by invitation of bronies & Tania
<Avatard RP reactionary leech is oUr fWiEnD u GuIsE
527 posts and 952 image replies omitted.While MLP's song Our Town shows a bleak picture from Plato's Community of Pleasures & Pains, MLP Equestria Girls Cafeteria song (I think) shows a better depiction seen in Plato's Statesmen of a royal weaver (Twilight Sparkle is that royal weaver here).
Plato Statesmen:
>The whole process of royal weaving is comprised—never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and reputation, and by the giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State.
>This then we declare to be the completion of the web of political action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two minds into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and having perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political life admits, and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them,
and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city, in no particular fails to secure their happiness.
#2:
2. Unitary / State Corporatism: All men as one man.
>The error concerning mixed government [constitutionalism] has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the union of many men.
And also from Hobbes:
>And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,) is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.”
Now compare with Plato Republic:
>And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man.
&
>“The same,” he said, “and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism.”
&
>But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts.”
&
>That the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity.
&
Plato Laws:
>That all men are, so far as possible, unanimous in the praise and blame they bestow, rejoicing and grieving at the same things, and that they honor with all their heart those laws which render the State as unified as possible
#4
Political & Economical no different.
I believe this is also maintained.
…
<Hobbes / That a Family is a little City
>"Propriety receiv'd its beginning, What's objected by some, That the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of Cities, was found in the Fathers of Families, that objection is vain, because I have already declar'd, That a Family is a little City. For the Sons of a Family have propriety of their goods granted them by their Father, distinguisht indeed from the rest of the Sons of the same Family, but not from the propriety of the Father himself; but the Fathers of diverse Families, who are subject neither to any common Father, nor Lord, have a common Right in all things."
Thomas Hobbes
>And though in the charters of subordinate corporations, a corporation be declared to be one person in law, yet the same has not been taken notice of in the body of a commonwealth [state] or city, nor have any of those innumerable writers of politics observed any such union
&
>A great Family if it be not part of some Commonwealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Sovereignty, a little Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the Father or Master is the Sovereign.
&
>And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families
<Plato / There won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a great household & the bulk of a small city
>Visitor: Well then, surely there won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a great household, on the one hand, and the bulk of a small city on the other? – Young Socrates: None. – It's clear that there is one sort of expert knowledge concerned with all these things; whether someone gives this the name of kingship, or statesmanship, or household management, let's not pick any quarrel with him.
Aristotle writes in Politics,
>Now there is an erroneous opinion that a statesman, king, householder, and a master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state.
Aristotle:
>For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same
Aristotle:
>The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head:
>whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals.
#5:
In Hobbes Leviathan, there is a Sword and Crosier in one body, and the sovereign is also a pastor.
King James VI & I:
>As your office is likewise mixed, betwixt the Ecclesiastical and Civil estate: for a King is not mere laicus, as both the Papists and Anabaptists would have him, to the which error also the Puritans incline over far.
In Plato's Laws, religious and civil offices are aligned for cultivate civic virtue.
In Plato Statesmen:
>…In Egypt, the King himself is not allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistrates, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by lot to be the King Archon.
#6:
Jean Bodin testifies Plato having a composition of a Tyrannical & Popular estate (which he later goes on to deny any mixed constitutionalism whatsoever and say it was purely popular).
>Plato having presupposed the best form of a Commonwealth, to be that which was composed of a Tyrannical and Popular estate: in framing the same, is contrary unto himself, having established a Commonwealth not only Popular, but altogether also Popularly governed;
…
Looking at Leviathan, it's exactly that: Hobbes isn't a mixed constitutionalist, but Leviathan is a composition of Monarchy and the People:
>The People is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of a Multitude. The People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the People Commands; for the People wills by the will of one man; but the Multitude are citizens, that is to say, Subjects…
>And in a Monarchy, the Subjects are the Multitude, and (however it seem a Paradox) the King is the People.
#7:
Beginning with the constitution of individuals and some families at odds – & later deference to an arbiter to hash out their differences and establish peace.
<Hobbes: The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement; [OR, the NECESSITY of an arbitrary power]
>And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Laws, there may nevertheless arise questions concerning a mans action; First, whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unless the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as far from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, "That they that are at controversy, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator."
…
This is a theme in Hobbes, and in Plato there is also a turn of deference of some Arbiter because of conflicting laws / customs of private families: these are in conflict, Plato establishes, but the unity of some Arbiter(s) takes what laws the private families have and decides which are best to keep from the families altogether… Which aligns with the absolutist agenda for deference to some arbiter to bring unity… in Hobbes case it is by virtue of fear (and I believe compulsion, but also a bit of persuasion through education), but for the Classics it is generally love of justice and laws and virtue… and persuasion over compulsion (which I can imagine with some very powerful music or eloquence to bring people together?)
…
Anyways, what I would point to is in Plato's Laws:
Plato Laws
>Athenian: And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the laws of others not so well.
–This right here is really the basis of what Hobbes gets at with a war of all against all – but more importantly, at this point, there is a failure to have a concord of hosts / partnership of clans, it is futile… every man will have the extent of his laws and boundaries in another man's boundaries, interceding and conflicting…. there must be deference to an Arbiter.
>Athenian: The next step will be that these persons who have met together, will select some arbiters, who will review the laws of all of them, and will publicly present such as they approve to the chiefs who lead the tribes, and who are in a manner their kings, allowing them to choose those which they think best. These persons will themselves be called legislators, and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort of aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of the government they will live.
…
IN the same way, King James VI & I talks about this process above and being an arbiter:
King James VI & I
>This I must say for Scotland, and I may truly vaunt it; Here I sit and govern it with my Pen, I write and it is done, and by a Clerk of the Councell I govern Scotland now.
>Of this I can best resolve you: for I am the eldest Parliament man in Scotland, and have sit in more Parliaments than any of my Predecessors. I can assure you, that the form of Parliament there, is nothing inclined to popularity.
>About a twenty days or such a time before the Parliament, Proclamation is made throughout the Kingdom, to deliver in to the King's Clerk of Register (whom you here call the Master of the Rolles) all Bills to be exhibited that Session before a certain day. Then they are brought unto the King, and perused and considered by him, and only such as I allow of are put into the Chancellor's hands to be propounded to the Parliament, and none others: And if any man in Parliament speak of any other matter then is in this form first allowed by me, The Chancellor tells him there is no such Bill allowed by the King.
>Besides, when they have passed them for laws, they are presented unto me, and I with my Scepter put into my hand by the Chancellor, must say, I ratify and approve all things done in this present Parliament. And if there be any thing that I dislike, they raze it out before. If this may be called a negative voice, then I have one I am sure in that Parliament.
#8:
Persuasion.
While fear and compulsion are predominate factors for Hobbes, he did take note of persuasion too.
People are entitled to their private conscience and opinion even, but publicly show obedience and worship and conformity.
Plato advocates persuasion numerous times over compulsion: like a freeman's doctor or a slave's doctor (the freeman's doctor persuades his patient before acting, but a slave's doctor just does it anyways). And recommended a preamble for the laws (persuading people).
Hobbes: Public instruction
>I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Sovereignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Sovereign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himself in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.
#9:Community of pleasures and pains through
a Cult of Personality.If there is one innovation here every monarchist should consider, it is the advent of the Cult of Personality, or work of One Person on the multitude.
Plato Republic>And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’Plato Republic - Community of Pleasures & Pains>And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains–where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow?
>No doubt.
>Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganizedThis is a controversial point, but Hobbes first talks about appetites (pleasures) and aversions (pains) of the private persons, then consolidates all the persons into One Personhood.
…
Not only does this come to a State where by a plurality of voices, as if they all said
YES but also that condition from Plato:
>And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’
<Thomas Hobbes The Generation Of A Common-wealth>The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will:&
>This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, “I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.” &
>This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence.…
This (in)famous picture of ᴉuᴉlossnW with a plurality of Si, si, si, si, si, si behind his personage represents this unity of the representer and a cult of personality described here:
>>662137 &
>>662136Imagine every Si behind ᴉuᴉlossnW as "Mine" and "Thine" like Plato says – it seems like the condition is met where all citizens utter in a unanimous voice "mine" and "thine" – without abolishing private property, but I'll talk about that soon.
…
Consider the Community of Pleasures and Pains, this is cultivated in Hobbes' Leviathan and private appetites and private aversions are not allowed to override the Leviathan:
>But in a Common-wealth this measure is false: Not the Appetite of Private men, but the Law, which is the Will and Appetite of the State is the measure. …
Now, considering private property: Hobbes allows the distribution of private property, but it is limited by the popular consent, the distribution from the Sovereign is also in accord with unanimous "mine" and "thine" in a way.
<Hobbes: Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion Of The Sovereign, But Only Of Another Subject>From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consists in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their Sovereign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch. For seeing the Sovereign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he represents,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd.So particular subjects are limited in their estate, all property is limited by an absolute power – as well as subordinate corporations – by a sovereign, who has in his cult of personality "thine" and "mine" of every subject in a plurality of voices brought unto one voice.
Those are similarities I've taken note of (despite their differences in philosophy).
Robert Filmer:
>Also before him [Aristotle] the Divine Plato concludes a Commonweal to be nothing else but a large Family.
&
>This it seems he learnt of his master Plato, who in his third book of Laws affirms, that the true and first reason of authority is that the father and mother, and simply those that begat and ingender, do command and rule over all their children.
Plato in Laws (Book 2) talks about educating a populace with holidays and seasonal festivities: By continually shaping a people with these seasonal festivities year round, over and over, they'll have the habit and loyalty divested.
…
I agree that a regime not only aims to take the education of the youth in whatever institution of schooling / education, but also makes holidays with festivities, songs, clothing, nice sweets – to associate all those happy memories with the regime itself. This will keep the loyalty and mood of the public in a trance with the regime.
…
Today there are "secular holidays" or public holidays like in North Korea Day of the Sun or Day of the Shining Star – In the US, the 4th of July (and more contemporary, Pride Month) and other numerous examples. This is pretty critical in educating a populace: to have a cult of personalty, to have control of public education, to form holidays and seasonal festivities.
…
Plato notes to take advantage of the pleasures and pains people feel at a young age: bring those happy sensations in line with the regime. & have a cult of personality that makes the identity of people in league with the festivities they celebrate and the clothes they wear, popular customs that will distinguish a people from the rest, so they feel independent and more attached to these customs because they'll be trademarks to their identity… Plato links this cycle of holidays / festivities to the stability of States, by inducing habits by a long trial of festivities and celebrations, people will be less inclined to abandon that State.
…
A good example is Christianity today: Christmas wins the hearts of youth early on, gives them gifts and candy, builds happy memories with their parents, and keeps Christianity alive even if people say that Christmas being heavily commercialized has subverted the themes and teachings of Christianity, I'd say to the contrary it is probably helping keep Christianity strong and relevant, even mostly secular people love Christmas.
…
Seasonal change and natural imagery is also important to take into consideration and the mood people, what they see.
Thucydides is praised as the father of political realism / Realpolitik and Hobbes praised as
>the most politic historiographer that ever writ
The Melian Dialogue is a sample.
Athenians:
>For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences—either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us—and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.
Melians:
>And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule?
Athenians:
>Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.
Melians:
>But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose; to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect.,
Athenians:
>Hope, danger's comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men with hopes to their destruction.
>>711459Another item Hobbes has from Plato's Laws:
Plato:
>That the man who receives the portion should still regard it as common property of the whole StateWhich Hobbes does. The Sovereign / "The People" by a community of pleasures & pains as a whole says "Thine" & "Mine" in a way
Hobbes writes,
>Propriety of a subject excludes not the dominion of the Sovereign, but only of another subject. Court Eulogy to Ramses II:
>They were upon their bellies, wallowing upon the earth before his majesty, saying: "We come to thee, lord of heaven, lord of earth, Re, life of the whole earth, lord of duration, of fruitful revolution, Atum for the people, lord of destiny, creator of Renenet, Khnum who fashioned the people, giver of breath into the nostrils of all, making all the gods live, pillar of heaven, support of earth, adjusting the Two Lands, lord of food, plentiful in grain, in whose footsteps is the harvest goddess, maker of the great, fashioner of the lowly, whose word produces food, the lord vigilant when all men sleep, whose might defends Egypt, valiant in foreign lands, who returns when he has triumphed, whose sword protects the Egyptians, beloved of truth, in which he lives by his laws, defender of the Two Lands, rich in years, great in victory, the fear of whom expels foreign lands, our king, our lord, our Sun, by the words of whose mouth Atum lives. Loe, we are now before thy majesty, that thou mayest decree to us the life that thou givest, Pharaoh, breath of life, who makes all men live when he has shone on them.
bump
Monarchies will make a comeback sooner or later.
Yet monarchists shouldn't count on the Bourbons, Orléanists, or Bonapartists. The Law monarchists should oblige is the Law of Nature:
Empires rise and fall, & generally old dynasties don't come back after being deposed 100+ years.
I'd say 70 years maximum.
The current state of monarchist legitimatism does more harm than good: 1st, monarchists are too easy to depose a ruler to begin with on any pretense of tyranny; 2nd, while Restorationism is feasible within 1 or 2 generations, 100+ years Restoration of an old dynasty is hoping for a miracle and does more harm than good, because it becomes a Scorched Earth policy against potential new monarchies that might develop, likely by Caesarism (which monarchists despise, but really that is how it usually happens).
Sadly, the overwhelming majority of monarchists are stupidly legitimatist.
I wish monarchists were as stupidly loyal when the dynasties in question were alive (& not stupidly loyal when they are finally dead), but monarchists are the opposite and are easy-going about overthrowing a monarchy in question when it is alive but stupidly loyal upon overthrow and successful usurpation – an effort to take it back and trying to restore a regime is considerable within 70 years, but 100+ years it is a lost cause.
…
If monarchists were smart, they'd be endorsing Caesarism and trying to slip Christian crowns over Christian-affirming, rightwing would-be Caesars or just push for hereditary dictatorship or go back to thinking how monarchies sprout up naturally (as if there were no dynasties to begin with).
>>717215Yo, Grace-Anon. You own 8chan.moe/b/ correct? I'm from /rwby/
We're going to be streaming RWBY on the weekends* and I'd like to make the announcement on the Meta Thread, but I'd rather avoid trolls, whaddya think?
*See:
https://8chan.moe/rwby/res/8643.html >>717488Gracefag will look.
Louis XIV story with Nicholas Fouquet:
>The King always wants to be the richest man & he never likes anyone wealthier than himself
<Louis XIV on reforming finance (part one):
Removing the superintendant
>It was then that I believed I should give serious attention to the re-establishment of the finances, and the first thing I deemed necessary was to remove the principal officials responsible for the disorder from their positions. For ever since I had assumed the care of my affairs, I had every day discovered new evidence of their squandering, and particularly by the superintendant. The sight of vast establishments of this man and of his insolent acquisitions could not but convince me of his wild ambition, and the general distress of my entire people constantly urged my justice against him.
>But what compounded his guilt toward me was that, far from profiting from the kindness I have shown him by retaining him in my councils, it gave him renewed hope of deceiving me, and that far from being the wiser for it, he merely tried to be more skillful at it. but whatever artifice he might employ, I was not long in recognizing his bad faith, for he could not refrain from continuing his extravagant expenses, fortifying strongholds, decorating palaces, forming conspiracies, and purchasing important offices for his friends at my expense, in the hope of soon becoming the sovereign arbiter of the State.
>Although this behavior was assuredly most criminal, I had initially intended only to exclude him from affairs, but having subsequently considered that with his restless disposition he would not endure this change of fortune without trying something new, I thought it best to arrest him. I postponed, nevertheless, the execution of this plan, and this plan distressed me greatly, for not merely did I see that he was in the meanwhile employing new subterfuges to steal from me, but what disturbed me more was that in order to appear more influential, he made a point of asking me for private audiences, and that in order not to arouse his suspicions, I was compelled to grant them and to submit to his useless discussions, while I know all about his disloyalty.
>You can imagine that I was at an age when it required a great deal of self-control for me to act with such restraint. But, on the one hand, I saw that the removal of the superintendant was necessarily connected with transferring the farmed taxes, and on the other hand, I knew that it being summer, this was the worst season of the year for making such innovations, aside from wanting above all to have a fund of four millions on hand for whatever needs might arise. Thus I resolved to wait for autumn to execute this plan.
>But having gone to Nantes toward the end of the month of August for the meeting of the Estates of Brittany and getting a closer look from there at the ambitious enterprises of this minster, I could not refrain from having him arrested at that very place on September 5. All France, as convinced as I was of the misconduct of the superintendant, acclaimed this action and praised particularly the secrecy with which I ha kept a decision of this nature for three or four months, primarily in regard to a man who had such private access to me, who was in contact with all those who were around me, who was receiving information from within and from outside the State, and whose own conscience should have given him ample warning that he ha everything to fear.
>But what I believed I had on this occasion that was most worthy of being observed and most advantageous to my people was to abolish the office of superintendant, or rather to assume it myself.
>Perhaps in considering the difficulty of this undertaking, you will one day be astonished, as all France has been, that I have undertaken this labor at an age when it is usual to love only pleasure. But I shall tell you frankly that although this work was unpleasant, I felt less repugnance for it than another might have, because I have always considered the satisfaction of doing one's duty as the sweetest pleasure in the world. I have even often wondered how it could be that love for work a quality so necessary to sovereigns should yet be one that is so rarely found in them.
>Most princes, because they have a great many servants and subjects, do not feel obliged to go to any trouble and do not consider that, if they have an infinite number of people working under their orders, there are infinitely more who rely on their conduct and that it takes a great deal of watching and a great deal of work merely to insure that those who act do only what they should and that those who rely tolerate only what they must. All these different conditions that compose the world are united to each other only by an exchange of reciprocal obligations. The deferences and the respects that we receive from our subjects are not a free gift from them but payment for the justice and the protection that they expect to receive from us. Just as they must honor us, we must protect and defend them, and our debts toward them are even more binding than theirs to us, for indeed, if one of them lacks the skill or the willingness to execute our orders, a thousand others come in a crowd to fill his post, whereas the position of a sovereign can be properly filled only by the sovereign himself.
Of all the functions of Sovereignty, the one that a prince must guard most jealously is the handling of the finances
>But to be more specific, it must be added to this that of all the functions of sovereignty, the one that a prince must guard most jealously is the handling of the finances. It is the most delicate of all because it is the one that is most capable of seducing the one who performs it, and which makes it easiest for him to spread corruption.
>The prince alone should have the sovereign direction over it because he alone has no fortune to establish but that of the State, no acquisition to make except for the Monarchy, no authority to strengthen other than that of the laws, no debts to pay besides the public ones, no friends to enrich save his people.
…
>And indeed, what would be more ruinous for the provinces or more shameful for their king than to raise a man who has his own private objectives and affairs, who claims the right to dispose of everything without rendering any account and to fill his coffers and those of his creatures constantly with the most liquid public funds? Can a prince be more foolish than to favor private individuals who use his authority in order to become rich at his own expense and whose squandering, although it gains him nothing, ruins both his affairs and his reputation? And putting it more piously, can he fail to consider that these great sums which compose the exorbitant and monstrous wealth of a small number of financiers always come from the sweat, the tears, and the blood of the wretched, whose defense is committed to his care?
>The maxims I am teaching you today, my son, have not been taught to me by anyone, because they had never occurred to my predecessors. But now that your advantage in being instructed in them at such an early age will come back to haunt you if you don't profit from it.
>Aside from the councils of finances and the boards that had always been held, I decided, in order to acquit myself more responsibly of the superintendancy, to establish a new council, which I named Royal Council. I composed it of Marshal de Villeroi, of two Councillors of State, D'Aligre and De Seve, and of an Intendant of Finances, who was Colbert, and it is in this council that I have been working ever since to disentangle the terrible confusion that had been introduced into my affairs.
>This was assuredly no minor undertaking, and those who have seen the point at which things were and who sees the precision to which I have no reduced them are astonished, with reason, that I was able to penetrate in so short a time into an obscurity that so many able superintendants had never yet clarified. But what must put a stop to this surprise is the natural difference between the interest of the prince and that of the superintendant. For these private individuals, approaching their position with no greater care than to preserve their own liberty to dispose of everything as they see fit, often put much more of their skill into obscuring this matter than into clarifying it, whereas a king, who is its legitimate lord, puts as much order and precision as he can into everything, aside from the fact that I was personally often relieved in this work by Colbert, whom I entrusted with examining things that required too much discussion and into which I would not have had the time to go.
>The manner in which the collections and the expenditures had been made was something incredible. My revenues were no longer handled by my treasurers but by the clerks of the superintendant who combined them haphazardly with his private expenses. Money was disbursed when, how, and as they pleased, and one looked afterwards at leisure for false expenses, orders for cash, and canceled notes to consume these sums. The continual exhaustion of the public treasury and the perpertual avidity for more money made for the easy awarding of exorbitant commissions to those who offered to advance it. The wild disposition of Fouquet had always made him prefer useless expenses to necessary ones, so that the most liquid funds having been consumed in gratituities distributed to his friends, in buildings constructed for his pleasure, or in other things of a similar nature, it was necessary, at the slightest need of the State, to have recourse to alienations that could only be negotiated at a pittance because of the extreme necessity. By these means the State had become so impoverished that notwithstanding the immense tailles that were levied, the treasury netted no more than twenty-one million per year, which had itself been spent for two years in advance, aside from my having been made liable for seventy millions in notes issued for the profit of various individuals.
(Pic related: Louis XIV against financial harpies)
<Part 2
>The thing that I was most eager to correct about this general abuse was the use of orders for cash, because these had assuredly contributed more than anything else to the squandering of my money; for in this way one gave freely to whomever one wanted, without shame and without any fear of discovery. To avoid this confusion in the future, I resolved to draw up and to record personally all the orders I would sign, so that no expenditure has since been possible without my knowing the reason.
>I also wanted to recontract my farmed taxes, which had not been brought to their just value, and in order to avoid the frauds that were so common on these occasions – whether through the corruption of the judges who awarded them or through the secret compacts between the bidders – I was present at the bidding personally; and this first effort of mine increased my revenues by three millions, aside from making the value of the contracts payable monthly, which then gave me enough to provide for the most pressing expenses and enabled me to save the State a loss of fifteen millions a year in interest on loans.
>As for the contracts for the direct taxes, I reduced the commission from five sols to only fifteen deniers per livre, a diminution that amounted to such a large sum for the entire kingdom that it permitted me, in my great exhaustion, to lower the taille by four millions.
<I was astonished myself that in such a short time and by such entirely just means I should have been able to procure so much profit for the public. But what might cause still greater astonishment in that those who dealt with me on these terms made almost as great and much more solid a gain than those who had dealt previously, because the respect of my subjects for me then and my care in protecting my servants in all their requests made them find as much facility in their collections than as there had previously been chicanery and obstruction.
>I resolved, a short time later, to reduce from three quarters to two the payments on the salary increases that the officials had acquired at the pittance and that had greatly diminished the value of my farmed taxes. But I have already explained the justice and the facility of this reduction to you now in passing as one of the good effects of the economy that was so necessary to my state.
>But my last decision of that year concerning the finances was the establishment of the Chamber of Justice, in which I had two principal motives: the first, that it was not possible, in the state to which things were reduced, to diminish the ordinary taxes sufficiently and to relieve the poverty of the people promptly enough without making those who had grown wealthy at the expense of the State contribute heavily to its expenses; and the second, that for this chamber to examine the contracts that had been made was the only means to facilitate the settling of my debts. For they had been raised to such prodigious sums that I could not have paid them all without ruining most of my subjects, nor cancel them arbitrarily without running the risk of committing an injustice, aside from not wanting to return to the abuse that had been practiced in the redemption of treasury notes, by which means influential people were paid sooner or later for sums that were not due them while the real creditors would have drawn only a small portion of their due. This is why I believe that I should liquidate exactly what I owed and what was owed to me in order to pay the one and to be paid the other, but because these discussions were delicate and because most of those concerned ha a great deal of influence and a good many relatives in the ordinary courts of justice, I was obliged to form a special one out of the most disinterested men in all the others.
>I have no doubt that from reading all these details you will get the impression that the effort required for all these sorts of things was not very pleasant in itself, and that this great number of ordinances, contracts, declarations, registers, and accounts that it was necessary not merely to see and to sign but to conceive and to resolve, was not too satisfying a matter to a mind capable of other things, and I will grant you this.
<But if you consider the great advantages that I have drawn from it later, the relief that I have granted to my subjects each year, of how many debts I have disengaged the State, how many alienated taxes I have repurchased, with what punctuality I have paid all legitimate burdens, and the number of poor workers I have supported by employing them on my buildings, how many gratuities I have given to people of merit, how I have furthered public works, what aid in men and in money I have furnished my allies, how greatly I have increased the number of my ships, what strongholds I have purchased, with what vigor I have taken possession of my rights when they were challenged, without ever having been reduce to the unfortunate necessity of burening my subjects with any extraordinary tax, you would certainly find then that the labors by which I have reached this position must have appeared very pleasant to me, since they have borne so much fruit for my subjects.
<For indeed, my son, we must consider the good of our subjects far more than our own. They are almost a part of ourselves, since we are the head of a body and they are its members. It is only for their own advantage that we must give them laws, and our power over them must only be used by us in order to work more effectively for their happiness. It is wonderful to deserve from them the name of a father and sovereign, and if one belongs to us by right of birth, the other must be the sweetest object of our ambition. I am well aware that such a wonderful title is not obtained without a great deal of effort, but in praiseworthy undertakings one must not be stopped by the idea of difficulty. Work only dismays weak souls, and when a plan is advantageous and just, it is weakness not to execute it. Laziness in those of our rank is just as opposed to the greatness of courage as timidity, and there is no doubt that a monarch responsible for watching over the public interest deserves more blame in fleeing from a useful burden than in stopping in the face of imminent danger; for indeed, the fear of danger can almost always be tinge by a feeling of prudence, whereas the fear of work can never be considered as anything but an inexcusable weakness.
>Louis XIV's close management of finances
>In working at the reorganization of the finances, I had already acceded, as I have told you, to signing personally all orders issued for the slightest expenses of the State. I found that this was not enough, an I was willing to go to the trouble of marking in my own hand, in a little book that I could always see, on one side, the funds that I was to receive each month, on the other, all the sums paid by my orders during that month.
<It may be, my son, that among the great number of courtiers who will surround you, some, attached to their pleasures and glorying in their ignorance of their own affairs, will someday portray this care to you as far beneath royalty. They will tell you, perhaps, that the kings our predecessors have never done such a thing and that even their prime ministers would have believed they were lowering themselves if they had not relied for these details on the superintendant and he, in turn, on the treasurer or on some lowly and obscure clerk. But those who speak this way have never considered that in the world, the greatest affairs are hardly ever concluded without the smallest, and that what would be baseness if a prince were acting through mere love of money becomes loftiness and superiority if its ultimate object is the welfare of his subjects, the execution of an infinite number of great plans, his own splendor, and his own magnificence, of which this attention to details is the most secure basis.
>Imagine, my son, what an entirely different thing it is for a king, whose plans must be varied, more extensive, and more hiden than those of any private individual, of such a nature indeed that there is sometimes hardly a single person in the world to whom he can entrust them all in their entirety. There are, however, none of these plans in which the finances do not enter somewhere. This is not saying enough. There are none of these plans that do not entirely and essentially depend on them, for what is great and wonderful when the state of our finances allows it becomes fantastic and ridiculous when it doe snot. Think then, I beg of you, how a king could govern and not be governed if his ignorance of these financial details subjects his best and most noble thoughts to the caprice of the prime minister, or of the superintendant, or of the treasurer, or of that obscure and unknown clerk, whom he would be obliged to consult like so many oracles, so that he could not undertake anything without obtaining their advice and their consent.
>But there are, you will be told, loyal and wise people who, without penetrating into your plans, will not mislead you about these financial details. I wish, my son, that these qualities were as common as they are rare.
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Unique IPs: 2