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/edu/ - Education

'The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses.' - Karl Marx
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 No.9849[View All]

A long time ago we had a very interesting thread on the question of what consciousness is. Perhaps we can have another interesting conversation like that. Share your thoughts and ideas of what consciousness is and how it arises.
68 posts and 10 image replies omitted. Click reply to view.

 No.11090

>be ancient farmer
>"hmm, consciousness is pneumatic, like the wind"
>be bronze age doctor
>"actually consciousness is clearly hydraulic, like the bodily humors"
>be enlightenment philosopher
>"actually consciousness is clearly mechanical, like clockwork"
>be 20th century modernist
>"actually consciousness is clearly electronic, like semiconductors"
>be current year scituber
>"ackshually consciousness is clearly digital, like computer algorithms"
Don't worry though, this era's technological metaphor for consciousness is totally true, unlike all those other metaphors, which are false.
>source
Dude trust me.

 No.11096

>>11090
They are all correct. All of these models can be construed in any way, they are all turing complete. This is part of what lets them be unfalsifiable. The modern algorithmic view is the best of these because it abstracts away unnecessary analogies.
The other reason these are unfalsifiable is that the intended meaning is not scientific.
The idea behind this post is that the components used in the theory determine its nature. But from a scientific perspective there are neither sense-bearing components nor natures of theories like this post implies.
You either approach the scientific problem scientifically or you abandon science entirely and obfuscate the question with quantum magic or something. There is no middle ground.

 No.11104

>>11096
You have no idea what you are talking about and I would be surprised if you ever seriously spent time studying Marxist philosophy and adjacent philosophy relating to dialectics.

>All of these models can be construed in any way, they are all turing complete.

Irrelevant, since the road towards artificial consciousness through computation is a dead end.

>The modern algorithmic view is the best of these because it abstracts away unnecessary analogies.

You will not grasp the nature of things by abstracting away the detail that essentially distinguishes one thing from the other and gives them their higher order qualities. This only makes sense to you because you‘ve already settled on computation being the solution, hence why reducing all these widely different systems seems sufficient to you for an equivalence, because you can build logic gates with them and by extension a computer.

>The idea behind this post is that the components used in the theory determine its nature.

Yep.

>But from a scientific perspective there are neither sense-bearing components nor natures of theories like this post implies.

>You either approach the scientific problem scientifically or you abandon science entirely and obfuscate the question with quantum magic or something.
Damn, you really like the word science. #science #geekculture
And on what philosophical grounds do you conduct your science? Let me guess, you haven‘t given that any thought and are entirely unaware of the cultural influences that you have been shaped by, which have lead you to approach the subject from a certain perspective. Worse yet, a culture made by capitalism including its philosophical underpinnings, which also necessitates rejecting philosophies from which emerges thought that threatens capitalism. Whatever pile of shit this culture deems to be „AI“ will be some autistic perversion like you see in Western sci-fi tropes when they depict robots. Beep boop this is logical. Beep boop that is illogical. What are emotions? My calculations say that. My calculations say this.
Read Reason in Revolt and Ilyenkov‘s essays before you post in this thread again.

 No.11105

>>11104 (me)
>>11096
And read Gödel‘s incompleteness theorem while you are at it. Give it a long hard thought before you talk to me about some shit like Turing completeness.

 No.11106

>>11104
>Irrelevant, since the road towards artificial consciousness through computation is a dead end.
You have at least not shown that with >>11090 but if you weren't actually trying to say anything and were just elucidating on your position then that's fine. I just showed how it's not an argument against digital consciousness, from a scientific position.
>You will not grasp the nature of things by abstracting away the detail that essentially distinguishes one thing from the other and gives them their higher order qualities.
We have no access to these essential details. This is equivalent to dualism which only delays the question.
>Damn, you really like the word science. #science #geekculture
You're not going to address the first sentence?
>And on what philosophical grounds do you conduct your science?
This approach only requires that observation is possible. If your position does not allow for this or has some interfering dependencies on observation or its processing then you must reject science as we know it entirely.
>You have no idea what you are talking about and I would be surprised if you ever seriously spent time studying Marxist philosophy and adjacent philosophy relating to dialectics.
>Read Reason in Revolt and Ilyenkov‘s essays before you post in this thread again.
You are right I just posted in this thread to say something about the nature of science.
You can just ignore what I said anyway, if you have a concept of science that bypasses my point entirely.
>>11105
>And read Gödel‘s incompleteness theorem while you are at it. Give it a long hard thought before you talk to me about some shit like Turing completeness.
I have, and given it a long hard thought. Or do you want me to read the original proof?
If you want to continue you could explain how the Incompleteness Theorems affect this.

 No.11107

>>11106
>We have no access to these essential details.
Why not?

 No.11108

>>11107
The senses of terms in a theory are not a part of the theory. Bindings beyond those to observations do not affect predictions, so assignments of "essential details" to terms cannot be founded in observation. This makes the sphere of essential details a separate sphere from observable reality, which can only aligned with reality through magical means. This is dualism.

 No.11109

>>11108
sorry now i am more confused. what are "senses of terms" and "binding"? Why can't you observe essential details and how is that even different from abstracting away what is unnecessary?

 No.11110

>>11109
The senses of terms are what we mean by the terms. In the theory itself a term is just a word or variable with just logical relation to other terms in the theory.
Binding means corresponding a term in a theory to some sense. What is unnecessary, or unobservable, is what does not affect the theory's use. That is whatever is not binding to observations.
Imagine a theory something like this: C consists of the combination of two components A and B. A and B are never found separately but how C behaves depends on the way in which A and B are combined in it.
We can bind C to "Color" (let's say that's the content of our observations, in reality it is not that simple ofc) and now use the theory to make predictions. However, binding A or B to anything would be pointless because they do not correspond to anything in observation. If we said A was "goodness" or "lightness" and B was "badness" or "heaviness" that would not be scientific, without additional ways to observe A or B directly.
Metaphors for consciousness are like A or B. If they were taken literally (the behaviors we attribute to consciousness are a result of a pneumatic/hydraulic/mechanical/electronic system) they would be incorrect or at least incomplete in their descriptions of the brain's operation. One of these is not like the others in that case, calling it "digital" wouldn't be talking about the physical processes in the brain, but higher level structure. However, these are all called metaphors so we can ignore the literal interpretation. What matters to a scientific description of consciousness is describing its behavior. If consciousness is computable, a pneumatic/hydraulic/mechanical/electronic analogy can describe its operation, though the algorithmic interpretation is most direct. The "essential details" of the physical process used in the analogy are not relevant to predicting the behavior of consciousness, so seeing them as more than different notation describing the same algorithm is not scientific.
>But consciousness isn't computable haha
Then what complexity does it have? What evidence do you have for this?
Computability is a property of the function describing the behavior of consciousness. It has nothing to do with the arbitrary assignment of senses or "essential details".
The example above is somewhat inspired by https://www.princeton.edu/~fraassen/abstract/PutnamParadox-published.pdf though with a different point.

 No.11111

>>11110

When you say we have no access to these essential details, it sounds like you are implying something like that it is not possible to know a thing fully in totality. It makes it seem like you are a kantian or dualist and unaware of it.

When that anon said
>You will not grasp the nature of things
I took that to mean things in general, not consciousness in particular.
and
>abstracting away the detail that essentially distinguishes one thing from the other
means reducing the whole into parts that are relevant for a certain use case, like modelling something into a finite number of variables to make an algorithm.

Things have properties that make them different from other things and that is how we tell different things apart. So if you have a tree one of its essential details could be that it is made of wood, and this is helpful for building things. If we want to investigate something like consciousness we need to define the concept by properties that only apply to it, what makes it different from other things.


>Computability is a property of the function describing the behavior of consciousness.

What evidence do you have for this? And how do you know that the function describing the behavior of consciousness corresponds to consciousness itself? Are you saying that an essential property of consciousnesses is computability?

 No.11112

>>11109
Another maybe clearer example of why not to assign senses to terms unnecessarily is quantum wave/particle duality. Instead of calling things "particles" or "waves" you have a mathematical wavefunction and operators that give you probability distributions for observables. It is not scientifically meaningful to ask "is it actually a particle or a wave" and the uncertainty principle makes keeping that intuition that worked under classical physics impossible. Classically there are things which correspond to the intuition of particles and waves which is why they were called that, but the mathematical model comes before the convenience of assigning senses. This is why it is unscientific to demand mechanical explanations of gravitation.

 No.11113

>>11111
>When you say we have no access to these essential details, it sounds like you are implying something like that it is not possible to know a thing fully in totality. It makes it seem like you are a kantian or dualist and unaware of it.
I am saying that what you call essential details do not exist from a scientific perspective. I don't agree that they exist at all either.
>Things have properties that make them different from other things and that is how we tell different things apart.
This is an oversimplified view. Wood is made out of matter which acts according to laws of physics regardless of whether you call it "Wood". Consciousness is a description of behaviors and a function that models those behaviors does not care whether you call it pneumatic/hydraulic/mechanical/electronic or interpret it as having whatever implementation.
>What evidence do you have for this?
Computability is a property of functions. Do you have a different definition of computability?
>And how do you know that the function describing the behavior of consciousness corresponds to consciousness itself?
From a scientific perspective the behavior is all that is relevant. If you want to differentiate them you need dualism.
>Are you saying that an essential property of consciousnesses is computability?
No I'm saying that computability is a property of functions. An argument for consciousness being uncomputable must use this. If consciousness cannot be described by a function then you must abandon science.

 No.11114

>>11113
>I am saying that what you call essential details do not exist from a scientific perspective.
Then how does "science" differentiate between two objects?
>Wood is made out of matter which acts according to laws of physics regardless of whether you call it "Wood"
Wood is a specific mixture of matter in a certain order and pattern, but this is an oversimplified view. Matter is a concept invented by humans to describe observable phenomena.
>Consciousness is a description of behaviors
Can you prove that?
>From a scientific perspective the behavior is all that is relevant. If you want to differentiate them you need dualism.
Why? People can differentiate between a dog and a tree without dualism just fine. It sounds like you are just making things up that no scientist would actually say.

 No.11115

>>11114
>Then how does "science" differentiate between two objects?
A and B are differentiated without having any essential details.
All we know about A and B are that they are distinct terms and the positions they have in the logical structure of the theory. That is sufficient.
>Wood is a specific mixture of matter in a certain order and pattern, but this is an oversimplified view. Matter is a concept invented by humans to describe observable phenomena.
I was indicating that physics deals with more fundamental objects than wood. If you wanted to ask scientifically about the properties of wood you would need to develop a sense of wood relevant to observation eg what kinds of wood from what trees tested under what conditions.
>Can you prove that?
What are you looking for the word "consciousness" to mean?
>Why? People can differentiate between a dog and a tree without dualism just fine. It sounds like you are just making things up that no scientist would actually say.
It is impossible to differentiate a function describing the behavior of consciousness and consciousness unless you consider something other than the behavior. I don't see how you jumped to the idea that no distinctions are possible without essential details.

 No.11116

>>11111
I'll clarify (I hope).
>means reducing the whole into parts that are relevant for a certain use case, like modelling something into a finite number of variables to make an algorithm.
Yes and the essential details are not relevant for the scientific use case. They are independent of it.
>Things have properties that make them different from other things and that is how we tell different things apart. So if you have a tree one of its essential details could be that it is made of wood, and this is helpful for building things. If we want to investigate something like consciousness we need to define the concept by properties that only apply to it, what makes it different from other things.
It should be sufficient to have a term T which has certain logical relations eg to term W and that the logical relations alone completely specify T as what we mean when we use the word "tree". The binding of T and tree cannot itself be part of the theory, we need to develop T within the theory in such a way that it lines up with what we call trees, relative to observation.
If we want to construct a term C in the scientific theory that aligns to "consciousness" it cannot use things outside the theory such as other bindings or essential details. It must simply have a position in the logic so that it aligns itself when we bind some base terms to observations.

 No.11117

>>11115
I don't know why you keep saying essential details.
Anon said
>You will not grasp the nature of things by abstracting away the detail that essentially distinguishes one thing from the other and gives them their higher order qualities.
So what we are talking about is details, which are properties of objects.
Say you have cats and dogs. Cats have retractable claws. Thats a property that cats have that dogs don't, its an "essential detail" that helps you tell apart A from B.

 No.11118

>>11117
C (cats) W (have the following type of claws) R (retractable claws)
R … (logical relations of retractable claws to biological structures etc)
W … (describes how to select the claws of an animal)
C … (identifies cats, maybe that includes the first sentence)
It's not "essential" because it's not part of the essence, or sense, of C.
(lol making a giant ontology)
The implementation of behavior is not a detail of the behavior.

 No.11119

>>11116
I really think you are just describing the limits of logic and mistaking it for science. Science isn't reducible to math or physics. I keep trying to get you to use terms correctly and instead you basically admitted that it is impossible your version of "science" to know anything.

>the essential details are not relevant for the scientific use case.

I didn't even say essential details, I said reducing the whole into parts. You are taking this and running without understanding what it means. When you model something you take all of its properties and you make them into variables and you exclude the ones that are not relevant for the particular experiment, not for knowing about that object in general.

If you want to predict how far a ball will go you need to know its speed and direction but you don't need to know its temperature. That doesn't mean that a ball is speed and direction. In your modelling you lost some of its "essential details", which are its properties. If now you want to do another experiment and need to know the circumference of the ball, speed and direction tell you nothing so you still need to measure that property on the actual ball, you can't rely on the model. You seem to be arguing that a ball is the model.

 No.11120

>>11119
> instead you basically admitted that it is impossible your version of "science" to know anything.
I don't see how.
>When you model something you take all of its properties and you make them into variables and you exclude the ones that are not relevant for the particular experiment, not for knowing about that object in general.
>You seem to be arguing that a ball is the model.
If we have no way of measuring the circumference of the ball then the ball does not have circumference. You can only make sense of the circumference of the ball after there is an experiment that can measure it.
A particular consciousness may have some measurable physical implementation but that is not relevant to consciousness as a property of observed behavior.
This implies a definition of consciousness where only observed behavior is relevant oh right that's like the Turing test.
But you can define the word "consciousness" to be whatever you want.
>I really think you are just describing the limits of logic and mistaking it for science. Science isn't reducible to math or physics.
Why?

 No.11121

>>11120
>I don't see how.
If A and B have no properties then you can't know anything about them they are just abstract nothing.

>A particular consciousness may have some measurable physical implementation but that is not relevant to consciousness as a property of observed behavior.

This seems extra absurd with the inclusion of "measurable physical" that is "not relevant". Why is behavior the only thing that matters? That is incredibly arbitrary.

>Why?

Because of your description of how to construct "scientific theory" terms and the limits you imposed on them. You are basically invoking Godels Incompleteness to say reality is defined by the limits of your model instead of realizing it is proof of the limit of models to describe reality.

 No.11122

>>11121
>If A and B have no properties then you can't know anything about them they are just abstract nothing.
The properties of A and B are entirely in the surrounding logical structure and their distinguishability. They do not have no properties, but they have no arbitrary sense. The logical structure precedes the intuition about the objects.
What you know about A and B comes from the bound terms which are the observations. Science cannot provide senses to things, only predictive models for observation. But why do you want to assign senses a priori so much?
>This seems extra absurd with the inclusion of "measurable physical" that is "not relevant". Why is behavior the only thing that matters? That is incredibly arbitrary.
You cannot tell that you are not a brain in a vat or an ancestor simulation.
If you have some definition of consciousness in mind say.
>Because of your description of how to construct "scientific theory" terms and the limits you imposed on them. You are basically invoking Godels Incompleteness to say reality is defined by the limits of your model instead of realizing it is proof of the limit of models to describe reality.
This has nothing to do with Godel's Incompleteness. If you want to prove me wrong state it and explain the connection.
I'm not saying you can't abandon science I'm saying you need to abandon science when you do.
>Science isn't reducible to math or physics.
Why?

 No.11123

>>11106
>You have at least not shown that with >>11090
I‘m not that guy. I‘m also not the other person or perhaps people you replied to afterwards. I might respond some other time.

 No.11127

>>11122
Quite simply, because of emergent properties, and abstraction.

When you consider the way things interact, you suddenly get behaviour that is much more complex than the constituent parts are capable of in isolation. If I gave you a book and asked you to look at only the letters in isolation, would you be able to understand the book? Nope.

Chemistry is the study of the emergent properties of interactions of particles, this emergence presents behaviour so complex that you literally do require a whole new field of study to study it. Just as books are the emergent properties of the interactions of letters on a page. If you try to read a book by looking at the individual letters, you'll not only waste your time, but you'll also fail to understand the book because you're too busy looking at the letters to see the meaning on the page.

Physics is the branch of science that studies how matter and energy behave, in a general sense. To do so, physicists often use simplified versions of real-world systems.

For example, to predict where a ball is gonna fall once you kick it, you can think of that ball as a single point containing the entire mass of the ball. You can get pretty accurate results doing this. The problem is, sometimes you have to make your representation of the real world a little more complex in order to suffice your needs. If you kick a ball, it can start moving forward or it can spin (if you kick it on the side). Now you need to account for the shape of the ball. You have to take into consideration the different forces acting on it to predict where it's going to fall.

You can imagine that more complicated questions require more complicated models. For example, it's relatively easy to predict what happens when two bodies orbit each other, but as soon as you have three bodies, it becomes a great problem.

Now, take a look at what chemists study. Atoms can be fairly simple (as a hydrogen atom, with only one electron moving around a proton) or really, really complex. To predict the behaviour of a single atom you have to take into consideration how protons and electrons will atract each other. Also, you have neutrons, which have no electrical charge. Electrons move really fast, so you have to take into consideration relativistic effects (which explain, for example, why mercury is a liquid). There are a lot of issues when you try to simulate an atom using a computer.

But chemists rarely work with single atoms. They work with molecules, which can be a lot more complex.

I just made a test. My computer needed 26.7 seconds to tell the most stable conformation for a simple organic molecule (1,2,3,4,5,6-hexamethylcyclohexane). It's made out of 12 carbon atoms bonded with as many hydrogen atoms as possible.

I'm using a normal computer, working at full speed. Things like these would've been very difficult until not so long ago, but chemists already knew the result I obtained before computers even existed. How?

Chemists just work with different tools. A chemistry students learns about 1,3-diaxial interactions, and about the different hybridizations that a carbon atom can attain. They learn about conformations, and about equilibria, and about Gibb's free energy and its relation with spontaneity.

That's the key. As you work with more complex systems, you need different tools. If you want to study how energy and matter behave in simple systems (and not-so-simple ones, now that we have computers), physics is the right thing to use. If you move up in the complexity scale, chemistry works well for atoms and molecules. As atoms and molecules start to conform bigger things (like cells and living organisms) you have to move on to biology. When a lot of different tissues create organs (like the brain), you need to use neuroscience and psychology. When a lot of humans live in society, it's very difficult to predict what they will do, so you have to use sociology and economy. Of course, as you move up the complexity ladder, predictions become harder to make and while some physical theories can predict phenomena with an astonishing accuracy, anyone would be skeptical about an economist who said that they know exactly how a certain country is gonna develop through the next 10 years.

That's the key: different systems, different tools. Since physicists work with simpler systems, they can also apply mathematics more rigorously, and that's why physics has that fame of being 'so difficult'. It's not inherently difficult, it's just more mathematically approachable.
https://www.quora.com/Is-chemistry-just-a-sub-field-of-physics-Why-do-scientists-separate-the-two

In theory everything is explainable in terms of fundamental forces and laws, but in practice, no. Remember the three-body problem in physics class? Relatively simple systems like that and double pendulums show chaotic behavior.

I am not sure if physics can explain turbulence yet.

Even if it were possible, description at such a detailed level is not always useful. Classical biology is the best science for describing the difference between a chicken and cow, not theoretical physics.
https://www.quora.com/Can-all-sciences-be-reduced-to-physics

>I began my reply by saying that nobody denies the amazing success of theoretical physics in the last four hundred years. Nobody denies the truth of Einstein’s triumphant words: “The creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed.” It is true that the fundamental equations of physics are simple and beautiful, and that we have good reason to expect that the equations still to be discovered will be even more simple and beautiful. But the reduction of other sciences to physics does not work. Chemistry has its own concepts, not reducible to physics. Biology and neurology have their own concepts not reducible to physics or to chemistry. The way to understand a living cell or a living brain is not to consider it as a collection of atoms. Chemistry and biology and neurology will continue to advance and to make new fundamental discoveries, no matter what happens to physics. The territory of new sciences, outside the narrow domain of theoretical physics, will continue to expand.


>Theoretical science may be divided roughly into two parts, analytic and synthetic. Analytic science reduces complicated phenomena to their simpler component parts. Synthetic science builds up complicated structures from their simpler parts. Analytic science works downward to find the fundamental equations. Synthetic science works upward to find new and unexpected solutions. To understand the spectrum of an atom, you needed analytic science to give you Schrödinger’s equation. To understand a protein molecule or a brain, you need synthetic science to build a structure out of atoms or neurons. Greene was saying, only analytic science is worthy of the name of science. For him, synthetic science is nothing but practical problem solving. I said, on the contrary, good science requires a balance between analytic and synthetic tools, and synthetic science becomes more and more creative as our knowledge increases.


>Another reason why I believe science to be inexhaustible is Gödel’s theorem. The mathematician Kurt Gödel discovered and proved the theorem in 1931. The theorem says that given any finite set of rules for doing mathematics, there are undecidable statements, mathematical statements that cannot either be proved or disproved by using these rules. Gödel gave examples of undecidable statements that cannot be proved true or false using the normal rules of logic and arithmetic. His theorem implies that pure mathematics is inexhaustible. No matter how many problems we solve, there will always be other problems that cannot be solved within the existing rules. Now I claim that because of Gödel’s theorem, physics is inexhaustible too. The laws of physics are a finite set of rules, and include the rules for doing mathematics, so that Gödel’s theorem applies to them. The theorem implies that even within the domain of the basic equations of physics, our knowledge will always be incomplete.

Freeman Dyson May 13, 2004 issue https://archive.ph/2LvBv

 No.11262

>>11113
>Consciousness is a description of behaviors
No, consciousness is not a description of behaviours. It is for a living subject to experience qualia. You made a leap to the mechanisms that govern responses to stimuli. If human beings were limited to playing chess, do you think a chess playing algorithm qualifies as being conscious like a human being?

 No.11309

>How does the brain produce the mind? This is one of the most difficult problems in science, because how can physical qualities, no matter how complex and sophisticated, actually be mental experiences? Electrical impulses and chemical flows are not at all the kind of stuff that thoughts and feelings are. The physical and the mental are different categories.

>Peter Ulric Tse is Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience in the department of Psychological and Brain Sciences at Dartmouth College. He holds a BA from Dartmouth (1984; majored in Mathematics and Physics), and a PhD in Experimental Psychology from Harvard University (1998).

 No.11310

>>11309
>How does the brain produce the mind?
Brain = Mind
problem solved

 No.11311

File: 1658785396105.png (40.9 KB, 860x650, ClipboardImage.png)


 No.11313

>>11311
Things that affect the brain also affect the mind, like drugs for example.

 No.11316

>>11313
shut up you fucking midwit, stop barging in without having engaged the prior contexts, you're so fucking stupid

 No.11318

>>11310
That's not even remotely close to what they're trying to answer, you DK.

 No.11319

>>11310
>>11313
Wow those were the most groundbreaking posts in this thread so far

 No.11703

Bump. Has been an interesting thread so far.

 No.11759

File: 1664594397707.jpg (1.63 MB, 3240x2216, nuero.jpg)

>How can one be a neuroscientist while simultaneously believing that mind uploading is impossible in principle?

https://twitter.com/KennethHayworth/status/1462145636652965897

 No.11760

>>11759
computational theory of mind incels blown the fuck out again

 No.11761

File: 1664648812498.jpg (76.58 KB, 600x536, LOL.jpg)

Computational theory of mind uyghas be like "We just need more computational power and deeper neural nets"
Heh

#emergence #mattermatters

 No.11762

>>11761
Computational theory of mind uyghas be like “According to my calculations the singularity will be in 2050”
According to my calculations you have roughly zero bitches

#emergence #fuckbertrandrussel

 No.11860


 No.11862

>>11759
If it was possible to make a detailed enough computer simulation of a brain, it might actually work.
However emulating software that was written for a slightly different type of hardware is already really hard.
Bridging the gap from organic brains to silicone chips seems rather daunting.
Keep in mind that no 2 people have identical brains, and that means you need to create an emulation layer per brain.

Also right now scanning a brain with the necessary detail would mean slicing it into hundreds of millions of very thin brain slices and then scanning each of those with an electron microscope.

 No.11864

>>11862
They already did that for the entire nervous system of a worm and they weren‘t successful with that either. You will not achieve consciousness emulating a brain in a digital system and you can‘t produce consciousness in an isolated manner either. Your consciousness can only exist in tandem with an outside world you are constantly interacting with.

 No.11866

>>11864
>They already did that for the entire nervous system of a worm and they weren‘t successful
I did say that i considered this too hard.
>You will not achieve consciousness emulating a brain in a digital system
I agree insofar that i think it's too impractical, but it should be possible in principle.
>you can‘t produce consciousness in an isolated manner either. Your consciousness can only exist in tandem with an outside world you are constantly interacting with.
I don't know how consciousness works exactly, but it does appear to be a reasonable assumption that it needs environmental input.

 No.11868

>>11866
No, you dweeb. I‘m not reasoning it on being hard, I‘m saying this approach doesn‘t create consciousness.

>I don't know how consciousness works exactly, but it does appear to be a reasonable assumption that it needs environmental input.

You don‘t get it. You likely believe in a static isolated notion of the matter and just imagine a program on standby ready to receive and process some input. I‘m saying the very existence of a consciousness is dependent on perpetual exchange with an outside world.

 No.11869

>>11864
Could you cite the study/source/whatever for the worm experiment? Sounds important

 No.11873

>>11869
I think the project is referred to as OpenWorm.

 No.12397

Does anyone here have something to say about Roger Penrose‘s theory on consciousness which is called Orchestrated Objective Reduction Theory?

https://www.wm.edu/as/physics/documents/seniorstheses/class2015theses/Collins_Amanda.pdf

 No.12406

>>10850
>another free component of a fully functioning neurological system made useful by the in-itself organism's sensory processing, involuntary muscle control and vital nerve clusters comprising a full neurological system as defined by scientists
Is consciousness the capacity to feel pain, then?

 No.12407

>>12406
thank you for the (you) astute leftypole
i guess the question of consciousness basically is the question of feeling as a subjective phenomenon in general

 No.12562

>>10971
>When do we break out of this place?
Soon hopefully. I'm getting antsy.

 No.12927

I will just post this here from another thread on the mainboard. Has anyone looked into his work here?

 No.12928

>>12927
Here is a presentation by him where he explains his theory.

 No.12972

>>10850
>>11759
>>11090
What a disaster. It's obviously ones and zeros
And why would anyone want to be conscious anyway, what a drag


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