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/leftypol/ - Leftist Politically Incorrect

"The anons of the past have only shitposted on the Internet about the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it."
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Not reporting is bourgeois


File: 1754078858962.jpg (218.52 KB, 1234x2168, Gt6Zj2OW8AA8ky9.jpg)

 

422 posts and 120 image replies omitted.

File: 1756316715272-0.mp4 (6.12 MB, 1280x720, trump students.mp4)

File: 1756316715272-2.mp4 (9.05 MB, 720x1278, UCLA.mp4)

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Even comrade Trump agrees: No Chinese students? Everything goes to shit. How? Because they all occupy the top colleges. Remove them and all the dumb Americans will move to those colleges and not only will they destroy the prestige of those top colleges but they'll also cause the low end colleges to go bankrupt once they leave them. That is the most brutal and insulting way to put it but I didn't say that first - Trump and Lutnick did.

>>2449102
Yep. China literally outgrew Harvard, Yale and Stanford.

>>2449142
That's the propaganda cope.
The real reason Trump wants Chinese kids in American schools is for subversion. American propaganda is strong. It's an easy way for the CIA to identify some randoms and send them back home as spies or trained up protest leaders. China has a famously strict immigration system that makes it hard for foreigners to gain citizenship so the easiest way to build an intellligence network is by converting people who are already citizens.

>>2449162
>w-we don't need educated specialists, i-it's because we want to infiltrate China!
<That's the propaganda cope.

>>2449162
True to some extent but it's primarily because universities are a huge part of American service based economy. Without the Chinese students they're utterly fact. Both the colleges as business and actual engineering positions.

Please just type "inside china business universities" into Youtube. This guy puts it clear as day and backs it up with data and sources everything. He has like 10 videos about this topic and they're all eye-opening goldmine.

File: 1756318597719.png (1006.22 KB, 998x2036, chinese students.png)

Also it's not working. Chinese parents are keeping their kids home. Why did Trump say 600k when their numbers never ever exceeded 370k? Because he was briefed about that number being what they need in order to recoup their losses.

Trump often does this because he's a geriatric - he often shows his ass by repeating either a term or a figure he heard on his briefings. This is also why he used the word "unifying" when he talked about Taiwan after his meeting with Chinese officials. That's the word the Chinese MFA uses when they talk about the question of Taiwan. And him just repeating it made the Taiwanese seethe and sweat.

>>2447815
>yes, common core killing brains
Commmon Core probably isn't even a thing anymore and I'd say that allowing Christian nationalist ideologues to influence the curriculum kills more brains than Common Core ever did.
>>2448850
>burgerville still does pretty well for itself even with its dogshit education system
Is this a cynical joke?
>it doesn't have to go to brutalizing and burning out 95% of kids and condemning them to a lower caste because of one fucking test.
America already does this anyway. They choose who succeeds and who fails. If you're in the lower class, they will never allow you to get a good education and the only jobs you'll ever be allowed to get are the most degrading ones. Say what you will about the Gaokao but it would unironically be better than this.
>>2449162
>The real reason Trump wants Chinese kids in American schools is for subversion. American propaganda is strong. It's an easy way for the CIA to identify some randoms and send them back home as spies or trained up protest leaders.
Few people would wistfully look at downtowns filled with used syringes and homeless encampments and wish this for their own country. If I were a Chinese student and saw what I've seen, I'd catch the first flight back to China and head straight to the nearest CPC office.

>>2449142
When you come to think of it, America was never that strong when it came to science. Just about every scientific breakthrough in America came from foreign-born scientists. The golden age of NASA (Mercury/Gemini/Apollo) was made possible by Nazi rocket scientists; after the USSR fell, the USA used ex-Soviet scientists to create everything from Google to the International Space Station. Although they haven't defeated China, they still hope to poach enough Chinese talent to save them and get them through for a few more decades.

>Kim is going to attend the parade
Kino optics incoming.

>>2449811
>The golden age of NASA (Mercury/Gemini/Apollo) was made possible by Nazi rocket scientists

This is wrong. Von Braun, if anything, was a negative influence on the program because he pushed through his failure of a rocket, with American breakthroughs coming only when von Braun was essentially neutralized in his ambitions. We are talking about von Braun's project failing to reach cosmos with his manned launch, ffs.

But yeah, USA depends on brain drain; their homegrown scientists are not up to the challenge because lack of education system makes it so potential scientists just don't get scouted; it's a simple numbers game, if you don't roll enough dice, you don't get enough sixes to feed a scientific program

File: 1756369983570.jpg (83.5 KB, 1146x1000, Tsien_Hsue-shen.jpg)

>>2449811
>>2450192
Don't forget the unsung and topic relevant Qian Xuesen. Actually contributed to NASA and as thanks he was put under house arrest for being Chinese. He returned to China disappointed in America and helped China kickstart their space program instead.

The more things change the more they stay the same.

>>2449069
>They're referred to as the "sea turtles" due to their tendencies to come back home to mate.
brutal burn

LATAM BLOG: China will let Maduro sink rather than confront US warships

https://www.intellinews.com/latam-blog-china-will-let-maduro-sink-rather-than-confront-us-warships-398046/?

>Nicolás Maduro's theatrical display of his new Huawei phone, allegedly a personal gift from Xi Jinping, during a recent public speech was more than diplomatic pantomime. As the Venezuelan president mimicked a satellite call to Beijing, punctuating his performance with "ni hao" and "xiexie," he was sending Washington a not-so-subtle message: Venezuela has powerful friends.


>Yet as US destroyers patrol Caribbean waters and the Trump administration doubles its bounty on Maduro's head to $50mn accusing him of being "one of the largest narco-traffickers in the world”, Beijing's muffled response suggests China's decades-long commitment to its Latin American ally has distinct limits, particularly when it comes to military confrontation with Washington.


>As usual, last week’s deployment of the USS Gravely, USS Jason Dunham, and USS Sampson, alongside 4,000 marines, prompted diplomatic protests from Beijing. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning warned that China "opposes the use or threat of force in international relations and the interference of external forces in Venezuela's internal affairs.”


>But experts who spoke to bne Intellinews following Maduro’s disputed re-election in July 2024 paint a starkly different picture of Beijing's actual intentions.


>"China fears that a transition to democracy or the rule of law would necessarily mean declining bargaining leverage in Venezuela," explains Javier Corrales, professor of political science at Amherst College. “They fear a Western-aligned government would revise their contracts and potentially expose embarrassing dealings.”


>However, Corrales doubts Beijing would actively intervene to preserve Maduro's grip on power. "China today will often care so much about being present that it will accept significant economic losses," he notes. "That said, Venezuela continues to deliver oil and to pay the debt [estimated at around $10bn in 2024], so it's not like China is experiencing profound economic losses."


>The Venezuela-China axis has seemingly strengthened recently, with Communist Party of China delegates visiting Caracas in June to establish “doctrinal training” programmes for the Bolivarian ruling socialist party. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yván Gil hailed these party-to-party exchanges as efforts to construct "societies based on social justice" aimed at building "a new international order."


>Such multipolar rhetoric resonates well with BRICS principles. But the burgeoning, Beijing-led trading bloc remains a pipe dream for Caracas, as its membership bid was blocked by Brazil last year over the contested election which saw Maduro claiming victory amid widespread allegations of fraud. Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly supported Venezuela’s entry at the Kazan summit in October 2024, whilst China remained notably silent. Eventually, Maduro left Kazan empty-handed: Venezuela failed to secure even the novel “partner country” status granted to fellow Bolivia and Cuba.


>Following May's China-CELAC summit, where Xi pledged cooperation on energy and trade plus massive investments in Latin America, both governments claim to be preparing more than 600 agreements for 2025, covering technology, investment and agriculture. The younger Nicolás Maduro, the president's son, has made multiple trips to China this year alongside Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to advance these initiatives.


>But the paradox of China-Venezuela relations lies in the gap between political rhetoric and a much harsher commercial reality. Whilst Xi elevated the relationship to an "all-weather strategic partnership" during Maduro's 2023 visit to Beijing – the highest classification in China's diplomatic hierarchy – Chinese businesses tell a different story.


>"Since [former president Hugo] Chavez died, the Chinese have been much more cautious with Venezuela. They haven't provided any new loans," Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin America Energy Program at Rice University, tells bne Intellinews. "They have had a very bad experience in Venezuela… They know that giving money to Venezuela is an absolute disaster, a terrible idea."


>Beijing's wariness stems from the spectacular failure of previous development loans that flourished after Chávez met former Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2008. Venezuelan mismanagement of these funds left numerous infrastructure projects incomplete and contributed to the economic chaos that economists trace to 2012, Chávez's final election win before his untimely passing. Beijing halted new disbursements in 2015 as hyperinflation took hold. At its peak, Venezuela absorbed nearly half of all Chinese development funding for Latin America, according to the China-America Research Center of the Andrés Bello Foundation, forcing Beijing to restructure payment terms and fundamentally reconsider its lending practices across the developing world.


>"I would be very surprised if the agreements announced with China include disbursements of funds through a credit line," Parsifal D'Sola Alvarado, director of the China-America Research Center, told El País. Instead, he expects Beijing to focus on Special Economic Zones—tax-advantaged industrial areas that Xi has discussed with Maduro. These zones require minimal capital whilst offering Beijing control over production using inexpensive Venezuelan labour, D'Sola explains.


>The numbers support this assessment. Whilst Chinese development banks have extended $59.2bn to Venezuela—nearly double Brazil's allocation—commercial banks have virtually abandoned the country. Chinese foreign direct investment turned negative in 2019, with net outflows continuing through 2022. According to Nikkei, IEIT Systems, a Shenzhen-listed IT firm which operated in the South American nation, has written off nearly $41mn in Venezuelan receivables as unrecoverable.


>China's official investment guide for Venezuela, compiled by its commerce ministry, contains unusually blunt warnings. It describes Venezuela as "a country with relatively high business risks," specifically citing US sanctions that could "create various obstacles" for Chinese companies. The guide warns of Venezuelan counterparties being "unable to pay off their liabilities on time."


>Even in the oil sector, the cornerstone of bilateral trade, China's engagement remains circumscribed by sanctions concerns. Chinese state oil company CNPC produces approximately 90,000 barrels daily in Venezuela, merely about 10% of national output, according to Monaldi. But Venezuelan crude destined for China takes a circuitous route through Malaysian intermediaries, arriving at independent refineries rather than state facilities.


>"CNPC is a global company listed in international markets that has business in the US," Monaldi explains. "Venezuela's oil, since the first Trump Administration, has been the subject of secondary sanctions. So it's more like Iranian oil."


>Future Chinese investment in Venezuelan energy appears unlikely. "The chances of Chinese investment in Venezuelan oil are slim," Monaldi says, noting that CNPC has repeatedly declined PDVSA's investment proposals for new fields, citing previous payment disputes and disagreements.


>Chinese oil interests have instead shifted to neighbouring Guyana, where the business environment proves more attractive. China's CNOOC is a minority partner (25%) in Guyana’s Stabroek block, which is operated by ExxonMobil and also includes Hess Corporation. However, the small, oil-rich country is locked in a century-old dispute with Caracas over the Essequibo region, which makes up two-thirds of Guyana's internationally recognised territory. Tensions were dormant under Chavez, but reignited after ExxonMobil’s discovery of substantial crude reserves there in 2015. Over the past year, Maduro and the opposition alike have ramped up claims over the territory, seeking to exploit nationalistic sentiment to advance their respective goals. Thus, the Asian superpower's investments in Guyana are directly at odds with Venezuela's territorial ambitions.


>Overall, China's strategic calculus appears driven more by long-term geopolitical positioning than economic benefit. "Xi Jinping became a bit more geo-strategic than his predecessor Hu Jintao," Corrales tells bne Intellinews. "In addition to wanting to expand the influence of Chinese businesses abroad and obtain raw materials, he also wanted to have a greater political presence abroad, regardless of the economic costs."


>And Venezuela, home to the world’s largest oil reserves, offers Beijing unique advantages in Latin America – a continent further drifting into China’s orbit of influence following the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency. "The Venezuelan government was not very accountable to any local group, so it could offer China anything China wanted," Corrales explains. "China could not find any other country in the Americas, other than Cuba, where it could call the shots to the same degree."


>This freedom from scrutiny has proved valuable as Chinese projects, often part of Beijing’s signature Belt and Road initiative, face increasing opposition from civil society across Latin America. "By the late 2010s, many groups in civil society in Latin America were questioning many Chinese deals, especially extractivist projects as well as non-transparent deals," Corrales notes. "But in Venezuela, the state insulated China from any of that scrutiny."


>Yet even this privileged position has not prevented Beijing from hedging its bets. As Venezuela's economy collapsed after 2014, driving nearly 8mn citizens to flee over the past decade, China's response has been calculated. While extending enough credit to prevent a sovereign default, Beijing has simultaneously opened channels to the opposition. Chinese government-linked entities have quietly hosted opposition figures, whilst advisers to opposition economists report exploratory meetings with Chinese officials about post-Maduro scenarios.


>"They basically, of course, will deal with whoever is in power," Monaldi says. "I don't think they will do anything to push Maduro out. They did, I think, signal Maduro that he shouldn't mess with Guyana. That's the only thing in which I think they have done some signalling."


>The latest US military deployment, framed as an anti-narcotics operation targeting the "Cartel of the Suns" allegedly led by Maduro, is yet another thorn in Beijing’s side. Speaking to SCMP, Denny Roy of the East-West Centre notes the warships demonstrate that Washington – which recently re-authorised Chevron to pump oil in Venezuela in a bid to shift crude exports away from China and back to the US market –  "has the capability of cutting off Venezuela's oil supplies to China."


>Some analysts suggest the pressure might paradoxically boost China-Venezuela ties in the short term. Zhao Xijun, a finance professor at Renmin University, argues that sanctioned countries "will feel they might be sanctioned, so they'd think of ways to join forces."


>Beijing's measured response, meanwhile, reflects a broader pattern in Chinese foreign policy. As Gabriel Pastor of Uruguay's CERES think tank observes in an interview with CNN, China's statement is "politically correct" but "does not mean that China is going to intervene in the conflict by supporting Venezuela."


>Indeed, a democratic transition might ultimately serve Chinese commercial interests better. "If there is a stable and more competent government in Venezuela led by the opposition and sanctions are lifted, I think they will be more willing to invest, actually," Monaldi suggests, pointing to China's successful partnerships with non-leftist governments across Latin America.


>The situation lays bare the limits of anti-American solidarity. Whilst Maduro can brandish his Xi Jinping-gifted phone and invoke China in his rhetorical battles with Washington, Beijing's actual support appears unlikely to extend beyond diplomatic statements and continued oil purchases through Byzantine arrangements.


>"China is not willing to do a lot to keep Maduro in power," Monaldi concludes. "They are not doing that much, but they are also not gonna push him out in any way."


>As Maduro claims to mobilise around 4.5mn militia members nationwide in response to perceived US threats, Beijing's stance remains coolly pragmatic. In the great power competition playing out in Venezuela's coastal waters, China seems content to watch from the sidelines, maintaining its investments whilst avoiding any moves that might escalate confrontation with Washington.


>For Maduro, frantically working his satellite phone, the message from Beijing is clear: symbolic support, yes; military intervention, absolutely not. In the hierarchy of China's global priorities, preserving an unprofitable Latin American ally ranks well below avoiding direct conflict with the United States.


>As Corrales summarises China's ultimate willingness to back Venezuela: "More than Colombia and Brazil, far less than Russia and Cuba." But Moscow remains consumed by its war in Ukraine, and Cuba faces an unprecedented economic crisis, which leaves little room for manoeuvre. In the end, Maduro may find that all the "ni haos" in the world will not summon the cavalry he desperately needs.

>>2447738
Ugh why didn’t they teach this technique at my shithole country?

>>2451268
Skimmed and
>Speaking to SCMP
>CERES think tank observes in an interview with CNN
This slop isn't worth reading tbh.

>>2451435
Brainlet

>>2451268
bolsonaro would've been better for brazil those faggots wouldn't have touched BRICS with a 12 foot pole and venezulea would be armed with the latest chinese weapons

>>2451607
bold of you to assume any of this

Question, now that Modi is going to meet Xi, what would be the most sensible way to delimit the border? Or at what time will it will be done. It would be amazing that this is the beginning of getting a good map in check.

I know it is pretty difficult since one of the knots is the Kashmir borders
>>2451607
Anon, are you clinically retarded?

>>2451821
I don't know about "sensible" and I do not know shit about this particular border issue.
But reasonable is that which works. So whatever gets them to stop fighting.

>>2449295
>Few people would wistfully look at downtowns filled with used syringes and homeless encampments and wish this for their own country. If I were a Chinese student and saw what I've seen, I'd catch the first flight back to China and head straight to the nearest CPC office.
Trvthnvclear strike. I had chinese grad student friends and they were always shocked by what shitholes our cities were. Small, unclean, and with a very obvious lack of social safety net. Went to a state capitol with one and we walked around downtown, went to a museum, and at the end of the day her reaction was "that's it?"

he wants to be Xi so bad lol

>>2449117
>>2448625
>>2448300
>>2447738
>>2447820

Explanation, she's using 100x100 = 10,000 as the "easy problem anchor" and approximating from that since 97x94 is close to 100x100 (I wasn't taught the chinese way but I used to think this way as a kid, out of pure intuition). I would always find an easier problem that's nearby and "walk away" from it to the problem I was actually doing.

100-97 = 3
100-94= 6
97-6 = 91
(another way to arrive at 91 is to just add the 3 and 6 above and subtract them from 100 since, again, we're just finding out how different from 100x100 97x94 is, but that would be an extra step, 97-6 is the abridgement of adding 3 and 6 and then subtracting from 100 again. After a while you find shorthand modes of expression)


now that we know 91 will be the first two digits of the answer (or rather 091 since we're "counting down" from 10,000 which is the answer to 100x100) we have to find out the remaining digits:

3x6 = 18

09,118 is the answer. 0 being the ten-thousands place because 97x94 is a two digit multiplication problem that we're using the 3 digit problem 100x100 as our "easy anchor" to approximate, so we know the answer is going to be less than 10,000 so we have an implied 0 already in the ten-thousands place. 9 being the thousands place, 1 being the hundreds place, 1 being the tens place, and 8 being the ones place.

>>2451312
shit like this is when I would get in trouble in america as a kid. I figured out some of this myself because it was easier and I was lazy and I liked easier ways but was punished for not "showing my work" like the south korean student does. burgers value "showing work" even when it's unnecessary work and the teachers are often stupider than the students and vindictive.

>>2452302
(cont.) i really wish they taught this way in america because it doesn't just work in math but also in engineering. I remember reading a soviet engineering textbook by the inventor of TRIZ Geinrich Altshuller and he says if a problem is difficult to solve, you always solve an ideal, easier problem that is "close to" the problem you are trying to solve. Even if it's not math. Basically someone asks you "97x94" and rather than getting straight to work you should listen to the lazy part of your brain that says "maaaaaaan, I wish I was doing 100x100 instead lol" The lazy part of your brain is actually telling you the shortcut, since the easier problem already is the approximation of the harder problem, and all you need to do is find the difference between the easy problem and the hard problem. A couple of easy subtractions, which is itself the method of finding diffrences, becomes the approxmation of a more difficult multiplication. LAZY = GOOD when used correctly.

>>2452302
Now do 25×25 or 32×87

>>2452312
well 25 is 5^2 so 25x25 is just 5^4, so it's 5x5x5x5. That's the easy anchor for that.
5x5 = 25
25x5 = 125
125x5 = 100x5 +25x5 = 500+125 = 625

32x87 is less convenient obviously but you could set up 40x90 as your "easy anchor". You know that 40x90 is just 4x9x100, i.e. 4x9 with two zeroes on the end, one from the tens place of each multiplicand.

4x9 = 36
36x100 = 3600

40x90 = 3600 = our "easy anchor" that you can figure out in your head

now you can't do the same shortcut as 100x100 because the multiplicands aren't using the same anchor. they're using different anchors. I'm too stupid and American to figure out what a Chinese student would do in that situation I'll admit but I'm sure there's some way they're taught.

>>2452030
it's kind of funny because Xi was a chemical engineer and did actual real work unlike Trump. If anyone from the Trump family could have been our Xi it would've been Dr. John Trump of MIT, who Donald much admires for knowing The Nuclear.

>>2452394
Thanks for explaining.

>>2452394
Thing is, korean one is easier.

>>2452407
Depends on who you are I guess.

>>2451583
why should people believe what SCMP, CERES, and CNN say about China?

>>2451268
>he was sending Washington a not-so-subtle message: Venezuela has powerful friends.
<we are the center of the world, everything that happens is directly a message to us!
hes just showing hes chummy with china and showing his cool new cia proofed phone, I feel like these ""experts"" morons read way too much into it

>"China fears that a transition to democracy or the rule of law would necessarily mean declining bargaining leverage in Venezuela,"

<venezuela getting couped by the comprador US puppets would be bad for china
no shit

>Corrales doubts Beijing would actively intervene to preserve Maduro's grip on power

<our puppets are so ridiculously incompetent and chavistas good enough that even with full sanctions and destabilization attempts, maduro doesnt even need the chinese
good

>That said, Venezuela continues to deliver oil and to pay the debt

<so there is 0 reason for china to not support them as much as they can

>Such multipolar rhetoric resonates well with BRICS principles. But the burgeoning, Beijing-led trading bloc remains a pipe dream for Caracas, as its membership bid was blocked by Brazil last year

<lula being pressured by the usa to block it make venezuela going into brics a "pipe dream"
thats stupid, they will very likely get in next time

>They haven't provided any new loans

maybe they dont need them anymore? everything I had seen was that the country was faring better and better

>contributed to the economic chaos that economists trace to 2012

oh yeah, nothing to do with the absolutely crushing sanctions

>Whilst Chinese development banks have extended $59.2bn to Venezuela—nearly double Brazil's allocation—

<wait, so actually we lied just earlier in the article, they do get new loans

>contains unusually blunt warnings. It describes Venezuela as "a country with relatively high business risks," specifically citing US sanctions that could "create various obstacles" for Chinese companies. The guide warns of Venezuelan counterparties being "unable to pay off their liabilities on time."

<china warning its businesses the us is trying to destroy the country economically is "unusually blunt"

>Thus, the Asian superpower's investments in Guyana are directly at odds with Venezuela's territorial ambitions.

<or at least thats what we tell ourselves, because its fucking obvious guyana oil would be exploited and profited of by western firms

>Overall, China's strategic calculus appears driven more by long-term geopolitical positioning than economic benefit

<which would point they will keep supporting venezuela no matter what, which contradict most of the bullshit we peddled in this article

>The Venezuelan government was not very accountable to any local group, so it could offer China anything China wanted

<our glowies network cant fuck with them, so its a lot easier for china than when we torpedo their deals by yanking the leash of our latam vassals

shit I dont have time to finish, but in short, this article is a pile of garbage

The short answer is: It is similar, but not identical, to the Western concept of "private," and the difference is significant.

While "民企" (mín qǐ) is accurately translated as "private enterprise," its meaning is shaped by the unique political and economic context of China. It's best understood as "non-state-owned under the ultimate authority of the Communist Party."

Here’s a breakdown of the key differences:
1. What "Private" (民 mín) Means in China

In the term 民营企业 (mínyíng qǐyè), "民" (mín) doesn't just mean "private"; it means "of the people" or "folk." This is a deliberate linguistic choice that frames these companies within a national collective framework, rather than emphasizing individual private ownership or rights against the state.
2. The Core Difference: The Role of the Party-State

In Western capitalism, "private" typically implies a firm that is:

Owned by private individuals or shareholders.

Operates independently from the government.

Its primary legal obligation is to its shareholders.

It exists within a system where the state is seen as a separate, and often limited, regulator.

In China, a "private" (民) enterprise is:

Non-State-Owned: Its capital primarily comes from private sources, not direct government investment.

Not Independent from the Party-State: This is the critical difference. All enterprises in China, including private ones, are expected to serve the strategic goals of the nation as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They operate within a system of "Party-led capitalism."

Subject to Party Influence: Most large private companies have CCP committees embedded within them. While their official role is often described as "supporting" business operations, they ensure the company's direction aligns with party policy, ideology, and national strategy (like in tech innovation or security).

Vulnerable to State Direction: The state can and does direct the activities of private companies through regulation, policy, and informal pressure. High-profile cases like the regulatory crackdowns on Alibaba (an e-commerce giant) and Didi (a ride-hailing app) exemplify how quickly the state can intervene to reshape an entire "private" industry.

3. The Implied Contract

The existence and success of large Chinese private enterprises are often seen as part of an implied contract:

The State allows entrepreneurs to innovate, create wealth, and compete globally.

In return, the Enterprises must adhere to party leadership, support national objectives (e.g., "Common Prosperity," technological self-reliance), and not challenge the party's political authority.

Summary: A Spectrum of Control

Think of it not as a binary (state vs. private) but as a spectrum of state influence and control.

State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs - 国企 guó qǐ): Directly owned and controlled by the state. They are tools of national policy.

Private Enterprises (民企 mín qǐ): Not directly owned by the state, but operate under its ultimate authority and must align with its goals. They are "private" in ownership but "public" in their expected responsibilities.

Western Private Firms: Operate within a regulatory framework but are generally understood to be independent entities with a primary focus on shareholder value.

So, when you see the "中国民企500" list, you are looking at the 500 largest companies in China that are not directly state-owned. However, their leaders are almost certainly working closely with party officials, and their strategies are deeply intertwined with the national goals set by the CCP. Their "private" status does not mean they are free from state control.

>>2453323
To summarize: "private company" in context of China is a deliberate mistanslation of Chinese term "people's company". Hilarious, innit?

>>2452302
>97-6 = 91
This step is the one that's confusing. Let's write it differently:

97 x 94 = (100 - 3)(100 - 6) = 10000 - 300 - 600 + 18
Or in other numbers, (10000 - 9 x 100) + (3 x 6) = 9100 + 18, i.e. we get 9100 from having to substract 3 x 100 and 6 x 100 in the formula

>>2452312
You don't do this method for "low" numbers, obviously. The point is to reduce the number of calculations, not increase them by flipping the numbers into "high" range (32 vs 100 - 32 = 68)

So, by that guy's >>2452394 anchor method, you get like (40 - 8)(100 - 13) = 4000 - 800 - 520 + 104 = 4000 - 1320 + 104 = 2680 + 104

I dunno how to get 2680 out of 32 and 87 combinations cleanly

https://mronline.org/2025/08/27/whose-workers-whose-wages/

Whose workers, whose wages? A revolutionary intervention against the Imperial Left’s China syndrome
by Prince Kapone

Bricks, Not Sermons: The Scale of Struggle in Concrete Terms

In the war for the future of the Global South, China is laying bricks while the West continues to drop bombs—and still, somehow, it’s China that gets scolded for not being charitable enough. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, has already funneled over $679 billion in infrastructure investment into Africa, Asia, and Latin America—compared to the United States’ paltry $76 billion in the same period. That is not a statistic; it is a revelation. It reveals who is building, who is breaking, and who is watching from a comfortable distance in the name of “solidarity.”

This explosion of Chinese investment, however, has stirred a curious response from some corners of the so‑called Western left. You won’t hear much about the thousands of miles of rail, the rural electrification projects extending power to communities long ignored by colonial grids, or the tens of thousands of local jobs created in construction, logistics, energy, and transport. What you’ll hear instead is a repetitive chorus: But what about the wage disparity? In Chinese-funded projects, they say, Chinese workers are often paid more than local laborers. This becomes their sticking point—not the IMF’s structural adjustment blackmail, not the French uranium extraction in Niger, not AFRICOM’s expansion. Just the fact that a Chinese welder might earn twice what a local worker earns on the same job.

Let’s be blunt: this is not anti-capitalist critique. This is imperial moralism in leftist drag. Because to focus on this disparity without context is to erase the entire structure of imperialist underdevelopment that these projects are beginning to overturn. It’s to weep over a symptom while ignoring the disease. It’s to cling to a fantasy of pure, abstract equality while the Global South claws its way out of centuries of looting and war.

This essay is an intervention. A scalpel against the smug, self-referential politics of the imperial left. We will dismantle the wage critique, reveal its ideological function, and re-center the only metric that matters: does the project empower the working class of the Global South? If it does, then let the critics scream. The bricks are still being laid.

On Whose Backs? The Material Realities Behind the Wage Gap

Let’s begin with the facts, because reality is always more grounded than ideology. In Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway project, a flagship BRI endeavor, protests emerged over disparities between Chinese and Kenyan workers. While precise monthly wage figures are inconsistent across sources, media reports indicate that Kenyan laborers were often paid between KES 400—700 per day (roughly $3—6), while Chinese workers—largely technical staff and engineers—earned significantly more. But what does this gap actually represent? Not racial hierarchy, not imperial disdain, but a layered combination of skill specialization, international relocation, and contractual negotiation—none of which is unique to China.

Chinese workers on overseas projects often fill roles that require years of technical training—rail engineers, tunneling specialists, energy grid architects. Their deployment comes with long-term contracts, typically lasting two to three years. These workers leave their families behind, live in isolated on-site dormitories, endure long hours, and navigate unfamiliar cultural terrains. Their contracts include relocation bonuses, per diems, risk pay, and housing allowances. In short: their higher wages reflect the cost of transnational labor deployment—just as it would for an American engineer posted to Afghanistan or a French technician working in Chad.

And here’s the kicker: despite this wage gap, the local workers on these projects are still earning more than they would in almost any other job in the domestic economy. While we lack consistently disaggregated wage data across all BRI projects, a SAIS-CARI study found that Chinese firms in Africa often paid better than local and other foreign firms in equivalent sectors. What the imperial left sees as inequality is, in the local material context, uplift. For millions of workers, these aren’t bad jobs. They’re the best jobs they’ve ever had.

Who Signs the Contracts? Sovereignty, Class, and the Local Bourgeoisie

One of the most dishonest elements in the wage disparity discourse is the implication that China unilaterally dictates pay scales. In reality, every infrastructure project—especially those under state-to-state BRI terms—is governed by a bilateral agreement. That means the wage structure is negotiated by the host government. If local workers are being underpaid relative to their needs, then the blame lies just as much with the national bourgeoisie as with the Chinese contractors.

Take Kenya again. The Kenyan state, eager to expedite financing and deliver visible progress, signed contracts that prioritized speed, cost, and capital inflows—often at the expense of stronger labor safeguards. According to researchers, labor protections for Kenyan workers on the Standard Gauge Railway were inconsistently enforced, with union representation limited and working conditions raising concern among local advocacy groups. But this was not imposed by China. It was a domestic ruling class decision made in service of capitalist priorities. If you want to fight for better wages on BRI projects, organize the working class to confront their own comprador elite, not to scapegoat China for the failures of postcolonial governance. Even European leaders have admitted that it wasn’t Chinese coercion—but domestic neoliberal policy—that transferred public assets into foreign hands. As Macron put it after meeting Xi in 2022: Europe must “reduce its dependence on the U.S. and avoid being drawn into confrontation” to reclaim sovereignty and act as a “third power.”

And let’s be clear: the idea that Chinese firms should simply pay all workers the same, regardless of location, training, or negotiation, is not a revolutionary demand. It’s liberal utopianism—a dream of frictionless fairness without power struggle, without imperial history, and without sovereign differentiation. That dream dies the moment your shovel hits dirt.

Compared to What? Naming the Real Exploiters

Let’s turn the question back on the critics. If China is guilty of inequality because of a 2:1 wage ratio, what do we call the West’s 4:1, 6:1, even 10:1 wage disparities in the same regions?

During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, American contractors frequently earned hundreds of dollars per day for logistical and security support, while Iraqi workers performing similar work earned only a few dollars daily. In one documented case, a subcontractor charged the U.S. military $75 per bag of laundry while paying local workers as little as $12 per shift. The markup wasn’t just financial—it was colonial. Were the socialists in Brooklyn outraged then? Did they write op-eds about “wage apartheid” on Halliburton sites?

French uranium giant Areva (now Orano) has extracted massive wealth from Niger for decades. Independent sources confirm longstanding criticism that Nigerien miners have worked under unsafe conditions for wages far below a living standard, while the profits fueled France’s nuclear energy infrastructure. There’s no skill differential here. Just raw, racialized extraction. For instance, a ReliefWeb analysis highlights “unsafe working conditions and exposure to radioactive poisoning in the community” around Niger’s uranium mines. So where is the Western left’s fury? Where is their forensic investigation of European wage hierarchies? Silence is not neutrality—it’s complicity.

The reason these critics are louder about China is simple: China threatens to end Western monopoly over the Global South. That’s the real problem. The rest is ideological smoke.

Infrastructure as Class War: Who Builds, Who Bombs, and Who Complains

Infrastructure is not neutral. It is not apolitical, technocratic, or just another sector of economic development. It is a weapon—either of imperial domination or of sovereign defense. And that is precisely why China’s infrastructure projects attract such fury from the West. For the first time in modern history, nations across Africa, Asia, and Latin America are building without begging. They are laying roads, connecting ports, powering cities—and doing it without needing permission from the IMF, USAID, or the European Commission.

But if you listen to the imperial left, you’d think the problem isn’t that the West abandoned development—it’s that China didn’t do it nicely enough. That China’s engineers were paid too much. That the local workers didn’t get matching socks. That railroads built in four years should’ve taken ten.

This is where the real ideological function of the wage critique comes into focus. It doesn’t emerge from proletarian struggle. It emerges from the NGO-academic complex—a class formation fluent in moral posturing but allergic to material power. Many of the loudest critics of BRI projects aren’t workers, unions, or peasant associations. They’re Western-funded think tanks, university departments, and “civil society” monitors funded by the very governments that bombed Libya, starved Yemen, and sanctioned Venezuela.

These forces are not neutral observers. They are the ideological wing of imperialism. Their task is not to uplift—but to delegitimize. And their criticisms of Chinese projects mirror, almost verbatim, the talking points of the U.S. State Department: concerns about “unsustainable debt,” “neo-colonialism,” and “authoritarian development.” Yet none of these concerns are raised about the 78% of Global South debt held by Western financial institutions. None are aimed at the $100 billion in extractive infrastructure built by European oil companies. This is not critique. It’s counterinsurgency in academic form.

In fact, field research in Central Asia offers one of the sharpest rebukes to the anti-China hysteria peddled by both neoconservatives and the NGO-academic complex. A joint ethnographic project led by anthropologists Agnieszka Joniak-Lüthi and Alessandro Rippa—published by Novastan—documents how many so-called BRI “debt traps” are mythical, and how Chinese projects often mirror or even outperform their Western counterparts. They emphasize that many of China’s flagship infrastructure developments, like the Karakoram Highway, predate the BRI by decades and were built on historic South-South solidarity—not extractive imperial design. These scholars dismantle the Orientalist myth that China is uniquely opaque or sinister, noting instead that Chinese firms often operate within—and alongside—global development frameworks, including international donors and co-financed infrastructure banks. The problem isn’t Chinese roads; it’s the fantasy that Western aid ever came without strings or bloodshed.

The Moral Optics of Empire: How Liberal Guilt Becomes Policy

Why does the Western left obsess over wage disparities in Chinese projects but say little about Areva’s uranium empire in Niger, or the EU’s agricultural subsidies that flood African markets with surplus corn and powdered milk, destroying local food systems and rural livelihoods? Why do they whisper about World Bank privatizations and shout about Chinese contractors paying too much to their own workers?

Because to confront Western exploitation would mean confronting their own governments, their own universities, their own careers. It would mean acknowledging that their lifestyle—every phone, every car, every Amazon order—is built on the backs of Global South labor. It’s easier to moralize from afar. To scold China for not being an ethical capitalist. To feign outrage over wage differences, all while paying taxes to fund NATO bombings.

This is what we call imperial moralism. It’s not grounded in solidarity, but in guilt. Guilt that gets transmuted into critique—but always aimed at the wrong target. Not at the empire they live in. But at the rival power challenging that empire’s dominance.

We must say it plainly: Western critiques of BRI labor practices that ignore the structural violence of Western imperialism are not leftist. They are a form of liberal colonialism—demanding that the Global South suffer ethically, develop slowly, and never use its alliances to escape imperial control.

From Moralism to Materialism: The Revolutionary Terrain of Multipolar Development

China’s development model is not perfect. It contains contradictions—wage hierarchies, environmental concerns, uneven bargaining between states and firms. But these are contradictions within the camp of anti-imperialist development, not between oppression and liberation. They are contradictions that arise from building under global capitalism while resisting its command center.

We are not moral arbiters. We are revolutionaries. Our task is not to grade China on a purity scale. It is to identify: where is imperialism dominant? And where is it being eroded? China’s infrastructure projects, despite their flaws, represent a rupture in the global system of dependency. They bring roads where the West brought drones. They build schools where the West built sweatshops. They offer finance without conditionality where the West offered debt traps—as noted in a Boston University analysis observing that China’s approach “lacks policy conditionality and fiscal austerity requirements of Western multilaterals.”

This broader multipolar shift is also reflected in the operations of the New Development Bank (NDB), the BRICS-led multilateral development bank headquartered in Shanghai. As documented by a Andrea Molinari and Rocío Ceballos, the NDB has expanded its mandate to support infrastructure, climate action, and sovereign development—though it still faces limitations in non-sovereign and local-currency financing. According to Reuters, the NDB has approved approximately $32.8 billion in loans and aims to increase local-currency lending from 22% to 30% by 2026. Its evolution signals a tectonic shift in the international financial architecture: not a rejection of multilateralism, but a reclamation of it by the Global South. The emergence of BRICS financial institutions like the NDB represents a concrete attempt to restructure global financing around Southern priorities—albeit unevenly, and with contradictions that must be resolved through class struggle, not abandonment.

And that is precisely why they are under attack. Not because they pay Chinese workers more—but because they pay anyone at all to build something that isn’t supervised by the empire.

So let us drop the measuring tape and pick up the shovel. Let us support development, even when it is uneven, so long as it points in the direction of sovereignty, dignity, and class power for the colonized.

Lines of Struggle: What a Revolutionary Position Actually Looks Like

To criticize without strategy is to serve the enemy. If we are to critique China’s overseas development model, it must not be on imperialism’s terms. It must come from the standpoint of internationalist class struggle—from the trenches of the Global South, not the seminar rooms of the Global North.

This means beginning with the fundamental question: Compared to what? Compared to IMF austerity? Compared to European multinationals paying pennies and dumping waste? Compared to decades of underdevelopment enforced by the very institutions now pretending to care about fair wages?

China’s infrastructure projects are not without contradictions. But these are contradictions against imperialism—not weapons of it. And in a world still ordered by colonial debt, imperial accumulation, and Western military domination, those contradictions must be resolved from within the camp of anti-imperialist sovereignty, not handed over to the NGO—World Bank axis to “audit.”

So what does a revolutionary position look like?

Build Sovereignty, Not Dependency: Strategic Demands for the South

First, we must defend the right of Global South governments to negotiate on their own terms. This includes pushing for:

Labor quota clauses in bilateral agreements—as part of Ethiopia’s strategy to maximize local participation in Chinese infrastructure projects, according to the Center for Global Development’s call for stronger local content in African BRI contracts.
Apprenticeship mandates requiring Chinese firms to transfer skills and technology to Indigenous engineers, architects, and trade workers.
Profit reinvestment guarantees—mechanisms ensuring a portion of revenues stay in-country to fund public infrastructure, not just private coffers.

These are not anti-China demands. These are anti-comprador demands. They are the demands of workers and peasants confronting their own domestic bourgeoisie—and leveraging China’s investment not to entrench dependency, but to build material independence.

Let it be said clearly: the contradictions within BRI are opportunities for class struggle. They are spaces where the Global South can press for more—more wages, more sovereignty, more control. But this struggle must be waged by the people of the South themselves—not outsourced to Western academics who never built a road or fought a loan shark in their lives.

>>2453495


The North’s Role Is Not to Police, But to Disarm the Empire

What, then, is the responsibility of the Western left? It is not to nitpick BRI contracts or wag fingers at Chinese labor hierarchies. It is to break the chokehold of their own imperial state.

Demand the U.S. and EU cancel the debts they imposed on BRI nations—and fully implement HIPC and MDRI debt relief, which has delivered 100% cancellation of eligible IMF, World Bank, and African Development Bank debts to 36—37 poor countries to date.
Expose and dismantle Western financial dominance in global bond markets—African governments now owe more to private Western creditors than to China (35% vs. 12% of external debt), and these loans carry significantly higher interest rates.
Organize class war at home: oppose military spending, shut down arms exports, and sabotage the engines of empire that profit from Global South collapse.

In other words: don’t tell China how to build a dam until you’ve stopped your own government from bombing one. Don’t talk about fair wages in Kenya until you’ve organized workers at Amazon and Raytheon. And don’t cry about Chinese construction sites when your own tax dollars pay for apartheid walls and surveillance drones.

From Solidarity to Strategy: Toward an Anti‑Imperialist Development Front

The real task before us is to forge a global front of sovereign development. One that links:

Chinese infrastructure capacity
Latin American resource sovereignty
African industrial potential
The revolutionary traditions of peoples who have resisted empire for centuries

This means building South‑South labour federations to bargain collectively with Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, and even domestic firms. It means creating political alliances across Global South governments to demand coordinated development, not just bilateral deals. These ideas aren’t theoretical—they reflect the steadily growing decolonial and technical cooperation models underway between the Global South and China:

Examples include China’s BRI-linked support via the AIIB and New Development Bank, designed to fund infrastructure projects without Western-style conditionality 1. Similarly, UN and regional bodies now champion South‑South and triangular cooperation—encompassing exchanges in trade, health, education, and technology—building practical capacity across countries, from Latin America to Africa to Asia 2.

Because the NGO model is not the path to liberation. It is the velvet glove of imperialism. A slower suffocation. A prettier poverty.

File: 1756544152126.jpeg (320.58 KB, 1413x2048, hstq4qrx21mf1.jpeg)

Requiem for a dream…

>>2453539
What happened to him???

>>2453541
Liberalism and gusanomericanism. Terminal, I'm afraid.

>>2453541
>>2453543
last i heard of this guy he was coping about democrats being the reason he was broke in LA, and that biden was an MSS asset or whatever. would be suprised if he's still alive atp

>>2453539
I'm getting a general picture of his decline here from yandex. the translation isn't perrfect but basically

>retired firefighter with happy family and social media clout


>in debt, divorced wife, cursed parents, had to stop crpyto gambling, threw a tantrum and quit his job as a kindergarten teacher (?)


>went to the USA, got attacked by Lao Mo (?) on the way, got put in immigration supervision for a year, released,


>after leaving immigration supervision, ate donuts and praised america, became popular


>got injured while doing doordash, dr. charged $5760 for ten minute visit


>started to hate the USA and went to australia and became homeless


>disappeared for a year, resurfaced with a missing eye, said he got kidnapped/beaten in california

>>2453771
also meant for >>2453541

>>2453771
<got injured while doing doordash, dr. charged $5760 for ten minute visit

Feels like a common point of dissapointment for many a gusano

File: 1756579766762.mp4 (24.45 MB, 576x1024, fnkwhb.mp4)

>>2453689
His twitter is https://x.com/fnkwhb if you want to stare into the gangstalked mentally ill abyss.

Same retarded broken english falun gong reddit memes you see on /pol/ and NAFO twitter.
Really shows how the only true believers of the neoliberal imperial slop are the schizophrenic gusanos. Really reminiscent of the self hating Taiwanese/HKers and Ukrainians dying for hamburgers.

Don't feel bad. These people are a danger to Chinese society. Deporting them to Meiguo is what they deserve.

>>2453948
Damn, this guy knows what's up, i'm tempted to send him some money to capture some chinese spie.

>>2449174
it is a genuine existing narrative in china tho, after some false accusation event

>>2445539
>The real academic blackpill is that 1:1 tutoring has the best outcomes but it's just not viable to provide that to everyone.
that's true! and it's not what is done in the chinese educational system as you can see in the video. 1:1 tutoring also does not inherently mean putting mean tremendous stress on the student. indeed it could mean the exact opposite.

>>2453323
The answer is different from "民营企业 (mín yíng qǐyè)" and revolves around a different character for "private."
The Key Character: 私 (sī)

The character 私 (sī) directly means "private," "personal," or "selfish." It is the direct conceptual opposite of 公 (gōng), which means "public" or "state."

Therefore, the general term for a privately-owned company, in a Western sense, is:

私人企业 (sīrén qǐyè) or 私有企业 (sīyǒu qǐyè)

私人 (sīrén): Private person / individual

私有 (sīyǒu): Privately owned

企业 (qǐyè): Enterprise / company

So, for a ranking of Western companies (like the Forbes list of largest private companies), you would translate it as:

美国私人企业500强 (Měiguó Sīrén Qǐyè 500 Qiáng) - "Top 500 US Private Companies"

>>2449174
it can be both. burgers are both desperate for specialists and hopes some of them can be used as turncoats. doesn't mean the strategy will work


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