>>2344054china imports like 10 percent of its oil from iran. china could replace iranian oil easily and ramp up its imports from elsewhere like saudi arabia, iraq, russia, or even angola. iran exports 90% of its oil to china, so it's more like china giving iran an economic life line.
also, less than 1% of china's elecricity generation comes from oil. and half of china's oil use is for road transportation. that means that once cars and trucks become fully electrified, it could reduce their oil consumption by potentially 40-50%. not to mention, the US isn't going to face china in a hot war because china has the options of nukes or holding off rare earth metals which is what is needed to build cars, advance weapons, etc and why trump recently rushed to call xi about rare earth metals and made a deal. it's the same options for any proxy war where it could try to block china's oil supplies.
>>2344222Isn't it
nice that they spend their time making unfunny wordfilters and several dead boards with 0 PPH but won't fix flood detection or allow editing posts? They sure do know their priorities.
https://jamestown.org/program/xi-jinpings-central-position-in-official-media-starts-to-erode/Xi weakening is American propaganda. But the important thing is that Xi Mingze is out of America; per regulations, she shouldn't be allowed to return.
But it disables the Xi Mingze shield between China and America, the hostage has been withdrawn.
https://tass.com/politics/1978775Putin to spend four days in China though such long visits rarity — Kremlin aide
>Ushakov said earlier that Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping had agreed to meet at the SCO summit, which will run from August 31 through September 1
>MOSCOW, June 22. /TASS/. A multi-day foreign visit is a rarity, though Russian President Vladimir Putin will spend four days in China, Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov said in an interview with GTRK journalist Pavel Zarubin.
>"Well, yes," he said when asked whether the visit would indeed last four days from August 31 to September 3. "There are several events planned there," Ushakov said, adding that such a long visit "is a rarity."
>Ushakov said earlier that Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping had agreed to meet at the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) summit, which will run from August 31 through September 1. Major bilateral talks are slated for September 2, while on September 3 in Beijing, the two leaders will take part in the festivities dedicated to the 80th anniversary of victory over militarist Japan and the end of WWII, he added. >>2349684China will get contracts to re-build Iran after the cease fire.
Also remember, Russia and China are close, but neither had the same relationship with Iran like they did with each other. Since 2022, Russia has repeatedly signaled its readiness to form formal military alliances with Iran. But Iran chose not to commit. Tehran likes to play different sides (this included being wishy-washy on some of its deals with China) so they can leave the door open for talks with the West as we saw in the past with the Obama deal and the recent negotiations in May. With the Israel strikes and US bombings, all trust is broken. The attacks will now drive Iran closer to Russia and China.
Thus, China bears the Mandate of Heaven and wields Dialectical Materialism as its skepter.
>>2352185how about learning about the meanings behind marxist terminologies such as "the real movement", before you publicly disclose your petite bourgeois anxieties about being ostracized from your hobby clique
what you have to understand is that you are the enemy of the working people, and your job is NOT to try and make marxism more palatable to your reactionary class, but to betray your class and join the real movement, before you're swept away and destroyed with the rest of em.
>>2344229You're excluding imports of gasoline and other refinery products, from places like Malaysia, which also rely on Iranian oil.
The future hot war with China is going to be a lot of naval action. In order to choke the mainland off from imports, including minerals. It's not like the infrastructure exists to route all of the freight through Vladivostok or Vietnamese ports.
>>2355614both of those HSR stations have a metro station connected directly below them that allows for seamless transfers without needing to exit the building
also here's a video of the evolution of china's metro systems from 1990-2020
https://archive.ph/MnjB5>China offers an alternative to Western ‘technofeudalism’>China’s answer to the Western model focuses on planning, an open source approach and whether the new technology earns its place in society>At the turn of the century, global innovation followed a Western script. Silicon Valley dominated the world in innovation. Europe exported standards and governance. Asia, in contrast, was cast as the manufacturer, assembler and consumer.>But the global innovation order is shifting. According to the latest Edelman Trust Barometer, change is under way not only in technical capability but also in public sentiment. In China, 72 per cent of people trust artificial intelligence (AI), compared to 32 per cent in the United States and 28 per cent in the United Kingdom. Similar patterns hold across India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand as developing Asian markets consistently outperform Western and developed peers on public trust in innovation.>This matters as without trust, even the most advanced technologies stall. Where trust is high, adoption accelerates, institutional alignment strengthens and public-private collaboration deepens. This serves as a powerful catalyst, especially for a country like China, whose innovation strategy is tightly interwoven with national development goals and the self-sufficiency mission. These dynamics play out against a broader philosophical divergence in how innovation is governed.>Broadly speaking, two models dominate the innovation landscape. The first is the “permissionless” model, which gave Silicon Valley its mojo. It champions speed, risk-taking and deregulation, based on the belief that innovation should be free to develop without prior approval.>Although this laissez-faire approach has produced some of the most valuable technology companies globally, recent years have also seen such companies face accusations of acting against the public’s best interests, sparking debates on their influence and societal role.>The second is the “permissioned” model, generally favoured across Asia, which takes a more regulated approach. Here, innovation is developed in line with national priorities, public oversight and deliberate planning. Once criticised as slow and bureaucratic, this model is proving increasingly fit for purpose as public concerns over job displacement, tech misuse and misinformation have brought trust in AI to a crossroads.>Few countries have displayed the permissioned model more comprehensively than China. While Shenzhen’s story is well known, cities such as Hangzhou have also risen to become a national innovation corridor. Home to companies like DeepSeek and Unitree Robotics, its ecosystem is shaped by government planning, industrial policy and targeted support, sometimes in the form of computing power “credits” instead of plain financial subsidies.>Chengdu is also a rising hub, investing in AI, supercomputing and the low-altitude economy. These developments are not random. They are the result of careful, cross-sector planning, showing how China’s model integrates policy into innovation design, rather than reacting to disruption after the fact. This coherence is China’s quiet strength.>Economist Yanis Varoufakis has warned that the West is drifting towards so-called “technofeudalism”, a system where big tech firms extract digital rents, enclose ecosystems and centralise value. Users become serfs within closed platforms, while companies prioritise shareholders over societal value.>In contrast, I believe China is charting an alternative which I call “technomeritism”. This builds on the principles of permissioned innovation but pushes beyond regulatory control to a broader value system, where technological success is judged not by valuation, but by whether it earns its place in society. It is earned through alignment with public goals, civic legitimacy and national strategy. Success is not concentrated but distributed across communities, the economy and wider ecosystems.>This model matters more than ever as the world faces not just a trust deficit, but a coordination deficit. Technologies like AI, quantum computing and semiconductors can no longer scale in isolation. They require systems that bind together state capacity, industry leadership and a social mandate.>China’s embrace of open source in this context, is an example of technomeritism in action. By making core technologies like large language models publicly accessible, companies such as DeepSeek and Alibaba Group Holding (which owns the South China Morning Post) are lowering barriers, encouraging collaboration and reinforcing the idea that innovation earns legitimacy through shared value, not private control.>As Huawei Technologies founder Ren Zhengfei recently put it, an open-source environment will benefit the country’s long-term future.>In a world shaped by sanctions and protectionism, open-sourcing undeniably serves as a strategic tool. But it also reflects a deeper principle that technological sovereignty isn’t achieved by hoarding and exploitation, but by distributing capability in ways that serve national and collective goals.>Against this evolving landscape, Hong Kong also plays a vital role. With its common law system, international standards and globally fluent talent, it is uniquely positioned to enable what I describe as “innovation osmosis”, that is, a multilateral collaboration environment for mainland Chinese and global innovators.>Initiatives like the InnoHK innovation programme at the Hong Kong Science Park show how the city can facilitate research and development collaboration that might otherwise be too complex or challenging to host elsewhere.>We are not moving towards a single global model of innovation but, rather, an era of coexistence where different systems, permissionless and permissioned, centralised and open, will compete, collaborate and co-evolve. The countries and companies that succeed won’t necessarily be the fastest or most capitalised. They will be the ones best trusted to scale technology responsibly, align with public values and contribute to the solving of shared global challenges.>In China, high levels of public trust in technology have been cultivated through long-term planning, design and a social contract that binds innovation to national development. When paired with an openness to multilateral collaboration, it becomes a powerful catalyst for progress. In a world searching for trust and direction, perhaps technomeritism is how China proposes to lead, not through unilateral dominance but with a more equitable alternative. Unique IPs: 40