>>2536795>you just disagree that china is experiencing those conditions(why though we will never know).>>2536802I made a passing remark because I thought that no special theory was necessary to prove the empirical fact that the second largest and upcoming imperialist economy in the 21st century, already surpassing the US in crucial high-tech sectors, is not the same as Europe during the era of bourgeois revolutions or as semi-feudal tsarist Russia. I think that if you use basic marxist methodological tools you will see that capital accumulation is going on, that labor is commodified and the state is not controlled by the people but by capital (this is called capitalism).
First of all can we agree that a state company is not inherently socialist? Friedrich Engels already pointed this out: “The more productive forces it (i.e., the state) takes into its ownership, the more it becomes the real aggregate capitalist, the more it exploits its citizens.” And Lenin also stated: “In the era of finance capital, private and state monopolies intertwine, and both, in reality, are merely links in the chain of imperialist struggle between the largest monopolists for the division of the world.” The fact that an enterprise is state-owned, therefore, does not in itself allow any conclusions to be drawn about its social character. If this wasn't the case then De Gaule's France would be socialist. State-monopoly is progressive only in one context: it is easier to socialise and therefore abolish because it is more centralised.
Since 1979, China’s economic transformation from a socialist planned economy to a capitalist system has unfolded gradually through widespread privatization and market reforms. During the 1990s and early 2000s, most state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatized, while the remaining large corporations became partially market-oriented under mixed ownership structures. Although state-owned firms still dominate key strategic sectors like energy, construction, and banking, they now account for only about 25% of GDP and a small share of total employment, meaning that private capital overwhelmingly drives production and job creation.
With the reform and opening up SOE managers profit incentives and autonomy, leading to capitalist behavior within nominally state firms. The 1990s marked the decisive turn toward capitalism, with stock exchanges enabling public listings and the large-scale sale of state assets. In the 2000s and 2010s, further reforms institutionalized the coexistence of state and private ownership. Since 2013, under Xi Jinping, the market has been officially described as playing a “decisive role,” and policies have promoted private investment, mixed ownership, and deeper integration with global capital.
Today, SOEs serve three main capitalist functions: providing infrastructure for private accumulation, acting as profit-oriented monopolies in global competition, and supporting China’s international expansion through initiatives like the Belt and Road. Despite retaining some state control, China’s economy is characterized by private profit, market competition, and integration into global imperialist structures—Xi is of course continuing in the capitalist path.
State-owned enterprises in the monopolistic stage of capitalism, can be necessary to generate the massive investments needed for some modern, high-tech industries and international expansion. China’s global economic rise is based on this concentration of capital, with state-led mergers creating powerful “national champions” that drive projects like the Belt and Road Initiative. However, these SOEs do not represent a socialist sector: despite state ownership, they function as capitalist enterprises operating for profit and under market competition, with budgets independent from the state and often partially privatized. The Chinese state maintains control to guide capital accumulation and macroeconomic development—similar to earlier Western “indicative planning”—but this coordination remains capitalist, not socialist. China’s financial system, dominated by state banks, supports this model by directing credit toward industrial growth while remaining insulated from global finance. Thus, state ownership in China serves capitalist modernization and global expansion, not socialist transformation.
most crucially, since the 1978–79 reforms, China has transitioned from socialism to capitalism by commodifying labor power — turning work into something bought and sold on the market. Under socialism, employment in state enterprises or communes was secure, socially guaranteed, and not wage labor in the capitalist sense. The reforms ended this system: tens of millions of workers were laid off, and peasants were expropriated from their land, creating a vast class of wage laborers. By the 2010s, most Chinese workers were employed in private or profit-driven state enterprises, often under harsh conditions, with migrant workers facing systemic discrimination through the *hukou* system. Despite high economic growth, unemployment and inequality persist, with youth unemployment surpassing 20% in 2023. Worker resistance has grown through thousands of strikes and protests, though trade unions remain state-controlled and largely side with management. The Chinese Communist Party suppresses or mediates labor struggles to maintain capitalist stability. Official claims of poverty eradication are misleading: while wages and consumption have risen, social protections, healthcare, and education have worsened, and inequality has deepened. Most Chinese still live in poverty by realistic global standards. Thus, China’s transformation has produced capitalist growth based on exploitation and inequality, not socialist development.
Finally on the question of the state.
China’s state and ruling party no longer represent the working class but serve the interests of a powerful and intertwined bourgeoisie. Despite the dengist dellusion it is automatically DotP because le Communist Party, the state’s real class character is revealed through its function: it defends capital accumulation and suppresses independent labor organization. Since the reforms, a new capitalist class has emerged, originating from privatized state enterprises, returning overseas Chinese capitalists, and new entrepreneurs in modern industries. This class is now among the richest in the world, with China ranking second globally in the number of billionaires.
A defining feature of the Chinese bourgeoisie is its deep integration with the state. Around two-thirds of the largest private capitalists have state participation in their enterprises, and upward mobility into the capitalist elite is often only possible through political connections. The Communist Party of China (CCP) plays a central role in this process. After 2001, when Jiang Zemin allowed capitalists to join the CCP, business elites flooded into the party—by 2006, 35% of private entrepreneurs were members. Party membership provides capitalists with access to political influence, government contracts, and protection. Leading figures like Jack Ma (Alibaba), Ma Huateng (Tencent), and Lei Jun (Xiaomi) are all CCP members, and dozens of billionaires hold seats in the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
Family networks also tie top CCP officials to monopoly capital, with documented billion-dollar fortunes linked to the families of Wen Jiabao and Xi Jinping. This fusion of political and economic power demonstrates that the CCP functions as an apparatus of the bourgeoisie, ensuring capital accumulation and preserving class hierarchy.
Lobbying and the fusion of state and capital in China reveal the fundamentally capitalist character of its political system. Since the 1990s, corporations—state-owned, private, and foreign—have actively influenced policymaking through lobbying networks, advisory roles, and personal connections (guanxi) with officials. The All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) institutionalizes this process, transmitting business demands such as deregulation, privatization, and tax relief directly to top leaders through bodies like the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Major policy shifts, including the 2004 constitutional protection of private property and the 2007 Property Law, resulted largely from capitalist lobbying. Industry groups have also shaped monetary, trade, and industrial policies in favor of export competitiveness and private accumulation.
Wealthy entrepreneurs occupy political positions within the ACFIC and maintain ties to CCP leadership, ensuring privileged access to state decision-making. While the government occasionally targets individual billionaires for corruption, these actions merely discipline capitalists who disrupt elite consensus rather than challenge the bourgeois class as a whole. The Chinese state thus functions as a collective capitalist—coordinating, protecting, and legitimizing accumulation while mediating conflicts within the ruling class. Despite its “socialist” rhetoric, it serves the interests of the bourgeoisie, embodying a fusion of political and economic power under the CCP that secures the expansion of Chinese capitalism. China’s state capitalism thus represents not socialism, but a mature form of capitalist rule under a CP that is a classic example of assimilation in capitalist path after leading the counter-revolution.