/leftypol/ - Leftist Politically Incorrect

>>2785821
>arbitrarily so
No, necessarily so.
>subjectivity is not factual
If I see something, is my perception itself not a fact? I may see something (i.e. factual), but it may not be "real". There is a distinction. For example, hallucination is perception of what is unreal. One still hallucinates; that is a fact of one's experience.

>>2785825
>No, necessarily so.
no, because the limits of what is considered 'formal' are arbitrary
>One still hallucinates; that is a fact of one's experience.
did you not just invoke the difference between form and content? so then you can understand that subjective perception can be wrong? so you agree that its not factual?

>>2785834
>the limits of what is considered 'formal' are arbitrary
Arbitrary to what?
>so then you can understand that subjective perception can be wrong? so you agree that its not factual?
No, no. The contents of subjective experience are necessarily factual (for example, you cannot have a "false" feeling). All experience is a posteriori and so counts as knowledge, but the knowledge of what? Of experience. Reality then, is given, by what may be reasoned about experience. For example, if I hallucinate, I may still know what I see is unreal, the same way the statement "woody and buzz escaped the house" in reference to Toy Story is a factual statement, but has no reality, since fiction is unreal.

>>2785841
>Arbitrary to what?
to your subjective definition of formality
>for example, you cannot have a "false" feeling
and what is the meaningful content of "true" feelings that correspond to objectively false realities?
>may
this is at least the third time you have used this word, but also necessary. do you think something "may" be true but also is "necessarily" true at the same time? seems pretty contradictory doesnt it?

>>2785850
>definition of formality
Do words have meanings, or is this more pretentious wankery?
>what is the meaningful content of "true" feelings that correspond to objectively false realities?
I would say that consistency gives us a sense of probability which then allows us to properly navigate the world. For example, fire is always hot; dropped things always fall - under usual environmental conditions, but if there is a change in phenomena, it is either in us, or in the space we inhabit. Consistency thus entails causation.
>do you think something "may" be true but also is "necessarily" true at the same time?
How do you mean? Give an example, please.

>>2785854
>Do words have meanings
of course they do you just happen to use special private definitions for every word that you refuse to share with the audience

>>2785879
Since you disagree with my use of the term "formal", please formalise the above propositions to fit your liking, so that I may see any potential ignorance on my part.

>>2785883
why would i do your work for you? if you are incapable of making a coherent argument maybe its because your position is flawed…

>>2786078
So you disagree with me but can't demonstrate why?
Very sane.

>>2785760
>moral propositions
Because they’re inherently related to subjective qualities, like how food can be « tasty ».

>preferences
Because they are slightly different. It’s like saying that enjoyment is the same as pleasure, they’re just a bit different

>>2786230
>subjective qualities
>taste
Taste is a fact of experience by a posteriori knowledge
So how do we come to know what is good? Do we sense it?
>they’re just a bit different
But WHAT is the difference?

>>2786237
>So how do we come to know what is good? Do we sense it?
By judging it in relation to whether or not it produces satisfaction, which itself is simply the chemicals produced by the brain's reward system
<ctrl + f "reward" => 73 results
lol lmfao I'm genuinely left wondering how one could be this stupid

>But WHAT is the difference?
Because a preference is simply a choice made between multiple options. It doesn't mean that we can derive satisfaction out of it, it simply means that it's the option we would pick between multiple outcomes.
If I say I prefer rape to being tortured, it doesn't mean that I find rape good.

>>2786283
>By judging it in relation to whether or not it produces satisfaction
So what is good is that which produces satisfaction? That's it?
>doesn't mean that I find rape good
So, is rape bad?

>>2786291
>That's it?
More or less yeah. It'd be what you call "eudemonia" given that you're presuming naturalist aristotlean ethics.

>So, is rape bad?
Yes. I would not be unsatisfied if I were to be rape. As such, I can say that rape is bad.

>>2786315
>More or less yeah
So let's say that a person intervenes upon another dissatisfactorily (i.e. a parent saving a baby), to preserve their safety - most would say that despite it being unsatisfactory to the child, it is still good for them. Would you agree that its BETTER, rather than WORSE, for a parent to intervene?
>Yes
Okay, so rape is bad. This means that rapists are also morally incorrect, yes?

>>2786319
>Would you agree that its BETTER, rather than WORSE, for a parent to intervene
<mistaking short term pleasure for satisfaction
You genuinely have to be sub80 autism score to not understand this. It's kind of obvious that a kid's decision can have long-term impact which will be detrimental to his "self" over the long term (albeit produces short term pleasure)

>This means that rapists are also morally incorrect, yes?
To me, it would appear as so. But let me guess, you're going to twist this into saying that I'm formulating an objective and universal moral proposition ?

>>2786322
>pleasure ≠ satisfaction
Explain the difference, please.
>detrimental to his "self"
So is whatever causes risk to one's life dissatisfactory?
>To me, it would appear as so.
So you have moral opinions, but can you assert moral propositions?

>>2786332
>Explain the difference
There is a difference which comes from the percieved continuity of the self. Pleasure is immediate and only affects the "self" at a given time, whilst satisfaction affects the "self" on a more continuous time. This doesn't mean that it's forever, but simply that it bears more consequences over the long time.

<satisfaction : fulfilment of one's wishes, expectations, or needs, or the pleasure derived from this
<pleasure : a feeling of happy satisfaction and enjoyment.

A feeling is brief, whilst fulfillment lasts longer.

>So is whatever causes risk to one's life dissatisfactory?
Not necessarily because that's not how the brain's reward system works.

>So you have moral opinions, but can you assert moral propositions?
<Gotcha ! By presuming that propositions need to express moral qualities as objective and universal things, I can say that you're wrong
Anon what's the point in this ? It's funny that you consider this a rebuttal because it also contradicts your position, as stated previously. The aristotlean naturalist ethics doesn't consider morality to be a thing in itself, as this would be more akin to Plotinus' position. You're simply repeating a debate that's already been settled : moral propositions are simply expressions about opinions.

>>2786347
>Pleasure is immediate and only affects the "self" at a given time, whilst satisfaction affects the "self" on a more continuous time.
So isn't satisfaction just pleasure of a longer duration? Or can one be satisfied without being pleasured?
>A feeling is brief, whilst fulfillment lasts longer
Is fulfillment not also a feeling?
>Not necessarily
So, can satisfaction ever be detrimental against oneself like pleasure can be?
>what's the point in this?
To test your logic. You said that rape is bad - okay, so is rape bad? You then stutter. Are you simply expressing "Rape is dissatisfactory to me" as "rape is bad"? Do these express the same thing?
>it also contradicts your position
Where? Link to my post.
>moral propositions are simply expressions about opinions.
So when you say "rape is bad", what opinion are you referring to? Or are you saying that moral propositions are in fact moral opinions?

>>2786356
>I'm too retarded to understand that the brain's reward system deals in feelings
yes

>You then stutter
I-i d-dd-dd-didntt-t stt-u-tu-ter I-ii've bee-been t-ttrue t-to m-my p-posi-si-tion t-the who-whole t-ttime

>Link to my post
<doesn't even remember his own position
yikes buddy

>that moral propositions are in fact moral opinions
Indeed, they are opinions made in relation to how one could percieve his own satisfaction.

>>2786479
So you once again fail to answer clarifying questions.
>Indeed, they are opinions
Okay, so you have reverted back into non-cognitivism:
<Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-cognitivism
So it turns out you weren't just pretending to be retarded after all. So then, do you admit that by your own understanding, all moral propositions are invalid, since they simply signal one's feelings?

>>2786494
>thinks moral propositions have to treat morality as an exterior object
>mistaking non-cognitivism for ethical subjectivism
>seething because I didn't take his bait on satisfaction
>ressorts to calling non-cognitivism retarded despite learning about it a week ago through skimming the wiki page

Just stop smithanon, it's becoming embarassing for you. Even I wouldn't wish you to be in your awkward position.

>>2786494
To clarify for anyone reading this tantamount pseudery, what SmithAnon has been trying to do for the past 40 posts, after he has himself admitted that his positions were unprovable, is to bruteforce moral propositions to be treated as objective moral claims about physical thing, like the color red or the sound of a plane.
This has become awkward for him, because I keep signaling to him that moral propositions simply express our opinions on a claim, in relation to how we percieve to our own satisfaction. As such, he mistakes moral non-cognitivism (moral claims don't express anything), for ethical subjectivism (moral claims express personal opinions). This is because, as usual, smith anon doesn't actually know what he's debating about, and won't cope with his absolute BTFO.
I would also like to add that SmithAnon doesn't seem to understand his own position, since it also doesn't make moral propositions to be objective things in-themselves.

>>2786585
>moral propositions simply express our opinions on a claim, in relation to how we percieve to our own satisfaction
Okay, so we first have (i) satisfaction [how does this relate to pleasure?], (ii) perception of satisfaction [so is satisfaction not a feeling, since otherwise, satisfaction and its perception would be synonymous?], (iii) relation to a perception of satisfaction [word-salad], (iv) a claim to this relation of perceptions of pleasure [can these claims be correct or incorrect?], (v) opinions upon these claims [so a claim precedes its speculation?], (vi) propositions, upon (vii) morality, which "express" opinions [how do opinions and their expression differ?]
>he mistakes moral non-cognitivism (moral claims don't express anything)
Anon, you don't even understand non-cognitivism yourself. Moral statements in non-cognitivism inherently express meaning, but not pertaining to the contents of a moral nature. Emotivism for example expresses one's emotions; e.g. "(x) is good" means "i enjoy (x)"; to a non-cognitivist, that is the reality of moral statements.
>ethical subjectivism (moral claims express personal opinions).
Again, how do opinions and their "expression" differ; don't opinions express themselves, like how the objects of perception are the content of what is perceived (e.g. the "perception" of satisfaction, is satisfaction itself).
>understand his own position
What is my position? Explain it to me.
>>2786575
>thinks moral propositions have to treat morality as an exterior object
Perhaps you misunderstand; you have just wrote that "[moral propositions] are opinions". But opinions are not propositions, since they have a different form, don't they? Or are opinions and propositions the same thing to you?
>mistaking non-cognitivism for ethical subjectivism
Are moral propositions valid? Do correct and incorrect moral statements exist? You say "rape is wrong", so is it wrong to rape?
>didn't take his bait on satisfaction
>bait
Wow, you are falling apart at the seems. I asked very simply, can you have satisfaction without pleasure? Tell me.
>ressorts to calling non-cognitivism retarded
If you aren't a non-cognitivist then you literally agree with me…

even fucking hegel had a more materialist understanding of what dialectics actually entails than the average pseud today

>>2786609
>satisfaction
Amazing mumbo jumbo that's literally all been adressed earlier or that's easily inferable

>Moral statements in non-cognitivism inherently express meaning
>Emotivism for example expresses one's emotions; e.g. "(x) is good" means "i enjoy (x)"; to a non-cognitivist, that is the reality of moral statements.
Both completely wrong. It's literally the opposite of both statements that is true.

>don't opinions express themselves
>But opinions are not propositions
>Are moral propositions valid?
Already answered.

>What is my position?
naturalist aristotlean ethics

>Wow, you are falling apart at the seems
>If you aren't a non-cognitivist then you literally agree with me…
Sloppy b8; you're just pissed that I didn't accept your loosy attempt at a concession earlier and now want to stall until the thread hits bump limit

>>2786643
>all been adressed
No it hasn't.
>easily inferable
And from what you write, I infer that satisfaction is a mode of pleasure; i.e. by prolonged duration. Thus I ask, is this a correct inference; if not, then explain whether or not satisfaction is pleasurable.
>completely wrong
Okay, so you disagree with these sources?
<Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotivism
<Emotivism teaches that moral statements do nothing more than express the speaker's feelings about the issue.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/introduction/emotivism_1.shtml
>Already answered.
Where? Link to the post.
>naturalist aristotlean ethics
Where do I claim that these are my ethics?
>Sloppy b8
Anon… If you are not a non-cognitivist, then you must think it is incorrect. Where is the controversy in this statement?

>>2786479
><doesn't even remember his own position
lol he just wants to roll in the mud he remembers perfectly well

>>2786585
>for the past 40 posts,
yeah a lot longer than that

>>2786585
>doesn't seem to understand his own position
no shit

>stall until the thread hits bump limit
MO #1. hit bump limit and then do it all over again endlessly

>>2786657
>so you disagree with these sources
These sources are NOT saying that moral non-cognitivism is about saying « I enjoy x » nor that they express meaning directly.

>propositions
From the wiki page (which you did not read evidently yet argue arduently about it)
« Ethical subjectivism (also known as moral subjectivism and moral non-objectivism)[1] is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

Ethical sentences express propositions.
Some such propositions are true.
The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.[2][3]
This makes ethical subjectivism a form of cognitivism (because ethical statements are the types of things that can be true or false).[4] Ethical subjectivism stands in opposition to moral realism, which claims that moral propositions refer to objective facts, independent of human opinion;[5] to error theory, which denies that any moral propositions are true in any sense; and to non-cognitivism, which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all.[6] »

>Where do I claim that these are my ethics?
You wouldn’t; you know literally nothing (0) about meta-ethics. But this is effectively your position.

>satisfaction/pleasure
So you are indeed able to make basic inferences and to understand basic concepts

>>2786774
>These sources are NOT saying that moral non-cognitivism is about saying « I enjoy x »
Yes they are… An emotivist believes the statement "(x) is good" means "Yay, (x)", and thus there is a distinction between the nominal and the real meaning of things. But if I am incorrect, explain what an emotivist believes, especially in contradistinction to an "ethical subjectivist".
>Ethical sentences express propositions. Some such propositions are true.
You write that the truth of a moral proposition depends upon satisfaction, which you differ from pleasure, so may you sufficiently explain their differences, please?
>You wouldn't
Okay… So I never claimed something, yet you impose it onto me; don't you find this dishonest?
>So you are indeed able to make basic inferences
If I have made an incorrect inference upon your meaning, then please correct it, as I humbly request.

>>2786851
Saying « I enjoy x » is a factual statement about me. It is a proposition, relational to me. Saying « Hurray ! X » is an expression of approval, it is neither true or false, unless you are saying « Is it true that this person approve of X ? ».
To a moral subjectivist, saying « X is good » is true, albeit reductible to the individual. It is a proposition that can be responded to, thus making it cognitive.
A rapist can answer « I disagree, I think rape is right » to someone saying « rape is bad ». However, he can’t say that directly to someone saying « Boo! Rape » without reformulating the expression in a statement.

>you impose it on me
It literally IS your position whether you like it or not. Believing that every being has pre-determined values is aristotlean naturalist ethics

>inferences
They are correct, unless you try to twist the meaning of it.

>>2786774
>ethical subjectivism
>non-cognitivism
aka a bunch of made up up shit so capital apologists dont have to read marx. istg the entire field of western philosophy after hegel is cope for getting btfo

>>2753095
>individualism
As soon as you define an individual as the unit of dialectical analysis you lose the plot completely. The whole point of dialectical materialism specifically is to furnish a method that operates independently of individual psychological quirks and behaviors. It makes very few assumptions even about human nature, namely that humans have a drive to improve the productive forces to produce the means of their own existence (species-essence); everything else follows from that. It's not a tool for psychoanalysis.

>>2786888
>Saying « I enjoy x » is a factual statement about me. It is a proposition, relational to me.
Absolutely.
>« Hurray ! X » is an expression of approval, it is neither true or false
Right, so if the real meaning of the statement "(x) is good" is "Hurray (x)", then as a moral proposition, it is invalid (like how if morality refers to approval or disapproval, it only denotes one's emotions).
>saying « X is good » is true
But what makes it true? How is disagreement resolved?
>They are correct
So my inferences were correct after all? So then, if satisfaction partakes of pleasure; is pleasure a mode of satisfaction or is satisfaction a mode of pleasure?

>>2787359
>But what makes it true?
It’s true on the basis of your own appreciation. You’re mistaking physical objectivity for truth-apt.

>How is disagreement resolved?
You can’t. Moral propositions are always going to be irreductible to the individual since they denote one’s perception in relation to their own satisfaction. Trying to resolve one is like trying to resolve a disagreement about taste.

>satisfaction and pleasure
What’s the argument you want to make ? That preventing a toddler from eating too much candy is bad for him ?

>>2787359
When I say that a cake is tasty, I’m making a cognitive statement in relation to me, which can be true or false (perhaps you can disagree that I find the cake tasty). Albeit purely subjective and individual, it is still truth-apt.
When I say « yum! A cake », I’m not expressing something in relation to me, but rather my current emotion at a given moment. You can infer that I find the cake tasty, but you can’t directly respond to my original expression

>>2787369
>It’s true on the basis of your own appreciation
So something can true just because you say so, and no one is allowed to disagree with it?
>they denote one’s perception in relation to their own satisfaction
Can you explain how (i) "relation to satisfaction" differs from satisfaction, and how one's (ii) "perception" of this "relation" differs from the expeience of satisfaction, please?
>That preventing a toddler from eating too much candy is bad for him ?
No, that it is GOOD for them, and so what is BEST for someone may not actually be what they desire or find satisfying/pleasurable.
>>2787370
>perhaps you can disagree that I find the cake tasty
Not at all; "tasty" is a valid adjective, while "good" is not.
>When I say « yum! A cake », I’m not expressing something in relation to me, but rather my current emotion at a given moment.
So something in relation to you is an objective relation?

>>2787388
>So something can true just because you say so, and no one is allowed to disagree with it?
Aww smithanon can't cope with the idea that some people which he thinks do bad stuff think of themselves as morally right, hilarious. But anon, what ultimatly decides whether or not something is good is going to be the individual based on his perception of what can bring happiness to him. That's it. I know it might be hard for you to digest, but you'll need to cope with it, like how you weren't able to prove any of your position.

>Can you explain how
No I don't think I will explain how humans are capable of forming hypotheticals, it seems a rather self-evident concept.

>and so what is BEST for someone may not actually be what they desire or find satisfying/pleasurable.
See ? It's not that hard to make a post detailing how you believe in aristotlean flourishing. You don't have to ask me rhetorical questions.
But I digress, satisfaction is a mode of pleasure so you are wrong, like always.

>Not at all; "tasty" is a valid adjective, while "good" is not.
Tasty literally means "tastes good"…

>So something in relation to you is an objective relation?
It's truth-apt, but I'm guessing you don't know the difference since you can't with nested propositions.

>>2787480
>Yes
Okay, so when you are emotionally expressing approval, it is in reference to an object which you relate to, and so the emotions associated with the object are immaterial of the objective relation itself? Of so, I doubt it very much, since emotions are surely signals which refer to an objectivity in our bodies. When I am hungry, this signals the capacity for appetite, etc. So, are emotions "unrelated" to us, and the object to which they correspond?
>if me likey banana and banana there, me gonna be likey
Okay, so is satisfaction the enjoyment of something? And our relation to satisfaction is a relationship to the object of our satisfaction, and our perception of this is in the judgement upon an object in its cause of satisfsction? In this case, you are reducing "moral propositions" to a description of physical states, no?
>satisfaction is a mode of pleasure.
Okay, so what is good is simply that which is pleasurable?
>Tasty literally means "tastes good".
Then it is invalid. "Good" is not a flavour.
>>2787492
>happiness
So, goodness is defined by happiness?
>can't explain
Right.
>satisfaction is a mode of pleasure
Okay, so what is good is simply that which is pleasurable?
>It's truth-apt
And a proposition cannot be both true and contradictory, right?

>>2787500
lmfao the entire post is just stalling by asking sloppy b8. Either make an argument or stop wasting bandwith, you're being pathetic.

>>2787512
You seem incapable of clarifying your position.
If what is good is determined what is personally satisfying, and satisfaction is a mode of pleasure, then is what is good simply that which is pleasurable to us? If so, then how do we justify the intervention upon another's satisfaction for the sake of their wellbeing (which is not directly dependent upon satisfaction).

Further, you hold that propositions (i.e. truth-apt statements) cannot be both (i) true and (ii) contradictory, correct? Of course, if you are too frustratefd to reply, you may stop replying if you wish. The conversation ends whenever you want it to.

>>2787515
Aah see anon, you're capable of formulating arguments rather than simply asking rhetorical questions ! I knew you had it in you. You're kind of like a little monkey that needs to be trained to not shit everywhere it goes at the zoo.

>then is what is good simply that which is pleasurable to us?
Yep, but given that pleasure if often associated with an ephemeral feeling, "happiness" or "satisfaction" would be more adequate words, albeit denoting the same thing here (according to YOUR definition btw)

>which is not directly dependent upon satisfaction
It literally is though lol. The complete opposite of your statement is true.
<https://knowingneurons.com/why-helping-feels-good-the-neuroscience-of-reciprocity/

>you hold that propositions (i.e. truth-apt statements) cannot be both (i) true and (ii) contradictory, correct?
You're mistaking objectivity and truth-apt, as explained earlier.
Saying "x is tasty" is truth-apt despite being entirely subjective, because it expresses a statement about how I feel about something. The same is true in morality; when we say "x is good", we are making subjective yet truth-apt statements. A person can respond "No, you don't think of this as good, this is false." to someone saying "XYZ is good".
Your confusion comes from the fact that you have not properly engaged in the minimum required to hold a serious conversation in meta-ethics. This is likely because, despite the abundant use of references you make, you have only read those in order to attain a superficial image of someone "educated". Throughout the thread, you have demonstrated this by admitting to not knowing basic meta-ethical positions, your inability to know in which category your own position falls in, and to argue properly for it.

It's frankly hilarious how wrong you are the second you start engaging in honest arguments and stop acting like a retarded child. It's like you're hiding your intellectual limits by overusing rhetorical questions and (wrong) semantics.

>>2787900
>Yep
Okay, so after all this time you come out as a utilitarian… 😶
>why helping feels good
No, no. I am speaking of being helped, against our will.
Can something displeasurable still be good? Yes or no?
>You're mistaking objectivity and truth-apt
What's the difference? Help me understand.
>how I feel about something
Right, and feelings are always correct, but do you see a difference between what is felt and what is judged upon a felt thing? As I say, it is correct to say "I enjoy (x)", but it is problematic to thus conclude that "(x) is good", which cannot be synonymous statements.
>A person can respond "No, you don't think of this as good, this is false."
But that's not the contention; it doesnt matter what people "think", it matters what is true.

>>2787919
aaah and of course the second you get confronted to basic counter-arguments, you slide back into retarded pedantic questionning only for the sake to deform my words.

>so after all this time you come out as a utilitarian… 😶
>What's the difference? Help me understand
So these are simply uninformed takes. I'm not your teacher, go ask chatgpt if you don't understand.

>Can something displeasurable still be good? Yes or no?
This is rhetorical fluff, as Ive already told you multiple times. You're using the polysemic character of "pleasure" to try to shift my words into something they're not.

>it is correct to say "I enjoy (x)", but it is problematic to thus conclude that "(x) is good", which cannot be synonymous statements.
No, not really. It's perfectly fine to say "I enjoy X therefore X is good". In fact, we do so very often.

>it matters what is true.
It literally is, you genuinely just don't understand the difference between objective moral propositions and truth-apt (but potentially subjective) moral propositions. Again, ask chatgpt.

>>2787939
>uninformed takes
A utilitarian believes that what is good is what is pleasurable, no?
>ask chat gpt
I am asking how you define terms so that I may understand your position. You say that there is a difference between "objective" and "truth-apt" claims and that I make the mistake of confusing the two, so could you explain where I go wrong in my reasoning, please?
>You're using the polysemic character of "pleasure" to try to shift my words into something they're not.
… But you said "yep" when I asked you if what is good is defined by what is pleasurable, so you appear to be contradicting yourself. If you could then answer the question again; is goodness defined by what is pleasurable?
>It's perfectly fine to say "I enjoy X therefore X is good". In fact, we do so very often.
Yes, informally; colloquially. But formally, there is a problem, since the statements do not directly relate.
>don't understand the difference between objective moral propositions and truth-apt
Then explain it to me, as I have requested. Help me be better

>>2787951
>A utilitarian believes that what is good is what is pleasurable, no?
>Then explain it to me, as I have requested. Help me be better
>You say that there is a difference between "objective" and "truth-apt" claims and that I make the mistake of confusing the two, so could you explain where I go wrong in my reasoning, please?
Not interested; it was fun to debate with you because it was entertaining to humiliate you. But now ? I'll pass.

>But formally, there is a problem, since the statements do not directly relate
This statement can be directly answered by the one just above it
>is goodness defined by what is pleasurable?
<(yes, but only in a limited sense that you'll try to twist)

>>2787952
India is actually ethnic han

>>2787966
>I'll pass.
Okay, well I'm sure we have helped each other in this discussion in our own ways, but I must say that I'm glad its over after so long. 😅
I wish you well, my friend. 🫡

>>2787970
Godspeed smithanon, have fun derailing other threads !

so shall we actually discuss dialectics now