taoism seems explicitly market-minded, in that it seeks a balance between supply and demand without any external authority imposed, like the emporer, who rules best by not having himself seen. his analog of the knife sharpening itself to bluntness can be put on jevonian and austrian notions of marginal utility. a thing loses its value when there is too much of it; a paradox, such as aristotle presents, that water is better than gold, yet gold is more expensive. he says this is due to scarcity - would you have an alternative position? i really like todd mcgowan's lacanian economics:
>>>/leftypol/2390777where he sees surplus value as a negative magnitude of what he deems "inutility" (but what can be rendered as jevonian "disutility" or the expenditure of labour). his idea is that the sublimity of the commodity is in the surplus enjoyment it gives us, by a phantasmatic "gap" between exchange-value and use-value (objet petit a). thus, what is generative is the void of uselessness attached to the commodity (he uses the example of how the vacuum seal of a product constitutes its surplus enjoyment by the degree of its emptiness; the same way that he says an apple iphone packaging is often preserved by people despite being useless; thus, the phone is useful, but what is "extra" valuable is what is useless (thus, we purchase what we cannot use). this appears similar to the tao; that it is its absence which is its presence. value to marx is similarly ephemeral, but comprises what we may call "subjectivity". value is something subjective to the extent that it is mutually recognised in sale; yet to marx there is also a "phantomlike" objectivity to value which we may adequately call "unconscious". it drives us to its own determination, but as todd says, what is unconscious cannot be *directly* realised, but only indirectly. this is why todd says that disutility must be sold as utility for it to be sublimed, in what it is not (its truth is only known by a fiction) - thus as lao tzu writes:
<The tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal Name.https://terebess.hu/english/tao/mitchell.htmlonce we name the thing directly, we lose it. so this is a potential criticism of "value"; that as a signifier of itself (i.e. $1 = $1), it loses itself to the signification. you can mend this in a hegelian way by seeing the value of something as the quantity of something else (X = Y), as jean-baptiste say and marx do. marx also says this:
<The commodity that figures as universal equivalent, is, on the other hand, excluded from the relative value form. If the linen, or any other commodity serving as universal equivalent, were, at the same time, to share in the relative form of value, it would have to serve as its own equivalent. We should then have 20 yds of linen = 20 yds of linen; this tautology expresses neither value, nor magnitude of value.https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htmso then, (X ≠ X), in a similar manner to this:
<How then is the value, e.g., of a 12 hour working-day to be determined? By the 12 working-hours contained in a working-day of 12 hours, which is an absurd tautology […] Labour is the substance, and the immanent measure of value, but has itself no value.https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch19.htmso then, a product of labour is not itself labour, or as engels writes:
<As an activity which creates values it can no more have any special value than gravity can have any special weight, heat any special temperature, electricity any special strength of current.https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1885-c2/ch00.htm#1885so then, we may see the nature of indirect signification, such as in the way of the tao. a thing is measured by its labour content, but is itself not labour. value to marx thus is not something *in* commodities, but a subjectivity which is realised *between* commodities in exchange: (X = Y)/(Y = X), etc.
just some basic suggestions. hope they help. 😅