/leftypol_archive/ - leftypol archive

12 lectures by a professor

INTRO TO DELEUZE

Great thread

Dolce & Gabbana helped me get out of the intellectual dead-end I found myself in a couple of years ago

Jonas Čeika, aka Cuck Philosophy, just dropped an intro to Deleuze using Drum Machines!

>>497052
Do you think there's a place for Deleuze in contemporary praxis?

>>497053
I think his notion of the nomadic war machine and exodus is a lot more adapted to the times than classical ideas of revolution, yes. I'm also a big fan of his rejection of representation in all its forms that follows from his monist ontology.

>>497054
Interesting. I'd love to see this nomadic war machine idea put into practice.

>Has he BTFOd Lacanians for ever and ever?
Yeah, about that. What exactly is D&G's solution to people suffering from mental illness? Nothing. Just read my book and uhm, idk, get better by yourself, bye!

D&G are to psychoanalysis what leftcoms are to Marxism.
>no praxis
>big words, big theory
>everybody is a faggot except you

enjoy your thread symptom

>>497056
In actuality it's like this:
>be scizophrenic
>have a severe mental breakdown
>go to a Deleuzean aesthetics professor because Deleuzeans don't have clinics and can only be found in academia or on weird twitter
>professor, plz help me, I'm hallucinating my balls off, my wife is afraid of me, I can't trust myself around my own children
>professor:
<NOOO!!! YOU MISUNDERSTAND!!!!! BEING AN UNTREATED SCHIZOPHRENIC IS BASED! YOU ARE A RHIZOME, A SCHIZO-MACHINE, YOU ARE DETERRITORIALIZING OUR OPPRESSIVE CULTURAL IMPRINTS!!! EMBRACE WHAT'S HAPPENING TO YOU!
>take his advice
>go home
>kill the green lizards pretending to be my children
>take out the CIA listening device from my wife's brain

thank you deleuze

>>497059
>3 seconds google search
there are studies out there about this but I won't even bother linking it to you, because you have nothing, just a clown pic

Answer the question: if Deleuzeans oppose medication (because biopolitics) and psychoanalsys/therapy (because muh oedipuss and muh authority of the specialist) what do they have to offer people in need?

But we already know the answer: nothing.

>>497060
Skepticism of mental reform, either by drugs, therapy, or even other bodily means, is obviously warranted.

How deep are the rejection of these things in D&G? Gauttari was known to have consumed GHB while writing a lot of his shit.

>>497060
Effective at what? You're operating under the assumption the purpose of medication and therapy is to help people instead of numbing them to the social circumstances at the root of their problems. Why do you think so many amerikkkans see a shrink?

>>497062
>Effective at what?
Elevating or completely ceasing suffering, you Deleuzean baboon.

>You're operating under the assumption the purpose of medication and therapy is to help people
You don't know jack shit about the assumptions I'm operating under until I make it clear to you:
Medication (psychiatry) < Ego psychology < CBT < Jungians < various psychotherapies < more "orthodox' Freudians (Klein, Ferenczi) < critical psychologists < "reformist" Freudians (various Lacanians)

But you don't know shit about shit, so what's the point even telling you this?
>therapy is to help people instead of numbing them to the social circumstances
Your assumption is so hilarious. It's basically protestantism masked as some vague rad left critique: "the more suffering there is, the better."

>>497061
>How deep are the rejection of these things in D&G?
As far as I'm concerned Deleuze's move to ditch Lacan was a pure career move on his part. You can't become a French superstar philosopher if you live in the shadows of a much more talented and renowned psychoanalyst who is actually revolutionizing the field, so you have to ditch him even if on theoretically shoddy and unsound basis.

Like, I'm not even kidding, a good 60% of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy deals with the patients' relationship with their parents, it's as empirically observable a problem as you can get, so his Anti-Oedipus move is just pure posturing, akin to ultras wanting to reach "full freedom" via abolishing the value form immediately.

>Guattari
He did run a "free" experimental mental asylum where patients could enter and leave at will, but nobody today, and I mean literally nobody, has an actual "Guattarist" practice, or "Guattarist" training, and Guattari didn't leave behind "Guattarist" training manuals or guidelines for analysts, nor anything that would argue that he had an applicable method or even results (!) to speak of, hence his "schizoanalysis" returned to its proper space: literature and other huminities departments in Academia.

You know you are a fucking snowflake when you literally have no praxis just critique and academic production in arcane segments of universities.

>>497063
>Elevating or completely ceasing suffering
I wish I was this naive

>>497065
Watch the fucking Lacan documentary and heqr his patients. Fucking read Bruce Fink's case study books or just chapters of it,, ou cynical, nihilist, westerno-urbanite, glasses wearing, dumb fuck.

Is Deleuzean ontology the sublation of Marx's and the highest form of ontology known to man? Essentially completing Marx for the contemporary era?

>>497063
Can someone explain why people shit on CBT ? It really helped me with social anxiety , though that might be a mental illness that isn't really political.

>>497068
It cannot work for more complexly rooted issues

>>497067
No, it's antithetical to Marx

>>497070
How so?

>>497071
Spinozean ontology. Pre-dialectical.

>>497068
It's basically a form of super ego psychology, you internalize a little voice in your head that corrects your wrongthink or wrongdo. It has limited applicability, helps you detect your own retarded patterns and correct it ASAP, but it doesn't tell you mutch about the underlying mechanism, the cause of your symptoms, etc.

BTW, Miller (Lacanian) recalls somewhere where he recieved a new patient, who said
>doctor, I have a deep seated fear of flying on a plane, and I have 2 weeks until my most important job interview in another country forcing me to take a flight
So Miller told the guy to take an intensive CBT session for the time being, and when the guy came back from his (failed) interview he worked with him for 2 years with the Lacanian approach.

So it's not like reasonable analysts are unpragmatic or dogmatic.

>>497072
Excerpt from: https://www.historicalmaterialism.org/blog/concept-indignation-spinozist-marxism

Seems you're wrong, friend.

>Althusser is undoubtedly the figure that most prominently supported the renewal of Spinozist studies with the aim of combining Spinoza and Marx and challenging the more traditional couple Hegel and Marx. To do so, he created in 1967 the Spinoza group at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, and invited other intellectual figures to join them, such as Gilles Deleuze or Alexandre Matheron. However, even though Spinozist Marxism originated in Paris in 1967, it has since then crossed the Alps, the Atlantic Ocean and, to a lesser extent, the Channel.

Cesare Casarino in his article ‘Marx before Spinoza’[4] offers the most exhaustive description of Spinozist Marxism, the latter being divided into several categories:

1 - Thinkers who have written about Marx and Spinoza in separate yet closely related works. For example, Negri and Balibar.
2 - Thinkers who refer implicitly or in passing to the relation between Spinoza and Marx, such as Althusser.
3 - Thinkers whose entire thought is imbued thoroughly with Spinozian and Marxian problematics, see Deleuze’s thought and Negri and Hardt’s collaborative works.
4 - Thinkers who confront the Spinoza-Marx relation indirectly yet significantly via the examination of a third and related thinker, the best example being Macherey’s book entitled Hegel or Spinoza.
5 - Thinkers who directly refer to both Spinoza and Marx, and Frédéric Lordon is one of them.

are you a bad enough dude to eat the Althussy

>t. brainlet
How does one even begin studying philosophy, let alone Deleuze and Guattari? I don't even know what the fuck an ontology is

>>497076
Find a relatively easy text on a topic that interests you and go from there. Don't start out jumping right into Hegel or something

>>497076
D&G is a bad place to start since they fucking love to make their text obscure and impenetrable, plus make up new weird terms that aren't intuitive.

That said, you can totally start with D&G. I linked a series of videos in the OP which can be a good starting point.

If you're a booklet like me, then indirect and direct exposure to philosophy for a long time will be a good way to absorb these concepts.

Read whatever sounds interesting to you. There are no bad philosophers as long as you find them interesting.

There's also very good philosophy resources on YouTube.

>>497079
>>497080
He didn't murder his wife, she had terminal cancer and she begged him to do it. It was an assisted suicide.

>>497081
Was that ever actually confirmed? Everything I've heard about the incident seems like Althusser just entered a fugue state

>>497082
I was a student of someone who was very close to Althusser. I don't think he was lying.

>>497083
Huh, interesting

>>497081
You post this every time people mention Althusser killing his wife and you've never produced a single source. It's completely made up.
Also Althusser was a gigantic hack and his only worthwhile contribution to philosophy is having influenced Deleuze.

>>497085
>Althusser was a gigantic hack
Elaborate

>>497087
He wrote about philosophers he later admitted he hadn't even read (among them Spinoza, Hegel and Marx)

>>497088
wasn't he also kind of out of his mind when he wrote that?

>>497074
How am I wrong, friend?

>>497075
I'm a full blown Althus boi, mayne.

>>497079
>I thank him for the fact

>>497080
He did elaborate, plz read Warren Montag's "Althusser and his Contemporaries"

>>497087
'no'

>>497088
He did read those texts, stop spreading shit, plz.

>>497090
>stop spreading shit
Literally read his memoirs

>>497091
again, I was pretty much under the impression that he wasn't exactly of sound mind when he wrote his memoirs and that him saying that shit about himself was some weird form of self-harm

t. I don't remember I read that shit somwhere

>>497092
Can't speak to that but sounds like cope
Maybe to get back to the topic of the thread: What do you think of Deleuze's reception of Althusser's critique of the subject?

>>497091
I did, and I've read his post-memoir texts too. He did in fact read those texts, so plz STFU

the single post that wrecks this thread's agenda

Deleuze <<< Althusser
Guattari <<< Lacan

welcome to adulthood, kid

>>497088
Yeah that was a suicide note wrote during a schizo episode.
C'mon man.

This songle book BTFO's all Delezuians

You see, he wasn't retarded and making shit up, it was his illness that was retarded and making shit up.

>>497073
So whats the Lacanian take on social anxiety?

>>497101
Serious chad vibes from this man

>>497104
say what you want about his philosophy but the man oozed charisma

>>497067
What the fuck is an ontology? It's been years of me hearing this word and not understanding it, despite looking up its meaning.

>>497107
The science of the essence of a thing

>>497108
A subsect within metaphysics then?

>>497108
That's not a helpful definition.

>>497107
Ontology is how you understand the way that things exist. So a Christian ontology would say that everything is an emanation or creation from God (something like that). A mainstream scientific ontology would be to the effect that the big bang happens and gives us a universe with consistent physical laws that allow everything we see to happen, and many processes are going on that can develop and evolve. A dialectical ontology would be like things exist but only in contrast to other things that they exist in tension with, and the tension causes them to always be changing until they change into something new but sort of the same. You can have ontology at different levels (e.g. ontology of Being itself or ontology of the earth or ontology of the USSR or ontology of ur mom) or or different types. It's basically like a "scientific model" of how existence works but for philosophy.

>>497050
Deleuze made me an ML. His writing reminds me of Lenin and Hegel. Some people say that Marx misinterpreted Hegel and that he was not an idealist. I think that rather than misinterpreting each other they were just extremely specific with their vocabulary and they mostly agree on everything except for emphasis and primacy, which is more about their cultural baggage or personal preferences. These same emphases are the reason people who support one or the other tend to disagree, and not really anything found in the authors. In my reading Hegel, Lenin and Deleuze have complimentary and complete theories of world systems, where most of their contemporaries hyper focus on a specific sub-discipline, like political economy or ethics. The same goes for Stirner and Marx, if you take their work to its logical conclusion it just ends up agreeing with Hegel, which is really just Lenin.

>>497067
yeah

>>497072
if you like dialectics then you can just say that deleuze is secretely a dialectician. dozens(!) of zizek students already do this. conversely if you don't like dialectics you can just say that the rational kernal of dialectics isn't negativity it is its reversal giving way to novel creativity, either way its the same process.

>>497074
what does it mean if hegel considered himself a spinozist?

>>497111
>Deleuze made me an ML
Could you elaborate how they are compatible? Ive heard people compare the nomadic war machine with a union of egoists. Do you think this is valid, if you're aware of the terms.

>>497113
NTA but a union of egoists is just a vanguard with more self-awareness.

>>497114
Interesting take. I've seen some "anti authoritarian" deleuzeans, as well as ñ "we will make no excuses, stalin didnt do enough terror" deleuzeans. Just wondering how things fit.

>>497097
Thanks for sharing.
Could you give a quick summary what it's about?

>>497115
NTA but I share this view, violence shouldn't be centralized. Think of Mao's red guard or the cultural revolution.

On a related note, basically every EPUB/MOBI and PDF copy online of "Anti-Oedipus" is shit in some way. I actually just finished (painstakingly) rendering the book into EPUB myself a few days ago, even though I'm more partial to Lacan and Althusser than Deleuze. I'm also mostly finished cleaning up the EPUB copy of "Difference and Repetition" I found online, but I don't have the notes/bibliography finished or the text footnoted properly.

Feel free to critique the file. I'll correct it if there are any problems. I'd like a higher quality version of the frontispiece image, but I couldn't find one in the available copies. Not sure how many people will even appreciate this, but I did it for myself anyway.

The 'ordered body' (See: your physical body) produces carnal desire and needs shit like nutrients, water and to be kept at a certain temperature and has 'set' and 'ordered' parameters, This clashes with your 'Body without organs' which to be reductionist is basically just the theoretical concept of a consciousness minus automatic bodily responses and phenomena.

This clash + The 'free ability to act on desire allowed by capitalism' causes people to become schizos / psychos.

BUT ACCORDING TO DELEUZE being a SCHIZOPHRENIC or a PSYCHOTIC is actually BASED AND REDPILLED because your regular 'Partial-Object' brain that does nothing but produce chemicals that cause desire has been TRANSFORMED into a 'Schizo-Machine' which has put you one step closer to realising the body without organs and freeing yourself of your automatic responses. Because now your operating off of a Rhizomatic method of knowledge where any piece of information can be linked to any other piece of information in existence [i.e The off kilter pattern recognition of a person with schizophrenia]

>TL;DR
Deleuze is a PoMo 68'er hack who literally attempts to reify and normalise being an actual paranoid schizophrenic or a psychotic detached from reality.
The only 'good' thing to ever come out of any of his theories was basically just Nick Land

i had a psychotic episode once, it wasnt based, it was scary. eventually i went to the nut hut and now i take crazy pills and get free retard money from the state.

I do understand that thing about pattern recognition, i was obsessed with the moon and the sun and its use in pop culture

>How compatible is it with Marxism Leninism?
Not at all. For Marxism, the only instance of cross-section between D&G was within Autonomism.

>>497120
wow this is my favourite one of these so far, very cool lol

>>497119
>The 'ordered body' (See: your physical body) produces carnal desire and needs shit like nutrients, water and to be kept at a certain temperature and has 'set' and 'ordered' parameters, This clashes with your 'Body without organs' which to be reductionist is basically just the theoretical concept of a consciousness minus automatic bodily responses and phenomena.
Why do people feel the need to give their opinion on something when it's painfully clear from the start that they have no idea what they are talking about?

>>497119
Wow… Thats so retarded

>>497125
It's also not what Deleuze says anywhere at all

>>497119
>'Body without organs' which to be reductionist is basically just the theoretical concept of a consciousness minus automatic bodily responses and phenomena
I wish this meme never existed. It's the foundation of all techbro singularity eschatology, "I can't wait to upload my brain and get rid of this meatsack", and probably the origin of a fair amount of the more out-there "build ur own identity bear" delusions like otherkin.

There is no distinction between your mind and your body or even your brain and the rest if you, you are not [something] trapped in [something else]. Realising this is the key to mental health. Pic related, it's the real you climbing into the evangelion.

>>497119
>>497127
Deleuze is a Nietzschean and a monist to the core. One of his main points is that there are no seperate realms of the physical and the psychological.

>>497128
I just hate the meme, if it is a gross misinterpretation all the more reason to hate it.

>>497128
Well yes that's why the Israeli's used their theory to great effect in urban warfare against the palestinians

>>497126
Ok, what does he actually say?

>>497126
>>497124
Prove me wrong.
>IM SORRY THAT'S BEEN DEBOONKED

Cope

Rope

>>497130
Literally what?

>>497131
>>497132
Basically, Deleuze conceives of the world as what he calls a "plane of immanence", which is an undifferentiated constant flux free from duality of any kind. Nothing stays fixed, there is no up and down, no base and superstructure, no seperate realms of ideas and matter, no heaven and earth. These transitional concepts are constantly being pulled back into the plane of immanence, just for new ones to arise. This is the process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.
Now in the broader sense, this plane of immanence is the body without organs itself. In the narrower sense, the BwO is what one becomes once one is freed from conceptual thinking which divides the plane of immanence into stable categories and tries to fix them in place.
Now as for idealizing this "schizophrenic" way of looking at the world, D&G have always urged people to be extremely careful and after Anti-Oedipus they even turned away from the idea of complete deterritorialization.

>>497124
>Why do people feel the need to give their opinion on something when it's painfully clear from the start that they have no idea what they are talking about?
When you see a name, trip, or flag, you'll almost without fail see something stupid right under it.


>>497132
Moron flagfag says:
>The 'ordered body' (See: your physical body) produces carnal desire and needs shit like nutrients, water and to be kept at a certain temperature and has 'set' and 'ordered' parameters, This clashes with your 'Body without organs' which to be reductionist is basically just the theoretical concept of a consciousness minus automatic bodily responses and phenomena.
The only way you could get that from reading the book would be if you interpreted the parts about Judge Schreber in the most literal way possible. From Eugene Holland's book on Anti-Oedipus:
<Unlike Freud, for whom a recording-apparatus emerges in the psyche because infantile desire hampered by lack of motor control is unable to obtain the real object of gratification and therefore invests (“hallucinatory”) images of satisfaction instead; and unlike Lacan, for whom the recording-function of the unconscious is based on the unary trait which radically separates bodily drives from consciousness, Deleuze and Guattari see disjunctive synthesis on the body-without-organs first emerging as a transformation of connective energy itself, at the point when an identity between the process of desiring-production and a finished product has been achieved.15 The connection between mouth and breast, for example, gets broken when it has finished producing its “product,” which is nourishment or satisfaction: as the connection gives way to disjunction, it registers on the body-without-organs as a sign of satisfaction, and the infant rejects the breast and turns away. The mouth is now freed from the breast, and may lapse into quiescence or become some other organ altogether: an organ for expelling instead of ingesting liquid, for example, if the infant proceeds to burp or vomit; or an organ for smiling; or an organ for expelling a flow of air instead of liquid, if the child sighs happily, or starts to cry or coo or babble.
<More significantly, the infant may pull away from the breast for other reasons, without any ultimate physiological satisfaction having been achieved. Perhaps a smile catches its eye, and it suspends the mouth-breast connection to pursue an eye-face connection instead – and then maybe looks away and brings a finger into connection with a lock of hair: in each case the disjunctive energy of anti-production functions to suspend one organ-machine connection, but only for the sake of another, in an open-ended series: either mouth-breast, or eye-smile, or finger-hair, or whatever. The body-without-organs is thus ultimately what frees the human animal from instinctual determination, for it prevents us from remaining fixated on any (developmentally or historically) given mode of satisfaction. What possibilities would exist for the development of culinary arts, for instance, if humans remained exclusively fixated on the breast for nourishment, or for oral gratification? The senses and organs can operate productively (in the broadest sense: creatively; as “theoreticians in their immediate praxis,” as Marx put it16) only on condition that they are freed from pre-established or instinctual connections and modes of satisfaction – and that is one effect of anti-production: to produce the body-without-organs as a kind of tabula rasa on which objects of drives and instincts register so as to multiply and differentiate.
You could try saving your point about "automatic bodily responses" by tying it to "drives and instincts" (and abandon "phenomena," unless you're going to explain how the body without organs would be without phenomena? and where does the conflict between the body without organs and the need for "water" come in exactly?), but D&G's point about the "body without organs" isn't to escape "drives and instincts" per se (let alone all "automatic bodily responses and phenomena"). It's to escape connections that have been established by the drives and instincts, and these connections aren't reducible to "automatic bodily responses" anyway.

>>497135
>Basically, Deleuze conceives of the world as what he calls a "plane of immanence", which is an undifferentiated constant flux free from duality of any kind. Nothing stays fixed, there is no up and down, no base and superstructure, no seperate realms of ideas and matter, no heaven and earth. These transitional concepts are constantly being pulled back into the plane of immanence, just for new ones to arise. This is the process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.
ie. The urban terrain can be deterritorialised and reterritorialised

Think blowing holes in walls to create new routes through the urban area

The Israeli's even wrote some papers on the application of D&G to urban warfare

>>497137
I mean yeah, the idea of the nomadic war machine is basically a manual for guerilla warfare, so counter-insurgency forces are doing well to study it, just like they study Che or Mao.

>>497138
>ie. The urban terrain can be deterritorialised and reterritorialised
>Think blowing holes in walls to create new routes through the urban area
Lmao what? This is like saying pouring a concrete foundation for building a house is an application of Marx' idea of base and superstructure.

>>497139
>Lmao what? This is like saying pouring a concrete foundation for building a house is an application of Marx' idea of base and superstructure.
Not really, think of it this way walls aren't really walls

Good thread.

Do these guys have a following or get cited in AES countries at all?

For if this third time, the future, is the proper place of decision, it is entirely likely that, by virtue of its nature, it eliminates the two intracyclic and extracyclic hypotheses; that it undoes them both and puts time into a straight line, straightening it out and extracting the pure form; in other words, it takes time out of 'joint' and, being itself the third repetition, renders the repetition of the other two impossible. There is eternal return only in the third time: it is here that the freeze-frame begins to move once more, or that the straight line of time, as though drawn by its own length, re-forms a strange loop which in no way resembles the earlier cycle, but leads into the formless, and operates only for the third time and for that which belongs to it. For it is not the other which is another I, but the I which is an other, a fractured I. There is no love which does not begin with the revelation of a possible world as such, enwound in the other which expresses it. Albertine's face expressed the blending of beach and waves: 'From what unknown world does she distinguish me?' The entire history of that exemplary love is the long explication of the possible worlds expressed by Albertine, which transform her now into a fascinating subject, now into a deceptive object. It is true that the other disposes of a means to endow the possibles that it expresses with reality, independently of the development we cause them to undergo. This means is language. Words offered by the other confer reality on the possible as such; whence the foundation of the lie inscribed within language itself. It is this role of language as a result of the values of implication or the centres of envelopment which endows it with its powers within internal resonance systems. The structure of the other and the corresponding function of language effectively represent the manifestation of the noumenon, the appearance of expressive values - in short, the tendency towards the interiorisation of difference.

Thinking itself to be in between the extremes, it holds them off and fills in the interval. It does not negate differences - on the contrary: it arranges things in the order of time and under the conditions of extensity such that they negate themselves. It multiplies the intermediates and, like Plato's demiurge, ceaselessly and patiently transforms the unequal into the divisible.

Alternatively, a real opposition is invoked, one that is capable of imposing an absolute natural blockage on the concept: by assigning to it a comprehension that is in principle necessarily finite, by defining an order external to the comprehension of even an indefinite concept, or by bringing in forces opposed to the subjective concomitants of the infinite concept (memory, recognition, self-consciousness).

To ground is to determine. But what is determination, and upon what is it exercised? Grounding is the operation of the logos, or of sufficient reason. As such, it has three senses. In its first sense, the ground is the Same or the Identical. It enjoys supreme identity, that which is supposed to belong to Ideas or to the auto kath' hauto. What it is, and what it possesses, it is and it possesses primarily, in the utmost. What, apart from Courage, would be courageous, or virtuous apart from Virtue? What the ground has to ground, therefore, is only the claim of those who come after, all those who at best possess secondarily. It is always a claim or an 'image' that requires a ground or appeals to a ground: for example, the claim of men to be cou- rageous, to be virtuous - in short, to have part or to participate in (metex- ein means to have after). As such, we may distinguish between the ground or ideal Essence, the grounded in the form of Claimant or claim, and that upon which the claim bears - in other words, the Quality that the ground possesses primarily and the claimant will possess secondarily, assuming that its claim is well grounded. This quality, the object of the claim, is dif- ference - the fiancee, Ariadne.

Is the Cogito a stupidity? It is necessarily a non-sense to the extent that this proposition purports to state both itself and its sense. However, it is also a confusion (as Kant showed) to the extent that the determination 'I think' purports to bear immediately on the indeterminate existence 'I am', without specifying the form under which the indeterminate is determinable. The subject of the Cartesian Cogito does not think: it only has the possibility of thinking, and remains stupid at the heart of that possibility. It lacks the form of the determinable: not a specificity, not a specific form informing a matter, not a memory informing a present, but the pure and empty form of time.


Thus begins the long history of the distortion of the dialectic, which culminates with Hegel and consists in substituting the labour of the negative for the play of difference and the differential. Instead of being defined by a (non)-being which is the being of problems and questions, the dialectical instance is now defined by a wow-being which is the being of the negative. The false genesis of affirmation, which takes the form of the negation of the negation and is produced by the negative, is substituted for the complementarity of the positive and the affirmative, of differential positing and the affirmation of difference. Furthermore, if the truth be told, none of this would amount to much were it not for the moral presuppositions and practical implications of such a distortion. We have seen all that this valorisation of the negative signified, including the conservative spirit of such an enterprise, the platitude of the affirmations supposed to be engendered thereby, and the manner in which we are led away from the most important task, that of determining problems and realising in them our power of creation and decision. That is why conflicts, oppositions and contradictions seemed to us to be surface effects and conscious epiphenomena, while the unconscious lived on problems and differences. History progresses not by negation and the negation of negation, but by deciding problems and affirming differences.

It is no less bloody and cruel as a result. Only the shadows of history live by negation: the good enter into it with all the power of a posited differential or a difference affirmed; they repel shadows into the shadows and deny only as the consequence of a primary positivity and affirmation. For them, as Nietzsche says, affirmation is primary; it affirms difference, while the negative is only a consequence or a reflection in which affirmation is doubled. That is why real revolutions have the atmosphere of fetes. Contradiction is not the weapon of the proletariat but, rather, the manner in which the bourgeoisie defends and preserves itself, the shadow behind which it maintains its claim to decide what the problems are. Contradictions are not 'resolved', they are dissipated by capturing the problem of which they reflect only the shadow. The negative is always a conscious reaction, a distortion of the true agent or actor. As a result, as long as it remains within the limits of representation, philosophy is prey to the theoretical antinomies of consciousness.

>>497142
Jiang Shigong is a big fan of them. But you shouldn't read them, you are obviously too much of a brainlet if you metric is ""what do AES think of them".

Manifold in French is multiplicitie, and while English translations of Deleuze have translated it multiplicity, the reference to Riemann was intentional.

DR 04 - It is as though every Idea has two faces, which are like love and anger: love
in the search for fragments, the progressive determination and linking of
the ideal adjoint fields; anger in the condensation of singularities which, by
dint of ideal events, defines the concentration of a 'revolutionary situation'
and causes the Idea to explode into the actual. It is in this sense that Lenin
had Ideas. (There is an objectivity on the part of adjunction and condensa-
tion, and an objectivity of conditions, which implies that Ideas no more
than Problems do not exist only in our heads but occur here and there in
the production of an actual historical world.)

Those commentators on Marx who insist upon the fundamental difference
between Marx and Hegel rightly point out that in Capital the category of
differenciation (the differenciation at the heart of a social multiplicity: the
division of labour) is substituted for the Hegelian concepts of opposition,
contradiction and alienation, the latter forming only an apparent
movement and standing only for abstract effects separated from the
principle and from the real movement of their production. Clearly, at
this point the philosophy of difference must be wary of turning into the
discourse of beautiful souls: differences, nothing but differences, in a
peaceful coexistence in the Idea of social places and functions … but the
name of Marx is sufficient to save it from this danger.
The problems of a society, as they are determined in the infrastructure in
the form of so-called 'abstract' labour, receive their solution from the
process of actualisation or differenciation (the concrete division of labour).
However, as long as the problem throws its shadow over the ensemble of
differenciated cases forming the solution, these will present a falsified
image of the problem itself. It cannot even be said that the falsification
comes afterwards: it accompanies or doubles the actualisation. A problem
is always reflected in false problems while it is being solved, so that the
Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference
208 Difference and Repetition
solution is generally perverted by an inseparable falsity. For example,
according to Marx, fetishism is indeed an absurdity, an illusion of social
consciousness, so long as we understand by this not a subjective illusion
born of individual consciousness but an objective or transcendental illusion
born out of the conditions of social consciousness in the course of its
actualisation. There are those for whom the whole of differenciated social
existence is tied to the false problems which enable them to live, and others
for whom social existence is entirely contained in the false problems of
which they occupy the fraudulent positions, and from which they suffer.


Ideas and the distinctions between Ideas are inseparable from their types of varieties,
and from the manner in which each type enters into the others. We pro-
pose the term 'perplication' to designate this distinctive and coexistent state
of Ideas. Not that the corresponding connotation of 'perplexity' signifies a
coefficient of doubt, hesitation or astonishment, or anything whatsoever in-
complete about Ideas themselves. On the contrary, it is a question of the
identity of Ideas and problems, of the exhaustively problematic character
of Ideas - in other words, of the manner in which problems are objectively
determined by their conditions to participate in one another according to
the circumstantial requirements of the synthesis of Ideas.
Ideas are by no means essences. In so far as they are the objects of Ideas,
problems belong on the side of events, affections, or accidents rather than
on that of theorematic essences. Ideas are developed in the auxiliaries and
the adjunct fields by which their synthetic power is measured.
Consequently, the domain of Ideas is that of the inessential. They proclaim
their affinity with the inessential in a manner as deliberate and as fiercely
Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference
188 Difference and Repetition
obstinate as that in which rationalism proclaimed its possession and
comprehension of essences. Rationalism wanted to tie the fate of Ideas to
abstract and dead essences; and to the extent that the problematic form of
Ideas was recognised, it even wanted that form tied to the question of
essences - in other words, to the 'What is X?'. How many
misunderstandings are contained in this will! It is true that Plato employs
this question in order to refute those who content themselves with offering
empirical responses, and to oppose essence and appearance. His aim,
however, is to silence the empirical responses in order to open up the
indeterminate horizon of a transcendental problem which is the object of
an Idea. Once it is a question of determining the problem or the Idea as
such, once it is a question of setting the dialectic in motion, the question
'What is X?' gives way to other questions, otherwise powerful and
efficacious, otherwise imperative: 'How much, how and in what cases?'
The question 'What is X?' animates only the so-called aporetic dialogues -
in other words, those in which the very form of the question gives rise to
contradiction and leads to nihilism, no doubt because they have only
propaedeutic aims - the aim of opening up the region of the problem in
general, leaving to other procedures the task of determining it as a problem
or as an Idea. When Socratic irony was taken seriously and the dialectic as
a whole was confused with its propaedeutic, extremely troublesome
consequences followed: for the dialectic ceased to be the science of
problems and ultimately became confused with the simple movement of the
negative, and of contradiction. Philosophers began to talk like young men
from the farmyard. From this point of view, Hegel is the culmination of a
long tradition which took the question 'What is X?' seriously and used it to
determine Ideas as essences, but in so doing substituted the negative for the
nature of the problematic. This was the outcome of a distortion of the
dialectic. Moreover, how many theological prejudices were involved in that
tradition, since the answer to 'What is X?' is always God as the locus of
the combinatory of abstract predicates. It should be noticed how few
philosophers have placed their trust in the question 'What is X?' in order to
have Ideas. Certainly not Aristotle. … Once the dialectic brews up its
matter instead of being applied in a vacuum for propaedeutic ends, the
questions 'How much?', 'How?', 'In what cases?' and 'Who?' abound -
questions the function and sense of which we shall see below. These
questions are those of the accident, the event, the multiplicity - of
difference - as opposed to that of the essence, or that of the One, or those
of the contrary and the contradictory. Hippias triumphs everywhere, even
already in Plato: Hippias who refused essences, but nevertheless did not
content himself with examples.

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/deleuze-and-ethics/
Morality, understood as the application of a transcendent standard to a case, was seen as a false step, something to be avoided and gotten rid of – "to be done with judgment" was one of Deleuze's wishes. Following a Spinozist and Nietzschean line, ethics is understood as the immanent evaluation of an encounter of bodies; what is evaluated is the affective dimension of the encounter, the changes in the composition of the bodies and the concomitant change in the power of the bodies, a change felt as joy or sadness, depending on the valence of the change.

Deleuzean normativity must be categorical without being transcendental; it must be an immanent or "pragmatic" conception of normativity. Deleuzean normativity then "must (a) be self-reflexive and (b) its adoption must not inhibit the self-reflexivity of norms" (101). The technical Deleuzean term here is "absolute deterritorialization," which is "categorical, insofar as it applies to every possible norm as such, but it is not transcendent; rather it is immanent to whatever norms (and, by extension, assemblages) constitute it"

According to Kaufman, Deleuze twists this question into an implicit precept: we should act so as "to not give ground relative to that place where desire is stopped in its tracks" (109). Deleuze is said to be preoccupied "with those zones where desire if arrested, and more often than not arrested at that point where it resonates with a higher notion of structure itself" (1

Deleuze is situated in the transcendental turn in philosophy which reconcieves as the transcendental not the noumenal thing in itself (as in Kant), but rather the situation in which the noumenal and the phenomenal are limits [as in Heiddeger, Husserl, Lacan, and Merleu-Ponty](recall the passage in A thousand Plateaus that the body without organs is a limit). What this means is that Deleuze's concept of Difference cannot be concieved as something apart from the situation of the human being which does not have access to all of reality

The Role of Mathematics in Deleuze’s Critical Engagement with Hegel
https://sci-hub.tw/10.1080/09672550903164418
Deleuze considers seventeenth-century thought to have developed a
new theory of relations by means of the infinitesimal calculus, one which
is determined according to the logic of the differential. The relation
between the two differentials of a differential, dy/dx, does not equal zero,
or is not undefined, despite the fact that dy/dx = 0/0. Instead, the differen-
tial relation itself, dy/dx, subsists as a relation. ‘What subsists when dy and
dx cancel out under the form of vanishing quantities is the relation dy/dx
itself’ (Deleuze, 17 Feb.). Despite the fact that its terms vanish, the
relation itself is nonetheless real. It is here that Deleuze considers seven-
teenth-century logic to have made ‘a fundamental leap’, by determining ‘a
logic of relations’. 14 He argues that ‘under this form of infinitesimal calcu-
lus is discovered a domain where the relations no longer depend on their
terms’ (Deleuze 10 Mar.). It is this logic of relations that provides a start-
ing point for the investigation into the logic that Deleuze deploys
throughout his work, and which can be traced through Difference and
Repetition as a part of his project of constructing a philosophy of differ-
ence; a logic which functions as an alternative to the Hegelian dialectical
logic.

Deleuzian events is that they are not immediately and necessarily tied to human thought. All levels of the infinite scale of life, from conscious to chemical plateaus and from the perceptible to the imperceptible, are pervaded by relations, observations, contemplations and thus eventualizations. In fact, quite apart from being elements of processes of conscious, cognitive integration, singular events are first of all elements of an unconscious, anonymous and preindividual virtual multiplicity. They are the atoms of the virtual. The atoms of thought. (On the virtuality of the event see Ansell-Pearson 1999: 124–5, 132.) As such, Deleuze’s events differ decisively from what Badiou calls events as specific, critical moments of bifurcation at which a system changes and thus develops a new landscape of constraints and potentialities. This fundamental structural difference makes it difficult to align their respective systems of thought. While Badiou considers events as exceptional moments, for Deleuze they are, as pure singularities, the smallest virtual elements that make up the fabric of sense. (On Badiou, see WP: 151–3; on events, Bell 2008: 74.) Concerning the misunderstandings between Badiou and Deleuze, one should think, perhaps, of their ‘nonrelationship’ (Badiou 2000: 1) as the enactment of a lost tragi-comedy by Samuel Beckett. In confronting Deleuze’s philosophy, Badiou proceeds like somebody who mistakes a bicycle for a wheelbarrow and then complains about how badly constructed that wheelbarrow is as a mode of transportation. Reading Badiou’s account of their correspondence, one can literally feel Deleuze’s incredulity, and his attempt to make the best of such a colossal misunderstanding; up to a point at which the encounter becomes simply too sad, and Deleuze feels that he has to stop responding. There might be some truth in Badiou’s claim that Deleuze’s thought is ‘profoundly aristocratic’ , but it is certainly not ‘a philosophy of death’ and his ‘conceptual productions’ are only ‘monotonous’ if one considers variations and modulations to be monotonous. Maybe with enough conceptual Lacanian contortions, one might somehow translate Deleuze’s formal distinction between formal distinction and ontological identity into a ‘distinction of the formal and the real’ in which ‘the One alone is real’ , although I doubt that it can be done. In fact, although there might be some truth somewhere in Badiou’s reading, one can feel that in actual fact, it is all utterly and sadly wrong. In a curious vertigo, one might argue, everything is so utterly wrong as to be almost completely true again. In this light, Badiou’s statement that the ‘power of the false’ is what Deleuze considers as ‘truth’ is doubly ironic. What to say about a sentence like ‘whatever is spontaneous is inferior to thought, which only begins when it is constrained to become animated by the forces of the outside’ ? Like all other claims, this one is so blatantly against the spirit of Deleuze that it only begins to make sense once it is completely inverted. But enough of this. (On Badiou’s Deleuze, see Toscano 2000: 236, on Badiou and Deleuze, Kaufman).
https://libgen.is/book/index.php?md5=5BE704EC89792210F5A59CB06B38D975

>>497138
>The Israeli's even wrote some papers on the application of D&G to urban warfare
Ok looked this up out of curiosity and this is actually fascinating stuff
https://www.frieze.com/article/art-war
Reminder to read theory

I must disagree with Hughes’ reading here. It is at best a partial reading. Partial because, when Hughes quotes Deleuze as saying that intensive quantity is transcendental and not physical, he shortens Deleuze’s sentence, which actually begins: “Energy or intensive quantity is a transcendental principle…” Deleuze is not just drawing inspiration from science, he is ungrounding representational interpretations of natural science to show that general concepts like “energy” in thermodynamics, “differential” in calculus, “gene” in biology, or “phoneme” in linguistics (D&R, 278) are really virtual intensive quantities which only become recognizable to scientific consciousness after they’ve been covered over by qualities and explicated in extensity. Far from turning to the natural sciences merely to extract their metaphorics, Deleuze critiques the naïve physicalism of these sciences in order to install the genetic power of the transcendental at the heart of nature itself.

Deleuze is trying to provide the natural science of his day with a metaphysics; but like Schelling (see Preface to Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature), he meant his metaphysics to come after physics, and not before it. By engaging with the natural sciences, Deleuze doesn’t mean to undermine them by applying transcendental limits to subjective knowledge; his transcendental empiricism aims to unsettle the clear and distinct categories of scientific representation by pointing to the ceaseless rumbling of a volcanic nature whose groundless ground (Abgrund) constantly disturbs the smooth surface features that allow for lawful generalization. The inner nature of the scientist, with all the truth and good sense of his inductive method, projects an external nature that circles and so repeats lawfully without undue difference. Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is a direct assault upon such a Cartesian science, on the way it covers over the implication of ideal intensities without affirming the virtual processes that remain behind or beneath these coverings, processes which Deleuze argues provide the conditions for the actuality of the qualitative extensities measured by the scientist. Deleuze’s differential concept of nature is spiralic: nature is groundlessly creative; it is eternally recurring but only by repeatedly disguising its own intensive depth; it is always spinning out of the general categories or circles of control posited by the spectating scientific Cogito. There is a ceaseless rumbling in nature that forms cracks in every smooth ground or sufficient reason that might pretend to hold back the transcendental volcano of virtual intensities, a rumbling forever forcing thought to think.
https://footnotes2plato.com/2013/05/13/reflections-on-deleuzes-engagement-with-natural-science-in-dr/

>>497150
>Derrida may be a little too opaque for our crowd. We share more with architects; we combine theory and practice. We can read, but we know as well how to build and destroy, and sometimes kill
Lmao even they shit on Derrida.

>>497113
Its more how reading Difference and Repetition helped me understand identity and negation which helped me understand dialectics.

>>497138
Lole, kinda ironic considering Deleuze dislikes israel
https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1684-the-indians-of-palestine-an-interview-between-gilles-deleuze-and-elias-sanbar

>>497135
>Now in the broader sense, this plane of immanence is the body without organs itself. In the narrower sense, the BwO is what one becomes once one is freed from conceptual thinking which divides the plane of immanence into stable categories and tries to fix them in place.
Have experienced this on various psychedelics. It's a shame that Deleuze was anti-psychedelic because they really help one achieve this state. When one peaks, things become deterritorialized, and when one comes down from the trip, things become reterritorialized allowing one to make rhizomatic connections and form new perspectives.

>>497140
They can't control who uses their theory for any given purpose. The fact that their ideas have had practical applications just gives their theory more credence.

Todd May, Clemson University, SC, USA, gave about Gilles Deleuzes dissertation from 1968: Difference and Repetition in DISPUK, Denmark April - May 2017
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pgh9hMgSKEM&list=PLD1szxop5A91gPCci-enrKnBfOBriemru

Nathan Widder, Digitized Humanity : the "Contractual" Ethico - political dimensions of the "machinic" networks, - GIAN - MHRD, IIT Kharagpur
Hegel as background to Deleuze's thought, Deleuze's Reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze on Difference and Repetition, Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLBNAhOTc16q85BCND4wiV53CT7cKIu-qq

Dialectics Deep Dive: History & Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism, Dialectics Deep Dive II: The Philosophy of Spinoza & God-as-Nature, Dialectics Deep Dive (pt. 3a): Spinoza On the Origin and Nature of Minds and Bodies, Dialectics Deep Dive (pt. 3b): Marshall McLuhan & the Medium-as-Message, Dialectics Deep Dive 4: Finishing Spinoza, Beginning Deleuze & Guattari
https://revolutionaryleftradio.libsyn.com/website/dialectics
https://revolutionaryleftradio.libsyn.com/website/spinoza
https://revolutionaryleftradio.libsyn.com/website/deep-dive-3a
https://revolutionaryleftradio.libsyn.com/website/deep-dive-3b
https://revolutionaryleftradio.libsyn.com/website/deep-dive-4-0

Webdeleuze, video/audio lectures and translation - https://www.webdeleuze.com/
https://www.youtube.com/c/Webdeleuze

Philosophize This! Deleuze part 1-5 episode # 125-129
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6RnMHRtos4&list=PL42xbnlSNG95FKVSwXcS3-5bJFB8ALjy_&index=2

Acid Horizon
https://www.youtube.com/c/AcidHorizon/search?query=deleuze

Plastic Pills
https://www.youtube.com/c/PlasticPills/search?query=deleuze

theory pleeb
https://www.youtube.com/c/theorypleeb/search?query=deleuze

Machinic Unconscious Happy Hour with Cooper Cherry
https://soundcloud.com/podcast-co-coopercherry

Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari Theory & Philosophy 1 / 16
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nADigXIRGyA&list=PLWp2B7872lffAbUVVSc12SEr3e2X9gwXw

Deleuze and Spinoza: Practical Philosophy and Process Ontology - Epoch Philosophy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lXhCsXcBdKI

Deleuze & Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus, Gilles Deleuze's Difference & Repetition, Postscript on the Societies of Control ​by John David Ebert
​https://www.youtube.com/user/johndavidebert/search?query=deleuze

SUBLATION AND REPETITION. Žižek’s Less Than Nothing: Ch. 7 - The Limits of Hegel Pt. 5
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BG_pkAga_vE

European Graduate School Video Lectures, Jacques Derrida. Gilles Deleuze: On Forgiveness. 2004, Manuel De Landa. Deleuze and The New Materialism. 2009. Sylvère Lotringer. Deleuze. 2011
https://www.youtube.com/user/egsvideo/search?query=deleuze

Actual Virtual Journal - Ian Buchanan - Deleuze and the Internet (Practical Deleuzism), Beth Lord - Kant, Deleuze, and the Difference of Being and Thought, Rick Dolphijn - Matter of Life: Ecology in Spinoza, Deleuze and Meillassoux, Kenneth Surin - Was Deleuze a Materialist?, Ronald Bogue - Corporate Movement, the State and the War Machine, Patricia MacCormack - Deleuze and the Demonological Text , Eric Guichard - Reading A Thousand Plateaus
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4CtHPqv6eKr8pYqe8qEoEA/search?query=deleuze

Anthropocene, Ecology, Pedagogy: The Future in Question, Hanjo Berressem | Gilles Deleuze’s Luminous Aesthetics
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCiYpb7adp3lvjdi-F8RktrQ/search?query=deleuze

Columbia Center for Contemporary Critical Thought Nietzsche's Deleuze with Barbara Stiegler, John Rajchman, and Mick Taussig.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFFxnf92XqY

The Micropolitics of the Drives (Nietzsche, Lacan, Foucault, Deleuze)"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lajsoQJ0V6A

NEW ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF GILLES DELEUZE’S PARIS LECTURES
https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/

Coursework Materials for Deleuze and Guattari - John Protevi
http://www.protevi.com/john/DG/index.html

Deleuze Page - commentaries for what they are worth, drawing on notes below, videos (with M Harris) in the series 'Deleuze for the Desperate'.
https://www.arasite.org/deleuzep.html

https://www.newappsblog.com/2012/08/how-to-begin-reading-deleuze.html

https://www.ribbonfarm.com/2014/07/09/a-koan-is-not-a-riddle/

https://www.quora.com/What-did-Deleuze-mean-by-becoming-molecular

https://naughtthought.wordpress.com/2011/05/08/what-is-transcendental-materialism-pt2/

>>497158
>Acid Horizon
This channel is giga based and has a lot of stuff on Bataille too, so everybody should check it out.
/leftypol/ will become a Bataillean board.

>>497144
It was a good faith question out of curiosity not a litmus test. I swear people on this board

>>497162
Sorry m8, It was kneejerk reaction at what I saw in the Gramsci thread.

>>497163
That's the inherent problem with imageboards, maybe the internet in general. It makes everybody kneejerk to everyone else any good faith discussion is fstally undermined.

>>497158
great, thanks

>>497166
Wow, a worse thread than this one. There's one person who knows what he's talking about, a few people who are interested or open (on the right or left), but the vast majority of the comments are from rightoid imbeciles blathering on about Jews/commies/pedophiles/transgender/"anti-nomians." If it weren't for that one person, the thread would be irredeemable.

>>497167
>the vast majority of the comments are from rightoid imbeciles blathering on about Jews/commies/pedophiles/transgender/"anti-nomians."
Welcome to 4chins

>>497159
/leftypol/ will become a Bataillean board.

>>497169
we already live in a bataillean world

>>497121
>he let the vampires steal his soul
breh, you had only just got it back

>>497156
Holy shit i think i know what you're talking about .
Can you explain your experience a bit more i want to see if i experienced tha same ething?

>>497135
What do you need to read to be able to understand this shit tho?
Also I've heard people say this is compatible with Marx and the stuff about deteritorialization and the plane of immanence reminds kind of reminds of dialectal and metaphysical ways of thinking but like, more refined . Does it have any connection or am i just a brainlet?

>>497174
think of marx's "everything solid melts into air" when looking at capitalist forms of deterritorialization and think of capital's reactionary symptoms in people like thatcher and regan when understanding reterritorialization. capitalism performs both and it needs both because of this self-limiting factor as part of it's mode of production - capitalism commoditises all things except it's conditions of substitution - but to "mad black deleuzeans" like nick land capitalism is the only way you get the liberating current of deterritorialization, and to contemporary leftists like todd mcgowan deterritorialization is right wing - so there is dispute, theres no perfect fit in with marxism, especially traditional forms.

>>497172
what did he mean by this

>>497156
>form new perspectives
Never once useful.
<whoa everything is like, connected man
Weird how it never gives us any practical new insights into political economy, OH WELL

>>497177
the ironic thing about liberal politics is that theres seemingly nothign more disempowering than individualism and "novelty". "new perspectives" are gay indeed.

>>497158
>>497161
Amazing, this is great.
We need to have this pasted in the next D&G thread too.
>>497127
>Pic related, it's the real you climbing into the evangelion.
Lmfao.

>Not reading Zerzan instead
NGMI

>>497118
That's very based. Thank you.
How you do it?
Perdonally i use OCR to extract text out pdf files and format them and correct them on Scrivner which is a program made to create epubs.
Results are decent.
So far i did only 4 books. I'd post them but my hard drive got burned and i lost them.
It's a terrible process that lasts even days at time. I'm looking for ways to optimize it.

>>497180
>Zerzan
>>497118
Baseddddddd. Did you upload it to libgen already?

>>497180
>Zerzan
Fuck, meant to ask, what is the relationship to D&G?

>>497181
I use ABBYY FineReader, manually correct as much of the OCR as possible, save the text to EPUB, then use Calibre's somewhat crash-prone EPUB editor. While I tried Sigil, I didn't like it as much, and I was already accustomed to Calibre's editor from modifying bad texts or replacing images of text with the actual text (fairly common with Ancient Greek, but the vast majority of OCRed Greek text is badly done anyway). "Anti-Oedipus" did take me a few days, but I was working off of a bad copy, one that I later discovered was missing a few pages; also, part of this process included adding page numbers/links in the index, which wasn't strictly necessary. If I hadn't done that and if the copy I had had been better, I could have finished it in two or three days of (still very tedious) work.

I've given a few other books the same treatment, but these are usually modified from the original since they were intended for myself alone originally. Normally, the modification is limited to correcting misspellings in the original text, but I'll also change the hyphenation slightly and sometimes add brackets around footnote links for (my own) ease of reading. I thought about posting my EPUB copy of Moishe Postone's "Time, Labor, and Social Domination" somewhere, but it's slightly modified in this way. It's really only the hyphenation change that stops me, since I assume the other minor changes will bother no one.



>>497182
No, not yet. I thought about it, but I was hoping for comments first since there could be some error. Probably this is the wrong thread for that sort of thing. I was thinking about adding a page map beforehand as well. I did upload a (very slightly) corrected version of Husserl's "Cartesian Meditations" to Library Genesis some time ago, though. I'd have been more elaborate, but I wasn't sure what the tolerance for modification there was.

Based thread. About time /leftypol/ gets into more recent theory. I did not expect a 4 day old thread with more than 100 posts though wow, how?

Can someone explain to me like I'm a prole (I am)? I can't understand a word from the discussion, but I'm really interested

>>497185
Interestingly, I (OP) only bumped the thread once.

We need to make a community-wide conscious effort to put theory back as a main topic on /leftypol/. Global politics are fine, but if people, especially noobies, have no framework to think about them, they will default to left liberal analysis.

You say "about time", it's only so because I made it happen by making the thread. You can also do this, it is entirely within your capacity to bring more contemporary theory into discussion.

I really want more of this style of threads, which is why I'm trying to convince you to make the threads you want to see, and help curate and get discussion going by posting thoughtfully in the thread you made. <3

>>497186
Check out the video playlist linked in the OP. It also has a transcript which is easy to read. It is done by a seasoned professor for lay audiences.

>>497187
I would like to see more threads like this too but I'm too much of a theorylet so I can't help

>>497189
>I would like to see more threads like this too but I'm too much of a theorylet so I can't help
And you think I'm a big theory brain or something?

>>497173
>>497174
Instead of viewing things as 0=0, view things as 1+(-1) = 0. They have the same value but are two "different" expressions. 1 exists only because (-1) allows it to, and vice versa. Two opposite numbers come into existence as an emergent properties of the same void.

if I'm even understanding this correct

>>497135
What's the point of such state? Categorizing things and percieving discrete objects is already implied in sense perception. We can't not perceive objects (both physical and non physical). Sure, under heavy doses of certain drugs, things stop having meaning and become a BwO, but that isn't really useful. The revolt against static objects is already partly a given in marxism. The only missing piece, one could argue, is the re-territorialization.

What I'm trying to say is that a state of BwO is impossible. When you de territorialize objects, what you are really doing is recontextualizing. Meaning, dismembering the object, and re assembeling it based on already understood relationships to other things.

This is basically lateral thinking and Zizek frequently comes up with examples using Lacan that do exactly this. "But what if the opposite is true". Essentially, Zizek uses Lacan as a treasure trove of tools of deterritorialization to come up with novel understandings.

And I mention Zizek because I know Deleuze was against psychoanalysis. But isn't Freud basically de/reterritorializing shit in his books too? Speculating massively based on counter intuitive ideas.

>maybe the kid is fixated with his anus and holding his shit in because he wishes to remain clean

If this isn't schizo analysis I don't know what is.

Thoughts?

>>497192
I am not the person you asked but problem with Freud, Zizek and Lacan, according to DnG, is that they use prefabricated static concepts. The Oedipus complex, for example. A real deteritorialisation and reteritorialisation only takes place when the reference to everything becomes possible and not only to another static narrative like the father-son relationship. Schizoanalysis is psychoanalysis only taken two steps further. But I'm not en expert, just my thoughts.

>>497193
Ok, we agree then.

>>497143
This shit reads like it was generated by AI

>>497195
Someone needs to run it through a GPT3 bot and feed the output to grad students

>>497195
At a certain point in the text, this sounds like Deleuze’s conclusion. As formal and groundless thought could be anything, thought is the most futuristic form of consciousness. It proceeds without truthvalues, and without time-values. Eros too could be oblivious to past desires, but thought is more so; thought empties itself of everything except its future interpretations, subject to chance and excess. But is the groundlessness of thought sufficient to call the future empty? Does this not repeat the problem: Are groundless thoughts empty? Is Deleuze affirming a kind of decisionism in the realm of thought? Is the future empty if empty thoughts are in it? How is this kind of future “the proper place of decision”?

This is a difficult passage to interpret. When Deleuze says here, at the end of his twenty pages on psychoanalysis, but with thirteen pages left to go in the chapter, that “this is how the story of time ends”, does he mean that this maximally empty time is finally the best definition of time, or is he suggesting (without saying it) that psychoanalysis does not finally generate a good enough theory of time, because the best it can say about the future is that it is a death drive? … unless the emptiness of the future is a condition for a different kind of content for the future. At this point in the text, psychoanalysis drops out of the picture, and the remaining pages of Chapter 2 of Difference and Repetition deal with “dark precursors” and Deleuze’s spin on Nietzsche’s “eternal return.” This certainly sounds like a more productive way to aim at the future than either the death instinct or the indeterminacy of thought. But even with the theory of dark precursors, it is not easy to say what, other than emptiness, the future is about.

We can start by asking: When do dark precursors exist? The point of saying that precursors are dark is to say that even when we believe that an event will mean something in the future, we recognize that we cannot foresee, or decide in advance, the series of repetitions that it will instigate. To be a normal sort of precursor, an event has to have some special property that prescribes something about future events. But if an event is a dark precursor precisely by not clarifying a future series, by pointing to the region of an event that remains undetermined and ungrounded, then in an important sense, dark precursors are the opposite of precursors. It would be nice if we could say that the future is the time when we take up events from the past, and by an act of will, repeat them differently, many times, on different branches, as it were. It would be nice, in short, if we could say that the future is when the “eternal return of the different” takes place. But with dark precursors, any connection between a past event and a future repetition is an “excessive coupling”: Neither the past nor the future elements of a pair explain why they are joined as they are. The foundational reason why dark precursors do not light up the future is that what is repeated is not an action: “all that returns [to the future], the eternal return, is the unconditioned,” a kind of unformatted problem space. Past contents can of course be repeated in new presents, which can be repeated in turn in later presents, but “the third repetition renders the repetition of the other two [past and present] impossible”. No matter how much repetition takes place, and no matter how much is anticipated, the future remains empty. This may not mean that there are no precursors at all, but that dark precursors are dark in a strong sense. A dark precursor is not a precursor of an event that will come later on, but is a dark precursor of itself. It is not a precursor of something dark; the precursor itself is dark. It empties itself out so that it cannot have deterministic effects. It is a kind of repetition-maker that ensures that its own agency does not yet exist. This is the force of saying that the dark precursor resonates not “in advance,” as a normal precursor would, but “in reverse”, by “retrojection”. The point is that the singularity of an event, such as it is, the way an event emits its stream of singularities, the differentiator of its differences, exists only in the future. The precursor is what has not yet happened.

As it happens, Deleuze’s most developed example of a dark precursor is difficult to fit into a theory of the future. The example involves Freud’s case of a childhood trauma that lies dormant, and gets actualized in symptoms only later in life.12 Deleuze calls the childhood trauma the dark precursor. There are two ways to think about futurity in this scenario. One way is to think that the trauma and its later expression make up together a single event that takes place at two distant times. We might want to call the later stage of the event the future of the earlier stage, but if they are really two poles in the same event, it is more a case of distribution of a single event across time, than of one event and its future. The second stage would be dark at the time of the first, but then again, the first would remain obscure until the second occurs. Because of this, one might equally say that the adult symptom is precursor of the childhood event. In any case, the dark precursor on this construal sounds more like before–after coexistence than like an empty future.

The second way to think about the trauma-to-symptom passage is that the second stage is the “delayed” presence of the first. (“It is this delay,”). This comes closer to thinking of the second as the future, despite the fact that it is the essence of the first. Whether we know or imagine the second stage in advance does not matter as much as the fact that the event is half future at any given time, that the event depends on the half that is not there yet. The part of the event which is empty would be the sense in which the event is in the future. The second reading allows us to go back to the question: When is there a precursor of the future? Answer: In the future. To say it simply, the future exists only in the future. Consequently, to perceive the future in its pure state, we would have to exist in our not-yet form. But in a future image, what is there to see? To sum up, it seems on the one hand natural, if perhaps a dead end, to think of the future as empty, as nothing has happened or is happening in it. It is conceivable that Deleuze’s interest in the future simply has nothing at all to do with our everyday chronological future, with what might happen to us later today, or to humans in the coming century. But put this way, it is no so natural after all to think of the future without actualities. Will the price of oil not fluctuate in the future? Will this semester never end? Of course, we do not read Deleuze for his stock market predictions. And it is right for philosophers to distinguish sharply between what it means to befuture and the particular occurrences that will end up happening in the future. It is tempting to conclude, with Arkady Plotnitsky, that “[Deleuze’s] formlessness may be called ‘pure time’ only insofar as it is no longer ‘time’ at all in any sense we can give to such a concept, in this respect making the term ‘pure’ more important than ‘time’” . But if possible, it would be preferable to preserve the time in “pure time,” the future in the “synthesis of the future.”

We want to push the problem of the future beyond the dichotomy of either a temporal void or a classical theory of precursors. In terms of Deleuze’s text, the thing to keep in mind is that even though the third synthesis of time involves forgetting past and present to empty out the form of time, nevertheless in time as a whole, the syntheses of the passing present and the coexisting past remain autonomous, and still keep chugging along. Even once we experience the future as empty, the present keeps contracting past and future, as you can plainly see; the past keeps bubbling up into the present and the future, just look; the future keeps emptying out past and present. So in what form do past and present events subsist once the future destroys them? Does simulated content from the other syntheses return, albeit emptily, to the empty future, like the free-floating forking paths in a Borges story?

>>497053
>Jonas Čeika
Is he Lithuanian or some burgeroid Chicagan WW2 refugee descendant?

>>497198
I think he lives in norway

>>497197
Forgive my brainlet nature when it comes to psychoanalysis but is this a genuine response or another AI generated shitpost???

SOMEONE HELP ME UNDERSTAND DEAR GOD

Henri Bergson (1859–1941) was one of the most famous and influential French philosophers of the late 19th century-early 20th century. Although his international fame reached cult-like heights during his lifetime, his influence decreased notably after the second World War. While such French thinkers as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and Lévinas explicitly acknowledged his influence on their thought, it is generally agreed that it was Gilles Deleuze’s 1966 Bergsonism that marked the reawakening of interest in Bergson’s work. Deleuze realized that Bergson’s most enduring contribution to philosophical thinking is his concept of multiplicity. Bergson’s concept of multiplicity attempts to unify in a consistent way two contradictory features: heterogeneity and continuity. Many philosophers today think that this concept of multiplicity, despite its difficulty, is revolutionary. It is revolutionary because it opens the way to a reconception of community.

The concept of multiplicity has two fates in the Twentieth Century: Bergsonism and phenomenology (Deleuze, 1991, pp. 115–118). In phenomenology, the multiplicity of phenomena is always related to a unified consciousness. In Bergsonism, “the immediate data of consciousness” (les données immédiates de la conscience) are a multiplicity. Here, two prepositions, “to” and “of,” indicate perhaps the most basic difference between Bergsonism and phenomenology. Of course, this phrase is the title of Bergson’s first work, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. The standard English title of this work is Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. It is the text that Sartre claimed attracted him to philosophy.

Time and Free Will has to be seen as an attack on Kant, for whom freedom belongs to a realm outside of space and time. Bergson thinks that Kant has confused space and time in a mixture, with the result that we must conceive human action as determined by natural causality. Bergson offers a twofold response. On the one hand, in order to define consciousness and therefore freedom, Bergson proposes to differentiate between time and space, “to un-mix” them, we might say. On the other hand, through the differentiation, he defines the immediate data of consciousness as being temporal, in other words, as the duration (la durée). In the duration, there is no juxtaposition of events; therefore there is no mechanistic causality. It is in the duration that we can speak of the experience of freedom.

For Bergson, we must understand the duration as a qualitative multiplicity — as opposed to a quantitative multiplicity. As the name suggests, a quantitative multiplicity enumerates things or states of consciousness by means of externalizing one from another in a homogeneous space. In contrast, a qualitative multiplicity consists in a temporal heterogeneity, in which “several conscious states are organized into a whole, permeate one another, [and] gradually gain a richer content” (Time and Free Will, p. 122). Bergson even insists that the word ‘several’ is inappropriate to qualitative multiplicity because it suggests numbering. In Time and Free Will, Bergson provides examples of a quantitative multiplicity; the example of a flock of sheep is perhaps the easiest to grasp (Time and Free Will, pp. 76–77). To constitute a quantitative multiplicity, which is always done out of a practical or utilitarian interest, one ignores the content of the space the items occupy, which results in the space being homogeneous. In the case of the flock of sheep, one ignores the fact that the pasture in which they are feeding is beautiful and the fact that the sheep are not strictly identical to one another. One focuses on what they have in common. What one is interested in is the total number of sheep, be it for meat or wool production. We are able to enumerate them because each sheep occupies a discernable location within the field, because they are juxtaposed to one another. Of course, the enumeration of the sheep is represented by a symbol, a number. Similarly, a calendar or a clock is a homogeneous form of time.

The idea of qualitative multiplicities is difficult to understand, although it is the heart of Bergson’s thinking. Normally, we would think that if there is heterogeneity, there has to be juxtaposition. But, in qualitative multiplicities, there is heterogeneity and no juxtaposition. Qualitative multiplicities are temporal; qualitative multiplicity defines the duration. As with quantitative multiplicities, Bergson gives us many examples. But perhaps, the most significant example is the feeling of sympathy because, in the 1903 “Introduction to Metaphysics,” Bergson defines intuition as sympathy. Here, in Time and Free Will, he calls it a moral feeling (Time and Free Will, 18–19). Our experience of sympathy begins, according to Bergson, with us putting ourselves in the place of others, in feeling their pain. But, Bergson continues, if this were all, the feeling would inspire in us abhorrence of others, and we would want to avoid them, not help them. But then, one realizes that, if one does not help this poor wretch, it is going to turn out that no one will come to my aide when I need help. There is a “need” to help the suffering. For Bergson, these first two phases are “inferior forms of pity.” In contrast, true pity is not so much fearing pain as desiring it. It is as if nature committed a great injustice and what we want is not to be seen as complicitous with it. As Bergson says, “The essence of pity is thus a need for self-abasement [s’humilier], an aspiration downward” into pain. But, this downward aspiration develops into an upward movement into the feeling of being superior. One feels superior because one comes to realize that one can do without certain sensuous goods. In the end however, one feels humility, humble since one no longer needs and desires such sensuous goods. By denying ourselves of these goods, we, in a way, reestablish justice. Later in the 1932 Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Bergson shows that the feeling of sympathy in fact progresses to the point of love for all things. In any case, the feeling of sympathy is “a qualitative progress.” It consists in a “transition from repugnance to fear, from fear to sympathy, and from sympathy itself to humility.” There is a heterogeneity of feelings here. The feelings are continuous with one another; they interpenetrate one another, and there is even an opposition between inferior needs and superior humility. If we tried to juxtapose the feelings, that is, separate them spatially, the feelings would have a different nature than when they interpenetrate. There would be no progress from one to the other. They would be isolated psychic states. Therefore, for Bergson, a qualitative multiplicity is heterogeneous (or differentiated), continuous (or unifying), oppositional (or dualistic) at the extremes, and, most importantly, temporal or progressive (an irreversible flow). Bergson also calls the last characteristic of temporal progress mobility; this characteristic truly distinguishes duration from space, which is an “immobile medium” (The Creative Mind, p. 180). Finally, because a qualitative multiplicity is heterogeneous and yet interpenetrating, it is inexpressible. The continuous and heterogeneous multiplicity of consciousness is given immediately, that is, without the mediation of symbols (Bergson 1992, 162). For Bergson — and perhaps this is his greatest insight — freedom is mobility. Because Bergson connects duration with mobility, in the second half of the Twentieth Century (in Deleuze and Foucault, in particular), the Bergsonian concept of qualitative multiplicity will be dissociated from time and associated with space (Deleuze 1986).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bergson/#ConcMult

>>497206
In “Introduction to Metaphysics,” Bergson gives us three images to help us think about the duration and therefore qualitative multiplicities (The Creative Mind, pp. 164–65). The first is that of two spools, with a tape running between them, one spool unwinding the tape, the other winding it up. (During his discussion of Bergson, Heidegger focuses on this image in his 1928 The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.) Duration resembles this image, according to Bergson, because, as we grow older, our future grows smaller and our past larger. The benefit of this image is that it presents a continuity of experiences without juxtaposition. Yet, there is a drawback: because a tape moves between the two spools, the image presents the duration as being homogeneous, as if one could fold the tape back over its other parts, as if the tape were super-posable, implying that two moments in consciousness might be identical. Yet, as Bergson says, “no two moments are identical in a conscious being” (The Creative Mind, p. 164). Duration, for Bergson, is continuity of progress and heterogeneity; moreover, thanks to this image, we can also see that duration implies a conservation of the past. Indeed, for Bergson and this is the center of his truly novel idea of memory, memory conserves the past and this conservation does not imply that one experiences the same (re-cognition), but difference. One moment is added onto the old ones, and thus, when the next moment occurs, it is added onto all the other old ones plus the one that came immediately before. In comparison, therefore to the past collection of moments, it cannot be the same as the one immediately before, because the past is “larger” for the current moment than it was for the previous moment. Although Bergson does not say this, one might say that Tuesday is different from Monday because Monday only includes itself and Sunday, while Tuesday includes itself, Monday, and Sunday. This first image, therefore, implies that duration is memory: the prolongation of the past into the present. We shall return to the question of memory below.

The second image of qualitative multiplicity is the color spectrum. We saw in the first image of the spools that there is constant difference or heterogeneity. The color spectrum helps us understand this, since a color spectrum has a multiplicity of different shades or nuances of color. Here we have heterogeneity, but there is a drawback to this image as well. We lose the characteristic of continuity or unity since the spectrum has colors juxtaposed. As Bergson says, “pure duration excludes all idea of juxtaposition, reciprocal exteriority and extension” (The Creative Mind, p. 164).

Bergson’s third image is an elastic band being stretched. Bergson tells us first to contract the band to a mathematical point, which represents “the now” of our experience. Then, draw it out to make a line growing progressively longer. He warns us not to focus on the line but on the action which traces it. If we can focus on the action of tracing, then we can see that the movement — which is duration — is not only continuous and differentiating or heterogeneous, but also indivisible. We can always insert breaks into the spatial line that represents the motion, but the motion itself is indivisible. For Bergson, there is always a priority of movement over the things that move; the thing that moves is an abstraction from the movement. Now, the elastic band being stretched is a more exact image of duration. But, the image of the elastic is still, according to Bergson, incomplete. Why ? Because, for him, no image can represent duration. An image is immobile, while duration is “pure mobility” (The Creative Mind, p. 165). Later, in Creative Evolution, Bergson will criticize the new art of cinema for presenting immobile images of movement. As Deleuze will show in his cinema books, however, Bergson does not recognize the novelty of this artform. Cinema does provide moving images. In any case, in “Introduction to Metaphysics,” Bergson compares all three images: “the unrolling of our duration [the spool] in certain aspects resembles the unity of a movement which progresses [the elastic], in others, a multiplicity of states spreading out [the color-spectrum].” Now we can see that duration really consists in two characteristics: unity and multiplicity. This double characteristic brings us to Bergson’s method of intuition.

>>497206
pretty neat, barley parsed it, but it seems in line with a more modern understanding of consciousness - periods of absolute darkness alongside periods of existence. 'you' is reconstructed each day meaning our understanding of identity is far more pliable in the world of politics and self-reflection than is typically attributed.

Very neat stuff, maybe I'll read my copy of AntiOed/ATP one of these days…

How do people get to a point where they can understand this shit

>>497210
Schizophrenia (based)
honestly just keep reading philosophy and it's gonna click at some point

>>497210
It's like learning a language. You have to constantly dip your toes in. After a while you'll be more familiar with the language and you won't even notice.

D&G are hard to read even for professionally trained philosophers.

Also, when you first start reading an author, their writing style might be very hard to parse, but as you continue, it'll be easier.

You can also read and watch secondary material to get a grasp of concepts before you read them directly.

Also, reading doesn't have to be linear, meaning from page 1 to page n. In fact it is better if you jump around, read the index, read the table of contents, skim to random sections, etc. Also, and particularly with D&G, you don't have to fully understand something before moving on. Sometimes skipping a difficult section or looking ahead helps to clarify topics.

Spinozas idea of being still retains a priority of substance over modes and therefore of identity over differences and basically what he says is that Spinoza defines substance as that which is conceivable only through itself which is infinite by way of which it can only be conceived of through itself and not any other whereas modes are always conceived of as substantive modes they belong to substance but substance does not belong to it. The individuals belongs to the absolute but the absolute does not belong to them, and what that means is that identity in the form of substance will have priority over difference. And what Deleuze will now say is that this can only be overcome at the cost of a reversal, where univocity is said directly of differences, where being is said directly of differences, and what is univocal isn't substance in relation to its differences but differences themselves. This is what he is going to say the eternal return amounts to. The eternal return is the eternal return of the same in the sense that it is different. The eternal return says that everything remains different because differences always return. Thats going to be the common sense of all things in Deleuze. That all things retain a difference that is superior to any identity and it is linked to notions of power, of overcoming and the thing that it common to all things is their capacity to overcome, their capacity to express power.

reading and discussion of Deleuze's 'Treatise on Nomadology' from ATP

i'm assuming you're all familiar with chess the way go is played is in chess there are sides right you you have your pieces lined up on the board and the sides themselves have a particular uh part to play in the game when a pawn reaches the other side it gets promoted to whatever piece you like and it's always a queen unless you're like trying to make some kind of statement and there's a directionality to it pieces can only go in one direction relative to your side or certain pieces can't um pawns specifically in go by contrast there are no real sides because the aim is not the elimination of the opponent's pieces the aim is to control most of the board

see in chess it's like there's something like a state there's something like a wall your pieces are arrayed from from the beginning they are raid against an ordered opponent um you have a king that can be taken your your side must be defended because if they manage to get their pawns into your territory they can now start deploying very powerful pieces right behind your alliance and it's basically game over at that point if they manage to do so that isn't the case in go in go uh it's purely abstract there there are no fixtures the only fixtures in the game are what are created by the dynamics of the game itself the board itself has nothing permanent uh prior to the battle

Archive plz.