940 became prime minister and acting president of the Lithuanian People's Government. From August 1940 to 1967 chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR. From 1966 until retirement in 1970 chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Panteleyev, Yuri Aleksandrovich** (1901–83). Joined Navy in 1918. In 1940–41 chief of staff of Baltic Fleet. Rear admiral (June 1941). During World War II led naval defense of Leningrad and the Lake Region. In 1941–42 commander of Leningrad Naval Base. From 1942 to 1944 assistant to head of Main Naval Staff. In 1944–45 commander of Belomor Flotilla. In 1945–46 commander of Belomor Naval Defense Area of Northern Fleet. In 1946–47 head of Navy's Combat Training Directorate. In 1947–48 deputy head of Main Naval Staff. From 1948 to 1951 head of Voroshilov Naval Academy. From 1951 to 1953 commander of Fifth Naval Fleet. From 1953 to 1956 commander of Pacific Fleet. From 1956 to 1960 head of Krylov Naval Academy of Shipbuilding and Armaments. From 1960 to 1967 head of Naval Academy.

**Patolichev, Nikolai Semyonovich** (1908–89). Joined party in 1928. From 1939 to 1946 first secretary of the Yaroslavl and Chelyabinsk province and city committees of the party. In 1946–47 a secretary of the party CC and concurrently head of its Administration for Checks on Party Bodies. In 1947 a secretary of the CC of Communist Party of Ukraine. From 1947 to 1950 first secretary of Rostov province and city committees of the party. From 1950 to 1956 first secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Belorussia. From 1956 to 1958 deputy, then first deputy minister of foreign affairs. From 1958 until retirement in 1985 minister of foreign trade. From 1941 to 1986 a member of the party CC and from 1946 to 1947 a member of its Orgburo.

**Paulus, Friedrich** (1890–1957). German general. Commanded the Sixth Army at Stalingrad in 1942. Shortly after promotion to field marshal in January 1943, surrendered with his army. Took part in the pro-Soviet National Committee "Free Germany" (*Freies Deutschland*). After World War II lived in East Germany.



**Pervukhin, Mikhail Georgiyevich** (1904–78). Joined party in 1919. Teacher and local party official. Graduated from the Plekhanov Moscow Institute of the National Economy in 1929. From 1929 to 1933 engineer at Moscow factories. From 1933 engineer and from 1936 director of an electric power plant. From 1937 head of the Chief Energy Administration (Glavenergo) of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. In 1938 deputy, then first deputy people's commissar of heavy industry. In 1939–40 people's commissar of electric power plants and the electrical industry. From 1940 to 1944 deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and chairman of its Fuel and Electricity Council. Concurrently from 1942 to 1950 people's commissar (minister) of chemical industry. From 1950 to 1955 deputy chairman and from 1955 to 1957 first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, also chairman of various specialized bureaus of the Council of Ministers and (in 1956–57) of its State Economic Commission for Current Planning. In 1957 minister of medium machine building. In 1957–58 chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Economic Ties. From 1958 to 1963 Soviet ambassador to the GDR (East Germany). From 1963 to 1965 head of the Department for Energy and Electrification of the Council of the National Economy, then head of the Territorial Planning Department of Gosplan and a member of its collegium. A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1961 and of its Presidium from 1952 to 1957.

**Petrovsky, Grigory Ivanovich** (1878–1958). Craftsman. Participant in the revolutionary movement from 1897. Joined RSDLP in 1898. Deputy to the fourth State Duma. From 1917 people's commissar of internal affairs of Soviet Russia. In 1919 chairman of the All-Ukraine Revolutionary Committee. From 1919 to 1938 chairman of the All-Ukraine CEC. From 1922 one of the chairmen of the All-Union CEC. From 1921 to 1939 a member of the party CC and from 1926 to 1939 a candidate member of its Politburo. Supreme Soviet deputy from 1937 to 1946. From 1940 until his retirement deputy director of the Museum of the Revolution.

**Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich** (1903–83). Joined party in 1930. From peasant background. Metalworker, then from 1921 to 1923 secretary of a county committee of the Komsomol in Poltava province. Studied from 1926 to 1931 at the Kiev Technological Institute of Food Industry. From 1931 to 1939 an engineer in the Ukrainian sugar industry. Deputy people's commissar of food industry of the Ukrainian SSR from 1939 to 1940 and of the USSR from 1940 to 1942. From 1942 to 1944 director of the Moscow Technological Institute of Food Industry. From 1944 to 1946 deputy people's commissar of food industry

of the Ukrainian SSR. From 1946 to 1950 permanent representative of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. From 1950 to 1953 first secretary of the Kharkov province committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. From 1953 second secretary and from 1957 to 1963 first secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine. From 1963 to 1965 a secretary of the CC of the CPSU. From 1965 until retirement in 1977 chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. A member of the Central Inspection Commission of the CPSU from 1952 to 1956. A member of the party CC from 1956 to 1981 and of its Presidium (Politburo) from 1960 to 1977. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Podlas, Kuzma Petrovich** (1893–1942). Joined party in 1918. Military man. Fought in Civil War. Commander of subunits, units, and formations. In connection with failures in combat against Japanese forces near Lake Khasan in 1938, dismissed from position of division commander in the First Maritime Army and sentenced by Military Collegium of Supreme Court to five years in camp. Case later reexamined, returned to Red Army shortly before outbreak of war. In 1941 lieutenant general. Commander of 57th Army in Southwestern Front. Perished in battle in May 1942 during encirclement of his army near Kharkov.

**Polikarpov, Nikolai Nikolayevich** (1892–1944). From 1910 worked at Russo-Baltic Aircraft Plant and returned there in 1916 on graduation from Petrograd Polytechnical Institute. In 1918 appointed head of technical department of the first Soviet aircraft plant. In 1923 built the first Soviet fighter in series production (IL-400). Formed design bureau OKB-51. Designed several fighters (including the I-15 and I-16, which played roles in the Spanish civil war and World War II) and a reconnaissance plane. Also taught at Moscow Aviation Institute. Awarded the State Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Polyakov, Vasily Ivanovich** (1913–?). Party official and journalist. Joined party in 1939. In 1927–28 worked on a collective farm. From 1928 to 1933 a teacher. From 1933 to 1935 agronomist at a Machine and Tractor Station. Graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Journalism in 1938, then engaged in editorial work. From 1941 to 1946 in Soviet Army. From 1946 to 1960 deputy editor, then editor of the Agriculture Department of the newspaper *Pravda* and a member of its editorial board. From 1960 to 1962 chief editor of newspaper *Selskaya Zhizn* (Rural Life). From 1962 to 1964 a member, a secretary, and head of a department of the CC of the CPSU, with responsibility for agriculture. From 1964 to retirement in 1984 deputy chief editor

and responsible secretary of the CC CPSU weekly *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Economic Newspaper).

**Polyansky, Dmitry Stepanovich** (born 1917). From 1949 to 1952 second secretary of the Crimean province committee of the party. From 1952 to 1954 chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Crimean province. From 1954 to 1955 first secretary of the Crimean province committee of the party. From 1955 to 1957 first secretary of the Orenburg (Chkalovsky) province committee of the party. From 1957 to 1958 first secretary of the Krasnodar territory committee of the party. From 1958 to 1962 chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. From 1962 to 1965 deputy chairman and from 1965 to 1973 first deputy chairman of USSR Council of Ministers. From 1973 to 1976 minister of agriculture. Soviet ambassador to Japan from 1976 to 1982 and to Norway from 1982 until retirement in 1987. A member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the party CC from 1960 to 1976.

**Ponomarenko, Panteleimon Kondratyevich** (1902–84). From a peasant background. Joined party in 1925. In 1932 graduated from the Moscow Institute of Transportation Engineers. From 1932 to 1936 battalion commander in Red Army. From 1938 to 1947 first secretary of the CC of the CP(B) of Belorussia. During World War II a member of several Military Councils and from 1942 chief of the central staff of the partisan movement. From 1944 to 1948 represented the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of Belorussia. Became a secretary of the party CC in 1948, a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1952, and first secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in 1954. From 1955 to 1962 Soviet ambassador successively to Poland, India, and the Netherlands. From 1962 to 1964 Soviet representative at International Atomic Energy Agency. Retired in 1965. A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1961 and of its Presidium in 1952–53.

**Popov, Georgy Mikhailovich** (1906–68). From a white-collar background. Joined party in 1926. From 1928 to 1938 a researcher at the Moscow Central Institute of Labor, then an official in the apparatus of the party CC. From 1938 to 1945 second secretary of the Moscow city committee of the party. From 1944 to 1950 chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet. From 1945 to 1949 first secretary of the Moscow committee and of the Moscow city committee of the party. From 1946 to 1952 a secretary of the party CC. From 1951 minister of town planning, then of agricultural machine building, thereafter director of a number of factories. From 1953 to 1954 Soviet ambassador to Poland. Retired in 1965.

**Poskrebyshv, Aleksandr Nikolayevich** (1891–1965). Joined party in 1917. From 1922 instructor (position in party apparatus) and aide to the general secretary (Stalin). From 1928 to 1953 head of the special sector of the Secretariat of the party CC and of its Secret Department. From 1952 a secretary of Presidium of the party CC and of its Bureau. From 1939 a member of the party CC.

**Pospelov, Pyotr Nikolayevich** (1898–1979). Joined RSDLP in 1916. Party official and propagandist. From 1940 to 1949 chief editor of the newspaper *Pravda*. From 1949 to 1952 and from 1961 to 1967 director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism attached to the party CC. A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1971, a secretary of the CC from 1953 to 1960, and a candidate member of its Presidium from 1957 to 1961. Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1953. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Priimak, Boris Ivanovich** (born 1909). Architect. Graduated from Faculty of Architecture of Kharkov Art Institute in 1930. From 1930 to 1935 engaged in planning of cities of Mariupol, Krivoi Rog, and Tbilisi. From 1936 to 1940 graduate student at Academy of Architecture. Took part in developing the first and second general plans for the reconstruction of Kiev (1949, 1964). Contributed to the plan to reconstruct the Kreshchatik (1949–54). Involved in design of post office on Kalinin Square (1952–57), the Hotel Moskva (1959–66), the Paton Bridge, and a number of subway stations in Kiev (1962–63, 1976). From 1955 to 1973 chief architect of Kiev. From 1971 professor at Kiev Art Institute. Made People's Architect of the USSR in 1979.

**Promyslov, Vladimir Fyodorovich** (1908–93). Born in poor peasant family. From 1924 metalworker. Joined party in 1928. In 1929 graduated from Moscow Engineering-Construction Institute. From 1929 to 1933 occupied various positions in Construction Workers' Union. From 1933 to 1938 worked in various construction organizations. In 1938 appointed aide to secretary of Moscow city committee of the party. From 1939 to 1941 worked in People's Commissariat of Heavy Machine Building. In 1941–42 headed construction at tank factories in Barnaul (Siberia). From 1942 to 1944 head of Chief Administration of Capital Construction of People's Commissariat of Tank Industry. After World War II occupied various party posts connected with construction. From 1949 to 1951 and from 1953 to 1954 deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee, then a secretary of the Moscow city committee of the party, first deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee and head of the Chief Moscow Construction Administration (Glavmosstroi), chairman of the State Committee for Con-

struction of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, minister of construction of the RSFSR, and from 1963 until retirement in 1986 chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee. In 1957 awarded Order of Lenin.

**Pryanishnikov, Dmitry Nikolayevich** (1865–1948). Soil scientist. Founder of the “agrochemical” school. Worked out theory of the role of nitrogen and phosphorus in plant nutrition. A member of the Academy of Sciences (1929) and of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (1935). Author of works on the liming of acid soils and the use of fertilizers and of the well-known textbook *Agrokhimiya* (Agrochemistry, 1940). Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Pustovoit, Vasily Stepanovich** (1886–1972). Plant breeder. Worked out a highly effective system for breeding sunflowers and developed twenty high-oil, blight-resistant varieties. A member of the Academy of Sciences (1964) and of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (1956). Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Pyatakov, Georgy (Yuri) Leonidovich** (1890–1937). Soviet state and party figure. Joined RSDLP in 1910, participant in the revolutionary movement. Commissar of the People’s Bank in 1917–18. Chairman of the Provisional Worker-Peasant Government of Ukraine. Leader of reconstruction of the Donbas from 1920. Deputy chairman of the RSFSR Gosplan. Deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy from 1923. Trade representative in France in 1927. Chairman of the board of the State Bank from 1929. Deputy and first deputy deputy people’s commissar of heavy industry from 1932 to 1936. Executed.

**Redens, Stanislav Frantsevich** (1892–1940). Joined RSDLP in 1914. Prominent official of the OGPU and the NKVD (secret police). From 1935 commissar of state security of the first rank. Executed, posthumously rehabilitated.

**Remeslo, Vasily Nikolayevich** (1907–83). Plant breeder. Worked out methods of creating high-yielding varieties of wheat. Developed seventeen new varieties of winter wheat. A member of the Academy of Sciences (1974) and of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (1964). Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Rodionov, Mikhail Ivanovich** (1907–50). Joined party in 1925. From 1940 to 1946 first secretary of the Gorky province and city committees of the party. From 1946 to 1949 chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. Executed in connection with the “Leningrad Affair.”

**Rudenko, Roman Andreyevich** (1907–81). From a peasant background. Joined party in 1936. Worked in the procuracy from 1925. In 1937 appointed procurator of Donetsk province. From 1944 to 1953 procurator of the Ukrainian SSR. In 1945–46 chief prosecutor for the USSR at the Nüremberg trial of Nazi war criminals. From 1953 to 1981 procurator general of the USSR. A member of the party CC from 1961. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Rudzutak, Yan Ernestovich** (1887–1938). From a peasant background. Worker. Joined RSDLP in 1905. Participated in the revolutions of 1905, February 1917, and October 1917. From 1917 chairman of Moscow Council of the National Economy, of Central Administration of Textile Industry, of the CC of the Trade Union of Transportation Workers, of the Turkestan Commission of the All-Russia CEC and of the Turkestan (Central Asian) Bureau of the party CC. From 1923 secretary of the party CC. From 1924 people's commissar of communications. From 1926 to 1937 deputy chairman of Council of People's Commissars and of Council of Labor and Defense. From 1931 people's commissar of workers' and peasants' inspection. A member of the party CC from 1920 and of its Politburo from 1926 to 1932. A member of the All-Union CEC. Executed, posthumously rehabilitated.

**Rukhimovich, Moisei Lvovich** (1889–1938). Worker. Joined RSDLP in 1913. Played an active role in the Civil War and the struggle for Soviet power in Ukraine. From 1921 to 1922 chairman of the Yuzovka Province Executive Committee. From 1923 to 1925 manager of the trust "Donugol" (Don Coal), then chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR and deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR. From 1930 to 1934 people's commissar of communications of the RSFSR. Manager of the trust "Kuzbassugol" (Kuzbas Coal). At time of arrest was people's commissar of defense industry. Rehabilitated posthumously.

**Rykov, Aleksei Ivanovich** (1881–1938). Joined RSDLP in 1898. Active participant in the revolutionary movement. People's commissar of internal affairs of the RSFSR from November 1917. Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy from 1918 to 1921 and from 1923 to 1924. Deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Council of Labor and Defense from 1921. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars from 1924 to 1930 and chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense from 1926 to 1930. People's commissar of posts and telegraphs (people's commissar of communications) from 1931 to 1936. For many years was a member of the

party CC and of its Politburo and Orgburo, and also of the All-Russia CEC and of the All-Union CEC. Executed, posthumously rehabilitated.

**Rylsky, Maksim Faddeyevich** (1895–1964). Poet, translator, and publicist. An active public figure. Composer of “subjective verse.” Teacher by profession. Joined party in 1943. A member of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences (1943) and of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1958). Chairman of the Ukraine Writers Union from 1943 to 1946. Director of Institute of Art Study, Folklore, and Ethnography of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences from 1944 to 1964.

**Saburov, Maksim Zakharovich** (1900–1977). Soviet state figure. Joined party in 1920. Chairman of Gosplan from 1941 to 1942 and from 1949 to 1956. Deputy and first deputy chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (Council of Ministers) from 1941 to 1944 and from 1947 to 1957. A member of the party CC from 1952 to 1961 and of its Presidium from 1952 to 1957, thereafter engaged in economic work. Supreme Soviet deputy from 1947 to 1958.

**Sakharov, Andrei Dmitriyevich** (1921–89). Theoretical physicist. From 1968 on, a prominent dissident. Author of works on the thermonuclear reaction and controlled thermonuclear synthesis, magnetic retention of high-temperature plasmas, the physics of elementary particles, astrophysics, gravitation, and cosmology. Son of a professor of physics. In 1942 graduated from Faculty of Physics of Moscow University and was sent to armaments plant in Volga region. After the war worked at Lebedev Physics Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences under the famous quantum physicist Igor Tamm. Doctor of Physico-Mathematical Sciences (1947). Worked with Tamm on the hydrogen bomb that was tested in August 1953. Youngest scientist ever to be elected a member of the Academy of Sciences (1953). In 1958 submitted memorandum to Khrushchev proposing halt to nuclear weapons testing. In 1960s became active in human rights movement. In 1968 circulated manifesto entitled *Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*, calling for freedom of thought and East-West cooperation and envisaging gradual convergence of the two systems. Removed from military work, but allowed to return to Lebedev Institute as senior research associate and resume theoretical research into elementary particles, gravitation, and cosmology. In 1970, together with other physicists, set up a committee for human rights. In 1973 criticized in *Pravda* in article signed by forty Academicians. In 1975 awarded Nobel peace prize for activity in defense of human rights. In 1980, after condemning invasion of Afghanistan, exiled to Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod)



and placed under house arrest. In 1986 telephoned by Gorbachev and invited to return to Moscow. In 1989, elected a deputy to the Supreme Soviet, he presented a draft for a new Soviet constitution. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Thrice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Serov, Ivan Aleksandrovich** (1905–90). In 1939 head of the Chief Directorate of Worker-Peasant Militias of the NKVD (secret police), then deputy head of the NKVD's Chief Directorate of State Security. From 1939 to 1941 people's commissar of internal affairs of Ukrainian SSR. In 1941 first deputy people's commissar of state security. From 1941 to 1954 deputy, then first deputy people's commissar (minister) of internal affairs. From 1954 to 1958 chairman of the KGB. From 1958 to 1963 head of Chief Intelligence Directorate of General Staff (GRU, military intelligence). Retired in 1965.

**Shakhurin, Aleksei Ivanovich** (1904–75). From peasant background. Joined party in 1925. Electrician, then an official of the Komsomol. Graduated from Moscow Engineering-Economic Institute in 1932. In 1932–33 engineer at aircraft plant. From 1933 to 1937 senior engineer, then head of scientific research department at Zhukovsky Air Force Academy. In 1937–38 party organizer at aircraft plant. In 1938–39 first secretary of the Yaroslavl province committee, then in 1939–40 of the Gorky province committee of the party. From 1940 to 1946 people's commissar of the aviation industry. Arrested in 1946 and sentenced by Military Collegium of the Supreme Court to seven years in camp, rehabilitated and released in 1953. In 1953–54 deputy minister, from 1954 to 1956 first deputy minister, and in 1956–57 again deputy minister of the aviation industry. From 1957 until retirement in 1959 deputy chairman of State Committee of the Council of Ministers for External Economic Ties. A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1946. Colonel general of the engineering-aviation service. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Shayakhmetov, Zhumabai** (1902–66). Born to family of a nomadic Kazakh shepherd. Joined party in 1929. Agricultural laborer, then village teacher. From 1923 to 1925 worked in local criminal-investigation agencies. From 1925 to 1928 secretary of a district committee of Union of Poor Kazakh Peasants. From 1928 to 1938 engaged in operational work for NKVD (secret police), deputy head of province administrations of NKVD. From 1938 third secretary, from 1939 second secretary, and from 1946 to 1954 first secretary of the CC of the CP(B) of Kazakhstan. From 1950 to 1954 concurrently chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet. From March 1954 until retirement in January 1955 first secretary of South Kazakhstan province party committee. A member of the party CC from 1952 to 1956.



**Shchadenko, Yefim Afakasyevich** (1885–1951). Colonel general. Commander in First Cavalry Army in Civil War. From 1935 to 1937 head of Organization and Mobilization Directorate of Red Army. From 1937 to 1945 deputy people's commissar of defense. From 1937 to 1941 head of Directorate for Commanding Personnel of Red Army. From 1941 to 1943 head of Directorate for Recruitment and Personnel of Red Army. In 1943–44 political commissar in Southern Front and then in Fourth Ukrainian Front.

**Shcherbakov, Aleksandr Sergeyeovich** (1901–45). Soviet state and party figure. Joined party in 1918. One of the leaders of the Writers Union at the beginning of the 1930s. Secretary of a number of province committees of the party from 1936. First secretary of the Moscow Committee and Moscow City Committee of the party from 1938 to 1945. A secretary of the party CC and head of the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformburo) from 1941. Head of Chief Political Directorate of the army and navy from 1942. Deputy people's commissar of defense and colonel general from 1943. A candidate member of the Politburo of the party CC from 1941.

**Shelepin, Aleksandr Nikolayevich** (1918–94). From 1940 an official of the Komsomol. From 1943 a secretary and from 1952 to 1958 first secretary of the CC of the Komsomol. From April to December 1958 a department head in the party CC. From 1958 to 1961 chairman of the KGB. From 1961 to 1967 a secretary of the party CC and concurrently from 1962 to 1965 chairman of the Committee of Party-State Control and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. From 1967 to 1975 chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. From 1975 until retirement in 1984 deputy chairman of the State Committee for Professional-Technical Education. A member of the party CC from 1952 to 1976 and of its Politburo (Presidium) from 1964 to 1975.

**Shelest, Pyotr Yefimovich** (1908–96). Graduated from Mariupol Metallurgical Institute in 1935. From 1940 party official at defense enterprises in Kharkov, Chelyabinsk, and Saratov. From 1948 enterprise director in Leningrad and Kiev. From 1954 second secretary of Kiev city committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, then second secretary and from 1957 first secretary of its Kiev province committee. From 1956 a member of the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine and from 1961 a member of its Presidium. From 1961 a member of the CC of the CPSU. From 1962 a secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine and head of its bureau for industry and construction. From 1963 first secretary of Communist Party of Ukraine. From 1964 a member of Presidium (Politburo) of the CC of the CPSU. As party leader of Ukraine, promoted autonomous economic development and

defended Ukrainian language and culture, bringing him into conflict with Brezhnev and other members of Politburo. Ousted in May 1972 and removed from Politburo in context of Soviet campaign against Ukrainian “nationalist” tendencies. In 1972–73 a deputy prime minister, then director of a defense enterprise near Moscow until retirement.

**Shepilov, Dmitry Trofimovich** (1905–95). Joined party in 1926. From 1935 engaged in party and scholarly work. In 1946–47 and from 1952 to 1956 chief editor of the newspaper *Pravda*. From 1947 to 1952 worked in apparatus of the party CC, including period as first deputy head of Department of Propaganda and Agitation. In 1952 became a member of the CC and a deputy head of its commission for ideology. From 1955 to 1957 a secretary of the CC. In 1956–57 minister of foreign affairs and a candidate member of Presidium of the CC. Demoted in 1957 for participation in the so-called antiparty group. From 1957 to 1960 director, then deputy director of Institute of Economics of the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences. From 1960 until retirement in 1982 archivist in Chief Archives Administration of Council of Ministers. Expelled from the CC in 1961 and from party in 1962, restored to party membership in 1976.

**Shevchenko, Andrei Stepanovich** (1911–93). Agronomist. From 1950 to 1953 aide on agricultural matters to Khrushchev when he was first secretary of the Moscow party committee. In 1953 joined apparatus of the party CC and remained Khrushchev’s aide until Khrushchev retired in 1964. Author of many publications on the virgin lands and corn cultivation. A corresponding member of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (1958).

**Shlikhter, Aleksandr Grigoryevich** (1868–1940). Worker. Participated in the revolutionary movement from 1891. Joined RSDLP in 1898. Took part in the revolutions of 1905, February 1917, and October 1917. From 1917 occupied leading state posts, and from 1921 high diplomatic posts. From 1927 to 1929 people’s commissar of agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR. From 1931 to 1938 vice president of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences. A candidate member of Politburo of the party CC from 1926 to 1937.

**Sholokhov, Mikhail Aleksandrovich** (1905–84). Writer and public figure. A member of the Academy of Sciences (1939). Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. Author of *Don Tales* (1926), the novels *The Quiet Don* (1928–40) and *Virgin Soil Upturned* (1932–60), the unfinished composition *They Fought for the Motherland*, and many other works.

**Shostakovich, Dmitry Dmitriyevich** (1906–75). Composed fifteen symphonies, quartets, preludes, fugues, and music for ballet, films, and the theater. Also a

pianist. From 1939 to 1943 taught at the Leningrad Conservatory and from 1943 to 1948 at the Moscow Conservatory. From 1957 to 1960 secretary and from 1960 to 1968 first secretary of the RSFSR Composers Union. Deputy in the Supreme Soviet from 1962. Made People's Artist of the USSR in 1954. Awarded the Lenin Prize, State Prize, and International Peace Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Shtykov, Terenty Fomich** (1907–64). Party official and diplomat. During World War II brigade commissar, then a member of Military Council of several Fronts. Took part in preparing and carrying out the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad and several other operations. Colonel general (1944). From 1948 to 1950 Soviet ambassador to Korean People's Democratic Republic (North Korea). From 1951 to 1954 deputy chairman of Kaluga province executive committee. From 1954 to 1956 first secretary of Novosibirsk province committee of the party. From 1956 to 1959 first secretary of Primorye (Maritime) territory committee of the party. In 1959–60 Soviet ambassador to Hungary.

**Shuisky, Grigory Trofimovich** (1907–85). Party official. From 1941 to 1943 deputy department head in CC of CP(B) of Ukraine. From 1943 aide to Khrushchev as first secretary of CC of CP(B) of Ukraine. From 1950 aide to Khrushchev as first secretary of the Moscow party committee and a secretary of the party CC. From 1964 consultant to the Ideology Department of the CC on matters relating to newspapers, magazines, and publishing houses. From 1965 consultant to the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the CC. Retired in 1976.

**Shuisky, Vasily Ivanovich** (1552–1612). A leading member of the boyar дума, or council of the nobility, during the "Time of Troubles" that followed the death of Ivan the Terrible (1584–1613). Headed the secret opposition to Boris Godunov. Made tsar in May 1608 as Vasily IV but deposed in July 1610. One of a long line of princes and boyars in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries.

**Shvarts, Semyon (Isaak) Izrail'yevich** (1879–1951). Joined RSDLP in 1899. From 1921 chairman of the Miners Union. From 1929 a member of Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. From 1924 to 1934 a member of the party CC. Executed.

**Shvernik, Nikolai Mikhailovich** (1888–1970). Joined RSDLP in 1905. From 1903 worker at electrical engineering plant in Saint Petersburg. Active participant in revolution of 1905. Underground party work in Saint Petersburg, Nikolayev, Tula, and Samara. In 1917–18 chairman of a plant committee and secretary of a district committee of the party in Samara. In 1925–26 secretary of the

Leningrad province committee of the party and of the Northwestern Bureau of the party CC. In 1926–27 a secretary of the party CC. From 1927 to 1929 secretary of the Urals province committee of the party. In 1929 secretary and from 1930 to 1944 and from 1953 to 1956 chairman (first secretary) of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. From 1944 to 1946 chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. From 1946 to 1953 chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. From 1956 until retirement in 1966 chairman of the Party Control Committee attached to the party CC. A member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the party CC in 1952–53 and from 1957 to 1966.

**Simonov, Konstantin (Kirill) Mikhailovich** (1915–79). Prominent writer, poet, dramatist, and publicist. Joined party in 1942. War correspondent and author of popular soldiers' lyrics. Well known for his novel about the battle of Stalingrad *Dni i nochi* (Days and Nights; 1943–44) and for his trilogy *Zhivye i myortvye* (The Living and the Dead; 1959–71). After World War II chief editor of the literary journal *Novy Mir* (New World) from 1946 to 1950 and again from 1954 to 1958. Chief editor of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Literary Newspaper) in 1938 and from 1950 to 1954. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Snesarev, Andrei Yevgenyevich** (1865–1937). Military commander and orientalist scholar. In World War I division and corps commander. In Civil War commanded a military district, then an army. Thereafter engaged in lecturing and research work. Fluent in fourteen languages. Author of works on military geography. Professor. Hero of Labor.

**Sokolov, Andrei Konstantinovich** (born 1931). Artist. Graduate of Institute of Architecture. His paintings portraying exploration of space have been exhibited in many countries. Also illustrator of works of science fiction. People's Artist of the RSFSR.

**Sokolov, Boris Pavlovich** (1897–1984). Plant breeder. First in the Soviet Union to make use of heterozygotic hybrids in the selection of corn specimens for breeding. A member of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (1956). Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Sokolov, Konstantin Mikhailovich** (1903–83). From working-class background. Joined party in 1925. Graduated from Leningrad Institute of Railroad Engineers in 1929. In 1929–30 engineer on shore installations for Baltic Fleet. From 1930 to 1934 graduate student and research associate at Leningrad Institute for the Mechanization of Construction. From 1934 to 1938 engineer on

construction of Moscow subway, then residential construction in Moscow. In 1938–39 a member of Committee of Council of People's Commissars for Construction Affairs. From 1939 to 1946 deputy people's commissar for construction. From 1946 to 1949 minister of construction and road-machine building, then minister of town planning. From 1950 to 1955 chairman of State Committee of Council of Ministers for Construction Affairs. From 1955 to 1958 deputy chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers. From 1958 to 1963 deputy minister of construction of RSFSR. From 1963 to 1965 deputy chairman of State Production Committee for Special and Assembly Construction Work under State Committee for Construction (Gosstroï). From 1965 until retirement in 1974 deputy minister of special and assembly construction work.

**Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich** (1897–1968). Joined Red Army in 1918. At start of war lieutenant general, promoted in 1946 to Marshal of the Soviet Union. During World War II occupied a series of important command and staff positions. Helped plan and carry out the counteroffensive in the battle for Moscow and took part in several offensive operations between Moscow and Smolensk, in the liberation of Western Ukraine and Poland, and in the assault on Berlin. In 1945–46 deputy commander in chief and from 1946 to 1949 commander in chief of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany. From 1949 to 1952 first deputy minister of armed forces. From 1952 to 1960 chief of the General Staff and first deputy minister of defense. From 1960 a member of the Group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1946). Hero of the Soviet Union.

**Solntseva, Yuliya Ippolitovna** (1901–89). Actor and film director. Wife and collaborator of the Ukrainian film director Aleksandr Petrovich Dovzhenko. Made People's Artist of the USSR in 1981. Awarded the State Prize.

**Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr Isayevich** (born 1918). Writer. Fought in war, arrested, in labor camps from 1945 to 1953, then in exile until 1956. Wrote about the camps in novel *Odin den Ivana Denisovicha* (One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich; 1962) and in his three-volume work *Arhipelag GULAG* (The GULAG Archipelago), which was published abroad in 1973 and circulated illegally in the USSR. Other works on the Stalin period include *V krughe pervom* (The First Circle) and *Rakovy korpus* (Cancer Ward), published abroad in 1968. Ten-volume work on Russian Revolution: *Krasnoe koleso* (The Red Wheel; 1971–91). Many short stories, articles, declarations. Expelled from USSR to West Germany in 1974, moved to United States in 1976. After return to Russia in 1994 toured the country and wrote works criticizing the

post-Soviet regime. Awarded Nobel Prize in 1970. Made a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1997.

**Spychalski, Marian** (1906–80). Joined Communist Party of Poland in 1931. Chief of general staff of the Gwardia Ludowa (People's Guard) from 1942. President of Warsaw from 1944 to 1945. First deputy minister of national defense from 1945 to 1948. A member of the Politburo of the CC of the Polish Workers Party (then the Polish United Workers Party) from 1944 to 1948. A close ally of Wladyslaw Gomulka, he was expelled from the party in 1949, along with Gomulka, and imprisoned in 1950, accused of being a "Titoite." Tortured in prison and forced to appear in a show trial in 1951 and give false testimony there against Gomulka. Released and reinstated in the party in 1956. A member of the Politburo of the CC of the PUWP from 1959 to 1970. Minister of national defense from 1956 to 1968. Chairman of the State Council of the Polish People's Republic from 1968 to 1970. Given rank of Marshal in 1963.

**Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich** (Soso Dzhughashvili), (1879–1953). Son of a shoemaker. Georgian. Joined RSDLP in 1898. Graduated from Gori Theological College in 1894 and expelled from Tiflis Orthodox Theological Seminary in 1899 for revolutionary activity. From 1901 engaged in party work in the Transcaucasus as a professional revolutionary. First wife Yekaterina Grigoryevna Svanidze died in 1908, leaving him a son, Yakov. Returned to Petrograd from exile in Turukhan territory after February 1917 revolution. From March 1917 a member of the Bureau of the party CC and of the editorial board of the newspaper *Pravda*. From October 1917 a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee. From October 1917 to July 1923 people's commissar for nationality affairs; concurrently occupied various leading positions in Red Army during Civil War and (in 1919–20) people's commissar of state control and (from 1920 to 1922) people's commissar of worker-peasant inspection. In 1918 married Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva; their son Vasily was born in 1921 and their daughter Svetlana in 1926. Nadezhda Sergeyevna committed suicide in 1932.

From March 1922 general secretary of the party CC. From 1941 chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers). During World War II chairman of the State Defense Committee, supreme commander in chief, and (until 1946) people's commissar of defense, then (in 1946–47) people's commissar (minister) of armed forces. A member of the party CC from 1912, of its Politburo (Presidium) in October 1917 and then from March 1919, and of its Orgburo from March 1919 to October 1952.

Honorary member of USSR Academy of Sciences (1939). Marshal of the Soviet Union (1943). Hero of the Soviet Union and Generalissimus of the Soviet Union (1945). Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Stanislavsky, Konstantin Sergeyeovich** (1863–1938). Famous theatrical director, actor, and teacher. Son of wealthy merchant. Began acting at age 14. Co-founded the Moscow Art Theater in 1898. Staged plays by Aleksei Tolstoy, Anton Chekhov, Maxim Gorky, Mikhail Bulgakov, and other playwrights. From 1922 to 1924 toured Europe and the United States with his troupe. His “system” or “method” of acting has influenced theatrical art throughout the world. It emphasizes psychological and emotional aspects of acting; by expressing his own personality, the actor should strive to be “believed” rather than “understood.”

**Starchenko, Vasily Fyodorovich** (1904–48) Plant breeder. Became a corresponding member of Ukraine Academy of Sciences in 1945. A deputy chairman of Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

**Starovsky, Vladimir Nikonovich** (1905–75). From a peasant family. Joined party in 1939. Worked in the field of statistics and accounting from 1919. Graduated from Moscow University in 1926. From 1927 to 1947 engaged in lecturing. In 1939–40 a deputy head of the Central Administration of National Economic Accounting of Gosplan. From 1940 head of the Central Statistical Administration of Gosplan, concurrently from 1941 a deputy chairman of Gosplan. From 1948 until retirement in 1975 head of the Central Statistical Administration of the Council of Ministers. A corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences (1958). Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Strazhesko, Nikolai Dmitriyevich** (1876–1952). Physician, pathologist, pathophysiological. Author of works on rheumatism and the pathology of digestion and blood circulation. Gave classical description of a myocardial attack. Became a member of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences in 1934, of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1943, and of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences in 1944. Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Strelyany, Anatoly Ivanovich** (born 1939). Writer and journalist. Graduated from Moscow State University. Worked for the provincial and central press, including the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and the literary magazine *Novy Mir*. Author of twelve books of journalism and prose and of the scripts for several artistic and documentary films. In 1989 his film *Arkhangelsky muzhik* (The Arkhangelsk Bumpkin) was awarded the State Prize. From 1995



to 1997 made weekly broadcasts for the Russian Service of Radio Freedom (Prague) and continued working there until 2002.

**Strokach, Timofei Amvrosyevich** (1903–63). Joined party in 1927. Lieutenant general from 1944. From 1942 to 1945 head of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement. From 1946 to 1956 (with breaks) minister of internal affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, then worked in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

**Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich** (1902–82). From 1939 to 1944 first secretary of the Ordzhonikidze [previously and currently Vladikavkaz] territory committee of the party. From 1944 to 1946 chairman of the Bureau of the party CC for the Lithuanian SSR. From 1947 to 1982 a secretary of the party CC, with special responsibility for questions of ideology, and concurrently chief editor of the newspaper *Pravda* from 1949 to 1951. In 1952 appointed head of the CC commission for ideology. A member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the party CC from 1952 to 1953 and from 1955 to 1982.

**Sverdlov, Yakov Mikhailovich** (1885–1919). Son of a Jewish engraver. Joined RSDLP in 1902. Became a prominent organizer and orator. Took part in revolution of 1905. Worked on the newspaper *Pravda*. Repeatedly imprisoned and exiled. After revolution of February 1917 became a member of the party CC. In July 1917, when many leading Bolsheviks were arrested and Lenin went into hiding, became de facto leader of the party. One of the organizers of revolution of October 1917. Chairman of Constituent Assembly before its dispersal. From January 1918 chairman of the All-Russia CEC. Secretary of the party CC. Author of Constitution of the RSFSR (the first Soviet constitution). Widely viewed as prospective successor to Lenin. During public speaking tour in support of Red Army, contracted typhus and died in March 1919 in Oryol. In 1924 Yekaterinburg in Urals, main center of his pre-revolutionary activity, renamed Sverdlovsk in his honor.

**Syrtsov, Sergei Ivanovich** (1893–1937). White-collar worker. Joined RSDLP in 1913. Fought in the Civil War. Prominent party figure in the Donbas. From 1921 official in the apparatus of the party CC. From 1924 editor of the newspaper *Kommunisticheskaya Revolyutsiya* (Communist Revolution). From 1926 secretary of the Siberian territory committee of the party. From 1929 chairman of the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars. After 1931 in various leading administrative and party posts. A candidate member of the Politburo of the party CC in 1929–30. Supposedly the central figure in a right opposition group in the party. Accused of cooperating with V. V. Lominadze to form a "Right-Left" opposition bloc. Expelled from the CC and lost his leading



positions in 1930. Arrested during the purges and died in detention. Posthumously rehabilitated.

**Thorez, Maurice** (1900–1964). A member of the French Communist Party from 1920, a member of its CC from 1924 and of its Politburo from 1925. General secretary of the French Communist Party from 1930 (in 1964 its chairman). A member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International from 1928 to 1943 and of its Presidium from 1935 to 1943.

**Timoshenko, Semyon Konstantinovich** (1895–1970). From a peasant background. Soldier. Joined party in 1919. During Civil War commander of a cavalry brigade and a cavalry division. Thereafter occupied various command posts. From 1933 deputy commander of the Belorussian Military District, then of the Kiev Military District. In 1937 commander of the North Caucasus Military District, then of the Kharkov Military District. From 1938 commander of the Kiev Special Military District. In 1939 commander of the Ukrainian Front that liberated Western Ukraine, and of the Northwestern Front in the campaign against Finland. From 1940 people's commissar of defense. From 1941 to 1945 a representative and member of the Stavka and commander in chief of a number of Fronts. From 1945 commander of the Baranovichi, South Urals, and Belorussian Military Districts. From 1960 general inspector of the Group of General Inspectors of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. From 1961 chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans. A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1952. Marshal of the Soviet Union from 1940.

**Tito, Josip Broz** (1892–1980). Marshal. From 1937 head of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (in 1952 renamed the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia). During World War II supreme commander in chief of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. In 1945–46 chairman of the provisional government and minister of people's defense. From 1946 to 1953 chairman of the Council of Ministers and from 1953 president of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

**Togliatti, Palmiro** (Ercoli; 1893–1964). A member of the Communist Party of Italy from its founding in 1921, member of its CC from 1922 and of its leadership from 1923. General secretary of the Communist Party of Italy from 1926. A member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International from 1924, of its Presidium from 1928, and of its Secretariat from 1935.

**Trotsky, Lev Davidovich (Leon)** (Bronshtein; 1879–1940). Participant in the social democratic movement from 1897. In 1903 joined the Mensheviks. In

1905 chairman of the Saint Petersburg Soviet. From 1917 to 1927 a member of the Communist Party. In 1917 chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and one of the leaders of the October armed uprising, then people's commissar of foreign affairs. From 1918 to 1925 people's commissar of military and naval affairs and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. From 1920 people's commissar of communications. A member of the party CC from 1917 to 1927 and of its Politburo in October 1917 and from 1919 to 1926. A member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy from 1925 to 1926. Leading organizer of the "left" opposition to Stalin. In 1929 exiled to Turkey, later given refuge in Mexico. In 1932 deprived of Soviet citizenship. In 1938 created the Fourth International. Assassinated by an NKVD agent.

**Trufanov, Nikolai Ivanovich** (1900–1982). Joined Red Army in 1919. During World War II occupied a series of staff and command posts in the Transcaucasus and in the Crimean, Southern, Voronezh, Second Ukrainian, and First Belorussian Fronts. After the war worked in the Soviet military administration in Germany. From 1950 to 1954 in charge of the combat and physical training of troops in the Far East. From 1954 to 1956 commander of an army and in 1956–57 first deputy commander of the Far Eastern Military District. From 1957 to 1959 chief military adviser to the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Retired in 1960.

**Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich** (1893–1937). From a gentry background. Before 1917 an officer of the tsarist army. Joined party and Red Army in 1918. Until 1921 commanded the First, Eighth, Fifth, and Seventh Armies and troops on the eastern, Caucasus, and western battlefronts of the Civil War. Subsequently head of the Frunze Military Academy, commander of the Western Military District, Assistant chief and chief of staff of the Red Army, commander of the Leningrad Military District, deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, chief of armaments of the Red Army, deputy and first deputy people's commissar of defense, and head of Red Army Directorate for Combat Training. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1935). Theorist of tank warfare. At time of arrest commander of Volga Military District. Executed, posthumously rehabilitated.

**Tupolev, Andrei Nikolayevich** (1888–1972). Aircraft designer. From 1908 to 1911 and from 1914 to 1918 at Faculty of Mechanics of Moscow Technical School, working closely with Professor N. Ye. Zhukovsky. On establishment in 1918 of Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI), headed by

Zhukovsky, became latter's assistant. Worked on hover-sleighs, speedboats, reconnaissance planes, fighters, the first Soviet heavy bomber (ANT-4), and the first Soviet hydroplane (ANT-8). In 1930s his design bureau separated from TsAGI to specialize in test planes. In 1934 completed construction of a gigantic eight-engine plane named in honor of the writer Maxim Gorky, but it crashed as a result of an accident. In 1937 arrested, in 1939 sent to work at Special Technical Bureau while still in detention, released in 1941 to head design bureau in evacuation in Siberia. Major general (1944). In all, involved in design of more than 100 military and passenger planes, including ANT-25, TU-104 (the first jet passenger plane), TU-114, TU-134, and TU-154. His planes won 78 world records and accomplished 28 pathbreaking flights, including that of V. P. Chkalov and M. M. Gromov in June 1937 in an ANT-25 across the North Pole to the United States. Made a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1953. Colonel general of the engineering service (1968). Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Thrice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Ugarov, Aleksandr Ivanovich** (1900–1939). Joined party in 1918. Engaged in Soviet and party work. From 1934 to 1938 second secretary of the Leningrad city committee of the party. In 1938 first secretary of the Moscow committee and Moscow city committee of the party. Executed, posthumously rehabilitated.

**Ustinov, Dmitry Fyodorovich** (1908–84). From 1938 to 1941 director of the *Bolshevik* plant in Leningrad. From 1941 to 1953 people's commissar (minister) of armaments. From 1953 to 1957 minister of defense industry. From 1957 to 1963 deputy chairman, and from 1963 to 1965 first deputy chairman, of the Council of Ministers and concurrently chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. From 1965 to 1976 a secretary of the party CC, with responsibility for defense industry. From 1976 to 1984 minister of defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1976). From 1976 to 1984 a member of the Politburo of the party CC.

**Vannikov, Boris Lvovich** (1897–1962). Joined party in 1919. From 1921 to 1926 worked in the People's Commissariat of Workers-Peasants Inspection. Graduated from the Bauman Higher Technical School in Moscow in 1926. From 1927 to 1930 engineer at an agricultural machinery plant. From 1930 to 1933 worked in Supreme Council of the National Economy. From 1933 to 1936 plant director. From 1937 deputy people's commissar and from 1939 to 1941 people's commissar of defense industry. In summer 1941 imprisoned for investigation by the NKVD (secret police), then deputy people's commissar of armaments. From 1942 to 1946 people's commissar of munitions. From

1946 to 1953 deputy chairman of the Special Committee of the Council of Ministers and of its First Chief Administration. From 1953 until retirement in 1958 first deputy minister of medium machine building (i.e., nuclear weapons production). A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1961. Colonel general of the engineering-artillery service (1944). Thrice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Varentsov, Sergei Sergeyeovich** (1901–71). During World War II deputy commander and commander of artillery in several armies. After the war commander of artillery in Central Group of Forces, then in Cis-Carpathian and Transcaucasus military districts. From 1952 to 1955 head of Chief Artillery Directorate of Red Army. From 1955 to 1961 commander of Soviet Army artillery. From 1961 to 1963 commander in chief of missile forces and artillery. Stripped of title of Hero of the Soviet Union, demoted from marshal to major general, and forced to retire in 1963 in view of his connection with the traitor Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Chief Marshal of Artillery (1961).

**Vasilyev, Vadim Nikolayevich** (born 1931). Friend of Sergei Khrushchev. His father, a steamship engineer, was arrested in 1937 and perished in a labor camp. From 1952 to 1958 studied at the Moscow Energy Institute in the same group as Sergei Khrushchev. From 1958 to 1971 worked at the Design Bureau of General Machine Building, designed launch complexes for missiles. From 1971 to 2003 worked at the Moscow Institute of Heat Technology on solid-fuel ballistic missiles. Since 2003 has worked at the Little (Maly) Theater.

**Venzher, Vladimir Grigoryevich** (1899–?). Agrarian economist. Last representative of the theory of cooperative socialism that was popular at end of nineteenth and beginning of twentieth century. In 1916 entered Division of Physics and Mathematics of Moscow University. Participated in October 1917 revolution. Joined party in 1918. Fought in Civil War. From 1921 to 1936 engaged in party work, for a time secretary of the Semipalatinsk province committee of the party (in Kazakhstan). Graduated from Institute of Red Professors, then in 1933–34 head of Political Department of a Machine and Tractor Station and from 1936 to 1938 director of a grain-producing state farm. From 1939 until his death a research associate of the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Although he held independent views, he was sometimes allowed to publish his work.

**Vesnin, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich** (1883–1959). **Vesnina, Leonida Aleksandrovna** (1880–1933). **Vesnina, Viktor Aleksandrovich** (1882–1950). Brothers. All architects. From 1925 onward headed the constructivist tendency in Soviet architecture. Their joint designs paid special attention to the functional purpose of buildings. Introduced new constructions and building

materials. Designed the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant (Dneproges, 1927–32) and the Palace of Culture of the Likhachev Automobile Plant in Moscow (1930–34).

**Vilyams, Vasily Robertovich** (1863–1939). Soil scientist, inventor of the grass-field crop-rotation system. A member of the Belorussia Academy of Sciences (1929), of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1931), and of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (1935). Author of works on agricultural soil science. Awarded the Lenin Prize.

**Vlasik, Nikolai Sidorovich** (1896–1967). Lieutenant general. Until 1952 headed the department for guarding the government in the Chief Directorate of State Security of the NKVD. Responsible for Stalin's personal guard.

**Vlasov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich** (1900–1962). Architect. Son of a forester. Graduated from Division of Architecture of Engineering-Construction Faculty of Moscow Higher Technical School in 1928. From 1931 lectured at Moscow Architectural Institute. From 1932 to 1941 took part in developing the general plan for the reconstruction of Moscow. His designs were used for the Central Park of Culture and Rest (Gorky Park), the building of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the embankment of the Moscow River, and the Crimean Bridge (1936–38). During World War II worked in eastern part of the country and contributed to reconstruction of devastated cities. From 1944 to 1950 chief architect of Kiev, where he reconstructed the Kreshchatik (1945–47) and introduced use of ceramic building materials. From 1950 to 1955 chief architect of Moscow, where he supervised the development of Luzhniki and of the southwestern residential area and designed Central Lenin Stadium. A member of the Academy of Construction and Architecture of the USSR and of the Ukrainian SSR. In 1955–56 president of the USSR Academy of Architecture. From 1960 to 1962 first secretary of board of Union of Architects. Doctor of Architecture. Professor. Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize.

**Volovchenko, Ivan Platonovich** (1916–98). Graduated from the Voronezh Agricultural Institute as an agronomist and seed selector in 1942. Joined party in 1946. Worked at a Machine and Tractor Station in 1942. After World War II worked as agronomist and manager at three sugar-beet state farms in Ukraine, except in 1949–50 when head of the Agriculture Department of a county committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in Sumy province. From 1951 to 1963 he was director of a state farm in Lipetsk province. Minister of agriculture from March 1963 to February 1965, when demoted to first deputy minister of agriculture. From 1972 to 1975 minister of state farms of

the RSFSR. From 1975 to 1977 a deputy minister of agriculture. From 1977 until his retirement in 1983 agriculture attaché in Soviet embassy to German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Deputy in Supreme Soviet. Made Hero of Socialist Labor in 1961. Awarded several medals, including two Orders of Lenin.

**Voronov, Gennady Ivanovich** (1910–94). From 1939 to 1948 secretary, then third secretary and second secretary, and from 1948 to 1955 first secretary of the Chita province committee of the party. From 1955 to 1957 deputy minister of agriculture. From 1957 to 1961 first secretary of the Chkalovsky (Orenburg) province committee of the party. From 1961 to 1962 deputy, then first deputy chairman of the Bureau of the party CC for the RSFSR. From 1962 to 1971 chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. From 1971 until retirement in 1973 chairman of the Committee of People's Control. A member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the party CC from 1961 to 1973.

**Voroshilov, Kliment Yefremovich** (1881–1969). Worker. Joined RSDLP in 1903. Participated in the revolutions of 1905, February 1917, and October 1917 and in the Civil War. From 1921 commanded the North Caucasus, then the Moscow, military districts. From 1925 people's commissar of military and naval affairs (from 1934 people's commissar of defense). From 1940 deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. During Second World War occupied a number of leading posts. From 1946 deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. From 1953 chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. From 1935 Marshal of the Soviet Union. From 1926 to 1960 a member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the party CC. From 1960 a member of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

**Voznesensky, Nikolai Alekseyevich** (1903–50). Joined party in 1919. A member of the Academy of Sciences (1943). Chairman of Gosplan from 1938 to 1949. Deputy head of the government from 1939. Member of the State Defense Committee from 1942 to 1945. A member of the party CC from 1939 and of its Politburo from 1947. Executed in connection with the "Leningrad Affair."

**Vyshinsky, Andrei Yanuaryevich** (1883–1954). From a gentry background. Joined the Menshevik wing of the RSDLP in 1903 and the RCP(B) in 1920. Jurist. After 1917 engaged in social, administrative, lecturing, and judicial work. From 1925 to 1928 rector of the First Moscow University, then a member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Enlightenment of the RSFSR. From 1931 an official of the judiciary. From 1935 to 1939 public prosecutor. Chief prosecutor in the three major Moscow show trials (1936–38). From 1939 to 1944 deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. From

1940 to 1949 deputy minister, and from 1949 to 1953 minister, of foreign affairs, thereafter permanent representative of the USSR at the United Nations. A member of the party CC from 1939. Author of works on judicial subjects.

**Wasilewska, Wanda Lwowna** (1905–64). Pro-Communist Polish writer. Daughter of conservative Polish politician Leon Wasilewski. After World War II began in September 1939, moved to USSR and became Soviet citizen. During World War II a regimental commissar, then colonel. Worked as agitator for the Chief Political Directorate of army and navy. Editor of the newspaper *Za Radiansku Ukrainu* (For a Soviet Ukraine). From 1943 to 1945 editor in chief of the newspaper *Wolna Polska* (Free Poland). Chair of the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR.

**Yagoda, Genrikh Grigoryevich** (Ieguda, Genakh Girshevich; 1891–1938). Joined RSDLP in 1907. After 1917 worked as a military inspector and in the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. In 1920 joined the Cheka. From 1924 deputy chairman of the OGPU (secret police). From 1934 to 1936 people's commissar of internal affairs. From 1934 to 1937 people's commissar of communications. From 1935 general commissar of state security of the first rank. A member of the party CC from 1934. Executed after an open trial.

**Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich** (1923–2005). From 1946 to 1973 mainly engaged in party work, from 1965 as first deputy head of Propaganda Department of the party CC. Following conflict with other CC officials over attitude to be taken toward Russian nationalism, sent in 1973 as Soviet ambassador to Canada. From 1983 to 1985 director of Institute of World Economy and International Relations of USSR Academy of Sciences. One of the initiators of perestroika. In 1985–86 head of the Propaganda Department of the CC. From 1986 to 1990 a secretary of the CC and from 1987 to 1990 a member of its Politburo. In 1991 expelled from the party in connection with his sharp criticism of Bolshevism and Marxism. From 1993 to 1995 head of Federal Television and Radio Service, concurrently chairman of presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression. Became a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1990 and of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1991.

**Yakovlev, Yakov Arkadyevich** (Epshtein; 1896–1938). From 1929 to 1934 people's commissar of crop agriculture. From 1934 to 1936 head of the Agriculture Department of the party CC and in 1936–37 first deputy chairman of its Party Control Committee. Arrested at end of 1937. Executed in July 1938 by sentence of Military Collegium of the Supreme Court.



**Yampolsky, Boris Samoilovich** (1912–72). Writer. Several of his stories, including *Malchik s Golubinoi ulitsy* (The Little Boy from Dove Street; 1959), *Tri vesny* (Three Springs), and *Molodoi chelovek* (The Young Man; 1963), are about World War II and the fate of the generation that lived through it. His posthumously published novel *Moskovskaya ulitsa* (Moscow Street; 1988) deals with social and moral conflicts connected with the “anti-cosmopolitan” campaign of the late 1940s and early 1950s.

**Yangel, Mikhail Kuzmich** (1911–71). Rocket and missile designer. From peasant background. In 1929–30 foreman’s assistant in textiles plant. In 1930 became student at Moscow Aviation Institute, where in 1934, while still a student, joined the team of designer N. N. Polikarpov. Worked in design bureaus of N. N. Polikarpov, Artyom Mikoyan, and V. M. Myasishchev. From 1948 to 1950 studied at Academy of Aviation Industry, then assigned to research institute NII-88, later became its director. In 1954 appointed head of design bureau OKB-586 (later renamed Yuzhnoe) in Dnepropetrovsk. Created dozens of launchers for space rockets and strategic and tactical missile complexes—in particular, the R-12, R-14, R-16, and R-36 Satana (SS-18). A member of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences (1961) and of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1966). Awarded the Lenin Prize and State Prize. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Yaroshenko, Luka Danilovich** (1896–?). Economist. Old party member. Fought in Civil War as partisan in Siberia. Graduated from Plekhanov Institute and Institute of Red Professors. Deputy head of a department in Gosplan. Disagreed with Stalin at a meeting in the CC in November 1951 to discuss a new textbook on political economy, leading to his expulsion from party and arrest. Released in December 1953, readmitted to the party, and returned to work at Gosplan. Following critical speech at party meeting in December 1956 to discuss the results of the Twentieth Party Congress, re-expelled from the party and removed from position in Gosplan. Re-readmitted to the party as pensioner after Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1962.

**Yasnov, Mikhail Alekseyevich** (1906–91). Joined party in 1925. Worker. From 1930 to 1938 occupied managerial positions in various construction organizations. From 1938 to 1949 deputy chairman of Moscow City Executive Committee. In 1949–50 deputy minister of urban construction. From 1950 to 1956 chairman of Moscow City Executive Committee. From 1956 to 1957 chairman, and from 1957 to 1966 first deputy chairman, of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. From 1966 until retirement in 1985 chairman of Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. A member of the party CC from 1952 to 1986. Hero of Socialist Labor.



**Yelizarov, Viktor Dmitriyevich** (1911–?). Architect. Joined party in 1944. Graduated from Moscow Architectural Institute in 1937. Took part in post-war reconstruction of the Kreshchatik, the “Kreshchatik” subway station, and the Dnieper Hotel in Kiev. From 1964 deputy chairman of State Construction Committee of the Ukrainian SSR. Awarded title of Meritorious Architect of the Ukrainian SSR (1970).

**Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich** (1895–1940). Worker. Joined party in 1917. During Civil War a military commissar. From 1922 secretary of the Semipalatinsk province committee and of the Kazakh territory committee of the party. From 1927 an official in the apparatus of the party CC. From 1929 to 1930 deputy people’s commissar of agriculture. From 1930 to 1934 head of the Personnel and of the Personnel Assignment Departments and from 1934 of the Industrial Department of the party CC. From 1936 a secretary of the party CC, chairman of its Party Control Committee, and deputy chairman of the Reserves Committee of the Council of Labor and Defense. From 1936 to 1938 people’s commissar of internal affairs. From 1938 people’s commissar of water transportation. From 1935 a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. From 1934 a member of the party CC. From 1937 general commissar of state security of the first rank. Arrested in 1939 and executed for criminal activity.

**Yuryev, Vasily Yakovlevich** (1879–1962). One of the founders of Soviet seed farming and plant breeding. Bred many new varieties of winter and spring wheat, rye, barley, oats, millet, and corn. From 1956 director of the Ukraine Scientific Research Institute of Plant Growing, Breeding, and Genetics. A member of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences (1945). An honorary member of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (1956). Awarded the State Prize. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor.

**Yusupov, Usman Yusupovich** (1900–1966). Poor peasant background, agricultural laborer from age 8 to 16, then worker in cotton-processing plant. Joined party in 1926. From 1926 to 1928 local trade union official. In 1928–29 head of organization department of Tashkent district committee of CP(B) of Uzbekistan. From 1929 to 1931 a secretary of the CC of the CP(B) of Uzbekistan. From 1931 to 1934 chairman of Central Asian Bureau of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. From 1934 to 1936 attended courses in Marxism-Leninism at the party CC. In 1936–37 people’s commissar of food industry of the Uzbek SSR. From 1937 to 1950 first secretary of the CC of the CP(B) of Uzbekistan. From 1950 to 1953 minister of cotton cultivation of USSR. From 1953 to 1955 chairman of Council of Ministers of the Uzbek

SSR. From 1955 until retirement in 1959 director of a state farm in Tashkent province. A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1956.

**Zakharov, Matvei Vasilyevich** (1898–1972). Son of a worker. Mechanic. Joined party in 1917 and took part in Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 as Red Guard. Joined Red Army in 1918 and fought in Civil War as artillery officer, then worked on mobilization and supply affairs on staff of Belorussian Military District. Graduated from Frunze Military Academy as supply specialist in 1928 and from Operations Faculty in 1933. In 1936–37 at General Staff Academy. Chief of staff of Leningrad Military District from 1937 to 1940, then of Odessa Military District. During World War II occupied a series of important staff positions. Helped plan and lead major operations, including those in Romania, Hungary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. From 1945 to 1949 and in 1963–64 commandant of General Staff Academy. From 1949 to 1952 deputy chief of General Staff. In 1952–53 chief inspector of Red Army. From 1953 to 1957 commander of Leningrad Military District. From 1957 to 1960 commander in chief of Soviet occupation forces in Germany. From 1960 to 1963 and from 1964 until retirement in 1971 chief of General Staff and first deputy minister of defense. Wrote a number of works on military theory and history. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1959). Twice Hero of the Soviet Union.

**Zasyadko, Aleksandr Fyodorovich** (1910–63). From 1942 to 1946 deputy people's commissar of the coal industry. In 1946–47 deputy minister of the construction of fuel enterprises. In 1947–48 minister of the coal industry of the western regions of the USSR. From 1948 to 1955 minister of the coal industry. From 1956 to 1958 deputy chairman of Gosplan. From 1958 to 1962 deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, concurrently from 1960 to 1962 chairman of the State Economic Council.

**Zemlyachka-Samoilova (Zalkind), Rozaliya Samoilovna** (more commonly known as Roza Zemlyachka; 1876–1947). Joined RSDLP in 1898. Active figure in the Bolshevik movement. Occupied from the 1920s a series of high-level positions in the Soviet and party control agencies. In 1937 was one of the top officials of the Soviet Control Commission. From 1939 deputy chairman of the Party Control Commission and (up to 1943) a deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

**Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich** (1896–1948). Son of a white-collar worker. Joined RSDLP in 1915. After 1917 a political official. From 1922 chairman of the Tver Province Executive Committee. From 1924 to 1934 secretary

of the Nizhny Novgorod province (in 1932 renamed Gorky province) committee of the party. From 1934 to 1944 a secretary of the Leningrad province and city committees of the party. During World War II a member of the Military Councils of the Northwestern Area and of the Leningrad Front. From 1944 colonel general and a secretary of the party CC. A member of the party CC from 1930, of its Orgburo from 1934, and of its Politburo from 1939. A member of the All-Russia CEC and of the All-Union CEC. A member of Stalin's closest entourage and one of the most active organizers of the purges.

**Zhdanov, Yuri Andreyevich** (born 1919). Son of Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov. Married Svetlana Iosifovna Alliluyeva (Stalina) in 1949, daughter Yekaterina born 1950, divorced 1952. Organic chemist. Author of works on the theory of organic chemistry, the chemistry of natural compounds, and philosophical problems of the natural sciences. A member of the party CC from 1952 to 1956. A corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences (1970). Awarded the State Prize.

**Zhemchuzhina, Polina Semyonovna** (Karpovich; 1897–1970). From 1936 to 1937 head of Chief Administration of Perfume, Cosmetics, Soap, and Synthetic Materials Industry of People's Commissariat of Food Industry, then deputy people's commissar of food industry and people's commissar of fisheries. From 1939 head of Chief Administration of Textiles Industry. Wife of Molotov. In 1949 exiled. In 1953 rehabilitated.

**Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich** (1896–1974). Son of a shoemaker. Apprenticed to a furrier. Joined party in 1919. In tsarist army during First World War. Joined Red Army in 1918. From 1920 occupied various command posts in cavalry units. From 1938 deputy commander of the Belorussian Military District. Commander of the forces in the Far East that routed Japanese forces at Khalkin-Gol in Mongolia in May–September 1939. From June 1940 commander of the Kiev Special Military District. During World War II occupied a series of important command and staff positions. Organized the defense of Leningrad (September 1941) and Moscow (October 1941 to January 1942). From August 1942 first deputy supreme commander in chief. From November 1944 to June 1945 commander of the First Belorussian Front in the final offensive against Germany. From 1945 commander in chief of Soviet occupation forces in Germany. From 1946 commander in chief of ground forces. From 1947 commander of the Odessa, then of the Urals Military District. From 1953 first deputy minister of defense and from

1955 minister of defense. From June 1957 a member of the Presidium of the party CC. Removed from all posts and retired in October 1957. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1943). Four times Hero of the Soviet Union.

**Zhukovsky, Nikolai Yegorovich** (1847–1921). Founder of theoretical and experimental aerohydrodynamics and “father of Russian aviation.” In 1868 graduated from Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of Moscow University. From 1870 to 1872 taught physics at Second Moscow Women’s Gymnasium. From 1872 taught mathematics at the Moscow Higher Technical School. In 1882 became Doctor of Applied Mathematics for work on theory of stable motion. From 1885 taught theoretical mechanics at Moscow University. Alongside teaching pursued research, mainly on the motion of bodies within a liquid or gas flow. In 1890–91 studied the theory of flight and the flight of birds, in late 1890s the theory of gliders. Also worked on problem of controlling hydraulic pressure in water pipes from reservoirs. In 1900 proposed for membership in Petersburg Academy of Sciences, but withdrew his candidacy in order to remain in Moscow. In 1902 established aerodynamics laboratory at Moscow University with one of the first aerodynamic tunnels in the world. In 1904 became director of a new aerodynamics institute near Moscow, the first such institute in Europe. Published a work on the possibility of a helicopter. In 1909 gave the first lecture course on air flight at Moscow Technical School and in 1910 set up an aerodynamics laboratory there. In 1910s his research focused on problems of air flow around aircraft wings and propellers. In December 1918 appointed director of newly established Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI). In 1920 became first rector of Institute of Engineers of the Red Air Fleet (in 1922 renamed the Air Fleet Academy and later the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy). Author of more than 170 works (including classical textbooks) on aerodynamics, hydraulics, mechanics, mathematics, astronomy, the theory of machine regulation, and other subjects.

**Zinoviev, Grigory Yevseyevich** (Radomyslsky; 1883–1936). Joined RSDLP in 1901. Active participant in the revolutionary movement. One of Lenin’s main lieutenants in the Bolshevik wing of the RSDLP from 1908 to 1917 when they were living in exile. Returned to Russia with Lenin in April 1917. From December 1917 chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. From 1919 to 1926 chairman of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. A member of the party CC from 1907 to 1927 and of its Politburo from 1921 to 1926. From 1917 to 1927 a member of the All-Russia CEC and of the All-Union CEC. Leader of the so-called Leningrad Opposition against Stalin in 1925–26, then of the United Left Opposition in 1926–27, he was expelled

from the party, then reinstated after capitulating to Stalin in 1928. Arrested on false charges after the Kirov assassination, he was executed in August 1936 after the first of the three major Moscow show trials, in which he and his close ally Lev Kamenev were the chief defendants. Posthumously cleared of all charges in the late 1980s, under Gorbachev.

**Zverev, Arseny Grigoryevich** (1900–1969). Working-class background. Joined party in 1919. Fought in Civil War. From 1924 to 1931 worked in local financial agencies. Graduated from Moscow Financial-Economic Institute in 1933, then continued working in local government in Moscow. In 1937–38 and in 1948 deputy people’s commissar (minister) of finance. From 1938 to 1948 and from 1948 to 1960 people’s commissar (minister) of finance. Doctor of Economic Sciences (1959). Retired in 1960. A member of the party CC from 1939 to 1961.

**Zykina, Lyudmila Georgiyevna** (born 1929). Singer. From 1947 to 1951 sang in the Pyatnitsky Choir. From 1951 to 1960 sang in the Choir of Russian Song of All-Union Radio. From 1960 to 1977 sang in Moscow Concert (Moskontsert). From 1977 artistic leader and soloist of the Rossiya Ensemble. Performer of Russian popular songs and of works by contemporary composers. Made People’s Artist of the USSR in 1973. Awarded the Lenin Prize. Hero of Socialist Labor.



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