/siberia/ - Off-topic

It's a good tactic. Minefields can slow you down for days as you get through and this can mean attacks go unsupported and many more people will die. This tactic saved lives.

>>792930
true but the way he said it, its hilarious to me

"If we come to a minefield, our infantry attacks exactly as it were not there" -gregory zhukov

"When they come into machine gun fire, our soldiers march exactly as if it was not there. we will prove the defenders wrong!" - Marshal gregory Zhukov

"when it comes to a german panzer division, our soldiers fight as if they aren't in the way" - Greg Zhukov

"Keep attacking, they'll run out of mines eventually" - Georgy Zhukov, Order no.520

"i secretly wrote the script for enemy at the gate, just to dunk on stalin and fuck with the dumb american cinema lovers" -Gregory Zhukov, a statement from his diaries

>>792943
thnx for the original anon

>>792943
Are we sure that Eisenhower is a reliable source for this?

>>792925
I am unsure of the validity of the quote but casualty-wise only few Soviet generals' tactics were resulting with less losses in their side.
One of them is Marshall Rokossovsky, who also had overseen Operation Bagration. One of the most successful Soviet offensives.

>>792943
This is not the original quote:
>Highly illuminating to me was his description of the Russian method of attacking through mine fields. The German minefields, covered by defensive fire, were tactical obstacles that caused us many casualties and delays. It was out laborious business to break through them, even though our technicians invented every conceivable kind of mechanical appliance to destroy mines safely. Marshal Zhukov gave me a matter-of-fact statement of his practice, which was roughtly 'There are two kinds of mines; one is the personnel mine and the other is the vehicular mine. When we come to a minefield our infantry attacks exactly as if it were not there. The losses we get from personnel mines we consider only equal to those we would have gotten from machine guns and artillery if the Germans had chosen to defend that particular area with strong bodies of troops instead of with minefields. The attacking infantry does not set off the vehicular mines, so after they have penetrated to the far side of the field they form a bridgehead, after which the engineers come up and dig out channels through which our vehicles can go. (Eisenhower; Crusade in Europe, John Hopkins University, 1997)
This also only excludes an important factor Eisenhower neglects to mention or was unaware of: Soviet sappers would work in specialized units that would rapidly demine their own and enemy positions as much as possible prior to a Soviet offensive, but physically could not address the minefields behind the first lines of German defense. During a counteroffensive this also applies, as the mines that were left over from the German assault and subsequent push back could not be accounted for in the heat of battle en masse. It's why the USSR implemented en-masse the PT-3 mine trawl for tanks prior to the major offensives of 1944, and during the mechanization of the Red Army in the 50s and 60s systems like the UR-67 and later UR-77.