>>2387981>the forces that are in direct command of the DPP are Americans.It's not just Americans. The Taiwan independence movement is a very pro-Japanese movement. I've always suspected that a lot of dark money from Japan has flowed to Taiwan to promote independence.
>>2389245There's a couple of Chinese anons but they haven't posted here recently. There could've been more though. I wanted Leftypol to get on XHS back when TikTok refugees were fleeing there during the TikTok ban but some furfag (Probably a mod) shot it down because it was "too proprietary." Let's just stick to Elon Musk's Nazi bar instead! That's
totally not proprietary.
>>2389156Crouching Tiger was HK but House of Flying Dragons (superior) was Mainland?
Please confirm or deny. It's all china to me.
https://youtu.be/UNGL12Jm0NgProminent American think tank,
Council on Foreign Relations declares China in the lead in tech
>>2390895>>2390801Actually, both China and the US have roughly 120-130% of GDP debt. But the Chinese also have between 140% of GDP and 225% of GDP assets, while the US at best has around 30% of GDP assets. So China is net positives, with assets yielding more than debts.
The US will probably attempt to inflate its way out, which is also known as the end of the dollar.
Either way, the mighty US military can't afford to fight; Iran wasn't invaded because the US couldn't afford it, what happens if it engaged a country with an economy 21-45x the size?
Sure, K/D ratios might be unfavorable, but a prolonged, attritional war will lead to the collapse of the dollar.
https://policytensor.substack.com/p/the-problem-of-the-strategic-defender
>These historical patterns offer crucial insights when considering a future great power conflict involving China, especially given the overwhelming fact that the Chinese Communist Party is explicitly committed to reunification with Taiwan, peacefully if possible, forcibly if not. The United States is the incumbent power in Asia. It is perhaps the clearest instance of a strategic defender. China therefore enjoys all the advantages of the first mover and the US all the disadvantages of the strategic defender.
>If and when China decides to absorb Taiwan by force or kick the US out of Asia, we should expect China to exploit this initiative in several ways.
>We can anticipate that China will attempt to achieve its objectives through a meticulously planned ‘time-table war,’ where its full military and economic potential is unleashed at a predetermined moment of its choosing. The strategic goal will be to achieve a swift, overwhelming knockout blow at the very outset of hostilities, designed to present a fait accompli to the United States.
>The CCP’s long-term military modernization efforts are geared towards reaching a specific peak of preparedness for the Taiwan scenario. This allows them to choose precisely when to initiate conflict, timing their move to coincide with a perceived window of vulnerability for their adversaries – whether due to their own temporary qualitative or quantitative advantage in the arms race, or external distractions facing the incumbent powers. If Chinese decision-makers perceived that they had the upper hand in the arms race during a brief window, they would very much like to seize that window of opportunity.
>China’s authoritarian system is well-suited for waging ‘totalitarian war.’ China has perhaps the most formidable state capacity in the world. Executive level decision-making in China is hyper-competent, certainly relative to the West and especially the contemporary United States. When they set out to do something, they get it done. And the state reaches very deep into everyday life. As Tooze put it recently, ‘China takes social engineering literally!’ This enables China to direct its stupendous human capital, world-dominating industrial capacity, and rapidly rising technological prowess towards military-strategic goals with unparalleled efficiency and focus, allowing for rapid and comprehensive mobilization akin to the ‘super-agencies’ and ‘planomania’ seen in Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union. When China goes to war, we can be certain it’s be fully prepared.
>Just as Germany used the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its alliance with Japan to mitigate a two-front problem and pin down Soviet divisions, China may employ opportunistic foreign policy maneuvers to isolate potential intervenors, deter third-party involvement, or divert US attention. If somehow Japan could be neutralized via intimidation or seduction, that would be a real coup for China. South Korea is almost already neutralized—there is no appetite in Seoul for intervening in a Taiwan scenario. These scenarios of losing fighting allies in Asia is what is worrying Bridge Colby these days.
>The ideal scenario for China would be to entrap the US in a capabilities-consuming major war far away from the Western Pacific. If the US got into a war with Iran, for instance, that would be a significant window of opportunity for China. When the US expended a THAAD battery defending Israeli cities in the 12 Day War, no doubt at least some toasted in Chinese military circles. We have previously argued that Iran will now give up its policy of self-reliance and seek a strategic alliance with China. The Chinese have a great interest in Iranian strength as part of this ‘strategy of distraction.’ The same is true even more so with respect to Russia. The worse Russo-American relations get, the better for China. The best case scenario for China is escalation in Ukraine and a protracted proxy war that consumes American strength.
>It is the thesis of this analyst that China’s exploitation of the first-mover advantage would involve a carefully orchestrated, rapid, and overwhelming assault, executed at a moment of its choosing to capitalize on its maximum military potential and strategic surprise. The enduring challenge for the strategic defender is to deny this ‘strategy of rapid decision.’ A strategic objective that will become increasingly difficult as the Chinese military buildup proceeds.
>The great question for US China policy is whether it is worth it. Is this a hill we want to die on? Should we not in fact secure a modus vivendi with China well before this nightmare scenario arrives? The Anglo-Saxon powers refused to accommodate Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. Was it worth it? And those were smaller powers relative to the US. China is bigger and about to get much bigger still. >>2391903bohrium.com
t. knower
>>2392621Can I invest in this or nah. Doesn't seem like it
>>2392639>>2392652Ohh right, forgot about Wukong. While kinda not talked about, still a good soft power. And fucking Genshin/Gacha in general. Crazy soft power.
The only place China is lacking is film. There really isn't any Chinese films that have broken into outside markets.
>>2391903You forgot EVs. Anglosphere is sleeping on the news but Chinese EVs already conquered SEA and South America. This creates a domino effect where they take away crucial market share which is needed to run indebted legacy auto companies.
It felt overnight how Chinese phones became the norm and once touted brands like Xperia and LG got completely erased. Samsung and Apple are now also getting overshadowed by combined Chinese brands.
Also fashion brands in general. Once again something that will just sneak up and murder what we thought were prestigious eternal giants.
Chinese efforts in service based areas first get overlooked then ridiculed and ignored. But like boiling frogs, western industries only realize they're cooked when it's too late.
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