>>2959432>begriff as a sort of hologram of various determinationsBut if begriff is itself the determination, then how can it be plural?
>in terms of actual existence he is caught in timeKant raises and lowers this question in terms of subjectivity, such as in his essay "The End of All Things", that if we presume an afterlife, it is itself contained in time. Thinking to Kant is linear, so is a condition, not unconditional. Plato approaches this somewhat where he writes that thinking is an internal speech. If God's first act is speech (Genesis and John 1), then God is temporalised within a finite determination. If his first act is thought, it is only the same, but this is all because we presume a "beginning". To begin is to end; each are held in sequence. This is perhaps why to some, eternity is where the beginning and end are identical, and so the circle, as motion, as line, is also stasis and curve. We see a cosmic cycle unfold in Biblical prophecy, where the end and beginning of history are united (e.g. Eden). To Marx, this is Communism, but Marx also sees that it is a sublation. Too, the New Heaven on a New Earth presents this higher form of the same. If we then say that God is caught in time, and God is absolute subjectivity, then we practice mediation; e.g. thinking about thinking, like Aristotle writes of the prime mover. Self-consciousness is consciousness of the self. Or in more extensive terms, the self as otherness of self, or what in logic is the law of non-contradiction; a negation of negation. However, a thinker is not a thought, and so the creator is not creation. Does Hegel believe in the unconditional? In that which is absolutely independent? If the self creates otherness out of itself, there is an irreducible identity. Evidently, to act is to externalise, and so to relate to otherness. When God acts therefore, it is simultaneously creative, and alienating, like wage labour. If all is one, how is it negated from within? With childlike curiosity, we simply ask, "why is there something rather than nothing?" This appears to be the only question, but does Hegel have an answer?
>the state as a false reconciliationI would infer that this is because the bourgeois conception is extremely dialectical; as per Montesqieu's tripartite state, balancing each other. It is the same principle of free markets, where like Heraclitus' Logos, there is equilibrium by tension; order by chaos, and so on. Law by anarchy. In this case, conflict isn't the exception, but the rule, where evil is made to be good, like Smith's Invisible Hand, converting selfishness into altruism, and consequently, altruism becomes selfishness. Charity is a new vice. It is this best of all possible worlds which is simply the least terrible, like what Churchill says about Democracy. Communism as a substitute thus carries the warning, "the road to Hell is paved with good intentions", no?
>it fails to actually measure up to its ostensible goals due to the mode of production it is situated withinBut what is the obstruction? If I understand Marx well enough, capitalism is a totality, so as self-consciousness, contains its self-otherness in the form of labour and capital, as you previously wrote on its abstraction. It was also the bourgeois economists who identified labour as the source of value and surplus value. There are some socialists thus who claim that liberalism didn't go far enough, and so you see socialists alongside abolitionists in the 19th century, not in spite of ideals, but in alliance with them. It has been the socialists who have always pushed for civil liberties to the same extent (e.g. female, queer and racial rights), which is an individualist project. The difference is that the liberal views it from the point of one's private property, which begins in his person, while a socialist is really less principled, I would say. What exactly is the subject of his politics? Liberals lead with "The Rights of Man", which is really the rights of property. Man exercises his freedom by self-possession. In free contract does man realise liberté, egalité and fraternité, as Marx writes. Marx, however, is not liberal, since he doesn't actually have these ideals, since Marx criticises thrice, (i) private property (which existed before capitalism), (ii) markets (which existed before capitalism), and (iii) capitalism (which both liberates and constrains markets, and property). Out of these 3, Marx is actually most pro-capitalist, wouldn't you agree? Many liberals in the 19th century see political contradiction in the state (e.g. Spooner, Spencer) while others see it in production (e.g. J.S. Mill, W.S. Jevons). Many still claim the state is the real obstruction from free market utopia. Msrx in writing on Proudhon says that the industrial revolution subverted the very project of a free market, since supply now took the lead over demand. Generalised crises begin in the 19th century.
>it is not any particular brick but rather their systematicityJust to clarify, this is a question of form. The form of a house is singular, yet as a whole is made of parts. If a part is only a part, it cannot be whole, yet if we suppose a house as a bunch of bricks, the form of a house is lost, since it assembled, not assembling. Efficient and final causes.
>retroactive necessity>i think here, the comparison to aristotle might lead to confusionI'm not so certain, since Aristotle also possesses a retroactive view of the telos of things; that as a final cause, it is only actual after the fact of its completion. All material possesses potential, but potency is not activity. In his first book of Politics, for example, he sees that parts of the state must proceed from the whole, else, parts couldn't be parts. For this, he writes that the household, and individual is himself a product of the state. In Pseudo-Aristotle, contrarily, housecraft is seen to be prior to statecraft. It is in the bourgeois era, such as with Montchretien (1615) that politics is a result of the economic, in conceprion. Marx is obviously a writer on this; of the economic base/superstructure. Theories of causes thus conflict, between the active (efficient) and retroactive (telos). Means and ends.
>the symbolic is capable of radically restructuring itselfSure, but to what end? If God is self-consciousness, we return to theism. So, God achieves self-consciousness in man; this is the given teleology.
>materiality as having more structural capacity than we give it creditWell, biological material proves there is a mystery in matter.
>also i like the idea of god emerging quite a bit. The classical cosmogony is one of Chaos, or elemental randomness, which is brought into order by God. Each are presupposed as being uncreated. This is also difference between harmony and discord. I find it convincing, since if time is only matter in motion, it would need to exist before time and also be brought into motion, meaning an immaterialiy.
tbh although i still sorta use trinitarian ideas
I haven't read the Church fathers and that's where the Trinity comes from, in tandem with neoplatonic influences. I don't personally read the Trinity being present in the Bible. In the scenes of Daniel, we see the Son of Man but not the Holy Spirit, the same in Revelation. In fact, we don't even see the Father, but only the Lamb of God, whose nsme is the Name of God. In John 1, God and Logos sre co-identified, without a third part. But also, in Matthew, Jesus receives the Holy Spirit only afrer his baptism, and this is where his ministry begins. So, Christ is not Christ without this power.
<material cause is fundamental<formal causality is an indispensable explanatory tool for biology<plasticityA wooden chair and a metal chair are both chairs.
Can an animal be made of flesh and paint?
Here, the form of a thing is entered into simulation. Plato struggled with simulation too, writing that a painting of a man is less real than a man in flesh, but this is complicated by the Greek imagination, which saw in myth how statues came alive and robots were created by Hephaestus. Indeed, even man is made of clay. The reality of a living thing is its soul, or power of Will; self-determination. For this, some Greeks imagined that magnets possess souls. Too, Plato and Aristotle disagreed as to which creatures possessed rational souls. Finally on this topic, would you agree with me that the final sin, of life being given to the "image of the beast", is a mimicry of God, by effecting idols (e.g. dead images) into having life?
<And he had power to give life unto the image of the beast, that the image of the beast should both speak and cause to be killed as many as would not worship the image of the beast.https://www.biblegateway.com/verse/en/Revelation%2013%3A15It is also in Jewish folklore, of the golem, but the golem is not self-willed. Marx's critique of capitalism is also Jewish, in desisting from idolatry. It is the fetishism of commodities which beguiles the gentiles. As yet, it is still money to Marx which is the God of Judaism, so he was not religious.