Recreational Racists and Performative Antisemites?: A Profile of Right-Wing Audiences from Fuentes to Carlson

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Heterodox Centre Report No. 8

January 19, 2026

Freedom, Courage, Truth.

CENTRE FOR HETERODOX SOCIAL SCIENCE

Executive Summary

This report uses new survey data to map the demographic and attitudinal profile of the American audience for Nick Fuentes, Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens, alongside other right-wing new media figures. Their followers are considerably less white, male and young than is commonly believed.

Although they are more likely to endorse Jewish or Israel conspiracies, right-wing online audiences are not especially anti-Jewish, anti-black, or white nationalist. Statements from Fuentes, Owens and to a lesser extent Carlson appear to have had a weak impact, even on their followers. Fuentes is most racist and antisemitic, but few young Trump voters follow him. Carlson has more followers, but is less inflammatory and does not affect attitudes. These findings suggest that alarmism about a rising antisemitic and racist young right is overblown. This report instead contends that a bigger concern is the emergence of a floating 'conspiracy vote,' leaning young and nonwhite, which could shape the political and cultural direction of today's unprecedentedly low-trust America.

Main counterintuitive findings:

• Only 13 percent of Nick Fuentes' audience and 9 percent of Tucker Carlson's want immigration cut to zero

• Only 20 percent of Nick Fuentes' and Tucker Carlson's audiences say you must speak with an American accent to be a true American

• Just 24 percent of Nick Fuentes' and 12 percent of Tucker Carlson's regular audiences say you have to be white to be a true American

• 35–40 percent of Nick Fuentes' and Tucker Carlson's audiences believe a majority nonwhite America is no less American than the country is today

• Only 58 percent of Trump voters under 35 agree that the US would be less American if most of its people spoke a language other than English

• Just 2–3 percent of adults regularly consume Nick Fuentes' show, rising to 7 percent of Trump voters under age 35—roughly comparable in size to Alex Jones' audience

• Among young audiences, 35 percent of Nick Fuentes' and 25 percent of Tucker Carlson's followers are non-white. Nick Fuentes' under-35 audience is thus significantly less white than the under-35 Trump voter average, while Tucker Carlson's is significantly more white.

• A majority of Candace Owens' audience is female, and 30–35 percent of Tucker Carlson's and Nick Fuentes' are as well

• The average consumer of right-wing influencer content is in their mid-to-late 40s, and older conservatives are almost as likely as younger conservatives to encounter Fuentes, Carlson, or Owens

• A fifth of Fuentes' followers regularly follow Ben Shapiro, rising to a third if we include Fuentes followers who occasionally watch Shapiro

• Half of Nick Fuentes' audience, and 40 percent of Tucker Carlson's, read the *New York Times* at least occasionally

• Nick Fuentes' and Candace Owens' young audiences have above-average levels of ADHD compared to other young Trump voters

• The typical follower of Nick Fuentes, Candace Owens, and Tucker Carlson feels 10–20 degrees warmer toward Jews than toward Palestinians

• Regular followers of Candace Owens and Tucker Carlson average 57 degrees of warmth toward American Jews, compared to 65 degrees among Ben Shapiro's followers, a modest difference

• Young Trump voters who follow or support Tucker Carlson are no more antisemitic than other young Trump voters

• Minority young Trump voters are, on average, 7 degrees cooler toward Palestinians than toward Jews

• 34 percent of young Trump voters are cold toward Palestinians while a much lower 14 percent are cold toward Jews

• Tucker Carlson's and Nick Fuentes' audiences rate blacks in a moderately positive 55–60 degree range

• Followers of Nick Fuentes, Candace Owens, and Tucker Carlson are considerably cooler toward Israel than toward Jews

• Audiences for anti-Israel influencers such as Carlson, Fuentes, or Owens are no more pro-Palestinian than followers of Ben Shapiro

• There is no statistical relationship between pro-Jewish and pro-Israel attitudes among young Harris voters. Young progressives are strongly anti-Israel but pro-Jewish.

• Those who say Israel's supporters control the media still rate Jews at roughly 50 out of 100 on a feelings thermometer—higher than their ratings of Palestinians

• Those who say Israel's supporters control the media rate Jews no more negatively than MSNBC viewers do

• Swing voters who moved to Trump after 2016 are more likely than consistent Trump voters to believe antisemitic conspiracy theories and to describe themselves as racist or antisemitic

• Among Trump voters under 50, minorities are as likely as whites to identify as racist

• Half of Trump voters under 50 who self-identify as racist also endorse affirmative action and DEI

• More Trump voters under 50 who self-identify as antisemites say whites receive too much favourable treatment than say Jews do

• Most open antisemites do not believe that most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States

• The average Republican under 35 rates Jews at 61 degrees of warmth—down four points since 2020 but within the historic range going back to 1964

Main intuitive findings:

• Seven percent of Republicans under 35 rate Jews below 25 out of 100—an all-time high for Republicans since 1964, though below the 9 percent peak among Independents in 2016

• Twenty-six percent of Trump voters under 50 say they are antisemitic, compared to 3 percent of Trump voters over 50

• Just 8 percent of Americans under 35 trust other people, and only 8 percent trust the government most of the time—both all-time lows

• Young Trump voters who follow Nick Fuentes or Candace Owens are more antisemitic than other young Trump voters

• Followers of Nick Fuentes, Tucker Carlson, and Candace Owens are twice as likely as other Trump voters to agree that 'Israel can get away with anything because its supporters control the media'

• Young Trump voters are evenly split on whether Israel can get away with anything because its supporters

control the media. Young liberals and moderates have the same views as young conservatives on this.

• Moving from not following to regularly following Nick Fuentes predicts 12 degrees less warmth toward Jews; following Candace Owens is linked to 6 degrees less warmth; following Tucker Carlson has no effect

• Following Ben Shapiro is associated with 6 degrees more warmth toward Jews, all else being equal

• By 2024, Democrats under 35 felt 12 points warmer toward Jews than their Republican counterparts

• Minority Trump voters—especially Black Trump voters—are cooler toward Jews than white Trump voters

• American Muslims are considerably cooler toward Jews than Jews are toward Muslims

• The share of Jewish students who self-censor on Ivy League campuses declined from 35 percent to 22 percent between 2024 and 2025

• Since 2023, Jewish self-censorship has been lowest on red-state campuses

• The policies of Donald Trump may have contributed to reducing Jewish self-censorship on elite campuses, particularly in the Ivy League

• Young Trump voters are aligned with older Trump voters in their near-unanimous desire to reduce immigration and to agree that American culture was better in the past. 86 percent of Tucker Carlson's regular audience wants less immigration and 92 percent say American culture was better in the past.

There has been a great deal of speculation, even panic, about young right-wing Americans, especially those that follow Nick Fuentes, Candace Owens and Tucker Carlson. These figures either propound antisemitism, racism and white nationalism, or appear to tacitly support it. Does their influence explain disturbing poll results that show young right-wing people to be more antisemitic and racist than their elders?[1]

An alternative perspective is that conspiratorial or edgy new right figures are viewed with a degree of ironic detachment by their followers. Katherine Dee, a writer on internet culture, considers Nick Fuentes a cult figure without a clear ideology whose followers '[center] Nick Fuentes as the fan object.'[2] Jesse Arm adds that today's young right-wing voters are an often bored, easily distracted group, with a light and detached relationship to ideology and politics: 'This group knows about the online Right's more incendiary content, but mostly as background noise. About half knew who Nick Fuentes is. Some described him as funny or provocative; others saw him as toxic; none was fully panicked. Extreme rhetoric often landed like another genre of Internet content—something to be halfheartedly consumed, laughed at, scrolled past, and then forgotten.'[3]

For right-wing nationalist writer Scott Greer, the new breed of right-wing audiences want infotainment and their show hosts are giving them what they want: 'Some influencers stick to facts and logic, and offer solid arguments for immigration restriction and race realism. But that stuff is often too boring…[Audiences] prefer magical thinking…They crave drama and plot twists…As long as influencers present their idiotic notions as something the 'elites' don't want you to know, their 'freethinking' listeners will gobble it up without hesitation.' For example, Megyn Kelly, Greer observes, has gone through multiple ideological reinventions depending on her followers: 'she feels primarily beholden to her online audience and tailors her opinions to suit them.'[4] In other cases, sincerely racist or antisemitic hosts may have little impact on the beliefs of their audience, who treat them with detachment as entertaining shock jocks, more as sizzle than as steak.

This perspective suggests Groyperism is a 'thin-centred' ideology and style like populism, with little specific content.[5] It can adapt to different ideologies and appeal to various groups. Just as there is left and right populism, there is left and right conspiracism, white and minority Groyperism. A main finding of this report is that

[1] Cohen-Kannik, Daniel, 'New Yale Youth poll finds Gen Z fueling rise in antisemitic views,' *Jewish Insider*, December 8, 2025; Arm, Jesse and Matthew Knee, 'The New GOP Survey Analysis of Americans Overall, Today's Republican Coalition, and the Minorities of MAGA,' *Manhattan Institute*, December 1, 2025.
[2] Nazaryan, Alexander, 'Who Are the Groypers?' *New York Times*, November 7, 2025.
[3] Arm, Jesse, 'Everyone Wants to Know What Gen Z Republicans Think. We Asked Them,' *City-Journal*, December 19, 2025.
[4] Greer, Scott, 'Megyn Kelly And The Influencer Business,' *Substack*, January 13, 2026.
[5] For more on thin-centre ideology, see Müller, J.-W. (2017). What is populism?, Penguin UK.

its connection to hating and excluding Jews and blacks, or desiring a white ethnostate, is more tenuous than many imagine.

A populism which mistrusts elites, experts, rationality and process can be found in the messaging of Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. It is evident in the opinions of Tucker Carlson, Cenk Uygur, Nick Fuentes, Candace Owens, Hasan Piker, Joe Rogan and Chapo Trap House, among others. The new populist-conspiracism is a big tent accommodating considerable race, gender and ideological diversity. While left populists target the corporate elite and right populists aim at cultural elites and the deep state, there are areas of overlap. Israel, the security services, big pharma, lobbyists, the 'uniparty' neoliberal establishment and corporate elites are oxen who both like to gore.

This style can be irrational, dangerous and destabilizing, but can also be important as a democratic outlet for frustration - as well as helping to shine a light on and disrupt special interests, dominant factions and venal or weak politicians. Populism is an important part of democracy, so long as it is kept in check by facts, norms and evidence.[6]

Building on the tendencies of the Boomer, Xer and Millennial 'Me' generations, Gen-Z is a highly individualistic cohort, dislocated from traditional community, with little trust in authority, elite institutions or each other.[7] Of Jonathan Haidt's 7 moral foundations, that of liberty/oppression, which resists authority and coercion, is likely to be especially pronounced among these low trust voters.[8]

This sensibility crosses political lines, and is therefore an important swing vote. This group of relatively young voters could prove a kingmaker in subsequent elections, amplifying their influence. All of which could threaten what Jonathan Rauch terms the 'truth-based order' of fact-based journalism, law, government and institutions.[9] Trollish right-wing shows such as those of Fuentes or Owens, or their quasi-enablers like Carlson, may be motivated by edgy transgression and humour, America First-style isolationism, anti-elite conspiracism or opposition to cancel culture.

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[6] Canovan, M. (1981). Populism, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt P.; Eatwell, R. and M. Goodwin (2018). National populism: The revolt against liberal democracy, Penguin UK.
[7] Ewing, G., 'Young Americans 'continue to lose faith in government institutions,' Politico, April 23, 2025.
[8] Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind : why good people are divided by politics and religion. London, Allen Lane. Note that liberty/oppression is a later addition to the original 5 moral foundations.
[9] Rauch, J. (2021). The constitution of knowledge: A defense of truth, Brookings Institution Press.

This does not mean that conspiratorial populist online right influencers have no impact on anti-Jewish or racist sentiment. There is a tail risk stemming from their effect on a tiny group of radicals. Or they may have an effect indirectly, via its influence on groups such as Muslim-Americans or ideological extremists. These tend to feel colder toward Jews and could be emboldened to engage in antisemitism by right-wing influencers' antisemitic permission structure. The uptick in expressed antisemitism among nonwhites and young conservatives could help legitimate more antisemitic harassment or attacks.

Nevertheless, it is also possible for Jews to overestimate antisemitism because they are attached to Israel and feel that a centering of its sins compared to other military actors in the world reflects a disproportionately antisemitic fixation – even if it may stem from a fetishization of whiteness and a 'white settler versus nonwhite colonized' view of the world. Excessive anxiety about antisemitism beyond what is reasonable reduces Jewish quality of life.

Accordingly, this report finds little cause for alarm. The young left tends to decouple sentiment toward American Jews, a historically oppressed and left-coded minority, from Israel, a right-coded 'settler-colonial oppressor'.[10] The young right, as we will see, is disengaging from, rather than hostile towards, Israel - and still supports it over the Palestinians. Anti-Jewish podcasters like Nick Fuentes do affect public opinion, but have a tiny reach, producing little trace even in young right-wing attitudes. Those with larger audiences like Tucker Carlson are the least antisemitic and do not appear to have shifted public opinion against Jews. The recent uptick in antisemitism is barely perceptible in the context of historic trends.

The Fuentes-Carlson Controversy on the Right

Nick Fuentes has described Adolph Hitler as 'cool', questioned whether 6 million people really died in the Holocaust and repeatedly advances conspiratorial claims about 'organized Jewry' influencing America. Fuentes was subsequently invited onto Tucker Carlson's show, where Carlson engaged in a collegial interview that that failed to interrogate Fuentes' past statements about Jews. Watched by over 5 million people, the interview appeared to launder Fuentes' reputation, bestowing a patina of respectability upon him. This led to a

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[10] Kirsch, A. (2024). On Settler Colonialism: Ideology, Violence, and Justice, WW Norton & Company.

vociferous backlash among sections of the right. However, Kevin Roberts, president of the Heritage Foundation, a pillar of the conservative establishment in Washington, DC, defended Carlson against internal critics in the name of resisting cancel culture and division within the right.[11] While Republican politicians such as Ted Cruz condemned Carlson's interview, Donald Trump defended Carlson's right to do it and J.D. Vance, whom Fuentes had insulted, remained silent.[12]

A number of right-wing media personalities subsequently delivered blistering attacks on Carlson, especially Ben Shapiro, who later spoke before Tucker Carlson at the recent Turning Point USA AmericaFest conference, opining:

'If you host a Hitler apologist, Nazi-loving, anti-American piece of refuse like Nick Fuentes – you know, the Nick Fuentes who said that the vice president of the United States is a, quote, "fat, gay race traitor married to a Jeet," the person who said that Charlie Kirk was a, quote, "retarded idiot," the person who said, and pardon my language here, it's his quote, that he, quote, "took Turning Point USA and fucked it and that's why it's filled with Groypers" – if you have that person on your show and you proceed to glaze him, you ought to own it.'

Carlson's reply focused on Shapiro promulgating cancel culture:

'To hear calls for like deplatforming and denouncing people at a Charlie Kirk event, I'm like, what?! That's hilarious…The whole like Red Guard Cultural Revolution thing that we so hated and feared on the left, that we did everything we could to usher in a new time where you could have an actual debate, I mean this kind of was the whole point of Charlie Kirk's public life and I think that he died for it. I really believe that.'[13]

The debate turns on whether forceful criticism of podcast hosts who do not challenge guests when they abandon norms of reason, evidence, or decency is a form of cancel culture. Does this moral-emotional censure run counter to what Greg Lukianoff calls a 'free speech culture,' or does it exemplify it?[14]

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[11] 'Leaders on the Right Must Unequivocally Condemn Antisemitism,' *Center for American Progress*, November 4, 2025.
[12] Lotz, Avery, 'Trump defends Tucker Carlson as Nick Fuentes interview divides MAGA world,' *Axios*, November 17.
[13] Nash, Charlie, 'Turning Point USA Conference Turns Into War Between Ben Shapiro and Tucker Carlson as They Trade Blows,' *Mediaite.com*, December 18, 2025.
[14] Lukianoff, G. and R. Schlott (2023). The canceling of the American mind: How cancel culture undermines trust, destroys institutions, and threatens us all, Random House.

Some commentators on both left and right view the controversy as reflecting a momentous generational shift from philosemitism to antisemitism. Surveys show that young Americans are currently much less supportive of Israel, more supportive of the Palestinian cause, and more likely to believe antisemitic conspiracy theories than their elders. 'The research collectively suggests that America is becoming more anti-Semitic because its young people are becoming more anti-Semitic,' observes Yair Rosenberg.[15] Some are especially worried about the rise of an antisemitic strain of conservatism on the young right. Rod Dreher, who is well-connected in Washington conservative circles, has been told that as many as 40 percent of young Republican DC staffers are 'groypers,' or followers of Fuentes.

Candace Owens, meanwhile, has frequently trafficked in anti-Jewish tropes. This includes claims that Israel is a 'cult nation,' that pro-Israel lobbying groups such as AIPAC 'own' U.S. policy and promulgating social-media content invoking blood-libel imagery. She has also defended Kanye West following his antisemitic remarks and accused Jewish figures of coordinated bad-faith influence. As a result, organizations such as StopAntisemitism labeled her 'Antisemite of the Year' (2024) and she was forced to leave her spot at The Daily Wire. Tucker Carlson has not said anything comparable to Owens and Fuentes. He has mainly been accused of engaging in more general conspiracy theorizing while hosting antisemitic guests such as Nazi apologist Darryl Cooper and Fuentes.

Rod Dreher, Ben Shapiro and others on the right worry that right-wing new media personalities such as Fuentes, Owens and Carlson are helping to mainstream antisemitism, racism and white nationalism within the conservative movement.

The Study

Still, behind the headlines and anecdotes we know very little about how young people's attitudes are shaped by right-wing influencers. Does right-wing personality content influence youth attitudes? While the term 'influencer' suggests as much, the case must be proven rather than asserted.

No study to date has asked young Trump supporters about which influencers they tune in to, and what those

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[15] Rosenberg, Yair, 'The More I'm Around Young People, the More Panicked I Am,' *Atlantic*, December 15, 2025; '60% of US Gen Z support Hamas in Harvard-Harris poll,' *JNS.com*, September 1, 2025.

who follow Fuentes, Owens or Carlson believe about antisemitism, racism or white nationalism. The closest in scope is a recent Manhattan Institute report by Jesse Arm and Matthew Knee.[16] This work found that young Trump voters, as well as Democratic or Independent voters who switched to Trump in 2024, were significantly more likely to express racist and antisemitic attitudes than older and more consistently Republican 'core' Trump voters.

I build on this important study by asking young right-wing respondents directly about which right-wing influencers they follow. This provides a quantitative measure of how extensively new right influencers are penetrating and shaping the consciousness of a new generation. For instance, the survey permits me to examine whether those who consume content from right-wing new media sources have more negative attitudes toward Jews and blacks, or are more likely to express white nationalist views.

I focus mainly on Nick Fuentes, Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens, but also consider a far-from-exhaustive selection of others, including Alex Jones, Ben Shapiro, Matt Walsh, the Federalist and Dan Bongino, and news outlets such as Fox News, the American Conservative, *New York Post*, Breitbart and Newsmax. These are compared with two liberal outlets, the *New York Times* and MSNBC.

Sources and Methods

This study involves new surveys, but also uses data from large-scale established nationally-representative surveys, notably the American National Election Study (ANES) – which has been running since 1958, the General Social Survey (GSS), dating from 1972, and the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) annual undergraduate student surveys which have been undertaken since 2020.

These are augmented by several smaller specialized surveys. The first is a Manhattan Institute survey of over 2,000 Trump supporters, with an oversample of black and Hispanic Trump voters as well as a comparator group of Democratic and Independent voters. This asks respondents whether they approve of Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens, among others. The survey includes items on conspiracy theories, antisemitic and racist attitudes, but does not ask people who they listen to, and does not include a question on Nick Fuentes. Between

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[16] Arm, Jesse and Matthew Knee, 'The New GOP Survey Analysis of Americans Overall, Today's Republican Coalition, and the Minorities of MAGA,' *Manhattan Institute*, December 1, 2025.

October 15 and 26, 2025, the Manhattan Institute surveyed four separate national audiences: 1,493 Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, 301 black Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, 501 Hispanic Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, and 500 additional registered voters overall. The sample was reached primarily via online panels (2,172 interviews) with an SMS-to-web component (623 respondents). The margin of error is ±2.0% for the general GOP sample, ±5.6% for the black GOP sample, ±4.4% for the Hispanic GOP sample, and ±4.4% for the registered voter sample.

The second source consists of two smaller surveys on Prolific, a high-end survey platform used heavily by academics. Half of the respondents are drawn from a sample of nearly 400 Trump voters under age 35 conducted from November 25 to December 3, 2025. A second group consists of a national adult sample which is balanced on politics, race and gender, conducted during November 25-26, 2025. The Prolific surveys asks people whether they follow specific right-wing new media shows, as well as some established news media outlets, on a regular or occasional basis. It also inquires about antisemitic conspiracy theories, as well as feelings toward Jews, blacks, whites, illegal immigrants and Palestinians - which can be compared with ANES data. It also tests whether respondents hold white nationalist attitudes to American identity. These two samples are augmented by two other Prolific surveys, conducted during December 14-15, 2023 and December 19-20, 2023, of 2,007 and 3,536 American adults respectively.

The aim in all cases is not just to present top line findings, but to use multivariate statistical analysis to ask whether tuning in to certain programmes, such as Fuentes, Owens or Carlson, predicts antisemitic, racist or white nationalist attitudes. I am also interested in the sociodemographics of followers: are they exclusively white and male, as some imagine, do they contain racial and gender diversity.

Part I   A Social Profile of Young Right-Wing Audiences

The News Sources of Young Right-Wing Americans

Younger Americans are more likely to get their news from podcasts than older Americans, and considerably less likely to read a newspaper. Over time, podcasts are becoming more important conveyors of news information. Figure 1, from Pew, shows that in 2025, nearly 40 percent of those under 50 years old 'often or sometimes' got their news from podcasts. This contrasts with just 20 percent who said the same among those over 65.

However, the proportion getting news from podcasts has risen 10 points across all age groups since 2020.

Getting news from podcasts, by age
*% who say they **often or sometimes** get news from podcasts*

Legend: U.S. adults ● Ages 18-29 ● 30-49 ● 50-64 ● 65+

Note: Other response options were "Rarely" and "Never." Respondents who did not answer are not shown. Respondents who do not use the internet did not receive this question; they are included with those who said "Never," along with those who do not say they get news from digital devices.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Aug. 18-24, 2025.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Figure 1

Source: '<u>Podcasts and News Fact Sheet</u>,' *Pew*, September 25, 2025.

There is, in addition, a partisan slant to podcast news audiences. While the proportion of people who get their news from podcasts 'often or sometimes' is similar among voters for the main parties, Republicans trust podcasts more than Democrats. As Figure 2 shows, 31 percent of Republicans trust news podcasts more than other sources, twice the 15 percent share among Democrats.

Trust in news from podcasts

Among U.S. podcast news consumers, % who say they trust the news they get from podcasts ___ the news they get from other sources

● More than ○ About the same as ● Less than

	More than	About the same as	Less than
U.S. adults	23%	53%	23%
Rep/Lean Rep	31%	50%	18%
Dem/Lean Dem	15%	56%	28%

Note: Respondents who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Aug. 18-24, 2025.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Figure 2

Source: 'Podcasts and News Fact Sheet,' *Pew*, September 25, 2025.

Republicans are more likely to tune in to partisan podcasts or YouTube videos. In a December 2023 Prolific survey, I asked respondents about consuming news content that has 'your political point of view.' Republicans were more likely than Democrats to watch partisan television, read partisan newspapers, magazines and websites, or take in partisan podcasts and YouTube videos. This could also reflect Democrats being less willing to describe progressive-tilted mainstream media as 'partisan', but the gap with Republicans was minimal for consuming partisan television.

Figure 3 shows that when it comes to watching partisan television on a daily or weekly basis, Trump voters edge Biden voters, but only by 41-37. For reading newspapers, magazines or news websites, the gap is a modest 35-29, but for partisan podcasts and videos, it widens to 38-25.

The last point is especially noteworthy: 38 percent of Trump voters consume a partisan news podcast on a regular basis compared to 25 percent of Biden voters, a 13-point gap that dwarfs the 4-point gap (41-37) in watching partisan television. Moreover, Trump voters are twice as likely as Biden voters to consume partisan podcasts daily (13 percent vs. 6 percent). Biden voters are also substantially more likely to never consume such content (57 percent vs. 42 percent). This echoes Pew's finding that Republicans trust podcast news more than other news sources.

"Do you regularly watch television channels that have your political view?",
by 2024 Vote Intention

"Do you regularly read newspapers, magazines or news websites that have your political view?",
by 2024 Vote Intention

"Do you regularly listen to podcasts that have your political view or watch YouTube videos that have your political view?",
by 2024 Vote Intention

Source: *Prolific Academic*, December 19-20, 2023

Figure 3

Source: Prolific, December 19-20, 2023. N=2,007. Sample size for partisans in brackets.

We saw from Pew data that younger Americans are more likely to get their news from podcasts. This accords with my survey data on Trump voters from December 2023, presented in Figure 4, which shows that 45-47 percent of Trump voters over age 35 never consume political podcasts or videos compared to 36-38 percent of Trump voters under age 35.

Younger voters are not more likely to engage with political podcast or video content on a regular basis than older voters, but are more likely to encounter it on an occasional (monthly) basis – perhaps via their social media feeds.

Frequency of Political Podcast/Youtube Consumption, Trump Voters, by Age

Age	Never	Monthly or less	Weekly	Daily
18-25	38%	30%	19%	13%
26-34	36%	28%	29%	6%
35-44	47%	14%	26%	13%
45-54	46%	17%	23%	14%
55-77	45%	14%	25%	17%

Figure 4

Source: Prolific, December 14-15, 2023. N=823 Trump voters out of 3,536.

The Pew Research Center analyzed over 500 influencers with more than 100,000 followers who regularly posted about the news on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, X or YouTube in early 2024. In Figure 5, Pew reports that just over half of news influencers have a political affiliation, and of these, more lean right than left.

More news influencers explicitly say they are right-leaning than left-leaning

% of news influencers who explicitly identify as ...

Right-leaning — 27%

Left-leaning — 21

52% explicitly express a political orientation

Other — 3

No clear orientation — 48

Note: Right-leaning includes people who explicitly identify as conservative, Republican or express support for Donald Trump. Left-leaning includes liberals, Democrats and people who have explicitly expressed support for Joe Biden or Kamala Harris. "Other" includes independent or moderate, libertarian, or other ideologies. Political orientation could be expressed in account bios, recent social media posts, personal and professional websites and news coverage.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 500 influencers with over 100,000 followers who regularly posted about news on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, X or YouTube in early 2024. Refer to methodology for details.
"America's News Influencers"

PEW-KNIGHT INITIATIVE

Figure 5

Source: 'America's News Influencers,' *Pew*, November 18, 2024.

For instance, the top 50 podcasts in Q2 of 2025 included 41 non-political shows, 5 right-leaning, 3 left-leaning and 1 centrist show. The right-leaning Tucker Carlson Show (ranked no. 14), Megyn Kelly Show (19), Ben Shapiro Show (26), Shawn Ryan Show (30) and Charlie Kirk Show (49) were in the top 50. On the left, Pod Save America (12), The MeidasTouch (24) and This American Life (9) also made the top 50.[17]

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[17] 'America's News Influencers,' Pew, November 18, 2024.

How do political podcasts on the right compete with left-leaning mainstream media? In Table 1, I compare a leading centre-left and centre-right newspaper, the *New York Times* and *New York Post*, with three new media shows that will be a focus of this report, the Tucker Carlson Show, Candace Owens Show and America First with Nick Fuentes.

Table 1.

Name	Platform Reach (est.)	Followers/Subs	Engagement Level
New York Times	100–120m monthly visitors	11.8m subs; 55m X	High for subscribers
New York Post	~85m monthly visitors	3–5m social	Medium-high
Tucker Carlson	10–200m X impressions/video	12.7m X; 200–500k subs	Extremely variable
Candace Owens	Moderate (100–500k/video)	4–5m X; 3.8m YouTube; 5m Instagram	Medium
Nick Fuentes	2k–10k live; 60k Telegram	Telegram only	Very high within niche

Table 1 can be reconfigured as a reach index, taking into account subscribers, surge volume and engagement. However, the *New York Times* has a paid subscriber base with high engagement. The *New York Post* is free, with a funding model based on driving traffic to its site. Podcasters like Carlson and Owens have a lot of engagement on X and occasionally viral episodes and clips, but not the stable high engagement of a paywalled paper like the *New York Times*. Newspapers are read daily while podcasters surge with each episode and its content. Thus we can compare by the reach of an average episode or edition, but also by using a scale adjusted for the intermittent engagement that right-wing shows achieve.

It is worth noting that a new analysis of Nick Fuentes' social media activity suggests that he uses overseas accounts to boost his signal by retweeting his posts on X en masse in the first 30 minutes after he uploads them.

This appears to have successfully driven mainstream media attention. All the more reason why this analysis uses survey data of American adults, providing a more accurate portrait of his reach and impact within the United States.[18]

The reach comparison chart in Figure 6 illustrates that right-wing podcasts punch above their weight in terms of intermittent reach and virality, but less so for daily engagement.


Combined Comparison: Raw Monthly Reach vs Corrected Daily-Equivalent Reach

Figure 6

Note: Based on Table 1 calculations.

Turning next to data from my November-December 2025 Prolific surveys of a politically, racially and gender-balanced sample of American adults (N=391) and of Trump voters under age 35 (N=392), I find a similar pattern to the audience reach graph above.

I ask responents which of the sites listed they regularly follow (see Figure 7), and then, in a separate question, which sites they occasionally follow. There is a far from exhaustive menu of options presented, though an 'other' option with textbox is also provided.

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[18] 'America Last: How Fuentes's Coordinated Raids and Foreign Fake-Speech Networks Inflate His Influence,' *National Contagion Research Institute*, Rutgers University, December 8, 2025

Figure 7

Source: Prolific November 25-December 3, 2025.

The broad pattern is similar to the Pew data and my December 2023 Prolific survey, which indicated that around 40 percent regularly get their news from podcasts. Around 35-40 percent of conservative and/or Trump-voting respondents in Figure 8 regularly consume one of the right-wing podcasts I asked them about.

Many who routinely tune in to one right-wing show follow others. The share of all adult Americans who listen to or watch right-wing new media shows at least occasionally is impressive: 27 percent of all adults, 55 percent of ideologically conservative adults and nearly 2 in 3 Trump-voting adults under age 35.

Share Consuming Right-Wing Influencer Content

Figure 8

Source: Prolific surveys, November 25-December 3. N=392 under-35 Trump voters and 391 national balanced sample of adults. Sample sizes in brackets. Refers only to specified right-wing content asked about in the survey.

Figure 9 is based on the adult sample, which finds that adult consumption of news still heavily favours mainstream television and newspaper sources such as the *New York Times* and *Fox News*. Their dominance is especially strong among regular news consumers (black bars). Bearing in mind that daily mainstream media content is much more continuous and substantial in volume than podcast content, this suggests that mainstream news sources continue to dominate public attention.

The selection of right-wing podcasts, YouTube channels and news sites presented to respondents on the survey tends to garner higher occasional than regular viewers. Accordingly, the percentage of all adults who regularly get their news from any one of these sources is only in low single digits.

Having said this, over 5 percent of adults surveyed regularly consume content from Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens, which represents millions of views and listens.

Figure 9

Source: Prolific, November 25-26, 2025. N=391.

Their influence grows considerably when limiting our purview to Trump voters under age 35 in Figure 10. While the mainstream media remains dominant among young Trump voters, with 43 percent regularly watching *Fox*, 27 percent reading the *New York Times* and 23 percent the *New York Post*, the gap between mainstream and new media narrows.

19 percent of this demographic regularly tunes in to Tucker Carlson, and 17 percent follow Candace Owens. These are within shouting distance of the *New York Times* and *New York Post*. And when it comes to occasional consumers within the young right, Carlson, Owens and Shapiro meet or exceed mainstream media influence. Nick Fuentes' tiny 2-3 percent share of regular viewership/listenership/readership among all adults expands to 7 percent of regular and 4 percent of occasional young Trump voters. This is still small (i.e. at the Alex Jones level), but is several times more important than in the general population.

Media Sources, Under-35 Trump Voters

Figure 10

Source: Prolific, November 25-December 3, 2025. N=392.

Many individuals follow multiple podcasters from the same ecosystem. Half of Nick Fuentes' regular listeners and viewers regularly tune in to Candace Owens and Tucker Carlson, rising to two-thirds if we include Fuentes' regular followers who occasionally watch Owens and Carlson.

Smaller accounts often have audiences who watch other new media content, even if the hosts are nominally at loggerheads. A fifth of Fuentes' followers regularly follow his nemesis Ben Shapiro, rising to a third if we include Fuentes followers who occasionally watch Shapiro. A third of Fuentes' regular audience regularly read the despised *New York Times* and over a fifth routinely tune in to MSNBC. Indeed, half his audience reads the Times at least occasionally! 25 percent of Tucker's regular audience regularly read the Times, rising to 40 percent if we include those who read it on occasion.

The reverse does not hold. Big mainstream media consumers are much less likely to follow new media than the other way round. To wit, only around 5 percent of regular Times readers in the adult sample are regular consumers of Tucker's content, rising to 10-15 percent if we include Times readers who occasionally watch Tucker. Only 15 percent of Fox viewers in the adult sample regularly tune in to Tucker, rising to a third who occasionally consume his content.

The overlap between Fox News and MSNBC is considerably greater than between Tucker and Fox: around a third of regular Fox and MSNBC viewers watch the other channel on a regular basis. Television watchers of all political stripe inhabit a substantially different world from new media audiences.

We thus have a pattern of distinct media ecosystems, albeit with some overlap. Figure 11 shows how regular consumers correlate in their consumption habits, with yellow highlight for correlations above .20 and red for those above .15. This reveals a right-wing influencer cluster including Carlson, Owens, Shapiro, Walsh, Jones and to some extent Steve Bannon. Many people follow multiple accounts within the right-wing influencer network.

There is also a conservative news cluster connecting Fox News with the *New York Post*, Breitbart, American Conservative, Dan Bongino and Newsmax. The right-wing podcast and news clusters are linked, but only at a modest level.

Finally we have the liberal *New York Times* and MSNBC whose audiences are interwoven, but which are highly separate from the right-wing clusters. The one glaring exception is the link between *New York Times* and *New York Post* readers. In the adult sample, over a quarter of Times readers regularly read the Post while two-thirds of Post readers regularly read the Times.

Nevertheless, the correlations in Figure 11 overstate connections between ecosystems: only a small share of large networks' audiences follow right-wing influencers while audiences for small accounts often tune in to larger channels and newspapers. We saw that up to half the audience of Nick Fuentes and Tucker Carlson read content from the *New York Times* at least occasionally - even if Times readers do not repay the favour.

	NY Times	NY Post	Fox News	Federalist	Breitbart	Am Con	MSNBC	Shapiro	Alex Jones	Bongino	Tucker	Candace	Fuentes	Bannon	Walsh	Newsmax
NY Times	1.00															
NY Post	**0.38**	1.00														
Fox News	0.05	**0.22**	1.00													
Federalist	0.06	0.07	0.05	1.00												
Breitbart	0.03	0.14	0.05	-0.01	1.00											
Am Con	0.10	0.13	0.11	-0.01	*0.15*	1.00										
MSNBC	**0.32**	*0.16*	0.08	-0.02	0.03	0.11	1.00									
Shapiro	0.02	*0.18*	*0.16*	0.11	0.07	0.08	-0.05	1.00								
Alex Jones	-0.01	0.12	0.09	-0.01	0.13	0.09	0.03	**0.20**	1.00							
Bongino	-0.06	0.02	*0.15*	-0.01	*0.16*	0.02	-0.07	0.11	0.12	1.00						
Tucker	-0.04	*0.15*	*0.19*	-0.01	0.12	0.10	0.00	**0.28**	**0.33**	*0.16*	1.00					
Candace	-0.03	0.06	0.13	0.10	0.08	0.08	-0.02	**0.22**	**0.29**	0.08	**0.33**	1.00				
Fuentes	0.01	0.07	0.09	-0.01	0.09	0.10	0.04	0.09	**0.22**	0.10	**0.28**	**0.26**	1.00			
Bannon	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.26	0.08	-0.01	0.07	*0.17*	0.06	0.13	0.01	0.05	1.00		
Walsh	-0.03	0.06	0.14	-0.01	0.08	0.08	-0.01	**0.23**	**0.22**	0.11	**0.27**	*0.17*	**0.26**	**0.22**	1.00	
Newsmax	0.06	*0.19*	*0.17*	-0.01	0.13	0.10	0.00	0.08	0.06	0.15	0.13	0.11	0.10	-0.03	0.08	1

Figure 11

Podcast Viewers More Attuned to Culture Wars

Trump voters who regularly consume political podcasts and YouTube videos differ in important ways from those who watch political television channels like Fox News, or read conservative newspapers and magazines such as the *New York Post*. In particular, as Figure 12 shows, Trump voters who consume political podcasts and YouTube shows are more likely to rank culture wars issues highly. By contrast those who watch conservative television rank such issues lower. The same isn't true for immigration, which is a top-ranked issue for both regular Fox News and right-wing podcast/YouTube audiences.

When asked about the three most important non-economic issues facing the country from a list of 9, the share selecting 'Political Correctness, Critical Race and Gender Indoctrination in Schools and Organizations, Free Speech, Wokeness' was highest (32-34 percent) among Trump voters who consumed political YouTube videos or podcasts regularly. By contrast, Trump voters who regularly watched political television channels like Fox tended to rank these issues lower. Twitter engagement was also correlated with placing a higher priority on culture wars issues, but the effect – controlling for confounding demographic and social factors - was not statistically significant the way it was for frequency of consuming new media content.


Figure 12

Source: Prolific, December 14-15, 2023. N=3,536.

Audience Demographics

Analysts were surprised to see Donald Trump win 46 percent of the Hispanic vote and 40 percent of the Asian vote in 2024. Most Hispanic men voted Republican. Trump also won 38 percent of women under 30 and 41 percent of women between the ages of 30 and 44.[19]

Likewise, those who have analyzed Nick Fuentes' groyper movement have observed that Hispanics and other nonwhites are an important component of the movement and its base. Fuentes himself has mentioned that his followership contains Hispanics, blacks and even Jews, while his conferences have featured minority speakers like Filipino-American Michelle Malkin and black Americans Jon Miller and Jesse Lee Patterson. Ben Lorber and Natalie Li point out that Hispanic accounts like 'Hispanic Groyper,' 'Venezuelan American Groyper,' and 'Latino Zoomer' regularly pop up to comment on his posts.

Much of Fuentes' appeal turns on his edgy transgression of society's most sensitive social taboos, such as racism and antisemitism. This has considerable appeal to minorities, who are somewhat more antisemitic in their attitudes than whites - especially conservative nonwhites.[20] As Surya Gowda remarks: 'It is not difficult to see how rants in which Fuentes declares that "Jews are running society, women need to shut the f— up, blacks need to be imprisoned for the most part, and we would live in paradise!" could appeal especially to men of non-European backgrounds who do, in fact, agree with him on those fronts. Moreover, nonwhites by and large dislike political correctness. It would not be surprising, therefore, if a small minority of them relished Fuentes' transgressions of our norms of acceptable speech.'[21]

Likewise, nonwhite Trump voters under 50 in Manhattan Institute survey data are as likely as their white counterparts to call themselves racist.[22] Ideologies of race seem oddly detached from race itself. Yet while some Surya Gowda has drawn attention to the surprising racial diversity of Fuentes' fan base, fewer have noticed the

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[19] CNN exit poll, accessed December 18, 2025.
[20] Hersh, E. and L. Royden (2023). "Antisemitic attitudes among young Black and Hispanic Americans." Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics **8**(1): 105-123. Yglesias, M. 'Antisemitism in America,' *Slow Boring*, November 15, 2025.
[21] Gowda, Surya, 'The curious case of nonwhite Groypers,' *The Dispatch*, December 17, 2025.
[22] Arm, Jesse and Matthew Knee, 'The New GOP Survey Analysis of Americans Overall, Today's Republican Coalition, and the Minorities of MAGA,' Manhattan Institute, December 1, 2025.

movement's gender and sexual diversity.

My Prolific data confirms that the audience for right-wing influencers is more diverse in terms of race, age, sex and sexual orientation than is commonly believed. When asked in December 2023 whether they consumed content from politically aligned podcasters or YouTubers weekly or more, 39 percent of blacks and 30 percent of Hispanics replied in the affirmative, compared to 27 percent of whites. Limiting the sample to prospective 2024 Trump voters, fully 56 percent of blacks and 51 percent of Hispanics said they consumed weekly podcast/video content compared to 37 percent of white Trump voters and 36 percent of Asian Trump voters.[23]

In statistical tests controlling for age, education, income, sex, sexual orientation, ideology and prospective 2024 voting, the 329 black Americans (of all political stripes) in the full sample were significantly more likely than other racial groups to consume political podcasts. This also held true within Trump voters, as Figure 13 illustrates. No other racial groups stood out on this measure as being under- or over-represented compared to whites. Trump voters, conservatives and men were also significantly over-represented among frequent podcast consumers.


Frequency of Political Podcast/Youtube Consumption, Trump Voters, by Race

Legend: ▢ Never ▢ Monthly or less ▉ Weekly ▉ Daily

Black (49): Weekly 27%, Daily 35%
Other (24): Weekly 21%, Daily 25%
White (654): Weekly 23%, Daily 14%
Asian (50): Weekly 20%, Daily 16%
Mixed (42): Weekly 19%, Daily 12%

Figure 13

Source: Prolific, December 14-15, 2023. N=823 Trump voters.

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[23] Source: Prolific, December 15, 2023. Sample includes 45 black Trump voters, 59 Hispanic Trump voters, 50 Asian Trump voters and 654 white Trump voters.

Turning to my November-December 2025 Prolific survey, the youth sample of 392 under-35 Trump voters is 69 percent non-Hispanic white, 9 percent Hispanic, 6 percent black, 8 percent Asian and 2 percent Native. Using Prolific's simplified racial categories, the figures are 74 percent white, 8 percent Asian, 6 percent black and 11 percent mixed or other.

Figure 14 plots the racial composition of regular consumers of various forms of media, arrayed by the proportion who are white. Note that some outlets have very few individuals in the sample, hence estimates must be taken with caution. Even so, a broad pattern emerges of liberal sources such as the *New York Times* and MSNBC scoring towards the more diverse end (around 30 percent nonwhite), alongside the centre-right *New York Post*. However, new media influencers such as Tucker Carlson, Ben Shapiro, Candace Owens and Nick Fuentes, as well as Fox News, have a young audience that contains significant diversity – with a fifth to a quarter reporting a nonwhite background. Small samples make it difficult to be precise about the size of each minority group in each audience, but the broad pattern of significant racial diversity among the young audience for new media personalities is clear.

Having said this, in contrast to the December 2023 samples (which did not specify any particular political podcasts), the audience for specified right-wing influencers - using a combined measure for Walsh, Fuentes, Bannon, Bongino, Carlson, Jones and Shapiro and controlling for individual ideology, age and sex – shows that blacks are not overrepresented compared to whites. The mixed group, often Hispanic, is well-represented across most accounts, as are Asians.

Racial Composition of Audience, Under-35s

Figure 14

Source: Prolific, November 25-December 3, 2025. N=784. Sample size for each outlet in brackets.

Some Hispanics identified as white rather than mixed race. Drilling beneath the basic racial categories, therefore, I find that the non-Hispanic white share ranges from 64 percent for Nick Fuentes and the *New York Times* to 68 percent for Candace Owens and 76 percent for Tucker Carlson. In other words, 30 percent of the young audience for these right-wing influencers is Hispanic, black or Asian.

The politically balanced adult sample of 391 individuals is 76 percent white. The under-35 Trump-voting sample of 392 individuals is 74 percent white, a similar share. The parity in the surveys arises because under-35s are more diverse (just 59 percent of under-35s in the balanced sample are white), yet Trump voters are whiter than average. The two forces offset each other nearly perfectly to produce racially similar survey samples.

Despite this artificial parity, a comparison between the two surveys is useful because it maximizes sample size to highlight common patterns. Figure 15 compares the overall adult and under-35 Trump surveys, with sample sizes in brackets. Notice that right-wing influencers have a considerably smaller audience among a national sample of adults than they do among young Trump voters. Thus Tucker Carlson has 132 following him at least occasionally among the young Trump voter sample but within the politically-balanced sample of adults just 61

do. For Nick Fuentes the numbers are 44 and 16, while for Candace Owens they are 145 and 48. Results confirm a pattern wherein liberal and 'established' outlets (NY Times, MSNBC, NY Post) have only a somewhat more diverse audience than Fox News and various right-wing influencers. Roughly 20-25 percent of Fox/right-influencer consumers are nonwhite compared to 30 percent for liberal/established outlets. This is not a major difference.

The above figures include some Hispanics as white. Taking this into account, the young audience for right-wing influencers and Fox News is between a third and a quarter minority (defined as other than non-Hispanic white). In statistical tests controlling for an individual's age, sex, ideology, education and income, Fuentes' under-35 audience is significantly less white than the under-35 Trump voter average while Tucker's is significantly more white.

In both adult and young Trump samples in Figure 15, Tucker stands out as having a significantly whiter audience share than average. Fuentes' and Owens' audiences, by contrast, do not statistically differ from the adult average (and recall that among under-35 Trump voters, Fuentes' audience is more racially diverse than other right-wing influencers).


Figure 15

Source: Prolific, November 25-December 3, 2025. N=784. Sample size for each audience in brackets.

The stereotype of right-wing influencers being followed exclusively by men also fails to be substantiated. My youth Trump voter survey is 45 percent female (likely somewhat higher than a national sample due to the 10-15 point overrepresentation of women on Prolific), while my adult gender-balanced survey is 50 percent female. In the 2025 Prolific surveys, between 20 and 40 percent of those who consume content from various right-wing influencers are female. Figure 16 shows that this ranges from a low end of 10-20 percent women watching Breitbart and Alex Jones, to Candace Owens, whose audience is majority female (52-3 percent) in both the adult and young Trump samples. Matt Walsh also has a significant female share, between 42-52 percent. Steve Bannon, Dan Bongino, Nick Fuentes and Tucker Carlson have a more female audience among adults than among the young. It is however impossible to know if this reflects actual audience dynamics or measurement error in small samples, especially for Bannon, Bongino and Fuentes.

Neverthless, across all right-wing influencers, most lie in the 20-40 percent female zone, averaging about 35 percent. This is not vastly different to mainstream sources such as the *New York Times* or MSNBC. Candace Owens' audience is more female than that of mainstream media sources.

A last point is that 13 percent of young Trump voters identify as having a sexual orientation other than heterosexual, which is a little more than half the share one would expect on a national survey of people under 35.[24] The LGB share rises to 16-18 percent for young Trump voters who regularly follow Owens, Carlson or Fuentes, though this is not stastically significant.

In summary, right-wing audiences do not inhabit a masculine echo chamber.

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[24] Jones, Jeffrey M., 'LGBTQ+ Identification in U.S. Rises to 9.3%,' *Gallup*, February 20, 2025.

Female Share of Audience, Under-35 Trump Voters vs. Overall Adult Sample

Figure 16

Source: Prolific, November 25-December 3, 2025. N=392 under 35 Trump voters and 391 politically-balanced adults.

A final point concerns the age of podcast audiences. In the adult survey, Nick Fuentes and Candace Owens had significantly younger audiences than average when controlling for other factors, but this was not true of Tucker Carlson or Ben Shapiro. Even in the case of Fuentes and Owens, the average age of those who consumed their content regularly or occasionally in the adult survey was 45, just slightly below average.

Characteristics of Potential Audiences

Beyond those who actually consume content from right-wing influencers, it is possible to discern how large the pool of potential customers is by asking people how favourable they are to right-wing media personalities. In mid-October 2025, the Manhattan Institute fielded a major survey of nearly 2,400 Trump voters.[25] It asked about favourability toward a range of right-wing political figures, including Candace Owens, Ben Shapiro and

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[25] Between October 15 and 26, 2025, the Manhattan Institute surveyed four separate national audiences: 1,493 Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, 301 black Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, 501 Hispanic Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, and 500 additional registered voters overall. From Arm, Jesse and Matthew Knee, 'The New GOP Survey Analysis of Americans Overall, Today's Republican Coalition, and the Minorities of MAGA,' *Manhattan Institute*, December 1, 2025.

Tucker Carlson. Those who are favourable toward these online influencers may already be tuning in, or may be potential customers – this cannot be discerned from the survey questions.

The first point to note is that approximately 25 percent of Trump voters had never heard of Owens or Shapiro or had no opinion about them, and the same was true of 15 percent with respect to Carlson. Bearing this in mind, Trump voters were favourable toward all these figures, but more so the ex-Fox host Carlson (65-19) than Shapiro (56-21) or Owens (52-23). Politicians Trump (93-6), Vance (86-10), Rubio (77-12) and George W. Bush (68-27) tended to have higher approval ratings than the media figures.

Favourability toward Carlson and Owens are tightly correlated at nearly .5. Favourability of Shapiro is quite strongly correlated with favourability toward Owens and Carlson, at almost .4. This maps a common podcast ecosystem. The connection between sentiment toward Trump, Vance and Rubio is even closer, between .52 and .69, reflecting general partisan sentiment toward political figures on one's team.

On the other hand, the correlation between media figures and politicians is lower, in the .10s between media personalities and George W. Bush or .20s for links between the media hosts and Trump, Vance or Rubio. The bridge between media and politicians is only strong for Carlson, whose approval is correlated at around .5 with favourability toward Trump, Vance and Rubio. This reiterates our earlier finding that those who follow one podcaster or youtuber tend to follow others, and differ from those whose media diet is primarily based on television and/or newspapers focused on national politicians. Carlson as a former Fox News host is able to bridge both audiences.

The demographics of potential audiences echoes actual audience demographics from my Prolific data. Respondents over 50 are 2 to 3 times more likely to have no opinion of Candace Owens than those under 50. For Ben Shapiro, those over 50 are twice as likely as those under 50 to have no opinion of them. There was no similar age contrast for Carlson, a well-known television personality among older Trump voters. In addition, there was no clear age pattern of support for these right-wing personalities.

These data also reinforce earlier findings about the diversity of right-wing podcast audiences. Figure 17 shows that minority Trump voters are somewhat more likely to have a favourable view of Owens, Carlson and Shapiro than white Trump voters are, except among seniors. Statistical modelling shows that Hispanic Trump voters

stand out as significantly more favourable toward these three online right-wing personalities than white Trump voters.

The small sample of 135 non-Trump (mainly Democratic) voters shows nonwhites to be less favourable to Owens but more favourable to Carlson than their white counterparts. Shapiro is viewed somewhat less favourably by minority than white non-Trump voters, but the slant is more modest than for Owens. In all cases only a minority had a favourable view of these right-wing personalities.

Figure 17

Source: Arm, Jesse and Matthew Knee, 'The New GOP Survey Analysis of Americans Overall, Today's Republican Coalition, and the Minorities of MAGA,' *Manhattan Institute*, December 1, 2025. N=2,390 Trump voters from October 15-16, 2025 survey.

Female Trump voters are no less enthuasiastic then their male counterparts about these online political influencers. Modelling suggests that, controlling for demographics, they are significantly less enthusiastic toward Ben Shapiro compared to Owens and Carlson, but their aggregate view of him is still positive by 45-22, not so different from Owens but less impressive than Carlson's 60-18 favourability among female Trump voters. The conclusion from the above is that the pool of actual and potential consumers for Owens, Carlson and Shapiro is much more diverse in race, age and gender terms than the popular stereotype of the based young white dude. This accords with my earlier finding about the surprising racial and gender diversity of these

influencers, as well as the fact that their average follower is in their mid-40s.

Part II Young Right-Wing Attitudes to Jews and Israel

I next turn to attitudes to Israel and Jews by podcast audience. Before doing so, it is worth revisiting recent American survey data on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Figure 18, based on Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs/Ipsos data, reveals that American warmth toward Israel on a 0-100 thermometer cooled somewhat between 1975 and 1995, from the low 60s to the mid 50s. Since 2000, opinion began to divide along partisan lines, with Democrats settling into the low 50s and Republicans into the mid-to-upper 60s. Following Hamas' attack on October 7, 2023 and Israel's punishing response in Gaza, American warmth toward Israel slipped 8 points. Warmth fell fastest among Democrats (down 11 points to 41), and more modestly among Republicans (down 6 points to 63).


Feelings Toward Israel

Please rate your feelings toward some countries, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred, the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that country or those people. (mean score)

Legend: Overall — Republican — Democrat — Independent

April 18-20, 2025 | n=1,019
CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS-IPSOS

Figure 18

This change does not mean Republicans have warmed to the Palestinians. As Figure 19 shows, Republicans continue to back Israel by a 58-3 margin, even as Democrats now support Palestine over Israel 20-10 with most on the fence. The dominant category is to take neither side, the choice of 68 percent of Democrats, 64 percent of Independents and 38 percent of Republicans.

The 'neither side' option has long dominated American public opinion, but has declined from the low 70s in the early 2000s to 58 percent of Americans today. The share saying they 'take the Palestinian side' is small, but rose from 4 percent in 2018 to 12 percent in 2025 while the fraction backing Israel slipped slightly from 31 to 28 percent during the same time frame.[26] In Gallup data, American opinion stood at 61-15 in favour of Israel as recently as 2016, but this narrowed to 46-33 by early 2025.[27] A key takeaway is that most of the time the majority position has been neutrality or disengagement.

Partisan Preferences in Middle East Conflict

In the Middle East conflict, do you think the United States should take Israel's side, take the Palestinians' side, or not take either side? (%)

Legend: Overall, Republican, Democrat, Independent

	Overall	Republican	Democrat	Independent
Not take either side	58	38	68	64
Take Israel's side	28	58	10	24
Take the Palestinians' side	12	3	20	11

May 2-4, 2025 | n=1,026
CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS-IPSOS

Figure 19

Though Americans continue to lean toward Israel over the Palestinians, attitudes to the conflict reveal a pronounced generational shift, with ANES data in 2024 showing Americans under 35 supporting Palestine over

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[26] 'Americans Grow More Divided on US Support for Israel,' *Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, May 15, 2015.
[27] Brenan, Megan, 'Less Than Half in U.S. Now Sympathetic Toward Israelis,' *Gallup*, March 6, 2025.

Israel by a 28-17 margin (with the rest backing neither or both), while Americans over 35 support Israel over Palestine 34-8 (with a majority backing neither or both).

The divisions are even starker when examined within party. Figure 20 shows that Democrats over 35 are evenly divided between Israel and Palestine, with 69 percent in the both or neither categories. However, their younger co-partisans lean 46-5 in favour of the Palestinians. Among Republicans, the most notable generational change is a disengagement from Israel rather than any enthusiasm for the Palestinians. Republicans over 35 lean 57-3 to Israel whereas those under 35 incline just 35-7 toward Israel, with 50 percent opting for the 'support neither' category. Young Republicans increasingly resemble older Independent voters in their 'plague upon both their houses' approach.

Figure 20

Source: ANES 2024. N=1,239 under 35 and 3,325 over 35.

Considerable generational attitude differences have opened up over Israel since 2016. At that time, ANES data showed that Democrats under age 35 differed little from Democrats over 35 in their propensity to say that the US was too supportive of Israel (29 vs 25 percent). In fact 28 percent of young Democrats said the US was not supportive enough of Israel compared to just 10 percent of Democrats over age 35!

However, as Figure 21 shows, 62 percent of Democrats under age 50 already expressed negative views of Israel by 2022 (this does not mean they supported Palestine over Israel, however). After October 7, 2023, these trends intensified. Pew research shows that older Democrats moved 23 points toward negative attitudes to Israel while Republicans under 50 moved 15 points in the same direction. Only Republicans over 50 largely resisted this increasing negativity toward Israel.

While sympathy for the Palestinians has reached nearly 50 percent among young Democrats, this is, as noted, much less noticeable among young Independents or Republicans. Their attitude changes largely concern disapproval of what is perceived as disproportionate Israeli military action, and US support for it, rather than endorsement of Palestinian military objectives.[28]

More Americans have adopted unfavorable views of Israel since 2022

Percentage of surveyed U.S. adults who expressed negative views toward Israel

Source: Pew Research Center, Survey of U.S. adults, March 24-30, 2025.

Figure 21

With this context in mind, I consider the effect of new media influencers on attitudes to Israel using my 2025 Prolific survey results. The survey asks respondents to indicate how warm they feel toward various groups, as well as Israel, on a 0-100 thermometer, from very cold to very warm. Figure 22 presents the results for warmth towards Israel. Results are sorted by the warmth gap between those who do not follow a particular source and those who follow it regularly.

The warmth gap could be a measure of either a) how much a news source reduces warmth towards Israel; b) how much people who dislike Israel self-select toward a particular source; or c) whether some upstream causal factor is related to both consuming the news source and feelings toward Israel. While I cannot rule out c), statistical tests that follow will help to reduce its confounding power. Option b) is arguably less convincing

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[28] Silver, Laura, 'How Americans view Israel and the Israel-Hamas war at the start of Trump's second term,' *Pew*, April 8, 2025; Galston, William and Jordan Muchnick, 'Support for Israel continues to deteriorate, especially among Democrats and young people,' Brookings, August 6, 2025.

conceptually since the issue of Israel-Palestine largely entered public consciousness after October 7, 2023, well after these news sources established their audiences.

The warmth gap is thus a reasonable indicator of the effect of particular news and opinion sources on attitudes. Figure 22 displays a chart of warmth towards Israel by news source consumed, with the boxed number representing warmth among a site's followers and the unboxed number the warmth felt by those who do not follow a particular site. Regular and regular-plus-occasional bars are provided because the regular is a better read of the size of the effect but low sample sizes for smaller podcasts mean that this signal contains noise through measurement error. The wider regular-plus-occasional figure helps to correct for measurement noise even if occasional viewers reflect audience effects less strongly. Readers should triangulate between the two bars to get the most accurate picture of the effect of smaller sites such as Fuentes.

The chart indicates that regular followers of Nick Fuentes are cooler towards Israel (30 out of 100) than those who do not follow him (45 out of 100). This -15 difference is the greatest of all media sources in the surveys. It is followed by a -10 for Alex Jones, and gaps of -7 for Candace Owens and -6 for Matt Walsh and Tucker Carlson. Given the limited sample sizes we should be wary of a degree of noise in estimates for the smaller outlets and thus it is worth also checking the regular-plus-occasional bars. This indicates that Matt Walsh is unlikely to be having the same effect as Fuentes, Jones, Owens and, to a lesser extent, Carlson.

At the other end of the scale, those who watch Fox News regularly rate Israel a 51, which is 12 points higher than those who do not watch Fox (39). Newsmax viewers are also 12 points more pro-Israel than non-viewers. They are followed by, respectively, +9 for Ben Shapiro, +7 for the American Conservative, +6 for Dan Bongino and +5 for the Federalist. Mainstream liberal sources such as MSNBC and the *New York Times*, or centre-right ones like the *New York Post*, lie in between, around the average. Thus we have the anti-Israel and pro-Israel right at the ends, with establishment liberal media in the middle.

It is worth noting that the views of those who check in occasionally to podcasts tend to track the pattern of regular listeners, albeit with a weaker signal. This produces a sloping pattern across the bars for each media outlet. The exception is for some smaller media (Jones, Walsh, Bannon, Breitbart, Federalist), where an inconsistent pattern arises due to sampling noise in small samples.

Figure 22

Source: Prolific November 25-December 3, 2025. N=784.

A second question on Israel tests for more conspiratorial beliefs, via the statement, 'Israel Can Get Away With Anything Because its Supporters Control the Media.' In the general adult population, 46 percent disagreed while 27 percent agreed with the statement. However, moderate and liberal adults under age 35 in the general sample agreed with the statement by 40-36. Among Trump voters under 35, 38 percent disagreed and 35 percent agreed with the statement. Young liberals in the general sample are about as likely as young conservatives to endorse this statement, but the 67 young *liberal Trump* voters in the data back the 'Israel controls the media' narrative more robustly, 46-30.

Figure 23 highlights that right-wing shows which mistrust those in a position of power and influence, ascribing intentionality to them, tend to display greater agreement with the statement that supporters of Israel control the media.[29] Tracking both regular and regular plus occasional listeners/viewers in Figure 23 shows that the 60 individuals who tune in to Nick Fuentes' America First, or the 84 people who follow Alex Jones, are over twice as likely to agree with the statement as those who do not follow them.

Regular followers of Candace Owens and Tucker Carlson are similarly twice as likely to believe this statement

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[29] While everyone who regularly listens to the Federalist supports this Jewish conspiracy, there is actually only one regular viewer in the data, so this is an artifact of a tiny sample and hence is not shown.

as those who do not follow them at all. These are substantial effects. They are also much larger than the media effects we saw in Figure 22 for warmth towards Israel. This suggests that there is something special about questions that tap into beliefs which ascribe agency to hidden forces in society.

At the other end of the scale, followers of right-wing or liberal network news, or established news media such as the *New York Times* or *New York Post*, are less likely to believe in the Israel media control theory than the average respondent. In subsequent analysis, I run models of this attitude which control for the effects of age, education, sex, ideology and other factors that may account for response differences between various media audiences.

Figure 23

Source: Prolific, November 25-December 3, 2025. N=784. *Federalist sample based on just one regular listener, with 12 regular plus occasional.

Antisemitism

In order to measure antisemitism, I examine warmth toward Jewish Americans. A question about warmth toward Jews has been asked by the American National Election Study (ANES) since 1964, and results are plotted in Figure 24. There has been considerable stability during this period, with answers oscillating in the 55-70 range

across the decades. However, since 2008, there has been a trend toward rising bipartisan warmth – albeit with Independents 10 points cooler toward Jews than Republicans or Democrats. In 2024 there was a modest downturn in warmth among Republicans and Democrats, but the two remain close, and are still 5-10 points warmer toward Jews than Independents.


Figure 24

Source: ANES 1964-2024.

Among those under age 35, the pattern was similar until 2008. However, as Figure 25 illustrates, by 2016, when the question was next asked, a partisan divide had opened up. Young Democrats had become 10 points more positive toward Jews, following the warming adult trend. Young Republicans did not join with their elders, instead remaining at their trend level of around 65 out of 100 in 2020. Between 2020 and 2024, young Republicans' warmth toward Jews dipped 4 points to 61, a level not seen since 1992.

While young Democrats also cooled a little, this was a very modest 1 point decline to 73 out of 100, and thus not statistically significant. By 2024, therefore, young Democrats had become 12 points warmer toward Jews than their Republican counterparts, a striking difference compared to older age groups, where high and rising bipartisan warmth has been the rule.

Broadly speaking, young Republicans over the past decade have spurned the growing philosemitic enthusiasm of older Republicans, and of Democrats. Instead, they have converged with the cooler, though still positive, attitudes of Independent voters. Whether the 4-point young Republican decline in warmth toward Jews between

2020 and 2024 is the beginning of a new trend is difficult to establish as we have only one data point (2024) in this direction.

Given what we know about attitudes to Israel, where young Democrats have soured considerably more than young Republicans, it is striking that feelings toward Jews seem to have warmed so much more among young Democrats than young Republicans. This indicates that sentiment toward Israel and Jews is substantially decoupled among young Democrats, a theme I will explore more depth later in the report.

Figure 25

Source: ANES 1964-2024.

Turning next to my Prolific data, this shows that conservatives under 35 in my Prolific data feel a 57 out of 100 towards Jews across both my under-35 Trump-voter and national adult surveys. This same group in the ANES 2024 survey gave Jews a 63 out of 100 warmth rating. Liberal adults overall are also 6 points cooler toward Jews in my Prolific 2025 data compared to ANES 2024 (68 vs. 74). ANES is a more representative sample than my Prolific data, but it could also be the case that 2026 ANES data will show that Americans - including conservative young Americans - feel cooler toward American Jews than they did in 2024.

Research shows that minorities are cooler toward Jews than whites, conservatives are cooler toward Jews than liberals, and the young are now cooler toward Jews than the old. This makes young nonwhite conservatives the least warm toward Jews.[30] ANES does not show much racial difference in the historical pattern d to 2020.

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[30] Hersh, E. and L. Royden (2023). "Antisemitic attitudes among young Black and Hispanic Americans." Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics **8**(1): 105-123. Yglesias, M. 'Antisemitism in America,' *Slow Boring*, November 15, 2025.

However, as Figure 26 illustrates, a race gap begins to open up in the ANES surveys from 2020 among young Republicans, with minority Republicans cooler toward Jews than young white Republicans. I have appended 2025 data from my Prolific young Trump voter survey, which may not be fully comparable.

The Prolific 2025 data show young minority Trump voters feeling a lukewarm 51 toward Jews compared to a more positive 62 for young white Trump voters and 55 for minority non-Trump voting adults. Worryingly, in the 2025 Prolific data, 23 percent of young minority Trump voters express antisemitic sub-25 degree levels of coolness toward Jews. This compares with 11 percent among young white Trump voters and 8 percent for minority adults who identify as liberal. This could reflect the sample as the 2024 ANES data showed lower levels of antisemitism: 10 percent of nonwhite Trump voters under 35 and less than 5 percent of young white Trump voters were sub-25 degrees cold toward Jews.


Figure 26

Source: ANES 2016-2024 (N for under 35s=62 in 2016, 101 in 2020, 62 in 2024); *2025 data is from Prolific under-35 Trump voter survey, November 25-December 3, 2025 (N=392, including 100 nonwhites).

Have right-wing influencers helped chill attitudes toward American Jews? My Prolific data in Figure 27 show that regular followers of Nick Fuentes feel less warm towards Jews or Israel than those who do not consume his content. Non-followers express a Jewish warmth of 65 compared to regular Fuentes followers who give Jews a mere 43. This negative 22-point difference compares to -15 for Alex Jones, -14 for Breitbart and -12 for Matt Walsh. However, the tiny samples for Breitbart and Walsh make it more meaningful to use the amalgamated

regular-plus-occasional figure, which reveals a much more limited (and statistically insignificant) effect of -4 for the effect of Breitbart and Walsh. Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens each register a modest -8. That is, their regular viewers feel a 57 toward Jews compared with 65 for non-viewers.

At the other end we find a +7 effect for the *New York Times*, but the booster effect for other sources that predict Jewish warmth (Shapiro, Federalist, Newsmax, MSNBC) is very small. These findings show that anti-Israel right-wing influencers have a roughly similar-sized effect on warmth toward Jews as they do on warmth toward Israel. However, consuming pro-Israel conservative media does not translate into greater warmth toward Jews (in comparison to non-consumers) as much as it does warmth toward Israel.


Figure 27

Source: Prolific November 25-December 3, 2025. N=784.

Are certain right-wing podcasters actually chilling attitudes toward Jews, or is this caused by the demographics of their follower base? In order to test for confounding effects, I use a statistical OLS regression model to predict an individual's warmth toward American Jews on a 0-100 thermometer.

I begin with ANES 2024 data on respondents under 35 in order to establish key demographic predictors. This is a nationally-representative sample of 1,195 individuals. Figure 28 illustrates that warmth toward blacks is the

strongest predictor of warmth toward Jews. Using unstandardized coefficients (not shown), a 1-point increase in warmth toward blacks increases warmth toward Jews by .41 of a point, controlling for other predictors in the model. Next in importance is warmth toward whites. A 1-point increase in warmth toward whites increases warmth toward Jews by .1 of a point. To a large extent, some people feel warmer toward a lot of groups than others, and these measures pick up that general goodwill.

Attitudes to immigration are about as important as warmth toward whites in predicting warmth toward Jews: moving 1 point along a 5-point immigration attitudes scale from 'increase a lot' to 'decrease a lot' reduces warmth toward Jews by 2 degrees. Black Americans are substantially cooler toward Jews than other racial groups: moving from a non-black to a black individual lowers warmth toward Jews by 6.5 degrees. Whites are 3.3 points warmer toward Jews than other racial groups are, while women are 3.4 points warmer toward Jews than men are.

Age is not statistically significant here because the sample consists only of those under age 35, but when I expand the sample to all adults, age becomes as important as immigration attitudes, being black or warmth toward whites, with older people considerably warmer toward Jews than younger respondents. Those who feel cool toward black Americans are much more likely to feel cool towards Jews, and immigration restrictionists feel cooler than pro-immigration voters toward Jews. The main noteworthy findings from the demographic analysis are that women are warmer toward Jews than men and whites warmer toward Jews than blacks.

Predictors of Warmth toward Jews among Americans under 35 (ANES 2024)

Figure 28

Source: ANES 2024. N= 1,195. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. R^2=.269.

I now turn to the full Prolific sample of both young Trump voters and all adults. Figure 29 generally replicates the findings from the ANES analysis. Warmth toward black Americans is still the strongest predictor of feelings toward Jews, though followed closely by warmth toward white Americans. I find that a 1-point increase in warmth toward blacks increases warmth toward Jews by .47 of a point and a 1-point increase in warmth toward whites increases warmth toward Jews by .38 of a point, which is a lot larger effect for this measure than I found in ANES. Age is significant, with a similar-sized effect as in the adult ANES model. Immigration attitudes and being black have almost identical effects in Prolific and ANES data. The effects of being white and female are, however, smaller and not significant in my Prolific data. Ideology as liberal or conservative is not significant in either model.

Controlling for these demographic and attitudinal confounders allows me to isolate the effect of media influencers on attitudes to Jews. Being a podcaster or established news outlet had no significant effect. However, regularly following Nick Fuenters or Candace Owens significantly reduces warmth toward Jews. In the case of Fuentes, moving from not following him to being a regular follower lowers warmth toward Jews by 12 degrees. Following Candace Owens reduces warmth by 6 degrees all else being equal. No other podcaster had a significant effect, though it may be that with a larger sample Alex Jones may register a significant dampening

effect as his followers score 5 degrees lower - albeit with too much statistical noise to be certain.

Meanwhile, following Tucker Carlson does *not* appear to significantly cool sentiment toward Jews, though it is associated with lowering it a little. At the other end of the scale, following Ben Shapiro significantly increases warmth toward Jews by 6 degrees. No other outlet was significantly associated with higher or lower warmth toward Jews.


Figure 29

Source: Prolific 2025. N=783. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. R^2=.532.

Figure 30 illustrates that running the same model on attitudes to Israel, and on whether Israel's supporters control the media, shows that tuning in to Nick Fuentes and Candace Owens is associated with more negative attitudes to Jews and Israel, as well as greater agreement with the statement that Israel's supporters control the media. Those who regularly follow Tucker Carlson are significantly more negative toward Israel and more likely to believe Israel's friends control the media but not significantly more negative towards Jews.

Finally, regular watchers of *both* Alex Jones and MSNBC are more likely to believe in the media control claim than others in the survey. The difference is that including individuals who watch Jones and MSNBC occasionally in their audience totals reduces the significance of watching MSNBC to only borderline statistical significance on the media control question but renders Jones' viewership a significant predictor of anti-Israel and – to a lesser extent – anti-Jewish sentiment. Jones' viewership is therefore significant on Israel-related questions and borderline significant on warmth towards Jews. Conspiracism seems to be linked to anti-Israel sentiment which has a more modest cascading effect on feelings toward Jews.

For MSNBC, there is a healthy sample of regular viewers (148) in the data, thus it is likely that MSNBC content is in fact modestly associated with more suspicious attitudes toward Israel's control of the media, and, to a lesser extent, views of Israel and Jews.

Fox News' audience stands out for being associated with pro-Israel attitudes and sporting a lower share who agree with the narrative that Israel's friends control the media. Ben Shapiro's audience is likewise more pro-Israel than average, and is especially warm towards Jews compared to the median respondent on the survey.


Effect of Media Sources on Attitudes to Jews/Israel

Figure 30

Source: Prolific 2025. N=783. Based on Prolific models of warmth toward Jews and Israel, and agreement with the statement that Israel's supporters control the media (reverse coded). Control variables (age, sex, race, ideology, feelings toward whites and blacks) are not shown. Any effect on the chart larger than the absolute

value of +/-.05 is statistically significant.

A more precise measure of antisemitism would isolate those who are cold toward Jews, that is, below 25 degrees out of 100 on the feelings thermometer. 14 percent of the under-35 Trump voting sample qualify as antisemitic on this definition, falling to 8.5 percent of the adult general sample. 23 percent of young minority Trump voters are antisemitic compared to 11 percent of young white Trump voters.

In Figure 31, we can see how responses differ by media consumed. 41 percent of Nick Fuentes' regular viewers, and 19 percent of his occasional viewers, are antisemitic on this measure. This very much exceeds the share for regular consumers of Alex Jones (24 percent), Candace Owens (16 percent) or Tucker Carlson (14 percent). 9 percent of MSNBC and Fox audiences qualify as antisemitic on this measure. In statistical analysis, only watching Fuentes and, to a lesser extent, Jones are statistically significant predictors of antisemitism. With controls for Israel sentiment, only consuming Fuentes remains a significant predictor of higher than average antisemitism.

We have seen that followers of Fuentes and Candace Owens are cooler towards Jews and Israel while Fox and Shapiro audiences are warmer towards both. Does this mean that consumers of these sources hold the opposite view of Palestinians? Not necessarily.

First of all, average warmth towards Palestinians is lower than for Jews in the general adult survey: 68 for Jews versus 54 for Palestinians. When it comes to feelings toward Palestinians, those who tune in to liberal outlets such as the *New York Times* and MSNBC are warmest, in the upper 50s, while audiences for most right-leaning sources score Palestinians in the cool 30-40 zone. This is especially so if we take regular plus occasional viewership as the benchmark for the smaller conservative sites (Bannon, Walsh, Federalist, etc).

There is no indication that audiences for anti-Israel influencers such as Carlson, Fuentes or Owens are more pro-Palestinian than Ben Shapiro. Indeed, statistical analysis shows no significant differences on this measure by site other than for readers of the *New York Post*, who come out as unusually pro-Palestinian given their right-leaning ideology; or viewers of Fox News, who are significantly cooler toward Palestinians even factoring in their ideology. Feelings toward Palestinians were most highly correlated with feelings toward illegal immigrants (standardized coefficient of .39), blacks (.29) and immigration (.09).

Nonwhite young Trump voters are somewhat warmer toward Palestinians (43) than young white Trump voters (39), but still remain cooler toward Palestinians (43) than Jews (50) or blacks (63). There is also a higher share of anti-Palestinian sentiment (33 percent below 25 degrees) than anti-Jewish sentiment (23 percent under 25 degrees) among young minority Trump voters. Including whites, 34 percent of Trump voters under 35 in the Prolific data are cold toward Palestinians compared to 14 percent who are cold toward Jews.

In the ANES data, 18 percent of white Trump voters under 35 and 15 percent of their nonwhite counterparts rate Muslims below 25 compared to 5 and 10 percent, respectively, rating Jews below 25. All told, Palestinians and Muslims are much less popular among young Trump voters than Jews.

This may shed light on why Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens' attempts to impugn Jews and defend Muslims appears not to have landed well with the Republican activist base. For instance, a poll of over 30,000 attendees to the Turning Point USA AmericaFest conference showed that 87 percent considered Israel an ally while 'radical Islam' was cited as the top threat from a list of over 10 items. Meanwhile Carlson's defense of Muslims in his TPUSA speech drew a cool silence from the crowd. [31]

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[31] Pinedo, Peter, 'Turning Point poll reveals conservatives 'all in' for JD Vance 2028 presidential run,' *Fox News*, December 22, 2025; Kolvet, Andrew, 'The results of the 2025 Turning Point Action America Fest Straw Poll are in. Thread,' X, December 22, 2025.

**Warmth Toward Palestinians, by News Source**

Figure 31

Source: Prolific November 25-December 3, 2025. N=784.

Open Antisemitism

Another measure of antisemitic attitudes comes from the Manhattan Institute October 2025 survey of Trump voters. In addition to asking about attitudes toward Tucker Carlson, Candace Owens and Ben Shapiro, a further question asked people directly about their antisemitism:

'Regarding individuals who openly express antisemitic views (hostility to or prejudice against Jewish people), what comes closer to your view regarding their role in your party and political movement?

1. I am such a person

2. I've had enough of cancel culture. This should not count against them.

3. We can try to get their votes if it is useful, but they should not be in positions of power and leadership.

4. They aren't welcome and don't represent what I stand for.

5. Not Sure

12 percent of Trump voters overall said they were antisemitic (option 1) and another 20 percent said antisemitic

comments should not count against a candidate. Were Tucker Carlson's approvers more hardline? No. 13 percent of those who had a favourable opinion of Carlson openly admitted to being antisemitic, with a further 18 percent saying that antisemitic comments should not count against them in the party. In fact, among those who had an *unfavourable* opinion of Carlson, the numbers were 13 percent and 27 percent, respectively.

Antisemitism was only somewhat lower among those who were unsure, at 8 percent. Overall, those approving of Carlson were slightly less antisemitic than the average Trump voter. When included in a statistical model controlling for a range of demographics and beliefs, Tucker favourability did not predict antisemitism.

For Owens, 18 percent of those who had a favourable opinion of her admitted to being antisemitic, with a further 18 percent saying antisemitic comments should not count against someone in the party. The open antisemites are thus 5 points above the Trump sample average. Thus those approving of Owens were slightly more antisemitic than the average Trump voter. When tested in a statistical model controlling for a range of demographics and beliefs, favourability toward Candace Owens *did* predict a significantly higher chance of identifying as an antisemite – even if the effect size was ony a few points.

Age is much more important than who one tunes in to: 26 percent of Trump voters under 50 say they are antisemitic versus 3 percent of Trump voters over 50. In a statistical model with under-50 Trump voters, controlling for demographics, those who favour Owens are 15 points more likely to say they are antisemitic than those who disapprove of her (15 vs 30). There was no effect for Carlson (26 vs 25). This however seems to be driven by the fact that philosemites strongly disapprove of Owens more than that antisemites approve of her. She may be influencing antisemites a little, but the rate of antisemitism among her approvers (30) is only 4 points above the young Trump voter average (26). Even so, this is a notable finding.

It is worth mentioning that neither believing the Holocaust 'was greatly exaggerated or did not happen' nor taking the Palestinian side in the war in Gaza was significantly related to identifying as an antisemite. And while agreement with the idea that Jews 'were collectively responsible for the killing of Jesus Christ' did predict being an antisemite, its effect was smaller than that of having a favourable opinion of Candace Owens. The way these attitudes intersect is more complicated than stereotypes portray.

The effect of backing Owens on antisemitism is real but should not be exaggerated: it is as much a function of her detractors being less antisemitic than average (7 percent versus 12 percent) than her supporters being a lot

more so than average (18 percent versus 12 percent overall).

The Many Meanings of Antisemitism

The Manhattan Institute survey asks several questions pertaining to antisemitism. Whether Jews killed Christ, whether Jews are more loyal to a foreign country than the United States, whether Jews get too much support and favourable treatment, whether the Holocaust is exaggerated or didn't happen, and whether a responent is antisemitic.

Consider that among the 12 percent who said they were antisemites:

- 48 percent said Jews got too much favourable treatment, but 52 percent said Jews received appropriate treatment, or that they should be treated better. This 52-48 balance compares with 84-16 among Trump voters overall and 86-14 for non-Trump voters.
- 44 percent of open antisemites said most Jews were more loyal to a foreign country than America, compared to 28 percent of Trump voters and 26 percent of non-Trump voters. The other open antisemites said only some or virtually no Jews were disloyal.
- 65 percent of open antisemites said the Holocaust didn't happen or was exaggerated, compared to 38 percent of Trump voters and 37 percent of non-Trump voters.
- 81 percent of open antisemites strongly or somewhat agreed that Jews killed Christ, compared to 45 percent of Trump voters and 23 percent of non-Trump voters.
- By 32-29 of antisemites favoured Israel over the Palestinians, compared to 55-10 among Trump voters and 27-13 among non-Trump voters.

While self-described antisemites certainly have far more negative attitudes to Jews and Israel, they are surprisingly diverse in their answers across 3 of 5 questions above. Even on the Holocaust denial and Jews killing Christ questions, a significant minority did not give the antisemitic answer. Cluster analysis suggests that answers to the 6 questions pertaining to Jews or Israel have only a moderate correlation (.10s to the low .30s). And this is the case even if the Israel-Palestine item is removed. Figure 32 shows that Holocaust denial is more closely connected to believing that the moon landings were faked or that 9/11 was an inside job than to believing that Jews killed Jesus Christ.

Figure 32

Source: Manhattan Institute survey, October 15-16, 2025. N=2,389 Trump voters, 355 non-Trump voters, 322 antisemites. N= 867-1763 for other categories.

Holocaust denial is linked to other conspiracy theories but not as clearly to attitudes toward Jews, with only 22 percent of Holocaust deniers saying that Jews are given too much support and favourable treatment in American society. Similarly, Figure 33 plots the share of each group that self-identified antisemites believe are treated overly well by American society. Whites top the list of groups that antisemites say are treated too well while Jews are below average. Trans people come in for the least resentment. This is not what many analysts would have predicted.

Percent saying 'Too much support and Favourable Treatment' for Group, Antisemites Only

Figure 33

Source: Manhattan Institute survey, October 15-26, 2025.

In my Prolific data, there are fewer unexpected associations. The correlation between the thermometer scales for Israel and Jews is a relatively tight .59. The same is true of the negative association between warmth toward Israel and the belief that Israel's supporters control the media (-.52).

However, the connection between the question about Israel's friends controlling the media has a more modest correlation of -.35 with feelings toward American Jews. Hence those who say that Israel's friends control the media still accord Jews a 50/100 thermometer reading on average (falling to 45 among under-35 Trump voters who agree with the Israel-controls-media statement).

This is certainly less than the 71 warmth for Jews among those who reject the Israel media conspiracy, but is very far from zero. And it is a few points higher than warmth for the Palestinians. Here again, a number of dimensions normally included within the construct of antisemitism seem to orbit along substantially separate pathways in American public opinion.

Those under age 50 in the Manhattan Institute survey are much more likely than those over 50 to declare themselves antisemitic, but there was no difference in attitudes between the 18-29 and 30-49 age groups, which is surprising.

26 percent of those under 50, but only 3 percent of the over-50s, identified themselves as antisemites. 27 percent of the under-50s say Jews get too much favourable treatment compared to only 8 percent of the over-50s. For Holocaust denial, the difference is 49 percent agreement among younger people falling to 30 percent for the over-50s, and for Jews killing Christ, it is 61 percent for the under-50s versus 34 percent for the old. On the other hand, there is not much difference between younger and older groups in the proportion who say Jews are disloyal to America (30 v 26).

The foregoing opens up the possibility that some under-50s on the right are recreational antisemites who revel in transgressing society's 'pearl clutching' moral taboos while acting as contrarian rebels who embrace cynical conspiracy theories. Yet when the question moves away from abstract meta-theories to concrete Jewish fellow citizens, they recoil from impugning them.

So too for racism. For example, 32 percent of Trump voters under-50 call themselves racist, compared to 4 percent of the over-50s. Likewise, 58 percent of the under-50s say political violence is sometimes justified, compared to 13 percent of the over-50s. On the other hand, there is virtually no difference between young and old in their view of whether blacks get too much special treatment or Indians are disloyal to America. Moreover, a 52 percent majority of 'racist' white Trump voters support DEI and affirmative action!

Consider who identifies as a racist and antisemite among Trump voters under 50 in Figure 34. First of all, around 3 in 4 antisemites also identifies as a racist and 2 in 3 racists as an antisemite, so these are closely linked.

In terms of who identifies this way, there is little difference by race. White Trump voters are not significantly more racist than nonwhite Trump voters. Female Trump voters under 50, however, are significantly less racist and antisemitic than their male counterparts (37 vs 22 percent). Not shown is the fact that Trump voters under 50 are significantly more racist and antisemitic than Trump voters over 50 (32 vs. 4 percent racists, 29 vs. 3 percent

antisemites).

While young people are more likely to be switchers, even among the under-50s, those who have switched to the Republicans in the Trump era are much more racist and antisemitic than longtime Republicans. Figure 34 highlights that among younger voters, 43 percent of those who switched to Trump from the Democrats or third party candidate at some point identify as racist compared to 16 percent of under-50 longtime Republicans and 13 percent of current non-Trump voters. For antisemitism the figures are 36 percent for switchers versus 16 percent for longtime Republicans and 15 percent for Democratic/Independent voters.

Conspiracy thinking is strongly connected to identifying as a racist or antisemite. 19 percent of those who hold to 1-2 conspiracies (typically including the reasonable lab leak hypothesis) are racist while 15 percent are antisemitic. But this jumps to 58 and 45 percent, respectively, among those who believe in the maximum 5-6 conspiracies. Attitudes to political violence are strongly associated with identifying as a racist or antisemite. 46 percent of Trump voters under age 50 who think political violence is sometimes acceptable identify as racist, and 37 percent of this group identify as antisemites. By contrast, among younger Trump voters who abjure political violence, the respective figures are 13 and 10 percent, respectively.


Figure 34

Source: Manhattan Institute survey, October 15-26, 2025. N=945 Trump voters under 50 and 1,445 Trump voters over 50. Sub-groups of under-50 Trump voters: 319 nonwhites, 231 women.

In statistical models predicting racism and antisemitism which take account of all factors at once (see Figure 35),

race is not statistically significant in picking out a racist or antisemite. Attitudes toward violence are by far the strongest predictor, at 3-4 times the effect size of the other significant predictors of ideology, sex, age and conspiracy beliefs. Notice that age and sex matter even when controlling for beliefs in conspiracies and violence which are correlated with age and sex. Even taking support for violence into account, female and older Trump voters under 50 are less racist and antisemitic than their young male equivalents.


Figure 35

Source: Manhattan Institute survey, October 15-16, 2025. N=2,530 Trump voters. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. N=2,384 Trump voters of all ages. R^2=.287 for racist and .241 for antisemite models.

Young people are known for being more 'woke' on questions pertaining to DEI than older Americans.[32] Yet our data on young Trump voters, especially those who switched their vote in the 2016-24 period to Trump, suggests they are *also* more racist and antisemitic than older voters. How can these two realities be squared? Figure 36

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[32] Kaufmann, Eric, 'The Politics of the Culture Wars in Contemporary America,' *Manhattan Institute*, January 2022.

plots the crosstabulation of attitudes to racism and DEI among Trump voters under 50. There is almost no relationship, except for the fact that the *most* anti-racist younger Trump voters are the *most opposed* to DEI (55 to 34). By contrast, those who are more tolerant of racist views lean in favour of affirmative action and DEI. Those who call themselves racists ('I am such a person') lean 55-43 in favour of DEI!


Figure 36

Source: Manhattan Institute survey, October 15-16, 2025. Note: sub-group sample sizes in brackets. N=945 Trump voters under age 50.

How can such counterintuitive results make sense? While noise (measurement error) in the data may be present, the aforementioned answers suggest that younger voters are reacting to questions about antisemitism, racism, Jews and blacks in highly decoupled, unstructured ways. Political scientists refer to this as weak *issue constraint*, with people unable to pin the tail of an issue to the donkey (or elephant) of party or ideology.[33] In this instance it seems that younger respondents seem only weakly aware of how various attitude dimensions align with each other and an integrated racist or antisemitic worldview. Ironic, rebellious and superficial taboo violation masks an absence of concrete hatred and exclusion.

The Decoupling of Views of Israel and Jews among Progressive Voters

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[33] Baldassarri, D. and A. Gelman (2008). "Partisans without constraint: Political polarization and trends in American public opinion." American journal of sociology **114**(2): 408-446; Box-Steffensmeier, J. M. and S. De Boef (2001). "Macropartisanship and Macroideology ‘in the Sophisticated Electorate." The Journal of Politics **63**(1): 232-248

I next change focus to consider young progressive opinion on Jews and Israel, especially the apparent tendency to decouple sentiment on Jews from that of Israel. Figure 37 presents raw data from the 2024 ANES on 454 Harris voters under the age of 35. Sentiment toward Israel or Palestine is arrayed across the top, with columns towards the right indicating a direction of pro-Palestinian sentiment, albeit with the rightmost category of 'neither'. This horizontal sympathy for Israel vs. Palestine dimension is plotted against warmth toward Jews on a 0-100 thermometer on the vertical axis. Red shading denotes the most intense opinion clustering and pink shows moderate clustering.

Results for young Democrats indicate a clustering of responses in the bottom right pro-Jewish anti-Israel quadrant. These young liberals are overwhelming pro-Palestine but also very warm toward Jews. There is a tranche of 15 percent of young pro-Palestine Democratic voters who are lukewarm toward Jews (50/100), another 15 percent who are extremely warm toward Jews (100/100) and a sizeable group who rate Jews very warmly: between 50 and 100. A large chunk, 132 individuals (29 percent of the total), favour neither Israel nor Palestine in the conflict, reflecting an important trend in wider American public opinion. 43 percent of this group of 132 fence-sitters rate Jews at 50 with the rest place them in the warmer 50-100 zone.

The most pro-Palestinian young Democratic voters are actually warmer toward Jews than their uncommitted fellow partisans who favour 'neither' side in the conflict. Meanwhile, just 12 of 454 young Harris voters feel colder than 50 towards Jews, with only 6 in the antisemitic zone scoring Jews a 25 or less. As a result, there is *no statistical relationship* between pro-Jewish and pro-Israel support among young Harris voters. Just 3 percent of young Democratic voters are cool towards Jews compared to 13 percent of young Republican voters.

	Pro-Israel	2	3	Both	5	6	Pro-Palestinian	Neither	Total
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
15	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
40	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	4
45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
50	2	1	1	8	12	22	36	57	139
55	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
58	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
60	0	1	0	13	0	1	12	5	32
65	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
70	1	0	1	11	0	1	17	10	40
75	0	1	2	0	3	0	0	5	11
79	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
80	0	0	0	0	1	1	10	0	12
85	1	1	0	10	1	4	12	24	53
90	0	0	0	1	0	0	13	4	19
95	0	0	0	3	0	1	1	0	5
99	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	7
100	2	1	1	19	3	35	34	25	119
Total	7	5	6	74	19	66	145	132	454

Figure 37

Source: ANES 2024. N=454 Harris voters under 35.

Contrast the above with the views of the 310 Trump voters under the age of 35 in the 2024 ANES data, displayed in Figure 38. This group is 10 points cooler toward Jews than their Harris-voting counterparts, and a lot less enthusiastic about Palestinians. 134 individuals, 43 percent, say they back 'neither' side, and just 22 individuals (7 percent) back the Palestinians. The rest – 42 percent – are pro-Israel.

What is most striking is the bimodal distribution in which young pro-Israel Trump voters split evenly between those who are lukewarm (50) and enthusiastic (100) about Jews. Among the nearly half of young Trump voters who support neither side, the balance likewise bifurcates, but this time at a ratio of 3:1 in favour of ranking Jews at a lukewarm 50 rather than a warm 100. That is, only 20 of this group score Jews at 100 while 64 rank them at 50.

It is also worth noting that 41 out of 310 respondents rank Jews below 50 and 22 are in the antisemitic range below 25. On this measure 1 percent of young Harris voters, but 7 percent of young Trump voters, are

antisemitic. This is still a low level of antisemitism, however. The general picture that arises from an analysis of young Trump voters is one of apathy and disengagement. This is a group of young people who have, to a degree, pulled back from the pro-Israel, pro-Jewish conservatism of their elders.

	Pro-Israel	2	3 Both		5	6	Pro-Pales	Neither	Total
0	0	0	1	0	0	3	2	7	14
8	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
20	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
30	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	8
40	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	4	6
45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
50	28	6	5	6	0	2	1	64	112
55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
60	6	2	0	1	0	2	0	2	14
65	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
70	3	11	1	3	0	0	0	7	26
75	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	5
80	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	4	7
85	2	5	7	4	0	3	0	8	29
90	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	6
95	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
100	28	7	2	0	1	2	0	20	60
Total	76	38	21	19	1	13	8	134	310

Figure 38

Source: ANES 2024. N=310 Trump voters under 35.

The picture for Trump voters over age 35 in Figure 39 looks quite different. First, they break 58-2 for Israel, though many are also 'neither'/ 'both' in attitude. This compares to 42-7 among young Trump voters. Second, just 3 percent feel cool toward Jews compared to 13 percent of younger Trump voters. Only 1 percent are in the antisemitic range of 25/100 or below compared to 7 percent of young Trump voters. The vast majority place Jews in the positive 50-100 range, with an average of 74. That is identical to Harris voters (of all ages) but 10 points above the warmth recorded for young Trump voters.

It is also worth mentioning that pro-Israel and pro-Jewish sentiment are correlated among Trump voters and older Harris voters, but not in young Harris voters. The correlation is highest among Republicans, intermediate among older Democrats, and zero among young Democrats. Trump voters tend to link Jews with Israel, hence pro-Israel Republicans are more pro-Jewish than Republicans who back neither side in the conflict. Young Democrats, by contrast, apply a 'vulnerable minority' leftist frame toward American Jews, but see Israel as an

oppressive, often settler-colonialist, majority.[34]

Older Democrats (not shown) tend to fall between the two stances above, viewing Jews as a vulnerable minority, but also bearing a legacy of good will toward Israel, either as the political expression of a minority, or as a liberal democracy in a troubled region. This has recently been counteracted by growing concern about Israeli military action, with a staggering 2 in 3 Democrats over 35 now landing in the 'both'/'neither' middle between the two protagonists in the conflict.

	Pro-Israel	2	3 Both		5	6 Pro-Pales	Neither	Total
0	2	0	1	5	0	0	0	4	11
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
15	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	5
40	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	5	9
45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
50	57	45	15	57	2	6	10	133	324
55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
60	19	10	3	6	0	0	2	26	66
64	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
65	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	3
70	55	23	6	9	0	2	1	36	133
73	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
75	14	4	1	0	0	0	0	6	25
77	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
78	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
80	13	10	1	1	0	0	2	11	38
85	109	38	8	25	0	2	0	44	226
88	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
90	27	16	0	2	0	0	0	2	48
95	18	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	22
98	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
100	166	25	4	20	0	1	0	60	276
Total	484	176	43	129	3	11	17	339	1202

Figure 39

Source: ANES 2024. N=1202 Trump voters over age 35.

Antisemitism on Campus?

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[34] Kirsch, A. (2024). On Settler Colonialism: Ideology, Violence, and Justice, WW Norton & Company.

The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE)'s 2024 annual survey of almost 60,000 undergraduates from around 250 leading universities shows that student sympathies divided more on Jewish versus non-Jewish than liberal-conservative lines. Figure 40 shows that Jewish Ivy League students back Israel against the Palestinians 48-28 while non-Jewish students favour Palestine over Israel 46-9. This is a huge divide within an overwhelmingly liberal student population.


Sympathies in Israel-Palestine Conflict, Ivy League, Jewish vs non-Jewish students

Figure 40

Source: FIRE 2024. N=164 Jewish and 1,969 non-Jewish students.

Figure 41 illustrates that Jewish students overwhelmingly blamed Hamas for the outbreak of hostilities after October 7, 2023, but most moderate and conservative non-Jewish students said they did not know who was at fault, or that both were. While only very liberal or somewhat liberal non-Jewish students were more likely to blame Israel than Hamas, the modal response was 'don't know', a kind of disengagement. Even among very conservative students, less than half blamed Hamas while most said they did not know. In fact, very conservative non-Jewish students were only slightly more likely than very liberal Jewish students to blame Hamas for the outbreak of hostilities.

Hamas is more Responsible for October 7 Outbreak of Hostilities, by Religion and Ideology

Figure 41

Source: FIRE 2024. N=58,800 non-Jewish and 2,079 Jewish students.

Young liberals, as noted, tend to decouple their view on Israel and Jews. Figure 42, for example, shows that 72 percent of the 11,600 students who identify as very liberal on a 7-point scale from 'very liberal' to 'very conservative' say Jewish student groups should operate on campus and receive student activity fees while just 41 percent of them say the same for pro-Israeli student societies. By contrast, 74 percent support Muslim student societies and 65 percent back pro-Palestianian societies.

Among the more than 3,000 'very conservative' students, scores are lower for both Jews and Muslims. Just 30 percent support the idea of pro-Palestinian societies operating on campus and getting student activity fees. Only 41 percent endorse the idea of allowing Muslim societies. But it is also the case that a mere 35 percent approve of pro-Israeli societies and only 45 percent back Jewish ones.

In other words, more 'very liberal' students support permitting pro-Israeli student groups on campus (41 percent) than 'very conservative' students (35 percent). Here is yet more evidence of young conservative disengagement from the Israeli cause.

Having said this, it should be noted that very conservative students are also over 5 points *less* supportive than

'very liberal' students of allowing fraternities and sororities, Christian societies and even conservative student groups to operate with student funds. Right-wing students seem to be generally more averse to campus-sponsored groups than left-wing students, though the question may also tap a general conservative opposition to fees being used for non-educational purposes.


Figure 42

Source: FIRE 2024, N=11,644 'very liberal' students and 3,031 'very conservative' students.

The foregoing suggests a large disconnect between Jews and the non-Jewish left over Israel, particularly on campus and especially at elite universities. Jews are attached to Israel as a symbol and as a refuge for diaspora Jews should persecution once again arise. They view the conflict as having been started by Hamas. Their leftist classmates instead castigate Israel and politically concentrate on it, alienating Jews who view this focus as motivated by antisemitism. Leftist students feel warmly toward Jews but cold toward Israel; yet coldness toward the latter is perceived by Jewish students as coldness toward them. Does antisemitism require *mens rea*, or merely the perception of hate?

Antisemitism on Elite Campuses?

In a previous University of Buckingham Centre for Heterodox Social Science report, I discovered that Jewish students at Ivy League campuses increased their level of self-censorship dramatically after encampments went

up in mid-April 2024.[35] FIRE data show that the proportion of Jewish students in the Ivy League who said they regularly self-censored in class or discussions more than tripled between 2023 and 2024, reaching 35 percent. There was a more modest rise in Jewish self-censorship across the mainly R1 research intensive universities captured in the FIRE surveys.

However, in 2025, as Figure 43 shows, Jewish self-censorship across the R1 universities returned to its historic trend, and in the Ivy League it declined to 22 percent. This is still higher than its baseline, but much better than last year. The ending of encampments, whether as a result of the Trump administration, donor pressure and/or university policies, appears to have played a part in reducing Jewish self-censorship on Ivy League campuses. Also worth mentioning is the fact that Jews used to self-censor at somewhat higher rates on red state campuses and at colleges with right-leaning student bodies, but, after 2022, Jews self-censored at lower than average rates in conservative institutions – especially compared to more liberal colleges such as those of the Ivy League. Red state policies toward prohibiting encampments and clamping down on DEI may be part of the story, though the decline in Jewish self-censorship on red state campuses was already in train before the encampments went up in 2023. A rising association between Israel, Jews and American conservatism may have been a factor as well, but further research is needed to substantiate this.


Figure 43

Source: FIRE 2020-25. Conservative campuses defined as student bodies with average ideology above 4 on a

[35] Kaufmann, Eric. 'CHSS Report No. 4 Jewish Inhibition, Conservative Freedom: New Trends in Expressive Freedom on Elite American Campuses,' Centre for Heterodox Social Science, University of Buckingham, July 1, 2025.

7-point liberal-conservative scale.

The decline in Jewish self-censorship in the Ivy League does not appear to be the result of the Middle East conflict becoming easier to discuss. The share of students saying that it is 'difficult' to discuss this issue on campus (see Figure 44) jumped between 2023 and 2024, when the conflict began, from 26 to 56 percent. Jews are especially more likely to say that discussing it is difficult. 74 percent responded this way in both 2024 and 2025. This indicates that general Jewish self-censorship is more connected to the presence of local encampments than to the dynamics of the conflict as relayed in the national press.

Figure 44

Source: FIRE 2020-25. Roughly 1200-2500 Jews and 800-1900 Muslims per annum.

Muslim Americans are cool toward Jews and Israel, but the feelings are not mutual. Muslim respondents in the 2024 ANES survey gave Jews a mere 30 out of 100 while Jewish respondents rated Muslims a 50. Likewise, in the FIRE data, just 47 percent of over 1,300 Muslim students endorsed the idea of Jewish student groups on campus compared to 72 percent of more than 2,000 Jewish students approving of Muslim student groups. While 56 percent of Jewish students approve of pro-Palestinian groups, only 21 percent of Muslim students endorse the idea of permitting pro-Israeli groups on campus.

A potential issue with anti-Israel sentiment on the left is that while it has little effect on liberals' feelings toward Jews it may help create a permission structure for some Muslims and left-wing extremists to engage in

antisemitic harassment or worse. Studies find, for example, that while most Muslims are not highly negative toward Jews in America (scoring 0-3 on a 10-point scale), the share is 4 times higher among Muslims than among non-Muslims (8 vs. 2 percent). Muslims who perceive high discrimination against Muslims are considerably more antisemitic than other Muslims. To the extent that the Israel-Palestine conflict taps into these grievances, it has the potential to stoke antisemitism.

There has been a documented rise in antisemitic hate crime, including physical attacks, since the conflict escalated. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) found that in 2024 there were 196 incidents of assault, targeting more than 250 people, though none were fatal. In addition, there were 2,606 incidents of vandalism (i.e. the painting of swastikas). In addition, the year saw 647 bomb threats, many against synagogues. Hatred of Israel was cited in fully 58 percent of new attacks. As Figure 45 shows, there was a noticeable spike in antisemitic incidents after October 7, 2023, when the Israel-Palestine conflict accelerated.[36] Muslim, leftist and far right activity are all important sources of antisemitism, but the post-October 7 spike is centred on leftists and Muslims. How so? Over 10 percent of antisemitic incidents occurred in highly diverse New York City alone, and half on university campuses. Incidents were concentrated in California, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, not in red states. While far right groups were implicated in 962 largely online 'antisemitic propaganda incidents,' these were down between 2023 and 2024.

What really stands out is the surge in aggressive face-to-face incidents after October 7, 2023, much of which occurred around anti-Israel protests, typically on campus. 'At Portland State University in Oregon, Jewish students and staff were heckled on campus with slurs such as "Fucking kike," "Zionist pig" and "Dirty Jew",' reports ADL. 'Around the University of Pittsburgh, a Jewish student was assaulted by a group of individuals who used antisemitic language after they noticed he was wearing a Star of David necklace.'[37]

[36] Sutherland, Callum, 'The Rise of Antisemitism and Political Violence in the U.S.,' *Time*, June 2, 2025.
[37] 'Audit of Antisemitic Incidents 2024,' *ADL*, April 2025.

Figure 45

Source: '[Audit of Antisemitic Incidents 2024](#),' *ADL*, April 2025.

On the other hand, American Jews should bear in mind that levels of antipathy toward Muslims and Palestinians are considerably higher than towards Jews in the US population. Leftist young Americans are, as we saw, quite pro-Jewish despite opposing Israel in the current conflict. While it is unpleasant for American Jews to see harsh criticism of Israel among liberal young Americans, this should not be mistaken for overt antisemitism.[38] Young Trump voters are disengaged rather than hostile to Israel, and the proportion who are seriously and consistently antisemitic is low. In nationally-representative data such as ANES, the uptick in young people's coldness toward Jews is barely perceptible, lying within its historic range. As the conflict ebbs, the modest anti-Jewish sentiment on the young right could readily fall back to its minimal long-run average. While nonwhite young Trump voters are more antisemitic than their white equivalents, this group does not appear invested in the

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[38] Yglesias, Matthew, '[Antisemitism in America](#),' *Slow Boring* (substack), November 15, 2023.

Israel-Palestine conflict and their rate of coldness toward Jews in the nationally-representative ANES sample is still a modest 10 percent. There is no evidence that this segment is well represented in antisemitic harassment or attacks.

The big question with respect to the national antisemitism picture is whether extreme Muslim and leftist anti-zionism abates, reducing antisemitic incidents on campus and in diverse urban areas more broadly. The dip in Jewish students' levels of self-censorship on Ivy League and other R1 campuses suggests this may already be underway, perhaps abetted by the policies of the Trump administration.

Part III Right-Wing New Media and White Nationalism

The next section of the report turns from antisemitism to racism and white nationalism.
I begin with trend data from the ANES in Figure 46, focusing on attitudes to whites and blacks among under-35s. The master trend among all young people since the mid-1960s has been a decline in warmth toward whites, from above 80/100 in 1966 to below 70 by 1992, and then sinking into the low 60s by the 2020s.

Views toward blacks have followed the opposite trend, rising from the low 60s in the 1960s and 1970s to the upper 60s by the 1990s and then to around 70 in the 2000s - albeit with some fluctuation. Warmth toward Jews is fairly steadily oscillating around the low 60s until 2008, then rises into the upper 60s thereafter - albeit with a modest 3-point decline between 2020 and 2024. The adult trend shows a similar path, with warmth toward whites steadily declining as warmth toward blacks rises, and then, in the late 2000s, warmth toward Jews increases.

These trends are not accounted for by the growing racial diversity of the American population, nor are they due to rising education levels, as most of the trend remains even when controlling for these factors. Warmth toward blacks and Jews, as noted in Figures 28 and 29, is heavily correlated, suggesting that both series are related to a liberalization of attitudes toward minorities. That is, both series should be viewed as part of a great liberalizing 'culture shift' of the post-1960s epoch, such as opinion on intermarriage or women working outside the home. [39]

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[39] Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

Under-35 Americans' Warmth Toward Whites, Jews and Blacks (after statistical controls), 1966-2024 (ANES)

Figure 46

Source: ANES 1966-2024.

Narrowing the focus to whites and blacks, I next consider partisan differences in sentiment toward these groups. Figure 47 illustrates that among under-35s Republicans, warmth toward whites (dashed line in red) declined somewhat from the 1960s until the 1970s before settling in at a long run trend of about 75 out of 100. However, Democratic warmth toward whites continued to fall steadily, especially during the 2008-16 spell when the era of Obama gave way to that of Trump and Biden. Young Democrats now feel only 66 degrees warmth toward whites.

When it comes to blacks, both Democrats and Republicans grew warmer between the 1960s and 2008, converging on 75 degrees. Since Obama's administration, however, there has been a partisan divide, with young Democrats about 10 points warmer toward blacks than young Republicans. Since 2016, young Republican warmth toward blacks has been similar to young Democrats' warmth toward whites, and vice-versa. Having said this, there is no recent dip in warmth towards blacks among young Republicans akin to the 4-point decline in warmth toward Jews among young Republicans since 2020. Young Republicans and Democrats warmed to blacks at the same time both cooled toward Jews.

Figure 47

Source: ANES 1964-2024. Generally 200-300 respondents under 35 in recent waves for each party identity.

Among adults, Figure 48 shows that the partisan differences are somewhat smaller, with Republicans in 2024 rating whites at 74 and blacks at 71 while Democrats rate whites at 66 and blacks at 73. Independents have blacks at 67 and whites at 64.

Republican warmth towards whites appears to have stabilized in the low 70s, but Democrats appear to be growing cooler toward whites over time, though this has been flat at around 65 since 2020. Republican warmth toward blacks is on an 8-year rising trend, reaching the low 70s, while for Democrats it shows stability in the low-to-mid 70s.

The long post-1960s minority rights revolution, whose tail end may still be working its way through public opinion, is a long-term factor shaping warmth toward blacks and Jews, and, possibly, coolness toward whites.[40] However, affective polarization means that a person's feeling toward racial groups they associate with their political outparty tends to be cooler.[41] This may not explain warmer Republican attitudes toward blacks, but it could account for cooler Democratic attitudes toward whites, a racial category that has leaned Republican in recent contests. Independents tend to be less enthusiastic toward a range of groups, even as the long-term balance has shifted in favour of blacks and against whites.

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[40] See Inglehart, Culture Shift
[41] Westwood, S. J. and E. Peterson (2022). "The inseparability of race and partisanship in the United States." Political Behavior **44**(3): 1125-1147.

Figure 48

Source: ANES 1964-2024. N is generally several thousand respondents per year.

From Antisemitism to Race

The young bipartisan trend over 2020-24 is toward more warmth toward blacks and stability toward whites. We have seen that sentiment toward whites and blacks converged from the 1960s to the 2000s, but that young Republicans now feel slightly warmer toward whites than blacks while young Democrats are considerably warmer toward blacks than whites.

There seems to be a new disconnect between the aforementioned racial trends and the Jewish trend. Thus in my Prolific data, Trump voters under 35 rate Jews a 59, blacks a 62, and whites at 74. This aligns with ANES data with respect to warmth toward whites, but is a few points lower for blacks and Jews.

A closer look at warmth toward blacks by news site audience, in Figure 49, shows that regular viewers of MSNBC are 10 points warmer toward blacks than the sample as a whole, while regular *New York Times* readers are 8 points warmer toward blacks than average. At the other end, mindful of low sample sizes (which mean we should pay attention to regular plus occasional numbers), many outlets on the right have audiences which are around 10 points cooler toward blacks than the sample average.

Yet this still means their audiences are positive toward blacks. Tucker Carlson's and Nick Fuentes' audiences rate blacks in the 55-60 range, which is far warmer than analysts' priors would suggest. Candace Owens' followers are in the upper 60s, noticeably warmer toward blacks than those of other right-wing influencers.


Figure 49

Source: Prolific November 25-December 3, 2025, N=784.

While warmth toward whites, shown in Figure 50, is higher on right-leaning sites than liberal outlets, there is less variation – especially when we bear I mind sample sizes for smaller outlets. All that can be said is that the liberal *New York Times* and MSNBC are, on average, a few points cooler toward whites than the right-wing outlets. Fuentes, Owens and Carlson tend to lie in the middle on this measure.

Figure 50

Source: Prolific November 25-December 3, 2025, N=784.

What about feelings toward illegal immigrants? Here there is a much larger, 20-point, gap between those who consume the liberal *New York Times* and MSNBC, and those who are followers of Fuentes, Carlson and Owens. But half of this is an artefact of the sample (which contains half young Trump voters and half politically-mixed adults). Taking this into account, the difference between the MSNBC/Times and new right podcast audiences shrinks to 10 points.

It appears that consuming content from Fuentes, Owens and Carlson is less strongly associated with sentiment toward blacks and whites than with coolness toward illegal immigrants, Palestinians, Jews and Israel.

Are Right-Wing Influencers Creating Racists?

Are those who listen to right-wing influencers the white nationalists and racists that many commentators believe them to be? The Manhattan Institute survey showed that 32 percent of Trump voters under 50 call themselves racist, compared to 13 percent of similar-aged non-Trump voters and 4 percent of Trump voters over 50. This survey measures approval of right-wing media figures but not whether people actually tune in to their shows. Trump voters under 50 who approve of Tucker Carlson come in slightly more racist than other young

Trump voters, at 34 versus 32 percent, while Candace Owens' supporters are somewhat more likely to be racist, at 37 percent.

When controlling for the demographics and religiosity of respondents, those who approve of Owens emerge as statistically more racist than average, even though the effect is small: moving from being a Trump supporter under 50 who disapproves of Candace Owens to one who approves of her is associated with an 8-point increase in the likelihood of identifying as racist. This reduces to 5 points when religious attendance, vote switching to Trump and immigration attitudes are included in the model. Again, much of this appears to be driven by non-racists tending to disapprove of Owens rather than racists approving of her. There were no significant effects for Carlson approval suggesting that those who back him do not differ in their level of racism from the average Trump supporter under age 50.

Overall, the Manhattan Institute data suggests that among Trump voters, being young, a Biden-Trump switcher or not attending church are the main correlates of identifying as a racist. Influencers do not appear to be driving this sentiment much since they are only modestly associated with it.

Are Groypers White Nationalists?

The foregoing is important background but does not directly measure engagement with right-wing new media accounts. My Prolific data asks directly about which influencers and news sources people consume. It also features four questions that tap 'ascriptive Americanism' items, arranged from agreement with white nationalism to support for radical universalism.[42] All use rotated response categories from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'. The questions, arrayed in order of ascriptiveness, are as follows:

- It is important to be white to be truly American
- If a future America is mostly non-white then it is less American than in the past
- It is important to speak English with an American accent to be truly American
- If a future America is mostly non-English speaking then it is less American than in the past

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[42] For more on this term, see Smith, R. (1995). 'American Conceptions of Citizenship and National Service,' in New Communitarian Thinking. A. Etzioni. Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia.

The first question is straightforwardly ethnonationalist, assigning membership in the nation only to those of white racial (i.e. panethnic) origin. The second is ethno-traditional nationalist, arguing that the loss of a mainly white racial composition dilutes American identity in relation to what most people consider archetypically American.[43] The third question is cultural nationalist, limiting membership only to those who arrived early enough in America to acquire an American accent. The final question measures cultural-traditional nationalism, arguing that the loss of a mainly English-speaking linguistic composition dilutes American identity in relation to in relation to what most people consider archetypically American.

81 percent of the under-35 Trump voter sample rejected the idea that you must be white to be a true American, with only 9 percent in agreement. Among a national sample of adults as a whole, respondents disagreed 87-8. Figure 51 plots the results by media outlet consumed, sorting sites from the least white nationalist to most white nationalist audiences. Small sample sizes necessitate that we take both the regular and occasional numbers into account. These show relatively little variation: all contain fewer than 10 percent white nationalists when averaging regular and occasional users. Tucker Carlson's audience is very slightly above average for white nationalism, with 12 percent of regular viewers saying you must be white to be a true American.

Only Nick Fuentes' audience show a higher share: 24 percent of regular, and 12 percent of occasional, viewers. However, even with Fuentes, it is striking that 56 percent of his followers disagree with the statement and the rest are unsure. If we include those who occasionally consume his content, 61 percent disagree and 20 percent are unsure, with only 19 percent white nationalist. When it comes to right-wing podcast audiences, none are white nationalist in any significant way.

43 Kaufmann, E. (2019). White identity and ethno-traditional nationalism in Trump's America. The Forum, De Gruyter.

Must be White to be a True American, by Outlet

% Agree (y-axis: 0 to 100)

| Outlet	Regular
NY Post	5
Alex Jones	5
Shapiro	6
Newsmax	8
MSNBC	8
NY Times	9
Candace Owens	9
Fox News	9
Tucker Carlson	12
Bannon's War Room	14
Nick Fuentes	24

Legend: ■ Regular ■ Occasional

Figure 51

Source: Prolific November 25-December 3, 2025, N=784.

Moving to the question of whether having an American accent is necessary to be considered a true American in Figure 52, a strikingly small share of respondents answered in the affirmative. Just 21 percent of young Trump voters and 13 percent of adults overall agreed with this national membership criterion. 59 percent of young Trump voters and 75 percent of adults overall disagreed. This is a highly inclusive and liberal average sentiment when you consider that an American accent can be acquired by someone of any race or religion who arrives in the country before becoming an adolescent.

Across news site audiences, there is - as with the white nationalist measure above - relatively little variation on this question. The regular and regular-plus-occasional audiences for Candace Owens and Tucker Carlson all score below 20 percent cultural nationalist. Even Nick Fuentes' followers largely reject the idea that you must have an American accent to be a true American. Just 1 in 5 of his followers agree with this sentiment while nearly half are opposed. The higher scores (Newsmax, American Conservative, Alex Jones) are for smaller sites where sample size may be skewing the results upward. Overall, the stunningly inclusive responses are the big story.

Figure 52

Source: Prolific November 25-December 3, 2025, N=784.

The idea behind ethno-traditional nationalism is that nations have ethnic, racial and religious compositions which add to their distinctiveness in the world. Even if membership is open to someone of any background on an equal basis, collective distinctiveness is reduced if a nation loses a critical mass of its distinguishing traits - including ethnic, racial and religious ones. Someone of any race, ethnic or religious background can be an ethno-traditional nationalist if ethnic and religious particularity is an important aspect of their 'personal' national identity.[44] That is, a Hispanic or Asian individual may be attached to the America they 'know', which includes a historic white majority and black minority.

Though this is a very different sentiment from an exclusive white nationalism, Trump voters under 35 reject it 55-26 while the national politically-balanced sample of adults rejects it 64-17. Figure 53 shows more difference between those visiting the liberal *New York Times* and MSNBC, 70-75 percent of whom reject ethno-traditional nationalism, and followers of most right-wing podcasters, who reject it at a lower range of 30-40 percent. Nick Fuentes' regular followers support ethno-traditional nationalism more than they oppose it, but only by a slim 47-35 margin. Including his occasional followers makes for a sample of 60, who back ethno-traditionalism by a

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[44] Kaufmann, E. (2019). White identity and ethno-traditional nationalism in Trump's America. The Forum, De Gruyter; Cohen, A. P. (1996). "Personal nationalism: a Scottish view of some rites, rights, and wrongs." American Ethnologist **23**(4): 802-815.

modest 48-37. Tucker Carlson's regular audience rejects ethno-traditional nationalism 39-33, rising to a 42-32 rejection if we include occasional followers. Candace Owens' regular followers reject it by a whopping 52-22 (48-28 for regular plus occasional). The upshot is that among right-wing influencers, only Fuentes has an audience that is moderately ethno-traditional, and then only narrowly.


Nonwhite America Would be no Less American, by Outlet

Figure 53

Source: Prolific November 25-December 3, 2025, N=784.

My final question on the Prolific survey, displayed in Figure 54, asks whether a majority non-English speaking America would be as American as today's majority English-speaking America. The country has been English-speaking since its inception. Its Constitution, literature and heritage are in English. Despite this, only 58 percent of Trump voters under 35 agree that the US would be less American if it did not contain an English-speaking majority. Fully 28 percent disagreed. In the wider adult sample, 45 percent disagreed with the cultural-traditionalist statement against only 37 percent in favour. Radical universalist Americanism predominates among respondents to the Prolific surveys.

Partisanship and ideology are important here. Conservatives endorse this version of cultural-traditionalist Americanism 62-23 whereas liberals oppose it 60-23. Liberal media outlets show near-majority support (in the 40s) for a universalist Americanism which claims that the country would be just as American if most of its citizens spoke a different language than English, with only 27-32 percent of their viewers saying that a non-English speaking America would be less American.

Most right-wing podcasters lie an opinion zone where 10-20 percent of their audience endorse radical universalist Americanism. Nick Fuentes' regular audience leans 68-18 against radical universalism, Candace Owens' 60-19 and Tucker Carlson's 72-14. While most who tune in to right-wing influencers are cultural traditionalist on the importance of English to American identity, there is still a group of 30-40 percent who are radical universalists or are unsure where they stand.

It may be the case that some respondents interpreted the questions on ethno-traditionalism as questions about who can belong. Even so, the range of responses over the four ascriptive Americanism items indicates that young Trump voters and right-wing new media audiences hold a remarkably liberal conception of American identity.

Young Trump voters are restrictionist on immigration, with only 21 percent either satisfied with current levels or wanting higher immigration. However, just 8 percent favoured immigration being cut to zero. This rises only modestly among Fuentes regular and occasional supporters, to 13 percent, while just 9 percent of Tucker Carlson's and 7 percent of Candace Owens' regular and occasional audience favour zero immigration. Their combined audiences are, however, 10 points more restrictive than average, with close to half favouring lowering immigration 'a lot' compared to 40 percent in the young Trump sample overall.

If a substantial share of their audiences identify as racist or antisemitic, or believe in Jewish conspiracies, this appears to stem from beliefs which orbit quite independently of white nationalism and its associated ethos of race purity.

Non English-Speaking America Would be no Less American, by Outlet

Figure 54

Source: Prolific November 25-December 3, 2025, N=784.

While much of the foregoing has focused on divides within the base, it is important to remember that young Trump voters are relatively unified around reducing immigration (79 percent support) and agreement with the idea that 'American culture was better in the past' (80 percent support). 86 percent of Tucker Carlson's audience supports reducing immigration and 92 percent say American culture was better in the past. For young Trump voters who follow any right-wing podcast, these numbers are in the mid-80s, delimiting a key zone of movement consensus.

A Cautionary Note on Surveying Young People

When polling young people, it is vital to appreciate the way in which survey populations differ from actual populations. British, Canadian and American census-bureau surveys report rates of non-heterosexual and non-binary gender identity that are often less than half of what is found in surveys. [45]

We see something similar for mental health. Currently in the United States, around 20 percent of adults

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[45] Kaufmann, Eric, 'The Decline of Trans and Queer Identity among Young Americans,' *Centre for Heterodox Social Science*, University of Buckingham, Report No. 5, October 10, 2025.

experience anxiety and 10 percent are depressed, 16-17 percent take medication and 10 percent use psychotherapy.[46] However, Prolific's respondent pool, which is viewed as among the highest quality for online survey platforms due to the higher wages paid, reveals that respondents are almost twice as likely as the population to experience mental illness, or to use medication or psychotherapy.

Young people, liberals, women and sexual minorities – who tend to have worse mental health - are all overrepresented in Prolific data. Young Trump voters in my Prolific sample are 55 percent male. Few are liberal or sexual minorities.

However, 80 percent say they have experienced anxiety (43 percent currently), 34 percent have ADHD, a quarter are on medication for anxiety or depression and 39 percent have been diagnosed with a mental health condition. While these numbers are considerably lower than those for young Harris voters, they are still well above the level expected in the population.

In addition, there is some evidence that worse-than-average mental health is somewhat associated with being a follower of certain right-wing influencers. Mental health questions were included in the young Trump voter sample. Figure 55 plots results for different media outlets by the proportion of their regular audiences reporting ADHD. In statistical models with a full range of controls for demographic factors, being a regular viewer of Candace Owens is correlated with having higher than average ADHD. For Nick Fuentes' followers, the effect is not significant, but signed in the right direction, suggesting that a larger sample could indicate a significant association. Owens' followers are also significantly more likely to be say they have experienced anxiety (91 vs 74 percent among young Trump voters overall) and depression (75 vs 51 percent overall). No significant effects are evident for Carlson's followers.

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[46] See, for instance, 'Mental Health', CDC, accessed December 18, 2025.

Share of under-35 Trump Voter Audience Reporting ADHD, by Regular Media Consumption

Figure 55

Source: Prolific November 25-December 3, 2025, N=392.

Part IV The Conspiracy Vote in a Low Trust Society

In the final section of this report, I ask whether the 'conspiracy vote' is emerging as an important swing constituency that may decide elections in a low trust society like the America of the 2020s.

It is increasingly clear that conspiratorial populism bridges factions on both the right and the left. For instance, Cenk Uygur and Ana Kasparian of the Young Turks, a left-wing populist podcast, have praised Tucker Carlson for his criticism of Israel and its supporters. After Ben Shapiro criticized Carlson at the Turning Point USA conference, Uygur tweeted, 'Ben Shapiro tried to cancel Tucker Carlson tonight. How do you think that went? I bet people in the establishment think it worked and Tucker doesn't exist anymore…Does anyone in their right mind think Ben Shapiro loves America more than he loves Israel?'[47]

Carlson has defended Islam and criticized the excesses of free market capitalism. In response, Ben Shapiro's speech at Turning Point USA's AmericaFest conference zeroed in on Carlson as a gateway to the left. Since

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[47] 'Tucker Carlson INFURIATES Israel Defenders,' *Young Turks*, December 14, 2025.

populism is 'thin-centred' and adaptable, it can serve as a conduit between left and right. The distance between 'left' conspiracy theories such as 9/11 or October 7 being inside jobs and right-coded conspiracy theories such as the Great Replacement or World Economic Forum-led Great Reset may be shorter than conventional political analysis would imply. Jewish conspiracies are also difficult to locate politically.

Social psychologists Imhoff and Bruder (2014) identify conspiratorial thinking about powerful groups in society as a distinct attitudinal dimension from right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Whereas the latter two express distaste for powerless minorities, the former tends to believe that advantaged or powerful groups are hatching plots against society.[48] Belief in conspiracy theories is also substantially independent of ideology. A study by Goldberg et. al (2020), for instance, found that beliefs that the government knew about 9/11 in advance, that Obama is a Muslim and that the covid vaccine carries more risks than benefits were highly correlated despite their different political codings.[49]

Turning to the Manhattan Institute survey, the belief that 9/11 was 'orchestrated or permitted by the government,' a left-coded conspiracy, correlates very well with many non-ideological and right-coded conspiracy theories. Table 2 shows that there is a correlation of around .5 or more between the 9/11, vaccine-autism, moon landings and Holocaust denial conspiracies. Holocaust denial is more connected with the other extreme theories than with believing that Christ was killed by the Jews.

Belief in the covid lab leak hypothesis, which is more likely than not to be true, is not related to believing in the wilder theories listed above – indeed it is inversely related to believing most of them. It is however associated with holding that the 2020 election was stolen.

Believing that the 2020 election was stolen by the Democrats is an attitude that behaves somewhat differently from the other conspiratorial beliefs. To be sure, there is an association between believing the 2020 election was stolen and holding more extreme conspiracy theories.

Yet the link is modest. Election skepticism instead appears to be connected with being white and male,

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[48] Imhoff, R. and M. Bruder (2014). "Speaking (un–) truth to power: Conspiracy mentality as a generalised political attitude." European Journal of Personality **28**(1): 25-43.
[49] Goldberg, Z. J. and S. Richey (2020). "Anti-vaccination beliefs and unrelated conspiracy theories." World Affairs **183**(2): 105-124.

identifying as part of the MAGA movement rather than as a traditional conservative, and being a Democratic-to-Republican switcher during the Trump era. That is, more Trumpist than Republican, being more likely to hold that 'When others are breaking the rules anyway and getting ahead, it's only fair to do what's necessary to keep up,' and to endorse political violence.

Table 2.

	Covid Lab Leak	Election Stolen	Vaccines Cause Autism	9/11 Inside Job	Holocaust Denier	Jews Killed Christ
Election Stolen	.453					
Vaccines Cause Autism	.180	.472				
9/11 Inside Job	-.016	.312	.477			
Holocaust Denier	-.323	.041	.360	.519		
Jews Killed Christ	.147	.222	.284	.252	.242	
Moon Landings Faked	-.205	.174	.470	.592	.676	.254

Source: Manhattan Institute survey, October 15-16, 2025.

Who believes in conspiracy theories? To answer this question I created a composite variable comprised of beliefs in 9/11, moon landings, Holocaust denial and vaccines causing autism. As Figure 56 shows, in the Manhattan Institute survey, the small sample of Democratic and Independent voters, as well as those who identify as moderate or left-leaning, are significantly less likely to believe these theories.

Those who identify as 'very left' are, however, no less likely than those on the right to believe that 9/11 was an inside job. Moderates and the moderate left are less likely to believe in the conspiracy theories than people on the far left, while 'very' right-wing respondents are more likely to believe in them than 'somewhat' right-wing individuals. These findings align with established research which finds that those at the political extremes are

more likely to believe in conspiracy theories than those who are more moderate.[50]

Beyond politics, results show that Hispanic, black, high income and religious voters are significantly more likely to believe in these conspiracies. Better-educated and older voters, especially seniors, are much less likely to believe in them. Age and race are arguably the most important socio-demographic factors when it comes to predicting conspiratorial beliefs. Age behaves in a nonlinear way, with the very oldest much less conspiratorial than the middle aged, who are somewhat less conspiratorial than the youngest.

Results for income are surprising, with those on highest incomes more likely to endorse conspiracy theories than the poor when we control for level of education.

Finally, those who attend religious services more tend to believe conspiracies more than those who do not. The academic literature repeatedly shows this, but finds that what really drives the relationship is belief in the magical and supernatural. Thus those strong in New Age orientation (i.e. 'Compared to most…I am probably somewhat of a spiritual seeker with an unusually open mind') and/or Supernatural beliefs (i.e. 'Horoscopes are right too often for it to be a coincidence') are more conspiratorial in their worldview, and this is correlated with religiosity. Religious attendance per se does not appear to predict conspiracism.[51] Magical thinking and interest in alternative medicine are additional factors.[52] In relatively low attention, alienated or bored segments of the population, conspiracies are more enticing and titillating than quotidian explanations based on uncoordinated actions, unintended consequences or multiple incremental effects arising out of clashing interests in a complex political system.

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[50] Van Prooijen, J.-W., et al. (2015). "Political extremism predicts belief in conspiracy theories." Social psychological and personality science **6**(5): 570-578.

[51] Frenken, M., et al. (2023). "On the relation between religiosity and the endorsement of conspiracy theories: The role of political orientation." Political Psychology **44**(1): 139-156.

[52] Wood, M. J. and K. M. Douglas (2018). 'Conspiracy Theory Psychology: Individual Differences, Worldviews, and States of Mind,' in Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them. J. E. Uscinski, Oxford University Press, pp. 245-56.

Belief in Extreme Conspiracy Theories

Hispanic***
Higher income***
Black***
Frequency of Religious Attendance***
Trump voter**
Education*
Age (older)**
Left-wing ideology***
Senior (over-65)***

-.20   -.15   -.10   -.05   .00   .05   .10   .15   .20   .25

Figure 56

Source: Manhattan Institute survey, October 15-16, 2025. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. N=2,384 Trump voters. R^2=.239.

Since the Manhattan Institute data is heavily skewed toward Trump voters, it is possible to redo the analysis excluding non-Trump voters to test whether Democratic or Independent voters who went over to Trump are more conspiratorial than longtime Republican voters. Figure 57 reveals the switcher group to be disproportionately young, with 62 percent of them under 50 compared to just 28 percent under 50 among those who have always voted Republican. In racial terms the new Trump votes are less different from established Trump voters, albeit with a somewhat higher black share.

 The switchers are much more likely to identify as antisemites (36 vs. 16) and racists (43 vs. 19). They are more likely than loyal Republican voters to believe all or most of the 6 conspiracies listed (39 vs. 11), support the idea that political violence may occasionally be necessary (69 vs. 43), and that breaking rules can be justified (21 vs. 6). These attitudes tap two psychological dimensions which are substantially distinct from ideology: conspiratorial thinking and social dominance orientation (SDO).

Concentrated among the young, the conspiratorial-SDO segment of Trump voters appears to be an important swing constituency since many in this group switched to Trump during or after 2016. Critically, just 79 percent of

switchers say they are likely to vote for Trump in the midterms compared to 98 percent of longtime Republicans.


Figure 57

Source: Manhattan Institute survey, October 15-16, 2025.

My Prolific data showed that right-leaning respondents under age 35 were twice as likely to believe that Israel can get away with anything because its friends control the media as right-wing voters over age 35. Minority Trump voters under 35 were only slightly more likely to endorse this statement as similar-aged white Trump voters.

However, those who tuned in to Nick Fuentes, Tucker Carlson or Candace Owens were, as noted earlier, significantly more likely to endorse this conspiracy. This tells us that certain podcast media are likely to be amplifying conspiratorial beliefs. This comports with research on the Trump assassination which showed that the tendency to believe that it was staged was related to getting news from social media and interpersonal networks rather than conventional news sources.[53]

If, as the Prolific and Manhattan Institute surveys suggest, young and, to a lesser extent, minority voters who switched to Trump after 2016 are drawn to the violent, rule-breaking and conspiratorial aspect of the right-wing media sphere and parts of the Trump message, then an important proportion of the younger electorate is post-

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[53] Ognyanova, K., et al. (2025). "Information from social ties predicts conspiracy beliefs: Evidence from the attempted assassination of Donald Trump." PNAS nexus **4**(6): pgaf193.

ideological and electorally up for grabs. If this group becomes a kingmaker in a divided electorate, with both parties crafting policies and messages to appeal to them, this could drag American policy away from what Jonathan Rauch terms a 'truth-based order', damaging American progress.[54]

The more conspiratorial end of podcast media, whether on the right or left, could be emerging as an important source of influence over this floating vote. Joe Rogan, a centrist who takes a skeptical stance toward authorities of all kinds, is an important influencer who switched his political endorsement from Bernie Sanders to Donald Trump ahead of his election in 2024. Trump's offer of a cabinet position to the Independent Robert F. Kennedy Jr. in late 2024 provides an example of how a politician can win the endorsement of voters who mistrust scientific authority.

Future candidates may therefore woo the conspiracy vote. Since the Democrats have skewed technocratic while the Republicans under Trump have leaned populist, the GOP have been able to attract this floating constituency to a greater extent than previously. Yet it is conceivable that a more populist and charismatic Democrat such as Bernie Sanders, AOC or perhaps even Gavin Newsom may be able to prise away part of this younger, more minority vote. An open question is whether these gains offset the loss of older, highly educated voters who prefer a more technocratic-style candidate.

The Decline of Trust in American Society

Researchers find that an important predictor of belief in conspiracy theories is low trust.[55] After all, conspiratorial thinking is predicated on a lack of trust in powerful elites and institutions, notably mainstream media, and a suspicion that one's fellow citizens have had the wool pulled down over their eyes.

When it comes to trust in fellow citizens, young people, Hispanics, blacks and Republicans are less trusting than older people, whites and Democrats. Figure 58, based on Pew data from late 2023 to early 2024, shows that whites under 30 are 17 points less trusting of people in general than whites over 65 (31 percent vs. 48 percent).

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[54] Rauch, J. (2021). The constitution of knowledge: A defense of truth, Brookings Institution Press.
[55] Goldberg, Z. J. and S. Richey (2020). "Anti-vaccination beliefs and unrelated conspiracy theories." World Affairs **183**(2): 105-124; Wood, M. J. and K. M. Douglas (2018). 'Conspiracy Theory Psychology: Individual Differences, Worldviews, and States of Mind,' in Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them. J. E. Uscinski, Oxford University Press, pp. 245-56.

Meanwhile black (18 percent) and Hispanic (25 percent) respondents in the 30-49 age bracket are less trusting than whites (36 percent) or Asians (42 percent) in the same age group – a pattern that holds across all ages. The same data shows that in each age group, Republicans are 8-10 points less trusting than Democrats. For instance, 28 percent of young Democrats trust people most of the time compared to 22 percent of young Republicans. Part of this is accounted for by differences in education since those with a bachelor's degree are 20 points more trusting than those with a high school education or less.[56]

Older adults are more trusting than younger adults

*% who say that **most people can be trusted**, by age, race and ethnicity*

Ages 18-29 · 30-49 · 50-64 · 65+

		Oldest-youngest diff
Total	26% — 31% 36% — 44%	+18
White	31 — 3641 — 48	+17
Asian	29 — 3742 — 45	+16
Hispanic	16 — 2425 — 31	+15
Black	18 — 2223 — 24	+1

Note: Statistically significant differences are in **bold**. White, Black and Asian respondents include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race. Estimates for Asian respondents are representative of English speakers only.
Source: Religious Landscape Study of U.S. adults conducted July 17, 2023-March 4, 2024.

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Figure 58

The rise in antisocial and conspiratorial new media is taking place against the backdrop of record low levels of interpersonal trust. This has been steadily declining in American society since 1960, as Robert Putnam detailed in his groundbreaking work *Bowling Alone*. The decline in face-to-face contact outside the home, whether in churches, unions, associations or even bowling leagues, is seen as undermining people's sense of trust in strangers. An ethos of expressive individualism and television (followed by the internet and social media), as

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[56] 'Americans' Trust in One Another,' *Pew*, May 8, 2025; Lippert, Jordan and Jonathan Schulman, 'Where most people trust others and where they don't around the world,' *Pew*, December 1, 2025.

well as rising ethnic diversity and inequality, help to explain this withdrawal from civic life.[57]

Figure 59 illustrates that trust in others has declined steadily in America since 1972, but has fallen more dramatically among the young than the old. This means that even as trust declined, people become more trusting as they age, helping to partially counteract the generational decline. Among young Zoomers and Millennials, however, trust appears to have fallen off a post-pandemic cliff, reaching critical levels. By 2024, just 7.5 percent of Americans under 35 said most people can be trusted.


Figure 59

In many studies, researchers find a connection between trust in fellow citizens and trust in institutions and government. For instance, Americans who say most people can be trusted are twice as likely to trust the government (22% vs. 11%).[58] Others find a more tenuous relationship now that trust in government is heavily determined by whether a voter's preferred party is in power.[59]

Figure 60 shows that trust in the federal government has fallen steadily since Watergate, with occasional reversals due to better economic times in the 1980s or the post-9/11 rally around the flag effect. Young people, who are less tuned in to politics, were slightly more trusting of the government than their elders until 1980. By contrast, 2024 data finds that just 8 percent of respondents under 35 said they trusted the federal government to do what is right, half the 17 percent trust level among people over 35. It is difficult to know if

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[57] Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York, Simon & Schuster; Putnam, R. (2007). "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century." Scandinavian Political Studies 30(2): 137-174.
[58] 'Americans' Trust in One Another,' *Pew*, May 8, 2025.
[59] Uslaner, E. M. (2016). Who do you trust? Interdisciplinary perspectives on trust: towards theoretical and methodological integration, Springer: 71-83.

recent data on young people's alienation from the government marks a new pattern. Regardless, levels of trust in the federal government hit a historic low by the tail end of the Biden administration in 2024, with only 15 percent of Americans overall saying they trust the government most of the time.


Figure 60

Source: ANES 1958-2024. Data not available for 2018-22.

Having examined trust in fellow citizens and in government, I next consider the final component of trust: faith in institutions. Figure 61, from Ryan Burge, shows the decline in trust by generation across a range of American institutions, as documented in successive waves of the General Social Survey (GSS) since 1972.

While all generations alive today are converging on historically unprecedented low trust in institutions apart from the military, the red time series for Millennials and aquamarine one for Gen-Z show the steepest collapses in recent years. That is, newer generations were, for many institutions, more trusting than their Boomer or Silent parents and grandparents until the past decade. Since then, however, Zoomers and Millennials (and Xers to some extent) have collapsed to the level of the population or below.

Three forces are important in the story of declining trust in institutions: a loss of generalized trust, scandals, and partisan polarization.[60] The first is the general fraying of social bonds, as outlined by Putnam, which has reduced

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[60] Brady, H. E. and T. B. Kent (2022). "Fifty years of declining confidence & increasing polarization in trust in American institutions." Daedalus **151**(4): 43-66.

people's trust in each other. The second involves scandals such as Watergate or child abuse within the Catholic Church, which have damaged trust in specific institutions.

More recently, cultural left bias in the media and scientific establishment over Black Lives Matter – such as exempting BLM protests from covid advice, trying to vaccinate by race rather than age, or teaching children that their country is racist; or around unscientific claims about gender reassignment surgery for minors, have damaged trust in the liberal professions.[61] Republican trust in higher education, for example, fell from 56 percent in 2015 to 20 percent by 2023.[62]

The drop in Republican trust in academia also involves the third cause, polarization. People are now more likely to trust an institution depending on whether it is coded Republican or Democratic, whereas in the 1970s trust in institutions was only partisan-differentiated for unions and big business. For instance, when the Supreme Court leaned more liberal, Democrats trusted it more than during the past decade, when it acquired a conservative bent.[63]

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[61] Mounk, Y. (2023). The identity trap: A story of ideas and power in our time, Random House.
[62] Jones, Jeffrey M. (2024). 'U.S. Confidence in Higher Education Now Closely Divided,' *Gallup*, July 8.
[63] Tyson, A. and B. Kennedy. (2024). 'Public Trust in Scientists and Views on their role in Policymaking,' *Pew*, November 14.

Figure 61

Source: Ryan Burge, using GSS data, posted on X, December 27, 2025.

Table 3, based on a factor analysis of 2024 ANES data, demonstrates that there are two trust mindsets. The first orientation concerns trusting government institutions (correlations in .64 to .81 range), which is also modestly correlated with trust in media (.34) and social media (.45) but only weakly with trust in science (.11) and people (.06).

The second form of trust concerns faith in expert institutions (science and the media) and people in general. This orientation is weakly linked to trust in government institutions and *inversely* correlated with trust in social media.

Statistical analysis shows that young people, conservatives and minorities are lower in the second form of trust – in elite institutions and strangers in general. However, these groups are more likely to trust social media, something we also saw for new media, with Republican voters trusting podcast news sources twice as much as Democrats.

The decline of trust in mainstream media and institutions over time has arguably led members of less trusting groups to look to alternative sources. This helps to explain the appeal of new media influencers - who sometimes lean toward conspiratorial thinking - among young, nonwhite and conservative audiences. The tone on these shows is uniformly skeptical and mistrustful of elite institutions. These sources also reflect the opinions of the conspiracy vote, an important swing constituency which leans young, conservative and nonwhite, and could prove decisive in elections.

Table 3.

	Trust government branches	Trust people, science and media
Congress	.81	.09
Media	.34	.62
Social Media	.45	-.28
Science	.11	.81
Government	.74	.36
Judiciary	.64	.23
Political parties	.79	.02
People in general	.06	.56

Source: ANES 2024. Varimax rotation, first factor explains .32 and second factor .20 of the variance. Shaded numbers represent main correlates of each of the two trust dimensions.

This report largely considers public opinion, especially among the young. However, elites and activists are also important, and if young cadres in the conservative movement have been disproportionately captivated by right-wing influencers such as Fuentes, this could bring outsized political consequences.

This seems overstated. The 2025 TPUSA AmericaFest post-conference poll suggests that the influence of the

anti-Israel and sometimes Palestinian-friendly Fuentes, Owens and Carlson on conservative activists is much more limited than has been intimated in the media or online.[64] This echoes findings from this report.

The paranoid phase of new media may be reaching its limits. In the wake of Charlie Kirk's assassination, Nick Fuentes has attacked Candace Owens as a conspiracist, suggesting that the leading edges of untrammeled mistrust and unbounded emotion are turning on each other using reason and evidence. Meanwhile, Ben Shapiro's criticism of Tucker Carlson and Megyn Kelly appears to have won more plaudits than barbs.

The right-wing cultural ecosystem faces a dilemma. A degree of populist disruption, mistrust and skepticism is necessary to reform established institutions and challenge the power of special interests, entryism and ideological capture. The challenge, surely, is to permit all theories to be advanced in the public square, but have commentators dismantle those which are ungrounded in systematic evidence.

Establishment conservatism was too focused on elite interests, institutions and a universalist form of nationhood, but a conservative populism without boundaries risks degenerating into an unreasoning form of politics that undermines the legitimacy of its arguments.[65] Recent research suggests that populist policies grounded in evidence tend to succeed whereas those resting on conspiracies or exaggerations do not.[66]

The quid pro quo is that elite institutions must do their utmost to win back legitimacy from a highly cynical electorate. This means they should stop suspending their rational faculties to promote DEI ideology, a cultural form of socialism.[67] Progressive corruption of institutions is an underexplored cause of today's institutional legitimation crisis.

The only major elite institution the right can currently control is elected government. When in power, it needs to abide by norms and rules even when it challenges or rewrites them. Right-wing media also should show that it can adhere to time-tested objective standards. The role of new media may be to err more on the side of mistrust than trust, yet without guardrails against poorly-substantiated claims, it will fail to realize its potential for

[64] Nantin-Cantel, E., 'I Spent A Week With Trump Supporters. The "MAGA Civil War" Is A Hoax,' *Substack*, December 27, 2025.
[65] Hofstadter, R. (2012). The paranoid style in American politics, Vintage.
[66] Yi, Joseph, 'Understanding Asymmetric Polarization in Korea,' *Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology*, April 6, 2025.
[67] Kaufmann, Eric. (2024). *The Third Awokening: a 12-Point Plan for Rolling Back Progressive Extremism* (Bombardier).

renewing society. This may undermine the truth-based order which has powered the success of the West for centuries. [68]

Ultimately the synthesis we require is a *rational populism* that optimally triangulates between disrupting and defending institutions. [69]

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[68] Rauch, J. (2021). The constitution of knowledge: A defense of truth, Brookings Institution Press.
[69] Kaufmann, Eric, 'Time for Populism to Grow Up,' *City-Journal*, February 27, 2025.