There's a balance between conspiratorial thinking and over-applying Occam's razor. Occam's razor, basically says that when several explanations fit the facts, the simplest one that requires the fewest assumptions is usually the best starting point. It works well in the natural sciences because nature often follows relatively simple underlying rules, for example, planetary motion became much easier to understand once Johannes Kepler described elliptical orbits (versus the previous needlessly-complicated system of epicycles) and Isaac Newton explained them with the single principle of Universal Gravitation. But the razor works less reliably in human systems, where incentives, secrecy, and deception can make the materialist explanation more complicated than it first appears; history includes genuine conspiracies such as the Watergate Scandal, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, and the countless CIA coups, all of which involved coordinated wrongdoing that might have sounded farfetched before evidence emerged. Conspiracies can also be difficult to prove even when real because participants keep secrets, information is compartmentalized or classified, and whistleblowers face risks, which means evidence often appears slowly or incompletely. The challenge, then, is finding a balance: if you apply Occam’s Razor too aggressively you may dismiss real hidden coordination, but if you assume elaborate plots everywhere you end up believing explanations that pile on unsupported assumptions. Good reasoning usually means starting with simple explanations while staying open to more complex ones when incentives, evidence, and context genuinely point in that direction.
its just pure idealism. theres no reason the simple explanation is more valid except human subjectivity
The less controversial form of Occam's razor is
>Plurality should not be posited without necessity
ie if a single cause is sufficient to explain many phenomena, then an alternative model that posits multiple causes should be revisited only when it explains something that the single-explanation model did not
But if you're willing to deal with the subjectivity of priors and approximation errors, a Bayesian framework (ie using directed graphical models) could provide a better distribution of what the probability of each explanation set would be
But then there is the problem of choosing your priors
But then I might argue we are already doing so implicitly
But I wanna talk about the real glowie razor, Hanlon's razor
We have a generation of people who repeat how Western leaders aren't maliciously serving capital, they're just bumbling oafs or incompetent
>>2725919it's about likelihood not inherent validity. like when something falls the likely explanation is gravity. this works for physics but falls apart for anything political or social.