leftypol's day of the sun edition
<if we dont have inbred monarchs ruling over us people will resort to cannibalism
460 posts and 690 image replies omitted.>the people of Leftypol see Nationalism as class collaborationism, not class dissolution
The appeal to Fascism is not merely the stress in the classes, but the stress in the State as an arbiter.
If you just focused on the classes divided and not the arbiter's unity, then it would lose its entire appeal to me. The appeal is the subordination of all classes to the State.
To stress class alone without this emphasis just means division and factionalism.
Again, it a matter of stress–I don't like class in the sense of division/factionalism, but I do like the stress on its unity.
I don't see a sovereign monarch as simply a top-down member of class or another rich man or noble, an agent of top-down class war, but a unifier that wholyl subsides this conflict.
A cult of personality is stressed to resolve the "mine" and "thine" of class division, people see all persons manifest by one person.
As for a body, it is not that Jesus would be a head on a different body, so only Jesus' head on Michael Jackson's body–the whole body is Jesus 's body with his persona on the head and shaped by this mold. Soul of commonwealth molds the body into a respective appearance and identity.
…
Anyways:
There is a sense of appeasement in the way that "you are all equal before god".
…
Joseph de Maistre: a kind of equality
>Now, it is one of the greatest advantages of monarchical government that in it the Nobility loses, as much as the nature of things allows, all those features offensive to the lower classes.
>And this order of things appears still more perfect when it is remembered that the Nobility of birth and office, already softened by the right belonging to every family to enjoy the same distinctions in its turn, is stripped of everything possibly offensive to the lower orders BY THE UNIVERSAL SUPREMACY OF THE MONARCH before whom no citizen is more powerful than another; the man in the street, who is insignificant when he measures himself against a great lord, measures the lord against the sovereign, and the title of subject which brings both of them under the same power and the same justice is a kind of equality that stills the inevitable pangs of self-esteem.
Thomas Hobbes
>And as the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be greater than that of any or all the subjects. For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honour. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince as his creatures. As in the presence of the master, the servants are equal, and without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in the presence of the sovereign. And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the Sun.
>The inequality of subjects proceeds from the acts of sovereign power, and therefore has no more place in the presence of the sovereign; that is to say, in a court of justice, than the inequality between kings and their subjects in the presence of the King of kings. The honour of great persons is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aids they give to men of inferior rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do are not extenuated, but aggravated, by the greatness of their persons, because they have the least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great proceed in this manner. Impunity makes insolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred, an endeavor to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness, though with the ruin of the Commonwealth.
Alexander Hamilton
>If government is in the hands of the few, they will tyrannize the many; if in the hands of the many, they will tyrannize over the few. It ought to be in the hands of both, and be separated…they will need a mutual check. This check is a monarch.
So if we take your view that the rich elites check the monarch, like nobles checking King John–then these adages have no appeal.
So in my view, if the monarch was only thought of just the head of a cabinet or clique of selfish elites, that would not be appealing at all –'That is why I don't like strict technocracy or cliqueism–I don't like thinking of monarchy in terms of strict class stratification that way–this appeal of the above^ paragraph would lack utterly its appeal – but if the poor thought "the monarch doesn't belong to us" they would feel no sense of identity and belonging to the monarch, which is a problem.
The monarch's appeal is everybody belongs to the monarch.
That might sound slavish to some and difficult to understand, but it does have a certain appeal. at least to me
It certainly is an acquired taste.
Thomas Hobbes - Subjects inheritance of the ruler
>We cannot on better condition be subject to any, than one whose interest depends upon our safety, and welfare; and this then comes to pass when we are the inheritance of the ruler; for every man of his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritance. But the lands, and monies of the subjects are not only the prince's treasure, but their bodies, and active minds.
>>824408De Jouvenel writes,
>Where will it all end? In the destruction of all other command for the benefit of one alone – that of the State. In each man's absolute freedom from every family and social authority, a freedom the price of which is complete submission to the State. In the complete equality as between themselves of all citizens, paid for by their equal abasement before the power of their absolute master – the State. In the disappearance of every constraint which does not emanate from the State, and in denial of every pre-eminence which is not approved by the State. In a word, it ends in the atomization of society, and in the rupture of every private tie linking man and man, whose only bond is their common bondage to the State. The extremes of Individualism and Socialism meet: that was their predestined course.De Jouvenel sees this as a bad thing,
>the extremes of individualism and socialism meet.And
>In the complete equality as between themselves of all citizens, paid for by their equal abasement before the power of their absolute master – the State.But I'm of such an opposite perspective that I romanticize this.
What De Jouvenel laments is a good thing from my perspective. This is what I want in absolute monarchy.
Jean Bodin
>No otherwise than Theseus his ship, which although it were an hundred times changed by putting in of new planks, yet still retained the old name. But as a ship, if the keel (which strongly bears up the prow, the poup, the ribs, and tacklings) be taken away, is no longer a ship, but an ill favoured houp of wood; even so a Commonwealth, without a sovereignty of power, which unites in one body all members and families of the same is no more a Commonwealth, neither can by and means long endure. And not to depart from our similitude; as a ship may be quite broken up, or altogether consumed with fire; so may also the people into diverse places dispersed, or be utterly destroyed, the City or state yet standing whole; for it is neither the walls, neither the persons, that makes the city, but the union of the people under the same sovereignty of government.
So the stress is not on the walls, neither the persons, but the -union-.
Thomas Hobbes
>The error concerning mixed government has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the union of many men.
The stress is not on the concord of many men, but the union of many men.
Jean Bodin on Monarchy
>If we should inspect nature more closely, we should gaze upon monarchy everywhere. To make a beginning from small things, we see the king among the bees, the leader in the herd, the buck among the flocks or the bellwether (as among the cranes themselves the many follow one), and in the separate natures of things some one object excels: thus, adamant among the gems, gold among the metals, the Sun among the stars, and finally God alone, the prince and author of the world. Moresoever, they say that among the evil spirits one alone is supreme. But, not to continue indefinitely, what is a family other than the true image of a state? Yet this is directed by the rule of one, who presents, not a fictitious image, like the doge of Venice, but the true picture of a king.
Bodin on Plato: not several lords, several heads, several pilots, several bee queens, several gods–
>If, then, Plato were to change the nature of things and set up several lords in the same family, several heads for the same body, several pilots on a ship, and finally several leaders among bees, flocks, herds (if only the farmers will permit); if at length he would join several gods into an association for ruling, then I would agree with him that the rule of the optimates is better than a kingdom.
Power belongs to one man in the homes and in the cities
>But if the entire nature of things protests, reason dissents, lasting experience objects, I do not see why we ought to follow Plato or anyone else and violate nature. What Homer has said, "No good thing is a number of masters; let one man be master, one man be king," Euripides has repeated, "Power belongs to one man in the homes and in the cities." For this reason Sibylla is said to have prophesied in her poems that the safety of the Roman Republic is founded upon a kingdom, that is, the citizens cannot be protected unless they have a king.
Maybe the analogy for soul here is understood – not as Plato's soul – but from what I have read to paraphrase the stoic view of the soul…
I consulted AI on this, so take this with a -heavy- grain of salt.
>The Stoics viewed the soul as a physical, corporeal substance made of a hot, fiery breath called pneuma that infuses and animates the human body. Unlike modern or Platonic ideas of an incorporeal, spiritual soul, the ancient Stoics treated the mind and soul as real, physical entities that obey the laws of physics.https://iep.utm.edu/stoicmind/>Finally, the Stoics denied Plato’s and Aristotle’s view that the soul has both rational and irrational faculties. Instead, they argued that the soul is unified and that all the faculties are rational concluding that the passions are the result not of a distinct irrational faculty but of errors in judgement.A Physical Substance (Pneuma)
>Vital mixture: They described the soul as pneuma, a dynamic blend of active fire and air elements that pervades every part of the living organism.…
>Chrysippus argued that the soul is one single substance—a physical, hot, tension-filled breath called pneuma.
>The Octopus Analogy: Chrysippus famously compared the soul to an octopus or a spider's web. The central head of the octopus is the hêgemonikon (the commanding faculty), located in the heart. The tentacles are the five senses, speech, and reproduction. The tentacles are not separate "parts" with independent wills; they are simply extensions of the exact same, single pneuma reaching out to touch the world and sending information instantly back to the center.
>An irrational emotion (like rage or greed) is not a separate beast waking up inside you; it is your entire commanding faculty making a sudden, distorted judgment. He described it as a rapid, total fluctuation of the single pneuma. …
>The pneuma of the soul has a specific structure which helps account for its capacities. The Stoics held that the soul consists of eight parts which are spatially recognized portions or streams of pneuma. The eight parts of the soul are the five senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch), the reproductive faculty, the speech faculty, and the central commanding faculty [hêgemonikon]. All of the parts of the soul can be seen as extensions of pneuma originating in the hêgemonikon. Several analogies were employed to explain the structure of the soul: the soul is like an octopus, a tree, a spring of water, and even a spider’s web. The analogies of the octopus, tree, and spring emphasize the unity of the soul and the idea that the individual powers or faculties are rooted in or sprout from the hêgemonikon in the heart.Queen Chrysalis' throne represents the idea of a monopoly on force.
All the other powers were canceled out by her supreme sovereignty.
That is what I firmly believe the throne represented in this episode.
…
Queen Chrysalis says,
>The secret of my throne:
>I can't have powerful ponies using their abilities against me
To be frank, that is great for the hive.
By investing all their strength into one queen, they were able to conquer their enemies thus far.
Yes, they have have a bit of fragility in the queen, but that's all the more reason to safeguard it and not flippantly overthrow her–the queen becomes an extremely vital to the life of the hive and to kill her thwarts everything.
The alternative to "monopoly on violence/force" is force and violence being free real estate amongst squabbling nobles/princessses and instead of running efficiently they overall weaken everything.
>Every pony will do as I command
For a monarchy, this is fair enough.
That is what you get in a monarchy, one commander.
If that is a problem, then don't have any pretense of monarchy, I say.
>My subjects and I will feed on their love for generations!
In any other regime, this is a great thing!
The changelings fought hard to get to this point… they want the spoils of war.
>>824939>>824941If you know how awful it is to be foiled by some squabbling, ANNOYING nobles, then what Queen Chrysalis says is fair.
In this case, I say… fuck the powerful ponies and squabbling nobles.
Let there be one ruler, one queen. >>824953This is exactly the problem with the near universal and frivolous use of the word 'tyrant' is now the changelings turn on their own queen when they were on the cusp of victory–the average changeling might not have realized what was at stake because only Queen Chrysalis is perched up with an eagle's view concerning the hive…
What happened was exactly what Hobbes and I warned about:
>From Aristotle's Civil Philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner of Commonwealths but the Popular, (such as was at that time the state of Athens,) Tyranny. All Kings they called Tyrants… A Tyrant originally signified no more simply, but a Monarch:
>From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government; for they find no such matter.
>From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in their books, and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. This pretty much is what happened to Queen Chrysalis.
The Assyrians would do this kind of thing–the effect is 1:1 even coming from within domestically.
…
The Assyrians would use a variety of tactics to convince the city to betray their king.
>Assyrian envoys would stand directly outside the city walls and deliver their speeches. When the local ruling officials begged them to speak in Aramaic (the diplomatic language of the elites) so the common people wouldn't understand, the Assyrian envoys aggressively refused. They deliberately shouted in the local native language (e.g., Judean Hebrew) so that the soldiers on the wall and the citizens inside could hear every word, driving an immediate wedge between the rulers and the public.
So Assyrian envoys would do this to coax the people inside to betray.
Spiritual Gaslighting ("God is on our side")
>To break the religious resolve of the citizens, the Assyrians used theological subversion. They argued that the local king had actually offended the gods by changing religious practices or failing to keep peace. The envoy would boldly claim that the local deity had personally commanded Assyria to destroy the city, telling the people that their king was leading them into a hopeless fight against the divine will.
So Assyrians would twist the religious resolve to favor the enemy:
Now religion and virtue are twisted against them and makes them capable of betraying each other. In an instance like this, religion and pretense become a severe enemy.
Assyrians would appeal to fear like the Mongols:
>The Assyrians relied heavily on their broad reputation for absolute brutality. The envoys would list all the neighboring nations and kings they had already crushed, pointing out that no god or ruler had ever successfully stopped them. They made it clear that if the people stayed loyal to their king and resisted, they would face systematic torture—including flaying, impalement, and disembowelment.
Offering an Attractive Counter-Proposal
>Once the population was thoroughly terrified and doubted their king, the Assyrians offered a highly appealing escape clause. They promised that if the citizens surrendered immediately and turned their backs on the king, they would be spared. They framed mass deportation not as slavery, but as an upgrade—promising to relocate the population to a "land of grain and new wine" where "every man would eat from his own vine and drink from his own cistern" until they moved.
This is what the Assyrians would do to conquer a city.
The same could be said for rebels trying to turn people against their ruler like Thorax with the aid of Starlight Glimmer.
Do you have that emerald eyes music video?
>>826238Thanks. I had no idea this was originally Sonic.
Kill yourself
Ferdinand Lassalle: The Role of the Army under a Monarchy
>And if it is further desired to provide that the King shall have personally as much power as – and even more than – all three electoral classes put together, than the whole nation, even with the landed aristocracy thrown in, then this is accomplished as follows:
>In Article 47 of the constitution it is written: "The King makes appointments to all posts in the armed forces," and Article 108 reads: "The army does not take an oath to the constitution." And alongside of this artcle is erected a theory which is in principle founded on this article – that in relation to the armed forces the King occupies an entirely different position than in relation to all other State institutions; that in relation to the army he is not only King but something else, absoltuely special, mysterious, and unknowable, for which a special term is coined, "War Chief" (Kriegsherr); and because of these considerations it turns out that the House of Commons or the nation has no concern with the army, cannot interfere with its affairs and organization, but can only vote funds for it.
>One must admit, gentlemen – truth comes first! – that this theory has an undeniable basis in Article 108 of the constitution. For once the constitution declares that the armed forces, unlike all other State institutions, including King and officers, need not take an oath to the constitution itself, then in principle it is recognized that the army stands outside the constitution, has nothing in common with it, in that it is related solely and exclusively to the persono f the King and not to the nation.
>Once this is established, the King enjoys not only as much as, but ten times more political power than the entire nation put together, even if the actual strength of the nation is ten, twenty, fifty times greater than that of the army. The reason for this seeming contradiction is very simple.
>The King's political instrument of power, the army, is organized, constantly mobilized, disciplined and ever ready to act; the power of the nation, on the contrary, even when it is far greater, is unorganized. The will of the nation, and especially the degree of determination which is necessary to implement this will, is not easily recognized by the people themselves; nobody therefore knows exactly how many will follow him. At the same time, the nation lacks those weapons of organized force, those very important constitutional props to which I have already referred – the cannon. True, they are paid for by notional funds; true they have been prepared and perfected only because the science which springs from society – physics, technology, etc. Their very existence is proof of the great power of civil society, of the great successes of science, technique, manufacture, and skills of all kinds.
>But here we must recall a verse from Virgil: Sic vos non vobis! You make it, but not for yourselves! For cannons are always made for the organized, force; therefore the nation knows that in case of a clash it will find these products of its power always arrayed against itself. That is why the numerically smaller but organized force often and for a long time is able to conquer the much greater but unorganized force of the nation until, through careful guidance and cultivation of the opportunities of the masses toward a growth of will and consciousness, the unorganized super-power can be prepared to face the organized.
>We now know the essence of both constitutions of the land, its real constitution – the actual relations of force existing in the country – and its written constitution whcih in cotnradistinction to the first may be called a scrap of paper.
>It is clear that real constitutions have existed in every land and at all times, and there is nothing shallower or more misleading than the current ntion that constitutions are peculiar to the modern age.
>Every country in every age therefore had a real constitution. What is peculiar to modern times is – and it is importantl always to bear this clearly in mind – not the actual but the written constitution – the piece of paper.
As a matter of fact, in modern times we witness a struggle in almost all the states to secure a written constitution which will formulate in a basic law, on a piece of paper, the principles upon which the institutions and governing practices of thel and will rest.
>What is the reason for this peculiar struggle of modern times?
Ferdinand Lassalle
>This difference springs, as you will recall, from the fact that the power of the nation is unorganized while that of the army is organized, constantly drilled, and capable of taking the field at any moment against the nation, which is united for action only under the influence of great events and at rare moments.
>Consequently, in order for the victory of March 18 not to have been an empty one for the people, the victorious moment should have been utilized to change the organization of the army in such a way as to make it impossible for the standing army to be used again as an isntrument in the hands of the King against the nation.
>The time spent in service by a soldier should, for instance, have been limited to six months, a period which military authorities recognize is long enough for a man to learn the military arts but not so long that he will develop a caste psychology. This brief period, furthermore, would result in a constant replenishment of the army from the people, thereby transforming it form a King's army to a people's army.
>It should, in addition, have been stipulated that all lower ranking officers – at least through the rank of major – shall be elected by the men and not appointed, so that the officiers' posts be filled not in a spirit basically antagonistic to the people which acts to facilitate the transformation of the army into a blind instrument for the King's power.
>The army should also be subject – except in isolated purely military matters – to ordinary civilian courts, in order to keep it part of the people and not something apart, and tending to develop a castle spirit.
>All armament which is intended for defense purposes – save those pieces which are absolutely necessary for drill purposes – should be kept in the custody of the civilian authorities elected by the people.
…
>Not at all, gentlemen! And the proof o this lies In the facts themselves. The National Assembly was disbanded, but the King, using the documents left behind by that body, composed himself and proclaimed a constitution on December 5, 1848, which in its main points was actually the constitution we might have expected from the Assembly.
>This constitution was granted by the King – not forced from him – but voluntarily granted by him after his victory. All the more reason why this constitution, it would appear, should be stable.
Ferdinand Lassalle – No Compromisehttps://www.marxists.org/archive/lassalle/revolt/8-no-compromise.html
>What will absolutism do if it has succeeded in putting through a victorious counter-revolution?
>Absolutism wants to continue in power. There is no doubt of this. But will it desire to maintain itself in its old form, namely, as a naked, undisguised Absolutism? Will it drop the constitution and continue to govern in the former absolutist method without any constitution at all? God forbid! Absolutism is not as stupid as that. . . . For Absolutism has reluctantly accepted the understanding — having been once subjected to a defeat, which in our case is the defeat of March 18, 1848 — of the fact that the unorganized social power of the citizenry is, in the last analysis, far superior to absolutism; that absolutism may, in a favorable hour, by virtue of the discipline of its organized forces, have defeated the citizenry for the moment, but that the latter continued to be, while unorganized, nevertheless the socially predominant force: in other words that a new conflict may arise at any moment, in which absolutism will be defeated again, and, if this defeat is better utilized by its adversary, this time forever.
>Absolutism, once having been made to feel the social power of the citizenry, now has at least some obscure suspicion of the fact that, as a man can beget only a man, an ape only an ape, and every creature, therefore, only a creature that shall resemble him, that shall be made in his image, so in the long run the organized elemental power residing in society must inevitably have produced the organized power — the form of government, let us say — which will resemble it and be made in its image.
>Of all these things absolutism has a more or less unclear notion, for after all, the men of the Government are — as I have told you — practical men, with an instinct for things as they are. . . .
>No matter how intractable absolutism may pretend to be, it is by no means pleased by the precarious existence it leads in its present outright and open contradiction with the social alignment of forces, incurring at any moment the risk of being overwhelmed and crushed, as if by an avalanche, by the descent of these social forces.
>Absolutism, therefore, has only one means of maintaining its existence for a time at least: the figment of the constitution. . . .
>As soon as absolutism has taken this step, namely, that of an ostensible constitutionalism, it will have achieved a great advantage and prolonged its existence for an indefinite period.
>If absolutism should attempt to continue its existence in the old undisguised form, it could not count on any long life. The outright and open contradiction between absolutism and the social condition would make its overthrow the unchanging and ever renewed slogan of society. All society, in fact, could do nothing else — by the very nature of the case itself — than constitute one great conspiracy for the overthrow of its form of government. No government in the world could maintain such a situation for a very long time! A government may, at a favorable moment, call together its army and carry out a successful attack, a successful counter-revolution, but its situation only becomes much more difficult when the government is the attacked party, is acting on the defensive, with the people the attacker. The advantage in struggles of this kind is always on the part of the attacker, for the reason that it is he that has had the opportunity to choose the moment. It is for this reason that most of the coups d’état carried out by governments in the present century have met with success, but then, so have most of the revolutions on the part of the people. However, a government may even be able to ward off for a certain time, for instance, for a few months, an attack which it expects the people to make upon it. But it is a matter of the utmost difficulty for any government to remain armed for this encounter over long periods, keeping itself on a war footing for the purpose of warding off an attack which will probably be launched upon it at the most awkward moment, when it is involved in other complications of the gravest nature. Such a situation is untenable for any government in the long run, and, therefore, almost inconceivable.
>But when an absolutist government has surrounded itself with the empty appearances of constitutional forms and proceeds to continue the practice of the ancient absolutism within these forms, it has carried off an immense advantage. For now, owing to the appearance of a favorably achieved balance between the form of government and the social group predominant in society, the latter has been lulled to sleep and satisfied for the moment. That which was to be fought for appears already to have been achieved. This illusion pacifies the struggle, cripples it and breaks its point, by making great masses of the people either satisfied or indifferent and uninterested. From now on only the forces operating unconsciously in society will — in general — work for an overthrow of the government, and not the real consciousness of society itself.
>Pseudo-constitutionalism is, therefore — and it is very important for you, gentlemen, to understand this — by no means an achievement of the people, but, on the contrary, only an achievement of absolutism, and the most essential means for prolonging the existence of the latter.
>Pseudo-constitutionalism, therefore, as you will now have understood, is to be found in the fact that the government makes statements of what is not so; that the government declares the State to be a constitutional State, while it is in reality an absolutist State; pseudo-constitutionalism is the lie. >In the struggle with this lie and with its might, the true and obviously victorious instrument is necessarily the exposure of this lie; the proper tactic is simply to destroy the appearance which has made the continuation of the deceptive forms possible, and thus to cut them off from any misleading influence on Tom, Dick and Harry. The proper procedure is to force the lie to take off its mask and to admit to all the world, even formally, that it is really an absolute government.
>I tell you that the Diet must — and this is a weapon leading indomitably to a victory — simply state the truth. . . .
>All great political action consists in the stating of that which is, and begins with, such a statement.
>All political pettifogging consists in concealing and cloaking that which is.
>As a matter of fact, gentlemen, I here could — and perhaps ought to — raise grave political accusations, if it were not for the fact that — for the sake of our unity — I consider it better to leave these things unsaid. For years, down to the present day — in and since the inception of the new era — leaders of the people’s party in the press — and even if I should carry my discretion so far as to mention no names, you could not help knowing that I have the so-called Volkszeitung[a] in mind — have been pursuing a method consisting absolutely in no other thing than in the statement of things that are not so. They have proceeded from the assumption that it is necessary to whitewash, to keep secret, to cloak things; according to their mind, it is necessary to persuade the Government that it is a constitutional Government to such an extent that the Government will ultimately believe this statement itself! It is, therefore, their aim to transform the Government by lying. But all true successes in life and in history may be attained only by a real transformation, a real plowing over of the soil, never by a transformation in words of falsehood! These mental starvelings have failed to understand that, without any desire of their own, they have become men of the Government, both in their choice of weapons as well as in the effect of these weapons. In their choice of weapons: for their weapons are the same as those we have become acquainted with in the absolutism that is disguised with a pseudo-constitutionalism, namely, the stating of things that are not so. And likewise, with regard to the operation of these instruments: for these mental starvelings have failed to understand that, in order to impart to the Government through the lies of their newspapers, the idea that the Government is a constitutional Government, they have been obliged daily to preach the same lie to the people and thus actually made the people believe it. These babes have been unable to understand, moreover, that by these lies they have only been encouraging the Government to continue along the path of pseudo-constitutionalism, a path made very smooth and easy by the work of our friends, and I may say that the Government itself was much astonished at the prestige and the halo prepared for it, at the crown of glory of a “new era” which was pressed upon its undeserving head, to such an extent that the Government has finally been able to make military demands. These unhappy men who preached daily in their leading articles against immorality, did not grasp the fact that the lie is a profoundly immoral instrument, which — in the political struggle — may indeed be of advantage to a Machiavellian art of government,[b] but never to the people themselves.
>It is these mental defectives who are responsible in great measure for the fact that things have come to the pass to which they have come.
>It is they who, with the battle cry: “Men of honor! The Ministers are men of honor! Confide in the Ministers!” have driven the Diet, by their leading articles, to appropriate the provisional budget for the army organization demanded by the pseudo-constitutional Schwerin-Patow Cabinet,[c] which at that time might easily have been refused. It is they who are responsible, therefore, for the fact that it was made possible at all to introduce the army organization bill, and to place us now in the position of having to meet this grave conflict, a thing that would have been impossible without their granting the provisional budget.
>But let the dead past bury its dead!
>It is our duty, however, to fight the more inexorably, the more jealously, in the serious encounters of the press, to prevent a policy of meretricious cloaking from depriving people of their rights once more. I have revealed to you the means which cannot fail to be followed by an unconditional and positive victory of the people; work for this end! There must be a mutual interaction between the Deputies and public opinion. Set up the means we have just discussed, and make it an educational slogan. Disseminate it, fight for it, throughout the circle of your acquaintances, in public and private places, in the whole sphere of your activity. Consider every man either as a conscious or an unconscious opponent of the good cause if he will not make use of this instrument. The method outlined to you is the only method within the Diet’s power. For, what others are at its disposal? It would obviously be a most lamentable, a most absurd illusion, if the Diet should believe that by continuing in session and continuing to vote down other demands of the Cabinet — even all the Cabinet’s demands — it will be able to put any compulsion on the Cabinet. If the Cabinet dares to tread under foot, to trample on the first unquestionably constitutional refusal on the part of the Diet, and proceed as if the Diet did not exist, how will it be possible to make the second or third or fourth refusal on the part of the Diet more effective? As a matter of fact, the Government would merely form the habit of regarding inconvenient decisions of the Diet as not having been adopted at all. Both Government and people would accustom themselves to this condition. The pleasant habit of disregarding the resolutions of the Diet would become a rooted one, and it would be more rooted among the people — and not without reason — than in the Government. A Diet which would consent, after its constitutionally adopted decisions had been trodden under foot, to continue to deliberate and go through the motions of legislation, to continue playing its part with the Government in this farce of pseudo-constitutionalism would actually be making itself the Government's worst accomplice. For, it would thereby be making it possible for the Government to annihilate the constitutional rights of the people in spite of the fact that the appearance of a constitutional form was being kept up. And the Diet would be more culpable in this procedure than the Government, for there is far more guilt in my own representative, in the man who should defend my rights, and who betrays them instead, than in my adversary himself.
>It would perhaps be even worse if the Chamber should . . . consent to introduce . . . a so-called compromise. You must raise your voices particularly against such an eventuality.
>No compromise is conceivable on this question. . . .
>If the Diet should consent to any form of compromise under these circumstances . . . this would no longer be a compromise, an agreement; it would be a complete surrendering of the public law. It would amount to an installing in office of the Bismarckian[d] diplomatic practice, whose watchword is as follows: when the Government is in conflict with the constitutional right of the Chambers,[e] it is the Diet that must yield. You must, therefore, regard every man outright as a conscious or unconscious — and in the latter case even more dangerous — enemy of the righteous cause, who would here speak of compromise. . . . Let us have no illusions, therefore, of conciliation, gentlemen. You have now gathered sufficient experience to know what the ancient absolutism amounts to. Therefore let us make no new compromise with it, but let our watchword be: our hands around his throat and his shoulders on the ground!
Hobbes' Leviathan
<A Person, what?
>A PERSON, is he “whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction.
<The Word Person, Whence
>The word Person is latin: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon, which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise, or Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguises the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, has been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himself, or an other; and he that acts another, is said to bear his Person, or act in his name; (in which sense Cicero uses it where he says, “Unus Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I bear three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;”) and is called in diverse occasions, diversely; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like.
>Actor, Author; Authority
>Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and he that owns his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the Actor acts by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner, and in latine Dominus, in Greeke Kurios; speaking of Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is always understood a Right of doing any act: and Done By Authority, done by Commission, or License from him whose right it is.
<Covenants By Authority, Bind The Author
>From hence it follows, that when the Actor makes a Covenant by Authority, he binds thereby the Author, no less than if he had made it himself; and no less subjects him to all the consequences of the same. And therefore all that hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14) of the nature of Covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity, is true also when they are made by their Actors, Representers, or Procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no farther.
<And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer, not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.
<But Not The Actor
>When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he, but the Author breaks the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily; to refuse to do it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbids breach of Covenant.
<A Multitude Of Men, How One Person
>A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that makes the Person One. And it is the Representer that bears the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.
<Every One Is Author
>And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from himself in particular; and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how far he shall represent them, none of them owns more, than they gave him commission to Act.
<An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By Plurality Of Voices [Or Majority Vote]
>And if the Representative consist of many men, the voice of the greater number, must be considered as the voice of them all. For if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the excess of Negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the only voice the Representative has.
<Nor From A Great Multitude [Which leads to Factionalism], Unless Directed By One Judgement
>And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another [in their factionalism]; and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Laws of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be nor need to be any Civil Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.
(Note: I like to think this is Hobbes' objection to Aristotle on "Too Much Unity" & "Atomization" in objecting to Plato's Republic – Where Aristotle suggests that the State goes & shrinks from the State, to the Family, & finally to the Individual, & is destroy, then Hobbes suggests to this & the idea that people are political animals by nature, that Mankind might as well have one world government and have peace without subjection).
<The Generation Of A Common-wealth
>The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to bear their Person; and every one to own, and acknowledge himself to be Author of whatsoever he that so bears their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concern the Common Peace and Safety; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment.
<This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a real Unity of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, “I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my self, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his Actions in like manner.”
>This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in latin CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which we owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad.
<The Definition Of A Common-wealth
>And in him consists the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,) is “One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.”
<Sovereign, And Subject, What
>And he that carries this Person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have Sovereign Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.
<The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What
>A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly Of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted For It, as [well as] he that Voted Against It, shall Authorize all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.
(Note: It is interesting that this also includes those who vote against it thereby are said to consent to it – I assume by Hobbes' definition of consent by inference; aka, that they yet still participate & accept this system & don't actively resist or go somewhere else).
<2. Sovereign Power Cannot Be Forfeited
>Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to him they make Sovereign, by Covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Sovereign; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretense of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection.
Bossuet:
<To imagine now, with M. Jurieu, in the people considered to be in this condition, a sovereignty, which is already a species of government, is to insist on a government before all government, and to contradict oneself. Far from the people being sovereign in this condition, there is not even a people in this state. There may be families, as ill-governed as they are ill-secured; there may well be a troop, a mass of people, a confused multitude; but there can be no people, because people supposes something which already brings together some regulated conduct and some establshed law – something which happens only to those who have already begun to leave this unhappy condition, that is to say, that of anarchy.
He that is Sovereign makes no covenant beforehand; like Bossuet says, would assume to have government before government
>That he which is made Sovereign makes no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men, those Covenants after he has the Sovereignty are void, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular.
>Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Sovereign at his Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversy: it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovers the right of Protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the Institution.
>It is therefore in vain to grant Sovereignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receives his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceeds from want of understanding this easy truth, that Covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public Sword; that is, from the untied hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Sovereign; then no man imagines any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Sovereignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a Popular Government, proceeds from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.
The Absolutism of Hobbes' Leviathan
Now Hobbes also says, that those who limit, or seek to limit, will themselves become like the center in a circle, and take the point & compass to draw the limits, becoming the absolute power:
>And whosoever thinking Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.
For all States, Hobbes believes they are simple & absolute:
>I have already sufficiently proved (chapt. 18.) that all Governments which men are bound to obey, are Simple, and Absolute.
If it is limited (outside of just the fundamental laws, natural & divine, that is), then another must be sovereign, and another form of state:
>Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not supreme; that is to say not Sovereign. The Sovereignty therefore was always in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a privilege to lead their Armies; but the Sovereignty was in the Ephori.
–
It is also important to consider, for the 17th law of Nature, Hobbes states
The Seventeenth, No Man Is His Own Judge
>And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversy, that is, the cause of War, remains, against the Law of Nature.
In the same sense, Jean Bodin states a Sovereign cannot bind his own hand, appealing to as the Canonists are supposed to have said, that neither could the Pope.
And lastly, Hobbes states again:
–
<Subjecting The Sovereign Power To Civill Laws
<A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth, is this, “That he that hath the Sovereign Power, is subject to the Civill Laws.” It is true, that Sovereigns are all subjects to the Laws of Nature; because such laws be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth be abrogated.
>But to those Laws which the Sovereign himself, that is, which the Common-wealth makes, he is not subject. For to be subject to Laws, is to be subject to the Commonwealth, that is to the Sovereign Representative, that is to himself; which is not subjection, but freedome from the Laws. Which errour, because it sets the Laws above the Sovereign, sets also a Judge above him, and a Power to punish him; which is to make a new Sovereign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the Confusion, and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.
By Absolute Sovereignty, there are some cases, Jean Bodin talks of an absolute sovereignty & majesty, where the Sovereignty is a simple unity just as a dot or a center in a circle is indivisible in geometry, and so sovereignty has the capacity to govern the State, by drawing the boundaries and limits of things, like a point and compass in geometry, I assume – (& Absolute Sovereignty in Monarchy is not understood to be a mixed, composite kind of State / mixed constitution, limited or mixed monarchy, where the limitation is understood either to the monarch's estate, or as a part of the whole, or by limitation of term or rotational government – since that kind of constitutional monarchy sees, as Aristotle does, the monarch as a part in relation to the whole, it is an inferior & thereby limited monarchy, but with Absolute Sovereignty it is a superior relationship, and does in a way have the relationship of the whole to the part) – & King James VI & I also describes it as a Free Monarchy (Free, signifying Absolute Sovereignty, so Absolute Monarchy) – Hobbes also understood it the same way as King James VI & I, stating that the liberty is to be the liberty of commonwealths or artificial persons (which you can see here: & for Hobbes, what really we call freedom in a Commonwealth is more of a sign of honor, such as the honor a parent has for his children and their status).
…
It is critical, that the Author is bound by covenant, but the Actor is not, – if I understand it correctly – for the justification for an Absolute Sovereignty in Hobbes' Leviathan.
<Jean Bodin / The citizens in particular & the people in general
>It is one thing to bind all together, and to bind every one in particular: for so all the citizens particularly swore to the observation of the laws, but not all together for that every one of them in particular was bound unto the power of them all in general. But an oath could not be given by them all: for why, the people in general is a certain universal body, in power and nature divided from every man in particular. Then again to say truly, an oath cannot be made but by a lesser to the greater, but in a popular estate nothing can be greater than the whole body of the people themselves.
>But in a monarchy it is otherwise, where every one in particular, and all the people in general, and (as it were) in one body, must swear to the observation of the laws, and their faithful allegiance to one sovereign monarch; who next unto God (of whom he holds his scepter & power) is bound to no man. For an oath carries always with it reverence unto whom, or in whose name it is made, as still given unto a superiour.
I think in response to Ferdinand Lassalle, I would add that a people have no organization without a king.
–If they seek to become organized, "the people" becomes a kind of king, as Aristotle says, and seeks to govern in a monarchical sway, which is just a poor imitation of a natural and proper king, which is a monarchy once realized it is better to have one king for corporatist reasons.
That is what North Korea has long realized, that the people need a leader or they are disorganized by default–and there is no organization and no cohesion as a "people" without a king and without even the pale imitation of a king in the state corporatist fashion of "king people" as De Maistre cals it–just as a people without a singer on the stage utterly lack coordination.
That is what Hobbes and Bossuet and ᴉuᴉlossnW understood.
ᴉuᴉlossnW:
>If the people are not organized, if the people are not a State, they are simply a population that will be at the mercy of the first group of internal adventurers or external invaders.
…
>In so far as it is embodied in a State, this higher personality becomes a nation.
>It is not the nation which generates the State
>Rather is it the State which creates the nation, conferring volition and therefore real life on a people made aware of their moral unity.
Bossuet:
>Otherwise there is no union; the people become wanderers, like a flock dispersed.
…
>Far from the people being sovereign in this condition, there is not even a people in this state. There may be families, as ill-governed as they are ill-secured; there may well be a troop, a mass of people, a confused multitude; but there can be no people
Joseph de Maistre
>If sovereignty is not anterior to the people, at least these two ideas are collateral, since a sovereign is necessary to make a people. It is as impossible to imagine a human society, a people, without a sovereign as a hive and bees without a queen:
That is above all else, what Hobbes understood and insisted upon.
No King, no people.
If you try to preserve the original laws without the essence of the cult of personality and the king, no matter what constitutionalist pretense, the spirit of the laws dies with the king: if you replaced the original developers behind a product with another team, the quality of that product subsides–if you replace the king and thereby the cult of personality and bloodline which by preservation wants to keep the original king through his descendents, you loose the same product as well.
You'll never have the same spirit and original content without the original creators or people in relation to them, and that is why monarchy keeps the offspring of the king, to keep the curation and spirit of that original regime alive–to replace a king in this instance destroys that spirit, just as much as a remake can never quite re-capture the spirit of the original movie where the original team orchestrated and lead the production of that film, the same effect happens with sovereignty and with replacing the king and his bloodline or trying to interfere–because in monarchy the monarch is the monarchy, these two things are treated as inseperable, and the replacement is not a mere replacement but the creation of a new civil life and a new civil god, not the resurrection of an older one, as Hobbes says,
>And they that go about by disobedience to do no more than reform the Commonwealth shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus, in the fable, which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit father, did by the counsel of Medea cut him in pieces and boil him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man.
So in that case, the monarchy dies with the monarch.
You replace the original team and kill all the original creators, there will be no recreation if it anymore, and hereditary monarchy is just an attempt to preserve that brand of the original cult of personality by the natural offspring. The offspring of a monarch act as a living fire and the retention of kings by blood is a living fire like they do in Zorastrianism–that fire being blown out cannot ever be restored–the constitutional monarchists who retain a hope in "restorationism" and replacement make a big mistake in not considering the fatality of this and don't appreciate the gravity of it all, that is why they think with ease that they can simply just replace a monarch like another cog or part (which denies monarchical preeminence as I have seen, it's not the replacement of another part but a replacement of the entire soul and body is being killed and turned into something else completely). The ultimate continution cannot be followed by simply looking at a recipe, but looking at the creators and living members who understood that art and killing those members and distorting that cult of personality and its preservation goes against the law and reason behind why a hereditary monarchy does preservation to begin with.
That is what Ivan the Terrible understood, as the legend goes, when he blinded the architects of St. Basil's Cathedral so he could never create anything so beautiful again.
But constitutional monarchist and restorationalism acts as if monarchical dynasties are trees that cannot die–that a dynasty can be "restored" or a king "replaced" without risking everything–that constitutional monarchist legitimatists even think a dynasty can be kept alive and restored after centuries have passed shows their lack of understanding of both the severity of keeping the monarchy to begin with and an utter lack of understanding that once an empire dies it doesn't come back. You will never have the original Roman Empire or Romans. You will never have the original, especially if you are eager to replace and kill it, since that only accelerates the declination even with the best and most noble and good intentions. The dynasties, the empires, the cult of personality, even "Caesar" – these are truly lost, the deception is, again, as I said, with Little Red Riding Hood and the Wolf, but what you're left with are wolves in grandma's clothes, and they play an active part in killing grandma to replace her with the wolf.
…
That is all "I am the next Roman Empire" or "I am the new Caesar, the new Tsar, the new Kaiser" really is–the act of the Wolf dawning on grandma's clothes–that is just another measure to secure obedience by rulers when they appeal to nostalgia or cultural memory, but the original team, the original bloodline, the original cult of personality and brand is all gone and one needs to truly feel the gravity of this. Those monarchies that monarchists want restored–they're dead and gone–there can only be a new cult of personality now, as restorations rarely happen past even 45 years, and almost never past 100 years.
>>826940I also attribute this naive characteristic of constitutional monarchists to Christianity–as Christians wait for Christ to return, but constitutional monarchists need to realize the severity of that these dynasties are lost and one does not simply "replace" or "restore" a monarchy, which they have come to take for granted as an easy thing due to the restoration of the Stuarts.
I think what constitutional monarchists need–in killing their gods, that is, their monarchies–a solemn reconsideration of what it means to replace that god.
That is what Nietzsche appeals to with this idea, beast or a god, and concerning monarchical preeminence, these are tremendous boots to fill, and not just a mere replacement of a part and going on with your day… but a re-consolidation of the entire life of a people, and, for monarchy, the dawn of a new god entirely, a new world order, a new political constitution entirely.
To attain monarchical preeminence isn't a degree of how many pushups or a mere show of human excellence in that fashion, "do this and you're qualified", but means to become a new kind of civil god that humbles all the people and is at once recognized as a superior to myriads, to thousands, to perhaps millions of people–that differs from just any kind of excellence, to be that kind of superior.
Frederick the Great: That a Sovereign Should Carry on the Government Himself
>In a State such as this it is necessary for the sovereign to conduct his business himself, because he will, if he is wise, pursue only the public interest, which is his own, while a Minister’s view is always slanted on matters that affect his own interests, so that instead of promoting deserving persons he will fill the places with his own creatures, and will try to strengthen his own position by the number of persons whom he makes dependent on his fortunes; whereas the sovereign will support the nobility, confine the clergy within due limits, not allow the Princes of the blood to indulge in intrigues and cabals, and will reward merit without those considerations of interest which Ministers secretly entertain in all their doings.
>But if it is necessary for the Prince to conduct the internal administration of his State himself, how much more necessary is it that he should direct his own [foreign] policy, conclude those alliances which suit his purposes, form his own plans, and take up his own line in delicate and difficult situations.
>Finance, internal administration, policy and defense are so closely interlinked that it is impossible to deal with one of these branches while passing over the others. If that happens, the Prince is in difficulties. In France, the kingdom is governed by four Ministers: the Minister of Finance, who is called Contrôleurgénéral, and the Ministers of Marine, War, and Foreign Affairs. The four “kings” never harmonize or agree; hence all the contradictions which we see in the government of France: the one pulls down out of jealousy what the other has put up with skill; no system, no planning. Chance governs, and everything in France is done according to the pleasure of Court intrigues: the English know everything that is discussed in Versailles; no secrecy and, consequently, no policy.
>A well-conducted government must have a system as coherent as a system of philosophy; all measures taken must be based on sound reasoning, and finance, policy, and military must collaborate toward one aim, the strengthening of the State and the increase of its power. But a system can be the product of only one brain; it must consequently be that of the sovereign’s. Idleness, self-indulgence, or weakness are the causes which prevent a Prince from working on the noble task of creating the happiness of his peoples. Such sovereigns make themselves so contemptible that they become the butts and laughingstocks of their contemporaries, and in history books their names are useful only for the dates. They vegetate on thrones that they are unworthy to occupy, absorbed as they are in self-indulgence. A sovereign has not been raised to his high rank, the supreme power has not been conferred on him, to live softly, to grow fat on the substance of the people, to be happy while all others suffer. The sovereign is the first servant of the State. He is well-paid, so that he can support the dignity of his quality; but it is required of him that he shall work effectively for the good of the State and direct at least the chief affairs with attention. He needs, of course, help: he cannot enter into all details, but he should listen to all complaints and procure prompt justice for those threatened by oppression. A woman came to a King of Epirus with a petition; he snubbed her, telling her to leave him in peace. “And why are you King,” she replied, “if not to procure justice for me?” A good saying, which Princes should always keep in mind.
>We have here the Directorate General, the Colleges of Justice, and the Ministers of the Cabinet, who daily submit their reports to the sovereign with most detailed memoranda on the questions which call for his decision. In controversial or difficult questions, the Ministers themselves set out the pros and cons, which makes it possible for the sovereign to take his decision at a glance, provided that he takes the trouble to read and understand the matter in question. A sound intellect easily grasps the essential point of a question. This method of dealing with business is preferable to the conciliar system practiced elsewhere, because it is not from big assemblages that wise advice comes, for Ministers are mutually divided by intrigues, private hatreds and passions intrude into the affairs of State, the system of debating questions by dispute is often too lively, casting shadows instead of bringing light, and, finally, secrecy, which is the soul of business, is never well kept by so many people.
>It may be well for a Prince, when uncertain, to consult the Minister whom he judges to be the wisest and the most experienced; if he wants to consult a second, this should be done separately so as to avoid sowing the seeds of an ineradicable jealousy by preferring the advice of one man to another’s. I shut up my secrets in my own mind; I keep only one secretary (of whose loyalty I am satisfied); without corrupting me personally, it is impossible to guess my designs. The Ministers here are charged only with Imperial [sic] affairs; all important negotiations, treaties, or alliances pass through my hands.
Frederick II:>In a State such as this it is necessary for the sovereign to conduct his business himself, because he will, if he is wise, pursue only the public interest, which is his own, while a Minister’s view is always slanted on matters that affect his own interests, so that instead of promoting deserving persons he will fill the places with his own creatures, and will try to strengthen his own position by the number of persons whom he makes dependent on his fortunes; whereas the sovereign will support the nobility, confine the clergy within due limits, not allow the Princes of the blood to indulge in intrigues and cabals, and will reward merit without those considerations of interest which Ministers secretly entertain in all their doings.
>His method of dealing with business is preferable to the conciliar system practiced elsewhere, because it is not from big assemblages that wise advice comes, for Ministers are mutually divided by intrigues, private hatreds and passions intrude into the affairs of State, the system of debating questions by dispute is often too lively, casting shadows instead of bringing light, and, finally, secrecy, which is the soul of business, is never well kept by so many people.
<Alexander Hamilton / An absolute monarchy would be more tolerable than the authority of British Parliament over America>I'll go farther, & assert, that the authority of the British Parliament over America, would, in all probability, be a more intolerable & excessive species of despotism than an absolute monarchy. The power of an absolute prince is not temporary, but perpetual.
>He is under no temptation to purchase the favour of one part of his dominions, at the expence of another; but, it is his interest to treat them all, upon the same footing.
>Very different is the case with regard to the Parliament: The Lords and Commons both, have a private and separate interest to pursue.To be found in Hamilton's Farmer Refuted in response to Samuel Seasbury:
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0057Hobbes' Leviathan:>From whence it follows, that where the public and private interest are most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise only from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious. nor secure; whose Subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune.Hobbes on Aristocratic Passions; too many cooks spoil the broth>And first it seems inconvenient, there should be committed so great a power to one man, as that it might be lawful to no other man or men to resist the samel and some think it inconvenient eo nomine, because he has the power. But this reason we may not by any means admit, for it makes it inconvenient to be ruled by Almighty God, who without question has more power over every man, than can be conferred upon any monarch. This inconvenience therefore must be derived, not from the power, but from the affections and passions which reign in every one, as well monarch as subject; by which the monarch may be swayed to use that power amiss. And because an aristocracy (or oligarchy of a few rulers) consists of men, if the passions of many men be more violent when they are assembled together, than the passions of one man alone, it will follow, that the inconvenience arising from passion will be greater in an aristocracy (or, an oligarchy of a few rulers), than a monarchy.Isocrates on Monarchy:>Thus it is clear that monarchy is the most efficient form of government. It is said even the gods are under the kingship of Zeus; even if this were untrue, yet the fact that we imagine that the gods are under a monarchy is an admission that we consider it the best form of government.
>In oligarchies and democracies, the rulers have private interests, further they only meet occasionally and opportunities for action are missed; monarchs are continually occupied in the public interest. Again, the former are jealous and wish to exalt themselves at the expense of their predecessors and successors, the latter seek the goo will of all. But the greatest difference is that monarchs treat public affairs as their own concern, other rulers transact them as if they were other people's business, and they choose their advisors accordingly.
>Those who hold office for one year only have to retire before they have mastered their duties; a monarch has the advantage of continuous experience. Again, he knows that he has to superintend everything; the oligarchic and democratic ruler has colleagues, and much remains undone because each thinks the other is doing it.A Worthy Panegyrick Upon Monarchy (Anonymous):>Monarchy's that Politick simple State,>Consists in Unity (inseparate>Pure entire;) a Government that stands,>When others fall, touch'd but with levelling hands:>So Natural and with such Skill endu'd,>It makes ONE Body of a Multitude.
>In Order (wherein latter things depend>On Former) that's most perfect doth attend>On Unity: But this can never be>The Popular State, nor Aristocracy,>For where or All, or Many bear the Sway,>Such Order, to Confusion leads the way. Louis XIV also makes it clear what the stamp of monarchical preeminence is all about.
In the song Publions en tous lieux:
>Barely can we suffice
>With all our voices
Or Hobbes Leviathan:
<Non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei. Iob. 41 . 24" (There is no power on earth to be compared to him. Job 41 . 24)
Hopefully, anons will understand this: a sovereign monarch with majesty isn't as, Hobbes would say,
>King, they thought, was but a title of the highest honour, which gentleman, knight, baron, earl, duke, were but steps to ascend to
Or reason like John Cook, that a king is no more than the Duke of Venice, a partner or in relation to an assembly like a part, and must take his turn in being governed, like statesmen… which again, is another blot against that notion of monarchical preeminence: a preeminent king doesn't take his turn in being governed, that is, swapped in and out like a cog that way; which is what the effect of "replacement" is trying to say, even the sheer at degrades the monarchy (no matter how good the intentions are).
I'll never get tired of telling you to kill yourself
<Jean Bodin: Concerning Popes
>But I think no man doubts, but that the king even before his consecration enjoys both the possession and propriety of the kingdom, not by inheritance or his fathers right, and much less by the country of the bishops or peers, but by the royal law and custom of the realm, as was long since decreed of the French men, that no man should think the power of the king to depend on the pleasure of the bishops; not for that the Senat ever doubted the power of the king before his coronation; but that those vain quirks of the bishops might be utterly reselled. For it is an old proverb with us, '''That the king doth never die, but that so soon as he is dead, the next male of his stock is seized of the kingdom, and in possession thereof before he be crowned, which is not conferred unto him by succession of his father, but by virtue of the law of the land; least the succession of the kingdom should be uncertain, then which nothing can be more dangerous in a Commonweal.
>And to show a greater submission of the emperors unto the popes, the subscription of the emperor's letters unto the pope, is this, I kiss the hands and feet of your Holiness. So used always the emperor Charles V to subscribe to his letters, when he writ unto pope Clement the seventh. Which he did not upon a feigned courtesy, but indeed in most humble and servile manner kissed the Pope's feet, in open sight of the people, and the greatest assemblies of many noble princes, at Bononia, Rome, and last of all at Marsielles in Provence, where were met together the Pope, the Emperor, the Kings of France and Navarre, the dukes of Savoy, of Buillon, Florence, Ferrara, Vitemberg the Grand Master of Malta, with many other princes and great lords, who all kissed the Pope's feet, except the dukes of Buillon and Vitemberg, Protestant princes, who had forsaken the rites and ceremonies of the church of Rome. In far more base sort did that duke of Venice humble himself (who of the Venetians themselves is called a dog) for that he with a rope about his neck, and creeping upon all four like a beast, so craved pardon of Pope Clement the 5th. But nothing was more base, than that which almost all historiographers which write of the Pope's affairs, report of the Emperor Frederick the Second, who to redeem his son out of prison, lying prostrate upon the ground at the feet of the Pope Alexander the Fourth, suffered him to tread upon his head, if the histories be true. Whereby it is well to be perceived, the Majesty of the Emperors, by the power (should I say) or by the outrageousness of the Bishops of Rome, to have been so diminished, as that scarce the shadow of their ancient majesty seems now to remain. They also say themselves to be greater than the emperors, and that so much greater, as is the Sun greater than the Moon: that is to say, six thousand six hundred forty and five times, if we believe Ptolemy and the Arabians. And that more is, they have always pretended a right unto the empire: for the imperial seat being vacant, they have given the investitures unto them which held of the empire, and received of them their fealty: as they did of John and Luchin, viscounts of Milan, the imperial seat being empty in the year 1341, who are in the records called vassals of the church of Rome, and not of the empire; and are forbidden their obedience unto Lewes of Bavaria the Emperor, who was then excommunicated, as we have before said. For which cause the Canonists have maintained, that the emperor cannot give up his imperial dignity unto any, but unto the pope.
>But howsoever the Bishop of Rome pretended to have a sovereignty over all Christian princes, not only in spiritual, but also in temporal affairs, whether they got it by force of arms, or by the devotion and grant of princes; or by long possession and prescription: yet could not our kings even for any most short time endure the servitude of the Bishop of Rome, nor be moved with any their excommunication, which the Popes used as firebrands to the firing of Christian Commonwealths. For these Popes interdictions, or excommunications, were wont with other nations, to draw the subjects from the obedience and reverence of their prince: but such has always been the love of our kings towards their people (and so I hope shall be forever) and loyalty of the people towards their kigns: that when pope Boniface the Eight saw himself nothing to prevail by his excommunication, nor that the people were to be drawn from the obedience of their king, after he had publically excommunicated Philip the Fair, he in like manner excommunicated all the French nation, with all them which took Philip for a king. But Philip having called together an assembly of his princes, and other his nobility, and pereceving in his subjects in general a wonderful consent for his defense of his state and sovereignty: he thereupon writ letters unto Boniface (which are common in every man's hand) to reprove him of his folly: and shortly after sent Nogaret with his army into the Pope's territory, who took the Pope prisoner, (giving him well to understand that the King was not his subject, as he had by his Bull published) but seeing him through impatience to become furious and mad, he set him again at liberty. Yet from that the Pope's interdiction, the King by the advice of his nobility and Senat, appealed unto a general council, which had power over the Pope, abusing the holy cities. For the king next unto Almighty God had none his superior, unto whom he might appeal: but the Pope is bound unto the decrees and commands of the council. And long times before Philip the Victorious, and his realm being interdicted by Pope Alexander the Third, who would have brought him into his subjection: answered him by letters, That he held nothing of the pope, nor yet of any prince in the world. Benedict the third, and Julius the second, had used the like excommunication against Charles the seventh, and Lewes the twelfth (who was called the Father of his country) that so as with firebrands they might inflame the people to rebellion: yet failed they both of their hope, the obedience of the subjects being nothing diminished, but rather increased: the Bull of excommunication which the Popes legat brought into France, being by the decree of the parliament of Paris openly torn to pieces, and the legat for his presumptuousness cast in prison… True it is, that they which have thought better to assure the majesty of the Kings of France against the power of the Pope, have obtained the Pope's bulls whilest they yet stat in the city of Auignion to be exempted from their power. And namely there is in the records of France a Bull of Pope Clements the Fifth, whereby he not only absolved Philip the Fair and his subjects from the interdiction of Boniface the Eight, but also declared the King and the realm to be exempted from the Pope's power. Pope Alexander the Fourth also gave this privilege unto the realm of France, That it could not for any cause be interdicted, which was afterward by seven Popes successively confirmed by Gregory, Clement the fourth, Urban the fifth, and Benedict the twelfth, whose bull yet remain in the records of France: which yet seem unto me not to increase, but rather to diminish the majesty of our Kings, who were never in any thing beholden unto the Popes. And that more is, the court of parliament of Paris, has been by many decrees declared the clause, By the authority Apostolical; usually inserted into the Popes rescripts sent into France, to be void, mere abusive, and to no purpose: and therefore it behooved him, that would help himself by any such the popes rescript, to protest in judgment, That he would not any way take benefit of that clause. By all which things it is plainly to be understood, not only the kings, but the Kingdom of France also, to have been always free from the Pope's power and command.
>Upon this difference cast themselves into the protection of the Kings of France, who were the GREATEST Monarchs of Christendom; wherein they were not of their hope deceived. For hereupon, Pipin, Grand M. of France (a man of great wealth and power, who then disposed of all the affairs of the realm) with a great army passing over the Alps, overthrew and discomfited the power of the Lombards, and afterward going to Rome, was the first that gave unto Pope Zacharie, part of the seignorie of Italy, who had before crowned him King of France, forbidding the peers and people of France to make of any choice of any other for their kings but of the house of Pipin, having publicly pronounced King Childeric for his sottishness to be unable for the government. Whereunto the people of France made so much the less resistance, for that Pipin then had the nobility and the army of France at command: and for that the Pope (who as then was esteemed as a God upon earth) was the author thereof, unto whom Pipin had before solemnly promised, and given him letters pattents thereof, That if he should become victorious over the Lombards, he should give unto the Church of Rome the Exarchate of Ravenna, which contained thirty cities, and the province of Pentapole, which contained sixteen cities moe; which he after the victory performed, laying the keys of the said cities upon Saint Peter's altar; yet reserving unto himself and his successors in the crown of France, the sovereignty of both the provinces; and that more is, power also to choose the Popes. Whereunto the Pope not only willingly granted, but almost persuaded Pipin to take upon him the name of an emperor: which title none then used, but the emperors of Constantinople. But Pipin being dead, the Lombards again took up arms, to the great disquiet of the Popes, who again had recourse unto the French Kings, as unto ta most sure sanctuary. Whereunto Charles, Pipin his son (for his many and worthy victories surnamed the Great) with a strong army passing the Alps, not only overthrew the king of the Lombards, but even their kingdom also: and having surely established the power of the Roman bishops, was by them called Emperor: and they again by Charles so long as he lived, all chosen bishops of Rome. But after the death of this Charlemagne, they which were of great credit in Rome, caused themselves to by chosen pope by the clergy, whether it were for the distrust they had to obtain that dignity of the Kings of France, having no favor in the court; or through the negligence of the French Kings, who had thereof no great care; or that it was by reason of the great civil wars which arose betwixt the children of Lewes the Gentle, wherewith the French Kings busied, lost the prerogative they had in choosing of the chief Bishop. Yet Guitard, a great antiquary, who lived in the same time writes, 3 Popes successively to have come into France to excuse themselves to Lewes the Gentle, That they had been by the clergy of Rome constrained to accept the papal dignity, beseeching him to confirm the same: which he either as a man not desirous of glory, or else fearing to provoke the clergy (being then in great authority) did: of which his error he afterwards though to late full sore repented him; being by the college of cardinals constrained to yield up his Crown, & to make himself a monk, and his wife a nun, shut up apart from her husband in a cloister with other nuns, who yet were again afterwards delivered by the princes and nobility of France, (disdaining to see the pride of the clergy) and so again restored unto their former honors. But after the death of this Lewes the Gentle (who was Emperor of France, of Germany, and of greater part of Italy, and Spain) the empire was divided into three kingdoms, which the brethren Charles the Bauld, Lothaire, and Lewes, every one of them held in title of sovereignty, without acknowledging a superiority of one another; and again, the kingdom of Lothaire was divided amongst his children into three parts: unto one fell the kingdom of Lorraine, unto another the kingdom of Arles, and to the third the kingdom of Italy: Lewes holding Germany, and Charles the Emperor, France. So their divided power began to decay, and the wealth of the bishops of Rome greatly to increase: they now succeeding one another by way of election, and in nothing acknowledging the majesty of the French kings, as they ought to have done: which came to pass especially in the time of Pope Nicholas the First, who better understood to manage matters of state than his predecessors, and was the first that used the rigors of excommunication against princes, having excommunicated Lothaire the younger brother of Lewes king of Italy."
>Howbeit that in truth the right of choosing of the pope belonged to the Kings of France, and not unto the German princes, who have but usurped the name and title of emperors, got by the prowess and force of Charlemagne king of France and by him left unto his successors the kings of France, and not unto the kings of Germany; for so they were called in all the ancient treaties and histories of Germany and France, and not emperors, except those which were crowned by the popes. But after that the power of the German kings was far spread in Italy, they then sought to usurp unto themselves that right of choosing of the bishops of Rome: whether it were for the increasing of their own wealth and power, or for to take away the ambition and foul corruption then used in voices giving, and in their elections. For the emperor Henry the third thrust out of his papacy Gregory the sixt, chosen pope by the clergy, and set Clement the second in his place, and afterwards compelled the clergy to swear, not from thenceforth to admit any into the papacy, without the consent of the German emperors; as we have learned out of the Vatican records. But Clement the second being dead, the college of cardinals sent ambassadors unto the emperor to appoint whom he thought good to be pope, who appointed Pepon, afterwards called Damasus the second; who dead, the clergy again sent ambassadors unto the emperor, for the creating of a new pope.
<Jean Bodin recounts in high esteem of the clergy:
>Truly all the best learned lawyers are of opinion, That the priestly dignity is to be preferred before all other honours and vocations: and that the ministers of divine things, & moderators of the most sacred rites, are not to be accounted among the number of the vulgar & common people: which is no new or strange opinion, but drawn & derived even from the most ancient antiquity. For the most ancient kings, to make their royal power the more reverend and stately, exercised also the priestly dignity. Neither did the Greeks only, but the Roman kings also, yea and the greatest emperors themselves, style themselves high Priests or Bishops, whom the chief Arabian princes being also bishops, seem therein to have followed.
>And so the Christian kings being by their religion forbidden to mingle prophane things with sacred or armes with religions; yet took that which was next; that is to say, in preferring a sacred, order of the Clergy, not only before the common and vulgar sort of the people, but before the Senators, yea and not before them alone, but even before dukes, earls, and other magistrates whatsoever: giving unto them the highest rooms, and first places next unto the kings themselves, in all assemblies, councels, enacting of laws, and granting of liberties and privileges. And why not? when as the most ancient people of the Celts, accounted their Druids, who were the princes of their religion and judgements, superiors not unto the common sort of the people only, but even unto their captains and rulers also. For which cause Caesar in recounting of their degrees, first reckons up the Druids, then their knights or horsemen, and after them the common people.
<Jean Bodin ranks the the Sovereign Monarch even before the clergy:
>The next unto the King himself, who out of the number of citizens, going far before the rest should follow the holy order of the clergy: next unto the sacred order of the clergy, the Senate: after the Senate should follow the martial men, and amongst them, frst the general of the army, or great constable, & then the dukes , countes, marquesses, governors of provinces, landgraves, burgraves, captains of castles, vassals, and other soldiers, with such others…
<Louis XIV, Sun King – Rest assured that Kings are Absolute Lords & naturally have free & full disposition of all the goods possessed by clergymen as well as by laymen
>I have never failed to call to your attention, whenever the occasion has arisen, how much respect we must have for religion and how much deference we must have for its ministers, particularly in regard to their mission, that is, in the celebration of the sacred mysteries and in the preaching of the Gospel. But since clergymen tend to be a little presumptuous about the privileges of their estate and since they seem to want to use them sometimes in order to escape their most legitimate duties, I feel obliged to explain to you here briefly what you should know about this matter, and which might prove useful to you, whether for making your decisions more confidently or for enforcing them more easily.
>You should therefore first rest assured that kings are absolute lords and naturally have free and full disposition of all the goods possessed by clergymen as well as by laymen, in order to use them at any time as wise administrators, that is, according to the general need of their State.
>In the second place, you should learn that these mysterious names of freedoms and liberties of the Church, with which they may try to dazzle you, regard all the faithful equally, whether lay or tonsured, who are all equally sons of this common mother who, however, exempts none of them from submission to sovereigns, which the Gospel itself specifically enjoins.
>Thirdly, all this talk about the special purpose of the property of the Church and about the intentions of the founders is only a forced scruple, for the founders of benefices could not free their donations from the restrictions and obligations that were naturally attached to them, nor can their possessors claim to hold them with more rights and privileges than the donors themselves.
>Fourthly, if the clergy have been permitted to fix their contribution in their assemblies, they cannot attribute this custom to any special privilege, since this is even practiced with the laity in most of our provinces, and it was practiced everywhere in the honesty of the early days; for indeed, at that time the mere spirit of justice sufficed to inspire each individual to give according to his means, which would never happen today; and yet all this has never prevented the compulsion of both the laity and the clergy when they have refused to perform their duty voluntarily.
>But in the last place, if anyone under our dominion should put all his possessions at our disposal, it would undoubtedly be those who, holding their benefices only by our appointment, are bound to this duty not merely by their birth like most of our subjects, but also by special motives of gratitude. The taxes that are laid on them are as old as the benefices, and we have titles to them that go back to the beginning of the Monarchy. Even the popes who have tried to deprive sovereigns of this power in order to take it over themselves have established our right in trying to weaken it, since they have been compelled to retract their claims specifically with regard to this Crown.
>But there is no need here of history, of titles, or of examples; natural equity alone suffices to prove my point. Is it fair that the nobility should work and bleed for the defence of the Kingdom and so often consume its wealth in the positions that it is given, that the people who have so many mouths to feed and provide so many soldiers should still pay all the regular taxes in spite of their poverty, while the clergy, who are dispensed by their profession from the dangers of war, from the costs of luxury, and from the burden of families should alone enjoy all the abundant public benefits without ever contributing anything to its needs?
Unique IPs: 8