leftypol's day of the sun edition
<if we dont have inbred monarchs ruling over us people will resort to cannibalism
OP Profile:
>OP?
OP is a monarchist on leftypol.org.
>What kind of Monarchist is Graceposter?
A modern day absolute monarchist & invested in the late 1500s & 1600s kind of absolutism, hereditary rule / dynasties, & the pre-eminent notion of monarchy as opposed to mixed constitutionalism / limited or mixed monarchy, formally called constitutional monarchy & constitutional monarchism.
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My notion of monarchy is not really traditional medievalist Christian royal monarchy, but more like Alexandrian model, Absolutism, State Shinto/North Korea/hereditary dictatorship–a hereditary monarchy with a kind of familialism/dynastic patriotism like North Korea somewhat has (but not completely).
Corgism:
>Politics as a colony of an absolute monarchy and people form a great family; a cult of personality for a community of pleasures & pains.
…
My notion of monarchy is like a singer on the stage, sings a life into people–if I had to sum up the way I think, and why I demand one singer, one teacher–is because I want the most direct attention drawn to a cult of personality to breathe a soul into people.
Adding more singers–like the saying "Too many cooks spoil the broth" is exactly the undertone of how I see it and why I want one monarch alone to sing.
Too many cooks risks replicating the condition of a people that a singer is there to resolve – the masses without a singer are like an amorphous blob, with no identity, no culture, no frame of mind, etc.
A singer on a stage makes a community of pleasures and pains that Plato lauds.
When it comes to too many cooks, like too many lords and masters, like Homer discounts, "Too many masters is a bad thing, let there be one ruler, one king", I stress monarchy over notables/decentralization/tocquevillism much like Hobbes sentiment.
>What about Medievalism & NeoFeudalism?
OP is ambivalent towards traditionalism, particularly the Medievalist or Neofeudalist style of Royalism, & traditionalists who are solely denoted by high church & sometimes the mixed constitutionalism of the Middle Ages & later periods.
The style of absolutism, concerning Monarchy, OP sees as fundamentally different in certain respects, so OP is ambivalent and wary of Medievalism & Traditionalism.
The Medievalist lacks a certain political forte with regard to Monarchy & the Herodotus Debate that absolutism carries (because the Medievalist is predisposed to ultra-clericalism / ultramontanism). Medievalists usually are strong proponents of mixed constitutionalism (having their roots in Aristotle & his politics) and wields Alexis de Tocqueville & Bertrand de Jouvenel against absolute monarchy.
OP is not that kind of monarchist, albeit invested in both monarchies such as the traditionalist connotation of a king with a Christian crown, but also Caesarism and even secular dictatorships sometimes as modern monarchies or bearing a resemblance to monarchical form.
>Who is Grace?
Grace is the board tan of /monarchy/ and /8flags/ on 8chan / 8moe and a monarchist tan.
Sometimes Grace is just an OC or apolitical (when representing /8flags/ or Graceposter is funposting), but primarily Grace is a monarchist tan (& supports Graceposter's taste, style, & niche of monarchy, tbh; she is not a constitutional monarchist or a staunch ultramontanist, but predisposed to absolutism and JUCHE, lmao, sorry Luce and constitutional monarchists).
Thomas Hobbes laments the prevalence of mixed monarchy / constitutionalism
>Saving only that he [the Earl] was carried away with the stream, in a manner, of the whole nation, to think that England was not an absolute, but a mixed monarchy; not considering that the supreme power must always be absolute, whether it be in the King or in the Parliament.
…
>You may know by the declarations themselves, which are very long and full of quotations of records and of cases formly reported, that the penners of them were either lawyers by profession, or such gentlemen as had the ambition to be thought so.
>Besides, I told you before, that those which were then likeliest to have their counsel asked in this business, were averse to absolute monarchy, as also to absolute democracy or aristocracy; all which governments they esteemed tyranny, and were in love with monarchy which they used to praise by the name of mixed monarchy, though it were indeed nothing else but pure anarchy.
>And those men, whose pens the King most used in these controversies of law and politics, were such, if I have not been misinformed, as having been members of this Parliament, had declaimed against ship-money and other extra-parliamentary taxes, as much as any; but who when they saw the Parliament grow higher in their demands than they thought they would have done, went over to the King's party.
…
>Only that fault, which was generally in the whole nation, which was, that they thought the government of England was not an absolute, but a mixed monarchy; and that if the King should clearly subdue this Parliament, that his power would be what he pleased, and theirs as little as he pleased: which they counted tyranny.
>This opinion, though it did not lessen their endeavour to gain the victory for the King in a battle, when a battle could not be avoided, yet it weakened their endeavour to procure him an absolute victory in the war.
>And for this cause, notwithstanding that they saw that the Parliament was firmly resolved to take all kingly power whatsoever out of his hands, yet their counsel to the King was upon all occasions, to offer propositions to them of treaty and accommodation, and to make and publish declarations; which any man might easily have foreseen would be fruitless; and not only so, but also of great disadvantage to those actions by which the King was to recover his crown and preserve his life.
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>Sometimes also in the merely civil government there be more than one soul… For although few perceive that such government is not government, but division of the Commonwealth into three factions, and call it mixed monarchy; yet the truth is that it is not one independent Commonwealth, but three independent factions; nor one representative person, but three. In the Kingdom of God there may be three persons independent, without breach of unity in God that reigneth; but where men reign, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so.
>To what disease in the natural body of man I may exactly compare this irregularity of a Commonwealth, I know not. But I have seen a man that had another man growing out of his side, with a head, arms, breast, and stomach of his own: if he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.
…
>And if there were a commonwealth, wherein the rights of sovereignty were divided, we must confess with Bodin, Lib. II. chap. I. De Republica, that they are not rightly to be called commonwealths, but the corruption of commonwealths.
>The error concerning mixed government [constitutionalism] has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the union of many men.
Thomas Hobbes / For all Monarchies, and all other States are truly indeed Absolute
>Secondly, they object, That there is no Dominion in the Christian world Absolute; which indeed is not true, for all Monarchies, and all other States, are so; for although they, who have the chief Command, do not all those things they would, and what they know profitable to the City, the reason of that is not the defect of Right in them, but the consideration of their Citizens, who busied about their private interest, and careless of what tends to the public, cannot sometimes be drawn to perform their duties without the hazard of the City. Wherefore princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their Right, and prudently remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of their Right.
William Blackstone / Sir Edward Coke:
<The Absolutism of Parliamentary Sovereignty
>The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says Sir Edward Coke, is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds. And of this high court he adds, it may be truly said "si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima; si dignitatem, est honoratissima; di juridictionem, est capacissima." It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restranshumanisting, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new model the succession to the crown; as was done in the reign of Henry VIII and William III. It can alter the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety of instances, in the reigns of King Henry VIII and his three children. It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the act of union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call it's power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. True it is, that what they do, no authority upon earth can undo. So that it is a matter most essential to the liberties of this kingdom, that such members be delegated to this important trust, as are most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their knowledge; for it was a known apothegm of the great lord treasurer Burleigh, "that England could never be ruined but by a parliament:" and, as sir Matthew Hale observes, this being the highest and greatest court, over which none other can have jurisdiction in the kingdom…"
Francis Theobald on Absolute Power with Cambden & Bracton
>We have, I say, absolute Monarchy, and herein we differ from the Lacedemonian Kings, who were subject to their Ephori, which had a power above them: No, ours agrees with the Persian-Government; for, their King had plenary power in all things, not subject to be called to account by any person whatsoever: and so ours, if you will believe Cambden, a famous Antiquary; who saith, That the King of England, supremam potestatem, & merum imperium habet, He hath supreme power and absolute Command in his Dominions–; and so, Bracton, a sage profound Lawyer, in ancient time, speaks to the same purpose, Omni quidem sub Bege, & ipse sub nullo, sed tantum sub Deo: So that it is an unquestionable truth, that the King is subject to no over-ruling power of man, and that he is free from all humane Coercion and Restranshumanistt, I do rather insist upon this.
Jean Bodin / Majesty or Sovereignty or Pre-eminence
>Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth [La Souveraineté est la puissance absoluë & perpetuelle d’une République], which the Latins call Majestas; the Greeks akra exousia, kurion arche, and kurion politeuma; and the Italians segniora, a word they use for private persons as well as for those who have full control of the state, while the Hebrews call it tomech shévet – that is the highest power of command.
>As for the title of Majesty itself, it sufficiently appears, that it only belongs to him that is a sovereign prince: so that for him that hath no sovereignty to usurp the same, were a very absurd thing: but to arrogate unto himself the addition of most excellent and sacred majesty, is much more absurd the one being a point of lightnes, and the other of impiety: for what more can we give unto the most mighty and immortal God, if we take from him that which is proper unto himself? And albeit that in ancient time neither emperors nor kings used these so great addition or titles: yet the German princes nevertheless have oft times given the title of Sacred Majesty unto the kings of France; aswell as unto their emperor. As I remember my self to have seen the letters of the princes of the empire, written unto the king, for the deliverance of countie Mansfeld, then prisoner in France: wherein there was sixe times V. S. M. that is to say, Vestra, Sacra, Majestas, or Your Sacred Majesty an addition proper unto God, apart from all worldly princes. As for other princes which are not soueraignes some use the addition of His Highnesse, as the dukes of Loraine, Sauoy, Mantua, Ferrara, and Florence: some of Excellency, as the princes of the confines; or else of Serenitie, as the duke of Venice.
>Majesty or Sovereignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonwealth: Which the Latins call Majestatem, the Italians Segnoria, that is to say, The greatest power to command. For Majesty (as Festus saith) is so called of mightiness.
>For so here it behoveth first to define what Majesty or Sovereignty is, which neither lawyer nor political philosopher hath yet defined: although it be the principal and most necessary point for the understanding of the nature of a Commonweal. And forasmuch as wee have before defined a Commonweal to be the right government of many families, and of things common amongst them, with a most high & perpetual power: it rest to be declared, what is to be understood by the name of a most high and perpetual power.
<We have said that this power ought to be perpetual, for that it may bee, that that absolute power over the subject may be given to one or many, for a short or certain time, which expired, they are no more than subjects themselves: so that whilest they are in their puissant authority, they cannot call themselves Sovereign princes, seeing that they are but men put in trust, and keepers of this sovereign power, until it shall please the people or the prince that gave it them to recall it
>Who always remained ceased thereof.
<For as they which lend or pawn unto another man their goods, remain still the lords and owners thereof: so it is also with them, who give unto others power and authority to judge and command, be it for a certain time limited, or so great and long time as shall please them; they themselves nevertheless continuing still ceased of the power and jurisdiction, which the other exercise but by way of loan or borrowing.
>For otherwise if the high and absolute power granted by a prince to his lieutenant, should of right be called Sovereignty, he might use the same against his prince, to whom nothing was left but the bare name of a prince, standing but for a cipher: so should the subject command his Sovereign, the servant his master, than which nothing could be more absurd: considering that in all power granted unto magistrates, or private men, the person of the prince is always to be excepted; who never gives so much power unto another, but that he always keeps more unto himself; neither is ever to be thought so deprived of his sovereign power, but that he may take unto himself the examination and deciding of such things as he hath committed unto his magistrates or officers, whether it be by the way of prevention, concurrence, or evocation: from whom he may also take the power given them by virtue of their commission or institution, or suffer them to hold it so long as shall please him.
>These grounds thus laid, as the foundations of Sovereignty, wee conclude, that neither the Roman Dictator, nor the Harmoste of Lacedemonia, nor the Esmynaet of Salonick, nor he whom they cal the Archus of Malta, nor the antient Baily of Florence, (when it was gouerned by a popular state) neither the Regents or Viceroyes of kingdoms, nor any other officers or magistrats whatsoeuer, vnto whom the highest, but yet not the perpetual power, is by the princes or peoples grant commit∣ted, can be accounted to have the same in Sovereignty.
>And albeit that the ancient Dictators had all power given them in best sort that might be (which the ancient Latins called Optima Lege) so that from them it was not lawful to appeal and upon whose creation all offices were suspended; until such time as that the Tribunes were ordained as keepers of the peoples liberty, who continued in their charge notwithstanding the creation of the Dictator, who had free power to oppose themselves against him; so that if appeal were made from the Dictator, the Tribunes might assemble the people, appointing the parties to bring forth the causes of their appeal, & the Dictator to stay his judgement; as when Papirius Cursor the Dictator, condemned Fabius Max the first, to death; and Fabius Max the second had in like manner condemned M•…nutius, both Colonels of the horsemen, for that they had fought with the enemy contrary to the command of the Dictator; they were yet both by appeale and judgement of the people acquitted. For so saith Livy, Then the father of Fabius said, I call upon the Tribunes, and appeal unto the people, which can do more than thy Dictatorship whereunto king Tullus Hostilius gave place. Whereby it appears that the Dictator was neither sovereign prince, nor magistrat, as many have supposed; neither had any thing more than a simple commission for the making of war, the repressing of sedition, the reforming of the state on instituting of new officers.
>So that Sovereignty is not limited either in power, charge, or time certain. And namely the ten commissioners established for the reforming of custom and laws; albeit than they had absolute power, from which there was no appeal to be made, and that all offices were suspended, during the time of their commission; yet had they not for all that any Sovereignty; for their commission being fulfilled, their power also expired; as did that of the Dictators.
<"Majesty or Sovereignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonwealth: Which the Latins call Majestatem, the Italians Segnoria, that is to say, The greatest power to command. For Majesty (as Festus saith) is so called of mightiness."
>And forasmuch as wee have before defined a Commonweal to be the right government of many families, and of things common amongst them, with a most high & perpetual power
<Bodin / The unity of sovereignty
>No otherwise than Theseus his ship, which although it were an hundred times changed by putting in of new planks, yet still retained the old name. But as a ship, if the keel (which strongly bears up the prow, the poup, the ribs, and tacklings) be taken away, is no longer a ship, but an ill favoured houp of wood; even so a Commonwealth, without a sovereignty of power, which unites in one body all members and families of the same is no more a Commonwealth, neither can by and means long endure. And not to depart from our similitude; as a ship may be quite broken up, or altogether consumed with fire; so may also the people into diverse places dispersed, or be utterly destroyed, the City or state yet standing whole; for it is neither the walls, neither the persons, that makes the city, but the union of the people under the same sovereignty of government.
>Now the sovereign prince is exalted above all his subjects, and exempt out of the rank of them: whose majesty suffers no more division than doth the unity itself, which is not set nor accounted among the numbers, howbeit that they all from it take both their force and power…. being indeed about to become much more happy if they had a sovereign prince, which with his authority and power might (as doth the understanding) reconcile all the parts, and so unite and bind them fast in happiness together.
<For that as of unity depends the union of all numbers, which have no power but from it: so also is one sovereign prince in every Commonweale necessary, from the power of whom all others orderly depend
>Wherefore what the unity is in numbers, the understanding in the powers of the soul, and the center in a circle: so likewise in this world that most mighty king, in unity simple, in nature indivisible, in purity most holy, exalted far above the Fabric of the celestial Spheres, joining this elementary world with the celestiall and intelligible heavens
It is of no importance whether the families come together in the same place or live in separate homes and area.
>It is of no importance whether the families come together in the same place or live in separate homes and area. It is said to be no other than the same family even if the father lives apart from children and servants, or these in their turn apart from each other by an interval of space, provided that they are joined together by the legitimate and limited rule of the father. I have said "limited," since this fact chiefly distinguishes the family from the state – that the latter has the final and public authority. The former limited and private rule. So, also, it is still the same government, made up of many families, even if the territories and the settlements are far apart, provided only that they are in the guardianship of the same sovereign power: either one rules all; or all, the individuals; or a few, all. From this it comes about that the state is nothing else than a group of families or fraternities subjected to one and the same rule.
>Cicero's definition of the state as a group of men associated for the sake of living well indicates the best objective, indeed, but not the power and the nature of the institution. This definition applies equally well to the assemblies of the Pythagoreans and of men who also come together for the sake of living well, yet they cannot be called states without great confusion of state and association. Furthermore, there are families of villains, no less than of good men, since a villain is no less a man than a good man is. A similar observation must be made about the governments. Who doubts but that every very great empire was established through violence by robbers? The definition of a state offered by us applies to villages, towns, cities, and principalities, however scattered their lands may be, provided that they are controlled by the same authority. The concept is not conditioned by the limited size of the region or by its great expanse, as the elephant is no more an animal than the ant, since each has the power of movement and perception. So Ragusa or Geneva, whose rule is comprised almost within its walls, ought to be called a state no less than the empire of the Tartars, which was bounded by the same limits as the course of the sun.
<Hobbes / Difference between concord or association and union or bond of a state
>They who compare a City and its Citizens, with a man and his members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power in the City, is the relation to the whole City, such as the head is to the whole man. But it appears by what has been already said, that he who is endued with such a power (whether it be a man, or a Court) has a relation to the City, not as that of the head, but of the soul to the body. For it is the soul by which a man has a will, that is, can either will, or nill.
>The other error in this his first argument is that he says the members of every Commonwealth, as of a natural body, depend one of another. It is true they cohere together, but they depend only on the sovereign, which is the soul of the Commonwealth
>The error concerning mixed government has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the union of many men.
>Colony is derived from colonus which is in turn derived from colere (to cultivate, to till, to inhabit).
Etymology
>from Latin colonia (colony), from colonus (farmer, colonist), from colo (till, cultivate, worship)
Pic related:
>from latin colonia 'settlement, farm', from colonus 'settler, farmer, from colere 'cultivate
Thomas Hobbes Leviathan:
<And of that opinion, the external signs appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called Worship; which is one part of that which the Latins understand by the word Cultus:
Hobbes Leviathan:
>For Cultus signifies properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestows on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it.
Hobbes Leviathan
>In the first sense the labour bestowed on the Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of their minds.
Hobbes' Leviathan also touches on this subject matter.
Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan on Worship
>But in a larger use of the word Image, is contained also, any Representation of one thing by another. So an earthly Soveraign may be called the Image of God: And an inferiour Magistrate the Image of an earthly Soveraign.
>To be uncovered, before a man of Power and Authority, or before the Throne of a Prince, or in such other places as hee ordaineth to that purpose in his absence, is to Worship that man, or Prince with Civill Worship; as being a signe, not of honoring the stoole, or place, but the Person; and is not Idolatry. But if hee that doth it, should suppose the Soule of the Prince to be in the Stool, or should present a Petition to the Stool, it were Divine Worship, and Idolatry.
>To pray to a King for such things, as hee is able to doe for us, though we prostrate our selves before him, is but Civill Worship; because we acknowledge no other power in him, but humane: But voluntarily to pray unto him for fair weather, or for any thing which God onely can doe for us, is Divine Worship, and Idolatry. On the other side, if a King compell a man to it by the terrour of Death, or other great corporall punishment, it is not Idolatry: For the Worship which the Soveraign commandeth to bee done unto himself by the terrour of his Laws, is not a sign that he that obeyeth him, does inwardly honour him as a God, but that he is desirous to save himselfe from death, or from a miserable life; and that which is not a sign of internall honor, is no Worship; and therefore no Idolatry. Neither can it bee said, that hee that does it, scandalizeth, or layeth any stumbling block before his Brother; because how wise, or learned soever he be that worshippeth in that manner, another man cannot from thence argue, that he approveth it; but that he doth it for fear; and that it is not his act, but the act of the Soveraign.
<Honour And Worship What
>Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the Power, and Goodnesse of another: and therefore to Honour God, is to think as Highly of his Power and Goodnesse, as is possible. And of that opinion, the externall signes appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called Worship; which is one part of that which the Latines understand by the word Cultus: For Cultus signifieth properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestowes on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it. Now those things whereof we make benefit, are either subject to us, and the profit they yeeld, followeth the labour we bestow upon them, as a naturall effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour, according to their own Wills. In the first sense the labour bestowed on the Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of their mindes. In the second sense, where mens wills are to be wrought to our purpose, not by Force, but by Compleasance, it signifieth as much as Courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offices; as by praises, by acknowledging their Power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly Worship: in which sense Publicola, is understood for a Worshipper of the People, and Cultus Dei, for the Worship of God.
<Several Signs of Honour
>From internal Honour, consisting in the opinion of Power and Goodness, arise three Passions; Love, which hath reference to Goodness; and Hope, and Fear, that relate to Power: And three parts of external worship; Praise, Magnifying, and Blessing: The subject of Praise, being Goodness; the subject of Magnifying, and Blessing, being Power, and the effect thereof Felicity. Praise, and Magnifying are significant both by Words, and Actions: By Words, when we say a man is Good, or Great: By Actions, when we thank him for his Bounty, and obey his Power. The opinion of the Happiness of another, can only be expressed by words.
<Worship Natural and Arbitrary
>There be some signs of Honour, (both in Attributes and Actions,) that be Naturally so; as among Attributes, Good, Just, Liberal, and the like; and among Actions, Prayers, Thanks, and Obedience. Others are so by Institution, or Custom of men; and in some times and places are Honourable; in others Dishonourable; in others Indifferent: such as are the Gestures in Salutation, Prayer, and Thanksgiving, in different times and places, differently used. The former is Natural; the later Arbitrary Worship.
<Worship Commanded and Free
>And of Arbitrary Worship, there be two differences: For sometimes it is a Commanded, sometimes Voluntary Worship: Commanded, when it is such as he requireth, who is Worshipped: Free, when it is such as the Worshipper thinks fit. When it is Commanded, not the words, or gestures, but the obedience is the Worship. But when Free, the Worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they are not Worship; because a sign is not a sign to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made; that is, to the spectator.
<Worship Public and Private
>Again, there is a Public, and a Private Worship. Public, is the Worship that a Commonwealth performs, as one Person. Private, is that which a Private person exhibits. Public, in respect of the whole Commonwealth, is Free; but in respect of Particular men it is not so Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never without some Restranshumanistt either from the Laws, or from the Opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.
<The End of Worship
>The End of Worship among men, is Power. For where a man sees another worshipped supposes him powerful, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his Power greater. But God has no Ends: the worship we do him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to capacity, by those rules of Honour, that Reason dictates to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of damage, or in thankfulness for good already received from them.
Like where Hobbes is concerned with outward motions and expressive gestures to signify worship and honor as the inward conscious thoughts.
>And of that opinion, the external signs appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called Worship; which is one part of that which the Latins understand by the word Cultus: For Cultus signifies properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestows on any thing, with the purpose to make benefit by it.
>In the first sense the labour bestowed on the Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of their minds.
Hobbes continues with the distinction of civil worship (the external praises and magnifying, actions and expressions to give a sense of honor to the State, such as the use of its emblems in currency and pilgrimages to its sites like Mt. Rushmore):
>To be uncovered, before a man of Power and Authority, or before the Throne of a Prince, or in such other places as hee ordaineth to that purpose in his absence, is to Worship that man, or Prince with Civill Worship; as being a signe, not of honoring the stoole, or place, but the Person; and is not Idolatry.
>To pray to a King for such things, as hee is able to doe for us, though we prostrate our selves before him, is but Civill Worship; because we acknowledge no other power in him, but humane
Hobbes makes the distinction between civil and divine worship: the former any person makes in a way everyday, private and public, for ordinary things, and directed toward civil persons it is with the end of power; the latter is the worship of God, which does not proceed from want of power, but from our natural duty.
<Thomas Hobbes Publique Worship Consisteth In Uniformity
>And this is Publique Worship; the property whereof, is to be Uniforme: For those actions that are done differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a Publique Worship. And therefore, where many sorts of Worship be allowed, proceeding from the different Religions of Private men, it cannot be said there is any Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion at all.
This all this from Hobbes reminds me of Plato's Republic.
Among the chief reason Plato wanted to abolish private property was to accomplish a unity of feeling. Where the State should be unified, and people should be united in feeling, in pleasure and pain, private property fractures the State: where others rejoice at their gain, others feel sorrow and loss, pitted against each other, and to the destruction of State.
Although I think Hobbes also has influence from Calvin here? (I might be wrong, but I think so).
Plato on Leader principle:
>The great principle of all is that no one of either sex should be without a commander; nor should the mind of any one be accustomed to do anything, either in jest or earnest, of his own motion, but in war and in peace he should look to and follow his leader, even in the least things being under his guidance; for example, he should stand or move, or exercise, or wash, or take his meals, or get up in the night to keep guard and deliver messages when he is bidden; and in the hour of danger he should not pursue and not retreat except by order of his superior; and in a word, not teach the soul or accustom her to know or understand how to do anything apart from others. Of all soldiers the life should be always and in all things as far as possible in common and together; there neither is nor ever will be a higher, or better, or more scientific principle than this for the attainment of salvation and victory in war. And we ought in time of peace from youth upwards to practise this habit of commanding others, and of being commanded by other.
<Hobbes Leviathan: The Word Person, Whence
>The word Person is latin: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon, which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise, or Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguises the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, has been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himself, or an other; and he that acts another, is said to bear his Person, or act in his name; (in which sense Cicero uses it where he says, “Unus Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I bear three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;”) and is called in diverse occasions, diversely; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like.
Plato Republic Book 5:
>This, then, Glaucon, is the manner of the community of wives and children among the guardians. That it is consistent with the rest of our polity and by far the best way is the next point that we must get confirmed by the argument. Is not that so?” “It is, indeed,” he said. “Is not the logical first step towards such an agreement to ask ourselves what we could name as the greatest good for the constitution of a state and the proper aim of a lawgiver in his legislation, and what would be the greatest evil, and then to consider whether the proposals we have just set forth fit into the footprints of the good and do not suit those of the evil?” “By all means,” he said.
>“Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that divides it and makes it many instead of one, or a greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?”
>“We do not.”
>“Is not, then, the community of pleasure and pain the tie that binds, when, so far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths?”
>“But the individualization of these feelings is a dissolvent, when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings to the city and its inhabitants?” “Of course.” “And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’ and similarly with regard to the word ‘alien’?
>“Precisely so.”
>“That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ of the same things in the same way.”
Plato State Corporatism / Unitary Policy:
State like an individual man (from Republic).
>And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man.
>For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connections stretching to the soul for ‘integration’
>with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any other member of the man the same statement holds, alike for a part that labors in pain or is eased by pleasure.”
>“The same,” he said, “and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism.”
>That is the kind of a state, [462e] then, I presume, that, when anyone of the citizens suffers aught of good or evil, will be most likely to speak of the part that suffers as its own and will share the pleasure or the pain as a whole.” “Inevitably,” he said, “if it is well governed.”
>But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts.”
…
>Then will not law-suits and accusations against one another vanish, one may say, from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common.
>So that we can count on their being free from the dissensions that arise among men from the possession of property, children, and kin.
…
Plato Laws:
>For there are three forms of government, a first, a second, and a third best, out of which Cleinias has now to choose… The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that 'Friends have all things in common.'. Whether there is anywhere now, or will ever be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions, and whatever laws there are unite the city to the utmost —whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state which will be truer or better or more exalted in virtue. Whether such a state is governed by Gods or sons of Gods, one, or more than one, happy are the men who, living after this manner, dwell there; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and to seek with all our might for one which is like this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and the only one which takes the second place; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second.
…
>Inasmuch as our citizens are not fitted either by nature or education to receive the saying, Friends have all things in common, let them retain their houses and private property, but use them in the service of their country, who is their God and parent, and of the Gods and demigods of the land.
>Their first care should be to preserve the number of their lots. This may be secured in the following manner: when the possessor of a lot dies, he shall leave his lot to his best-beloved child, who will become the heir of all duties and interests, and will minister to the Gods and to the family, to the living and to the dead.
>Of the remaining children, the females must be given in marriage according to the law to be hereafter enacted; the males may be assigned to citizens who have no children of their own.
>How to equalize families and allotments will be one of the chief cares of the guardians of the laws.
…
>Wherefore we will thus address our citizens:—Good friends, honour order and equality, and above all the number 5040.
>Secondly, respect the original division of the lots, which must not be infringed by buying and selling, for the law says that the land which a man has is sacred and is given to him by God.
#2:
- Unitary / State Corporatism: All men as one man.
Hobbes
>The error concerning mixed government [constitutionalism] has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the union of many men.And also from Hobbes:
>And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,) is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.”Now compare with Plato Republic:
>And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man.&
>“The same,” he said, “and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism.”&
>But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts.”&
>That the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity.&
Plato Laws:
>That all men are, so far as possible, unanimous in the praise and blame they bestow, rejoicing and grieving at the same things, and that they honor with all their heart those laws which render the State as unified as possibleBossuet on All of Israel Went Out as One Man:
>It is by the sole authority of government that union is established among men. This effect of legitimate command is marked to us by these words, so often repeated in the Scriptures: at the command of Saul, and of the legitimate authority "all Israel went out as one man. All the multitudes as one man, were forty-two thousand three hundred and sixty. Behold, such is the unity of a people, when each one renouncing his own will, transfers and reunites it to that of the prince and the magistrate. Otherwise there is no union; the people become wanderers, like a flock dispersed. "May the Lord, the God of spirits of all flesh, provide a man that may be over this multitude, and may go out and in before them, or bring them in: lest the people of the Lord be as sheep without a shepherd."#4
Political & Economical no different.
I believe this is also maintained.
…
<Hobbes / That a Family is a little City
>"Propriety receiv'd its beginning, What's objected by some, That the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of Cities, was found in the Fathers of Families, that objection is vain, because I have already declar'd, That a Family is a little City. For the Sons of a Family have propriety of their goods granted them by their Father, distinguisht indeed from the rest of the Sons of the same Family, but not from the propriety of the Father himself; but the Fathers of diverse Families, who are subject neither to any common Father, nor Lord, have a common Right in all things."
Thomas Hobbes
>And though in the charters of subordinate corporations, a corporation be declared to be one person in law, yet the same has not been taken notice of in the body of a commonwealth [state] or city, nor have any of those innumerable writers of politics observed any such union
&
>A great Family if it be not part of some Commonwealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Sovereignty, a little Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the Father or Master is the Sovereign.
&
>And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families
<Plato / There won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a great household & the bulk of a small city
>Visitor: Well then, surely there won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a great household, on the one hand, and the bulk of a small city on the other? – Young Socrates: None. – It's clear that there is one sort of expert knowledge concerned with all these things; whether someone gives this the name of kingship, or statesmanship, or household management, let's not pick any quarrel with him.
This is different from Aristotle's verdict, who opposes Monarchy to a political constitution as a household unit only and not proper for political rule (so mixed constitutionalists like the Windsorites deny monarchical rule of politics because of this teaching).
Aristotle writes in Politics,
>Now there is an erroneous opinion that a statesman, king, householder, and a master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state.
Aristotle:
>For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same
Aristotle:
>The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head:
>whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals.
#5:
In Hobbes Leviathan, there is a Sword and Crosier in one body, and the sovereign is also a pastor.
King James VI & I:
>As your office is likewise mixed, betwixt the Ecclesiastical and Civil estate: for a King is not mere laicus, as both the Papists and Anabaptists would have him, to the which error also the Puritans incline over far.
In Plato's Laws, religious and civil offices are aligned for cultivate civic virtue.
In Plato Statesmen:
>…In Egypt, the King himself is not allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistrates, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by lot to be the King Archon.
#6:
Jean Bodin testifies Plato having a composition of a Tyrannical & Popular estate (which he later goes on to deny any mixed constitutionalism whatsoever and say it was purely popular).
>Plato having presupposed the best form of a Commonwealth, to be that which was composed of a Tyrannical and Popular estate: in framing the same, is contrary unto himself, having established a Commonwealth not only Popular, but altogether also Popularly governed;
…
Looking at Leviathan, it's exactly that: Hobbes isn't a mixed constitutionalist, but Leviathan is a composition of Monarchy and the People:
>The People is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of a Multitude. The People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the People Commands; for the People wills by the will of one man; but the Multitude are citizens, that is to say, Subjects…
>And in a Monarchy, the Subjects are the Multitude, and (however it seem a Paradox) the King is the People.
#7:
Beginning with the constitution of individuals and some families at odds – & later deference to an arbiter to hash out their differences and establish peace.
<Hobbes: The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement; [OR, the NECESSITY of an arbitrary power]
>And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Laws, there may nevertheless arise questions concerning a mans action; First, whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unless the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as far from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, "That they that are at controversy, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator."
…
This is a theme in Hobbes, and in Plato there is also a turn of deference of some Arbiter because of conflicting laws / customs of private families: these are in conflict, Plato establishes, but the unity of some Arbiter(s) takes what laws the private families have and decides which are best to keep from the families altogether… Which aligns with the absolutist agenda for deference to some arbiter to bring unity… in Hobbes case it is by virtue of fear (and I believe compulsion, but also a bit of persuasion through education), but for the Classics it is generally love of justice and laws and virtue… and persuasion over compulsion (which I can imagine with some very powerful music or eloquence to bring people together?)
…
Anyways, what I would point to is in Plato's Laws:
Plato Laws
>Athenian: And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the laws of others not so well.
–This right here is really the basis of what Hobbes gets at with a war of all against all – but more importantly, at this point, there is a failure to have a concord of hosts / partnership of clans, it is futile… every man will have the extent of his laws and boundaries in another man's boundaries, interceding and conflicting…. there must be deference to an Arbiter.
>Athenian: The next step will be that these persons who have met together, will select some arbiters, who will review the laws of all of them, and will publicly present such as they approve to the chiefs who lead the tribes, and who are in a manner their kings, allowing them to choose those which they think best. These persons will themselves be called legislators, and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort of aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of the government they will live.
…
IN the same way, King James VI & I talks about this process above and being an arbiter:
King James VI & I
>This I must say for Scotland, and I may truly vaunt it; Here I sit and govern it with my Pen, I write and it is done, and by a Clerk of the Councell I govern Scotland now.
>Of this I can best resolve you: for I am the eldest Parliament man in Scotland, and have sit in more Parliaments than any of my Predecessors. I can assure you, that the form of Parliament there, is nothing inclined to popularity.
>About a twenty days or such a time before the Parliament, Proclamation is made throughout the Kingdom, to deliver in to the King's Clerk of Register (whom you here call the Master of the Rolles) all Bills to be exhibited that Session before a certain day. Then they are brought unto the King, and perused and considered by him, and only such as I allow of are put into the Chancellor's hands to be propounded to the Parliament, and none others: And if any man in Parliament speak of any other matter then is in this form first allowed by me, The Chancellor tells him there is no such Bill allowed by the King.
>Besides, when they have passed them for laws, they are presented unto me, and I with my Scepter put into my hand by the Chancellor, must say, I ratify and approve all things done in this present Parliament. And if there be any thing that I dislike, they raze it out before. If this may be called a negative voice, then I have one I am sure in that Parliament.
#8:
Persuasion.
While fear and compulsion are predominate factors for Hobbes, he did take note of persuasion too.
People are entitled to their private conscience and opinion even, but publicly show obedience and worship and conformity.
Plato advocates persuasion numerous times over compulsion: like a freeman's doctor or a slave's doctor (the freeman's doctor persuades his patient before acting, but a slave's doctor just does it anyways). And recommended a preamble for the laws (persuading people).
Hobbes: Public instruction
>I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Sovereignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Sovereign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himself in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.
#9:
Community of pleasures and pains through a Cult of Personality.
If there is one innovation here every monarchist should consider, it is the advent of the Cult of Personality, or work of One Person on the multitude.
Plato Republic
>And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’
Plato Republic - Community of Pleasures & Pains
>And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains–where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow?
>No doubt.
>Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganized
This is a controversial point, but Hobbes first talks about appetites (pleasures) and aversions (pains) of the private persons, then consolidates all the persons into One Personhood.
…
Not only does this come to a State where by a plurality of voices, as if they all said YES but also that condition from Plato:
>And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’
<Thomas Hobbes The Generation Of A Common-wealth
>The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will:
&
>This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, “I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.”
&
>This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence.
…
This (in)famous picture of ᴉuᴉlossnW with a plurality of Si, si, si, si, si, si behind his personage represents this unity of the representer and a cult of personality.
Imagine every Si behind ᴉuᴉlossnW as "Mine" and "Thine" like Plato says – it seems like the condition is met where all citizens utter in a unanimous voice "mine" and "thine" – without abolishing private property, but I'll talk about that soon.
…
Consider the Community of Pleasures and Pains, this is cultivated in Hobbes' Leviathan and private appetites and private aversions are not allowed to override the Leviathan:
>But in a Common-wealth this measure is false: Not the Appetite of Private men, but the Law, which is the Will and Appetite of the State is the measure.
…
Now, considering private property: Hobbes allows the distribution of private property, but it is limited by the popular consent, the distribution from the Sovereign is also in accord with unanimous "mine" and "thine" in a way.
<Hobbes: Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion Of The Sovereign, But Only Of Another Subject
>From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consists in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their Sovereign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch. For seeing the Sovereign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he represents,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd.
So particular subjects are limited in their estate, all property is limited by an absolute power – as well as subordinate corporations – by a sovereign, who has in his cult of personality "thine" and "mine" of every subject in a plurality of voices brought unto one voice.
….and I wish you a revolutionary birthday, dear Grace-poster <3
>>777462I.hope you kill yourself on your next one
>>777462beautiful artstyle, I love potato coded anime girls, like the stuff drawn by the author of girls last tour.
>>777542Monarchists should be bullied it's an antihuman ideology like zionism
https://hidwehproject.nekoweb.org/pages/blog/posts/2026-03-27-Between-Materialism-And-Aeonics.html>We find in the writings of the O9A discussions with regards questions of local governance and ethical principles abound. One place we shall look at for now is in the practices of the Rounwytha. The article 'Veiled Strength' by Dr. Chris Giudice (an article I very much recommend you read) is a good explication on how these ideas relate to social organization. The author draws a comparison between the social principles of the Rounwytha with the anthropological concept of the 'Mutterrecht'. Within this concept is not the articulation of "matriarchy" as some sort of juridical alternative to "patriarchy", but rather as a distinct mode of knowing an authority. In Mother Right, knowledge is situated, embedded, local. It is something that one gains from accumulated experience and an empathic connection to the surrounding environment. The mother has authority, not by some formalistic abstraction, but from having lived the longest in a shared horizon of endurance. Rather than coercion, there is an implicit influence based off of ties of obligation grounded on inheritance, kinship and shared existence. With the federation of cooperatives model that I have pointed to above, there is some movement towards reconciling this local situated model of knowledge and authority with the needs of large scale social organization. Of course, I do not believe that this is the end all of the story. Another organizational entity which I envision as being important to us shall be what I call the "meedshken". This would be a group of people with particular virtues, drawn from those discussing the Rounwytha and beyond, which shall share as an unofficial source of moral authority and group cohesion. A point of difference would be that while these people will be tied for the most part to a particular locality, they shall also fraternize and sororize with one another. They should also have some element of nomadicism in their behaviour, moving from locale to locale ensuring the transmission of local cultural practices to other localities. This is influenced by the traditional Igbo system of social organization based upon market days whereby different tribes will become the hub of trade in a cyclical manner as a means of ensuring there is not a concentration of power in just one. This could be adapted to a spiritualized form where it is a hub of exchange in culture and knowledge.>[…]Personally I believe this system of authority and governance is superior to fascism and monarchy insofar as it reflects a deeper understanding of their prior. In monarchy especially, there is a frequent legitimization based upon seeing larger society as an extension of the family. In such a framework, the monarch is the absolute patriarch of the entire family. One of my criticisms of such a system is not that it is backwards or barbaric, but that it is still maintains some of the naivites of modernitiy. What the monarch betrays is a raising up of the fetish of the absolute individual above all else. This goes against the ways families functioned in deep tradition. Before, it was understood that the raising of the child took a larger community, it can't be done by one or two people. This issue is only more pronounced when we move to the scale of an entire nation. The tyrannical excesses of monarchical powers in history have been a testament to this basic fact that you can not put so much responsibility on one individual alone. Based upon this observation, I think the meedhsken concept is ethically superior. It would be something akin more to the nocturnal council described by Socrates rather than that of the philosopher king, whilst still emphasizing the cultivation of virtue and altruistic obstinancy found in the latter. I am still somewhat attracted to the idea of a monarch, but more as a sort of collective scapegoat figure that is the "face" of the organization and upon which chaotic psychic energy is allowed to pool around. >>777671>I am still somewhat attracted to the idea of a monarch, but more as a sort of collective scapegoat figure that is the "face" of the organization and upon which chaotic psychic energy is allowed to pool around.Boo.
Ceremonial / symbolic "monarchists" have to go far, far away…
I'm not content with pictures or icons (like in Christianity) to be a substitute. Or even a real presence (like in Christianity with a Eucharist ceremony). So the same for royalty–I am not content with simply as it were that there were no actual, active, living & breathing kings who we can consult now and who is among us, but merely pictures of a mascot like a cereal mascot on a box of cereal (who never actually exists, but we have the image of).
Say there is a real king then but we simply take pictures and completely doesn't partake or govern or lead on his own initative or do anything – that doesn't qualify as monarchy for me – that is hardly better than the cereal mascot who never existed to begin with, except it could be a celebrity on the cereal box.
…You might have a cult of personality… but the utter lack of an arbiter, decision maker, leadership makes this cult of personality soulless and dead like a stone, boring and nonexistant… without an actual arbiter, the effects of a war of all against all, political pluralism, and the negative effect of people voting and coming into discontent amongst each other that way by the voting booth and amongst the actual leaders who rule by turn (without any connection to that cult of personality) – doesn't go away – it is the same problem I have with the Christianity and the Pope, where we simply have a ceremonial regime and elective monarchy as far as we're concerned where the rulers harvest a cult of personality and still rule by turns without a hereditary regime… and without any conscience attached to the king as if he was his own blood… but simply as a spiritual teacher…
I'm not really too keen on the peak Victorian era style of constitutional monarchy as a political ideology (really, I despise with the most livid passion 🔥 that era's dull Whiggy ideal of constitutional monarchy).
I'll re-state, there is nothing I detest more than the Whiggish, 19th century, Anglocentric Victoran era dull and droll view of "constitutional monarchy" that everyone celebrates and that has prevailed well after the English Civil Wars unto the 1800s with the decline of the French monarchy as an alternative model…
I hate it with a fierce zealotry, and I hate that this is the only prevalent mode of monarchy and how it is thought of – as opposed to French Absolutism or the Alexandrian Model that the Caesars embraced with their own imperial rule… notably the stories of the Julio-Claudian Emperors.
I hate it with every fibre of my being and my soul… with all my heart…
…I say that "constitutional monarchy" is a war against every notion of monarchical preeminence…
…There is a reason why I champion Louis XIV, King James I, or even Gaius Caligula… or even contemporary dictators… because I try to push far, far away from that.
…
I lament with Hobbes the prevalence of it:
<"…Saving only that he [the Earl] was carried away with the stream, in a manner, of the whole nation, to think that England was not an absolute, but a mixed monarchy; not considering that the supreme power must always be absolute, whether it be in the King or in the Parliament…"
<"…Besides, I told you before, that those which were then likeliest to have their counsel asked in this business, were averse to absolute monarchy, as also to absolute democracy or aristocracy; all which governments they esteemed tyranny, and were in love with monarchy which they used to praise by the name of mixed monarchy, though it were indeed nothing else but pure anarchy…"
<"…Only that fault, which was generally in the whole nation, which was, that they thought the government of England was not an absolute, but a mixed monarchy; and that if the King should clearly subdue this Parliament, that his power would be what he pleased, and theirs as little as he pleased: which they counted tyranny…"
I praise Hitler over "constitutional monarchists" for attacking their sacred cow of parliamentarianism – If there is anything I'd laud Hitler over them for – is that Hitler criticizes the Anglocentric, Whiggish parliamentarianism and the mixed constitutionalism they all highly esteem.
Adolf Hitler concerning Austria's political situation:
>Among the institutions which most clearly manifested unmistakable signs of decay, even to the weak-sighted Philistine, was that which, of all the institutions of State, ought to have been the most firmly founded–I mean the Parliament, or the Reichsrat (Imperial Council) as it was called in Austria.
>The pattern for this corporate body was obviously that which existed in England, the land of classic democracy. The whole of that excellent organization was bodily transferred to Austria with as little alteration as possible.
>There it was that Vienna encountered the first difficulty. When Hansen, the Danish architect, had completed the last gable of the marble palace in which the new body of popular representatives was to be housed he had to turn to the ancient classical world for subjects to fill out his decorative plan. This theatrical shrine of 'Western Democracy' was adorned with the statues and portraits of Greek and Roman statesmen and philosophers. As if it were meant for a symbol of irony, the horses of the quadriga that surmounts the two Houses are pulling apart from one another towards all four quarters of the globe. There could be no better symbol for the kind of activity going on within the walls of that same building
>The 'nationalities' were opposed to any kind of glorification of Austrian history in the decoration of this building, insisting that such would constitute an offence to them and a provocation. Much the same happened in Germany, where the Reich-stag, built by Wallot, was not dedicated to the German people until the cannons were thundering in the World War. And then it was dedicated by an inscription.
>I was not yet twenty years of age when I first entered the Palace on the Franzens-ring to watch and listen in the Chamber of Deputies. That first experience aroused in me a profound feeling of repugnance.
>I had always hated the Parliament, but not as an institution in itself. Quite the contrary. As one who cherished ideals of political freedom I could not even imagine any other form of government. In the light of my attitude towards the House of Habsburg I should then have considered it a crime against liberty and reason to think of any kind of dictatorship as a possible form of government.
>A certain admiration which I had for the British Parliament contributed towards the formation of this opinion. I became imbued with that feeling of admiration almost without my being conscious of the effect of it through so much reading of newspapers while I was yet quite young. I could not discard that admiration all in a moment. The dignified way in which the British House of Commons fulfilled its function impressed me greatly, thanks largely to the glowing terms in which the Austrian Press reported these events. I used to ask myself whether there could be any nobler form of government than self government by the people.
>But these considerations furnished the very motives of my hostility to the Austrian Parliament. The form in which parliamentary government was here represented seemed unworthy of its great prototype. The following considerations also influenced my attitude:
>The fate of the German element in the Austrian State depended on its position in Parliament. Up to the time that universal suffrage by secret ballot was introduced the German representatives had a majority in the Parliament, though that majority was not a very substantial one. This situation gave cause for anxiety because the Social-Democratic fraction of the German element could not be relied upon when national questions were at stake. In matters that were of critical concern for the German element, the Social-Democrats always took up an anti-German stand because they were afraid of losing their followers among the other national groups. Already at that time–before the introduction of universal suffrage–the Social-Democratic Party could no longer be considered as a German Party. The introduction of universal suffrage put an end even to the purely numerical predominance of the German element. The way was now clear for the further 'de-Germanization' of the Austrian State.
>The national instinct of self-preservation made it impossible for me to welcome a representative system in which the German element was not really represented as such, but always betrayed by the Social-Democratic fraction. Yet all these, and many others, were defects which could not be attributed to the parliamentary system as such, but rather to the Austrian State in particular. I still believed that if the German majority could be restored in the representative body there would be no occasion to oppose such a system as long as the old Austrian State continued to exist.
>But I soon became enraged by the hideous spectacle that met my eyes. Several hundred representatives were there to discuss a problem of great economical importance and each representative had the right to have his say.
>That experience of a day was enough to supply me with food for thought during several weeks afterwards.
>The intellectual level of the debate was quite low. Some times the debaters did not make themselves intelligible at all. Several of those present did not speak German but only their Slav vernaculars or dialects. Thus I had the opportunity of hearing with my own ears what I had been hitherto acquainted with only through reading the newspapers. A turbulent mass of people, all gesticulating and bawling against one another, with a pathetic old man shaking his bell and making frantic efforts to call the House to a sense of its dignity by friendly appeals, exhortations, and grave warnings.
>I could not refrain from laughing
Hitler continued:
>Then I began to reflect seriously on the whole thing. I went to the Parliament whenever I had any time to spare and watched the spectacle silently but attentively. I listened to the debates, as far as they could be understood, and I studied the more or less intelligent features of those 'elect' representatives of the various nationalities which composed that motley State. Gradually I formed my own ideas about what I saw.
>A year of such quiet observation was sufficient to transform or completely destroy my former convictions as to the character of this parliamentary institution. I no longer opposed merely the perverted form which the principle of parliamentary representation had assumed in Austria. No. It had become impossible for me to accept the system in itself. Up to that time I had believed that the disastrous deficiencies of the Austrian Parliament were due to the lack of a German majority, but now I recognized that the institution itself was wrong in its very essence and form.
>A number of problems presented themselves before my mind. I studied more closely the democratic principle of 'decision by the majority vote', and I scrutinized no less carefully the intellectual and moral worth of the gentlemen who, as the chosen representatives of the nation, were entrusted with the task of making this institution function.
>Once again these object-lessons taken from real life saved me from getting firmly entangled by a theory which at first sight seems so alluring to many people, though that theory itself is a symptom of human decadence.
>Democracy, as practised in Western Europe to-day, is the fore-runner of Marxism. In fact, the latter would not be conceivable without the former. Democracy is the breeding-ground in which the filth of the Marxist world pest can grow and spread. By the introduction of parliamentarianism, democracy produced an abortion of filth and fire (Note 6), the creative fire of which, however, seems to have died out.
…
>I am more than grateful to Fate that this problem came to my notice when I was still in Vienna; for if I had been in Germany at that time I might easily have found only a superficial solution. If I had been in Berlin when I first discovered what an illogical thing this institution is which we call Parliament, I might easily have gone to the other extreme and believed–as many people believed, and apparently not without good reason–that the salvation of the people and the Empire could be secured only by restrengthening the principle of imperial authority. Those who had this belief did not discern the tendencies of their time and were blind to the aspirations of the people.
>In Austria one could not be so easily misled. There it was impossible to fall from one error into another. If the Parliament were worthless, the Habsburgs were worse; or at least not in the slightest degree better. The problem was not solved by rejecting the parliamentary system. Immediately the question arose: What then? To repudiate and abolish the Vienna Parliament would have resulted in leaving all power in the hands of the Habsburgs. For me, especially, that idea was impossible.
>Since this problem was specially difficult in regard to Austria, I was forced while still quite young to go into the essentials of the whole question more thoroughly than I otherwise should have done.
Hitler continues to make some critical complaints about parliamentarianism:
>The aspect of the situation that first made the most striking impression on me and gave me grounds for serious reflection was the manifest lack of any individual responsibility in the representative body.
>The parliament passes some acts or decree which may have the most devastating consequences, yet nobody bears the responsibility for it. Nobody can be called to account. For surely one cannot say that a Cabinet discharges its responsibility when it retires after having brought about a catastrophe. Or can we say that the responsibility is fully discharged when a new coalition is formed or parliament dissolved? Can the principle of responsibility mean anything else than the responsibility of a definite person?
>Is it at all possible actually to call to account the leaders of a parliamentary government for any kind of action which originated in the wishes of the whole multitude of deputies and was carried out under their orders or sanction? Instead of developing constructive ideas and plans, does the business of a statesman consist in the art of making a whole pack of blockheads understand his projects? Is it his business to entreat and coach them so that they will grant him their generous consent?
>Is it an indispensable quality in a statesman that he should possess a gift of persuasion commensurate with the statesman's ability to conceive great political measures and carry them through into practice?
>Does it really prove that a statesman is incompetent if he should fail to win over a majority of votes to support his policy in an assembly which has been called together as the chance result of an electoral system that is not always honestly administered.
>Has there ever been a case where such an assembly has worthily appraised a great political concept before that concept was put into practice and its greatness openly demonstrated through its success?
>In this world is not the creative act of the genius always a protest against the inertia of the mass?
>What shall the statesman do if he does not succeed in coaxing the parliamentary multitude to give its consent to his policy? Shall he purchase that consent for some sort of consideration?
>Or, when confronted with the obstinate stupidity of his fellow citizens, should he then refrain from pushing forward the measures which he deems to be of vital necessity to the life of the nation? Should he retire or remain in power?
>In such circumstances does not a man of character find himself face to face with an insoluble contradiction between his own political insight on the one hand and, on the other, his moral integrity, or, better still, his sense of honesty?
>Where can we draw the line between public duty and personal honour?
>Must not every genuine leader renounce the idea of degrading himself to the level of a political jobber?
>And, on the other hand, does not every jobber feel the itch to 'play politics', seeing that the final responsibility will never rest with him personally but with an anonymous mass which can never be called to account for their deeds?
>Must not our parliamentary principle of government by numerical majority necessarily lead to the destruction of the principle of leadership?
>Or may it be presumed that for the future human civilization will be able to dispense with this as a condition of its existence?
>But may it not be that, to-day, more than ever before, the creative brain of the individual is indispensable?
…
The Fuhrer asks the most fundamental question:
>Does anybody honestly believe that human progress originates in the composite brain of the majority and not in the brain of the individual personality?
Hitler asks the right question here.
Which I see as another jab at Aristotle and mixed constitutionalism/political pluralism.
Hitler continues.
>The parliamentary principle of vesting legislative power in the decision of the majority rejects the authority of the individual and puts a numerical quota of anonymous heads in its place. In doing so it contradicts the aristrocratic principle, which is a fundamental law of nature; but, of course, we must remember that in this decadent era of ours the aristocratic principle need not be thought of as incorporated in the upper ten thousand.
>The devastating influence of this parliamentary institution might not easily be recognized by those who read the Jewish Press, unless the reader has learned how to think independently and examine the facts for himself. This institution is primarily responsible for the crowded inrush of mediocre people into the field of politics. Confronted with such a phenomenon, a man who is endowed with real qualities of leadership will be tempted to refrain from taking part in political life; because under these circumstances the situation does not call for a man who has a capacity for constructive statesmanship but rather for a man who is capable of bargaining for the favour of the majority. Thus the situation will appeal to small minds and will attract them accordingly.
>The narrower the mental outlook and the more meagre the amount of knowledge in a political jobber, the more accurate is his estimate of his own political stock, and thus he will be all the more inclined to appreciate a system which does not demand creative genius or even high-class talent; but rather that crafty kind of sagacity which makes an efficient town clerk. Indeed, he values this kind of small craftiness more than the political genius of a Pericles. Such a mediocrity does not even have to worry about responsibility for what he does. From the beginning he knows that whatever be the results of his 'statesmanship' his end is already prescribed by the stars; he will one day have to clear out and make room for another who is of similar mental calibre. For it is another sign of our decadent times that the number of eminent statesmen grows according as the calibre of individual personality dwindles. That calibre will become smaller and smaller the more the individual politician has to depend upon parliamentary majorities. A man of real political ability will refuse to be the beadle for a bevy of footling cacklers; and they in their turn, being the representatives of the majority–which means the dunder headed multitude–hate nothing so much as a superior brain.
>For footling deputies it is always quite a consolation to be led by a person whose intellectual stature is on a level with their own. Thus each one may have the opportunity to shine in debate among such compeers and, above all, each one feels that he may one day rise to the top. If Peter be boss to-day, then why not Paul tomorrow?
>This new invention of democracy is very closely connected with a peculiar phenomenon which has recently spread to a pernicious extent, namely the cowardice of a large section of our so-called political leaders. Whenever important decisions have to be made they always find themselves fortunate in being able to hide behind the backs of what they call the majority.
Hitler writes here:
>One truth which must always be borne in mind is that the majority can never replace the man. The majority represents not only ignorance but also cowardice. And just as a hundred blockheads do not equal one man of wisdom, so a hundred poltranshumanists are incapable of any political line of action that requires moral strength and fortitude
>The lighter the burden of responsibility on each individual leader, the greater will be the number of those who, in spite of their sorry mediocrity, will feel the call to place their immortal energies at the disposal of the nation. They are so much on the tip-toe of expectation that they find it hard to wait their turn. They stand in a long queue, painfully and sadly counting the number of those ahead of them and calculating the hours until they may eventually come forward. They watch every change that takes place in the personnel of the office towards which their hopes are directed, and they are grateful for every scandal which removes one of the aspirants waiting ahead of them in the queue. If somebody sticks too long to his office stool they consider this as almost a breach of a sacred understanding based on their mutual solidarity. They grow furious and give no peace until that inconsiderate person is finally driven out and forced to hand over his cosy berth for public disposal. After that he will have little chance of getting another opportunity. Usually those placemen who have been forced to give up their posts push themselves again into the waiting queue unless they are hounded away by the protestations of the other aspirants.
>The result of all this is that, in such a State, the succession of sudden changes in public positions and public offices has a very disquieting effect in general, which may easily lead to disaster when an adverse crisis arises. It is not only the ignorant and the incompetent person who may fall victim to those parliamentary conditions, for the genuine leader may be affected just as much as the others, if not more so, whenever Fate has chanced to place a capable man in the position of leader. Let the superior quality of such a leader be once recognized and the result will be that a joint front will be organized against him, particularly if that leader, though not coming from their ranks, should fall into the habit of intermingling with these illustrious nincompoops on their own level. They want to have only their own company and will quickly take a hostile attitude towards any man who might show himself obviously above and beyond them when he mingles in their ranks. Their instinct, which is so blind in other directions, is very sharp in this particular.
>The inevitable result is that the intellectual level of the ruling class sinks steadily. One can easily forecast how much the nation and State are bound to suffer from such a condition of affairs, provided one does not belong to that same class of 'leaders'.
>Though the Austrian Prime Minister was appointed by the King-Emperor, this act of appointment merely gave practical effect to the will of the parliament. The huckstering and bargaining that went on in regard to every ministerial position showed all the typical marks of Western Democracy. The results that followed were in keeping with the principles applied. The intervals between the replacement of one person by another gradually became shorter, finally ending up in a wild relay chase. With each change the quality of the 'statesman' in question deteriorated, until finally only the petty type of political huckster remained. In such people the qualities of statesmanship were measured and valued according to the adroitness with which they pieced together one coalition after another; in other words, their craftiness in manipulating the pettiest political transactions, which is the only kind of practical activity suited to the aptitudes of these representatives.
>The whole spectacle of parliamentary life became more and more desolate the more one penetrated into its intimate structure and studied the persons and principles of the system in a spirit of ruthless objectivity. Indeed, it is very necessary to be strictly objective in the study of the institution whose sponsors talk of 'objectivity' in every other sentence as the only fair basis of examination and judgment. If one studied these gentlemen and the laws of their strenuous existence the results were surprising.
>There is no other principle which turns out to be quite so ill-conceived as the parliamentary principle, if we examine it objectively.
>It is not the aim of our modern democratic parliamentary system to bring together an assembly of intelligent and well informed deputies. Not at all. The aim rather is to bring together a group of nonentities who are dependent on others for their views and who can be all the more easily led, the narrower the mental outlook of each individual is. That is the only way in which a party policy, according to the evil meaning it has to- day, can be put into effect. And by this method alone it is possible for the wirepuller, who exercises the real control, to remain in the dark, so that personally he can never be brought to account for his actions. For under such circumstances none of the decisions taken, no matter how disastrous they may turn out for the nation as a whole, can be laid at the door of the individual whom everybody knows to be the evil genius responsible for the whole affair. All responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Party as a whole.
>The parliamentary regime became one of the causes why the strength of the Habsburg State steadily declined during the last years of its existence. The more the predominance of the German element was whittled away through parliamentary procedure, the more prominent became the system of playing off one of the various constituent nationalities against the other. In the Imperial Parliament it was always the German element that suffered through the system, which meant that the results were detrimental to the Empire as a whole; for at the close of the century even the most simple-minded people could recognize that the cohesive forces within the Dual Monarchy no longer sufficed to counterbalance the separatist tendencies of the provincial nationalities. On the contrary!
why would someone who isn't a monarch support monarchy?
>>777686the monarch is not meant to solve those issues with democracy. that is partially addressed by the first part of my critique. the issue is with modern governments is that they rely on an abstract form of authority in order unify an entire nation of people. this is decided in an immediate way. everyone immediately votes for the leader of their entire nation without any intermediary. i regard such a state of affairs as utterly nonsensical. true authority is not something that comes from above, it must be something that is cultivated. you can not stroll in one day and establish it in an immediate fashion. there must be struggle and a sense of shared destiny before a people could ever be united under a head in the first place. the patriarchal form of the family is not even the natural form that humans necessarily take so the naturalistic argument is moot. the phallus must have descended from heaven, and the clearing of the celestial vault must have been apocalypse. at any rate, according to the principle of mutterrecht, the way authority is cultivated in deep tradition is done through localist shared struggle, the mother acquires her authority because she has begotten, she has survived, she has reared in the same shared struggle for existence as us. that is what makes her powerful. as such true leadership should first and foremost arise localistically. afterwards i propose two methods by which this authority scales up 1) by the progressive determination of higher levels of leadership, with each stage collections of localities unify into one hyper-locality 2) spiritually, by the migration of spiritual leadership from locale to locale assuring spiritual unity by interaction rather than abstract reinforcement. when you have these in place, the role of this ceremonial figure becomes increasingly less important, but it may still yet prove useful for giving outside observers something which they can latch unto and for members of the collective a symbol communicating how their collective sovereignty may be expressed under a single unity. the role of this matriarch would be to give a compressed voice to what has been already taken into account by the hierarchical fiscal leadership on one hand and the hyper-active spiritual leadership on the other, though perhaps even this is unnecessary
to summarize, there must be a democratic fractal localism combined with a hyper-active spiritual leadership. factionalization is reduced with the fact that authority is based cultivated localistically, as well as the fact that with the removal of of the ability to vote for higher leadership in an immediate way, the individual's will-to-power is unable to rise beyond the level of immediate locality. unity is insured with shared mythos and frequency of interaction. a cult of personality may be cultivated from out of the hyper-active spiritual leadership to give voice to this unity but it is not strictly necessary
>>777806https://hidwehproject.nekoweb.org/pages/blog/posts/2026-04-27-Brief-Remarks-On-Technology.html>With this said, I think the relational view leads Floridi to make a very commendable observations with regards to the reality of democracy, namely that good democracy should try and maximize the granularity of alternatives in regards to voting. With, for instance, the American election system, the voter can only really choose between two parties. There is no real third or fourth option. Moreover, upon choosing a party, they have very little control over the subsequent range of choices that can be made by said party. This ends up diminishing the presence of real representation. In this point we see an ontological turn in the conceptualization of politics. What is important is not only the ability to choose, but also having an effect on how the space of actions gets parametrized. The problem of information encapsulation has become a political problem. We might here make a distinction between quantitative and qualitative democracy to drive this point home.>The way things are done, there is very poor qualitative representation. Personally I believe localism can play an important role. At smaller scales of governance, individuals are able to have a more feasible shot at influencing choices not just quantitatively but also qualitatively as well. We should note here how action parametrization and hence qualitative representation is something that can be partially dissociated from the formally democratic form. For instance, in a capitalist economy, money becomes the main signal for action parametrization. The logic of "profit" and investor speculation ends up determining what companies persist and how these companies evolve over time. At the same time the range of qualitative actions has the corporation as a basic bottleneck. For instance, McDonalds has a different space of products compared to Starbucks, and the average person is not likely to eat anything that falls outside the things offered by fast food chains and grocery stores. Hence, we see how speculative and consumer dynamics become the main positive signals that build towards representation.>Note that we can apply this same logic to authoritarian and monarchical regimes as well. Even these political entities have their own subtle forms of qualitative democracy. For instance the monarch got their information and suggestions for possible actions to take from their advisors, and their advisors had various ways of gathering information contrained to the feudal mode of production and their lacking information technologies at the time. The Soviet bureaucrats also had devised ways to try and model something akin to consumer demand in an effort to keep their socialist economy running smoothly. A blogpost talking about Nick Land and his relation to Timenergy theory makes a great point as well in pointing out how the neo-reactionary advocation of monarchy is in fact a perfectly redundant gesture:<The real transformation is not the return of kingship as dream-image but the collapse of sovereignty into algorithmic governance. Decisions are increasingly delegated to predictive models, actuarial tables, risk algorithms, and automated logistics. Authority no longer resides in the symbolic pact between ruler and ruled. It is coded into the protocols of platforms, the scripts of financial markets, the architectures of surveillance. Moldbug’s neo-monarchist script is therefore less the master narrative than a symptom produced by this infrastructural displacement. He articulates in clumsy political theology what has already occurred silently in code: the outsourcing of command to systems indifferent to the subject.>In general it is important not to discount how much qualitative decision making is determined by the underlying mode of production, a constraint that is even placed upon an absolute monarch or dictator. There is an extent in which many of the average leftist's fears of authoritarianism is in a way just falling for the great man of history theory. In an ironic turn of events, they are often still not materialist enough. >>777768ok, I'm not defending democracy, but still don't see how monarchy is any better.
Also why doesn't Grace have cat ears like all the others
>>777427The Nietzsche quote shows why your ideology is dead. Demigods don't exist.
That's an absolutist position too.
>Even if your father is a thief, a murderer, a traitor, an incestuous person, a manqueller, a blasphemer, or an atheist, you have a BLOOD DEEP loyalty.
…
People will make fun of Catholics for this, but take it upstairs beyond the Pope to God himself.
Look at the Bible verses where God commands the killing of entire cities, not even sparing the suckling babies, let alone hapless animals.
People will remain Christian in spite of this–even though for any other ruler, they'd consider it the greatest tyranny and rupture with human rights and dignity for any ruler to positively command the slaying of infants.
1 Samuel 15:3
>Now go and smite Am′alek, and utterly destroy all that they have; do not spare them, but kill both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.’”
Deuteronomy 20:16-17: instructions regarding Canaanite cities.
>But in the cities of these peoples… you shall save alive nothing that breathes, but you shall devote them to complete destruction, the Hittites and the Amorites, the Canaanites and the Perizzites, the Hivites and the Jebusites.
Joshua 6:20-21
>So the people shouted, and the trumpets were blown. As soon as the people heard the sound of the trumpet, the people raised a great shout, and the wall fell down flat, so that the people went up into the city, every man straight before him, and they took the city. Then they utterly destroyed all in the city, both men and women, young and old, oxen, sheep, and asses, with the edge of the sword.
Deuteronomy 7:1-2
>When the Lord your God brings you into the land which you are entering to take possession of it, and clears away many nations before you, the Hittites, the Gir′gashites, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Per′izzites, the Hivites, and the Jeb′usites, seven nations greater and mightier than yourselves, 2 and when the Lord your God gives them over to you, and you defeat them; then you must utterly destroy them; you shall make no covenant with them, and show no mercy to them.
Jean Bodin also makes a case for Alexander the Great–that he didn't tolerate a traitor even for an enemy & rival king:
>Alexander the Great caused cruelly to be put to death him who had murdered King Darius, abhorring the subject who lays his hand upon his king: although Alexander himself by lawful war sought after his life & state, as his lawful enemy.
A monarch is reputed to be the life, unity, soul & being of the country, the father of the people (& the people his offspring, a tight knit familial bond descended from him as a people), the Sun, the root & motion of all civil activity, with a strong, blood-deep familial loyalty, like this DPRK video purports.
…
People can't comprehend a bond that deep–they identify as republicans, democrats, tories, labour, etc; they're used to being enemies.
They don't see themselves as a family, where the loyalty among each other is they must be a kindred people & not a nation divided against itself.
Familial loyalty is to be such a strong bond that it is immensely difficult to break it apart, even in the worst, very bad, most pressing trials that press kinfolk apart, a blood bound loyalty and communal affection between members of a family, loyal as kindred people.
Jean Bodin even acknowledges that Hell itself has a great monarch with kindred demons:
>If we should inspect nature more closely, we should gaze upon monarchy everywhere. To make a beginning from small things, we see the king among the bees, the leader in the herd, the buck among the flocks or the bellwether (as among the cranes themselves the many follow one), and in the separate natures of things some one object excels: thus, adamant among the gems, gold among the metals, the Sun among the stars, and finally God alone, the prince and author of the world. Moresoever, they say that among the evil spirits one alone is supreme. But, not to continue indefinitely, what is a family other than the true image of a state? Yet this is directed by the rule of one, who presents, not a fictitious image, like the doge of Venice, but the true picture of a king.
<Bodin's Anti-Regicide Remarks
>But when I perceived on every side that subjects were arming themselves against their princes; that books were being brought out openly, like firebands to set Commonweals ablaze, in which we are taught that princes sent by providence to the human race must be thrust out of their kingdoms under the pretense of tyranny, and that kings must be chosen not by their lineage, but by the will of the people; and finally that these doctrines were weakening the foundations not only of this realm only but of all states, then I denied that it was the function of a good man or of a good citizen to offer violence to his prince for any reason, however great a tyrant he might be; and contended that it was necessary to leave this punishment to God, and to other princes. And I have supported this by divine and human laws and authorities, and most of all by reason which compel assent.
>But if it be so that the soldier which had only broken the vine truncheon of his Captain, beating him by right or wrong, was by the law of arms to be put to death: then what punishment deserves the son which lays hand upon his father?
>But if the prince be an absolute Sovereign, as are the true Monarchies of France, of Spain, of England; Scotland, Turkey, Muscovy, Tartarie, Persia, Ethiopia, India, and of almost all the kingdoms of Africa, and Asia, where the kings themselves have the sovereignty without all doubt or question; not divided with their subjects: in this case it is NOT lawful for any one of the subjects in particular, or all of them in general, to attempt any thing either by way of fact, or of justice against the honour, life, or dignity of the Sovereign: albeit that he had committed all the wickedness, impiety, and cruelty that could be spoken; for as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subject has no such jurisdiction over his Sovereign prince: of whom depends all power and authority to command: and who may not only revoke all the power of his Magistrates; but even in whose presence the power of all Magistrates, Corporations, Colleges, Estates, and Communities cease, as we have said, and shall yet more fully in due place say. Now if it be not lawful for the subject by way of justice to proceed against his prince; the vassal against his lord; nor the slave against his master; and in brief, if it not be lawful, by way and course of justice to proceed against a king, how should it then be lawful to proceed against him by way of fact, or force. For question is not here, what men are able to do by strength and force, but what they ought of right to do: as not whether the subjects have power and strength, but whether they have lawful power to condemn their Sovereign prince. Now the subject is not only guilty of treason of the highest degree, who has slain his Sovereign prince, but even he also which has attempted the same; who has given counsel or consent thereunto; yea if he have concealed the same, or but so much as thought it… And albeit that the laws inflict no punishment upon the evil thoughts of men; but on those only which by word or deed break out into some enormity: yet if any man shall so much as conceit a thought for the violating of the person of his Sovereign prince, although he have attempted nothing, they have yet judged this same thought worthy of death, notwithstanding what repentance soever he have had thereof. As in proof it fell out with a gentleman of Normandy, who confessed himself unto a Franciscan Friar, to have had a purpose in himself to have slain Francis the first, the French king: of which evil purpose and intent he repenting himself, received of the frier absolution, who yet afterward told the king thereof, who sending for the gentleman, and he confessing the fact, turned him over to the parliament of Paris for his trial, where he was by the decree of that high court condemned to death, and so afterwards executed.
>One must not however label as evidence of tyranny the executions, banishments, confiscations, and other deeds of violence that mark a restoration [or transition] in a commonwealth. Such changes are necessarily violent, as was illustrated by what happened at the establishment of the Triumvirate in Rome, and at the election of many of the Emperors. It is not proper, either, to call Cosimo de Medici a tyrant for building a citadel, surrounding himself with foreign guards, and taxing his subjects heavily for their upkeep, after the assassination of Alessandro, Duke of Florence. Such medicine was necessary to a commonwealth ravaged by so many seditions and insurrections, and for a licentious and unruly populace, everlastingly plotting against the new duke, though he was accounted one of the wisest and most virtuous princes of his age.
>Not only is the subject guilty of high treason who kills his prince, but so also is he who has merely attempted it, counselled it, wished it or even considered it… We read that the most holy doctors that the Jews ever knew, those who were known as the Essenes or experts in the law of God, held that Sovereign princes, of whatever character, should be regarded by their subjects as sacred and inviolable, and given of God. One cannot doubt that David, king and prophet, was informed by the spirit of God if ever man was, having always before his eyes the law of God. It was he who said, "Slander not the Prince, nor speak evil of the magistrate." Nothing is more insisted on in the Holy Writ than the wickedness of compassing the death of the prince, or any responsible magistrate, or even making any attempt against their life or honour, even though, adds the Scripture, they be evil men.
And if anyone should have tried to kill Stalin or Hitler, those regimes would fully be capable of executing the would-be conspirators or assassins, no matter how evil they claimed Stalin or Hitler to be.
…
While Bodin sticks with a pretense, Hobbes makes no pretense whatsoever even barring the virtue of a sovereign.
<Covenants Not Discharged By The Vice Of The Person To Whom Made
>Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do nevertheless make exception of certain persons; as Heretics, and such as use not to perform their Covenant to others: And this also is against reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it.
<Jean Bodin: O how many Tyrants should there be:
>O how many Tyrants should there be, if it should be lawful for Subjects to kill Tyrants? How many good and innocent Princes should be as Tyrants perished by the conspiracy of their subjects against them? He that should of his subjects but exact subsidies, should be then, as the vulgar people esteem him, a Tyrant: He that should rule and command contrary to the good licking of the people, should be a Tyrant: He that should keep strong guard and garrisons for the safety of his person, should be a Tyrant: He that should put to death traitors and conspirators against his State, should be also counted a Tyrant. How should good Princes be assured of their lives, if under colour of Tyranny they might be slain by their subjects, by whom they ought to be defended?
>And in this, the princes much deceive themselves [and namely they which give reward to them that have slain Tyrants, to make them a way unto the sovereignty]. For they shall never assure themselves of their own lives, if they severely punish not the conspirators against their own prince and murderers of him, although he was never so great a Tyrant. As most wisely did Severus the emperour, who put to death all them which had any part in the murder of the emperour Pertinax: which was the cause (as says Herodian) that there was no man which durst attempt his life. So also Vitelliu the emperour put to death all the murderers and conspirators against Galba, who had presented requests signed with their own hands unto the emperour Otho, to have had of him reward for their disloyalty. And Theophilus emperour of Constantinople caused them all to be called together, who had made his father emperour, after they had slain Leo the Armenian, as if he would have well recompensed them for so great a turn: who being come together with many other, who though not partakers of the murder, were yet desirous to be partakers of the reward; he caused them altogether to be slain. And that more is, the emperour Domitian put to death Epaphroditus, Nero his servant, and secretary to the state, for having helped Nero to kill himself, who most instantly requested him so to do, being thereby delievered from the executioner's hands, and cruel exemplary death. And these things we read not only Tyrants, but even good kings also to have done, not so much in regard of their own safety, as of the dignity of them who were slain. As David did unto him who in hope of reward brought him his father in law's head cut off, but slain by his enemies. And Alexander the Great caused cruelly to be put to death him who had murdered king Darius, abhorring the subject which durst to lay hand upon his king: although Alexander himself by lawful war sought after his life and state, as being his lawful enemy.
The same, I'll add, happened to a notable conspirator against Caligula, Cassius Chaerea.
<It is okay to judge and kill Limited Monarchs, but not Absolute Sovereign Monarchs; Or if Defeated by Right of Conquest by a Foreign nation or Prince
>But the chief question of this our discourse, is to know, whether a Sovereign Prince come unto that high estate by election, or by lot, by rightful succession, or by just war, or by the especial vocation of Almighty God; forgetting his duty, and become without measure cruel, covetous, and wicked, so perverting the laws of God and man, and such an one as we commonly call a Tyrant, may be lawfully slain or not. And true it is that many interpreters, both of God's and man's laws, have said it to be lawful: many of them without distinction joining these two incompatible words together, a King a Tyrant: which so dangerous a doctrine has been the cause of the utter ruin and overthrow of many most mighty empires, and kingdoms. But to decide this question well, it behooves us to distinguish an Absolute Sovereign Prince, from him which is not so: and also subjects from strangers, according as wee have before declared. For it is great difference to say that a Tyrant may lawfully be slain by a prince a stranger; or by his own subject.
>And for that only cause Timur, whom our writers commonly call Tamerlane emperour of the Tartars, denounced war unto Bayezid I, Sultan of the Turks, who then besieged Constantinople; saying that he was come to chastise his tyranny, and to deliver the afflicted people; whom indeed he in a set battle vanquished in the plains near unto Mount Stella: and having slain three hundred thousand Turks, kept the tyrant (taken prisoner) in chains in an iron cage until he died.
<Neither in this case is it material whether such a virtuous prince being a stranger proceed against a Tyrant by open force, or fineness, or else by way of justice. True it is that a valiant and worthy prince having the tyrant in his power, shall gain more honour by bringing him unto his trial, to chastise him as a murderer, a manqueller, and a robber: rather then to use the law of arms against him.
>Wherefore let us resolve upon that, that it is lawful for any stranger to kill a Tyrant; that is to say a man of all men infamous, and notorious for the oppression, murder, and slaughter of his subjects and people. But as for subjects to do the same, it is to be known whether the prince that bears rule be an Absolute Sovereign; or not: for if he be no Absolute Sovereign, then must the Sovereignty of necessity be either in the People, or in the Nobility: in which case there is no doubt, but that it is lawful to proceed against a Tyrant by way of justice, if so men may prevail against him: or else by way of fact, and open force, if they may not otherwise have reason. As the Senate did in the first case against Nero: and in the other against Maxi∣minus: for that the Roman Emperours were at the first nothing else but princes of the Commonweal, that is to say the chief and principal men, the sovereignty nevertheless still resting in the People and the Senate: as I have before showed, that this Commonweal was then to have been called a principality: although that Seneca speaking in the person of Nero his scholar says: I am the only man amongst living men, elect and chosen to be the Lieutenant of God on earth: I am the Arbitrator of life and death: I am able at my pleasure to dispose of the state and quality of every man. True it is that he took upon him this Sovereign authority by force wrested from the Senate and people of Rome: but in right he had it not, the state being but a very principality, wherein the People had the Sovereignty. As is also that of the Venetians, who condemned to death their Duke Falier, and also executed many others, without form or fashion of any lawful process: forasmuch as Venice is an Aristocratical principality, wherein the Duke is but the first or chief man, sovereignty still remaining in the state of the Venetian Gentlemen. As is likewise the Germain Empire, which is also nothing else but an Aristocratical principality, wherein the the Emperour is head and chief, the power and majesty of the Empire belonging unto the States thereof: who thrust out of the government Adolphus the emperour in the year 1296: and also after him Wenceslaus in the year 1400, and that by way of justice, as having jurisdiction and power over them. So also might we say of the state of the Lacedemonians, which was a pure Oligarchy, wherein were two kings, without any sovereignty at all, being indeed nothing but Captains and Generals for the managing of their wars: and for that cause were by the other magistrates of the State, sometime for their faults condemned to pay their fine; as was king Agesilaus: and sometime to death also as were Agis and Pausanias. Which hath also in our time happened unto the kings of Denmark and Sweden, whereof some have been banished, and the others died in prison: for that the nobility pretends them to be nothing but princes, and not Sovereigns, as we have before showed: so also are they subjects unto those states which have the right of their election. And such were in ancient times the kings of the cities of the Gauls, whom Caesar for this cause oftentimes calls Regulos, that is to say little kings: being themselves subjects, and justifiable unto the Nobility, who had all the Sovereignty: causing them even to be put to death, if they had so deserved. And that is it for which Amphiorix the captain general, whom they called the king of the Liegeois said; Our commands (says he) are such, as that the people hath no less power over us, then we over the people: wherein he showed evidently that he was no sovereign prince: howbeit that it was not possible for him to have equal power with the People, as we have before showed.
<Wherefore these sorts of princes, having no Sovereignty, if they polluted with wickedness and villainy, cannot be chastised by the authority and severity of the magistrate, but shall abuse their wealth and power unto the hurt and destruction of good men; it always has and shall be lawful not for strangers only, but even for the subjects themselves also, to take them out of the way.
>And least any man should think themselves to have been the authors of these laws and decrees, so the more straightly to provide for their own safety and honour, let us see the laws and examples of holy Scripture. Nebuchadnezzar king of Assyria, with fire and sword destroyed all the country of Palestine, besieged the city of Jerusalem, took it, robbed and razed it down to the ground, burnt the temple, and defiled the sanctuary of God, slew the king, with the greatest part of the people, carrying away the rest that remained into captivity into Babylon; and yet not so contented, caused the image of himself made in gold, to be set up in public place, commanding all men without exception to adore and worship the same, upon pain of being burnt alive: and caused them that refused so to do, to be cast into a burning furnace: and yet for all that the holy Prophets directing their letters unto their brethren the Jews, then in captivity at Babylon, will them to pray unto God, for the good and happy life of Nebuchadnezzar and his children, and that they might so long rule and reign over them as the heavens should endure. Yea even God himself doubted not to call Nebuchadnezzar his servant; saying, That he would make him the most mighty prince of the world. And yet was there ever a more detestable tyrant than he? who not contented to be himself worshipped, but caused his image to be also adored, and that upon pain of being burnt quick. And yet for all that we see the prophet Ezechiel, inspired with the spirit of God, angry with Sedechia king of Jerusalem, greatly to detest his perfidious dealing, disloyalty, and rebellion against king Nebuchadnezzar whose vassal all he was, and as it were rejoiced him to have been most justly slain.
>We have also another more rare example of Saul, who possessed with an evil spirit, caused the priests of the lord to be without just cause slain, for that one of them had received David flying from him, and did oftentimes what in his power was, to kill, or cause to have been killed the same David, a most innocent prince, by whom he had got so many victories over his enemies: at which time he fell twice himself into David his hands; who blamed of his most valiant soldiers (over whom he then commanded) for that he would not suffer his so mortal an enemy then in his power, to be slain, being in most assured hope to have enjoyed the kingdom after his death, he detested their counsel, saying, God forbid that I should suffer the person of a king, the Lords anointed to be violated. Yea moreover he himself defended the same king persecuting of him, when as he commanded the soldiers of his guard overcome by wine and sleep to be wakened. And at such time as Saul was slain, and that a soldier thinking to do David a pleasure, presented him with Saul his head: David forthwith caused the same soldier to be slain, which had brought him the head, saying, Go thou wicked, how durst thou lay thine impure hands upon the Lords anointed? thou shalt surely die therefore: and afterwards without all dissimulation mourned himself for the dead king. All which is worth our good consideration. For David was by Saul persecuted to death, and yet wanted not power to have revenged himself, being become stronger than the king by the aid of his enemies, unto whom he fled even against his will: besides that he was the chosen of God, and anointed by the hands of Samuel, to be king of the people, and had also married the kings daughter: and yet for all that he abhorred to take upon him the title of a king, and much more to attempt any thing against the life or honour of Saul, or to rebel against him, but chose rather to banish himself out of the realm, than in any sort to seek the kings destruction. So we also read, that the most holy and best learned men that ever were amongst the Jews whom they called the Essei (that is to say, the true executors of the law of God) held, that Sovereign Princes whatsoever they were, ought to bee unto their subjects inviolable, as persons sacred, and sent unto them from God. And we doubt not, but that David a king and prophet, led by the spirit of God, had always before his eyes the law of God, which says, Thou shalt not speak evil of thy prince, nor detract the Magistrate. Neither is there any thing more common in all the holy Scripture, than the forbidding not only to kill or attempt the life or honour of a prince, but even for the very magistrates also, although (says the Scripture) they be wicked and naught. If therefore he be guilty of treason against God and man, which doth but detract the magistracy; what punishment then can be sufficient for him that shall attempt his life?
>For the law of God is in this case yet more precise than are the laws of men: For the law Julia holds but him guilty of treason, which shall give counsel to kill the magistrate, whereas the law of God expressly forbids in any sort to speak of the magistrate evil, or in any wise to detract him. Wherefore to answer unto the vain and frivolous objections & arguments of them which maintain the contrary, were but idly to abuse both our time and learning. But as he which doubts whether there be a God or nor, is not with arguments to be refuted, but with severe punishments to bee chastised: so are they also which call into question a thing so clear, and that by books publicly imprinted; that the subjects may take up arms against their prince being a Tyrant, and take him out of the way howsoever:
<Howbeit that the most learned divines, and of best understanding, are clear of opinion, that it is not lawful for a man not only to kill his Sovereign Prince, but even to rebel against him, without an especial and undoubtful commandment from God; as we read of Jehu, who was chosen of God, and by the prophet anointed king of Israel, with express commandment utterly to root out all the house of king Achab. He before as a subject had right patiently borne all his wickedness and outrages. Yea the most cruel murders and torturing of the most holy prophets, and religious men, the unworthy murders, banishments, and proscriptions of the subjects; as also the most detestable witchcraft of queen Jezebel: yet for all that durst he attempt nothing against his Sovereign Prince, until he had express commandment from God, by the mouth of his prophet, whom God indeed so assisted, as that with a small power he slew two kings, caused seventy of king Achab his children to be put to death, with many other princes of the kings of Israel and of Juda, and all the idolatrous priests of Baal, that is to say of the Sunne, after that he had caused Jesabel the queen, to be cast headlong down from an high tower, and left her body to be torn in pieces and eaten up of dogs.
>But we are not to apply this especial commandment of God, unto the conspiracies and rebellions of mutinous subjects against their Sovereign Princes. And as for that which Calvin says, if there were at this time magistrates appointed for the defense of the people, and to restrain the insolency of kings, as were the Ephori in Lacedemonia, the Tribunes in Rome, and he Demarches in Athens, that they ought to resist and impeach their licentiousnesse and crueltie: he sheweth sufficiently, that it was never lawful in a right Monarchy, to assault the prince, neither to attempt the life or honour of their Sovereign King: for he speaks not but of the popular and Aristocratique states of Commonwealths. And we have before showed, that the kings of Lacedemonia were no more but plain Senators and captains: and when he speaks of states, he says, Possibly, not daring to assure any thing. Howbeit that there is a notable difference betwixt the attempting of the honour of his prince, and the withstanding of his tyranny; between killing his king, and the opposing of ones self against his cruelty.
I feel more sympathetic to Hobbes' positions than Jean Bodin.
Thomas Hobbes: The Causes of Rebellion:
<The things that dispose to rebellion. Discontent, pretence, and hope of success
>To dispose men to sedition three things concur. The first is Discontent; for as long as a man thinks himself well, and that the present government stands not in his way to hinder his proceeding from well to better; it is impossible for him to desire the change thereof. The second is Pretence of right; for though a man be discontent, yet if in his own opinion there be no just cause of stirring against, or resisting the government established, nor any pretence to justify his resistance, and to procure aid, he will never show it. The third is Hope of success; for it were madness to attempt without hope, when to fail is to die the death of a traitor. Without these three: discontent, pretence, and hope, there can be no rebellion; and when the same are all together, there wanteth nothing thereto, but a man of credit to set up the standard, and to blow the trumpet.
Two Sorts of Discontent
>And as for discontent, it is of two sorts: for it consisteth either in bodily pain present or expected, or else in trouble of the mind (which is the general division of pleasure and pain, Part I. chap. VII, sect. 9). The presence of bodily pain disposes not to sedition; the fear of it does. As for example: when a great multitude, or heap of people, have concurred to a crime worthy of death, they join together, and take arms to defend themselves for fear thereof. So also the fear of want, or in present want the fear of arrests and imprisonment, dispose to sedition. And therefore great exactions, though the right thereof be acknowledged, have caused great seditions. As in the time of Henry VII. the seditions of the Cornish men that refused to pay a subsidy, and, under the conduct of the Lord Audley, gave the King battle upon Blackheath; and that of the northern people, who in the same king’s time, for demanding a subsidy granted in parliament, murdered the Earl of Northumberland in his house.
>Thirdly, the other sort of discontent which troubleth the mind of them who otherwise live at ease, without fear of want, or danger of violence, ariseth only from a sense of their want of that power, and that honour and testimony thereof, which they think is due unto them. For all joy and grief of mind consisting (as hath been said, Part I. chap. IX, sect. 21) in a contention for precedence to them with whom they compare themselves; such men must needs take it ill, and be grieved with the state, as find themselves postponed to those in honour, whom they think they excel in virtue and ability to govern. And this is it for which they think themselves regarded but as slaves.
>Now seeing freedom cannot stand together with subjection, liberty in a commonwealth is nothing but government and rule, which because it cannot be divided, men must expect in common; and that can be no where but in the popular state, or democracy. And Aristotle saith well (lib. 6, cap. 2 of his Politics), The ground or intention of a democracy, is liberty; which he confirmeth in these words: For men ordinarily say this: that no man can partake of liberty, but only in a popular commonwealth. Whosoever therefore in a monarchical estate, where the sovereign power is absolutely in one man, claimeth liberty, claimeth (if the hardest construction should be made thereof) either to have the sovereignty in his turn, or to be colleague with him that hath it, or to have the monarchy changed into a democracy
Noteworthy: discontent of liberty, covertly a plea for more honours
>But if the same be construed (with pardon of that unskilful expression) according to the intention of him that claimeth, then doth he thereby claim no more but this, that the sovereign should take notice of his ability and deserving, and put him into employment and place of subordinate government, rather than others that deserve less. And as one claimeth, so doth another, every man esteeming his own desert greatest. Amongst all those that pretend to, or are ambitious of such honour, a few only can be served, unless it be in a democracy; the rest therefore must be discontent. And so much of the first thing that disposeth to rebellion, namely, discontent, consisting in fear and ambition.
<[Semi-relevant, from a previous chapter]
<[The subjection of them who institute a commonwealth amongst themselves, is no less absolute, than the subjection of servants. And therein they are in equal estate; but the hope of those is greater than the hope of these. For he that subjecteth himself uncompelled, thinketh there is reason he should be better used, than he that does it upon compulsion; and coming in freely, calleth himself, though in subjection, a FREEMAN; whereby it appeareth, that liberty is not any exemption from subjection and obedience to the sovereign power, but a state of better hope than theirs, that have been subjected by force and conquest. And this was the reason, that the name that signifies children, in the Latin tongue is liberi, which also signifies freemen. And yet in Rome, nothing at that time was so obnoxious to the power of others, as children in the family of their fathers. For both the state had power over their life without consent of their fathers; and the father might kill his son by his own authority, without any warrant from the state.]
<[Freedom therefore in commonwealths is nothing but the honour of equality of favour with other subjects, and servitude the estate of the rest. A freeman therefore may expect employments of honour, rather than a servant. And this is all that can be understood by the liberty of the subject. For in all other senses, liberty is the state of him that is not subject.]
On Pretence of Right
>The second thing that disposeth to rebellion, is Pretence of right. And that is when men have an opinion, or pretend to have an opinion: that in certain cases they may lawfully resist him or them that have the sovereign power, or deprive him or them of the means to execute the same. Of which pretences there be six special cases. One is, when the command is against their conscience, and they believe it is unlawful for a subject at the command of the sovereign power to do any action, which he thinketh in his own conscience not lawful for him to do, or to omit any action, which he thinketh not lawful for him to omit. Another is, when the command is against the laws, and they think the sovereign power in such sort obliged to his own laws, as the subject is; and that when he performeth not his duty, they may resist his power. A third is, when they receive commands from some man or men, and a supersedeas to the same from others, and think the authority is equal, as if the sovereign power were divided. A fourth is, when they are commanded to contribute their persons or money to the public service, and think they have a propriety in the same distinct from the dominion of the sovereign power; and that therefore they are not bound to contribute their goods and persons, no more than every man shall of himself think fit. A fifth, when the commands seem hurtful to the people; and they think, every one of them, that the opinion and sense of the people is the same with the opinion of himself, and those that consent with him; calling by the name of people, any multitude of his own faction. The sixth is, when the commands are grievous; and they account him that commandeth grievous things, a tyrant; and tyrannicide, that is, the killing of a tyrant, not only lawful, but also laudable.
>The fifth opinion: that the people is a distinct body from him or them that have the sovereignty over them, is an error already confuted, Part II. chap. XXI, sect. 11, where it is showed, that when men say: the people rebelleth, it is to be understood of those particular persons only, and not of the whole nation. And when the people claimeth any thing otherwise than by the voice of the sovereign power, it is not the claim of the people, but only of those particular men, that claim in their own persons; and this error ariseth from the equivocation of the word people.
>Besides discontent, to the disposing of a man to rebellion, and pretence, there is required, in the third place, hope of success, which consisteth in four points:
Four Dispositions for the Hope of Successful Rebellion:
<1. That the discontented have mutual intelligence;
<2. That they have sufficient number;
<3. That they have arms;
<4. That they agree upon a head.
<The Anatomy of Hopeful Rebellion
>For these four must concur to the making of one body of rebellion, in which intelligence is the life, number the limbs, arms the strength, and a head the unity, by which they are directed to one and the same action.
<Authors of Rebellion
>The authors of rebellion, that is, the men that breed these dispositions to rebel in others, of necessity must have in them these three qualities:
<1. To be discontented themselves;
<2. To be men of mean judgment and capacity;
<3. To be eloquent men or good orators.
>And as for their discontent, from whence it may proceed, hath been already declared. And for the second and third, I am to show now, first, how they may stand together; for it seems a contradiction, to place small judgment and great eloquence, or, as they call it, powerful speaking, in the same man: and then in what manner they both concur to dispose other men to sedition.
>It was noted by Sallust, that in Catiline (who was author of the greatest sedition that ever was in Rome) there was Eloquentiæ satis, sapientiæ parum; eloquence sufficient, but little wisdom. And perhaps this was said of Catiline, as he was Catiline: but it was true of him as an author of sedition. For the conjunction of these two qualities made him not Catiline, but seditious
>And that it may be understood, how want of wisdom, and store of eloquence, may stand together, we are to consider, what it is we call wisdom, and what eloquence. And therefore I shall here again remember some things that have been said already, Part I. chap. V, VI. It is manifest that wisdom consisteth in knowledge. Now of knowledge there are two kinds; whereof the one is the remembrance of such things, as we have conceived by our senses, and of the order in which they follow one another. And this knowledge is called experience; and the wisdom that proceedeth from it, is that ability to conjecture by the present, of what is past, and to come, which men call prudence.
>This being so, it is manifest presently, that the author of sedition, whosoever he be, must not be prudent. For if he consider and take his experiences aright, concerning the success which they have had, who have been the movers and authors of sedition, either in this or any other state, he shall find that of one man that hath thereby advanced himself to honour, twenty have come to a reproachful end
>The other kind of knowledge is the remembrance of the names or appellations of things, and how every thing is called, which is, in matters of common conversation, a remembrance of pacts and covenants of men made amongst themselves, concerning how to be understood of one another. And this kind of knowledge is generally called science, and the conclusions thereof truth. But when men remember not how things are named, by general agreement, but either mistake and misname things, or name them aright by chance, they are not said to have science, but opinion; and the conclusions thence proceeding are uncertain, and for the most part erroneous
>Now that science in particular from which proceed the true and evident conclusions of what is right and wrong, and what is good and hurtful to the being and well-being of mankind, the Latins call sapientia, and we by the general name of wisdom. For generally, not he that hath skill in geometry, or any other science speculative, but only he that understandeth what conduceth to the good and government of the people, is called a wise man. Now that no author of sedition can be wise in this acceptation of the word, is sufficiently proved, in that it hath been already demonstrated, that no pretence of sedition can be right or just; and therefore the authors of sedition must be ignorant of the right of state, that is to say, unwise.
>It is required therefore in an author of sedition, that he think right, that which is wrong; and profitable, that which is pernicious; and consequently that there be in him sapientiæ parum, little wisdom
>Eloquence is nothing else but the power of winning belief of what we say; and to that end we must have aid from the passions of the hearer. Now to demonstration and teaching of the truth, there are required long deductions, and great attention, which is unpleasant to the hearer; therefore they which seek not truth, but belief, must take another way, and not only derive what they would have to be believed, from somewhat believed already, but also by aggravations and extenuations make good and bad, right and wrong, appear great or less, according as it shall serve their turns. And such is the power of eloquence, as many times a man is made to believe thereby, that he sensibly feeleth smart and damage, when he feeleth none, and to enter into rage and indignation, without any other cause, than what is in the words and passion of the speaker.
>This considered, together with the business that he hath to do, who is the author of rebellion, (viz.) to make men believe that their rebellion is just, their discontents grounded upon great injuries, and their hopes great; there needeth no more to prove, there can be no author of rebellion, that is not an eloquent and powerful speaker, and withal (as hath been said before) a man of little wisdom. For the faculty of speaking powerfully, consisteth in a habit gotten of putting together passionate words, and applying them to the present passions of the hearer.
<Rebellion, a condition of war
>because the nature of this offence, consists in renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of war, commonly called Rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as Subjects, but as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but war renewed.
<Hurt To Revolted Subjects Is Done By Right Of War, Not By Way Of Punishment
>Lastly, Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not under the name of Punishment: Because seeing they were either never subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgresse it, all the Harmes that can be done them, must be taken as acts of Hostility. But in declared Hostility, all infliction of evill is lawfull. From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly deny the authority of the Representative of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for Treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denyes such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Common-wealth; that is, according to the will of the Representative. For the Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to Enemies; such as are they, that having been by their own act Subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the Soveraign Power.
<The Punishment Of Innocent Subjects Is Contrary To The Law Of Nature
>All Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the Law of Nature; For Punishment is only of Transgression of the Law, and therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent. It is therefore a violation, First, of that Law of Nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good: For there can arrive no good to the Common-wealth, by Punishing the Innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing all Soveraign Power, is originally given by the consent of every one of the Subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the Punishment of the Innocent, is a rendring of Evill for Good. And thirdly, of the Law that commandeth Equity; that is to say, an equall distribution of Justice; which in Punishing the Innocent is not observed.
<But The Harme Done To Innocents In War, Not So
>But the Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature. For all men that are not Subjects, are either Enemies, or else they have ceased from being so, by some precedent covenants. But against Enemies, whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawfull by the originall Right of Nature to make warre; wherein the Sword Judgeth not, nor doth the Victor make distinction of Nocent and Innocent, as to the time past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the good of his own People. And upon this ground it is, that also in Subjects, who deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-wealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended
<Attaining Sovereignty by Rebellion
>And for the other instance of attaining Sovereignty by Rebellion; it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of Covenant is the Rule of Reason, by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our own life; and consequently a Law of Nature.
<Hobbes' Warning to Rebels, On Their Sovereignty Attained: Be careful not to boast or plant the seeds of more pretences
<There is scarce a Common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified
>One reason whereof (which I have not there mentioned) is this, That they will all of them justify the War, by which their Power was at first gotten, and whereon (as they think) their Right dependeth, and not on the Possession. As if, for example, the Right of the Kings of England did depend on the goodnesse of the cause of William the Conquerour, and upon their lineall, and directest Descent from him; by which means, there would perhaps be no tie of the Subjects obedience to their Soveraign at this day in all the world: wherein whilest they needlessely think to justify themselves, they justify all the successefull Rebellions that Ambition shall at any time raise against them, and their Successors. Therefore I put down for one of the most effectuall seeds of the Death of any State, that the Conquerours require not onely a Submission of mens actions to them for the future, but also an Approbation of all their actions past; when there is scarce a Common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.
<Dissolution Of Common-wealths Proceedeth From Imperfect Institution
>Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internall diseases. For by the nature of their Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as the Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but as they are the Makers, and orderers of them.
>For men, as they become at last weary of irregular justling, and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts, to conforme themselves into one firme and lasting edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit Laws, to square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and combersome points of their present greatnesse to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able Architect, be compiled, into any other than a crazy building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.
>Amongst the Infirmities therefore of a Common-wealth, I will reckon in the first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institution, and resemble the diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from a Defectuous Procreation.
<Liberty Of Disputing Against Soveraign Power
>To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power, by pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the most part in the Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines, are perpetually medling with the Fundamentall Lawes, to the molestation of the Common-wealth; like the little Wormes, which Physicians call Ascarides.
<Excessive Greatnesse Of A Town, Multitude Of Corporations
>Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse of a Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit, the number, and expence of a great Army: As also the great number of Corporations; which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.
<From Behemoth
<B:
>It seems not only by this, but also by many examples in history, that there can hardly arise a long or dangerous rebellion, that has not some such overgrown city with an army or two in its belly to foment it.
<A:
>Nay more; those great capital cities, when rebellion is upon pretence of grievances, must needs be of the rebel party: because the grievances are but taxes, to which citizens, that is, merchants, whose profession is their private gain, are naturally mortal enemies; their only glory being to grow excessively rich by the wisdom of buying and selling.
<B:
>But they are said to be of all callings the most benefical to the commonwealth, by setting the poorer sort of people on work.
<A:
>That is to say, by making poor people sell their labour to them at their own prices; so that poor people, for the most part, might get a better living by working in Bridewell, than by spinning, weaving, and other such labour as they can do; saving that by working slightly they may help themselves a little, to the disgrace of our manufacture. And as most commonly they are the first encouragers of rebellion, presuming of their strength; so also are they, for the most part, the first to repent, deceived by them that command their strength.
<Two Great Virtues
<A:
>The two great virtues, that were severally in Henry VII and Henry VIII, when they shall be jointly in one King, will easily cure it. That of Henry VII was, without much noise of the people to fill his coffers; that of Henry VIII was an early severity; but this without the former cannot be exercised.
<B:
>This that you say looks, methinks, like an advice to the King, to let them alone till he have gotten ready money enough to levy and maintain a sufficient army, and then to fall upon them and destroy them.
<A:
>God forbid that so horrible, unchristian, and inhuman a design should ever enter into the King’s heart. I would have him have money enough readily to raise an army able to suppress any rebellion, and to take from his enemies all hope of success, that they may not dare to trouble him in the reformation of the Universities; but to put none to death without the actual committing such crimes as are already made capital by the laws.
Rebel Intelligentsia / Universities [providing mutual intelligence for hopeful rebellion?]
<The core of rebellion, as you have seen by this, and read of other rebellions, are the Universities; which nevertheless are not to be cast away, but to be better disciplined: that is to say, that the politics there taught be made to be, as true politics should be, such as are fit to make men know
<Thomas Hobbes on monarchomachists & pro-regicides
>From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in their books, and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull.
<Hobbes / From the same books (like Aristotle's Politics), they think in Democracies they are all freemen, but under Monarchies, all slaves
>From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government; for they find no such matter.
<Anti-Monarchy writers, they're like Rabid Dogs
<Like rabid dogs won't drink water & have a rabid hydrophobia, rabid democratical writers have a rabid tyrannophobia;
<A monarchy bitten by rabid, snarling democratical writers wants nothing more than a strong, mean Monarch
<Once there is that Strong Monarch, it is a self-fulfilling prophesy & they abhor their Tyrant
>In sum, I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudicial to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publicly read, without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venom; Which Venom I will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad Dog, which is a disease the Physicians call Hydrophobia, or Fear Of Water. For as he that is so bitten, has a continual torment of thirst, and yet abhors water; and is in such an estate, as if the poison endeavoured to convert him into a Dog: So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall writers, that continually snarl at that estate; it wants nothing more than a strong Monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain Tyrannophobia, or fear of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhor.
<From Aristotle, they learned to call anything but mixed constitutionalism / representative, Western multi-party democracy – Tyranny
>From Aristotle's Civil Philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner of Commonwealths but the Popular, (such as was at that time the state of Athens,) Tyranny. All Kings they called Tyrants… A Tyrant originally signified no more simply, but a Monarch: But when afterwards in most parts of Greece that kind of government was abolished, the name began to signify, not only the thing it did before, but with it, the hatred which the Popular States bare towards it: As also the name of King became odious after the deposing of the Kings in Rome, as being a thing natural to all men, to conceive some great Fault to be signified in any Attribute, that is given in despight, and to a great Enemy. And when the same men shall be displeased with those that have the administration of the Democracy, or Aristocracy, they are not to seek for disgraceful names to express their anger in; but call readily the one Anarchy, and the other Oligarchy.
Hobbes' Nominalism & the arbitrary, petty Namecalling of the political arena
<Tyranny and Oligarchy, But Different Names of Monarchy, and Aristocracy
>There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other Forms of Government, but of the same Forms misliked. For they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy, call it Oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the Governours.
<Thomas Hobbes / The toleration of a professed hatred of Tyranny, is a toleration of a hatred of Commonwealth in general, & another evil seed
>And because the name of Tyranny, signifies nothing more, nor less, than the name of Sovereignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they that use the former word, are understood to be angry with them they call Tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of Tyranny, is a Toleration of hatred to Commonwealth in general, and another evil seed, not differing much from the former.
Hobbes / Greeks & Romans, the Universities, Schoolmen, & Parliament Men
>Fourthly, there were an exceeding great number of men of the better sort, that had been so educated, as that in their youth having read the books written by famous men of the ancient Grecian and Roman commonwealths concerning their polity and great actions; in which books the popular government was extolled by that glorious name of Liberty, and monarchy disgraced by that name of Tyranny; they became thereby in love with their forms of government. And out of these men were chosen the greatest part of the House of Commons, or if they were not the greatest part, yet by advantage of their eloquence, were always able to sway the rest, especially the great haranguers, and such as pretended to learning.
For who can be a good subject in a Monarchy…
<For who can be a good subject in a Monarchy, whose principles are taken from the enemies of Monarchy, such as were Cicero, Seneca, Cato, and other politicians of Rome, and Aristotle of Athens, who seldom spake of Kings but as of wolves and other ravenous beasts?
>You may perhaps think a man has need of nothing else but to know the duty he owes his governor, and what right he has to order him, but a good natural wit; but it is otherwise. For it is a science, and built upon sure and clear principles, and to be learned by deep and careful study, or from masters that have deeply studied it. And who was there in the Parliament or in the nation, that could find out those evident principles, and derive from them the necessary rules of justice, and the necessary connection of justice and peace? The people have one day in seven the leisure to hear instruction, and there are ministers appointed to teach them their duty.
>But how have those ministers performed their office? A great part of them, namely, the Presbyterian ministers, throughout the whole war, instigated the people against the King; so did also the Independents and other fanatic ministers. The rest, contented with their livings, preached in their parishes points of controversy, to religion impertinent, but to the breach of charity among themselves very effectual; or else eloquent things, which the people either understood not, or thought themselves not concerned in. But this sort of preachers, sad they did little good, so they did little hurt. The mischief proceeded wholly from the Presbyterian preachers, who, by a long practised histrionic faculty, preached up the rebellion powerfully.
Thomas Hobbes' anti-scholasticism / Universities
Needless Factionalism
>All the Presbyterians were of the same mind with Gomar: but a very great many others not; and those were called here Arminians, who, because the doctrine of free-will had been exploded as a Papistical doctrine, and because the Presbyterians were far the greater number, and already in favour with the people, were generally hated. It was easy, therefore, for the Parliament to make that calumny pass currently with the people, when the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Laud, was for Arminius, and had a little before, by his power ecclesiastical, forbidden all his ministers to preach to the people of predestination; and when all ministers that were gracious with him, and hoped for Church preferment, fell to preaching and writing for free-will, to the uttermost of their power, as a proof of their ability and merit. Besides, they gave out, some of them, that the Archbishop was in heart a Papist; and in case he could effect a toleration here of the Roman religion, was to have a cardinal's hat: which was not only false, but also without any ground at all for a suspicion.
>It is a strange thing, that scholars, obscure men that could receive no clarity but from the flame of the state, should be suffered to bring their unnecessary disputes, and together with them their quarrels, out of the universities into the commonwealth; and more strange, that the state should engage in their parties, and not rather put them both to silence [Presbyterians & Arminians]
They must punish then the most of those that have had their breeding in the Universities
>They must punish then the most of those that have had their breeding in the Universities. For such curious questions in divinity are first started in the Universities, and so are all those politic questions concerning the rights of civil and ecclesiastic government; and there they are furnished with arguments for liberty out of the works of Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, and out of the histories of Rome and Greece, for their disputation against the necessary power of their sovereigns.
>Therefore I despair of any lasting peace amongst ourselves, till the Universities here shall bend and direct their studies to the settling of it, that is, to the teaching of absolute obedience to the laws of the King, and to his public edicts under the Great Seal of England. For I make no doubt, but that solid reason, backed with the authority of so many learned men, will more prevail for the keeping of us in peace within ourselves, than any victory can do over the rebels. But I am afraid that it is impossible to bring the Universities to such a compliance with the actions of state, as is necessary for the business.
The core of rebellion – the Universities
>The core of rebellion, as you have seen by this, and read of other rebellions, are the Universities; which nevertheless are not to be cast away, but to be better disciplined: that is to say, that the politics there taught be made to be, as true politics should be, such as are fit to make men know, that it is their duty to obey all laws whatsoever that shall by the authority of the King be enacted, till by the same authority they shall be repealed; such as are fit to make men understand, that the civil laws are God’s laws, as they that make them are by God appointed to make them and to make men know, that the people and the Church are one thing, and have but one head, the King; and that no man has title to govern under him, that has it not from him; that the King owes his crown to God only, and to no man, ecclesiastic or other; and that the religion they teach there, be a quiet waiting for the coming again of our blessed Saviour, and in the mean time a resolution to obey the King’s laws, which also are God’s laws
The Pastorall Authority Of Soveraigns Only Is De Jure Divino, That Of Other Pastors Is Jure Civili
>If a man therefore should ask a Pastor, in the execution of his Office, as the chief Priests and Elders of the people (Mat. 21.23.) asked our Saviour, “By what authority dost thou these things, and who gave thee this authority:” he can make no other just Answer, but that he doth it by the Authority of the Common-wealth, given him by the King, or Assembly that representeth it. All Pastors, except the Supreme, execute their charges in the Right, that is by the Authority of the Civill Soveraign, that is, Jure Civili. But the King, and every other Soveraign executeth his Office of Supreme Pastor, by immediate Authority from God, that is to say, In Gods Right, or Jure Divino. And therefore none but Kings can put into their Titles (a mark of their submission to God onely ) Dei Gratia Rex, &c. Bishops ought to say in the beginning of their Mandates, “By the favour of the Kings Majesty, Bishop of such a Diocesse;” or as Civill Ministers, “In his Majesties Name.” For in saying, Divina Providentia, which is the same with Dei Gratia, though disguised, they deny to have received their authority from the Civill State; and sliely slip off the Collar of their Civill Subjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the Common-wealth.
>So that where a stranger hath authority to appoint Teachers, it is given him by the Soveraign in whose Dominions he teacheth. Christian Doctors are our Schoolmasters to Christianity; But Kings are Fathers of Families, and may receive Schoolmasters for their Subjects from the recommendation of a stranger, but not from the command; especially when the ill teaching them shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that recommends them: nor can they be obliged to retain them, longer than it is for the Publique good; the care of which they stand so long charged withall, as they retain any other essentiall Right of the Soveraignty.
>And therefore the second Conclusion, concerning the best form of Government of the Church, is nothing to the question of the Popes Power without his own Dominions: For in all other Common-wealths his Power (if hee have any at all) is that of the Schoolmaster onely, and not of the Master of the Family.
>The third place, is John 21.16. “Feed my sheep;” which is not a Power to make Laws, but a command to Teach. Making Laws belongs to the Lord of the Family; who by his owne discretion chooseth his Chaplain, as also a Schoolmaster to Teach his children.
The Universities… Again
>Seeing the Universities have heretofore from time to time maintained the authority of the Pope, contrary to all laws divine, civil, and natural, against the right of our Kings, why can they not as well, when they have all manner of laws and equity on their side, maintain the rights of him that is both sovereign of the kingdom, and head of the Church?
<Why then were they not in all points for the King’s power, presently after that King Henry VIII was in Parliament declared head of the Church, as much as they were before for the authority of the Pope?
>Because the clergy in the Universities, by whom all things there are governed, and the clergy without the Universities, as well biships as inferior clerks, did think that the pulling down of the Pope was the setting up of them, as to England, in his place, and made no question, the greatest part of them, but that their spiritual power did depend not upon the authority of the King, but of Christ himself, derived to them by a successive imposition of hands from bishop to bishop; notwithstanding they knew that this derivation passed through the hands of popes and bishops whose authority they had cast off. For though they were content that the divine right, which the Pope pretended to in England, should be denied him, yet they thought it not so fit to be taken from the Church of England, whom they now supposed themselves to represent.
<Kim Jong Il & KCU (Children's Union) / Education of the Youth, like clean sheets of paper
>Childhood is a very important period when young people's outlook on the world begins to form.
>As the Leader has stated, the minds of the children in this period are as clean as a sheet of blank paper and perceive given phenomena just as a camera does. Therefore, depending on their education in this period, they can become red, yellow, or black.
Hobbes / Instruction of the Subjects
<And To Have Days Set Apart To Learn Their Duty, like such is done every Sunday
>Seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when ’tis taught, remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the Sovereign Power is placed, without setting a part from their ordinary labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble together, and (after prayers and praises given to God, the Sovereign of Sovereigns) hear those their Duties told them, and the Positive Laws, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the Authority that makes them Laws.
<Thomas Hobbes on Instruction / Propaganda (basically)
>Another thing necessary, is rooting out from the consciences of men all those opinions which seem to justify, and give pretense of right to rebellious actions… that there is a body of the people without him or them that have the sovereign power… and because opinions which are gotten by education, and in length of time are made habitual, cannot be taken away by force, and upon the sudden: they must therefore be taken away also, by time and education. And seeing the said opinions have proceeded from private and public teaching, and those teachers have received from grounds and principles, which they have learned in the Universities…
>Instruction of the people in the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty… it is his duty to cause them [his subjects] to be instructed; and not only his duty, but his benefit also.
Ordinary people's minds are like clean paper, fit to receive whatever the Sovereign shall imprint upon them
>Whereas the common people's minds, unless they be tainted with dependence on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever the public authority shall be imprinted in them.
Subjects Are To Be Taught, Not To Affect Change Of Government
>And, to descend to particulars, the people are to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any form of government that they see in their neighbor nations, more than with their own, nor, whatsoever present prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed than they, to desire change. For the prosperity of a people ruled by an oligarchical or democratical assembly comes not from Oligarchy, nor from Democracy, but from the obedience and concord of the subjects: nor do the people flourish in Monarchy because one man the has right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of state the obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and they shall not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience to do no more than reform the Commonwealth shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus, in the fable, which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit father, did by the counsel of Medea cut him in pieces and boil him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change is like the breach of the first of God's Commandments: for there God says, Non habebis Deos alienos: "Thou shalt not have the Gods of other nations," and in another place concerning kings, that they are gods.
Keep the means of sovereignty to maintain the end thereof
>For he that deserts the Means, deserts the Ends; and he deserts the Means, that being the Sovereign, acknowledges himself subject to the Civil Laws; and renounces the Power of Supreme Judicature; or of making War, or Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and Soldiers, when, and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making Officers, and Ministers both of War, and Peace; or of appointing Teachers, and examining what Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant, or misinformed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall Rights; because thereby men are easy to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require their use and exercise.
>I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Sovereignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Sovereign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusts in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not only his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himself in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.
<The Use of Universities
>As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions, contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them… It is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people, depends wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities.
>"It is his Duty, to cause them to be so instructed; and not only his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security…"
Though he reserved for fathers to educate their children as they like.
<And because the first instruction of children depends on the care of their parents, it is necessary that they should be obedient to them while they are under their tuition; and not only so, but that also afterwards, as gratitude requires, they acknowledge the benefit of their education by external signs of honour. To which end they are to be taught that originally the the father of every man was also his sovereign lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the fathers of families, when by instituting a Commonwealth they resigned that absolute power, yet it was never intended that they should lose the honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right was not necessary to the institution of sovereign power; nor would there be any reason why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them than from other men. And this accords with the fifth Commandment.
Hobbes, like Xenophon, also puts a great stress on obedience:
<Take away in any kind of state the obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and they shall not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience to do no more than reform the Commonwealth shall find they do thereby destroy it
>>779267Tabula rasais a chauvinistic ideal for adults to justify forcing their opinions onto kids
Kids are not all the same. They are individuals with different skillsets and inclinations.
Adults try too hard to micromanage/cultivate childhood and then end up disappointed when kids fail
>>779282Most people will follow the opinions they hear around them.
Media and the climate reinforcing it will mold them with entertainment and a lifetime of hearing about it.
>>779287People still will have opinions they agree or disagree with even with brainwashing.
People are manipulable but headstrong.
And again, children are denied individuality by adults
>>779290People need a common bond, a common cult of personality, to keep the common peace and mutual identity.
I don't deny that their individuality is ever lost, but what will be lost is the common feeling they have altogether as a people.
>>779295Public education is mainly against individual thought.
Also, the quote you used from the Bible proves my point
>>779302People always say this when it come to children but for adults they cater towards individuality. Adults homogenize children too much
>>779305Jesus is saying he wants people to be like naive children, so he can raise them.
>>779309This is being said towards children -and- adults.
A world where people lack a common culture and convictions will make them common enemies.
>>779310That's infantilism.
>>779316Most cultures share commonalities.
And the biggest enemies are usually people who share similar opinions to you but have differing opinions on a few things
>>779320>Most culturesErase culture itself, and the cultivation of the public, around things such as political allegiances like nationhood, common language, and public education… it will break the peace and communion with you.
It's cultivation of the public is so transparent everywhere you look, you'd hardly notice it.
>>779402Monarchy, esp. in the West, has typically been a happy accident… there are very few people who accept this prospect or are content with any arbiter–or see the need for it–so monarchy isn't something that is legally devised beforehand because people are either full of doubt and disbelief or too factious or like Hobbes laments piled with generations of repetition the mixed constitutionalist brainworm so won't allow it.
Proof of that is you cannot rely on most e-monarchists themselves to fully plan and devise a monarchy–it must happen by accident or at least not by any accord and public deliberation, but whatever compels people to finally accept it or if someone should be ambitious enough.
I wish it was the case that people naturally with ease accepted a monarchical regime, but that isn't the case.
Especially, not in the West, with its Greco-Roman influence, and the Old Testament Jews warning about monarchy and their distrust of Pharaoh, with the distrust of the Persians with the Greeks–Aristotle's mixed constitutionalism and denial that a state should be modeled after a family or have any corporate state like Plato mentions (& Plato's own denial of it or doubt)–it's not like the Far East with Confucius who taught generations of people that a familial state with some parental monarch figure would be harmonious.
From the beginning, Western civilization has felt monarchy was obnoxious and has its doubts and generally preferred popular mandate or some elite council… or piled those feelings of unity into sheer metaphysics and abstract personalized gods without reflection.
Paradoxically, the West does accept Christianity, but like I said in the previous thread it's because Christianity appeals to certain Occidental passions.
It has to be an accident when people accept it mostly–but with the West and its discretion towards monarchy, you pretty much have to be a Hobbesian and deny that people are naturally sociable that way, and that you -must- educate and bring people towards it.
Like Xenophon says, you have to win them over… it doesn't happen naturally like how the grass grows, esp. in the West (where we're working against what most Westerners are taught to highly esteem).
>>779402Ask yourself, why is that?
–Because you simply don't feel the system provides.
Ancaps believe fully in the preeminence of the free market, because they think it provides for them;
Same for socialists:
<PEACE, LAND, AND BREAD!…
And the Egyptian loyalist teaching:
Egyptian Teachings of a Man for his Son (Praise extracts):>Praise the King, may you love him, as a worker. He makes radiant by the giving of his powers. He is greater than a million men for the one he has favored. He is the shield for the one who makes him content… Praise the King, adore the King. That is the post before god. Spread his powers, rejoicing when he has decreed and devising plans for what he has desired… He is the bodily health of the nameless. He exercises his body for him. He is the right arm of the man whose arms are weak. Egyptian Loyalist Teaching>He is the sun in whose leadership people live>Whoever is under his light will be great in wealth>He gives sustenance to his followers>He feeds the man who sticks to his path>the man he favors will be a lord of offerings>the man he rejects will be a pauper>He is Khuum for every bodyThese people believe because they believe it is a system that provides and feeds them, overall has the wisdom (and the capacity) to sustain the provision of foods and sustenance, and has the strength of arms to defend them, keep them safe.
…
Christian monarchies suck at propaganda today. Nobody really is in a state of awe, and not really with Christianity – far from it.
…
Compare that with Lenin's words, Lenin, who is received like a prophet, and in this cartoon simply speaks, words that become electricity and bread.
…
Compare it with this Joe Biden picture.
<w/ small stroke of his pen, he claims to build the economy & provide millions of jobs Xenophon Cyropaedia
>“When the interests of mankind are at stake, they will obey with joy the man whom they believe to be wiser than themselves… You may see how the sick man will beg the doctor to tell him what he ought to do, how a whole ship's company will listen to the pilot, how travellers will cling to one who knows the way better, as they believe, than they do themselves. 'You would have me understand', said Cyrus, 'that the best way to secure obedience is to be thought wiser than those we rule?' 'Yes', said Cambyses, 'that is my belief.'
>“None quicker, my lad, than this: wherever you wish to seem wise, be wise.”
>“Well, my son, it is plain that where learning is the road to wisdom, learn you must, as you learn your battalion-drill, but when it comes to matters which are not to be learnt by mortal men, nor foreseen by mortal minds, there you can only become wiser than others by communicating with the gods through the art of divination. But, always, whenever you know that a thing ought to be done, see that it is done, and done with care; for care, not carelessness, is the mark of the wise man.
From what I have seen and experienced, Xenophon's advice is very true, but people don't see the throne as a seat of wisdom.
There is also two forces that compel obedience: love and fear, rewards and punishments.
Hobbes and Machiavelli both say it is better to make use of fear than love, because fear is a strong emotion that compels people, not only fear of punishment or fear of disaster that would come if not for a ruler but also fear of an enemy or stranger.
Now I agree with Hobbes–what emotion is going to bring men into flight, and make them feel compelled to indiscriminately unite no matter what differences in their beliefs?
<Fear
When the army is at the gates, people will give everything to ensure their safety to the commander to drive off the enemy.
Plato:
>If this fear had not possessed them, they would never had met the enemy or defended their temples and sepulchres and their country, and everything that was near and dear to them, as they did; but little by little they would have been all scattered and dispersed.
Xenophon Cyropaedia
>But none the less Cyrus was able so to penetrate the vast extent of the countries by the sheer terror of his personality that the inhabitants were prostate before him.
Thomas Hobbes
>That men who choose their Sovereign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute: But in this case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it they do it for fear.
Hobbes says fear is the main unifying passion:
William of Orange is an example of Machiavellian/Hobbesian themes–fear of Louis XIV & Catholicism crowns him.
De Witt brothers are cannibalized; he takes England with ease.
He rewards his followers for killing his enemies.
…
Trump's foreign policy is mostly to take advantage of US allies because he knows US allies won't abandon US protection so long as the enemies are there, and Trump wants to negotiate with the enemies even–this helps with US expansion and solidifying US control over its vassal states.
Nothing is more useful to subjugating your vassals than fear of an enemy.
What would NATO be without fear of Russia? Or fear of European countries breaking into world wars without US hegemony?
What would US protection of the Sunni Gulf Monarchies be without fear of the Revolutionary Republican Anti-Monarchy Islamic Shia sect of Iran?
What would South Korea and Japan be without fear of North Korea & China?
USA right now is calling to capture Greenland, because of fear that China or Russia might take it later and offset NATO security.
In my experience, when defeat and the approach of an enemy is extremely close, people are willing to give so much–that is why war propaganda is so effective.
…
When did Britain lose colonial America to the American Revolutionaries? –Just after it finally defeated France in colonial America.
>>779821Mods bow to Grace-poster
<George Bernard Shaw
In Good King Charles's Golden Days
>The truth is Charles, like most English kings, was continually in money difficulties because the English people, having an insuperable dislike of being governed at all, would not pay taxes enough to finance an efficient civil and military public service.
>In Charles's day especially they objected furiously to a standing army, having had enough of that under Cromwell, & grudged their king even the lifeguards which were the nucleus of such an army. Charles had to raise the necessary money somewhere;
>…To Whig historians the transaction makes Charles a Quisling in service of Louis & a traitor to his country. This is Protestant scurrility: the only shady part of it is Charles, spending the money in the service of England, gave le Roi Soleil no value for it…
…
George Bernard Shaw:
Excerpt 1
>CHARLES. "No doubt; but the British people do not make kings in England. The crown is in the hands of the damned Whig squirearchy who got rich by robbing the Church, and chopped off father's head, crown and all. They care no more for your naval victory than for a bunch of groundsel. They would not pay for the navy if we called it ship money, and let them know what they are paying for."
…
Excerpt 2
<JAMES. Well, I suppose I must, since England is governed by its mob instead of by its king. But I tell you, Charles, when I am king there shall be no such nonsense. You jeer at me and say that I am the protector of your life, because nobody will kill you to make me king; but I take that as the highest compliment you could pay me. This mob that your Protestant Republicans and Presbyterians and Levellers call the people of England will have to choose between King James the Second and King Titus Oates. And James and the Church–and there is only one real Church of God–will see to it that their choice will be Hobson's choice.
<CHARLES. The people of England will have nothing to do with it. The real Levellers today, Jamie, are the lords and the rich squires–Cromwell's sort–and the moneyed men of the city. They will keep the people's noses to the grindstone no matter what happens. And their choice will be not between you and Titus Oates, but between your daughter Mary's Protestant husband and you.
<JAMES. He will have to cross the seas to get here. And I, as Lord High Admiral of England, will meet him on the seas and sink him there. He is no great general on land: on water he is nothing. I have never been beaten at sea.
<CHARLES. Jamie, Jamie: nothing frightens me so much as your simple stupid pluck, and your faith in Rome. You think you will have the Pope at your back because you are a Catholic. You are wrong: in politics the Pope is always a Whig, because every earthly monarch's court is a rival to the Vatican.
…
Excerpt 3
>CHARLES. Why am I a popular king? Because I am a lazy fellow. I enjoy myself and let the people see me doing it, and leave things as they are, though things as they are will not bear thinking of by those who know what they are. That is what the people like. It is what they would do if they were kings.
…
Excerpt 4
>CHARLES. Nothing; but they hate it. And nobody teaches them how necessary it is. Instead, when we teach them anything we teach them grammar and dead languages. What is the result? Protestantism and parliaments instead of citizenship.
>CATHERINE. In Portugal, God be praised, there are no Protestants and no parliaments.
>CHARLES. Parliaments are the very devil. Old Noll began by thinking the world of parliaments. Well, he tried every sort of parliament, finishing with a veritable reign of the saints. And in the end he had to turn them all out of doors, neck and crop, and govern through his major-generals. And when Noll died they went back to their parliament and made such a mess of it that they had to send for me.
…
Excerpt 5
>CHARLES. They are no use here: the English will not be ruled; and there is nothing they hate like brains. For brains and religion you must go to Scotland; and Scotland is the most damnable country on earth: never shall I forget the life they led me there with their brains and their religion when they made me their boy king to spite Old Noll. I sometimes think religion and brains are the curse of the world. No, beloved, England for me, with all its absurdities!
…
Excerpt 6
>CHARLES. Why not, indeed? I daresay you will do it very well, beloved. The Portuguese can believe in a Church and obey a king. The English robbed the Church and destroyed it: if a priest celebrates Mass anywhere in England outside your private chapel he is hanged for it. My great grandmother was a Catholic queen: rather than let her succeed to the throne they chopped her head off. My father was a Protestant king: they chopped his head off for trying to govern them and asking the Midlands to pay for the navy. While the Portuguese were fighting the Spaniards the English were fighting oneanother. You can do nothing with the English. How often have I told you that I am no real king: that the utmost I can do is to keep my crown on my head and my head on my shoulders. How often have you asked me to do some big thing like joining your Church, or some little thing like pardoning a priest or a Quaker condemned to some cruel punishment! And you have found that outside the court, where my smiles and my frowns count for everything, I have no power. The perjured scoundrel, Titus Oates, steeped in unmentionable vices, is lodged in my palace with a pension. If I could have my way he would be lodged on the gallows. There is a preacher named Bunyan who has written a book about the Christian life that is being read, they tell me, all the world over; and I could not release him from Bedford Gaol, where he rotted for years. The world will remember Oates and Bunyan; and I shall be The Merry Monarch. No: give me English birds and English trees, English dogs and Irish horses, English rivers and English ships; but English men! No, NO, NO.
>CATHERINE. And Englishwomen?
>CHARLES. Ah! there you have me, beloved. One cannot do without women: at least I cannot. But having to manage rascals like Buckingham and Shaftesbury, and dodgers like Halifax, is far worse than having to manage Barbara and Louise.
Shaw's remarks there in the preface remind me of Hobbes.
Dialogue
<Hobbes speaks through P
>L: But I know, that there be statutes express, whereby the King hath obliged himself never to levy money upon his subjects without the consent of his Parliament. One of which statutes is 25 Edw. 1. c. 5, in these words: We have granted for us, and our heirs, as well to archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors, and other folk of holy Church, as also to earls, barons, and to all the commonalty of the land, that for no business from henceforth, we shall take such aids, tasks, or prizes, but by the common consent of the realm. There is also another have been since that time confirmed by diverse other Kings, and lastly by the King that now reigneth.
>L: In the said statutes that restrain the levying of money without consent of Parliament, is there any thing you can take exceptions to?
>P: No, I am satisfied that kings that grant such liberties, are bound to make them good, so far as it may be done without sin: but if a King find that by such grant he be disabled to protect his subjects, if he maintain his grant, he sins; and therefore may, and ought to take no notice of the said grant. For such grants, as by error or false suggestion are gotten from him, are, as the lawyers do confess, void and of no effect, and ought to be recalled. Also the King, as in on all hands confessed, hath the charge lying upon him to protect his people against foreign enemies, and to keep the peace betwixt them within the kingdom: if he do not his utmost endeavour to discharge himself thereof, he committeth a sin.
>P: Nor do I hereby lay any aspersion upon such grants of the King and his ancestors. Those statutes are in themselves very good for the King and the people, as creating some kind of difficulty for such Kings as, for the glory of conquest, might spend one part of their subjects' lives and estates in molesting other nations, and leave the rest to destroy themselves at home by factions. That which I here find fault with, is the wrestling of those, and other such statutes, to the binding of our Kings from the use of their armies in the necessary defense of themselves and their people. The late Long Parliament, that in 1648 murdered their King, (a King that sought no greater glory upon earth, but to be indulgent to his people, and a pious defender of the Church of England,) no sooner took upon them the sovereign power, than they levied money upon the people at their own discretion. Did any of their subjects dispute their power? Did they not send soldiers over the sea to subdue Ireland, and others to fight against the Dutch at sea; or made they any doubt but to be obeyed in all that they commanded, as a right absolutely due to the sovereign power in whomsoever it resides? I say not this as following their actions, but as testimony from the mouths of those very men that denied the same power to him whom they acknowledged to have been their sovereign immediately before
>P: I know what it is that troubles your conscience in this point. All men are troubled at the crossing of their wishes; but it is our own fault. First, we wish impossibilities; we would have our security against all the world upon right of property, without paying for it; this is impossible. We may as well expect that fish and fowl should boil, roast, and dish themselves, and come to the table, and that grapes should squeeze themselves into our mouths, and have all other contentments and ease which some pleasant men have related of the land of Cocagne. Secondly, there is no nation in the world where he or they that have the sovereignty, do not take what money they please for the defense of those respective nations, when they think it necessary for their safety. The late Long Parliament denied this; but why? Because there was a design amongst them to depose the King. Thirdly, there is no example of any King of England that I have read of, that ever pretended any such necessity for levying money against his conscience. The greatest sums that ever were levied, comparing the value of money, as it was at that time, with what it is now, were levied by King Edward III and King Henry V; kings in whom we glory now, and think their actions great ornaments to the English history
>P: All this I know, and am not satisfied. I am one of the common people, and one of that almost infinite number of men, for whose welfare Kings and other sovereigns were by God ordained: for God made Kings for the people, and not people for Kings. How shall I be defended from the domineering of proud and insolent strangers that speak another language, that scorn us, that seek to make us slaves, or how shall I avoid the destruction that may arise from the cruelty of factions in civil war, unless the King, to whom alone, you say, belongeth the right of levying and disposing of the militia by which only it can be prevented, have ready money, upon all occasions, to arm and pay as many soldiers, as for the present defense, or the peace of the people, shall be necessary? Shall not I, and you, and every man, be undone? Tell me not of a Parliament, when there is no Parliament sitting, or perhaps none in being, which may often happen. And when there is a Parliament, if the speaking and leading men should have a design to put down monarchy, as they had in the Parliament which began to sit the third of November, 1640, shall the King, who is to answer to God Almighty for the safety of the people, and to that end is intrusted with the power to levy and dispose of soldiery, be disabled to perform his office, by virtue of these acts of Parliament which you have cited?
…
>And by that means the most men, knowing their Duties, will be the less subject to serve the Ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the State; and be the less grieved with the Contributions necessary for their Peace, and Defence; and the Governours themselves have the less cause, to maintain at the Common charge any greater Army, than is necessary to make good the Publique Liberty, against the Invasions and Encroachments of foraign Enemies
Christian integralists have left monarchists with two choices:
- Alexander the Great.
OR
- Prophet Isaiah & his humiliating description of gentile kings coming in procession, licking dust, having their milk sucked.
I choose Alexander the Great, the Caligulan answer.
Christian Integarlists only accept Kings who build upon their Church tribalism & sell off their own tribalism.
They only accept cuckoo bird royalism.
They are like the cuckoo bird chick in the nest suffocating all the other nativist loyalties until only cuckoo bird eggs are left.
…
>"What miserable drones and traitors have I nurtured and promoted in my household who let their lord be treated with such shameful contempt by a low-born cleric"<Louis XIV's disdain for & roast of so-called "constitutional monarchy":
>For there is no doubt that this subjection that makes it necessary for a sovereign to take orders from his people is the worst calamity that can befall a man of our rank.
-Louis XIV Quote #1
>It is perverting the order of things to attribute decisions to the subjects and deference to the sovereign, and if I have described to you elsewhere the miserable condition of princes who commit their people and their dignity to the conduct of a prime minister, I have good cause to portray to you here the misery of those who are abandoned to the indiscretion of a popular assembly.
-Louis XIV Quote #2
>I fail to see, therefore, my son, for what reason the kings of France, hereditary kings who can boast that there isn't either a better house, nor greater power, nor more absolute authority than theirs anywhere else in the world today, should rank below these elective princes.
-Louis XIV Quote #3
>It is the essential fault of this monarchy that the Prince may not levy any extraordinary taxes without the Parliament nor keep the Parliament in session without gradually losing his authority, which is sometimes left shattered, as the example of the previous King [Charles I] had sufficiently demonstrated.
-Louis XIV Quote #4
>As to the persons who were to support me in my work, I resolved above all not to have a prime minister, and if you and all your successors take my advice, my son, the name will forever be abolished in France, there being nothing more shameful than to see on the one hand all the functions and on the other the mere title of a king.
-Louis XIV Quote #5
Unique IPs: 13