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292 posts and 63 image replies omitted.How Mexican drug cartels have outsourced meth labs to NigeriaThe Nigerian judge was formally dressed, the lawyers maintained legal decorum and protocol was followed – but this hearing was not in the comfortable confines of a Lagos courtroom, it was inside an alleged illicit drug laboratory in the thick of a dense forest.
Three Mexicans and seven Nigerians were paraded in handcuffs, as Justice Musa Kakaki inspected the chemicals and equipment they were accused of using to produce the harmful illegal synthetic drug, methamphetamine, commonly known as meth, crystal meth or, locally, ice.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crmrnxp4nllo
>bandits>islamist insurgency >latent separatists >and now drug cartelsIs Nigeria just doomed to collapse?
A Thin Rope Holds the Line Against Ebola on Uganda’s BorderUganda has developed a global reputation for its efficiency in containing infectious diseases, including H.I.V., Covid-19 and Ebola. While the disease is raging through communities in Congo, Uganda appears to have it under control.
There have been 20 confirmed Ebola cases in Uganda thus far, but the country has not registered a new case in more than a month. Fifteen of those patients came across the border, some to seek treatment in Ugandan hospitals. Aside from two patients who died, the rest have recovered. The others were quarantined and released, the authorities said this month. Bundibugyo has not recorded a single infection in this outbreak.
“They know how to handle it,” said Dr. Wessam Mankoula, who leads the country’s Ebola response unit at the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, referring to Ugandan health officials.
The effect of that expertise in Bundibugyo is to see life carry on as normal, despite the threat just across the river, which is often shallow enough to ford.
Schools, shops and offices here remain open, though hand-washing stations have been set up at the entrances to public places. Teams play soccer on the field beside the town’s government offices every evening. No one in the town wears a mask.
https://archive.is/yYbLF A Mother’s Crusade to Rid South Africa of African ImmigrantsOn a Saturday in May, Ms. Khoza joined a group of about 50 people who marched down a residential street near her neighborhood. Their goal was to raid a home they said had been overrun by illegal Congolese immigrants.
The mob used bolt cutters to break through the driveway gate. They banged on the doors and jostled the burglar bars on the windows. The house was dark and seemed empty.
A few minutes later, the mob breached the front door. Teary-eyed children emerged from a dark corridor, hustling out of the house, shivering.
“We are sorry,” some of them squealed.
Their mother, Sandra, an immigrant from the Democratic Republic of Congo, shuffled out in shock as she cradled her youngest child in a blanket, a two-week-old baby. Tall with her hair braided in cornrows, Sandra’s eyes welled with tears as she confronted the angry crowd.
Ms. Khoza has been watching with envy clips of U.S. immigration agents raiding American streets to capture and deport illegal immigrants under the Trump administration.
“The government here should be doing exactly what Trump is doing,” she said, “so that South Africa can have order and South Africans are put first.”
Ms. Khoza said the defense of her own children went hand-in-hand with her effort to rid South Africa of immigrants. Last year, she explained to her eldest daughter, Owethu, that foreign nationals were taking over their country.
“I am a victim,” Owethu, 17, said in an interview, adding that she sees her mother and others like her as being on a noble pursuit.
https://archive.is/TrUMO >>2880399The Afrikaners Trump is filling my neighborhood with would probably like to see Ms Khosa tossed out of "their country" along with all the rest.
>>2880406i'm surprised afrikaners and zionists haven't found a way to embed themselves in these anti-immigrant protests (as far as i know)
How white farmers still dominate land ownership in South Africa in spite of land reform – new research
https://theconversation.com/how-white-farmers-still-dominate-land-ownership-in-south-africa-in-spite-of-land-reform-new-research-285507
>More than 30 years after South Africa achieved democracy it remains one of the world’s most unequal countries. The democratic transition has not produced the transfer in wealth and ownership from a white minority to Black majority population that many had hoped for.
>Land is at the centre of the debates about this lack of transfer of wealth. During apartheid, because of racist laws around land ownership, Black South Africans could only own land in 13% of the country’s territory even when they made up 80% of the population.
>In 1995, the government set an initial target to redistribute 30% of all white-owned land to Black farmers under a market-based programme, which ensured the white farmers could choose whether to sell their land and did so at or above market value. But only between 12% and 20% of the land has been redistributed so far.
>For the last seven years, I have studied the land reform programme as a political scientist, merging my knowledge of political, social and economic forces to better understand why land reform has failed to live up to its initial goals.
>In a recent paper I set out to gain a deeper understanding of how land reform occurred and under what conditions transfers of land from white to Black farmers had taken place. To do this, I looked at both sides of the process.
>On the one hand, I examined what motivated existing landholders to transfer land, including economic incentives to keep farms productive and social factors shaped by the legacy of apartheid and segregation. On the other hand, I looked at the forces driving demand for land reform, including land claims and pressure from landless people.
>I held in-depth conversations with established white commercial farmers and Black land reform farmers, asking white farmers why they had sold their farms for the purposes of land reform, or why they had refrained from doing so. I then asked Black farmers about their experiences as emerging farmers in South Africa.
>I found that landowners’ decisions were shaped by South Africa’s history of racial segregation. Some white farmers used land redistribution to create a buffer between their farms and neighbouring Black communities. Others, in areas with many Black farmers, used land redistribution to bring Black farmers into their farming businesses.
>My findings show that where land ownership is very unequal, land redistribution doesn’t always reduce old divides. In some cases, it can actually reinforce them.
>These findings are important because the powerful US government has recently taken strong action against the South African government, with US president Donald Trump publicly and wrongly accusing the land reform programme of persecuting white farmers, expropriating their land and encouraging violence against them.
>Based on this, Trump withdrew all aid from South Africa and opened up an asylum process for South Africa’s white farmers to come to America as refugees.
>But as my research shows, land reform does not unfairly target white farmers. Instead, white farmers find it to be a useful and profitable tool to resolve longstanding problems that they face. This shows that the best way to understand land reform is to look at the evidence rather than the political debate.
<Land reform to buffer against theft
>I looked at how land reform was going in the Free State province, a part of South Africa with historically stark spatial segregation that led to minimal Black agriculture and high urbanisation. During apartheid, white and Black residents interacted in specific buffer zones between Black towns and white rural areas.
>I interviewed 10 white farmers who lived next to the buffer areas. They said they were afraid of livestock theft and land reform had allowed them to sell their land to the state for a good price and move into the rural heartland.
>It also meant that stock theft then became the problem of the new group of Black land reform farmers, just as national statistics on farm attacks have shown that Black people make up most of the victims of rural crime.
<How land reform preserved old farming patterns
>I also interviewed a dozen KwaZulu-Natal farmers to find out why they had sold their land. In this province, white farmers historically employed Black workers in a form of semi-feudal servitude called labour tenancy. Labour tenants were given access to small plots of land in exchange for their labour on the white-owned farm.
>This meant that many more Black rural dwellers had small livestock farms scattered among the province’s white commercial farms in KwaZulu-Natal than in Free State.
>Some white farmers sold part of their land through the land reform programme because they wanted to separate labour tenants’ small cattle herds from their larger commercial herds. Before land reform, labour tenants’ cattle often roamed across the farm, breaking fences and mixing with commercial cattle, which made grazing and disease control more difficult. Selling land allowed farmers to confine former labour tenants and their livestock to one part of the farm, separate from the commercial herd.
>However, my research found that this left Black land reform beneficiaries on small plots with little opportunity to expand into profitable commercial farming, preserving the economic divide between the white commercial and Black cattle sectors.
<What needs to happen next
>My research suggests we need to rethink land reform rather than abandon it. In South Africa, much of the land has been redistributed through willing sellers selling land to willing buyers, with government support. This approach may help keep farms profitable, but it does little to tackle the deep inequalities created by colonialism and apartheid over many centuries.
>While the US government has strongly condemned South Africa’s state-driven land reform framework, my research suggests the opposite problem: the state has relied too heavily on market forces instead of taking a more active role in deciding how land is transferred and supporting new farmers.
>For example, in the Free State, land reform did little to reduce racial divisions where people live or the large gap in land ownership between Black and white South Africans. The state must do more to acquire farms or create incentives for existing landowners to sell if it wants to change the make-up of the Free State’s agriculture.
>In KwaZulu-Natal, the government redistributed more land, but many of the small-scale farmers who received it have not been given the support they need to succeed. If the government wants more people to benefit from South Africa’s farming economy, rather than simply transferring land, it needs to do more to help emerging farmers get access to larger farms or earn a decent living from the land they already have.
>Land reform will inevitably change agricultural practices in South Africa. It is up to the state and commercial sector to more equitably incorporate the new modes of farming that are present in the growing Black farming sector.>>2881092And white reactoid's agenda is 99% compatible with the Shariah, yet the overwhelming majority still screech about muzzies.
They just don't mingle with swarthier people, strategic advancement of their own goals be damned.
An Invasive Mosquito Is Spreading With Alarming Speed, Threatening Africa’s CitiesAn invasive, malaria-carrying, insecticide-resistant mosquito that thrives in cities, where malaria has not been a major threat, has moved farther and faster across Africa than even pessimistic scientists had feared. And many public health experts believe it is too late to eliminate, or even contain, it.
A new genomic analysis of the mosquito, called Anopheles stephensi, using specimens collected from 10 countries, showed that those found in Africa had genetic resistance to all of the chemicals currently used in spraying campaigns and other mosquito-control efforts, meaning those insecticides will not kill it.
Before stephensi arrived in 2013, Djibouti was on the cusp of declaring malaria eradicated. In 2012, there were just 27 cases. A year after stephensi was found, cases shot up to nearly 1,700. Each year thereafter, the number crept up, and in 2020, there was an explosion: more than 70,000 cases.
The spread of stephensi is yet another setback in an already sputtering battle with mosquitoes in Africa. In 2024, there were nine million more malaria cases than in 2023. While the full 2025 data is not available yet, and will be less comprehensive due to health program funding cuts, there are clear signs that malaria is resurgent.
https://archive.is/TMjZ7 COSATU's ANC support faces test as SACP eyes 2026 local elections>COSATU will decide at its 15th National Congress whether to stick with its ANC support or broaden its position as affiliates seek mandates on backing the ANC or SACP in the 2026 local elections.https://www.ewn.co.za/2026/08/25/cosatus-anc-support-faces-test-as-sacp-eyes-2026-local-electionsVidrel: National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (NEHAWU) has resolved to support the South African Communist Party NEHAWU has resolved to support the South African Communist Party as it prepares to contest the 2026 Local Government Elections independently. The decision, solidified during NEHAWU's 13th National Congress, marks a massive fracture in the labour movement's traditional "vote ANC" stance. Nehawu's new president Nyameka Macanda says they believe the SACP is the vanguard of the working class.
Conference of the Left signals realignment in South African politicsWhile ideological differences among participating organisations remain substantial — particularly on questions of nationalism, socialism, Pan-Africanism, electoral strategy and the role of the state — the conference nevertheless signals a growing recognition that fragmentation on the left has strengthened neoliberal and centrist forces.
The possibility of tactical cooperation among left-leaning organisations could therefore herald the emergence of a new political bloc capable of reshaping opposition politics in South Africa.
For the ANC and the DA, such a development would pose a serious challenge. The ANC risks losing even more of its traditional working-class support base, while the DA could become increasingly identified with defending the status quo within the GNU.
Should a coherent left alternative emerge, it could fundamentally alter the ideological terrain of South African politics in the years ahead.
Whether the Conference of the Left becomes a genuine vehicle for left unity or remains merely another symbolic gathering will depend on its ability to move beyond rhetoric and achieve organisational coherence, ideological clarity and effective mass mobilisation.
Nevertheless, its emergence reflects a deeper crisis in South Africa’s post-apartheid political order — one marked by declining trust in established institutions, intensifying socio-economic inequality and renewed debates about socialism, nationalism and the future of democratic transformation.
https://iol.co.za/opinion/2026-05-27-conference-of-the-left-signals-realignment-in-south-african-politics/ Attempted Coup: Niger junta still in control, but situation remains tense
<The situation in Niger Republic remains fluid after a mutiny was thwarted by national security forces in collaboration with Russian-linked Africa Corpshttps://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/906327-attempted-coup-niger-junta-still-in-control-but-situation-remains-tense.html
>On Saturday, Niger Republic came under an attack by mutineers who attempted to seize power from the junta led by Abdourahamane Tchiani. After fighting that lasted for hours, Mr Tchiani’s government still remains in power.
>The mutinous soldiers took the regime by surprise, besieging and holding sway over the Diori Hamani International Airport and Air Base 101. They also attempted to breach the fortified perimeter of the presidential palace. The attack briefly disrupted the state television and radio broadcasts.
>Footage seen by our reporter showed armed soldiers, tactical armoured vehicles and troops securing the streets of Niamey. The mutineers seized control of Air Base 101, the paratroopers’ camp and other positions near the international airport.
>The mutineers released a statement from the air base, announcing that Mr Tchiani was no longer the head of state. The statement, signed under the name of Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Fatherland, also announced the dissolution of the constitution, border closure and restriction of movement.
>While the fighting continued, it was reported that the head of the junta requested the intervention of Africa Corps, a Russian-backed mercenary group which has entrenched itself in Sahelian states led by military rulers.
>Before that, the mercenaries, stationed at the air base, had come under attack by the rebellious soldiers, prompting them to defend themselves. After a formal request to neutralise the mutineers, the Africa Corps collaborated with the Nigerien Presidential Guard, launching an air and ground offensive, making it a second primary mission in the region since their show of strength in Bamako in April.
>This led to the killing and arrest of the mutinous soldiers, with the Nigerien government announcing that it remained in control.
<In solidarity with Niger
>In the face of the attempted mutiny, several countries sided with the junta in Niger.
>Given its friction with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), it is expected that no member of the regional bloc will stand in solidarity with Niger. But its allies, Burkina Faso and Mali, with whom it co-founded the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), did throw their weight behind their falling member.
>The AES, in a statement issued in Ouagadougou, affirmed it remained “fully committed to and mobilised alongside Niger, sharing its determination to continue the struggle for sovereignty and peace.”
>It also praised “the loyalty, courage, and sense of duty of the Nigerien Defence and Security Forces who, true to their oath, confronted this mutiny and helped restore order.”
>Affirming its solidarity with Niger and its people, the Turkiye Republic called for “restraint” to preserve the country’s security and stability.
>Algeria also assured the Niamey government of its “full solidarity and firm support” to help the nation overcome the ordeal and restore security.
<Who are the mutineers?
>The full identities of the mutinous soldiers remain sketchy at press time. However, footage of captured soldiers suggests that they are mainly young and junior-ranked personnel.
>Yet, some unverified reports have linked some senior officers to the plot. Among them are Kimba Tahirou, a colonel, and Abdoulaye Idé, a captain promoted to the rank in 2021, according to I-Sahel.
>According to social media claims, Mr Tahirou, who is the head of the national gendarmerie, has sided with the mutineers.
>The government has not issued a statement to debunk these claims, and it has also not mentioned the names and ranks of the young officer arrested in connection with the incident.
<Why the action?
>Most of the soldiers that took part in the mutiny were drawn from active frontlines around Ouallam, Téra, and Dosso, including Tillabériwhere, suggesting that the action might have been triggered by worsening insecurity.
>According to a jihadi researcher, Hasret Kargin, the mutiny erupted a day after the Nigerien junta released four al-Qaeda linked jihadists in exchange for 11 soldiers, a kind of policy that Mr Tchiani frowned at when he seized power in 2023.
>The ousted President Mohamed Bazoum had pioneered the approach of dialogue, reconciliation and conditional amnesty as part of its counterterrorism strategies. But Mr Tchiani, upon overthrowing him, vowed a military-only approach.
<A window for jihadists
>Because soldiers abandoned their posts to stage the mutiny, jihadi groups like the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), JNIM and other terror networks might take advantage of their absence and the ongoing instability to further entrench themselves in the country.
>“The security vacuum in these regions will allow these armed groups to secure further gains in territories where they are already strong,” Mr Kargin warned in an X post.
>He urged the Nigerien government not to see the plot as a mere mutinous uprising, as “recurrence of similar crises would not be surprising.”
>Niger has suffered three similar attacks this year, with the two incidents staged by jihadists.
>As of the time of this report, Niger’s larger and more powerful neighbour, Nigeria, has yet to comment on the coup. The relationship between the two countries became tense when Mr Bazoum was ousted by Mr Tchiani’s government.
>Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu, who was the ECOWAS leader at the time, condemned the coup and led the regional organisation to impose sanctions and a blockade on Niger.
>Although the blockade and sanctions have been lifted, the neighbours are yet to fully mend their relationship. 'The crowd shouted that we'd stolen someone's genitals' - deadly rumours spread on social mediaMore than 80 people were killed between October 2025 and July this year following false accusations about what is termed "genital theft", the BBC Global Disinformation Unit has found after gathering data from police forces across six African countries.
The killings are linked to rumours that a simple tap on the shoulder can cause a man's genitals to shrink or disappear. They are being fuelled by widespread misinformation on social media.
Such claims are rooted in longstanding fears and superstitions - and are not new on the continent, particularly in communities where belief in witchcraft remains widespread. Social media has amplified these fears.
The recent wave of rumours appears to have started last year in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where similar claims had surfaced in 2008.
They progressively spread across the region to Burundi, Zambia and Tanzania as well as Mozambique, Angola, Malawi and Kenya.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg8lw7n2ddo TotalEnergies Fast-Tracks Angola Oil Find, Expands Exploration FootprintTotalEnergies announced a new oil discovery at the Acacia-5 well on Block 17 offshore Angola and plans to bring the project into production just three months after the June find, adding 6,000 barrels per day through the Pazflor FPSO. The company also signed agreements with ANPG to acquire 40% operated interests in exploration Blocks 17/25 and 32/21 in the Lower Congo Basin. This marks TotalEnergies' second exploration success in Angola in 2026, following a Block 0 discovery with Chevron. The company has operated in Angola since 1953, and the country contributed 156,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day to its 2025 production. Chairman and CEO Patrick Pouyanné said the moves reflect confidence in Angola's offshore potential and the effectiveness of investment incentives. TotalEnergies shares edged higher on the news, outperforming a weaker broader market.
https://finance.biggo.com/news/e421960c-8915-43fc-bdad-ec1cdf9446bdHow Angola Turned Production Decline into a $70B Upstream Investment DriveAfter more than a decade of falling crude output, Angola is beginning to reverse the trajectory that once threatened its status as one of Africa’s largest oil producers. Production has stabilized at around 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd), supported by offshore developments, exploration campaigns and one of the continent’s most aggressive upstream reform programs.
https://www.worldoil.com/news/2026/9/11/angola-signs-new-deepwater-exploration-deals-with-shell-chevron-totalenergies/Angola touts a post-oil economy, even as high crude prices power its reboundAngola is billing itself as a nation weaning off crude, after year-on-year inflation eased to 10.11% in June and the government projected in its 2026 budget that non-oil revenue would outstrip oil revenue for the first time on record.
The pitch, laid out by Minister of State for Economic Coordination José de Lima Massano at a July gathering of the ruling MPLA’s parliamentary group in Soyo, rests on a genuine disinflation story. Consumer prices rose 10.11% from a year earlier in June, according to national data, compared with 15.7% at the close of 2025 and 27.5% at the end of 2024. Average inflation over the trailing 12 months stood at 14.54%.
https://archive.is/tyYSO Mali: at least 50 soldiers killed in Dioura attackThe assault on September 10 against the military camp in Dioura is among the deadliest attacks recently suffered by Malian forces. Local and security sources also report that five Russian members of the Africa Corps were killed.
https://beninwebtv.bj/en/mali-at-least-50-soldiers-killed-in-dioura-attack/ Almost 50 dead in Nigeria after drinking alcohol suspected to contain methanolAt least 48 people have died and about 100 others are receiving treatment in southern Nigeria after consuming a locally brewed alcoholic concoction suspected to contain methanol, officials said on Thursday.
Banji Ajaka, Ondo state’s commissioner for health, said the cases had been reported in the Odigbo and Irele local government areas. A total of 182 people are believed to have been affected and some are being treated in the hospital, he said.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/18/nigeria-deaths-suspected-methanol-alcohol-brew-drink Seven Ethiopian rebel groups form new alliance Several of the rebel groups which have been fighting the Ethiopian authorities in different parts of the country have announced they have formed an alliance to remove the government in Addis Ababa.
The alliance brings together the Fano militia in Amhara, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and four other smaller groupings in a coalition named Alliance for Survival.
The seven groups accuse Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government of presiding over "war, genocide, mass destruction and utter poverty", claiming Ethiopia is at risk of disintegration.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckp84pj8zpngo Ethiopia and Tigray accuse each of launching offensives, fuelling fears of new warEthiopia's government and the party in control of the northern region of Tigray have accused each other of launching offensives, escalating fears of a return to full-scale conflict.
Getachew Reda, a cabinet minister and adviser to Ethiopia's prime minister, said Tigrayan fighters had taken control of federally administered airports in Tigray and launched offensives in neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions.
Earlier, the Tigrayan authorities said their forces had been forced to enter a "defensive war". The statement followed reports of drone strikes in Tigray.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cry8zwwq21pxo News: Ethiopia expands domestic drone production as conflicts persist across regions Ethiopia has expanded its domestic production of military and civilian drones, with two factories reportedly manufacturing unmanned aerial vehicles as the federal government increasingly relies on drones in its operations against armed groups in several regions, according to Agence France-Presse (AFP).
Analysts cited by AFP estimate that Ethiopia may now possess a fleet numbering in the thousands. The country’s growing drone capability follows the prominent use of Turkish-made drones by federal forces during the 2020–2022 war in Tigray, when air power played a significant role in pushing Tigrayan forces back after they had advanced to within about 200 kilometres of Addis Abeba.
The Ethiopian federal army is currently the only military force in the country reported to operate armed drones. Their use has expanded beyond Tigray to include operations against armed groups in Amhara and Oromia regions.
https://addisstandard.com/ethiopia-expands-domestic-drone-production-as-conflicts-persist-across-regions/ Morocco’s Mali mediation signals new diplomatic weight in the Sahel Morocco’s role in securing the release of a French intelligence officer detained in Mali has highlighted a broader shift in the balance of influence across the Sahel, where Rabat is increasingly positioning itself as a diplomatic interlocutor able to communicate with governments that have fallen out with traditional Western powers.
The current case looks less like an isolated diplomatic success and more like part of an emerging pattern in which Morocco acts as an intermediary between France and military-led governments in the Sahel.
https://thearabweekly.com/moroccos-mali-mediation-signals-new-diplomatic-weight-sahelWestern Sahara: Mali Renews Support for Morocco’s Autonomy PlanMali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdoulaye Diop has renewed his country’s position in support of the Moroccan autonomy plan as the only serious and credible basis for resolving the dispute over Western Sahara.
This comes after Mali withdrew in April its recognition of Polisario’s self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/09/339683/western-sahara-mali-renews-support-for-moroccos-autonomy-plan/ Billionaire Dangote launches oil refinery 'people's IPO', Africa's biggestNigerian billionaire Aliko Dangote on Monday launched Africa's largest share sale yet with the initial public offering of his oil refinery, targeting the general public to raise as much as $2.1 billion for its expansion.
Dangote, Africa's richest man, has marketed the offer of a roughly 3% stake as a "people's IPO," saying it is about giving ordinary Nigerians the opportunity to participate in the success of the plant.
Built at a cost of about $20 billion on the outskirts of Lagos, the refinery has reshaped Nigeria's fuel market since it started operations in 2024.
It processes 700,000 barrels of crude a day and has a goal to increase that to 1.4 million barrels by 2029. The refinery "has transformed Nigeria’s economy from a net importer to a net exporter of refined petroleum products, making it a systemically important institution for the nation," Renaissance Capital Africa analysts said in a note.
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/djibouti-ethiopia-dangote-plan-petroleum-pipeline-ethiopian-pm-says-2026-09-24/Africa's richest man helps fund $660m fuel pipeline between Ethiopia and DjiboutiNigerian billionaire Aliko Dangote has announced that he is helping to fund a new $660m (£500m) fuel pipeline between Ethiopia and Djibouti
The project will include a 120km- (75 mile-) pipeline connecting Djibouti's Damerjog port to a distribution facility in Dewele, Ethiopia, as well as storage capacity of about 400 million litres.
It is expected to begin operations within 18 months.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c6z9z7lv41wgo >>2922382Dangote signs $4.2 billion gas agreement for fertilizer plant in EthiopiaDangote Industries Limited and the Chinese group GCL have signed a $4.2 billion agreement over 25 years to supply natural gas to Dangote’s future urea fertilizer complex in Ethiopia.
The plant, valued at $2.5 billion and owned 60% by Dangote and 40% by Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH), will produce 3 million tons of urea per year and is expected to start operations in 2029. The gas will be extracted from the Calub field in the Ogaden basin and transported via a 108 km pipeline to the Somali region.
The project aims to make Ethiopia the leading regional producer of modern fertilizer, reduce dependence on imports, and supply neighboring markets. Analysts estimate that the initiative could generate thousands of direct and indirect jobs and boost the industrial and infrastructural development of the region.
https://www.financialafrik.com/en/2026/03/17/dangote-signs-4-2-billion-gas-agreement-for-fertilizer-plant-in-ethiopia/Dangote to build 1,000MW power plant at Kenya refinery, double Lagos capacityDangote Industries plans to build a 1,000-megawatt power plant at its planned refinery in Lamu, Kenya, with half of the electricity expected to be sold to the government.
https://businessfront.com/energy/news/dangote-1000mw-power-plant-kenya-refinery/Ghana eyes new 1,200MW gas power plant to boost electricity supply, its biggest ever yetGhana plans to add a 1,200-megawatt gas-fired power plant to its electricity system, in what would become the country’s largest single generating facility.
The proposed plant would have a higher installed capacity than the 1,020MW Akosombo Hydroelectric Power Station, currently Ghana’s largest single generating facility.
Mahama said the project would not require new borrowing, with the government intending to finance it from its own resources.
https://businessfront.com/energy/news/ghana-gas-power-plant-project-to-boost-electricity/ Lamu Port’s Cargo Throughput Jumps by 900%, Buoyed by Shipping Disruption With ocean carriers drawing up contingency plans for cargo destined to the Gulf region, some ports on the East African coast have gained a strategic advantage. As the Hormuz blockade persists, major shipping lines have informed customers on potential rerouting of goods, with the option of leaving containers at safer ports.
Lamu Port was commissioned back in 2021 but remained largely under-utilized for its first three years. However, global shipping disruptions have seen Lamu benefit as ocean carriers adjust their services. Last year in August, Lamu port made history with the docking of Hapag Lloyd’s Nagoya Express, which is the longest containership to ever call at an East African port. The 335-meter-long boxship has capacity for 8,604 TEUs.
https://maritime-executive.com/article/lamu-port-s-cargo-throughput-jumps-by-900-buoyed-by-shipping-disruption Three mega-projects backed by Dangote, Turkish investors put $40bn behind East Africa’s Indian Ocean trade ambitions hree major projects backed by Dangote, Turkish investors, and East African governments aim to invest over $40 billion to reshape trade along the Indian Ocean coast.
A $17 billion refinery in Lamu, Kenya, spearheaded by Aliko Dangote, plans to process 700,000 barrels of crude oil daily for regional distribution.
Somalia and Turkish investors are developing a $4 billion port, special economic zone, and industrial hub near Warsheekh.
Tanzania and Uganda are collaborating on a $20 billion-plus energy hub at Tanga, including a refinery, pipelines, storage, and a marine terminal to serve East and Central Africa.
https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/three-mega-projects-backed-by-dangote-turkish-investors-put-dollar40bn-behind-east/yzfxmxl Somalia, Tükiye boost spaceport cooperationA Turkish military transport docked at Mogadishu Port in February 2026, offloading a shipment of M48 and M60 Patton battle tanks in a move that signals a significant escalation of Ankara’s military footprint in the Horn of Africa. According to informed security sources, the tanks will be positioned to defend Turkish installations in the Warshiikh district, approximately 60 kilometers north of Mogadishu. The location is reportedly being prepared for missile and satellite launch operations, leveraging Somalia’s equatorial position—an optimal site for aerospace trajectories.
The protection of the Warshiikh installations represents a primary concern for Ankara. As the aerospace project advances into a critical stage, these tanks offer an essential shield against unconventional threats in the Middle Shabelle region. The increase in heavy military equipment follows recent security assessments regarding Turkish personnel and facilities. This mobilization aligns with Turkey’s recent introduction of F-16 fighter aircraft to the area, demonstrating a broader dedication to protecting its multi-billion-dollar investments in Somalia’s energy and technology sectors.
https://www.ftlsomalia.com/somalia-t-rkiye-boost-spaceport-cooperation/Somali-Turkish Energy Partnership Reaches Milestone as Drilling Progresses Ahead of ScheduleTürkiye’s deep-sea oil and gas exploration drilling off the coast of Somalia is progressing ahead of schedule and could be completed by the end of September, according to the Somali Petroleum Authority Director General Abdulkadir Adan.
https://www.ftlsomalia.com/somali-turkish-energy-partnership-reaches-milestone-as-drilling-progresses-ahead-of-schedule/ Will the TPLF ever learn? They keep starting shit and getting smacked and making everyone in the region hate Tigrayans on a racial level.
>>2922927ethiopia has a proclivity for christian zionism and racial autism. it's already in cahoots with the uae to destroy sudan so it wouldn't be a great lost if it gets torn apart
Ethiopia's Tigray rebels abandon regional capital Mekelle as government forces enter cityEthiopian federal forces have entered the capital of the northern Tigray region and seized its airport, witnesses said Saturday, reversing a takeover by rebels from the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) that prompted the suspension of commercial flights last month.
The conflict has triggered a breakdown in Ethiopia's relations with Eritrea and Egypt, which Ethiopia accuses of supporting the rebels.
Ethiopia expelled 10 Eritrean diplomats and shut its embassy in Asmara on Thursday, while Eritrea responded that it would "sever all diplomatic ties".
Ethiopia also expelled an Egyptian diplomat without explanation, prompting a reciprocal move by Cairo.
A diplomatic source told AFP that a mini-summit on Sunday would bring together the presidents of Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, as well as the head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Abdel Fattah al-Burhane, in Alamein, Egypt, on the sidelines of an African Business Forum.
https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20261003-ethiopia-s-tigray-rebels-abandon-regional-capital-of-mekelle-as-pro-government-forces-advance Libya: Racism and ‘resettlement’ conspiracies fuel fear among Tripoli’s migrants In June, large crowds of Libyans protested for the first time against what they called a “resettlement plan”, allegedly orchestrated by the United Nations to prevent migrants from leaving the country.
Despite firm denials from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), hundreds of protesters blocked the UNHCR headquarters in Tripoli on 4 June, accusing international agencies of trying to alter Libya’s demographics.
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/libya-racism-and-resettlement-conspiracies-fuel-fear-among-tripolis-sub-saharan-migrants So apparently Joseph Kabila has allied himself with M23 and Rwanda, I don’t think they’ll be able to sweep the country with paratroops into the presidential palace like the last two times they did so. The further we get from the Rwandan genocide the less sympathy and glazing Paul Kagame and the RPF gets, especially as liberal democracies like Botswana develop and make his dictatorship look less and less like the lesser of all possible evils.
>>2337546>>2337798Semantics nonsense. Go create the threads yourself if you have enough posts yourself to make it make sense or you know it will attract other posters.
There were European and other regional generals that died because of lack of posts.
Somalian immigrant "goes back" to Somalia EP 5 outside Mogadishu:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OHaTQJ4GfIU >>2938629It's kind of "funny"/ironic
In one of the earlier episodes they cover how foreign ships take 300 million dollars worth of resources a year from Somalian waters illegally.
While the pirates took 400 million between 2005-2012 and part of the reason why piracy even started in Somalia was foreign ships appearing illegally in Somalian waters.
From newsanon's thread
Pulaku: The two faces of Nigeria’s vigilantesAllegations of torture and abuse shadow a Fulani-led vigilante group despite its role in clamping down on kidnappers.
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2026/10/23/pulaku-the-two-faces-of-nigerias-vigilantes DP World clears dredging hurdle at Senegal’s $1.2bn Ndayane port DP World has completed major dredging works at Senegal’s new Port of Ndayane 13 months ahead of schedule, clearing the way for quay construction and the next stage of the $1.2bn development.
The marine works delivered a 5 km access channel dredged to 20 m, a 600 m turning basin and an 875 m berth pocket capable of handling two Triple E-class containerships. More than 95% of the material removed was rock, with the work completed without blasting.
https://splash247.com/dp-world-clears-dredging-hurdle-at-senegals-1-2bn-ndayane-port/ Here's some suicide fuel I just stumbled upon:
>In 1960 gdp per person in Africa, adjusted for the different costs of goods in different places (so-called purchasing-power parity, or ppp), was about half of the average in the rest of the world. Today it is about a quarter. Then the region was roughly on a par with East Asia. Today East Asians have average incomes seven times higher than those in sub-Saharan Africa.
>On current trends Africans will make up over 80% of the world’s poor by 2030, up from 14% in 1990.
>Even in the heady days of 2000-14, when real gdp per person rose by 2.4% per year, other developing regions were growing more than twice as fast and creating more jobs. Since then, despite some stellar performers, income per person has stayed flat. The World Bank talks of “a decade of futility in economic performance” in sub-Saharan Africa.
>If the global temperature rises more than 2°C above what it was in the 19th century African crop revenues could fall by 30%, according to a recent paper by Philip Kofi Adom for the Centre for Global Development.
>The IMF says that about half the countries in Africa are experiencing “high macroeconomic imbalances”, by which it means one or more of the following: inflation at 50% or higher; a wide fiscal deficit; debt-service costs of 20% or more of government revenue; and foreign currency reserves that can cover just three months of imports.
>Finance is increasingly hard to come by. Borrowing in dollars on capital markets is more expensive than in the 2010s. Foreign direct investment flows have fallen by about a third since 2021. In 2023 Chinese lending to Africa was $4.6bn, a rebound from paltry amounts at the start of the decade, but still below what was seen in every year of the 2010s. The share of Western aid flowing to Africa is declining.
>Robert Osei, an economist, has written that Ghana developed “without a green revolution, an industrial revolution, or a service revolution of the types seen …in Asia”; the observation applies beyond his homeland. In 2024 the African Centre for Economic Transformation (acet), a Ghana-based think-tank, likened African economies to “early transformers” in Asia and Latin America. Its “African Transformation Index”, which scores countries based on their adoption of technology, labour productivity and diversity of exports, was sobering. “Most African countries are not transforming their economies at a consistent or steady rate.”
>The second channel—increasing how productive each worker is—remains the crucial one. Research by the World Bank has found that growth in total-factor productivity (tfp)—how efficiently labour and capital are combined, and a proxy for the use of technology in production—has been “negligible” on the continent for the past 60 years. This suggests that African economies have grown from increases in labour, capital and natural resources, but not from technology.
>In 1960, 15% of sub-Saharan Africa’s population lived in cities. Now 43% of people are classed by the un as urban. The region is urbanising faster than any other. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), our sister organisation, reckons that more than half of Africans will live in cities by 2035. Africa will have six cities of over 10m and a further 17 of over 5m.
>On the face of it this is a repeat of the global shifts from rural to city life. But African urbanisation is happening in countries poorer than has been the norm elsewhere. And elsewhere more productive farms encouraged urban migration, with less need for farmhands to till fields. Again Africa is different. Its urbanisation looks more like an alternative to rural development than a consequence of it.
>>2949550>Today a little more than half of workers in sub-Saharan Africa still labour on farms, about the share in western Europe two centuries ago. They typically work unproductive plots of less than two hectares (five acres) using methods more suited to the 19th century. The “value-added” per worker in sub-Saharan Africa, a measure of productivity, is less than half the global average, and less than one-fiftieth of the places with the most productive farms. Africa’s cereal yields, another measure of productivity, are less than half the average in the rest of the world. And though production has increased since 1980, this has largely been because Africans are farming more land, not farming it more productively. Between 1980 and 2018 South Asia more than doubled cereal yields without using any more land. In sub-Saharan Africa yields tripled, but the land used more than doubled.>Though there are hi-tech commercial farms in parts of Africa, most small farms are low-to-no tech. Fertiliser use is a tenth of that in Asia. Only 3.5% of agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa is irrigated. A lack of cold storage means that much food is wasted; in Nigeria 45% of produce rots. Christopher Udry, an economist based at Northwestern University in Illinois, notes how, in America’s Midwest, farmers just 80km apart may use different seed varieties. But in Africa, “We don’t have seeds optimised for every 50 miles, we have seeds optimised for the continent.”>African policymakers and donors have tried to encourage smallholders to adopt better technology. But it has proved difficult. In a review of the evidence on technological adoption published in 2024, Mr Udry and Tavneet Suri of mit found that “there is no single binding constraint”. Mr Malupande, the Zambian farmer, has barely any savings to invest, no access to finance and little option but to buy the generic seeds on offer from state-subsidised schemes.>Small surprise that some farmers, or at least their children, are upping sticks. In a lecture in 2024 Mr Udry showed that, in a sample of 200,000 plots in six African countries, yields fell by 4-5% per year between 2008 and 2018. After mulling many explanations—such as changing weather, land degradation, nearby conflict—he concluded that it was because the farms were being worked less. Farmers, and their children, are opting to try their luck elsewhere. Yields declined most in farms closest to cities, suggesting that there is a flow of erstwhile farmhands from the fields to the hustle on the margins of the urban economy. >The share of Africans working in the service economy has risen from 26% to 37% over the past three decades, more or less mirroring the decline of the share in agriculture from 64% to 52%. However, these jobs are not in corporate back offices. They are casual work in shops, markets and building sites. McKinsey, a consultancy, notes that service-sector productivity in Africa is less than half that in Latin America, and lower than in India.>So far manufacturing has not offered the plethora of jobs seen in other parts of the world. Only 11.5% of sub-Saharan African workers are employed in industry, marginally higher than the 9.9% share in 1991. Why manufacturing has struggled to take off is hotly debated. Africa has for centuries had lots of land and a scarcity of labour, the opposite of Asia. At independence economies were geared to resource extraction. And perhaps because unproductive farms mean more expensive food, it seems to cost more to employ Africans than it does to employ Asians. Research by the Centre for Global Development (cgd), a think-tank based in Washington, has found that in Africa labour costs were on average roughly twice as much as a country’s gdp per person, whereas in Bangladesh, for instance, they were roughly the same.>So far manufacturing has not offered the plethora of jobs seen in other parts of the world. Only 11.5% of sub-Saharan African workers are employed in industry, marginally higher than the 9.9% share in 1991. Why manufacturing has struggled to take off is hotly debated. Africa has for centuries had lots of land and a scarcity of labour, the opposite of Asia. At independence economies were geared to resource extraction. And perhaps because unproductive farms mean more expensive food, it seems to cost more to employ Africans than it does to employ Asians. Research by the Centre for Global Development (cgd), a think-tank based in Washington, has found that in Africa labour costs were on average roughly twice as much as a country’s gdp per person, whereas in Bangladesh, for instance, they were roughly the same.>In 2021 Xinshen Diao and co-authors at the Washington-based International Food Policy Research Institute analysed what they call “Africa’s manufacturing puzzle”. Using data from factories in Ethiopia and Tanzania, they find a dichotomy: highly productive plants use lots of hi-tech equipment but few workers, and many less productive plants use lots of people and little kit. This is not what happened in Vietnam and Taiwan, they note, where labour was absorbed into productive factories—creating a flywheel that helped boost gdp per person over many years.>The authors suggest that this is primarily because, to be globally competitive and plug into international supply chains, factories need to adhere to high technological standards. “The choice that African manufacturers seem to face is either to increase productivity or to increase employment.” >The implication is that Africa was late to the party; cheap labour may not be the advantage it once was. “The escalator is slowing, although it will not stop altogether,” says Alan Gelb of CGD.>It may be the case that Africa’s development will look more like South Asia’s than East Asia’s. A paper by Tianyu Fan of Yale University and co-authors, entitled “Growing like India”, noted that Indian development has come in part from improving productivity in non-traded service sectors, such as retail, hospitality and property, rather than export-oriented manufacturing. This suggests that Africa could follow the same path, given its large services sector. The authors imply, however, that the cost could be high levels of inequality and joblessness, as seen in India.>African politics is subject to the same forces as elsewhere. When governments do a bad job, citizens want them out. Yet there are certain aspects of the political economy in many African countries that seem especially bad for growth, making it harder to close the Africa gap. The first is the weakness of the state. Most African countries are autocracies of one sort or another; the eiu, our sister outfit, classifies just six of the 54 countries as full or flawed democracies. That can bring to mind the idea of all-powerful, ever-present government. The reality is different. African states are often incapable of doing the things a state should do, while doing plenty of things that it should not.>Whether it is the provision of security and basic services or the collection of taxes, Africa is under-governed. Less than half of babies have their births registered in sub-Saharan Africa. Congo has not had a census in 40 years. The imf estimates that in sub-Saharan countries tax revenues make up 13% of gdp on average, against 18% in other emerging and developing countries and 27% in rich countries. The number of public-sector workers as a share of the population is lower in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region. When Afrobarometer asks Africans to name the most important problems they face, the issues they mention are things taken for granted elsewhere: clean water, electricity, roads, food and security. >The World Meteorological Organisation, a un agency, estimates that in sub-Saharan Africa the cost of adaptation to climate change will be $30-50bn per year over the next decade, or 2-3% of gdp. This is money that most African countries do not have.>And there is a yet more subtle cost. If secure property rights depend on the whims of African leaders, they last only as long as the Big Man is in office. This discourages long-term investment. Ken Opalo, a Kenyan academic at Georgetown University, in Washington, DC, argues that when politicians and businessmen do not keep to their “lanes” it makes for the worst of both worlds. “The fusion of lanes makes it difficult for elites to specialise in either business or politics, resulting in a region full of mediocre politicians and politically dependent mediocre businesspeople.”>The closeness of business and politics also helps explain why there are so few African entrepreneurs of global standing, and so few globally competitive African firms. It is hard to become a legitimate billionaire when wealth depends on politics. It also encourages Africans with cash to stash it offshore. Perhaps 30% of African wealth is held outside the continent, compared with a global average of 8%, according to (somewhat old) estimates by Gabriel Zucman, an economist. >To match the sort of capital flows that led to East Asian economic booms, Africa would need to roughly double investment as a share of gdp from its current level of around 16%. The African Development Bank (afdb) has a similar figure, estimating that the continent needs to close an annual financing gap of $400bn, or almost 14% of its gdp, to “accelerate its structural transformation process”. >Until recently, the 21st century appeared a benign time for Africa in international affairs. China’s rise fuelled demand for its natural resources. Globalisation encouraged investors into emerging and “frontier” markets. Widespread debt relief in the mid-2000s gave governments room to borrow. They took out loans not just from the World Bank and Western governments but from commercial creditors. Between 2007 and 2020, 21 African countries borrowed on global capital markets, many for the first time. China became the largest official bilateral creditor, lending more than $180bn since 2000, according to the Chinese Loans to Africa database managed at Boston University. >It is also harder than it was for most African countries to raise financing. This is to some extent a problem of Africans’ own making. After the debt relief of the 2000s, states borrowed heavily. Debt to gdp in sub-Saharan Africa has doubled over the past 15 years. Poor countries need to borrow to pay for infrastructure to help them become less poor. But in Africa debts are growing faster than output and productivity. >Now governments are spending more scarce revenue on paying off old debts. Since 2022 a higher share of government revenues has gone on servicing debts than on health. The median share in Africa is 14% and in 13 countries it is more than 20%. Principal and interest payments are expected to rise as a share of gdp across sub-Saharan Africa in 2025, says the imf, which has warned that Africa faces a big funding squeeze. Some bright spots, such as Ivory Coast, have refinanced their debt by returning to capital markets. But interest rates on “eurobonds” (debt issued in a foreign currency) are one to four percentage points higher than before the covid-19 pandemic. Kenya, for instance, issued a bond at 10% interest rate in February 2024 to pay off an older eurobond due a few months later. It thus risks piling up problems for the future. >>2949802>Other sources of capital are relatively scarce. Chinese lending to Africa peaked at $28.8bn in 2016. In the 2020s it has averaged $2.5bn per year (the pandemic played a role). Foreign-direct investment in Africa in 2023 was just $53bn or 4% of the global total, less in nominal terms than a decade previously. In 2022 the share of aid from rich countries going to Africa was at its lowest level since at least 2000. >What might change this? Even a small increase in the share of global private capital going to Africa could make a big difference. (Between 2013 and 2021 Africa accounted for just 0.5% of the global private-equity market.) There is a debate about whether investors neglect Africa because they think it is riskier than it is. Ignorance about the continent’s diversity means that what happens in the most fragile states can affect would-be investors’ opinions about, say, Kenya. Data suggest the default risk of African infrastructure projects is lower than in Asia and Latin America.>Some African policymakers have latched onto climate finance as a chance to direct more cash their way. But “the dirty secret of climate finance is that much of it is displacing traditional development aid,” says Vijaya Ramachandran of the Breakthrough Institute, an American think-tank. care, an ngo, believes half of climate finance provided by 23 rich countries from 2011 to 2020 was money that previously went on funding for areas like health, education and women’s rights.>The risk, however, is that Africa combines high population growth with low or stagnant productivity growth—and that the Africa gap only widens. If current trends continue unchecked, this is what will happen. The Institute for Security Studies (iss), a South African think-tank, has published scenarios for the future of the continent. These “African Futures” incorporate data on a variety of factors including demography, productivity, financial flows, infrastructure and measures of human capital. Its “current path” makes for sober reading. By 2043, the year its forecasts end, median African gdp per person, adjusted for purchasing-power parity (ppp), will be about a quarter of the rest of the world’s, essentially what it is today. And Africa will still have 400m people in extreme poverty, the vast majority of the world’s destitute. >This special report has tried to explain the reasons for this disappointing path. These include the scarce use of technology in agriculture, the rise of unproductive, low-end services and the absence of a manufacturing revolution. Productivity is further hampered by small firms and small markets. Africa has perhaps just half of the investment it needs to close the gap. “Something drastic is needed to change this rather dismal forecast,” write the authors from the iss. https://www.economist.com/special-report/2025/01/06/the-economic-gap-between-africa-and-the-rest-of-the-world-is-growing Thoughts on ZA elections?
I have a question: why are Africans so brown?
SACP humbled by support in local government electionsThe South African Communist Party says it is humbled by the support it garnered in the local government elections.
Across South Africa, 264 SACP councillors will take up their seats when councils meet for the first time in just over two weeks.
In December 2024, the SACP resolved to go it alone in the elections, breaking away from its pact with the ANC. This prompted several SACP members representing the ANC to be purged in late August.
"These results have exposed those who wished to ban and silence the South African Communist Party. This behaviour reminded the party of the Suppression of Communism Act," said SACP Western Cape spokesperson Lizwi Gegula.
https://www.ewn.co.za/2026/11/08/sacp-humbled-by-support-in-local-government-electionsSACP says it won’t bend over backwards to save ANChttps://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2026-11-07-sacp-says-it-wont-bend-over-backwards-to-save-anc/ >>2951113The smaller progressive parties will probably further converge together, i do not think though they'll merge in to a single party, for now at least.
Heres a press release from a meeting earlier in the year:
https://effonline.org/eff-statement-on-bilateral-meeting-with-the-south-african-communist-party-to-consolidate-the-left/Unique IPs: 30