>>2864725I think that almost everything you've said is empirically untrue. Public debts have increased in some countries but not in others, despite the GFC, the Coronavirus pandemic, and the global superpower deciding to completely lose its mind, there is no inherent reason countries
need to get into debt. To take one example, New Zealand has a debt to GDP ratio of just 50% (and NZ is
unusually exposed to global shocks, being almost entirely dependent on imported fuel and agricultural exports.)
There's basically no correlation between how economically liberal a country is and its debt to GDP ratio. Bourgeois democracy is a wash: it is true that many areas are no longer really controlled by politicians (power they gave up quite voluntarily for the most part) but public power over politicians has generally increased. Trump, for example, is in large part a phenomenon of a segment of the public who used to ignore politics because it is boring suddenly being engaged by an entertaining politician. The rise of Corbyn and Sanders is a similar phenomenon for the "better things are possible" side of the aisle.
>"dependent, lacking their own technology, with privatizations entering the private sector without public participation" borders on gibberish but as best as I can respond to it: countries are all
interdependent which is a good thing, technology transfer generally flows from trade (see Malaysia's rise to upper middle income country status and impending high-income country status) more effectively than from import-substitution, public sector industries have no inherent element of public participation (while nominally politically controlled, politicians very rarely intervene in the public interest in practice. look at Britain's NHS for example: there are lots of high-profile bottlenecks that could be fixed at the stroke of a pen, but politicians have in fact only interfered to
remove treatment options.), and for the most part "capitalist blackmail" (e.g. deciding to dump bad investments) has served in recent years to avoid obviously moronic policies which any competent political system would've vetoed before they got that far. (e.g. trump tariffs, liz truss budget.)
Coup attempts peaked in the 1960s-70s and then declined precipitously in line with the rise of neoliberalism (~85 in 1980s, ~60 in 1990s, ~45 in 2000s, ~30 in 2010s) although obviously this also correlates with the end of the cold war, sabotage is not - on the whole - a major problem in most countries, and we do not see the situation of "an economy solely focused on exporting primary products" - the reality is that globally, growth is concentrated in the tertiary (e.g. service) sector. To my knowledge only five countries have seen their service sector's share of GDP shrink since 1980: Guyana, Equatorial Guinea, Venezuela, Libya, and Syria. The first two struck oil, the latter has run grotesquely incompetent economic policy by any standard, and the last two had civil wars. Indeed, in the last 3
primary production also suffered.
You do not adequately take into account the likelihood that there is war but no revolution given the comically dismal state of communist organisation. You do not take into account that you cannot simply wave a magic wand and socialise production. (Where, pray tell, will you find the administrators for this? Who is currently training them? Where does this magic state capacity come from?)
I am acting as a lackey of nothing. Neither you nor I will have any impact on anything by this conversation. I will be punished by nobody because you have no serious plans or mechanisms by which to punish me even if you only wanted to do so for being annoying. If the bourgeois state collapses either in the conditions I predict or in the please-don't-call-me-Keynesian conditions you desire, you will be caught completely unprepared before ultimately finding yourself on the sharp end of something much nastier.