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GrapheneOS cannot be fully trusted because it runs on Google's proprietary hardware stack, which remains a critical vulnerability. While GrapheneOS markets itself as a privacy-focused alternative, its security is undermined by the fact that it operates on devices like Google's Pixel smartphones—hardware designed and controlled entirely by Google. Unlike other OEMs, Google does not merely integrate off-the-shelf components; it designs its own processors (e.g., Tensor chips) and develops the closed-source firmware and software that power them. Other manufacturers receive binary blobs from chipmakers, which they cannot modify, but Google retains unilateral authority to embed hidden functionalities or surveillance mechanisms directly into the hardware-software ecosystem.

This means Google could inject malicious code into the processor’s firmware—code that operates independently of Android (and thus independently of GrapheneOS itself). Such malware would run at the hardware level, bypassing the operating system entirely and evading detection. If Google exploits this capability in its proprietary GApps, the same logic applies to the foundational software controlling its processors. Since GrapheneOS cannot audit or modify these closed-source components, users are left exposed to potential backdoors.

If you trust GrapheneOS on Pixel devices, you must also trust Google’s closed-source hardware stack—the very same infrastructure that could enable pervasive surveillance. In that case, there is no meaningful distinction between GrapheneOS and stock Android; both rely on Google’s opaque technology. Conversely, if you reject GApps and Google’s data harvesting, you cannot reconcile that distrust with reliance on Google’s hardware. To truly deGoogle, you must abandon devices where the manufacturer controls the silicon itself.