A Demonstrator’s Guide to Operational Security How do police and federal agents identify and target those who participate in demonstrations? What countermeasures can we take to hinder this kind of repression? In this anonymously submitted text, one affinity group explores how they address these questions. Once upon a time, only those who intended to engage in high-risk confrontational protest activity had to concern themselves with surveillance and security. Today, surveillance and policing are becoming much more invasive and arbitrary. Even if you never violate any law, the state may nonetheless seek to make an example of you. Everyone who might participate in a demonstration at some point should familiarize themselves with the security protocols that radicals have developed over the years. If you are new to demonstrating, do not be intimidated by all of these considerations. The more people take the streets, the safer it will be for everyone—and nothing could possibly be more dangerous than remaining isolated and passive, letting the police state come for all of us one by one. This guide simply outlines how to maximize your safety while engaging in protest activity.
https://crimethinc.com/2025/08/28/a-demonstrators-guide-to-operational-security-fighting-back-staying-free KKE: Using the “multi-polar world” to whitewash capitalism: Comment by the International Relations Section of the CC of the KKE The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit meeting was used to foster new illusions among the peoples. Certain forces see imperialism merely as the “empire” of the USA and on this basis they salute the promotion of new emerging capitalist powers in global affairs, such as the emergence of new inter-state unions (BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Collective Security Treaty Organization, ALBA etc.), which are formed by capitalist states, with an economic–political and military content. These developments are saluted as the beginning of the emergence of a new “multi-polar world”, which will “reform” and will give “new life” to the UN and the other international organizations that will escape the US “hegemony”. These hypotheses conclude that peace will be ensured in this way. It is argued that the “new” inter-imperialist contradictions and the apparent realignment of the global system can lead to the “democratization” of international relations, as a world with many “poles” is emerging with the strengthening of Russia, China, Brazil and other states and the relative retreat of the USA’s position. Related proposals are heard, such as, for example,the expansion of the UN Security Council with other countries. So the question arises: Can an increased global role for the EU, as, for example, SYRIZA and the Party of the European Left argued for, or even an enhanced role for Russia and China, as claimed by the apologists for the Eurasian imperialist axis that is being formed, create another “peaceful” environment for international developments?
https://www.solidnet.org/article/CP-of-Greece-Using-the-multi-polar-world-to-whitewash-capitalism/Lula’s Coalition Beat the Right. Can It Deliver for the Left?In assessing the broad-front strategy that ensured Lula’s election and largely defined his third term in office, this article proceeds in three parts. The first discusses the 2022 race, examining the moves and arguments undergirding Lula’s decision to actively incorporate centrist figures into his sixth presidential campaign. The article then discusses Lula’s government from 2023 to 2025, touching on the internal debates that have defined the administration’s political orientation. The final part turns to 2026 and the presidential campaign ahead, offering some speculative analysis as to whether and how Lula might try to run a race similar to the one that led him to victory in 2022. During his previous stints in office, Lula benefited from his reputation as a skilled yet ideologically flexible negotiator committed to delivering material improvements for his traditional base of poor and working-class voters. Economic gains, such as controlling inflation, increasing employment, and raising incomes, were once key indicators of his administration’s success and contributed to positive public opinion. He left office with an 83 percent approval rating — an achievement unimaginable amid the rancorous polarization that has defined Brazil, among other democracies around the world, in the years since — handing the reins of national governance to his chosen successor, the nation’s first woman president. With his country poised to continue its slow but steady climb toward global influence, Lula’s legacy seemed secure. But the political landscape has shifted drastically in a decade and a half. The growing ideological divisions in the country, fueled by new media platforms rife with misinformation, have shifted the focus away from traditional economic metrics, which have consistently outperformed market expectations throughout Lula’s third term, and toward more c ontentious debates over morality and cultural values. This shift has created a less favorable environment for Lula, with policy successes no longer having the same impact on his approval ratings as they once did. According to José Dirceu, who served as Lula’s chief of staff twenty years ago, the president “set up a center-right government.” He adds that “the PT gets outraged” when he points this out, “but it is a requirement of the historical and political moment we are living in.” Lula, he says, “has not opted for ideological polarization.” Indeed, Lula has not picked major fights on topics that animate the Left. However, if polls are to be believed, the political benefit of avoiding controversy has been negligible. As of late April 2025, Lula’s approval rating stood just below 40 percent. Well over half of those polled expressed a negative view of his administration, raising red flags as to how he might perform in the 2026 presidential race. Lula’s experience in power illustrates that a broad-front strategy in campaigning is decidedly weaker as a case for how to actually govern. Assembling a diverse coalition against a far-right extremist is one thing; being beholden to political actors outside of your ideological camp, each of whom credit themselves in large part for your victory, is quite another. Delivering on a coherent, ambitious social democratic agenda under such circumstances has proven difficult, if not impossible, in the world’s fifth-largest democracy. This is a structural problem for progressive governance in an era of profound ideological polarization, one that Lula — who will be eighty when Brazilians go to the polls next year — has struggled to resolve.
https://jacobin.com/2025/09/lula-coalition-broad-front-left