Most Chinese people support the current Communist government less out of devotion to Marxist–Leninist ideals and more from a sense of obligation to their ancestral homeland. Every family that lived through the 1950s and 60s has seen firsthand how Marxist–Leninist policies damaged family structure, values, traditions, and heritage. But with the Party now firmly entrenched in power, it has intertwined its own survival with the survival of China itself.
No longer rallying people around internationalism, the party now appeals to Chineseness—merging patriotism with loyalty to the Party. This framing allows opposition to the party to be cast as opposition to China and the Chineseness itself, a powerful tool for shaping public opinion.
By redefining “Chinese culture” on its own terms, the Party can suppress aspects of heritage it views as dangerous (such as certain folk traditions, religion, family values) and elevate those that bolster centralized control (Shang Yang Han Fei legalism). Once enough citizens believe that “China” and “the Party” are the same, any push for political change can be framed as an existential threat. This psychological fusion makes systemic reform far more difficult to allow for the party elites to remain in power.
Many ordinary Chinese today may have little interest in Marxist–Leninist theory, yet they support the Communist Party for the sake of stability and because no viable alternative exists. This is not ideological conviction so much as legitimacy built through cultural, ethnic, and national identity capture.