>>2915426>additional happiness (marginally decreasing utility)I would rather term it "diminishing marginal utility". As total "happiness" increases, marginal "happiness" decreases. Hence, if it takes 30 spoonfuls to eat a bowl of soup, we are pleasured with each one, but we are still less pleasured at the same rate of each one. As hunger declines, so does marginal utility. On this point too, this is mainly applicable to constant consumption rather than variable consumption, hence if we add bread and butter to the soup, we increase total happiness at the same rate, by also increasing each margin of pleasure. So, utility is multiplied with each commodity added. In marginal theories of production, this is applied by the factors of labour, capital and land, which are multiplied.
>estimating the utility of a productYes, especially when you don't have money as a means. A useful trick by Carl Menger is a comparison of various goods, making value (e.g. utility) entirely relative, never absolute (this is also stressed by Gossen, the founder of marginal utility theory). For example, if I have two goods, my immediate choice between them expresses the greater utility it brings me, and so goods which have the same level of "indifference" (t. Jevons) of choice have the same value to us. If we could either take or leave a choice between chocolate and vanilla, they have the same value. An issue however is that while Gossen and Menger both make this point, they also use the sum of Intensity and Duration as absolute metrics, the same as Jevons. Here, utility is caught between its relative case and absolute case. More rigorous Austrian theorists will then say that since life is a constant series of choices, we are always preferring one thing over another, making value entirely relative. So, we come into a strange case where the value of a thing is measured against the value of another thing, but value in itself is not established. It should also be said that value can be configured very basically to simply be a supply and demand equation in Menger's writings, which is then the very basis of price.
>To Marx, the use-value is knownHere I would disagree. To Marx, use-value is entirely contingent to circumstance, including history. If one makes a thing which is supposed to be useful, but isn't, by lack of sale, then it has no use-value. At most, it has a potential use-value; but if it's unrealised, it doesn't count.
>shifting a thing from a non-user to a user increases somebody's wealth without decreasing the wealth of another.This is affirmed by Jevons; that transferring a private item into the public realm multiplies its total utility (1882):
<The main raison d'être of Free Public Libraries, as indeed of public museums, art-galleries, parks, halls, public clocks, and many other kinds of public works, is the enormous increase of utility which is thereby acquired for the community at a trifling cost. If a beautiful picture be hung in the dining-room of a private house, it may perhaps be gazed at by a few guests a score or two of times in the year. Its real utility is too often that of ministering to the selfish pride of its owner. If it be hung in the National Gallery, it will be enjoyed by hundreds of thousands of persons, whose glances, it need hardly be said, do not tend to wear out the canvas. The same principle applies to books in common ownership. If a man possesses a library of a few thousand volumes, by far the greater part of them must lie for years untouched upon the shelves; he cannot possibly use more than a fraction of the whole in any one year. But a library of five or ten thousand volumes opened free to the population of a town may be used a thousand times as much. It is a striking case of what I propose to call the principle of the multiplication of utility, a principle which lies at the base of some of the most important processes of political economy, including the division of labour.https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/jevons-methods-of-social-reform-and-other-papers#lf0236_head_005Too, Gossen (1854) says that since each thing loses its value with constant addition, that the hoarder of money is irrational.
>You can be the owner of something without being capable of using it.To Locke (Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 5), property is established by the rights of labour over the appropriation of a thing. This is later termed the Liberal "homestead principle" which establishes the privation of a thing from common use, or private dereliction, by the acquirement of it by cultivation. For example, if a house is abandoned, and people live in it, they gain a right to it - so, property is qualified by this direct utility. This is also continuous of Proudhon's own thoughts on possession. Further, I would concur that the right of exclusion is the more primary right, since rape, for example, is trespass against the property of another, and is unlawful. More than being able to "use" my body is my right for my body to not be used by others without consent. Thus, the mad utilitarian might justify rape against the right of property.
>Such a society will not have patentsDid you know that the Soviet Union had patents?
Ayn Rand also attempted to justify patents by citing that intellectual labour granted her the right to intellectual property.
>set ways to limit hoardingIs this not simply taxation?