the standard ontological argument for God:
(i) being exists. therefore the greatest being exists.
(ii) the greatest being is God. therefore, God exists.
i dont think its a bad argument, except that we only presuppose God to be the greatest being. as i have previously shown, God cannot be good, so the good must be higher than god - further, if God is not the highest being, then why call him God? so then, we can make an ontological argument against God by appealing to a higher being, rather than a non-being.
>i dont think its a bad argument
Literally why wouldnt you think so.
>>731464because its logically necessary that there must be a greatest being.
>>731465So not only isn‘t it obvious what a „greatest being“ is but then you integrate an unjustified conclusion in your first premise. If „greatest being“ is just a synonym for God, then you basically cheated in your attempt to prove God by having already incorporated God in your premise for your conclusion.
>i) truthful state exists (A) therefore ambiguous thing exists (B) (no evidence that A leads to B, B is still ambiguous and how could you reason that A leads to B if B is ambiguous?)
>ii) ambiguous thing B is the thing in question (no reasoning stated why that is the case)
>therefore thing in question exists
Completely bogus. How can you declare that the greatest being is God when prior to your conclusion of God’s existence you don‘t even know that God exists? That you can conceive of something doesn‘t mean it‘s real and if it isn‘t real then it can‘t be „the greatest being“ because it‘s not even a being to begin with due to being unreal.
>>731467no, i am arguing that "God" cannot be a synonym for the greatest being, since God himself has conditions, whilst being is unconditional. being does not require God's permission to exist, and we know this because we can equally imagine a world with or without God. God discriminates, while being is indiscriminate, etc.
>>731469if being (e.g. "goodness") exists, there is the greatest being (e.g. "the greatest good"). we can accept this, but we cannot accept that the greatest good is God, for example, unless we define "God" as "the greatest being", but in this case, "God" becomes a dependent variable rather than independent, and so contingent on being, rather than necessary of being. to clarify, goodness does not define itself in relation to God, but God defines itself in relation to goodness - therefore, God depends on goodness, not vice versa.
>>731470>whilst being is unconditionalSays who?
>being does not require God's permission to exist, and we know this because we can equally imagine a world with or without God.That you can imagine something doesn‘t mean it‘s a veridical conception of the world. Whether or not God exists is still inconclusive and so is a cosmological model for how this world even came to be.
This ontological argument is fallacious from the get go and so is your nonsense.
>>731472>Says who?being has no condition for its own being. its an axiom.
>This ontological argument is fallaciouswhat is the fallacy being committed?
>>731471>if being (e.g. "goodness") exists, there is the greatest being (e.g. "the greatest good").No, because depending on what we are talking about something like a greatest could either not conceptually exist or has no absolute answer because it is dependent on an arbitrary point of reference. Photons exist, but something like a greatest photon doesn‘t exist. It‘s conceptually nonsensical. Good exists but the greatest good can only be assessed based on a value system and those are subjective, therefore it has no one absolute answer but multiple relative answers. So being doesn‘t necessarily lead to there being the greatest being.
>being exists
does not in any way imply
>the greatest being exists
and definitely doesnt tell you anything what is even ment by "greatest being".
>>731474option A: innocent person is killed
option B: guilty person is killed
we can say what is the greater and lesser good in this situation. so then, goodness has a variable being. further, if we imagined a state of "perfect" justice, we would conceive of "the greatest good", which can be agreed to or disagreed to on the basis of reason.
>>731476You don‘t prove something general with something specific. My point is that a greatest of a particular kind of thing can be a conceptual error or can be inconclusive due to it being relative. Therefore, you can‘t assume if being exists that something like a greatest being must exist.
>>731473>what is the fallacy being committed?See
>>731469 >>731475the greatest and least quality of all being exists; it is rather self-evident.
>>731478i dont presume anything in the argument
>>731479It was already addressed in this thread that assuming something like a most or least of something exists is not justified and can lead to conceptual errors.
>>731477if there is something greater rather than lesser, we can say that there is "more" of this thing, and for something to possess "most" of this makes it the greatest of that thing. if something can be said to be better, then there is also the possibility of what is "best".
>>731481so a whale is not bigger than a dog?
>>731480And where did I say you presumed anything in that argument? I the course of this thread you definitely make presumptions (and they too were already pointed out) but the point is that the post explains why the syllogism is fallacious.
>>731484what presumptions have i made?
if we accept goodness, there is the greatest good
if there is size, there is the greatest size
as i say, these are axiomatic statements
>>731479No they arent, there is no such thing "greatest" in itself, you need to qualify what metric are you using.
>>731483Hahahaha, you actually don‘t get it
>>731486for something to be great in itself is to be greater than what is less of itself.
>>731487so, is that a yes or a no?
>>731489You still have not answered what metric are you using.
>>731491it depends on what youre describing.
but the question in accepting the validity of greatness is a self-evident matter. if we accept being, then we easily accept what is more or less of that being. to say that size exists but to deny the scale of size is contradictory, since if two things possess size, they may be compared.
>>731485>what presumptions have i made?So I already wasted my time in other responses addressing exactly that, and because you have the memory of an ant I must repeat myself?
>if there is size, there is the greatest sizeas i say
A greatest size exists because the nature of size is laid out in a manner for a greatest of it to exist. A greatest of something doesn‘t solely exist merely by the thing in question existing. It depends what kind of thing we are talking about, hence why just assuming the greatest of it must exist is presumptive.
>these are axiomatic statementsI don‘t think you even know what an axiom is, because
>if there is size, there is the greatest sizeis not an axiom. Not to mention that you apparently don‘t even know the epistemic problem of axioms and formal logic in general, but given that you can‘t wrap your head around what has been explained to you so far I wouldn‘t even begin to open that can of worms with you.
>>731492>then we easily accept what is more or less of that beingWhat is a measure of being? What unit are you using?
>>731493>assuming the greatest of it must exist is presumptivehow? it is an a priori proof to say that if there is something for which greatness is possible, then the greatest of that thing must exist. its not incorrect for me to claim that the largest mammal on earth is a whale, for example.
>if there is size, there is the greatest size is not an axioman axiom is a self-evident statement. we may deduce from the fact of size a greatest size, thus to speak of something with size as being related to what is greatest of this being. i can say that there is a smallest or largest size of thing without perceiving it a posteriori.
>epistemic problem of axiomsdoes 1+1=2?
>>731495it depends
>>731498>it dependsExactly, so unless you qualify what it depends on this argument is meaningless.
>>731499the typical ontological argument attempts to see being itself as good (e.g. being is preferable to non-being) and so whatever is best is also that which possesses most of being, and if God is defined as the best, then the goodness of being proves God. as i say however, this is a valid argument, except that God cannot be identified with the good, since God cannot be good. thus, being can be good in itself, but God cannot be.
>>731483in volume,yes,in size,yes,in height,yes,in number of teeth,yes,in number of eyes,they're equal,in how many joules they consume,yes.
in general bigger ? not in everything,dogs have bigger ears.
>>731499>>731500the reason God cannot be good is because either he makes up what goodness is as his own rules (worship me or go to hell), or he is subject to goodness as a condition of his being (he creates stones he cannot lift), or is elsewise is a creation of a superior being. what is most primary cannot be personal, either, since personality is a condition of prior being.
… and if God is not primary, good, or all-powerful, then they cannot be said to be God. thus, there is no God by virtue of being. yet, there can be "supernatural" entities, but none have ultimate authority over existence.
>>731500How the hell is this valid argument for anything, its just a string of semi-unrelated statements. And still does not answer my question how are we measuring "being".
>>731462I would question the very notion that a "greatest" being exists. I'm not convinced that beings can be ordered by "greatness."
>>731510if you cant follow, thats your own fault.
>>731514why not?
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