I recently started reading Lukacs's ontology of a social being and my whole understanding of dialectics has been flipped.
Originally, I had read Engels' Anti-Duhring, in which he argues that dialectical analysis is essentially a physical interaction, which, in human societies, translate into different classes fighting for their existence and needs (i.e. the bourgeoisie wants low salaries, the proletariat needs higher salaries, conflict occurs = law of interpenetration of opposites). The argument is very "physicalist" and relies on seeing nature as a totality in constant mutation.
HOWEVER, Lukacs seems to completely disregard this. Instead, his dialectics could be best described by the following : Any individual has multiple possibilities to realize his "teleological acts" (conscious acts aimed at satisfaction of desires/needs/sustenance etc). Alienation occurs when he is constrained by an external cause to choose a possibility unsatisfactory compared to others. As such, the dialectic is essentially a movement between the individual who attempts to overcome this alienation, which translates into class war (proletariat see capitalism as irrational for them, but are forced to endure it => conflict with the bourgeoisie).
So, which is it ? Lukacs' dialectics imo can be reconciled with Engels, but it makes the latter's work appear as very superficial.
What would decide what the correct answer is?
>>2753099Probably the one which corresponds best to reality ?
Lukacs was retarded, so was the entire western marxism
Read materialism and empro criticism by lenin
Read losurdo instead of lukacs
But first of all, read the second thesis on feuerbach;
>The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.
This is the birth of materialist dialectics and of marxism as such. No, it wasn't engels who came up with "marxist epistemology"
And finally, marx and engels collaborated on almost everything. Anything engels wrote, you can simply assume marx co-signed on it
>>2753115Lenin was an engelsian, he gave us the october
Lukacs was western marxist, he tried to castrate marxism into a mere "social science"
It's plain to see whose epistemology is superior
>>2753199>Read losurdo instead of lukacsthey dont even write about remotely similar topics lmao. /leftypol/ continues to be terrified of bogeyman "intellectualism" (i.e. being familiar with any literature or philosopher outside of twitter flaghead memes)
Potency and actuality arent exactly "dialectical" propositions, but are moreso "demonstrative" propositions of causation. Telos is a "final cause" which gives meaning to a process, but if one invokes contingency (e.g. "choice") then one forgoes teleology, unless by genius devices, like the classical narrative of "fate" (also called "necessity"). In this framework, "choice" was always an illusion, yet still instrumental, since the ends were predetermined (imagining oneself superior to fate was called "hubris"). Think of Oedipus Rex, where the decision to subvert fate is the catalyst to realise fate; here, telos is inscribed into prophecy, the same as in Shakespeare's Macbeth. So then, telos must be singular, and if potential gives rise to many ends, then what is given as a result must be either (i) failure or (ii) false. So then, if we accept the necessity of a certain end, we then prescribe norms which foster the ends we seek. So then, "alienation" merely appears as a synonym for "failure", rather than possessing any esoteric content. So then, what does it mean to be disalienated, besides being excellent? (e.g. realising an essentially "human" end).
>>2753199Is that so ? Imo Lukacs made some pretty good points but Engels (and subsequently Marx too) also had a decent conception of the dialectic.
>second thesis of feuerbachThis doesn't really adress what I'm saying though. Both Lukacs and Engels would agree on their materialism, the matter of the question is the conception of the world that remains more relevant to use for analysis.
>>2753304>Potency and actuality arent exactly "dialectical" propositions, but are moreso "demonstrative" propositions of causationI don't think Lukacs would deny this. For him the dialectical movement is about seizing a subject within a totality to inquire about its evolutions. It's just that, for man, this evolution is fixated around alienation and self-realization.
>"alienation" merely appears as a synonym for "failure"Failure to act upon yourself, or more precisely, to choose between multiple alternatives.
>So then, what does it mean to be disalienatedBeing able to control your own life to posit your own ends. Not in some metaphysical freedom which can be reappropriated, but by choosing for yourself how you seek to self-realize through your own labor. You get denied this potential realization by external social forces which reduce your ability to "choose" for yourself, and by having your objectivations (the result of your labor) escaping you.
>>2753304>choice" was always an illusionHuman will or choice is the ability to create and use stimuli to shape which neural/behavioral path will later run automatically. Freedom = recognizing necessity. You recognize some preconditions, you set out to do them, then the consequences of that are automatic.
>>2753199>>2753247this is what happens when you get communism from mems, haz and youtube
>>2753534But what is necessary? What you mean is that freedom is in recognising ends, or purpose. The purpose of man must then be presupposed as part of his essence. Sartre attempts to reverse this by saying "existence precedes essence", and thus man must derive his own purpose. Nonetheless, there is still what can be demonstrated what is better or worse for man in general. We might say that man's ends are "happiness", so how does a man become happy? Philosophical testimony is that man is contented by ethics.
>>2753547No, you're over-complicating. Man has desires, these are random processes (neural fireworks) which are supported on what is real (notice I didn't say possible!) in a given time-frame. A thought is never insular and is always a thought processes which can start and end in the mind or needs some material model to test against and continue the processes. Establishing and recognizing these material models is the 'free will' part of man. Then once man changed nature and himself, the cycle starts once more. Man doesn't become anything. Man is.
>>2753547>But what is necessary?There are always constraints in which options are available to you. At some point, you "choose" a given option because there cannot be physical indeterminacy.
This appears as a choice but is in reality simply the accord of the self with the path taken : I "choose" to go home after a night out simply mean that this path of actions (going out -> going home) satisfies me.
>The purpose of man must then be presupposed as part of his essence.>SartreOh no no no no not the aristotlean ethics
On a more serious note not really because this is not what Sartre means when he means "essence". Acting towards your own satisfaction is indeed a biological fact of life. HOWEVER, the entire point is that this fact of life has no universal point of reference where we can all agree biologically "this is what satisfies me".
>Nonetheless, there is still what can be demonstrated what is better or worse for man in generalRead filerel.
>>2753567Mhm I see. So Lukacs essentially reverted back to a hegelian dialectic of some sort, rather than using it as a purely analytic tool to examine capitalism ?
>>2753580you can use idealist dialectics to examine capitalism just fine, the image i posted involves a hegelian doing just that. it just doesn't take into account historical contingency radically enough. richard winfield uses his project to give normative validity to the capitalist mode of production and uses it as a launching off point for his socdem politics. as such the capacity for capitalist relations to reproduce themselves is not really problematized, he even rejects the ltv .. this is a consequence of not grasping the essential historical contingency of marx's analysis of capital and the categories that are supposed to unfold from such a point hence his grasp of value is related to the negotiation of ownership between consciousnesses
>>2753568>recognising desireYou are close, but still far.
Once we recognise desires, are we obliged to fulfill them?
>>2753574There are better men than others, would you agree?
What makes a man better or worse?
>>2753607>would you agree?No, there's no universal criteria. You're going to fall into the same problem every moral realist runs into :
<but why is human flourishing/xyz good ? >>2753664>noso why is communism better than capitalism, if no standard of virtue can exist?
>>2753115Don't you commies hate verificationism and logical positivism?
>>2754419it's not necessarily "better" it's just a development, like having a chemical reaction that develops from one stage to another.
personally, I want it, but that's not morality any more than wanting anything else.
>>2753567>pictureis that hegel?
>>2754419It's not morally better. It's marxism101 that marx's ideas were not normative but purely descriptive.
Communism is not "better" from a universal moral standpoint but from a material class interest (people self-realize through their labor → the organization and relations of production prevent this self-realization or is unoptimal → the possibilities for a revolution occur).
>>2754477>Don't you commies hate verificationism and logical positivism?Most critiques of that from marxists is essentially that it never questions the totality in which things develop and has a tendency to say anything which isn't empirically verifiable as "le pseudoscience".
Popper's claims are the perfect picture of that. Claiming that marxism is pseudoscientific because it can't be submitted to falsifiability is erroneous. Marxism is a method, which already complicates the idea of testing a hypotheses. But even if we analyze that method, what we find is that the "theses" that it holds are hardly testable.
How do you verify for instance the falsifiable claim for dialectical materialism that things are actually static with fixed essence and perfect unity, as arranged by whatever cosmic law ? Or how do you verify that people self-realize in their labor despite being estranged to it ? It's not technically impossible to verify that, but it brings about very complicated matters.
>>2754479>wantThere are things you desire but which you do not pursue, so you must discriminate based on reason, not mere animal instinct. If you wanted something, but in having it, you would harm someone, you would naturally decline, based on moral sense. Further, there are things you would do which would harm yourself to the benefit of others, so you cannot be wholly selfish. What then, is this force of regulation besides morality?
>>2754582>Communism is not superior to capitalismThen why do you want it, and why do you want other people to want it?
>>2754582>Marxism (a spurious belief system) is a methodA method of what?
And what is the "method", exactly?
>>2753247The one topic lukacs covered decently, losurdo did a better job of, so there's no reason to ever talk about lukacs again.
>>2753527>conception of the world that remains more relevant to use for analysis.That's the thing. Marxism is not about analysis (as such). It's about praxis.
By balking at applying dialectics in the realm of science, yoy cede political ground to liberals.
Furthermore, science is a social (and therefore political) activity also, the dichotomy is falso. It's all wissenschaft
>>2754589>Then why do you want it, and why do you want other people to want it?Because it's supposed to be in their interest ?
>>2754591>A method of what?A method to analyze society and endogenous change within it.
>And what is the "method", exactly?Well that was originally why I made the thread in the first place. But in essence, the rational kernel for marxism is dialectical materialism, and arguably alienation.
Dialectical materialism is the idea that there is an external world to us which is not filled with fixed essences nor governed by abstract gods or cosmic laws. This world is dialectical in that there is a constant back and forth interaction in between its differnet components.
Alienation is the idea that men aim to self-realize (needs, desires, ambitions etc) in their labor but can be denied this potential. For instance, a worker could working for himself can be systematically stripped of his creation if he has to sell it to pay rent. As such, amongst the alternatives available to him, the one which he endures is not which gives him the possibility to self-realize. He is ALIENATED from his conscious activity.
Historical materialism is simply a historical analysis that uses dialectical materialism to analyze society by seeing how its internal structure can dispose of contradictions, notably like alienation.
>>2754593Losurdo wrote about dialectics ?
>>2754591>>2754589To add onto what's already been said, even if Marx writes his analysis to explain why he believes the capitalist society cannot sustain itself on the long term and systematically creates the conditions ripe for revolutions, you could in theory accept dialectical materialism without necesarilly accepting communism. Similarly, you can accept his theory of alienation or historical materialism without accepting Marx's praxis.
>>2754585> you would harm someone, you would naturally decline, based on moral sensepretty big assumption
>>2754600But why do you care about the interest of others?
>methodYou havent described the method. We all know the scientific method, so what's the marxist method?
>>2754608If dialectics means that everything decays, then why would communism not decay? Why is linearity also presumed in the movement of things? (i.e. "progress")
>>2754613Why is it a big assumption? Most people are moral.
But lets investigate; are there things you would not do to harm others even if it conferred personal benefit to you?
>>2754608>Losurdo wrote about dialectics ?More than merely writing *about* it, he applied it in every single book of his (as marx did, instead of writing *about* dialectics)
Losurdo's works dealing with concrete history thru applying dialectics is a *practical* refutation of western marxist abstract vacillation around the question of whether dialectics applies to this or that
Lukacs work on dialectics is a cowardly castration of marxism as a science of revolution, a retreat, refusal to accept october, pretending that lenin hadn't btfo him already, attempt to put a wwdge between marx and engels, retreat to premarxist young hegelianism
Lukacs book shitting on nietzsche is good, but losurdo took care of that as well.
>>2754585>>2754627in any case, there's plenty of answers here. I enjoy making others happy and I don't like making others unhappy. I am a member of a species which has evolved over millions of years finding an advantage in being socially cooperative and trusting. The human brain has lots of shortcuts in it, many to help with vision processing, many to help with social reasoning, many that are there just to help you quickly make sense of things. Empathy and social wellbeing can be expressed just as well as shortcuts that encapsulate a great deal of natural logic down into easy, quick, "it feels good" and "it feels bad". Of course this is just a shortcut and it can be missing in some people, or environmental factors can alter it. and we can reason our way through it to come to different answers. But a lot of morality is just pattern recognition that spits out a cheap, easy "gut instinct" that is neither more or less "true" to anything, it's just one possible answer.
To answer your question, yes. I realize that in many cases either I suffer in some other way when I harm others, or it is something that I want to make more consistent with myself. I picked up being a vegetarian because I don't want to contribute to animal harm, even though it's been a difficulty I now have to overcome.
>>2754627Contradiction is what causes decay, communism has no contradictions
>>2754627Many people would say yes, many would say no.
This demonstrates that this question hasn't been answered *practically*. But the answering of it will not be done through thinking, but by praxis: by class war and building of communism.
The question will then become meaningless because the CONDITIONS of society changed from underneath it.
It will become as irrelevant as how "would you blaspheme to save your family" was "answered" (ie made obsolete) by capitalism
It's not that we have two positions it's just that the QUESTION itself is a product of capitalism.
This shit so easy when you grok marxism
>>2754627>But why do you care about the interest of others?This is like asking « why do you want to stop being exploited ». I’m not a bourgeois, I don’t gain anything in the recurring crisis, I don’t have capital etc.
>You havent described the method.I have, it’s called dialectical materialism (and arguably alienation). You analyze society by looking at its structures, at its elements, its contradictions, its totality. You don’t presume things to be eternal or fixed, and you make claims based on the logic that you derive. Read Marx’s 18th brumaire if you want an example of how it’s used.
>If dialectics means that everything decays, then why would communism not decay? Because communism is the abolition of contradictions within human society by means which enable them to be overcome. Like how our judicial system in theory provides the resolution for vengeance.
>Why is linearity also presumed in the movement of things? (i.e. "progress")It’s not. This is a deviation which occurred later.
>moralityMorality is not and has never been the sole determinant in society’s form. Morality is inherently subjective and you won’t derive universal claims about it.
>>2754633contradiction causes change, to say that there is no contradiction is to say nothing will change about it. "decay" isn't really the right term for it.
>>2754627to make even more questions with moral realism, it rapidly becomes more and more incoherent when viewed historically and across a broader section of the animal kingdom.
Like, are animals that live in ways incompatible with human society "evil"? Why is it humans, and specifically only humans, whose social order lines up with "morality" as some real thing? And even if humans are the only ones who can "access" morality, or are subject to it, what about the apes and earlier mammals that humanity used to be? When did humans start being subject to morality, what was morality before homo sapiens? Did morality just vaguely exist without anything that was connected to it, or were all the animals before humans just underdeveloped in their morals?
at some point moral realism either necessitates religious creationism of some kind, or arbitrary cherrypicking.
>>2754582>It's marxism101 that marx's ideas were not normative but purely descriptiveIn his analysis of bourgeois and proletarian relations Marx always says that the bourgeois steal the proles' additional value which is kinda normative and not descriptive
>Popper's claimsIt's off topic. Popper wasn't a logical positivist, he was one of the dudes who buried it, but whatever. Post-positivism WAS NOT a successor of neopositivism, it was its opponent in intellectual debates
I still don't get the difference between verificationism and the Marxist's 'practice is the criterion of truth blah blah blah'
>>2754632>I enjoy making others happy and I don't like making others unhappy>I picked up being a vegetarian because I don't want to contribute to animal harmRight, so you cannot justify your ethos on the basis of selfishness, since you are often driven by selflessness. This is what we would call "morality" in an elementary sense.
>>2755188>Why is it humans, and specifically only humans, whose social order lines up with "morality" as some real thing?Because human beings have reason.
>>2754669>This is like asking « why do you want to stop being exploited ». Right - why do you care about others? Because… you have a moral intuition. So then, your politics is about morality. Why be ashamed of this?
>dialectical materialismthats an ontology, not an epistemology, or "method".
>Because communism is the abolition of contradictions within human societyBut if contradiction exists in matter and humans are material, then all human societies are contradictory.
>Morality is inherently subjective and you won’t derive universal claims about it.So if i say "rape is wrong", you disagree?
>>2757074>you cannot justify your ethos on the basis of selfishness, since you are often driven by selflessness. the one point stirner gets unambiguously correct is that all "selflessness" is just unconscious egoism. there is no contradiction in someone selfishly desiring to minimize harm to others. the notion that such a desire could be or is in fact selfless is what he called a "spook".
>Right - why do you care about others? Because… you have a moral intuition.there are innumerable concrete reasons why people care about others, and almost none of them are captured in the vague abstract notion of "moral intuition".
>if i say "rape is wrong", you disagree?he very likely doesn't disagree. all that demonstrates is that at least two subjects affirm the same normative proposition. this is by far the most dishonest form of argument moral objectivists employ. the force of the argument is rhetorical, not intellectual. in fact, it is relying on the emotive rhetorical force of absolute moralism to poison the well against an intellectual critique of moralism. even if both parties agree to the normative precept in question, the moralist frames their interlocutor as in some way suspect for refusing to assent to the precept's natural and universal validity.
>>2757179>everything is selfishnessnow we descend into idiotic tautology.
>there are innumerable concrete reasons why people care about otherswhich all extends from the same principle of caring about something more than ourselves; hence, we tolerate our own suffering to allow for the benefit of another. thus, if there is a choice between maximum personal benefit at the expense of the suffering of another, we decline - unless we are evil.
>he very likely doesn't disagree.do you disagree? is rape wrong?
>universal validityit is universally valid to say "rape is wrong".
can you concur? if not, what is the condition which makes rape right?
>>2757186>now we descend into idiotic tautology.that's not what a tautology is.
>which all extends from the same principle of caring about something more than ourselvesno it doesn't, not reading the rest because it's premised on a falsehood.
>do you disagree? is rape wrong?no, i agree. i believe rape is wrong, and i can contribe no condition under which i believe it would be right. once again, all this demonstrates is that at least two subjects agree on a normative proposition. it in no way evidences the notion that said normative proposition in some way naturally evaluates "true" independent the real material evaluators.
>it is universally valid to say "rape is wrong".>can you concur? if not, what is the condition which makes rape right?validity doesn't even enter into it. it's neither valid nor invalid because there are no premises nor rules of inference by which one can mechanically deduce the truth value of any given normative proposition without presupposing it. could be mistaken, but i believe we've had this exact discussion before.
>>2757212>no it doesn'tit self-evidently does.
again - if i would make a willing sacrifice for the benefit of another person, i am valuing their wellbeing over my own; thus, i am being selfless rather than being selfish.
>i believe rape is wrongbut why is rape wrong?
>it's neither valid nor invalidif you agree to the statement "rape is wrong", you are affirming its validity, so explain why its a valid statement.
>>2757221>but why is rape wrong?no answer I could give would be "the" reason because there is no single reason or even collection reasons i could ennumerate to deductively conclude that it is.
>if you agree to the statement "rape is wrong", you are affirming its validitywhen i agree that "if i drop something it will fall", i am not affirming the deductive validity of the statement. similarly when i say "rape is wrong", i am not claiming to have derived a conclusion. rather, i am asserting something that cannot be demonstrably valid even in principle.
>>2757234You agree to the statement "rape is wrong"
please explain why.
>i am asserting something that cannot be demonstrably valid even in principle.if not by principle, by what means is rape wrong?
>>2757237>You agree to the statement "rape is wrong">please explain why.in the first place because i don't want to be raped. in the second place because there are other people whom i would prefer not be raped. in the third place because i believe social violence like normalized rape culture makes a society materially poorer and more dangerous for all involved, including myself and those others i care about personally. none of these function as premises from which I can derive the truth value of the proposition "rape is wrong". they are post hoc justifications for an assertion.
>by what means is rape wrong?by means of my evaluation and assertion of the opinion.
>>2757257>rape is wrong because (i) you dont want to be raped, (ii) you dont want others to be raped, (iii) rapes makes countries poorer(…?)these are insufficient answers as to why the proposition "rape = wrong" is valid. But lets try again from a different perspective:
please define "wrongness", so that "rape" may be identified with it. What makes something "wrong"?
>>2757270>these are insufficient answers as to why the proposition "rape = wrong" is valid.yeah, the point is that there are no sufficient answers by which one could show that the proposition is valid without begging the question.
>What makes something "wrong"?there is no mechanical procedure by which one could demonstrate any natural identity between some concrete normative proposition and the abstract moral categories "right" or "wrong".
>>2757275>there are no sufficient answersSo when you affirm the statement "rape is wrong", you have no means to prove this claim? Thus, you speak falsely of the nature of things? Rather than saying "I find rape to be unpleasant" you instead say "rape is wrong", but now discover that you cannot justify this. So then, for a final time - do you think "rape is wrong"?
>abstract moral categories "right" or "wrong".yet you have previously affirmed that "rape is wrong". Do you then retract this statement and instead say, "rape is not wrong"?
>>2757278>you have no means to prove this claim?no one does.
>Thus, you speak falsely of the nature of things?speaking without proof is not the same thing as speaking falsely.
>Rather than saying "I find rape to be unpleasant" you instead say "rape is wrong"because the two are not equivalent statements.
>but now discover that you cannot justify this.i didn't discover it, it was the entire premise of my intervention in this conversation. neither of us can justify the proposition deductively. you are deluded to think that you can.
>yet you have previously affirmed that "rape is wrong". Do you then retract this statement and instead say, "rape is not wrong"?i say that my identification of "rape" with "wrong" is not and cannot be founded on any logical derivation of same that does not either infinitely regress or question beg.
>>2757284>neither of us can justify the proposition deductivelyI already did; evil is unjustified selfishness and rape is an unjustifiably selfish act. Your failure to comprehend this is the source of your current cognitive dissonance, where you morally intuit that "rape is wrong", yet fail to reason what you know to be true.
>my identification of "rape" with "wrong" is not and cannot be founded on any logical derivationWhat is it based on, then? When you said "rape is wrong", did you misspeak? Just be honest.
>>2757286>evil is unjustifiedcouldn't get past the third word of your sentence before begging the question, good work.
>What is it based on, then?I already answered this question, i'm not going to keep repeating myself just so you can continue to be dissatisfied with my answers.
>>2753247Ironically leftypol is an incredible example of what’s really wrong with the western left, which is that we’ve become out of touch pseudo-intellectual internet trolls. We’ve effectively become the alt-right’s mirror
>>2757295>I already answered this questionNo you didn't. You explained why you find rape to be disagreeable, but you failed to answer why rape in itself is wrong. So then, to fulfill my rhetoric, according to your testimony, rape cannot be proven to be wrong, and thus, it is improper to say that rape is wrong. So then, when I ask "is rape wrong", you should say "no". Thus, by your standards, rape is not wrong.
This is your cognitive dissonance.
This is the utter failure of your reasoning.
>>2757306>No you didn't.yes i did.
>according to your testimony, rape cannot be proven to be wrong, and thus, it is improper to say that rape is wrong. So then, when I ask "is rape wrong", you should say "no". Thus, by your standards, rape is not wrong.no, i never said it is improper to assert without proof. that it your precept, not mine, and a delusional one at that because you are in fact also incapable of proving your assertion as you've shown with your circular appeal to justification.
>>2757319>i never said it is improper to assert without proofprecisely; you are a dullard.
>>2757324lmao concession accepted
>>2757338Concession to what…?
>>2753095Let me add another layer of confusion for you
Ilyenkov's dialectics. (He was a Soviet philosopher and scholar of dialectical materialism). For Ilyenkov, Dialectics comes from Hegel, who should be seen as primarily a logician, and relates to the ideal aspects of knowledge. That is, all knowledge is an approximate ideal representation of reality. If we say that our subject, reality, is primary, that's Materialism. Dialectics is in how the ideal abstractions that we symbolize reality with interact in the ideal realm. And Materialism (taken seriously) is necessarily dialectical because the world is concrete (i.e. interconnected, contextual, rich in qualities). That is, if we are to attempt to accurately represent the material world in symbols, the relationship of the symbols must also be concrete. And this conflicts with the act of symbolizing, because to symbolize is to abstract (you define "objects" and in defining them strip them of the context that is actually innate to them, rather than external, and thus lose a truth about them). So this is why we have seeming contradictions in dialectics, like A≠,A, and negation of negation (which should be read as first a negation of the conceptual unity of a symbolization, and then the negation of that negation by a kernel of inherent difference). For Hegel there is no ultimate paradox here, for him it's "identity of identity and non-identity". That is, within a symbolization there are, harmoniously, both that which is consonant with the definition of the concept, and that which is not harmonious with it, but is nonetheless still necessarily seen as part of it, antagonistically.
With this lens, what Lukacs is talking about is a specific relationship, explained with a dialectical lens, and not an explanation of that lens itself. What Engels is talking about is the whole of natural science through the lens of dialectics. And yes Engels, like Marx and most modern scientist is a physicalist, since that is a synonym of materialist, and the only rational position.
I kind of simplify things, because Hegel was also trying to explain things like motion and change with his dialectical logic, and I chose to focus on identity and non-identity. But these are intertwined, and if you understand how something can harmoniously be and not be something, you can understand how e.g. something can harmoniously be and not be somewhere (i.e. in motion). I think Engels goes too hard on dialectics as motion and change, when it equally applies to static concepts, and dialectics is necessitated simply because of the act of abstractly symbolizing concrete reality.
>>2753115>Probably the one which corresponds best to reality ?maybe they're both useful frameworks that simply use different language?
>>2758058>So this is why we have seeming contradictions in dialectics, like A≠,A, and negation of negation (which should be read as first a negation of the conceptual unity of a symbolization, and then the negation of that negation by a kernel of inherent difference). For Hegel there is no ultimate paradox here, for him it's "identity of identity and non-identity".Hegel attributes correctness to the law of identity (A=A), he simply claims that it is a form without content, the same as what Fichte writes in the "Science of Knowledge" (1795). The negation of negation is also just the second law of logic; the law of non-contradiction, whereby (A ≠ non-A); i.e. A is not, not-A (a double-negative). Hegel advances from this since he sees that A has determination by this internal negativity, thus, he bases identity in non-identity (i.e. non-A), yet it is still self-relating, otherwise it would be illogical, like asserting (A ≠ A). So please be careful when discussing these topics.
To see Hegel's writings on this topic, you can read:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlessenc.htm#HL2_393Begin at §860
>>2758058So if I understand you: knowledge A_0 is an approximation of reality A, and we have in our every day equality A_0 = A between the two. However, sometimes it also happens that we encounter something which doesn't fit with our approximation (not A_0) but is steal A so not A_0 = A. Then we update our approximation A_0 + not A_0 = new A_0 and we again declare A_0 = A until the next update. This abstract process is what we call dialectics? You can think of A_0 as A_0(t) a function of time.
>>2756627>steal the proles' additional value which is kinda normativeHe rarely does so, and even whe he does, he attaches no moral statement to it.
>>2757074>le morality o algoThis has already been adressed. It simply doesn't matter because we're talking about marxism, and not why someone could be compelled for communism.
>thats an ontology, not an epistemology, or "method"Dialectical materialism is the conception from which the dialectical method is derived.
>But if contradiction exists in matterThis is just poor bait. Contradictions don't literally exist, they're simply a way to model things.
>you disagree?I find these statements funny because what would you say to the millions of people who disagree ?
I don't think you understand what marxism or dialectics are really. Dialectical materialism is the conception of the world which posits an external world to us which is dynamic, and where change occurs constantly. The "dialectical method" is the analysis of why and how change occurs in a given system. Marxism is not moral claims for communism, it's a structural analysis of why capitalism is unstable and systematically reproduce the conditions for its overcoming.
>>2757278>Rather than saying "I find rape to be unpleasant" you instead say "rape is wrong"You are SO close anon lmfao
>>2757306I can find something to be disagreable to be wrong. You're presupposing moral universality and objective standards to be necessary for a moral judgement, which isn't the case (beyond being purely unasserted).
>This is your cognitive dissonance.It's very funny you say this because you obviously don't know much about moral philosophy. There is an entire branch of philosophy that precisely claims that moral claims are (somewhat) of a dissonance. Look up anti-cognitivism.
>>2758210Yeah this is what I've come to conclude mostly.
>>2758058Isn't this just analyzing the dialectic of how knowledge is acquired ?
>>2758448>Contradictions don't literally existright, so you were just pretending to be retarded the whole time.
>Marxism is not moral claims for communismwhich is why it fails.
>I can find something to be disagreable to be wrongthe reason you should find something disagreeable is because it is wrong, not that it happens to be wrong by coincidence, otherwise you are displaying prejuduce. if something is not wrong yet you find it to be disagreeable, are you not having false judgement. lets take homophobia as an example; if one sees that homosexuality is not wrong, it has no means of disagreement - the homophobe then has false judgement if he finds homosexuality disagreeable.
>You're presupposing moral universalityIve already proven it by rhetoric. You cannot justify the statement "rape is not wrong", therefore rape is wrong. This itself is not a justified claim however, so I would ask "why is rape wrong?" for which reason you will evidently become paralysed by the discovery that reason is wrong in itself, not for the sake of opinion. Thus I claim that you have a moral intuition, but have retarded moral reason by your present sophistry.
>>2758464>right, so you were just pretending to be retarded the whole time.lol you just don't have any arguments. It's obvious a heuristic model is not going to be a physical thing but rather a representation of that thing.
>which is why it failsDo you also say that empiricism fails because it isn't moral ? Or that a historial analysis fails because it isn't moral ?
>the reason you should find something disagreeable is because it is wrongI can find rape something to which I disagree with, hence making it wrong. Your statement is the equivalent of saying that I can't find brocoli to taste bad because I can only disagree with you that it tastes good.
>You cannot justify the statement "rape is not wrong", therefore rape is wrongYou're presupposing the statement to be truth-apt. You're also presupposing a moral universality which is still asserted and not justified. Tell me, why can't I find rape wrong on a personal level without implying that it is the case for everybody ?
>>2758490>don't have any argumentsI already finished the argument. If "progress" is the dialectical movement of "contradictions" to their resolution, then why does progress end at communism, if all human societies are in contradiction? You have no answer.
>Do you also say that empiricism fails because it isn't moral ?Empiricism fails because it begins by a rationalistic (e.g. a priori) demonstration of its epistemology; to say that "all knowledge is a posteriori" is an a priori statement.
>Or that a historial analysis fails because it isn't moral?Historical analysis can fail if it is immoral, yes. If you wrote a book about ww2 and constantly praised Hitler, could this be considered a good work of history?
>I can find rape something to which I disagree with, hence making it wrongso you would define falseness as that which you disagree with, and what you disagree with as false, thus creating a vicious circle?
>Tell me, why can't I find rape wrong on a personal level without implying that it is the case for everybody ?The statement "rape is wrong" has nothing to do with opinion, but only fact. So you are misunderstanding the point. Your feelings about rape have no effect on wehther or not it is wrong, since your feelings can be the result of a false judgement.
>>2758529>You have no answerYou already explain it in your argument. Communism is the resolution of contradictions, hence the end.
>empiricismsloppy bait. Let me guess, it requires a god ?
>Historical analysis can fail if it is immoralmissedthepoint.jpg
A historical interpretation doesn't need to make moral judgements to be good or bad, it needs to be accurate.
>so you would define falseness as that which you disagree with>The statement "rape is wrong" has nothing to do with opinion>but only factYou're smuggling truth-apt and universality.
If I make the statement "brocoli tastes bad", do I need to universalize it and make it a truth claim ? Or am I simply expressing a personal value of mine ? I only skimmed through your prior exchange but it appears the other anon already told you so many times.
>Your feelings about rape have no effect on wehther or not it is wrongThey do, because when you ask me whether or not I think rape is wrong, you're asking me how I feel about that subject.
>your feelings can be the result of a false judgementIsn't this some ayn rand bullshit?
>>2758570>Communism is the resolution of contradictions, hence the end.But again, if matter is "dialectical" (i.e. internally contradictory), and human society is "dialectical", then communism must have internal contradictions, no? If not, then how does matter have internal contradictions?You are "contradicting" your ontology and politics.
>sloppy bait. What? I'm afraid you are philosophically illiterate if you don't understand the foundational flaw of empiricism, which itself was resolved in the 18th century. The claim of empiricism is an a posteriori epistemology, but this cannot be asserted besides an a priori testimony.
>They do, because when you ask me whether or not I think rape is wrong, you're asking me how I feel about that subject.No I'm not, I am asking if rape is wrong, not if you feel wrong about rape. This is the moral universality you have been so critical of but now it has slipped your mind, but your esteemed ignorance of epistemology clarifies the point a bit; youre only a novice.
>Isn't this some ayn rand bullshit?Are you this forgetful? If we suppose homosexuality to not have falseness, the homophobe then employs false judgement, wouldnt you say? It is rather tiresome to have to teach these things to you over again.
>>2758576>What? I'm afraid you are philosophically illiterateI do understand them it's just that it'll lead to the most pseud answers from your part which will amount "teehee we need le god for this therefore christianity right"
>No I'm not, I am asking if rape is wrong>not if you feel wrong about rapeYou're presupposing "wrongness" to have truth-apt and to be a universalizable sentence, for the 100th time.
Besides, I'm not the other anon you were replying to originally, and I'm not claiming that rape is universally and objectively bad. In other words, I'm not making a moral realist claim that rape is bad. Are you not able to track who is replying to what anon?
>but now it has slipped your mind>you're only a noviceIt's meta-ethics101 that moral claims can be treated as non-cognitive.
>wouldnt you say?If we suppose the taste of brocoli to not have falseness, does the brocoli-hater employ false judgement in saying that they taste bad ?
>It is rather tiresome to have to teach these things to you over again.!!!MANDATORY READING LIST!!!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaethics#Moral_semanticshttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/ >>2758576Forgot to reply to your point on dialectics
It’s not « matter » which has contradictions, it’s any system comprised of matter (nature, society, economics etc), given that matter is not motionless if you will.
This is why they can be represented accurately with the dialectical method, as it captures the internal dynamics beneath the appearance of a thing more precisely.
>>2758597>I do understand themOkay, so you understand that empiricism is false, then.
>I'm not claiming that rape is universally and objectively bad.Okay, so to the question "is rape wrong?" you would say no, "rape is not wrong"? Once you say "rape is not wrong" we can progress from this filibuster.
>taste of brocoliTaste is a form of a posteriori knowledge based in the sensation of taste, so has phenomenal validity; taste is true of a thing in itself, yet the variance of preference for taste differs, which itself is not a claim to knowledge of the thing. Preference for taste is not a judgement of what taste is, lest a person misspeaks in assigning falseness to the quality of taste (e.g. bitterness, sweetness). Thus to call taste "bad" is to signal preference, but if extended, it is necessarily a form of false judgement, since it confuses preference (a subjective determination) to a quality of the thing itself. Here is also where you may understand; you have no preference for rape, but this cannot demonstrate the qualities of rape itself. When I speak then of rape, I am speaking of the thing itself, not one's preference for it.
>>2758619>It’s not « matter » which has contradictions, it’s any system comprised of matterright, and communism is a system comprised of matter, so it must have contradictions, no?
>>2758625>empiricismNo but I’m not interested in that discussion frankly given the pseudery that will ensue
>rapeAlready told you, if you presume « wrong » to be universalizable and truth-apt then no
>taste is a preference not a judgementYou’re still presupposing a multitude of things here but sure I want to see where you go with this
>communismAsk chatgpt at this point. There’s already been multiple answers addressed to you
>>2758635To add onto the taste paragraph you’ve said, the core problem is that you’re presuming moral realism but most of us here are operating on a moral anti-realist position. You’re wasting bandwidth arguing because you’re presuming your position to be the « true » moral position when it’s one of the most debated position in philosophy. There’s many people that argue that moral judgments are also a posteriori expressions and not a priori truth claims (in fact most moral philosophers would disagree with moral claims being a prior truth claims but I digress)
>>2758635>Empiricism isnt falseI believe you are quite confused. To claim that all knowledge is a posteriori is an a priori statement. So the foundation of empiricism is rationalistic. Nothing more can be said except that to be an empiricist is to live a lie.
>if you presume « wrong » to be universalizable and truth-apt then noOkay, so to you "rape is not wrong"
Now, please define wrongness.
>I want to see where you go with thisWhat do you mean? Its settled.
A preference and a judgment are different things.
>CommunismAnon… You must realise that you look like a fool at this moment; you are plainly contradictory and evasive. Here is your statement:
>>2758619>any system comprised of matter [has contradictions]Communism is comprised of matter, therefore it has contradictions. You are forced to accept this. So then, to save your pride, you must say that either (i) communism is internally contradictory or (ii) not all things made of matter are internally contradictory, retracting prior claims.
DialeKKKtiKKKs is fascist.
>>2758673>I believe you are quite confused. To claim that all knowledge is a posteriori is an a priori statement.Lol you’re so edging for a pointless debate. Haven’t you seen what I’ve already said ?
>Now, please define wrongness.Personal judgement out of personal values that’s sometimes not truth-apt
>What do you mean? Its settled.Why are you trying to debate meta-ethics if you don’t know the basics ?
>A preference and a judgment are different things.Judgements are relational to preferences. I dislike salty things (preference), therefore a salty brocoli tastes bad (judgement)
>CommunismWhy would I bother retyping something already said ? You obviously don’t know what dialectics and are edging to debate so why bother ?
>Communism is comprised of matter, therefore it has contradictions.Not all contradictions within a system necessarily lead to a destruction of said-system. Certain contradictions imply systemic change whilst certain others don’t. Besides, tendencies would’ve been a better word desu. But this is why I told you to go on chatgpt. Grasp the basics before trying to engage
>>2758694>a pointless debateIts not a "debate" that 1+1≠3
i am simply demonstrating that empiricism is false
>Personal judgement out of personal valuesWhat are personal values? If valuation is a rational process, then what is the object it considers? For example, if i value one thing over another, can this be a false judgement, and thus my values may change?
>I dislike salty things (preference), therefore a salty brocoli tastes bad (judgement)There is no such thing as a "bad" taste as it was established (tastes are qualities such as bitterness and sweetness which are subject to preference, but not to moral judgement), so i would say that this is malformed.
>Not all contradictions within a system necessarily lead to a destruction of said-system. Not all contradictions within a system necessarily lead to a destruction of said-system. Okay, so communism is internally-contradictory, then, but what is the difference between stabilising and destabilising contradictions?
>>2758759>morality, value, etcNo let’s do something else, why do you believe that morality is truth-apt and universalizable ? Are you able to explain so without invoking god ?
>communismBy analyzing what change can be subsumed and which change cannot.
>>2758794You haven't defined what "personal values" are.
If they are subject to change by reason, then they are an attribute of abstract truth, and thus wrongness, as you put it, must be a false judgement in relation to true values. Thus, one is "wrong" if they are expected to "know better", yet one is not wrong if they are ignorant. For example, a child "doesn't know any better", and so their innocence is in a lack of ability to evaluate, by a lack of reason. So then, innocence and guilt are qualified by the degree to which they apply proper judgement to proper values.
>moralityAs I have explained, morality is a force of regulation in man which prohibits certain behaviours and a force of license which promotes certain behaviours. Every human being has these, which are fundamentally based in selfishness and selflessness as orientations. That is the basic understanding.
>Are you able to explain so without invoking god ?What is "God"? You are the one that keeps bringing it up.
>what change can be subsumed and which change cannot.Can you explain each of these?
>>2760054>You haven't defined what "personal values" areSimple : it's what I value. The mechanism by which value are acquired is the brain reward system and its imaginative capacities.
>yap yap making a quality error about moralityNot sure where you want to go with this
>morality is a force of regulation in man which prohibits certain behaviours and a force of license which promotes certain behavioursWhich mechanism is responsible for this ? Is it genetics ? If so, are you contending that it is so universally in its form (i.e. everyone has a same determination for what is bad)
>which are fundamentally based in selfishness and selflessness as orientationsThis is either going to be about Ayn Rand or it's going to be about some christian/platonist/aristotlean thinker. Which is it anon?
>You are the one that keeps bringing it up.I'd say approximatly 2/3 of moral realists end up relying on god to assert it. Given your poor bait I assumed you were christian.
>Can you explain each of these?Some contradictions cause revolutionnary change, whilst some only cause disputes. Given that class conflict has been the motor of political SYSTEM change, if class conflict disappears, so does its contradictions, and so does the need for political SYSTEM change.
>>2761111>values are what people valueYou don't see an issue in this? Regardless, the question is "why" we value some things over others. So then, why do you value (x) rather than (y), and if your judgement was that it is incorrect to value (x), could you desist and value (z) instead?
>Which mechanism is responsible for this?Reason; the determination of logical thinking. Thus, we prescribe moral responsibility to adults but not to children.
>This is either going to be about Ayn Rand or it's going to be about some christian/platonist/aristotlean thinker. Which is it anon?You seem to have a lot of baggage that you carry with you into conversations. I would suggest clearing your mind.
>Some contradictions cause revolutionnary change, whilst some only cause disputes. And "revolution" is turning something back to the same point, correct? In this case, a revolution is only a change to the same.
>if class conflict disappears, so does its contradictionsIf class could have been created where it was originally absent, then what prevents it from returning?
>>2753095>Engels' …argues that dialectical analysis is essentially a physical interaction…The argument is very "physicalist" and relies on seeing nature as a totality in constant mutation.i think this is too narrow of an interpretation but not exactly wrong. i always say engels makes "simple concrete" examples and marx makes "verbose abstract" examples but they are talking about the same thing. I think thats whats going on here. so engels presents as a "physicalist" but by nature as a totality he means something like a material conception of hegels absolute. so its deeply dialectical and conceptual, but material, not physical reductionist. it gets interpreted that way because engels is trying to dumb it down for proles, stalin does the same, where lenin, like marx is more abstract, which makes them harder to decode but also harder to strawman, whereas engels often gets presented as distorting marx despite having his permission and approval for final edits. engels might also fudge his terms a bit to rhetorically distance himself from hegels "idealism" due to the time period he was writing in and the popularity of such idealisms. . so the answer is that its because dialectics actually is the way engels says, even hegel says so actually but thats a whol new can of dispute worms.
>So, which is it ? both
>Lukacs' dialectics imo can be reconciled with Engelswhy not
>>2753199Lukacs is actually decent hes not like the frankfurters
>>2754477yeah
>>2754627>We all know the scientific method, so what's the marxist method?its dialectics. which means immanent critique. that means you take a subject and accept its terms then stretch them to the limit to see where they break, then update your terms to more accurately reflect reality. so with political economy you accept supply and demand or whatever and then investigate all its edges until you find where it breaks to get a bigger fuller truth. and things that were previously true also change as society develops because reality is in a dynamic flux that recursively acts on itself. so what explained something before might not tomorrow, but you would still use the same word because the core relation didnt change just the particular manifestation of that phenomena developed to a higher more integrated level of interaction which unvieled a higher more integrated level of understanding previously not attainable.
>>2756627>In his analysis of bourgeois and proletarian relations Marx always says that the bourgeois stealassuming he does, he also says the opposite, that its not theft but right.
>Popper wasn't a logical positivistits just a crypto version of the same thing, with the same core tenets, narcissism of small differences
>>2758426yeah, and also the difference between kant and everything before hegel is that kant says we cant know A itself but hegel says we can triangulate it, according to people like zizek through something analagous to a conceptual parallax. it corresponds to debates about the infinite and calculus. dialectics is like calculus for philosophy, with the same implications for those who reject it. that(anticommunism) is why modern academia is utterly fucked because accepting hegel necessarily leads to admitting marx was correct, and it has profound implications in everything from biology to physics. its probably why china will crack fusion while america collapses
i love when both sides of a debate get so into the weeds you cant tell who is who or what they support
>>2761144>why do we value things"The mechanism by which value are acquired is the brain reward system and its imaginative capacities"
>Reason; the determination of logical thinkingHow do we determine what is rational ? How do we determine the result of what is "logical" ?
>I would suggest clearing your mindSo which is it ?
>correctno
>If class could have been created where it was originally absent, then what prevents it from returning?Frankly this would be quite simpler if you read what Marx had to say about this. I'd advice you start with the manifesto, and then read Engels' "socialism : utopian and scientific". Engels does a pretty good job at describing contradictions within society iirc.
>>2761226Yeah I think that explains and confirms my doubts. A lot of other anons said the same thing and after some rereading of the passages at hand it does seem more accurate.
>>2761231the last guy you're replying to is baiting
>>2761267Isn't Hegel claiming that there is certainty by supposing that the real is fundamentally logical ?
>Sympathetic westoid intellectual creates seminal work in revising marxism because Actually Existing applications of Marxism in concrete practice are too "vulgar" for his petty borg blood and engels/lenin/stalin scared them
>years later, retracts claims but damage has already been done, leading astray
millions
Noticing a pattern there? Sartre and althusser did the same shit
>>2761339>Isn't Hegel claiming that there is certainty by supposing that the real is fundamentally logical ?yeah. thats what he means by the real is rational and the rational is real
>>2761339>>2757074No, I am driven by what I want and desire to do. My desire to see others happy is my own desire. I am not being driven by their happiness but by my own. I could also do things that make people happy but not have a desire to cause happiness in others for its own sake. This is something that happens all the time. There simply is no need to invent "morals" that we then appeal to when "i am doing what I want to" works just as well and requires less assumptions and complexity.
>Because human beings have reason.Plenty of other animals very clearly have reasoning capabilities. And that still doesn't explain how these other animals relate to morality.
>>2761646The question isn't "what" you desire, its "why". Why (x) and not (y)? And if you find that it is incorrect to value (x), then what are the means by which we come to this judgement? Can you incorrectly desire something? If so, what determines correctness?
>>2761231>[the marxist method] is dialecticsPlato was also a dialectician (e.g. the Socratic method).
Does that make Plato a Marxist or Marx a Platonist?
>>2761339>values are determined by rewardsSo, if you could earn $1M, but an innocent child is tortured to death somewhere for it, you can only gain, while another suffers, so would you value money over the well-being of another (i.e. would you inhabit the position of a capitalist)? If not, then clearly your values are not determined by "rewards" in your favour. So then, if our values are not based in selfish gain, they must be based in a consideration of others (e.g. selflessness). Thus, it is wrong to be selfish at the expense of others, and so, our values are determined by what is moral. To speak further, if it is our values which determine us, then clearly, our politics are also determined by our morality. This is extremely obvious to all sensible leftists, but to Marxists, its like trying to get blood out of a stone. So then, you are against capitalism, because it is immoral.
>How do we determine what is rational ? How do we determine the result of what is "logical" ?Reason is the process of correct thinking - you admit to the possibility of incorrect thinking (since otherwise you could not debate the issue). Logic is the standard of correctness (Reason and Logic have the same root word of "Logos", so they can be neatly identified).
>read MarxWhere does he write about the origin of class society?
>>2762044>Does that make Plato a Marxist or Marx a Platonist?obviously not since these are different things
>>2762400If the Marxist "method" is "dialectics", and Plato used "dialectics", then why is it a "Marxist" method and not a "Platonic" method?
That's the point.
>>2762044>If not, then clearly your values are not determined by "rewards" in your favourYou're mistaking egoism (lack of care for others), with a biological fact (the reward system). Valuing the life of others because it produces xyz feeling of accomplishment is part of the reward system. Guilt and shame are also part of the reward system. These are biological facts, which we "feel" and which our body naturally produces due to evolutionarry pressure.
>if our values are not based in selfish gain, they must be based in a consideration of othersFalse dichotomy. They are simply based on what we value. This can be indeed selflessness, but also selfishness (as egoists tend to do). The rest of your arguments can be discarded from here.
>our politics are also determined by our moralityWhat does "politics" mean here ? What we believe in ? What we advocate for ? Marxists believe that capitalism systematically reproduces the condition for its revolution and overcoming. This is not a moral belief. However, communists who try to upheave a revolution might be acting for a multitude of reasons that are very much moral. This is the dichotomy you have been missing.
>you are against capitalism, because it is immoralMarxism (philosophy and analysis) =/= communism (political movement)
>reason and logicBut what makes something "good" ? How do you determine that a given regulation is "good", and that another is "bad" ? You've explained the tools, but you haven't explained how they're used. Furthermore, how do you universalize this process to create a moral-realist position ?
Also, before the obvious error, don't fall into circular reasoning here. Don't say that reason determines goodness by seeking what is selfless, explain why goodness IS selflessness
>origin of class societyGerman ideology, the manifesto, the origin of family private property and the state
But read secundary sources tbh, they'll explain his arguments more clearly probably
>>2762445Can we just ban obvious bait at this point ?
>>2762445it would be more correct to call platos method dialog than dialectic
>>2762451Plato (via Socrates) calls his own method "dialectic".
He is the inventor of it. This is common knowledge.
>>2762448>Marxism ≠ CommunismOh, so its even more of a failure of effort than I originally anticipated
>Valuing the life of others because it produces xyz feeling of accomplishment is part of the reward system.Why is valuing others rewarding if it causes us to suffer loss? Why is gaining at the expense of another person a false value to have?
>But what makes something "good" ? How do you determine that a given regulation is "good", and that another is "bad" ? by Reason.
>how do you universalize this processall those who possess reason possess a moral faculty.
>explain why goodness IS selflessnessYou have it backwards; selflessness is good, but goodness itself is not selflessness. The reason why selflessness is good is because of both means and ends. The means of seflessness are correct, because it displays the lack of necessity we have in considering ourself over others; in other words, it reduces what we are to what is most efficient. In terms of ends, if everyone was selfless, everyone would be accomodated for, since we would all give instead of taking. All pleasantness is a result of this regulation. If we reverse this, the means of selfishness are immediately destructive, since it contests for gain over others (one cannot take, without taking what another possesses). The ends of selfishness are thus a few having everything and most having nothing.
>German ideology, the manifesto, the origin of family private propertyGive me a quotation, please.
>obvious baitAre you not familiar with Plato? You are still a novice who believes there is validity in empiricism, so i can forgive ignorance, but please do not be so shameless about it.
>>2762485>Plato (via Socrates) calls his own method "dialectic".okay thats fine but the methods are not the same. thats why we dont call them the same
>>2762497>the methods are not the same>thats why we dont call them the sameExcept that they are literally given the same name, "dialectic".
And if they are different, could you please explain the difference?
>>2762445>why is it a "Marxist" method and not a "Platonic" method?People reading Plato's The Republic today might immediately recognize as Jeffrey Epstein style bourgeois liberal democracy, complete with late night pedo cabal conspiracy politics
Marx is a proletarian version of Hegel's Neoplatonic dialectics, the working class of course has strong feelings about such degeneracy as pedarast slave oligarchy from the soy reich of "philosopher kings" like Elon Musk (and like you condescending autistic debate bros apparently!)
https://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/3307/chapter/8623288/The-Play-of-Conspiracy-in-Plato-s-Republichttps://jacobin.com/2023/04/plato-republic-athens-democracy-aristocracy-tyrantshttps://greekreporter.com/2026/03/29/platos-republic-utopian-vision-dystopian-nightmare/ >>2762500>Except that they are literally given the same name, "dialectic".well no,
we dont call them both dialectic. one is called socratic dialogue. thats why i suggested dialogue as a more accurate name.
>And if they are different, could you please explain the difference?yeah one is talking through two sides of an argument, the other is discussed itt, and describes how rational conceptions of the material world develop and relate to that material
>>2762485>Why is valuing others rewarding if it causes us to suffer loss? because we value socialization more than the loss
>Why is gaining at the expense of another person a false value to have?Presupposing truth-apt & presupposing universality. Congrats anon, you made 2 category errors in the same sentence. Zoo Wee Mama !
>all those who possess reason possess a moral facultyOh no no no not the cognition/value dichotomy
>You have it backwards; selflessness is good, but goodness itself is not selflessnessAaaand congrats, you fell into circular reasoning ! Selflessness is good because good encompasses selflessness
>Give me a quotation, please.cmon keep the b8 alive, it's fun to argue with retards, this is too obvious
Can you try harder for the bait ? This is getting a bit boring. It was fairly fun to engage when you had posts harder to respond to, but now ? This is just very lazy. Ask an AI if you can't keep at it, I'd recommend Claude
>>2762448>Can we just ban obvious bait at this point ?real
>>2762508He's baiting he's not actually trying to get anything off the conversation. He's probably going to respond something along the lines of :
>but why is marx not a socratic dialogist then ? >>2762508>we dont call them both dialecticWell, you should, since Plato is a dialectician.
>one is talking through two sides of an argument, the other is discussed itt, and describes how rational conceptions of the material world develop and relate to that materialThe second case seems more like "demonstration" than dialectic, which Aristotle divides between; dialectic sorts between the true and false, leading to a total understanding of something, while demonstration concerns proposition. Can you provide an example of Marx's "dialectic" so that we may assess the difference, please?
>>2762511>we value the benefit of others more than the gain of ourselvesAnd would you not call this "selflessness"?
>cant produce quotationI have my worries about your literacy.
>>2762526>The second case seems more like "demonstration" than dialectic, which Aristotle divides between; dialectic sorts between the true and false, leading to a total understanding of something, while demonstration concerns propositionYou're quite close
>And would you not call this "selflessness"?The neurological architecture underlying reward-processing and the subsequent assignment of value to lived experience cannot be meaningfully confined to a framework oriented exclusively around other-directed motivations and altruistic imperatives. It follows, therefore, that the ensemble of moral and evaluative constructs which emerge from and are continuously shaped by these neurologically-mediated processes are, by virtue of their very origin, irreducibly personal in nature and resistant to any claim of universal applicability, rendering the entire domain of human values fundamentally and unavoidably contingent upon the particular psychological and experiential constitution of the individual who holds them.
The formation of values, broadly conceived, appears to emerge as a downstream consequence of the brain's continuous and largely unconscious process of assigning motivational significance to stimuli encountered across the lifespan. As experiences accumulate and are repeatedly filtered through reward-processing mechanisms, certain outcomes, behaviors, and relational configurations come to be neurologically reinforced, gradually consolidating into stable dispositional orientations that the individual comes to recognize as personal convictions or moral commitments. This process is neither static nor uniformly rational, given that the reinforcement patterns underlying it are themselves shaped by a confluence of developmental history, social environment, and the idiosyncratic emotional responses particular to each individual. What one comes to regard as genuinely valuable is therefore less the product of detached reasoning and more the sedimentary result of accumulated neurological reinforcement, wherein the repeated experience of reward or aversion quietly sculpts the contours of one's evaluative landscape long before conscious reflection ever enters the picture
>>2762537Here you are naturalising values as biological imperatives (necessitating valuation more than me, since Reason often appears contrary to nature). So then, if values are based in adapted neurological networks, there is a standard which is not "irreducibly personal", but is obviously inherited (e.g. genetic). If most people value (x) rather than (y) then are you asserting that there are "natural" values and deviant values; deviant values which we may call "mental illness", such as those who have antisocial tendencies? If a value is then inherited is it more properly adapted to our being and so is naturally preferred?
>>2762541That's not what I'm saying, try again
>>2762544You are claiming that values come from brain structures, so where do brain structures come from?
>>2762553>You are claiming that values come from brain structures, so where do brain structures come from?"The formation of values, broadly conceived, appears to emerge as a downstream consequence of the brain's continuous and largely unconscious process of assigning motivational significance to stimuli encountered across the lifespan."
reading skill ez
>>2762557Why would a person then choose to suffer loss over gain?
You have claimed that its because they value "socialisation".
I defined this spurious term as "selflessness" for which you produce this current word vomit, attempting to reduce values to something undefinable (besides its object being clearly explained; "socialisation"). So then, explain what "socialisation" is and how it essentially differs from selflessness.
>>2762561>socialization it is the same as selflessness
>explain what "socialisation" is and how it essentially differs from selflessness.Reading skills issues. That's not what I'm saying.
"the subsequent assignment of value to lived experience cannot be meaningfully confined to a framework oriented exclusively around other-directed motivations and altruistic imperatives. It follows, therefore, that the ensemble of moral and evaluative constructs which emerge from and are continuously shaped by these neurologically-mediated processes are, by virtue of their very origin, irreducibly personal in nature and resistant to any claim of universal applicability"
"As experiences accumulate and are repeatedly filtered through reward-processing mechanisms, certain outcomes, behaviors, and relational configurations come to be neurologically reinforced, gradually consolidating into stable dispositional orientations that the individual comes to recognize as personal convictions or moral commitments"
>word vomitgetting filtered by basic english topkek
>>2762044>Can you incorrectly desire something?No, I don't think you can. Desire is neither correct nor incorrect, it simply is. The only thing that happens is when we decide one value or desire is more important than another.
>Why (x) and not (y)?Historical developments mostly. Physical, social, empirical changes and evidence, as well as whatever happens as part of human development given by birth and bodily development.
>>2762579If desire "is", then that surely makes it true; i.e. a fact, like taste.
As it was once originally asserted however, we have no loyalty or duty to desire, so can resist it; but is resisting desire simply another desire? In which case, an agent must choose which desire is best - so, between two truths, what decides that which is best?
>Historical developments mostly.What influence does reason have on our desire?
>>2762565Okay, so "what" we value is others, over oneself - this has been finally agreed upon, as a development from previous comments regarding "egoism".
but "why" do we do this? why do we value (x) instead of (y)?
I thought you were introducing a biological reason for this, but i was mistaken, so i apologise for that misunderstanding, although it has precedence in previous comments:
>>2753574>Acting towards your own satisfaction is indeed a biological fact of life. <HOWEVER, the entire point is that this fact of life has no universal point of reference where we can all agree biologically "this is what satisfies me".I'm not sure if you still maintain these sentiments.
>universal applicabilitythe universality is in the singular determination of Reason to the ends of morality; so then, it only applies to sufficiently rational beings. You say that reason proceeds valuation, but in this case, it does not answer why by reason, our values may change, and for what cause reason has in our change of values.
So then, to proceed:
(i) why are we (relatively) selfless?
(ii) why can selfishness never be rationally justified?
>>2762604>Okay, so "what" we value is others, over oneself - this has been finally agreed uponNo ? Where did you derive this from ?
>I'm not sure if you still maintain these sentimentsI do.
>our values may change, and for what cause reason has in our change of valuesStill mistaking the process itself for the conclusion inquired
>why are we (relatively) selfless?already explained : "Valuing the life of others because it produces xyz feeling of accomplishment is part of the reward system. Guilt and shame are also part of the reward system. These are biological facts, which we "feel" and which our body naturally produces due to evolutionarry pressure."
>why can selfishness never be rationally justified?I never said that, I said : "because we value socialization more than the loss" to the question "Why is valuing others rewarding if it causes us to suffer loss?". You presupposed a universal characteristic in your statement that I did not assume for granted. My answer was a response to why someone COULD value xyz, not why someone WILL value xyz
holy fuck this fucking shit is still going on.
>>2757342concession to the fact that you were being a weasely little fuck like you always are. you put the words to the effect of "it is improper to say rape is wrong without proof" in my mouth to try to corner me with the exact kind of rhetorical moralist sophistry i was describing earlier in our exchange. when i denied you your ability to employ your cheap trick by countering that actually i don't think it is everywhere and anywhere improper to assert without deductive proof, you could only sputter, impotently insult me, and concede the point that actually i said no such thing.
>>2762526>Well, you should, since Plato is a dialectician.Well no, you shouldnt, since Plato is not a dialectician and no one refers to him as one. That term isn't used until Hegel.
>AristotleThats nice but we are not talking about Aristotle
>Can you provide an example of Marx's "dialectic" his analysis of the commodity in Capital
do you think its smith anon. this asshole types like smith anon
>>2762648of course it's smith anon
>>2762648Who's that ? Is this the resident troll on leftypol ?
I've reread the convo we had and we have genuinely not gone one inch closer to him providing a justification for his claim.
>>2762653the resident liberal idealist.
>>2762653some randian crypto fascist that posts about aristotle and keynes. when people get fed up with his shit and stops posting in his containment thread he infects the rest of the board
>>2762604They are true or false insofar as to whether or not we can report on them accurately.
"I want to shoot up a school" is a false thing for me not because it is immoral to shoot up a school but because I don't desire that. If I did desire to do so, then it would be true.
>As it was once originally asserted however, we have no loyalty or duty to desire, so can resist it; but is resisting desire simply another desire? In which case, an agent must choose which desire is best - so, between two truths, what decides that which is best?Strength of desires and to a significantly lesser extent reason.
Reason helps us apply understanding given historically.
>What influence does reason have on our desire?Gives us some predictive capacity of outcomes.
>>2762621>No ? Where did you derive this from ?If we are willing to suffer a loss for the gain of another person, this is "selflessness" as you have admitted; selflessness is valuing others over oneself.
>evolutionary pressureAnd these pressures produce standard brain structures in the species, which collect around average values, as previously stated? If not, then how do we explain average valuation in the species, in relation to evolutionary pressure?
>>2762754>Strength of desires and to a significantly lesser extent reason.>[reason gives] predictive capacity of outcomes.But would you not see a contradiction between the positive desire to do something and negative desire to not do it, as an instrument of reason? For example, the irrational person simply performs their positive desire, for which we may call them "impulsive" or "uninhibited" (e.g. inconsiderate of long-term consequences). For example, a person who is intoxicated loses their reason and thus becomes more impulsive (in effect, externalising the internal). So then, the "strength" of desire is subject to reason, as a force of regulation; this regulation being based in consideration of consequence. The self-restricting person thus values future rewards over present gains, for the sake of their fruitfulness, wouldnt you say? Thus, reason gives value to maximum reward, as against a minimum reward.
>>2762647>Plato is not a dialectician>Hegel invented dialecticsSupreme illiteracy
>>2762628You seem upset.
>>2763210>>2763210>selflessness is valuing others over oneselfNot what you were originally inquiring but yes
>And these pressures produce standard brain structures in the species, which collect around average values, as previously stated? Still confusing the process for the object of said-process. Re read my posts more carefully dumb mongoloid.
>how do we explain average valuation in the species, in relation to evolutionary pressure?Because the brain tends to respond similarly to a given situation with similar projections of values.
You haven't answered what makes something good btw. Did you concede that your morals are unfounded ? If not, try justifying it without any argumentative error.
>>2763276>yesso we have established what was already written:
>>2762621>Okay, so "what" we value is others, over oneself<No ? Where did you derive this from ?Now it is agreed that people generally value others over themself. The further question then concerns "why" we are generally selfless, to which you speak of "rewards" encoded by "evolutionary pressures", which clearly have a standard outcome; you say that this confuses the process for the object, so could you elaborate on this, please?
>You haven't answered what makes something good You never asked me what makes some-thing good, you asked me what makes selflessness good, which I answered in regards to means and ends. The means of selflessness make things more efficient (i.e. necessary) and its ends provide self-sufficiency (e.g. independence; freedom), since if two people are selfless, they take care of each other (mutual benefit), while if two people are selfish, one gains from the other's loss (exclusive benefit). So then, selflessness is good because it has these extended qualities of a total benefit and freedom, which are derived by a primary necessity. Thus, what is good in this is that which accords to necessity, the principle of need, for it can be said that conversely that selfishness is "unnecessary". Necessity is also the principle which rules the mind, since logic and reason are determined to certain and necessary ends. So then, goodness appears primarily as what is necessary.
>"my" moralsYou still misunderstand; there is only one true moral standard, so they are not "my" morals, they are morals, as such.
>>2763306>Now it is agreed that people generally value others over themselfNo, not really
>which clearly have a standard outcomeNo, there's no "standard" outcome.
>could you elaborate on this, please?You're mistaking the act of performing judgements with the judgements themselves. There's indeed standard processes to assess whether or not something is valued, but the claim that there is a standard outcome implies some external criterions which, from my end, seems to correlate from your error in assessing the nature of morality itself.
>which I answered in regards to means and endsWhy is necessity good ? The problem with moral realists is that you never explain your criterias of why "x" is good (mostly because you can't). Moral anti-realists don't have this problem because they've correctly assessed that goodness is not a thing in-and-of itself but rather a judgement, hence making morals contingent upon the judgement they are made from. From this, it's not hard to understand that as a conclusion from a judgement, there's no universal premise to that judgement which could incur necessarilly the same results (barring tautological ones)
>>2763210>You seem upset.it's a natural reaction to blatant dishonesty. you don't have any argument. you can only frame the other person as though they already accept the conclusions you're arguing.
>>2763210i mean youre correct about the is/ought gap or whatever but i dont see how its related to the discussion
>>2763332>No, not reallyHere we are at an impasse because you are providing continually contradictory remarks.
>there's no "standard" outcome.So you deny human being?
>the claim that there is a standard outcome implies some external criterions Yes, I am relating your point that if valuation is a biological process, and we share biology, then we must share common values.
>Why is necessity good ?Anything which is performed to an end we may see as an activity, which if it is "necessary", provides its own cause. If we relate this back to values and we see that there are things which are necessary do, it seems that these things have the highest value to us, no? If I am starving, I value food more than if I am full, and so food becomes necessary to me, making it the greatest good of that moment.
>goodness is not a thing in-and-of itself but rather a judgement, hence making morals contingent upon the judgement they are made fromAnd can judgements be either correct or incorrect where it regards goodness? If we disagree on the nature of the good, does this not imply that there is something called "good" which we are relating to?
>>2763349Did you use reason to conclude this, or have you "asserted without proof"?
>>2763361Could you clarify what you mean here, please?
>>2763384>Did you use reason to conclude thisno, you conceded it, and now it is taken for granted.
>>2763384>Could you clarify what you mean here, please?yeah i didnt want to scroll up but whoever is saying that
>The claim of empiricism is an a posteriori epistemology, but this cannot be asserted besides an a priori testimony.is correct, that "prove rape is objectively wrong" is impossible, but also that the other person defined their framework enough that its self justifying to the extent it can be and i dont know why you are still harping on aboutit
>>2763387I can't listen to people who "assert without proof", sorry.
I don't need any more of your attention.
>>2763431>I can't listen to people who "assert without proof", sorry.you assert without proof. you are too deluded and dishonest to admit this, and so you concede the point and exit the conversation.
>>2763430All of this depends upon a definition of "morality";
can you provide it for me, please?
>>2763434So do you "assert without proof" or not?
>>2763435>can you provide it for me, please?no? what the fuck are you talking about
>>2763443Okay, so we cannot discuss claims about morality unless morality has a meaning
>>2763447ok? i didnt dispute that i said you were correct
>>2763449What am I correct about?
It seems that things have become confused.
>>2763451the is/ought gap. unless that was other anon. its hard to keep you guys apart when you get this far away from the topic into minutiae
>>2753095I like to come up with my own ideas instead of reading what other people think
>>2763435>So do you "assert without proof" or not?everyone makes assertions without deductive proof. i already gave the example of induction. this is also demonstrated by gödel on mathematical incompleteness. normative propositions are not provable just as the regularity of nature or the internal consistency of pleano arithmetic are unprovable. i don't even have to adduce these examples to demonstrate my point, as you already demonstrated it earlier when you attempted to circularly define immorality in terms of "unjustified" selfishness. it only changes the pertinent questions from what is moral and immoral and why we ought not do that which is immoral to what is justified and unjustified and why we ought not do that which is unjustified.
>>2763447morality is "what most people think is true and righteous"
>>2763461Would you not rather say that this is is moral judgement, and that morality is that which is "good" in itself? What is good is moral, while what I think about the good is not itself morality.
>>2763455You have to be patient with the dialectic
>>2763458>everyone makes assertions without deductive proof.And as it concerned earlier judgement, would you not say that this is "improper"? If I "assert without proof", then any assertion is as good as any other. If you submit to this but abide by its irrationality, then all further assertions you make are illegitimate.
>normative propositions are not provable If we agree as to the nature of the good, then are we not obliged by it? The exercise in deconstructing basic rhetorical statements such as "rape is wrong" is to show that it cannot be said to not be wrong, or at least, it cannot be said, but why? If there are limits, then that means we are at the boundaries of something real.
>>2763474>Would you not rather say that this is is moral judgementnope
>>2763484If two people have opposing thoughts on what is "true and righteous" does necessarily make either of them correct, and the other, false? Clearly not (since both could be incorrect), so then truth and righteousness must be considered as something separate from our judgement upon it, since our judgement may be false.
>>2763489morality doesn't scale
>>2763490Could you explain this statement, please?
>>2763474>would you not say that this is "improper"?no, i would not. i would say quite the opposite in fact. "improper" implies it could be any other way
>If I "assert without proof", then any assertion is as good as any otherthat's plainly untrue. you don't even believe it. if you did then you would believe asserting that pleano arithmetic is inconsistent is just as "good" as asserting that it is inconsistent.
>If we agree as to the nature of the good, then are we not obliged by it?obligations are interpersonal social relations, not relations between people and abstract propositions.
>The exercise in deconstructing basic rhetorical statements such as "rape is wrong" is to show that it cannot be said to not be wrong, or at least, it cannot be said, but why?it can be said to be wrong, and it can also be said. it simply cannot be proven in the sense of deductive proof.
>>2763493>no, i would not.So, you reject the concept of requiring evidence for truth claims?
>that's plainly untrueAnd what justifies this statement?
>obligations are interpersonal social relations, not relations between people and abstract propositions.So you don't understand the duty one has to the truth? If you are confronted with truth, you are indeed obliged to accept it.
>it can be said to be [not] wrong,No it cant, otherwise you would have had the balls to say it already.
>it simply cannot be proven in the sense of deductive proof.What if "morality" can be defined in such a way so as to derive a deductive proof? This is the error in your thinking; you are presupposing a definition of morality without explicating it. Can you please define the term "morality" for me?
>>2763501>you reject the concept of requiring evidence for truth claims?first of all, evidence is not equivalent to proof. second, any standard of evidence, i.e. that which defines what counts as evidence or not, is itself unprovable without either appealing to itself or contriving a new standard to appeal to and so on.
>what justifies this statement?the two sentences that immediately follow the sentence you have quoted here.
> you would have had the balls to say it alreadyi did say it multiple times in this thread.
>What if "morality" can be defined in such a way so as to derive a deductive proof?you could do that just fine. you would be asserting a definition of morality without proof, and then deriving proofs from this assertion, just as with any deductive process.
>Can you please define the term "morality" for me?a "morality" is a socially constructed system of ethics through which truth-values are assigned to normative propositions. what distinguishes morality as a species of ethics is that it identifies the category of "true" normative claims with the category of "good" and "false" normative claims with the category of "bad".
>>2763384>you are providing continually contradictory remarks.No lol you're just putting words in my mouth. I never said that people are generally altruistic nor that morality was centered around that. I merely said that when people don't act """selfishly""", it's generally because they value more their socialization than their ego. If you want to make replies and derail my post, at least make it properly.
> you deny human being?non sequitur
>then we must share common values.So it's not standard then, it's "common".
>necessity is le goodThis is just an argument as to why we value things that are necessary to our existence lmfao. Please don't tell me you made all these shitposts just to say that.
>And can judgements be either correct or incorrect where it regards goodnessWe can be incorrect in what we think we value, just like we can be wrong about which food we think we like.
> that there is something called "good" which we are relating to?You've kept trying to evade defining your own position, and have only (probably after >50 posts) defined what constitutes "good" now. And, as it turns out, you're just saying that what is good is what is necessary for our own existence. I don't disagree with this, IF you presume existence to be valued by the subjective self. HOWEVER, in this scenario you don't explain why we assess certain things to be good beyond the necessity of maintaining our existence.
>>2763447>>2763451I don't understand why you insist on starting new debates that you will just lose and be dishonest about. I genuinely can't fathom why someone would subject themselves to this.
>>2763540>EvidenceSince you are as obtuse as ever, please demonstrate to me an example of a statement which has correctness compared to one that doesn't, so that we may understand your contention between what you personally claim (which must presume correctness) as opposed to that which you disagree with. Or is it wrong to say that in your 'unproven' assertions, you do not even attribute correctness as a quality to statements? In which case, why on earth are you talking to me, if you deny the distinction between the true and the false?
>i did say it multiple times in this thread.No you didn't; I extracted it from you by inference and you have entered upon me again, hissy-fitting that I have forced your hand with "tricks". There is nothing tricky about what I write, but you are full of evasions.
>deductionRight, so you accept the validity of deductive proofs, then, so what is all this controversy about?
>MoralityYou are debasing morality to semiotics, rather than a science of human activity, which is your error. As I have constantly asked, "why do we value (x) over (y)?"
>>2763547>I never said that people are generally altruistic nor that morality was centered around that>common valuesDo you accept that as biological species, we necessarily share common values?
>This is just an argument as to why we value things that are necessarySo you agree that our highest values correspond to necessity?
>We can be incorrect in what we think we valueHow do you tell the difference?
>what is good is what is necessary for our own existenceNo, its more abstract; what is necessary to our existence comprises "health" which continues our being (and so is our highest value), but goodness itself does not depend upon relative valuation (since then, health would only be best if we were unhealthy). If health is good because it causes the extension of our being, then the ends, not the means of health must itself be what is best. Thus, what is good is being itself, since all good things in relation to beings come from this cause. As yet, evil is said to partake in being, but evil is a negation of being, not a being unto itself.
>I don't disagree with this, IF you presume existence to be valued by the subjective self. HOWEVER, in this scenario you don't explain why we assess certain things to be good beyond the necessity of maintaining our existence.There is no further cause than being itself. Why would existence require more than its necessary maintenance? And since you invoke goodness, could you also share your definition of it, please?
>>2763612>demonstrate to me an example of a statement which has correctness compared to one that doesn'ti already have multiple times.
>No you didn'tyes i did.
>I have forced your hand with "tricks". you didn't force my hand. i circumvented it by denying you your preferred framing, and then you conceded the point. we've been over this.
>so you accept the validity of deductive proofs, then, so what is all this controversy about?whether there is any valid and non-ciecular "proof" for the truth value of any given normative proposition.
>You are debasing morality to semioticsnot all semiotics are concerned with truth-value assignment. regardless, this isn't an argument. just more rhetorical moralism without a shred of intellectual force.
>>2763653>i already have multiple times.Okay, so what is the qualification which distinguishes between the true and false?
>>2763612>we necessarily share common values?No not necessarily but you're going to chimp out and say "WHAAAT YOU DENY THAT WE CAN ALL AGREE ON CERTAIN THINGS OMG"
> you agree that our highest values correspond to necessity?No, reading skill issue.
"IF you presume existence to be valued by the subjective self. HOWEVER, in this scenario you don't explain why we assess certain things to be good beyond the necessity of maintaining our existence"
Frankly this would be easier if you just stopped trying to be dishonest and put words in my mouth. Focus on the arguments here to make good b8, otherwise it's too obvious.
>How do you tell the difference?STILL mistaking the process for the object holy christ lmfao
>and so is our highest valueFirst presupposition, and arguably begging the question
>then the ends, not the means of health must itself be what is bestSecond (and quite massive lol) presupposition
>what is good is being itself, since all good things in relation to beings come from this causeNon sequitur, coming from a quality-error
>but evil is a negation of beingThird presupposition
You're presupposing being to be the highest value because it's the precondition for value (and then make a weird and unasserted claim about evil being the negation of being). This is pretty much the randian argument101 but less developed and more retarded.
Again, as always, you're still making a quality error of what morality is in-itself.
Morality is a judgement made on things, it's an assessment. When you say that being is our highest value because it's the precondition of value, you're saying that to have values implies valuing being. This is (somewhat) correct, but this does not contradict my claims. All you have proven is the transcendental nature of valuing one own's life if he has other values. You have not proven however the objectivity (or the moral realist) position of your beliefs in morals.
>Why would existence require more than its necessary maintenance? Because our existence rhymes with eternal search for happiness and satisfaction ? But you're going to stretch the definition of existence to imply this.
>could you also share your definition of it, please?I'm not invoking it and I've already given you the definition multiple times
>>2763655>what is the qualification which distinguishes between the true and false?standards of evidence, of which there are multiple, and which themselves have to either be unproven or appealing to another unproven standard. in symbolic logic we call these standards truth-value assignment functions.
>>2763689>standards of evidenceWhat measures the standard of evidence?
What makes a statement either true or false?
>>2763680>not necessarily But this is plainly contradictory since if values emerge from biology and we share biology, we necessarily share values; this commonness I earlier referred to as "human being" (i.e. being "human"). Do you then deny our common human being?
>IF you presume existence to be valued by the subjective selfIt is a necessary presumption.
>You're presupposing being to be the highest value because it's the precondition for valueYes, the same way you base values in "biology" - but refuse to elaborate.
>Morality is a judgement made on things, it's an assessment.An assessment of WHAT?
>search for happiness and satisfactionWhich can be defined negatively as being free from unhappiness and dissatisfaction. Indulging in pleasure leads to suffering, while evading suffering leads to its lack. Thus, how can you be more "happy" than in a position of being free from sources of unhappiness? (i.e. the maintenance of our being).
>wont define goodnessPlease stop talking to me if youre this unserious.
>>2763540idk why you are being so autistic they openly are
>contriving a new standard to appeal to your issue isnt with them not understanding its you rejecting their standard they have declared subjectively sufficient. thats not the same thing. and thats on top of the fact that we know youre a weasily shithead who wont apply this standard to yourself
>>2763653>i circumvented it by denying you your preferred framingsee, just like i predicted. why is your denial more justified than their approval? its not, you cant prove that without contriving your own subjective standard thats equally valid as theirs by the same measure
>>2763702>we necessarily share valuesNot necessarily but coincidentally. As explained previously, our values come from experiences (and inferred knowledge about situations) where our brain "rewards" us through the reward system. Every individual is unique, so every individual is always going to have a different phenomenal input of the world, leading to different values.
>the same way you base values in "biology" - but refuse to elaboratethat you refuse to read* :
>>2762537From the constant self-referencing that I make it's become obvious you have gotten filtered by this.
>An assessment of WHAT?Are you retarded ? Of our experiences. Dude this has been said like 10 000 times already
>*stretches the definition of the maintenance of a being to include happiness*Yup, called it.
>stop talking to me if youre this unseriouslmfao you're making randian arguments and refuse to read and you think I'm the one being unserious ? Genuine question btw.
So do I take for granted that you've conceded that :
>evil is not the negation of being>morality is an assessment of a given thing, and not a thing in-itself>reason is not the source of morality but a mean to inquire about our assessments>that morality is not necessarilly truth-aptGiven that you haven't replied to these points
>>2763736You're not understanding what he's saying dumbass.
>>2763702>What measures the standard of evidence?this is a totally meaningless question until you specify what predicate dimension you want a metric for.
>What makes a statement either true or false?standards of evidence, of which there are multiple, and which themselves have to either be unproven or appealing to another unproven standard. in symbolic logic we call these standards truth-value assignment functions.
>>2763736>they openly are contriving a new standard to appeal to yeah i know, that's my point.
>we know youre a weasily shithead who wont apply this standard to yourself i do very openly and eagerly apply it to myself.
>why is your denial more justified than their approval?you are so confused lmao
>>2763755>yeah i know, that's my point.if they are doing it openly then thats not a point.
>>2763919>if they are doing it openly then thats not a point.it is, because even once you've contrived another standard, now that standard is subject to the same foundational crisis. either some other standard evidences it, or it is unevidenced. there is no such thing as self-evidence.
>>2763931>now that standard is subject to the same foundational crisisits not because their threshold for justification is lower than yours, hence subjective. you are literally bitching about someone having a different opinion
>>2763941i am bitching about someone having the opinion that their opinion is actually objectively demonstrably by force of pure reason alone. he does not recognize anything subjective about anything going on here.
>>2764022the thing in question is whether normative claims, particularly moral ones, are matters of constructed opinion or demonstrable fact. you say that i just have a disagreement of opinion, and i say yes! tell that to the other guy!
>>2764041you are epstein. you are a zionist.
>>2763755>standards of evidence provide truth to statementsAs a practical exercise, provide a standard of evidence to this statement to demonstrate its truth.
>>2763743>Not necessarily but coincidentally. No; by necessity. You misunderstand logic.
>Every individual is uniqueAnd every individual is common, by belonging to a more general kind, type or species. Your denial of humanity leads you to this irrational individualism. You do accept our common human being, right? We are both human. We are both of a biological species.
>Of our experiences. This does not answer anything. What is assessed according to morality? Saying that it is "experience" is incoherent. Morality assesses what is "good" and "bad" - in experience, you mean. Once we clarify this, it then leads you to define what is "good" and "bad", unless you simply mean what is "preferential" and "valued", for which you owe clarification (e.g. to deny the category of morality itself; relatively or absolutely). If not, what is the meaning of "good"?
>I'm the one being unserious?You are purposefully failing to advance the discussion, wasting everyone's time. If you disagree with my definition of the good (e.g. being, which by necessity, attains its own means and end) and I ask you to give an alternative definition, but you decline, then you are meaninglessly forestalling things.
>Evil as negationIf being is good, then all evil negates from being. Sickness is a lack of health; death is a lack of life.
>Morality is as an assessment of a given thingAnd if a thing is assessed as "good", it is either good (i) relatively, and/or (ii) absolutely.
>reason is not the source of morality but a mean to inquire about our assessmentsWhich causes the question, can assessments be incorrect? In which case, reason provides correct moral assessment. You already said that we can be mistaken about our values, so then, correct judgement of our values must be a rational process. So then, reason allows us to know what is truly good and evil, and by this, our assessments change.
>morality is not necessarily truth-aptIf "morality" describes some-thing, correct and incorrect judgements can be made of this thing (e.g. the good), and so a correct judgement provides truth of the thing. So then, can moral judgements (i.e. "assessments") be either true or false?
>>2764310Dude you're still at this ? Just admit you got filtered lol
>No; by necessity. You misunderstand logicWhat is this going to be about again. Just spill the beans so we can see where you're wrong.
>You do accept our common human being, rightYou do accept the individuality of phenomenal experience, right ?
>unless you simply mean what is "preferential" and "valued"Took you long enough
>for which you owe clarificationlook back on the "word vomit"
>You are purposefully failing to advance the discussion, wasting everyone's time<ignores my argument<presumes his definition to be correct without justification<constantly miswords and misrepresents the other sideYep, you're smith anon all right.
>If being is good, then all evil negates from being. Sickness is a lack of health; death is a lack of lifepretty much sums up what was just said : you define goodness as being and refuse to justify this. You then define evil as the opposite of good, and thus infer that it's the negation of being. However, the first premise is still not justified.
>reason allows us to know what is truly good and evil, and by this, our assessments change.That doesn't make it the source tho
>So then, can moral judgements (i.e. "assessments") be either true or false?That's not what truth-apt refers to here retard
>>2764808>pretty much sums up what was just saidme too when i said hes a hypocritical shithead who applies standards only to his opposition
my bad for abandoning polecongen(at his request lol) and spurring him to post out of containment
>>2764835Huh ? What do you mean?
>>2764853Is he like some retarded child that needs to be entertained lol ? What kind of dumb monkey degenerate is he ?
>>2764883i think hes addicted to public humiliation
>>2764808>You do accept the individuality of phenomenal experience, right ?Yes, which is extensive of our collective being, which you still fail to affirm, drifting into idle fantasy. You invoke "biology" and then dismiss it. You are living a lie.
>Took you long enoughRight, so you would deny the category of "the good" itself?
>you define goodness as being and refuse to justify this.I already justified it by relating it to your concept of relative valuation; your only retort is to say that a being is not necessitated by the investment in its own being - failing to see that if one "is", they are actively continuing their existence, placing value in it. Unless someone kills themself, they necessarily value life.
>That doesn't make it the source thoThe source of what? Our preferences or the category of goodness?
>That's not what truth-apt refers toSo, can correct and incorrect assessments be made? You are gradually melting into an evasive, insulting pest - What happened to your capacity to advance this discussion?
>>2762500>And if they are different, could you please explain the difference?If you mean the difference between classical ideas of dialectic and something like Hegel's development, Hegel's own centers around a reconciliation of oppositions. "Reconciliation" shouldn't be understood here as negotiating a middle position between extremes (which did happen in classical dialectic), but recognizing the truth of the oppositions is found (and the contradictions resolved) in their subsumption in something beyond the opposed positions.
In classical dialectic, one (or a few) views tend to get preferential treatment after the presentation and discussion of each view (showing some to be implausible or false in some way, others to be plausible or true), while a characteristic Hegelian move would be stepping back from the oppositions (after reaching an impasse of sorts upon arriving at the contradictions inherent to each position when taken by itself, similar to reaching "aporia" in Plato) to look at what the oppositions mean together, as a whole. Plato arguably gets close to something like this in "Parmenides," but there isn't a step back in the dialogue, just apparent impasses (even if the contradictions are "together" in a way, in the one).
>>2765273>negotiating a middle position between extremes (which did happen in classical dialectic)Yes, well we see this employed in Plato [266e-267c] which produces the infamous "featherless biped" conclusion - but in the argument of the Eleatic stranger, these divisions occur where as he puts it, subdivision of "types" or "kinds" are made most generally, while what is particular is still contained in the type. Plato emphasises middleness at [265a-b]. Aristotle also later sees that the "golden mean" is ideal.
>the truth of the oppositions is found (and the contradictions resolved) in their subsumption in something beyond the opposed positions.Isn't this just the process of abstraction? If two things belong to one thing, then one thing gives identity to each, as different types of the one. Opposition here implies contradiction, however (which Aristotle describes as the contrariness of things, particularly in the modality of positive and negative claims). For example, an answer to a question cannot be both "yes" and "no" (in receiving the same conclusion), and so the dialectic resolves this contradiction by developing the logic of internal consistency (e.g. computational algorithms are a type of dialectic, since they process inputs by a chain of binaries until a final result is given). Contradiction can only be "resolved" by giving separateness to contraries. A ≠ B, if B ≠ A.
In personally reading Hegel, he mediates appears to mediate contradiction by mutual negativity (e.g. A in itself relates to B by not-A and not-B having abstract equivalence as becoming) beginning in the second law of logic; the law of non-contradiction; and so he does not imply that A = B, except by syllogism; e.g.
(i) if, A = B
(ii) and, B = C
(iii) then, A = C
This is also abstracted by different modes, however, where A is singular, B is particular and C is universal. Hegel does not equate contrary beings (A, B, C) in themselves, since that would be a contradiction.
Further, the method of self-identity in opposites is already present in ancient thought, such as in Heraclitus and Lao Tzu, who both invoke the formula of non-being (i.e. becoming) as the unity of things. Lao Tzu calls this Tao, while Heraclitus calls it Logos. Thus, contradiction is not unified positively, but negatively. The issue is clear however, since negativity cannot provide unity, since negative identity already presupposes duality as the basis of becoming. Thus the yin-yang is two-in-one. But this then causes three, as Lao Tzu also writes, in tandem with Pythagoras - Plato stumbles upon the same issue in [259a-b]; between plurality and singularity. Plato was not a naive monist. The Christian trinity also mirrors this, but in more dogmatic terms (e.g. being as both one and many).
>In classical dialectic, one (or a few) views tend to get preferential treatment You mean that a logical conclusion follows a discussion of opposing views?
>what the oppositions mean together, as a whole.Which in Plato can be entirely mapped out by dialectical disgression of subdivision into types. Plato is a thinker of totality, which means connecting the whole to its parts.
>Plato arguably gets close to something like this in "Parmenides," but there isn't a step back in the dialogue, just apparent impassesWhich means that first principles must be reformulated; the endless task of the philosopher.
>>2765322>Further, the method of self-identity in opposites is already present in ancient thought, such as in Heraclitus and Lao Tzu, who both invoke the formula of non-being (i.e. becoming) as the unity of things. Lao Tzu calls this Tao, while Heraclitus calls it Logos.I wouldn't say this is equivalent to what happens in Hegel, though. While there is a similarity of unity (in spirit or the absolute for Hegel), the "beyond" that subsumes the oppositions in the dialectical working-through isn't immediately spirit or the absolute, but something encompassing the particular oppositions. For Hegel, it would be wrong to see the contradictions as subsumed within spirit as the immediate result of the contradictions found in the given oppositions.
>You mean that a logical conclusion follows a discussion of opposing views?One would hope, but not always. There are occasional problems in Plato's logic, for example, but it can be hard to tell whether these are mistakes on Plato's part or "mistakes" intended to show something. I think Leo Strauss, for example, believed some of the logical problems in "The Republic" were deliberate and the work was in part satirical, while Stanley Rosen thought they mostly weren't and came to a different conclusion about the work, even while largely accepting many of Strauss's points.
Regardless, I'm not saying the process is irrational or "bad" in some way (Aristotle seems to try to represent as many credible starting points as possible when being dialectical), so this isn't intended as a partisan point "against" classical dialectic. I'm only saying it's distinct from what Hegel does.
>Plato is a thinker of totality, which means connecting the whole to its parts.It's not that Plato isn't concerned about totality, but the "together, as a whole" I meant in what you quoted is the "together, as a whole" of the given oppositions at the stage of the development of the logic.
>Which means that first principles must be reformulated; the endless task of the philosopher.I don't find it impossible that he left the task of "stepping back" for the reader to work out as a kind of exercise, given what happens in the dialogue and the apparent propaedeutic purpose of most or all the dialogues for the esoteric Platonism at the Academy, but I didn't want to be overly conclusive about it, thus the "arguably." So I do think it's close to Hegel's dialectic, although it's still a bit off since it seems to resolve into the Parmenidean one. It does work through the logic in a way that is a step beyond (what we have of) the real Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Taoism, though.
>>2765353>I wouldn't say this is equivalent to what happens in Hegel,You wouldn't? Hegel's Logic begins by a disputation of the unity of being, introducing negativity as a means of its becoming, and similarly concludes that the Idea (or being as such) is striven for, but is ultimately unattainable by its constituent parts:
<The absolute Idea has turned out to be the identity of the theoretical and the practical Idea. Each of these by itself is still one-sided, possessing the Idea only as a sought for beyond and an unattained goal; each, therefore, is a synthesis of endeavour, and has, but equally has not, the Idea in it […] the absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth.https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlabsolu.htm#HL3_824This he essentially resolves to a process of thought thinking itself, like Aristotle's prime mover of the cosmos, and so where there is thinking, there is becoming, while what is being in itself, is, as he resolves it in Fichtean terms, form without content, and thus, it is immediate. I agree to this position, that knowledge is a category of ignorance (i.e. mediation), for to come into knowing is to negate the unknown, while noumenon is unthought. I criticise Plato on this point as compared to Lao Tzu here:
>>>/edu/25682>There are occasional problems in Plato's logicCan you provide an example?
>the "together, as a whole" of the given oppositions at the stage of the development of the logic.You are seemingly unclear as to what you mean by "opposition" here. If you are referring to "contradiction", then what is positive is defined by what can be negated. Plato in Republic describes dialectic as a purely negative act of moving to truth by subtracting from untruth (that is, particularising from the general, so as to refine it). So, does truth include the untrue in itself? No, yet untruth is still related to truth by negativity. There is a similar issue with Parmenides, where if Being is One, does it include non-being in itself? If all is one, then we come into apparent impossibility, which is the crisis of all abstraction (whether idealist or materialist).
>It does work through the logic in a way that is a step beyond (what we have of) the real Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Taoism, though.If you haven't read it before, I would sugest you read Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book I, which goes through a progressive history of philosophical thought up to his time (600 BCE - 330 BCE):
https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.1.i.html >>2765244leftypol is bugging so I have to divide my answer but :
>which is extensive of our collective being>Collective being There is no such thing as collective being. We may share common experience but we are not a singular consciousness anon.
>>2766000>so you would deny the category of "the good" itself?Already adressed in prior posts, step up the bait anon
>I already justified it by relating it to your concept of relative valuationI'm simply using this example to show you your dishonesty. I had to pull the worms out of your nose to get you to formulate a coherent position, and, as it turns out, you're just repeating mine but under different terms.
>Our preferences or the category of goodnessFalse dichotomy
>>2766002>So, can correct and incorrect assessments be made?That's not what truth-apt refers to. Truth-apt refers to a statement containing a proposition which can be true or false. It's not about correct/incorrect but true/false. (as correct/incorrect would imply a referential point).
>>2766003>What happened to your capacity to advance this discussionIt took >100 posts for you to essentially admit that your conception of morality is essentially the following :
>what is morality ?<morality is about judging the actions in relation to self-regulation>how do you define good then ?<what is good is what maintains and upholds being, and what is bad is the negation of said-being>but why is that good ?<this is because being encompasses happinnes<hence morality is about judging actions in relation to what makes us happyYou're literally a position similar to mine : we determine goodness and badness in relation to what makes us happy. You're just semantically nitpicking and baiting for debates because you're a troll.
>>2766002>>2766003>>2766005>>2766000>There is no such thing as collective beingSo when I say "we are both human beings", you deny this?
You have dodged this question, so please answer it.
>Already adressed in prior postsNo it isnt, so please clarify: do you believe in the category of goodness? You believe in preference and valuation, but do these signify virtue?
>You're literally a position similar to mineHow can I tell when you don't reveal your position?
>we determine goodness and badness in relation to what makes us happyThat is not my position - It is goodness which determines our wellbeing, not our wellbeing which determines goodness. "Happiness" is also a false term, since as we have discovered, we may willingly suffer for the sake of others, and so the good forces us to suffer, for the sake of something greater than happiness (e.g. excellence). Further, if one derives happiness from what is harmful to others, is this a determination of virtue, or is it a false judgement upon morality?
>>2766002>as it turns out, you're just repeating mine but under different terms.well maybe he just doesnt like your tone! harrumph
>>2766095We have determined in prior post (>>2764808) that most of your posts rests on begging the question. We can examine multiple of these cases here too.
>So when I say "we are both human beings", you deny this?I do not deny this. As we can see, you commit to begging the question here. What I am denying is having necessary moral values due to our human species. You are, here, assuming that by having a common human species, we must necessarily share some common values.
Funnily enough, this was noticed earlier on in
>>2763680.
>do you believe in the category of goodness?This has already been cleared in
>>2763332.
>How can I tell when you don't reveal your position?Already have :
>>2762537. This is like the fifth time I've done so. Step up your game if you want to keep baiting.
>That is not my positionThen tell me. This is like the third time I've asked you. What is morality, how do we determine it, and how does the criteria you use to determine it makes it "good".
>>2766627>Then tell me.Ah but anon… not having a position allows endless baiting…
>>2766627>I do not deny thisSo our human being is a collective being, correct?
>What I am denying is having necessary moral values due to our human species.If values derive from "biology" and we share biology, we then share values. That is a necessary sequence.
>moral judgement is relative to something unrealBut if there is a judgement of "morality" then you are affirming the reality of something. Your issue is that you are preserving moral language where you ought to decline to such categorisation. This is part of the same issue as when you claimed that there can be a "bad" taste; no, there can be non-preferential tastes, but preference does not confer morality upon anything. So then, if you wish to conclude, we may agree that preference cannot be synonymised with moral judgement, unless something is preferrred for its abstract moral content. Preference persists amorally, such as in irrational beings.
>What is moralityMorality is a concern with what is good and evil, and thus presupposes their reality (you cannot have morality without a realistic perspective).
>how do we determine itBy reason, hence irrational beings are not subject to moral guilt
>how does the criteria you use to determine it makes it "good"My criteria is reason. The determination of virtue is in considering what activity is correct to perform and not perform. Correctness is defined in consideration to need, which corresponds to being. Need is the principle of self-cause, for it determines itself. What is necessary is always justified, while what is unnecessary can only be justified under particular conditions. We may then call the process of judgement upon morality "justification" (e.g. "to make good"). We may further call necessity a positively justified, while what is unnecessary is either (i) negatively justified, (ii) positively unjustified, or (iii) negatively unjustified. Thus, we may (i) not-do certain things which are good, (ii) do certain things which are bad, or (iii) not-do certain things - which are bad. In the last case we see that what is "bad" are ends or results, making morality in this case "consequential" or relative to outcome. In the first case then, necessity is an end in itself (e.g. deontological) and so is self-justifying, while in the second case, a lack of necessity either concerns what is (i) self-unjustified by means or (ii) unjustifed by ends. What then concerns ends is a question of valuation, which is both universal and particular, according to the being which we are. Here, necessity also rules universally, but so does contingency in particular. Thus, water quenches the thirst of all men, and so this first (impersonal) case is primarily morally considered (e.g. possessing total value) while in the second case, personality reigns by volition, and preference. As Plato writes therefore, a patient may dislike medicine, but the doctor still has authority over them, by knowing what is "best" for them; the same way the child is governed by parents, as rightful and rational guardians over the irrational. Preference then, is the lowest of all moral concerns, since it is most particular.
I hope this suffices as an explanation.
>>2767174>If values derive from "biology" and we share biology, we then share valuesWhy is it that we all see different things despite having the same eyes ? Or why is it that we all have different tastes ?
>But if there is a judgement of "morality" then you are affirming the reality of somethingNo you're just presupposing your definition of morality to be correct whilst exlcuding other definitions without justification.
>there can be non-preferential tastes, but preference does not confer morality upon anything<you can't say that something tastes bad because it goes against my logic!!!lmfao the absolute state
>we may agree that preference cannot be synonymised with moral judgementWe may not. I could also say that morality is in reality purely a emotive language with no genuine content, and that as such everything you have said is false because morality is not truth-apt nor a real object.
As you've noticed, I don't do this because it would be a massive instance of begging the question, which is exactly what you have done since the beginning.
>I hope this suffices as an explanation.<I define necessity as good and justified<therefore goodness encompasses necessity teeheetopkek you can't even answer the last question without resting on a massive argumentative fallacy. Try again : why is necessity good without pre-defining it as so.
>>2767277>Why is it that we all see different things despite having the same eyes? Or why is it that we all have different tastes?Because we are both universal and particular in our being; collective and individual; whole and partitioned.
>presupposing your definition of morality to be correct>whilst exlcuding other definitionsNo alternative has been given; I ask for your definition and you decline. You speak of preference (which is not a moral category). What you prefer is not what is "good"; we cannot continue until you admit this. If you asked me "what is good?" and I said "what's good is what I enjoy" you would think I'm a fool, no? Be consistent.
>you can't say that something tastes badYes; if you dont like the taste of something but I do, we are giving conflicting claims of the same thing; thus, this judgement cannot be upon the thing itself, but only in how we relate to it. It is relative, not absolute, so cannot be said of the thing itself. Preference ≠ Morality.
>We may not agree that [preference ≠ moral judgement]So your definition of "good" is "what i prefer" and definition of "bad" is "what i dont prefer"? No wonder you have been ashamed to offer this "definition". Like I say, we cannot continue until you admit your error.
>why is necessity good without pre-defining it as so.I cannot, since they are the same thing; what is necessary is self-determined of being - thus (i) it is done as an end in itself, (ii) it is always justified, and (iii) it has universal value. And finally, preference has no part in necessity, which is why preference is entirely secondary to our being. The equation between virtue and necessity has been present in all basic philosophy; from Plato and Aristotle, to Kant and Hegel. If you disagree, can you contradict something which is necessary from what is good? Think, for example, that a "necessary evil" is justified by means of realising a "greater good"; Plato uses this device to demonstrate his "noble lie", where the ends "jusfify" the means. Thus, even a "necessary evil" is still good, by means of its necessity. So then, what is necessary is good, by definition.
>>2767539>Because we are both universal and particular in our beingexcept you reject this lol
pretty insidious and fucked up to post falsehoods about dialectics when you openly reject it
>>2767539>Because we are both universal and particular in our beingThen, if we define morality as subsequent to our preferences, could it be that morality is individualized ?
> I ask for your definition and you decline. >You speak of preference (which is not a moral category). >What you prefer is not what is "good"unjustified assertion
>If you asked me "what is good?" and I said "what's good is what I enjoy" you would think I'm a foolappeal to emotion
>It is relative, not absolute, so cannot be said of the thing itself. Preference ≠ Morality.begging the question fallacy.
>I cannot, since they are the same thingConcession accepted : you cannot answer why morality is good because you have not developed your own moral standard. You are making an analytical claim rather than a synthetic one.
Come back when you can accurately defend your own position without relying on unjustified assertions.
>If you disagree, can you contradict something which is necessary from what is good? Is the comsic heat death of the universe good ?
But since you'll reject this because it contradicts existence as the highest good : given that a rapist must necessarilly rape to be a rapist, is rape good ?
>>2767608Where do I reject our universal and particular nature?
>>2767609?
>>2767645>if we define morality as subsequent to our preferences…But this is a category error, as I have explained.
An insect has preference, but does it have morality? No.
>morality is individualizedBut again, if i say (x) is good and you say (y) is good, this is a contradiction; so between moral judgements upon (x) and (y), how do we determine which is correct? You need to follow the logic, anon. I'm trying to teach you.
>appeal to emotionIts rhetoric, to demonstrate the point that you are being foolish. If I was saying the things you are saying, it would be silly, wouldn't it?
>you cannot answer why morality is good This is a strange statement; what you mean to say is "you cannot explain what makes things good", but I already have.
>you have not developed your own moral standardTruth does not depend upon "my" standardisation of anything. I am discovering reality, not creating it.
>You are making an analytical claim rather than a synthetic one.Analytic claims are still true.
>unjustified assertionsGive an example of an unjustified assertion in my reasoning.
>Is the comsic heat death of the universe good ? Yes; it is a necessary evil to the greater good which it produces.
>rapist must necessarilly rape to be a rapist, is rape good?Rapists aren't good and there is no necessity for them to exist.
>>2768037<NOO YOU CANT DEFINE MORALITY AS PERSONAL VALUES YOU JUST CANT AAAAH<YOU NEED TO PRESUPPOSE TRUTH-APT AND UNIVERSALITY YOU JUST NEEED TOAnd still, after 200 posts, you have yet to provide a justification.
>"you cannot explain what makes things good", but I already have>Analytic claims are still true.>Give an example of an unjustified assertion in my reasoning.You define "good" as what is necessary and self-cause, and you say this is good because it is necessary and self-caused. Don't you see the obvious flawed logic ? If I follow your logic, I can say that goodness is squirrels, and that squirrels are good because they are goodness.
>le heat death is awesome>rapists are meanies :(How do you define what is necessary and what isn't ?
>>2768622>MORALITY AS PERSONAL VALUESAgain, if I say (x) is "good" (denoting a quality in something),
and you say (x) is "bad" (denoting a quality in something),
we are attributing contrary qualities in the same thing, causing a contradiction. This is impermissible. However, if I say I "enjoy (x)" and you say you "dont enjoy (x)", there is no contradiction, since we are not making claims of things in themselves, but only in how we personally relate to them. So as I say, you are mistakenly using moral language in the place of personal preference. In terms of personal "values", I have already demonstrated that our primary values concern necessity, and secondary values, contingency.
>You define "good" as what is necessary and self-causeI define good as that which can be justified (e.g. "made good" - by rational judgement) which as far as I can deduce, primary concerns necessity (since what is necessary, even if it is "necessary evil", is always justified; and justified in terms of its necessity). This is a positive definition. A negative definition is consequential, and so concerns means and ends. Thus, we devise both the deontological and consequential frameworks into moral understanding.
>this is good because it is necessary and self-causedWell, as I said a while ago, if we are basing morality in "values", our primary values concern necessity (e.g. survival). Taking this line of thought, how do you configure necessity into your understanding?
>I can say that goodness is squirrels, and that squirrels are good because they are goodness."Squirrels" are not abstract principles. Also, aren't you again being a bit hypocritical? Your perspective is "things are good because i like them". I at least recognise the impersonal dimension of morality (which I have demonstrated since the beginning, by showing how our values are not determined by selfishness, but relative selflessness).
>How do you define what is necessary and what isn't ?Necessity is what must be the case. Rape is not necessary, since all rapists have a choice not to rape. Much fiction explores the topic of necessary evil, where a hero has to violate his principles by killing the bad guy, lets say. Murder, in this case, can be justified (for a greater good), but rape has never been an ultimatum.
>>2768649>we are attributing contrary qualities in the same thing, causing a contradictionYou're still operating on a universal premise. Why can't they be qualities inherently subjective ?
>In terms of personal "values", I have already demonstrated that our primary values concern necessity, and secondary values, contingencyYou mean when you came to the same conclusion as I did using obfuscated language ?
>I define good as that which can be justified […]You're still falling into the obvious pittrap. What is justifiable is good and therefore good is what is justifiable.
More over, the problem gets worse because you now have to face the problem of which criteria you use to say that something is justifiable. I'd suggest retracting.
>Taking this line of thought, how do you configure necessity into your understanding?You're asking me what I think of your transcendental argument for why we value existence and being ? I've already said that I agreed under certain conditions.
>which I have demonstrated since the beginning, by showing how our values are not determined by selfishness, but relative selflessnessYou haven't proven that tho. Iirc you just said that selflessness is good because it comes from self-regulation which creates stability for being.
To which I replied that you're reducing being to what is necessary for life. Then, you replied that being encompassed happiness, hence making the same argument as me (we value things in relation to our personal values, themselves determined by our brain's reward system).
>Necessity is what must be the caseBut a rapist must rape to be a rapist, so it is necessary.
<but the rapist doesn't have to existThen which standard are you using to determine what must exist, given that necessity imply an objective or condition to fulfill. (i.e. the universe needs existence -> necessarily implies entropy)
>>2768663>Why can't they be qualities inherently subjective ? Its twainfold; there are objective qualities and subjective qualities. Concerning the object itself, there are things which are true about it, which relate to subjects, yet the subject does not determine a thing's objectivity henceforth. If we see taste as a quality of things themselves (e.g. bitternesss and sweetness), we judge an isolated quality, which in itself, is true of an object (e.g. x is sweet) while how we relate to sweetness does not determine secondary qualities of sweetness. Now, if we advance from this and say that sweetness is a synthetic quality of an object, which only exists where it is tasted, the taste, as phenomena, is still a fact, and so its truth is similarly independent of our judgement of it. This is especially true if we both eat the same thing, yet derive alternative preferences. So then, in preferring something, we relate to an object, but do not determine it. Thus it is appropriate to say "I prefer (x)"; not "(x) is good".
>What is justifiable is good and therefore good is what is justifiable. Yes, it is self-defining, like an axiom.
>which criteria you use to say that something is justifiable.Which we would resolve by correct and incorrect judgement.
>I've already said that I agreed under certain conditions.So if our highest values are determined by necessity, are you not saying that what is best is what is necessary?
>we value things in relation to our personal values, themselves determined by our brain's reward systemI am using a more abstract argument.
>But a rapist must rape to be a rapist, so it is necessary. Perhaps you misread my previous post, but I do not presuppose the subject of rape; the rapist, as a necessary precondition, for his object, rape, to be fulfilled. This is because rapists in themselves are unnecessary beings.
>which standard are you using to determine what must existCausation. Heat death is the effect of a primary cause.
>>2768673>Concerning the object itself, there are things which are true about it, which relate to subjects, yet the subject does not determine a thing's objectivity henceforth<if we presume morality to be objective we can say that goodness/badness are objective qualities and hence nothing tastes "bad"Don't you see the obvious flaw in your argument anon ? You're presuming the thing that is yet to be proven.
>we would resolve by correct and incorrect judgementBegging the question; what makes something justifiable ?
>are you not saying that what is best is what is necessary?You're referencing another thing than I thought, tell me clearly what you intend to express without dishonesty and I'll reply.
>This is because rapists in themselves are unnecessary beings>causation (is the criteria that I use)Yet rapists exists, so why are they not necessary ? As everything that exists must be caused, right ?
Frankly I'm getting bored of your entertainment. Stop replying or step up your baiting game, your argumentative fallacies have become quite dull (which is to be expected of someone from your intelligence tbf).
>>2768673Your moral framework can be essentially laid out as the following :
>1. The nature of a being contains what it must do>2. What it must do is necessary for that being, hence is self-caused and is self-justifying>3. Being (existence) is the highest good, as it is from this that comes what a being must do>4. Therefore all beings must value their existence>5. selflessness sustaits collective being whilst selfishness doesn't>6. therefore selflessness is the primary moral virtue.Point 1 - 4 rests on presuming essence precedes existence : a human must do XYZ because he is human.
Point 5 - 6 rests on presuming there is a collective being that humans aspire to. I'm guessing you must either be fond of platonic ideals or that you aspire towards a hivemind collectivist position.
>>2768740>You're presuming the thing that is yet to be proven.Taste as phenomenon is not subject to moral judgement, since a disputation of preference for taste cannot confer objectivity to the thing. I don't think this is controversial to say.
>what makes something justifiable ?Its degree of necessity. Something more or less necessary is more or less justified.
>tell me clearly what you intend to expressIt is written clearly; if our highest values comport to what is necessary of our being, then what is best for man is most necessary.
>Yet rapists exists, so why are they not necessary?Because rape is a voluntary act, which can be subverted.
>As everything that exists must be caused, right ?Yes, but there are necessary and unnecessary causes. Rape has an unnecessary cause, otherwise all rape would be justified.
>>2768748>a human must do XYZ because he is human.Yes; we must eat and drink to survive.
>presuming there is a collective being that humans aspire toNo, human beings are both collective and individual in actuality. Our individuality is a result of our collectivity and vice versa.
>you aspire towards a hivemind collectivist position.Not at all; I think that a collective welfare can be facilitated by a counterposed individualism, since both depend upon each other, as previously established. In formal terms, a whole is the sum of its parts and parts create wholes. Further, morality certainly requires reason and choice, so esteeming to virtue by dispossessing people of agency means the impossibility of morality. We might otherwise say that it is evil which gives notion to morality, like how it is the first sin which leads to the "knowledge of good and evil". So, moral failure is constitutive of moral excellence, while a lack of evil means a lack of good, which itself is virtuous. Lao Tzu is fascinating on this topic, since he sees how morality is a degeneration of an original order, and thus, ritual signifies virtue without its true operation:
<When the Tao is forgotten, there is righteousness. When righteousness is forgotten, there is morality. When morality is forgotten, there is the law. The law is the husk of faith, and trust is the beginning of chaos.So then, Lao Tzu defines righteousness as Tao (i.e. Being) yet sees morality (e.g. good and evil) as failures of righteousness, creating the designation of law, which is the mask of crime. The intellect fails to grasp the things of wisdom.
>>2768773>since a disputation of preference for taste cannot confer objectivity to the thing<morality is objective<therefore good and bad are objective<good and bad therefore cannot be subjectiveWhy is it that it's always impossible to have the minimum level of intellectual honesty when debating with retards online ? It's like you guys are incapable of having the bare minimum.
>if […] then […]The if premise is not granted and has been the topic of conversation for over 100 posts topkek, surely you wouldn't be trying to smuggle it in, right anon ?
Try writing it in basic english, I want to see how obvious it becomes once you dumb it down a notch.
>Because rape is a voluntary act, which can be subverted.>Its degree of necessity. Something more or less necessary is more or less justified>Yes, but there are necessary and unnecessary causes. Rape has an unnecessary causeNecessary for what ? For the universe to survive ? For the human race to endure ?
>Yes; we must eat and drink to survive.You can't both imply free will ("Because rape is a voluntary act"), and defend that essence precedes existence. Either humans have necessary "oughts" as a result of their fixed biology, either they choose what to value.
I adopt the biological position, but think that our personal experience makes it irreductible to the individual, with anything else being extension of said-individuality.
>Our individuality is a result of our collectivity and vice versa>le socialization is important to humans o algo!!So you're fine with rape as long as it is inconsequential ? If I rape someone with a death sentence, that's also fine then right ?
>>2768817>intellectual honesty What is intellectually dishonest, exactly?
>The if premise is not grantedWhy not?
>Necessary for what ?Necessary in itself; rape is not self-determined.
>You can't both imply free will […] and defend that essence precedes existenceI dont imply "free will", i imply the rational capacity for agency.
>Either humans have necessary "oughts" as a result of their fixed biology, either they choose what to value.Its both; we are determined by our natural necessity as organisms, but also through our rational faculties. At once, what is most rational is most suitable to our being, and so we come to value our own nature. We doubly have a collective and individual nature.
>I adopt the biological positionDoes this mean that one can make incorrect judgements upon what is best for them, creating a conflict between preference and value? For example, between a patient and a doctor, a doctor has authority over them since he "knows better", like a parent over a child? If values comport to biology, are values correctly judged upon objectivity?
>irreductible to the individualIndividuals have subjective preference, but one's "values" are objectively determined in their biology (i.e. species), no?
>So you're fine with rape as long as it is inconsequential?No, since as I have previously written, rape is wrong in-itself, which means that it is positively unjustifiable, because it is absolutely unnecessary. There is no case where rape has relative necessity.
>>2768831>Why not?Because you're trying to derive ALL valuation from relation to being. You're making a transcendental claim for the valuation of life, which is honestly debatable, and then you use it to extend the meaning of being into necessitating socialization, health etc.
It's the same as the randian argument; you're going to claim next that given that socialization is necessary for being, rape is bad because it goes against that ?
>Necessary in itself; rape is not self-determinedNothing is "necessary", everything is necessary for "something". We value the necessary things for that something because we value that "something". A rapist which values unconsented sex will find rape to be necessary, and will come to value that.
<le heckin beingrinoIf a man were to value rape more than his being, what would you respond ? Besides, you're arbitrarily reducing everything to being
>we are determined by our natural necessity as organisms, but also through our rational faculties. >I dont imply "free will", i imply the rational capacity for agency.There's no human "nature". Human biology makes us strive towards our happiness, which we can determine rationally (my position), but there's no "essence" or "nature" of sorts. Not only would this imply a denial of agency, it would also imply a universal valuation which is not to be found.
>If values comport to biology, are values correctly judged upon objectivity?>Individuals have subjective preference, but one's "values" are objectively determined in their biologyHumans aren't biologically wired to have a universal situation in which they are to value. You've cited "being" multiple times but even then suicidal men don't value their "being". That's why there's no objectivity, because there's no necessity.
>because it is absolutely unnecessary>There is no case where rape has relative necessity.But it doesn't "negate" my being given that it is inconsequential. So it's morally neutral then ?
>>2768663Why do you insist on denying an shared external objective reality? Kind of sounds like you are inventing cope for being wrong.
>>2769010I'm not, what makes you say that ?
>>2769126>I'm notpeople can read what you post you know
>>2768663>You're still operating on a universal premise. >>2768984>the valuation of lifeLife is self-valuing. Even death serves the ends of life.
>If a man were to value rape more than his being, what would you respond ? I would say that he is morbidly irrational, and thus his valuation (e.g. moral judgement) is incorrect, namely for the sake that it cannot be justified. Not all judgements are valid.
>There's no human "nature".>Human biology makes us strive towards our happiness>but there's no "essence" or "nature"You do realise that you are arguing against yourself, right? But lets press the matter; you are making a universal claim that "human biology makes us strive towards our happiness" - so how do you know that?
>suicidal men don't value their "being"Yes, because they are irrational.
>there's no necessityHuman being has its necessary conditions, which you have already referred to as "biology".
>it's morally neutral then ?Is rape morally neutral? No, of course not. Are you unwell?
>>2769162Are you one of those people that believe morality is something which floats in the air like the wind ?
>>2769172>Life is self-valuing>Yes, because they [suicidal men] are irrationalThey're not irrational, they value death more than their own life. The process of valuation is simply not determined by "being" only.
<nooooo i cant cope they must be irrational aaaaGenerally, once you start bending reality to fit within your system, you can more or less be sure of your own failure.
>namely for the sake that it cannot be justifiedIt can be justified : he values rape more than his life. If every human values their being because of their nature, one could be an anomaly and value rape more than his being. How hard is that to comprehend for you ?
>so how do you know that?Brain's reward system. This, with our cognitive capabilities, makes us infer on situations, which creates good/bad categories.
Given that the brain's reward system and that our inferences are always going to be based on our individual experience, they're irreductible to the individual. It's shrimple as that !
>Human being has its necessary conditionsIf you value your own life that is. But, not only do most people value much greater things than their own life, many people would also prefer dying than to live. This is because valuation is not intrinsically tied to being, but is rather tied to [enormous shocker] personal values/satisfaction.
>Is rape morally neutral? No, of course not. Are you unwell?Answer the question using your own arguments lmfao. An unconsequential rape would not harm the collective being, so would it be neutral then ?
There is human nature but its universial nature. All species seek to expand and dominate
>>2769680Nature is both universal and particular.
>>2769675>They're not irrational, they value death more than their own life.… Which is irrational. If "reward" is a biological concept, death acquires no reward. It is like burning your life savings because you are in a manic state; it is the intoxication of short-term thinking.
>It can be justified : he values rape more than his life.This is not a "justified" valuation, since it has no defense.
>Brain's reward systemWhich is a self-defined universal?
>If you value your own life that isNo, lets take it back; if our brain's "reward system" is a universal operating system which economises activity, this is an essential aspect of human nature, and life in general, no?
>most people value much greater things than their own life>many people would also prefer dying than to liveNo they don't, otherwise they would immediately kill themselves.
>valuation is not intrinsically tied to beingIf it is tied to our neurology, then this is an aspect of our human being.
>An unconsequential rapeThere's no such thing, since a rapist requires someone who is raped.
>>2769803>If "reward" is a biological concept, death acquires no rewardIt does. We value being for the satisfaction it provides us. Suicidal people feel that the pain of living cannot at point transform into satisfaction.
>This is not a "justified" valuation, since it has no defenseEither beings by nature have fixed values that they cannot change, meaning that an anomaly could value rape.
Either you're just reducing values to what is physically necessary to survive, which begs the question as to why the reduction (and the obvious contradiction that we value much more than what is simply necessary for our physical maintaining)
>a self-defined universal?All humans have a reward system; but the value produced by this reward system is not universal. How hard is it to comprehend the input-valuation-output process lol?
>which economises activityWhy do you keep trying to transfigure my words ? The brain's reward system is simply the biological process by which we constantly seek satisfaction. This does not imply that we must value life, because sometimes life cannot bring more satisfaction than pain.
>No they don't, otherwise they would immediately kill themselves.<More than 720 000 people die due to suicide every year<What is a mother dying for her children<What are "ambitions"You are so spineless lmfao. Let me guess, it's "irrational" to want anything more than the bare minimum to survive ?
>If it is tied to our neurologyI find it hilarious that you're genuinely unable to understand particularity topkek. What we value is always going to be subjective (given the subjectiveness of experience), and is always going to be judged in relation to experience (which is subjective). There's no "universal" case for what humans value, as it's always going to be irreductible to personal experience.
In other words, what brings us satisfaction is always going to be tied to our subjective experience.
>There's no such thing, since a rapist requires someone who is rapedYour argument is that our being presupposes us with certain values, and that the "collective" is valued. Hence, rape is wrong because it hurts the collective which hurts our being.
However, not all rapes must hurt the collectives. So why is it necessarilly bad ?
>>2753095seems pretty metaphysical, and if thats what you're into cool. i don't see how you'd reconcile it with engels' tho much less make his position look "superficial". if anything i felt vice versa
>>2769675>Are you one of those people that believeno? are you retarded? (yes)
>>2770322retard what do you even think I'm arguing ?
>>2770379you seem to be arguing in favor of a subjective reality. similar to fascists who believe the world is defined by ideas and willpower instead of material reality
>>2770294>Suicidal people feel that the pain of living cannot at point transform into satisfaction.And they are incorrect.
>fixed values that they cannot changeAs we have previously established, reason causes a necessary change in our values.
>All humans have a reward system; but the value produced by this reward system is not universal.Right, so this reward system is axiomatic of human being.
>This does not imply that we must value lifeAll satisfaction occurs in life, so if we value satisfaction, we primarily value life. The economic aspect is in regard to yielding future reward by present investment; the reason people may tolerate suffering in the short-term is because of prospective satisfaction in the long-term.
>What is a mother dying for her childrenSomeone valuing the life of another, and so death serves the ends of life. In this case, life itself is the highest value.
>it's "irrational" to want anything more than the bare minimum to survive>moreWhat is more? You give the example of selflessness, so are you saying that it is a greater value to have consideration for others rather than oneself?
>What we value is always going to be subjective >There's no "universal" case for what humans valueDoes our subjectivity depend upon objective conditions?
>rape is wrong because it hurts the collective which hurts our being. No, I don't invoke utility into my argument, since suffering can be virtuous, if it has a virtuous end. The reason why rape is wrong is because it is absolutely unnecessary. It has no justification.
>>2770391Genuinely point me to one sentence where I say this mongoloid
>>2770440>and they are incorrectIt's generally a sign of low autism score to not be able to concieve hypothetical scenarios. How would you feel if you didn't have breakfast this morning anon ?
>reason causes a necessary change in our valuesNo, reason would only allow to discover values according to you.
So I ask you, are they predetermined and waiting to be discovered, or are they simply extreme risk-aversion (you reduce your values to what is only necessary for you to survive) ?
>the reason people may tolerate suffering in the short-term is because of prospective satisfaction in the long-term<satisfaction<we value life because of satisfactionCan't believe you would concede this way but thanks for your concession. Now, all we need to do is to determine what brings about satisfaction (hint :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reward_system)
>In this case, life itself is the highest valueIt's not my life dumbass. Thanks for the other concession : I can value things higher than MY being.
>what is more ? Objectively speaking more than what is strictly the minimum to survive physically.
>are you saying that it is a greater value to have consideration for others rather than oneself?>Does our subjectivity depend upon objective conditions?I pointed out we are not reducible to our valuation of our mere existence. We strive for more, as we do not wish merely to survive but to thrive. Yet, this "thriving", so to speak, is not determined by our collective species but rather gets determined by the singularity of our experience. Moral judgements are not determined purely on an objective basis for what is good for humanity, but rather in relation to what we think we "ought" to do. Furthermore, this "ought" is not based upon our objective biology, but is the product of personal valuation done in regards to one's own life and ambitions. You mistake the appearance of universality of our moral judgements, for the actual content of these judgements. You have simply not realized that what can be good for me can be bad for you, and so without possible reconciliation.
>because it is absolutely unnecessaryBut nothing is "necessary" except for the self. You've said so yourself. As such, someone who wants to rape to become a rapist will necessarilly have to rape.
You've said that he does not need to be rapist as it is unnecessary, but on which grounds then do you bring about necessity ?
If you reduce it merely to survival, then what about the possible anomaly I have presented to you ?
>>2770440I think you'd understand my position better if you read about Hume's Sentimentalism.
>we judge things in relation to whether or not we approve of them>we approve of them based on personal interest and preferences, on what we feel preferable>but we also have strong feelings about empathy, making our values often coincide.This tracks mostly with my position (albeit with a few differences)
>>2770792Yes I’m saying this as in taste is subjective.
>>2770828Did you even follow the conversation ?
>>2770530>breakfastI didn't have breakfast this morning.
>reason would only allow to discover values according to you. Right.
>are they predetermined and waiting to be discovered, or are they simply extreme risk-aversionI don't see why its an either/or. In any case, I would refer to my earlier comments which regards the economy of activity, as an estimation between risk and reward. The irrational person chooses short-term reward for long-term risk (e.g. debt) while the rational person must have long-term thinking to apply causation to consequence. Thus, the drunk person is irrational, and so are "impulsive" or uninhibited (not regulated by reason). Risk aversion then has its temporal dimension, but is ultimately scaled by a counterbalanced reward (the primary reward being a continuation of being). We can say that as we develop reason, we come into knowledge of consequence (not merely by induction, but deduction), thus a child may incur risk by irrationality, and so a rational guardian must mediate their activity. A guardian which puts children at risk is "unfit" and so the child is put under the guardianship of another. So, risk can be justified, not by its means, but its ends, if its ends are greater than its means, like how suffering can be justified if its ends are good.
>we value life because of satisfactionNo, life is valued for its own sake, primarily. Satisfaction is just a rationalisation of the contents of life, but as we know, life is mostly suffering. The continuation of being is self-determined, hence, it is its own cause.
>can value things higher than MY being.The life of another is part of our being. This is why its important to understand the universal and particular.
>We strive for more, as we do not wish merely to survive but to thrive.And thriving is added to our original being, not subtracted from it; this is what you seem to miss - valuing things other than survival does not mean we then lack a valuation of survival, by adding to our life.
>not determined by our collective speciesYes it is; since individuals can only relate to others.
>this "ought" is not based upon our objective biologySo when I am hungry, this is not a phenomenon corresponding to objective conditions of satiation? I myself suddenly "decided" to desire food?
>what can be good for me can be bad for youOnly as regards what is unnecessary to our being. You are properly speaking of something additional to mere survival, but this means that what is more is still "secondary" to what is "primary" in our being. What is primary in survival is necessary, while what is additional is unnecessary.
>But nothing is "necessary" except for the self.Once the self exists, it must establish means to relate to other selves, which crafts law and custom, which if it is to sustain each person, requires non-violent contraction. This is why all social beings must persist by relative selflessness, since in the case of universal selfishness, the social body would collapse. So, the bonds of society are mediated by an agreement not to harm insiders, at the relative expense of outsiders. The facilitation of outsiders comes by the trade of goods and marriage, which integrate families as communities. So, if we regard the Self and its necessary conditions, would you not see society as its basis?
>anomalyA threat to society becomes a criminal and so is either enslaved (e.g. imprisoned), executed or exiled. A rapist thus faces either of these three charges, where it regards public consideration. Either the cause of rape is in neurological predetermination or irrational thinking. As a fan of civilisation, I choose the second explanation.
>>2770547Hume proposed the notion of "sympathy" as a social habit of recognising shared feelings we have toward things, and to each other. As a purely empirical exercise, it still lacks its essential element, which is in why we ought to feel a certain way about facts of the matter. A person can be recognised to feel sad, but why ought we care about sadness at all? Hume of course distinguishes between "is" and "ought" claims on this very basis, and so valuation appears socially encoded (e.g. you are taught to feel a certain way), yet reason allows us to be skeptical about these teachings. So, feeling and preference to Hume must have a habitual cause, based in society (the same way Aristotle called virtue a habit, or how Plato saw that it is necessary to teach children how to be civilised, formulating a social contract for the clause of popular morality). If we are to question our cultural values however, then what are we left with except pure reason to guide us to virtue? Of course, Socrates upset the social values of his day, yet still maintained his correctness (as regards questioning authority - Socrates in Apologia makes no positive claims for himself). Thus, if one has no necessity to conform to the values of his society, yet his values are formed from his society, then what is the cause of his potential rebellion? An interesting example is the Reformation, which resisted the Catholic Church, not in the terms of pure reason, but by appeal to scripture, and thus, by appeal to the written values of the day, which are in conflict with the spirit. We see this in the gospel, where Christ battles against the "letter of the law" by the "spirit of the law", claiming that he has not come to change anything, but only to reinterpret what is written. Indeed, Paul also "discovers" Christ in the old testament, and so what is new is the offspring of the old. This finally relates to Hegel's master-servant dialectic, where the master is subverted by his self-relatedness, like the parent who tells their children "Do as I say, not as I do", signifying the primary contradiction in the subject and object of authority; if we are to follow the words of the parent, but not their actions, the parent has already been debased by the standard of a moral law, and thus the child is enlightened by the failure of the parent to be the source of their own power (e.g. the father is castrated).
What this expresses is that many of our values are based in what is original of our social conception, and thus, to believe in everything we are told is to appear as disloyal to what is corrupted by habituation. This is most historically expressed in religion. If you spoke the words of Christ under an adversarial guise, you would appear as the devil to Christians, showing distinction between essence and appearance. Similarly, if you spoke the words of Satan by a christian glow, you will be followed by the sinful (e.g. Trump). Christ and anti-christ then appear as a reversal of appearance and essence, which is expressed by the letter and spirit of the law. So then, is reason simply the spirit of the law, or is it a law unto itself? For example, can my values be so distant from what I grew up to believe - could you teach an ancient to have modern values? I personally believe that reason is pure, and can deduce virtue by its own means, rather than relying upon conventions of induction. Thus, what is right and wrong, is right and wrong for all history. The real is rational, but only in potential, not actuality, as Hegel wrote. I am fond of the scene in Children of Men where all war stops at the sign of a child in distress; here, peace becomes actual of its potential, and thus, war is always unnecessary, such as we saw with the Christmas Truce of 1914, one of the greatest moments in History.
>>2771090>I don't see why its an either/orIt appears you have chosen the former
>No, life is valued for its own sakeThat's not biologically true though. If you understand that valuation is the basis of morality, then you have to concede on this point, because we do not "biologically" and inherently value our life for its sake (in all situations we find an ought to value to our life), but rather for what it represents (the possibility to thrive, to achieve our dreams, to keep on living etc.).
>The life of another is part of our beingIf you've conceded that morality comes from valuation, this implies some form of shared consciousness and experience of the world. You're literally saying we are a collective hivemind.
>And thriving is added to our original being, not subtracted from it; this is what you seem to missAlready called you out for stretching "being" to "everything we do" in
>>2763743.
I've already told you, if your moral argument is just "what is necessary for what we value is good" then there's nothing complicated about it : you're just wrong on the conclusion you bring about it.
>since individuals can only relate to othersno ?
>Once the self exists […]A modal fallacy and a naturalistic fallacy in one paragraph to make a quality error between norms and morals, Zoo Wee MAMA ! Jesus, you're really outdoing yourself here anon…
>As a fan of civilisation, I choose the second explanationWell I'm a fan of poptarts personally but this does not answer the question. Would rape be good for that person ?
<inb4 it wouldn't for societyI'm asking you for that person
<b-but he would be killedWithout making a modal fallacy.
>Hume proposed the notion of "sympathy"Hume is descriptive, not prescriptive
>le reason o algoFrankly why are you even effortposting if you're just going to presume the assertion (that morality is objective) that needs to be proven for the conversation to advance ?
Honestly can you just reduce and simplify what you say ? I'm tired of having to decipher some piss-poor arguments to in the end have the most sloppyesque meta-ethic takes
>>2771440>life is not an end in itself (i.e. self-determined) but is a means to an endI simply disagree. Life is its own cause. The primary ends of life are (i) survival and (ii) reproduction. Now, Schopenhauer writes that if men operated by pure reason alone, there could be no such thing as reproduction, since life is suffering. Schopenhauer goes further to defend the rationality of suicide, which causes us to ask, why didn't Schopenhauer kill himself? Thomas Ligotti also promoted a two-child policy to regulate mankind out of existence, but why not a one-child policy? Why not a no-child policy? All these schemes and hypocrisies defy the position of consistency.
There is a theory of evolution for homosexuality, that the "gay uncle" mutates as an adaptation to extended families, to assume the place of a caregiver; we see this mentality from many, that they decline to personally reproduce, yet invest in the reproduction of others. Foster and Step-parents fulfill a similar role, of raising the child of another as one's own (we see Agamemnon plead to Achilles for him to become his adopted son in the Iliad, 800 BCE). Kinship then, is not directly familial, since even Odysseus and Zeus had beloved pet dogs. Christ also universalised family to extend to humanity in general (e.g. brothers, sisters, mothers). So then, the disinclination to universalise extinction (e.g. Holocaust) by pessimists, especially in their own being, show a primary value of life which cannot be erased. Even in the "Denial of Death", there is convincing argumentation that the suicidal person still has a prospective gaze, hence why they punctuate the ritual of suicide with a note, or implicit intention. It is a calling from the grave which strives for immortality in some way, like the martyr. If suicide was really the "end", why would anyone write a note? Why would an explanation be necessary? This theorisation of one's death is not the silence of oblivion. So, all pessimists, nihilists, misanthropes and suicidals inherently value life. It is a necessary cause of being.
>shared consciousness and experience of the world. We have a shared being, which is real and tangible; we also share experience, in the abstract, hence why I can relate to a foreigner who speaks a different language - or an animal, simply by their behaviour. As animals, we learn to observe the behaviour of other creatures, and can have kinship with others. I've seen cats save babies from danger and birds save hedgehogs from cars, so empathy is potential between all living things.
>You're literally saying we are a collective hivemind.It depends how you define this. Biological and chemical signals are rudimentary forms of communication which transmit sensory information to be recalled in systems of intuition and experience. The eye was first formed by light impressing upon areas sensitive to photons. Some creatures "see" by heat alone while others see by light. Here, there is communication but not representation, since it is symbols which represent indirectly, and thus are able to embed more information in a smaller code, compressing knowledge into "meaning". We see this in early writing, which eventually formalises into distinct words that denote individual, rather than general terms. Mathematics is the ultimate formalisation, by assigning values to each variable, while what is written and spoken can still have informality, especially in speech. In the primary case, all life shares one "mind" as regards the content of knowledge by experience, but in terms of symbolism, representation is basic; animals can communicate with humans representationally, but is this inherently symbolic? Wittgenstein and Nagel remark that the particularity of animals makes communication with them inherently unintelligible, but I don't think this is true, since particularity is still mediated by generality. I don't expect animals to learn English, but then again, we can translate French into English, even if something is lost in translation (according to degree of particularity - indeed, some things are untranslatable). So, what is general, between life, can be symbolised, I would say.
>stretching "being" to "everything we do"Well, how else would you describe it?
>what is necessary for what we value is goodIt is reversed; we primarily value what is necessary. I am imposing objectivity upon our subjective condition.
>individuals cannot only relate to othersWhat is this supposed to mean?
>Would rape be good for that person?It would be preferred, but I cannot say it would be good. We can desire things which are bad for us.
>effortpostingI was being generous to the Humean position that values may simply be encoded into our experience, rather than by pure reason, for the sake that all revolution (t. Proudhon) is the encirclement back to the same, and thus a legal re-constitution of existing values. Jesus did not come to change the law but to "fulfill it", Luther did not come to destroy the Church, but to "reform" it. Similarly, the English Civil War was rife with legal polemics about the Magna Carta (1215), and Marx also writes in the Critique of the Gotha programme (1875) that the first phase of Communism is about turning bourgeois theory into practice, by laws of value.
>Honestly can you just reduce and simplify what you say ?I think I already speak rather simply and reductively.
>>2771588>life is valued biologicallyThis is simply untrue genetically speaking. There is no moral ought derived from birth alone that we attach to life.
>we have a shared being>we are a collective hivemindYou know it'd be a lot simpler if you just said "humans are social animals that often need society to live". Because then, I'd just be able to point out you're committing a modal fallacy.
>It is reversed; we primarily value what is necessary>how else would you describe it (being)You keep avoiding it but necessary for what ?
<for being (with our values)<what must value is our values
>but I cannot say it would be goodWhy not ? Develop your thought.
>for the sake that all revolution (t. Proudhon) is the encirclement back to the sameThis is simply untrue
The only things you need to answer is simply how can morality be objective if what we value is what we value (this is your statement after all, given that you say that we must necessarilly value our being [values]), and how can rape be bad universally without committing some argumentative/logical fallacy.
<we are genetically determinedThere's no gene that universally says "we must value xyz", including life itself.
>>2773224>simply untrue [life]If life is not self-valuing, then what is the cause of life to persist?
>This is simply untrue [politics]"Revolution" denotes ecirclement back to the same point. The circularity of political revolution (e.g. "Anacyclosis") is described by Plato in Statesman, continued into Aristotle and Polybius, by a transition of class rule (e.g. monarchy, oligarchy, democracy). Ideally, the pathos of revolution is also textual, as I examine it, and thus appeals to the past, which allows the possibility of a future. Even "Communism" is just a return to primitivity, like how the New Jerusalem is a return of Eden in a new form. Nothing new is under the sun (ecclesiastes 1:9).
>Why isn't rape good for a rapist?It is preferred of a rapist, but cannot be morally justified. Justification is both (i) absolute and/or (ii) relative to necessity, which relates to our (i) universal and (ii) particular being.
>how can morality be objective if what we value is what we valueBecause we can 'value' things incorrectly; thus, reason causes us to value things which are correct, which thus concerns our being.
>>2773552>If life is not self-valuing, then what is the cause of life to persistThe prospects of joy and satisfaction motivates us to live longer. This is why suicidal people are not irrational, they simply don't think that their life can bring them any more joy. There's of course many cultural aspects too which come into play as to how we consider it sacred but that's the gist of it.
I've already told you, once you've conceded that good and bad are determined from valuation, you'll have to face reality and accept that biologically, our life is valued by our brain through the brain's reward system. And once you've conceded that, you won't be able to demonstrate cases of genetic "oughts" being wired in at birth (and without committing modal fallacies).
>revolutionFrankly I don't care about your babble
>[rape] cannot be morally justifiedYou can't simultaneously hold that being comprises our values, and that a rapist can't morally justify it because it is not necessary.
Either the rapist values rape and so must think of rape as good.
Either you ground necessity in pure survival, making rape neutral.
>Because we can 'value' things incorrectlyConflating the process for the object; I'm not asking you how we can value things correctly, I'm asking you how you argue that our values are all the same.
>>2773607>The prospects of joy and satisfaction motivates us to live longer. >usdoes the prospect of "joy and satisfaction" motivate a worm to keep living?
>This is why suicidal people are not irrational, they simply don't think that their life can bring them any more joy. and our thoughts can be incorrect, no…? If suicide is caused by chemical reasons, these can be fixed by medicine; if it is caused by mental reasons - this can be fixed by logic. But to delve further; if suicidal people are NOT irrational, why arent you suicidal?
>our life is valued by our brain through the brain's reward systemdoes bacteria have a reward system?
>I don't care about your babbleMakes me wonder why you are on this political forum, then.
>Either you ground necessity in pure survival, making rape neutral.how is rape "neutral" to the object of survival?
>how our values are all the same.Because we are all human beings.
>>2773615>does bacteria have a reward system?>what motivates a worm to keep living?Most animals with a complex nervous systems and cognitive abilities have a reward system which pushes them to live.
>[suicide] can be fixed with medicineYou should come forward if you have the magic drug to solve everyone's problem
>if suicidal people are NOT irrational, why arent you suicidalBecause we're not a collective hivemind ?
>how is rape "neutral" to the object of survival?Inconsequential rape would be, in your own logic, inconsequential to whatever necessity. Therefore, it is neutral.
<but rape cannot be inconsequentialMost victims would disagree that their rapist got any consequences
>Because we are all human beings>we all value our values therefore we all value "value"Don't you think this is a bit dishonest anon ?
>Makes me wonder why you are on this political forumDude your takes are genuinely the most retarded I've seen in a while. You don't even make a proper defense of naturalist ethics. Why would I think that you're even able to have a hint of intellectual fervor and honesty, and that you're not just a complete pseud larping as "LE ARISTOTLEAN ARGUMENT BASED!!!"
>>2773732>complex nervous systemsSo bacteria has no reward system yet still persists in its life?
>You should come forward if you have the magic drug to solve everyone's problemIf suicidal ideation is caused by chemical reasons, it can be treated chemically.
>Because we're not a collective hivemind ?Youre not quite understanding… If someone is being rational, we would see that they are thinking correctly; so, if suicidal people are not irrational (ergo, rational) then they are thinking correctly. If they are thinking correctly, why dont you think like them?
>Most victims would disagree that their rapist got any consequencesthe consequence of rape is the victim.
>Don't you think this is a bit dishonest anon ?To say that we are all human beings and thus share common ends? no, it is startlingly common sense understood by most people.
>spergs out at question of why he is hereI would like an answer though; if you dont care about politics and simply exist to perpetuate absurd irrationality, are you not just wasting everybody's time?
>>2773741>So bacteria has no reward system yet still persists in its life?bacterias and humans are qualitatively different
>it can be treated chemicallyYes, which means ?
>If they are thinking correctly, why dont you think like them?I know and will repeat myself; because we are not a collective hivemind.
>the consequence of rape is the victimSo no consequence on being, hence neutral ? Kinda gross anon…
>To say that we are all human beings and thus share common ends? <common endsDo you not see the issue ? This is what you need to prove ffs
>I would like an answerSealioning
>>2773768>bacterias and humans are qualitatively differentAnd qualitatively identical, as forms of life.
But please tell me, what is the cause of bacteria to persist?
>YesOkay, so you agree that the suicidal person who "feels" and "thinks" that life can provide no more satisfaction is incorrect.
>because we are not a collective hivemind.So, if person (x) and (y) disagree about (z), can both be correct, despite their contradictory judgement upon it? If so, you are blatantly illogical.
>Being a victim has no consequence on beingWhy do you say this?
>This is what you need to prove Do you disagree with this logic? (i) we are all human beings; (ii) all human beings require certain conditions to survive. If not, then we share common ends as common beings.
>sealioningaka "pretending to be retarded" to cover your ass.
what does this have to do with dialectics?
anything to get people not to talk about it huh?
>>2773847>And qualitatively identical, as forms of life.<humans value things because of the reward system<but what about non-complex organismswhataboutism; argument discarded
>that life can provide no more satisfaction is incorrect.conceivable =/= possible irl
>Why do you say this?I'm not asking why is being a victim bad, I'm asking why an unconsequential rape with no negative effect to the rapist's being would be bad.
>If not, then we share common ends as common beingsThat's not a common end, that's a common condition
>aka "pretending to be retarded" to cover your ass.lmfao I gave you a reason, do you want me to dumb it down for you even more ? Why are you so disingenuous ?
aah I love that your retardation is being exposed
<from which grounds can you say that rape is bad>because rape is not selfless<why is selflessness good>because it goes beyond being<why is being good>because we MUST value being<this is biologically not true for humans>NOO BUT BY BEING I ACKSHUALLY ALSO MEAN WHAT WE VALUE <so then it's not objective>but erm we need common things like food so erm it must be common too right ?This entire argument has been you making a complete buffoon of yourself. Your language has progressively gotten dumber too as you start to seethe at your incapacity to respond coherently.
>>2773848Nothing, the guy I'm replying to (smithanon) derailed the thread to make retarded arguments to start pointless debates. I like debating, and it's obvious that he's retarded and doesn't know much about philosophy in general, so I find it amusing to make fun of him.
There are some good replies in the beginning of the thread tho
>>2773906>argument discardedAre both a bacterium and human being living things?
>an unconsequential rapeA rape implies the raped; a victim, which is a consequence.
>That's not a common end, that's a common conditionand conditions are precepts toward necessary ends, correct?
>>2773914>derailed the thread to make retarded arguments to start pointless debatesah still a modicum of good faith in you. he did it because he thinks dialectics is black magic that pulls people away from christ.
>>2773914>doesn't know much about philosophy in generalare you the person who claims that all knowledge is aposteriori?
>>2773906
>disingenuousYou failed to answer this logical question I asked earlier:
- If person (x) and (y) have contradictory judgement upon (z), can both of them be right? e.g. can (z) = (a) and (b) at once? No - so, if a suicidal person makes a claim about life, and they are deemed correct (i.e. "rational") in their judgement, then either we must become suicidal ourselves, or be incorrect. If we are not incorrect however, the suicidal person must be. So then, if you are currently not suicidal, you are implying that the suicidal person has made an incorrect judgement.
So, can (z) = (a) and (b) at the same time?
This is what concerned our earlier discussion regarding values versus preferences. To have preference is a fact of desire, which comports to a fact of experience, which may thus esteem alternative results without contradiction, unless one makes a universal claim upon something particular (e.g. bitterness is bad). Thus, preference is singular and thus cannot be subject to moral judgement - even the desire to rape cannot be scrutinised, since it is merely a fact, yet the act of rape itself can have moral judgement. Thus, reason regulates desire, but desire in itself is merely factual. So, a fact of a person's experience cannot be disputed (e.g. x prefers y), and this is what allows for non-contradiction.
>>2773925>Are both a bacterium and human being living things?Anon this is irrelevant because we're talking about beings with the capacity of valuation.
>A rape implies the raped; a victim, which is a consequence.Not to the rapist no, so again, what it makes it bad for the rapist ?
>and conditions are precepts toward necessary ends, correct?You're still presupposing that we value those ends when the question is precisely why we must all value these ends.
>>2773963>can both of them be rightYes, they can. You're presuming objectivity and truth-apt, which is the subject of the conversation dumbass.
>>2773985>beings with the capacity of valuationI have proposed that life is self-valuing, since it is self-determined of its own being. So we disagree as to the nature of values, which you presuppose as neurological economisation, while I see it as primarily unconditional of being itself.
>Not to the rapist noSo if I kill you but am not aware of it, you dont actually die?
>You're still presupposing that we value those endsOkay, so we do indeed have common ends, correct?
>Yes, they canOkay, so this is very important because you are choosing to be formally illogical, so can you please answer these questions?
(i) if person (x) says that 1+1=2 and person (y) says 1+1=3, are they both correct, or is only one person correct?
(ii) if person (x) says that 1+1=3 and person (y) says that 1+1=4, are they both correct or are they both incorrect?
>>2774029>So we disagree as to the nature of values>if I actually say that values are unprovable metaphysical things then I can escape thisThis is all so tiring
>So if I kill you but am not aware of it, you dont actually die?>a rape has to be consequential for my own survivalAnon can you answer the question without making a modal fallacy ?
>we do indeed have common ends, correct?Sure
>mathWhy would math not be truth-apt ?
>>2774052>UnprovenLife is self-determined; it is unconditional; it is self-caused.
Thus, life is an end in itself, not a means to an end.
What about this do you disagree with?
>answer the questionYou said that rape is inconsequential, to rapists - so i am proving that it doesnt matter what people think is true, if theyre incorrect.
>SureOkay, so if we have common ends, then we have common values.
>Why would math not be truth-apt ?You seem hesitant to answer my question, so I will simplify it for you - between two propositions of the same thing, can each of them be incorrect?
>>2774108>What about this do you disagree with?Bad/Good comes from valuation. By denying valuation as a real thing and by pretending you were just arguing from some form of metaphysical valuation, you're simply retreating behind a meaningless term that you've self-defined and refuse to elaborate on.
>so i am proving that it doesnt matter what people think is true, if theyre incorrect.So you can't without committing modal fallacy. Concession accepted.
>if we have common ends, then we have common values.<still hasn't said (after 15 posts) why we must necessarily value said-endsIt's amazing that you can run in circles like this.
>two propositions of the same thing, can each of them be incorrect<still presupposing moral claims to be equivalent to mathematical claimslol
Frankly if you can't :
>say why rape is bad without committing a moral fallacy>say why morality is necessarily truth-apt>explain why beings must value their own lives without ressorting to some vague and unjustified definition of valuationThen I think you should just concede at this point.
>>2774108The broader problem is that your argument is circular :
>we value life because we definitionally must>therefore we must value the ends towards life>hence we have common goalsBeyond the obvious problem of the conclusion, you have a circular reasoning on value which you can't prove biologically for humans.
The conclusion is also not genetically derived from the premise : my valuation of my life does not imply the valuation of your life beyond what is necessary for mine to endure, hence I do not need to value your life if it is inconsequential to me. You simply keep on repeating modal fallacies to breach the gap but haven't managed to point towards a necessary aspect of it (i.e. life has a strict condition to survive others).
>>2774124>Bad/Good comes from valuation.And valuation begins in being itself, not neurology. Hence, life values itself; but if it does not, in the case of brainless beings, then what causes this life to persist?
>Concession accepted.Concession to what? That rape can be good? I am not sick in the head.
>why we must necessarily value said-endsDo you know what an end is? If an end is not necessary, it is not an end, thus, all ends are a necessary aspect of things.
>lolSo you literally cant answer the question? Can two people both be wrong about the thing they are discussing? You can do it.
>Rape can be good; suicide can be rationalThis is your mental illness, anon. But you have already said that contradictions are valid, so you are not playing with a full deck. This is beyond the consideration of your notion that all knowledge is a posteriori.
>>2774137>my valuation of my life does not imply the valuation of your life beyond what is necessary for mine to endureRight, i already explained this; that murder can be justified so long as it serves a greater good.
>I do not need to value your life if it is inconsequential to meRight; but you ignoring (x) and you raping (x) are entirely different things, wouldnt you say?
>life has a strict condition to survive othersWe must kill to eat, but we will die one day. Its called the circle of life, Simba. Thus, all death serves the ends of life. I have also explained the particularity and universality of kin, previously.
>Any individual has multiple possibilities to realize his "teleological acts" (conscious acts aimed at satisfaction of desires/needs/sustenance etc). Alienation occurs when he is constrained by an external cause to choose a possibility unsatisfactory compared to others
Wouldn't that be the case for temporarily embarrassed billionares who are pissed at rich ballers like me for being a socialist with hella bread? It kinda seems like it ignores the complex web of conditions that distorted them into thinking that it were the case?
>>2774184>And valuation begins in being itself, not neurology>in the case of brainless beings, then what causes this life to persist?Valuation is a cognitive trait, did you not know its definition? Either way, you shouldn't employ words you don't know the meaning of anon, it'll confuse you ! As for their bacterias, it is solely due to evolutionnary pressure molding them into the way they are.
>If an end is not necessary, it is not an endAnon it's a pretty straightforward question : why is my necessary end for my values common ? I'll add onto it : why aren't you able to answer, is it because you're cognitively weak?
>Can two people both be wrong about the thing they are discussing?Depends whether they're discussing a proposition. You do know what that is, right ? (Can you type it in your reply, I want to make sure just in case)
>This is your mental illness, anonAnon you've conceded that rape is morally neutral. This is very disgusting and only a freak of nature would say so, I'm just glad I'm not stuck defending abhorrent positions like this.
>I have also explained the particularity and universality of kin, previously.Please beg my pardon, I simply cannot find a previous attempt that does not imply a modal fallacy. Surely if you can do so you won't have to rely on such cheap tricks, right anon ?
>>2774267>it is solely due to evolutionnary pressure But you claim this about human values as well:
>>2762621<[Values] are biological facts, which we "feel" and which our body naturally produces due to evolutionarry pressure>why is my necessary end for my values common ?You already admitted that we have "common ends". "Your" ends are the same as mine by what is common to each; this does not make us individually equal, but collectively equal - You seem to lack the notion that parts require wholes and vice versa.
>Dependsdepends upon what? I say that it depends upon what is real, and thus objectively true (e.g. arithmetic). Your hesitancy to answer this question and your validation of contradiction thus leads me to believe that "morality" is unreal, and so is not subject to correct or incorrect judgement, so can you please clarify this point?
>>2774267>>2774794Anyway, I am thoroughly exhausted with this dialectical exercise, so I will recount mine and your own testimony so as to bring it into wholeness and resolution. I begin here:
>>2753304>>2753547I counterpose contingency with necessity in regards to the ends of man (e.g. telos), using the classical device of "fate" as a means to signify our essence; that our self-determination is objective, but subjectively expressed. After this I write:
>>2753607>>2754419That politics is inherently normative, and thus ethically derived. Desire has no part in it, since we can decline to fulfill our desires by reason. After this:
>>2754627>>2757074>>2757186I demonstrate that humans are inherently selfless, and thus inherently moral, by an elementary reason; e.g. I present the fact that we must always have relative care for others, and thus we are willing to suffer for them. If we were purely selfish, we would want others to suffer. After this, I talk to an irrationalist:
>>2757221>>2757278>>2757286Showing that a value-statement upon an act (e.g. rape) must be justified by appeal to rational argumentation; they state directly, "my identification of rape with wrong is not and cannot be founded on any logical derivation", demonstrating their incoherence - they say things without justifying why they say it. They conclude: "i never said it is improper to assert without proof", simultaneously invalidating all assertions they make thereafter. This character shows up later, but stops replying after I ask them to demonstrate the truth of their statements by their own epistemological standard.
In the midst of this, I speak to you:
>>2754669Where you eventually give up your Marxist illusions of a "non-contradictory" state of society:
>>2758694But in your original post, you state:
<Morality is inherently subjective and you won’t derive universal claims about it.Which appears to still be consistent. I follow up on this by asking "So if i say rape is wrong, you disagree?" Which is still in contention as we currently speak. This is partially advanced here:
>>2758448Where you equate preference and morality, which is the real source of the disagreement. I respond:
>>2758464Saying that what is morally wrong and preferable are different things, since if I judge morality by my preference, I can make a false judgement (like the racist, who judges his preference as moral), while if I estimate preference by morality, I am not prejudicial. You write:
>>2758490<I can find rape something to which I disagree with, hence making it wrong. Your statement is the equivalent of saying that I can't find brocoli to taste bad because I can only disagree with you that it tastes good.Which is still currently stressed. You utterly misuse moral language in the place of preferential language. All this could have been over if you just said that "morality is an illusion caused by personal preference", which is a formally valid statement. I emphasise the point here:
>>2758576<I am asking if rape is wrong, not if you feel wrong about rape.Thus, how we feel about something has no bearing on its objectivity; by asking you about the possibility of mutual incorrectness I show the same point; that if we regard morality to be some-thing, its thingness can either be correctly or incorrectly understood. But, if we suppose morality to be no-thing, there is no issue, since we are discussing something unreal. If you simply said this, we could have ended this conversation. Here is where you double-down by valuation, however:
>>2758694<Judgements are relational to preferences. I dislike salty things (preference), therefore a salty brocoli tastes bad (judgement)But as I have proven, taste is factual, so cannot be false, while a judgement upon something being "bad" asserts falseness, causing a contradiction. You seem oblivious to this logical error. I further the conversation here:
>>2760054>>2761144<If [values] are subject to change by reason, then they are an attribute of abstract truth, and thus wrongness, as you put it, must be a false judgement in relation to true values […] the question is "why" we value some things over othersYou simply reply by saying:
>>2761339>The mechanism by which value are acquired is the brain reward systemWhich fails to compartmentalise between primary and secondary values in accordance to priority; thus I repeat "why", not "what", but also invoke quantity, here:
>>2762044<So, if you could earn $1M, but an innocent child is tortured to death somewhere for it, you can only gain, while another suffers, so would you value money over the well-being of another (i.e. would you inhabit the position of a capitalist)? If not, then clearly your values are not determined by "rewards" in your favour. Repeating my original argument in the thread, that we inherently value others, and so gaining from their loss cannot be explained by the solipsism of a "reward" system. You simply reply:
>>2762448>>2762511<Valuing the life of others because it produces xyz feeling of accomplishment is part of the reward systemDebasing everything down to rewards, but with an important addition, citing man's biological essence:
<Guilt and shame are also part of the reward system. These are biological facts, which we "feel" and which our body naturally produces due to evolutionarry pressure. […] we value socialization more than the loss Thus placing reward in "evolutionary pressure", invoking man's collectivity as species and organism. I press you on this point and you take a long time to break, but eventually admit that humans are generally selfless:
>>2762565<[socialisation] is the same as selflessnessThus completing my very original argument, that man's selflessness is a primary knowledge of his morality. Yet you contradict yourself by claiming that man is not generally selfless by his general human being:
>>2763332So I ask whether you accept our human being:
>>2763384Which takes a very long time, but you finally admit to it:
>>2766627<I do not deny [our human being] […] What I am denying is having necessary moral values due to our human speciesOf course, you have recently accepted that as human beings, we share common ends, so you have basically admitted to necessary values in the species. In this same post, I beg you to clarify your position as to the reality of morality, which you defer to a semantic sophism, seeing morality as constitutive of judgement, without reference to universals; presupposing the particularity of morality; in effect, simply confusing preference for morality once again. After this, you attempt to simply self-define morality as "personal values", which as related to earlier comments, simply "rewards" behaviour, but as I already showed you, the valuation of others conditions our values to certain ends, which correspond to our collective being. I try very hard to drill logic into you in this post:
>>2768673Where I explain that preference is not morality, since what we prefer has no determination upon the objective qualities of a thing, even if it has a synthetic effect upon ourselves. You answer with this:
>>2768740<You're presuming the thing that is yet to be proven.Which is misunderstood, since as I repeat, to make moral judgement upon taste is a category error. To say that "bitterness is bad" rather than saying "i dislike bitterness" is the cause of all further confusion, and the descent of this conversation.
To conclude, we have both been rather consistent in our perspectives; mine being one of self-defined moral objectivity, while yours is self-defined moral subjectivity. The issue I find in your original thinking, which stains all further development, is that you confuse preference for morality, invoking incorrect language, and thus inferring things which lead to apparent contradiction (e.g. two people being validated in their contrary judgement upon the same thing, leading to formally illogical results). As I write, contrary preference has no means to contradict, since it assumes no judgement upon an object in itself, but only in how one relates to it; e.g. "I dislike (x)", rather than "(x) is bad… because i dislike it", which falsely attributes determination to an object. So then, if we say "i like/dislike (x)" contrarily, there is no contradiction - but to say "i like/dislike (x), THEREFORE, (x) is good/bad", extends a subjective claim into an objective claim, causing inherent contradiction by contrary judgement.
So then, can these terms be agreed to? 🙂🤝🙂
>>2774794>evolutionI said that evolution created the reward system, not that it created the values from it. As for the common values, I’m asking why we are a collective being without resorting to modal fallacies about social cooperation (hence making my values also yours)
>morality is unrealRead about meta ethical non-cognitivism
I’ll read your other post later
>>2775329>evolution created the reward system, not that it created the values from itSeems paradoxical.
>I’m asking why we are a collective beingBecause we share collective attributes as being (e.g. species)
>meta-ethical non-cognitivism<non-cognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossiblehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-cognitivismRight, so this is the central concern and the theme of the longer post; when you say "(x) is good" you are making a moral claim, based on preference. I would say that it is erroneous to make moral claims based on this. The contradiction of applying noncognitivism is that you are simultaneously applying morality to things, while denying the knowledge of morality of things. So, things would be resolved if you denied the use of moral language altogether.
>>2775348>we share collective valuesThat’s not a possible resolution. Either you say this in a genetic sense, in which case biology disagrees (no innate moral values are found in humans). Either you say this in a vague pseudo-metaphysical sense, in which case values loose all relevance to proof given their nature.
>deny moral languageGenerally speaking, once you need to reshape reality and nominal conventions to fit your reasoning, that’s usually a sign of circular and analytical reasonings.
>>2775366When you say "(x) is good" because you enjoy it, is this a moral judgement? A moral proposition?
>>2775374A moral judgement doesn’t have to be a moral proposition.
>>2774795Beyond the obvious bias in your description, I find that you miss to point out that your position always oscillates between a form of moral valuation in a determined biological manner (which you haven’t been able to prove), or in a vague metaphysical manner (unprovable and taken as an axiom, and also not clearly objective as you’ve not responded to how determined values must be common values too).
The broader picture is that you also keep committing argumentative fallacies, like treating contingent facts as necessary claims and making nested circular arguments. More over, you presumably deliberately try to avoid answering my questions, and as such have not provided a clear answer as whether or not your moral system could condemn a inconsequential (to the rapist’s being) rape.
> So then, can these terms be agreed to? 🙂🤝🙂Just concede. You started a pointless debate which you could not argue for as you lack the prerequisites, and you lost. Get over it.
>>2775661>A moral judgement doesn’t have to be a moral proposition"(x) is good/bad" is a moral proposition, no? It is a statement which denotes the moral quality of something. If you are a "noncognitivist" then you must reject these moral semantics.
>you presumably deliberately try to avoid answering my questionsAnon… you are the one too afraid to say that 1+1=2, remember.
>Just concedeConcede to what? You apparently promote noncognitivism yet also give moral propositions based in moral judgements. So if I was conceding to your position; what am I conceding too, exactly?
>>2776084>It is a statement which denotes the moral quality of something. Anon I've already told you, if you haven't read the wiki page, there's frankly no point for you to argue.
"A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world.""
>If you are a "noncognitivist" then you must reject these moral semantics.<creates his own standard of definition based on circularity and without any synthetic knowledge<"well according to my standard you can't use the commonly used moral lexicon"lmfao
>you are the one too afraid to say that 1+1=2, rememberDidn't I already tell you ? Come back once you can assert that moral judgements necessarily have to be propositions.
>what am I conceding too, exactlyYou've been unable to show that rape was bad, that moral judgements had to be propositions, that biological pre-defined values had to be "common", and lastly to bring any kind of proof to your moral system.
I hadn't realized it but you literally got BTFOed on everything you said lmfao. And now, you're trying to escape the debate because you know you can't handle it.
You started a pointless debate and lost because you're a pseud who'se knowledge is exclusively limited to a /lit/ reading list on the classics lol. Come back once you've read the basics about the topic you wish to debate upon. See ya !
>>2776180is "(x) is good" a moral proposition?
wow smith btfo fr fr
>>2776180>wiki<non-cognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossiblehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-cognitivismSo, when you write "(x) is good" you are either misusing moral language in place of preferential language (a point i have stressed) or, you are not actually a non-cognitivist. To say "(x) is good" is to give epistemology to a moral quality of something, but if morality is unknowable, you cannot assert that something is moral.
>commonly used moral lexiconWhy would you invoke morality if it "moral knowledge is impossible"?
>Didn't I already tell you ?Tell me that 1+1=2? No, because you have already openly embraced contradiction, so you literally struggle to admit logical truths. This is your confusion.
>moral judgements necessarily have to be propositions<The term proposition also overlaps with the term judgment, with one difference being that judgments are more closely associated with mental processes that affirm or deny the truth of a content.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition<Aristotle observed that while propositions can be drawn from judgements and called "true" and "false", the objects that the terms try to represent are only "true" or "false"—with respect to the judging act or communicating that judgement—in the sense of "apt" or "inapt"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JudgementThey are inherently related acts. So, would you say that "(x) is good/bad" a moral judgement or proposition? I would say that "(x) is good/bad" is a proposition which subject to further judgement upon its validity. Thus, when you say "(x) is good - because i like it", you are making a moral proposition, and a moral judgement. This of course presupposes moral epistemology.
>You've been unable to show that rape was badNo, I proved that rape is absolutely unnecessary, while you say that rape is good - to the rapist; further calling the act "inconsequential", extending your nonsense solipsistic subjectivism.
>that moral judgements had to be propositionsThey require each other; if there is no proposition; e.g. "(x) is good", how can it be judged?
>biological pre-defined values had to be "common"We have a common being and common ends, as you have already admitted.
>bring any kind of proof to your moral system.I have provided proof in logical necessity.
>you're trying to escape the debateIts not a "debate", its a lesson I'm giving a stubborn child. You have made a mistake, and the truth is finally being revealed to you. Its okay to make mistakes, anon, but must also admit to them.
>You started a pointless debateI never started a debate; I began my posting by explaining the nature of teleology and correcting people's mistakes (such as you claiming that all knowledge is a priori). The current discussion is an extension of me correcting your primary error.
>Come back once you've read the basics about the topic you wish to debate uponI read about noncognitivism and it said that moral knowledge is impossible, so may I enquire upon why you have relentlessly claimed moral knowledge?
>>2776755>Why would you invoke morality if it "moral knowledge is impossible"? >To say "(x) is good" is to give epistemology to a moral quality of something, but if morality is unknowable, you cannot assert that something is moral.>you are making a moral proposition, and a moral judgement. This of course presupposes moral epistemology.That's the whole point. I'm not a non-cognitivist but the entire gist of non-cognitivism is that we shouldn't be using moral claims as propositions. I keep referring you to this because you were debating the other guy by presuming that he couldn't hold that position (despite you not even having read the wiki absolute topkek)
>so you literally struggle to admit logical truthsAwwww poor smithanon didn't read my posts. I've already answered it here :
>>2774267
>I proved that rape is absolutely unnecessaryIt's really not that hard anon lol.
<we MUST value our being<rape can be inconsequential to our being<hence inconsequential rapes are morally neutralThis is the position you defend. Please be coherent with it, even though I know it might be hard to digest.
>We have a common being and common ends, as you have already admitted.If I'm biologically wired to value MY being, why must I value YOUR being ? It's pretty straightforward, why do you keep dancing around it ?
Is it because you're unable to answer without making modal fallaies ? Genuine question btw
>I never started a debateIs this why you've been trying to start debates about empiricism multiple times ?
>may I enquire upon why you have relentlessly claimed moral knowledge?- you haven't "read", you've skimmed the wiki page lol
- Because I'm not a non-cognitivist, I'm an ethical subjectivist. Wasn't this already clear ?
>>2777682>That's the whole point. >I'm not a non-cognitivistRight, so when you are backed into a corner you were just pretending to be retarded the entire time. How convenient. But to return to what I wrote earlier - when you say "(x) is good" and another says "(x) is bad", how do we determine who is correct? If both are correct, there is contradiction. But if both can be wrong, then moral truths exist independently of us. So then, in the first and second case, moral claims cannot be justified without moral evidendce. So, what gives knowledge to moral content? How do you justify the claim that (x) is good?
>the other guyWhat other guy?
>I've already answered it hereJust answer it now; does 1+1=2?
>rape can be inconsequential to our beingYou keep asserting this and I keep denying it.
>This is the position you defendI have never described rape as "inconsequential".
>If I'm biologically wired to value MY being, why must I value YOUR being ?You fundamentally lack the ability of abstract thinking; We as individuals are not co-equal beings, but as the same common being, we are identical. Do you recognise the difference between wholes and parts? As species, we are the same being. The unconditionality we have to each other is the inherent value of our collectivity.
>trying to start debates about empiricismBut there is no debate; I am demonstrating the axiomatic fallacy of empiricism, to prove the point that you are promoting indefensible positions (or is your seeming defense of empiricism just another "noncognitivist" role play session?). I'm trying to educate you in your errors so that you become a better person.
>I'm an ethical subjectivistWhich holds to moral realism or non-realism? If it is realism, then you hold that morality is real; substantive, and therefore objective; it is a claim of things in themselves (e.g. "x is good"), not "i like x". So, do you hold that morality is real, and therefore objective (e.g. identifiable by correct proposition and judgement)?
>>2777716Jesus I'm really dealing with a retard here. Don't worry anon, I'll keep it down a notch.
>so when you are backed into a corner you were just pretending to be retarded the entire timeAah I see you don't really understand why I brought up non-cognitivism. Earlier in the conversation you were discussing with someone else who wrote that there was no objective way to measure morality, and who seemed to abide to a non-cognitivist position.
When I pointed it out to you, your cortisol level shot through the roof and you felt very compelled to ask basic mathematical questions. I'm personally not a non-cognitivist, but you seem to agree that there is actually room for that position. So, it seems at last you've understood that you require the burden of proof to posit that moral positions have to be cognitive.
>does 1+1=2I've already answered : propositions can't be both true and contradictory. (1+1 does equal 2)
>I keep denying itYes, to which I ask you again : why can't there be an inconsequential (to being) rape. You keep avoiding it yet it seems relatively simple. Is it because you can't answer without ressorting to fallacies ?
>The unconditionality we have to each other is the inherent value of our collectivity.Aah it really is always the same thing with you isn't it ?
You argue that we "value" OUR being. I'll point to you that this isn't true biologically. And then, let me guess, you'll argue that it's actually an unprovable axiom ?
If it's the case, can you call it "Gloobygloopgorp" ? It'll help with avoiding your imaginary concept with real things.
>to prove the point that you are promoting indefensible positionsAnon nobody in this thread is talking about empiricism. Why do you want to bring it up so hard topkek
>Which holds to moral realism or non-realism>So, do you hold that morality is real, and therefore objective<mistakes cognitivism for non-cognitivismAww it's cute anon doesn't even know the basic differences. I'll make an analogy with bananas so that you can understand it more easily.
Cognitivism: When monkey likey this banana, monkey is making a real statement, like when monkey saying "this banana is yellow."
Non-cognitivism: When monkey likey this banana, monkey is really just going "OOH OOH AH AH, BANANA!" Monkey not saying something true or false, monkey is just showing how monkey feels.
Realism: The banana is good or bad no matter what monkey thinks. Even if every monkey disappeared from the jungle, banana keep good or bad.
Anti-realism: The banana is only "good" because monkeys think it good. If no monkey ever had feelings or opinions, nothing would be good or bad. It's all made up by monkeys.
brutal meta-ethics mogging, sub5 moral-let can't cope and will realistically have to rope
>>2777838>you were discussing with someone else Who? Link the post.
>propositions can't be both true and contradictoryExcellent; so if person (a) declares "(x) is good" and person (b) declares that "(x) is bad", either one of them is correct or both of them are incorrect. Do you concur?
>why can't there be an inconsequential (to being) rape. … Because rape is by definition, consequential. A rape requires the raped, as I have already said.
>You argue that we "value" OUR beingAs humans, we share an identical being with each other.
>imaginary concept You appear to struggle with abstraction.
>nobody in this thread is talking about empiricismGood, because it is a false doctrine; one which you could scarcely be so bold so as to defend.
>The banana is only "good" because monkeys think it goodInteresting that you put "good" in quotes here; are you finally admitting that you have been misusing moral language in place of preferential language all this time?
>>2777854>Who? Link the post.>>2757275
>good has to be objective and can’t be contradictory >moral propositions can’t be inherently subjective like tasteWe’ve already been over this anon. Simply refusing to accept that good can denote an inherently subjective and relational to self category does not make your position true, it just makes you deny reality
>gloobygloopgorb is a true concept !!! >:(Make an argument for it instead of circling around it lmfao. I’ve been waiting for it for a while lol
<erm we’re biologically bound to value xyzAnd there we go again…
>>2777877>good can denote an inherently subjective…Anon! You said this one post earlier:
>>2777838>propositions can't be both true and contradictorySo, if person (a) says "(x) is good" and person (b) says "(x) is bad", both of them cannot be correct, since they are contradictory propositions. So then, either one of them is correct, or both of them are incorrect. Do you agree? This is a logical question.
>>2777969>So then, either one of them is correct, or both of them are incorrect.Anon we've already been over this multiple times …
When monkey likey this banana, monkey is not saying the banana has some magical "good" juice inside it. Monkey is just saying "ME likey this banana." So if one monkey says "good banana!" and another monkey says "bad banana!", they are not actually fighting about the banana. They are just both talking about their own tummies and their own feelings.
For the monkeys to REALLY disagree, the second monkey would have to say "NO! YOU do not actually likey this banana!" And that would be a very silly and rude monkey.
See ? It's not that hard.
Now that's it settled, can you bring any proof to your gloobygloobgorp ?
>>2778686>When monkey likey this banana, monkey is not saying the banana has some magical "good" juice inside it. Monkey is just saying "ME likey this banana." So if one monkey says "good banana!" and another monkey says "bad banana!", they are not actually fighting about the banana. They are just both talking about their own tummies and their own feelings.So would you say that the statement "(x) is good" is misusing moral language for preferential language, since it applies moral qualities to an object, rather than signalling the feelings of a subject? Instead of the monkey saying "(x) is good", it is better to say "i like (x)"?
>>2778714No because you're restricting moral language to your definition of usability.
>>2778967>you're restricting moral language I am taking moral propositions to be descriptive of morality.
The "restriction" is not applied by me, but by the terms themselves.
Tell me then, if the statement "(x) is good" does not denote that "(x) is good", but rather denotes "i like (x)", then why is "i like (x)" not a more appropriate statement? Is it not better to use more accurate and precise terms to communicate feelings?
>>2778986>why is "i like (x)" not a more appropriate statement?"Liking" is more ambiguous and more polysemic. But yes, both terms are somewhat exchangeable, in the same way that you can say that you like a brocoli/that you think that a brocoli tastes good.
>Is it not better to use more accurate and precise terms to communicate feelings?It's been understood since Saussure that language is a social convention that does not necessarily evolve towards optimal precision.
Still no answer btw for your proof of your made-up concept, should I consider this a concession ?
>>2779072>is "i like (x)" not a more appropriate statement?<yesSo, as I wrote around 15 days ago:
>>2758625<Preference for taste is not a judgement of what taste is, lest a person misspeaks in assigning falseness to the quality of taste (e.g. bitterness, sweetness). Thus to call taste "bad" is to signal preference, but if extended, it is necessarily a form of false judgement, since it confuses preference (a subjective determination) to a quality of the thing itself.Thus, you have been speaking falsely this entire time.
>both terms are somewhat exchangeableYet they do not denote the same thing?
>you can say that you like a brocoliRight, since taste is a fact and thus indisputable.
>that you think that a brocoli tastes good.But this is assigning a moral value to something, leading to inherent contradiction between preferences, if they are so asserted by moral proposition (e.g. "(x) is good").
>language is a social convention that does not necessarily evolve towards optimal precisionBut if you were to speak precisely, you would not equate preference for moral judgement upon a preference?
>Still no answer btw for your proof of your made-up conceptWhich concept did I make up? Necessity? Humanity?
>>2779100>you can't use moral language if you don't apply MY unasserted definition We've already been over this anon. Saying that something tastes good is not a semantical error. It only is one if you presume good to be a physical quality, a thing-in-itself.
I'd also add that is not going to help you because you're not arguing for morality as a physical quality of a thing, but rather as an intrinsic value encoded within humans.
>Which concept did I make up?The gloobygloobgorp. You said that your gloobygloobgorp was encoded within humans, so I ask you what this thing physically is.
>>2780285>Saying that something tastes good is not a semantical errorIf person (a) says "(x) is good" and person (b) says "(x) is bad" is this a contradiction? If so, either one person is correct or both are incorrect - in that case, how do we determine correctness? However, if "(x) is good" does not actually denote "(x) is good", then this is incorrect language, which should be adjusted (i.e. "i enjoy x"). The statement "i enjoy (x)" cannot be contradicted by the opposing statement "i dont enjoy (x)", since enjoyment is a subjective claim.
>The gloobygloobgorp. Care to clarify?
>>2780290>morality has to be a quality of a thingYou’re just repeating for the 10th time what you’ve already said, and I’ll ask you again : why does morality need to be an objective quality of a thing rather than a subjective assessment ?
Beyond that, you’re not arguing for your position here too given that you’re coming moral naturalism.
>care to explainYou’re arguing that we are genetically encoded with values. When I’ve pointed out that this isn’t the case biologically, you’ve conceded that it wasn’t what is typically understood by value.
As such, to avoid confusions, I’ve called it the gloobygloobgorp, and asked you to provide any proof for it.
>>2780307Furthermore, I’ll give you 3 replies to provide any advancements. If you fail to do so, I’ll delete the thread. This isn’t going anywhere, because you sperged out like an autistic kid desperate for attention.
I’ll make an ethics thread for you to be btfo’d given that it’s frankly quite fun to humiliate you.
>>2780310Why do you write like an anime villain? 🤣
>>2780307>why does morality need to be an objective quality of a thing rather than a subjective assessment?Because if we give a moral proposition; e.g. "(x) is good", we are denoting the moral quality of a thing; e.g. "(x) = good". Thus if we apply a contrary value; e.g. "(x) = bad", we cause a contradiction, like an arithmetical sum; e.g. (x) = "(y/z)". So, if person (a) claims that (x)=good and person (b) claims (x)=bad, either one of them is correct, or both are incorrect, as you have previously written:
>>2777838<propositions can't be both true and contradictorySo, this is the necessary clause of moral propositions.
However, if you were to say that "(x) is good" is NOT a moral proposition, but a colloquial, informal and nominal rendering of the proposition "i enjoy (x)", then all confusion is solved by assessing the fact that the statement "(x) is good" is inaccurate and should be replaced with "i enjoy (x)", thereby substituting MORAL language for PREFERENTIAL language, since they are not the same thing.
>You’re arguing that we are genetically encoded with valuesYes, both a germ and human strive to preserve their being.
>this isn’t the case biologically,Yes it is; ALL life is self-preserving.
>provide any proof for itI have shown that all suicidal people misrecognise their feelings, making suicidal ideation inherently irrational. The denial of life in particular also serves life in the abstract. Hence, killing for food is justified while killing wastefully is unjustified. Similarly, murder is lawful if it serves a greater end than its means.
>>2780316>Because if we give a moral proposition […]Because if we give a moral proposition; e.g. "(x) is good", we are denoting how subjective assessment in relation to our personal morality; e.g. "(x) = good according to my criterias". Thus if we apply a contrary value; e.g. "(x) = bad", we cause an indication, like a different taste or preference. So, if person (a) claims that (x)=good and person (b) claims (x)=bad, both of them can be correct, as I have previously written :
>>2777838<propositions can't be both true and contradictorySo, this is the indication that they are simply different moral propositions relational to the self.
>both a germ and human strive to preserve their being>Yes it is; ALL life is self-preserving.Already been adressed; a germ doesn't "strive" to protect his being. He just "is", it just happens that evolutionary pressures have made his behavior in a given way. A germ "protects" his being in the same way that a banana "rots" its being.
Humans do not strive to protect their being too. There is no moral "ought" to live that's genetically encoded within ourselves. All we have is the brain's reward system, which rewards us when we accomplish certain things (the natural "ought"). This reward system does not automatically makes us value life but only does so in reference to certain situations or context (i.e. does living bring us benefits ?)
>I have shown that all suicidal people misrecognise their feelings>The denial of life in particular also serves life in the abstractThis indicates that you seemingly believe that it's not actually life that's valued, but rather the chemicals produced by life.
Similarly you're still arguing that Imust intrinsically value MY life, not ours. You fail again to prove why I should value collective being.
Again, you're delving into biology and failing miserably. You'll retreat again as you've done in the past 20 posts.
>>2780362>if we give a moral proposition; e.g. "(x) is good"…Which as you say cannot have contrary values.
>we are DENOTING how subjective assessment in relation to our personal moralityAnd can our personal sense of morality be incorrect?
>good according to my criteriasCan our criterion be incorrect or malformed?
>if we apply a contrary value; e.g. "(x) = bad"…We contradict the primary proposition, thus making either one of them false, or both of them false.
>like a different taste or preference.Which has NOTHING to do with morality. If I enjoy something, that has nothing to do whether it is good or evil. For example, I can enjoy things which are bad for me, can I not?
>So, if person (a) claims that (x)=good and person (b) claims (x)=badThey cause a formal contradiction by assigning contrary values (good/bad) to the same variable (x). (x) CANNOT be both "good" and "bad" at the same time; you have admitted this. A proposition cannot be both TRUE and CONTRADICTORY, as you put it.
>both of them can be correctOnly if "(x) is good" is not a moral proposition, but is an informal and colloquial approximation of "i enjoy (x)". So, for BOTH to be correct, neither can assert a TRUE proposition, as you have already written. So, when monkey say "(x) is good", he means "i like (x)", correct?
>a germ doesn't "strive" to protect his being. He just "is"He? 🤔 And a germ is indeed self-determined in the preservation of its own being. This is a biological fact.
>You fail again to prove why I should value collective being.But you already do value our collective being. Tell me why.
THANK GOD. SMITH ANON IS STILL HERE
>>2780380>And a germ is indeed self-determined in the preservation of its own beingadam smith poster not the other anon but im wondering what you mean by self-determined
>>2780413I mean that it has its own cause in itself. The Greeks separated the living and the dead by what was "animate" (e.g. ensouled; posessing "anima", the principle of motion). Self-movement was thus supposed to be the first principle of life, as opposed to the dead, which had motion from external, rather than internal causes. Thales believed that magnets had souls in them for similar reasons, since they caused other objects to move by their influence. The Greeks also had sophisticated notions of artificial life, as told in the Iliad, where Hephaestus (the god of craft) built robots for himself:
https://kosmossociety.org/automatons/The principle of soul moved to the mind (psyche), as told by Aristotle in his first book of Metaphysics, and in De Anima, he speaks upon 3 kinds of soul (vegetative, animal and rational) which comport to the 3 kinds of life - which he bases in the bodies of living things, seeing motivation as an automatic cause of generation, for example, and thus animation as an embodied fact. For example, even a "dead" creature will persist in its movement (like the Homeric automaton) but does it possess the potential and actuality of reason? Of course, this is a question of our time, and cannot be simply answered.
In relating this to what was originally asked, Richard Dawkins gives two contrary positions. First in the Selfish Gene (1976):
<We are survival machines-robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genesand then in "River out of Eden" (1995):
<DNA neither cares nor knows. DNA just is. And we dance to its music.Here, he applies a certain 'subjectivity' to genes, who are "selfish" and composers of "music". This can be mistaken for poetic flourish, but it does matter for what he later writes in The God Delusion (2006), that "memes" like genes, have a viral nature, and seek their self-preservation in our vehicles for transmission. Here, the gene and meme are pure subject, which determine man toward THEIR own ends, at man's own expense (think of it how Marx describes alienation, where man becomes an object, to the subject of value; e.g. money, and thus his own cause is external). This neo-Darwinist picture then denies the self-determination of beings, by having beings subordinate to the programs of a thing "within" them, but conceived separately from "them". Dawkins is mysterious however, since he asserts that by "reason", man may break the chains of his "delusion", making reason still as yet superior to genes - but by a negative of positive power of determined objectivity?
Nietzsche speaks somewhat on this in his work; that the creation of morality is a repression of immediate desires, but still a sublimation of the Will to Power; thus, the priest does not discard the framework of virtue, but simply inverts it (e.g. strength is weakness, mercy is power, etc.) Here, the "genetic" or essential being of organisms is preserved, but adapted to different circumstances, and so morality appears as frankly Darwinistic; that the weak conspire to usurp the strong by de-fanging them, or elsewise, by growing internal fangs of their own. But as it was classically understood, self-determination is an internal potency made actual, with the animal soul of sensation and immediate desire making the cause of being as largely external. This makes man an object, and dependent, while the strong-willed man can choose. Nietzsche thus sees that the priest is the one to utilise his Will to Power by an internal strength, which the externally strong lack. So then, the man who controls others makes men slaves, but the one who controls himself, makes men into masters.
So then, self-determination, or self-cause can be understood as (i) the principle of generation and (ii) the potency of Will. Now, the question is whether generation (e.g. the beat of the heart) is Willed or unwilled. As an activity, it is the fulfilment of potential, and thus gives cause to itself, yet is involuntary, or automatic (self-moved), so cannot be called willful, which by its means, must imply the greater capacity for potential activity (for those who have the greatest means may be said to possess most Will). Generation then, is pure activity, while Will is pure potency (in itself). Lao Tzu and Plato concur that Reason is a purely passive or inactive thing, and so gives way to righteousness (無為 ; wu-wei, non-doing). Here, there are two wills conceived - that of man and that of God, or Nature. Once man submits to that which is, he thus becomes liberated from himself (as a contradiction). Here, man's ends are likewise conceived objectively (that is, as man objectified by a higher Will). This then reverts to what is written by Dawkins, that man's ends are in something other than himself.
What I would say is that life is its own cause, self-generating for its own ends; it has no being besides pure activity, with even passivity conceived as giving way to the activity of another (this can be elaborated on in economic terms, as I have described it, between immediate and delayed gratification, or selfishness and selflessness). Reason regulates these modes of activity by a consideration between particularity and generality, scaled both temporally and spatially. What is "best" is that which is most rational and what is "worst" is most irrational, with freedom being the self-determined Will - thus, the potency of the rational Will being made fully actual. This may be an incorrect assessment, but it seems to make sense to me. I at least take authority from philosophy. 🤔👍
>>2780506stop using capital letters! its hard to tell who is smith retard without them! (not this time you used one of your classic images)
>>2780380>can I be wrong in my moralityYes, but only in so far that you can be wrong about what you think tastes wrong
>you can’t use moral language because it has to be objective and universalAnon… that’s kinda like… what you need to prove…
>germs are self-determinedCalled it lol, the second you need to give some grounding to your concepts, you go back to an unjustified assertion about what morality is. Tell me, how does self-determination bring about what is « good » beyond what is simply valued by the brain.
>collective beingNo, explain to me why I must value your being without ressorting to my interests. This really shouldn’t that hard, right anon ?
First strike / 3
>>2780642Sorry meant to say « tastes bad »
>>2780642>you can be wrong about what you think tastes wrongPlease explain how one can incorrectly "think" about what "tastes" "bad".
>what you need to proveIts in the terms themselves ; and you have seemingly avoided the blatant contradiction you are giving. You wrote "propositions can't be both true and contradictory", yet claim that contradictory propositions CAN be both true and contradictory. Explain how.
How can (x) = (y) be true, as well as (x) = (z)?
>how does self-determination bring about what is goodself-determination is good; it is self-defined, once again. Can self-determination be bad? You tell me.
>explain to me why I must value your beingYou still don't quite understand; it is OUR being.
>>2780660>Please explain how one can incorrectly "think" about what "tastes" "bad".Monkey sees rotten banana, monkey thinks "banana yummy even if rotten", but monkey is wrong; banana tastes bad for monkey
>Explain howYikes buddy, I thought you read what I said ? Saying "this is good for me" is not contradictory with "this is good for you", isn't it ?
>self-determination is good; it is self-defined, once againSo axiomatic and unprovable definitions then ?
>Can self-determination be bad? You tell meAnon I think that pedophiles raping kids is wrong. I am also against cosmic death because of entropy, and would rather humanity to endure.
Am I a monster for you to believe this ?
>You still don't quite understand; it is OUR being.Mhmm not quite. I don't suffer from autism nor am I retarded.
>>2780673>banana tastes bad for monkeyIs this synonymous with "monkey dislikes taste of banana"?
>Saying "this is good for me" is not contradictory with "this is good for you"Person (a) says "(x) is good" and person (b) says "(x) is bad". These are moral propositions, and so as you put it, cannot both be true and contradictory, so both cannot be true. If both are true thus, they are not propositions. So, are person (a) and (b) making moral propositions? If yes, then how can both be true yet have contrary values?
>axiomatic and unprovable definitionsaxioms are self-proven.
>I think that pedophiles raping kids is wrongHold on. If morality is determined by preference, then raping children is GOOD to pedophiles, no? You are acting strangely all of a sudden. Who cares what you think, if morality is individual? Consensus is impossible, right? So when you say "I think (x) is wrong", what general standard are you appealing to? Are you just talking to yourself aloud?
>and would rather humanity to endure.Why? Explain.
>Not quiteWhen I say "we are both human", you disagree?
>I don't suffer from autismThou doth protesteth too much. Now get back to the baseball. 😆
>>2780701>moral propositionsWhat don’t you understand in « moral propositions explain personal attitudes and subjective value judgments » ? I think it is pretty clear but I can reformulate in monkey-linguo since you seem to understand it well.
>axioms are self-proven I accept your concession. It’s okay anon, I’m sure you can resume to shitposting in polecon
>whoa buddy how can you say anything is bad if morality is SUBJECTIVEYou believe that pedophiles ought to rape kids. I’m not saying this because it is universally bad, but rather because it provokes disgust in me. But yes, I’m not trying to make a universal and objective moral claim.
>we are both human beingsYes, which implies ? Why are we self-determined to value others ?
>>2780758>moral propositions explain personal attitudes and subjective value judgmentsWhen you said "propositions can't be both true and contradictory" how does this apply to the above-stated?
>monkeyYes, we need to get back to that. I asked this question:
"Is [banana tastes bad for monkey] synonymous with "monkey dislikes taste of banana"?
Can you please answer this?
>I accept your concessionSo you disagree that axioms are self-proven?
>You believe that pedophiles ought to rape kidsNo, thats what you believe. So answer directly, is raping children GOOD for pedophiles who prefer to do so? If so, a pedophile OUGHT to do what is in their preference, correct? In fact, such as with the monkey analogy, if a pedophile THINKS raping children is wrong, he is thinking incorrectly according to his values, RIGHT? 😉
Also, you never answered why you wish humanity persist. Youve been quite avoident lately - should I give you a "strike"? 😆
>I’m not trying to make a universal and objective moral claim.So when you said "I think that pedophiles raping kids is wrong" this literally has no communicative content since it cannot be generalised as a sentiment?
>YesOkay, so we are both human beings, which means that we share a being. Thus you saying "not quite" to the proposition of a shared being is void.
>>2780770> how does this apply to the above-stated?It’s fine anon, I’ll make it easier by using the monkey analogy : monkey A says « BANANA ME LIKEY »; monkey B says « BANANA NO ME LIKEY ». The « ME » indicates a inherently relational proposition.
As such, I would agree when you ask :
> Is [banana tastes bad for monkey] synonymous with "monkey dislikes taste of bananaFurthermore, I’d also indicate that this was already answered to multiple times. But it’s fine, I understand the cognitive requirements for such discourse.
>pedophiles and humanity I would have thought that my previous post was pretty clear, so what did you not understand ? As for why I value humanity, it is because I am human and would rather not face certain death. I do not care however if cosmic death occurs after my death.
>axiomsWe usually say « I’m unable to prove it », but it’s okay anon
>a collective beingBeing from the same species does not imply a collective being. There’s a qualitative leap between a specy and its particulars
>>2780887>monkey A says « BANANA ME LIKEY »; monkey B says « BANANA NO ME LIKEYSo would you say that "(x) is good" is synonymous with "i enjoy (x)"?
>The « ME » indicates a inherently relational proposition.You don't make it a relative statement, but an absolute statement. You write "(x) IS good". The statement "I enjoy (x)" is entirely relative, synthetic and non-problematic, so would you say that this is what you are attempting to express?
>Can't answer questionIs raping children good to the pedophile who prefers to do so, and thus, ought he do what he values? If he does not act in accordance with these values, is he thinking incorrectly?
>As for why I value humanity, it is because I am humanWould you sacrifice your life to save others?
>I do not care however if cosmic death occurs after my deathBut this is contradicted by what you write here:
>>2780673<I am also against cosmic deathSo are you against it or indifferent to it?
>Being from the same species does not imply a collective beingYes it does, by abstraction, or generality.
>There’s a qualitative leap between a specy and its particularsYes, and both are beings unto themselves by what is universal and particular. This is why I say that you lack the faculty of abstract thought.
>>2781173Why are you still going at it ? You’ve literally conceded that your system is unprovable. Just admit your defeat anon
>moral language Poor b8, we already both know the answer to it.
>pedophilesIf I was a pedophile that thought that then yes, I’ve already said-so multiple times. The difference is that I’m not one and don’t think so. However, you think that without being a pedophile (presumably).
>cosmic deathMonkey no likey when forest goes BOOM
>collective beingFor Aristotle, universals are not self-determined because they are not a primary substance. If you mean that we are inherently bound to value others through our pre-determined moral preferences, then there is no collective being but simply an innate value to socialization. Beyond that, you’ve already said that your system is unprovable so you might aswell add random values to it
>>2781206>we already both know the answer to itSo yes, "(x) is good" means "i enjoy (x)"?
>If I was a pedophile that thought that then yesOkay, so you think that child rape can be good and is an ought, so long as one already desires to rape children. Anon, this is the monstrosity of your delusions, which is clearly being breached by your cognitive dissonance. You know what you're saying is absurd. Just admit that child rape can never be good, no matter who prefers it.
>Monkey no likey when forest goes BOOMHeat death doesn't affect you so why do you care? Oh wait, you "don't care", i thought? You are full of contradictions. But please be transparent; would you sacrifice your life for other people?
>>2781227>So yes, "(x) is good" means "i enjoy (x)"?Lmfao I don’t get what’s so hard to understand given that I’ve already replied to this many times already.
« X is good » simply means « I think that x is good to me ». It doesn’t mean that I « like » or « enjoy » X, because those words are not strict equivalent of « I value ». You’re trying to argue about semantics, when not only do they not really prove anything by themselves (as they are inherently conventional), but they furthermore do not apply in the case of cognitivist positions. If you want to have an honest attempt at dismantling my position, I’d suggest looking elsewhere.
>pedophilesAah your intellectual simplicity never ceases to amaze me. I’m not saying that it is good, I’m saying that some people think it as so. I don’t think that claiming that certain monstrous people value child rape is particularly shocking, given it is simply a description of reality.
This is the difference between a subjective account of morality and an objective account; I can claim that some people are bad despite themselves thinking as good. You, on the other hand, are stuck thinking in either category because you are incapable of higher order thought, and as such cannot conceptualize subjectivity.
>heat deathFirst of all, I think you should take a deep breath. You seem to have some lingering anger.
Now, read carefully (possibly outloud) the following words : monkey no likey BOOM, because monkey sad if he and other monkey dead.
Also absolute topkek at the fact that you’ve not even responded on the aristotlean claim. You don’t even try to argue your position anymore, just concede lmfao
>>2781277>"X is good" simply means "I think that x is good to me"There is a problem here. If one "thinks" upon what is "good", this is not a formal statement, and thus cannot be a moral proposition, and so is debased as an opinion. So, when one says "I think (x) is good for me", this cannot express "(x) is good". In all cases, you are twisting around the denotation of "(x) = (y)". Just admit that you are misusing terms and this nonsense can end, or else delve further into confusion - so answer this:
is "i think (x) is good for me" equivalent to "(x) = (y)"?
>It doesn’t mean that I « like » or « enjoy » X, because those words are not strict equivalent of « I value ».So, enjoying something is not the same as valuing it? Can we value things which we do not prefer for ourselves? What is the difference?
>dismantling my positionI want you to actually explain your position. You are jumping through hoops to sustain incomprehension.
>I’m not saying that it is good,YES YOU ARE - you are saying that to a pedo, it is GOOD, and that a pedo OUGHT to rape kids. You are demented.
>people value child rapeand if they VALUE it, is this GOOD for them, and OUGHT they be instructed by their VALUES? OUGHT A PEDOPHILE RAPE CHILDREN? Enlighten us all with your brilliance.
>I can claim that some people are bad despite themselves thinking as goodWHAT MAKES PEOPLE GOOD OR BAD? YOUR OPINION?
If a person says "child rape is good", you submit to their personal correctness, because it aligns with THEIR values, so you forfeit any moral disagreement. Who cares what your OPINION is if it has no general ability to become sentimental or a shared feeling since we are all atomic, disconnected and irreducible individual units, after all, right? Literally, why are you speaking of moral disagreement if morality is exclusively personal?
>monkey sad if he and other monkey deadHeat death doesn't affect you, so you have no present investment in it; just admit you are altruistic already. Why are you ashamed of being nice and normal? Your alternative is to say that rapists OUGHT to rape people. This is the madness of rejecting your common sense.
>AristotleWhat is the claim, exactly? We know that words are entirely conventional with no fixed meanings, after all.
>>2781353>x = yOnly if you presuppose goodness to be an objective quality
>pedophilia and moral agreementsA pedophile doesn’t have an ought from a universal standard, because he can only himself set his own values. Saying anything moral is going to be descriptive of indicative of personal values.
Moral judgements of people are indeed your personal judgements, but can also be used to establish a common interest.
Do you have anything else than appeal to emotions?
>heat deathHuh anon if the universe implodes I’m going to die too. Furthermore, our brain makes us have empathy, but this is only a passion rather than an assessment through reason (hence why I originally had said that there is a part of non-cognitivism in our moral values).
>aristotleDude make the basic efforts ffs
Unique IPs: 108