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Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is an umbrella agency under the Department of Homeland Security. Within ICE are Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO).

All ICE operations are using APCO P-25 digital mode with AES encryption. The different offices within ICE have their own encryption keys, as well as a common encryption key for all ICE agencies. It appears that these radio networks are not linked to a nationwide dispatch center. But they are apparently connected to regional and local area ICE offices. If an ICE unit needs to run a license plate or requires some other assistance, they do contact the CBP National Law Enforcement Communications Center (NLECC) in Orlando on the CBP radio channels. Here are some frequencies that are specifically allocated to Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operations;

162.0500

162.6125

162.8250

162.9000

162.9250

163.1250

163.2250

163.6250

163.6750

164.1000

164.3000

164.3250

164.6000

164.7750

164.8625

164.9625

165.2375

165.3250

165.3375

165.4125

165.4375

165.4625

165.4875

165.5125

165.6375

165.6875

165.7375

165.7625

165.9500

165.9750

166.1250

166.2000

166.2250

166.2750

166.3000

166.3750

166.4375

166.4625

166.4875

166.5375

166.5625

166.5875

166.6000

166.6750

166.7375

166.8750

168.0000

169.5500

170.1000

170.2000

170.6250

171.5000

172.3500

173.5000

407.6500

407.7000

412.9250

414.8000

415.1000

415.7500

418.4000

418.7250

419.5750



CONVENTIONAL CHANNELS

Here are the nationwide ICE conventional channels that have been confirmed over the to the years;

162.9125 N069 ICE Nationwide Repeater – input

163.1125 N169 ICE Nationwide TAC 3

163.7000 N169 ICE Nationwide TAC 1

163.7250 N169 ICE Nationwide Direct

164.7875 N169 ICE Nationwide TAC 4

165.8375 100.0PL DHS Common (analog)

165.8375 N001 DHS Common (P-25)

166.4625 103.5PL Nationwide Federal Common (analog)

166.4625 N001 Nationwide Federal Common (P-25)

168.5875 N169 ICE Nationwide TAC 2

171.2500 N069 ICE Nationwide Repeater

407.7000 N169 ICE UHF TAC 1

414.8000 N169 ICE UHF TAC 2

414.8625 N169 ICE UHF TAC 3

416.7000 N169 ICE UHF TAC 4



REGIONAL NETWORKS

In addition to these assigned frequencies, ICE has regional “clusters” of VHF repeaters that are linked together. The systems are usually set up using “vote-scan”, where the subscriber radios in the field will automatically search out the nearest repeater sites as they move through the region. Vote scan systems can be spotted by watching for repeaters keying up briefly at regular intervals.

Let us look at some of these ICE regional systems. In 2014, ICE began to upgrade their older radio systems in Florida. These new ICE repeaters have been seen using a P-25 network access code (NAC) of N100, N200 or NF00. Here are some of the new repeater frequencies that appear to be associated with the ICE communications system:

164.2250, N200

164.9250, N200

166.7375, N200

167.3000, N200

167.8500, N200

169.1625, N100

169.6000, N100

169.9125, N100

170.3375, NF00

172.0625, N100

172.5625, N200

172.7625, N100

These frequencies have been heard along the western coast and Florida panhandle area:

164.9250, N200

165.8500, N169

171.3250, N200

171.6625, N200

171.7625, N200

The frequencies using the NAC of 200 seem to be all linked and used along the Florida panhandle and into Mississippi and Alabama, from listener reports.

Moving up to the northeast part of the country, including Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania;

163.6500, N305 Bolton, CT

163.6500, N385 Philadelphia, PA

163.6750, N319 Boston, MA (Logan Airport)

163.6750, N296 Manchester, NH

163.7000, N301 Providence, RI

163.7375, N382 Trenton, NJ

163.7500, N289 Boston, MA

163.7500, N300 Ledyard, CT

163.7750, N303 Mt. Washington Observatory, NH

165.7375, N291 Boston, MA

166.2750, N296 Greenfield, MA

167.5375, N297 Avon, CT

169.8000, N389 Pittsburgh, PA

170.7250, N388 Harrisburg, PA

172.7750, N294 Worcester, MA

Here is a list of suspected locations of ICE vote-scan repeaters in the Garden State. This network uses a common P-25 NAC for all the sites:

167.7250, N9C5 Trenton

167.7750, N9C5 Long Beach Island

170.3375, N9C5 Swedesboro

171.6875, N9C5 Newark

171.7500, N9C5 Morristown

171.9875, N9C5 Philadelphia

172.2125, N9C5 Atlantic City

In the Philadelphia, PA area, I believe there is an ICE vote-scan network operating. I do not have the exact location of the repeaters, but they are all operating with similar P-25 NACs:

162.8250, N383

162.9000, N383

163.7875, N382

170.1625, N382

171.1875, N385

172.2625, N384

Now let’s move out to the west coast and the Los Angeles area, with some known ICE operations there:

163.7500, N109

163.8250, N111

165.9250, N112

168.8250, N104

168.8250, N108

168.8500, N110

168.9250, N115 - LAX Airport TBIT (Tom Bradley International Terminal)

168.9750, N106

170.6250, N114

170.6750, N113

In the Atlanta, Georgia area, I have found multiple regional repeaters that seem to be part of an ICE vote-scan network. I first stumbled on these during the Super Bowl game in Atlanta in 2019. These repeaters were busy during my visit to the Atlanta area, and were completely encrypted, and using the Network Access Codes (NAC) of NB10 and NB11. The P-25 radio identifications all appeared to be in the range previously identified as being used by ICE. The 162 MHz frequencies are likely the input channels to the repeaters:

162.2250, NB10

162.9250, NB11

166.4750, NB10

169.3750, NB10

169.7375, NB10

169.9125, NB10

170.1000, NB10

170.4375, NB10

170.9875, NB10

171.1875, NB10

171.5250, NB10

172.1125, NB10

173.7875, NB10



TRUNKED SYSTEMS

ICE has a VHF trunked system in the San Francisco Bay area and is planning for additional trunked systems in the future. The SF area P25 trunked system, identified as System 4D5, is shared by other DHS agencies as well. You can find out more about this system and frequencies on the Radio Reference site. It lists the system under Customs and Border Protection, but the system is managed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

The planned ICE trunked system for the Caribbean will be VHF P-25 and will also be shared with other DHS agencies, as well as other federal law enforcement agencies. This new trunked system will replace a mishmash of aging conventional repeaters that are not able to currently cover the U.S. territories in the area around Puerto Rico. These new frequencies should start coming online in the next couple of years as construction progresses.

>>2702622

A VHF repeater is essentially a radio station that listens on one frequency and immediately rebroadcasts what it hears on another frequency, allowing two-way radios to communicate over much longer distances than they could directly. Here's how it works in practice; imagine you have a walkie-talkie that can only reach a few miles due to terrain or buildings. You transmit on the repeater's input frequency say 146.520 MHz, the repeater's receiver picks up your weak signal, and its powerful transmitter immediately blasts that same audio out on its output frequenc, say 147.120 MHz at much higher power. Other radios in the area are listening on that output frequency, so they hear your message clearly even though you were too far away to reach them directly. The repeater uses a device called a duplexer, which is essentially a sophisticated filter that allows the transmitter and receiver to share the same antenna without the transmitter overwhelming the receiver, even though the frequencies are very close together. This requires precise engineering because transmitting and receiving simultaneously on nearby frequencies is technically challenging.

A voting system, sometimes called a voting comparator, takes this concept further for large coverage areas. Instead of one repeater with one receiver, imagine five different receiver sites scattered across a city or region, all connected by internet or radio links to a central location. When you transmit, maybe two or three of these receiver sites can hear you, each with different signal quality depending on your location, terrain, and interference. The voting comparator instantly analyzes all incoming signals and selects the one with the best audio quality, typically the one with the strongest signal and least noise then sends that clean audio to the repeater transmitter. As you drive around, different receivers become the best choice, and the system seamlessly switches between them without you noticing, maintaining clear communication throughout a wide area that no single receiver could cover alone.

Trunked radio systems represent a completely different approach to managing radio communications, designed to maximize efficiency when you have many users and limited frequencies. In a conventional system, each group has its own dedicated frequency, police on one channel, fire on another, public works on a third, even if they are not actively talking. This wastes spectrum because channels sit idle while others are busy. A trunked system instead pools all available frequencies into a shared resource managed by a computer controller. When you want to talk, your radio sends a request to the controller, which instantly assigns you whatever frequency is currently free from the pool. You and your group communicate on that frequency for the duration of your conversation, then the frequency returns to the pool for others to use. Your radio handles all this automatically; you simply select your talk group say "Tactical Team Alpha" and the system ensures only radios in that group hear your transmission, even though you might be using a different physical frequency each time you key up. This allows hundreds or thousands of users to share a relatively small number of frequencies efficiently, with features like priority override, encryption, and individual calling that conventional systems cannot easily provide.


Federal Police and emergency services in the United States typically use encryption standards governed by the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) and Project 25 (P25), a suite of standards for digital radio communications. P25 Phase 2 supports Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 256-bit keys, which is considered computationally secure against brute force attacks with current technology. Many agencies also use Data Encryption Standard (DES) or Triple DES for legacy systems, though these are being phased out due to vulnerabilities. The implementation is usually through proprietary algorithms controlled by the radio manufacturer, Motorola's ADP (Advanced Data Protection) and ARC4, Harris/BK Technologies' encryption modules, or similar vendor-specific solutions. A significant policy debate exists around encryption in public safety while agencies cite officer safety and operational security as reasons to encrypt routine traffic, journalists and transparency advocates argue that full encryption undermines public oversight and community accountability.

Some jurisdictions have compromised by encrypting tactical channels while leaving dispatch channels in the clear, or by providing delayed access to encrypted recordings through public records requests.
Motorola's ADP (Advanced Data Protection) and similar vendor solutions use ARC4 (Alleged RC4), a stream cipher with documented vulnerabilities including keystream biases and weak key scheduling. While AES-256 is available in P25 Phase 2, many agencies continue operating legacy DES or Triple DES systems due to budget constraints, ciphers that can be broken in hours with modest computing resources. The closed nature of these algorithms prevents independent cryptanalysis; security through obscurity is the default model, which cryptographic consensus considers poor practice.

The most severe vulnerabilities in this form of encryption are operational rather than mathematical. Keys are often distributed manually through physical keyloaders transported by personnel, creating interception opportunities during transit. Many agencies use static keys for months or years without rotation, meaning a single compromised key exposes all communications during that period. Over-the-air rekeying (OTAR), while convenient, transmits key material via radio waves that can be intercepted and decrypted if the system itself is compromised. Unlike military Key Management Infrastructure with tamper-evident hardware and multi-person integrity controls, policings key management often relies on single individuals with minimal oversight.

These radios are commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment available for purchase by anyone. This creates supply chain risks; intercepted or dropped radios can be modified with firmware implants, and used equipment markets provide adversaries with identical hardware for reverse engineering. Radios lack the physical tamper resistance of military COMSEC devices, no epoxy potting, no mesh shielding, no automatic zeroization upon opening. Side-channel attacks (power analysis, timing attacks, electromagnetic leakage) are practical against these devices with inexpensive equipment.

Even when voice content is encrypted, trunked systems leak substantial metadata through control channels. Every radio registration, affiliation with talk groups, and channel grant request transmits in the clear or with weak protection, revealing unit locations, organizational structure, and operational patterns. Military systems use encrypted control channels and spread-spectrum waveforms that obscure this metadata; public safety systems typically do not.

The push for interoperability between agencies during emergencies often introduces cryptographic downgrade attacks. Radios may be configured to fall back to unencrypted analog or weak digital modes when communicating with legacy equipment, and adversaries can force this fallback through jamming or spoofing. Encryption keys shared across multiple agencies for interoperability expand the attack surface and compromise one agency, thus compromise the network.

While AES-256 remains computationally secure, public safety implementations often use shorter key lengths or reduced rounds for performance. More critically, default keys and factory reset keys are sometimes hardcoded or widely known within user communities. Radio programming software, while nominally restricted, circulates online and allows extraction of key material from cloned configurations. A motivated adversary with physical access to a single radio can extract keys and decrypt network traffic indefinitely.

These weaknesses reflect the fundamental threat model mismatch; public safety encryption is designed to deter casual eavesdropping and criminal interception, not to resist determined nation-state or sophisticated non-state adversaries with resources for hardware reverse engineering, signals intelligence collection, and cryptanalytic attacks.


I'm sure AES-256 itself has no known practical cryptographic weaknesses when implemented correctly. It remains computationally secure against brute force attacks with current and foreseeable technology. Poorly implemented AES in software or hardware can leak key material through these channels. Key management failures are the dominant vulnerability. AES-256 with a weak password, static key, or poorly generated randomness is easily broken regardless of cipher strength. Keys stored in plaintext, transmitted insecurely, or derived from predictable sources compromise the system. If AES has a vulnerability not rooted in the human error I listed, then I'm all ears.

>>2702622

APCO Project 25 (P25, what DHS uses) is a suite of digital radio standards developed for public safety communications in North America, designed to replace analog systems with interoperable digital voice and data capabilities. When implementing AES-256 encryption within P25 Phase 2, the cryptographic strength is technically robust and itself remains unbroken, but the overall security of the communication system depends heavily on implementation choices, key management practices. Failure to abide to operational procedures can introduce significant vulnerabilities.

P25 operates in two phases; Phase 1 uses 12.5 kHz channels with four-level FSK modulation and IMBE voice coding, while Phase 2 implements 6.25 kHz equivalent bandwidth through TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access), allowing two simultaneous voice channels per 12.5 kHz frequency allocation. Both phases support encryption, but Phase 2 specifically incorporates AES-256 as an option alongside legacy algorithms like DES and Triple DES. The encryption is applied to the digitized voice frames after vocoding but before modulation, protecting the content from interception by anyone lacking the correct key.

The strength of AES-256 in this context is that brute-force attacks are computationally infeasible with current technology. An adversary cannot simply capture encrypted P25 traffic and decrypt it through mathematical analysis of the cipher. However, several systemic weaknesses compromise this theoretical security. P25 uses fixed key lengths and does not implement forward secrecy, meaning that if a key is compromised, all historical traffic encrypted with that key is retroactively exposed. The standard also includes provisions for encryption bypass through "clear" override commands and maintenance backdoors that can be exploited if the control channel is compromised.

Key management in P25 systems is typically handled through the Keyloader Interface Protocol (KLP) or Over-The-Air Rekeying (OTAR). OTAR transmits encrypted key material usually via the radio network itself, which creates a bootstrap problem; the keys protecting the key transmission must themselves be secure, and compromise of the system key exposes all subsequent key updates. Many agencies lack the infrastructure for sophisticated key management, resulting in static keys that remain unchanged for months or years, or keys shared across large numbers of radios and personnel. Physical keyloaders, while more secure than OTAR in some respects, require human couriers and create opportunities for interception, social engineering, or insider leak threats (whether accidental while in the field, or on purpose).

Metadata leakage presents another critical vulnerability. Even when voice content is AES-256 encrypted, P25 control channels transmit unencrypted or lightly protected information including radio IDs, talk group affiliations, channel grant requests, and unit location data through GPS reporting. An adversary monitoring these control channels can map organizational structure, track unit movements, identify operational patterns, and determine when encrypted communications indicate heightened activity all without decrypting a single voice transmission. Military systems encrypt control channels and use spread-spectrum techniques to obscure metadata; P25 generally does not regardless.

Interoperability requirements often introduce cryptographic downgrade attacks. P25 includes mandated fallback to unencrypted analog or digital modes when communicating with legacy equipment or during emergency interoperability scenarios. Sophisticated or capable adversaries can force this fallback through selective jamming of encrypted channels or spoofing of control messages, compelling radios to transmit in the clear. The very features designed to ensure communication during crises become attack vectors.

Implementation quality varies significantly between manufacturers. Motorola, Harris, Kenwood, and other vendors each implement P25 encryption with proprietary firmware, hardware security modules, and key storage mechanisms. Some implementations have suffered from buffer overflow vulnerabilities, weak random number generation for key material, or insufficient protection against side channel attacks.
Unlike military Type 1 encryption products, which undergo rigorous NSA certification including physical tamper resistance and electromagnetic shielding, P25 radios are still commercial off shelf equipment with minimal hardening. Extracting key material through power analysis, fault injection, or direct memory access is feasible with moderate technical resources.

The fundamental limitation is that P25 encryption was designed to protect against criminal eavesdropping and casual monitoring, not sophisticated adversaries. The threat model assumes opponents with scanner receivers and software-defined radios, not high tech signals intelligence capabilities or organized non-state actors with cryptanalytic expertise. AES-256 provides the mathematical foundation for security, but the surrounding infrastructure key management, metadata protection, physical security, and operational discipline, often fails to meet standards that would resist determined attack.

>>2702637

Lets imagine some scenarios related to the APCO PJ 25 systems vulnerabilities.


>>The Compromised Keyloader


A mid-sized department purchases twenty new portable radios and contracts with a local technician to program them. The technician receives the encryption keys on a physical keyloader device shipped via standard commercial courier. An adversary monitoring the shipment intercepts the package at a distribution hub, extracts the keys using known default passwords on the keyloader, then repackages and delivers the device. The department loads the compromised keys into all radios. For eighteen months, the adversary decrypts all tactical communications, including narcotics investigations and witness protection details, using intercepted traffic and the extracted keys. The compromise remains undetected because the department lacks key rotation policies and assumes AES-256 encryption provides absolute security regardless of key management practices.

>>Metadata Tracking


Activists monitoring police activity during public demonstrations use software-defined radios to capture P25 control channel traffic without decrypting voice content. By analyzing unencrypted radio ID registrations and talk group affiliations, they map which units belong to specialized response teams, identify the command structure in real-time, and track unit movements through GPS location reports embedded in control messages. When encrypted voice traffic spikes on tactical channels, they infer that a raid or arrest operation is imminent and broadcast warnings through alternative communication networks. The police department assumes their encrypted communications protect operational security, yet adversaries anticipate their actions using only metadata analysis of the control channel.

>>The Fallback Attack


During a coordinated response to a major incident, networks between multiple agencies with mixed encryption capabilities. A sophisticated adversary deploys portable jamming equipment targeting the encrypted traffic while leaving control channels functional. Radios automatically fall back to unencrypted analog mode to maintain interoperability. The adversary captures clear text transmissions containing suspect locations, officer assignments, and tactical plans. The fallback mechanism designed for emergency interoperability becomes the attack vector, exploiting the system's inability to distinguish between legitimate interoperability needs and forced degradation attacks.

>>Insider Extraction


A terminated or low morale IT employee with administrative access to the radio system database exports the entire key inventory to somebody. The keys were stored in plaintext within the network management software, accessible to anyone with system administrator credentials. The employee sells the key database to journalist sources, who subsequently monitor encrypted communications during activity. The compromise persists for months because the agency lacks centralized key management with audit trails, revocation capabilities, or personnel exit procedures that include cryptographic deauthorization.

>>Side-Channel Extraction


Researchers at a security conference demonstrate extraction of AES keys from a commercially available P25 radio using inexpensive equipment. By monitoring power consumption during encryption operations, they identify correlations between power signatures and key bits, eventually recovering the full 256-bit key after several hours of automated analysis. The radio lacks power analysis countermeasures no random delays, no power balancing circuits, no epoxy shielding around the cryptographic processor that military COMSEC devices employ. The manufacturer had assumed that AES-256 mathematical strength eliminated the need for physical security hardening, ignoring implementation attacks that bypass the cipher entirely.

>>Control Channel Spoofing

An adversary with a software defined radio and open source P25 tools transmits forged control channel messages to targeted radios. The messages instruct radios to affiliate with a specific talk group and transmit location updates. Units across the city begin reporting their positions to the adversary's receiver, revealing patrol patterns, response routes, and staging locations. When the spoofing stops, radios return to normal operation with no indication of compromise. The department discovers the breach only when the adversary publicly responds to unit movements, demonstrating that control channel authentication in their P25 implementation was insufficient to prevent injection attacks.


>>The Long-Term Static Key


Say an agency employs P25 with AES-256 encryption in 2015, loading keys manually into each radio during initial deployment. Budget constraints and staffing limitations prevent key rotation for seven years. An investigator discovers that a single radio lost in 2017 was recovered by individuals with connections to the agency. The unchanged keys allow decryption of all archived traffic from the years would be available and coordination with federal agencies from that timeline could be exposed. The mathematical strength of AES-256 provides no protection when keys remain static across years and personnel changes, this effectively treating temporary access as permanent compromise.

File: 1771910574269.jpg (37.42 KB, 550x357, BPsectormap.jpg)


File: 1771910810912.gif (3.74 KB, 348x258, junttt01-3435344221.gif)


what exactly is teaching people methods (wrong by the way hah) on how to sit on their asses all day and listen to DHS radios going to do? You idiots really push all the wrong buttons and nobody will be there to save you when SHTF. FAFO OP.

https://www.academia.edu/5486857/Counterinsurgency_and_the_Occupy_Movement

>>This paper examines the parallels between counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies in both international and domestic contexts, particularly focusing on the Occupy Movement. It argues that recent shifts in COIN doctrine, which emphasize ideological control and population engagement, have influenced policing strategies against protest movements, leading to a dichotomy between 'good' and 'bad' protesters. By analyzing these developments, the paper sheds light on the implications for social movements and the tactics used to undermine them.


This is a general praxis related thread; if you're not going to read on how to resist counter insurgency you wont even be able to watch a news clip without being swayed in subtle ways you don't see.

to solidify resistance to the constant COIN op being waged, it's time to read on the tactics the state uses, every single bit of them. This book is the basic starting level of reading for this topic. Godspeed comrades.

>muh coin manuals
You are a… well whatever.

>>2703683

A small example of this COIN is the media saying "peaceful protestors were the majority, but used as human shields by anarchists and agitators". Or the term "outside agitators" itself, but that's just surface level of the method.

Le proletarian uprising lead by le party will be immune to all the coin tactics for these tactics are used in interimperialist conflicts between bourgeoisie and their proxies

>>2703685

I wonder what type of person would dislike or mock the sharing of studies on police tactics in relation to the left. Keep fidgeting, analyst. Stay uneasy.
You have excellent reason to be. 😐

>>2703694
Le police never dealt with le genuine proletarian uprising lead by le party.

>>2703695
>>le party will get it's door kicked in by GWOT swat for RICO charges in 2026

You speak as if you just arrived from another era. But understand this without grasping counterinsurgency its methods of co-optation, its management of dissent, its absorption of antagonism into democratic spectacle you will not even succeed in organizing workers toward a single objective that exceeds bourgeois parameters, let alone construct a communist party adequate to the present conditions of the working class.

>>2703696
Le party is already le here. And its leeee naaaaaame is leeeee I C P, okay chud?

>>2703697
>>A party without protracted peoples war is like fries without ketchup.

The "invincibility" of any party whether the ICP, CPC, or otherwise does not absolve you of the duty to understand the enemy's methods. This is pathetic substitutionism. You transform yourself from subject to spectator, from lion to livestock awaiting deliverance of communism. The US empire's counterinsurgency apparatus and its fusion centers, its psychological operations, its management of dissent through co-optation and fragmentation will not pause because you hold correct opinions about a party's growth curve in another hemisphere.

I think you could actually use a lot from reading on Juche ideas. It's not directly related to this discussion, but Juche demands that you become the master of your own future. That means studying the terrain, analyzing the specific contradictions of your context, constructing your own organizational forms capable of withstanding repression. The ICP's victories, however genuine, do not transport themselves to your local conditions and absolve you of the need for growth. To believe otherwise is not communist internationalism; it is laziness. You wish to be the object of history, acted upon by saviors. We demand to be the subject, acting upon the world through our own efforts.

"The popular masses are the masters of the revolution and construction. Whether they are conscious of their position and role or not makes a great difference in the revolution and construction."

"The revolution is not a gift from someone, nor is it a favour from outside. It should be carried out by one's own effort. The revolution in each country should be carried out responsibly by its own people, the masters, in an independent manner, and in a creative way suitable to its specific conditions"


- Kim Il Sung



https://www.marxists.org/archive/kim-jong-il/works/On-The-Juche-Idea.pdf

>>2703709
Auygh broken from the outside is food; a egg broken from the inside is new life.

>>2703709
>muh duty
>do something
No. You are a voluntarist and a stalinist.

>>2703729

Sybau you dirty pig.

>>2703740
>moralism

>>2703740
You are a product of stalinist counter revolution. You are le enemy more insidious and more dangerous to le workers' movement and revolution than any cop could ever hope to be.

Now before the salty agents so rudely diverted the topic.

——————————————————————

https://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Interface-3-1-Williams.pdf

This essay outlines the current counterinsurgency model, with an emphasis on its
domestic application in the United States. It shows that many contemporary counterinsurgency practices were developed by police agencies inside the U.S.,
and illustrates the transfer of theory, strategy, and technique from domestic police to the military - and back. The essay also examines the state's use of non governmental or nonprofit agencies, as one element of counterinsurgency strategy, to channel and control political opposition. The conclusion briefly
considers the strategic implications for social movements, especially as we learn to recognize and respond to political repression



also as linked before,

https://www.academia.edu/5486857/Counterinsurgency_and_the_Occupy_Movement


Here are some of the main functions of modern COIN waged against the left in USA

>>Co-optation of community organizations and leaders


>>Intelligence gathering and surveillance


>>Narrative control


>>Preemptive disruption of organizing capacity



>>Channeling dissent into institutional, reformist directions

>>2703755
Dis shid is not le new gib me new

>>2703756

I already haves done not but posting about new forms of organizing that need to be adapted by all movements to survive modern repression (so you see it happen between all movements it adapt to the material reality), but like everything it gets shouted down by feds; specifically because it works for the purpose it serves. Distributed vanguard is the form the militant wing of the vg must take.

>>2703744

the counter revolution was the revisionism and US imperialism.

realize doing this radio shit youre doing to feds is like 10 years in federal penitentiary minimum right?

>>2703759
But le party? Le centralism?


Unique IPs: 5

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