>Next week, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) is expected to adopt a Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress (Law) [民族团结进步促进法]—designed to codify General Secretary Xi Jinping’s new orthodoxy for governing China’s ethnic minorities. That doctrine, known as the “Important Thinking on Improving and Strengthening Ethnic Work,” reflects the “Second-Generation Ethnic Policies” promoted by several prominent scholars. In a nutshell, this new “assimilationist” approach aims “not just to strengthen citizens’ sense of belonging to a larger, unified Chinese nation under the Party but also to mute expression of other—in the Party’s view, competing—identities.”
>Xi’s “Important Thinking” canonically consists of a dozen requirements, or “Twelve Musts” [十二个必须]. Echoing the scholarly proposals, these include prioritizing “forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation [or Zhonghua minzu]” [铸牢中华民族共同体意识], “building a shared spiritual home,” and “promoting extensive interactions, interchanges, and intermingling [交往交流交融] among different ethnic groups.” The doctrine also views ethnic issues through a securitized lens, emphasizing the duty of all ethnic groups to “consciously safeguard national unity, national security, and social stability.”
>Xi’s ethnic policy, moreover, calls for “correctly grasping” “Four Pairs of Relationships” [四对关系]—a concept that the Law’s drafters expressly invoke. One relationship concerns the hierarchy between the Han-centric Zhonghua culture and various ethnic cultures: the former is the “trunk [or backbone],” while the latter are subordinate to it, likened to “branches and leaves.” “Only when the roots are deep and the trunk is strong can the branches and leaves flourish,” Xi said in a seminal 2021 speech on ethnic governance.
>The Law is envisioned as “a comprehensive and fundamental law in the field of ethnic work.” Like statutes of this nature, it primarily contains general policy statements and imposes broad obligations on a wide array of state and private actors, with few enforceable rules. But it should not be dismissed as merely symbolic. The Law would legitimize and entrench Xi’s new doctrine by placing it on a firm legal footing. And, precisely because of its open-textured policy goals, it would supply a capacious statutory basis—à la the 2015 National Security Law [国家安全法]—for all official actions that broadly align with those goals.
>The Law’s high-profile legislative journey demonstrates its importance. The Communist Party expressly called for its enactment in the 2024 Third Plenum Decision. Last August, the Party revealed that the full Politburo had discussed a draft of the Law—the first such disclosure in almost four decades. In December, the NPC Standing Committee decided to refer the bill to the NPC on the ground that it qualifies as a “basic statute” [基本法律] on ethnic affairs that constitutionally must be approved by the full legislature.
>The Law’s political salience is also evident in two atypical features. First, it begins with a rare narrative preamble of over 800 characters. Only three statutes now include a preamble: the closely related Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [民族区域自治法] and the Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macao. Second, the Law uses Party-speak drawn from the “Twelve Musts” as the headings of three core chapters (II–IV): “Building a Shared Spiritual Home,” “Facilitating Interactions, Interchanges, and Intermingling,” and “Promoting Common Prosperity and Development.” Far from being descriptive and dry, as headings typically are, they incorporate key prongs of Xi’s doctrine and organize the Law around them.
>Finally, we briefly summarize the latest draft that NPC delegates received on March 5. This post will be updated after the Law’s final text is released.The preamble presents the orthodox narrative that China’s various ethnic groups, through five millennia of shared history, have created a “unified multiethnic state”—“a community of common destiny bound by intertwined bloodlines, common beliefs, cultural similarities, economic interdependence, and close emotional ties”; and that, despite periods of foreign aggression after 1840, they have successfully preserved their civilization (para. 1).
>Later, the Communist Party, as the “vanguard of the Chinese people and the Zhonghua minzu,” led all ethnic groups in achieving independence and equality, charting “a correct path with Chinese characteristics for addressing ethnic issues” (para. 2). That approach has evolved into the Party’s “Important Thinking on Improving and Strengthening Ethnic Work,” under which its “main task” is to forge “a sense of community for the Chinese nation” [中华民族共同体意识]—a term that subsequently appears no fewer than 30 times in the Law (id.).
>The preamble concludes by calling on all citizens and institutions, state and private, to fulfill their shared obligations to “forge a sense of community for the Chinese nation” and to develop that community (para. 3).
>Chapters I and V set forth the organizational structure and overarching principles of ethnic governance. The Law affirms the Party’s “comprehensive leadership” over efforts to advance ethnic unity and progress (art. 2). Underneath it, the Party’s United Front Work Department and the National Ethnic Affairs Commission—the latter has been reporting to the former since 2018—are responsible for coordinating and supervising the implementation of the Party’s new ethnic policy (art. 41, para. 2).
>The Law declares “a sense of community for the Chinese nation” to be “the foundation of ethnic unity” (art. 6). It mobilizes the whole of government and society to achieve assimilationist goals, imposing general obligations on a wide range of public and private actors, including public employees, mass organizations, enterprises, public-service institutions, industry groups, religious institutions, neighborhood committees, and the military (arts. 42–48).
>Chapter II (Building a Shared Spiritual Home)lays the ideological foundation for the assimilation project. It affirms the policy of fostering identification with “the great motherland, the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the Communist Party of China, and socialism with Chinese characteristics” through patriotic education, education in official historical narratives, publicity of “the fine Zhonghua traditional culture,” and promotion of “Chinese cultural symbols and image of the Chinese nation” (arts. 11–14).
>This Chapter then affords language and education particular attention. It incorporates the relevant rules of the newly revised Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language [国家通用语言文字法], but often goes beyond them. For instance, it codifies the goal of having preschoolers become proficient in Putonghua and requires that Chinese characters be displayed more prominently than minority scripts if both must be used in public (art. 15, paras. 2, 4). It also tasks the education and ethnic affairs ministries with developing textbooks on “the community of the Chinese nation,” while requiring all schools to integrate that concept into their curricula (art. 16, paras. 1–2; art. 18, para. 1). This Chapter does vow to support the standardization, digitization, and preservation of minority texts (art. 15, para. 5), but the goal of such investment is to “protect languages from being completely forgotten rather than protecting their ongoing, everyday use by living people.”
>Finally, this Chapter broadly requires media, internet service providers, families, among others, to promote the Party’s ethnic policy (arts. 19–21). Parents are reminded of their duty to provide lawful family education and are prohibited from “instilling in minors ideas detrimental to ethnic unity and progress” (art. 20, para. 2).
>Chapter III (Facilitating Interactions, Interchanges, and Intermingling) aims to further social and spatial integration. It sets forth the overall governmental obligation to develop “inter-embedded community environments” [互嵌式社区环境] so that different ethnic groups can “live, study, build, share, work, and enjoy together” (art. 22). Toward that goal, local governments must strive to “forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation” and promote integration in all aspects of urban planning and governance (art. 23). Specifically, they are directed to implement policies to facilitate cross-regional population movement, employment, student enrollment, and teacher and youth exchanges (arts. 24–27).
>In addition, this Chapter instructs state authorities to promote integration by supporting—and shaping—volunteer services, cultural institutions (libraries, museums, etc.), the tourism industry, and modern technologies and online media (arts. 28–31). It reiterates internet service providers’ legal obligations to promptly stop the transmission of “information containing ethnic hatred, ethnic discrimination, or other content that undermines ethnic unity and progress.” (art. 31).
>Chapter IV (Promoting Common Prosperity and Development) focuses on integrating ethnic and border areas into national economic and security priorities. It requires all economic and social policies to further assimilationist objectives, to improve people’s lives and build popular support—and to help safeguard national unity and fight against separatism (art. 33). It emphasizes the “mission and responsibility” of ethnic areas to safeguard the nation’s “border security, resource and energy security, food security, and ecological security” (art. 34, para. 2). It also lays out general mandates for the relevant central and local authorities to improve infrastructure connectivity, develop appropriate local industries and agriculture, equalize public services, and strengthen environmental protection (arts. 35–38).
>This Chapter ends by pivoting to “civic and moral development” (art. 40). In the name of development, it announces the policy of “transforming outdated customs and traditions” [移风易俗] and “promoting a new culture of civility and progress” (id.). This provision appears to reflect the common stereotype that all ethnic minorities are “backward” and to curtail their distinctive cultural and religious practices.
>Chapters V and VI both touch on the Law’s enforcement mechanisms. It permits citizens to report conduct that “undermines ethnic unity and progress” and to lodge complaints against government agencies and employees who fail to discharge their obligations under the Law (art. 54, para. 1). When any such conduct also “undermines national interests or the public interest,” procuratorates may initiate public interest litigation (id. para. 2).
>Beyond generic provisions directing the competent authorities to stop violations and order corrections, and in some cases to issue warnings or notices of criticism, the Law by itself does not prescribe any meaningful punishments. Rather, it leaves penalties to be imposed under other applicable laws (arts. 57–62). For instance, inciting ethnic hatred or discrimination is punishable, depending on the severity, by up to 15 days of detention under the public-order offenses law, or up to 10 years in prison under the criminal code.
>Finally, the Law asserts jurisdiction over foreign organizations or individuals who “commit acts targeting the PRC that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division” (art. 63).https://npcobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/2025-09-12-Public-Consultation-Explanations.pdf#page=19https://npcobserver.com/2026/03/05/china-npc-2026-ethnic-assimilation-unity-law/ 72 posts and 4 image replies omitted.>>2730579Russian is a language of world-historic culture, its the analogue to Mandarin in this case. Latvian is the equivalent of all of these petty languages without a single worthwhile piece of writing like Uyghur.
>>2731068>acknowledging facts is "imperialism"Imperialism isn't "having vibes I don't like"
>cultural chauvinismChauvinism actually means something materially so of course you have to add in mystic nonsense before. Every Marxist prior acknowledged superior national cultures existing.
>>2730842>He was known as a staunch Russian chauvinistFunny enough that was actually Gorbachevs faction trying to depict him like that despite Romanov condemning Great Russia Chauvinism. They only said that because he would have done something like Andropov's plan to get rid of the 15 Soviet Republics and replace them with 41 different Republics based off of population and geography instead.
>>2731066Ukraine,Baltics,Caucasus and Central Asia are all speaking more English than Russian. English is now the world language and Russian is pretty much going to get subdued by English and its influence
>>2730936>Based. Multiethnic societies are inherently counterrevolutionary.leftypol.org
TIL from the comments that bigotry and ethnic chauvinism are okay as long as you give it a red coat of paint
what are some proletarian languages and bourgeois ones?
>>2731190only made up languages are of proletarian
lmao the eglin bots are talking to each other trying to build a fake consensus on some garbage ass forgotten discord occupied imageboard with a population of 5 people
>>2731190Modern hebrew is a fake and bourgeois language
>>2731190Languages that will be spoken in a Communist society when unification rids the world of useless petty languages are, at most: English, Spanish, French, Russian, Chinese. These thus are proletarian languages. Any language not listed above, meaning that it will die off under Communism and only survives today because of the fragmented bourgeois society, is a bourgeois language.
>>2731371You are missing Arabic. In short, the proletariat languages are the languages that are official in the United Nations.
>English>Spanish>French>Russian>Chinese>Arabic Xinjiang would be an Afghanistan-tier shithole of warlord cocaine growers raping boys for fun if not for China taking it upon itself to develop the land. If Mandarin is what it takes to make them connected to culture then so be it, maybe eventually they won't need to have their Gaokao scores artificially inflated in order to make up for their abysmal academic performance.
>>2731389What about Hindustani and French? Shouldn't we just go by what languages have the most speakers?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_languages_by_total_number_of_speakers >>2731579>HindustaniEnglish is pretty much the unifying language in South Asia so no need for that and French is an official language in the UN so it would be used. Basically the six languages listed
>>2731582Bleh, I can't read today. I still think that it's possible to do better. I suppose you'd say that Arabic, English or French should be the unifying language for sub-Saharan Africa. I think it might be possible to do better for Africa which is less economically and linguistically unified.
>>2730781We're back into 2nd International levels of bankruptcy
>>2731584Languages are tools of communication, thinking of it as an expression of your ethnicity is bourgeois nationalism. There will be no loss if the African languages loss all native speakers, just as languages of New Guinea are dropping like flies without anything of value being lost.
"leftists" on "lefty"/pol/ be like fucking pinkos want to destroy muh trad cvltures remember the black book stalin genocided millions AIIIEEEEEEE
>>2731608That is why Esperanto will be mandatory and the destruction of all bourgeois languages
>>2730562correct but i'd just like to point point out that all kkkrakkkerz are pissant tribes compared to zhongguo and should be likewise absorbed and forgotten
>>2730842>Proud anti intellectual No, he was just hated by the intelligentsia, particularly in the performing arts. Romanov was a smart guy, and a technocrat.
>>2731735I'm from India btw
>>2731785I hope your armies in kashmir, manipur, and nagaland get their asses kicked
>>2730763not a counterargument
Small languages will survive unless state forbids to speak them.
China isnt run by communist party
>>2731842Depends what you mean with forbids, if you're forced to learn the national language anyway, the youth and children just end up only knowing that one because they don't give a shit about learning another useless local dialect
>>2731789uh oh widdle kwakker got his panties in a twist. No, Kyle, you don't get to steal 30 million square kilometers of land and claim it as a whites only land. It belongs to the whole world.
>>2731981
Leftists do that because the Left is just a proxy/Trojan Horse for the ethnic, religious and economic nationalisms of various non-Western groups. You will never see a single Leftist with actually consistent positions just like you will never see a single liberal or right winger with consistent positions because at the end of the day, they are all nationalists and have a favorite in-group and hated out-groups.
>>2732009>Haha everyone in the entire world is a hypocrite I'm so smartList all your political positions right now so that we can start poking through your own contradictions you sophist.
>>2731981Agree. It's the least bad option, ethnic enclaves are a terrible idea, they lead to unnecessary conflict and crime. Many issues linked to the migrant crisis would not arise if there were stronger efforts to assimilate newcomers, making them to adopt local names, read their religious texts in the native language and integrate into the host society’s cultural values.
>>2732009blame the New Left
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_LeftI don't understand what is going on in this thread. The vast majority of people in China already speaks Mandarin to top of their local language. Han chauvinism does exist to a degree, but Han Chinese are the majority of the population. In short, this is just business as usual. Literally a nothingburger.
>>2730332China is doing the opposite of what USSR did. You can see it in all their policies. Instead of giving ethnic minorities autonomy they assimilate them as they are seen as a threat to DOTP.
>>2730562I agree with this with the only difference being that Kurdish nationalism can be used as vehicle for socialism.
>>2733160You don't get it. Sinophobes aren't satisfied until China has been crushed into a million statelets.
>>2733160Mate, read the op image well.
It's not just about language
>3 anti-china threads on the front
Ahh, normal day on 2026-era /leftypol/.
>>2739960
Lol
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