[ home / rules / faq / search ] [ overboard / sfw / alt ] [ leftypol / edu / labor / siberia / lgbt / latam / hobby / tech / games / anime / music / draw / AKM ] [ meta ] [ wiki / shop / tv / tiktok / twitter / patreon ] [ GET / ref / marx / booru ]

/leftypol/ - Leftist Politically Incorrect

"The anons of the past have only shitposted on the Internet about the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it."
Name
Options
Subject
Comment
Flag
File
Embed
Password(For file deletion.)

Not reporting is bourgeois


 

Chynah Indians funds the war in Ukraine edition.

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-scotland-uk-starmer-eu-trade-deal/


Previous: >>2406661

Evidence of the influence and origin of neo-Nazi groups in Ukraine

https://archive.ph/44B9Q
https://archive.ph/x1sRT#1323637
https://archive.ph/x1sRT#1323658
https://archive.ph/x1sRT#1323663
https://archive.ph/x1sRT#1323688
https://archive.ph/x1sRT#1323729
https://archive.ph/x1sRT#1323733
https://archive.ph/x1sRT#1323731
https://archive.ph/x1sRT#1323735
https://archive.ph/x1sRT#1323740

—————————————————–

ALWAYS APPROACH SOURCES CRITICALLY

Live maps and updates
DeepStateMap: https://deepstatemap.live
Events in Ukraine: https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/
SouthFront: https://southfront.press/category/all-articles/world/europe/ukraine/

Watch Together
📺 News/events: https://tv.leftypol.org/r/HappeningsviaKlash
📺 Hangout/chill: https://tv.leftypol.org/r/bloodcast

Watch By Yourself
>Video Essays / Historical Background
📺 • Ukraine: The Avoidable War - Boy Boy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LL4eNy4FCs8

📺 • Ukraine's Nazi Problem - The Marxist Project
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4yZvWAwU5W4

📺 • America, Russia, and Ukraine's Far Right - Gravel Institute
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t0pyVJG7_6Q

📺 • The Nature of Putin's Russia and Its Causes (3-Part Series) - 1Dime
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o8d6Vzi7zYg
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zODWTfMwFGw
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Zuygh9Mzuo

<Current Happenings

📺 • The Grayzone: https://www.youtube.com/@thegrayzone7996
📺 • DDGeopolitics: https://www.youtube.com/@DDGeopolitics
📺 • Defense Politics Asia: https://www.youtube.com/@DefensePoliticsAsia
📺 • The Duran: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCdeMVChrumySxV9N1w0Au-w
📺 • The News Atlas: https://www.youtube.com/c/thenewatlas
📺 • Military Summary: https://www.youtube.com/@militarysummary

—————————————————–

Social media
>Twitter
https://twitter.com/GeromanAT
https://twitter.com/plnewstoday
https://twitter.com/RALee85
https://twitter.com/MarQs__
https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael
https://twitter.com/IntelCrab
https://twitter.com/michaelh992
https://twitter.com/Suriyakmaps

<Telegram

https://t.me/milinfolive
https://t.me/hueviykharkov
https://t.me/conflictzone
https://t.me/vorposte
https://t.me/intelslava
https://t.me/grey_zone
https://t.me/AussieCossack
https://t.me/asbmil
https://t.me/Slavyangrad

🇰🇵🇱🇦🇷🇺🇺🇦
Thread guidelines:
• Please remember to add a spoiler to NSFW and extreme content such as graphic violence and gore.
• Try your best to not derail discussion too much from the main events and relevant places where the war is taken place, as well as other happenings, groups and public figures related to it.
• Meta discussion of the historical, philosophical and ideological background of the war is fine as long as its done in good faith and comradely.
• In the event the meta discussion overstays its welcome, participating users will be referred to take the conversation to the INTERNATIONALISM general thread.
• Quality shitposting and original content is encouraged! Spamming glowie memes is low effort.
• this is /isg/ for Hearts of Iron chads
• Slam dunk a NATO baby, etc.
473 posts and 102 image replies omitted.

>>2421379
This dumb ass russian imperialist war is such a blunder for russian, they already lost above 100k soldier in this stupid ass quagmire of a war.

>>2421385
100k is nothing compared to the 2-3 million-plus troops they will lose over the next 10-15 years. Eurasia is going to war as the West makes its last stand against the world

File: 1754583165609.png (155.14 KB, 730x863, operation cyclone.png)

>>2421278
>cucktin was actually a genius and did the fucking impossible which is to repeat 1980s afghanistan but for amerikka
This is ironic because the Afghanistan debacle of Operation Cyclone was framed by Zbigniew Brzezinski as baiting the Soviets into their own Vietnam war.

>>2421396
Russian keep coping about "muh NATO enchroment" or something, instead of starting a stupid ass war to lose thousand of young able body man that would help the country, they should just had updated their nuclear weapons to keep up any threats off their country, but no, they need to invade a country and start a pointless war where they are not outright losing, but bleeding a lot, after this war Russia will be a far weaker country and probably will need China helps to keep afloat, only in the mind of most delusional zigger Russia is somehow winning.

File: 1754584577146.jpeg (4.21 KB, 302x167, laugh bid.jpeg)

4Ushakov: The U.S. proposed a "acceptable" plan to the Kremlin

According to Putin's aide Yury Ushakov, Washington presented a proposal that Moscow considers "acceptable." The talks were initiated by Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff.

Polish outlet Onet claims to have obtained the details of the proposal:

A ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia — not a peace treaty; De facto recognition of occupied territories by "freezing" the issue for 49–99 years; Lifting most sanctions imposed on Russia; Eventual return to importing Russian gas and oil; No guarantees regarding NATO’s non-expansion; The U.S. will not stop military support for Ukraine.


Ukraine collapse status? Maybe in 49-99 years

>>2421423
Can definitely see Putin cucking but there will definitely not be anything without official recognition of Crimea. That’s all he cares about. So it’s safe to go ahead and dismiss these polack retards

kEEEEEEK pustula von der merde comes in, and while some Finnish guys protests at her in a public event is arrested FOR PROSTESTING HER, she screams that he should be thankful because in RUSSIA HE WOULD BE ARRESTED FOR PROTESTING.
KEEEEK

>>2421155
>Your takes have been deteriorating for some time, Gay Nazi-kun
It wasn't obvious back when he was a hardcore self-proclaimed KHiver?

>>2421449
Or when he was in here pushing clean Wehrmacht shit

File: 1754586896147.png (24.1 KB, 613x172, ClipboardImage.png)

>>2421448 (me)
some wild shit, keeeek
imagine branding yourself as the opposite of Russia in the same moment your words are being watered down.

>>2421451
>>2421449
or when he said that is a looney theory that al-joolani is a zionist agent. be very mindful of what he says, he tries to appeal to some pseudo-intellectualism while immediately placing some genuinely devastating psyop propaganda.

>>2421449
>he was a hardcore self-proclaimed KHiver
Are u for real LMAO

File: 1754587342400.jpg (494.05 KB, 1080x1961, 825Ua.jpg)


>>2421379
The war is international and based on attrition, not territory.

>>2421461
1-2 more years before a revolt ends the war then.

>>2421151
as far I am concerned, the SMO isn't related to destroy some people dancing in the richest neighbors in Kiev/Lvov.

>>2421448
It can't get more embarassing. She is soooo fucking STUPID. It hurts.

File: 1754589126447.png (45.73 KB, 500x470, ClipboardImage.png)


<BREAKING: “Trump will agree to meet with Putin only if he also holds talks with Zelensky”
<— White House representative
<Putin rejected a meeting with Zelensky today, so we have trouble.
This is a simple test whether Putin still has it. If Don the con keeps pushing and Putin caves, thereby legitimizing Zelensky, he doesn't have it. :)

Hell, showman Don the con may even try to ambush Putin with Zelensky.

>>2421469
>destroy some people dancing in the richest neighbors in Kiev/Lvov.
"Even Rybar gave up trying to understand why they have enough power for their nightlife and concerts."

>>2421423
kek, nice bait. Not even Putin is naive enough to accept that.

BREAKTHROUGH IMMINENT

>>2421423
They're just going to stick to July 2024

Putin's been fighting this war with kid gloves and with a huge inferiority complex toward his Western partners from day one. If the war ends with the Banderite regime still in power, hard to see that as anything other than a strategic defeat.

>>2421469
Who do you think funds Azov and Zele sky and all these Banderites? The poor pensioners living in Kharkiv? Or rich fucks like Poroshenko? Kill the wealthy and you remove all internal pressure in ukraine to continue the war.
Nuke Kiev NOW

>>2421423
Rejoice, Zisters! Our beloved western partners have awoken and will now treat us as respectable lackeys! Time for President Putin to sign Minsk 5!

gotcha!
>Putin must meet with Zelenskyy before Trump, White House says
https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/07/putin-zelenskyy-meeting-white-house-00497908

>>2421555
lel they are going to try and kill him again like they wanted to in Turkey a few months ago

>>2421555
If Putin had any self-respect whatsoever after what the US/UK have done on his soil, he'd ghost all negotiations and await Ukraine's unconditional surrender.

File: 1754599142854.png (23.43 KB, 637x301, ClipboardImage.png)

>>2421219
you aren't counting the extensions, because you are a retard.
those are the recruitment waves I am talking about. and yes, totaled 14 calls.
suck it up, nafoid.

File: 1754603735618.jpg (74.89 KB, 460x288, shoes_1389718c.jpg)

>>2421423
>Polish outlet Onet claims

>>2421338
Pretty much every time Ukraine cries about some civilian site getting leveled it's because it's full of natoids, and not long after there will be reports of several us officers dying of innocuous circumstances.

>>2421343
Barring something extremely unlikely and unforeseen like a meteor falling onto Moscow, yeah, that's the likely outcome.

>>2421412
Nafoid cope

https://www.intellinews.com/russia-s-rosstat-decides-to-hide-increasing-bleak-income-and-retail-figures-from-the-public-394858/?source=russia

Russia’s Rosstat decides to hide increasing bleak income and retail figures from the public

>In July Rosstat declared it will withhold data on monthly retail, wholesale trade, income, and salary data from its June release. Analysts say the reason is those numbers paint an increasingly bleak picture the government is trying to  hide from the public.


>Reconciled data between Rosstat and Sberbank shows that real wage growth is, for all intents and purposes, stagnant, Kommersant reports.


>Growth in demand of individuals for goods and services in June was just 1.4% y/y according to Sberindex and statisticians increased their estimate of annual growth of real disposable income in the first quarter of 2025 by 0.3 percentage points to 8.7%, down modestly from last year’s record levels.


>Real wages growth is also slowing. In annual terms it increased by 4.2% in May against growth of 4.6% in April, 0.1% in March, 3.2% in February and 6.5% in January 2025 in nominal terms, Kommersant reports. But removing seasonality and all these numbers become negative: growth in May compared to April was -0.4%, in April compared to March -1.5%, in March -0.2%, in February -1.2%, in January -2.2%, according to Centre for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF).


>Banks are expecting the government to scale back subsidy support as budgetary pressures intensify as Russia’s economic problems grow, says Nicholas Trickett, a political economy analyst writing in Riddle.


>Inflation is falling faster than expected allowing the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to put in 300bp of rate cuts in the last two months to help boost growth and could put in another 300bp of cuts before the end of the year. But the Russian economy is cooling fast as well, sparking a debate over if this is a recession or just an economic slowdown. As a warning sign, Russia’s manufacturing PMI suffered its sharpest fall in three years in July, S&P Global reported this week.


>“The Ministry of Finance is issuing debt at a breakneck pace this year—RUB2.8 trillion so far. The impending spending squeeze, as oil market pressures tighten, will leave families worse off,” says Trickett.


>Banks providing subsidized mortgages that survived the June 2024 suspension of a generous mortgage subsidy programme that rocked the real estate market now require borrowers to deposit 30.1% of the property’s value upfront, up from 20.1%. Housing prices have fallen, but recent reports say they have not fallen as far or fast as some feared after the subsidies were cancelled. Russia’s chronic labour shortage has also eased somewhat in recent months, but with unemployment stuck at a historic low of 2.2% it remains a problem.


>Trickett argues that the economy will come under increasing pressure from the changes in the labour market, which is why Rosstat has shut off access to the wage and retail numbers.


>“As the labour market weakens slightly and these shifts in financial flows accumulate, businesses will be caught trying to raise prices to protect their bottom line while slowing wage increases. The current balance is unsustainable,” says Trickett.


>Russia’s average monthly salary is nearly RUB100,000 ($1,250) – a third of Russians earn RUB100,000, according to Rosstat – the weakness of import demand has contributed to a stronger ruble, and most forms of investment are declining, which are helping to bring down inflation, but they are depressing consumption too. The extent of these changes has become hard to assess since this data is now being withheld or manipulated. That suggests things have become “dire,” says Trickett.


>“Consumer sentiment surveys simply don’t align with spending patterns on goods and services. Something is breaking, and rate cuts alone won’t mend the damage,” says Trickett.

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/western-analysts-find-little-hope

<We have seen for the past few months the slow acceptance in the pro-Ukrainian information field of the fact that Russia will not stop, nor will be stopped by any feeble political games from the US and EU. But more than this, they have begun to accept that the war will last a long time, that Ukraine has few options—and most importantly—that no deus ex machina-style salvation will come by way of some magic wunderwaffen or huge financial windfall.


<The latest to voice these hardening outlooks is military commentator—esteemed in the West—Michael Kofman, who has been quiet on the analytical front for a long time, given that he had little positive spin to share. Now he has returned from a trip—presumably to Ukraine—and decided to share his updated thoughts on the situation as a whole. It’s worth looking at because in many ways Kofman’s interpretations of events have always represented the ‘leading edge’ of the pro-UA analytical sphere, and thus serve as a kind of canary in coalmine for shifts in the narrative.




https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1950998968416215459.html

An update on the war following a recent trip. As Russian offensive presume mounts, the front is not at risk of collapse, though salients have formed. More concerning is that Russian improvements in drone employment have reduced Ukraine’s advantages. Long thread. 1/

In 2024 AFU expanded drone units within the force. This helped offset Russia’s materiel advantage, while compensating for the AFU’s continued manpower deficit. These initiatives are now well known and I covered them in previous threads. 2/

https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/1902694940485767451

Drones became responsible for most day-to-day casualties at the front, attriting Russian forces at 0-15km, and serving as the main force multiplier for the AFU. This enabled a low-density defending force to hold the 1200km+ front line, establishing defeat and denial zones. 3/

Russian casualties increased relative to terrain being gained. However, it was unclear whether drones would be enough to stabilize the front line given Ukraine’s manpower challenges, RF ability to replace losses, and if Russian forces could adapt to counter this approach. 4/

Since then, the Russian military began deploying its own offensive ‘line of drones,’ and improving how it employs drone units. Russian Rubicon drone units have spread to every Russian grouping of troops, and are the most spoken of challenge across the front. 5/

Rubicon formations focus on severing logistics with fiber-optic drones operating 20-25km behind the front line, destroying drone positions, and intercepting Ukrainian drones (winged ISR/heavy multirotor). In general, Russian drone units have become better organized. 6/

This does not mean that Ukraine has lost its qualitative edge in drone employment, but that the advantage has narrowed, Russian forces continue to adapt, and Ukraine must find ways to stay ahead. 7/

The situation in Sumy has stabilized after AFU deployed air assault units there to counter the Russian advance, holding it to a small buffer of 200km2. Russian forces make slow progress by Kupiansk, and east of the Oskil river, but continue inching forward. 8/

The immediate problem is the near envelopment of Pokrovsk, the pocket formed around Kostiantynivka, and the fighting near the Dnipro/Donetsk border by Novopavlivka. Russian units are also trying to stretch AFU manpower with attempts to push in Zap along the Dnipro river. 9/

The Russian military continues to underperform given their overall advantage in manpower and materiel. It is remarkable that AFU has held Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar this long. But the situation has worsened, and probably will further before Russian offensives stall. 10/

The current dynamic is one of lines held by what are often 3-man positions with large gaps in between. These are neither firing positions, or observation points. They form a porous line in which infantry are often told to not to expose themselves unless absolutely necessary. 11/

Russian attacks are sometimes in 4-6 man groups, but in many cases have decreased to numerous 2-3 man sections trying to penetrate in between Ukrainian positions. Russian infantry seeks to advance as far as possible past Ukraine’s initial line and entrench there. 12/

Although many may be lost, some get through, and entrench awaiting reinforcements. Much the same can be said of motorcycle and buggy assaults, trying to bypass initial 'lines' and enter the rear. Most fail, but not all, leading to small tactical advances. 13/

Mechanized assaults are now seen much less frequently. In part because Russian forces are trying to conserve equipment, but also because AFU has long optimized for defeating traditional mechanized attacks which invariably fail with high vehicle losses. 14/

This is why evaluating armor availability as a metric is still useful, but less relevant if Russian forces are advancing at a faster rate than in 2024 with much lower use of AFVs. Similarly, artillery fire rate asymmetry was critical 2022-2023, but no longer as relevant. 15/

Although there is great work done detailing Ukrainian fortifications, most of the observed positions are constructed in the open and will never be occupied by units. They are easily targeted and destroyed. Ukraine lacks infantry to man most of them in the first place. 16/

This is not a war of trenches. It is a war of individual fighting positions, fortified and well masked units in tree lines, buildings, basements, or in dense forests. Occupying fortifications in the open is usually considered suicidal by troops. 17/

Since pervasive ISR and fires impose a degree of fire control over forward positions it is not possible to maintain large numbers of troops forward, sustain, or rotate them. Now some are on the line for 90+ days, and it often takes several days to reach a position on foot. 18/

Despite drones being the main casualty producing weapon (80%+), artillery remains important, with many units’ artillery use holding steady, or in some cases increasing. Artillery canalizes attacks, suppresses, operates in all-weather conditions, and is still relevant. 19/

Overemphasis on drones overlooks that the current dynamic is due to a combination of mining, use of drones, and traditional artillery fires. Hence maintaining adequate supply of arty and mortar munitions remains important despite drones doing much of the lifting. 20/

Russian tactics do not lend themselves to attaining operationally significant breakthroughs, but given the character of the fight, territory changing hands is a lagging indicator for what’s happening. Consequently, ‘gradually then suddenly’ transitions are possible. 21/

Ukrainian forces are increasingly defending in salients, with Russian drone units working to constrain logistical supply to these areas in an effort to collapse the pockets. Hence the geometry of the battlefield lends itself poorly to stabilization. 22/ (DeepStateMap)

The main culprit is a policy to hold onto every meter, even when in near envelopment, or in disadvantageous terrain. Rather than trading space for attrition, or conducting a mobile defense, AFU commanders are forced to try and hold onto untenable positions. 23/

Russian drone strikes have increasingly focused on bombarding civilian structures, and Ukraine’s defense industry in particular, seeking to suppress domestic production. Shahed (Geran) drones are also used against targets close to frontline positions. 24/

There has been an exponential increase in Russian drone & missile strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure. However, Ukraine is rapidly scaling up use of drone-based interceptors, paired with light radars. 25/

It will take time to expand production, upgrade mobile air defense, and build out a defensive line of air defense units, but the technical solution to the Shahed/imitator drone saturation problem exists and it is a matter of resourcing its deployment. 26/

Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces are now led by Robert Brovdi, head of Madyar, and is launching plans that will better integrate and systematize drone employment. These hold promise as Ukrainian drone employment needs to evolve to stay ahead. 27/

One area where Ukraine remains clearly ahead of Russian forces is UGV employment for logistics, and medivac. This is more about establishing capable mesh networks to enable UGV use across terrain, and the cost of the comms can easily equal that of the platform. 28/

Ukraine is also seeking to close the gap in strike munitions that cover the 30-100km range, and strike systems for operational depths of 300km+ that are much more effective than cheap light drones, i.e. GLCMs and SRBMs. 29/

Ukraine is finally getting rid of the OTU and TG command layers that offered little besides trying to micromanage brigades, and set unrealistic combat tasks. Corps will take over, arranged under two Joint Task Forces (East and North) reporting to the OSUV. 30/

The new Corps hold promise, but the commands are being formed quickly. They will take time to become a cohesive structure, and unfortunately, they will have to command the units around them, not the those assigned to them, since BDEs can’t be easily redeployed. 31/

But it is not clear how much decision-making authority Corps, JTFs, or even OSUV commanders will have if the General Staff attempts to micromanage at the tactical level, retaining authority for allowing withdrawal from any positions, or order costly counterattacks. 32/

Russia continues to receive large volumes of artillery ammo from DPRK, and artillery systems, while being supported by China. Yet its economy is slowing down, and the increased rate of manpower losses has forced a postponement of force expansion plans in 2025. 33/

Bottom line: Despite the challenges, Ukrainian forces continue to hold Russian forces to incremental gains, extracting a steep price for territorial gains. Drone units are a key part of the solution, but by themselves may not be sufficient to stabilize the front. 34/

Ukraine needs a mix of hi-low capabilities (including expanding offensive strike), steady Western support & investment in its defense sector, alongside necessary reforms to force management, organization, and force generation. 35/

There's a fair amount I couldn't include in this thread as it was already 35 posts long, and I always ask myself how do we know what we know? Are we looking at the right things? Is there enough evidence for any given claim? If you've made it this far - thanks for reading.

File: 1754610562057-0.png (112.18 KB, 320x399, ClipboardImage.png)

File: 1754610562057-1.png (360.04 KB, 960x683, ClipboardImage.png)

File: 1754610562057-2.png (270.93 KB, 640x657, ClipboardImage.png)

File: 1754610562057-3.png (205.48 KB, 640x524, ClipboardImage.png)

Zelensky has now made four tweets in the last seven hours stressing that Europe must be a participant in the diplomatic process

File: 1754610670299-0.png (162.02 KB, 900x177, ClipboardImage.png)

File: 1754610670299-1.png (234.4 KB, 768x355, ClipboardImage.png)

File: 1754610670299-2.png (935.25 KB, 900x900, ClipboardImage.png)

File: 1754610670299-3.png (106.47 KB, 600x275, ClipboardImage.png)

its ova

>>2421792
>>2421794
we've already done this a few months ago. nothing will come of it. grinding will continue

Anti autist aktion

>>2421703
Yes, and toddlers and children will turn out to be NATOids, so it's better to get them when they are young, it's more environmentally friendly as well.

>>2421412
>they should just had updated their nuclear weapons to keep up any threats off their country, but no
The entire war is because of the US pulling out of the ABM and START treaties and putting dual use medium range ballistic missiles <5 minutes from Moscow. The purpose of which was to destablize mutually assured destruction by enabling a crippling first strike on Russias hardened static launch silos, which is the whole of the reason they started making Kinzal Zircon Avangaurd and Oreshnik. Thats the core of what "muh NATO enchroment" has always meant, its a reverse Cuban missile crisis.

The reason ABM and START treaties exist in the first place is to make MRBM off limits because the counter to that was Reagan's Star Wars program. The Soviets had better rocketry by the 70s and the US conceded after making the Pershing II and signed the treaties so they wouldn't go bankrupt.

Now they are instead openly violating the outer space treaty because they can't into hypersonics because they are decades behind in materials science and fuel chemistry, so they retrofitted the Shuttle as an orbital nuke platform while they light money on fire while waiting to develop laser tracking satellites that wont work. In other words Russia did update their nukes, and are bankrupting NATO on top of that.

>>2421792
>Zelensky has now made four tweets in the last seven hours stressing that Europe must be a participant in the diplomatic process
Zelenskyy seems in the middle of the tug-o-war between the EU and Washington to control Ukraine, he has to be useful to both. Neither will have a problem taking the Zman out and plying their trade, which will look a lot more organic anyway, than Zelenskyy signing something at symbolic gunpoint from everyone. But the latter may let him fall off graciously, as a PR mediator, rather than a nuisance to be rid of from either side.

>>2421759
Readable English Version
1. Drones at the Front
Drones have become the primary cause of daily casualties at the front, striking Russian forces within 0–15 km and acting as the main force multiplier for the AFU. This has allowed a relatively small defending force to hold over 1,200 km of front line, creating zones of denial and attrition.

2. Russian Adaptation
While drones have increased Russian losses relative to terrain gained, it’s unclear if they can fully stabilize the front given Ukraine’s manpower shortages, Russia’s ability to replace losses, and possible Russian countermeasures. Russia has now deployed its own “line of drones” and improved their use, particularly with Rubicon units, which are present across all troop groupings. These target logistics 20–25 km behind the line, destroy Ukrainian drone sites, and intercept ISR and heavy multirotor drones.

3. Shifting Battlefield Dynamics
Ukraine retains a qualitative edge in drones, but the gap is narrowing. The Sumy front has stabilized after air assault units were deployed, while Russian forces advance slowly near Kupiansk and east of the Oskil River. The most urgent threats are around Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, and Novopavlivka.

4. Russian Offensive Tactics
Despite advantages in manpower and materiel, Russia has underperformed. Attacks now often involve 2–3 man teams infiltrating gaps rather than large mechanized assaults, which have become rare due to equipment conservation and Ukraine’s strong anti-armor defenses. Some infiltrations succeed, leading to small gains.

5. Fortifications and Troop Deployment
This is not a war of continuous trenches, but of dispersed, fortified positions hidden in tree lines, buildings, and forests. Open-field fortifications are rarely used due to high vulnerability. Limited manpower means positions are thinly held, with some troops staying in place for over 90 days.

6. Artillery and Drones
While drones cause over 80% of casualties, artillery remains critical for channeling attacks, suppression, and all-weather use. The most effective defense combines mines, drones, and artillery.

7. Strategic Challenges
Ukrainian forces often hold on to every meter of ground, even in near-encirclement, rather than trading space for attrition. Russian drone strikes increasingly target civilian infrastructure and Ukraine’s defense industry. Ukraine is expanding drone interceptors with light radars, but production and deployment will take time.

8. Ukrainian Adaptations
The Unmanned Systems Forces, now under Robert Brovdi, aim to better integrate drones. Ukraine leads in UGVs for logistics and medevac and is seeking more effective long-range strike capabilities (GLCMs, SRBMs). Command restructuring is underway, replacing outdated layers with Corps under Joint Task Forces.

9. Russian Supply and Limits
Russia receives artillery supplies from DPRK and support from China, but its economy is slowing, and manpower losses have delayed force expansion plans.

10. Bottom Line
Ukraine continues to inflict heavy costs for small Russian gains. Drones are vital but cannot alone stabilize the front. A mix of high- and low-end capabilities, steady Western support, defense sector investment, and force structure reforms are essential.

>>2421412
Russia was supposed to gain population not lose it with this war by annexing both Ukraine and Belarus with this 3-day-special-operation. Problem is that once Russia was stuck in this war it cant get out of it without risking government collapse and Putin ousted.

>>2423052
Abridged version: 14:1 K/D ratio in favour of Ukraine! Do not panic!

>>2423057
>annex Belarus
Any second now NATObros

>>2423057
Even the IMF says there around 6-7 million people in New Russia, retard

IMMINENT BREAKTHROUGH



Unique IPs: 27

[Return][Go to top] [Catalog] | [Home][Post a Reply]
Delete Post [ ]
[ home / rules / faq / search ] [ overboard / sfw / alt ] [ leftypol / edu / labor / siberia / lgbt / latam / hobby / tech / games / anime / music / draw / AKM ] [ meta ] [ wiki / shop / tv / tiktok / twitter / patreon ] [ GET / ref / marx / booru ]