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/AK-47/ - Guns, weapons and the art of war.
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New /roulette/ topic: /AK-47/ - Guns, weapons and the art of war. - New board: /draw/

File: 1637627301623-0.jpg (36.47 KB, 306x640, Tukhachevsky.jpg)

File: 1637627301623-1.png (82.6 KB, 1283x1134, CAued.png)


Thoughts? There isn't much material over it on youtuber, but from what I gather, it's a materialist approach to warfare.
Instead of the classical Prussian doctrine of encirclement, deep operations focuses on breaking through to the back line and destroying communications and supply lines, which greatly help other areas of the line besides your own immediate victory, which the blitzkrieg focused on.


I'll update this thread and screenshot interesting parts of the pdf. Here's a diagram from the first part explaining Soviet military vocabulary and hierarchy.
The author is clear in that Soviet operations are hm much higher on the hierarchy than US operations, which focus mainly on how troops should react in a certain situation.
For instance, it is currently (as of 2008 I'm a little behind on USA protocol) US army doctrine to not fire on an individual unless they fire first, but the author is quick to mention that US doctrine is:
>what is written, approved by appropriate authority, and published concerning the conduct of military affairs. Doctrine generally describes how the army fights tactically, thus, what we call doctrine falls into the Soviet categories of operational art and tactics.


File: 1637642078226.jpg (76.38 KB, 600x572, 6e421de39f1e8a76fc.jpg)

>Military art (theory and practice of armed conflict)


Praxis and theory, the dialectical cornerstones of all things Marxism


More charts

>He participated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 as a Company Commander in the 22nd Eastern Siberian Regiment, and subsequently as a staff officer at the headquarters of the 16th Army Corps, and a staff officer at the headquarters of the 3rd Manchurian Army.

>After the start of World War I, he was assigned the command of the 5th Finland Rifle Regiment, and was later named Chief of Staff of the 7th Infantry Division, commander of the Black Sea Marine Division, major general in 1916 and finally chief of staff of the Russian 5th Army.

>Following the October Revolution, in March 1918, he joined the Bolsheviks and was immediately appointed military commander of the Smolensk region. He rose to become the head of the All-Russian General Staff.

>In October 1918, Following disagreements with the Soviet commander-in-chief Jukums Vācietis, Svechin was removed from his position and appointed professor at the Academy of General Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The new position enabled Svechin to combine his talent as a writer with his knowledge of military strategy. His work Strategy became required reading at Soviet military schools.


Can the Bobruysk offensive be considered an example of deep operation?

https://youtu.be/rJAEdLnZsgI?t=1155 (site isn't allowing me to embed it for some reason).


Operation Bagration was the first time the Soviets could really get the deep battle up and going, as they were on the back foot almost the entire war prior.



is this the military doctrine based off of genghis khan's general


>Russia derived the most use out of a careful study of the Mongol campaigns. Their closer proximity to the steppe gave them greater interest and access to the Mongolian campaigns, first analyzed by the Russian General Mikhail Ivanin in the 19th century, which became a recommended text in the Russian military academies up until the mid 20th century. Ivanin's work became used in the Deep Battle doctrine developed by Soviet Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Frunze, and G. S. Isserson. Deep Battle doctrine bore a heavy resemblance to Mongol strategic methods, substituting tanks, motorized troop carriers, artillery, and airplanes for Mongol horse archers, lancers, and field artillery. The Red Army even went so far as to copy Subutai's use of smokescreens on the battlefield to cover troop movements. Later in the 20th century, American military theorist John Boyd and some of his followers used Genghis Khan and Subutai's campaigns as examples of maneuver warfare.
<Gabriel, Richard A. (2004). Subotai the Valiant: Genghis Khan's Greatest General. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers. pp. 111-118
<LTC Joe E. Ramirez, Jr, Genghis Khan and Maneuver Warfare (2000).


Yeah, the horse question was a big problem for red army.
Some generals were very attached to the cavalry and fought every attempt to modernize with tanks and other armored vehicles.

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