By the invitation of Cat Alunya
444 posts and 719 image replies omitted.<Alexander Hamilton / An absolute monarchy would be more tolerable than the authority of British Parliament over America>I'll go farther, & assert, that the authority of the British Parliament over America, would, in all probability, be a more intolerable & excessive species of despotism than an absolute monarchy. The power of an absolute prince is not temporary, but perpetual.
>He is under no temptation to purchase the favour of one part of his dominions, at the expence of another; but, it is his interest to treat them all, upon the same footing.
>Very different is the case with regard to the Parliament: The Lords and Commons both, have a private and separate interest to pursue.To be found in Hamilton's Farmer Refuted in response to Samuel Seasbury:
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0057What Alexander Hamilton says is eerily similar to Hobbes' Leviathan:
>From whence it follows, that where the public and private interest are most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise only from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious. nor secure; whose Subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune. >>9140You forgot one:
0. Alunya
>>9142Alunya will holding onto Grace and saying sorry and begging forgiveness for the guillotine jokes & accursed execution Romanov thread.
& the transgressions over the Queen's funeralGrace-chan will be x-tremely thorny over this.
>>9144I support hereditary monarchy like Bodin.
If you don't get why hereditary, then you must not understand the royalist mentality (at least as I understand it). Hereditary monarchy supports all the themes of royalism: the familial design, especially.
>>9145I'm familiar enough with history to know that it does not prevent it, they will try to cripple or kill people before them in the line of succession or just start civil wars. Wikipedia says most wars were wars of succession and has this:
> According to British statesman Henry Brougham (Lord Chancellor 1830–34), there were more and longer wars of succession in Europe between 1066 and the French Revolution (1789–99) than all other wars put together. "A war of succession is the most lasting of wars. The hereditary principle keeps it in perpetual life – [whereas] a war of election is always short, and never revives", he opined, arguing for elective monarchy to solve the problem.>>9147You are right that I do not understand it, that's why I am asking.
Following the Sun rising from Mt. Paektu 🌄
Our hearts are beating faster with every step 🫀🩸
We are the children of the Grand Marshal Kim Il Sung 🇰🇵
Aristotle on Education
>No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of youth; for the neglect of education does harm to the State. The citizen should be molded to suit the form of State under which he lives. For each State has a peculiar character which originally formed and which continues to preserve it.
>And since the whole City has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all, and that it should be public, and not private–not as at present, when every one looks after his own children separately, and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks best; the training in things which are of common interest should be the same for all. Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the State, and are each of them a part of the State, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the Whole.
Xenophon Cyropaedia
<The education of youth
>It is true that he was brought up according to the laws and customs of the Persians, and of these laws it must be noted that while they aim, as laws elsewhere, at the common weal, their guiding principle is far other than that which most nations follow.
>Most states permit their citizens to bring up their own children at their own discretion, and allow the grown men to regulate their own lives at their own will, and then they lay down certain prohibitions, for example, not to pick and steal, not to break into another man's house, not to strike a man unjustly, not to commit adultery, not to disobey the magistrate, and so forth; and on the transgressor they impose a penalty. (3) But the Persian laws try, as it were, to steal a march on time, to make their citizens from the beginning incapable of setting their hearts on any wickedness or shameful conduct whatsoever. And this is how they set about their object.
<Friend & Enemy distinction: careful not to teach children dangerous things
>Yes, my son, it is said that in the time of our forefathers there was once a teacher of the boys who, it seems, used to teach them justice in the very way that you propose; to lie and not to lie, to cheat and not to cheat, to slander and not to slander, to take and not to take unfair advantage. And he drew the line between what one should do to one's friends and what to one's enemies. And what is more, he used to teach this: that it was right to even deceive friends even, provided it were for a good end, and to steal the possessions of a friend for a good purpose.
(This is important b/c regicide theories would also use the basis of friend / enemy distinction between a king or tyrant & justify killing their king; though I think that the subjects shouldn't be taught to distinguish their Sovereign as any such enemy–their relation like children & the sovereign monarch their father–if they are taught anyone is an enemy, it is the opponents of their Sovereign & never the Sovereign himself, b/c esp. the monarchy-haters are too apt to abuse this).
>And in teaching these lessons he had also to train the boys to practise them upon one another, just as also in wrestling, the Greeks, they say, teach deception and train the boys to be able to practise it upon one another. When, therefore, some had in this way become expert both in deceiving successfully and in taking unfair advantage and perhaps also not inexpert in avarice, the did not refrain from trying to take an unfair advantage even of their friends.
>In consequence of that, therefore, an ordnance was passed which obtains even unto this day, simply to teach out boys, just as we teach our servants in their relations towards us, to tell the truth and not to deceive and not to take unfair advantage; and if they should act contrary to this law, the law requires their punishment, in order that, inured to such habits, they may become more refined members of society.
(All States today do this: they teach their citizens at birth to uphold the values of their State & only a friendly image, & reserves the bad teachings for any enemies, like is said – that they may become more refined members of society)
>But when they came to be as old as you are now, then it seemed to be safe to teach them that also which is lawful towards enemies; for it does not seem likely that you would break away and fun into savages after you had been brought up together in mutual respect. In the same way we do not discuss sexual matters in the presence of very young boys, lest in case lax discipline should give a free rein to their passions the young might indulge them to excess.
Thomas Hobbes on Instruction / Education
>Another thing necessary, is rooting out from the consciences of men all those opinions which seem to justify, and give pretense of right to rebellious actions… that there is a body of the people without him or them that have the sovereign power… and because opinions which are gotten by education, and in length of time are made habitual, cannot be taken away by force, and upon the sudden: they must therefore be taken away also, by time and education. And seeing the said opinions have proceeded from private and public teaching, and those teachers have received from grounds and principles, which they have learned in the Universities…
>Instruction of the people in the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty… it is his duty to cause them [his subjects] to be instructed; and not only his duty, but his benefit also.
>Whereas the common people's minds, unless they be tainted with dependence on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever the public authority shall be imprinted in them.
>And, to descend to particulars, the people are to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any form of government that they see in their neighbor nations, more than with their own, nor, whatsoever present prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed than they, to desire change. For the prosperity of a people ruled by an oligarchical or democratical assembly comes not from Oligarchy, nor from Democracy, but from the obedience and concord of the subjects: nor do the people flourish in Monarchy because one man the has right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of state the obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and they shall not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience to do no more than reform the Commonwealth shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus, in the fable, which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit father, did by the counsel of Medea cut him in pieces and boil him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change is like the breach of the first of God's Commandments: for there God says, Non habebis Deos alienos: "Thou shalt not have the Gods of other nations," and in another place concerning kings, that they are gods.
>[The Means to be Sovereign such as] appointing Teachers, and examining what Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant, or misinformed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essential Rights; because thereby men are easy to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require their use and exercise.
>But Kings are the Fathers of Families… [the Public Good / education of subjects], the care of which they stand so long charged withal, as they retain any other essential Right of the Sovereignty.
>I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.
<The Use of Universities
>As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions, contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them… It is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities.
>It is his Duty, to cause them to be so instructed; and not only his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security…
>>9148>You are right that I do not understand it, that's why I am asking.The model of the State is the household well ordered & extends a familial bond to the subjects.
It is easier to imagine subjects like the children of the Sovereign when the Sovereign practices this at the very peak of his government. It draws all eyes to the relationship of father and son.
Bees and Ants are called royal animals because they are born of one Queen and have a blood relationship. They are all in a blood relationship and form a great family.
Royalism and Loyalism aim towards the very same thing: all subjects consider their union with the Sovereign to be a familial bond at large for the public good. By stroking the flame of familial kinship, the hereditary royalism instills the subjects to treat each other as a united kin such as the ants and bees do in communion with their queen. This becomes the Stately virtue of hereditary royalism above all else, King and Kin or King and Country.
We must see the Sovereign Monarch as a public father and the country as a great family, by bringing into the picture his Son, to extend that relationship to ourselves. The loyalism espoused in royalism is an unbreakable kinship.
This is also the means to preservation of the person: because hereditary succession brings a person after his own blood and helps maintain the appearance of a healthy State.
Patriotism within royalism is a broad act of filial piety for the whole country.
This is the true meaning of royalism.
Hitler denounced dynastic patriotism, but Grace-chan endorses it.
Aristotle / Of the same blood, suckled by the same milk>And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; …the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood [and suckled 'with the same milk']In Christianity, the Eucharist is a royalist ceremony. It signifies the same relationship Aristotle pointed out about royalism. Christians share a blood bond with a King. They are of the same blood. Eat the flesh and are suckled by the same milk (well, blood, as it were).
For the same reason, ants and bees.
Aristotle on fatherly Monarchy>For the association of a father with his sons bears the form of monarchy… it is the ideal of monarchy to be paternal rule.
>The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus –father of Gods and men – because he is the king of them all. For a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son.Robert Filmer: That the First Kings were Fathers of Families>It may seem absurd to maintain, that Kings now are the Fathers of their People, since Experience shows the contrary. It is true, all Kings be not the Natural Parents of their Subjects, yet they all either are, or are to be reputed the next Hers to those first Progenitors, who were at first the Natural Parents of the whole People, and in their Right succeed to the Supreme Jurisdiction
>Father and King are not so diverse; it is confessed, that at first they were all one, for there is confessed Paternum imperium & haereditarium, and this Fatherly Empire, as t was of itself hereditary, so it was alienable by Patent, and seizable by an Usurper, as other goods are: and thus every King now is, hath a Paternal Empire, either by inheritance, or by Translation, or Usurpation; so a Father and a King may be all one.Bossuet on Hereditary Monarchy>The people, by themselves, have grown accustomed to this. "I saw all men living, that walk under the Sun with the second young man, who shall rise up in his place."
>The second reason which favors this government, is that it makes the authorities who guide the State the ones who are most interested in its preservation. The prince who works for the State works for his children; and the love he bears his kingdom, mixed with that he has for his family, becomes natural to him.
>Thus it is that peoples become attached to royal houses. The jealousy that one naturally feels against those whom one sees above him here turns into love and respect.Ramesses II Speech for his Father>For the son becomes the champion of his father, like Horus, when he championed his father, forming him that formed him, fashioning him that fashioned him, making to live the name of him that begat him.
>My heart leads me in doing excellent things… I will cause it to be said forever and ever: 'It was his son, who made his name live.' May my father, Osiris, favor me with the long life of his son, Horus, according as I do that which he did; I do excellent things, as he did excellent things, for him who begat me.Like you pointed out.
Blood signifies the heart and the life force and perpetuity for generations. Like ants depend on their queen, the country depends on the sovereign: the sovereign is their lifeforce and heart, giving life and motion to all the blood offspring.
Thomas Hobbes: Civil Sovereign is the Head, Source, Root, & Sun>The Civill Soveraign in every Common-wealth, is the Head, the Source, the Root, and the Sun, from which all Jurisdiction is derived. >>9157>this whole caring father of the people was some modern invention to justify the welfare stateI have no idea what you're talking about.
Bossuet / Royal Shepherds<It is a royal right to provide for the needs of the people… It is for this that royalty is established, and the obligation to take care of the people is the basis of all the rights that sovereigns have over their subjects.
>I thought people were loyal to the crown or some abstract symbol like thatI strongly dislike this adage. No, I hate this adage. Some royalists hold it, but it's a kind of daft idolatry that defies the whole notion of personal guidance or personal rule.
You cannot expect a headpiece or helmet to guide anyone or rule. If you take the instruments like the scepter and orb and crown and have no king, there is no monarchy. But you can have monarchies without these instruments.
Like Hobbes noted in Behemoth.
<The King raised a guard for his person in Yorkshire, and the Parliament, thereupon having voted that the King intended to make war upon his Parliament, gave order for the mustering and exercising the people in arms… for the defence of the King and Parliament, (meaning by King, as they had formerly declared, not his person, but his laws). I'm sure monarchists and leftists are both surprised I say this about crowns.
Constitutional monarchist is a redundant term imo.
Absolute monarchists reject the notion of a composite monarchy or mixed constitution. Jean Bodin remarks that Aristotle placed a mixed form of State there. But only admit 3 pure forms of State. An absolute monarchist doesn't reject fundamental laws for Monarchy or laws that enable monarchy to be monarchy – so that's why I say constitutional monarchist is a redundant term. It isn't any constitution – ask yourselves what are these laws fundamental for – the laws fundamental for monarchy. Simply being called a monarchist is enough.
Even Aristotle has a passage here on how the fundamental laws are relative to the form of State:
>The same political insight will enable a man to know which laws are the best, and which are suited to different constitutions; for the laws are, and ought to be, relative to the constitution, and not the constitution to the laws.
When a monarch pledges to uphold the fundamental laws, the most fundamental is upholding his very own Monarchy or those laws that enable the Monarch… to have Monarchy, such as the succession or whatever molds the Monarchy to be Monarchy.
This is our main contention: they want a mixed State and confusion of laws for each kind of State in one form of State. I surmise Aristotle makes Monarchy to be composite, like he does for Tyranny as a composite of democracy and oligarchy at times. –This is where I believe Jean Bodin, too, rejects Aristotle and likewise Hobbes rejects Aristotle. So the constitutionalists make confused appeals to democracy and confounding the forms of State or don't think these fundamental laws are relative to the form of State.
Jean Bodin / An infinite labyrinth of errors
>But here happily some man will say, that none but myself is of this opinion, and that not one of the ancient and much less of the modern writers which intreat of matters of State or Commonwealths, have once touched this point. True it is that I cannot deny the same; yet this distinction nevertheless seems unto me more than necessary, for the good understanding of the state of every commonweal; if a man will not cast himself head long into an infinite labyrinth of errors, where into we see Aristotle himself to have fallen: mistaking the popular Commonwealth for the Aristocratic: and so contrarywise, contrary to the common received opinion, yea and contrary to common sense also: For these principles evil grounded, nothing that is firm and sure can possibly be thereon built. From this error likewise is sprung the opinion of them which have forged a form of a Commonwealth mingled of all three, which we have for good reasons before rejected.
And again:
>[We allow only three forms of State such as Monarchy, Oligarchy, & Democracy] – To avoid the obscurity and confusion which might otherwise arise, by the variety of governours good or bad: which hath given occasion unto many, to make more sorts of Commonwealths than three. But if that opinion should take place, and that we should by the foot of virtues & vices, measure the estate of Commonwealths; we should find a world of them, and them in number infinity. Now it is most certain, that to attain unto the true definitions and resolutions of all things, we must not rest upon the external accidents which are innumerable, but rather upon the essential and formal differences: for otherwise a man might fall into an infinite and inextricable labyrinth, whereof no knowledge is to be had, or certain precept to be given. For so a man should forge and fashion infinite numbers of Commonwealths, not only according to the diversities of virtues and vices; but even according to the variety of things indifferent also. As if a Monarch were to be chosen for his strength, or for his beauty, for his stature, or for his nobility, or riches, which are all things indifferent; or for his martial disposition, or for that he is more given to peace, for his gravity, or for his justice, for his beauty, or for his wisdom, for his sobriety, or his humility, for his simplicity, or his chastity; and so for all other qualities, a man should so make an infinity of Monarchies: and in like sort in the Aristocratic state, if some few of many should have the sovereignty above the rest, such as excelled others in riches, nobility, wisdom, justice, martial prowess, or other like virtues, or vices, or things indifferent, there should thereof arise infinite forms of Commonwealths: a thing most absurd, and so by consequent the opinion whereof such an absurdity arises, is to be rejected. Seeing therefore that the accidental quality changes not the nature of things: let us say that there are but three estates or sorts of Commonwealths; namely a Monarchy, an Aristocracy, and a Democracy.
In another book, this is repeated:
>There can be no fourth, and indeed none can be conceived, for virtue and viciousness do not create a type of rule. Whether the prince is unjust or worthy, nevertheless the state is still a monarchy. The same thing must be said about oligarchy and the rule of the people, who, while they have no powers but the creation of magistrates, still have the sovereignty, and on them the form of government necessarily depends. We shall then call the form one of optimates, or else popular (let us use these words in order that we may not rather often be forced to use the names aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, ochlocracy, according to the type of virtue or vice)
But back to fundamental laws. If the succeeding monarch is offered a crown on condition that this crown should be a vessel to institute rule by turns and not a lifelong rule or personal rule, then it wouldn't be the kind of fundamental law for monarchy but a subversion of monarchy and the monarch ought to disregard it.
Thomas Hobbes / Fundamental Law
>For a Fundamental Law in every Commonwealth is that, which being taken away, the Commonwealth fails, and is utterly dissolved; as a building whose Foundation is destroyed. And therefore a Fundamental Law is that, by which Subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the Sovereign, whether a Monarch, or a Sovereign Assembly, without which the Commonwealth cannot stand, such as the power of War and Peace, of Judicature, of Election of Officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the Public good. Not Fundamental is that the abrogating whereof, draws not with it the dissolution of the Commonwealth; such as are the Laws concerning controversies between subject and subject. Thus much of the division of laws.
WP Esq
>The Law of Royal Government, is a Law Fundamental, 1 Pars Institut. Eol. 11.
Jean Bodin / Fundamental laws
>But touching the laws which concern the state of the realm, and the establishing thereof; foreasmuch as they are annexed & united to the crown, the prince cannot derogate from them, such as is the law Salic: & albeit that he so do, the successor may always disanull that which hath been done unto the prejudice of the laws royal; upon which the sovereign majesty is stayed & grounded.
A constitutional monarchist imo is on par with the most misinformed absolute monarchist (if not worse!) – because for all they warn about the fundamental constitution, what tyrant would renounce the sovereignty? but with constitutional monarchists would have monarchs saying this and that about democracy and reforming their states (and we already laid down that these are relative to the form of state). For constitutional monarchists for all this fluff about the fundamental constitutions of states have everything to say about democracy.
Jean Bodin reproved this:
>In which doing, the estate of the Monarchy shall be simple, and yet the government so compound and mixt, without any confusion at all of the three kinds of Estates, or Commonweales. For we have before shewed, that there is a great difference betwixt the mingling, or rather confounding of the three estates of Commonweales in one (a thing altogether impossible) and the making of a government of a Monarchy, to be Oligarchic and Popular.
>Wherefore let us firmly set down and resolve there are but three forms of Commonweals, and no more, and those simple also, and without any confused mixture of the with another, albiet that the government be sometimes contrary to the state. As a Monarchy is contrary to a Democracy or popular estate; and yet nevertheless the sovereignty may be in one only prince, who may popularly govern his estate, as I have before said; and yet it shall not be for that a confusion of the popular estate with a Monarchy, which are states of themselves incompatible, but is well (as it were) combining of a Monarchy with a popular government, the most assured Monarchy that is.
The key is this is a fashion of his governing and the government itself is not independent from the governance of the Monarch. That's why it is called His Majesty's Government and HM's Most Loyal Opposition.
The danger of this constitutionalism is not about changing the method of government into a more democratic fashion, but the state itself into a democracy.
>So as if the mixture of things of diverse and contrary natures, arises a third all together differing form the things so together mixed. But that State which is made of the mixture of the three kinds of Commonweales differs in deed nothing from a mean popular State (democracy); For if three cites, whereof one of them is governed by a King, and so a Monarchy (One); the second by an Optimacy, and so an Oligarchy (Few); the third by the People, and so a Democracy (Many); should be confounded, and so thrust together into one and the same form of a Commonweale (State), and so the chief power and Sovereignty communicated unto all; who is there that can doubt but that that State shall be altogether a State popular (Democracy)? except the Sovereignty should by turns be given; first to the King, then to the Nobility, and afterwards to the People; As in the vacancy of the Roman Kingdom, the King being dead, the Senators ruled by turns.
>There are those who say, and have published in writing, that the constitution of France is a mixture of the three pure types, the Parlement representing Oligarchy (few), the Estates-General representing Democracy (many), and the King representing Monarchy (one). But this is an opinion not only absurd but treasonable. It is treasonable to exalt the subjects to be the equals and colleagues of their Sovereign Monarch
This is not about doing away with parliaments or assemblies or senates or estates: as these are said to increase the majesty of a monarch. It is ultimately about who holds the sovereignty, who has the state and where the governance is derived from.
There are a bunch of misconceptions within monarchist circles.
For example, the monarchism vs republicanism dilemma.
We use the terms State or Commonwealth or Republic: they are all tantamount to the same thing. You could call monarchy a kind or form of republic, actually, since republic simply means state. There are three forms of republic: monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, like we say.
Lately, reactionaries too ramble about philosophical constitutions or those baked with liberal principles: this is trivial to us absolute monarchists. Some might be misinformed, but it isn't whether there are written constitutions or not and whether they be philosophical or baked with liberal policies and rights. The sovereignty retains absolute power for all States regardless. Whether these conform to the form of state (or republic or commonwealth if you call it) and upholds the sovereignty is what makes this a fundamental constitution. Otherwise there is no majesty.
We hear absolute power corrupts absolutely and so and so.
Even Jean Bodin concedes here and there about the power of the Monarch, but I don't believe for the bare necessities of sovereignty (which involves an absolute power) – but really it's about the capacity and how the monarch doesn't need to micromanage every single thing.
It is said that the sovereign monarch is lord of all goods, but there's no need to hoard and retain a monopoly on each industry. As a state usually divides these and channels their yield to return to the common good. A monarchy might have a couple monopolies and wealth.
(& I think this works well because when the monarch use taxes even by the consent of assemblies they'll complain about it–but sadly this is considered the route to a lordly monarchy to retain the land and power and influence within the economy. Bodin even says the lordly monarchies can last longer, but nevertheless the ideal monarchy is deemed royal monarchy. & lordly monarchy is different from tyrannical monarchy. Saudi Arabia is a good example. They have hardly have taxes there except a corporate tax, I believe, b/c they have tremendous wealth. It's a dilemma with absolute monarchists knowing how the power of the purse can be abused and anchored against monarchy and have the monarch making concessions even cutting into his sovereignty like it was with King Charles I. But if not a lordly monarchy where the royal family has considerable wealth and influence within the economy, then like Bodin says it goes back to finding a way to get taxes and making this work to support monarchy. Thomas Hobbes also pondered this issue considerably – I am beginning to think a little bit of lordly monarchy is not a bad idea if it means having a bit more of a substantial wealth apart from taxes which are too conspicuous in rousing people against monarchy – but if can done without the the power of the purse leveraged too much against the monarchy and the monarchy can attain what is necessary for sovereignty it would be ideal also).
This is the biggest stumbling block for absolute monarchists, imo.
Dialogue
Hobbes speaks through P
>L: But I know, that there be statutes express, whereby the King hath obliged himself never to levy money upon his subjects without the consent of his Parliament. One of which statutes is 25 Edw. 1. c. 5, in these words: We have granted for us, and our heirs, as well to archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors, and other folk of holy Church, as also to earls, barons, and to all the commonalty of the land, that for no business from henceforth, we shall take such aids, tasks, or prizes, but by the common consent of the realm. There is also another have been since that time confirmed by diverse other Kings, and lastly by the King that now reigneth.
>L: In the said statutes that restrain the levying of money without consent of Parliament, is there any thing you can take exceptions to?
>P: No, I am satisfied that kings that grant such liberties, are bound to make them good, so far as it may be done without sin: but if a King find that by such grant he be disabled to protect his subjects, if he maintain his grant, he sins; and therefore may, and ought to take no notice of the said grant. For such grants, as by error or false suggestion are gotten from him, are, as the lawyers do confess, void and of no effect, and ought to be recalled. Also the King, as in on all hands confessed, hath the charge lying upon him to protect his people against foreign enemies, and to keep the peace betwixt them within the kingdom: if he do not his utmost endeavour to discharge himself thereof, he committeth a sin.
>P: Nor do I hereby lay any aspersion upon such grants of the King and his ancestors. Those statutes are in themselves very good for the King and the people, as creating some kind of difficulty for such Kings as, for the glory of conquest, might spend one part of their subjects' lives and estates in molesting other nations, and leave the rest to destroy themselves at home by factions. That which I here find fault with, is the wrestling of those, and other such statutes, to the binding of our Kings from the use of their armies in the necessary defense of themselves and their people. The late Long Parliament, that in 1648 murdered their King, (a King that sought no greater glory upon earth, but to be indulgent to his people, and a pious defender of the Church of England,) no sooner took upon them the sovereign power, than they levied money upon the people at their own discretion. Did any of their subjects dispute their power? Did they not send soldiers over the sea to subdue Ireland, and others to fight against the Dutch at sea; or made they any doubt but to be obeyed in all that they commanded, as a right absolutely due to the sovereign power in whomsoever it resides? I say not this as following their actions, but as testimony from the mouths of those very men that denied the same power to him whom they acknowledged to have been their sovereign immediately before
>P: I know what it is that troubles your conscience in this point. All men are troubled at the crossing of their wishes; but it is our own fault. First, we wish impossibilities; we would have our security against all the world upon right of property, without paying for it; this is impossible. We may as well expect that fish and fowl should boil, roast, and dish themselves, and come to the table, and that grapes should squeeze themselves into our mouths, and have all other contentments and ease which some pleasant men have related of the land of Cocagne. Secondly, there is no nation in the world where he or they that have the sovereignty, do not take what money they please for the defense of those respective nations, when they think it necessary for their safety. The late Long Parliament denied this; but why? Because there was a design amongst them to depose the King. Thirdly, there is no example of any King of England that I have read of, that ever pretended any such necessity for levying money against his conscience. The greatest sums that ever were levied, comparing the value of money, as it was at that time, with what it is now, were levied by King Edward III and King Henry V; kings in whom we glory now, and think their actions great ornaments to the English history
>P: All this I know, and am not satisfied. I am one of the common people, and one of that almost infinite number of men, for whose welfare Kings and other sovereigns were by God ordained: for God made Kings for the people, and not people for Kings. How shall I be defended from the domineering of proud and insolent strangers that speak another language, that scorn us, that seek to make us slaves, or how shall I avoid the destruction that may arise from the cruelty of factions in civil war, unless the King, to whom alone, you say, belongeth the right of levying and disposing of the militia by which only it can be prevented, have ready money, upon all occasions, to arm and pay as many soldiers, as for the present defense, or the peace of the people, shall be necessary? Shall not I, and you, and every man, be undone? Tell me not of a Parliament, when there is no Parliament sitting, or perhaps none in being, which may often happen. And when there is a Parliament, if the speaking and leading men should have a design to put down monarchy, as they had in the Parliament which began to sit the third of November, 1640, shall the King, who is to answer to God Almighty for the safety of the people, and to that end is intrusted with the power to levy and dispose of soldiery, be disabled to perform his office, by virtue of these acts of Parliament which you have cited?
>And by that means the most men, knowing their Duties, will be the less subject to serve the Ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the State; and be the less grieved with the Contributions necessary for their Peace, and Defence; and the Governours themsleves have the less cause, to maintain at the Common charge any greater Army, than is necessary to make good the Publique Liberty, against the Invasions and Encroachments of foraign Enemies
Jean Bodin on the same
>As for the right to impose taxes, or imposts upon the subjects, is as proper unto sovereign majesty, as is the law it self: not for that Commonwealth cannot stand without taxes and tallages, as the President the M. hath well noted, that taxes were not levied in this realm, but since the time of Saint Louis the king. But if it must needs be that they must for the public necessity be levied or taken away; it cannot be done but by him that hath the sovereign power; as it hath been judged and by a decree of parliament, against the duke of Burgundy; and many times since, aswell in the high court of parliament, as also in the privy council.
>But here might some object and say, "That the estates of England suffer not any extraordinary charges and subsidies to be laid upon them, if it be not first agreed upon and consented unto in the high court of parliament: for so it is provided by an ancient law of Edward the first, king of England, wherewith the people as with a buckler hath been oftentimes seen to defend itself against the prince. Whereunto mine answer is, "That the other kings have in this point no more power than the kings of England: for that it is not in the power of any prince in the world, at his pleasure to taise taxes upon the people, no more than to take another man's goods from him; as Philip Commines wisely showed in the parliment holden at Tours, as we read in his Commentaries: and yet nevertheless if the necessity of the Commonwealth be such as cannot stay for the calling of a parliament, in that case the prince ought not to expect the assembly of the states, neither the consent of the people; of whose good foresight and wisdom, next unto God, the health & welfare of the whole state dependeth.
>And yet for all that the just Monarchy, hath not any more assured foundation or stay, than the Estates of the people, Communities, Corporations, and Colleges: For if need be for the king to levy money, to raise forces, to maintain the Estate against the enemy, it cannot be better done, than by the estates of the people, and of every Province, Town, and Community. For where can things for the curing of the diseases of sick Commonwealth, and of the members thereof; there are heard and understood the just reforming of the Estate, be better debated and handled, than before the Prince in his Senate before the people? There they confer of the affairs concerning the whole body of the Commonwealth, and of the members thereof; there are heard and understood the just complaints and grievances of the poor subjects, which never otherwise come unto the prince's ears; there are discovered and laid open the robberies and extortions committed in the Prince's name; whereof he knoweth nothing, there the requests of all degrees of men are heard. Besides that, it is almost a thing incredible to say, how much the subjects are eased, and how well they are also pleased, to see their king to sit as chief in the assembly of the estates, and to hear him discouring; how every man desirabeth to be seen of him, and if it please him to hear their complaints, and to receive their requests, albeit that they be often times denied the same; yet O how it pleaseth them to have had access unto their Prince…[Although] Our Kings do not so often call together the assemblies of their estates, as do the kings of England.
Personally, I am conflicted with Bodin's testimony in context of Hobbes' testimony. I think they say it's not too necessary to have a provision of land and wealth – I forgot who said so – I think Hobbes considering that even for lordly monarchy, it is preferable to have the wealth flow from all across the land rather than some estates the sovereign has… since the aim is ultimately for the commonweal and will have this channeled back.
It is clear lordly monarchies don't have this problem, but with royal monarchies when it works it works considerably well.
>>9164Right, it was Hobbes.
Thomas Hobbes / The Public Is Not To Be Dieted>In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth itself, may be conceived to have a portion, and possess, and improve the same by their Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to sustain the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence necessarily required: Which were very true, if there could be any Representative conceived free from humane passions, and infirmities. But the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of Public Land, or of any certain Revenue for the Commonwealth, is in vain; and tends to the dissolution of Government, and to the condition of mere Nature, and War, as soon as ever the Sovereign Power falls into the hands of a Monarch, or of an Assembly, that are either too negligent of money, or too hazardous in engaging the public stock, into a long, or costly war. Commonwealths can endure no Diet: For seeing their expence is not limited by their own appetite, but by externall Accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, the Public Riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those which the emergent occasions shall require. And whereas in England, there were by the Conquerour, diverse Lands reserved to his own use, (besides Forests, and Chases, either for his recreation, or for preservation of Woods,) and diverse services reserved on the Land he gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his Maintenance in his Public, but in his Natural capacity: For he, and his Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes on all Subjects land, when they judged it necessary. Or if those public Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the Commonwealth, it was contrary to the scope of the Institution; being (as it appeared by those ensuing Taxes) insufficient, and (as it appears by the late Revenue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation, and Diminution. It is therefore in vain, to assign a portion to the Commonwealth; which may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give it away when tis done by their Representative.I have mixed feelings here.
For instance, I recall that a taxation policy under an imperial dynasty of China was to have a portion of farmland on each farm and its yield reserved for the public. Or certain quotas would be another tax policy.
Hobbes deemed it dieting and insufficient for the sovereign to rely on his own estates or expand them, but it might certainly help a Monarch (knowing the needs of monarchs is greater to attain all splendid royal things they might want a few monopolies and estates to cover this so dissenters will have less to bitch about when it comes to the public expense covering royal accommodations). Imo the Monarch should have these and I know it annoys the free marketeers to have a monarch meddling in the economy or monopolies or any royal provisions or royal estates. Besides, it happens regardless for any form of State – they will have a hand in the economy and the nature of economy is political anyways like I mentioned.
IDK I think Hobbes thinks if we removed these pretenses about taxes, it wouldn't be a problem.
Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion Of The Soveraign, But Onely Of Another Subject>From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their Soveraign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch. For seeing the Soveraign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he representeth,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd. It is true, that a Soveraign Monarch, or the greater part of a Soveraign Assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their Passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature; but this is not enough to authorise any subject, either to make warre upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill of their Soveraign; because they have authorised all his actions, and in bestowing the Soveraign Power, made them their own. But in what cases the Commands of Soveraigns are contrary to Equity, and the Law of Nature, is to be considered hereafter in another place.
>The seventh Doctrine opposite to Government, is this, That each subject hath an absolute Dominion over the goods he is in possession of. That is to say, such a propriety as excludes not only the right of all the rest of his fellow−subjects to the same goods, but also of the Magistrate himself. Which is not true; for they who have a Lord over them, have themselves no Lordship, as hath been proved, Chap. 8. Artic. 5. Now the Magistrate is Lord of all his Subjects, by the constitution of Government. Before the yoke of Civill Society was undertaken, no man had any Proper Right; all things were common to all men. Tell me therefore, how gottest thou this propriety but from the Magistrate? How got the Magistrates it, but that every man transferred his Right on him? And thou therefore hast also given up thy Right to him; thy Dominion therefore, and Propriety, is just so much as he will, and shall last so long as he pleases; even as in a Family, each Son hath such proper goods, and so long lasting, as seeme good to the Father. But the greatest part of men who professe Civill Prudence, reason otherwise; we are equall (say they) by nature; there is no reason why any man should by better Right take my goods from me, than I his from him; we know that mony sometimes is needfull for the defence and maintenance of the publique; but let them, who require it, shew us the present necessity, and they shall willingly receive it. They who talk thus, know not, that what they would have, is already done from the beginning in the very constitution of Government, and therefore speaking as in a dissolute multitude, and yet not fashioned Government, they destroy the frame.
>Farthermore, its necessarily requisite to the peoples defence, that they be fore−armed. Now to be fore−armed is to be furnisht with Souldiers, Armes, Ships, Forts and Monies, before the danger be instant; for the listing of Souldiers, and taking up of Armes after a blow is given, is too late at least, if not impossible. In like manner, not to raise Forts, and appoint Garrisons in convenient places, before the Frontiers are invaded, is to be like those Country Swains (as Demosthenes said) who ignorant of the art of Fencing, with their Bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first felt the smart of the strokes. But they who think it then seasonable enough to raise Monies for the maintenance of Souldiers, and other Charges of War, when the danger begins to shew itself, they consider not surely how difficult a matter it is to wring suddenly out of close−fisted men so vast a proportion of Monies; for almost all men, what they once reckon in the number of their goods, doe judge themselves to have such a right and propriety in it, as they conceive themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to employ but the least part of it for the publique good
>Now a sufficient stock of monies to defend the Country with Armes, will not soon be raised out of the treasure of Imposts, and Customes; we must therefore, for fear of War, in time of Peace hoord up good summs, if we intend the safety of the Common−weal. Since therefore it necessarily belongs to Rulers for the Subjects safety to discover the Enemies Counsell, to keep Garrisons, and to have Money in continuall readinesse, and that Princes are by the Law of Nature bound to use their whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of their Subjects, it followes, that its not onely lawfull for them to send out Spies, to maintain Souldiers, to build Forts, and to require Monies for these purposes, but also, not to doe thus, is unlawfull. To which also may be added, whatsoever shall seeme to conduce to the lessening of the power of foreigners whom they suspect, whether by sleight, or force. For Rulers are bound according to their power to prevent the evills they suspect, lest peradventure they may happen through their negligence.
>The fourth opinion (viz.): that subjects have their meum, tuum, and suum, in property, not only by virtue of the sovereign power over them all, distinct from one another, but also against the sovereign himself, by which they would pretend to contribute nothing to the public, but what they please, hath been already confuted
>For the second grievance concerning meum and tuum, it is also none, but in appearance only. It consisteth in this, that the sovereign power taketh from him that which he used to enjoy, knowing no other propriety, but use and custom. But without such sovereign power, the right of men is not propriety to any thing, but a community; no better than to have no right at all, as hath been shewed Part I. chap. XIV, sect. 10. Propriety therefore being derived from the sovereign power, is not to be pretended against the same; especially when by it every subject hath his propriety against every other subject, which when sovereignty ceaseth, he hath not, because in that case they return to war amongst themselves. Those levies therefore which are made upon men’s estates, by the sovereign authority, are no more but the price of that peace and defence which the sovereignty maintaineth for them. If this were not so, no money nor forces for the wars or any other public occasion, could justly be levied in the world; for neither king, nor democracy, nor aristocracy, nor the estates of any land, could do it, if the sovereignty could not. For in all those cases, it is levied by virtue of the sovereignty; nay more, by the three estates here, the land of one man may be transferred to another, without crime of him from whom it was taken, and without pretence of public benefit; as hath been done. And this without injury, because done by the sovereign power; for the power whereby it is done, is no less than sovereign, and cannot be greater. Therefore this grievance for meum and tuum is not real; unless more be exacted than is necessary. But it seemeth a grievance, because to them that either know not the right of sovereignty, or to whom that right belongeth, it seemeth an injury; and injury, how light soever the damage, is always grievous, as putting us in mind of our disability to help ourselves.Apart from belittling it as a mere pretense against the necessity of having funds via taxation, I'm not sure Hobbes has a solution other than that commonwealths inevitably will ignore those pretenses anyways. Maybe this is right. States today don't make as big a pretense than they did against Monarchies (as others have pointed out). As for taxation, Hobbes suggests a consumption tax as equitable and fair. While I am convinced that it is ideal to have funds from all across the lands funnel, a bit of lordly monarchy and revenue feels like what most people would accept as the path of least resistance.
Monarchist apologists today make this case: they say that the British monarchy today doesn't take much at the public expense because of money earned from the crown estates and tourism. This is all is lordly monarchy is, but at a much larger scale… so people prefer a lordly monarchy in the sense that the monarchy has monopolies and immense wealth and lands. It doesn't ache them as much as taxation under a royal monarchy, so I'm not sure with Hobbes about the problem of dieting. I see his point that the Monarch will inevitably have to tax and adjust accordingly so a strict diet wouldn't do, but some dieting to funnel into the public wealth might help with lessening the tax burden or the grievances. But maybe States today are better primed since I know many right libertarians are complaining about the exorbitant taxes of the modern day. So I'm sure that by now they'd be used to it or wouldn't think they'd be better off with another form of State.
I love this scene with Tsar Paul I overlooking this model city of St. Petersburg and planning.
It is a theme I like, whether Leviathan overlooking the City or stories detailing utopian cities on a hill.
Jean Bodin also said Aristotle mistaken a city for a commonwealth, but since then we still refer to the city as a symbol of the State.
In the past, I would post this clip of Louis XIV and Versailles, but also the city of Pi-Ramses: the Monarch's first introduction to management of policy is the management of their household, and their palaces. As well as the maxim that a city or state is like no more than a great household under a monarchy. So we extend not only the symbol of the city for the state, but also the household, and especially the royal palace.
Not only the household relationships, but also building a literal house itself as well as the city. It is a theme in history comparable to the great monarchies that founded cities themselves and were founders of states – it was always a mark of pre-eminence.
Monarchists recognize the significance of these actions and how it fits into the scheme and ideals of monarchy.
Aristotle / Kingly Rule
>For as household management is the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule is the household management of a city, or of a nation, or of many nations.
Despite the disagreements previously had w/ him, Aristotle is on the mark here. That is why the nation under monarchy is called a great family. Or why it has been a maxim for universal monarchy to say, that all the world would be under one roof or the four corners of the world.
Bizi besleyen baba - the father who feeds us
The title of the Sultan among the Janissaries.
This is an important theme for /monarchy/, but not only /monarchy/ but all forms of State. In order to garner a belief from people, they'll need to believe it will provide for them
for what reason I made a monarchist creed to help unravel any mind into seeing how monarchy will provide As I outlined numerous times, but here
>>8934 &
>>8935 &
>>8963 &
>>8964 &
>>8965 about the significance of a term like bizi besleyen baba.
>>9172I like King James VI & I. He's my #1 king.
But I don't think Catholicism was a hill worth dying on & I'm not too sympathetic there. Pretty much dynastic suicide.
Traditional Catholics after the Hoppeans tend to be pester me too. Eh.
>>9178I'm one of the relaxed posters here.
The main reason I have 2 threads is to help slow them down + one is for slice of life everyday content while the other is politics.
This Alunya avatar you can play in VRchat.
Jean Bodin / An infinite labyrinth of errors
>But here happily some man will say, that none but myself is of this opinion, and that not one of the ancient and much less of the modern writers which intreat of matters of State or Commonwealths, have once touched this point. True it is that I cannot deny the same; yet this distinction nevertheless seems unto me more than necessary, for the good understanding of the state of every commonweal; if a man will not cast himself head long into an infinite labyrinth of errors, where into we see Aristotle himself to have fallen: mistaking the popular Commonwealth for the Aristocratic: and so contrarywise, contrary to the common received opinion, yea and contrary to common sense also: For these principles evil grounded, nothing that is firm and sure can possibly be thereon built. From this error likewise is sprung the opinion of them which have forged a form of a Commonwealth mingled of all three, which we have for good reasons before rejected.
But three Commonwealths or forms of State
>Forasmuch as we have before sufficiently spoken of Sovereignty, and of the rights and marks thereof; now it behooves us to consider who they be which in every Commonweal hold that Sovereignty; thereby to judge what the estate is: as if the Sovereignty consist in one only prince, we call it a Monarchy: but if all the people be therein interested, we call it a Democracy, or Popular estate: So if but some part of the people have the Sovereign command, we account that state to be an Aristocracy [Or, in more proper wording, Oligarchy]. Which words we will use, to avoid the obscurity and confusion which might otherwise arise, by the variety of governours good or bad: which has given occasion unto many, to make more sorts of Commonwealths than three. But if that opinion should take place, and that we should by the foot of virtues and vices, measure the estate of Commonwealths; we should find a world of them, and them in number infinite. Now it is certain, that to attain unto the true definitions and resolutions of all things, we must not rest upon the external accidents which are innumerable, but rather upon the essential and formal differences: for otherwise a man might fall into an infinite and exctricable labyrinth, whereof no knowledge is to be had, or certain precept to be given. For so a man should forge and fashion infinite numbers of Commonwealths, not only according to the diversity of virtues and vices; but even according to the variety of things indifferent also. As if a Monarch were to be chosen for his strength, or for his beauty, for his stature, or for his nobility, or riches, which are all things indifferent; or for his martial disposition, or for that he is more given to peace, for his gravity, or for his justice, for his beauty, or for his wisdom, for his sobriety, or his humility, for his simplicity, or his chastity; and so for all other qualities, a man should so make an infinity of Monarchies: and in like sort in the Aristocratic state, if some few of many should have the sovereignty above the rest, such as excelled others in riches, nobility, wisdom, justice, martial prowess, or other like virtues, or vices, or things indifferent, there should thereof arise infinite forms of Commonwealths: a thing most absurd, and so by consequent the opinion whereof such an absurdity arises, is to be rejected. Seeing therefore that the accidental quality changes not the nature of things: let us say that there are but three estates or sorts of Commonwealths.
Whether the prince is unjust or worthy, nevertheless the state is still a monarchy
>There can be no forth, and indeed none can be conceived, for virtue and viciousness do not create a type of rule. Whether the prince is unjust or worthy, nevertheless the state is still a monarchy. The same thing must be said about oligarchy and the rule of the people, who, while they have no powers but the creation of magistrates, still have the sovereignty, and on them the form of government necessarily depends. We shall then call the form one of optimates, or else popular, (let us use these words in order that we may not rather often be forced to use the names aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, ochlocracy, according to the type of virtue or vice).
Rejection of a mixed State or mixed Constitution
>All the ancients agree that there are at least three types of commonwealth. Some have added a fourth composed of a mixture of the other three. Plato added a fourth type, or rule of the wise. But this, properly speaking, is only the purest form that aristocracy can take. He did not accept a mixed state as a fourth type. Aristotle accepted both Plato's fourth type and the mixed state, making five in all. Polybius distinguished seven, three good, three bad, and one composed of a mixture of the three good. Dionysius Halicarnassus only admitted four, the three pure types, and a mixture of them. Cicero, and following his example, Sir Thomas More in his Commonwealth, Contarini, Machiavelli, and many others have held the same opinion. This view has the dignity of antiquity. It was not new when propounded by Polybius, who is generally credited with its invention, nor by Aristotle. It goes back four hundred years earlier to Herodotus. He said that many thought that the mixed was the best type, but for his part he thought there were only three types, and all others were imperfect forms. I should have been convinced by the authority of such great names, but that reason and common sense compels me to hold the opposing view. One must show then not only why these views are erroneous but why the arguments and examples they rely on do not really prove their point.
Jean Bodin on Herodotus:
>It goes back four hundred years earlier to Herodotus. He said that many thought that the mixed was the best type, but for his part he thought there were only three types, and all the others were imperfect forms
>Let us therefore conclude, never any Commonwealth to have been made of an Oligarchy and popular estate; and so much less of the three states of Commonweals, and that there are not indeed but three estates of Commonweales, as Herodotus first most truly said amongst the Greeks, whom Tacitus amongst the Latins imitating, saith, The people, the nobility, or one alone, do rule all nations and cities.
>Wherefore such states as wherein the rights of sovereignty are divided, are not rightly to be called Commonweales, but rather the corruption of Commonweales, as Herodotus hath most briefly, but most truly written.
This is where the stress on 3 forms of State originates w/ absolute monarchists, & imo monarchy would have long been irrelevant without it.
Thomas Hobbes' anti-scholasticism / Universities
>All the Presbyterians were of the same mind with Gomar: but a very great many others not; and those were called here Arminians, who, because the doctrine of free-will had been exploded as a Papistical doctrine, and because the Presbyterians were far the greater number, and already in favour with the people, were generally hated. It was easy, therefore, for the Parliament to make that calumny pass currently with the people, when the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Laud, was for Arminius, and had a little before, by his power ecclesiastical, forbidden all his ministers to preach to the people of predestination; and when all ministers that were gracious with him, and hoped for Church preferment, fell to preaching and writing for free-will, to the uttermost of their power, as a proof of their ability and merit. Besides, they gave out, some of them, that the Archbishop was in heart a Papist; and in case he could effect a toleration here of the Roman religion, was to have a cardinal's hat: which was not only false, but also without any ground at all for a suspicion.
>It is a strange thing, that scholars, obscure men that could receive no clarity but from the flame of the state, should be suffered to bring their unnecessary disputes, and together with them their quarrels, out of the universities into the commonwealth; and more strange, that the state should engage in their parties, and not rather put them both to silence [Presbyterians & Arminians]
They must punish then the most of those that have had their breeding in the Universities
>They must punish then the most of those that have had their breeding in the Universities. For such curious questions in divinity are first started in the Universities, and so are all those politic questions concerning the rights of civil and ecclesiastic government; and there they are furnished with arguments for liberty out of the works of Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, and out of the histories of Rome and Greece, for their disputation against the necessary power of their sovereigns.
>Therefore I despair of any lasting peace amongst ourselves, till the Universities here shall bend and direct their studies to the settling of it, that is, to the teaching of absolute obedience to the laws of the King, and to his public edicts under the Great Seal of England. For I make no doubt, but that solid reason, backed with the authority of so many learned men, will more prevail for the keeping of us in peace within ourselves, than any victory can do over the rebels. But I am afraid that it is impossible to bring the Universities to such a compliance with the actions of state, as is necessary for the business.
The core of rebellion – the Universities
>The core of rebellion, as you have seen by this, and read of other rebellions, are the Universities; which nevertheless are not to be cast away, but to be better disciplined: that is to say, that the politics there taught be made to be, as true politics should be, such as are fit to make men know, that it is their duty to obey all laws whatsoever that shall by the authority of the King be enacted, till by the same authority they shall be repealed; such as are fit to make men understand, that the civil laws are God’s laws, as they that make them are by God appointed to make them and to make men know, that the people and the Church are one thing, and have but one head, the King; and that no man has title to govern under him, that has it not from him; that the King owes his crown to God only, and to no man, ecclesiastic or other; and that the religion they teach there, be a quiet waiting for the coming again of our blessed Saviour, and in the mean time a resolution to obey the King’s laws, which also are God’s laws
The Pastorall Authority Of Soveraigns Only Is De Jure Divino, That Of Other Pastors Is Jure Civili
>If a man therefore should ask a Pastor, in the execution of his Office, as the chief Priests and Elders of the people (Mat. 21.23.) asked our Saviour, “By what authority dost thou these things, and who gave thee this authority:” he can make no other just Answer, but that he doth it by the Authority of the Common-wealth, given him by the King, or Assembly that representeth it. All Pastors, except the Supreme, execute their charges in the Right, that is by the Authority of the Civill Soveraign, that is, Jure Civili. But the King, and every other Soveraign executeth his Office of Supreme Pastor, by immediate Authority from God, that is to say, In Gods Right, or Jure Divino. And therefore none but Kings can put into their Titles (a mark of their submission to God onely ) Dei Gratia Rex, &c. Bishops ought to say in the beginning of their Mandates, “By the favour of the Kings Majesty, Bishop of such a Diocesse;” or as Civill Ministers, “In his Majesties Name.” For in saying, Divina Providentia, which is the same with Dei Gratia, though disguised, they deny to have received their authority from the Civill State; and sliely slip off the Collar of their Civill Subjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the Common-wealth.
>So that where a stranger hath authority to appoint Teachers, it is given him by the Soveraign in whose Dominions he teacheth. Christian Doctors are our Schoolmasters to Christianity; But Kings are Fathers of Families, and may receive Schoolmasters for their Subjects from the recommendation of a stranger, but not from the command; especially when the ill teaching them shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that recommends them: nor can they be obliged to retain them, longer than it is for the Publique good; the care of which they stand so long charged withall, as they retain any other essentiall Right of the Soveraignty.
>And therefore the second Conclusion, concerning the best form of Government of the Church, is nothing to the question of the Popes Power without his own Dominions: For in all other Common-wealths his Power (if hee have any at all) is that of the Schoolmaster onely, and not of the Master of the Family.
>The third place, is John 21.16. “Feed my sheep;” which is not a Power to make Laws, but a command to Teach. Making Laws belongs to the Lord of the Family; who by his owne discretion chooseth his Chaplain, as also a Schoolmaster to Teach his children.
The Universities… Again
>Seeing the Universities have heretofore from time to time maintained the authority of the Pope, contrary to all laws divine, civil, and natural, against the right of our Kings, why can they not as well, when they have all manner of laws and equity on their side, maintain the rights of him that is both sovereign of the kingdom, and head of the Church?
<Why then were they not in all points for the King’s power, presently after that King Henry VIII was in Parliament declared head of the Church, as much as they were before for the authority of the Pope?
>Because the clergy in the Universities, by whom all things there are governed, and the clergy without the Universities, as well biships as inferior clerks, did think that the pulling down of the Pope was the setting up of them, as to England, in his place, and made no question, the greatest part of them, but that their spiritual power did depend not upon the authority of the King, but of Christ himself, derived to them by a successive imposition of hands from bishop to bishop; notwithstanding they knew that this derivation passed through the hands of popes and bishops whose authority they had cast off. For though they were content that the divine right, which the Pope pretended to in England, should be denied him, yet they thought it not so fit to be taken from the Church of England, whom they now supposed themselves to represent.
Greeks & Romans
>Fourthly, there were an exceeding great number of men of the better sort, that had been so educated, as that in their youth having read the books written by famous men of the ancient Grecian and Roman commonwealths concerning their polity and great actions; in which books the popular government was extolled by that glorious name of liberty, and monarchy disgraced by the name of tyranny; they became thereby in love with their forms of government.
>And out of these men were chosen the greatest part of the House of Commons
>For who can be a good subject in a monarchy, whose principles are taken from the enemies of monarchy, such as were Cicero, Seneca, Cato, and other politicians of Rome, and Aristotle of Athens, who seldom spake of kings but as of wolves and other ravenous beasts?
>[They] became acquainted with the democratical principles of Aristotle and Cicero, and from the love of their eloquence fell in love with their politics, and that more and more, till it grew into rebellion we now talk of.
Imitation Of The Greeks, And Romans
>And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of the most frequent causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy, and Histories of the antient Greeks, and Romans
<From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latine writers, in their books, and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull. From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves.
>In summe, I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publikely read, without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venom.
Unique IPs: 11