/leftypol/ - Leftist Politically Incorrect

>>2496597
Yes. Whenever there is an increase in constant capital responsible for manufacturing commodity A, unless there is economic planning to curb the production of commodity A, there is an increase in the market's ability to supply commodity A, and the oversupply of commodity A decreases its demand, which causes the price to fall. The falling prices subsequently cause a decrease in profits. Capital's own Achilles heal is that it increases the efficiency of production, while keeping it unplanned, privatized, and profit-driven. This leads to crises of ovrerproduction and the tendency of profit rates to fall. The counter tendency is war and the deliberate destruction of productive forces. This is the reactionary tendency of capitalism to destroy its own bounty (cheap commodities) in the name of bringing the price back up. This is a long term tendency that has been observed repeatedly over 2 centuries. But capitalists cope because there are brief periods of prevailing counter-tendency, usually during and after wars. Because the destruction of constant capital increases the need for variable capital, and the exploitation of variable capital (living labor) is responsible for high prices and consequently high profit rates. Make sense?

>>2496610
the question was
<this seems to be a central economic question then; how long should the working day be, and why are we unable to change the current state of affairs?

>>2496597
i would say for empirical evidence we can see the amount of businesses subsidised by the state.

>>2496624
>what youre thinking of labour-time as "measure of value", but smith already said this.
smith talks about abstract socially necessary labor time?

>>2496608
>humanity has achieved communism, famously a state of affairs to be established, because the work week has been lowered from 80 hours to 40 hours.
r u sure?

>>2496642
we have to approach it gradually. when marx speaks of "abstract labour" what he means is the consideration of different concrete labours as quantities of the same substance (an abstraction made by exchange):
>But the exchange of commodities is evidently an act characterised by a total abstraction from use value. Then one use value is just as good as another, provided only it be present in sufficient quantity […] As use values, commodities are, above all, of different qualities, but as exchange values they are merely different quantities, and consequently do not contain an atom of use value.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm
he often makes reference to benjamin franklin in this regard (who wrote before smith) as theorising this:
<The celebrated Franklin, one of the first economists, after Wm. Petty, who saw through the nature of value, says: “Trade in general being nothing else but the exchange of labour for labour, the value of all things is … most justly measured by labour.”
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm
<Franklin, on the contrary, considers that the value of shoes, minerals, yarn, paintings, etc., is determined by abstract labour which has no particular quality and can thus be measured only in terms of quantity.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/ch01a.htm
aristotle also speaks of *money* being the "measure of value", but to marx, this is obviously insufficient. according to marx, franklin successfully sees value as abstract labour, but its smith who formalises it:
>Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/smith-adam/works/wealth-of-nations/book01/ch05.htm
so far we have abstract labour-time. where it regards a notion of "necessity", there is then ricardo:
<The value of a commodity, or the quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends on the relative quantity of labour which is necessary for its production
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/ricardo/tax/ch01.htm
so now we have exchange-value defined by the necessary abstract labour-time read to produce commodities. for this reason, paul cockshott says that marx and ricardo share the same theory of value:
>the theory of value in Marx is identical in all major predictions to that of Ricardo […] The theories are therefore substantially identical in the empirical predictions they make, differing only slightly in terminology […] Marx and Ricardo say the same thing where they are both right and say the same thing where they are both wrong. So yes Marx has a labour theory of value as Ricardo had. 
https://paulcockshott.wordpress.com/2018/04/05/did-marx-have-a-labour-theory-of-value/
lets see marx's formulation of SNLT:
>The value of a commodity, therefore, varies directly as the quantity, and inversely as the productiveness, of the labour incorporated in it.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm
[q] = quantity of labour-time
[p] = productivity of labour
[q/p] = SNLT
this is also the same formula as what jevons uses to express the "rate of production" (theory of political economy, chapter 5): [x/t]

in this, harvey sees the same theory of value as ricardo:
>One reason Marx could get away with this cryptic presentation of use-value, exchange-value and value was because anybody who had read Ricardo would say, yes, this is Ricardo. And it is pure Ricardo with, however, one exceptional insertion.
<companion to capital, chapter 1
what is this insertion however?
>Marx uses the concept of socially necessary labor­ time. What Marx has done here is to replicate the Ricardian conceptual apparatus and, seemingly innocently, insert a modification. But this insertion, as we shall see, makes a world of difference.
<companion to capital, chapter 1
harvey elaborates:
>A representation of value, says Marx. And value is socially necessary labor­ time. But value doesn't mean anything unless it connects back to use­ value. Use-value is socially necessary to value […] But in order for the labor to be socially necessary, somebody somewhere must want, need or desire the commodity, which means that use-values have to be reintegrated into the argument.
<companion to capital, chapter 1
all that he seems to be qualifying is the very basic point that a commodity must be useful to be valuable, but we can already read this in marx:
>Lastly nothing can have value, without being an object of utility. If the thing is useless, so is the labour contained in it; the labour does not count as labour, and therefore creates no value.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm
and here he defines social necessity as usefulness:
>For this, it is necessary that the labour expended upon it, be of a kind that is socially useful, of a kind that constitutes a branch of the social division of labour.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch03.htm
this would differ from ricardo only if he didnt qualify value in the same way, but he does:
>If a commodity were in no way useful, - in other words, if it could in no way contribute to our gratification, - it would be destitute of exchangeable value, however scarce it might be, or whatever quantity of labour might be necessary to procure it.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/ricardo/tax/ch01.htm
we may read patrick murray in the same way,
>Concrete labour involved in commodities that are not sold proves itself to be not ‘socially necessary’. It fails to produce value. Thus, though the general idea of abstract (physiological) labour has nothing to do with the market or demand, market considerations definitely enter into the concept of ‘practically abstract’ labour.
<the mismeasure of wealth, chapter 5
he foonotes this to make distinction from ricardo:
>In Marxian value theory, value is not an independent variable that determines price, as in Ricardian value theory. This difference signals the ‘truly social’ character of Marx’s theory of value. Marx recognises price as the necessary expression of the value of a commodity, that is, of the peculiar social form of the labour that produced the commodity. But labour does not exist independently of its social form, a reality to which Ricardian theory is oblivious.
<the mismeasure of wealth, chapter 5, footnote 38
of course, this has been down to be a totally erroneous interpretation of ricardo. to ricardo, a commodity only possesses a value in exchange if it also has utility. continuing with harvey, he even apppears misunderstands marx's law of value:
>The rise of monetary exchange leads to socially necessary labor-time becoming the guiding force within a capitalistic mode of production. Therefore, value as socially necessary labor-time is historically specific to the capitalist mode of production. It arises only in a situation where market exchange is doing the requisite job.
<companion to capital, chapter 1
of course this is untrue, since value to marx has always been SNLT and it is only in the capitalist mode of production that the law of value begins to be usurped by the law of surplus value, spoken of by smith in the decomposition of the value of commodities (the cost of production being shared between wages, rents and profits, which differs from the "rude" state of man). the mystifying allure harvey applies to marx appears entirely disastrous from his intentions, especially where he severely misinterprets his work by value-form historicism, the same fatal flaw which plagues michael heinrich's treatment of marx. even if we grant the historicity of value, marx still sees money as ancient:
>The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it all
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p1.htm
so its academic failure on their part. to say that value is a modern "concept" is true to marx's own meaning:
>The economic concept of value does not occur in antiquity.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch15.htm
>Aristotle therefore, himself, tells us what barred the way to his further analysis; it was the absence of any concept of value
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm
as yet, marx still sees value present in exchange:
<The brilliancy of Aristotle’s genius is shown by this alone, that he discovered, in the expression of the value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm
and in hegelian terms, the realisation of something means its self-relation by mutual otherness; it only comes to be as it passes away, such as marx says:
>Production as directly identical with consumption, and consumption as directly coincident with production, is termed by them productive consumption. This identity of production and consumption amounts to Spinoza’s thesis: determinatio est negatio […] For example, a garment becomes a real garment only in the act of being worn; a house where no one lives is in fact not a real house; thus the product, unlike a mere natural object, proves itself to be, becomes, a product only through consumption. Only by decomposing the product does consumption give the product the finishing touch; for the product is production not as objectified activity, but rather only as object for the active subject
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm
we may relate this to hegel's own words:
>The absolute Idea has turned out to be the identity of the theoretical and the practical Idea. Each of these by itself is still one-sided, possessing the Idea only as a sought for beyond and an unattained goal; each, therefore, is a synthesis of endeavour, and has, but equally has not, the Idea in it; each passes from one thought to the other without bringing the two together, and so remains fixed in their contradiction. 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlabsolu.htm
so i feel that academic marxists like david harvey, (patrick murray, andrew kliman) and michael heinrich are misunderstanding many points in marx's work.

to conclude,
(i) smith speaks of abstract labour-time
(ii) ricardo adds necessity
(iii) marx makes no obvious advancement from this since social necessity is still defined by social utility, which ricardo also qualifies values as possessing. the only real difference, which he also builds his case against the classical school on is to distinguish labour-power as a commodity from labour as a substance (capital vol. 1, ch. 19). this he even depends on thomas hobbes to achieve, however (value, price and profit, ch. 7). this seems to be his biggest theoretical difference:
>Labour is the substance, and the immanent measure of value, but has itself no value […] For the rest, in respect to the phenomenal form, “value and price of labour,” or “wages,” as contrasted with the essential relation manifested therein, viz., the value and price of labour-power, the same difference holds that holds in respect to all phenomena and their hidden substratum […] Classical Political Economy nearly touches the true relation of things, without, however, consciously formulating it. This it cannot, so long as it sticks in its bourgeois skin.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch19.htm

John Bates Clark's (1899) influential theory of wages:
>In like manner, we may find it useful, in presenting the law by which wages are fixed, to go through an imaginary operation of setting men at work, one man at a time or one company of men at a time, and thus to find what importance the market places on the last one. This reveals the operation of a law of diminishing productivity; and whether we take a single man or a body of men as the unit of labor, any unit can get, as pay, what the last one would produce, if the force were set working in this way.
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/clark-the-distribution-of-wealth-a-theory-of-wages-interest-and-profits
here we see what is presented in precise similarity to jevons; that wages comport to the price paid per marginal product of labour in relation to fixed capital. what is more elaborate here however is treating it more macroeconomically, that as the quantity of workers increases, so does their diminishment of product - this is also why unemployment has its inevitable gradient at the point where the disutility of labour is excessive. it is a myth that keynes disbelieved in this gradient and simply wanted to hire people for useless positions (thus increasing disutility, or costs over return).

There's any good book about criticism to mainstream modern economics?

John Bates Clark's (1899) mercantilist theory of profit vs jevons' equalisation of utility and disutility:
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/clark-the-distribution-of-wealth-a-theory-of-wages-interest-and-profits
chapter 8:
>Theoretically, there is competition between employers for every workman whose presence in an establishment affords to the owner any profit over what he pays to him; and the competition stops only when this profit is annihilated.
in the first place, clark understands profit in an expressly mercantile sense, of requesting a price over the cost of production - as he freely admits here (chapter 12):
<We have noted the fact that an entrepreneur's net profit is an incentive to competition. Such a profit is mercantile, and means that employees are selling their products for more than they are paying out in wages and interest—that the price of the goods exceeds the cost of the elements that compose them.
in speaking of costs of production he says this:
>It has been rightly asserted by early economists that the natural price of an article is one that yields only the cost of producing it, and this view is in harmony with common experience.
yet he qualifies this smithian assertion with this:
<Normal prices are no-profit prices.
he estimates this based on this:
>They afford wages for all the labor that is involved in producing the goods, including the labor of superintending the mills, managing the finances, keeping the accounts, collecting the debts and doing all the work of directing the policy of the business. They afford, also, interest on all the capital that is used in the business, whether it is owned by the entrepreneur or borrowed from some one else. Beyond this there is no return, if prices stand exactly at their normal rate; and the reason for this is that entrepreneurs compete with each other in selling their goods, and so reduce prices to the no-net-profit level.
he says it elsewise here (chapter 12):
>We noted the fact that "natural price," as defined by economists, is really a wages-and-interest price; for it equals the sum of these two outlays. A profit-giving price exceeds that sum, but the competition that tends to annihilate the profit cuts it off at both ends.
he is right in one sense, that perfect competition leads to perfect equilibrium, but he fails to see that within the costs of production is the revenue composition which affords itself to the replenishment and gain of the entrepeneur, above the rates of capital interest. if this were not the case, then all entrepeneurs would be poor. what he appears to be saying then is that competition itself must be unequal for personal profits to be gained, by the subsequent losses of another. jevons explains this loss to the worker rationally, by an excess pain balancing to an equalised rate of utility, while clark is much less rational, proposing a vulgar economics of perpetual gains and losses in place of equation of inverse ratios.

>>2496624
so smith does not talk about abstract socially necessary labor time. thanks

>>2497410
the original question concerned labour-time as the "measure of value", which smith indeed theorises. youre free to explain the difference in your own terms however, which i already have.

>>2497883
>the original question concerned labour-time
>>2496642
>abstract socially necessary labor time?
>>2496611
>abstract socially necessary labor time as a the true universal equivalent
just because you cut a quote short doesn't mean people cant see the original text

jevons' marginalism finding unity with classicism:
as we have seen earlier (chapter 4), jevons portrays a gradation of value from the first cause of the cost of production:
>Cost of production determines supply. Supply determines final degree of utility. Final degree of utility determines value.
he returns to this later (chapter 5) to see the relation between all these variables in the ratios of exchange:
>The quantities of commodity given or received in exchange are directly proportional to the degrees of productiveness of labour applied to their production, and inversely proportional to the values and prices of those commodities and to their costs of production per unit, as well as to their final degrees of utility.
he puts this more succinctly here:
<value is proportional to cost of production. As, moreover, the final degrees of utility of commodities are inversely as the quantities exchanged, it follows that the values per unit are directly proportional to the final degrees of utility.
he expresses the connective chain likewise: (picrel)

to conclude, as he says:
>It may tend to give the reader confidence in the preceding theories when he finds that they lead directly to the well-known law, as stated in the ordinary language of economists, that value is proportional to the cost of production. As I prefer to state the same law, it is to the effect that the ratio of exchange of commodities will conform in the long run to the ratio of productiveness, which is the reciprocal of the ratio of the costs of production.
to clarify: to jevons, the ratio of exchange equalises to the rate of the final degree of utility - so commodities of the same supply will have an equally diminished utility per commodity as it relates to total productivity. the "long run" normal price of commodities therefore depends upon rates of production corresponding with costs.

>>2497887
i already corrected you that the measure of value and universal equivalent are different things and said that to consider labour-time as measure of value is what smith had already theorised. you asked if it was "abstract socially necessary labour-time" (whatever that means in your head), so i give you the genaeology. marx also happily substitutes SNLT with "labour-time" plainly here:
>Money as a measure of value, is the phenomenal form that must of necessity be assumed by that measure of value which is immanent in commodities, labour-time.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch03.htm
of the actuality and immanence of the measure of values, marx also brings distinction where it regards smith:
>he confuses the measure of value as the immanent measure which at the same time forms the substance of value, with the measure of value in the sense that money is called a measure of value.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1863/theories-surplus-value/ch03.htm
so its more of marx's hegelian pedantry at work. smith's generality works well enough.

>>2497895
>smith's generality works well enough.
but he misses social necessity, which is only introduced by Ricardo as you pointed out. and you are still missing the abstract part, which only occurs with the generalization of wage labor and commodity production and is not the same thing as the average or total concrete labor

>>2497898
>necessity
its not an important detail
>still missing the abstract part, which only occurs with the generalization of wage labor
as you clearly failed to read, the abstraction of labour to marx occurs where concrete labours are considered quantities of the same substance by exchange. the very act of commodity exchange itself produces the social abstraction of labour (value):
>But the exchange of commodities is evidently an act characterised by a total abstraction from use value. Then one use value is just as good as another, provided only it be present in sufficient quantity […] As use values, commodities are, above all, of different qualities, but as exchange values they are merely different quantities, and consequently do not contain an atom of use value.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm

>>2497898
>>2497901
to marx, the conceptualisation (self-realisation) of value only occurs in modernity however, precisely because it is passing away into the determination of the magnitude of exchange of commodities by surplus value:
>>The economic CONCEPT of value does not occur in antiquity.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch15.htm
so its hegelian jargon. easy to be confused by it.

>>2497905
at least you have finally managed to reproduce marx accurately.

>>2497898
in my post however, you can see that there is an academic marxist position that the concept and abstraction of value are the same thing, so both occur in capitalism: (i.e. david harvey, patrick murray and michael heinrich). so you can take that position and be in respectable hands, but to me it appears to entirely contradict the text. what is unique in capitalism is as smith puts it; labour as "the first price" is supplanted for a composition between labour, capital and land. this also appears to largely be marx's historical perspective. i would say that there is too much simplification in this however and marx is actually more correct than smith, that ancient forms of capital like interest (chrematistics) existed to compose prices of surplus values. modern anthropological texts also treat debt as a basic social relation, which obviously continues into capitalism. so in the past, it was not simply men trading equal quantities of labour, but coin clipping and cheating at every turn.

>>2497921
as opposed to when?

exposing marxian lies about the origin of marginalism:
paul mattick (1939):
>The development of marginal utility economics is closely connected with the difficulty of the proponents of the classical theory to confute Marxist theories, as both the Classicists and the Marxists based their argument on the same objective value concept. The marginal utility school arose in defense of capitalism, and its apology consisted in the construction of a value concept which justified the prevailing class and income differentiations.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/mattick-paul/1939/marginal.htm
ernest mandel (1962):
>In order to neutralise the “socialist danger”. which was felt with especial keenness after the revolution of 1848, and above all after the Paris Commune (1871), the entire structure based on the labour theory of value had to be demolished. This was the great turning-point of bourgeois political economy, towards the marginal theory of value
https://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/works/marxist-economic-theory/marginalists.htm
this isnt just paul mattick or ernest mandel however, but michael hudson, richard wolff, steve keen, paul cockshott and edward l. smith - relatedly, ian wright has called jevons a racist for comments much milder than what engels writes (on the housing question, 1845), yet i dont see that bad press. as i have presented from jevons' preface for the second edition of "theory of political economy" (1879), marginalism began in 1854 (3 years before marx began the grundrisse) by a german named gossen, and only later saw popularity with jevons (who first published his ideas from 1862-6, a year before marx's das kapital and 16 years before the first english edition in 1887). jevons in his work heavily cites major spokespersons of the LTV, ricardo and j.s. mill, of whom he also largely agrees with, directly and indirectly. there is no conspiracy to undermine them at all. of alfred marshall (1890) also, keynes makes this comment (1936):
>Alfred Marshall, on whose Principles of Economics all contemporary English economists have been brought up, was at particular pains to emphasise the continuity of his thought with Ricardo's. His work largely consisted in grafting the marginal principle and the principle of substitution on to the Ricardian tradition; and his theory of output and consumption as a whole, as distinct from his theory of the production and distribution of a given output, was never separately expounded. 
https://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks03/0300071h/gerpref.html
if the father of neoclassical canon was really just a polemicist against the classical school, why would he offer appreciation to ricardo? as paul mattick says, the marginalists are trying to get away from the classical school, but this is obviously false. the neoclassical school and marginal utility theory can then be reasonably seen to be an honest pursuit of economic theory, rather than an attack on any existing traditions.

friedrich engels' comments on marginal utility theory:
>The fashionable theory just now here is that of Stanley Jevons according to which value is determined by utility, i.e. Tauschwert-Gebrauchswert [exchange value - use-value] and on the other hand by the limit of supply (i.e. the cost of production), which is merely a confused and circuitous way of saying that value is determined by supply and demand. Vulgar Economy everywhere!
https://marxists.architexturez.net/archive/marx/works/1888/letters/88_01_05.htm
>One need not strain his thinking powers to see that this explanation for the profits of capital, as advanced by "vulgar economy," amounts in practice to the same thing as the Marxian theory of surplus-value; that the workers are in just the same "unfavourable condition" according to Lexis as according to Marx; that they are just as much the victims of swindle because every non-worker can sell commodities above price, while the worker cannot do so; and that it is just as easy to build up an at least equally plausible vulgar socialism on the basis of this theory, as that built in England on the foundation of Jevons’s and Menger’s theory of use-value and marginal utility. I even suspect that if Mr. George Bernard Shaw had been familiar with this theory of profit, he would have likely fallen to with both hands, discarding Jevons and Karl Menger, to build anew the Fabian church of the future upon this rock.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/pref.htm
as i have written before, jevons' view (1871) is not the same as clarke's (1899), who indeed has a "vulgar" imagination as to viable trade being a condition of disequilibrium, while jevons sees equilibrium as the very condition of trade. jevons also theorises surplus value of the capitalist as simultaneous disutility to the worker.

marginal utility theorists on the falling rate of profit:
first is jevons (1871):
https://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Jevons/jvnPE.html?chapter_num=11#book-reader
>It is one of the favourite doctrines of economists since the time of Adam Smith, that as society progresses and capital accumulates, the rate of profit, or more strictly speaking, the rate of interest, tends to fall. The rate will always ultimately sink so low, they think, that the inducements to further accumulation will cease. This doctrine is in striking agreement with the result of the somewhat abstract analytical investigation given above. Our formula for the rate of interest shows that unless there be constant progress in the arts, the rate must tend to sink towards zero, supposing accumulation of capital to go on. There are sufficient statistical facts, too, to confirm this conclusion historically. The only question that can arise is as to the actual cause of this tendency.
a cause which he gives is in the next section:
<We must take great care not to confuse the rate of interest on capital with the whole advantage which it confers on industry. The rate of interest depends on the advantage of the last increment of capital, and the advantages of previous increments may be greater in almost any ratio. In considering the laws of utility, we found that an article possessing an immensely great total utility, for instance corn or water, might have a very low final degree of utility, because our need of it was almost entirely satisfied;
yet the ratio of exchange always depends upon the final, not the previous degree of utility.
this basically means that the interest on capital (costs of repair from capital investment) are set at the rate of marginal utility, not total utility - so declining profits are in fact an inevitable fact of increased production, which ensures a total product over marginal output. we see another marginalist, clark (1899):
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/clark-the-distribution-of-wealth-a-theory-of-wages-interest-and-profits
>They afford wages for all the labor that is involved in producing the goods, including the labor of superintending the mills, managing the finances, keeping the accounts, collecting the debts and doing all the work of directing the policy of the business. They afford, also, interest on all the capital that is used in the business, whether it is owned by the entrepreneur or borrowed from some one else. Beyond this there is no return, if prices stand exactly at their normal rate; and the reason for this is that entrepreneurs compete with each other in selling their goods, and so reduce prices to the no-net-profit level.
so according to marginal utility theory, the increasing investment of capital in production leads to a tendency in the rate of profit to fall, combined with competition leading prices toward equilibrium.

(1/4)
summarising and reviewing william stanley jevons' "theory of political economy" (1871-9)

beginning with the prefaces, jevons makes overt reference to bentham's utilitarianism (explored later in the book) along with stating that he wishes to reduce economic deduction to physical models of statical mechanics. he also wishes to relate economics to a purely mathematical framework as he sees already in effect since the time of smith. mathematics he swiftly defines as a science of quantities and their relation.

of the term "economics", jevons says that he prefers it to "political economy" if nothing more for brevity's sake, but also that it may be more properly codefied amongst the philosophical sciences like "ethics" and "aesthetics". here then we begin to see the shift from "political economy" toward "economics".

in the second preface, he speaks of the supposed novelty of his work as it first appeared, but reveals from subsequent correspondence that the theory of marginal utility (what jevons calls "degree of utility") began in 1854 with a german named gossen. his work fell into total obscurity and he died soon after, unable to retain his legacy. jevons says that the similarities between his and gossen's work are remarkable but have no present connection. from this, jevons concludes that his work is not as novel as he imagined, but may still be useful.

chapter 1 begins with this:
>Repeated reflection and inquiry have led me to the somewhat novel opinion, that value depends entirely upon utility
this is the basis of his theory, which was prefaced by reference to intervals of pain and pleasure. of the notion that labour is the cause of value, he says this:
<Labour is found often to determine value, but only in an indirect manner, by varying the degree of utility of the commodity through an increase or limitation of the supply.
here then, we see the meaning of value to jevons; the increase of supply by labour has indirect determination upon the utility of goods. what is greater in supply constitutes a lesser (final) degree of utility, and vice versa - but we'll get to that later.

in establishing a proper study of phenomena by mathematical means requires jevons to quantify variables in relation to one another. he speaks upon the viability of this and also makes reference to bentham:
>Now there can be no doubt that pleasure, pain, labour, utility, value, wealth, money, capital, etc., are all notions admitting of quantity; nay, the whole of our actions in industry and trade certainly depend upon comparing quantities of advantage or disadvantage. Even the theories of moralists have recognised the quantitative character of the subject. Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation is thoroughly mathematical in the character of the method.
he speaks upon the difficulty of determining the quantity of pleasure one may feel, but still gives an axiom:
>Pleasures, in short, are, for the time being, as the mind estimates them; so that we cannot make a choice, or manifest the will in any way, without indicating thereby an excess of pleasure in some direction.
pleasure then, is simply the prerequisite for purposive human activity, with pain being an opposite force. pleasure then, is utility and pain is disutility. jevons also stresses that what is truly subjective of feeling is that which is entirely indeterminate of quantity:
>The reader will find, again, that there is never, in any single instance, an attempt made to compare the amount of feeling in one mind with that in another. I see no means by which such comparison can be accomplished.
he clarifies here:
<The theory turns upon those critical points where pleasures are nearly, if not quite, equal. I never attempt to estimate the whole pleasure gained by purchasing a commodity; the theory merely expresses that, when a man has purchased enough, he would derive equal pleasure from the possession of a small quantity more as he would from the money price of it. Similarly, the whole amount of pleasure that a man gains by a day's labour hardly enters into the question; it is when a man is doubtful whether to increase his hours of labour or not, that we discover an equality between the pain of that extension and the pleasure of the increase of possessions derived from it.

continuing, he gives his macroeconomic method as a means of assessing what is aggregate in phenomena:
>I must here point out that, though the theory presumes to investigate the condition of a mind, and bases upon this investigation the whole of Economics, practically it is an aggregate of individuals which will be treated […] it is quite impossible to detect the operation of general laws of this kind in the actions of one or a few individuals […] The use of an average, or, what is the same, an aggregate result, depends upon the high probability that accidental and disturbing causes will operate, in the long run, as often in one direction as the other, so as to neutralise each other.
and he gives emphasis upon its scientific nature:
>the theory here given may be described as the mechanics of utility and self-interest […] Its method is as sure and demonstrative as that of kinematics or statics, nay, almost as self-evident as are the elements of Euclid, when the real meaning of the formulæ is fully seized […] I do not hesitate to say, too, that Economics might be gradually erected into an exact science, if only commercial statistics were far more complete and accurate than they are at present, so that the formulae could be endowed with exact meaning by the aid of numerical data […] The deductive science of Economics must be verified and rendered useful by the purely empirical science of Statistics. Theory must be invested with the reality and life of fact.
and he concludes chapter 1 with this:
<the object of Economics is to maximise happiness by purchasing pleasure, as it were, at the lowest cost of pain […] The calculus of utility aims at supplying the ordinary wants of man at the least cost of labour.

beginning chapter 2, he comes to define the various manners of utility from bentham, which have relevance to the field of economics. he defines them thusly:
(1) Its intensity.
(2) Its duration.
(3) Its certainty or uncertainty.
(4) Its propinquity or remoteness.
he now comes to define the dimensions of utility by its basic units of pleasure and pain (after already perceiving the relations of duration and intensity):
>we may treat pleasure and pain as positive and negative quantities are treated in algebra […] Our object will always be to maximise the resulting sum in the direction of pleasure, which we may fairly call the positive direction
he comes to define propinquity or remoteness of utility:
>It is certain that a very large part of what we experience in life depends not on the actual circumstances of the moment so much as on the anticipation of future events […] The intensity of present anticipated feeling must, to use a mathematical expression, be some function of the future actual feeling and of the intervening time, and it must increase as we approach the moment of realisation.
here, the propinquity (proximity) to something builds anticipation, which can be expressed inversely in its potential from its actuality. for this function, jevons percieves it to be the root of all saving. this closely relates to the uncertainty of pleasure, which is also present, since to invest in the future is to save, and thus to grant the dimension of time inversely of propinquity (potential pleasure) to consumption (actual pleasure). propinquity then differs from pain as a denial of pleasure; it is rather the building of pleasure by an increase of purchasing power (though jevons does not directly state this here). this concludes chapter 2.

(2/4)
chapter 3 begins with a description of the commodity:
>By a commodity we shall understand any object, substance, action, or service, which can afford pleasure or ward off pain […] Whatever can produce pleasure or prevent pain may possess utility
what jevons neglects in his general assessment is the condition of the item being purchased for other goods; it is this reciprocity which surely defines the economic category of commodity, rather than simply utility. after this, jevons equates utilitarian morality exactly with economic activity. this blending of economics, morality and mechanics appears to be an unsightly hodgepodge. after this, jevons describes the relativity of value:
>In the first place, utility, though a quality of things, is no inherent quality. It is better described as a circumstance of things arising out of their relation to man's requirements.
he describes utility's relativity in this manner:
>Utility must be considered as measured by, or even as actually identical with, the addition made to a person's happiness.
here, utility is already segmented as a quantity to be added to an existing sum of happiness. following from this we may see further arithmetical implications:
>(1) We must now carefully discriminate between the total utility arising from any commodity and the utility attaching to any particular portion of it.
>(2) Thus the total utility of the food we eat consists in maintaining life, and may be considered as infinitely great; but if we were to subtract a tenth part from what we eat daily, our loss would be but slight.
<(3) We should certainly not lose a tenth part of the whole utility of food to us. It might be doubtful whether we should suffer any harm at all.
we must follow the logic. in the first place, we distinguish between total and partial utility. secondly, to subtract a part of the total is to lower total utility, but not to lower what is only partial of the whole. thirdly, to lose a certain part of the whole is not to lose any utility at all. it seems confusing, but it is represented by jevons in a diagram of 10 bars descending in size from one another in linear order. he describes it this way:
>We can now form a clear notion of the utility of the whole food, or of any part of it, for we have only to add together the proper rectangles. The utility of the first half of the food will be the sum of the rectangles standing on the line oa; that of the second half will be represented by the sum of the smaller rectangles between a and b. The total utility of the food will be the whole sum of the rectangles, and will be infinitely great.
so then, total utility and partial utility are separated by divided segments of the commodity provided. with each addition of the commodity, the total value increases positively, but at a diminished rate, while partial value decreases with each margin of consumption. what we may determine then is that total value grows incrimentally as partial value decreases. as a real example of food, we may of course see how relieving of hunger diminishes pain, causing pleasure, but consumption after satiety causes distress. what is lacking in this primary example then (fig. iii) is the negation of total value by the absolute and inverse diminishment of marginal utility. in economic terms, the overproduction of a commodity causes part of it to not be sold, making the producer lose value. the losses suffered from lack of sale are clearly indicative of a negation of total utility by a marginal product which serves the market. jevons only speaks briefly on overproduction and simply says that it is a particulsr issue for particular industries but has no relevance to the economy generally. a thinker like marx perceives an inherent loss to overproduction in a way that jevons doesnt, which makes him more comprehensible on this point. even as a simple hypothetical, the total value of water at one time has an absolutely negative total utility since drinking too much water can kill you. jevons' positivistic framework causes issues, yet it is where jevons admits of the disutility of labour where his theory has most relevance to me, so that is his worthiness.

jevons now formalises the separation:
>Utility may be treated as a quantity of two dimensions, one dimension consisting in the quantity of the commodity, and another in the intensity of the effect produced upon the consumer […] We are now in a position to appreciate perfectly the difference between the total utility of any commodity and the degree of utility of the commodity at any point.
this partial utility he calls "(final) degree of utility":
>I shall therefore commonly use the expression final degree of utility, as meaning the degree of utility of the last addition, or the next possible addition of a very small, or infinitely small, quantity to the existing stock. In ordinary circumstances, too, the final degree of utility will not be great compared with what it might be. Only in famine or other extreme circumstances do we approach the higher degrees of utility.
in other words, the greater the supply of good, the lesser in utility is its additional consumption (and therefore, the lower its price, for sake of its relative uselessness). only where there is low supply can there be a higher gradient of utility for what is produced (and thus a higher price):
<We cannot live without water, and yet in ordinary circumstances we set no value on it. Why is this? Simply because we usually have so much of it that its final degree of utility is reduced nearly to zero. We enjoy, every day, the almost infinite utility of water, but then we do not need to consume more than we have. Let the supply run short by drought, and we begin to feel the higher degrees of utility, of which we think but little at other times […] We may state as a general law, that the degree of utility varies with the quantity of commodity, and ultimately decreases as that quantity increases. No commodity can be named which we continue to desire with the same force, whatever be the quantity already in use or possession.
yet he qualifies this by speaking of higher consumption:
>This may be the case with some things, especially the simple animal requirements, such as food, water, air, etc. But the more refined and intellectual our needs become, the less are they capable of satiety. To the desire for articles of taste, science, or curiosity, when once excited, there is hardly a limit.
perhaps this is to imply where the price of luxury goods derive, or maybe it is merely a flippant remark upon the diversity of possible goods, but regardless, he doesnt follow up on it.

after this, he introduces a new term:
>For the abstract notion, the opposite or negative of utility, we may invent the term disutility, which will mean something different from inutility, or the absence of utility. It is obvious that utility passes through inutility before changing into disutility, these notions being related as +, 0 and -.
this becomes relevant later, where the exertion of labour as pain is seen to meet its own marginal product in a corresponding pleasure. thus, we may suffer, by exertion of privation, but only for a higher pleasure. this sublimation of activity is not equated with saving (propinquity), but only what is immediate to its object. after this, he speaks upon the relativity of utility:
>The principles of utility may be illustrated by considering the mode in which we distribute a commodity when it is capable of several uses […] Let (s) be the whole stock of some commodity, and let it be capable of two distinct uses. Then we may represent the two quantities appropriated to these uses by (x¹) and (y¹), it being a condition that (x¹ + y¹ = s) […] We must, in other words, have the final degrees of utility in the two uses equal.
this appears to be a confused argument on the face of it however, since no condition of equality is pre-established, but must only be presupposed. what the grounds of equality may consist in is what jevons describes in composition of physical commodities:
>Beginning with the easiest and simplest ideas, the dimensions of commodity regarded merely as a physical quantity will be the dimensions of mass.
we may then say that (x¹) and (y¹) compose equal portions of the same mass of total stock (s). what is interesting in this element of mass however is the condition of utility depending upon production (which becomes explicit later on). if we now organise utility by the partiality of segmented masses of a total mass, then consumption becomes a comprehensible quantity:
>Quantity of supply must necessarily be estimated by the number of units of commodity divided by the number of units in the time over which it is to be expended. Thus it will involve M positively and T negatively, and its dimensions will be represented by MT -1. Thus in reality supply should be taken to mean not supply absolutely, but rate of supply […] Consumption of commodity must have the same dimensions. For goods must be consumed in time; any action or effect endures a greater or less time, and commodity which will be abundant for a less time may be scanty for a greater time […] Accordingly it is rate of supply, rate of production, rate of consumption, per unit of time that we shall be really treating; but it does not follow that T -1 enters into all the dimensions with which we deal.
so then, what is considered in simultaneity is,
(1) rate of supply
(2) rate of production
(3) rate of consumption
and all measured by the dimension (MT -1): quantity of goods (supplied/produced/consumed) over time. added to this is (U), or intensity of pleasure (degree of utility):
>To enjoy a highly pleasurable condition, a person must want a good deal of commodity, and must be well supplied with it. Now, this supply is, as already explained, rate of supply, so that we must multiply U by MT -1 in order to arrive at the real instantaneous state of feeling. The kind of quantity thus symbolised by MUT -1 must be interpreted as meaning so much commodity producing a certain amount of pleasurable effect per unit of time.
so (U) to jevons is an infinitesimal of utility, and MUT -1 is its temporal dimension by alloying it to duration:
<But this quantity will not be quantity of utility itself. It will only be that quantity which, when multiplied by time, will produce quantity of utility. Pleasure, as was stated at the outset, has the dimensions of intensity and duration. It is then this intensity which is symbolised by MUT -1, and we must multiply this last symbol by T in order to obtain the dimensions of utility or quantity of pleasure produced. But in making this multiplication, MUT -1 T reduces to MU, which must therefore be taken to denote the dimensions of quantity of utility.
here then we have the dimensions of the quantity of utility as a means to measure pleasure: (MU). jevons explains that upon (figure iv), (U) is measured vertically while MT -1 (rate of supply) is measured horizontally. time has no positive dimension, since it is negative, and so eliminates itself by multiplication (MUT -1 * T = MU). he otherwise defines the variables likewise:
(M) = absolute amount of commodity.
(MT -1) = amount of commodity applied, per unit of time.
(U) = increment pleasure of that supply
(MUT -1) = pleasure of commodity per unit of time.
(MU) = absolute pleasurable effect produced by commodity in an unspecified duration of time.

admittedly, in the terms that jevons describes this, it seems slightly incomprehsible. i follow up to the point where time eliminates itself to offer us MU, yet i have my own understanding. i would describe it thusly:
(M) = total supply of commodity
(MT -1) = rate of supply
(U) = final degree of utility (intensity)
(MUT -1) = quantity of pleasure (duration)
(MU) = quantity of total pleasure (total utility)
(shockingly, there appears to be no secondary resources online to clarify my own understanding. does no one actually read the primary sources for anything?)

following from this, jevons discusses more terms:
>actual, prospective, and potential utility.
he clarifies here:
<It will be apparent that potential utility does not really enter into the science of Economics, and when I speak of utility simply, I do not mean to include potential utility […] Only when there arises some degree of probability, however slight, that a particular object will be needed, does it acquire prospective utility, capable of rendering it a desirable possession
so then, what he previously described as propinquity is not mirrored onto potentiality. this seems to be contradictory, especially since savings themselves are only potential and therefore have no present actuality. to avoid contradiction, he would then have to render propinquity as a "prospective" or probable, utility. he gives more terms:
>We might also distinguish, as is customary with French economists, between direct and indirect utility. Direct utility attaches to a thing like food, which we can actually apply to satisfy our wants. But things which have no direct utility may be the means of procuring us such by exchange, and they may therefore be said to have indirect utility. To the latter form of utility I have elsewhere applied the name acquired utility.
if we are to interpret this correctly, a commodity can said to possess direct utility, while what purchases a direct utility is that which is an indirect/acquired utility. so money then is an acquired utility. by its term, it is then something useless in itself and so only useful as a means to an end. if this is to be interpreted correctly, jevons is saying that money has no value besides that which it can purchase. jevons finally speaks on propinquity/remoteness (anticipation) but does not factor it into any revision of economic understanding.

(3/4)
with chapter 4, jevons discusses exchange:
>It is impossible to have a correct idea of the science of Economics without a perfect comprehension of the Theory of Exchange; and I find it both possible and desirable to consider this subject before introducing any notions concerning labour or the production of commodities.
what concerns exchange is a concept of "value" as he concurs with j.s. mill. of this term however, he says that it is unclear what it must mean. of what the act of exchange implies however, is itself, not an attribute of values, but a circumstance by which values co-relate:
>Now, if there is any fact certain about exchange value, it is, that it means not an object at all, but a circumstance of an object […] Value implies, in fact, a relation; but if so, it cannot possibly be some other thing […] Value in exchange expresses nothing but a ratio, and the term should not be used in any other sense
this appears to be very similar to marx's consideration of value; it is not that value belongs to any object, but only that value is expressed between objects, as ratios. value then, as marx says, is immaterial in itself, since it is only a relation between objects, not itself an object.

after defining value thusly, he considers what has been previously understood as the value of commodities:
(1)Value in use; (use-value)
(2)Esteem, or urgency of desire;
(3)Ratio of exchange. (exchange-value)
jevons explains each term in relation to adam smith:
>Smith evidently means by value in use, the total utility of a substance of which the degree of utility has sunk very low […] By purchasing power he clearly means the ratio of exchange for other commodities […] Thus I am led to think that the word value is often used in reality to mean intensity of desire or esteem for a thing. A silver ornament is a beautiful object apart from all ideas of traffic; it may thus be valued or esteemed simply because it suits the taste and fancy of its owner, and is the only one possessed […] in this sense value seems to be identical with the final degree of utility of a commodity […] it is measured by the intensity of the pleasure or benefit which would be obtained from a new increment of the same commodity
of this independent quality of an item, he compares with its related factors however,
<No doubt there is a close connection between value in this meaning, and value as ratio of exchange. Nothing can have a high purchasing power unless it be highly esteemed in itself; but it may be highly esteemed apart from all comparison with other things; and, though highly esteemed, it may have a low purchasing power. because those things against which it is measured are still more esteemed.
thus, the esteem or desire we have for an object is never absolute, but only relative to what it compares against. gold is desired at a certain ratio above bread, and a lesser ratio above silver. this then, is jevons' theory of relative value, as the relativity of final degrees of utility. he then comes to ammend the old terminology:
<Thus I come to the conclusion that, in the use of the word value, three distinct meanings are habitually confused together, and require to be thus distinguished: (1) Value in use = total utility; (2) Esteem = final degree of utility; (3) Purchasing power = ratio of exchange.
so then, it is not as engels would have it, that use-value comes to define value in the marginalist worldview, but rather it is only the final degree of utility which orients what is relative in purchasing power between commodities. jevons seemingly does away with use-value (as total utility) in economic consideration and only focuses on the degree of utility, but which of itself is conditioned by rate of supply - but not only supply of itself, but the supply of other commodities.

of the ratio of exchange ("value"), jevons perceives its inherent equivalence between commodities in trade:
>There is no difficulty in seeing that, when we use the word Value in the sense of ratio of exchange, its dimension will be simply zero.
he demonstrates this by relating the different forms of value dimensionally:
>If we compare the commodities simply as physical quantities, we have the dimensions M divided by M, or MM-1, or M0. Exactly the same result would be obtained if, instead of taking the mere physical quantities, we were to compare their utilities, for we should then have MU divided by MU or M0U0, which, as it really means unity, is identical in meaning with M0.
so then, the quantities of separate commodities cancel each other out in exchange. he categorises things here:
(1) value in use = total utility = (MU)
(2) esteem, or desire = final degree of utility = (U)
(3) purchasing power = ratio of exchange = M0
this massively helps what was confused earlier.

(jevons places importance on what he terms "the law of indifference", which is only to say that a homogeneously composed stock of commodities can mutually replace itself and preserve its final degree of utility. it doesnt appear profound to me but jevons emphasises it.)

jevons now comes to define the law of exchange:
>The keystone of the whole Theory of Exchange, and of the principal problems of Economics, lies in this proposition—The ratio of exchange of any two commodities will be the reciprocal of the ratio of the final degrees of utility of the quantities of commodity available for consumption after the exchange is completed […] Both parties, then, rest in satisfaction and equilibrium, and the degrees of utility have come to their level, as it were […] This point of equilibrium will be known by the criterion, that an infinitely small amount of commodity exchanged in addition, at the same rate, will bring neither gain nor loss of utility. In other words, if increments of commodities be exchanged at the established ratio, their utilities will be equal for both parties. Thus, if ten pounds of corn were of exactly the same utility as one pound of beef, there would be neither harm nor good in further exchange at this ratio.
for demonstration he offers a diagram (fig. v) which illustrates the point perfectly (and also appears to still be in effect for modern economic demonstrations of consumer and producer surpluses). the diagram portrays 2 commodities equalising at different rates of their supply and demand, ideally meeting at their equilibrium point (M0), but what may be swayed either way by an aforementioned surplus (which we will later get to concerning jevons' theory of labour value).

after this, he comes to a theory of money's utility. it is a theory rather self-evident, that the poor will spend money on cheaper goods and the rich on more expensive goods. his point is rhetorically confused and this continues later in the book as we will see. what is at least intelligible in his ideas on money however is what he says about utility being determined from price:
>The price of a commodity is the only test we have of the utility of the commodity to the purchaser; and if we could tell exactly how much people reduce their consumption of each important article when the price rises, we could determine, at least approximately, the variation of the final degree of utility—the all-important element in Economics.
of course this is only extensive of the original confusion as to the capacity of the final degree of utility per good of a certain purchasing power, and what may be possible at a higher gradient of income. i suppose this is where jevons may depend upon the remoteness of a potential utility while at once speaking against its economic inconsideration. but as i say, there will be time to be more critical of his perspectives of inequality.

now, jevons speaks upon the value of labour:
>A great undertaking like the Great Western Railway, or the Thames Tunnel, may embody a vast amount of labour, but its value depends entirely upon the number of persons who find it useful. If no use could be found for the Great Eastern steamship, its value would be nil, except for the utility of some of its materials.
here it is as ricardo puts it, and jevons quotes ricardo in the same regard, that an article of production lacking value in use at once lacks a value in exchange. jevons advances and sees the indirect cause of value as from labour in many cases with exceeding lucidity:
<But though labour is never the cause of value, it is in a large proportion of cases the determining circumstance, and in the following way:—Value depends solely on the final degree of utility. How can we vary this degree of utility?—By having more or less of the commodity to consume. And how shall we get more or less of it?—By spending more or less labour in obtaining a supply. According to this view, then, there are two steps between labour and value. Labour affects supply, and supply affects the degree of utility, which governs value, or the ratio of exchange. In order that there may be no possible mistake about this all-important series of relations. I will re-state it in a tabular form, as follows: Cost of production determines supply. Supply determines final degree of utility. Final degree of utility determines value.
here then is a causal chain: (1) costs determine supply, (2) supply determines final degree of utility and (3) final degree of utility determines value. its without exaggeration then that we can say that jevons sees labour as the "first cause" of value in many cases, which directly mirrors marx's comments upon social necessity being dependent upon social usefulness.

(4/4)
in chapter 5, jevons continues:
>labour is the beginning of the processes treated by economists, as consumption is the end and purpose.
he explains his concept of labour here:
<Labour is the painful exertion which we undergo to ward off pains of greater amount, or to procure pleasures which leave a balance in our favour.
this language becomes important to consider. either man will seek to benefit from exertion at a surplus or will seek to equate his exertion with reward. he theoretically defines labour here:
>Labour, I should say, is any painful exertion of mind or body undergone partly or wholly with a view to future good […] amount of labour will be a quantity of two dimensions, the product of intensity and time when the intensity is uniform, or the sum represented by the area of a curve when the intensity is variable […] we may say that there are three quantities involved in the theory of labour—the amount of painful exertion, the amount of produce, and the amount of utility gained.
from this elementary sketch, we can see labour as a negative quantity, which as pain, represents disutility, but from its exertion, produces utilities to balance it. now comes famous (fig. viii) which represents the working day as a calculus of varying utility. the gradient between excess pleasure and pain seek to give equivalence to the task and its output, but also the possibility of a surplus for the worker himself (what jevons describes at the beginning of the chapter as warding off pain of a "greater amount" of what is necessary). the variables of the diagram are as follows:
[ox] = the quantity of produce created by labour
[pq] = the degree of utility of the produce
[abcd] = the exertion of labour over time
[bc] = excess pleasure [necessary labour]
[cd] = excess pain [surplus labour]
[m] = balance between utility and exertion [qm=dm]
[m] = rate of wages based on marginal productivity
reading the diagram, we can see that theoretically, wages for the worker (his output relative to duration, or marginal product) would be higher and so he should be paid more per his total product. this indirectly proves also that the longer a man works, the more he will produce, but the less he will receive for it - his loss then must become the gain of someone else, namely his employer, which of course, is an empirical fact. jevons actually concurs with this and states that a greater marginal product by a lower working day produces higher wages for workers. this is very important stuff. jevons makes more comments on this topic here:
>A man must be regarded as earning all through his hours of labour an excess of utility; what he produces must be considered not merely the exact equivalent of the labour he gives for it, for it would be, in that case, a matter of indifference whether he laboured or not. As long as he gains, he labours, and when he ceases to gain, he ceases to labour […] If a man works regularly twelve hours a day, he will produce more commodity than in ten hours; therefore the final degree of utility of his commodity, whether he consume it himself or whether he exchange it, will not be quite so high as when he produced less […] Thus, the last two hours of work in the day generally gives less reward, both because less produce is then created in proportion to the time spent, and because that produce is less necessary and useful to one who makes enough to support himself in the other ten hours […] Evidence to the like effect is found in the general tendency to reduce the hours of labour at the present day, owing to the improved real wages now enjoyed by those employed in mills and factories.
this is really, really important stuff which it appears only i have discovered from jevons' text, which is a shame.

final comments to look at from this chapter include this:
>A man of lower race, a negro for instance, enjoys possession less, and loathes labour more; his exertions, therefore, soon stop. A poor savage would be content to gather the almost gratuitous fruits of nature, if they were sufficient to give sustenance; it is only physical want which drives him to exertion.
here, jevons is partly contradictory, since he is only seeing one dimension of the disutility of labour in effect rather than two. for example, as he says, to increase marginal product by means of substituting intensity for duration means higher wages and thus a higher means of purchase for less time. this accounts for a full expenditure of labour at one time, but may also mean the spectre of laziness as the desire to end work quickly. here, aversion to labour is not merely laziness, but efficiency, and so the desire to work less does not mean the desire to work for less - indeed, less duration and intensity grants its own (lack) of reward, but duration and intensity must be related as inverse quantities.

a final comment from this chapter is this:
>It may tend to give the reader confidence in the preceding theories when he finds that they lead directly to the well-known law, as stated in the ordinary language of economists, that value is proportional to the cost of production. As I prefer to state the same law, it is to the effect that the ratio of exchange of commodities will conform in the long run to the ratio of productiveness, which is the reciprocal of the ratio of the costs of production […] we have proved that commodities will exchange in any market in the ratio of the quantities produced by the same quantity of labour. But as the increment of labour considered is always the final one, our equation also expresses the truth, that articles will exchange in quantities inversely as the costs of production of the most costly portions, i.e. the last portions added.
jevons then sees general validity to the cost of production theory of exchange-value, but only where the final degree of utility can be proportional to its costs. concluding on this, he says:
>We may state the matter more briefly in the following words:—The quantities of commodity given or received in exchange are directly proportional to the degrees of productiveness of labour applied to their production, and inversely proportional to the values and prices of those commodities and to their costs of production per unit, as well as to their final degrees of utility. I will even repeat the same statements once more in the form of a diagram— Quantities of Commodity exchanged vary directly as the quantities inversely as their produced by the same labour. (1) Values. (2) Prices. (3) Costs of production. (4) Final degrees of utility.

… as for the rest of the book, the marginal utility of my writing is accumulating its descension, so i'll sum up with jevons' comments on the falling rate of profit (chapter 7):
>It is one of the favourite doctrines of economists since the time of Adam Smith, that as society progresses and capital accumulates, the rate of profit, or more strictly speaking, the rate of interest, tends to fall. The rate will always ultimately sink so low, they think, that the inducements to further accumulation will cease. This doctrine is in striking agreement with the result of the somewhat abstract analytical investigation given above. Our formula for the rate of interest shows that unless there be constant progress in the arts, the rate must tend to sink towards zero, supposing accumulation of capital to go on. There are sufficient statistical facts, too, to confirm this conclusion historically. The only question that can arise is as to the actual cause of this tendency.
he prefixtures the general correctness of its concept, due to the rate of capital interest (cost of repairs) declining with increased investment of capital. i speak more conclusively on this here:
>>2498402

stop botting around and tell when the next crisis occurs and how to profit from it

the jevonian theory of wealth inequality is based in the inequality of marginal utilities. basically, what is common to production is cheaper and is consequently bought by the poor, while what is more expensive is rarer and so is bought by the rich. the more that luxury pervades society, the more inequality there will be, while the more homogenous that production becomes, the more equal people will be forced to become based on what is able to be consumed. this then explains why communist central planners have no composite theory of luxury in a postcapitalist society, since luxury depends on what jevons calls "propinquity" in saving money (which increases its indirect or acquired utility). without money, there is no saving mechanism and so the indirect utility of propinquity cannot be granted. in austrian terms, a communist society is a society of high time-preference, or spending over saving, thus.

what is curiously absent from jevons' work is what is present in later ammendments to marginal utility theory; the so-called "law of diminishing marginal utility" (picrel). in this, either production or consumption dont simply limit utility but create disutility as a factor. jevons says that he invents the term "disutility" but only reserves it for 2 negative magnitudes; the decline of pleasure per final degree of utility (MUT -1), or "time" in regard to consumption, and he explicitly uses "disutility" to describe the exertion of labour (which he defines as "pain" in two dimensions, between intensity and duration). the only presence of a negative quantity is in the graph for labour, but which is also equalised by its marginal product. jevons insists that labour cannot exert itself beyond this result and so will either gain a surplus (M+) or equality (M0). jevons also often describes total utility as "infinite", since in his diagrams, consumption can lessen utility but never erase or reverse its effects (since like in the example of labour, he is presuming rationality). what we see then in later graphs (picrel) is a repudiation of this positivism however, and so we get the introduction of negativity (irrationality) in the fields of production and consumption. what jevons perceives is what concerns (m), and speaks of (M+), but never of (M-). it is quite obvious for example that one may eat too much food or drink too much drink. so then, the total utility of a good must incrimentally decline at the margin of its disutility, which is intuitive in the diagram. jevons fails this, but another thinker succeeds, namely, marx. marx perceives the natural possibility of overproduction for example, and so the decline of value of goods in store, or what in monetary terms, is a loss for the producer by the loss of sale of commodity. this is why all production must be regulated by the margins of what marx refers to as "social necessity" or "social usefulness". what isnt necessary or useful thus incurs disutility for its producer, since it has cost them labour which has no equation to its own commodity. here's what marx writes about it:
>For this, it is necessary that the labour expended upon it, be of a kind that is socially useful, of a kind that constitutes a branch of the social division of labour.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch03.htm
<To-day the product satisfies a social want. Tomorrow the article may, either altogether or partially, be superseded by some other appropriate product […] If the community’s want of linen, and such a want has a limit like every other want, should already be saturated by the products of rival weavers, our friend’s product is superfluous, redundant, and consequently useless […] The labour-time that yesterday was without doubt socially necessary to the production of a yard of linen, ceases to be so to-day […] suppose that every piece of linen in the market contains no more labour-time than is socially necessary. In spite of this, all these pieces taken as a whole, may have had superfluous labour-time spent upon them […] The effect is the same as if each individual weaver had expended more labour-time upon his particular product than is socially necessary […] All the linen in the market counts but as one article of commerce, of which each piece is only an aliquot part. And as a matter of fact, the value also of each single yard is but the materialised form of the same definite and socially fixed quantity of homogeneous human labour.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch03.htm
marx indirectly helps jevons complete his own theory therefore

jevons does comment on overproduction but only slightly. he makes no special place for it since to him, commodities equate at their marginal utilities and it would be contradictory to insist that a person would be motivated by inducing disutility (pain/loss) due to his axiom that men operate by the drive for pleasure. i would say that early 20th century fields like psychoanalysis allow us to better theorise the relation of human activity and self-sabotage.

as i have posted before, todd mcgowan conceives of commodities as possessing negative value. he uses the term "inutility" (uselessness) rather than "disutility" (harmfulness) however. an "increase" in inutility seems contradictory in itself, since 0 has no function to be multiplied, while negative quantities may accumulate. he has spoken more properly in other places though, taking freud's concept of death drive as a drive to disutility (hence, food tastes better when its worse for us). there is also a subject/object split in this conception as we see. desire in any case cannot be rational, as jevons presumes, since we may desire things which we even find displeasurable. this is also the same distance between what mediates commodities in exchange (desire) and its actual consumption (utility). jevons hardly makes a distinction, so confuses methodology. is marginal utility measuring what is positively consumed or exchanged for, or is it simply measuring effective demand? in any case, the utilitarian axiom is ineffecient to base economics on. so then, in hegelian style, we must introduce negativity to complete the concept.

carl menger (1871) on the LTV (principles of economics, chapter 3, section 3):
https://mises.org/library/book/principles-economics
>Among the most egregious of the fundamental errors that have had the most far-reaching consequences in the previous development of our science is the argument that goods attain value for us because goods were employed in their production that had value to us. Later, when I come to the discussion of the prices of goods of higher order, I shall show the specific causes that were responsible for this error and for its becoming the foundation of the accepted theory of prices (in a form hedged about with all sorts of special provisions, of course). Here I want to state, above all, that this argument is so strictly opposed to all experience that it would have to be rejected even if it provided a formally correct solution to the problem of establishing a principle explaining the value of goods. But even this last purpose cannot be achieved by the argument in question, since it offers an explanation only for the value of goods we may designate as “products” but not for the value of all other goods, which appear as original factors of production. It does not explain the value of goods directly provided by nature, especially the services of land. It does not explain the value of labor services. Nor does it even, as we shall see later, explain the value of the services of capital. For the value of all these goods can-not be explained by the argument that goods derive their value from the value of the goods expended in their production. Indeed, it makes their value completely incomprehensible.
he supplements this by explaining that production only attains a value prospectively of the value of the future product sold (rather than retroactively, as in the case of marx's "social necessity"). in menger's notion then, value is completed by what is teleological and so pre-determined. the contradiction here is that this assogns a value to what is only potential of purchase, rather than in marx's case, where the contingency of a present purpose actualises what was potential of value in production. we may read menger's continuation:
>there is no necessary connection between the value of goods of lower or first order in the present and the value of currently available goods of higher order serving for the production of such goods. On the contrary, it is evident that the former derive their value from the relationship between requirements and avail-able quantities in the present, while the latter derive their value from the prospective relationship between the requirements and the quantities that will be available at the future points in time when the products created by means of the goods of higher order will become available. If the prospective future value of a good of lower order rises, other things remaining equal, the value of the goods of higher order whose possession assures us future com-mand of the good of lower order rises also. But the rise or fall of the value of a good of lower order available in the present has no necessary causal connection with the rise or fall of the value of currently available corresponding goods of higher order. Hence the principle that the value of goods of higher order is governed, not by the value of corresponding goods of lower order of the present, but rather by the prospective value of the product, is the universally valid principle of the determination of the value of goods of higher order.
he makes sense that the only purpose commodity production has is to grant us a greater value in a final product, but to say that what is without final sale is without subsequent value is false, since the labour and instruments used in production are still paid for. menger fails to see this very basic intermediation where rates of price are set according to costs of production. i would say then that since value has been sufficiently assigned to the lower (basic) orders of commodity, they transfer their particular values into the final product, rather axiomatically. to take commodities singularly of their costs is to be lost in methodological confusion. it is true that the use-value of (A) is different from (X, Y, Z), yet the exchange-value (equilibrium price) of (A) = (X + Y + Z), hence quality and quantity in the commodity. so then, what is prospective is still cumulative.

In pre-capitalist times, to accumulate exchange value meant to strategically trade use values, not just commodities with lower SNLT for commodities with higher SNLT, but trading commodities that go bad in exchange for commodities that don't. Hence the lust for Gold. People can't eat Gold, but their family can keep it for 1000 years without it losing its exchange value due to rotting.

andrew kliman; he looks awful, he sounds awful, and he's an awful expositor of marxism. here, "tjump" asks the most rudimentary question of all: "why cant machines create value?" and kliman suttters and stammers his way through nonsense (as per usual).

tjump's entirely reasonable assertion that machinery engages in labour is denied by kliman, but tjump already possesses the spirit of marx without reading him, since marx specifically designates machines as "dead labour" whose value is fixed by the price conserved within it. capital is characterised by marx as objectifying the worker; abstracting him to simply be an extension of its mechanical limbs. there is no qualitative difference between man and machine in production, except that a machine may be even better than man at performing certain functions (hence the automation of labour).

so then, both men and machines labour, but simply at different capacities. machines produce commodities at a greater rate than men and therefore increase the number of goods in a market. this raises supply, which decreases demand per product. this leads to lower prices, which totally, equals the value of the machine. this is the most straightforward understanding of it. machines do more work for cheaper, leading to more commodities for cheaper. the issue is then twofold; more machines mean more unemployment, paired with lower prices not being able to make suitable profits. so, machines do not produce values in exchange (prices) above their own cost, but only transfer what they already possess; increasing the intensity of labour inverse to duration (SNLT). what then makes men unique? only the wage, which is a cost cheaper than what is totally produced by labour-power. consequently, according to marx, human slaves do not produce exchange-values above their cost, but simply are a form of fixed capital, like animals or machines in the character of their labour. profit as surplus value rather than as surplus production then comes at the advent of generalised wage labour. there is nothing unique about men then, except that they are the consumers of the competitive social product; to marx, there is no value outside of commodity exchange.

tjump also makes the inference that more production means more value, not less. he is certainly correct in a particular way. what remains constant in commodities is their use-value, while exchange-values are variable. increased production means a surplus of social utility (yet, more production means a lesser marginal utility). so tjump is right in everything he's saying, by just being a random guy thinking about the issue, while kliman is not just being an obscurantist, but is actively deceptive.

(1/5)

summarising and reviewing carl menger's "principles of economics" (1871). this is the founding text of austrian economics and one of the founding texts of marginal utility theory. starting with chapter 1:
>Things that can be placed in a causal connection with the satisfaction of human needs we term useful things. [Nützlichkeiten]
this term is also what marx uses to describe "utilities".
>If, however, we both recognize this causal connection, and have the power actually to direct the useful things to the satisfaction of our needs, we call them goods.
so a utility *becomes* a good if it can be possessed. we may then present items of produce modally. there are items with potential means of satisfaction (utilities) and actual means of satisfaction (goods). lets continue:
>If a thing is to become a good, or in other words, if it is to acquire goods-character , all four of the following prerequisites must be simultaneously present: (1) A human need. (2) Such properties as render the thing capable of being brought into a causal connection with the satisfaction of this need. (3) Human knowledge of this causal connection. (4) Command of the thing sufficient to direct it to the satisfaction of the need.
"goods-character" [Güterqualität] is also interchanged with "commodity-character" [Waarencharakter] by menger, so can be seen as conferring the same meaning. from the 4 conditions of commodities, we can define goods generally, as "useful objects which are capable of being possessed as a means of satisfaction". menger states that if there is variation of the 4 attributes, then the good loses its character. menger offers odd constrictions upon what may qualify something as a good:
>Among things of the first class are most cosmetics, all charms, the majority of medicines administered to the sick by peoples of early civilizations and by primitives even today, divining rods, love potions, etc. For all these things are incapable of actually satisfying the needs they are supposed to serve. Among things of the second class are medicines for diseases that do not actually exist, the implements, statues, buildings, etc., used by pagan people for the worship of idols, instruments of torture, and the like. Such things, therefore, as derive their goods-character merely from properties they are imagined to possess or from needs merely imagined by men may appropriately be called imaginary goods.
so then, there are real goods and imaginary goods:
>As a people attains higher levels of civilization, and as men penetrate more deeply into the true constitution of things and of their own nature, the number of true goods becomes constantly larger, and as can easily be understood, the number of imaginary goods becomes progressively smaller.
so progress to menger is in the greater causality between production and consumption by the relations of men to true goods. this rationalises production to real ends of satisfying needs. in the first place then, we see that menger does not conceive of anything "subjective" in his evaluation, but only what is causally efficient.

in the next section he says this:
>The thought developed in this section may be summarized in the proposition that it is not a requirement of the goods-character of a thing that it be capable of being placed in direct causal connection with the satisfaction of human needs. It has been shown that goods having an indirect causal relationship with the satisfaction of human needs differ in the closeness of this relationship. But it has also been shown that this difference does not affect the essence of goods-character in any way. In this connection, a distinction was made between goods of first, second, third, fourth, and higher orders.
so then, what is causal may not be merely directly related, but may nonetheless conserve usefulness by indirection. of goods (or commodities) then, we may speak of direct and indirect uses and correspondingly, the order of their useful effects by gradients of distance. following from this, he devises relative laws of goods:
>A. The goods-character of goods of higher order is dependent on command of corresponding
>B. The goods-character of goods of higher order is derived from that of the corresponding goods of lower order.
so he perceives a causal chain of usefulness in goods.

next, he considers temporality between production and consumption between lower and higher goods:
>After what has been said, it is evident that command of goods of higher order and command of the corresponding goods of first order differ, with respect to a particular kind of consumption, in that the latter can be consumed immediately whereas the former represent an earlier stage in the formation of consumption goods and hence can be utilized for direct consumption only after the passage of an appreciable period of time, which is longer or shorter according to the nature of the case. But another exceedingly important difference between immediate command of a consumption good and indirect command of it (through possession of goods of higher order) demands our consideration.
upon this consideration of the alienation between producers and consumers, menger makes more odd comments:
>Human uncertainty about the quantity and quality of the product (corresponding goods of first order) of the whole causal process is greater the larger the num-ber of elements involved in any way in the production of con-sumption goods which we either do not understand or over which, even understanding them, we have no control—that is, the larger the number of elements that do not have goods-character. This uncertainty is one of the most important factors in the economic uncertainty of men, and, as we shall see in what follows, is of the greatest practical significance in human economy.
he appears to imply that without the adequate knowledge of a good which is sold, we lose causal connection to its process and so the thing itself loses its condition as a viable commodity; we may perhaps say otherwise that it takes on imaginary or unreal attributes in the process of exchange, and so the distance between buyer and seller creates exploitation. there is certain truth in this, but i would say that the risk of any market without regulation is the risk of being sold something illegitimate, or even to be sold a legitimate item at an illegitimate price. this passage is interesting nonetheless and it reminds me of what aldous huxley writes in "brave new world" concerning the alienation of scientific knowledge in the scheme of mass production.

at the end of chapter 1, we have established many things, but lets list them. a good is an actualised utility, which is an object used to satisfy human needs. there are true goods and imaginary goods. of true goods, there are direct and indirect uses attached to them, where a direct good of a lower order depends on the elements of indirect, higher orders of utilities. a direct good we define temporally, as something immediately consumable, while an indirect good is something consumable through the process of production of refinement. finally, the distance between the quality and quantity of indirect goods to their final product is a medium of knowledge which may create alienation to consumers and thus make what is deemed to be a true good imaginary, or at least marginally unreal in its effects. i feel that this is a good way to systematise the initial meaning of menger's economic science.

chapter 2 begins with this:
>Needs arise from our drives and the drives are imbedded in our nature. An imperfect satisfaction of needs leads to the stunting of our nature. Failure to satisfy them brings about our destruction. But to satisfy our needs is to live and prosper. Thus the attempt to provide for the satisfaction of our needs is synonymous with the attempt to provide for our lives and well-being. It is the most important of all human endeavors, since it is the prerequisite and foundation of all others […] The quantities of consumption goods a person must have to satisfy his needs may be termed his requirements.
here again, he is basing the goodness of something in an objective or causal context, and natural need [satisfaction] is quantified as requirement [demand]:
>The concern of men for the satisfaction of theirs needs thus becomes an attempt to provide in advance for meeting their requirements [bedarf] in the future, and we shall therefore call a person’s requirements those quantities of goods that are necessary to satisfy his needs within the time period covered by his plans.
here, menger is temporalising satisfaction once more. he continues:
>There are two kinds of knowledge that men must possess as a prerequisite for any successful attempt to provide in advance for the satisfaction of their needs. They must become clear: (a) about their requirements—that is, about the quantities of goods they will need to satisfy their needs during the time period over which their plans extend, and (b) about the quantities of goods at their disposal for the purpose of meeting these requirements.
so again, menger appears to place sufficient knowledge as a prerequisite for the satisfaction of need, since what is insufficient in knowledge may apply an insufficiency in satisfaction.

for the next section, he gives 3 economic relations:
>A. Requirements for goods of first order (consumption goods).
<Human beings experience directly and immediately only needs for goods of first order—that is, for goods that can be used directly for the satisfaction of their needs
>B. Requirements for goods of higher order (means of production).
<We can bring quantities of goods of higher order to the production of given quantities of goods of lower order, and thus finally to the meeting of our requirements, only if we are in the position of having the complementary quantities of the other goods of higher order simultaneously at our disposal.
>C. The time limits within which human needs are felt.
and provides details for each of them
<Human requirements for goods of higher order, like those for goods of lower order, are not only magnitudes that are quantitatively determined in strict accordance with definite laws, and that can be estimated beforehand by men where a practical necessity exists, but they are magnitudes also which, within certain time limits, men do calculate with an exactness sufficient for their practical affairs.

after this, menger establishes the categories of human economic affairs and their manner of relation:
>A. Economic goods.
<The first effects of this insight upon the activity of men intent to satisfy their needs as completely as possible are that they strive: (1) to maintain at their disposal every unit of a good standing in this quantitative relationship, and (2) to conserve its useful properties […] (3) to make a choice between their more important needs, which they will satisfy with the available quantity of the good in question, and needs that they must leave unsatisfied, and (4) to obtain the greatest possible result with a given quantity of the good or a given result with the smallest possible quantity […] The complex of human activities directed to these four objectives is called economizing, and goods standing in the quantitative relationship involved in the preceding discussion are the exclusive objects of it […] Property, therefore, like human economy, is not an arbitrary invention but rather the only practically possi-ble solution of the problem that is, in the nature of things, imposed upon us by the disparity between requirements for, and available quantities of, all economic goods.
>B. Non-economic goods.
<As a result [of a surplus of resources over necessity], economizing men are under no practical necessity of either preserving every unit of such goods at their command or conserving its useful properties […] It is clear, accordingly, that all the various forms in which human economic activity expresses itself are absent in the case of goods whose available quantities are larger than the requirements for them, just as naturally as they will necessarily be present in the case of goods subject to the opposite quantitative relationship. Hence they are not objects of human economy, and for this reason we call them non-economic goods […] we can actually observe a picture of communism with respect to all goods standing in the relationship causing non-economic character; for men are communists when-ever possible under existing natural conditions. In towns situated on rivers with more water than is wanted by the inhabitants for the sat-isfaction of their needs, everyone goes to the river to draw any desired quantity of water. In virgin forests, everyone fetches unhin-dered the quantity of timber he needs. And everyone admits as much light and air into his house as he thinks proper. This communism is as naturally founded upon a non-economic relationship as property is founded upon one that is economic.
>C. The relationship between economic and non-economic goods.
<According to our analysis, there can be only two kinds of reasons why a non-economic good becomes an economic good: an increase in human requirements or a diminution of the available quantity. The chief causes of an increase in requirements are: (1) growth of population, especially if it occurs in a limited area, (2) growth of human needs, as the result of which the requirements of any given population increase, and (3) advances in the knowledge men have of the causal connection between things and their welfare, as the result of which new useful purposes for goods arise. I need hardly point out that all these phenomena accompany the transition of mankind from lower to higher levels of civiliza-tion. From this it follows, as a natural consequence, that with advancing civilization non-economic goods show a tendency to take on economic character, chiefly because one of the factors involved is the magnitude of human requirements, which increase with the progressive development of civilization.
>D. The laws governing the economic character of goods.
<From this we derive the general principle that the economic character of goods of higher order depends upon the economic character of the goods of lower order for whose production they serve. In other words, no good of higher order can attain economic character or maintain it unless it is suitable for the production of some economic good of lower order […] But with these goods, as with goods of first order, they find that some are available in quantities exceeding their requirements while the opposite relationship pre-vails with others. Hence they divide goods of higher order also into one group that they include in the sphere of their economic activity, and another group that they do not feel any practical necessity to treat in this way. This is the origin of the economic character of goods of higher order.
(i will summarise these points at the end of the chapter)

next we get further categories of understanding
>Earlier we called “the entire sum of goods at a person’s command” his property. The entire sum of economic goods at an economizing individual’s command we will, on the other hand, call his wealth.
property then, when economised, becomes wealth - despite menger already claiming that property is an inherently economic category due to resource scarcity…
<The non-economic goods at an economizing individual’s command are not objects of his economy, and hence must not be regarded as parts of his wealth. We saw that economic goods are goods whose available quantities are smaller than the requirements for them. Wealth can therefore also be defined as the entire sum of goods at an economizing individual’s command, the quantities of which are smaller than the requirements for them. Hence, if there were a society where all goods were available in amounts exceeding the requirements for them, there would be no economic goods nor any “wealth.” Although wealth is thus a measure of the degree of completeness with which one person can satisfy his needs in comparison with other persons who engage in economic activity under the same conditions, it is never an absolute measure of his welfare, or the highest welfare of all individuals and of society would be attained if the quantities of goods at the disposal of society were so large that no one would be in need of wealth.
so then, wealth is a relative term, which measures the welfare of individuals, and without scarcity, there would only be welfare and there would be no wealth. but would there be property, if property is not also wealth…? menger doesnt say.

to summarise chapter 2 then, we see menger's first condition of economy as scarcity (or a lower quantity of produced goods than that which satisfy the needs of everybody in a population). this scarcity leads to the rationalisation of distribution by different properties. the economic state develops from the non-economic by the graduation of lower civilisation to higher stages (by the division of labour and rising populations). the economic (scarcity) is then a consequence of social advancement. the measure of economic goods one has relative to satisfaction we call wealth, which has the end of welfare. once welfare is established, wealth loses its meaning therefore (here we see originary marginalism).

(2/5)

chapter 3 is about the concept of value:
>If economizing men become aware of this circumstance (that is, if they perceive that the satisfaction of one of their needs, or the greater or less completeness of its satisfaction, is dependent on their command of each portion of a quantity of goods or on each individual good subject to the above quantitative relationship) these goods attain for them the significance we call value. Value is thus the importance that individual goods or quantities of goods attain for us because we are conscious of being dependent on command of them for the satisfaction of our needs. The value of goods, accordingly, is a phenomenon that springs from the same source as the economic character of goods—that is, from the relationship, explained earlier, between requirements for and available quantities of goods.
here, value and wealth appear simultaneous, as means to an end of particular satisfaction, since if we possessed total satisfaction, now and later, we would have no need for present and future goods, and so no goods could possess a value for us. thus as menger says, value is a condition of economic relations:
<From this, it is also clear why only economic goods have value to us, while goods subject to the quantitative relationship responsible for non-economic character cannot attain value at all.
to put it in marginal terms, the value of a good declines in relation to the rate of its consumption, since its economic (scarce) character as a good loses utility. he speaks of the difference between utility, value here:
>For this reason the former [non-economic goods] possesses utility, but only the latter [economic goods], in addition to utility, possesses also that significance for us that we call value. Of course the error underlying the confusion of utility and use value has had no influence on the practical activity of men. At no time has an economizing individual attributed value under ordi-nary circumstances to a cubic foot of air or, in regions abounding in springs, to a pint of water. The practical man distinguishes very well the capacity of an object to satisfy one of his needs from its value.
menger then appears to (rightfully) disconsider "utility" as a "use-value" proper, since something can be useful without it being valuable (since use-value obviously denotes a "value in use" grammatically, and etymologically, as we read in smith). this is an error similarly made by marx - as i have previously pointed out: >>2489515
while in menger's footnote, he cites proudhon as conflating utility and use-value as categories; one is generally applicable, while one is strictly economic. utility then (as menger says in chapter one) precedes the quality of something as a good, since a good may also take the shape of a commodity. i find menger extremely proper in his distinction here therefore.

next, menger speaks on what value is and isnt:
>Regarding this knowledge, however, men can be in error about the value of goods just as they can be in error with respect to all other objects of human knowledge. Hence they may attribute value to things that do not, according to economic considerations, possess it in reality, if they mistakenly assume that the more or less complete satisfaction of their needs depends on a good, or quantity of goods, when this relationship is really non-existent. In cases of this sort we observe the phenomenon of imaginary value.
here we see a return of the term "imaginary value" and in this context, menger appears to imply again, that value is not subjective, but is objective, and so may accordingly be misrecognised of a commodity. this is rather similar to marx's estimation, that a good may take the form of a commodity without it as such *being* a commodity, and so possessing imaginary value. in the same way to menger, if one sold a drink with the promise of health, yet it made one sick, then the value of this commodity would be "imaginary" regardless of whatever it may trade for. menger like marx then see value normatively as a particular quality of an object. menger penetrates this relativity of value:
>The value of goods arises from their relationship to our needs, and is not inherent in the goods themselves. With changes in this relationship, value arises and disappears. For the inhabitants of an oasis, who have command of a spring that abundantly meets their requirements for water, a certain quantity of water at the spring itself will have no value. But if the spring, as the result of an earth-quake, should suddenly decrease its yield of water to such an extent that the satisfaction of the needs of the inhabitants of the oasis would no longer be fully provided for, each of their concrete needs for water would become dependent upon the availability of a definite quantity of it, and such a quantity would immediately attain value for each inhabitant. This value would, however, sud-denly disappear if the old relationship were reestablished and the spring regained its former yield of water.
here, value is then not an unconditional aspect of something, but is conditional upon its economic factors. if its factors change in relation to us, then so does its value (menger still fails to claim that exchange is the constitutive act of measuring value, so value here does not yet possess formal separation from "utility"):
<Value is thus nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent thing existing by itself. It is a judgment econ-omizing men make about the importance of the goods at their dis-posal for the maintenance of their lives and well-being. Hence value does not exist outside the consciousness of men […] Objectification of the value of goods, which is entirely subjective in nature, has nevertheless contributed very greatly to confusion about the basic principles of our science.
here, the qualification of value as subjective first makes its claim.

in the next section, menger explores what differentiates the magnitude of value of different commodities:
>the differences we observe in the magnitude of value of different goods in actual life can only be founded on differences in the magnitude of importance of the satisfactions that depend on our command of these goods.
the satiation of a particular satisfaction thus renders the value of a subsequent good for the same task as proportionally valueless. if i eat food, i become full - the same food loses value at the same rate of consumption. he separates between two factors of consideration:
>We must investigate: (1) to what extent different satisfactions have different degrees of importance to us (subjective factor), and (2) which satisfactions of concrete needs depend, in each individual case, on our command of a particular good (objective factor) […] For we shall have reduced the economic phenomenon whose explanation we stated to be the central problem of this investigation to its ulti-mate causes. I mean differences in the magnitude of value of goods.
he now details four areas of consideration:
>A. Differences in the magnitude of importance of different satisfactions (subjective factor).
<these differences in the importance of different satisfactions can be observed not only with the satisfaction of needs of different kinds but also with the more or less complete satisfaction of one and the same need […] I shall designate the importance of satisfactions on which life depends with 10, and the smaller importance of the other satisfac-tions successively with 9, 8, 7, 6, etc. In this way we obtain a scale of the importance of different satisfactions that begins with 10 and ends with 1 […] For satisfactions on which, up to a certain point, our lives depend, and on which, beyond this point, a well-being is dependent that steadily decreases with the degree of completeness of the satisfaction already achieved, we obtain a scale that begins with 10 and ends with 0. Similarly, for satisfactions whose highest importance is 9, we obtain a scale that begins with this figure and also ends with 0, and so on […] By this reference to an ordinary phenomenon of life, I believe I have clarified satisfactorily the meaning of the numbers in the table, which were chosen merely to facilitate demonstration of a difficult and previously unexplored field of psychology. The varying importance that satisfaction of separate concrete needs has for men is not foreign to the consciousness of any econ-omizing man, however little attention has hitherto been paid by scholars to the phenomena here treated.
>B. The dependence of separate satisfactions on particular goods (objective factor).
<Suppose that an individual needs 10 discrete units (or 10 meas-ures) of a good for the full satisfaction of all his needs for that good, that these needs vary in importance from 10 to 1, but that he has only 7 units (or only 7 measures) of the good at his command.
From what has been said about the nature of human economy it is directly evident that this individual will satisfy only those of his needs for the good that range in importance from 10 to 4 with the quantity at his command (7 units), and that the other needs, rang-ing in importance from 3 to 1, will remain unsatisfied. What is the value to the economizing individual in question of one of his 7 units (or measures) in this case? According to what we have learned about the nature of the value of goods, this question is equivalent to the question: what is the importance of the satisfac-tions that would be unattained if the individual concerned were to have only 6 instead of 7 units (or measures) at his command. If some accident were to deprive him of one of his seven goods (or measures), it is clear that the person in question would use the remaining 6 units to satisfy the more important needs and would neglect the least important one. Hence the result of losing one good (or one measure) would be that only the least of all the satis-factions assured by the whole available quantity of seven units (i.e., the satisfaction whose importance was designated as 4) would be lost, while those satisfactions (or acts of satisfying needs) whose importance ranges from 10 to 5 would take place as before […] If we summarize what has been said, we obtain the following principles as the result of our investigation thus far: (1) The importance that goods have for us and which we call value is merely imputed. Basically, only satisfactions have importance for us, because the maintenance of our lives and well-being depend on them. But we logically impute this importance to the goods on whose availability we are con-scious of being dependent for these satisfactions. (2) The magnitudes of importance that different satisfactions of concrete needs (the separate acts of satisfaction that can be realized by means of individual goods) have for us are unequal, and their measure lies in the degree of their importance for the maintenance of our lives and welfare. (3) The magnitudes of the importance of our satisfactions that are imputed to goods—that is, the magnitudes of their val-ues—are therefore also unequal, and their measure lies in the degree of importance that the satisfactions dependent on the goods in question have for us. (4) In each particular case, of all the satisfactions assured by the whole available quantity of a good, only those that have the least importance to an economizing individual are depend-ent on command of a given portion of the whole quantity. (5) The value of a particular good or of a given portion of the whole quantity of a good at the disposal of an economizing individual is thus for him equal to the importance of the least important of the satisfactions assured by the whole available quantity and achieved with any equal portion. For it is with respect to these least important satisfactions that the economizing individual concerned is dependent on the availability of the particular good, or given quantity of a good […] Thus, in our investigation to this point, we have traced the dif-ferences in the value of goods back to their ultimate causes, and have also, at the same time, found the ultimate, and original, meas-ure by which the values of all goods are judged by men […] All this holds only for the ordinary circumstances of life, when drinking water is available to us in copious quantities and gold and diamonds in very small quantities. In the desert, however, where the life of a traveller is often dependent on a drink of water, it can by all means be imagined that more important satisfactions depend, for an individual, on a pound of water than on even a pound of gold.
>C. The influence of differences in the quality of goods on their value
<If the differences, as to type or kind, between two goods are to be responsible for differences in their value, it is necessary that they also have different capacities to satisfy human needs. In other words, it is necessary that they have what we call, from an economic point of view, differences in quality […] Human needs may be satis-fied either in a quantitatively or in a qualitatively different manner by means of equal quantities of qualitatively different goods.
>D. The subjective character of the measure of value. Labor and value. Error.
<not only the nature but also the measure of value is subjective. Goods always have value to certain economizing individuals and this value is also determined only by these individuals […] Whether a diamond was found accidentally or was obtained from a diamond pit with the employment of a thousand days of labor is completely irrelevant for its value […] Equally untenable is the opinion that the determining factor in the value of goods is the quantity of labor or other means of pro-duction that are necessary for their reproduction. A large number of goods cannot be reproduced (antiques, and paintings by old mas-ters, for instance) and thus, in a number of cases, we can observe value but no possibility of reproduction. For this reason, any factor connected with reproduction cannot be the determining principle of value in general […] The determining factor in the value of a good, then, is neither the quantity of labor or other goods necessary for its production nor the quantity necessary for its reproduction, but rather the magnitude of importance of those satisfactions with respect to which we are conscious of being dependent on command of the good. This principle of value determination is universally valid, and no exception to it can be found in human economy.
all of this then lays out the popular notion of austrian economic thinking; subjective value, marginal utility, etc.

(3/5)

the next section deals with the value of higher goods:
>A. The principle determining the value of goods of higher order.
<there is no necessary connection between the value of goods of lower or first order in the present and the value of currently available goods of higher order serving for the production of such goods. On the contrary, it is evident that the former derive their value from the relationship between requirements and avail-able quantities in the present, while the latter derive their value from the prospective relationship between the requirements and the quantities that will be available at the future points in time when the products created by means of the goods of higher order will become available. If the prospective future value of a good of lower order rises, other things remaining equal, the value of the goods of higher order whose possession assures us future com-mand of the good of lower order rises also. But the rise or fall of the value of a good of lower order available in the present has no necessary causal connection with the rise or fall of the value of currently available corresponding goods of higher order. Hence the principle that the value of goods of higher order is governed, not by the value of corresponding goods of lower order of the present, but rather by the prospective value of the product, is the universally valid principle of the determination of the value of goods of higher order.
>B. The productivity of capital.
<A primitive Indian is occupied incessantly with the task of meeting his requirements for a few days at a time. A nomad who does not consume the domestic animals at his command but decides to breed them for their young is already producing goods that will become available to him only after a few months. But among civilized peoples, a con-siderable proportion of the members of society is occupied with the production of goods that will contribute only after years, and often only after decades, to the direct satisfaction of human needs […] In other words, he can procure this gain only by employing goods, which are available to him, if he so chooses, for the present or for the near future, for the satisfaction of the needs of a more distant time period […] When this occurs, each individual can participate in the economic gains connected with employment of goods of higher order in contrast to purely collecting activity (and, at higher levels of civilization, with the employment of goods of higher order in contrast to the limitations of means of production of lower order) only if he already has command of quantities of economic goods of higher order (or quantities of economic goods of any kind, when a brisk commerce has already developed and goods of all kinds may be exchanged for one another) in the present for future periods of time—in other words, only if he possesses capital […] The more or less complete satisfaction of our needs is therefore no less dependent on command of quantities of economic goods for certain periods of time (on capital services) than it is on com-mand of other economic goods […] the pay-ment of interest must not be regarded as a compensation of the owner of capital for his abstinence, but as the exchange of one economic good (the use of capital) for another (money, for instance).
>C. The value of complementary quantities of goods of higher order.
<In order to transform goods of higher order into goods of lower order, the passage of a certain period of time is necessary. Hence, whenever economic goods are to be produced, command of the services of capital is necessary for a certain period of time. The length of this period varies according to the nature of the produc-tion process. In any given branch of production, it is longer the higher the order of the goods to be directed to the satisfaction of human needs. But some passage of time is inseparable from any process of production. During these time periods, the quantity of economic goods of which I am speaking (capital) is fixed, and not available for other productive purposes. In order to have a good or a quantity of goods of lower order at our command at a future time, it is not suf-ficient to have fleeting possession of the corresponding goods of higher order at some single point in time, but instead necessary that we retain command of these goods of higher order for a period of time that varies in length according to the nature of the particular process of production, and that we fix them in this pro-duction process for the duration of that period […] Entrepreneurial activity includes: (a) obtaining information about the economic situation; (b) economic calculation—all the various computations that must be made if a production process is to be efficient (provided that it is economic in other respect); (c) the act of will by which goods of higher order (or goods in general—under conditions of developed commerce, where any economic good can be exchanged for any other) are assigned to a particular production process; and finally (d) supervision of the execution of the production plan so that it may be carried through as economically as possible. In small firms, these entrepreneurial activities usually occupy but an inconsiderable part of the time of the entrepreneur. In large firms, however, not only the entrepreneur himself, but often several helpers, are fully occupied with these activities […] After what has been said, it will be evident that I cannot agree with Mangoldt, who designates “risk bearing” as the essential function of entrepreneurship in a production process, since this “risk” is only incidental and the chance of loss is counterbalanced by the chance of profit […] Let me summarize the results of this section. The aggregate present value of all the complementary quantities of goods of higher order (that is, all the raw materials, labor services, services of land, machines, tools, etc.) necessary for the production of a good of lower or first order is equal to the prospective value of the product. But it is necessary to include in the sum not only the goods of higher order technically required for its production but also the services of capital and the activity of the entrepreneur. For these are as unavoidably necessary in every economic production of goods as the technical requisites already mentioned. Hence the present value of the technical factors of production by themselves is not equal to the full prospective value of the product, but always behaves in such a way that a margin for the value of the services of capital and entrepreneurial activity remains.
>D. The value of individual goods of higher order.
<We have seen that the value of a particular good (or of a given quantity of goods) to the economizing individual who has it at his command is equal to the importance he attaches to the satisfac-tions he would have to forgo if he did not have command of it.
From this we could infer, without difficulty, that the value of each unit of goods of higher order is likewise equal to the importance of the satisfactions assured by command of a unit if we were not impeded by the fact that a good of higher order cannot be employed for the satisfaction of human needs by itself but only in combination with other (the complementary) goods of higher order […] the value of a good of higher order will be greater (1) the greater the prospective value of the product if the value of the other complementary goods necessary for its production remains equal, and (2) the lower, other things being equal, the value of the complementary goods.
>E. The value of the services of land, capital, and labor, in particular.
<Land and the services of land, in the concrete forms in which we observe them, are objects of our value appraisement like all other goods. Like other goods, they attain value only to the extent that we depend on command of them for the satisfaction of our needs […] The value of services of land is therefore not subject to different laws than the value of the services of machines, tools, houses, fac-tories, or any other kind of economic good […] In reality, as we shall see, the prices of actual labor services are governed, like the prices of all other goods, by their values. But their values are governed, as was shown, by the magnitude of importance of the satisfactions that would have to remain unsatis-fied if we were unable to command the labor services. Where labor services are goods of higher order, their values are governed (prox-imately and directly) in accordance with the principle that the value of a good of higher order to economizing men is greater (1) the greater the prospective value of the product, provided the value of the complementary goods of higher order is constant, and (2) the lower, other things being equal, the value of the complementary goods […] Entrepreneurial activity must definitely be counted as a category of labor services. It is an economic good as a rule, and as such has value to economizing men. Labor services in this category have two peculiarities: (a) they are by nature not commodities (not intended for exchange) and for this reason have no prices; (b) they have command of the services of capital as a necessary prerequi-site since they cannot otherwise be performed […] It may well appear deplorable to a lover of mankind that possession of capital or a piece of land often provides the owner a higher income for a given period of time than the income received by a laborer for the most strenuous activity during the same period. Yet the cause of this is not immoral, but simply that the sat-isfaction of more important human needs depends upon the serv-ices of the given amount of capital or piece of land than upon the services of the laborer.

this then concludes chapter 3. to quickly summarise what menger has wtitten we may begin duly. there is a difference between the economic and non-economic in terms of abundance versus scarcity. for this purpose, economies create the relationship of commodity values. values occur by relative magnitude according to their degree of utility/necessity. water for a thirsty man is more important than a quenched man for example. thus, value only arises in the circumstance of need/desire, which is a condition of privation. the degree of satisfaction then is where commodities lose their values. of certain goods, we may also define them in relation to their order in production, and so temporally also. that which may be immediately consumed is of the lower, primary order of goods, while that which requires a mediated sequence to actualise its prospective product is a good of a higher or greater order. the more civilised society becomes, the generally more concerned it becomes about saving, and so capital attains its value as this composite source of value, which must of itself by utilised by entrepeneurial labour services, which include the temporality and technicality of his labour. menger says however that at scale, entrepeneurship is outsourced to managers, and that owners do not grant interest on capital by mere virtue of investment, but only from valuable service. he then fails to explain why a capitalist who has outsourced entrepeneurial labour to managers still requites a reward for his supposed labour. as he says, what makes capital valuable is its particular utilisation, not simply its ownership. menger could be implying an anti-capitalist argument here.

(4/5)

we begin chapter 4 with a discourse on adam smith's apparent failure to disclose the origin of trade. i have previously dealt with menger's false comments and shown him to reproduce smith's own arguments, but i will go through menger's reasoning nonetheless:
>Since it has been established that exchange is not an end in itself, and still less itself a pleasure for men, the problem in what follows will be to explain its nature and origin […] It is therefore evident that we have encountered a case in which, if command of a certain amount of A’s goods were transferred to B and if command of a certain amount of B’s goods were transferred to A, the needs of both economizing individuals could be better satisfied than would be the case in the absence of this reciprocal transfer.
here, menger sees trade begin where a surplus of one particular good is traded for a surplus of another. thus, commodities become valueless to those who possess them at the margin of their relative satisfaction. exchange then comes at the end of use. this principle basically sums up the whole chapter, and it is also spoken of in a more succinct style by adam smith, "wealth of nations", book 1, chapter 4.

chapter 5 finally comes to prices, which menger only sees as derivative of economic activity in general:
>Economizing individuals strive to better their economic positions as much as possible. To this end they engage in economic activity in general. And to this end also, whenever it can be attained by means of trade, they exchange goods. Prices are only incidental manifestations of these activities, symptoms of an economic equi-librium between the economies of individuals.
menger breaks with all economic sense and sees that there is no equivalence in exchange, but only what is unequal (or mutually preferable of another's value):
>Suppose A had exchanged his house for B’s farm or for a sum of 20,000 Thalers. If these goods had become equivalents in the objective sense of the term as a result of the transaction, or if they had already been equivalents before it took place, there is no reason why the two participants should not be willing to reverse the trade immedi-ately. But experience tells us that in a case of this kind neither of the two would give his consent to such an arrangement.
thus, to get what one wants from another entails what is mutually unpreferable in reciprocity. one only trades what he does not want for what he does, and so to acquire what one doesnt want for what he does is an irrational relation, and so exchange is inherently unequal:
>A correct theory of prices cannot, therefore, have the task of explaining an alleged “equality of value” between two quantities of goods when such an equality does not, in truth, exist anywhere.

next, menger attempts to explain the basis of price formation as a style of bargaining between quantities of goods. he is careful to note that prices can only form by what is particular to each ratio of exchange:
>The result is the phenomenon which, in ordinary life, we call bargaining. Each of the two bargainers will attempt to acquire as large a portion as possible of the economic gain that can be derived from the exploitation of the exchange opportunity, and even if he were to try to obtain but a fair share of the gain, he will be inclined to demand higher prices the less he knows of the economic condition of the other bargainer and the less he knows the extreme limit to which the other is prepared to go […] In our case, the price for a quantity of wine of 40 units upon which the two bargainers will finally agree will lie within the lim-its of 80 and 100 units of grain, with the further restriction that it must be higher than 80 and lower than 100 units. As concerns its position between these limits, if the two bargainers are otherwise equally situated, it will be equal to 90 units of grain. But if this equality in their situations does not prevail, an exchange at another price between the two limits would not be economically impossible.
<The quantities of goods that are given for each other in an economic exchange are therefore precisely determined by the economic situation obtaining in each case…
of course, what is particular may also be general, yet menger apparently refuses to consider the tendency of sale toward equilibrium (as jevons does, for example). now he speaks of monopoly and competition:
>Summarizing, we obtain the following principles: (1) When several economizing individuals, for each of whom the foundations for an economic exchange are present, compete for a single indivisible monop-olized good, the competitor who will obtain the good will be the one for whom it is the equivalent of the largest quantity of the good offered for it in exchange. (2) Price formation takes place between limits that are set by the equivalents of the monopolized good in question for the two competitors who are most eager, or who are in the strongest competitive position, to perform the exchange. (3) Within these limits, the price is fixed according to the principles of price formation already demonstrated for isolated exchange.
so then, the addition of competitors into the realm of price formation alters its potential rate of exchange. differing from monopoly (competition of consumers) and its tendency to raise prices, we may see the opposite, the competition of producers:
>competition in supply is to exercise any effect at all on price formation, total sales, and the distribution of a good among its competing purchasers, either different quantities of the good must be offered for sale or the competing sellers must find themselves obliged to set different prices under the regime of com-petition in supply than under monopoly […] competition, which concerns itself with the exploitation of even the smallest economic gain wherever pos-sible, tends to descend with its goods to the lowest social classes that the economic situation at any time permits. The monopolist has the power to regulate, within certain limits, either the price or the quantity of a monopolized good coming upon the market. He readily renounces the small profit that can be made on goods des-tined to be consumed by the poorest social classes in order to be able to exploit the classes of greater purchasing power more effec-tively. But under competition, where no single competitor has the power to regulate by himself either the price or the quantity of a good traded, each individual competitor desires even the smallest profit, and the exploitation of existing possibilities of making such profits is no longer neglected. Competition leads therefore to large-scale production with its tendency to make many small profits and with its high degree of economy, since the smaller the profit on each unit the more dangerous becomes every uneconomic waste, and the brisker the competition the less possible becomes an unthinking continuation of business according to old-established methods.
so then, monopoly and competition are established.

(5/5)

in chapter 6, menger considers use value and exchange value:
>The value of [X] in the first case and its value in the second case are therefore only two different forms of the same phenomenon of economic life. In both cases value is the importance that goods acquire for economizing individuals when these individuals are aware of being dependent on command of them for the satis-faction of their needs. What lends a special character, in each of the two cases, to the phenomenon of value is the fact that goods acquire the importance, to the economizing individuals commanding them, that we call value by being employed directly in the first case and indirectly in the second. This difference is nevertheless of sufficient importance both in ordinary life and in our science in particular to require specific terms for each of the two forms of the one general value phenomenon. Thus we call value in the first case use value, and in the second case we call it exchange value.
<Use value, therefore, is the importance that goods acquire for us because they directly assure us the satisfaction of needs that would not be provided for if we did not have the goods at our command.
Exchange value is the importance that goods acquire for us because their possession assures the same result indirectly.
now, this appears to simulate a previous categorisation of lower and higher order goods applying satisfaction by consumption immediately and non-immediately, or directly and indirectly by causation and temporality. he elaborates upon the point here:
>the importance of goods to us with respect to a direct employment and with respect to an indirect employment for the satisfaction of our needs are only different forms of a single general phenomenon of value […] A gold cup will undoubtedly have a high exchange value to a poor man who has won it in a lottery. By means of the cup he will be in a position (in an indirect manner, through exchange) to satisfy many needs that would not otherwise be provided for. But the use value of the cup to him will scarcely be worth mentioning at all. A pair of glasses, on the other hand, adjusted exactly to the eyes of the owner, probably has a consider-able use value to him, while its exchange value is usually very small.
here, this resembles the classical understanding:
>In all cases, therefore, in which a good has both use value and exchange value to its possessor, the economic value is the one that is the greater. But from what was said in Chapter IV, it is evident, in every instance in which the foundations for an economic exchange are present, that it is the exchange value of the good, and when this is not the case that it is the use value, that is the economic value.

next is chapter 7, on commodities:
>the characteristic feature of the isolated household economy is not the absence of any division of labor but its self-suf-ficiency, production being concerned exclusively with goods des-tined for the consumption of the household itself, and not at all with goods destined to be exchanged for other goods […] [in more advanced conditions] Products that the producers or middlemen hold in readiness for sale are called commodities. In ordinary usage the term is limited in its application to movable tangible goods (with the exception of money) […] From the definition just given of a commodity in the scientific sense of the term, it appears that commodity-character is nothing inherent in a good, no property of it, but merely a specific rela-tionship of a good to the person who has command of it. With the disappearance of this relationship the commodity-character of the good comes to an end. A good ceases to be a commodity, therefore, if the economizing individual possessing it gives up his intention of disposing of it, or if it comes into the hands of persons who do not intend to exchange it further but to consume it […] Commodity-character is therefore not only no property of goods but usually only a transitory relationship between goods and economizing individuals […] as soon as they have reached their economic destination (that is, as soon as they are in the hands of the ultimate consumer) they obviously cease to be commodities and become “consumption goods” in the narrow sense in which this term is opposed to the concept of “commodity.”
here then, we must clarify. a commodity to menger is an object made to be exchanged by their possessor and so possess means as an immediate goods-character, but is rather a commodity-character. a commodity then is a means to an end, as a value in exchange rather than use:
<To be consumed a good must cease to be a “commodity” and relinquish the form in which it has been traded
menger appears to also consider money as commodity:
>the view of those who deny the commodity character of money because “money as such, especially in the form of coin, does not serve any consumption purpose” is untenable simply because the same argument can be advanced against the commodity-character of all other goods […] The coin and the ingot are the most common forms in which the precious metals are traded, and the fact that these forms must be abandoned before the pre-cious metals can be brought into consumption is therefore nothing that justifies doubting their commodity-character.
we may now move on to the next chapter, on money.

beginning chapter 8:
>In considering the goods he will acquire in trade, each man takes account only of their use value to himself. Hence the exchange transactions that are actually per-formed are restricted naturally to situations in which economizing individuals have goods in their possession that have a smaller use value to them than goods in the possession of other economizing individuals who value the same goods in reverse fashion.
menger appears to imply that the function of money as commodity is due to its use-value being below its exchange-value for the possessor. menger applies another attribute of marketability or saleability into the composition of money however. that which is difficult to transfer in possession is that which becomes illegitimate as a medium of exchange. from this basic principle, he sees the origin of money in saleable items such as cattle [which is where the term "capital" comes from]:
>In the earliest periods of economic development, cattle seem to have been the most saleable commodity among most peoples of the ancient world […] The trade and commerce of the most cultured people of the ancient world, the Greeks, whose stages of development history has revealed to us in fairly distinct outlines, showed no trace of coined money even as late as the time of Homer. Barter still prevailed, and wealth consisted of herds of cattle. Payments were made in cattle […] Until very late, cattle and, next to them sheep, formed the means of exchange among the Romans […] Among our own ancestors, the old Germanic tribes, at a time when, according to Tacitus, they held silver and earthen vessels in equal esteem, a large herd of cattle was considered identical with riches […] Among the Arabs, the cattle standard existed as late as the time of Mohammed…
this is also spoken of by smith in his reference to homer's iliad, where animals are used as measures of value, where metals like gold or bronze were themselves measured by the value they shared in cattle quantities. more from menger:
>In all cultures in which cattle had previously had the char-acter of money, cattle-money was abandoned with the passage from a nomadic existence and simple agriculture to a more complex system in which handicraft was practiced, its place being taken by the metals then in use.
this is also spoken of by smith, and marx.

in the next section, menger deals with relations between "effective (variable) prices" and "average (fixed) prices". he curiously adopts the convenience of calling the average price the "equivalent" of another's by them sharing the same exchange value:
>We need only call the equivalent (in this sense) of a commodity (or one of its many equivalents) its “exchange value,” and the sum of money for which it can be both bought and sold its “exchange value in the preferred sense of the term,” to arrive at the concept of exchange value in general and of money as the “measure of exchange value” in particular, which dominate our science.
yet he entirely backtracks here:
<In my discussion of price theory, however, I have shown that equivalents of goods in the objective sense of the term cannot be observed anywhere in the economy of men, and that the entire theory that presents money as the “measure of the exchange value” of goods disintegrates into nothingness, since the basis of the theory is a fiction, an error.
he makes separation between the particular and general in this sense:
>But a particular quantity of wool and a particular quantity of money (or any other commodity) that can mutually be exchanged for each other—that are equivalents in the objective sense of the term—can nowhere be observed for they do not exist […] Where only an approximate correctness of the estimates is required, average prices can properly serve as the basis of valuation, since they are generally most suitable for this purpose
his concern then is the imperfection of considering equilibrium as a measure of the value of commodities. he still appears to validate its approximation however. he then restates price formation as supply and demand:
>The basis for making the first two estimates follows from what has been said. Price formation, we have seen, always takes place between two extremes, the lower of which may also be called the demand price (the price at which the commodity is asked for on the market) and the higher of which may also be called the supply price (the price at which the commodity is offered for sale on the market).
so then, he simply repeats the classical prosition, especially where he gives emphasis to a smithian effectual supply and demand of goods:
<When an exact valuation of goods is necessary, three things must be distinguished according to the intention of the person making the estimate. He must direct his attention to estimating (1) the price at which certain goods, if brought to market, can be sold, (2) the price at which goods of a certain kind and quality can be bought on the market, and (3) the quantity of commodities or the sum of money that is the equivalent, to the particular individual himself, of a good or of a quantity of goods.
he oncemore states the validity of this price theory:
>Although the theory of “exchange value” in general, and as a necessary consequence, the theory of money as a “measure of exchange value” in particular, must be designated as untenable after what has been said, observation of the nature and function of money teaches us nevertheless that the various estimates just discussed (as distinguished from measurement of the “exchange value” of goods) are usually most suitably made in terms of money […] Thus it is clear why the only commodity in terms of which val-uations are usually made is money. In this sense, as the commod-ity in terms of which valuations are as a rule and most suitably made under conditions of developed trade, money may, if one desires, be called a measure of prices.
money thus, in equilibrium to supply and demand, comes to be the measure of exchangeable value. for this conclusion he also references aristotle's view of money (chapter 8, footnote 24), as measure of value. menger also uses "measure of price" as a term. he rebukes certain ideas attached to money however:
<But it appears to me to be just as certain that the functions of being a “measure of value” and a “store of value” must not be attributed to money as such, since these functions are of a merely accidental nature and are not an essential part of the concept of money.
as he says, money is only a measure of exchange value, which is but one pole of a commodity's total value (this seems similar to marx's value form dialectic, except that marx formulates value as a social relation between two commodities, rather than an ideal relation between the two values of a single commodity - menger then individualises the process of valuation in his writing).

this for all intents and purposes closes the book. so then, this is the beginning of austrian economics, which only rivals marxism and keynesianism in its influence over the economic and political world.

I never understood that one poster's obsession with "its a cRiTiQuE of Politikkkal ekkkonomy"
Yeah, and it's also clear that Marx never makes a critique just as a vulgar 'criticism'. The critique of XYZ of Marx are always ammunition and fertilisier for the elevation of XYZ.

Smith Anon I'm gonna go ahead and make thread #4 soon, since this one is getting full, but rest assured this one will be archived so you won't lose your notebook or whatever it is you are using the thread for.

>>2507104
> The critique of XYZ of Marx are always ammunition and fertilisier for the elevation of XYZ.

Depends on the subject being criticized. The critique of reactionary thought is not meant to elevate reactionary thought, but under socialism there will still, arguably, be a political economy, even if it is not of the same form as before.

>>2506575
I noticed Smith anon that your strongest opinions seem to be:

1. Machines can create value rather than just transfer it
2. Value is a social construct and not a magnitude of SNLT

Thread full; btw

>>2507104
They dont understand what critique means in German Philosophy. I guess they think that Kant was a hater of reason.

>>2507104
same way hegel's "science of logic" is not a series of empirical experiments.