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Youtube Playlists
Anwar Shaikh - Historical Foundations of Political Economy
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLTMFx0t8kDzc72vtNWeTP05x6WYiDgEx7
Anwar Shaikh - Capitalism: Competition, Conflict and Crises
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLB1uqxcCESK6B1juh_wnKoxftZCcqA1go
Anwar Shaikh - Capitalism
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLz4k72ocf2TZMxrEVCgpp1b5K3hzFWuZh
Capital Volume 1 high quality audiobook from Andrew S. Rightenburg (Human-Read, not AI voice or TTS voice)
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUjbFtkcDBlSHVigHHx_wjaeWmDN2W-h8
Capital Volume 2 high quality audiobook from Andrew S. Rightenburg (Human-Read, not AI voice or TTS voice)
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUjbFtkcDBlSxnp8uR2kshvhG-5kzrjdQ
Capital Volume 3 high quality audiobook from Andrew S. Rightenburg (Human-Read, not AI voice or TTS voice)
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUjbFtkcDBlRoV5CVoc5yyYL4nMO9ZJzO
Theories of Surplus Value high quality audiobook from Andrew S. Rightenburg (Human-Read, not AI voice or TTS voice)
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUjbFtkcDBlQa-dFgNFtQvvMOgNtV7nXp
Paul Cockshott - Labor Theory of Value Playlist
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKVcO3co5aCBnDt7k5eU8msX4DhTNUila
Paul Cockshott - Economic Planning Playlist
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKVcO3co5aCDnkyY9YkQxpx6FxPJ23joH
Paul Cockshott - Materialism, Marxism, and Thermodynamics Playlist
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKVcO3co5aCBv0m0fAjoOy1U4mOs_Y8QM
Victor Magariño - Austrian Economics: A Critical Analysis
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLpHi51IjLqerA1aKeGe3DcRc7zCCFkAoq
Victor Magariño - Rethinking Classical Economics
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLpHi51IjLqepj9uE1hhCrA66tMvNlnItt
Victor Magariño - Mathematics for Classical Political Economy
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLpHi51IjLqepWUHXIgVhC_Txk2WJgaSst
Geopolitical Economy Hour with Radhika Desai and Michael Hudson (someone says "he's CIA doing reheated Proudhonism" lol)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7ejfZdPboo&list=PLDAi0NdlN8hMl9DkPLikDDGccibhYHnDP

Potential Sources of Information
Leftypol Wiki Political Economy Category (needs expanding)
https://leftypedia.miraheze.org/wiki/Category:Political_economy
Sci-Hub
https://sci-hub.se/about
Marxists Internet Archive
https://www.marxists.org/
Library Genesis
https://libgen.is/
University of the Left
http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/Online
bannedthought.net
https://bannedthought.net/
Books scanned by Ismail from eregime.org that were uploaded to archive.org
https://archive.org/details/@ismail_badiou
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia: Articles from the GSE tend to be towards the bottom.
https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/
EcuRed: Cuba's online encyclopedia
https://www.ecured.cu/
Books on libcom.org
https://libcom.org/book
Dictionary of Revolutionary Marxism
https://massline.org/Dictionary/index.htm
/EDU/ ebook share thread
https://leftypol.org/edu/res/22659.html
Pre-Marxist Economics (Marx studied these thinkers before writing Capital and Theories of Surplus Value)
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/index.htm
Principle writings of Karl Marx on political economy, 1844-1883
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/subject/economy/index.htm
Speeches and Articles of Marx and Engels on Free Trade and Protectionism, 1847-1888
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/subject/free-trade/index.htm
(The Critique Of) Political Economy After Marx's Death
https://www.marxists.org/subject/economy/postmarx.htm
224 posts and 72 image replies omitted.


I just lost $3000 in investments.

>>2872733
Good, go fuck yourself pb
this is the 21st century

https://karlof1.substack.com/p/the-governance-challenges-of-western

The Governance Challenges of Western Politics Through the Lens of Western Bureaucratic Systems and Chinese Minds

>When I saw the title of this Dragon TV, “This is China” production, I was very curious to learn what the distorted translation called The “Kaftin Canyon” of Western Political Civilization, which was made even harder when it was also called a “gorge”. At least there was a clue—the term was associated with Marx and one of his observations: “The Krafting Canyon” which referred to the shaping process a society undergoes when subjected to Capitalism that’s possible to avoid as I discovered thanks to Yandex. By the time I’d read far enough to answer my initial question I was fascinated by the history and interpretations being presented and determined that I ought to share this transcript with Gym readers. So, lets dive right in with the program’s preamble:


<In China’s political civilization, bureaucracy is an organic part of the overall state system, serving a higher “political path.” But Western bureaucracy is more of a tool-based “technique,” extremely immature and prone to deviation or regression.


<On July 13’s Dragon TV’s program “This Is China,” Professor Zhang Weiwei, Director of the Institute of China Studies at Fudan University, and Professor Fan Yongpeng, Deputy Director of the Institute of China Studies, observed the governance challenges of Western politics through the lens of Western bureaucratic systems.

>>2872744
>pb is when you save money from decades of employment
waow

File: 1784705895767-6.png (634.12 KB, 779x643, The Real Proles.png)

>>2873984
(this pic is a meme, do not take it too seriously, but also consider the questions it implies)

File: 1784706001855-9.png (104.8 KB, 475x526, ClipboardImage.png)


>>2873342
>In China’s political civilization, bureaucracy is an organic part of the overall state system, serving a higher “political path.” But Western bureaucracy is more of a tool-based “technique,” extremely immature and prone to deviation or regression.
Well, it's interesting that in 18th century France, theories of "enlightened despotism" were popular, largely based in China's system of governance. So much so was it the case that the very term "laissez-faire" was translated by Quesnay from the chinese "wu-wei", the principle of Lao Tzu's philosophy of "non-action"; a dialectical approach to governance, where passivity rules, yet is not corrupted by apathy. Libertarians often confuse laissez-faire with a lack of government, when it is more a principle of wise government which preserves order. Lao Tzu splendidly describes it as the Emporer ruling so well that people imagine they rule themselves - thus, non-inteference as a basis is compatible with authoritarian structures, but not "totalitarian" regimes. Western 'Liberal Democracy' is a non-authoritarian regime, but is still totalitarian. This is also why "freedom" cannot be merely understood as the liberality of decadence, but must be seen as orderliness.

Upon this issue, we can see that Lao Tzu posits order as precedent to law, and so law arrives at the threshold of disorder. As Cicero and Tacitus write (44 BCE - 118 CE):
<More law, less justice.
https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Officiis/1B*.html
<when the state was most corrupt, laws were most abundant.
https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Annals/3B*.html
Thus, law inverts order, the same way Paul tells us that it is the letter of the law which kills, and betrays its spirit. With the parliamentary "rule of law", we rather get the rule of lawyers - aided by a "long parliament" of revision (you can compare the sessions of parliament between the West and China on this issue. The USSR also had short parliaments, which demonstrates stately order). Bureaucracy as "rule of the party" is more dysfunctional in the West because we have competition between the different parties, establishing an antagonistic oligarchy, rather than a loyal aristocracy. It is often said that the "two party system" (e.g. "duopoly") is itself a sham, and if this is the case, why not have a formal ["monopoly"]? The bicameralist parliaments of the West also increase these issues by meaningless dividing power as they do. Rousseau makes it clear that the law rules by principle of the General Will, whilst the Pharisees betray the Will.

As for solutions to the problem, I would adopt Platonic measures to debase the condition of statesmen down to austerity, with any willful betrayal of one's position leading to the result of execution by charge of treason. Stalin's Great Purge (1936-8) is an excellent example of class war within the Bureau, not of the Bureau against the Demos. All effective dictators have justly murdered pretenders to the throne. Interestingly, Hitler bemoaned his mercy against officials after signs of his defeat, and he wished to be more like Stalin. If Caesar killed Brutus, rather than the other way round, how much better for the Plebs. So, the first reform would be the Great Purge of all traitors of the Nation. We read Robespierre (1792):
<[the king] must die because the nation must live.
https://revolution.chnm.org/items/show/526
The Reign of Terror is the scene of Justice on earth, like the Day of Wrath as foretold of. Indeed, all revolution is the re-constitution of the Law, and thus of society itself. This does not mean the ocean becoming lemonade, as spoken of by Fourier, but it means that the corpse of the old makes the new, like Marduk crafting the cosmos by Tiamat. Novus ordo seclorum. Ordo ab Chao.

>the so-called electoral representative system and multi-party system, thus originating from a highly feudal system of bestowal and distribution of spoils

This is false; with England's ministerial development, we see an effective one-party state by the Whigs (1721-83), which only splinters internal interests as time moves on. The division of spoils is incentivised by an increase in membership in parliament, which is recommended to be around 400 according to Cromwell (1653), but today has grown to over 600 seats in the House of Commons alone, and with 800 members in the House of Lords, even with contemporary obscenities such as salaries upwards of £100,000. The spoils are then shared as the spirit of capitalism goes onward, to blatant kleptocracy. A good film about this sort of bourgeois coup d'etat is "The Madness of King George" (1994), which also displays the proof of Plato in Statesman, that politics (e.g. class warfare; anacyclosis) is tragic, since only a benevolent dictator can bring perfect order. The hatred of authority is an envy for one's own - thus as ᴉuᴉlossnW says, an anarchist is a baffled dictator (or as Engels writes, authority is intrinsic to competence; or even as Yarvin says, everyone is 'reactionary' in their own field of expertise). The anti-authoritarian is usually most totalitarian for these reasons.

Laissez faire, laissez passer, I say.
無為

File: 1784892366082-6.jpg (293.64 KB, 906x906, David_Lloyd_George.jpg)

A report known as the "Yellow Book", but formally titled "Britain's Industrial Future" (1928) was an inquiry given by the Liberal Party (1856-1988); a report which in its third book (Ch. 13-19) seeks to rectify the discontents of the working class by a programme of co-operative ownership of industry. The Liberal Party combined with the Social Democratic Party in 1981, and in 1988, both formed the party of the Liberal Democrats (1988-).

Chapter 13 of the report begins by analysing discontent, which concludes with the question of the "capitalism system" in general (pg. 150), by which "the relation of master and servant" is "untenable in a democratic era". Indeed, Locke (1690) considers wage labour a type of temporary slavery, and Smith (1776) views employment plainly as a relationship of "masters" over servants. It is only in the 19th century that capital and labour are seen to be "harmonious" (e.g. Bastiat, 1850). The Lberalism of Mill (1848) is maintained by a belief in a democracy of the workplace, which is continued into Jevons (1870), that what is best is for workers to own their own capital. This legacy is then apparent in the early 20th century.

Chapter 14 deals with Collective Bargaining. We see a history of Trade Union membership from 1866 to 1924 (pg. 153). The Trade Union Congress began in 1866 with 110,000 members. Soon after, Unions were legalised in 1871, with membership at 500,000. From 1917-20, the total membership went from 3-8 million, or over 2/5 of the total working population, but which later declined to 1/3 of industrial workers (pg. 154). Ultimately, the class war is said to be resolved (pg. 160) by the competition of capital and labour leading to co-operation. Settlement is not certain by means of collective bargaing. Although there are noted successes of compromise, there is still irresolution in certain sectors, such as mining (pg. 165).

Chapter 15 concerns the role of the state in "civil war" between the two disputants. Positive legislation is the prescription given, in accordance with "peace, justice and liberty" (pg. 166). The first law of intervening upon industry is cited from 1833 by the "Liberal" (e.g. Peelite) government (pg. 167). Indeed, Peel was a reformer, and followed from his father, who was friends with Robert Owen, the Socialist. Owen's suggestion of preventing crime can be seen as contributing to the creation of the Metropolitan Police, administered by Peel, and so there is already a deep entanglement. Upon present times, the report suggests a standard 48-hour work week as the "law of the land" (pg. 168), but for which it is written, is being won in the post-war era by Bargaining (pg. 167). So, the Liberals are simply following the Unions' lead. As it continues, the "dictatorship of the employer" (pg. 168) rules in many places where Bargaining is ineffective, for which in 1909, the Trade Boards Act was established to set minimum wage rates (pg. 169). Thus, the state is a more effective entity than Unions in this way. Asquith (the Liberal leader before David Lloyd George) in 1916 set up the "Committee on Industrial Relations", which set out the task of organising by co-operation (pg. 172). This is elaborated as "Joint Industrial Councils", which had equal representation for employers and employees. The Board of Trade also established the Ministry of Labour in 1917 (pp. 176-7), and as previously discussed, this set minimum wages for industry, with over a million workers being represented by 1918 (pg. 170). Industrial Courts were also established in 1919 (pg. 177), which have been suggested as arbiters for trade disputes (pg. 179). The report declines to affirm any compulsion upon this object, however (pg. 180), so the state is limited.

Moving onto Chapter 16, the report makes the partisan statement that "the general level of wages should be as high as possible" (pg. 181). This is for the sake of the "community", since industry is only a means to the end of general well-being [or at least, ought to be]. Here, the report also claims that "high real wages are an end in themselves" (pg. 182), counterposing the interests of capital against labour, by necessity. The report equally adds that the rate of return to capital should be as low as possible, invoking political economy upon the topic. The cause of the rise of wages is seen as (i) "efficiency", and (ii) free trade (pg. 185). Efficiency is not precisely explained, though, since "productive power" is relative. Section B of Chapter 16 concerns "The Elements of a Sound Wage System" (pp. 188-9), which involves (i) the minimum wage, and (ii) wages determined by effort. The difficulty of a national minimum wage is discussed, with the conclusion that the minimum wage must be set by particular industry, lest a common standard ruin the rest, as suggested by The Independent Labour Party (pg. 189-90). A suggestion of "profit-sharing" is given (pg. 198), which amounts to setting a minimum profit, and for an excess to be redistributed, added to wages. In 1925, 161,000 workers benefitted from profit-sharing. This principle is not based in "right", but "social utility", as a function. As yet, profit-sharing only saw a small increase to annual salaries, and so higher wages are still preferred (pg. 199). The purpose of the scheme is not to simply increase income, as it is written, but to allow the worker to have a stake in capital, as an "evolution" (pg. 150) to co-operation. Thus, as the report concludes, the act of profit-sharing is beneficial, "even if there are no profits to divide" (pg. 200). These schemes ought not to be compulsory, except for public corporations (pg. 203).

Chapter 17 begins plainly, that a "new industrial order" is envisioned, described as "industrial self-government" by encouragment of the state. This order, it is written, will not be like the "harsh individualism" underpinning 19th century capitalism, but nor will it be like the "trade-union dictatorship" envisioned by Socialists. The outline of the new vision is one where the share of ownership is given as much as possible, which has been Liberal policy from 1921 onwards (pg. 206). This is seen as the inevitable outcome of relations between labour and capital, and so the government should conform to it. A new "Council of Industry" is suggested to represent industry as a whole, rather than dispersed Trade Boards (pg. 210). With this, a minimum wage should be set (pg. 211). The Joint Industrial Councils are also suggested to have greater powers in enacting agreements between capital and labour (pg. 211-2). "Essential Public Services" are also posited, and from whence, industry itself is sustained (pg. 215). These include: (i) Health, (ii) Water, (iii) Gas, (iv) Electricity, (v) [Railway] Transport. The transparency of industry is also required (pg. 218).

Chapter 18 includes the provision that "worker's control" as attributed by certain people will lead to disaster, if the subordinates vote on the executives, since management is not subject to such qualification (pg. 228). The idea of "Consultation not control" (pg. 227) is then the position, with a doubt as to workers occupting a space in boards being relevant (pg. 228). This is simply a matter of the division of labour. Consultation is said to work best by a "Work Council" in every factory (pg. 230). The terms of a man's employment is also suggested (pg. 234), that no dismissal can be given which could not be anticipated. For both this and Work Councils, Germany is highlighted as the example. Finally, joint ownership by means of the Work Council agreements is posited, which is seen to be the policy of a "free man" rather than a "slave" (pg. 238).

Chapter 19 fully deals in the "Diffusion of Ownership" of industry (pg. 242). It begins by describing the "existing economic order" as that which has "divided society into a small class of owners who live by owning, and a very large class of workers whose labour enrich these owners". This goes even further, describing a dichotomy between those who own the "means of production", and the "propertyless proletariat", living by the sale of labour. The Liberals then embrace both: (i) the labour theory of value, and (ii) a critique of capitalism - even if they are weary to use that term. Incredibly useful statistics are then provided from Professor Clay (1920-1), upon the distribution of wealth in society: 75% have less than £100, whilst 0.5% have over £25,000. In terms of gross population, this is 13 million people versus 50 thousand. The difference in population is around 1/260 and wealth inequality is around 1/250. In terms of property, the 75% have only 7.5% of property, while the 0.5% have 38%. So then, this is a massive monopoly, and scales of income can be seen as derivative of property ownership. From these figures, the report argues that the ownership of capital must be put "into many hands, not a few", but most especially of "industrial wage-earners" (pg. 243). The disagreement with the socialists does not come in seeing "mal-distribution", but in solving the crisis, by a platform of "popular ownership, not public ownership". In the proper Liberal reversal, it is written that "The aim must be not to destroy the owner class, but to enlarge it". Indeed, this is identical to what Jevons writes (1870). Marx's polemic in the Manifesto (1848) is that capital abolishes private property by concentration, which is true, but his ultimate argument is that this is a good thing, while the Liberal position is that it is a bad thing.

The report continues that although 62% of revenue goes to wages and salaries, the other 38% should gradually contribute to this portion, inciting a Lassallean reading that 'labour is entitled to all it creates' (pg. 243-4). The means of redistribution by progressive taxation is given, as well as inheritance, or "death-duties" (pg. 245-7). All of these proposals by themselves are not adequate to solve all issues. If investment funds are converted into consumption funds, there will be a loss of wealth, which is why a "popular savings" scheme is offered (pg. 253). The model of this is based in co-operative societies (pg. 254), which as membership increases, subscription revenues also rise. Thus, an increase of investment can be linear to growth. Upon further schemes, employee shares are cited (pg. 256), as well as customer shares (pg. 257), both being examples from America. Finally in Section 9 of Chapter 19, conclusions of the chapter are given, which are as following (pg. 260-1): (i) Existing distribution of ownership is undesirable, (ii) Progressive taxation and inheritance tax are necessary, (iii) that the ownership of industry should be given to workers as much as possible, (iv) that popular saving is necessary, by greater investment shares in companies. The end goal is stated as follows: "that goal of Liberalism in which everybody will be a capitalist, and everybody a worker, as everybody a citizen". This will surely offend most Marxists. How else may this all be described besides a most conscious petit-bourgeois socialism? Such is Liberalism.

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015063743218&seq=167

>>2875646
Go be a prostitute in your beloved brothels you onanist. This is the /Political Economy/ General.

>>2875649
I reckon sex lifestyle is the best lifestyle :)

Anyone have any experience with building simulations with many entities that have complex relations to each other? I want to build an economic simulation that works on Marxian principles

File: 1784924761543-9.png (426.37 KB, 680x688, ClipboardImage.png)

>rate of profit falls
>porky still relies on wage labor but can no longer profit from it
>increasingly relies on constant capital, automation, products of past labor to even keep up with standards of production
>increasingly relies on subsidies, taken from taxes, which are taken from income, including the wages of labor
>wages of labor are "taxed" twice, once by the private sector for (dwindling) surplus value (profit) then a second time by the public sector for social services, military, governance, and subsidizing productino
>eventually porky will receive more out of the workers wage in the form of subsidies than he receives in the form of profit, due to falling rate of profit, and increased subsidization under state capitalism
>at some point there will be a tipping point where the profit rate reaches zero and porky will only receives subsidies to plan and orchestrate production from the state, taken out of the workers income taxes
>at this point socialist revolution no longer becomes a revolt against surplus value, but a classical tax revolt, something even the "right" tends to support in contemporary western culture war terms.

Thoughts?

>>2876220
  • (i) It is impossible for the general rate of profit to reach zero.
  • (ii) Much of the subsidies which businesses receive de facto are from benefits received by the unemployed in general. 10% of total GDP in the UK (2025/6) is in covering social secutity expenses.
  • (iii) The redistribution of wages for profit can be seen in Henry George's description of "socialism for the rich" (1891), famously uttered by Martin Luther King, Jr. later on (1968).
  • (iv) A "classic tax revolt" is simply the meaning of revolution itself, since a tax is nothing more than the redistribution of wealth. If the working class is taxed, it is by necessity to the non-working classes, whether poor or rich. If we look at tax history, the income tax did not exist before the need to fund wars. This is the case in every country where it has been introduced. This is then a redistribution of wealth toward the military, for the benefit of capitalists. Oil share prices went up after the Iraq War, meaning that your income tax was an indirect transfer into profits, and so is theft. Taxation is theft - where there is no representation. Only taxation with representation is just.

>>2876260
>pic
things that have never happened

>>2876260
The American "revolution" was just about whether aristocrats had to pay nominal taxes to the crown lol

>>2876708
The Declaration of Independence gives a long list of the reasons why America declared its separation: (i) the refusal of Royal Assent for colonial law, (ii) the blocking of representative bodies in the colonies, (iii) the denial of migration and naturalisation, (iv) blocked trade and imposed taxes, (v) maintaining a standing army in order to oppress the inhabitants - and so on.
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript
The cause of political independence was a bourgeois concern, not an aristocratic one, since the aristocracy already benefitted from the colonisation of America. We see that the US established its own paper currency from the early 18th century onwards ("bills of credit"), which were equally supported by Franklin (1729). Imposition of British money onto America began with the Currency Act (1751) which denied independent currency, and thus made Britain the colonial creditor - especially of private debts, which were still ruled by means of British money. This was continued all the way to 1764, after which we get the Stamp Act (1765), which inspires the Sons of Liberty, who later form the Boston Tea Party (1773). It is shown that funds from the Seven Years' War (1756-63) doubled the debt of the British Empire, leading to further extraction, and this is also when tyranny is increased. It is was with the Sons of Liberty where the revolutionary slogan of "no taxation without representation" began. In the same year as the Stamp Act, there is a Quartering Act (1765), which is also seen as overreach, and this is further expanded in 1774. By this time, the patriots were in open rebellion against British aggression, leading to the War, which began April 19, 1775, and this prompted the Proclamation of Rebellion (1775) by King George III. It was over a year of armed struggle, and decades of taxation without representation which led to revolution.

>>2876804
>The cause of political independence was a bourgeois concern, not an aristocratic one
I notice a lot of Americans don't know the difference between bourgeoisie and aristocracy because these are fancy European words they don't get taught in school.

>>2878012
Americans don't get taught about Marxism or class struggle at all.

>>2876804
mel gibs kills like 50 redcoats with only 2 children as backup. absurd

>>2878012
It’s not just an American thing.

>>2878012
those words mean the same exact thing in current year tho,the old money aristocracy is most of the time bourgeois nowadays or completely reliant on renting their castles and land speculation (which unless you're following the Smithian idea that rent economy is a remnant of feudalism,is capitalism too)

>>2878172
This was during Mel Gibson's anti-English era.
>>2878213
Where rents are paid in money rather than in-kind, this is treated as a capitalist relationship.
>>2878012
Both terms "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat" are obtusely outdated and contentious today. Bourgeoisie refers to a medieval class of city-dweller, and Proletarii refers to a Roman class of 'propertyless' citizens. In 500 BCE, the proletarii were those who possessed less than 11,000 copper asses (1,100 denarius - with 1 denarius being the rate of daily wages, making 1,100 denarius equivalent to over $150,000 in net wealth today). By 50 BCE, proletarii were valued only at 1,500 asses (or $30,000), with an even lower "capite censi" at 375 asses (or $7,000). So, the concept is historically relative, and socially relative also, since the term "proletarius" means "producer of offspring", as a security for military service. Sismondi was the first to compare the modern working class to the ancient proletariat. You will notice that Marx never uses this term in his political economy, but only in his political writings, so it is not in any way a technical term.

Both burghers and proletarii comprise the "third estate", or class of "commoners" (e.g. plebeians), which are the peasants and burghers, but even the serfs (e.g. slaves) did not count as part of this, which is why the term "the fourth estate" included the masses in the 18th century, but only unofficially. Marx writes that the proletariat of today is created by the decline of serfdom and eviction of peasants, leading to propertyless dependents. This condition of unemployment is recorded since at least 1489 in England. The landlord is the first capitalist, and so the aristocracy still rules. The merchant is secondary until the 17th century, in Marx's estimation, and so the bourgeoisie is not the "capitalist" as such, but moreso the urban capitalist, as opposed to the rural. Marx gives distinction as late as 1870. We see in Americana like The Great Gatsby (1925) that old and new money is still competing, leading the way to a decline of the WASPs. The fine line between nobility and bourgeoisie is blurred on the surface, but deeper, the conflict is racial, being based in status, such as between Buchanan and Gatz.

The term "rentier" was also popularised after Veblen (1899), where "conspicuous consumption" rules the "political economy of the sign" (1972), and which designates a new aristocracy, or "leisure class", which according to Bukharin (1914) is the end-stage of capitalist society, by a reversion into the feudal. Of course, Smith (1776) sees that services are feudal, and goods are modern, in the conception of wealth. As economies develop, services spring up in place of goods, following the same logic of degeneration - but this would only mean that the bourgeois citizen is increasingly aristocratic (i.e. wasteful).

File: 1785169826334-0.png (634.12 KB, 779x643, The Real Proles.png)

>>2878240
>Both terms "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat" are obtusely outdated and contentious today.
finally someone dropping this truth nuke without fear on leftychud dot larp

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>>2878240
> You will notice that Marx never uses this term in his political economy, but only in his political writings, so it is not in any way a technical term.

Are you sure? Here it is in Chapter 10 of Volume 1 of Capital

>>2878240
>Smith (1776) sees that services are feudal, and goods are modern, in the conception of wealth.
How? Ancient societies trafficked in goods all the time. Maybe I misunderstand the point.

>>2878240

Half of your argumentation is playing with the etymology of words used. If I exchange the word proletariat by a constante such as "A" but keep in it the strictly modern meaning you are left without an argument, you can no longer say that the term is relative. That's like trying to argue against a Hegelian account of "essence" by attacking the scholastic use of the same term, pretending it will exhaustively apply to Hegel as well

>>2878388
>Half of your argumentation is playing with the etymology of words used.

>>2878391
Wittgenstein has nothing to do with what I said bruh

>>2878377
But he's not using the term in any intrinsic sense to the demonstration of political economy. Both "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat" most appear in the prefaces and the historical chapters, while the term "labourer" appears throughout the entire text over a thousand times.
>>2878386
Unfortunately, he doesn't provide much detail.
>>2878388
>Half of your argumentation is playing with the etymology of words used.
Precisely. The meaning of words has to do with their etymology. We can even read the anachronism and the particularity of the term in Engels' description (1847):
<The proletariat, or the class of proletarians, is, in a word, the working class of the 19th century […] The class of the wholly propertyless […] This is called the class of proletarians, or the proletariat.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/11/prin-com.htm
We no longer exist in the 19th century, and if according to Marx, the worker must sell a "commodity" of labour-power, he is transferring his own property to another. Thus, Engels' literal meaning of "proletariat" as one who is "propertyless" is false by the very logic of his class. Marx provides a more concise definition here (1867):
<Our “prolétarian” is economically none other than the wage labourer, who produces and increases capital
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch25.htm
This then avoids any extra baggage. For the rest of what you wrote; it's up to people to use words incorrectly, so when people are left confused, that's also their problem.

>>2878498
All I meant is a terminological identity is not a conceptual identity, you were implicitly saying the contrary by critiquing the Marxist concept of proletarian through a critique of the roman concept.

>>2878388
you're talking to a llm

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its over

>>2878511
>a terminological identity is not a conceptual identity
Perhaps you misunderstand, but the term "proletariat" to identify the 19th century working class was a conscious allusion to the Roman "proletarii", by Sismondi, and which was later adopted by Socialists. Engels' literal interpretation of "proletarian" denoting "propertyless" persons displays overt continuity. I am critiquing, in the first place, (i) its very appropriation, and (ii) its continuation beyond the 19th century. The term serves no benefit and can only cause problems.
>>2878514
I have written before on how Marxism is a subversion of socialism for the ends of capital, but it remains "bourgeois" nonetheless. Lenin (1902):
<Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/ii.htm
And the "proletariat" by their own efforts only achieve Fascism.

Everything you think you know about Economics is wrong

https://www.patreon.com/ProfSteveKeen/posts/everything-you-164699970

>The American humourist Henry Louis Mencken once wrote of human thought that “Explanations exist; they have existed for all time; there is always a well-known solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong.”


>I can think of no better aphorism for Neoclassical economics. Its solutions are well-known, its models are neat, its explanations are plausible, but its arguments are wrong. But to understand this, you have to go well beyond a textbook-level of knowledge of economics, because economic textbooks present a sanitised version of the theory, shorn of the fallacies which infest it.


>Normally, this is because the textbook writers are themselves unaware of the problems with the theory. But on occasions, textbook writers who themselves uncovered fallacies in the theory ignore their own discoveries, and teach the theory as if their own work had never happened.


>The most significant instances of this phenomenon—a leading economist finding a flaw in the theory, and then publishing a textbook which ignores both the flaw and his own research into it—concern the two fundamental constructs in economics, the demand curve and the supply curve. The textbook writers in question were prominent and highly influential economists: one, Paul Samuelson, was the main architect of post-WWII mainstream economics; the other, Alan Blinder, was Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Vice-President of the American Economic Association.


>Together, their findings destroy the iconic foundations of Neoclassical economics, the supply and demand diagram. Explaining why this is so will take us on a substantial diversion from the specific topic of the economics of climate change, and it will take several chapters to show just how unsound Neoclassical economics is. But it is necessary to know this background in order to be able to understand how the laughably bad work of climate change economists came to be published in the first place.


<Samuelson and America as the One Big Happy Family


>Paul Samuelson and John Hicks developed the methods by which economists derive an individual’s demand curve {Samuelson, 1938 #291;Samuelson, 1947 #5848;Samuelson, 1948 #6947;Hicks, 1934 #4984;Hicks, 1934 #4985}. Their methods showed that an individual’s demand curve necessarily sloped downwards: that the individual’s demand for a commodity necessarily declined as its price rose. [1] In his textbook Economics—now maintained by William Nordhaus—Samuelson told students that the “law of downward-sloping demand” also applied to the market demand curve:


<Market Demand

<Our discussion of demand has so far referred to “the” demand curve. But whose demand is it? Mine? Yours? Everybody’s? The fundamental building block for demand is individual preferences. However, in this chapter we will always focus on the market demand, which represents the sum total of all individual demands. The market demand is what is observable in the real world.

<The market demand curve is found by adding together the quantities demanded by all individuals at each price. Does the market demand curve obey the law of downward-sloping demand? It certainly does. {Samuelson, 2010 #6096`, p. 48}


>“Certainly”? Half a century earlier, Samuelson reached a very different result.


>In Neoclassical theory, individual demand curves are derived by combining an individual’s tastes—represented by what are called “indifference curves”—with the individual’s income and relative prices. For the market demand curve to have the same properties as an individual demand curve, it must be conceptually possible to represent an entire economy by “social indifference curves”. Samuelson commenced his 1956 paper “Social Indifference Curves” {Samuelson, 1956 #1495} with the concession that this was only possible in extremely limited and clearly unrealistic cases:


<What defense do we make when challenged on the use of community indifference curves for a country or group of individuals? I suppose one of the following:


<(a) We may claim that our country is inhabited by Robinson Crusoe alone and claim only to show how trade between such single person countries is determined. This is admittedly not very realistic.


<(b) In order to give the appearance of being more realistic, we may claim that our country is inhabited by a number of identical individuals with identical tastes; they must also have identical initial endowments of goods if this artifice of examining what happens to the representative individual’s indifference curves is to give us a true description of the resulting market equilibrium. This case, too, is not very realistic, though it may seem a slight improvement over Robinson Crusoe.


<(c) We may claim to be depicting trade of a totalitarian nation. One dictator determines demand within his country and his consistent indifference curves provide us with the community indifference curves for that country. Some might regard this as Robinson Crusoe brought painfully up to date.


<(d) None of the previous explanations meets the case of two (or more) dissimilar individuals within each country. {Samuelson, 1956 #1495`, p. 3. Emphasis added}


>He then proved that community indifference curves were impossible, with the sole exception being “where tastes are identical, not only for all men, but also for all men when they are rich or poor” {Samuelson, 1956 #1495`, p. 5}. This proof showed that a market demand curve derived by adding up multiple individual downward-sloping demand curves could have any shape at all—it did not have to slope down.[2] As later rediscoverers of this conundrum concluded, “The utility hypothesis tells us nothing about market demand” {Shafer, 1993 #349}.[3]


>This should have been “a Pythagorean moment” for economics. Pythagoras believed that all numbers could be expressed as the ratio of two integers: we call such numbers “rational” today. But one of his followers discovered that there were “irrational numbers”: numbers that were not the ratio of two integers. This follower was purportedly drowned for his troubles,[4] but the result was ultimately accepted. The dogma that all numbers were rational was abandoned, and mathematics advanced dramatically as a result.


>This has not happened with economics, because the economists who proved this result {Gorman, 1953 #1491;Samuelson, 1956 #1495;Sonnenschein, 1972 #1484;Sonnenschein, 1973 #1483;Sonnenschein, 1973 #1486;Sonnenschein, 1974 #1482;Kihlstrom, 1976 #1485;Shafer, 1982 #6082;Shafer, 1993 #349} were too wedded to their dogma—the teleological belief that a free market economy maximizes social welfare—to accept this conundrum that they had discovered.


>This led to behaviour by these economists which, in a purely psychological sense, can be characterised as insane. The desire to show that a free-market system maximizes social welfare was so strong that they devised “solutions” to this conundrum which literally contradicted the foundations of Neoclassical thought.


>Samuelson’s solution was to invoke altruism.


>Classical scholars will remember Virgil’s famous warning in The Aeneid to “Be wary of Greeks bearing gifts”.[5] The same warning applies to Neoclassical economists wielding the concept of “altruism”. A theory based entirely on the concept of maximizing self-interest appealing to altruism to overcome a logical conundrum, is as trustworthy as a Wooden Horse at the gates of Troy…

>>2878240
> You will notice that Marx never uses this term in his political economy, but only in his political writings, so it is not in any way a technical term.
>>2878498
>But he's not using the term in any intrinsic sense to the demonstration of political economy. Both "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat" most appear in the prefaces and the historical chapters, while the term "labourer" appears throughout the entire text over a thousand times.
ok i get your point but that's a significant retreat from the much bolder "never"

>>2879509
You're right.
I was hyperbolic.
>>2879355
I'm currently re-reading Carl Menger's "Principles of Economics" (1871) and he seems to be the origin of the theory of economic "indifference"; meaning that two goods may provide the same value (e.g. utility) and thus either can be consumed for one another. An example would be how many foods equally satisfy a person, and thus any may be consumed. The value of goods then concerns their symmetry of indifference. Menger deprives this to pre-monetary judgement (latent in immanent contradiction), while Samuelson adds the element of income, according to Keen, making price a measure of value, and thus of effective demand. Wikipedia:
<As price rises for a fixed money income, the consumer seeks the less expensive substitute at a lower indifference curve.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indifference_curve
This is only common sense, of course, but it shows the crucial nature of market demand as a function of distributed income. Smith (1776) thus presents a distinction between absolute and effectual demand, being the same difference between desire and availability. If one's income changes one's effectual demand, then this is what determines market equilibrium. Quesnay writes (1767):
< it is the demand, the market, that regulates the production each year.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/quesnay/1767/maxims.htm
This is a reversal of "Say's Law" over a century before Keynes. The presumption of many economists of the 19th century was that the poor were poor because they simply desired less, but if providing more money increases spending, then it must be money which is the limit of effectual demand. A pauper would not burn cash, while a rich man may waste his own. Justice then, is rational re-allocation.

>>2878520
>And the "proletariat" by their own efforts only achieve Fascism.

by themselves as in, directed by bourgeois agents, cause they dont exist in a vacuum. In the hands of communists, they can do more than that. They are the only social agent capable of running communism natively, since all other classes must rid themselves of their class status to avoid a performative contradiction, since their interest lay elsewhere. The proletariat is the only agent whose starting condition enables a strive towards communism. They are the only possible hardware for that program, which doesnt mean they are perfect. Not only because they are the labouring class, the global majority, with no much to loose and yada yada, but also because modernity enables precisely this kind of self-conscious activity on a social scale, in terms of technoscientific progress, economic surplus and philosophic sophistication. This doesnt mean such a wonderful algorithm cant be stucked at a local optimum, such as succdem treats.

>>2879681
well, theres the ass of buridan also

>>2880473
In Menger's theory, the donkey is caught between basic necessities and diamonds in terms of social valuation.
>>2880467
>by themselves as in, directed by bourgeois agents
By themselves means by themselves.
To Lenin, sovialists are "bourgeois" agents (1901):
<The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness […] The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/ii.htm
The consciousness of labour cannot conceive beyond a consciousness of wages, rather than its abolition, and even worse, as Keynes writes, workers will fight for higher nominal wages at the expense of real wages.

>>2880654
how can the working class be "by itself" when it already always is in a social system influenced by agents other than itself? Do you really believe that when they achieve fascism "by themselves" the bourgeoise get benefitted on a purely accidental, unintended way, as if it was a spontaneus thing the proletariat itself devised in total isolation?

Granted, when organized under a labour movement, they cant get beyond trade unionism or economism, this is why I said that "communists" can install the program onto them, and communist can come from any given class, as long as they got the program in. Besides, what you answered to wasnt even the core of my argument, which was saying that if they reach fascism or economism, is because their behaviour was stuck at a local optimum, not because their inherent nature leads exclusively to it or something like that. They can be directed to communism as well, which would be their global optimum, which is at the same time the hardest one to achieve, because of the very strong entropy of capital. In fact, they are the only historical class with such a capability, to date at least.

>>2880764
>Do you really believe that when they achieve fascism "by themselves" the bourgeoise get benefitted on a purely accidental, unintended way, as if it was a spontaneus thing the proletariat itself devised in total isolation?
No, since a proletariat presupposes a bourgeoisie. This is why chauvinist politics quite often advantage local capitalists. Most Marxists today base their politics in whatever advances the national capital of China, as an example. The German National Socialists were backed by German industrialists; Italian capitalists in Italy, etc.
>when organized under a labour movement, they cant get beyond trade unionism or economism, this is why I said that "communists" can install the program onto them, and communist can come from any given class, as long as they got the program in.
But what does this imply except that politics is idealist?
>not because their inherent nature leads exclusively to it or something like that
Why wouldn't it be? The interests of labour are wages, which means a preservation of capitalist institutions.
>they are the only historical class with such a capability
Such a capability to what? Capital is global. Labour is local.

  1. The fact that achieving a different mode of production requires self-conscious and rational activity doesn't logically entail any form of idealist ontology by itself. Rational activity on a social scale is perfectly compatible with materialism. Humans are highly complex animals that through the evolution and the historical development of language and social institutions have reached meta-cognitive and self-conscious operations. And only in modernity or capitalism has the range of this kind of self-conscious activity reached a global scale.

  2. Not only wages, a strategy focused on wages would be a very clear case of getting stuck at a local optimum, such as a fungi overcommitting its mycelium in a determinate patch, from which it gets enough nutrition to survive, instead of expanding into other nearby patches, that provide much more opportunity for growth. Also in the interest of labourers is their development in the full range of human qualities, which they cannot achieve because they have to work alienating shitty jobs. This is also true of the capitalist class, but unlike the labouring class, their own constitution REQUIRES competitive, predatory and even cannibalistic behaviour, unlike that of the labouring class, which IS CAPABLE of a universally cooperative behaviour, although it IS ALSO CAPABLE of cannibalistic, competitive behaviour, BUT, unlike the bourgies, it DOESN'T REQUIRE IT. The fact that the capitalist class has to be eliminated from the game doesn't take away this fact, it rather says much more about the bottlenecks of the capitalist system and class than any inherent violence or hostility or non-cooperativeness in the working class.


I bet that if you somehow were an abstract observer considering anatomically modern humans in prehistoric times, by your logic you would conclude that they are only capable of organizing into hunter-gatherer societies, since their only incentive is to collect food or some shit. But humans have so complex capabilities as to wonder how many possible systems can they organize themselves in, even global ones, how many things can they do… Something that to wonder about both hypothetically, in an abstract plane, and in the prospect of the infinite years to come from this determinate point in history.

  1. Labour is already global in many other senses, since the mode of production, technical knowledge, production processes, and even workforce is largely integrated in a global system, both theoretically (modern technoscience, measuring systems, engineering, etc.) and practically (as in, an actual global economy). But I understand you mean political capability. Labour has such a global capability if there is a global communist movement. But to bring about this global movement and succeeding in its objectives is, understandably, the hardest task in the world, since it is the creation of a complex system of order countering directly the main force of entropy in the globe, which is capital, and thus, it is probabilistically the least likely thing to happen, although not at all impossible. Capital itself has provided means to bring about such a transformation, although it continuously counteracts the operation in countless ways. What is clear is that it can only happen through the labouring class, since all other classes can't host the behaviour of universality required for the task, like I said in point 2.

>>2881269
>The fact that achieving a different mode of production requires self-conscious and rational activity doesn't logically entail any form of idealist ontology
This isn't a philosophical discussion; it's a discussion of politics. To you, communists are able to come from any class in society, and effective action is simply putting theory into practice, making ideas the political pivot on which things depend upon, and making ideas universal of reason, rather than particular to class interest. I have a more materialist view that what is universal of class consciousness is the only universal class of the citizen, although "civil government" often disguises particular interest as common interest. Adam Smith writes on this dilemma (1776):
<Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/smith-adam/works/wealth-of-nations/book05/ch01b.htm
A similar point is made by Marx in the Manifesto (1848).
This is the struggle for universality in general (1875):
<Hence, equal right here is still in principle – bourgeois right, although principle and practice are no longer at loggerheads
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ch01.htm

>>2878409
the anon you are replying to is conflating language games, not you, if they are using etymology as a trump card while failing to remember that words mean different things in different contexts.

Net worth just went up $8k in two days

>>2883855
did you do some degenerate options trade?

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>>2883856
Mostly mutual funds.

>>2883855
This is a very cool webm. I especially enjoy the red background the artistic representation of an luminescent red movement and find it to be an incredible artistic representation.

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The Austrian School begins with Carl Menger (1840–1921), who after beginning his economic study in 1867, published the "Principles of Economics" (1871), which at the time was not widely received. It was only with later works from 1883-4 that he gained attention in a dispute entitled the "methodology struggle" (Methodenstreit), where the "Austrian" School also gained it's namesake. In the same year we get the early works of both Böhm-Bawerk and Wieser, who are its earliest representatives.

We read in James Bonar's "The Austrian Economists and their View of Value" (1888) the direct comparison between Jevons' and Mengers' theory of value. Indeed, Wieser takes Jevons' "final degree of utility" and from it crafts the term "marginal utility" (1884) to mean the same thing. Menger illustrates the same principle but in less eloquent (e.g. formal) terms, and so this stands. In approaching the so-called "Neoclassical" and "Austrian" Schools, what stands between them? Wieser in "The Austrian School and the Theory of Value" (1891) claims that Jevons' view is a "narrower view" of price and value, where value only manifests as price, while to Austrians, value expresses something intrinsic to our experience.

We must start with Menger's "Principles" (1871), which begins with a consideration of causation (Ch. 1, Sct. 1). A thing which is known to have the capacity to satisfy a human need is called a "useful thing" (Nützlichkeiten), which if it may be commanded, is a "good". All goods have a goods-character (Güterqualität). Goods may either be "true" or "imaginary" in their means to satisfy, and thus, goods-character is not arbitrary. The nature of goods can be given in "relationships" (Verhältnisse), as well as individual items. Menger resolves that goods are of two kinds: (i) material goods, and (ii) useful human in/activity; e.g. labour and its product. Causal connections may be seen between goods (Ch. 1, Sct. 2), such that what is directly consumed in bread is a result of goods which indirectly cause our satisfaction (e.g. flour). What is directly consumed is thus a good "of the first order", while what is indirect is of the second/third/fourth, etc. order. The more orders of good, the more indirect causes, and so the greater the process of production, which henceforth corresponds to a greater length of time in production (Ch. 1, Sct. 4). Goods which belong to the same order as each other are "complementary goods", and these are used to create goods of different orders (Ch. 1, Sct. 3A–B). The goods-character of higher and lower orders are thus codependent of each other, toward the end of realising the end of the consumption of goods of first order. If goods fail to serve the ends of consumption, they lose their corresponding goods-character, so are useless. In general, the knowledge of production is uncertain, and relative to the knowledge of society (Ch. 1, Sct. 4); thus, what was previously useless may become useful, given greater a causal conception (e.g. scientific technique). The progress of wealth is seen to be based in the division of labour (Ch. 1, Sct. 5), which thus varies the production of particular goods. The increased variety of goods able to be commanded thus measures wealth, which itself depends upon an increase in goods of higher order. Thus, civilisation and barbarism differ in regard to the scale of ordered goods; by the complexity of production, and of course, human knowledge in general is the basis of all advancement.

Needs are said to arise from our natural drives (Ch. 2, Sct. 0), which concretely correspond to the consumption of a certain quantity of goods. This quantity is seen as a man's "requirements" (Bedarf), or "demand" (Nachfrage). Adequate knowledge of requirement entails planning in advance for the satisfaction of need, and it is this long-term, or provident activity, that also defines civilisation. Goods of first order are "consumption goods", and goods of higher order are termed "means of production" (Ch. 2, Sct. 1A–B). Production is measured from periods of time, designated "Period I, II, III", etc. that corresponds to each sequential good of higher order (Ch. 2, Sct. 1C). Thus, Period I measures the time from a second order good to the production of a first order good; Period II is the period from the third to the second, and so on. The length of provident activity for civilised production is thus given according to these recorded periods of time. All complex forms of production are evidently planned, strengthened by record-keeping, along with government statistics (Ch. 2, Sct. 2). The rational assorting of goods based in the priority of their use is called "economising" (Ch. 2, Sct. 3A), based in the order of consumption, from necessary to luxury goods. Where scarcity reigns, each member of a society will thus compete to economise the available goods for themselves, and it is opposition of self-interest which manifests the institution of law for the protection of property. Economy and property thus have the same origin, in the scarcity of requirement for the satisfaction of (social) need. Abundance thus allows for "non-economic goods" to persist (Ch. 2, Sct. 3B), and so where there is a greater number of available goods than necessary to satisfy people, the status of property also declines. Thus, Menger sees that a propertyless "communism" is the norm where social demand is much lower than the social supply. Oxygen is common to all. The non/economic status of goods is thus dependent upon the requirements given from a certain population (Ch. 2, Sct. 3C). Menger attributes causes for changes in social requirement: (i) change in total population, and (ii) change in human knowledge. There are intermediate goods in economic status also, which largely exist as public services, such as schooling. Menger also adds that abundant goods may become artificially scarce as a result of force - he gives the example of monopolists of land. Since command of these non-economic goods is henceforth restricted, they attain economic character. Quality and quantity is compared, where greater quality attains a smaller quantity for the satisfaction of the same need (Ch. 3, Sct. 2C). Just as the goods-character of a good of lower order determines that of the higher, so too is it the case for their economic character (e.g. scarcity), so to Menger, higher economic goods cannot produce non-economic goods (Ch. 2, Sct. 3D). Just as the entire sum of goods at a person's disposal is his "property", a sum of economic goods is his wealth (Ch. 2, Sct. 4). So then, one's wealth is a result of the lack of requirement from one's property. Wealth may extend to governments in particular, and of social wealth (e.g. "national wealth") in general, Menger advises that this is a sum of individual economising units, and shan't be made legally fictitious.

From these theories of concrete human needs leading to goods, which in quantities of requirement, possess an economic character of wealth, as a type of property, we finally come to the theory of value (Ch. 3, Sct. 1). Value is said to have the same origin as economisation, that it is the importance we impute to goods, and so it is only economic goods which possess "value". All goods have "utility", but not all goods are economic. The measure of value given is twofold (Ch. 3, Sct. 2): (i) degree of importance given to a good (subjective factor), and (ii) the command of each good (objective factor). The first case is simply measured by pleasure, given in quantities of duration and intensity (Ch. 3, Sct. 2A), mapping to a scale of degrees of importance (read: pleasure) given from each good. This is in essence a geometry of the total utility of each good, which thus measures its value, yet as satisfaction is diminished, it reaches "equilibrium" with the marginal utilities of other goods, for which the consumption of one good over another is economically rationalised. This is scaled, like all goods, from what is most necessary to least necessary - the least necessary possessing the lowest total utility, or least importance. Upon this point, Menger writes that from circumstances of quenched thirst, water attains a lesser value than diamonds, since the importance of water becomes less than what may be fulfilled by luxury. Conversely, he says that the need for water may be greater than diamonds only in extreme circumstances of thirst. Ultimately, he insists that it is scarcity which measures the value of these goods (Ch. 3, Sct. 2B). The nature and measure of value are repeated to be subjective (Ch. 3, Sct. 2D), and this dispells any attempt to equalise value with labour or costs necessary for re-production. Examples Menger provides are naturally scarce products which exact a value without consideration of reproduction, and also an incongruity between means of production and a product which may have different total values. He repeats the axiom that the value of goods is determined from an imputation of the importance of goods to satisfying our needs, but is careful to add that this is not just arbitrary. As a reversal of attributing value to costs of production, Menger instead sees that it is the "expected value" of means of production from their final product which is the cause of their requirement (Ch. 3, Sct. 3A). So, just as both the goods-character and economic character of the lower order determines that of the higher order, so too is it the case of the prospective value of the lower for the higher. Present goods, on the other hand, may be different in value than in prospective goods. Goods of higher order are exclusively determined by prospectivity. Upon these means of production, Menger speaks of the "services of capital" (Ch. 3, Sct. 3B), which he claims is not reimbursed by interest upon "abstinence", but upon the simple purchase of a valuable service. Abstinence by itself adds nothing, Menger claims, and from this, he adds that capital is often original of "seizure", where like his earlier example of land monopoly, the services of capital may be commanded by force to meet certain ends. The services of capital are renumerated by the "entrepenurial activity" of the capitalist (Ch. 3, Sct. 3C), or classically, "wages of superintendence", which must then be included within the prospective value of capital. Entrepeneurial activity is given as: (i) information, (ii) economic calculation, (iii) willingness, (iv) supervision. As he adds, the larger the capital, the more entrepeneurs who are required (e.g. managers). Menger also rejects a notion of "risk" management as entrepeneurial activity, although he writes that transport costs are factored into the value of higher order goods, as service. Since the prospective value of capital includes interest, Menger sees that present goods are reduced in value, and so this resolves earlier comments on incongruity. From this, the value of land, if it's to be treated as means of production, is determined in the same way, although Menger declines to affirm "rent" as a service of the land owner, but still rejects Ricardo's theory of ground-rent (Ch. 3, Sct. 3E). Menger also determines the value of the services of labour as prospective of their final product.

The next chapter moves to economic exchange, which as Menger writes, cannot be an end in itself, but only a means to an end; this end being increased satisfaction (Ch. 4, Sct. 1–2). The origin of exchange is the surplus of a good which serves no use to its owner, and a use to another. The mutual transfer of goods adds value to the good which is sold (e.g. W+x). The limits of exchange are then evidently given by a diminishment of gain unto a lack of mutual gain. Where trade cannot offer added value, there is no economic reason in trade. Thus, it is mutual gain (x) which determines economic exchange, by means of bargaining. Moving to prices (e.g. mutually exchanged quantities), Menger considers different forms. Isolated exchange (Ch. 5, Sct. 1) results in a perfect equilibrium of mutual gain (e.g. since there is equal supply and demand). With monopoly (Ch. 5, Sct. 2–3), we see that the less supply and greater demand, the price will increase with the one who offers the most, and so a monopoly of sellers produces a competition of purchasers. With greater supply of the monopoly good, the price tends to diminish, leading to greater purchase. Thus, while mutual gain in bargaining leads to formation of prices, the "laws" of exchange are supply and demand.

Next, economic goods are decoded from their: (i) direct and (ii) indirect value, or between (i) use-value, and (ii) exchange-value (Ch. 6, Sct. 1). As Menger continues, the only value a good can have in an isolated economy is a use-value (Ch. 6, Sct. 2). As use-values diminish in their direct satisfaction as wealth, they may transform into exchange-values for their possessors (Ch. 6, Sct. 3), like the surplus product of trade goods already discussed. Products which expand beyond the household and are ready to be sold (e.g. goods which possess exchange-value) are called "commodities" (Ch. 7, Sct. 1), and so economic goods possessing a "commodity-character" (Waarencharakter). By their nature, commodities are only transitory, and so by conversion into a use-value, they cease to be commodities as such. Money as a commodity thus possesses the same waarencharakter - Menger criticises fiat currency (Ch. 8, Sct. 4), yet in other places, permits the reality of fiat money (e.g. "Lectures to Crown Prince Rudolf of Austria", 1876). He also describes the effectual demand of commodities as a factor of their "marketability" (Ch. 7, Sct. 2A–C), while he prefers the term "saleability" for money. On money, he continues that money is a "natural" creation of custom, and not the state (Ch. 8, Sct. 1), although, he separates "money" from "coin" (e.g. a particular type of money). He adds that the state has perfected money by intervention, but is not its origin - he repeats this in his later article "The Origins of Money" (1892), which is not in any way an historical document. It is the increased "saleability" of certain commodities which grant them the form of money (Ch. 8, Sct. 2), and the form of money thus changes throughout history, with precious metals becoming more important as civilisation expands, yet Menger wants to restate that value is subjective, and so where money serves as means of circulation, it is itself not in any way a representation of "value" (Ch. 8, Sct. 3). Money thus is neither a "measure" nor "store" of value. He rather sees money's imperishability and divisibility as more intrinsic factors of its service (Ch. 8, Sct. 4). This is also the underwhelming conclusion of Menger's book.

So then, to summarise what is written: Originally, man existed in a state of primitive communism where goods were abundant, until some type of disruption which led to scarcity and property, either as an oversupply of the population, or the forceful acquisition of resources, or both at different times. The division of property also led to the division of labour, creating varied resources and so a scale of relative values. As productivity increases, goods are distributed in more variable fashion, but also leading to the creation of luxuries which are valued at a rate beyond the security of necessities. The turn from a household economy to a commercial economy converts goods from use-values to exchange-values, and so the form of commodities, most especially money, and thus the abundance of money signifies a rise in uselessness, since circulation is merely transitory. The rise of social wealth must mean the provision of "true" goods over "imaginary" goods, which are assessed by the rational judgement of economic individuals, which can include governments. All providential production is planned, and all planning entails economic calculation. Therefore, the basis of social production is the soundness of planning. This all has its socialist rhetoric. Engels (1894):
<it is just as easy to build up an at least equally plausible vulgar socialism on the basis of this theory, as that built in England on the foundation of Jevons’s and Menger’s theory of use-value and marginal utility.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/pref.htm
I would also recommend this excellent article on the early Austrians:
https://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2011/06/why-are-there-no-austrian-socialists.html?m=1


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