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/AKM/ - Guns, weapons and the art of war.

"War can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun." - Chairman Mao
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 No.1345[View All]

What can we learn from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and this example of relatively modern warfare? Strategy, tactics, operations, geopolitical responses, information warfare, civilian pov and response. Anything related. Not the thread to talk about "who is in the right".
216 posts and 96 image replies omitted. Click reply to view.

 No.4495

>>3915
>OG Soviet tactics
Are about maneuvering fast and avoiding urban areas to not get stuck into attritional quagmires. Russia obviously failed their initial offensive and ended up stuck doing the exact opposite this entire war.

 No.4496

>>4495
>/k/ope faggot got btfo on /ukraine/ so he came to /AKM/ thinking he wouldn't get dunked on
LMAO.
>maneuvering fast and avoiding urban areas
Absolutely meaningless, vague statement and not even a correct one.
>Russia obviously failed their initial offensive
Russia was literally around Kiev and retracted its forces after Ukraine acquiesced to sitting down at Minsk, and then it proceeded to treacherously heel-face-turn on the peaceful conflict resolution and attacked Russian forces, forcing Russia to slowly take and hold land which is an entire different strategy compared to rapid force projection.

 No.4499

>>4496
So Russia was outwitted by Ukraine which is why they failed their inital offensive, got it

 No.4500

>>4499
>I have no argument so I'll create a strawman to prop up my retarded assertion
You're /k/oping as usual, got it

 No.4502

>>4495
"OG soviet tactics" is just not a thing. WWII was fundamentally different from Afghanistan or Chechnya and also these differ from Ukraine and the cold war doctrine.
Russia is chiefly using Russian tactics, which are the result of the last two decades and exercised yearly, then changed in Ukraine. There is not much Soviet left in this.

 No.4512

The two years mopping up operation

 No.4513

>>4512
You forgot bukmoot stallin'

 No.4629

File: 1710898660021.png (2.38 MB, 1200x900, ClipboardImage.png)

One of the Ukrainian channels published photos of a new Russian planning module for unguided aerial bombs with a turbojet engine and fuel tank.
The markings on the hull say that it is a UMPB (Unified Planning and Barrage Module). The production date is February 2024.
By its concept - it is a direct analog of the American PJDAM announced only in the past. Except that we have already used our engine bomb.

In terms of range, the situation is as follows:
The Americans have a conventional JDAM - 15 miles from maximum altitude
JDAM-ER - 40 miles from maximum altitude.
PJDAM - 300 miles from maximum altitude.
The maximum recorded range of our JDAMs is about 30 kilometers from the front + distance from the launch site.
At the end of last year there was news that there were plans to increase this distance to 200-300 kilometers and, apparently, today's photos are just a consequence of these developments.

Advantages of UMPB over UMPK (in theory):
1. Increased range.
Possibility to put bridges in Zaporozhye cheaply and tastefully.
Possibility to launch a bomb into the building of the Supreme Council from Bryansk region.
2. Possibility of participation of new platforms: SU-25 in theory can become a carrier of this system and slightly unload other platforms.

Disadvantages of UMPB compared to UMPK:
1. Price.
2. Speed and volume of production.
It would be simply unprofitable to make a rain of fire out of them as in Avdiivka. Therefore, UMPB is more of an analog of cruise missiles and ballistics, which will:
1. Less long-range.
2. But much cheaper means for destroying targets from 0 to 300 kilometers behind the LBS and for overloading enemy air defense.

https://southfront.press/russia-has-developed-its-own-small-diameter-bomb-photos/
https://t.me/prolivstalina/9968

The results are already visible in 2024, with Ukrainian sources complaining about 16x increase of strikes by Russian bombs
https://southfront.press/16-times-more-russian-bombs-pounding-ukrainian-military-in-2024/

 No.4669

File: 1711896935088.png (768.13 KB, 800x425, ClipboardImage.png)


 No.4674

File: 1712067461915.jpg (63.77 KB, 505x447, 5591886.jpg)

>>3911
Ukraine is using a lot of relics from the WW-2 era. Other than Maxim machine-guns and Mosin rifles of course.
https://topwar.ru/237609-antikvariat-na-sluzhbe-vsu.html

 No.4693

So a month or so back NATO decided it was time to finally react to their rapidly depleting stockpiles, with the EU making a grand announcement about ramping up production. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-plan-war-ready-complex-european-defence-industrial-strategy/

This has already run into problems as many production lines haven't been operating at high capacity in decades and have lost the capability to ramp up. The lack of technical specialists are forcing the re-activation of retired technicians, mechanics and other people that have the experience and knowledge necessary to execute this plan, and there is a critical shortage in willing people, both because many have died and because teaching new cadres takes time. This is on top of the fact that many production facilities were shut down some time ago, with some being lost, destroyed or sold (such as the M-113 production line) and others being poorly preserved and requiring a lot of repairs and maintenance to bring back into service.

A recent study on ammunition production and restoring stockpiles found a lot of critical issues, pic and link rel.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebuilding-us-inventories-six-critical-systems

 No.4769

>According to the leaked document of the US Department of Defense, it turned out that the radioactive vehicles were sent to the Foxtrot military base in Germany before they were transferred to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
They didn't even need to wait for the DU APFSDS rounds, the Ukrainians are already being irradiated by the armored vehicles themselves. Ironic.
It reminds me of Centurion 169041 which was used in a nuclear bomb test and then used in combat operations afterwards and its something the Aussies are proud of; sending their troops to fight in an irradiated tank. As a reminder the Centurion lacks CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) protection and the Bradley only got NBC protection in the M2A1 variant, and it was always ad hoc as fuck because it doesn't use over-pressure, only filtration systems and lacks integrated radiological protection that every Soviet IFV had.

https://southfront.press/us-supplied-ukrainians-with-radiologicaly-contaminated-m2-bradley-vehicles-beregini/

https://tankhistoria.com/cold-war/169041-atomic-tank/

 No.4798

>>4769
Wow, that's dishonest garbage journalism even for southfront standards. Just read (and understand) the fucking document.
Worthy of a reminder that Russia sends men to die in Desertcross 3000 offroad buggies every day. I'd take the irradiated Bradley.

 No.4800

File: 1713019648250.jpg (9.02 KB, 200x200, stalin laugh.jpg)

>>4798
>Muh southfront baaad
>I'd take the Bradley
>Le offroad buggies!
<ignores that radiation is radiation and an IFV shouldn't be releasing it
<Attacks article while explaining nothing
<Thinks fast, unarmored vehicles used for flanking recon attacks is something new when Russian and formerly German/US armies did this as part of their doctrine in high-speed reconnaissance in conventional conditions
Considering that F-35 and Abrams wankery in the main thread I should have expected this retarded take would be posted
>I'd take the irradiated Bradley.
<Admits they're irradiated
<Would still get in the blatant mine-unresistant death trap which screams "target me" rather than a small fast vehicle
LOL, fucking /k/opers, retarded every time.

 No.4801

>>4800
Document recommends the radioactivity (not great, not terrible) shall be decontaminated according to host nation standards before anything else is done with that Bradley.
Reading is easy, try it.

 No.4802

>>4801
>reading is easy
Yes, but as your face-value takes demonstrate, comprehension is not.
>the radioactivity (not great, not terrible
<it's not that bad guyz cuz it doesn't instantly give you cancer!
How compelling, lol.
Not even going to touch on how irradiated metal reacts to high kinetic/thermal impacts
>decontaminated according to host nation standards before anything else is done with that Bradley
Which in reality means jack shit because the Ukrainians aren't going to bother doing so, and the Germans are only transferring the units. Hell, basic decontamination protocol just gets rid of surface radioactivity by removing particulates, which requires the removal of sensitive equipment prior, and reinstallment after. Fucking retard.

 No.4804

>just gets rid of surface radioactivity
What do you think how the radioactivity got on that Bradley? Likely some radioactive dust collected on a firing range.
Hell, even some Chernobyl machinery got returned after a good scrub down.
Decontamination literally is just cleaning until the thing reads background levels.

 No.4805

>>4804
>just radioactive dust
Really trying to undersell it, huh? This reads like the idiots thing to claim DU is 'totally' safe.
>Hell, even some Chernobyl machinery got returned after a good scrub down.
I knew you'd bring that up, in no way is that comparable.
1) Most Soviet vehicles in close proximity to those operations were abandoned at Pripyat in open air lots, where they stayed until the Ukrainians grew desperate to use them a few years back.
2) Scrubbing procedures for Soviet vehicles were extensive, and along with their CBRN protection such as overpressure,, filters and outer+inner radiation lining using Boron and lead negated the radiation. Bradley's are poorly protected from radiation to begin with and proper scrubbing would require full ammunition and equipment removal to properly clean it all, which is a hell of a lot more complicated than on soviet vehicles.

 No.4806

>>4805
You are just beyond clueless. Why should they clean the ammo, tech and disassemble other shit?
They take a geiger counter, identify the contaminated area, and clean only there. After the first cleaning cycle, they measure again and continue cleaning if necessary.
You never ever just randomly disassemble and clean without measuring beforehand because that just creates a bigger mess than targeted decontamination of the affected areas.

 No.4807

>>4806
>You are just beyond clueless.
Ad hominum
>Why should they clean the ammo, tech and disassemble other shit?
<Why clean ths insides of an irradiated vehicle
Gee billy, I dunno!
> identify the contaminated area
That's not how decontamination works. You're decontaminated all over if you have a 'patch' of radioactivity when working at a nuclear plant, scrubbed thoroughly and for a long time.
>You never ever just randomly disassemble and clean without measuring
I never said that you strawmanning fuck.

 No.4812

File: 1713196510114.png (1.69 MB, 953x713, ClipboardImage.png)

>>4629
>"Tornado-S" with the help of a D-30SN "bomb missile" defeated a warehouse in Sumy. The first photos of the consequences of a D-30SN UMPB strike that hit a large warehouse in Sumy appeared on the World Wide Web. According to information from the Russian military, the 300-mm glide control unit was launched using the 9M544, better known as the Tornado-S multiple rocket launcher. It was she who launched a hybrid two-stage projectile at an important military facility. The TG channel “Russian Weapons” wrote about this.
>"In general terms, it worked like this: the upper stage on solid fuel elements was launched first, after which the D-30SN warhead was thrown to an altitude of up to 23 meters and received a speed of Mach 000. As soon as the high altitude ceiling was reached, the solid propellant accelerator was discarded automatically using built-in squibs. After which the flight was already carried out along a flat motion vector with a progressive reduction in speed. As soon as the warhead slowed down to speeds of 4 km/h, the retractable wings switched into activation mode, having previously been hidden in the body. After which the projectile itself went into planning mode. The latter, according to indirect data, can fly 1100 kilometers at this stage of the flight. And if we take as the starting position, where the length of the first stage of flight with a working solid propellant upper stage is up to 140 km in the early modifications of the D-60SN, then the total maximum launch range of the UAB will be equal to an effective 30 km. What makes this type of guided munition extremely dangerous for the Ukrainian Armed Forces."

https://dzen.ru/a/Zhydu_MAtgZV-7Fw
https://t.me/RussianArms/6349

 No.4823

>>4693
- The US DoD published its first National Defense Industrial Strategy report, detailing major problems preventing America from mobilizing its industry to out-compete Russia and China;
- Most problems identified by the report stem from the DoD's dependence on private industry, yet private industry itself was never identified as a problem;
- The foreign and domestic policy is based on profit-driven prioritizing, creating industry that pursues profits at the cost of fulfilling that industry's role in providing goods and services for society;
- Russia and China maintain massive state-owned enterprises not only to manufacturing arms and ammunition, but also downstream suppliers for providing raw materials and goods;

References:
>NEO - Fatal Flaws Undermine America’s Defense Industrial Base (February 15, 2024):
https://journal-neo.su/2024/02/15/fatal-flaws-undermine-americas-defense-industrial-base/
>US Department of Defense - The National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) (2023):
https://www.businessdefense.gov/NDIS.html
>NY Times - Russia Overcomes Sanctions to Expand Missile Production, Officials Say (September 2023):
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/13/us/politics/russia-sanctions-missile-production.html
>RFE/RL - Satellite Images Suggest Russia Is Ramping Up Production Capacity For Its War Against Ukraine (November 2023):
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ramping-up-war-production/32658857.html
>RUSI - Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024 (February 13, 2024):
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024
>The National Interest - MBT-70 - The German-American Super Tank That Never Came to Be (April 2021):
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/mbt-70-german-american-super-tank-never-came-be-182224
>The Guardian - ‘A lot higher than we expected’: Russian arms production worries Europe’s war planners (February 15, 2024):
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/15/rate-of-russian-military-production-worries-european-war-planners

>The first-ever US Department of Defense National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) confirms what many analysts have concluded in regard to the unsustainable nature of Washington’s global-spanning foreign policy objectives and its defense industrial base’s (DIB) inability to achieve them.

>The report lays out a multitude of problems plaguing the US DIB including a lack of surge capacity, inadequate workforce, off-shore downstream suppliers, as well as insufficient “demand signals” to motivate private industry partners to produce what’s needed, in the quantities needed, when it is needed.
>In fact, the majority of the problems identified by the report involved private industry and its unwillingness to meet national security requirements because they were not profitable.
>For example, the report attempts to explain why many companies across the US DIB lack advanced manufacturing capabilities, claiming:
>Many elements of the traditional DIB have yet to adopt advanced manufacturing technologies, as they struggle to develop business cases for needed capital investment.
>In other words, while adopting advanced manufacturing technologies would fulfill the purpose of the US Department of Defense, it is not profitable for private industry to do so.
>Despite virtually all the problems the report identifies stemming from private industry’s disproportionate influence over the US DIB, the report never identifies private industry itself as a problem.
>If private industry and its prioritization of profits is the central problem inhibiting the DIB from fulfilling its purpose, the obvious solution is nationalizing the DIB by replacing private industry with state-owned enterprises. This allows the government to prioritize purpose over profits.
>Yet in the United States and across Europe, the so-called “military industrial complex” has grown to such proportions that it is no longer subordinated to the government and national interests, but rather the government and national interests are subordinated to it.
Literally the process of how Nazi Germany the German Industrialists collaborated with the Nazi Party in the 1930s to the point that the word Privatization was coined. To replenish Westoid stockpiles and weapons, they'll be forced to supply their private Military Industrial Complex enterprise with the cheapest labor possible, probably prisoners. Nazis were forced into forced labor not because they just wanted to be evil or they lacked labor per se, but because their labor was highly inefficient because German private MIC enterprise refused to make any improvements. Hell, they forced an entire nation to adopt a "healthy diet" which saw a decreased consumption of meat* - hence the myth about vegetarian Hitler. He did that policy because he was a fucktard who made people starve for the reason of decreasing labor costs. It's really fucking reminiscent of what Europeans are going through, the insect proteins propaganda, saving on electricity and water bills not by improving the industries but making consumers consume less, shit like that

*Source: The Nazi Economic Recovery 1932-1938, R. J. Overy. Table XV: Consumption in Working-Class Families 1927 and 1937 (annual)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wrlMFFXmbxQ
>The Fatal Flaw Undermining America's Defense Industrial Base Embed

>28 Febuary 2024 Pentagon report on National Defense Industrial Strategy:

>It is clear that the European armaments industry is in a mess - the chaos of arms deliveries set to continue
>This report from the Pentagon shows that it is much the same in the US
>“Fatal flaws undermine America’ Defense Industrial base”
https://journal-neo.su/2024/02/15/fatal-flaws-undermine-americas-defense-industrial-base/
https://www.businessdefense.gov/NDIS.html

Recognition spreads in US that significant industrial scale re arming of the on shore production of the range of basic products to equip and sustain an industrial scale army is an fantasy – even or especially at the Pentagon. Nothing new, but the DOD is increasingly prepared to admit failure

Brian Berletic writes:
>“The report lays out a multitude of problems plaguing the US DIB including a lack of surge capacity, inadequate workforce, off-shore downstream suppliers, as well as insufficient “demand signals” to motivate private industry partners to produce what’s needed, in the quantities needed, when it is needed. In fact, the majority of the problems identified by the report involved private industry and its unwillingness to meet national security requirements because they were not profitable. For example, the report attempts to explain why many companies across the US DIB lack advanced manufacturing capabilities, claiming: Many elements of the traditional DIB have yet to adopt advanced manufacturing technologies, as they struggle to develop business cases for needed capital investment. In other words, while adopting advanced manufacturing technologies would fulfill the purpose of the US Department of Defense, it is not profitable for private industry to do so. Despite virtually all the problems the report identifies stemming from private industry’s disproportionate influence over the US DIB, the report never identifies private industry itself as a problem.”

NDIS
>“Many elements of the traditional DIB have yet to adopt advanced manufacturing technologies, as they struggle to develop business cases for needed capital investment.”
>“Over the last decade, the DoD has struggled to curtail adversarial sourcing and burnish the integrity of defense supply chains. Despite these efforts, dependence on adversarial sources of supply has grown. DoD continues to lack a comprehensive effort for mitigating supply chain risk."
>“The labor market lacks the required number of skilled workers to meet defense production demand while driving innovation at all levels. This shortfall is becoming exacerbated as baby boomers retire, and younger generations show less interest in manufacturing and engineering careers.”

 No.4824

File: 1713381015289.png (542.25 KB, 602x339, ClipboardImage.png)

Arestovich's rather insightful analysis of the tactical reasons Ukraine's counter-offensive not only did not achieve results but failed catastrophically.
TL;DR: Battalion Tactical Group retards BTFO by Soviet large-scale combined arms doctrine.

>aTranslated Interview START

1. - Avdiivka was stormed by three Russian armies + a tank division*.
These are permanent units with a unified logistics and management system.
With us, everything above the brigade is assembled management bodies.

2. We saw elements of operational camouflage when creating a grouping/outfit of forces.
Deception and cunning are in the best traditions of the Red Army.

3. Massing of forces and means.
The Russians are strengthening the artillery capabilities of their formations and associations - even before the creation of artillery brigades as part of the combined arms army.
The number of cabs used is growing every month.
In the Avdiivka defense area, 250 units arrived in one day.
The irretrievable losses of the Russian group during the capture of Avdiivka are ~ 30% of the group.
At the same time, they took the fortified area.
Soviet norms are 12-20% for an army operation.
Avdiivka is their first success at the operational and tactical level, associated with the drift towards the Soviet system.

The deadlock at the front, which Valery Zaluzhny spoke about in the article "Economist", has been overcome not by technical methods, but by organizational ones.
When they fully enter the Soviet system, we can expect that they will begin to gain success at the operational level, because it is ideal for this type of war - under their given initial conditions. And they need about five such operations in order for us to lose the entire Left Bank.

They are increasing their capabilities and reducing the time between operations, which a year ago amounted to up to six months for concentration and preparation, will be reduced to four months or less if there are no strategic black swans (you need to plan based on what will not happen). I am not the only one who has been saying since the very beginning of the war that Russia's problem in this war is that they set Soviet goals without having Soviet capabilities. And now they are gradually pulling up the possibilities to the Soviet ones, as far as possible.

And all our (and their, by the way) dreams about Western structures, Western technology and Western strategy are complete fornication. We currently have neither Soviet nor Western capabilities, but they are catching up to the Soviet ones. What is our answer?

Valery Zaluzhny was never allowed to form divisions and armies - formations and associations of permanent personnel, with their own logistics and permanent management bodies, capable of solving the task of breaking through long-term, layered enemy defenses and creating/maintaining such defenses.

"This is against NATO standards!"
Idiots, instead of creating a national military school, under our specific conditions, choosing the best from different systems, are killing the army under a concept that:
- we will never see,
- which is not suitable for large-scale wars on its own.

In the near future, we will see the consequences these "… NATO standards" in full.
>Translated Interview END

As he bitterly explains, NATO standards aren't for fighting peer countries, but inferior militaries with quick precise shock and awe strikes and with minimum expenditure, a policy that began with the Vietnam fiasco and influenced US (and so NATO) doctrine for decades to come. However, even against an inferior military, if they can pull NATO forces into a protracted conflict, NATO will not be able to establish control. In essence NATO tactics are pure Aufstragtaktik autism.

All this is without even mentioning Ukrainian criticisms of Western tech being either inferior to Soviet contemporaries/equivalents or being ill-suited to the Ukrainian environment, with the best tech having little difference to Soviet tech, only with Ukrainians have to train to readjust to NATO standard equipment as opposed to Soviet standard. >>3900
Ukraine recently received a batch of M1117s. Several have already been destroyed and have basically no superiority to the much older BRDM-2. Even the Abrams gets such criticism, and the F-16 is already seen as such, with Ukrainian pilots that have flown them calling it inferior to the Soviet Su-27 and a glass cannon, an opinion even the USAF shares. https://southfront.press/us-pilot-warns-kiev-regime-about-f-16s-deficiencies-calls-it-prima-donna/
https://topwar.ru/238635-silno-ustupaet-sovetskim-ukrainskie-voennye-raskritikovali-amerikanskie-tanki-abrams.html
https://southfront.press/ukrainian-pilot-find-performance-of-western-fighters-inferior-to-russian-jets/

This isn't even going into the fact that Ukraine does not have the facilities to repair Western tech, being forced to ship Leopard 2s and Bradleys back to Germany and the USA, if they can recover them at all. >>4486

*See >>3915

 No.4852

File: 1713744544717.png (2.38 MB, 1148x1043, ClipboardImage.png)

There's a lot of unusual weapons used in this war, but I think this one is kinda strange despite logically making sense. It's a heavy (4 tons!) anti-ship missile made to sink the largest ships like Aircraft Carriers from long range in a single hit, so it's not really made for ground targets.

https://topwar.ru/238532-rakety-3m44-progress-v-specoperacii.html

 No.4870

File: 1714102709806.png (2.62 MB, 1360x1154, ClipboardImage.png)

>>4812
Funniest part about this is that this system is the contemporary equivalent of the US Army's HIMARs launched GLSDB system was found to have subpar performance.
https://topwar.ru/241308-ne-opravdali-ozhidanij-pentagon-priznal-nejeffektivnymi-peredannye-ukraine-malogabaritnye-vysokotochnye-bomby-glsdb.html

 No.4877

It's become widely reported as of April 25th (2024) that the Abrams tanks sent to Ukraine have been withdrawn from the front-lines after several have been taken out in a row. The Ukrainian soldiers have been very unfavorable of the vehicle, despite how lauded it was in their propaganda videos, months before deployment.

https://southfront.press/ukraine-withdrew-american-made-abrams-tanks-from-front-report/

>>4824
>>3900
>All this is without even mentioning Ukrainian criticisms of Western tech being either inferior to Soviet contemporaries/equivalents or being ill-suited to the Ukrainian environment, with the best tech having little difference to Soviet tech, only with Ukrainians have to train to readjust to NATO standard equipment as opposed to Soviet standard. >3900
Also see >>4692 and >>4634 as further examples of this, vid rel.

 No.4886

>>4870
More detail and criticism of the GLSDB. Apparently Russian Electronic Warfare has rendered the main point of the weapon moot, as it neutralizes the guidance systems of the GBU-39 and so, the purpose of GLSDB. Besides the USA, even Poland has tossed in its 2 cents.

https://southfront.press/u-s-admits-glsdb-wunderwaffe-was-rendered-ineffective-by-russian-electronic-warfare/

https://topwar.ru/241450-polskoe-smi-amerikanskie-bomby-glsdb-pokazali-svoju-bespoleznost-na-ukraine-iz-za-raboty-rjeb-vs-rf.html

 No.4897

File: 1714431070642.jpg (174.38 KB, 1080x1337, shell production.jpg)

>>4823
>>4824
>From 1914 to 1918, Germany and Austria-Hungary produced up to 680 million shells and the industries of the Allies France, Britain, Russia (to October 1917), Italy, the U.S. and Canada, produced up to 790 million shells (the statistics vary greatly). The U.S. produced between 30 million and 50 million of these shells.
<[2023] - European Commissioner for the Internal Market Thierry Breton suggested that Europe could now make some 400,000 rounds annually. Estonia’s Pevkur, speaking at a November media roundtable, put the figure between 600,000 and 700,000—and said it would reach one million rounds in 2024.

So what happened? Even France, who had much of its industrial regions occupied by the Germans, were producing 200,000 shells A DAY by the end of WWI. That's half of current European annual output in a single day. Why are Europeans today struggling to mass-produce something as simple as an artillery shell, despite managing just fine 100+ years ago, let alone during the WW-2 period?

The answer is relatively simple. Besides NATO's strategy of warfare shifting into non-mass combat tactics, the Neo-libs off-shored a lot of heavy industry to China. Basically unbolting the smelters and accompanying industrial factories, and shipped them away. A technical factor may also play a role. Metal production changed energy inputs from coal to electricity. That enabled more sophisticated metallurgy but also induced a decline in quantity, do to insufficient electricity production. The colossal error of refusing to build out nuclear power is on display once again. Note that this is another reason why the USSR took longer to produce super-high quality commodity products and so on, as they focused on raising productive capabilities along with technological improvement, because mass-production of high-quality products without existing infrastructure could not be done without otherwise exploiting other countries or the people, something that the Imperialist West had no problem doing. A big part is also that military industry was state-run or directed 100 years ago. The privatized weapons industry has different goals, capitalists do not want to produce more shells, they want increased military spending to drive up prices for the existing shell production. We see this in Nazi Germany and its highly privatized industry; German production was so focused on wunderwaffe precision production, which brought more money to industrialists like Krupp, that it lost sight of the necessity of mass-production and field-use; thus we got over-engineering super-tanks like the Panther, with glaring weaknesses and poor production numbers.

Also privatized military industry is making a killing from ludicrously overpriced military supply
1986: US military buys toilet seat for 640 bucks
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-07-30-vw-18804-story.html
2018: US military buys toilet seat for 10000 bucks
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-10000-toilet-seat-cover-doesnt-pass-smell-test-dod-flushing-taxpayer

The Chinese and Russian militaries likely don't pay more than 10-20 bucks for a toilet-seat.

The idea behind a lot of neoliberal doctrine regarding this is the false bourgeois theory of "absolute and comparative advantage". It would support the idea that since the US handles shell production and steel, it would actually be negative to develop your own manufacturing. It is this same ideology driving globalists to keep Latin America an agrarian cesspool.
The Russian case
https://zenodo.org/records/4422709
Alt Link: https://scholar.archive.org/work/4vnd6hplsbf7tetlv2hxpkhybe

General historical critique
https://critiqueofcrisistheory.wordpress.com/responses-to-readers-austrian-economics-versus-marxism/world-trade-and-the-false-theory-of-comparative-advantage/

TL;DR: These are the problems of the modern Military Industrial Complex (MIC): A Neo-Liberal socio-economic push resulting in outsourcing and decay.

 No.4899

>>4897
>Basically unbolting the smelters
One 155mm M107 shell weighs about 38 kg of steel and 7 kg of TNT.
One million shells weigh 38.000 tons, which is 12 hours of the yearly German steel smelting.
One million shells contain 7.000 tons of TNT, which is days or weeks worth of what Dyno Nobel or Orica release on the civilian markets.
The only reason why the west can't and won't churn out millions of shells a year is lack of revenue and reinvestment once the war is over. The actual industrial basis needed to make one, five or even 10 millilon shells is not an issue at all. They just don't do it because shell factories would collect dust without more wars and you can't heckin' do that to the investors.

 No.4901

>>4899
>One 155mm M107 shell weighs about 38 kg of steel and 7 kg of TNT.
Yes and where are you going to get the TNT and Steel? How much is available. Steel used for shells is different than steel used for civilian production, the composition, the methods, etc. That's a lot of infrastructure to restore or replace and civilian production lacks military capability, unlike Russia, where many civilian Soviet factories were constructed SPECIFICALLY to double as military production lines in times of war (For example Russian cigarette production facilities from the USSR, were made that they could be easily converted to making ammunition for infantry weapons).

 No.4929

Excellent news everybody!
With the advent of drone warfare, machine shotguns are definitely no longer a categorical war crime.

Quantity has a quality all of its own.

 No.4945

File: 1714699432926.png (1.37 MB, 1179x1342, ClipboardImage.png)

>>4870
>>4886
Russian EW has made the GPS guided Excalibur shell similarly lose efficiency. Krasnopol wins again!

https://southfront.press/russian-electronic-warfare-made-american-made-excalibur-shells-useless-in-ukraine/

 No.4946

Not only has Russian air defense successfully been intercepting ATACMs barrages, targeting Crimea, but their counter-battery fire has taken out HIMARS systems in return.

https://southfront.press/in-video-russian-army-kills-two-more-ukrainian-himars-launchers/

 No.4947

A /k/ope I've seen online about American tech being lost in Ukraine is that "it's not the most modern/an export version" which is kind of a cop-out given that they dismiss the same argument relative to Soviet tanks in the Middle East. While this can maybe apply to the M1A1SA, this really does not apply to the Bradley's. The M2A2ODS, while not the most modern is still a version from the late 90s-early 2000s that was used in the 2nd Gulf War, and which does not significantly have protective differences to current M2A3 and M2A4 Bradleys of the US Army, despite what is claimed. More importantly Russian troops captured an M3A3 CFV, a recon version of the Bradley that is the second most modern modification, with the M3A4 only coming into service 4 years ago.

https://topwar.ru/241670-vs-rf-zahvatili-na-avdeevskom-uchastke-fronta-bmp-m3a3-bradley-v-modifikacii-fire-support-vehicle.html

 No.4954

File: 1715141445101.png (910.68 KB, 920x465, ClipboardImage.png)

An interesting development is a new MLRS system being worked on in Russia. It is a bi-caliber system, meaning it has 2 different rocket calibers meaning it can fire different ammunition types and ranges at the same time including mine-laying. This seems to be a reflection of the basic concept the M-270 has of allowing it to mount both MLRS systems and a large tactical ballistic missile, I suspect that Russia is improving it's already formidable MLRS systems based on this concept.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M270_Multiple_Launch_Rocket_System?useskin=vector#Rockets_and_missiles

https://topwar.ru/237394-pervye-kadry-novoj-bikalibernoj-sistemy-rszo-vozrozhdenie-pojavilis-v-seti.html

 No.4957

I've noticed that most videos of tanks and AFVs being actually destroyed in Ukraine are either those that hit anti-tank mines, hit by artillery directly or destroyed after being mobility-killed an abandoned (or hit by ATGMs in weakspots). An example of that is vid rel where a Ukrainian drone drops an M-67 hand grenade into the open hatch of an abandoned T-90M near Chasov Yar. The tank got mobility killed and abandoned. It got hit but not penetrated with an ATGM to the right-hand turret cheek (you can see the detonated ERA).
>Inb4 "why don't they close the hatch!?
Most modern tanks have spring assisted hatches to make opening them (and bailing) easier, so actually closing one takes a lot more than just a nudge. Besides even if it was easy, every millisecond spent not getting outta there increases the chance that closing that hatch will be the last thing you'll do, especially as the hatch is often used as a shield against bullets when leaving. During drills for escaping you are expected to GTFO as fast as possible and only grab your gear and assist any other survivors first. Even if you've got time, there's a human factor: You just got hit, there's probably smoke in the air, electronics might be sparking, hydraulic fluid leaking, your comrade may be wounded or straight up killed, you're really not thinking about a fucking hatch, you just get the fuck out.

Occasional kills of AFV on AFV combat happen, but most of it isn't tanks. A M2A2 ODS Bradley recently took out an MT-LB with its 25mm autocannon from behind, but the MT-LB is lightly armored troop tractor. Around the same time the Ukrainians claimed a Bradley took out a T-80BVM with a BGM-71 TOW, however the video footage only shows a TOW launch against a moving vehicle in blurry drone FLIR. Considering that the T-72M used by the Syrians was outright immune to the original TOW missile back in the 80s without any ERA or the thicker armor of the T-72B variant. and the T-80BVM's frontal armor (which is what is demonstrated as hit) is far better protected even against a TOW II. The day-time photograph of the supposed T-80 taken out is questionable but is at worst a mobility kill, as the tank isn't even burnt, only missing a track.

There's a few tank-tank battles but most are 1-hit kills, because only frontal armor on any MBT is survivable against another peer combatant tank, thus a T-72B has wrecked at least one Leopard 2A6 and one M1A1 SA Abrams and T-80s, T-90s, T-72s and T-64s have taken out one another mostly in single hits, usually hitting the side directly or off the 35 degree frontal face.

This is happening on both sides, the same video shows a T-80U of the ВCУ burnt out from a similar attack right next to the T-90M.

Drones on their own aren't taking out most Soviet tanks, only damaging them and occasionally mobility killing them (*link rel). Crews also take to abandoning their tanks as fast as possible, since its better to live and try to recover the tank later if possible than die for nothing. Despite NAFO-fags trying to portray this as "cowardly Russkies" (even though Ukrainians do this too) it's a fairly standard practice in peer combat situations. In WW-2 Soviet, German and American tankers did the same thing.

*A T-90M during an assault got hit by 3 FPV drones from behind but continued to operate without trouble.
https://topwar.ru/242202-rossijskij-tank-prodolzhivshij-vypolnjat-boevuju-zadachu-posle-neskolkih-popadanij-fpv-dronov-vsu-popal-v-kadr.html

PS - removed audio because it was just shitty music thrown in.

 No.4959

>>4957
One thing I notice is that T-90M often turn their turrets before the crew bails out. Likely to avoid that the gun or larger turret, or debris, block the drivers hatch.

 No.4960

>>4959
Unlike the Abrams and other Western tanks they don't NEED to but you're correct that it's done to make exiting for the driver easier.

 No.4968

>>4957
Need a source on that Syrian T-72 story. Seems rather ridiculous considering how many T-72 were destroyed in their civil war by ancient recoilless rifles.

 No.4969

File: 1715718811522.png (214.61 KB, 1725x1050, ClipboardImage.png)

>>4968
It's one of the most well known incident of 1982 war. It's why the TOW missile was upgraded to BGM-71C (ITOW) with the extended probe, so as to increase HEAT penetration. BGM-71A and B variants only penetrated 430mm of RHA at best. The lowballed estimates of armor equivalent for the T-72 against HEAT warheads was 450mm for the frontal plate (600mm according to Soviet sources) and the same applies for the turret armor.

Mind you, this is for the T-72/T-72A/T-72M/T-72M1 and is lower than the armor protection of the T-72B variants.

Source on T-72 armor
- М. Б. Барятинский. Т-72. Уральская броня против НАТО. — Москва: Яуза, Коллекция, Эксмо, 2008. https://www.labirint.ru/books/247101/
- S. Zaloga, M. Jerchel, S. Sewell. T-72 Main Battle Tank 1974—1993. — London: Osprey Publishing, 1993. — С. 39. — 48 с. — (New Vanguard № 6)

https://below-the-turret-ring.blogspot.com/2015/06/the-armor-protection-of-t-72-tank.html
http://mass-destruction-weapon.blogspot.com/2021/01/72.html

 No.4970

>>4969
>>4968
Should have clarified - immune frontally, noticed that was missing in my post just now.

 No.4991

File: 1716141706786.png (1.63 MB, 4096x2731, ClipboardImage.png)

>>4897
>>4823
>>4824
Russia has recently published the amount of Western military equipment sent to Ukraine. The numbers are immense.
>In total, the Ukrainian army received about 800 tanks of Soviet and Western production, more than 3,5 thousand armored combat vehicles, about 1,5 thousand artillery pieces, about 270 MLRS, more than 250 anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM), 7,7 thousand portable Air defense systems, up to 290 thousand anti-tank weapons, 130 aircraft and helicopters, over 30 thousand UAVs.
This is not easy to replace for the low production ability of the current Western military. The IRIS-T factory suffered a catastrophic fire recently, and the need to send Israel arms, as well as the growing New Caledonia conflict is also taking resources from these countries, meaning that stockpiles are depleting much faster than current production. By the time the Russian-Ukrainian war ends NATO will lack conventional combat ability by that point.

https://topwar.ru/242571-v-rossijskom-genshtabe-podschitali-kolichestvo-peredannoj-kievu-voennoj-tehniki-i-vooruzhenij-s-nachala-svo.html

 No.5000

>>4957
>A T-90M during an assault got hit by 3 FPV drones from behind but continued to operate without trouble.
More details about the entire situation have been released, vid rel. Source is https://www.youtube.com/@Alpha17/videos The channel isn't the most accurate in its analyses but it has some valid content.
Video Catbox: https://files.catbox.moe/jsu7ro.mp4

People are going to be confused as to why the tank was here and what the fuck was going on so I'll explain: Tanks patrol contested villages and check them for enemy armored vehicles and other things. In Russian doctrine this is often called Scouting Through Battle. Such actions, in principle, are not particularly dangerous for the tankers driving the T90M, because as we saw in this and previous videos, the tank copes very well with the task of protecting tankers, which means that you can always put more experienced people behind the wheel and do such checks for reconnaissance. As I understand it, the 1st tank is going on advance patrol (with damage and bailing of personnel), the second is driving behind it as a secondary patrol, but the artillery crew began to work on it and after that the 2nd tank begins to dodge the artillery, and the 3rd patrol vehicle comes in to help the second.

For those that thought the bailed tank crew and infantry died from the artillery strike, if you look carefully at 4:33 Looking carefully at the house with an orange roof on the top left (this is a landmark), at 4:40 a house with this roof is clearly visible that the incoming shell flies over and impacts past this house. So it's quite likely they survived that hit.

The video author says that the Firing Guidance System of the tank was damaged so it began to rotate its turret randomly but I doubt that. I think more likely the commander/gunner was turning the turret rapidly to get a 360 degree view and possibly fire on attackers, because they don't know if it's a drone or an enemy AFV firing on them. Turning mechanisms and the like are buried pretty deep in the turret/turret-ring, so I doubt a drone would easily penetrate that deep.

A strange part was the lack of smoke grenades and curtains used but its possible that they weren't used because it would cause more disorientation for the drivers than for the enemy drones, and not only reduce visibility and force the tank to drive slower but also cause it to go off the cleared road and hit a mine.

As an addendum regarding drones still hitting tanks despite the presence of heavy Electronic Warfare - many drones used for anti-tank strikes have primitive A.I. guidance that will take over when connection is lost and use the camera on the drone to guide into the selected target.

 No.5037

>>4991
Really the only thing that is of major concern in terms of production is PGMs. Its always PGMs. Practically all estimates for if there was a war between America & China suggest that within 1-2 weeks they'll be almost entirely out of PGMs. One other thing is artillery munitions, its part of the reason why Russia has shifted away from using Battalion Tactical Groups as a form of organization and also procured artillery shells from North Korea. Systems aren't the primary concern, its the munitions the systems fire.

The United States has many systems like the M113 in storage doing absolutely nothing. It does not even want these, really. It doesn't fit into its modern doctrine, they're outdated, and they're just a drain on the budget to keep them around. So instead of sending them to its police force, they send it to Ukraine. These aren't ever going to be reproduced again, the DoD just wants them out.

>New Caledonia conflict is also taking resources from these countries


Not really, this is purely a concern for France, and even then I'd probably guess its colonial crusade in West Africa probably consumes far more resources and manpower.

 No.5039

File: 1716964633199.png (1.59 MB, 1528x1080, ClipboardImage.png)

>>5037
>this is purely a concern for France
France is a major NATO power militarily, and by taking French military resources, it reduces French military strength, and so NATO strength.
>It doesn't fit into its modern doctrine, they're outdated
The thing is, they aren't. The M-113 production line was exported to other countries and is still being produced. The upgrades to it make it a pretty good APC and in terms of transportability, speed, off-road etc. it's capable of keeping up with American armored units such as the Abrams, and is superior to the Stryker which it replaced, or the Humvee, which is a terrible vehicle tbh, even with the up-armoring upgrades (that kill the chassis and engine life). The M-113 is also cheaper to upgrade, maintain and build than the Bradley or Stryker, and is very versatile, which is why its still used. The USA does want to get rid of it, but they're idiots for doing so because they're still stuck on the "wunderwaffen" nonsense that cannot be feasibly built in numbers required to sustain a real peer-combat conflict.
>Systems aren't the primary concern
Perhaps, point is that NATO doesn't seem to realize this. They cannot produce the munitions required. The USA MIGHT be able to restore production but that's in the future and even then the lack of artillery factories has lead to artisan production, Europe is a lost cause, they don't have the ability to produce the necessary explosive filler even with artisan production. Britain is reducing the number of tanks it has in reserve and active service, Japan, France, Spain, Germany etc. are retiring hundreds of older military tech but have nothing to replace it with. Even Poland can't and it has spent decades of militaristic focus trying to replace and stock up on new weaponry.

https://topwar.ru/243168-britanskoe-izdanie-nazvalo-prichinu-po-kotoroj-ukraina-ostanetsja-bez-artillerijskih-snarjadov.html

As British Sky News reports and as previously mentioned ITT, Russia is producing 3x more artillery than Europe, for about 4x lower cost. It's getting rid of old stock simultaneously producing new stock. The West is not doing this and with the conflict in the Middle East, the tensions around Taiwan, the increasing tensions across Africa and now New Caledonia and Haiti, NATO and its allies are spread thin.

 No.5052

File: 1717006571269.png (714.35 KB, 685x654, ClipboardImage.png)

>>5039
>British Sky News reports and as previously mentioned ITT, Russia is producing 3x more artillery than Europe, for about 4x lower cost.
Some sauce: https://southfront.press/russia-produces-artillery-cheaper-and-three-times-faster-than-kievs-western-allies/

 No.5064

>>5052
>look inside
>it's refurbished north korean shells

 No.5065

>>5064
>It's all those North Koreans! They're starving commies that can't make anything!
>but are also somehow producing more than Russia!
I hope you're making a joke, because you are grossly incorrect.

 No.5066

>>5039
Gavin's all grown up

 No.5082

File: 1717441751214.png (510.8 KB, 871x245, ClipboardImage.png)

A stryker was destroyed along with a crossing bridge recently. It proves a point made in >>2374 - the lack of amphibious capability. The BTR-80 series or BMPs could have forded that little stream on the fly, no bridge needed. Such bridges are ample targets, I'm more than willinvg to bet that Russian drone surveillance saw the bridge but decided to not destroy it and wait for a bigger target to come, killing 2 targets with one strike. And yet redditors and /k/opers will claim that "amphibious capability isn't useful anymore" because some amphibious APCs got taken out during combat near a river.

https://topwar.ru/243643-amerikanskij-btr-stryker-vsu-unichtozhen-vmeste-s-perepravoj-cherez-reku-volchja-v-volchanske.html

As a side note, there's ZOV sites popping up for different Ukrainian cities: https://news-kharkov.ru//society/2024/06/02/105601.html


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