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/leftypol/ - Leftist Politically Incorrect

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A general to compile all news, articles, essays and info related to the Greater Middle East-North Africa region.

Creating this general in an effort to centralize all the info that currently gets posted to 5 different threads concerning conflicts and developments in the MENA region. Seeing how slow they generally are and at risk of getting bumped off besides the Palestine thread and that it’s likely people interested in Yemen, Syria, Iran, Sudan and Palestine are likely also interested in news and info from across the region I think it would be useful to post everything in one place.

This will be the inaugural edition to see how it goes. Welcome!

Officials in Egypt and Iran are protesting the scheduling of a FIFA World Cup match between the two teams next June in Seattle, where local organizers had planned Pride festivities around the match.

https://www.npr.org/2025/12/10/nx-s1-5639958/egypt-iran-seattle-pride-match-fifa-world-cup

US pushes Netanyahu–el-Sissi meeting as Egypt ties summit to major Israel gas deal
Cairo links a three-way summit with Netanyahu and Trump to Israel approving a multibillion-dollar Leviathan gas deal; Energy Minister Eli Cohen objects without guarantees on domestic prices, though officials say talks are narrowing gaps with Egypt

https://www.ynetnews.com/article/b1ozkarf11x

Syria: How Turkey helped engineer Ahmed al-Sharaa's rise to power

It was the spring of 2019, and Syrian government forces were beginning to push towards Idlib with the help of the Russian air force. 
Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the commander of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, was sitting with his entourage and some foreign guests, including Turks, at a safe house in the heart of Idlib.
As the night progressed, he opened up, and began sharing some personal stories.
"When I was a child, I once had a dream about my future," he said slowly, with deliberate intensity. "In the dream, I became the Emir of Damascus."
Now going by his birth name Ahmed al-Shaara, the 43-year-old has quickly transformed himself from a "jihadi terrorist" into a statesman. 
"Turkey played a practical role in his transformation," a Turkish official who met him years ago, when he was still the leader of HTS, told Middle East Eye.

>First engagements


According to the official, Sharaa had his own reasons to change. He needed to survive the war and relied on Turkey, as he was cornered in a territory where Ankara was his only lifeline.
His first significant engagement with Turkey began after his group, then known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, seized the Bab al-Hawa border gate in Idlib in 2017, a vital passage for UN humanitarian aid. 
His first significant engagement with Turkey began after his group, then known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, seized the Bab al-Hawa border gate in Idlib in 2017, a vital passage for UN humanitarian aid. 
After Turkey decided to close the crossing, Sharaa established a civilian administration to manage it, distancing his group from direct control.
Although Turkey continued supporting rival opposition groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and Nureddin Zengi against him, Sharaa ultimately emerged as the dominant force in Idlib, forcing Ankara to reconsider its stance. 
The Turkish security team that previously handled the Syria file and opposed Sharaa was gradually replaced as he consolidated power.
Under the Astana process, it was assigned to build observation posts around Idlib, which required establishing a working mechanism with HTS.
"Sharaa was eventually convinced, though reluctantly, by Turkey's messages that Idlib's issue could not be resolved under the dominance of a single faction. That is how Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was born," a Turkish security source familiar with the process told MEE.
Founded in 2017, HTS brought together some of its former rivals, adopted a more Syrian identity, and established a council including other factions, granting it more legitimacy and flexibility to cooperate with or oppose Turkey as needed. 
Soon after, the so-called Salvation Government, a civilian administration for Idlib, was created.
Turkey believed that a more civilian and governance-focused structure would ease the legitimacy problem. 
"If we establish it this way, we can frame it as a continuation of the Syrian revolution, a defensive struggle and the protection of civilians," a Turkish official said during a meeting at the time. 

>A new strategy


Dareen Khalifa, a senior adviser at the International Crisis Group (ICG), said that both Sharaa's decision to open up, and Turkey’s engagement with HTS, happened simultaneously, as both parties sought a new strategy.
"He began changing his messaging toward Turkey's deployment and softened his tone," she said. 
"It was clear that he was signalling to Turkey because he needed their help."
Khalifa added that Sharaa understood Turkey was shifting gears, and that Ankara and Moscow’s fragile ceasefire was unlikely to hold.
"When we talk about Turkey, you have to distinguish between the intelligence services and the state institutions like the army," Jerome Drevon, co-author of Transformed by the People: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Road to Power in Syria, told MEE.
"The military and bureaucracy never liked HTS and continued to treat it as a terrorist organisation, arresting its members. 
"Only the intelligence branch dealt with HTS pragmatically."
According to Drevon, both sides understood they shared interests. 
Turkey wanted Idlib to remain under opposition control, to prevent another massive refugee wave. Nearly 1.9 million people lived there, which could destabilise Turkey. Ankara also wanted to curb threats from foreign fighters. 
"They reached a kind of understanding," Drevon said.
When Syrian government forces, backed by Iran-aligned militias and the Russian air force, launched a new offensive in early 2020, Turkey was forced to intervene directly to prevent another refugee influx. 
Ankara struck hundreds of Syrian government targets and stationed more than 12,000 soldiers across the province, establishing practical ties with HTS.
These interactions gradually changed the nature of HTS. 
"Turkey's influence was indirect but powerful," Drevon said. 
"Every time Russia made new demands, like withdrawing heavy weapons or organising joint patrols, HTS had to comply, even if unwillingly."
Some within HTS opposed these concessions, pressuring Sharaa to sideline or purge them.
"HTS had to transform and remove radicals who rejected such compromises," Drevon added. "That was the main impact of Turkey's engagement."

>More responsive after jihadist splits


After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government last December, a senior Turkish official said Ankara managed to influence HTS "through engagement".
Omer Ozkizilcik, a fellow at the Atlantic Council and a longtime Syria observer, described the strategy as "change through engagement".
"For the first time in history, a jihadist organisation labelled as a terrorist group became a legitimate entity through this approach," he told MEE.
The key turning point came when HTS began targeting the Hurras al-Din group, which had remained loyal to Al-Qaeda after Sharaa's split. 
"Sharaa became more responsive to Turkey after confronting Hurras al-Din," Ozkizilcik said. "It proved his claim that HTS had genuinely broken from Al-Qaeda."
Ozkizilcik adds that Turkey understood the division and formulated a policy to divide the dogmatists from the pragmatists in Idlib.  
Over time, Sharaa's close associate Shaibani was allowed to enter and leave Turkey and to meet foreign officials there with Ankara’s tacit approval. 
Turkish insiders believe Ankara shared intelligence on Hurras al-Din with the United States, which then targeted senior commanders, though Drevon disputes that claim.
Khalifa emphasised that Turkey also cared deeply about how HTS presented itself publicly, encouraging moderation and tolerance toward minorities. 
"Turkey had much more leverage than anyone else," she said. "It was important for Ankara that HTS adjusted its relations to minorities such as Christians and avoided imposing a strict Islamist rule. Turkey did not want to appear as protecting a problematic group."

>Outreach to the west


Several Turkish officials later said their influence over Sharaa helped him evolve from a jihadist commander into a revolutionary figure focused on protecting civilians in Idlib.
Ozkizilcik said that once Idlib was secured, HTS began building a small functioning state - expelling rival armed groups from urban areas, deploying a police force, collecting taxes, and supporting businesses. 
"Money started to enter the province once basic security was guaranteed," he said, describing this as a key step in the group's transformation.
A senior regional official recalled a Turkish envoy advising Sharaa: "You are good-looking. If you want to die, you will be a handsome martyr, but if you want to live, you could be the ruler of Syria."
Drevon noted that the more Sharaa contained radicals within his ranks, the more openly he could express his pragmatic side. 
"He is an Islamist who believes that Islam has a political and social role, but he has no clear ideology," he said. "He is more a man of action than of ideas."

>A distracted Russia


By 2022, both Turkey and Sharaa reached a new turning point. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine quickly reduced Moscow’s military presence in Syria, shifting the balance. 
At the end of that year, during a conversation at a house in Sarmin, Sharaa reportedly said: "There is little time left before all the knots are untied. The revolution will return to the pre-2015 process."
By then, Turkey had already invested in the military academy established under HTS control in Idlib. Books had been translated, training programmes prepared, and full curriculums developed. 
The academy drew on the combat experience of fighters from Afghanistan, Mali and Chechnya, and became highly active. Meanwhile, Turkish-backed opposition groups in northern Syria still lacked a military school, though they would establish one by 2023.
One Turkish official said they were also able to convince some of the British interlocutors to engage with Sharaa and HTS. This eventually led to a role for Jonathan Powell - then the chairman of conflict resolution NGO Inter Mediate, now the UK prime minister's national security adviser - who organised trips and workshops in 2023 to help the group reform itself.
As HTS expanded its capabilities and strengthened its control, Sharaa began pressuring Ankara for permission to launch new offensives to seize additional territory.
For months, Turkish officials resisted, warning that such action would provoke Russia and trigger another humanitarian catastrophe.
Ozkizilcik said Turkey eventually lifted its veto after reconciliation efforts with Damascus failed and Russian officials began issuing hostile statements. In November 2024, Russia’s special envoy for Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, said Turkey should "stop acting as an occupying power" in Syria.
"It is very difficult for Damascus to engage in dialogue without guarantees from Ankara regarding the withdrawal of its troops," he added.
The subsequent Astana meeting did not improve the situation. Russia demanded a withdrawal timeline for Turkish forces, prompting Ankara to reconsider.
"The Turkish view then was that HTS could launch an offensive to seize the western countryside of Aleppo and reach the city," Ozkizilcik said. 
"No one expected the lightning speed of the operation, which saw city after city fall to Sharaa's forces."
A Syrian source who was with him at the time described Sharaa's euphoria:
"As the Aleppo operation that reignited the revolution advanced, the capture of Qaptan al-Jabal and, one after another, the surrounding villages made Sharaa extremely happy. 
"From the operations room, he spoke to units over the radios as they pushed toward central Aleppo. At one point, the offensive stalled on the western front, but fighters, including some Uyghurs, infiltrated through an old water tunnel and resolved the issue.
"Aleppo fell. Sharaa was overjoyed. They turned south. When Hama fell, he became convinced that the revolution would triumph. 
"In the operations room, unable to contain himself, he stood up, lifted both hands, and shouted joyfully: 'Bear witness, O people of Damascus! History is being written here!'
"Those around him later said it was the first time they had ever seen him so emotional."

https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/syria-how-turkey-helped-engineer-ahmed-al-sharaa-rise-power

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Sudan's Heglig: Why the oil field taken by the RSF matters

Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured the country’s largest oil field on Monday, as the paramilitary group continues to gain ground from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the strategic, resource-rich south. 
Heglig, a small town that sits in the Muglad Basin on the border between Sudan’s South Kordofan state and South Sudan’s Unity State, hosts some of Sudan’s most important oil fields and key infrastructure, including about 75 wells, as well as tanks and processing stations.
It is a crucial stop on the approximately 1,600km-long Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, which runs from the Unity oil field in South Sudan to Port Sudan, where the oil is exported to the international market. 
The stretch of pipeline that runs through West Kordofan to the vicinity of el-Obeid, the SAF-held state capital of North Kordofan, is now under the control of the RSF, which has brought engineers with it to Heglig.
“The liberation of the Heglig oil region is a pivotal point in the liberation of the entire homeland, given the region's economic importance,” the RSF said.
Emadeddin Badi, the author of a recent report on Sudan’s war economy, told Middle East Eye: “Militarily, the fall of West Kordofan opens a corridor towards el-Obeid, and ultimately a pathway back to Omdurman and Khartoum."
"This is the RSF’s strategic aim, and one the UAE is facilitating by ensuring supplies and financial backing,” he added.
“Economically, Heglig is a critical transfer node, while el-Obeid hosts a major refinery. Securing both would give the RSF an additional revenue stream and further entrench its wartime economy,” Badi said. 

>RSF advances across southern Sudan

At the end of October, the RSF captured el-Fasher, the army’s last holdout in the vast western region of Darfur, after a siege of over 500 days.
Victims and eyewitnesses told MEE that the paramilitary fighters raped and executed civilians in large numbers.
Since then, it has - with the support of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu - turned its attention to Kordofan, which neighbours Darfur and is rich in gold and oil, both resources exported to the UAE.
Earlier this month, it took Babanusa, the headquarters of the SAF’s 22nd infantry division. 
The capture of Heglig means the RSF now controls the whole of West Kordofan and a vital part of the Sudanese and South Sudanese economy.
On Tuesday, the paramilitaries began targeting Um Rawaba in North Kordofan with drones. The key city had been recaptured by the army in January.
The RSF also has its sights set on the strategically vital city of el-Obeid, where there is an oil refinery and where the SAF’s fifth infantry division has been heavily reinforced.
El-Obeid sits on the road from Darfur to Khartoum, which the RSF’s chief, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, has not given up retaking. 

>SAF withdrawal from Heglig


Military sources told Middle East Eye that the SAF’s 90th infantry brigade withdrew from Heglig and its oil fields after striking an agreement with leaders from the local Messiria group and South Sudan’s army, the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF). 
The 90th infantry brigade and the SSPDF previously worked together to secure the oil fields that straddle the border between Sudan and South Sudan.
These are vital to landlocked South Sudan’s economy, which is almost entirely reliant on oil and the pipeline that leads to Port Sudan.
South Sudanese television broadcast footage of South Sudanese soldiers with RSF fighters in Heglig, but MEE understands that faced with advancing Rapid Support Forces, the SSPDF had little choice but to facilitate the departure of the Sudanese army and welcome in the RSF.
“I suspect that South Sudanese officials are divided on whether to support the RSF,” Jihad Mashamoun, a Sudanese analyst on Sudan and Horn of Africa affairs, told MEE. 
“One reason is that the government might be beholden to the UAE’s control of the RSF in terms of ensuring the RSF does not attack the oil pipelines,” he said, pointing also to a $12bn “loan deal” struck between South Sudan and a junior member of Abu Dhabi’s ruling Al Nayhan family.

>Oil in Sudan and South Sudan


In April 2023, just as the war between the RSF and the SAF broke out, data from S&P Global Commodities at Sea showed that 130,400 bpd of crude was shipped from Port Sudan’s Bashayer terminal to the UAE and Malaysia. 
At the same time, Heglig itself produced about 40,000 bpd and processed some 130,000 bpd of South Sudanese crude, according to government data. It was the main processing facility for South Sudan’s oil exports.
Earlier this year, a UN panel of experts reported that South Sudan’s oil exports had fallen by 70 percent, and before its capture, operations at Heglig were regularly disrupted by RSF drone strikes, which in November forced the South Sudanese government to shut the field and reduce its capacity.
One source briefed by RSF commanders told MEE that the paramilitary group wants a greater cut of the revenue from Heglig’s oil. In the past, the SAF and RSF have struck resource revenue-sharing agreements.
At the same time, sources briefed on the plans told MEE that businessmen connected to the RSF in Darfur want to take oil from Heglig and elsewhere in Kordofan and East Darfur, put it into container trucks and drive it overland to be refined outside Sudan.
The RSF controls major oil fields in Darfur operated since the 1990s by China before being forced to shut early in the war. Last month, the China National Petroleum Corporation informed Sudan it would end its investments there.

>Split Sudan


The RSF’s control of Darfur and its gains in Kordofan mean that Sudan is now effectively split in two, with the army holding the north, east and centre, and the RSF in control of the west and, with the help of its allies, swathes of the south.
The situation raises, once again, the prospect that Sudan will, like Libya, split in two.
Mashamoun said he did not think this was likely to happen yet. “That is because Libya is split down the middle with each side having seashores,” he said. In Sudan, the Red Sea coast is effectively controlled by Sudan's army-backed government and its allies.
“The RSF has a lack of bureaucracy compared to Haftar in Libya, while General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his de facto Sudanese government has the bureaucracy of a state.”
Badi sees clear parallels between the way the UAE-backed RSF operates and the way eastern Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar, another Emirati ally, works.
“The parallel with Haftar in Libya is clear. Politically, his UAE-enabled control of Libya’s oil crescent became a decisive bargaining chip, with shutdowns used to force concessions,” he said. 
“The RSF can now replicate a similar model. Economically, both cases involve leveraging oil infrastructure to underwrite military operations and negotiate from a position of strength.”

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudans-heglig-why-oil-field-taken-rsf-matters

My dad was syrian btw

>>2591251
>In 2017, Leviathan was estimated to hold enough gas to meet Israel's domestic needs for 40 years, having 22 trillion cubic feet in recoverable natural gas.[9][10][11] The field began commercial production of gas on 31 December 2019.[12] As of 2024, 90% of the field's production was being exported to Egypt and Jordan. [13]
oh my fucking god

>>2591251
>The deal with Egypt is at $7.4 per gas unit.
can anyone with knowledge on this area explain if this is an exceedingly high price? normal? or below average?

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الموت للوطن

الموت للامة

عاشت الثورة العالمية
لا اله الا الحزب
لا رسول الا ماركس

Death to the Ummah. Long live world revolution.

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Every time I attend a book fair here in Iraq I almost gag at the sight of Iran and US lapdogs' stands next to one another, the symbolism is just poetic seeing their class unity against workers

Woe to the vanquished

>>2591807
I was sick of inbred MENA that's why I bred your mother

chances he gains power?

>>2591382
Al-Based

>>2591809
What did the polyp say?


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