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/leftypol/ - Leftist Politically Incorrect

"The anons of the past have only shitposted on the Internet about the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it."
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Not reporting is bourgeois


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Recent news:
STG sets up roadblocks on the roads leading to Suwayda, pursuant to the ceasefire agreement.
Remaining tribals in Suwayda governorate launch a last-ditch attack on Suwayda city.
Tribals enter some of the city's northwest areas. They suffer heavy casualties and retreat from the city on the same day.
Straggler tribals launch a few attacks on Druze villages here and there, nothing significant.
Overall ceasefire holds up after that. STG prevents further entry of tribals and their numbers keep dwindling.
STG releases their report on the massacres of Alawites in March of this year. They say that they aren't directly responsible.
Saudi announces they will buy a bunch of property in Syria.
Israeli and Syrian officials meet in Paris. A second meeting in Baku was cancelled.
Accusations that the STG is doing a soft siege on Suwayda governorate and worsening the humanitarian situation.
Turkey/SNA starts threatening the SDF and launches a few attacks against them in Deir Hafer and Tishreen dam.

Links:
t.me/Medmannews - Well known channel (Egyptian owner). Posts frequently about MENA
t.me/Middle_East_Spectator - Iranian owner
t.me/Suriyak_maps - Posts maps/latest news. Less prone to hype/hysteria but slower.
https://nitter.poast.org/SAMSyria0 - Local Syrian army soldier. Used to post in Arabic. (Account deleted. RIP)
https://nitter.poast.org/WarMonitors
https://nitter.poast.org/bosni94
https://nitter.poast.org/Sy_intelligence
https://nitter.poast.org/sayed_ridha
https://syria.liveuamap.com

Kill all Druze

New thread of islamist cope

Fuck everyone involved in the balknaziation of Syria.

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Video of clashes and SDF reinforcements in Deir Hafer.

Multiple reports that tribals launched attacks on various Druze villages and that they have been repelled, however I'm not seeing any videos of that so far and it's weird they'd launch attacks in the night.

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Grad rocket shelling by SNA (or STG? Aren't they supposed to have integrated?) against Deir Hafer, followed by SDF artillery counterstrikes.

>>2414280
Jolani trying to let the SNA and SDF fight to the death?
what instigated this wave btw?

>>2414297
SNA is supposed to have already been integrated into the STG and the new Syrian Army. There's no reason for Julani to be against them.

I think that the SNA units are only formally integrated into the STG's army, but in practice (since in general the STG is still a mess) they're autonomous and still take orders from Turkey.
At least that's the best way to explain the recent Tishreen dam and Deir Hafer clashes, otherwise it'd be the STG attacking the SDF.

Update - Our forces exercise their right to self-defense against attacks on Deir Hafer. The Syrian Democratic Forces' media center rejects the allegations made by the "Media and Communications Department of the Syrian government's Ministry of Defense" regarding its positions being subjected to an alleged attack by our forces. On the contrary, "undisciplined factions" operating within the ranks of the Syrian government forces are the ones who continue their provocations and repeated attacks on the contact areas in the Deir Hafer area, as happened yesterday evening, Saturday, with artillery shelling carried out by these factions on populated areas with more than ten shells, without justification. Our forces exercised their full right to self-defense and respond to the sources of fire. The "Ministry of Defense"'s attempts to distort the facts and mislead public opinion do not serve security and stability, at a time when our forces are exercising the utmost self-restraint against the repeated attacks and provocations of these factions, who have continued to dig trenches and transfer militants over the past period, confirming their intentions for escalation. While we emphasize the need to respect the ceasefire, we call on the relevant agencies in the Syrian government to assume their responsibilities and control the undisciplined factions operating under their control.
Syrian Democratic Forces Media Center, August 3, 2025

Homs?
Yep, holding.

>>2414291
>>2414280
So have begun.
>>2414306
>SNA units are only formally integrated into the STG's army, but in practice (since in general the STG is still a mess) they're autonomous and still take orders from Turkey
SO everyone taking orders from nato, basically.

>>2414308
>we call on the relevant agencies in the Syrian government to assume their responsibilities and control the undisciplined factions operating under their control.
kek.

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I know this xitter account is low hanging fruit when it comes to cringe, but is no one concerned by how quickly the ISIS flag got normalised in Syrian society?

The usual excuse is that the it shows the seal of Muhammad so it's not just an ISIS thing. But it has been well-known for a long time that this particular design is a forgery by the Ottomans meant to pad out their fake Topkapı collection. So even if someone is supposed to be a devout Muslim they wouldn't don it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seal_of_Muhammad

File: 1754178133679.mp4 (1.21 MB, 864x1264, GGIJg5cBkuWSiidE.mp4)

Clashes still ongoing in Deir Hafer.

>>2414346
interested to know what its about. Large numbers of security forces in the julani regime are crypto-ISIS? if he falls then they'll try to re-start a caliphat?

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>>2414346
we got alqaeda state before before global communism
>Ahmad Zidan was appointed as the Syrian president's advisor

>>2414363
>Large numbers of security forces in the julani regime are crypto-ISIS?
HTS had some ex-ISIS fighters here and there, but the SNA though was well-known to be filled to the brim with them. Turkey courted a lot of ISIS members around 2016-2019 and offered to get them out of a sinking organisation in exchange for joining the SNA.

And all of those SNA units were integrated into the STG's forces after the fall of Assad, so yeah that sentence isn't wrong.

>>2414306
SNA won't integrate because theyre Turkey's fifth column and if Jewlani ever goes against them, they will chimp out at him.

>>2414346
It's normalized because Syria is literally a third world shit hole. There's no educated class, bureaucracy, anything. It's guys like this >>2414372 larping in suits.

The tribals that were fighting against Druze IS Syria now. That's it what has become. Hilarious neolibs think Syria is going to reform into NAFO liberal republic

>>2414346
>is no one concerned by how quickly the ISIS flag got normalised in Syrian society
Not really. It was always a NATO proxy to destabilize Syria. We… well, I knew it ever since ISIS apologized to Israel, which was…
>Monday 28 August 2017
Oof. Well, even before that both Turkey and Israel gave ISIS fighters medical aid.

>>2414414
2016 with
>efraim halevy
they to be "humane". right, like they are with Gaza now.
it's a shame people can't see through these lies.

SDF says things have mostly calmed down in Deir Hafer.

>>2414188
fpbp
DEATH TO DRUZE

I hope kurds win

>>2414468
It's an arab region, afaik.

Druze have captured Tal Hadid from the tribals. It's between al-Thaala and Suwayda city.

Reportedly, it was done after tribals attempted to launch an attack on Ura from Tal Hadid.

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>>2414679 (samefag)
1st: Tribals fighting in the hill this morning.

2nd: Druze in Tel Hadid.

3rd: Druze militant on abandoned police car.

File: 1754215184842.mp4 (4.08 MB, 1280x560, 1754215122946.mp4)

Small-scale attack from tribals outside the governorate on the southwestern village of Dhiban. Reportedly it has already been repelled.

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>>2414684 (samefag)
More vids of Druze on the hill.

There are still ongoing fighting to the west of the hill towards the direction of Thaala.

>>2414522
Arabs are safer in Rojava than in ISISyria

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>>2414684
>>2414709
>>2414714
how long before they ask direct turkish intervention.



>Arabs are safer in Rojava than in ISISyria


sure budy ask no ypg/sfd/pkk western supporter how come that being ethnic minorities in North-Eastern they are the sole governmental officers without coercion, use of force, and violence

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Round 2?

>>2414428
>it's a shame people can't see through these lies
It's worse than that; ignorance.

Tel Hadid situation has deescalated. Druze have withdrawn from the area after talks with the STG.

>>2415044
guy invented his very own reddit spacing.

Sharaa government’s Suweida catastrophe: Druze fully alienated from post-revolution Syria, Israel’s ongoing aggression unleashed
In bombing the Syrian Defence Ministry building in Damascus, and also outside the presidential palace, along with killing 15 Syrian troops and several civilians, Israel was only escalating what it has been doing since December 8, the day the Syrian people overthrew Israel’s preferred leader.

Israel has launched hundreds of airstrikes, possibly over 1000, since December 8. In the first few weeks, Israel destroyed some 90 percent of Syria’s strategic weaponry, in its largest air war ever, while occupying a significant part of southern Syria beyond the already-occupied Golan Heights, in “Syrian Golan” (Quneitra province). While airstrikes have returned with some intensity approximately monthly, in the meantime aggression takes place on the ground, away from headlines: taking over more land, destroying farmland, abducting “suspected terrorists,” attacks into Daraa and Damascus provinces, seizure of south Syria’s water sources and the like. It has not let up. Since February, Israel also banned the Syrian army from entering south of Damascus, ie, Quneitra, Daraa and Suweida provinces, with the threat of bombing.

So, while the latest aggression goes under the title of “protecting the Druze,” this background helps us understand that this is merely one of Israel’s excuses. Since the beginning, Israeli leaders like Netanyahu, foreign minister Gideon Saar, defence minister Israel Katz and others have called the new Syrian leadership “jihadists,” “terrorists,” “extremists,” “al-Qaeda” and so on. Both arch-fascist Ben-Gvir and Israel’s Minister for Diaspora Affairs, Amachai Chikli have now called for assassinating Sharaa; Chikli called the Syrian government an ‘Islamo-Nazi regime’ and ‘Hamas’. Arch-fascist Smotrich has stated that conflict with Syria will end only when Syria is “partitioned.” Israel has said it wants Syria split into “cantons,” and requests the US keep its forces in east Syria, and that Russia keep its air and naval bases in west Syria, as part of dividing up the land.

Now, all that said, there was of course a huge crisis in the southern Druze-dominated province of Suweida, and while for Israel it is an excuse, that does not alter the fact that real crises, and how a government handles them, can be critical in terms of the political facilitation of an aggressor. And while much can be said of the antics of some more extreme Druze leaders, or of Druze revenge attacks against Suweida’s Bedouins – all of which will be discussed below – the main story here is the hellish massacre of the Druze population in Suweida – even Israel’s outrages must be seen within the context of the events that politically facilitated its actions.

It did not need to be this way, especially given the goodwill shown to Damascus by the majority of the Druze leadership, who continually tried to reach agreement with the government on compromise plans to integrate the minority-dominated province, based on locally-controlled security arrangements, and who continually rejected Israeli “protection” and condemned Israeli attacks. But Sharaa’s apparent decision in the midst of the crisis to attempt to impose a military solution, and the resulting horrific crimes imposed on the Druze by government-led fighters – whether planned or not, whether due to state loss of control or state-led sectarian instrumentalisation – has almost certainly resulted in the complete alienation of the Druze minority (like the Alawite minority since March) from the post-Assad polity, from what the Syrian majority still see as their revolution. It also resulted in a total defeat for the government’s position, and an enhancement of both Israel’s position and that of the most pro-Israeli wing of the Druze, as the population is now more united than ever against the Sharaa government.

While there is a great deal of dust to settle, and the “fog of war” makes countless claims and counter-claims still unclear, this is my general understanding of what happened.

Background to the crisis in Suweida

The Druze in Suweida have their own sect-based military formations, which arose during the Syrian revolution; while for the most part they were anti-Assad, they were also strongly independent of the Syrian rebels; their focus was on defence of Suweida, and resisting being recruited by Assad to fight his war. Some parts of the Druze leadership and militia were more pro-rebel than others, some more pro-Assad, but always independent. In a sense, analogous to the Kurdish-led SDF in the northeast, with the difference though that the SDF included large numbers of Arabs and somewhat reflected the multi-ethnic nature of the region, whereas the Druze militia were explicitly Druze. This is not a criticism, but it is important going forward, because while Druze account for 90 percent of the population, their militia do not represent the non-Druze in the province.

Following the overthrow of Assad, the Druze militia have guarded their autonomy, rejected simply dissolving their militia into the new Syrian army, while agreeing in principle to eventual integration; as with the SDF, the question is on what terms. As with the SDF, the government rejects incorporating the Druze militia as ‘blocs’ within the army, but rather wants them to dissolve and for their members to join the army as individuals, which is theoretically what happened with all the mainstream rebel formations in January, including HTS. The problem for minority groups however is that the army and the government itself remains overwhelmingly dominated by the Sunni Arab majority, and, given the kinds of violations which have occurred (such as the large-scale massacre of Alawites in March following an Assadist coup and massacre), minorities need to feel the new Syrian polity is more inclusive than it currently is, and hence the terms of integration are important.

During clashes in late April and early May between Druze security forces and armed jihadi gangs in two outer suburbs of Damascus, Druze militia in Suweida clamoured to enter the fray to protect the Druze, but were attacked along the road north by armed Bedouin fighters. Following these events, the government reached an accord with the majority of the Druze religious and military leaderships, that the government’s public security and police would be activated in Suweida to look after internal security, but would consist only of local people. It was also suggested that a new brigade of the Syrian army could be formed at some stage for local Druze militia to join, but nothing happened due to the differences noted above. In the meantime, the Druze leadership remained opposed to the Syrian army or public security from outside deploying in the province, except to maintain security on the Suweida-Damascus highway.

In the background was a long-term low-level conflict between the Druze and the Sunni Bedouin people in the province, over trade routes, land-use and many similar ongoing issues. These are two very useful background articles.

With the Bedouin minority socially and economically marginalised, the lack of any government security forces – banned by both the Druze leaderships and by Israel for different reasons – meant they were also unrepresented in the region’s security forces, the Druze militia being for Druze. This left their region a kind of lawless no-man’s land. Meanwhile, the government abandoned its obligation to maintain security on the highway in practice.

Onset of armed clashes

Hence the background to the current disaster began with a seemingly random crime, when a Bedouin gang seized a Druze truck on the highway. In response, Druze militia kidnapped eight Bedouins as hostages, from the in the al-Maqhous quarter of Suweida city (although ‘Bedouin’ often denotes ‘nomad,’ the majority in Syria are settled), an escalatory move given that the issue was not with city Bedouin at the time. Bedouin then responded in kind. This soon led to serious clashes and killings.

After two days of clashes, amid calls for the government to do something, it sent in General Security and army units on Monday July 14, defying the ban imposed by the Druze and by Israel. What happened next is disputed. According to Druze sources, government forces took the side of the Bedouin in the clashes. SOHR reporting supports this view. According to many Syrians, as the government security forces entered to separate the sides, they were ambushed by one of the Druze militia, the Suweida Military Council (SMC), associated with Sheikh Hikmet al-Hijri, one of the three top Druze religious leaders, whose forces are most associated with former Assadist elements, and who has consistently called for Israeli intervention and opposed cooperation with the Syrian government. Some 18 government troops were killed on Monday morning. A third version has it that, yes, the Druze attacked, but it was not only Hijri’s forces; rather, all Druze militia still rejected the government security presence and tried to resist their entry. A version of this is actually cited by Laith al-Bahlous, the most pro-government Druze leader, and Hijri’s main political opponent, yet he acquits Hijri’s forces of these accusations, claiming that the Syrian government told Druze leaders of its intention to enter Suweida, but they did not convey this to the people; therefore, armed Druze fighters, coming across government troops, mistakenly assumed them to be invading so they attacked them.

I don’t have a solid opinion on this, and there may have been a mixture of all these factors. But it cannot be disputed that government security forces were ambushed as they arrived, before being involved in any violence, because Druze fighters posted images of themselves standing over the bodies of the troops, and marching others away in their underwear. These images enraged Syrians, leading to demonstrations around Syria calling for revenge, which included ugly sectarian incitement against the Druze.

The conflict spread to Suweida city, between Druze fighters and Bedouins in al-Maqhous. Again, who shot first is disputed; some report it that Hijri’s militia launched an attack on the neighbourhood to subdue it, while others simply report clashes amid the mutual hostage taking. Either way, it led to Bedouin fighters from the countryside attacking the city in support of al-Maqhous, and also attacking smaller Druze towns. At the same time, in response to what they considered the ambush of their troops by Hijri’s forces, the government massively mobilised troops and began a siege of the city, attacking with tanks, mortars and heavy weaponry. And so, if the government and Bedouin forces were not already one, as claimed by many Druze, they effectively became one in the process. This was a fateful, destructive and unnecessary decision, which I will comment on below. Israel began bombing Syrian tanks on Monday, then stepped it up on Tuesday, killing at least 15 government troops, further fueling sectarian rage around the country.

After some 24 hours of conflict, the government security forces and the main Druze religious and military leaderships, including Hijri, the other two main religious leaders, Yousef Jarbou and Hamoud al-Hanawi, along with Laith al-Balous, associated with the powerful Men of Dignity militia which fought the Assad regime, signed a peace agreement on Tuesday. Fighting would cease, “the entry of the Interior and Defence Ministries’ forces in order to impose control over the security and military centres and to secure the province” was “welcomed,” Druze militia were called upon to “organise their weapons under the supervision of state institutions,” and the state was called on to activate its institutions “in cooperation with the province’s people.”

What happened next is again disputed. Many reports claim that, 30 minutes after the meeting ended, Hijri repudiated his own signature, claiming it was made under pressure, and called on Druze to rise up and attack government forces, and for “external Druze” (ie in Israel) to come to their aid. According to one source, Hijri’s forces “launched simultaneous ambushes against government forces across a dozen locations in the city, timed perfectly with renewed Israeli airstrikes.” The obvious coincidence between Hijri’s and Israel’s actions demonstrates what gave a local Druze leader the kind of confidence to take on the government’s army and security forces. However, Druze sources on the ground, such as this harrowing account of the ensuing massacre, claim that after their militia allowed in government forces, they at first were peaceful but then launched their all-out horrific attack on Druze civilians, and this is what caused the Druze militia to renew the fight, while other Druze sources claim the government forces never stopped attacking.

It seems clear the fighting did stop for some time. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), which tends to have an anti-government bias in its reporting, reported that “the clashes reached an end, after a ceasefire agreement … SOHR activists have reported seeing tanks and armoured vehicles, which have recently been deployed in Al-Suwaida city, withdrawing from the city … Meanwhile, security forces have been deployed in the city’s major streets, amid tense calm which comes after two days of fierce clashes that left tens of fatalities.”

Therefore, the question really is whether Hijri’s rejection of the ceasefire and renewal of hostilities took place before the government forces renewed their attack, or only as a result of the government re-unleashing hostilities. While it is impossible from this distance to determine who shot first next, a couple of things are clear. First, it was initially only Hijri who rapidly rejected the agreement. The other leaders, including Jarbou, Hanawi and Bahlous, and other militia groups, did not do so until fighting had clearly resumed and it became a defensive war. On the whole, there has been a clear division within the Druze leaderships all along: Hijri and the SMC reject cooperating with the government, reject integration, and call for Israeli intervention; the other main leaders prefer to try to de-escalate, to reach agreements with the government, to negotiate towards eventual integration, and reject Israeli intervention.

While it is possible that outside observers exaggerate the differences amongst the Druze leadership, it is useful to listen to Bahlous. Here he takes aim at some of the Druze “religious and political leadership” for acting “unilaterally,” supporting Israeli intervention and “attempts at division,” and even goes so far as claim they bear responsibility for the bloodshed. Likewise, Sheikh Yusuf Jarbou, claims the agreement had widespread support, but noted “Yes, there is support for al-Hijri’s position. We do not deny that, and sometimes it may have an effect on the ground. We respect their opinion, and they must respect our opinion and the opinion of he majority.” He claimed that supporters of Hijri’s position “burdened society with many losses because of their refusal to accept this agreement,” and vigorously condemned Israeli air strikes.
<…
https://theirantiimperialismandours.com/2025/07/22/sharaa-governments-catastrophic-debacle-in-suweida-full-druze-alienation-from-post-revolution-syria-israel-unleashed-to-step-up-ongoing-aggression/

>>2415044
What can I say, secular arabs don't like islamists.

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Kongra Star: We'll exert all our efforts to rescue the missing girls and women taken captive by ISIS
Kongra Star, the umbrella organization of women in North-East Syria, released a statement marking the 11th anniversary of the ISIS genocide against the Yazidi community in the city of Shengal (Sinjar) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

The Kongra Star statement on Sunday includes the following:

“On the 11th anniversary of the Shengal genocide, as Kongra Star we respectfully honor the memory of all the martyrs who were killed by ISIS. To liberate the Yazidi people from the clutches of ISIS gangs, HPG and YJA-STAR fighters headed to Shengal. At the same time, to open a humanitarian corridor, YPG and YPJ fighters also moved toward Shengal. We commemorate with respect and love those fighters who fought against the ISIS occupation and were martyred in the liberation of Shengal.

To liberate the Yazidi people from the clutches of ISIS gangs, HPG and YJA-STAR fighters headed to Shengal. At the same time, to open a humanitarian corridor, YPG and YPJ fighters also moved toward Shengal. We commemorate with respect and love those fighters who fought against the ISIS occupation and were martyred in the liberation of Shengal.

We also pay tribute to our Yazidi people, who have resisted all forms of attacks over the past eleven years. Amid these assaults, we commend their self-administration system, founded upon the ideology and philosophy of Leader Abdullah Öcalan.

Over these eleven years, the developments experienced by our Yazidi people demonstrate the confidence they have built and reveal the strength of their organization. In particular, the organization of women in society, politics, diplomacy, and the military stands as a model of empowerment. Yazidi women organized themselves under the umbrella of TAJÊ and responded to the attacks of occupation, sectarianism, and discrimination against women with unified strength: women are the pioneers of a free future for Shengal. The Yazidi people have also organized themselves across all fields, and today, thanks to this organization, they protect the Yazidi identity.

The brutality of ISIS and the forces behind these gangs have been defeated. History once again shows that no power can prevail against the organized strength of the people. The Yazidi people now possess a profound collective memory and faith, a steadfastness that carries the legacy of Yazidi resistance.

During the massacres, thousands of Yazidi women fell into the hands of ISIS. We, Kongra Star, reaffirm that we will exert all our efforts to rescue the missing girls and women taken captive by ISIS.

We once again honor the Yazidi people, especially Yazidi women, and strongly condemn the genocide committed against them.”

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Damascus forces escalate repression against artists
<Damascus-backed forces tortured a musician in Al-Bab, destroyed instruments in Homs, and threatened two Kurdish artists returning from Beirut.
Artists are being obstructed, arrested, beaten, and subjected to torture in regions controlled by the Syrian Interim Government.

Most recently, in the city of Al-Bab, an artist named Omar Khayri was attacked by armed groups affiliated with Damascus while singing at a wedding. The attackers cut Khayri’s hair, wrote on his face, and, claiming that songs were forbidden, tried to force him to sing for the Damascus government.

Similarly, yesterday, the artist Walat Haji Nasir (40) from Afrin (Efrîn) and his brother Mustafa (38) were stopped on 21 July at the “Sewatir” checkpoint on the Homs, Lebanon road while returning from Beirut. Syrian Interim Government forces smashed their musical instruments, insulted the brothers by claiming that “folk dance and music are anti-religious,” and threatened to kill them.

The Haji Nasir brothers filed a complaint in Aleppo, but forces affiliated with the Damascus government responded by threatening to arrest the artists.


So is FPTV lying to me or are faggot anons being faggot anons as usual?
Who are the Druze? Guardians of Arabic Borders, from Yemen to Lebanon.

>>2415350
Don't know who he is. Eyeing the channel, it doesn't seem to be islamist.

>>2414717
Yeah, but they don't want it to be safe for Kurds.

Free tanks, nice!

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Clashes between tribals and Druze in the western countryside near Ura.

>>2415350
the morons who continuously say "kill the Druze" are conflating those absorbed by the IDF with any regular Druze.

>>2414118
At this point there is no reason to support Syria in any way or form. I hope it will break down into several states including a socialist Kurdish state.

>>2414250
Its a completely artificial nation created by French colonists.

>>2415816
The alternative to the fake country is having no country at all, not great with Israel right there

>>2415827
I agree that no-state-solution should be considered. This could be easily achieved with nuclear salt bombs.

Article by Qatari outlet about the recent rise of the tribes' powers after the fall of Assad:

https://www.newarab.com/analysis/syrias-formidable-tribes-fighting-force-be-reckoned

One interesting thing is that there were lots of exiled tribal sheikhs that used to exert only modest influence on their tribes when they were out of the country, but who have now come back and re-asserted themselves.

STG relies a lot on local supportive tribes to keep control on certain territories. While the Assads also used and relied on the tribes a lot, the STG seems to do so more and is also relatively less of a senior partner in their relationship compared to the way the Assads governed, with the tribes having more influence.

The majority of the SDF's Arab population have a tribal affiliation, and most Sheikhs are leaning pro-STG, which is seen by the STG as one of their leverages over SDF.

At the same time, a less charitable assessment is that the reliance on the tribes is bad in the long-term as it turns the country into a feudal-esque mess with a weak central government (remember that lots of pro-STG people justified invading Suwayda under the pretext of centralisation, so this is ironic).

I don't understand one bit of Arab, and maybe the Arab anons on lpol can confirm, but apparently, this tv presenter said the following:
>A Syrian TV presenter asks: When will mobile phone use be banned during violations against minorities?
In response to all the violence committed by the headchoppers.

>>2415922
The justification is very much a threadbare veil to excuse what the more openly genocidal in their camp do, these people do not even believe the words themselves, i think.

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SDF repels an attack on their positions in Deir Hafer area
The Press Center of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reported that factions affiliated with the Syrian Transitional Government launched an attack on four of their positions in the village of Al-Imam, located in the Deir Hafer area, at 3:00 a.m. on Monday morning.

The SDF stated that their forces confronted the attack and responded as necessary in defense of their positions and fighters. Clashes ensued and continued for 20 uninterrupted minutes, it added.

“We emphasize that this repeated aggression constitutes a deliberate escalation and poses a serious threat to the stability of the region. We hold the Damascus government fully responsible for this behavior, and reaffirm that our forces are now more prepared than ever to exercise their legitimate right to respond with full force and determination,” SDF said.


Abandoning self-defense in Rojava would expose Kurds to massacre
Awarded the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economics for their work on the formation of institutions and their impact on prosperity, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson explore the future of states, societies, and freedom in their co-authored book The Narrow Corridor. The preface is dedicated to what they describe as one of the greatest humanitarian disasters of our time: the Syrian crisis. In the section titled The Narrow Corridor to Freedom, they write: “For freedom to emerge and thrive, both the state and society must be strong. A strong state is needed to prevent violence, enforce laws, and provide essential public services that enable people to make their own choices. But there must also be a strong and active society, one that can monitor and restrain the state…”

These sentences point to a universal truth that transcends ideological debate. The narrow corridor between the chaos of statelessness and the tyranny of unchecked power now defines the most critical equation shaping the fate of Syria, and more specifically, of Rojava.

Anyone closely following the Syrian crisis can see that the war has entered a new phase. The massacres carried out by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Druze and Alawite villages, the mass attacks in Suwayda (Sweida), and the forced displacement of civilians all reveal that the civil war is far from over and carries an ever-growing risk of deepening further. In his article titled What Does Each Actor Want in Syria?, published by ANF on 30 July 2025, Zeki Bedran describes the situation starkly: “The mentality of HTS remains unchanged no matter how much it is polished. They unleash beheading squads on the people.”

This reality and risk, on which there is broad consensus, also reflects a notable level of political maturity on the part of Rojava’s political leadership, showing that it is neither mistaken nor complacent in its assessments.

The attacks in Suwayda and its surrounding areas following the formation of a provisional government aligned with HTS are not simply acts of terror. They are part of a deliberate strategy aimed at subjugating the Druze population and changing the region’s demographics through fear and violence. While these massacres have drawn condemnation in the United States and Europe, and prompted direct intervention by Israel, Turkey’s efforts to legitimize HTS and its refusal to denounce the atrocities stand out as a clear reflection of a shared mindset.

All of this points to a single, stark truth: If the Kurds in Rojava abandon self-defense, they will be left directly exposed to massacre.

Even the mere discussion of weakening the parameters of self-defense in technical terms, or dissolving the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under the guise of “integration”, poses a serious risk. It could very well mark the beginning of the end. For this reason, Kurdish diplomacy must step into this new phase with a spirit of courage and determination. At the same time, the Kurdish community must be called upon to remain vigilant. All political actors in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan (Bakur) should understand clearly that any step that weakens Rojava’s defense amounts to a historic act of self-destruction. The fact that the political developments unfolding in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan are running parallel to those in Rojava is no coincidence. Rojava must remain the top priority, because the future of Rojava is, in a broader sense, the future of Kurdistan as a whole.

Indeed, Turkey’s sole geopolitical priority is to leave the Kurds in Rojava without any political status. Ankara’s Syria policy has become unambiguously clear:

1. To strip the Kurds of political status

2. To dismantle the Autonomous Administration

3. To eliminate the SDF

To achieve this objective, Ankara continues both its military occupations on the ground and its diplomatic pressure at the negotiation table. It uses its NATO membership as leverage, placing the gains of the Kurdish people on the bargaining table with the United States and Europe.

Yet the people of Rojava have been governing themselves for over a decade. Built on women’s leadership and organized through communes and councils, this system does not seek to establish a separate state. Rather, it proposes a democratic, decentralized model for Syria. Observers familiar with the Middle East widely acknowledge the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria as a viable and constructive model. Turkey’s imposed disarmament is not just a call for military weakening, it is an attempt to dismantle that model entirely.

Today, the most critical diplomatic axis for Syria’s future is centered in Paris. France is not only involved from a humanitarian perspective but also plays an active role in the security of the Mediterranean, in migration policy, and in the strategic energy routes of what is historically referred to as “Le Levant”, covering Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, and partly the Hatay region. The planned Paris talks between Damascus and the SDF-Autonomous Administration were postponed due to pressure from Turkey. For Kurdish diplomacy, Paris now represents both a vital opportunity and a race against time.

Throughout both recent and distant history, France has played an enduring role, at times supportive, at other times damaging, across all parts of Kurdistan. Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, France has once again assumed this role in a serious and active manner. At this critical historical juncture, it is worth remembering how Kurdish diplomacy, shaped by young and determined hearts, emerged, particularly during and after the Kobane resistance, through its impact on public opinion and its development of political relations.

The clearest outcome of the negotiations unfolding in the shadow of Paris is this: there is a concerted effort to leave the Kurds without political status. The only way to counter this strategy is to maintain self-defense and to intensify diplomatic pressure. Today, Paris stands out as a key center for both Rojava and Southern Kurdistan (Başur); special focus and effort must be directed there.

In a moment when massacres against Druze and Alawite communities are unfolding in plain sight, any disarmament of the Kurds would amount to historical suicide. Abandoning self-defense would only invite a new wave of massacres.

Relying on the temporary balances of international powers has, in the past, led to disaster, as seen in Halabja and Shengal. The same risk remains today.

Today in Syria, the Kurds form not only the backbone of the resistance defending their own people, but also a protective shield for minorities ranging from Druze to Syriacs. If that backbone is broken, Syria will plunge into a new darkness.

Ultimately, if the process unfolding across Turkey and Northern Kurdistan does not become overly interventionist, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria holds a strong potential to emerge as a model for all of Syria. The people of Rojava, with over a decade of self-governance, have built more than just a line of defense, they represent the narrow corridor to peace and democratization in the Middle East. For the Kurds, calls for disarmament do not reflect the reality on the ground; rather, they risk becoming the prelude to a new catastrophe.


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