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What were the class dynamics behind the rise of fascism in Europe?

A while ago I read The Persistence Of The Old regime by Arno Mayer (I wrote a short summary here >>>/edu/25554). It can be summarized as follows:
<"Down to 1914 Europe was preeminently pre-industrial and prebourgeois. Its civil societies being deeply rooted in economies of labor-intensive agriculture, consumer manufacture and petty commerce."
>Mayer goes on to show that economically, politically and culturally the now post-feudal ancien regime was still dominant. The grande bourgeoisie did not yet exist as a class for itself. Its new industrial economic base was grafted onto the old, but still dominant, agricultural one, the latter of which the nobility held in their hands through their vast land ownership.
Mayer asserts in Why Did The Heavens Not Darken, his book on the Judeocide, that Germany was "very much still an old regime" even after the revolution that ended the Wilhelmine autocracy. The same was true for much of Eastern Europe, hence why there too there was an aristocratic propensity towards empowering fascists as to use their popular base for the former's continued survival.

Right now I'm reading Hitler And The Peasants by Gustavo Corni and he too mentions the continued, but waning, supremacy that large landowners enjoyed on the countryside:
>[…] until 1940-5 the cast of large landowners in the east (aristocratic or otherwise) continued to exercise a hegemonic role from a social and politico-cultural point of view, rather than from an economic one.
Hitler was appointed chancellor by Hindenburg, himself an arch-Junker, and entered into a coalition with the traditional conservatives of the DNVP. The latter were only willing to do so after losing many (countryside) votes to the NSDAP because they failed to copy their "popular" conservatism.

Corni notes on Nazi agricultural ideology:
>The vital role of the state, the preservation of the landed estates for strategic purposes, and imperialist expansion (which was much more a response to the deeply rooted demands of the Junkertum than a move in the interests of the peasants) — these were all muted notes in the 'leitmotif' which ran through [Nazi agricultural ideologist Richard Walter] Darré's ideology

Of course, there is also the lower middle-class of self employed artisans who were being outcompeted by large scale industry. They, like the peasants, also found little representation in the new Weimar Republic where the main conflict seemed to be between the industrial Bourgeoisie and the unions and Social Democratic and Communist parties of the working class. Here too there was fertile ground for fascism to expand its popular base.

This all runs counter to the idea I sometimes see propagated that fascism is the Bourgeoisie's last ditch effort to stay in power when a real or imagined revolution seems near. Instead, it seems like actually existing fascism, at least in Europe, is aristocratic in origins, all the forces of pre-modernity sperging out one last time before truly losing all relevance (of course, the Bourgeoisie — cucked, as per Mayer — doesn't mind any of this). This would also imply (?) that in much of our contemporary world, the social base for fascism is completely gone, which is a conclusion I'm not sure I'd be willing to make.

Interesting topic. Yeah fascism and nazism allied with some monarchist and aristocratic elements but fascism itself was modernist, even deemed itself progressive, had anti-monarchist and anti-clerical demands, sought to advance industrial capitalism, tried to be populist, etc. When you look at the founding of fascism in 1919, the majority of people were middle class, intellectuals, soldiers, etc. all pretty young. And I think later there were few aristocrats in the upper echelons of the Italian state. Fascism wasn't enough but it was the closest thing they would have to a restoration of old values and rights they'd been gradually losing since 18th century. It was supported critically as the desperate last cry against the modern world. I'm going to check out those books because they sound very interesting.

>This all runs counter to the idea I sometimes see propagated that fascism is the Bourgeoisie's last ditch effort to stay in power when a real or imagined revolution seems near.
How so? Nothing you said here is mutually exclusive with this view. In fact it complements it nicely since the remaining aristocracy obviously would have been aligned with the big bourgeoisie in its opposition to socialism and the working class.
>Instead, it seems like actually existing fascism, at least in Europe, is aristocratic in origins
That's not really what your sources say here though. They say that traditional conservatives eventually fell in line behind the Nazis because they were unable to mobilize enough popular support to combat the social democrats and communists on their own. In other words, the aristocracy wasn't the source of fascism, but they did resort to it to protect their interests.

>>2813789
>>2813860
I just see fascism as a kind of Cromwellianism. A lot of bourgeois revolutions were pretty despotic. The capitalists just resorted to fascism when liberal democracy was unable to complete carrying out the tasks of creating ab industrialized nation-state. Pretty much every country has relied on penal labor and internal colonies to industrialize. The USA and Britain just did some of their awful shit a few decades ago in the past.

>>2813922
Have you ever read Gramsci's work on Caesarism from the Prison Notebooks? He doesn't use it to analyze fascism directly due to censorship, but it's clear that this is what he had in mind. It's an interesting take, and he essentially argues that fascism is just the latest iteration of a phenomenon where two class forces exhaust each other in the struggle and open space for an intervention by a previously un-mobilized or impotent third force.

>>2813930
Indiana Jones is a movie where literally every scene is about how white people are superior and non-whites are like cattle who are helplessly herded around…but the villains are German nazis, because it was made by liberal Zioinist Jews 🤷‍♀️

>>2813860
>Nothing you said here is mutually exclusive with this view. In fact it complements it nicely since the remaining aristocracy obviously would have been aligned with the big bourgeoisie in its opposition to socialism and the working class.
If it's true that well into the Twentieth Century the Grande Bourgeoisie was still a junior partner to the old nobility, then it would follow that it is exactly the other way around, i.e. the capitalists aligning with the nobility. Mayer also sees the Great War as a preemptive counter-revolution by the nobility.
>the aristocracy wasn't the source of fascism, but they did resort to it to protect their interests.
You are correct, I worded that wrong. The whole point of empowering fascists is exactly to make use of their popular base which could never originate from the waning nobility. What I'm trying to find out is who played the active part in their empowerment. To me, it seems like these anti-modern forces who still held significant sway were the prime movers, while the Bourgeoisie took more of a backseat. The infamous meeting between Hitler, Göring and various industrialists on February 20 1933, as told by Tooze in Wages of Destruction, also seemed more like the Nazis stating their intentions rather than begging for desperately needed support. Meanwhile the DNVP played a much more active role in the walkways of the Reichstag in getting Hitler his coveted position.

I'm just trying to understand the consequences of Mayer's assertion about the continued supremacy of the nobility in the first half of the 20th century and where exactly fascism fits into this. The man had meant to write a sequel to his book, but he never finished it or gave up on it. In his mind, the nobility was central to what he calls "the second thirty years war of the general crisis of the twentieth century".

It doesn't help that fascism is characterised by a nonsensical syncretism that is impossible to make sense of.

Didnt the nobility hate their asses?

>>2814043
The grand bourgeoisie was not junior partner, this would be 19th century. It was already master class, while aristocracy was just some rentiere nuisance to industrial capitalism.

HOWEVER, one should analyze the role of FINANTIAL capitalism, especially English international finance, in this whole ordeal, as opposed to industrial capital and aristocracy. One of Nazism ideological points was it's fight against finantial capitalism

>>2814129
Obviously they were not their first choice or all of conservatism would have had a fascist character after the establishment of the Weimar republic.
>>2814165
>The grand bourgeoisie was not junior partner, this would be 19th century
I would love to hear your thoughts on the first chapter of The Persistence of the Old Regime then

>>2814043
> To me, it seems like these anti-modern forces who still held significant sway were the prime movers, while the Bourgeoisie took more of a backseat
Fascism took off in the 1920s, after 1918/19, it did not exist before aristocracy was abolished and the bourgeoisie managed to seize power and control of the military, police and administration entirely. The old junkers, barons, dukes, kings, emperors etc. retained their elite prestige and elite networks though so despite their new status at the top of the class pyramid in the Weimar republic the bourgeoisie kind of kept simping for the old elite and longed to get approved by former aristocrat big shots like Hindenburg and their monarchist loyalists in the military. However there is no doubt the bourgeois bankers, industry bosses (+associations), media oligarchs and liberal associates in the Reichstag were the main driving force behind fascism 100 years ago.

>Its new industrial economic base was grafted onto the old, but still dominant, agricultural one

That's bs tbh. The bourgeoisie and capitalism thrived here in the Free & Hanse cities since medieval times, feudalism and aristocracy was a rural thing. The cities were in fact politically ruled by the bourgeois already.

the aristocracy largely opposed nazism because it encroached on a lot of basic rights, even if they tolerated it, although italian-style fascism is certainly compatible with aristocratic rule, the difference between the two isn't contrasted and analysed as much as it should

>>2814043
>then it would follow that it is exactly the other way around, i.e. the capitalists aligning with the nobility
That's an interesting way to look at it, but I don't think it's super relevant for our understanding of fascism and it's current prospects and expressions. The big bourgeoisie still did behave in exactly the way described by the Marxist analysis of it. I don't think the absence of an aristocracy would have a large influence on its ability to function and take power today. The bourgeoisie are perfectly capable of it on their own.

>>2814206
Idk compare with Trump. Trump was shit but relatively harmless until his second term when he got the support of the bourgeois tech sector behind him. Trump's base of family business and land/resource owners (oil, coal, etc..) just couldn't come up with a real strategy for change. Trump was a reactionary in his first term. Trump is a fascist in his second term with big tech backing him.

It's the same with historical fascism. The aristocracy and the artisans could never unify around their own political project. It's only when the steel mill ran into a crisis of over-accumulation that these reactionaries could really be weaponized.

>>2814182
>That's bs tbh. The bourgeoisie and capitalism thrived here in the Free & Hanse cities since medieval times, feudalism and aristocracy was a rural thing. The cities were in fact politically ruled by the bourgeois already.
I don't quite see how the mercantile elites of back in the day are relevant to what I am discussing here, so feel free to explain. The post-feudal nobility of the early 20th century still dominated society with a strong economic base in the countryside and almost total control over politics, especially in those countries that were semi-absolutist like Wilhelmine Germany. They continually made decisions in favor of agriculture over industry and commerce, which is why there was so much protectionism at this time. As you also mention, they enjoyed an immense amount of prestige that made the Bourgeoisie long for their approval and acceptance. You also mention the military, whose officer class was still permeated with sons of the nobility and their values even after 1918/19. (If this sounds interesting to you you should read the book, which I obviously can't do justice in a short post like this)

>However there is no doubt the bourgeois bankers, industry bosses (+associations), media oligarchs and liberal associates in the Reichstag were the main driving force behind fascism 100 years ago.

See, that's what I believed as well, but with these recent books I feel like the nobility played a big role as well that is not often talked about. A big role which could even be that of a prime instigator amongst the elites.

>>2814385
A medieval HRE city and urban society was legally subject to the emperor, however not subject to feudal lords, kings etc. Like for example any urban bourgeois with financial means to do so could recruit a band of Landsknechts and start a proper war against some random rural feudal Junker or other aristocrat of whatever noble rank (not just in theory, such feuds actually took place and could prolong over a long time). What's more, serfs from the feudal countryside might run from their lords, move to a city and become free men if they managed to get a job (i.e. join the proletariat) and accomodation and the former lord could do nothing against it. The cities were ruled by councils which consisted of elected bourgeois guild bosses who would either inherit their position from their family or bought political influence with money. In medieval times the proletariat existed already inside the free cities as free wage workers, however proletarians were not allowed to take part in bourgeois elections, politics was strictly for rich people. This was called "Ständestaat" and it is what our current German rightoids mean when they say "we want to go back to the "good old times", fuck the modern world". As city population grew, manufacturing processes diversified, technology and automation developed and urban societies networked globally the bourgeois guild bosses and merchants became the modern capitalists, amassed more private property and financial wealth than aristocrats (resulting in aristocrats becoming dependent on the richest bourgeois oligarchs to obtain loans for their wars and purchases of the latest representative luxury items) while the situation of the proletariat gradually became worse and worse, which was particularly evident in the form of big slum districts in the cities (like, half of Hamburg used to be a slum of the worst kind) but also in the founding of the predecessors of the unions and first unions, secret worker's societies, in the founding of the first communist party and eventually violent worker's uprisings against the bourgeoisie. Why is this relevant? Well, because the author says that Germany was a monolithic feudal society with dominant feudal entities executing absolute political power well into the 20th century, which is simply wrong: The junkers, barons, dukes etc. and the clergy only ever ruled the countryside, their power in the cities was always very limited to non-existent and from the renaissance onwards to the enlightment age they gradually lost their power grip over the the countryside too as industrialization rapidly increased and the capitalist mode of production spread to rural areas as well. In 1848, when Marx wrote the Communist Manifesto, this process was almost complete, with Junkers and other feudal entities only retaining their political privileges in very rural areas. With the 1918/1919 abolishment of the monarchy the aristocracy, including the emperor, lost their legal privileges definitely and entirely to the bourgeoisie. The former aristocrats were merely allowed to keep their inherited financial wealth and former noble prestige (though both remains very attractive and the latter an unreachable desire for richest bourgeois oligarchs and aspiring petit bourgeois PMCs alike, their shitty tabloids still simp for "royals" etc.).

The take of the author can't be based on the history of Germany. There are no historic grounds for that, especially as it's quite obvious that the medieval urban bourgeois Ständestaat society model with a dominant, privileged bourgeoisie on the very top and the exploited proletariat at the very bottom is something every bourgeois of either "liberal", conservative", "reactionary" or "fascist" variety would love to go back to. I don't know much about society in Russia pre-October revolution tbh, let alone about other Eastern European countries, so maybe his take works on them. For Germany however it looks like a really bad attempt of some "anti-authoritarian" bourgeois liberal at whitewashing the bourgeoisie and putting the responsibility for fascism entirely on the authoritarian former aristocrat caste. I mean, some of them sure have supported Freikorps and the NSDAP, but not with the intention to install Hitler as front figure of a fascist dictatorship. Aristocrat and bourgeois interests do intersect as they both aspire to be the dominant class and exploit labour, however their respective endgames are different.

>>2814232
>Trump was a reactionary in his first term. Trump is a fascist in his second term with big tech backing him.
wtf are u talkin about, Jesse

>>2814569
Thank you for the write up, that clears up why you mentioned that.

>because the author says that Germany was a monolithic feudal society with dominant feudal entities executing absolute political power well into the 20th century, which is simply wrong: The junkers, barons, dukes etc. and the clergy only ever ruled the countryside, their power in the cities was always very limited to non-existent and from the renaissance onwards to the enlightment age they gradually lost their power grip over the the countryside too as industrialization rapidly increased and the capitalist mode of production spread to rural areas as well

And yet this post-feudal nobility still retained a lot of power. 40% of the population of Germany still worked the land as late as 1907, compared to 30% in industry and manufacture. 40% of the population lived in the countryside in towns and villages not exceeding 10.000 inhabitants. The nobility were first amongst the major land owners in Germany (and in the other countries that the text concerns itself with) and exercised a huge amount of influence in associations in the countryside, which from what I can tell from the book by Corni lasted until Darré and the Nazis as a whole completely outmanoeuvred them. Even after the Nazi takeover they managed to continue cushioning their fall from relevance by influencing policy (for example, completely side-stepping any kind of land reform).

90% of firms in manufacturing and industry were small family owned businesses employing no more than 5 workers and over half the sector worked in firms not exceeding 50 workers. Most of these firms were characterized by artisanal labor. In retail and commerce most firms were also tiny with department stores only accounting for a small percentage of revenue in the sector.

Mayer's whole point is that this old economy, if you will, was not an irrelevant vestige of a time long gone waiting to be washed away once and for all by modern industrial firms, but rather that this was the still extremely relevant social base from which the old elite drew its tremendous, but terminally declining, economic and especially political and cultural power. He emphasizes Europe's dual character (modern and pre-modern), which was the source of the general crisis of the early Twentieth Century. He does not argue for the existence of a monolithic feudal society, as you say.

There is also, of course, the fact that the officer corps was completely permeated, especially at the top level, by the sons of the first estate. They happily went along with remilitarization and war, until perhaps 1944 when Tom Cruise tried to blow Hitler up. They also arguably got their way in getting rid of Röhm and the SA, who they saw as rivals to the tradional military.

>For Germany however it looks like a really bad attempt of some "anti-authoritarian" bourgeois liberal at whitewashing the bourgeoisie and putting the responsibility for fascism entirely on the authoritarian former aristocrat caste

I think that is unfair. The author is a Marxist and puts rightful blame on the Bourgeoisie, despite him seeing them as the lesser half of a union with the nobility.

>>2814569
>>2815414
What about the Church which held substantial amounts of valuable real estate? People always boil feudal remnants down to the aristocracy when IMO the clergy are the bigger threat.

>>2823897
Idk about the bigger threat, but they are definitely very relevant to the topic. From birth until the grave they played a big part in people's lives through their holy rites. They also held political office, both elected as well as in Europe's upper chambers. Every sunday they could spout reactionary rhetoric in favour of the old order and against forces of progress. They played a big role in education as well. A lot of the high clergy were also of noble birth so the two estates were linked in that way as well.

As for German fascism, they were, similar to the nobility, both critical of the Nazis in some regards, like Aktion T-4 or the treatment of converted and intermarried Jews, while being enthusiastic when it came to, for example, Operation Barbarossa: a holy crusade against atheistic Bolshevism. Also, again similar to the nobility, they got treated with the kids gloves by the Nazis out of pragmatism.

Interestingly, they have of course done a far better job of remaining relevant than their noble counterparts.

>>2813922
Wouldn't Bonapartist be a better description

File: 1779918140612.png (708.17 KB, 678x1000, ClipboardImage.png)

>>2814129
It varied quite a bit. According to Jonathan Petropoulos there were broadly three common attitudes among nobles toward the Nazis. The most common view was that of conservative nobles who saw the Nazis as an effective way to defeat the liberals and restore Germany to greatness. Many of them would have preferred the monarchy’s return, but they were ultimately willing to tolerate the Nazis.
The second group supported the Nazis, though not necessarily in a deeply ideological sense. They were deeply antisemitic but didn't care about Aryan super race stuff, they just viewed Adolf Hitler like a new Emperor figure.
The third group, which was less common but later became more famous consisted of aristocrats who disliked the Nazis, not for progressive reasons, but because they saw them as peasant socialist upstarts and resented being lectured by a Bohemian corporal.

>>2824965
There was a British intelligence study of German POWs examining their motivations for fighting. Only around 15% were genuinely committed to Nazi ideology, while about 35% said they were simply doing their duty. The remaining 50% said they were fighting for Hitler or for Germany. For most of them, loyalty to Hitler was the same kind of loyalty an earlier generation felt toward the Kaiser. I think the nobles viewed him in much the same way, overlooking his lower-class origins because they saw him first and foremost as Germany’s leader.

>>2825333
Makes you wonder where half the population that voted for the SPD and KPD went. A lot of soldiers would have been young teenagers at the time of the Machtergreifung and the threat of detention in the concentration camp system loomed over them if they were anything but enthusiastic about dying in a ditch on the eastern front, but still curious how they managed to integrate these people into the Wehrmacht.

>>2825341
Its leaders were arrested or forced to resign and parties were dissolved, so regular voters and even lay party members afterwards could only just live their lives. there were basically only two real outcomes, being a passive citizen workers a communist working with the Nazis.

Now there was active resistance, but the overwhelming majority of people generally fell into two broad camps.
One example might be a unionized factory worker in Berlin who voted for the SPD in 1932 and lost his union after the Nazis destroyed independent labor organizations. He dislikes the Nazis but has a wife and children to support. He stops attending political meetings, avoids criticizing the regime publicly, joins the Nazi Labor Front because it becomes effectively mandatory for employment, and performs outward displays of loyalty. Privately, he may complain at home, but publicly, he conforms.
The other path might be an unemployed industrial worker in the Ruhr who voted for the Communist Party of Germany during the Great Depression and later finds stable employment as Nazi rearmament expands factory work. Over time he begins to believe Nazi claims that Germany has “recovered” because of national unity under Adolf Hitler. He may never become deeply committed to Nazi racial ideology, but he becomes broadly supportive of the regime.


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