By the invitation of EQG chads
>no hooves<War of all against all edition<Gunpowder Treason DayKing James VI & I movie:https://www.bitchute.com/video/PPRUFSGdI22n/OP Profile:
>OP?
OP is a monarchist on leftypol.org.
>What kind of Monarchist is Graceposter?
A modern day absolute monarchist & invested in the late 1500s & 1600s kind of absolutism, hereditary rule / dynasties, & the pre-eminent notion of monarchy as opposed to mixed constitutionalism / limited or mixed monarchy, formally called constitutional monarchy & constitutional monarchism.
>What about Medievalism & NeoFeudalism?
OP is ambivalent towards traditionalism, particularly the Medievalist or Neofeudalist style of Royalism, & traditionalists who are solely denoted by high church & sometimes the mixed constitutionalism of the Middle Ages & later periods.
The style of absolutism, concerning Monarchy, OP sees as fundamentally different in certain respects, so OP is ambivalent and wary of Medievalism & Traditionalism.
The Medievalist lacks a certain political forte with regard to Monarchy & the Herodotus Debate that absolutism carries (because the Medievalist is predisposed to ultra-clericalism / ultramontanism). Medievalists usually are strong proponents of mixed constitutionalism (having their roots in Aristotle & his politics) and wields Alexis de Tocqueville & Bertrand de Jouvenel against absolute monarchy.
OP is not that kind of monarchist, albeit invested in both monarchies such as the traditionalist connotation of a king with a Christian crown, but also Caesarism and even secular dictatorships sometimes as modern monarchies or bearing a resemblance to monarchical form.
>Who is Grace?
Grace is the board tan of /monarchy/ and /8flags/ on 8chan / 8moe and a monarchist tan.
Sometimes Grace is just an OC or apolitical (when representing /8flags/ or Graceposter is funposting), but primarily Grace is a monarchist tan (& supports Graceposter's taste, style, & niche of monarchy, tbh; she is not a constitutional monarchist or a staunch ultramontanist, but predisposed to absolutism and JUCHE, lmao, sorry Luce and constitutional monarchists).
Thomas Hobbes laments the prevalence of mixed monarchy / constitutionalism
>Saving only that he [the Earl] was carried away with the stream, in a manner, of the whole nation, to think that England was not an absolute, but a mixed monarchy; not considering that the supreme power must always be absolute, whether it be in the King or in the Parliament.
…
>You may know by the declarations themselves, which are very long and full of quotations of records and of cases formly reported, that the penners of them were either lawyers by profession, or such gentlemen as had the ambition to be thought so.
>Besides, I told you before, that those which were then likeliest to have their counsel asked in this business, were averse to absolute monarchy, as also to absolute democracy or aristocracy; all which governments they esteemed tyranny, and were in love with monarchy which they used to praise by the name of mixed monarchy, though it were indeed nothing else but pure anarchy.
>And those men, whose pens the King most used in these controversies of law and politics, were such, if I have not been misinformed, as having been members of this Parliament, had declaimed against ship-money and other extra-parliamentary taxes, as much as any; but who when they saw the Parliament grow higher in their demands than they thought they would have done, went over to the King's party.
…
>Only that fault, which was generally in the whole nation, which was, that they thought the government of England was not an absolute, but a mixed monarchy; and that if the King should clearly subdue this Parliament, that his power would be what he pleased, and theirs as little as he pleased: which they counted tyranny.
>This opinion, though it did not lessen their endeavour to gain the victory for the King in a battle, when a battle could not be avoided, yet it weakened their endeavour to procure him an absolute victory in the war.
>And for this cause, notwithstanding that they saw that the Parliament was firmly resolved to take all kingly power whatsoever out of his hands, yet their counsel to the King was upon all occasions, to offer propositions to them of treaty and accommodation, and to make and publish declarations; which any man might easily have foreseen would be fruitless; and not only so, but also of great disadvantage to those actions by which the King was to recover his crown and preserve his life.
…
>Sometimes also in the merely civil government there be more than one soul… For although few perceive that such government is not government, but division of the Commonwealth into three factions, and call it mixed monarchy; yet the truth is that it is not one independent Commonwealth, but three independent factions; nor one representative person, but three. In the Kingdom of God there may be three persons independent, without breach of unity in God that reigneth; but where men reign, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so.
>To what disease in the natural body of man I may exactly compare this irregularity of a Commonwealth, I know not. But I have seen a man that had another man growing out of his side, with a head, arms, breast, and stomach of his own: if he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.
…
>And if there were a commonwealth, wherein the rights of sovereignty were divided, we must confess with Bodin, Lib. II. chap. I. De Republica, that they are not rightly to be called commonwealths, but the corruption of commonwealths.
>The error concerning mixed government [constitutionalism] has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the union of many men.
Thomas Hobbes / For all Monarchies, and all other States are truly indeed Absolute
>Secondly, they object, That there is no Dominion in the Christian world Absolute; which indeed is not true, for all Monarchies, and all other States, are so; for although they, who have the chief Command, do not all those things they would, and what they know profitable to the City, the reason of that is not the defect of Right in them, but the consideration of their Citizens, who busied about their private interest, and careless of what tends to the public, cannot sometimes be drawn to perform their duties without the hazard of the City. Wherefore princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their Right, and prudently remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of their Right.
William Blackstone / Sir Edward Coke:
<The Absolutism of Parliamentary Sovereignty
>The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says Sir Edward Coke, is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds. And of this high court he adds, it may be truly said "si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima; si dignitatem, est honoratissima; di juridictionem, est capacissima." It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restranshumanisting, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new model the succession to the crown; as was done in the reign of Henry VIII and William III. It can alter the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety of instances, in the reigns of King Henry VIII and his three children. It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the act of union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call it's power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. True it is, that what they do, no authority upon earth can undo. So that it is a matter most essential to the liberties of this kingdom, that such members be delegated to this important trust, as are most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their knowledge; for it was a known apothegm of the great lord treasurer Burleigh, "that England could never be ruined but by a parliament:" and, as sir Matthew Hale observes, this being the highest and greatest court, over which none other can have jurisdiction in the kingdom…"
Francis Theobald on Absolute Power with Cambden & Bracton
>We have, I say, absolute Monarchy, and herein we differ from the Lacedemonian Kings, who were subject to their Ephori, which had a power above them: No, ours agrees with the Persian-Government; for, their King had plenary power in all things, not subject to be called to account by any person whatsoever: and so ours, if you will believe Cambden, a famous Antiquary; who saith, That the King of England, supremam potestatem, & merum imperium habet, He hath supreme power and absolute Command in his Dominions–; and so, Bracton, a sage profound Lawyer, in ancient time, speaks to the same purpose, Omni quidem sub Bege, & ipse sub nullo, sed tantum sub Deo: So that it is an unquestionable truth, that the King is subject to no over-ruling power of man, and that he is free from all humane Coercion and Restranshumanistt, I do rather insist upon this.
Jean Bodin / Majesty or Sovereignty or Pre-eminence
>Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth [La Souveraineté est la puissance absoluë & perpetuelle d’une République], which the Latins call Majestas; the Greeks akra exousia, kurion arche, and kurion politeuma; and the Italians segniora, a word they use for private persons as well as for those who have full control of the state, while the Hebrews call it tomech shévet – that is the highest power of command.
>As for the title of Majesty itself, it sufficiently appears, that it only belongs to him that is a sovereign prince: so that for him that hath no sovereignty to usurp the same, were a very absurd thing: but to arrogate unto himself the addition of most excellent and sacred majesty, is much more absurd the one being a point of lightnes, and the other of impiety: for what more can we give unto the most mighty and immortal God, if we take from him that which is proper unto himself? And albeit that in ancient time neither emperors nor kings used these so great addition or titles: yet the German princes nevertheless have oft times given the title of Sacred Majesty unto the kings of France; aswell as unto their emperor. As I remember my self to have seen the letters of the princes of the empire, written unto the king, for the deliverance of countie Mansfeld, then prisoner in France: wherein there was sixe times V. S. M. that is to say, Vestra, Sacra, Majestas, or Your Sacred Majesty an addition proper unto God, apart from all worldly princes. As for other princes which are not soueraignes some use the addition of His Highnesse, as the dukes of Loraine, Sauoy, Mantua, Ferrara, and Florence: some of Excellency, as the princes of the confines; or else of Serenitie, as the duke of Venice.
>Majesty or Sovereignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonwealth: Which the Latins call Majestatem, the Italians Segnoria, that is to say, The greatest power to command. For Majesty (as Festus saith) is so called of mightiness.
>For so here it behoveth first to define what Majesty or Sovereignty is, which neither lawyer nor political philosopher hath yet defined: although it be the principal and most necessary point for the understanding of the nature of a Commonweal. And forasmuch as wee have before defined a Commonweal to be the right government of many families, and of things common amongst them, with a most high & perpetual power: it rest to be declared, what is to be understood by the name of a most high and perpetual power.
<We have said that this power ought to be perpetual, for that it may bee, that that absolute power over the subject may be given to one or many, for a short or certain time, which expired, they are no more than subjects themselves: so that whilest they are in their puissant authority, they cannot call themselves Sovereign princes, seeing that they are but men put in trust, and keepers of this sovereign power, until it shall please the people or the prince that gave it them to recall it
>Who always remained ceased thereof.
<For as they which lend or pawn unto another man their goods, remain still the lords and owners thereof: so it is also with them, who give unto others power and authority to judge and command, be it for a certain time limited, or so great and long time as shall please them; they themselves nevertheless continuing still ceased of the power and jurisdiction, which the other exercise but by way of loan or borrowing.
>For otherwise if the high and absolute power granted by a prince to his lieutenant, should of right be called Sovereignty, he might use the same against his prince, to whom nothing was left but the bare name of a prince, standing but for a cipher: so should the subject command his Sovereign, the servant his master, than which nothing could be more absurd: considering that in all power granted unto magistrates, or private men, the person of the prince is always to be excepted; who never gives so much power unto another, but that he always keeps more unto himself; neither is ever to be thought so deprived of his sovereign power, but that he may take unto himself the examination and deciding of such things as he hath committed unto his magistrates or officers, whether it be by the way of prevention, concurrence, or evocation: from whom he may also take the power given them by virtue of their commission or institution, or suffer them to hold it so long as shall please him.
>These grounds thus laid, as the foundations of Sovereignty, wee conclude, that neither the Roman Dictator, nor the Harmoste of Lacedemonia, nor the Esmynaet of Salonick, nor he whom they cal the Archus of Malta, nor the antient Baily of Florence, (when it was gouerned by a popular state) neither the Regents or Viceroyes of kingdoms, nor any other officers or magistrats whatsoeuer, vnto whom the highest, but yet not the perpetual power, is by the princes or peoples grant commit∣ted, can be accounted to have the same in Sovereignty.
>And albeit that the ancient Dictators had all power given them in best sort that might be (which the ancient Latins called Optima Lege) so that from them it was not lawful to appeal and upon whose creation all offices were suspended; until such time as that the Tribunes were ordained as keepers of the peoples liberty, who continued in their charge notwithstanding the creation of the Dictator, who had free power to oppose themselves against him; so that if appeal were made from the Dictator, the Tribunes might assemble the people, appointing the parties to bring forth the causes of their appeal, & the Dictator to stay his judgement; as when Papirius Cursor the Dictator, condemned Fabius Max the first, to death; and Fabius Max the second had in like manner condemned M•…nutius, both Colonels of the horsemen, for that they had fought with the enemy contrary to the command of the Dictator; they were yet both by appeale and judgement of the people acquitted. For so saith Livy, Then the father of Fabius said, I call upon the Tribunes, and appeal unto the people, which can do more than thy Dictatorship whereunto king Tullus Hostilius gave place. Whereby it appears that the Dictator was neither sovereign prince, nor magistrat, as many have supposed; neither had any thing more than a simple commission for the making of war, the repressing of sedition, the reforming of the state on instituting of new officers.
>So that Sovereignty is not limited either in power, charge, or time certain. And namely the ten commissioners established for the reforming of custom and laws; albeit than they had absolute power, from which there was no appeal to be made, and that all offices were suspended, during the time of their commission; yet had they not for all that any Sovereignty; for their commission being fulfilled, their power also expired; as did that of the Dictators.
<"Majesty or Sovereignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonwealth: Which the Latins call Majestatem, the Italians Segnoria, that is to say, The greatest power to command. For Majesty (as Festus saith) is so called of mightiness."
>And forasmuch as wee have before defined a Commonweal to be the right government of many families, and of things common amongst them, with a most high & perpetual power
<Bodin / The unity of sovereignty
>No otherwise than Theseus his ship, which although it were an hundred times changed by putting in of new planks, yet still retained the old name. But as a ship, if the keel (which strongly bears up the prow, the poup, the ribs, and tacklings) be taken away, is no longer a ship, but an ill favoured houp of wood; even so a Commonwealth, without a sovereignty of power, which unites in one body all members and families of the same is no more a Commonwealth, neither can by and means long endure. And not to depart from our similitude; as a ship may be quite broken up, or altogether consumed with fire; so may also the people into diverse places dispersed, or be utterly destroyed, the City or state yet standing whole; for it is neither the walls, neither the persons, that makes the city, but the union of the people under the same sovereignty of government.
>Now the sovereign prince is exalted above all his subjects, and exempt out of the rank of them: whose majesty suffers no more division than doth the unity itself, which is not set nor accounted among the numbers, howbeit that they all from it take both their force and power…. being indeed about to become much more happy if they had a sovereign prince, which with his authority and power might (as doth the understanding) reconcile all the parts, and so unite and bind them fast in happiness together.
<For that as of unity depends the union of all numbers, which have no power but from it: so also is one sovereign prince in every Commonweale necessary, from the power of whom all others orderly depend
>Wherefore what the unity is in numbers, the understanding in the powers of the soul, and the center in a circle: so likewise in this world that most mighty king, in unity simple, in nature indivisible, in purity most holy, exalted far above the Fabric of the celestial Spheres, joining this elementary world with the celestiall and intelligible heavens
It is of no importance whether the families come together in the same place or live in separate homes and area.
>It is of no importance whether the families come together in the same place or live in separate homes and area. It is said to be no other than the same family even if the father lives apart from children and servants, or these in their turn apart from each other by an interval of space, provided that they are joined together by the legitimate and limited rule of the father. I have said "limited," since this fact chiefly distinguishes the family from the state – that the latter has the final and public authority. The former limited and private rule. So, also, it is still the same government, made up of many families, even if the territories and the settlements are far apart, provided only that they are in the guardianship of the same sovereign power: either one rules all; or all, the individuals; or a few, all. From this it comes about that the state is nothing else than a group of families or fraternities subjected to one and the same rule.
>Cicero's definition of the state as a group of men associated for the sake of living well indicates the best objective, indeed, but not the power and the nature of the institution. This definition applies equally well to the assemblies of the Pythagoreans and of men who also come together for the sake of living well, yet they cannot be called states without great confusion of state and association. Furthermore, there are families of villains, no less than of good men, since a villain is no less a man than a good man is. A similar observation must be made about the governments. Who doubts but that every very great empire was established through violence by robbers? The definition of a state offered by us applies to villages, towns, cities, and principalities, however scattered their lands may be, provided that they are controlled by the same authority. The concept is not conditioned by the limited size of the region or by its great expanse, as the elephant is no more an animal than the ant, since each has the power of movement and perception. So Ragusa or Geneva, whose rule is comprised almost within its walls, ought to be called a state no less than the empire of the Tartars, which was bounded by the same limits as the course of the sun.
<Hobbes / Difference between concord or association and union or bond of a state
>They who compare a City and its Citizens, with a man and his members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power in the City, is the relation to the whole City, such as the head is to the whole man. But it appears by what has been already said, that he who is endued with such a power (whether it be a man, or a Court) has a relation to the City, not as that of the head, but of the soul to the body. For it is the soul by which a man has a will, that is, can either will, or nill.
>The other error in this his first argument is that he says the members of every Commonwealth, as of a natural body, depend one of another. It is true they cohere together, but they depend only on the sovereign, which is the soul of the Commonwealth
>The error concerning mixed government has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the union of many men.
Thomas Hobbes Leviathan:
<And of that opinion, the external signs appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called Worship; which is one part of that which the Latins understand by the word Cultus:
Hobbes Leviathan:
>For Cultus signifies properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestows on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it.
Hobbes Leviathan
>In the first sense the labour bestowed on the Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of their minds.
>>723247I want to unite with Grace-chan!!
do you still have that image posted in one of the previous threads or maybe also /draw/ of Marx pointing at lassalle's chest and angrily shouting an unfinished poem which is implied ended in you know what
Hereditary Monarchy / dynasty is an extension of the cult of personality (or work of this person on the people).
The original ruler passes, but there is an attempt to extend his person by his offspring in the most natural fashion & proximity to his person and appearance, as if to copy and paste that progenitor – that is another reason why I think the eldest & firstborn is preferred, because of proximity and closeness.
Think of it also like another form of state preservation when the original person is preserved through his offspring… it is presumed the children will have a similar likeness and appearance and character for the most part.
Imagine if Lenin died, but instead of trying to preserve his body through all these techniques – it was decided to preserve Lenin by blood relationship, and find the offspring of Lenin.
Ramses II
>For the sun becomes the champion of his father, like Horus, when he championed his father, forming him that formed him, fashioning him that fashioned him, making to live the name of him that begat him.
>My heart leads me in doing excellent things… I will cause it to be said forever and ever: 'It was his son, who made his name live.' May my father, Osiris, favor me with the long life of his son, Horus, according as I do that which he did; I do excellent things, as he did excellent things, for him who begat me.
It is like what Bossuet says.
I cannot imagine the State as a greater family, if for the ruler's love for his kingdom isn't mixed with the love he has for his family.
If we don't build the State around that ideal of Father & Son.
Aristotle / The Association of Father & Son, the Ideal of Monarchy
>For the association of a father with his sons bears the form of monarchy… it is the ideal of monarchy to be paternal rule.
Bossuet / My Father the King
>Man who, as has been said, saw the image of a kingdom in the union of several families under the leadership of a common father, and who had found gentleness in that life, brought themselves easily to create societies of families under kings who took the place of fathers… it is apparently for that reason that the ancient people's of Palestine called their kings Abimelech, that is to say: my father the king. Subjects took themselves to be children of the Prince: and, each calling him, My father the king.
Understand that hereditary monarchy completes this vision of the State as a greater family for royalists. –It is incomplete without it.
–
Aristotle / Suckled by the same milk, of the same blood
>And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; …the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood [and suckled 'with the same milk']
The rulers should be of the same blood & extend that blood relationship to everyone else, so they too can see themselves as of the same blood and family – which makes for a stronger bond of loyalty not only to the prince, but amongst the people themselves.
Hobbes' Leviathan also touches on this subject matter.
Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan on Worship
>But in a larger use of the word Image, is contained also, any Representation of one thing by another. So an earthly Soveraign may be called the Image of God: And an inferiour Magistrate the Image of an earthly Soveraign.
>To be uncovered, before a man of Power and Authority, or before the Throne of a Prince, or in such other places as hee ordaineth to that purpose in his absence, is to Worship that man, or Prince with Civill Worship; as being a signe, not of honoring the stoole, or place, but the Person; and is not Idolatry. But if hee that doth it, should suppose the Soule of the Prince to be in the Stool, or should present a Petition to the Stool, it were Divine Worship, and Idolatry.
>To pray to a King for such things, as hee is able to doe for us, though we prostrate our selves before him, is but Civill Worship; because we acknowledge no other power in him, but humane: But voluntarily to pray unto him for fair weather, or for any thing which God onely can doe for us, is Divine Worship, and Idolatry. On the other side, if a King compell a man to it by the terrour of Death, or other great corporall punishment, it is not Idolatry: For the Worship which the Soveraign commandeth to bee done unto himself by the terrour of his Laws, is not a sign that he that obeyeth him, does inwardly honour him as a God, but that he is desirous to save himselfe from death, or from a miserable life; and that which is not a sign of internall honor, is no Worship; and therefore no Idolatry. Neither can it bee said, that hee that does it, scandalizeth, or layeth any stumbling block before his Brother; because how wise, or learned soever he be that worshippeth in that manner, another man cannot from thence argue, that he approveth it; but that he doth it for fear; and that it is not his act, but the act of the Soveraign.
<Honour And Worship What
>Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the Power, and Goodnesse of another: and therefore to Honour God, is to think as Highly of his Power and Goodnesse, as is possible. And of that opinion, the externall signes appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called Worship; which is one part of that which the Latines understand by the word Cultus: For Cultus signifieth properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestowes on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it. Now those things whereof we make benefit, are either subject to us, and the profit they yeeld, followeth the labour we bestow upon them, as a naturall effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour, according to their own Wills. In the first sense the labour bestowed on the Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of their mindes. In the second sense, where mens wills are to be wrought to our purpose, not by Force, but by Compleasance, it signifieth as much as Courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offices; as by praises, by acknowledging their Power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly Worship: in which sense Publicola, is understood for a Worshipper of the People, and Cultus Dei, for the Worship of God.
<Several Signs of Honour
>From internal Honour, consisting in the opinion of Power and Goodness, arise three Passions; Love, which hath reference to Goodness; and Hope, and Fear, that relate to Power: And three parts of external worship; Praise, Magnifying, and Blessing: The subject of Praise, being Goodness; the subject of Magnifying, and Blessing, being Power, and the effect thereof Felicity. Praise, and Magnifying are significant both by Words, and Actions: By Words, when we say a man is Good, or Great: By Actions, when we thank him for his Bounty, and obey his Power. The opinion of the Happiness of another, can only be expressed by words.
<Worship Natural and Arbitrary
>There be some signs of Honour, (both in Attributes and Actions,) that be Naturally so; as among Attributes, Good, Just, Liberal, and the like; and among Actions, Prayers, Thanks, and Obedience. Others are so by Institution, or Custom of men; and in some times and places are Honourable; in others Dishonourable; in others Indifferent: such as are the Gestures in Salutation, Prayer, and Thanksgiving, in different times and places, differently used. The former is Natural; the later Arbitrary Worship.
<Worship Commanded and Free
>And of Arbitrary Worship, there be two differences: For sometimes it is a Commanded, sometimes Voluntary Worship: Commanded, when it is such as he requireth, who is Worshipped: Free, when it is such as the Worshipper thinks fit. When it is Commanded, not the words, or gestures, but the obedience is the Worship. But when Free, the Worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they are not Worship; because a sign is not a sign to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made; that is, to the spectator.
<Worship Public and Private
>Again, there is a Public, and a Private Worship. Public, is the Worship that a Commonwealth performs, as one Person. Private, is that which a Private person exhibits. Public, in respect of the whole Commonwealth, is Free; but in respect of Particular men it is not so Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never without some Restranshumanistt either from the Laws, or from the Opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.
<The End of Worship
>The End of Worship among men, is Power. For where a man sees another worshipped supposes him powerful, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his Power greater. But God has no Ends: the worship we do him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to capacity, by those rules of Honour, that Reason dictates to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of damage, or in thankfulness for good already received from them.
Like where Hobbes is concerned with outward motions and expressive gestures to signify worship and honor as the inward conscious thoughts.
>And of that opinion, the external signs appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called Worship; which is one part of that which the Latins understand by the word Cultus: For Cultus signifies properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestows on any thing, with the purpose to make benefit by it.
>In the first sense the labour bestowed on the Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of their minds.
Hobbes continues with the distinction of civil worship (the external praises and magnifying, actions and expressions to give a sense of honor to the State, such as the use of its emblems in currency and pilgrimages to its sites like Mt. Rushmore):
>To be uncovered, before a man of Power and Authority, or before the Throne of a Prince, or in such other places as hee ordaineth to that purpose in his absence, is to Worship that man, or Prince with Civill Worship; as being a signe, not of honoring the stoole, or place, but the Person; and is not Idolatry.
>To pray to a King for such things, as hee is able to doe for us, though we prostrate our selves before him, is but Civill Worship; because we acknowledge no other power in him, but humane
Hobbes makes the distinction between civil and divine worship: the former any person makes in a way everyday, private and public, for ordinary things, and directed toward civil persons it is with the end of power; the latter is the worship of God, which does not proceed from want of power, but from our natural duty.
<Thomas Hobbes Publique Worship Consisteth In Uniformity
>And this is Publique Worship; the property whereof, is to be Uniforme: For those actions that are done differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a Publique Worship. And therefore, where many sorts of Worship be allowed, proceeding from the different Religions of Private men, it cannot be said there is any Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion at all.
This all this from Hobbes reminds me of Plato's Republic.
Among the chief reason Plato wanted to abolish private property was to accomplish a unity of feeling. Where the State should be unified, and people should be united in feeling, in pleasure and pain, private property fractures the State: where others rejoice at their gain, others feel sorrow and loss, pitted against each other, and to the destruction of State.
Although I think Hobbes also has influence from Calvin here? (I might be wrong, but I think so).
Plato on Leader principle:
>The great principle of all is that no one of either sex should be without a commander; nor should the mind of any one be accustomed to do anything, either in jest or earnest, of his own motion, but in war and in peace he should look to and follow his leader, even in the least things being under his guidance; for example, he should stand or move, or exercise, or wash, or take his meals, or get up in the night to keep guard and deliver messages when he is bidden; and in the hour of danger he should not pursue and not retreat except by order of his superior; and in a word, not teach the soul or accustom her to know or understand how to do anything apart from others. Of all soldiers the life should be always and in all things as far as possible in common and together; there neither is nor ever will be a higher, or better, or more scientific principle than this for the attainment of salvation and victory in war. And we ought in time of peace from youth upwards to practise this habit of commanding others, and of being commanded by other.
<Hobbes Leviathan: The Word Person, Whence
>The word Person is latin: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon, which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise, or Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguises the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, has been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himself, or an other; and he that acts another, is said to bear his Person, or act in his name; (in which sense Cicero uses it where he says, “Unus Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I bear three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;”) and is called in diverse occasions, diversely; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like.
Plato Republic Book 5:
>This, then, Glaucon, is the manner of the community of wives and children among the guardians. That it is consistent with the rest of our polity and by far the best way is the next point that we must get confirmed by the argument. Is not that so?” “It is, indeed,” he said. “Is not the logical first step towards such an agreement to ask ourselves what we could name as the greatest good for the constitution of a state and the proper aim of a lawgiver in his legislation, and what would be the greatest evil, and then to consider whether the proposals we have just set forth fit into the footprints of the good and do not suit those of the evil?” “By all means,” he said.
>“Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that divides it and makes it many instead of one, or a greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?”
>“We do not.”
>“Is not, then, the community of pleasure and pain the tie that binds, when, so far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths?”
>“But the individualization of these feelings is a dissolvent, when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings to the city and its inhabitants?” “Of course.” “And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’ and similarly with regard to the word ‘alien’?
>“Precisely so.”
>“That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ of the same things in the same way.”
Plato State Corporatism / Unitary Policy:
State like an individual man (from Republic).
>And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man.
>For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connections stretching to the soul for ‘integration’
>with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any other member of the man the same statement holds, alike for a part that labors in pain or is eased by pleasure.”
>“The same,” he said, “and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism.”
>That is the kind of a state, [462e] then, I presume, that, when anyone of the citizens suffers aught of good or evil, will be most likely to speak of the part that suffers as its own and will share the pleasure or the pain as a whole.” “Inevitably,” he said, “if it is well governed.”
>But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts.”
…
>Then will not law-suits and accusations against one another vanish, one may say, from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common.
>So that we can count on their being free from the dissensions that arise among men from the possession of property, children, and kin.
…
Plato Laws:
>For there are three forms of government, a first, a second, and a third best, out of which Cleinias has now to choose… The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that 'Friends have all things in common.'. Whether there is anywhere now, or will ever be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions, and whatever laws there are unite the city to the utmost —whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state which will be truer or better or more exalted in virtue. Whether such a state is governed by Gods or sons of Gods, one, or more than one, happy are the men who, living after this manner, dwell there; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and to seek with all our might for one which is like this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and the only one which takes the second place; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second.
…
>Inasmuch as our citizens are not fitted either by nature or education to receive the saying, Friends have all things in common, let them retain their houses and private property, but use them in the service of their country, who is their God and parent, and of the Gods and demigods of the land.
>Their first care should be to preserve the number of their lots. This may be secured in the following manner: when the possessor of a lot dies, he shall leave his lot to his best-beloved child, who will become the heir of all duties and interests, and will minister to the Gods and to the family, to the living and to the dead.
>Of the remaining children, the females must be given in marriage according to the law to be hereafter enacted; the males may be assigned to citizens who have no children of their own.
>How to equalize families and allotments will be one of the chief cares of the guardians of the laws.
…
>Wherefore we will thus address our citizens:—Good friends, honour order and equality, and above all the number 5040.
>Secondly, respect the original division of the lots, which must not be infringed by buying and selling, for the law says that the land which a man has is sacred and is given to him by God.
#2:
2. Unitary / State Corporatism: All men as one man.
Hobbes
>The error concerning mixed government [constitutionalism] has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the union of many men.
And also from Hobbes:
>And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,) is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.”
Now compare with Plato Republic:
>And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man.
&
>“The same,” he said, “and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism.”
&
>But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts.”
&
>That the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity.
&
Plato Laws:
>That all men are, so far as possible, unanimous in the praise and blame they bestow, rejoicing and grieving at the same things, and that they honor with all their heart those laws which render the State as unified as possible
Bossuet on All of Israel Went Out as One Man:
>It is by the sole authority of government that union is established among men. This effect of legitimate command is marked to us by these words, so often repeated in the Scriptures: at the command of Saul, and of the legitimate authority "all Israel went out as one man. All the multitudes as one man, were forty-two thousand three hundred and sixty. Behold, such is the unity of a people, when each one renouncing his own will, transfers and reunites it to that of the prince and the magistrate. Otherwise there is no union; the people become wanderers, like a flock dispersed. "May the Lord, the God of spirits of all flesh, provide a man that may be over this multitude, and may go out and in before them, or bring them in: lest the people of the Lord be as sheep without a shepherd."
#4
Political & Economical no different.
I believe this is also maintained.
…
<Hobbes / That a Family is a little City
>"Propriety receiv'd its beginning, What's objected by some, That the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of Cities, was found in the Fathers of Families, that objection is vain, because I have already declar'd, That a Family is a little City. For the Sons of a Family have propriety of their goods granted them by their Father, distinguisht indeed from the rest of the Sons of the same Family, but not from the propriety of the Father himself; but the Fathers of diverse Families, who are subject neither to any common Father, nor Lord, have a common Right in all things."
Thomas Hobbes
>And though in the charters of subordinate corporations, a corporation be declared to be one person in law, yet the same has not been taken notice of in the body of a commonwealth [state] or city, nor have any of those innumerable writers of politics observed any such union
&
>A great Family if it be not part of some Commonwealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Sovereignty, a little Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the Father or Master is the Sovereign.
&
>And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families
<Plato / There won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a great household & the bulk of a small city
>Visitor: Well then, surely there won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a great household, on the one hand, and the bulk of a small city on the other? – Young Socrates: None. – It's clear that there is one sort of expert knowledge concerned with all these things; whether someone gives this the name of kingship, or statesmanship, or household management, let's not pick any quarrel with him.
This is different from Aristotle's verdict, who opposes Monarchy to a political constitution as a household unit only and not proper for political rule (so mixed constitutionalists like the Windsorites deny monarchical rule of politics because of this teaching).
Aristotle writes in Politics,
>Now there is an erroneous opinion that a statesman, king, householder, and a master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state.
Aristotle:
>For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same
Aristotle:
>The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head:
>whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals.
#5:
In Hobbes Leviathan, there is a Sword and Crosier in one body, and the sovereign is also a pastor.
King James VI & I:
>As your office is likewise mixed, betwixt the Ecclesiastical and Civil estate: for a King is not mere laicus, as both the Papists and Anabaptists would have him, to the which error also the Puritans incline over far.
In Plato's Laws, religious and civil offices are aligned for cultivate civic virtue.
In Plato Statesmen:
>…In Egypt, the King himself is not allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistrates, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by lot to be the King Archon.
#6:
Jean Bodin testifies Plato having a composition of a Tyrannical & Popular estate (which he later goes on to deny any mixed constitutionalism whatsoever and say it was purely popular).
>Plato having presupposed the best form of a Commonwealth, to be that which was composed of a Tyrannical and Popular estate: in framing the same, is contrary unto himself, having established a Commonwealth not only Popular, but altogether also Popularly governed;
…
Looking at Leviathan, it's exactly that: Hobbes isn't a mixed constitutionalist, but Leviathan is a composition of Monarchy and the People:
>The People is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of a Multitude. The People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the People Commands; for the People wills by the will of one man; but the Multitude are citizens, that is to say, Subjects…
>And in a Monarchy, the Subjects are the Multitude, and (however it seem a Paradox) the King is the People.
#7:
Beginning with the constitution of individuals and some families at odds – & later deference to an arbiter to hash out their differences and establish peace.
<Hobbes: The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement; [OR, the NECESSITY of an arbitrary power]
>And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Laws, there may nevertheless arise questions concerning a mans action; First, whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unless the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as far from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, "That they that are at controversy, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator."
…
This is a theme in Hobbes, and in Plato there is also a turn of deference of some Arbiter because of conflicting laws / customs of private families: these are in conflict, Plato establishes, but the unity of some Arbiter(s) takes what laws the private families have and decides which are best to keep from the families altogether… Which aligns with the absolutist agenda for deference to some arbiter to bring unity… in Hobbes case it is by virtue of fear (and I believe compulsion, but also a bit of persuasion through education), but for the Classics it is generally love of justice and laws and virtue… and persuasion over compulsion (which I can imagine with some very powerful music or eloquence to bring people together?)
…
Anyways, what I would point to is in Plato's Laws:
Plato Laws
>Athenian: And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the laws of others not so well.
–This right here is really the basis of what Hobbes gets at with a war of all against all – but more importantly, at this point, there is a failure to have a concord of hosts / partnership of clans, it is futile… every man will have the extent of his laws and boundaries in another man's boundaries, interceding and conflicting…. there must be deference to an Arbiter.
>Athenian: The next step will be that these persons who have met together, will select some arbiters, who will review the laws of all of them, and will publicly present such as they approve to the chiefs who lead the tribes, and who are in a manner their kings, allowing them to choose those which they think best. These persons will themselves be called legislators, and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort of aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of the government they will live.
…
IN the same way, King James VI & I talks about this process above and being an arbiter:
King James VI & I
>This I must say for Scotland, and I may truly vaunt it; Here I sit and govern it with my Pen, I write and it is done, and by a Clerk of the Councell I govern Scotland now.
>Of this I can best resolve you: for I am the eldest Parliament man in Scotland, and have sit in more Parliaments than any of my Predecessors. I can assure you, that the form of Parliament there, is nothing inclined to popularity.
>About a twenty days or such a time before the Parliament, Proclamation is made throughout the Kingdom, to deliver in to the King's Clerk of Register (whom you here call the Master of the Rolles) all Bills to be exhibited that Session before a certain day. Then they are brought unto the King, and perused and considered by him, and only such as I allow of are put into the Chancellor's hands to be propounded to the Parliament, and none others: And if any man in Parliament speak of any other matter then is in this form first allowed by me, The Chancellor tells him there is no such Bill allowed by the King.
>Besides, when they have passed them for laws, they are presented unto me, and I with my Scepter put into my hand by the Chancellor, must say, I ratify and approve all things done in this present Parliament. And if there be any thing that I dislike, they raze it out before. If this may be called a negative voice, then I have one I am sure in that Parliament.
#8:
Persuasion.
While fear and compulsion are predominate factors for Hobbes, he did take note of persuasion too.
People are entitled to their private conscience and opinion even, but publicly show obedience and worship and conformity.
Plato advocates persuasion numerous times over compulsion: like a freeman's doctor or a slave's doctor (the freeman's doctor persuades his patient before acting, but a slave's doctor just does it anyways). And recommended a preamble for the laws (persuading people).
Hobbes: Public instruction
>I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Sovereignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Sovereign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himself in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.
#9:
Community of pleasures and pains through a Cult of Personality.
If there is one innovation here every monarchist should consider, it is the advent of the Cult of Personality, or work of One Person on the multitude.
Plato Republic
>And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’
Plato Republic - Community of Pleasures & Pains
>And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains–where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow?
>No doubt.
>Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganized
This is a controversial point, but Hobbes first talks about appetites (pleasures) and aversions (pains) of the private persons, then consolidates all the persons into One Personhood.
…
Not only does this come to a State where by a plurality of voices, as if they all said YES but also that condition from Plato:
>And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’
<Thomas Hobbes The Generation Of A Common-wealth
>The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will:
&
>This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, “I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.”
&
>This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence.
…
This (in)famous picture of ᴉuᴉlossnW with a plurality of Si, si, si, si, si, si behind his personage represents this unity of the representer and a cult of personality.
Imagine every Si behind ᴉuᴉlossnW as "Mine" and "Thine" like Plato says – it seems like the condition is met where all citizens utter in a unanimous voice "mine" and "thine" – without abolishing private property, but I'll talk about that soon.
…
Consider the Community of Pleasures and Pains, this is cultivated in Hobbes' Leviathan and private appetites and private aversions are not allowed to override the Leviathan:
>But in a Common-wealth this measure is false: Not the Appetite of Private men, but the Law, which is the Will and Appetite of the State is the measure.
…
Now, considering private property: Hobbes allows the distribution of private property, but it is limited by the popular consent, the distribution from the Sovereign is also in accord with unanimous "mine" and "thine" in a way.
<Hobbes: Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion Of The Sovereign, But Only Of Another Subject
>From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consists in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their Sovereign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch. For seeing the Sovereign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he represents,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd.
So particular subjects are limited in their estate, all property is limited by an absolute power – as well as subordinate corporations – by a sovereign, who has in his cult of personality "thine" and "mine" of every subject in a plurality of voices brought unto one voice.
>>723279>Would you agree that a revolutionary organisation requires a chairman? Yes, I support any ideology that has a one-party state like ML / Juche on the Far Left and Fascism: My conviction is State Corporatist ideologies naturally play into a monarchical cult of personality or Leader principle, because their notion of a State being like one personhood leads to being more formidable behind the leadership of one actual person.
…
The only difference between a chairman like this and a royal monarch in some instances is simply the high church regalia of a monarch: in other ways, I see modern dictators as modern caesars like modern monarchs, and I support Caesarism/Bonapartism/Whatever you call it as a suitable case for monarchy in the modern world if High Churchism cannot compete.
Unique IPs: 5