

THE NEW DUEHRING

By DR. JOSEPH SLAVIT.

"We too often forget that not only is there a soul of goodness in things evil," but very generally, also, a soul of truth in things erroneous." This is the first sentence and the first principle of "The First Principles" of Herbert Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy. When, therefore, Karl Kautsky somewhere severely scores as foolish the popular proverbialism, "There is nothing new under the sun," he evidently forgets the "soul of truth" in this popular error.

Undoubtedly Kautsky is justified in his criticism, but not absolutely so, and while we agree with him, we do not absolutely do so. For Spencer states in the above quotation the dialectic truth that there is no absolute error or absolute evil, and likewise there is no absolute truth or absolute good.

There is nothing absolute in the whole universe, except the absolute universal whole. And likewise all differences and all agreements are relative and not absolute. Thus there is nothing that is absolutely like anything else, nor is there anything that is absolutely different from anything else. All existence is eternally the same, yet all being is incessant transformation. There is nothing absolutely old, nor is there anything absolutely new. Constant change and changing constancy are the essence of all existence.

The "soul of truth," which popular language expresses in concrete form when it declares: "There is nothing new under the sun," is still more concretely expressed in the popular adage: "History repeats itself." Indeed, therein lies the value of history. For from the past we are enabled to judge the present and predict the future. We go from the old to the new and from the known to the unknown. This is precisely the scientific or inductive method, the evolutionary or historical method. Therefore the reader will pardon a little digression into history.

It was in 1875 that Eugene Duehring, privat docent at Berlin University, noisily announced his conversion to Socialism and came forth with a "new" philosophy, a "new" science, a "new" economics, a "new" morals, and a "new" Socialism. Soon, too, he succeeded in gathering about him a circle of adherents, drawing them even from the ranks of the Socialist movement.

As the various Socialist factions in Germany had at that time but recently effected an amalgamation into the united Social Democracy, it was felt that the "new" Socialism might have an unknown and untoward effect on the young unified movement. Frederick Engels was therefore urged by his Comrades, and, in fact, compelled by these circumstances, to take up an analysis and refutation of the "new" Socialism.

The result was Engels' famous work, "Herr Duehring's Umwälzung der Wissenschaft," a masterly mental dissection of Duehring, in which Engels not only mercilessly exposed the fallacies of this "Socialist" adventurer, but also explained the general philosophic position of Marx and himself in greater detail than had hitherto been done by either.

Now, Marx, Engels and Duehring are sleeping the eternal sleep of the just. Engels' "Anti-Duehring" has fulfilled its mission and has passed into history as one of the greatest Socialist classics. Since then the general philosophic standpoint, the general philosophic method and conception of modern Socialism has been fairly well understood and agreed upon. At least, so it was thought.

But now, lo and behold! there looms on the horizon the menacing figure of William English Walling. He, too, issues forth from the sacred folds of a university, or, still better, two universities. He, too, proposes a "new" philosophy, a "new" science, a "new" history, a "new" morality, a "new" politics, a "new" Socialism. And for the inspiration of this "new" Socialism and "new" everything else we are referred to the halls of Harvard and the corridors of Columbia. Thus history repeats itself. Duehring is gone; but Walling has come!

The "new" Duehring presents his "new" Socialism in two volumes, "Socialism As It Is," published in April, 1912, and "The Larger Aspects of Socialism," published in April, 1913. The first volume deals with economics and politics and presents the "new" capitalism, the "new" politics, the "new" unionism and the "new" Socialism. The second volume, "The Larger Aspects of Socialism," deals with philosophy, science, history, morals, etc., and reveals the vision of the "new" culture, the real spirit of the "new" Socialism.

This "new Socialist thought" is not based on the "early" and "older" teachings of the "Socialist" authorities, Marx, Engels and Lassalle, whose chief writings are now half a century old. We need no longer rely "on the old familiar, if still little understood, theories," we are told by Walling in his preface to his "Socialism As It Is." And in the introduction to his "Larger Aspects of Socialism" he says: "The older theory is neither being merely revised nor wholly repudiated, but it is being completely revolutionized." And again, "The great need is not to patch up theories of 1850 . . . but to employ such new principles and methods as most adequately express the present day movement and the present period generally." "Revolutionary Socialists," he says again, "are beginning to formulate their opposition to present society in the terms of a philosophy and science which have grown

up altogether since the time of Marx and Darwin." And he ends with the query, "What part, then, of the theoretical formulations of the Socialism of the past remains wholly unobjectionable . . . ?"

In giving the reader the above brief bit of history, an apology is perhaps due to Comrade Walling. Perhaps his horror of history, his prejudice against the past, his deep distrust of the "old" and his abiding faith in the "new" have some justification. For it is well for the Socialist movement to re-examine its theoretical and tactical positions from time to time. But this does not mean that we should reject the old because it is "old" or accept the new because it is "new."

Some sinister souls have already intimated that there is nothing in Walling's "new" Socialism that is particularly new or even Socialist. If that be so, it is an important matter. Leaving, however, the internal evidence, the contents of the books, out of consideration for the present, it cannot be denied by the most doubting Thomas that at least "The Larger Aspects of Socialism" is a "new" book, not only because of its very recent appearance, but also for a more important reason which will soon appear.

With "Socialism As It Is," the case is, however, somewhat different. Undeniably it is the "older" book and more than a year "old" at that. A year's time is no trifle; many a thing can happen or fail to happen in that time. A book may even become "old" or "ancient history" in that time, and that would be quite a calamity from Walling's viewpoint. Thus, while "Socialism As It Is" is very valuable for the mass of information which it contains (though not particularly "new") it does not seem to have had as yet any notable effect on the American Socialist movement. With William James we say that "a difference somewhere should make a difference elsewhere."

"The Larger Aspects of Socialism," on the other hand, is a "new"-born infant, and it is as yet impossible to foretell its full possibilities for good and for evil. Already the eyes of some have been dazzled by its brilliancy. Already there is a disposition in some quarters to accept skin-deep beauty for real bone and blood. Let us, then, remember that not all is gold that glitters.

But let us not forget also the Spencerian dictum quoted above. For Walling's work has also a soul of truth and a germ of good. It has its positive virtues as well as its positive vices. Whether we agree or disagree with Walling's methods, premises and conclusions, and whatever the merits or failings of the books themselves, it cannot be denied that Comrade Walling in his own way has rendered to the American Socialist movement at least one great service. He has redirected the attention of American Socialists to practically deserted paths in the field of Socialist theory.

Socialism has been variously referred to as a system of society, as a theory of history, as a science, as a philosophy, as a religion, as an ethical movement and as a spiritual movement, and of course, as a political and economic movement. But Socialists are so absorbed in the economic and political phases of Socialism that, as a rule, they are apt to pay but scant attention to the "larger aspects" of the subject. It is to these aspects that Comrade Walling earnestly and insistently points. He says justly: "Marx and the other most representative Socialists never described Socialism as a purely political and economic doctrine and never failed to point out its larger relations." In this sense, then, Walling's book may be called a "new" book.

But for this very reason it is important that this work of Comrade Walling's should be carefully examined. Whatever there is in it really new and really good ought to be accepted with thanks, if true, and whatever there is in it false and harmful should be exposed and rejected. Laudatory and derogatory reviews have appeared, but what is really wanted is not a "brief" or a "roast," but an analysis.

Such a critical analysis of Walling's "completely revolutionized" Socialism, of his "new" methods and principles, will be attempted in what is to follow. As the essential position of Walling's "revolution" in Socialist theory and tactics is presented in his second "new" book, we shall begin our analysis with the "Larger Aspects of Socialism," paying chief attention for the present to this work and using the other volume, "Socialism As It Is," for purposes of further illustration of our arguments. We shall quote, as far as possible, Walling's own words. We shall then see the "new" Socialism of the "new" Duehring "as it is."

(To be continued.)

Nothing is thoroughly approved but mediocrity. The majority has established this, and it fixes its fangs upon whatever gets beyond it either way. —Pascal.

Man's obligations do not tend toward the past. We know of nothing that binds us to what is behind; our duty lies ahead. —C. Richet.

Many a seeming farce played on the great stage of the world is in reality a tragedy, if we could but see into the heart of it. —Anon.

It is the treating of the commonplace with the feeling of the sublime that gives to art its true power. —J. F. Millet.

It is only men collectively that live the life of man. —Goethe.

It is the cause, not the death, that makes the martyr. —Napoleon.

THE OLD BOOK AND THE OLD METHOD



By DR. JOSEPH SLAVIT

The experience of those who read books habitually and extensively will confirm not only the fact that the title of a book often betrays its class and character, but also the fact that the essential position of an author is often as readily discoverable in the beginning or the end of his book as in the main body. This is, indeed, the only saving feature of many a worthless volume, since the first reading of the introduction or the conclusion of a book will often save us useless work and unnecessary vexation.

As we have already stated in our previous article entitled "The New Dushring," Comrade William English Walling presents his "new" Socialism in two volumes, "Socialism as It Is" and "The Larger Aspects of Socialism," which we have called for purposes of distinction (and with some justification) the "old" and the "new" book, respectively. The essential theoretical basis of Walling's entire position is presented at length in the "new" book, "The Larger Aspects of Socialism." This book, however, is not one of those worthless volumes above referred to. While Walling's position is evident in the beginning and the end of the book as in the intervening contents, yet the whole book is interesting and important from beginning to end, from the preface to the appendix.

The preface alone speaks volumes, though it is the shortest part of Walling's "new" book. Here Walling gives us, so to speak, a little "history" of his work. He tells us how he came to "conceive" the work and how he came to christen the offspring. Here, too, he states in deliberate terms what his "new" Socialism is. And what is most important of all, here Walling unwittingly betrays the real basis and character of his "new" Socialism—his mental methods or his methods of investigation and demonstration.

"Socialism," we are told by Walling in this preface, "may be treated in two opposite directions, i. e., either as a social movement that aims to build up a new civilization, or as a new civilization that is gradually being embodied in a social movement." In his "Socialism as It Is" he discusses the social movement and deals with "the economic and political features of Socialism" exclusively. In his "Larger Aspects of Socialism" he will "proceed in the reverse direction and deal exclusively with its larger aspects, its intellectual and spiritual side." Thus we see that the two books are really "two inseparables" or literary Siamese twins. In fact, Walling tells us himself, "As the two books were conceived and written together, they are parts of a single, whole; but—". But we hope that these literary Siamese twins are not a literary monstrosity.

But what is Walling's "but"? "But they are built on entirely independent foundations." But here we are impelled to "but" in with our own "but." But why should "the parts of a single whole" be treated "exclusively"? If it were because of the "great magnitude" of the task, it would be a good and sufficient reason. But that is not the reason here, for, in fact, the two books were conceived and written together.

And why should they be built on "entirely independent foundations"? Can the new civilization and the social movement be considered "exclusively"? Can the intellectual and spiritual side of Socialism be treated "independently" of the economic and political? Let Walling answer himself. "The principle that asserts the absolute interdependence of the cultural and economic and political sides of civilization and human progress is the most basic of the whole Socialist philosophy and policy."

But the mystery deepens. Why should the social movement and the new civilization be considered in "op-

posite" and "reverse" directions? Why should not the "economic and political features of Socialism" and the "intellectual and spiritual side of Socialism" be treated in the same direction? Why should they not be built on one and the same foundation? And what are these "entirely independent foundations"? Are they also in "opposite" and "reverse" directions?

Comrade Walling explains what these "entirely independent foundations" are. "In dealing with the economic and political movement I followed the inductive method; taking the activities of the movement itself as my point of departure. In concluding with its generalizations, I followed the deductive method. Taking as my point of departure the philosophy of modern science which I show to be wholly socialistic in its bearings," etc.

But still the ghost of independence and exclusiveness haunts us. Why does Walling take "the activities of the movement itself" as his "point of departure" only when dealing with the "economic and political movement"? Why not also take the same "point of departure" when dealing with the cultural movement? Is it possible that the Socialist movement has no "cultural" or intellectual and spiritual "activities"? Or is it possible that Walling considers only "economic and political" activities as "activities" and that "intellectual and spiritual activities" (beg pardon!) are not "activities" at all?

Or, in other words, does Walling take his different points of "departure" because he draws a sharp line of distinction between "practical" and "theoretical" activities? In his preface to his book, "Socialism as It Is," he says: "The only Socialism of interest to practical persons is the Socialism of the organized Socialist movement. Yet the public cannot be expected to believe what an organiza-

tion says about its own character and aims. It is to be rightly understood only through its acts. Fortunately, the Socialists' acts are articulate; every party decision of practical importance has been reached after long and earnest discussion in party congresses and press."

We see, then, that "practical persons" are interested only in the Socialism of the "organized Socialist movement." But how are "practical persons" to find out what this Socialism of this movement is and what its character and aims are? According to Walling, not by what the organized movement says of itself, but "only through its acts." Walling suspects, however, that this might leave both the "organized Socialist movement" and "practical persons" in an unfortunate position. Therefore he hastens to add, "Fortunately, the Socialists' acts are articulate," or hang together, so to speak. But why do these "acts" so "fortunately articulate"? Is this merely a "fortunate" coincidence? Oh, no! It is simply because "every party decision of practical importance has been reached after long and earnest discussion." But what do "practical persons" care about party decisions and discussions? "Practical persons" do not judge an organization by what it thinks or says about its aims and character. Evidently "acts" have something to do with "decisions" and "discussions." Evidently "practical activities" are intimately connected with "theoretical activities."

Walling says also in the same preface, "To know and understand Socialism as it is, we must lay aside both the claims of Socialists and the attacks of their opponents and confine ourselves to the concrete activities of Socialist organization, the grounds on which their decisions have been reached, and the reasons by which they are ultimately defended." That we should not rely on the opponents of Socialism for our knowledge of the subject is quite a reason-

able proposition. But Walling's advice that we should "lay aside the 'claims' of the Socialists themselves" should be taken with a good dose of salt. It seems that the Socialists themselves, according to him, do not know what they want or do not want what they want.

If we are to confine ourselves to the "concrete activities of Socialist organizations, the grounds on which their decisions have been reached, and the reasons by which they are ultimately defended," then what, after all is said and done, remains beyond these "confinements"? The Socialist "concrete activities" apparently have "grounds" and "reasons." Are not these "grounds" and "reasons" the very "claims" and "aims" which we are told to disregard? And what becomes again of Walling's sharp line of distinction between "practical" and "theoretical" activities?

Walling refuses to "rely on the old and familiar, if still little understood, theories" of "Socialist authorities" such as Marx, Engels and Lassalle. But he is ready to rely on the "responsible declarations of representative statesmen, economists, editors, and writers, which are not mere theories." Many of these "representative statesmen, economists, writers, and editors" are opponents of Socialism; but their "claims" and "declarations" are "responsible" and "not mere theories," like the "claims" and "reasons" and "grounds" of "representative Socialists" or "Socialist authorities," or even of the "organized Socialist movement" itself. The movement must not be judged by its theoretical position, but "only through its acts."

This is Walling's method of using the inductive method when he deals with the social movement or the economic and political Socialist movement in his "Socialism as It Is." It is at least an attempt to use the inductive method, which is universally recognized as the scientific method,

the method of modern science. But in dealing with the cultural movement, with the "intellectual and spiritual side of Socialism," he abandons the inductive methods altogether and proceeds in the "reverse direction." Why this "intellectual and spiritual" somersault? Is it because the cultural movement cannot be treated inductively? Is it because the "inductive method" cannot be used in dealing with the intellectual and spiritual side of Socialism?

It is true that Walling complains of "the lack of any official formulation on these broader questions." In the introduction to his "Larger Aspects of Socialism" he says: "Organized Socialism often attempts to confine itself to political and economic activities; when we get beyond this sphere we no longer have the movement as a whole to guide us, and we come against the difficulty that the Socialist congresses have decided that Socialism can have no official position on questions outside the political and economic struggle."

But Walling himself manages to overcome this "difficulty" very readily. "When, however," he continues, "the overwhelming majority of Socialists do have ascertainable and common opinions on some of these broader issues, and these opinions are clearly outlined in the official party press and literature, we can still direct ourselves by the movement—though we can no longer say that it has fought out such opinions," etc. And, again, he says: "If we study the Socialist press, and periodicals the tactics of the Socialist congresses, and the writings of the most representative Socialist writers (when they are not dealing with theoretical questions) we not only gain a more profound insight into Socialism than by any other method, but we are laying the only possible authentic foundation for Socialist political and economic policy as well as Socialist culture and civilization."

We can no longer say what these "common opinions" which "overwhelming majority of Socialists do have" and which "are clearly outlined in the official party press and literature" have been "fought out" merely reached "after long and earnest discussion." But we do agree with Walling that in dealing with these "broader issues" and "larger aspects" we can "still direct ourselves by the movement."

In fact, Walling, not only admits that his "inductive method" is applicable to the cultural aspects of Socialism, but deliberately declares that we can gain "a more profound insight into Socialism" by this method than by "any other method." So complete a somersault does he turn again, that this method now becomes the means of laying "the only possible authentic foundation for Socialist political and economic policy as well as Socialist culture and civilization." He is even willing to accept the "opinions" of the Socialists which we were told before to "lay aside." True, he would still exclude "theoretical" questions, but we have already seen that the distinction between "theoretical" and "practical" questions amounts to a point to which we shall return later.

Thus we see that Walling follows the inductive method in his "old" book when dealing with the economic and political movement. Thus we see how Walling assures us that we may still—nay, we must—follow the same method when dealing with the cultural movement. Why, then, does he abandon this method when he deals with this cultural movement in his "new" book, "The Larger Aspects of Socialism"? Does he not wish to direct himself by the movement? Is another case of independence and exclusiveness? Or a "revolution" against "Socialist authorities"? These "theoretical" and "practical" questions we shall consider in the next article, "The New Book and the New Method."

(To be continued.)

The New Book and the New Method

By DR. JOSEPH SLAVIT.

In the second article, entitled "The Old Book and the Old Method," we saw how Comrade William English Walling proposes to "build" his "new" Socialism in his two books, "Socialism as It Is" and "The Larger Aspects of Socialism." In the former volume, which we called the "old" book, he proposes to deal with Socialism as a social movement, i. e., with the economic and political side of Socialism. In the latter volume, which we called the "new" book, he proposes to deal with Socialism as a cultural movement, i. e., with the intellectual and spiritual side of Socialism.

In dealing with the economic and political side of Socialism in the "old" book, Walling proposes to use the inductive method, taking his point of departure in the "activities" of the movement itself, guiding himself "by the movement," and thus reaching his generalizations. Even in dealing with the cultural side of Socialism, we were assured by Walling, it is still possible to use this inductive method, to take our point of departure in the activities of the movement itself, and to still direct-ourselves by the movement. In fact, we saw that not only do we gain a more profound insight into Socialism "as it is" by this method than by "any other method," but that also this method gives us the "only possible authentic foundation for Socialist political and economic policy as well as Socialist culture and civilization."

Whether we agree or disagree with Walling's idea and use of the inductive method in his "old" book, at least he makes an attempt to use the inductive method, or, at the very least, he gives public recognition of the importance and the value of this method. Despite all this, when he comes to consider the cultural side of Socialism in his "new" book, he builds on "entirely independent foundations," he gives up the further attempt to use the inductive method, to take his point of departure in the "activities of the movement itself," or to guide or direct himself "by the movement." He proceeds in the "opposite" and "reverse" direction. He resorts to the deductive method, instead of the inductive method.

What is this inductive method which Walling attempts to use but is compelled to abandon? What is this deductive method which Walling is forced to resort to? Why does Walling take his point of departure in "the activities of the movement itself" when dealing with the economic and political side of Socialism? And why does he take his point of departure in the "philosophy of modern science" when dealing with the intellectual and spiritual side of Socialism? Why does he use the inductive method in the former case and the deductive method in the latter case? Indeed, which is the method of modern science—deduction or induction? Or, perhaps, is modern science inductive, while the "philosophy of modern science" is deductive?

These questions are very significant and they demand an adequate answer. The significance of these questions consists in this: That the difference between deduction and induction is precisely the difference between scientific investigation and philosophic speculation. And this, too, is the relative difference between Walling's two books. His "Socialism as It Is" is more or less of an inductive or scientific attempt to investigate the Socialist economic and political movement. His "Larger Aspects of Socialism" is a purely deductive or speculative treatment of the intellectual and spiritual phases of Socialism.

While the inductive method is an "old and familiar" method, the deductive method is by no means a "new" method. Both methods have been used by mankind for many thousands of years. The deductive method especially has always been the basis of theological doctrine and dogma. It was the chief method of past and present speculative philosophy. It has been the basis of all types of Utopianism, Socialism and otherwise. Its intricacies and fallacies were exposed over 2,000 years ago by the Grecian giant of thought, Aristotle. And still many minds, including those of many Socialists, are in its grasp. Indeed, the influence of the deductive method of thinking on Socialist thought and action is a vital and serious problem in Socialist logic and psychology.

The distinction between deduction and induction is highly important, though we cannot go into its discussion exhaustively at this time. Briefly stated, induction begins with the facts or evidence and develops out of these its principles or conclusions; it begins with the special or concrete matters of experience and therefrom elaborates general or abstract thought or theory. Deduction, on the contrary, begins with the principle or conclusion and seeks to conform the facts or evidence with the given principle or conclusion; it begins with general and abstract thought and forms of thought, and seeks to press the special and concrete experience into these forms. Deductive logic is universally recognized as a logic of form, or "formal" logic; while inductive logic is a logic of experience, a substantial or "material" logic. All science and all scientific movements are inductive, and therefore materialistic in their conception. All idealist, Utopian and speculative conceptions and movements of the past have had the deductive method of thinking for their basis and bottom.

Induction begins with the subject matter for its basis; deduction begins with hypothesis or assumption. The latter is precisely the basis of Walling's "new" standpoint, deduction from hypothesis. His pragmatic method and argument are nothing more than deduction garbed in a "new" dress. The essential form of the deductive method is the "old and

familiar" syllogism, which reasons from assumed material premises to formally logical conclusions. The deductive method and form of thought may be made clear perhaps by two simple illustrations.

Here is an "old and familiar" example. Major premise—man is mortal; all men are mortal; minor premise—Tom, Dick and Harry are men; conclusion—therefore, Tom, Dick and Harry are mortal. And here is a "new" example. Major premise—pragmatism is Socialism or pragmatists are Socialists; minor premise—Dewey, Sturmer and Walling are pragmatists; conclusion—therefore, Dewey, Sturmer and Walling are Socialists. This is Walling's immortal argument.

Such are the methods by which Walling constructs the "new standpoint" of his "new" Socialism. He uses the deductive method, which reasons from certain "basic assumptions" to certain "conclusions." He takes his "point of departure . . . in the philosophy of modern science." His "basic assumptions" are that pragmatism is the philosophy of modern science and that pragmatism is Socialism. His own words are: "His philosophy I have called pragmatism, because I believe pragmatism is Socialism," . . . especially, its "most able and consistent interpretation," the pragmatism of Prof. John Dewey of Columbia University.

By the deductive method and from these "basic assumptions" Walling reaches "conclusions" which are said to be "wholly Socialistic." This dialectic is rejected as "obsolete" and "antiquated." The theory of evolution is condemned as "reactionary." The materialistic conception of history and the theory of class struggles are dubbed "semi-dogmatic and semi-partial truths" and are revised and remodeled. The economic and political movement is made "secondary and incidental" to "intellectual and moral processes." While James, Marx, Sturmer, Dewey, Engels, Nietzsche, and a host of others, compatible and incompatible, are duly labeled "pragmatist or Socialist" and beautifully fused into "a single whole" like the variegated colors of a kaleidoscope.

And now comes the master stroke. In the introduction to the "new" book, Walling says: "Each Socialist writer is forced, in the lack of any official formulation on these broader questions, to restate the Socialist philosophy as he sees it." In the appendix of the book he says: "The pragmatism of John Dewey I consider to be the Socialist philosophy." And in the preface he says, as we have seen above: "I believe pragmatism is Socialism." It would seem, then, that Walling presents here his individual views. His methods, premises, and conclusions would certainly indicate that he has truly taken his departure from the Socialist movement.

But no! For he tells us that "the work consists of Socialist criticism and not of my individual views. I have used every effort to find a pragmatic or Socialist writer at every point," etc. And then the prodigal son returns to the Socialist movement; in fact, he identifies himself with the whole of it. "The general standpoint I have presented is that of the philosophy of modern science and the Socialist movement." He no longer presents the Socialist philosophy "as he sees it." He deliberately presents pragmatism as "the general standpoint of the Socialist movement."

This much is certain, as an inductive investigation of the Socialist movement and its practical and theoretical activities will disclose: Walling's general standpoint may be that of the "philosophy of modern science," but it is not that of the Socialist movement; and his work may be one of "Socialist criticism," but it is nothing more than his own "pragmatist or Socialist" views and those of "pragmatist or Socialist writers." In the Socialist movement "pragmatist" and "Socialist" are by no means synonymous terms. And surely Walling's "assumptions" and "conclusions" are by no means "the general standpoint of the Socialist movement," are not the "common and ascertainable opinions of the overwhelming majority of Socialists," and will not be discovered "in the official party press and literature."

No wonder Walling was somewhat at a loss to find a suitable title for the book which he finally and unfortunately named "The Larger Aspects of Socialism." "From the point of view of its basic assumptions, then," says he, "I might have called the present volume 'The Philosophy of Socialism'; from the point of view of its conclusions it might be entitled 'The Sociology of Socialism.'" Finally, he comes to the rather unexpected conclusion that neither title, nor even a combination of them, will do—in conclusion with which we are strongly inclined to agree.

Perhaps the reader will ask, "What's in a name, anyhow?" But this matter of titles of books is sometimes very important! Walling himself is certainly quite concerned about this. And as we have stated in a previous article, the title of a book will often point to its class and character. We have seen how Walling himself argues pre and con in the matter of titles for his books. A book's title is evidently a proper subject for argument, and we may indeed reach at times some very annoying conclusions in such a matter.

Thus, for example, leaving out of consideration the particular views presented in Walling's volumes, his books are certainly unfortunately named. The deductive method is sufficient to prove it. If the volume which deals exclusively with the economic and political features of Socialism is correctly named "Socialism as

It Is," then Socialism must be exclusively an economic and political question, there can be no larger aspects, and the other book is either superfluous or does not deal with Socialism at all. On the other hand, if Socialism is not exclusively an economic and political question, of Socialism has other and larger aspects, and if the second book is correctly named "The Larger Aspects of Socialism," then the first book, "Socialism as It Is," deals with some of the aspects of Socialism (the economic and political) but not with all its aspects, and therefore does not present Socialism "as it is."

By the deductive method we thus reach the conclusion that either Walling's "old" book is not a presentation of Socialism as it is, or his "new" book is no presentation of Socialism at all. And we may even deduce a suitable title for the "new" book by this method, as, for example, "Socialism as It Is Not." This title would fairly indicate that with "Socialism as It Is" it is part of a "single whole," and that it is in fact the "opposite" and "reverse" of "Socialism as It Is."

That these deductions are not only formally but also materially correct will readily be proved by an inductive examination of Walling's books and of the practical and theoretical Socialist movement. For, as we shall see later, Walling's "basic assumptions" are not the philosophy of Socialism, and his "conclusions" are not the sociology of Socialism. "The Larger Aspects of Socialism" or "Socialism as It Is Not," is certainly conceived in the "opposite" and "reverse" direction, since it leads us away from Socialism and back to bourgeois philosophy and anarchist individualist sociology.

Spencer was undoubtedly right. There is a soul of truth in all error, and a germ of good in all evil. Deduction is a method of formal truth, which generally makes it a method of error and evil. But it has also its germ of good, which lies in the fact that formal truth may often agree with the material truth of inductive logic. Then the deductive method often reacts like a boomerang on him who would use the method exclusively. Thus, for example, we have seen the havoc which the method raises with Walling's books and their titles. No wonder our author is worried. He accents the danger of the deductive method instinctively, "by intuition," as would say that problematical pragmatist, the "brilliant Bergson."

Walling also feels instinctively the power and importance of the inductive method, as we have already seen in the previous article. But he has not yet grasped the real spirit of this method of modern science, and has not yet acquired the ability to handle it correctly and confidently. When he does attempt to use the inductive method he uses it deductively, as is sufficiently shown by his efforts to draw a sharp line of distinction between "mere theories" and "concrete activities," by his "absolute" and "dogmatic" differentiation between theory and practice.

So long as he deals with "concrete activities," with so-called "practical questions," such as economics and politics, he attempts to use the scientific or inductive method. But so soon as he treads on the ground of philosophy, science, history, ethics, and other kindred matters, i. e., as soon as he attempts to deal with abstract matters, with so-called "theoretical questions," he is compelled to abandon altogether the inductive method of modern science and to resort again to the deductive method of past and present class philosophy. In short, he has not yet grasped the real spirit and philosophy of modern science.

(To be continued.)

EVIDENCE

RALPH BACON, in Life.

Day after day she stands
With aching back, her busy hands
Smoothing the silks and laces fair
She does not wear.
Night after night she climbs up to
her barren cell,
Whose dingy walls foretell
The drawn-out torture of the future
years.
She shudders, and her frightened
tears,
Flooding the roses of her skin,
Turn it to parchment, wax and thin.
And then—
We call together sleek and prosperous
mea
Fat-jowled and double-chinned,
To find out why the girl has sinned!

THE CAUCASIAN PLAYED OUT.

The Toyo-Kisen Kaisha liner Hong-kong Maru arrived at San Francisco a week ago with an all-Japan crew. This is said to be the first steamer engaged in carrying passengers which entered the Golden Gate with a Jap skipper and officers. "All is well that ends well"—for now, when the white officers begin to lose their jobs on those vessels, we will probably hear no more of their fulsome laudations of Asiatic crews. And since the Japs insist upon all-Jap crews for Jap vessels, there will be more force to our demand of "all-American crews for American ships." So long as our brown brothers remain on their own country's ships they have our very best wishes. And we are inclined to compliment the Japanese ship owners upon their determination to "fire" the white officers. May we hope that our patriotic American ship owners will take the hint?—Coast Seaman's Journal.

Twined, twined, twined—the dry-
dust twine, be-gone. Always on the
hot hair-splitter on the market. Try
'em. In daily use by thousands of re-
putable statesmen, lawyers, editors, gen-
erals, business men, educators, etc. In-
dorsed by the learned professions. Re-
sults: From Fulpat Bar & Co. for de-
fective writings and sample business
Adventures.

The New Socialist Movement

By DR. JOSEPH SLAVIT.

In the previous article, entitled "Some New Definitions of Socialism," we began the examination of Comrade William English Walling's introduction to his book, "The Larger Aspects of Socialism." We were there introduced to the "new" Socialism itself, especially its "practical" or its economic and political side. We gave a brief statement of the "new" economic and political philosophy and a brief discussion of the "new" definitions of Socialism. We saw how the "new" capitalism gives rise to the "new" capitalist politics or "progressivism," and also makes necessary the "new" Socialism or "revolutionism"—a "new" revolutionary movement based on "new" principles and methods.

The "old and familiar" theories and definitions now current in the Socialist movement must be "not merely revised nor wholly repudiated but completely revolutionized." The "older theory," the "semi-dogmatic and partial truths," such as the materialistic conception of history and the theory of the class struggle, are "antiquated," "survivals of the middle ages," etc. The "rigid and dogmatic" definitions generally accepted in the Socialist movement, as, for instance, that Socialism means industrial democracy or democratic collectivism, are not in "accord with the present methods of science," i. e., they are not "broad and loose enough so that they will not have to be qualified."

"The only possible definition of Socialism is the Socialist movement." Socialism or the Socialist movement is not "mainly a class struggle of workmen against capitalists," nor is it "in reality a class struggle" at all. "It is not a conflict between two classes or even two groups of social classes." "Socialism is a movement of the non-privileged to overthrow the rule of the privileged in industry and government. . . a struggle of those who have less against those who have more than equal opportunity would afford."

But the Socialist movement is not only an economic and political movement; it is also a cultural movement. It is not only a social movement; but also a movement in philosophy, science, morals, education, art, etc. "Socialism," as we were told by Walling in his preface, "may be viewed as a social movement which seeks to realize a new civilization, or as a new civilization which is being embodied in a social movement." It means "not merely a political and economic revolution, but even a revolution in culture, but both of these together. . . . It is 'a conflict between two classes and the whole of two civilizations they represent. . . a conflict of future culture with present culture.' In fact, 'political democracy can become social democracy and build up a new society only through an actual conflict of the new civilization with the old.'"

Who the contestants are in this social and cultural struggle we have already seen to some extent in our discussion of Walling's theory of the privileged and nonprivileged. His views of the Socialist theories of history and class struggles, at which we have already hinted, will be discussed more fully when we come to consider the "new" history. It is interesting to note here, in passing, that though Walling declares that "the conflict of Socialism with present society is not in reality a class struggle. . . not a conflict between two social classes or even two groups of social classes," yet he deliberately goes on to say that that "the conflict is between two classes and the whole of the two civilizations they represent."

The Socialist movement, then, is a social movement (i. e., an economic and political struggle) and a cultural movement (i. e., an intellectual and spiritual struggle). What is the relation between the two and what is the importance of each? These questions and Walling's views in this matter will bear some examination at this time.

"The principle that asserts the absolute interdependence of the cultural

and the economic and political sides of civilization and human progress, is the most basic of the whole Socialist philosophy and policy. It is the essence of what is called 'the materialist interpretation of history.'" At different times, however, there has been a tendency "to narrow this principle by this or that theorist or faction to the economic or political or both exclusively. And now comes the 'new' faction with the 'new' theorist at their head and with his 'opposite and equally dangerous tendency' to subordinate the economic and political side of Socialism (and especially the latter) to the cultural side.

In the second article, entitled "The Old Book and the Old Method," we saw that the organized Socialist movement lays more stress on the economic and political side of Socialism than on the cultural; that is has made no "official formulation" on the broader issues; that it often "attempts to confine itself to political and economic activities," and that Socialist congresses have even decided that "Socialism can have no official position on questions outside the political and economic struggle."

All this would seem to indicate that the economic and political movement or struggle is of greater practical importance than the intellectual and spiritual side of Socialism. Certainly this practical and tactical position and policy must have been "fought out" and "tested" in practical life. Walling, himself, explains and excuses this position by saying, "This does not necessarily mean that the movement considers these larger aspects of Socialism less fundamental, but that it regards it as less necessary to concentrate immediate attention on them." And surely, from the "absolute interdependence" of the social and the cultural movement, it would follow that the economic and political struggle is at least as important as the cultural struggle.

But Walling is not satisfied with this practical position. With Wells, whom he quotes approvingly, he is "at great pains" to impress it on the reader that the political side of Socialism is "least important," that "the actual changing of practical things in the direction of the coming Socialized state. . . the actual Socialization. . . is the least pressing part of Socialist activities." He quotes Wells as saying: "Socialism is a moral and intellectual process. . . only secondarily and incidentally does it sway the world of politics." Thus the apostle of "concrete activities" and "actual struggles" and "practical questions" allows himself to sink to the low level of the despised and abused "theoretical" activities, and would subordinate the practical economic and political struggle, the actual changing of practical things, to "moral and intellectual processes." And yet it is Walling who tells us in his "Socialism As It Is," p. 129, "Revolutionary thoughts are empty abstractions unless accompanied by revolutionary methods."

The radical is not he who looks forward to great changes after long periods of time, but he who will not tolerate unnecessary delay."

And then the Socialists are referred to the English economist and publicist Hobson for "the broader conception of the task that lies before them," for the "new" conception of the Socialist struggle. We present Walling's quotation from Hobson in full: "The history, the political economy, the literature and the biology taught in schools and colleges under the control of persons whose training and character are molded by class influences will inevitably be anti-democratic. They will continue to construct and propagate, as they have always done, a politics and economics designated to ward off assaults upon vested interests, of which they are the intellectual mercenaries. Since the real power of the people lies not in the possession of votes, but in the

capacity to use them, the real struggle for democracy centers around the struggle for free education, free alike from financial, political and moral control of the classes. Educational democracy is an essential condition of political and industrial democracy."

This statement and argument is radical enough, to be sure. But the conclusion is rather "broad and loose." We have here the logic which rejects the definition of Socialism as democratic and collectivism or industrial democracy as a narrow conception "of the task that lies before the Socialists." Hobson, and apparently Walling also, would have us abandon the practical struggle for political and industrial democracy, and have us center our movement around the struggle for educational democracy. The latter is an essential condition of the former. We cannot have political and industrial democracy without first having educational democracy, they tell us.

Now none would deny the great importance of educational democracy. Socialists are strongly in favor of education and educational democracy. We are, furthermore, no worshipers of mere votes and offices. But we can no more depend on a purely educational struggle than we can on a purely economic or even the purely political struggle. We must recognize the dialectic connection of economic and political and educational action.

But why do we not have educational democracy today? Why is present education anti-democratic? Because the schools and colleges teach especially a politics and economics designed to ward off assaults upon vested interests. And why do the schools and colleges teach such a politics and economics? Because those who are in the control of the schools and colleges, and who construct and propagate this economics and politics, are the intellectual mercenaries of these vested interests. And why are they the intellectual mercenaries of these interests? Because they are persons whose training and character are molded by class influence.

Thus we see by Hobson's own reasoning how education becomes anti-democratic. It is through politics and economics, vested interests, class control and class influence. How, then, can education become democratic? How shall we free the schools and colleges from the financial, political and moral control of the classes, from the political and economic class interests and influences? The Socialist movement has but one answer: Those who control industry and government will also ultimately control educational institutions. The real task is the assault on the vested interests and their class control and class influences. Political and industrial democracy are the essential conditions for educational democracy. The real struggle is for political and industrial democracy, and this struggle will not be successful until "vested interests" and the control of industry and government by interested classes will be abolished.

Nor should we forget the dialectic connection between the "possession of votes" and the "capacity to use them." To be sure, the possession of votes without the capacity to use them is useless; but the capacity to use votes without their possession is just as useless. And while the capacity to use votes may lead to their possession, so also, may the possession of votes develop the capacity to use them. Political knowledge will depend greatly on political experience. The evolutionary process of political development may be too "slow" to suit some "revolutionists," but it's there just the same. Wherefore the extension of the suffrage and political democracy are an essential part of the Socialist program for industrial democracy or democratic collectivism.

But the statement that Socialism means democratic collectivism or industrial democracy is said by Walling to be "as misleading as any dogma." The practical or political and eco-

nomic problem of Socialism," he continues, "is neither how much of industry the government controls (the problem of collectivism), nor the form of government (the problem of democracy), nor even how much of industry a democratic government controls (the problem of democratic collectivism), but this—Does a class, or group of classes, control the government?"

The reader will readily see the difference. It is not a question of collectivism or democracy or even both, but this: "Does a class, or group of classes, control the government?" But is not the control of the government by a class, or group of classes, a question of democracy? And is not the control of the government by a class, or group of classes, a question of collectivism? Ownership and rulership are inseparable. Ownership of industry by a class, or group of classes, means social or collective rulership in government by a class, or group of classes. Social or collective social property in industry means social or collective rulership in the State. The former is the essential condition of the latter; the latter is the essential means to the former.

Private capitalism means no collectivism and no democracy. State capitalism or so-called State Socialism means collectivism without democracy. Real Socialism means social ownership and social democracy. It is not a question of collectivism only or democracy only, but of collectivism and democracy. It is not merely a question of "Who controls the government?" but also of "Who controls industry?" The problem of democracy and the problem of collectivism are inseparably connected in the problem of democratic collectivism or political and industrial democracy.

So long as the mechanism of social production and distribution is in the hands of a class, or group of classes, so long will the administration and regulation of men and things be in the hands of a class, or group of classes, and so long also will education and culture be subject to class control and class influence. Wherefore, it is true that the Socialist movement cannot confine itself to economic and political problems exclusively. It must participate in the struggle for education and culture as well as for a social movement, we say with Walling. But the center of Socialist activities must remain the economic and political struggle, around which will revolve the vortex of the intellectual and spiritual struggle, "the moral and intellectual process." What this process is we shall see in the future articles.

MUCH NEEDED.

Lives of famous men remind us
Though our deeds may be sublime
Old Oblivion, right behind us,
Hides in the sands of time.

Brief the hours which represent a
Time of cheering o'er our name—
Let us sit down and invent a
Safety-pinnacle of fame.
—Willbur D. Nesbit in Judge.

The Bard in

Along the forest's virgin aisles I
Walk in rapture, miles on miles; at
every turn delights unfold, and won-
drous vistas I behold. What noble
scenes on every hand! I feel my ar-
dent soul expand; I turn my face to-
ward the sky, and to the firmament I
cry:

"The darned mosquitoes—how they
bite! The woods would be a pure de-
light, would lure all men back to the
soil if these blasted brutes were
banned in all! They come forth buzz-
ing from their dens, and they're as
big as Leghorn hens, and when they
bite they raise a lump that makes the
victim yell and jump."

What wondrous voices have the
trees when they are rocked by morn-
ing breeze! The voices of a thousand
lyres, the music of a thousand choirs,
the chorus of a thousand spheres are
in the noble song one hears! The
same sad music Adam heard when
through the Eden groves he strayed,
and ever since the primal birth,
through all the ages of the earth, the
trees have whispered, chanted, sung,
in their soft, untranslating tongue.

THE NEW CULTURAL MOVEMENT

By
DR. JOSEPH
SLAVIT

In the last two articles dealing with Comrade William English Walling's introduction to his book, "The Larger Aspects of Socialism," we briefly discussed his conception of Socialism as a "practical movement or his 'new' economic and political philosophy. We also discussed the relation of the economic and political side of Socialism to the intellectual and spiritual side, and the relative practical importance of each.

In this, the third and last article dealing with Walling's introduction, we shall introduce the reader to the intellectual and spiritual side of Socialism as conceived by Walling, to the "new" civilization and culture. For Socialism is not merely a social movement, but also a cultural movement. In the words of Walling, "Socialism may be viewed as a social movement which seeks to realize a new civilization, or, as a new civilization which is being embodied in a social movement." It is not only a movement in life and labor, but also in feeling and thought; it is not only a movement in industry and government, but also in science and philosophy, in morals, education, art, etc. And Walling quotes from representative Socialists to confirm this substantially correct position.

And the Socialist struggle is not merely a struggle for political and industrial democracy or democratic collectivism, not a struggle merely between workmen and capitalists or between capitalists and "non-capitalists," not even a struggle merely between "privileged" and "non-privileged." It is a social and a cultural struggle, a conflict between two classes and between the whole of two civilizations they represent." It is a conflict between the coming civilization and culture and the civilization and culture of the present. To quote Walling again, "Socialism means not merely a political and economic revolution, not even a revolution in culture, but both of these together. . . . Political democracy can become social democracy and build up a new society only through an actual conflict of the new civilization with the old."

What are this "present" or "old" civilization and culture, and what are the "future" or "new" civilization and culture? And what is the character of the conflict between the "present" and the "future," the "old" and the "new" civilizations and cultures? Walling replies, "Whatever the ruling classes, as a whole, stand for may rightly be called a part of present civilization, and whatever a sufficient majority of representative Socialists stand for, whether in philosophy, science or literature, is an indication of what the Socialist civilization will be."

What is this "present" culture, this "old" civilization? What do the ruling classes as a whole stand for? "Present day culture," says Walling, "like that of every period of the past, is ruling class culture. . . . necessarily based in large part on the idea of authority. Then it is leisure class culture, very near to what is commonly called aristocracy. . . . And, finally, our culture has been competitive."

Walling is, relatively speaking, undoubtedly right. Although not absolutely all past culture was class culture, since classes did not always exist, still culture, present and past, is class culture. "Every element of culture is shaped by the social system or civilization of which it is a part," Walling further correctly observes. This, too, is the reason why culture hitherto was competitive in character and a ruling class and leisured class culture.

Culture, present and past, is class culture necessarily, since society, present and past, is a class society. Culture, present and past, is necessarily a ruling class culture, i. e., a culture of vested interests that control and influence industry and government as well as educational and cultural institutions, as we have already seen in the previous article entitled "The New Socialist Movement."

Culture, present and past, is also necessarily a leisured class culture, since culture requires leisure, and only the exploiting and ruling classes, present and past, could afford such leisure, or could confer it on others. Indeed, the rise of class society, based on economic exploitation, with exploiting, ruling and leisured classes on one hand, and exploited, ruled and toiling classes on the other, made our so-called civilization and culture possible, and gave us our philosophies, sciences and arts.

And finally, a society divided into classes, and rent by the strife for economic existence, by the competition between individual and individual and the struggle between class and class, necessarily gives rise to a competitive culture, a culture whose inspiration is individual and class interest.

We have already considered the practical problems that lie before the Socialist movement. What now is the cultural problem before the Socialist movement? What is the "new" civilization that is being embodied in the Socialist movement? What is the "new" culture that is in conflict with present class culture? "State Socialism of the immediate future," says Walling, "promises to leave present class culture intact. It remains for the Socialist movement to supply the principles and the forces required to create a new type of man and society." And how shall we determine what this coming culture and civilization is or is to be? Walling's answer is that "whatever a sufficient majority of representative Socialists stand for, whether in philosophy, science or literature, is an indication of what the Socialist civilization will be."

What kind of civilization will the Socialist civilization be? What type of man and society should the Social-

ist movement seek to create? What "principles" and "forces" must the Socialist movement supply? And what do a "sufficient majority of representative Socialists stand for" in philosophy, science, etc.? Is it Walling's "new" kind of culture, or his "new" type of man and society, or his "new" methods, principles and forces, or his "new" philosophy, "new" science, "new" history, "new" morality, etc.? Does Walling's "new" intellectual and spiritual Socialism leave present class culture any the less intact?

"State Socialism promises to leave present class culture intact." What, then, are the forces that are required for the change from present civilization to the "new" civilization? Says Walling in this connection, "While Socialists would agree that humanity has been guided chiefly by involuntary forces in the past, the very essence of the great change that Socialism is to inaugurate is that the new society is to be consciously organized—nor can that great revolution in civilization and culture be prepared for except by voluntary effort."

Here are three propositions; and while Socialists would agree with the first two, they cannot agree with the last. Undoubtedly, unconscious and involuntary efforts and forces have played a prominent part in the past history of humanity. Undoubtedly, also, conscious and voluntary forces and efforts will play an important part in the future, and are playing an important part today. But Socialists cannot agree with Walling's third proposition: "Nor can the great revolution in civilization and culture be prepared for except by voluntary effort." The materialist interpretation of history teaches here a valuable lesson. But Walling's "new" methods and principles blind him to this lesson, and he has again forgotten the "principle of the absolute interdependence" of the cultural and the social-economic.

The process of economic evolution is laying the material foundation for the "great change" and the "great revolution." And what is this process

Blind Alleys

By ELSA H. NAUMBURG,
in the Independent.

In the United States more than 6,000,000 boys and girls between 14 and 16 are now employed in industry. To this number the 3,000,000 leaving school at 14 are added annually. In New York City alone more than 25,000 are graduated yearly; 4,000 under 16 receive employment. For the most part these children enter industry untrained and unprepared. They know neither their own capabilities and limitations nor the conditions of industry.

The Permanent Census Board of New York City recently made an investigation of 132,000 school children between 14 and 18 who left school to go to work. The partial statistics of these occupations having more than 500 workers are as follows:

Occupations.	No. Boys.	No. Girls.
Housework	2	18,276
Errand boys and girls	12,539	1,223
Clerks	9,145	2,986
Office boys and girls	7,993	1,775
Helpers	4,951	1,370
Machine operators	1,226	2,614
Packers and wrappers	1,056	3,559
Idle	3,846	107
Stenographers and typists	586	3,244
Sales men and women	1,289	2,428
Not known	2,317	1,369
Messengers	2,475	235
Stock boys and girls	1,367	1,251
Bookkeepers	824	1,364
Dressmakers	2	1,089
Seamstresses	2	1,692
Featherworkers	45	1,601
Shirt and waist makers	1,840	1,463
Millinery	17	1,420
Wagon boys	1,553	
Telephone operators	220	1,067
Outer clothing workers	261	872
Paper box makers	263	830
Drivers	1,104	
Printers	1,029	46
Tailors	772	286
Embroidery	91	793
Cash boys and girls	156	628
Cashiers	96	698
Bookbinders	202	117
Servants	46	635
Machinists	584	1
Neckwear	61	462
Vendors	486	23
Artificial flowers, etc.	46	643
	57,784	59,306

Most significant is the fact that the more than 50 per cent of boys and girls between 14 and 18 are working at "blind alley" occupations, that is, occupations which the child enters by accident and haphazard. To him they promise a fair initial wage. They require no skill. They teach no initiative and offer no incentive for ambition or merit. Few who enter them rise to skilled trades. Frequently the work is temporary or seasonal. The children drift from one low grade occupation to one requiring still less ability. By reason of the competition of fresh and cheaper labor the older children are pushed out by the army of new recruits. Gradually they are compelled to join another more menacing army, that of the unemployed, and unemployable. For them there is only one solution, namely, adequate industrial and trade training for the child who must leave school for work and organized guidance to find out the ability and character of every child. To further his ambitions and to develop his social efficiency is the province of the selected occupation. Who can estimate the cost of this ever increasing number of misfits, for the child, for industry, and for the nation?

of economic evolution if not the sum total of actions and interactions chiefly of the unconscious and involuntary forces that are operative in society? In fact, what is this "new" capitalism or state Socialism, if not the unconscious and involuntary "preparation" for Socialism, the skeletal framework into which the living spirit of Socialism will be infused by the "conscious organization" and "voluntary effort" of society? This terrible bugaboo of "State Socialism" is the necessary transition and preparation to "true" or "genuine" Socialism. The capitalist class is unwittingly helping to organize the "new" society.

Unconscious forces and involuntary efforts have as much to do with the preparation for "the great change" as "voluntary effort." Social existence and social change are physical-psychical processes. They involve simultaneously conscious and unconscious forces, voluntary and involuntary efforts, reacting and interacting. And just as we should not forget that conscious forces and voluntary efforts have played their part in the past, so also we should not forget that unconscious forces and involuntary effort will probably play their part in the future, and do certainly play as important part today. To believe otherwise is to believe in the omniscience of man without the material of experience.

Finally, what is the character and essence of the "new" civilization and culture? According to Walling, "Socialism is more than constructive; it is creative. . . . In the actual experience of the Socialist movement . . . is incorporated not only a whole phase of modern civilization and a large part of the history of our generation, but some of the deepest subconscious strivings which are as yet not capable even of the most tentative formulation. . . . Genuine Socialism is the product of the creative intelligence of humanity."

Walling's abstract discussion of the differences between "constructive" and "creative" is as illuminating as any of the "abstractions" of the "ab-solutists" that Walling so strongly abhors. He is lost in a labyrinth of "old" and "new" forces and "old" and "new" beginnings. His effort to identify Socialism not only with a whole phase of modern civilization, but with "the creative intelligence of humanity," and even with the "deepest subconscious strivings" smacks a good deal of the "intuition" and the "creative evolution" of Bergsonian metaphysics and mysticism. And yet, we were warned by Walling that "we cannot identify Socialism with the universe or with all progress, for it would then have no definite meaning at all."

The "essence" of the "new" culture or Socialism is even more marvelous and mystical. It is the pragmatic conception of truth: In the presence of this "essence" the Marxian theoretical structure vanishes like the mist before the sun. For Walling asks, "What part, then, of the theoretical formulations of the Socialism of the past remains wholly unobjectionable from the pragmatic standpoint?" And he answers, "Only this. . . . Social truth is born in social struggles."

Thus truth in itself is a sufficient basis for a complete revolution in every phase of our present class culture. . . . This deeper and larger truth is so generally accepted, so fundamental and pervasive within the Socialist movement, that it is taken as a matter of course, has become subconscious and is rarely discussed or formulated. . . . The magnitude of this truth is so great that even the leading Socialist writers have barely touched upon it." And then Walling descends from eulogy to lamentation. "What a pity that this momentous revolutionary concept should lie buried among so many lesser and more partial truths!" (e. g., the "semi-dogmatic and partial truths of the materialist conception of history and the class struggle.")

Truly, a remarkable truth and a remarkable state of affairs! A truth which is so great in magnitude, so large and deep, so momentous and pervasive, so generally accepted, "that it is taken as a matter of course, has become subconscious, is rarely discussed or formulated. . . . and even the leading Socialist writers have barely touched upon it." What is the matter with the Socialists, anyhow? No one seems to give a "revolutionary" rap for the most momentous concept on which the Socialist movement is said to be based.

And then, too, let us give heed to the following: "This truth, and this alone, is the essence of all Socialism from Marx to modern pragmatism." Here, again, we have the "essence" of Walling's whole contention. Modern pragmatism is also Socialism. Or, rather, Marxian Socialism is the "old" Socialism, while modern pragmatism is the "new" Socialism. Do a "sufficient majority of representative Socialists" stand for this? We shall see. (To be continued.)

Boys will be boys, except when they are little witches, and Tommy was no exception.

He had broken one of the school rules, and the teacher told him to tell his mother about it, and also about the punishment he had received. This was fox of the teacher. She thought his mother might thank him again.

The next morning she asked, "Well, Tommy, did you tell your mother about your bad behavior yesterday, and how I punished you?"

"Yes, miss," replied Tommy, quickly. "Well, what did your mother say?" was the teacher's next question.

"Said she'd like to wring your darned neck, miss," replied Tommy calmly.—E.

Judge of a man by his questions rather than his answers.—From the French.

THE OLD PRAGMATISM OF MARX AND ENGELS

By DR. JOSEPH SLAVIT

No. 7.

In previous articles we began the analysis of Comrade William English Walling's "new" Socialism with an examination of the preface and the introduction to his "new" book, "The Larger Aspects of Socialism." We saw how he treats of Socialism as a social movement and as a cultural movement, as a movement in industry and politics and in philosophy, science, etc. We examined each of these two sides of the movement separately and in their relationship. We saw that Socialism is not only a conflict between two social classes, but also a conflict of the "new" culture or civilization with the "old," of the "future" with the "present." And for a "deeper insight" into the "larger aspects" of Socialism for an understanding of what the "future" of the "new" civilization or culture is or will be, we were told by Walling to go to the "common and ascertainable opinions" of the "overwhelming majority of Socialists" or to "whatever a sufficient majority of representative Socialists stand for, whether in philosophy, science or literature."

We stated also in one of the previous articles that the essential position of an author often may be discovered as readily in the beginning or the end of his book as in the main body of the work. We have, therefore, examined the beginning of Walling's book, and have found in both preface and introduction that Walling's essential position is that "pragmatism is Socialism," and that the great "truth" that "social truth is born in social struggles" is the "essence of all Socialism from Marx to modern pragmatism."

When we now turn to the end of Walling's "Larger Aspects of Socialism," the force of habit, a feeling of chagrin, and the demands of good manners impel us to lapse into technical language. We resort to the medical lingo, at the risk of being unintelligible, to escape what might be unprintable. Having then made the initial incisions in our mental operation on Walling's "new" book, we skip hastily through the visceral contents of the book to examine that well known, useless and,

at times, troublesome organ, the appendix. And here we are confronted with one of the worst cases of intellectual appendicitis recorded. Some parts of the organ even present distinct signs of gangrene or death of tissue. A cultural examination reveals a high degree of infection with the pragmatic virus, evidenced not only by this local inflammation, but also by a general toxemia with marked constitutional symptoms.

But just as all-inflammation is but the reaction to injury of the physical organism, and is in so far a healthy sign, so Walling's "pragmatism" is also a reaction to the injury which the American Socialist movement in particular has suffered of late from the neglect of fundamental education of the rank and file in the basic social and philosophic theory of Socialism.

Among the "larger aspects" of Socialism is the relation between Socialism and philosophy, perhaps the most neglected aspect of the subject. While it is true that Socialism is often referred to as a "philosophy," yet the term is thus used in the narrow sense of a social theory, of a "philosophy" of society or history, but not in the broader sense of a general philosophy. Of late, however, healthy signs are appearing of the recognition on the part of American Socialists of the intimate relation existing between the Socialist "philosophy" and philosophy in general. And, however much we may disagree with it, Walling's "Larger Aspects of Socialism" is one of these healthy signs of the time.

Walling raises in the appendix of the work a number of interesting and important questions. Has the Socialist movement a general philosophy? If so, what is this Socialist philosophy? Was this philosophy produced by the Socialist movement itself, or did it come from outside of the movement? Should the Socialist movement have produced its own general philosophy? Walling has done well enough to ask these questions, even though his answers to them may not be acceptable to others. Let us, then, see how he answers these questions.

"How does it happen," asks Walling in the opening sentence of the appendix, "that the pragmatism of John Dewey, which I consider to be the modern Socialist philosophy, did not come from the Socialist movement?" Let us note several things before we consider Walling's answer to this question as well as

other answers. Walling states here, first, that there is a modern Socialist philosophy; secondly, that this Socialist philosophy is the pragmatism of John Dewey and, thirdly, that this pragmatism of John Dewey or this Socialist philosophy did not come from the Socialist movement. Thus Walling answers three of the questions raised above. The questions which remain unanswered yet are: First, should we have expected the modern Socialist philosophy, or Dewey's pragmatism, to come from the Socialist movement? and, secondly, if yes, why did it not come from the Socialist movement?

Should we have expected the Socialist movement to produce its own general philosophy? Walling does not seem to have clearly made up his mind about this question. He says: "I do not mean to imply that we should expect all the elements of Socialist thought to come from the Socialist movement." And then he says again, "We might have expected that the Socialist movement would also produce the socially radical philosophy of the present day." The Socialist "semi-dogmatic and partial truth" of the materialistic conception of history, or his own "principle of the absolute interdependence" of the social and the cultural movement, should have answered the question for him. But his "new" methods and principles have made confusion worse confounded.

Now, either we should or we should not have expected the Socialist movement to produce the socially radical philosophy, its own general philosophy. If not, or if, perhaps, the Socialist philosophy is one of the "elements of Socialist thought" which we should not have expected to come from the Socialist movement, then it would be quite natural that the modern Socialist philosophy did not come from the Socialist movement, and all questions concerning this are superfluous. But, on the other hand, Walling assures us again that we should have expected the Socialist movement would produce its own philosophy. And still he assures us, likewise, that it did not. How, then, does it happen?

This profound problem may be attacked in the following way: The Socialist movement either did or did not produce the Socialist philosophy; and pragmatism, even that of John Dewey, either is or is not essentially the Socialist philosophy. There follow then four assumptions: First, the Socialist movement did produce the Socialist philosophy, as might have been expected, and the pragmatism of

Dewey is this philosophy. Secondly, the Socialist movement did produce the Socialist philosophy, as might have been expected, but pragmatism, even that of Dewey, is not this philosophy essentially. Thirdly, the pragmatism of Dewey is the Socialist philosophy, but the Socialist movement did not produce it, as might have been expected. Fourthly, pragmatism, even that of Dewey, is not the Socialist philosophy; the Socialist movement has not yet produced the Socialist philosophy, as might have been expected, and the Socialist philosophy is yet to be produced by the Socialist movement, as we might expect. Let us take up each of these "working hypotheses" in connection with Walling's own argument, and let us see whether we can come to a conclusion by a process of elimination.

"How does it happen," we repeat Walling's question, "that the pragmatism of John Dewey, which I consider to be the modern Socialist philosophy, did not come from the Socialist movement?" Like Alexander, we cut the Gordian knot of this question very simply. It simply happens this way, Comrade Walling, that it simply does not happen. Pragmatism, even of the type of Dewey, is nothing "new" to the "old and familiar" Socialists—Marx, Engels and others. Furthermore, it is not essentially the Socialist philosophy. Finally, the Socialist movement, i. e., Marx, Engels and others, did produce the socially radical philosophy. And first and foremost of the witnesses whom we shall produce against Walling is Walling himself.

Walling calls Appendix A "The Pragmatism of Marx and Engels." This title in itself is enough to show that he considers Marx and Engels as pragmatists. But all doubt is dispelled by what he says about this matter, by his quotations from Marx and Engels, and by his comments on these questions. Here is the tenor of his argument:

"Marx and Engels made a decided beginning in the direction of pragmatism more than half a century ago, a full generation before the appearance of present day pragmatism."

Marx and Engels undoubtedly had a firm grasp on some of the chief elements of the new philosophy; broadly speaking, they were pragmatists, but they missed some of the most basic and essential features of the new philosophy. . . . Engels has given far more elaborate expression to the philosophical aspects of Socialism than has Marx, and his point of view is in most striking accord with that of the present day pragmatists.

The notes of Marx give in the briefest way Marx's general philosophic position, which is very similar to that of Engels." Again and again Walling comments on statements which he quotes from Marx and Engels to show the "striking accord" of their philosophic views with those of John Dewey and the present day pragmatists, as the following will show: "Here we have the pragmatic and realistic view. . . . It is only recently, or in these early cases of Marx, Engels, Stirner and others, that such a standpoint has been elaborated into a philosophy. . . . Here the words hal-icized again show an exact parallel to Dewey. . . . etc."

So, then, after all, Marx and Engels did have a "general philosophic position," and had made "a decided beginning in the direction of pragmatism," and had "a firm grasp on some of the chief elements of the new philosophy," and were "in striking accord" with the point of view and at times in "exact parallel" with the views of Dewey and the "present day pragmatists." And all this, let us not forget, "over half a century ago" and "a full generation before the present day pragmatists."

But not only Marx and Engels were pragmatists, but the whole Socialist movement is pragmatist or pragmatic. We were already told in the introduction to the "new" book about the "essence of all Socialism from Marx to modern pragmatism." And in the appendix we are further told by Walling that "the Socialist movement is the social embodiment of pragmatism. Pragmatism is the spirit and method of modern Socialist thought."

The later Socialists show every indication of a growing acceptance of the pragmatic spirit and method." In this connection Karl Kautsky and Anton Pannekoek are given as examples.

Thus it would seem that the "new" philosophy is not so very "new" to the Socialist movement, and even had its "decided beginning" in the Socialist movement itself. Thus, too, Walling, beginning with the "working hypothesis" that the Socialist movement did not produce the modern Socialist philosophy (the pragmatism of Dewey), as we should should not have expected, "works" out to "conclusion" that it did produce this Socialist philosophy. Q. E. D. and W. E. W. (the latter meaning "we expected" which, or "according to the new methods and principles.") dently the deductive method is again played havoc with Walling's "basic assumption."

(To be continued.)

THE OLD DIALECTIC OF MARX AND ENGELS

By DR. JOSEPH SLAVIT

No. 5

Medical men often make an "old and familiar" comment on a brilliant piece of surgery, which runs somewhat like this: "The operation was a success, but the patient died." Sometimes, we suppose, this brilliant result is due to the skill of the surgeon, or perhaps to keeping the patient too long on the operating table. Other times, of course, the surgeon is not to be blamed, for the case may be serious and even hopeless from the very beginning.

In performing our theoretical surgery on the Appendix of Comrade William English Walling's book, "The Larger Aspects of Socialism," we have already consumed some time, and the anesthetist reports that the pulse of the patient is getting poor. But as the bungling job has begun, we must continue the operation at all costs—even at the cost of killing the patient. We are hardened to the work, anyway, and if the patient must die, then let him die! Let the reader remember, however, that this case of appendicitis was very grave from the outset, and we serve notice on all and sundry, here and now, that we intend to prosecute to the limit of the law any insinuation of malpractice. So, then, more ether, please, and let's cut away.

We saw in the previous article, entitled "The Old Pragmatism of Marx and Engels," how Walling begins with the query, "How does it happen that the pragmatism of John Dewey, which I consider to be the modern Socialist philosophy, did not come from the Socialist movement?" We saw also how Walling ends with the conclusion that the Socialist movement did produce this socially radical philosophy. At least, we are assured by Walling himself that Marx and Engels had made "a decided beginning" in this direction, had "a firm grasp on some of the most essential and basic elements of the new philosophy," were in "striking accord" and even in "exact parallel" with the viewpoint and views of Dewey, and the "present day pragmatists"—in short, "broadly speaking, they were pragmatists."

So, then, pragmatism is Socialism, and the pragmatism of Dewey is the modern Socialist philosophy? Although we have made "a decided beginning" in answering this question, still we are not so "decided" about it. Walling himself seems to have some misgivings in the matter. He "believes" and "considers" it so, and he "hopes to convince" the reader that it is so. Others evidently do not "believe" and "consider" it so, and have to be "convinced." And here is how we are convinced.

"The earliest Socialist writers," says Walling, "followed Hegel in his antiquated process of reasoning. . . . It is possible that they themselves (i. e., Marx and Engels) lost nothing by using his dialectical method. It is only we that must try to avoid misconception

arising out of this obsolete phraseology and dialectics.

The length to which Engels will go may be seen in the following statement giving us the "kernel" of the dialectic view of nature. . . . It is evident that Engels was attempting to use the Hegelian dialectic in a pragmatic manner, but the question is whether it is possible to do so."

We see, then, that Marx and Engels followed Hegel's dialectic and developed a dialectic view of nature. We see also that Walling is opposed to this "general philosophic position" of Hegel, Marx and Engels. He doubts the value of the dialectic, condemns it in uncompromising terms, and indicates the opposition between the dialectic and pragmatism. And this is precisely the crux of the question.

Walling is compelled to admit that the dialectic method and view is the essence of the general philosophic position of the "pragmatists" Marx and Engels. How is it, then, that they were pragmatists? How explain this anomaly? His ingenious answer is that they "used the dialectic in a pragmatic manner." Somehow, however, he feels it in his bones that such dubious reasoning will not do, and he hastens to add, "but the question is whether it is possible to do so?"

The truth of the matter is that Walling is still laboring with his "working hypothesis" that pragmatism is Socialism. His "basic assumption" and the deductive method are playing havoc with him, and he strains every effort to force the facts to fit into the forms of his logic. Wherever he turns he sees pragmatism and pragmatists. Marx and Engels become pragmatists, even though the unholy union of Marx and Stirner in the bonds of pragmatism should cast grave suspicion on the whole business. And, finally, when Walling is brought face to face with the dialectic of Marx and Engels, he seeks to escape the dilemma by his confused fusion of the dialectic and pragmatism, the use of the dialectic "in a pragmatic manner."

Thus pragmatism comes to Socialism, like the Greeks bearing gifts. Despite his antipathy against the dialectic, Walling seeks to bring it into "striking accord" with pragmatism. But he meets with some difficulty in doing this. The dialectic, good old revolutionist that it is, refuses to fuse with pragmatism. Its motto is, to paraphrase the words of the "old and familiar" Liebknecht, "No compromise! no philosophical trading." Thus Walling is compelled to cast off entirely the dialectic of Marx, Engels and other "representative Socialists."

He not alone doubts, but with James denies, the value of the dialectic. He calls it an "antiquated process of reasoning" and "this obsolete phraseology and dialectic." "It is possible," he continues, "that they (Marx and Engels) themselves lost nothing by using his (Hegel's) dialectic." James denies the value not alone of Hegel's philosophy but also his very method of reasoning, his dialectics.

We cannot agree, from the point of view of our own generation, that though Hegel reached a very tame political conclusion, it was by means of a thoroughly revolutionary method of reasoning."

That Marx and Engels held to the dialectic method and the dialectic view of nature and society is entirely unquestionable, as a reading of their works will reveal, and as we have already seen from Walling's own admissions. But the two Williams (Walling and James) deny the value of the dialectic view and especially of the dialectic method. Of course, "it is possible that they (Marx and Engels) lost nothing by using it," says Walling condescendingly. Indeed, quite possible! And it is "possible" that they gained a great deal by using it. At least, we have Engels' word for it that they did. In his famous little work, "Feuerbach: The Roots of the Socialist Philosophy," Engels declares, "And this materialist dialectic was our best tool and sharpest weapon." It is only we, the present generation of Socialists, who, according to Walling, are apt to misconceive and misuse this weapon, and it is best not to have anything to do with it at all.

Walling's advice is to the point. For he himself finds it impossible to conceive "how a thoroughly revolutionary method of thinking" might yield a "tame political conclusion." Quite possible, however. Hegel, by means of the dialectic, reached a "tame political conclusion"; while Marx and Engels, by means of the dialectic, reached a conclusion which all Europe considered as dangerously "wild."

Karl Marx, in the preface to the second edition of his "Capital," characterizes clearly the difference between his use of the dialectic and that of Hegel. "My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian," says Marx, "but is its direct opposite. To Hegel the life process of the human brain, i. e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of the 'Idea,' even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of the 'Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought."

Then Marx continues on to show the revolutionary character of the Hegelian dialectic despite its mystical form. "The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell. In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary."

Let us illustrate the point in question by a vital and concrete case. Surely, pragmatist Walling would resent the imputation that he is

not a "revolutionist," and surely the present day pragmatists are the incarnation of modern "revolutionism" and the "new" revolutionary "methods and principles." Yet James, Schiller, Bergson and other pragmatists have landed in the philosophical swamps of idealism, humanism, intuitionism, pluralism, theism, spiritualism and mysticism. While the practical conclusions of pragmatism are embodied in the metaphysical syndicalism of a George Sorel, or the "tame" sociology and economic and political philosophy of a Walling.

True, Walling may argue that James was inconsistent, Bergson was fantastic, etc., and that, as we were actually told in the preface, "the most able and consistent pragmatism" is that of Prof. John Dewey. Even granting this, Walling thereby admits that a "thoroughly revolutionary method" may be inconsistently used. And this is precisely the state of affairs with the Hegelian and the Marxian dialectic. Hegel used the dialectic inconsistently, while Marx and Engels used it consistently. Hence, the former developed an idealist dialectic view and a tame political conclusion, while the latter developed a materialist dialectic view and a thoroughly revolutionary conclusion.

Walling continues with his diatribe against the dialectic. It is "obsolete" and "antiquated," and "does not play an important part in modern thinking." He would "relegate the methods of Engels based on the science of his time into the background today." He continues: "Their (Marx and Engels) philosophy was limited by the exigencies of the movement and its theoretical defense, as well as the science of their time . . . their conclusions were founded primarily on the great biological discoveries which were taking place in his (Engels') day, and were centered mainly around the name of Darwin. As modern scientific psychology had not even appeared on the horizon, the whole field of psychology and logic was still left to the realm of metaphysics."

Here, at last, is something really "new" to Socialists. The dialectic does not play an important part in modern thinking. "Ain't it awful, Mabel?" Hereafter we shall have to label the dialectic whenever it appears. "This is the dialectic!" But seriously speaking, the good old dialectic is still with us "in terms of the thought of our time." The dialectic is but the philosophical counterpart of the scientific theory of evolution. The evolutionary theory or conception does play an important part in modern science and modern thought. The influence of Darwin and the great biological discoveries of the time of Marx and Engels have not noticeably dwindled. We could furnish plenty of proof of this from living scientists and thinkers. The dialectic certainly does play an important part in the thinking of Socialists, and Socialist thought certainly plays an important part in modern thinking.

The "old and familiar" comment of Engels on the Hegelian dialectic and philosophy is still timely. "We must further not forget that though the Hegelian school was destroyed, the Hegelian philosophy was not critically vanquished. . . . One has not finished with a philosophy by simply declaring it to be false, and so enormous a work as the Hegelian philosophy which has had so tremendous an influence upon the mental development of the nation did not allow itself to be put aside per-

emptorily. It had to be destroyed in its own way, which means in the way that critically destroys its form, but saves the new acquisitions to knowledge won by it."

Let this sink into the mind and the memory of "modern Socialists" and "present day pragmatists." One has not finished with a philosophy by simply declaring it to be false; nor does one finish with a philosophy by simply declaring it to be "obsolete" and "antiquated." This applies not only to the Hegelian dialectic, it applies also to the Marxian Socialist theories, and we are consistent enough to assert that it applies even to pragmatism.

Engels asserts that the Hegelian dialectic has had "a tremendous influence upon the mental development of the nation." Remember that the nation referred to is Germany, and remember also the "tremendous influence" of Germany and the German Socialist movement on the "mental development" of the world and of the world-wide Socialist movement. Note also that Marx and Engels not only "lost nothing" by the dialectic, but "won by it." It was their "best weapon and sharpest tool." And it is the best weapon and sharpest tool of a "sufficient majority of representative Socialists" living today.

We agree with Walling when he says, "Not many of us are likely to master Hegel's philosophy sufficiently to understand the early Socialist writers. But fortunately many of the leading Socialists now alive have done so and have reproduced all the best of these old ideas in terms of the thought of our time, as, for instance, Kautsky, Mehring and Lafargue." How fortunate, indeed! And it would be still more fortunate for the Socialist movement if more of us would take up the cry of "Back to Marx!" and master sufficiently "these old ideas" of the "early Socialist writers."

Finally, according to Walling, the conclusions of Engels "were founded primarily on the great biological discoveries which were taking place in his day, and were centered mainly around the name of Darwin. As modern scientific psychology had not even appeared on the horizon, the whole field of psychology and logic was still left to the realm of metaphysics." Granting the premises of this argument, for the sake of the argument, what then is the conclusion? What has been the positive contribution of modern scientific psychology? What more has modern scientific psychology essentially done than to confirm the general dialectical or evolutionary method and conception of Darwin and his great biological discoveries, or of Marx and his great sociological discoveries?

Nor was the whole field of psychology and logic "left to the realm of metaphysics." Marx and Engels, it is true, missed some of the most basic and essential elements of the Socialist philosophy, and therefore failed to take the "whole field of psychology and logic" completely out of the "realm of metaphysics." But others right in the ranks of the Socialist movement took up and completed the work which Marx and Engels left undone, as we shall see in the next article. And, as we shall also see in the succeeding articles, even the consistent pragmatism of Dewey failed to rescue the whole field of psychology and logic from the grasp of metaphysics.

(To be continued.)

THE OLD SOCIALIST PHILOSOPHY

By DR. JOSEPH SLAVIT

No. 2.



In the last two articles, "The Old Pragmatism" and "The Old Dialectic" of Marx and Engels, we examined Appendix A of Comrade William English Walling's "Larger Aspects of Socialism." We considered his answers to the highly important question, "Did the Socialist movement produce its own general philosophy?" and "What is this Socialist philosophy?" The first question is finally answered in the affirmative. The answer to the second question leaves us in a paradoxical position.

What is the general philosophic position of Marx and Engels? On the one hand, Walling answers that it is pragmatism; on the other, that it is dialectic. But there is the opposition between pragmatism and the dialectic. This opposition Walling overcomes by suggesting that Engels uses the dialectic "in a pragmatic manner." Certainly, the social philosophy of Marx and Engels, or at least the materialistic conception of history, is "purely pragmatic."

Now, how shall we determine what really is the Socialist philosophy? By the deductive method or the inductive method? Shall we go to the Socialist press and literature, to the writings and views of "representative Socialists"? Shall we assume that "pragmatism is Socialism" and then seek for evidences of pragmatism in these for "representative Socialists"? Or shall we find views and writings? Or shall we find out rather what representative Socialists really think and write, what they really stand for "in philosophy, science, or literature?"

An inductive examination of the views of representative Socialists like Marx, Engels, Kautsky, Pannekoeck and others, will reveal that the dialectic method and view, the materialist dialectic conception of society and nature, is the general philosophic position not only of Marx and Engels, but also of most other representative Socialists. And this philosophy is the product of the Socialist movement itself.

This materialist dialectics was the real Socialist philosophy in the direction of which they made "a decided beginning," the "new philosophy" on which they had a "firm grasp." It is true, they missed some of the basic and fundamental elements of the "new philosophy," but these missing links were supplied by others right in the ranks of the Socialist movement and not from the outside. Nor was "the whole field of psychology and logic still left to the realm of metaphysics." The "new philosophy" went beyond the beginning made by the "early pragmatists" and even beyond the "present day pragmatists." It supplied one of the most important links which the Socialism of Marx "missed," and which even modern pragmatism fails to supply. This important link was a scientific theory of the process of human understanding, a dialectical view of the nature of the human mind. This link took the whole field of psychology and logic out of "the realm of metaphysics."

The Socialist to whom the chief credit is due for this monumental work was Joseph Dietzgen, a tanner by trade, though at other times a

merchant, teacher, and editor. Some so-called Socialists, who has much to unlearn as well as to learn, referred to this German philosopher sneeringly as a "cobbler." He wanted to know indignantly whether the Socialist movement was to be committed to the "abstract speculations" of the "German cobbler"? "And do we intend to cram down the philosophy of 'this cobbler' into the throats of the Socialists?"

Perish the thought! The philosophy of Dietzgen has already been thoroughly digested by many representative Socialists. And, anyway, we do not believe in forced mental feeding. And, furthermore, even had Dietzgen been a cobbler (which he never was) he would not have been the only cobbler who was a philosopher. And, finally, has a cobbler, or a worker in general, no ability or no right to be a philosopher? Must a philosopher be only one who is duly degreed and diplomated? Dietzgen calls his first little work "The Nature of Human Brain Work, a Renewed Critique of Pure and Practical Reason, by a Manual Worker." He not only demonstrated the dialectic nature of human brain-work, but also the dialectic connection between hand-work and brain-work. If only some would do a little more brain-work!

But what do representative Socialists say of Dietzgen and his work? Karl Marx introduced Dietzgen to the International with the pregnant words, "This is our philosopher." In the preface to the first edition of "Capital" Marx writes in a footnote,

"The learned and unlearned spokesmen of the German bourgeoisie . . . found, in the workers' press, e. g., Joseph Dietzgen's articles in the Volkstaat—antagonists stronger than themselves, to whom (down to this very day) they owe a reply." The articles referred to by Marx deal with Socialism, ethics, religion, philosophy, etc.

In his "Fuerbach, or the Roots of the Socialist Philosophy," Friedrich Engels says, "This materialist dialectic, which since that time has been our best tool and sharpest weapon, was discovered, not by us alone, but by a German workman, Joseph Dietzgen, in a remarkable manner and utterly independent of us." What was it that constituted the "remarkable manner and utterly independent of us" of which Engels speaks? It was the development of the materialist dialectic by means of Dietzgen's scientific theory of cognition.

Karl Kautsky says in the preface to his "Ethics and the Materialistic Conception of History": "I take as my starting point, consequently, that materialist philosophy which was founded on one side by Marx and Engels, on the other, though in the same spirit, by Joseph Dietzgen." And he adds, "No world conception has been in so high degree a philosophy of deeds as the dialectical materialism!"

Anton Pannekoeck, who is supposed by Walling to have divined "the essence of all Socialism from Marx to modern pragmatism," refers to Dietzgen's work as the "proletarian philo-

sophy," and says, "Joseph Dietzgen . . . by this work won for himself the name of the philosopher of the proletariat." He characterizes Dietzgen's work thus: "Dietzgen had created the basis for a dialectic and materialistic theory of understanding. The indispensable character of dialectic thought, which is illustrated by the monumental works of Marx and Engels, has been first demonstrated in a perfectly convincing manner by Dietzgen's critical analysis of the human force of thinking. . . . We owe to Dietzgen's theory of cognition the firm foundation of our world philosophy."

We could quote many such passages from Pannekoeck's introduction to Dietzgen's "Positive Outcome of Philosophy." But we shall be content with his concluding paragraph to show his estimate of the position of Dietzgen in Socialist thought: "Marx has disclosed the nature of the social process of production, and its fundamental significance as a lever of social development. But he has not fully explained by what means the nature of the human mind is involved in this material process. . . . This weak spot in Marxism is one of the main reasons for the incomplete and erroneous understanding of Marxian theories. This shortcoming of Marxism is cured by Dietzgen, who made the nature of the mind the special object of his investigations. For this reason, a thorough study of Dietzgen's philosophical writings is an important and indispensable auxiliary for the understanding of the fundamental

works of Marx and Engels. Dietzgen's work demonstrates that the proletariat has a mighty weapon not only in proletarian economics, but also in proletarian philosophy."

Many American Socialists could be quoted to show their similar estimate of Joseph Dietzgen and his work. I shall quote only from Ernest Untermyer, the American translator of one of Dietzgen's works, who gives a brief and clear bibliographical outline and estimate of "our philosopher" in the appendix to Labriola's "Socialism and Philosophy." Says Untermyer: "His (Dietzgen's) 'Nature of Human Brain-Work' was published in 1869. It is a critique of reason in which he gives an epistemological substantiation of Marxian historical materialism. But the monist dialectics of this work are not so clearly developed that its advance over Hegel, Marx, and Engels becomes apparent without close study. The next larger work of Dietzgen dealing with philosophical problems appeared in 1886. It was entitled 'Excursions of a Socialist into the Domain of Epistemology,' and contained a critical discussion of the contemporary idealist and materialist philosophies. . . . The next work of Dietzgen on this subject did not appear, until 1895, the year of Engels' demise. This was the culminating work of Dietzgen, 'The Positive Outcome of Philosophy,' and it also contained his 'Letters on Logic.' Here he fully elaborated his cosmic dialectics and drove metaphysics from its last hiding place."

Untermyer also adds: "Marx and

Engels were acquainted with Dietzgen's theory of cognition, but had not familiarized themselves with it except in so far as it touched upon society. They had not assimilated its meaning as a concrete theory of cognition, but only its general aspects as a contribution to historical materialism. They had not realized its importance as a key to the dialectic connection of class psychology with individual psychology."

Now, we submit to the reader that we have made out at least a prima facie case on the importance of Dietzgen to Socialist thought and the Socialist movement. We have indicated what is the real Socialist philosophy, what it was that Marx and Engels missed and that Dietzgen supplied, and how the fields of psychology and logic were thus taken out of the realm of metaphysics by means of Dietzgen's theory of reason.

What, then, does Walling say of Dietzgen and his work, of the man whom "representative Socialists" call "our philosopher" and "the philosopher of the proletariat," whose work they acknowledge and accept, and who did precisely, they declare, what Walling avers Marx and Engels failed to do—placed psychology and logic on a scientific basis and drove metaphysics "out of its last hiding place"? Right or wrong, Dietzgen deserves at least careful consideration at the hands of those who would write on "the larger aspects" of Socialism.

We are of a mathematical bent of mind and we present the following

(Continued on page 16.)

The Old Socialist Philosophy

(Continued from page 9.)

figures in connection with the foregoing facts; they are approximate but important. Here is a book dealing with Socialism and philosophy, science, logic, psychology, morals, history, religion, etc.—a book of over 400 pages, more than 1,200 paragraphs, about 15,000 lines, and about 125,000 words. How much space is devoted to Dietzgen who is said to have dealt with the same subjects so effectively? Not a page, not even a paragraph; just one sentence of seven lines and sixty-three words!

And what does Walling say in his single sentence? "If, then, we find a Socialist philosopher like Dietzgen offering a system of scientific reasoning as a key to the riddles of the universe, we will certainly attach no particular significance to the fact that he was a Socialist, but merely remember that he was caught, as even Socialists must frequently be (according to their own philosophy) in the current of his times."

But is "a system of scientific reasoning" of so little moment to Socialists? Shall we build pragmatic castles out of thin air? Deductive methods, working hypotheses, and basic assumptions have no use for a "system of scientific reasoning." And who cares, anyhow, about a "key" to the connection between class psychology and individual psychology, or about a "key to the riddles of the universe"? Throw away the key and keep the door locked forever! Yet here is another view about this key, the view of Pannekoek: "By means of this theory of understanding," says he, "dialectical materialism also furnishes the means for the solution of the riddles of the world. Not that it solves all these riddles; on the contrary, it says

explicitly that this solution can be but the work of an ever advancing scientific research. But it solves them in so far as it deprives them of the character of a mysterious enigma and transforms them into a practical problem, the solution of which we are approaching by an infinite progression."

Nor do we deny that Dietzgen was caught "in the current of his times." That is just why he gave us his great work. Only angels can fly above these currents without wetting their wings. Thanks to Hegel, Marx, Engels, Dietzgen, and others, and to the current of their times, we now have in our own time a strong current of scientific Socialism, and we wonder whether Walling has been caught in this current. Yet Walling is no angel, either, and he has been caught in some current of his times, "as Socialists must frequently be." For scientific Socialism is not the only current of the times. There are also bourgeois currents, and pragmatism is the current of the times in bourgeois scientific and philosophic thought. In fact, Walling is caught between two currents, pragmatism and Socialism; he is caught in a "pragmatist or Socialist" maelstrom.

This is why Walling attempts to read pragmatism into the views and writings of Marx, Engels, Kautsky, Pannekoek, and others. That pragmatic commonplace, "The wish is father to the thought," has an element of truth, as all pragmatism, indeed, has, and (to repeat Spencer's dictum) as even all error has. It is this, indeed, that enables Walling to find the evidences of pragmatism in Marx and others, and to gratify his wishes.

Every philosophy has some element of truth and of value. This often leads

to certain points of resemblance between two philosophies. While two philosophies do not absolutely agree, neither do they absolutely differ. Pragmatism and the dialectic differ in some respects, but agree in other respects. It is this that enables Walling to find again his evidences of pragmatism in Marx and other Socialists. Thus it is that Marx and Engels "made a decided beginning in the direction of pragmatism"; why they had a "firm grasp on some of the chief points of the new philosophy"; why "broadly speaking they were pragmatists"; why they "attempted to use the dialectic in a pragmatic manner"; and why Walling thinks that the materialistic conception of history is "purely pragmatic."

This is well illustrated in the following enthusiastic statement of Kautsky's in his "Ethics" from which we quoted above: "The materialist conception of history is not only important because it allows us to explain history better than has been done up to now, but also because it enables us to make history better than has been done hitherto. And the latter is more important than the former. From the progress of the practice our theoretical knowledge grows and in the progress of the practice our theoretical knowledge is proved. No world conception has been in so high a degree a philosophy of deeds as the dialectical materialism. Not simply through research but with deeds do we hope to show the superiority of our philosophy." Pragmatists may find confirmation and consolation in this statement of Kautsky's, but they will have to explain, then, what Kautsky means by calling the dialectical materialism "a philosophy of deeds."

(To be continued.)