>>25069871. /ukr/ has a low opinion of Dugin.
2. notice how he actually mentions the problems with both sides instead of being a glowie cunt claiming to be a both-sideser but always criticizing only one side
>>2506994Blonde haired, blue eyes, a look of extreme satisfaction when voicing fascist rhetoric. It’s all there.
>goddessThat’s a yikes from me dawg, there is a spectre descending on Europe, it’s the spectre of coomers getting excited over Kallas, Marin, Sandu, Von Der Leyen when she was younger, that photo of Merkel from her East German nudist days, etc.
>>2507009
>photo of Merkel from her East German nudist dayscmon man you cannot not post that pic here
>Kallas, Marin, Sandu, Von Der Leyendont care, my only goddess i simp for is melanie jolie <3
>>2507009>that photo of Merkel from her East German nudist daysYeah, the thirsty lads need to—
wait, WHAT?
>>2507128Different series, but I'll give it a watch.
>>2507137>Its a slow burn I have no doubt about that.
>>2507144This is the verisimilitude I like in my movies.
>>2507318That’s a new take on this conflict
>The great cock theory<whoever fucks the other leader’s wife first wins the war
>Russia really will take off the gloves.Anti-campists truly are just talking to themselves the entire time.
>When is Putin going to take the gloves off?<*effortpost disputing that framing of the conflict*>Oh soon? I’ll check in tomorrow to ask again >>2507318Putin is the great mirror of the self, a reflection of a person's personal failings. He reflects one's personal failings regardless of whether one's attitude toward him is negative or positive.
The people who criticize Putin for his weakness and timidity are typically people of middling stature (figuratively speaking) who regret a life of sloth and underachievement.
The people who laud Putin for his monumental restraint and patience are typically the most impulsive, combative, short-fused curmudgeons around.
>>2507551Who do you think works in power plants? Poroshenko's family? Zelensky's?
This interimperialist war
must stop.
Thousands of proles have died and continue to die for nothing. Workers of the world, unite against the fascist dictatorships of Ukraine and Russia!
>>2507568 (me)
Or are they just Avangards that look a little different from typical pics?
https://www.lilyslynch.com/p/the-global-sumud-flotilla-the-view?
<Moldova’s other autonomous region
>This week, I covered the elections in Moldova. That piece should be coming out today. I haven’t enjoyed learning about a new country so much in a long time. I was especially taken by the autonomous region of Gagauzia. When it comes to internationally-recognized autonomous regions of Moldova, Transnistria gets all the attention. The de facto Russia-controlled rebel territory of Transnistria might be more popular with backpackers on the “dark tourism” circuit, and it may have Lenin statues, but Gagauzia is far more interesting. First of all, the Gagauz people are Turkic by ethnicity but are Orthodox Christian by confession. They are also overwhelmingly pro-Russian. They really hate the EU and the pro-EU political party that just won the parliamentary election, the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). In fact, just over 3% of people in Gagauzia voted for PAS on Sunday. This poor showing echoed the results of last year’s constitutional referendum on EU membership in which 95% of people in Gagauzia voted against joining the EU.
>What’s fascinating about these poor results for the pro-EU party and for the EU itself in Gagauzia is that you’ll never hear about them. The Moldovan elections were reported on in the West as if they had dealt a crushing blow to Moscow. Of course, the pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) did win the election. But the fact that there were such stark regional and ethnic variations strikes me as important and newsworthy. My sense is that the pro-EU/NATO side in Europe is so eager to present an image of itself as the undisputed winner in the current contest with Russia that it often papers over cracks that detract from that picture. We all know that papering over cracks doesn’t actually make them go away. If anything, cracks tend to grow wider with neglect.
>And that is exactly the way the Moldovans I spoke with this past week characterized Chisinau’s relationship to Gagauzia: as one of neglect. And indelicacy. In the few recent reports from Gagauzia that exist, the pro-Russian sentiments of the Gagauz are explained away as the result of “Russian propaganda”. There is little attempt to explore why Russian messaging would find such fertile ground in Gagauzia. Reading the handful of Western media reports that acknowledge the abysmal result for the EU referendum in the region you can tell that the journalists think that their job is to make the EU look good and popular everywhere, regardless of what the numbers say. Ironically, it is very Soviet. How big of a difference is there really between the poor sap from Deutsche Welle who encounters a 5% figure of support for the EU and who must bury it or explain it away as a product of “Russian brainwashing”, and a Soviet bureaucrat who has to fudge the numbers in a report to meet a high production quota for grain?
>Of course, there is a very real and relevant story about Gaguazia here. It is one that goes back to the late 1980s and the resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe. During the Soviet era, Gagauzia underwent Russification, meaning the Russian language was promoted over smaller local languages. The Gagauz language was not taught in schools, so Gagauzia was more Russified than any other region of Moldova. But with perestroika in the 1980s, the Gagauz grew interested in their national heritage and traditions. Moldovans, who were experiencing their own nationalist renaissance, hated that: they were interested in unification with Romania. In October 1990, a full-on civil war between Moldovans and the Gagauz was narrowly avoided. Gagauzia declared independence and the leadership in Chisinau mobilized thousands of people to march on the region. However, a military unit dispatched from Odessa managed to prevent any bloodshed. Gagauzia agreed to autonomy instead. Even so, the nationalist fad of the 1990s saw the Moldovan majority adopt slogans and attitudes with fascist overtones. One famous slogan used against the Russian-speaking minority was “suitcase, station, Russia”, suggesting that minorities like the Gagauz should self-deport. Chisinau still uses nationalist rhetoric to this day. In 2023, the Moldovan parliament changed the name of the country’s official language from Moldovan to Romanian. This passed almost without comment in Western media, but was viewed as hostile in Russia, where Romanian is seen as the more nationalist name and also carries pro-NATO and pro-EU associations. Naturally, it was viewed much the same in Gagauzia, where Russia is seen as a protector. In 2024, the governor of Gagauzia, Evghenia Gutul, traveled to Moscow to meet with Putin and secure his support for the region’s secession in the event that Moldova united with Romania. She also asked for Russian protection in a scenario in which Gagauzia’s separatist aims were impeded by the central government. Then, in March of this year, Gutul was arrested at Chisinau Airport, where she was to board a plane to Istanbul. She was accused of having received illegal funding from Russia for her gubernatorial campaign. In Comrat, the regional capital, thousands of people protested Gutul’s treatment by the authorities in Chisinau. Finally, less than one month before the parliamentary election, Gutul was sentenced to seven years in prison. Somehow, I think there is a bit more going on here than mere “Russian propaganda”. For its part, Turkish media has also depicted the Chisinau government’s treatment of Gutul terms unsympathetic to the pro-EU side. As Gagauz are Turkic people, goings on in Gaguazia receive far more attention here than in the West. I also find it eternally fascinating that on Europe’s Eastern flank, any nationalism that asserts an identity emphasizing separateness from Russia is to be celebrated, while any nationalism that expresses an affinity with Russia has to be suppressed. >>2507568 (me)
>>2507573 (me)
nm, they look nothing like Avangards. I must've been thinking of something else I can't remember the name of.
>>2507600Yeah, I think you're right.
Don't know why it was in an article about nukes.
>>2507638https://korybko.substack.com/p/re-evaluating-the-special-operationRe-Evaluating The Special Operation In Light Of The Valdai Club’s Startling Insight
>To be clear, the Valdai Club only represents one of Russia’s policymaking factions and their insight might not accurately reflect Putin’s calculations, which could always change in any case.
>The Valdai Club, which is Russia’s premier think tank and elite networking platform at whose annual meetings Putin participates, shared some startling insight into “the changing purpose of wars”. It was included in the eponymous section of their report titled “Dr. Chaos or: How to Stop Worrying and Love the Disorder”, which was written by Oleg Barabanov, Anton Bespalov, Timofei Bordachev, Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrey Sushentsov, and Ivan Timofeev. They’re all regarded as Russia’s top policy influencers.
>They wrote on page 25 that “Russia would not risk its own socioeconomic stability for a decisive victory in a military conflict. One exception is direct full-scale aggression, but the probability of such an action against a nuclear superpower is close to zero…Perhaps the purpose of wars has changed. The contemporary objective may no longer lie in victories – wherein one party achieves all its goals – but rather in maintaining a balance necessary for a period of relative peaceful development.”
>This startling insight prompts a re-evaluation of the special operation, which has been going on for over 3,5 years, in no small part due to Putin’s restraint in not waging a US-inspired “shock-and-awe” campaign at the cost of Iraqi-like civilian casualties among what he believes to be the fraternal Ukrainian people. In light of what Russia’s top policy influencers just revealed, however, a complementary reason might be his trusted policy advisors’ reluctance to risk their country’s “socioeconomic stability for a decisive victory”.
>It can only be speculated what form this could take if Putin abandoned his restraint by ordering the bombing of bridges across the Dnieper, the total destruction of all major Ukrainian power plants, and/or targeting political sites like the Rada. Nevertheless, the salience rests in the Valdai Club’s implied assessment that pursuing “a decisive victory in a military conflict” presumably like the present one could lead to such risks, thus further contextualizing why this hasn’t yet happened and might never will.
>More insight followed on page 26. According to the authors, “The current system is not excessively unfair to any of the major players; in other words, it is not so flawed as to require revolutionary solutions. The world has experienced numerous social and political upheavals on its path to self-awareness, learning to manage nature and control the most destructive socio-political processes. This capability has now reached a significantly high level.”
>Moreover, “It appears that the era of grand ideas, overarching theories, comprehensive programmes, and great expectations is over…national plans – even the most ambitious – are based on existing opportunities and realistic, accessible means of expanding them; they do not require a fundamental restructuring of the global order.” This suggests Russia’s satisfaction with the multipolar gains since 2022 and its reluctance to risk their reversal through a “decisive victory” that might destabilize this new order.
>To be clear, the Valdai Club only represents one of Russia’s policymaking factions and their insight might not accurately reflect Putin’s calculations, which could always change in any case. Even so, it does indeed explain Russia’s willingness to compromise with the US, ideally with the aim of reforming the European security architecture as the grand strategic outcome of this conflict. Trump thinks that he can coerce Russia into concessions, however, which risks unleashing the chaos that Putin’s restraint seeks to avoid. Unique IPs: 29