/leftypol/ - Leftist Politically Incorrect

idk why you think this drivel is compelling mr smith you really are just discrediting yourself even further

>>2717848
You were discussing knowledge.
When I close my eyes, do I "know" - or "believe", that which I cannot perceive having permanence?
>verification
By contrast, how do I verify that 1+1=2? How does this count as a form of knowledge, rather than mere belief?
>>2717853
We must be patient when building argumentation.

>>2717870
gfy baiting bater

>>2717921
>bait
No, its called an epistemological discourse (or perhaps even a demonstration). If the claim is that we come to "know" without the means of our senses (such is the case you have made) then it portrays knowledge as something insensible, or derived from the mind alone. I contrast "knowledge" (that is, of apprehending "things") from "belief" (that is, supposing to knowledge of things, yet having necessary ignorance) to prove that the view of knowledge as deriving from sensation alone is insufficient. Proof of this is in the necessary terms of empirical knowledge needing sensation to "verify" claims, which thus makes all empirical claims "beliefs" rather than knowledge, for to know is to not believe (for belief is necessarily a form of ignorance, as I have said).

In developing the means of the discussion, I invoke a form of insensible knowledge, such as (1+1=2). This is known, not believed, and so is verified by its own terms. If what is "known" does not belong to experience, but only belongs to the mind, and what is purported as knowledge by experience is necessarily ignorance, then we conclude that knowledge cannot belong to the body, and so all knowledge necessarily belongs to the mind.

The relevance of this epistemology is to demonstrate ontology, for if we return to earlier arguments, the materialist appears to only believe in "stuff", and cannot purport to believe in "things". If we then accept the epistemological argument that knowledge is only the knowledge of things, then the materialist abandons knowledge, for he denies the existence of distinction. This then explains why the materialist is most often an empiricist, for both make knowledge an impossibility. Of course, the materialist falls into inherent contradiction for all these efforts, by claiming no knowledge, except the knowledge that all no-things are made of stuff. The contradiction is in that he concludes this by his mind, and so comes to knowledge, from its abstract negation.

Of course, one can remain a materialist (but only by denying the validity of rational argumentation, and many materialists are shamelessly irrational, as we've seen). The materialist suffers greater problems however, since he is not just in a crisis of ontology and epistemology, but also of ethics. If the materialist adopts Marxism for example, what is the means of his ethical conviction? The easiest answer is to say "material interest" or "selfishness", but this causes a problem, for what it implies is that if one's "material interests" were satiated enough, he would abandon his politics, and so all of his beliefs in Marxism are literally an illusion, a deception, caused by his socio-economic particularity (it is to say that, to the Marxist, there is no Truth at all, only hunger). This is plainly contradictory however, since Engels was a "class traitor", but how? Only by a belief in the Truth, which is not sensuous, but is abstract and permanent. Thus, one cannot be both ethical and a materialist, which is to say, one cannot be political and materialist.

So then, we arrive at the Truth once and for all. The politics of the Marxist is his ethics, and these ethics are his ontology, and his ontology is his epistemology, and to possess knowledge means possessing a mind, which must possess inherent ideas and reason for it to work. So then, to be political is to be an idealist, and so most people on this website are idealists in denial. The issue then is that as much as people deny the divine spark of humanity, they become evil, while contrarywise, they become good. My issue is that many people here are becoming evil by their confusion, but may still be saved from themselves, if only they listen to Reason. I am not perfect either, but I still communicate what I discover to be True, and wish to spread the good news. 🫡🙏

… If an extended dialogue is needed, then we may proceed henceforth. First is the claim of what "knowledge" describes. I see that knowledge must refer to the knowledge of "things" (i.e. "being"; "that which is"), which is either positive or negative (e.g. one may know what "is" by dividing it from what is not. Plato calls this methodology "dialectic" - what we may call "algorithm"). If we dispute the existence of "things" and rather say that there is no-thing, we appear to be contradictory, for we claim that every-thing is really no-thing, but if there is an "every-thing" to be considered, then every thing must be some-thing. Further, to speak of no-thing is to make exception of being for what is not; that is to say, we negate what is, by affirming the being of no-thing-ness, in turn, making it some-thing (e.g. "nothing exists" is still a positive statement). To demonstrate the basic point, if there was really no-thing to be considered, then how could no-thing-ness be considered without a being? So then, the denial of being requires a being to deny itself, which in this act, proves itself to be, contradicting itself.

We have thus understood knowledge to inherently refer to being; that is, knowledge is the act of knowing what is, and consequently, what is not, by what is. Advancing, we may then admit that in matter, there is difference, but this then requires identifying things by their qualitative abstraction, rather than their quantifiable magnitude, for if a "table" differs from a "chair" despite containing the same matter, then it cannot be its matter which defines their qualities as "things". The difference between a chair and a table thus refers to a difference of Form, which cannot be reduced to matter, but only to itself. A chair is a chair by its essence (e.g. chair-ness). Proof of this is in the fact some chairs are more "chair-like" than others, with the least Formal chair losing its chair-ness as such, and so the Form of a thing is its essence by which its being must be identified. To repeat the point, if the real difference between things is not in the quantity of their matter, but in their Formal composition, then when a Form changes into another, we may say that it changes its being from one into another. For example, a tree may become a chair, but a chair is still not a tree. The only disputation of this insight is again to deny the difference of "things" from their "stuff", and so to deny "being", but only by the contradiction of being a being.

To relate this back to political economy, we can see in Marx's writings, the distinction between quality and quantity as the heterogenous and homogenous (e.g. use-value and exchange-value), which thus denotes "things" and stuff. To Marx, the use-value of a thing (i.e. commodity) is its qualities, as pertaining to its individual character, while exchange-value is what is common to all commodities as they are equally measured in their magnitude (e.g. matter; mass). Thus, (A) and (B) are "incommensurate" as beings, yet (Ax) and (By) relate, by their content of matter (i.e. a chair and table are both themselves, and wood). This is further achieved by the "form of value" (of which Marx claims that Aristotle is its discoverer) that distinguishes between the "immaterial" (value) and "natural" (utility) properties of a commodity in their exchange, connoting Aristotelian Substance, between Form and Matter, as Paul Cockshott has said. Marx in the Grundrisse also applies the Aristotelian notion of δυνάμει ("potential") with direct reference to his metaphysics, distinguishing it from actuality (such is the telos of value by its syllogistic completion). We have of course also further seen that Marx's modes of circulation are taken directly from Aristotle's "Politics". None of this ought to be surprising, since Marx praises Aristotle the most out of any thinker; more than Hegel, more than Smith, by repeatedly calling him a genius.

Hopefully you find this reasoning to be adequate, but if not, let me conclude: (i) knowledge is the knowledge of "things", (ii) things can only exist by mutual difference, (iii) this difference must imply self-identity as being the ground of difference, (iv) the self-identity of a thing is necessarily abstract, and individual, (v) proof of this is in the fact that "things" are composite by different modes; e.g. "this thing", "that thing", "every thing", etc, (vi) a thing thus retains its being by its Formal qualities, which may also transsubstantiate; e.g. a tree may become a chair or table, and so substitute its being for another (vii) if not, then whence cometh being? (viii) if so, then being may be said to be actual of what was potential, (ix) and so we have a sense of motive causation, (x) which all begins at the unmoved mover of the cosmos, for if all things are moved, and motion is contingency, then motion cannot be its own cause, and so must have its cause from what moves, but what is itself unmoved, (xi) further, if all matter in motion is a product of temporality, or rather, time is an illusion of motion, then what is unmoved must be eternal, (xii) and so if matter is defined by temporality, and time begins in the timeless, then what is timeless must also be immaterial. 😁👍

>>2719275
no im not reading ur gpt slop

>>2719775
Won't or can't?
As I have previously said, you are irrational and so a threat to humanity. Like all insane people, what is best is that you are expurgated from the realm by exile, or otherwise held captive til rehabilitation. Of course, we otherwise grant exception to self-possession for the irrational, who may be legally held as slaves by guardians, like children or animals.

>>2719275
>In developing the means of the discussion, I invoke a form of insensible knowledge, such as (1+1=2)
NTA, but how is this insensible? Humanity created the idea of number to describe the sensation of running into multiple of the same sort of entity. We put tally notches on bones when counting animals, or people, or distance walked. At some point we came up with words for specific quantities, invented different numerical systems with various pros and cons, until we collectively came to a consensus on the base 10 sanskrit-arabic numeral system with the zero as a placeholder that we use globally today. Only after this adoption and the invention of operators did the specific form of the expression "1+1=2" become possible, but the idea of seeing one sheep, and notching a tally on your bone, and then another sheep, and notching another tally on your bone, and therefore recognizing that there were two sheep you had witnessed, as a sum total of witnessed sheep, that notion goes back to the concrete experience of acutally sensing multiple entities of the same kind. a concrete sensation.

>>2702935
>Idk if this is a good thread to ask this but why whenever marx is trying to explain something in kapital does he explain it for a second or thrid time that is extremely confusing compared to the first instance of him discussing it.

it's immanent critique in action

>>2720228
>how is this insensible?
Because it is true by reason, not perception. To "verify" that (1+1=2) does not require empirical evidence. It is by nature an abstract proposition; (A+A=2A).
>Humanity created the idea of number
If humans invented mathematics, why can't its laws be changed, but only be misunderstood?
>Only after this adoption and the invention of operators
You are obscuring the logic behind the sum, which abides by the necessity of the identified variables, the same way A ≠ B if B ≠ A. To put it more finely, does (1+1=2) even if no one believes it? If so, then logic is universally true. If not, then you are denying reality, since even if we grant logic as an attribute of necessity, and necessity as causation, you are denying causation.
>a concrete sensation
But you appear to be failing to grasp the nature of knowledge here. If we must abstract from our concrete experience to allow us to better navigate reality, then isnt concreteness insufficient, and the abstract real? If abstraction is insanity, then how can it be sufficient?

>>2721646
Abstraction is just selectively disregarding certain concrete particularities for the purposes of achieving a goal in your environment. Like maybe you count sheep because you care how many sheep you have. Maybe you count animals in general because you care how many animals are nearby, regardless of whether or not they are sheep. One task is more abstract than the other only depending on your needs. You invent the category of arbitrary concreteness or abstractness to achieve a goal because you are selectively disregarding the aspects of reality which aren not important for your goals. This happens without ideas. Humans evolved to only see certain wavelengths of radiation on the electromagnetic spectrum. When we eventually developed instruments which could detect other wavelengths, we incorporated them into our general theory of electromagnetic radiation, and designated that arbitrary portion we had evolved to be able to see the "visible" spectrum. But the "visible" spectrum isn't visible to everyone, that's an oversimplification. Some people are colorblind or completely blind. So our abstractions are necessarily oversimplifications of reality oriented towards achieving specific goals. Even our notion of quantity had to be refined to include the rational, irrational imaginary numbers based on new needs we developed in scientific practice. This isn't because ideas have a literal physical existence independent of their application, it is because their application is the point of their existence, and the historical happenstance of their invention determines the form of their existence, which is why some humans invented "roman" numerals and others "arabic" numerals, but we all adopted the "arabic" eventually because of the practicality of their application.

>>2721646
1+1=3 becomes true the moment we redefine the symbol 3 to represent the quantity 2. because numbers are just symbols we assign arbitrarily to quantity, but quantity does not have physical existence independent of particular instances of their being more than 1 of "the same" thing, the "same" being an arbitrary mental construct that categorizes some things as arbitrarily belonging to "the same" category as someone else. The neolithic human who notched his bone with tallies to count the sheep in the valley will arrive at a different quantity than the man notching his bone with tallies to count animals in general, because one has determined that all animals belong to the category being assigned a quantity, and the other one has determined that all sheep belong to the category being assigned a quantity.

>>2722132
>1+1=3 becomes true the moment we redefine the symbol 3 to represent the quantity 2.
In other words, (1+1=3, when 3=2). You are distinguishing between the "nominal" and "real" thus. What is real persists even if it is mis-identified, no?
>… filibustering
Are you incapable of answering my basic question? Does (A+A=2A) even if no one has "invented" the sum?
>>2722124
>Abstraction is just selectively disregarding certain concrete particularities for the purposes of achieving a goal in your environment.
Right; abstraction is "generalisation", but by this act, it makes things intelligible, by giving them identity.
>disregarding the aspects of reality
No, you are locating reality in a mix of unreality.
>This happens without ideas
The abstraction is the idea.

>>2722175
Does (1+1=2), Winston?

>>2722178
>abloo bloo blah blah blah
does it hurt?

>>2722184
Does what hurt? Knowing basic arithmetic?
As it was said, (1+1=3, if 3=2), denoting the difference between the nominal and the real, and so proving the reality of the sum, against any mode of mis-identification. As Socrates was to Theaetetus, I am a midwife for those who are ready to give birth; I attend to the souls of men so that they may deliver their child, even if it takes the axe of Prometheus, such as Athena bursting from the wound. I can also be cesarean. Some men are barren or produce still-birth, however. Some also abort their children.

So, as it has been firmly established, (1+1=2).

>>2722196
>Does what hurt?
being so incredibly stupid. it must be painful

>>2722271
I say (1+1=2) and you say this is "stupid".
So, does (1+1≠2)? Please clarify.

>>2722284
what makes you think my comment and your off topic spam are related?

>>2722289
To claim "stupidity" requires content to relate the judgement to. You appear to make the claim of "stupidity" continuous of current controversies over the basic sum (1+1=2) which prompts your frustrated and impotent insult, yet you now deny continuity between the content of my writing and the quality of its authorship; that is, of deriving from "stupidity". This then either means that (1+1=2) or that it doesn't. So then, if your claims of "stupidity" is disconnected from my current writing, it shows that you have no disputation as to the conclusion that (1+1=2).

Therefore, we both agree, (1+1=2). Very good. 👍

>>2722298
>you appear to make the claim of "stupidity" continuous of current controversies over the basic sum (1+1=2)
the post you are replying to states the opposite. its true, you really cant read huh?

>>2550258

tradesmen typically get paid more than BA holders. So the plebs are getting more than the patricians. Most people with BAs now are baristas and cashiers etc since the market is oversaturated.
>>2550289
in the US at least they will be too dumb and cucked to see the connection or ever agree

>>2722310
Here you are missing necessary context.
Lets return to the original claims of "stupidity":
>does it hurt? […] being so incredibly stupid.
This is in response to these post:
<Does (1+1=2)? […] (1+1=2).
Thus, the immediate claim of "stupidity" implies a direct connection to the question asked and answer given, which you appear to have forgotten about. So then, you appear to lack a sense of short-term memory, or a rational faculty of causation. Hope this helps. 👍

>>2722332
>This is in response to these post:
no its a response to your insane offtopic rambling. the thread has become just you talking yourself in circles about increasingly insignificant minutia because you have nothing left to say about political economy that hasn't been thoroughly debunked. soon you will fill up yet another thread with garbage that no one reads

>>2722338
It seems strange that you have this contrived personal engagement with a stranger online. Don't they call this a "parasocial relationship"? I don't think about you, but you think about me… Get some help, fren. 🙂❤️
>>2722327
>tradesmen typically get paid more than BA holders
Yes, the "overproduction" of elites is a standard form of market justice, as demand shifts to more necessary sectors (Marx in the Communist Manifesto, 1848, refers directly to this phenomenon):
<Further, as we have already seen, entire sections of the ruling class are, by the advance of industry, precipitated into the proletariat, or are at least threatened in their conditions of existence. These also supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm
Later writers refer to this as "Proletarianisation".

>>2721646
>Because it is true by reason, not perception.
this relies on a conflation between perception and sensation when the latter is a subset of the former. all conscious acts of reason and inference occur perceptually but non sensually.
>If humans invented mathematics, why can't its laws be changed, but only be misunderstood?
they are just stipulations. you absolutely can change them. that's why we have different forms of arithmetic, geometry, and even pre-arithmetic logic itself.
>does (1+1=2) even if no one believes it?
only in as much as we stipulate the axiomatic definitions and rules of inference which make the equation meaningful beforehand. essentially all you've done with this question is implicitly stipulate a truth value, and rhetorically ask whether the proposition you've stipulated to be true remains so if no one believes it. the answer is of course it remains true, but only because you've already presupposed it.
>If so, then logic is universally true.
this is a category error. truth value is a property of propositions. logic is not a proposition. the axioms of elementary logic (because there is no such thing as one unified ideal Logic to be "universally true" in the first place, but we can leave this aside) are a set of propositions which are, again, stipulated to be true. when one appeals to deductive logic, one is inherently appealing to one or more of these propositions which cannot be derived or demonstrated by any means internal or external.
> If we must abstract from our concrete experience to allow us to better navigate reality, then isnt concreteness insufficient, and the abstract real?
neither is sufficient absent the other.
>Does (A+A=2A) even if no one has "invented" the sum?
i prefer the term stipulated, and no, it does not, because without stipulating things like the law of identity and the successor function ex ante the construction is meaningless. it expresses nothing. it only has expressive force after you have stipulated what the terms mean, and by then you have already presupposed truth values that are beyond derivation.
>As Socrates was to Theaetetus, I am a midwife for those who are ready to give birth
i like that book. i think the one part in there where socrates makes an analogy between the intellect and a ball of wax registering impressions is the closest western epistemology has ever gotten to a proper materialist theory of knowledge. it's a shame that we still haven't been able to rid ourselves of doxastic accounts of knowledge like justified true belief being as how plato already showed why it fails in the part of the book i guess academics just stop reading before they get to.

>>2722362
>I don't think about you, but you think about me
you have ruined many threads that could have been otherwise productive. you continue to insist posting on a board that is fundamentally at odds with your incoherent worldview. i think its you who needs help with your addiction to humiliation

>>2722425
I wish you peace in life, my friend. 🙏❤️
>>2722372
>insensible perception
Perhaps. In any case, this is a rather novel argument, such as in the annals of Kant, regarding the synthetic a priori. I do appreciate this perspective, since it does seem to me that if thinking is necessarily sequential (such that Plato calls thought the inward speech of the soul) then it is equally temporal and linear (i.e. Intuitive). This then makes thinking phenomenal, and so perceived, though not sensed. Sensation still as yet belongs to the imagination, but not to pure reason. The further issue then is that if thinking is becoming, and not being, then knowing is unthinking. This of course is the basic mystical discourse, such as we find in Lao Tzu.
>they are just stipulations.
The flaw in this notion is that it does not see the law of identity as its basis: (A=A) is absolute. It is always true.
>you've already presupposed it.
So you don't believe that the laws of thought permit us to discover what is necessary of thinking itself? "Logic" derives from Logos, which is also the root of "Reason".
>logic is not a proposition
What is logic? If it is a set of laws, then does (A=A) count as a proposition or as a necessary law of logic?
>stipulating things like the law of identity
Identity is inherent of stipulation, so precedes it.
>i think the one part in there where socrates makes an analogy between the intellect and a ball of wax registering impressions is the closest western epistemology has ever gotten to a proper materialist theory of knowledge
He takes this example from Homer, as Memory being the "Mother of the Muses" and being placed in the heart. He also repeats this example in Republic. Plato also calls Homer a materialist because he imagines that all things run like water, hence Oceanus and Tethys being the parents of the world. But again, in the same dialogue, Plato already says that Memory cannot be a form of knowledge directly because it is the impression of what is no longer the case, like how we may remember dreams, yet insanity is in the day-dreamer. The most genius aspect of the dialogue however is where Theaetetus attempts to define knowledge, but in doing so, must already know so as to know how to know, proving the inherence of knowledge. I have sufficiently proven this with materialism, since if the materialist claims that nothing is, besides matter (such that Plato uses the example of Heraclitus), then this is still some-thing known, and thus in the materialist proposition, he becomes a rationalist, by abstracting sensation into the general concept of matter as-such. Thus we return to Lao Tzu, or even Biblical Proverbs; He that knows, doesn't speak. He that speaks, doesn't know.

Of course, the mysteries of God are far beyond the intellect, so I don't pretend to understand the masters.

I respect you adam smith anon. Keep posting your shit.

>>2722492
>this is a rather novel argument
i try to think outside of the box from time to time.
>So you don't believe that the laws of thought permit us to discover what is necessary of thinking itself?
i don't believe that there is such things as "laws of thought". in general i try to avoid appealing to notions of natural law.
>does (A=A) count as a proposition or as a necessary law of logic?
it is a proposition which we call a "necessary law of logic" after we have stipulated it as a tautology, e.g. after we have already constructed it as true by definition and under any interpretation.
>Identity is inherent of stipulation, so precedes it.
i'd respond that identification is the prototypical form of logical stipulation, but not by any metaphysical necessity. i could very easily construct a system of logic which stipulates non-identity, i.e. a=/=a, and there is no way for anyone to demonstrate non-identity's falsehood except by appeal to its negation, which is just to beg the question.
>in the same dialogue, Plato already says that Memory cannot be a form of knowledge directly because it is the impression of what is no longer the case
that's that doxastic theory of knowledge i was talking about which treats the content of knowledge as being intentionally "about" what "is the case", i.e. that the content of knowledge is propositional, and that its form is that of a correspondence between its content and an external object. i'm of the opinion that this basic model of human episteme is the single most potent misapprehension philosophic idealism has in its arsenal to misdirect people from materialism. knowledge is attentional, not intentional. once you've reached intention, you've moved from the domain of registration and translation proper to mnemonic knowledge and into the domain of correspondence and representation proper to doxastic ideation.
>if the materialist claims that nothing is, besides matter (such that Plato uses the example of Heraclitus), then this is still some-thing known, and thus in the materialist proposition, he becomes a rationalist, by abstracting sensation into the general concept of matter as-such.
a more precise formulation i would use would be that "nothing is that is not composed of matter". either way, there isn't any inherent problem with being a rationalist materialist. i would characterize myself as something of a fence sitter on the empirico-rationalist question, but this has to do with the nature and providence of knowledge and belief, not the nature and providence of reality as such specifically as relates to the question of whether matter precedes ideas (in whatever sense of the word "precede" you like to use here).
>Thus we return to Lao Tzu, or even Biblical Proverbs; He that knows, doesn't speak. He that speaks, doesn't know.
i like what zhuangzi has to say here:
<Heaven, Earth, and I were produced together, and all things and I are one. Since they are one, can there be speech about them? But since they are spoken of as one, must there not be room for speech? One and Speech are two; two and one are three. Going on from this (in our enumeration), the most skilful reckoner cannot reach (the end of the necessary numbers), and how much less can ordinary people do so! Therefore from non-existence we proceed to existence till we arrive at three; proceeding from existence to existence, to how many should we reach? Let us abjure such procedure, and simply rest here.

provenance not providence. i have discredited myself.

>>2722154
i wasn't filibustering, man… it wasn't even that long of a post….

new thread >>2722737
new thread >>2722737
new thread >>2722737
new thread >>2722737
new thread >>2722737
new thread >>2722737
new thread >>2722737
new thread >>2722737

>>2719275
there's no such thing as insensible knowledge. if it were possible to raise a brain in an environment free of all sensations it would learn nothing, let alone arrive at mathematical laws.

>>2722667
>i'd respond that identification is the prototypical form of logical stipulation, but not by any metaphysical necessity. i could very easily construct a system of logic which stipulates non-identity, i.e. a=/=a, and there is no way for anyone to demonstrate non-identity's falsehood except by appeal to its negation, which is just to beg the question.
thinking about it more, i didn't even have to grant that much. the most direct response is simply to point out that the constitutive predecessor of stipulation is actually the truth-apt proposition, not identity. from there it is easy to see that smithanon has the order of operations here reversed. one cannot stipulate that a = a without first stipulating a.

>>2722556
what do you respect about me

>>2723094
that instead of giving up, you keep trying and trying. In a place where a lot of people stubbornly disagree with you.
Thats admirable

>>2722744
it would learn the darkness though

>>2722744
So you believe in the blank slate?
Watch this video of a crow understand water displacement. Instinct then, is inherent knowledge.
>>2722864
>one cannot stipulate that a = a without first stipulating a.
That's precisely my point, except that (A) is not stipulated, it is presupposed. For identity to be proposed, it requires a Being to propose Being. That's why negating Being within Mind is equally contradictory, and why materialism must still insist upon Matter as Being, but in turn, must consistently see Matter as Mind.
>>2722667
>laws of thought
>laws of nature
If Nature is made intelligible by thought, then are mind and nature not subject to the same principles? If nature is not made intelligible by thought, yet Mind grasps itself (by necessity of Reason), then you appear to be promoting dualism (which is not unrespectable, but just not transparent of the current discussion's terms). What must be understood however is that Knowledge is an abstract category, which I hope you would agree with.
>i'd respond that identification is the prototypical form of logical stipulation, but not by any metaphysical necessity.
Why not? How can one perceive, if it is not of things which possess identity? Even to be a subject is still to be, and so one's identity is presupposed (e.g. Descartes)
>i could very easily construct a system of logic which stipulates non-identity
No you couldn't, thats the point. But let's proceed: The first law of anti-logic is the law of non-identity (A≠A). Now what? If (1+1≠2), then what does it equal? See how contradiction here is negative, so cannot be logical.
>that the content of knowledge is propositional
Yes, Knowledge is abstract. It is mediated. Immediacy is necessarily ignorance, since it cannot Know itself.
>knowledge is attentional, not intentional
So you are an empiricist?
>there isn't any inherent problem with being a rationalist materialist
Only if you place Reason in matter (thus in turn, making it a mode of mind, like Hegel's "unconscious"), but you have seemingly denied a continuity between rational necessity and the knowledge which Nature has of itself.
>zhuangzi
Plato says that the religious masters are the truest philosophers, and don't you think its interesting that in the Biblical account, God orders reality by his speech, and at once, it is declared that this is Logos (Word)? Thus, to signify is to obscure the real by the nominal, and it is also why God has no name (YHWH meaning "I Am", the fundamental axiom of subjectivity). I have looked at this in Plato's dialogue Cratylus as well, which I regard as the earliest kabbalistic text, since it deals in attributing names as the essences of things (as well as associating grammar and arithmetic, e.g. gematria). If the world thus begins as undifferentiated Chaos and Order manifests from language, then Being is difference, while UnBeing is the abyss beyond the intellect, and so is unknowable. Wisdom then, is not Knowledge.

>>2723676
>That's precisely my point, except that (A) is not stipulated, it is presupposed.
reads as a distinction without a difference. i've been using the terms interchangeably.
>If Nature is made intelligible by thought, then are mind and nature not subject to the same principles? If nature is not made intelligible by thought, yet Mind grasps itself (by necessity of Reason), then you appear to be promoting dualism (which is not unrespectable, but just not transparent of the current discussion's terms).
the question of what makes nature intelligible is separate from the question of whether mind and matter are homoousian. mind does not grasp itself by any "necessity of reason". if mind "grasps itself" at all, it does so contingently in a historical act of practical reasoning which constructs, adopts, and reifies conventional certainties as "things". this act is what we call thought. it is the same act by which mind "grasps" any object with propositional content. all that is special about this case is the apparent reflexivity which makes it the constitutive act of symbolic subjectivity.
>What must be understood however is that Knowledge is an abstract category, which I hope you would agree with.
i don't know that there is such a thing as a concrete category.
>How can one perceive, if it is not of things which possess identity?
we do not perceive objects of definite identity, e.g. in sensation. the identity of the objects obtained in sensation is constructed in post-sensual perception. it is through the practical act of abstracting from common sense memories that we construct and reify categories like "brown", "tree", "chair", "table", "1", "+", "=", "2", and so on ad infinitum if we had the time and energy.
>Even to be a subject is still to be, and so one's identity is presupposed (e.g. Descartes).
that is to say, it is stipulated as certain.
>No you couldn't, thats the point. But let's proceed: The first law of anti-logic is the law of non-identity (A≠A). Now what? If (1+1≠2), then what does it equal? See how contradiction here is negative, so cannot be logical.
it doesn't follow from 1=/=1 that 1+1=/=2. or put more precisely, it does follow, but it also follows that 1+1=2, because any proposition is valid on a system of logic which allows strict anti-identity. you can only "disprove" this result circularly (by substituting the law of non-identity for its negation) or pragmatically (by appealing inductively to the contingent historical results of applying one or the other system of intentional constraint to thought).
>Yes, Knowledge is abstract. It is mediated. Immediacy is necessarily ignorance, since it cannot Know itself.
knowledge is immediate. it's content is embodied in real material structures of neurobiology. it becomes mediated when we attempt to symbolize and communicate it in propositions.
>So you are an empiricist?
in as much as this means all knowledge comes from sensation, no. in as much as this means all knowledge comes from perception, yes.
>Plato says that the religious masters are the truest philosophers, and don't you think its interesting that in the Biblical account, God orders reality by his speech, and at once, it is declared that this is Logos (Word)? Thus, to signify is to obscure the real by the nominal, and it is also why God has no name (YHWH meaning "I Am", the fundamental axiom of subjectivity). I have looked at this in Plato's dialogue Cratylus as well, which I regard as the earliest kabbalistic text, since it deals in attributing names as the essences of things (as well as associating grammar and arithmetic, e.g. gematria). If the world thus begins as undifferentiated Chaos and Order manifests from language, then Being is difference, while UnBeing is the abyss beyond the intellect, and so is unknowable. Wisdom then, is not Knowledge.
i don't have much else to add other than that it's fascinating to me how many of our premises and understandings align, and yet the conclusions we draw on most everything are fundementally opposed.

>>2724474
So who taught the first crow how to fly?
>>2723983
>no difference between proposition and presupposition
But thats clearly false. A proposition must be demonstrated to be true, while a valid presupposition is self-evident. You already said that in The Law of Identity, that Identity is presupposed in the proposition.
>Reason is historically contingent
This is nonsensical in the terms that you put it, hence why its seemingly impossible for you to be honest and say that (A+A=2A) as an absolute fact. Even if we are Hegelian, Hegel does not deny the actuality of Reason throughout history, but rather sees that History is defined by its immanent rationality (e.g. telos), and so at the dawn of self-consciousness, freedom is already present, but as yet not "realised" in its Being. We can otherwise call it potency; if Reason springs up from Nature, then Nature must be rational so as to Be.
>identity is inherently abstract
Yes, and Knowledge is the Knowledge of identity (e.g. "things"). How else can we define Knowledge?
>any proposition is valid on a system of logic which allows strict anti-identity.
The point is that to propose non-identity is contradictory, so then Identity is presupposed.
>knowledge is immediate
And how do you "know" this, exactly?
>i don't have much else to add other than that it's fascinating to me how many of our premises and understandings align, and yet the conclusions we draw on most everything are fundementally opposed.
It must be because one of us is being more rational than the other.

>>2725448
>A proposition must be demonstrated to be true, while a valid presupposition is self-evident.
again, a presupposition (stipulation) is just a kind of proposition, namely that kind of proposition the truth value of which is not demonstrated as a conclusion through deductive inference, but given as an axiom or premise. the demonstrably valid truth value of any conclusion is only ever a conventional result already contained within truth values we stipulate beforehand.
>You already said that in The Law of Identity, that Identity is presupposed in the proposition.
i said the opposite. you have to have propositions to formulate the law of identity.
>its seemingly impossible for you to be honest and say that (A+A=2A) as an absolute fact.
it's an absolute fact within an intentionally constructed practice of constrained signification.
>>2725448
>if we are Hegelian
i'm not a christian, so i'm not hegelian.
>if Reason springs up from Nature, then Nature must be rational so as to Be.
it does not follow that because reason is a part of nature, that nature is wholly rational in as much as that means reason itself is just nature's own self-apprehension. rationality is constructed in material reality by reason's practical and historical apprehension of nature, just as reason itself is constructed through the historical and unreasoned dynamical processes of nature.
>Knowledge is the Knowledge of identity (e.g. "things"). How else can we define Knowledge?
the question is malformed, because you haven't provided a definition, you've only asserted that the identity of things, i.e. an equation of truth apt-propositions, is the content of knowledge.
two common language intuitions i find massively instructive when trying to get at a definition of knowledge: first, you only know what you've learned. this is the rational kernel of naive tabula rasa empiricism. the epistemic subject is genuinely a blank slate prior to the perceptual act of knowledge creation we call learning. second, you only know what you remember. if i learn 1+1=2 on monday, and forget it by tuesday, then i didn't know it on tuesday even if i remember it on wednesday. this is why written and oral exams are such potent and universal pedagogical tools. tests of recall are maybe the only reliable practical measurements of epistemic uptake we currently possess.
so then i say knowledge is the persistent memory trace of perceptual activity left within a subject capable of perceiving and remembering.
>The point is that to propose non-identity is contradictory, so then Identity is presupposed.
contradiction cannot be demonstrated without first stipulating identity. premising the presupposition of identity on non-contradiction which you agree must itself presuppose identity is clearly circular.
>And how do you "know" this, exactly?
i believe it on the basis of what i take to be good evidence and theory. whether or not i affirmatively "know it" is a question which is beyond discursive demonstration and can only be provisionally settled in conventional practice in so far as we stipulate correspondence between doxastic propositions and mnemonic articles of knowledge. the best i can do by way of "proving" that i know it absent any explicit formal rules of evidence and inference is by elaborating my position and subjecting it to general scrutiny, as i am doing now.
>It must be because one of us is being more rational than the other.
must be.

>>2725875
>i'm not a christian, so i'm not hegelian.
lmfao

>>2725875
>a presupposition is just a kind of proposition
I simply disagree, so we must abandon this issue. You see that a valid presupposition is true in the terms which it constitutes, but in my opinion, you fail to see how what is proposed is different from what is presupposed.
>you have to have propositions to formulate the law of identity.
Okay, so what are the primary propositions of logic?
>it's an absolute fact within an intentionally constructed practice of constrained signification.
Yes, which denotes the content of thinking, which as something bound to necessity, is a logical structure. Thus as I have written, the laws of thought are logical.
>reason's practical and historical apprehension of nature
Reason is not an object of history, it is the subject. If not, then the meaning of history is absolved.
>you haven't provided a definition
But this is the same trouble in Theaetetus; to provide a theory for how we come to know (epistemology), we find that we must already know so as to come to know. This is why the rational subject is a knowing being, which begins in self-identity. If you deny your own identity, then from whence doth thou speaketh?
>the epistemic subject is genuinely a blank slate prior to the perceptual act of knowledge creation we call learning
Kant disproves this by seeing how the form of empirical knowledge is formed from the pure intuitions of space and time (in the understanding). Phenomena (i.e. perception) is constituted by these, which do not exist in things themselves, but in how things appear to us. To perceive thus, is to have content for what is formal. Proof of this is in how thinking itself is perceptual, as you put it, and so is conditioned by an internal space and time, which as I have said, links necessity to causation, and so logic to the realm of intelligence.
>you only know what you remember
We also come to know by Reason alone, hence I can know that all bachelors are unmarried, despite never having a memory of all bachelors and married people.
>knowledge is the persistent memory trace of perceptual activity left within a subject capable of perceiving and remembering.
This fails to describe abstraction, which you are currently engaging in. Knowledge here is formalised as this thing, apart from other things. This is not due to memory, but by making Knowledge identical with itself. If Knowledge was merely memory, then the madman who recounts his dreaming life as fact would be correct. The memory of the experience is correct, but is this still knowledge of the world? So, memory is not a sufficient definition of Knowledge, even if it counts as fact.
>contradiction cannot be demonstrated without first stipulating identity
Yes, and in a formal law, identity is in the law itself.
>clearly circular
Circularity is not in itself a mark of ignorance. Hegel accuses the law of identity as being tautological, yet he admits to its formal validity, such that Fichte also calls the law of identity a Form without content.
>i believe it
But is belief the same as Knowledge? No, since belief can be false, while Knowledge is always true.

>>2726718
>I simply disagree, so we must abandon this issue.
it's difficult to do that and continue the conversation because it's essentially the central issues we have.
>Okay, so what are the primary propositions of logic?
those propositions which define truth-function operators, which i maintain are simply formal instructions for the practical activity of constrained signification. e.g. a biconditional equality is evaluated as false if the truth-value of the composite propositions differ, and true if they do not. the law of identity then stipulates that every symbol within a logically admissible universe of discourse satisfies a true biconditional equality with itself. what is constitutive here is not an identical equation of two symbols, but rather the structural non-identity of the symbols "true" and "false" inherent to the form of truth-value. i.e. truth is not true by reflexive identity with itself, but by virtue of not being false, and vice versa.
>denotes the content of thinking
it denotes the content of one particular species of thought formalized through intentionally constructed practice.
>the laws of thought are logical.
thought constructs imperatives by which it constrains itself, and among those imperatives are the imperatives of the historical and plural disciplines of logic.
>Reason is not an object of history, it is the subject.
i'm not an idealist so i disagree. reason is an object created within natural history. reason is only the subject of its own particular history within the wider self development of nature.
>If you deny your own identity, then from whence doth thou speaketh?
i don't see that the cartesian certainty issue has bearing on the possibility of a definition of knowledge. regardless, i don't deny identification outright as a functional instrument of thought, but i do deny any supposed correspondence between propositions and noumenally differentiated "things". the "things" to which the propositions correspond are the propositions themselves. as sellars said, all intentional "awareness of things" is a linguistic affair.
>Kant disproves this by seeing how the form of empirical knowledge is formed from the pure intuitions of space and time (in the understanding).
you are being sloppy here because for kant intuitions are given in sensibility, not understanding. my disagreement would actually be to say that space and time are, contra kant, discursive products of understanding. for any symbol laden with referential intent, it was some stipulative discourse which saddled it.
>Proof of this is in how thinking itself is perceptual, as you put it, and so is conditioned by an internal space and time, which as I have said, links necessity to causation, and so logic to the realm of intelligence.
but the point is that the epistemic subject does not and cannot know such necessity prior to the practical application of epistemic activity, regardless of the ontological or metaphysical status of that necessity. experience and memory condition the construction of such ideas as process and extension. the epistemic subject cannot not know, e.g. that thoughts occur in succession without first actually experiencing such a succession, and second actually remembering that experience.
>We also come to know by Reason alone, hence I can know that all bachelors are unmarried, despite never having a memory of all bachelors and married people.
this is still learned knowledge. you had to learn the semantic value of "bachelor" and "unmarried" and "person", etc. to know how to apply it, you have to learn what objects satisfy the predicates "unmarried" and "person". there is no such thing as knowledge unlearned.
>If Knowledge was merely memory, then the madman who recounts his dreaming life as fact would be correct.
i have already said that truth and falsehood are properties of propositions, and that knowledge is pre-propositional. therefore, it is also pre-judgemental, and the question of what the madman knows is different from the question of what he believes and reports in propositions as true or false. the questions are not totally seperable, i.e. what he believes and reports is in fact formed from what he knows to the degree he is reporting honestly, but this says nothing about whether the knowledge which conditioned his report is itself "correct" or "incorrect".
>The memory of the experience is correct, but is this still knowledge of the world?
a memory of experience is neither correct nor incorrect, as we both agree. my whole project here is to dispense with the idea that knowledge is some species of correct proposition about "the world", and to move towards an understanding of propositions as mediated symbolizations of partial and perspectival mnemonic knowledge.
>Circularity is not in itself a mark of ignorance.
correct, it is the mark that someone has stipulated a truth-value somewhere.
>But is belief the same as Knowledge?
no it is not.
>No, since belief can be false, while Knowledge is always true.
the actual distinction is that only beliefs can admit of truth or falsehood and the justification of same within stipulated constraints, whereas knowledge does not and cannot.

>>2729042
>it's essentially the central issues we have
A presupposition is implicit. A proposition is explicit.
>truth is not true by reflexive identity with itself, but by virtue of not being false, and vice versa.
No, you are confusing the series of laws in logic. The law of identity is primary (self-proof), but the law of non-contradiction as a negative proof (i.e. non-otherness) is secondary - this accords with (i) reflexivity and (ii) non-falseness. It's not either/or, since a double-negative provides a positive result anyway. Hegel uses the law of non-contradiction to criticise identity, as being grounded by the difference of difference (e.g. "A ≠ not-A"), but both propositions are still true, but exist in different modes. Hegel likewise admits to the validity of identity as a formal proof, but just says it is contentless, like Fichte.
>it denotes the content of one particular species of thought
You are contradicting yourself. If thought is perception, as you say, then it has necessary conditions, which Kant locates as internal space and time which gives linearity. To say that thinking is unconditional cannot be true.
>reason is an object created within natural history.
Yet "natural history" has no self-conception without it.
>the "things" to which the propositions correspond are the propositions themselves.
So again, you deny the existence of "things" to know, and so deny the category of knowledge itself. This is the epistemological contradiction of materialism, that you yourself propose an ontology, yet deny being in itself. Like I said earlier, the "true" materialist cannot propose materialism, since in naming it, you lose the Tao. This is also why it's important to distinguish between intelligence (i.e. the knowledge of being) and wisdom (the unknowable). When we engage in speech (i.e. thought), we are in the realm of intelligence (λόγος). God does not have a name: (Exodus 3:14, John 1:18).
>for kant intuitions are given in sensibility, not understanding
To Kant, sensibility is a condition of the understanding. It is the mind which impresses space and time on things. If we are to consider time "in itself", it is unconditional, while linearity is a condition, of thought.
>the epistemic subject cannot not know, e.g. that thoughts occur in succession without first actually experiencing such a succession.
How do you explain instinct, which is a genetic memory which lives in the body and precedes the mind?
>you had to learn the semantic value of "bachelor" and "unmarried" and "person", etc.
Again, you are failing seeing the logic behind the variables.
>there is no such thing as knowledge unlearned.
Who taught the first bird how to fly?
>knowledge is pre-propositional.
No, being is presupposed, but knowledge is mediated. You said it yourself that knowledge comes from memory, which then requires what is prior to give what is posterior, in knowing. How can memory precede an event?
>an understanding of propositions as mediated symbolizations
Yes, which if they have correctness, we call knowledge.
>partial and perspectival mnemonic knowledge.
When a phone camera records phenomena and stores it as digital memory, it has sensation and a brain, but can this be called knowledge? If not, then what is essentially missing is a mind to mediate information.
>knowledge
You still haven't provided an adequate definition. List some examples of knowledge to help us understand.

>>2729042
>>2729098
To relate what you say to what I am saying, we both agree that thought and speech are symbolic devices (such that Plato inherently relates speaking and thinking as two modes of the same act), and that the entities which these interact with are abstract variables which give proposition to their own being. You perhaps also agree to the Kantian position that space and time are causal impressions imposed on objects - I emphasise the point that this then makes logic an inherence of thought, since if thinking has conditions which necessitate ends then there are laws which it abides by (you dismiss this but entirely insufficiently, by offering the alternative proposition of non-identity, failing to see that "non-identity" is a formal identity in itself, since if it is proposed it maintains positivity, or self-identity. Further, formal non-identity leads to immediate contradiction, since if A≠A, then the presupposition of A cannot be proposed, so is an impossible claim. Your dismissal would be as if I claimed "1+1=3" but provided no proof. It's not just lazy, but incredibly dishonest). Thus, as it will be proper to conclude, thought is logical, and so thought can be identified with the Greek (λόγος). Once we establish this, we may see that if thought may grasp anything, it is itself, and so this is the primary proposition (e.g. Cartesian subjectivity; A=A), which also has the implicit presupposition of identity in itself (A).

Moving on, to see thinking and speaking as the same act, mediated by symbols, with Being apprehended as identity, and thus as unity with a symbol, is to see Being as necessarily differentiated by different symbols. Thus, a different word denotes a different "thing" (for else, it would not be distinguished; a table and a chair differ in their nominality only by the extent that they differ in their formal reality). So then, Being is difference, by which words identify the essences of things in their real signification (for example, the nominal in itself is insufficient, for if we speak different languages yet signify the same thing; say, "chair" and "καρέκλα", the name is different, but the formality is maintained). So then, signification is divided, between appearance and essence, where all appearances aim at essences. Thus, we take the qabalistic position, that the descension of being is by the composition of their real symbols, which are constituted by "letters" which act as elements (the same position Plato takes). If we begin by a primary symbol, we develop symbolisation until everything is able to be communicated. We may call this body an "alphabet" (e.g. Sephiroth) which enter into the forms of things, arithmetically (e.g. Gematria). The mind then, is a map of all Being, which can be named (e.g. Dictionary). I would say that we agree on this point, except that you imply that the mind is in someway an "illusion", while I maintain its necessary reality, by means of intelligibility.

Beyond this, is the unconditioned, unknowable and unspeakable (Ain Soph), which is the subject of Wisdom, which is then necessarily unintelligent. Perfect wisdom then appears as perfect ignorance, and so cannot be speculated about, which I fear you are doing. As I say, speech cannot utter silence; the nameless cannot be given a name.

>>2729161
>To relate what you say to what I am saying, we both agree
mr smith does not agree or argue in good faith. he wont meet you in the middle he will say your position is symbolic and wrong and his is universal and correct. he will then claim his position is humble and conciliatory and your position is dogmatic and leads to slavery. he is a crypto nazi who thinks you should be killed.

>>2729446
such scandalous illiteracy