I recently started reading Lukacs's ontology of a social being and my whole understanding of dialectics has been flipped.
Originally, I had read Engels' Anti-Duhring, in which he argues that dialectical analysis is essentially a physical interaction, which, in human societies, translate into different classes fighting for their existence and needs (i.e. the bourgeoisie wants low salaries, the proletariat needs higher salaries, conflict occurs = law of interpenetration of opposites). The argument is very "physicalist" and relies on seeing nature as a totality in constant mutation.
HOWEVER, Lukacs seems to completely disregard this. Instead, his dialectics could be best described by the following : Any individual has multiple possibilities to realize his "teleological acts" (conscious acts aimed at satisfaction of desires/needs/sustenance etc). Alienation occurs when he is constrained by an external cause to choose a possibility unsatisfactory compared to others. As such, the dialectic is essentially a movement between the individual who attempts to overcome this alienation, which translates into class war (proletariat see capitalism as irrational for them, but are forced to endure it => conflict with the bourgeoisie).
So, which is it ? Lukacs' dialectics imo can be reconciled with Engels, but it makes the latter's work appear as very superficial.
What would decide what the correct answer is?
>>2753099Probably the one which corresponds best to reality ?
Lukacs was retarded, so was the entire western marxism
Read materialism and empro criticism by lenin
Read losurdo instead of lukacs
But first of all, read the second thesis on feuerbach;
>The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.
This is the birth of materialist dialectics and of marxism as such. No, it wasn't engels who came up with "marxist epistemology"
And finally, marx and engels collaborated on almost everything. Anything engels wrote, you can simply assume marx co-signed on it
>>2753115Lenin was an engelsian, he gave us the october
Lukacs was western marxist, he tried to castrate marxism into a mere "social science"
It's plain to see whose epistemology is superior
>>2753199>Read losurdo instead of lukacsthey dont even write about remotely similar topics lmao. /leftypol/ continues to be terrified of bogeyman "intellectualism" (i.e. being familiar with any literature or philosopher outside of twitter flaghead memes)
Potency and actuality arent exactly "dialectical" propositions, but are moreso "demonstrative" propositions of causation. Telos is a "final cause" which gives meaning to a process, but if one invokes contingency (e.g. "choice") then one forgoes teleology, unless by genius devices, like the classical narrative of "fate" (also called "necessity"). In this framework, "choice" was always an illusion, yet still instrumental, since the ends were predetermined (imagining oneself superior to fate was called "hubris"). Think of Oedipus Rex, where the decision to subvert fate is the catalyst to realise fate; here, telos is inscribed into prophecy, the same as in Shakespeare's Macbeth. So then, telos must be singular, and if potential gives rise to many ends, then what is given as a result must be either (i) failure or (ii) false. So then, if we accept the necessity of a certain end, we then prescribe norms which foster the ends we seek. So then, "alienation" merely appears as a synonym for "failure", rather than possessing any esoteric content. So then, what does it mean to be disalienated, besides being excellent? (e.g. realising an essentially "human" end).
>>2753199Is that so ? Imo Lukacs made some pretty good points but Engels (and subsequently Marx too) also had a decent conception of the dialectic.
>second thesis of feuerbachThis doesn't really adress what I'm saying though. Both Lukacs and Engels would agree on their materialism, the matter of the question is the conception of the world that remains more relevant to use for analysis.
>>2753304>Potency and actuality arent exactly "dialectical" propositions, but are moreso "demonstrative" propositions of causationI don't think Lukacs would deny this. For him the dialectical movement is about seizing a subject within a totality to inquire about its evolutions. It's just that, for man, this evolution is fixated around alienation and self-realization.
>"alienation" merely appears as a synonym for "failure"Failure to act upon yourself, or more precisely, to choose between multiple alternatives.
>So then, what does it mean to be disalienatedBeing able to control your own life to posit your own ends. Not in some metaphysical freedom which can be reappropriated, but by choosing for yourself how you seek to self-realize through your own labor. You get denied this potential realization by external social forces which reduce your ability to "choose" for yourself, and by having your objectivations (the result of your labor) escaping you.
>>2753304>choice" was always an illusionHuman will or choice is the ability to create and use stimuli to shape which neural/behavioral path will later run automatically. Freedom = recognizing necessity. You recognize some preconditions, you set out to do them, then the consequences of that are automatic.
>>2753199>>2753247this is what happens when you get communism from mems, haz and youtube
>>2753534But what is necessary? What you mean is that freedom is in recognising ends, or purpose. The purpose of man must then be presupposed as part of his essence. Sartre attempts to reverse this by saying "existence precedes essence", and thus man must derive his own purpose. Nonetheless, there is still what can be demonstrated what is better or worse for man in general. We might say that man's ends are "happiness", so how does a man become happy? Philosophical testimony is that man is contented by ethics.
>>2753547No, you're over-complicating. Man has desires, these are random processes (neural fireworks) which are supported on what is real (notice I didn't say possible!) in a given time-frame. A thought is never insular and is always a thought processes which can start and end in the mind or needs some material model to test against and continue the processes. Establishing and recognizing these material models is the 'free will' part of man. Then once man changed nature and himself, the cycle starts once more. Man doesn't become anything. Man is.
>>2753547>But what is necessary?There are always constraints in which options are available to you. At some point, you "choose" a given option because there cannot be physical indeterminacy.
This appears as a choice but is in reality simply the accord of the self with the path taken : I "choose" to go home after a night out simply mean that this path of actions (going out -> going home) satisfies me.
>The purpose of man must then be presupposed as part of his essence.>SartreOh no no no no not the aristotlean ethics
On a more serious note not really because this is not what Sartre means when he means "essence". Acting towards your own satisfaction is indeed a biological fact of life. HOWEVER, the entire point is that this fact of life has no universal point of reference where we can all agree biologically "this is what satisfies me".
>Nonetheless, there is still what can be demonstrated what is better or worse for man in generalRead filerel.
>>2753567Mhm I see. So Lukacs essentially reverted back to a hegelian dialectic of some sort, rather than using it as a purely analytic tool to examine capitalism ?
>>2753580you can use idealist dialectics to examine capitalism just fine, the image i posted involves a hegelian doing just that. it just doesn't take into account historical contingency radically enough. richard winfield uses his project to give normative validity to the capitalist mode of production and uses it as a launching off point for his socdem politics. as such the capacity for capitalist relations to reproduce themselves is not really problematized, he even rejects the ltv .. this is a consequence of not grasping the essential historical contingency of marx's analysis of capital and the categories that are supposed to unfold from such a point hence his grasp of value is related to the negotiation of ownership between consciousnesses
>>2753568>recognising desireYou are close, but still far.
Once we recognise desires, are we obliged to fulfill them?
>>2753574There are better men than others, would you agree?
What makes a man better or worse?
>>2753607>would you agree?No, there's no universal criteria. You're going to fall into the same problem every moral realist runs into :
<but why is human flourishing/xyz good ? Unique IPs: 11