No, trotkyite-rightist bloc is a bloc between trotskyists and rightists. Sorry if there's my fault in explaining it. Moscow Trials labelled them as such. Nationalists of all kinds, military specialists and officers, various officials, leftist Party members - that kind of cooperation.>>235610
Fuck, I didn't want to continue, but look at this
>闯: In a previous conversation you mentioned that these changes actually started before 2012, for example with the local policy experiments of Bo Xilai and Qiu He which the Xi regime later adopted while throwing their authors into prison. Were these the earliest manifestations of the coming changes?
Bo Xilai and Qiu He are doing stuff, and authors portray it as if CPC stole their ideas. Then:
>LX: Qiu He has been called “China’s Pinochet,” since his experiments included neoliberal reforms. For example he sold off local schools, hospitals and SOEs to private investors. But that was about the extent of his neoliberalism. His other reforms were similar to those of Bo Xilai, just on a smaller scale. For example he tried to increase administrative efficiency through top-down pressure on state employees, including selective crackdowns on corruption. He also invested state funding heavily into the improvement of basic infrastructure—roads, water, electricity, etc. This differed somewhat from Bo’s infrastructure projects in that Qiu’s projects were focused exclusively on attracting private investors, which he successfully did, to some extent: a few companies came and opened factories in Kunming while Qiu was in office.
>Bo’s experiments in Chongqing were similar to Qiu’s in their focus on increasing administrative efficiency, selectively cracking down on corruption, improving infrastructure, and attracting private investors. But this was all done on a much grander scale, not only because Chongqing is a provincial-level municipality, but also because Bo was allied with Chen Yuan, son of Chen Yun and head of the China Development Bank, so he had a basically unlimited line of credit for large-scale loans.
Then there's a lot of text about Bo's "crackdown on corruption"
>But the other side of Bo’s housing experiment was the privatization of land, where the government took ruralites’ land in exchange for “land tickets” (地票) and forced them into high-rise apartments. I haven’t heard of any collective resistance to this, but it was the only sphere where the Chongqing Model promoted privatization. In contrast with Qiu He, Bo didn’t privatize schools, hospitals or SOEs.
>LX: All of these policies I’ve just listed were adopted except, on the one hand, the central leaders abandoned Qiu He’s strategy of complete marketization, while on the other, they also rejected Bo’s strategy of trying to placate the masses through measures such as building public housing. Indeed, Chairman Xi’s policy has been to actually prop up housing prices. But more generally, the state could simply not afford such spending to placate the poor on a nationwide scale. Bo was able to do that because it was just one city and he had an unlimited line of credit. Finally, the Xi regime also hasn’t imitated Bo’s crackdown on organized crime as such, again because it would be hard to do that on a nationwide scale, but also because the relevant aspects of that crackdown are already included in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign.
Bo and Qie were propping up private companies, feeding them state property, while using unlimited credit from banks to placate populace by giving them apartments (into private property), while simultaneously giving land to private investors and increasing marketization.
So, what did Xi copy from them, lol? It seems to me that those two guys were actively trying to sabotage the economy while removing public property from under Party's direct control and into cronies' hands.
Then they write this anyway:
>As for the regime’s economic strategy, this has two main aspects. One is the assertion of more direct control over the central SOEs, opposing those in the party who have advocated privatizing them and instead reaffirming their role as the central state’s most important source of income. The current campaign to reduce excess capacity in the steel and coal sectors needs to be understood as part of this broader strategy.
So, Bo and Qie were doing "party consolidation" in "administration", so, around themselves basically (don't forget privatizations and placating the masses), while Xi is doing actual party consolidation with reaffirming SOEs leading role in the economy while maintaining private investments (and refusing to cede capitalists any political power).
How are those similar?