Misusing the Children: The UK Online Safety Act, Privacy and CensorshipThe United Kingdom can always be relied upon to supply us with the eccentric, the admirably dotty, and the odd extreme bit of adventure in policy. Lately, those mad protectors and censors with their shields of false virtue and hollow intellect have decided to launch an assault on the users of the Internet. In this, they are joining the platoons of hysteria from such countries as Australia, where age verification restrictions on platforms are all the rage. It’s all about the children, and when adults start meddling with children, all sorts of trouble arise. Much in line with the foolish, and potentially dangerous efforts being made by the eCommissioner (not a misspelling) in Australia to impose “industry codes” of child safety, the UK Online Safety Act (OSA) is being used to blanket social media, search engines and virtually any other site of service with age verification restrictions. The OSA lists three categories that are said to be harmful to children: primary priority content, priority content and non-designated content. Primary priority content is a British favourite of the repressed classes: pornography, and content that supposedly encourages suicide, self-harm, or various behaviours and disorders with eating. (If only there was a form of pornography that might encourage good eating habits.) Priority harmful content covers abuse relevant to race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability or gender reassignment and any content that incites hatred against such people. To this, among others, can be added bullying, the promotion of “serious violence, and depiction of serious violence” whether authentic or fictional. To make things even more expansively ludicrous, the regulations cover content that is non-designated (NDC), which might as well be the entire body of knowledge and existence on this planet and beyond seen by the regulators of the day as dangerous. Examples are skimpy, and do not mention the enriching apple in the Garden of Eden offered to Eve by the opportunistic serpent. Something, however, is “NDC if it presents a material risk of significant harm to an appreciable number of children in the UK”. What a triumph of insufferable vagueness.
https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/08/04/misusing-the-children-the-uk-online-safety-act-privacy-and-censorship/Who Gets a “Right of Return”?The Forward has been running a series of articles about a group in northern Arkansas that owns adjacent tracts of land that Jews and non-whites are forbidden to purchase or live on. On Thursday, the attorney general of Arkansas said this was legal. The details are complicated — mostly focused on the fact that there’s been no purchase or sale or business transaction yet, so nothing formally violating the law — but the significance of this story for thinking about Israel and Zionism is not. The Arkansas group is called Return to the Land, and it is part of a larger national movement. Focusing on people’s proof of “ancestral heritage,” it seeks, according to its mission statement, to “put land [in the United States] BACK [my emphasis] under the control of Europeans.” The parallels between this movement and Zionism are striking. Both movements claim that they are movements of return; hence the “back to control of Europeans.” Both movements style themselves as the original owners/stewards of the land, with no reference to its previous indigenous inhabitants. Both movements focus on some proof of lineal descent. Even more striking than the question of ownership of land is the question of whom the land can be sold to. While I would imagine anyone reading these articles in the Forward would be horrified by this Arkansas movement, what exactly do supporters of Israel think the Jewish National Fund (JNF), which many of us raised money for when we were children, is? It owns 13 percent of the land within the pre-1967 borders of Israel, and in the last few years, it has sought to purchase land in the West Bank. More important, the JNF has refused to sell the land it owns to Palestinians. That is not some sub rosa practice, never talked about openly; it is part of its charter and part of the claims it has made in court. The JNF has argued, “The loyalty of the JNF is given to the Jewish people and only to them is the JNF obligated. The JNF, as the owner of the JNF land, does not have a duty to practice equality towards all citizens of the state.”
https://jacobin.com/2025/08/right-of-return-arkansas-zionismWhy Sudanese people are losing faith in the 'government of hope'When former UN official Kamil Idris was sworn in as Sudan’s new prime minister this spring, he became the first person to hold the position in a permanent capacity since Abdalla Hamdok resigned in January 2022 amid ongoing political turmoil. His appointment by Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan elicited a polarised response. Proponents viewed it as a potential turning point in Sudan’s democratic transition, citing Idris’s political independence, technocratic expertise, and established ties with international organisations. They argued that his non-partisan background would help in navigating Sudan’s complex transitional landscape. Sceptics, meanwhile, questioned the legitimacy of an unelected leader, arguing that his appointment - as opposed to a popular mandate - could constrain his autonomy. Critics have also pointed to the persistence of military influence, suggesting that Idris might function as a civilian proxy, with his authority circumscribed. This perspective underscores broader apprehensions about the deep involvement of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in politics - a role that contradicts the principle of a military remaining neutral in governance. While not all observers may recognise this dynamic, analysts, and those closely following Sudanese politics, note SAF’s entrenched influence in political life. Furthermore, during the ongoing conflict in Sudan this politicisation of the army has led to suggestions about the close connections with the Islamist-led regime which had been overthrown by the revolution of 2018/2019. There is heightened skepticism about whether Sudan’s current transition will produce a genuinely inclusive civilian government, or if military-backed structures will continue to shape power behind the scenes, and therefore the risks of a facade of civilian rule without substantive democratisation. Idris faces multiple challenges, chief among them the ongoing war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has raged since April 2023, severely destabilising Sudan’s economy and social cohesion. Forming a new government was his first hurdle. Last month, Idris unveiled plans for a non-partisan, technocratic "government of hope" - a move that swiftly drew criticism from key political factions, who accused him of sidelining major civilian coalitions that had been instrumental in resisting military rule.
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/why-sudanese-people-are-losing-faith-government-hope