Thread #2 is hereby dedicated to Adam Smith, since we had a very dedicated "Smithian" anon keep the previous thread alive for several months. Here's to you buddy. Thanks for posting.
Links:
Archive of Thread #1https://archive.ph/ROnpOFeatured: An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smithhttps://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/38194/pg38194.txtYoutube PlaylistsAnwar Shaikh - Historical Foundations of Political Economyhttps://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLTMFx0t8kDzc72vtNWeTP05x6WYiDgEx7Anwar Shaikh - Capitalism: Competition, Conflict and Criseshttps://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLB1uqxcCESK6B1juh_wnKoxftZCcqA1goAnwar Shaikh - Capitalismhttps://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLz4k72ocf2TZMxrEVCgpp1b5K3hzFWuZhAndrew S. Rightenburg - Human-Read Audiobook (not AI voice or TTS voice) of Capital Volume 1https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUjbFtkcDBlSHVigHHx_wjaeWmDN2W-h8Andrew S. Rightenburg - Human-Read Audiobook (not AI voice or TTS voice) of Capital Volume 2https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUjbFtkcDBlSxnp8uR2kshvhG-5kzrjdQAndrew S. Rightenburg - Human-Read Audiobook (not AI voice or TTS voice) of Capital Volume 3https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUjbFtkcDBlRoV5CVoc5yyYL4nMO9ZJzOAndrew S. Rightenburg - Human-Read Audiobook (not AI voice or TTS voice) of Theories of Surplus Valuehttps://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUjbFtkcDBlQa-dFgNFtQvvMOgNtV7nXpPaul Cockshott - Labor Theory of Value Playlisthttps://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKVcO3co5aCBnDt7k5eU8msX4DhTNUilaPaul Cockshott - Economic Planning Playlisthttps://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKVcO3co5aCDnkyY9YkQxpx6FxPJ23joHPaul Cockshott - Materialism, Marxism, and Thermodynamics Playlisthttps://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKVcO3co5aCBv0m0fAjoOy1U4mOs_Y8QMVictor Magariño - Austrian Economics: A Critical Analysishttps://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLpHi51IjLqerA1aKeGe3DcRc7zCCFkAoqVictor Magariño - Rethinking Classical Economicshttps://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLpHi51IjLqepj9uE1hhCrA66tMvNlnIttVictor Magariño - Mathematics for Classical Political Economyhttps://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLpHi51IjLqepWUHXIgVhC_Txk2WJgaSstGeopolitical Economy Hour with Radhika Desai and Michael Hudsonhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7ejfZdPboo&list=PLDAi0NdlN8hMl9DkPLikDDGccibhYHnDPPotential Sources of InformationLeftypol Wiki Political Economy Category (needs expanding)https://leftypedia.miraheze.org/wiki/Category:Political_economySci-Hubhttps://sci-hub.se/aboutMarxists Internet Archivehttps://www.marxists.org/Library Genesishttps://libgen.is/University of the Lefthttp://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/Onlinebannedthought.nethttps://bannedthought.net/Books scanned by Ismail from eregime.org that were uploaded to archive.orghttps://archive.org/details/@ismail_badiouThe Great Soviet Encyclopedia: Articles from the GSE tend to be towards the bottom.https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/EcuRed: Cuba's online encyclopediahttps://www.ecured.cu/Books on libcom.orghttps://libcom.org/bookDictionary of Revolutionary Marxismhttps://massline.org/Dictionary/index.htm/EDU/ ebook share threadhttps://leftypol.org/edu/res/22659.htmlPre-Marxist Economics (Marx studied these thinkers before writing Capital and Theories of Surplus Value)https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/index.htmPrinciple writings of Karl Marx on political economy, 1844-1883https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/subject/economy/index.htmSpeeches and Articles of Marx and Engels on Free Trade and Protectionism, 1847-1888https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/subject/free-trade/index.htmPolitical Economy After Marx's Deathhttps://www.marxists.org/subject/economy/postmarx.htm>>2190402found the article btw
https://paulcockshott.wordpress.com/2020/04/28/please-waste-no-time-on-hegel/Please waste no time on Hegel! by Paul Cockshott, published 2020-04-28:
<Hello all, I want to study Hegel’s dialectical materialism. Can you suggest some lucid material?
<(Post on Facebook Marxist Internet Archive )
>We can all see that this is a rather naive question. The person asking was under some vague impression that as a leftist they should understand dialectical materialism, and that this had to do with Hegel. But the answers to it were in a sense even worse, revealing a level of ignorance and scientific backwardness that has handicapped the left for a couple of generations.
>Some responded that dialectical materialism was invented by Marx not Hegel. That is wrong, it was invented by another German proletarian philosopher Joseph Dietzgen:
<Yet, it is not sufficient to dethrone the fantastic and religious system of life; it is necessary to put a new system, a rational one, in its stead. And that, my friends, only the socialists can accomplish. Or, if the doctors of philosophy think this language too presumptuous, I will put it differently, though the meaning remains the same: our social-democracy is the necessary outcome of a non-religious and sober way of thinking. It is the outcome of philosophic science. Philosophers wrestled with the priests in order to replace a non-civilized mode of thinking by a civilized one, to replace faith by science. The object is achieved, the victory is won. Cannibal religion of primitive ages was softened by Christianity, philosophy continued in its civilizing mission, and after many untenable and transient systems produced the imperishable system of science, the system of democratic (dialectic) materialism.<(https://www.marxists.org/archive/dietzgen/1870s/religion.htm)
<Idealism, which derives its name from the circumstance that it sets the idea and the ideas, those products of the human head, above and before the material world – both in point of time and importance, this idealism has started very extravagantly and metaphysically. In the course of its history, however, this extravagance has toned down and become more and more sober till Kant himself answered the question which he had set out to solve, viz.: “Is Metaphysics at all possible as a science?” in the negative; Metaphysics as a science is not possible; another world, that is, a transcendental world can only be believed and supposed. Thus the perversion of idealism has become already a thing of the past, and modern materialism is the result of the philosophical and also of the general scientific development.
<Because the idealist perversity in its last representatives, namely Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, was thoroughly German, its issue, dialectical materialism, is also a pre-eminently German product.
<Idealism derives the corporeal world from the mind, quite after the fashion of religion where the great spirit floats over the waters and has only to say: “Let there be,” and it is. Such idealist derivation is metaphysical. Yet, as mentioned already, the last great representatives of German idealism were metaphysicians of a very moderate type. They had already emancipated themselves considerably from the transcendental, supernatural, heavenly mind, – not, however, from the spell-bound worship of the natural mind of the world. The Christians deified the mind, and the philosophers were still permeated to such an extent with this deification, that they were unable to relinquish it – even when the physical human mind had already become the sober object of their study – making this intellect of ours the creator or parent of the material world. They never tire in their efforts to arrive at a clear understanding of the relation between our mental conceptions and the material things which are represented, conceived and thought.
<To us, dialectical or Social-Democratic materialists, the mental faculty of thinking is a developed product of material Nature, whilst according to the German idealism the relation is quite the reverse. That is why Engels speaks of the perversity of this mode of thinking. The extravagant worship of the mind was the survival of the old metaphysics.<(https://www.marxists.org/archive/dietzgen/1887/epistemology.htm)
>But nobody on the Marxist Internet list advised the poster to go study Dietzgen. Instead a whole bunch of ‘hegelian marxists’ were advocated: Marcuse, Lukacs, Colletti etc.
>But the bigger question of why waste your time with Hegel was left aside. As an undergrad, under the influence of public lectures by the Trotskyist Gerry Healy, I read the Logic, Phenomenology of Spirit and good part of the Philosophy of Nature along with Lenin’s notes on Hegel. I must say it was a total waste of time.
>Even as an undegrad I was struck by the way the author pretended to deduce things from premises, which went far beyond what the premises would support. The dialectical logic looked awfully like a conjuring trick used to distract attention whilst the desired conclusions were introduced as if by magic.
>Later, I think as a second year student, I read Bachelard and Althusser whose skeptical views on Hegel reinforced my own hostile impression.
>It is an odd paradox that Marx and Engels, the most prominent Communists theorists developed their own historical materialism in a process of root and branch criticism and demolition of Hegelianism of German philosophy of the 1840s ( The Holy Family, The German Ideology). But today in the 21st century almost the only reason that Hegel is studied is because many Marxists believe that Hegel’s ideas were in some way fundamental to understanding historical materialism.
>It is notable that in the German Ideology, not only do Marx and Engels make no mention of dialectics, let alone a positive reference to it but they quite specific in their rejection of Hegel. Speaking of the young Hegelian school they write:
<Far from examining its general philosophic premises, the whole body of its inquiries has actually sprung from the soil of a definite philosophical system, that of Hegel. Not only in their answers but in their very questions there was a mystification. This dependence on Hegel is the reason why not one of these modern critics has even attempted a comprehensive criticism of the Hegelian system, however much each professes to have advanced beyond Hegel. Their polemics against Hegel and against one another are confined to this — each extracts one side of the Hegelian system and turns this against the whole system as well as against the sides extracted by the others. To begin with they extracted pure unfalsified Hegelian categories such as “substance” and “self-consciousness”, later they desecrated these categories with more secular names such as species “the Unique”, “Man”, etc.
>The idea that Marxism was based on dialectical rather than historical materialism goes through two stages. First Dietzgen invents dialectical materialism in the 1870s and claims that the theory of social democracy is based on it. At the start of the 20th century it was still recognised that Dialectical Materialism was Dietzgen’s innovation. The dialectical materialism of Dietzgen then became the official philosophy of Social Democracy and then of Communism. Since Marx’s Historical Materialism was also the official theory of both movements, dialectical materialism was projected back onto Marx and Engels and supposed to be their ‘method’. This is formalised in texts such as Stalin’s Dialectical and Historical Materialism. Stalin gave no credit to Dietzgen but instead projects the whole of diamat back onto Marx and Engels claiming that they had got diamat from the ‘rational kerenel’ of Hegel.
>Later, during the cold war, a wave of Western Marxists arose who, despite their anti-stalinism had so imbibed Stalin’s statement about Marx using the rational kernel of Hegel that they went back to study Hegel in order to try to understand Marx. Trotskyists like Healey demanded that their followers study Hegel’s logic if they were to understand revolutions.
>Marx had remarked :
<The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language. (https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm)
>The horrible paradox is that a tradition that Marx himself had decisively rejected in the 1840s came, a century later, to weigh like a nightmare on the brains of late 20th century marxists.The problem is that if you read a very out of date logician like Hegel, you cut yourself off from a century and half of advance which has long since shown the futility of the whole Hegelian idealist project. The point about Turing, brought out brilliantly by the more recent Turingist Greg Chaitin in his books is that as he puts it ‘you can not get two kilos of theorems from one kilo of axioms’. Hegel wants to derive all sorts of things from the dialectical development of negation, but what Chaitin and Turing prove is that you can never derive more from a logical system than is contained in your initial axioms. Hegel only appears to do it by sleight of hand where he introduces conclusions that he wants that are actually unsupported by his axioms. If you are willing to allow that sort of handwaving nonsense you completely depart from all science and materialism.
>You have the absurdity of Marxists using computers and the internet to discuss anachonistic terms like dialectical versus formal logic when their very activities are entirely depependent on other logicians and materialists like Boole, Shannon and Turing about whom they know little or nothing. Without Booles logic and Shannon’s demonstration that this could be implemented in switching circuits, there would be no digital electronics. Without Turing no mechanisation of thought, without Shannon’s information theory no wifi or internet.
>If you want to understand logic Hegel is the last person to study. If you want to understand complex systems as they change, study Markov theory cybernetics and process algebra not Hegel. https://archive.ph/2N97I COCKSHOTT VS HEGEL - ROUND 3 - FIGHT!!!
https://archive.ph/IKGnX leftypol.org 04/30/21 No.201865 If you don't understand Hegel
https://archive.ph/ZSznk bunkerchan.xyz 02/21/2020 No. 290148 /cybersoc/ general
March 20, 1970
About "istmat" and its similarity with quantum physics. It is absolutely true that political economy (and this is real history, unlike its pop images in textbooks) should not be charged with the task of explaining why potatoes on the Zatsepsky market on March 20, 1970 cost so many kopecks. It suffices that it has revealed the law of value, and thereby of the movement of prices. But the real - the real "istmat" can also explain the "individuality". I mean "The Eighteenth Brumaire …", where the personality of Napoleon the Small is outlined no less expressively and accurately than in any other novel. So it's not out of the question.
http://caute.ru/ilyenkov/texts/phc/shilov.htmlApril 12, 1970
This is the reduction of Logic to a system of operational technical schemes for working with signs, and only with signs. After such a "division" of real thinking into "reason," in this understanding, there remains too great a remainder, perhaps
the most important thing in thinking. Including mathematics in thinking. This is one of the most formidable phenomena of the division of labor developed by bourgeois society - a tendency towards professional cretinism, towards the transformation of each profession into a closed caste, already isolated from its neighbors by language . - a group of people who do not understand another group - who, therefore, do not understand the "common cause" around which they actually continue to work, not seeing it and not clearly understanding their specific role and the limits of its competence - hence the constant conflicts …
No offense be said, lately it is the representatives of your profession who often (much more often than the "humanities") sin here. You are already protected from unprofessional intrusions into your area with your language, we are not. Although we (philosophers) also have our own language, and if I wished, I could also enter into such a dispute in the armor of my impenetrable terms for mathematicians, such as “transcendental apperception”, “in-itself and for-itself of being”, “ selfhood” and similar professional phrases. I always have to
translate these esoteric expressions into “natural language”, otherwise you wouldn’t even talk to me, but the conversation is so interesting to me, and therefore I am forced to decipher expressions in natural language that have a very long and rather complicated history behind them. And this translation quite often leads to the fact that everything has to be “deciphered” in more detail - up to the original definitions and axioms of philosophy, to clarify their definitions.
The fact is that in mathematical logic, many terms, starting with such as “general”, “special” and “individual”, have a different meaning and meaning than in the logic in the traditions of which I work. Hence our disagreements in the conversation about Anna Karenina, about my right to consider "pop art" as an inevitable form of the decay of art on the soil of bourgeois culture (disregarding the fact that there are such things as excellent recordings of Wagner's masterpieces as a rather insignificant fact when it comes to the general trends in the development of this culture as a whole) and draw a conclusion from this (“inference”) about the abnormality of known forms of life.
Take, for example, the "general" ("universal"). In mathematical logic (and this is probably justified in it), this term is a synonym for the identical definition “in all cases of a given series”. All people are bipedal, all triangles have the sum of angles equal to two right angles, and so on. The exception here - the only one - "refutes" the universal, shows that this is only an erroneously fixed universal, that in fact it is not universal, but only "special".
In the logic developing in the traditions of Kant-Fichte-Hegel (and precisely in these traditions, materialistically reinterpreted by Marx), the term "universal" has a significantly different meaning. Perhaps this is the root of our disputes.
A sense that is closer to the word usage of natural language, according to which we speak of a “common field”, a “common cause”, that is, an object to which we all, while remaining different, doing completely different things, performing different functions, and precisely thanks to this "division of labor", we have an equally essential relationship. The meaning of the “universal” here is not the meaning of an identical, invariant “feature”, but rather the meaning of the “cumulative”, the meaning of a certain “whole”, a certain “totality”, which is internally divided into different and even opposite ) moments, "parameters", so understood the universal always has
within itself(as part of its immanent definitions) tense dialectics, which is not fixed in the formally understood "general", in its definitions, subject to the well-known "prohibition of contradiction".
According to Hegel, and here, in my opinion, he is 100% right, the principle of “identity” and its negative form of expression is “the prohibition of contradiction”, the prohibition to violate such identity in definitions. - it turns out and remains the principle of the formation of
an abstract representation , and in no case the form and principle of the concept. For the concept here is a form of synthesis, a form of combining diverse abstract representations in the composition (in unity) of a system of abstract definitions. And such a meaningful system (unlike a purely formal one) is always built in violation—through a series of violations—of the original "identity." That this is also the case in mathematics was shown brilliantly, in my opinion, by Lakatos…
Lakatos himself is a supporter of neo-positivist logic. With all her weaknesses. That is why he, like Kant in his time, from the fact of the constant emergence of antinomies in the composition of the formal system and from the impossibility of once and for all so “clarifying” the original definition so that the possibility of the appearance of “monsters” was forever excluded, draws a conclusion to the impossibility of theoretical truth in general , i.e. to the position that in our language is called "agnosticism" - the conclusion that in scientific thinking there are some "
problems " but no, there was not and cannot be a single "
solution " to at least one of them…
If a similar train of thought towards complete agnosticism is already possible in mathematics, then what can we say about the “humanitarian” disciplines?
And the "guilty" here - as far as I understand - is precisely the formal (from Locke and Hobbes) idea of the "universal" as "the same" for all "single" cases without exception. The following logical definition is adopted - agnosticism becomes the only logical position in relation to theoretical knowledge in general …
According to a different logic—its sample has been realized consciously and systematically so far, it seems, only in Capital (that's why I'm doing it most of all)—a solution turns out to be possible. And besides, in such a way that the "monsters" that arise in the course of the
development of the initial definitions do not force us to revise these initial definitions each time, if they are really firmly established. This means that the original definitions themselves suggest the possibility (moreover, the necessity) of the emergence of "monsters" - in the form of contradictions that are revealed as part of a universal concept.
Such, for example, is the analysis and definition of "value". Marx's definition made it possible
to resolve numerous antinomies without "correcting" the original concept - not by "refining" it as such, but by
developing it through the definitions of such "monsters" as profit, rent, interest, etc. - all those "monsters" which in their definitions contain a "sign" that directly contradicts the definitions of value in general, although they constitute "special" types of this cunning category, their "universal".
In general, this logic, figuratively described by Hegel as follows: “A bud is destroyed when a flower blooms, and, one might say, is refuted by the appearance of this latter” (I quote inaccurately, from memory), and works in the course of the
development of concepts and their systems. Development is not purely deductive, as in mathematical formalism, but content-dialectical.
In real mathematical thinking (in contrast to the scheme of its expression in formalism, that is, in its
result ), the situation is probably the same, and it would be very interesting to reveal the dialectics of mathematical thinking. But, alas, my ideas about mathematics are too amateurish to do something serious here. It's sad but what can you do
Related to this is the discussion about the “price of potatoes” (I was not talking about the price of potatoes, which, in general, can and should be predicted approximately ), but about the price of this potato at a given single point in space and time - say, about its price on Zatsepsky market on September 17, 1973. This is an unrealistic task, not a single fastest computer can solve it precisely because of the nature of “price” as a market category, because in the process of price deviation from value (and this deviation is the very nature of the price) an actually-infinite number of fundamentally unpredictable factors take part. Right down to the mutation of the microbes that cause disease in this crop, up to the stupidity of the management of this market or the difficulties in the transport system that provides transportation. It is just as impossible to take into account and predict mathematically precisely, as well as exactly what kind of movement a molecule will make in the chaos of a Brownian system at such and such a moment in time … It is impossible to calculate about a single molecule, right? It is possible only in relation to the system - "in general and as a whole." So here too. I’ll finish with this today, otherwise it turns out to be a planned work, more precisely, an unplanned one to the detriment of all my planned ones … It’s probably easier to sit down and talk about all this face to face than alone with paper …
Give me a call when the time comes - I'll be very happy. And the records must finally be returned - it’s inconvenient for me to keep them for so long and without any need, because I made the recording a long time ago, already two months ago, and it seems not bad.
With best wishes and with the hope that mutual understanding somewhere in the ideal, at least in the limit, is still possible - contrary to the philosophy of Lakatos, who (like his teachers in philosophy) excludes such a possibility in principle …
Ewald
http://caute.ru/ilyenkov/texts/phc/shilov.htmlhttps://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/articles/school-learn.pdf>>998487>Even hypothetically, if a hypercomputational system of logic existed it would be incomprehensible to human minds because we can’t compute it. For the same reason humans can’t apprehend actual physical infinities. There is literally no human brain big enough to understand it, let alone write it down. If such a system existed only an infinite being (i.e. God) would have any chance of understanding it.It was common in Soviet Marxist discourse to use “positivism” in a rather loose way to mean any form of western philosophy that is not dialectical. Ilyenkov was not an exception in this regard and often used “positivism” in this rather casual way.
So used in this broad sense it would mean not just positivism proper (i.e. the philosophy of Comte and Poincaré) but also later neo-positivists (logical positivists such as Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle); but beyond that to include empiricism (from Hume, Locke and Berkley as well as more modern philosophers such as Russell) and also the various expressions of pragmatism (Peirce, James and Dewey).
So even though empiricism, positivism and pragmatism all have different nuances of expression, for the Marxist they all have one thing in common - they are all non-dialectical.
The easiest way to get your head around it, is to think of more in terms of the terminology in sociology as an academic subject. There are really only two ways to do sociology - either through a Marxian frame or a positivist frame.
And it is that stark contrast that between the (dialectic and the non-dialectic, the one and the other), that the Soviet (and other eastern European Marxists) use the term “positivist” in a general lose casual sense only.
This use of positivism is not as loose as the Frankfurt School's virtual equation of positivism with 'scientism. Here positivism refers to a phenomenalist tendency…. i.e. surface level sense data or 'just the facts'.
Cockshott rejects dialectical materialism, agrees with Böhm-Bawerk in rejecting Marx's LTV and rejects the existence of class consciousness and in turn its role in socialist revolution. Hes an idealist that thinks socialism can be achieved by making the best argument in the market place of ideas, that the problem with socialism is that it hasn't been scientifically proved correct to the bourgeoisie.
https://paulcockshott.wordpress.com/2020/05/17/guest-post-pauls-theory-and-marxs-theory-of-value-a-response/
>What is the theoretical basis for a new socialism? The principal bases for a post-Soviet socialism must be radical democracy and efficient planning. The democratic element, it is now clear, is not a luxury, or something that can be postponed until conditions are especially favourable. https://users.wfu.edu/cottrell/socialism_book/new_socialism.pdfCockshott defends the bourgios position that the USSR failed because it was not sufficiently demoratic rather than being overthrown in a coup.
Cockshott is a reformist and rejects revolution in "advanced countries"
http://paulcockshott.co.uk/reality/polemic/strat.htmCockshott is against Irish independence.
Cockshott thinks the British Empire is "the most progressive force"
Cockshott cherry picks data removing it from context to say things that it doesn't prove, basically makes the 13-50 argument
>Science is a process which is decentering of the subject, moving beyond it in order to come to terms with objects as they relate to each other. It is only by whack-a-moling the subject as it appears in objects do we make scientific progress. Science, just as ideological production, must be accomplished by particular individuals. And when a science is in its infancy, and the product of only a small number of individuals, these personal subjectivity, particularities of time and space, can be greatly amplified.
>These reactionary tendencies are the results of accidents of history, of the particular subjectivity of Professor Cockshott and his cohort, rather than the fundamental goals and methods of the science they have helped to produce, and in fact that the liberatory goals of socialist cybernetics are precisely at odds with these prejudices.
>Cockshott’s class analysis of male homosexuals, painting them as an upper middle class interest group, is quite convenient considering what it leaves out, such as the extremely high rates of poverty, roughly double the poverty rates for the general population. Perhaps more importantly, however, is the arc of the article itself which acts as an indictment of gay men as economic-political actors on the one hand, and a dismissal of LGBT concerns on the other…
>It is notable however that this kind of analysis is missing when talking about trans people, given their high poverty rates and homelessness. Eliminating poverty and guaranteeing access to housing are key aspects to any socialist program, after all…
>Cockshott would have us believe that his social reproduction analysis makes his point of view a foregone conclusion, however his point of view is premised on a total rejection of the concept of the subject in a way that makes his analysis of language lead to analytic and positivist errors.
>There is something fundamental left out of this analysis. We acknowledge the person who inherits the Dukedom, and we acknowledge the Duke as a structural role, but what exactly is the relationship between the two? What is the Duke to the person who inherits the title? Here is the crucial role of interpellation – if the title-holder acknowledges themselves as the Duke, they themselves become the subject of this logic of the estate, they as an individual.
>Assuredly, one could create such categories with arbitrary criteria for the purpose of scientific study, but the social categories of male and female are both historically contingent and relate to individuals not through analytic sorting but through complex processes of interpellation…
>A materialist conception of history entails that when we advocate for a new mode of production, a new set of relationships of production, we are also embracing new values and social conventions, whether we can really anticipate what those will be or not.
>Cockshott would like to have his cake and eat it too, he wants his radical commitments to reorganize society through economic planning and new economic forms or organization, but he’s unwilling to accept that this may produce results counter to his aesthetic preferences as a British baby boomer…
>Moving from his poor treatment of transgender women and homosexual men in his online blog, there is a more central, though less explicitly reactionary problem to be found in his theoretical work of economic planning.
>This is the problem of methodological nationalism: the socialist commonwealth found in “Towards a New Socialism” was originally intended to directly correspond to the countries of the communist bloc, and the text was intended to be a method of reforming the inefficient and failing planning system of the 80s. Given this background, it is no wonder that Cockshott focuses on the one hand national economic systems and trade between states on the other.
>Attempting to apply the lessons of the book to political and economic struggle in capitalist countries seems to suggest that the application of socialist cybernetic planning would be in what to do after nationalizing industry after gaining control of the state…
>Perhaps more importantly, waiting to apply socialist cybernetic planning until socialists take power is a grave mistake based on the simple fact that in order for the workers movement to succeed it must be powered by a political, ideological and economic revolution which are concurrent.
>While not as immediately abrasive as the attacks on trans women and gay men, methodological nationalism can lead to endorsement of very dark reactionary tendencies should socialists ever take power somewhere in the world, including the rejection of internationalism itself as was the case in many shameful points in the history of the communist bloc…
>In both cases, though, we may surely find that these errors are the result of pure sentimentality grounded in the subjectivity of one Paul Cockshott, who cannot go beyond his generational distaste for queer people, or the now long dead soviet union which dominated the questions of socialist politics for the first half of his life.https://casperforum.org/blog/a-defense-of-cybernetic-planning-and-social-reproduction-theory-from-the-reactionary-tendencies-of-paul-cockshott/https://comraderene.wordpress.com/2021/01/18/the-dialectical-conception-of-cybernetics-translation/the point of capital is proof by contradiction of exploitation and the trpf
>>1202347
>>1203171
The argument isn't really whether brains are computers or not but whether the mind is a computer. Brains are defined within preconceived limits that could arguably be equivalent to a computer, but there is nothing scientific or useful that follows from this, its an empty conjecture that proves nothing but its own theoretical limitations. The mind is not a computer, and this is the problem. Cockshott rejects the existence of the mind, consciousness, the subject as superfluous "idealism" and "bourgeois legal categories" and refuses to acknowledge or engage with scientifically rigorous definitions of mind outside of this restricted view.
As Marx explained these "bourgeois legal categories" come from definite social relations. They are social constructs but they real in the same way that money is real. To call them fictional is to say that all of language is fictional.
This idea that the mind is a computer relies on the assumption that the mind==brain by imposing the limits of the brain as definite physical object which is an anthropocentric abstract concept created for scientific utility in medical applications.
To prove the mind is the brain you would have to show it is possible to simulate the mind in full, which is the same problem as predicting the weather. You can make forecasts by arbitrarily limiting the scope of data by conceiving the planet earth as a closed system, and you can make the predictions more accurate by including solar flares or whatever you want but you cannot fully capture actual reality from inside a finite set of data.
The computation theory of mind says that there is a central processor, which can access one memory location at a time, but this is not how reality operates, there is no central processor. Its flawed from the beginning. Cognition is interelational and distributed.
The truly objective view conceives of the mind constituted as a relational process between the brain and its environment, including the body, society, all of nature up to and including the whole universe. The self is a concept created by the physical human that imagines it is a discrete object separate from its environment but it is not.
This is the essence of dialectics, objects refer to definite collections of matter, but are human created categories that split the actually existing material world into subjectively defined parts to more easily deal with them. They are only useful in so far as they are applied to their specific domain and must be tailored to the specific task at hand by applying theory to practice.
The universe itself is a hypercomputer, physics is nonlocal and there are no parts, there is only the actually existing material whole, and existence is being itself in totality.
>>1002488This argument already happened decades ago and we already know how the modern rehashing ends. Cockshott and his followers redefine words to narrow categories that fit their conclusions and then claim victory. He has already done this with "subject" "Machist" "idealist" "materialism" and "positivism". Every time this comes up we go around in circles and then the vulgar materialist side declares that they won because they don't literally believe exactly what Mach believed in the exact same terms even though every argument against Berkeley, Mach, Bagdanov etc applies directly to Cockshott in the same way. It is the fight scene from They Live with you refusing to put on the glasses every time and never bringing anything new to the argument. It is all so tiring.
>Therefore, no matter how formally irreproachable Plekhanov’s criticism of Machism as terminologically disguised Berkeleianism was, it made virtually no impression upon the Machists. ‘Who cares,’ they would say, ‘that our philosophy doesn’t correspond to the criteria of “Baron Holbach” or the “verbal trinkets of Hegel”? This upsets and disturbs us not in the slightest – our strength lies in our agreement with the principles of contemporary scientific thought.’
>It is not surprising that Bogdanov considered it sufficient to simply brush Plekhanov and his supporters aside with one phrase from all their criticism – he didn’t even want to examine their ‘polemical ploys’ against Mach which accused him of idealism and even solipsism. ‘All this,’ he said, ‘is nonsense, having nothing to do with the essence of the argument, which is that Mach teaches mankind “the philosophy of 20th century natural science,” while Plekhanov has stayed behind with the “philosophy of 18th century natural science, as contained in the formulations of Baron Holbach”.’
>This ‘scoffing at the spirit of dialectical materialism’ by Plekhanov is shown by the fact that during the debate with the Machists, because of a number of considerations he limited his task to demonstrating that the philosophy of dialectical materialism and Bogdanov’s philosophy are two different things. He set out to prove that dialectics and materialism are integral components of Marxism and by no means the verbal atavism of Hegelian and Feuerbachian philosophy, as Bogdanov’s supporters had tried to suggest to the reader.
>In the given instance this confusion emerged in the form of a lack of knowledge about materialist dialectics, i.e. about the actual logic and theory of knowledge of modern materialism, and about modern scientific cognition of the surrounding world. This was accompanied by a false conception of materialist dialectics as idealist philosophical speculation. As was perfectly well shown in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, ignorance of dialectics was the catastrophe leading to the degeneration of the spontaneous materialism of natural scientists – their ‘natural’ epistemological position – into the most vulgar and reactionary varieties of idealism and clericalism, which was diligently encouraged by professional philosophers, the conscious or spontaneous allies of clericalism.
>Actually, not a single word of theirs can be trusted when it comes to the theory of knowledge, logic, or the method of scientific thinking, for they professionally do not know this field and therefore they become confused, and stagger at every step, continually stumbling into idealism, i.e., into a philosophical position which is essentially anti-scientific and hostile to science in general, including their own specialised science. And even under these conditions they continue to be leading theoreticians in their own, specialised field of thought.
>Philosophical materialism (the materialist theory of knowledge, logic which is materially understood) is orientated toward a strict, critical differentiation between what scientists actually do in their specialised fields and how they speak and write about it. Idealism, on the other hand (and this is especially characteristic of 20th century positivism), is always orientated only toward the words and utterances of scientists, as the ‘initial data’ of their specialised analysis and their philosophical work.
>Idealists concentrate, of course, not just upon any words, but upon those which can best be used to reinforce the idealist reconstructions of the real process of cognising nature and to interpret this process in an idealist way. As a result, those assertions which, in the mouths of the scientists themselves, were terminologically incorrect descriptions of real events in the path of cognition, are presented as the precise expression of their essence and as conclusions drawn from natural science.
>And such assertions are no rarity, especially since the idealist-positivists are precisely engaged in trying to arm natural scientists with philosophically inexact, muddled and incorrect terminology, given out as the last word in modern philosophy. It becomes a closed circle. Thus the image is created that it is natural science which refutes both materialism and dialectics, while the ‘philosophy of natural science’ (as positivism prefers to call itself) is simply and unpretentiously summing up the true epistemological positions of natural science.
>To create this image the positivists instil in scientists a muddled conception both of matter and of consciousness. Meanwhile they try to discredit the simple, clear and carefully considered definitions of the primary concepts of materialist philosophy with labels that are primitive, naive, non-heuristic and antiquated.
>As a result, 20th century positivists have managed to achieve considerable success insofar as the whole environment in which the majority of scientists for the time being live and work, ‘estranges them from Marx and Engels and throws them into the embrace of vulgar official philosophy’. Hence, ‘the most outstanding theoreticians are handicapped by a complete ignorance of dialectics’.
>These words of Lenin’s which were spoken more than 70 years ago remain absolutely true even today in relation to the capitalist world and the situation of the scientist in it.
>Lenin was absolutely clear and unequivocal when he raised the questions about the relationship between the ‘form’ of materialism and its ‘essence’, and about the inadmissibility of identifying the former with the latter. The ‘form’ of materialism is made up of those concrete scientific ideas about the structure of matter (about ‘the physical world’, about ‘atoms and electrons’) and those natural-philosophical generalisations of these ideas, which inevitably prove to be historically limited, changeable, and subject to reconsideration by natural science itself. The ‘essence’ of materialism consists of the recognition of objective reality existing independently of human cognition and reflected by it. The creative development of dialectical materialism on the basis of the philosophical conclusions drawn from the latest scientific discoveries’ Lenin sees neither the revision of the ‘essence’ itself, nor in the perpetuation of scientists’ ideas about nature and about ‘the physical world’ aided by natural-philosophical generalisations, but in deepening our understanding of ‘the relationship of cognition to the physical world’, which is tied to new ideas about nature. The dialectical understanding of the relationship between the ‘form’ and ‘essence’ of materialism, and between ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’ constitutes the ‘spirit of dialectical materialism’.
>The main, link in the entire strategy of the Machists’ campaign against the philosophy of Marxism consisted of the attempt to sever the living unity between materialist dialectics as a theory of development and as a theory of knowledge and logic, first by isolating ‘ontology’ from ‘epistemology’, and then by counterposing one to the other, thereby destroying the essence of dialectics as a philosophical science. The design was simple: having made such a separation it would be easiest of all to identify the materialist world outlook with any sort of concrete and historically limited scientific ‘picture of the world’, with the ‘physical’, and then ascribe the flaws and errors of this ‘ontology’ to all materialism. On the other hand, the same operation could be performed with materialist epistemology by identifying it with whatever was the latest scientific conception of the ‘psychical’. By identifying philosophy as the generalised summation of scientific facts, claims could be made that natural science itself gives birth to idealism. To destroy what distinguishes philosophy, its system of concepts and its approach to phenomena, meant to ascribe idealism to natural science itself. Lenin unmasked these schemes by giving a clear demonstration of what constitutes ‘the fundamental materialist spirit’ of modern natural science, which gives birth to dialectical materialism.
>According to Lenin, the latest results of science, in themselves, or the ‘positive facts’, as such, are by no means subject to philosophical generalisation (and consequently, to inclusion in the system of philosophical knowledge). Rather what is subject to philosophical generalisation is the development of scientific knowledge, the dialectical process of the ever more profound, all-sided and concrete comprehension of the dialectical processes of the material world, so that it cannot be excluded that even tomorrow natural science itself will re-evaluate its results in a ‘negative’ manner. While interpreting the revolution in natural science from the standpoint of dialectical materialist philosophy, Lenin draws generalised conclusions about how the objective content of scientific knowledge can be fixed and evaluated only from the standpoint of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge which reveals the dialectics of objective, absolute and relative truth. He shows how ‘ontology’ is just as inseparably connected with ‘epistemology’, as the categories expressing the dialectical nature of truth are connected with objective dialectics. To include the ‘negative’ in the conception of the ‘positive’, without losing the unity of opposites (and this is what constitutes dialectics) is impossible without an ‘epistemological’ approach to the ‘ontology’ of scientific knowledge. Genuinely scientific philosophical generalisation must consist, according to Lenin, of the ‘dialectical reworking’ of the entire history of the development of cognition and practical activity, and of the interpretation of the achievements of science in the context of its integral historical development. From such a position Lenin broached the question of the relationship between philosophy and natural science.
>From an analogous position, positivism looks upon the theory of knowledge (epistemology). Its scheme is to counterpose epistemology as a ‘strict and exact science’ to materialist dialectics as a philosophical science, and then to criticise dialectics in the light of such an ‘epistemology’. This plan is even reflected in the title of Berman’s book, Dialectics in the Light of the Modern Theory of Knowledge. In essence, however, this is not a theory of knowledge at all, but once again the accumulation of ‘the latest facts’ from research in psychology, psychophysiology, the physiology of the sense organs, and so forth. The interpretation and application of these facts in isolation from ‘ontology’, from the universal laws of development of nature and society, made it possible to counterpose ‘epistemology’ to dialectics.
>what in Machism is connected with this school is not what distinguishes it from all other trends and systems of idealist philosophy, but what it has in common with philosophical idealism in general.’
>Without dialectics, materialism invariably proves to be not the victor (or a militant), but the vanquished, i.e. it inevitably suffers a defeat in the war with idealism, Lenin repeats a bit later in his philosophical testament, the article ‘On the Significance of Militant Materialism’. This is a fundamental idea with Lenin. Moreover, this idea is not simply stated in the form of a thesis, but proven by a meticulous analysis of the crisis-ridden state of affairs in physics, and by a meticulous, critical analysis of those concepts, the non-dialectical explanation of which led to ‘the slipping of the new physics into idealism’.
>Among them belongs the principle (concept) of the relativity of our knowledge, including scientific knowledge, a principle ‘which, in a period of abrupt breakdown of the old theories, is taking a firm hold upon the physicists, and which, if the latter are ignorant of dialectics, inevitably leads to idealism.’
>As for ‘philosophers’ who write today as if Lenin was not interested in dialectics when he was working on Materialism and Empirio-Criticism but was simply defending the ‘universal ABC’s of all materialism’, it must be that they just have not carefully read this chapter of his book. Or, what is also possible, they have a conception of dialectics which is essentially different from Lenin’s and about which he speaks not only here, but in all his subsequent works on philosophy including the Philosophical Notebooks and the article ‘On the Significance of Militant Materialism’.
>Bogdanov disassociates himself from what he finds to be the unpleasant dialectic of the relative and the absolute in the development of scientific knowledge by means of diatribes against ‘all absolutes’, although along with these ‘absolutes’ he is forced to fulminate against the thesis of the very possibility of objective truth.
>This question by no means centres on whether this or that concrete truth is objective. The central point being discussed is about the fundamental possibility of objective truth in general. According to Bogdanov, any truth is either objective or purely subjective; no third is given. The attempts to search for this third by way of investigating the development of cognition, the transformation of the objective into the subjective and vice versa, is for him, as well as for Berman, only an insidious fabrication of Hegelian speculation. For this reason his conception precludes the very posing of the question about the relationship of the object to the subject and the subject to the object.
>Therefore, in Bogdanov’s schema there is subsequently no place for the material relations between people – for the economic relations between people and classes. He is forced to interpret them as the externally expressed psychical relations between classes, as the ideological schemas of the organisation of class experience. And all this began with an inability to unite in the theory of knowledge such opposites as the relative and the absolute. It must be either one or the other. Bogdanov never acknowledged any other logic.
>Neither Bogdanov nor Berman understood the real dialectics of Marx and Engels; they simply did not see it. And they only began to search for it (in order to refute it) among the statements about dialectics which can be found in the writings of the classics. This meant first of all, of course, among those fragments by Engels where he popularly explains the ABCs of dialectics, the most general propositions.
>Berman’s entire ‘criticism of dialectics’ for example, is reduced to demonstrating that the ‘examples’, which Engels introduces in order to illustrate the correctness of dialectics, can easily be restated in different terms, without using ‘specifically Hegelian’ terminology. Berman proves nothing else. In general there is no mention in his book of any actual dialectics, either Hegelian, or much less Marxism. His book deals exclusively with words and terminology which, he says, Engels and Marx unwisely copied from Hegel.
>By rummaging around in the ‘Hegelian’ lexicon and diligently explaining what is meant in pre-Hegelian and post-Hegelian logic by the terms ‘identity’, ‘contradiction’, ‘negation’, ‘opposition’, and ‘synthesis’, Berman triumphantly proves that ‘Hegel and his imitators use these terms in an extremely unscrupulous and completely uncritical manner’, i.e. ‘in various meanings’ and ‘in different contexts’. All this, he says, is because ‘Hegel treated formal logic with contempt’, ‘continuously lumped together’ contrary and contradictory judgements, and so forth. After he had calculated that ‘with Hegel the term “contradiction” has six different meanings’, Berman triumphantly decrees the ‘one solitary sense’ in which this term must henceforth be used. That is nonsense and nothing else. Whosoever uses this term in any other sense (and particularly in the ‘ontological’ sense!) will be excommunicated from Marxism and from ‘modern science’ in general by the Machist logic and theory of knowledge.https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positiv1.htmhttps://archive.ph/Dysyo Cockshott Unironically the most important Socialist theorist since Lenin.
https://archive.ph/tkHi4 Is Hegel really necessary to understand Marxism?
https://archive.ph/vw14d Lenin's Materialism and Empiro-Criticism
>>2190532>Cockshott agrees with Böhm-BawerkHow do you know that an author you don't read agrees with another author you don't read? Must be the power of doing "dialectics" (Greek for crack).
>Cockshott is against Irish independence.>Cockshott cherry picksLike that time he cherry-picked some statement from an article written
half a century ago? Oh no wait, that's you right here.
>>2190534What does this mind-brain blahblah have to do with economics.
>>2190592>because you keep bringing this back to the OPthe conversation started here
>>2190522Notice how the post doesn't elaborate on anything?
And then instead of simply elaborating and providing a handful of links (for us to use next time) you spammed huge walls of text and
strikethrough links to dead posts?
And the question of why didn't you complain in last thread is relevant because the same links were in the last thread but nobody spammed like this. Somehow we were able to get to 600 posts without this kind of spam. Most people know how to conduct themselves. Respond directly to questions. Quote people. Not vaguepost complain, refuse to elaborate, then spam text out of context. It's very strange behavior. It also makes me think you've been absent for months if you didn't notice it in the previous thread. So not only are you doing this out of nowhere, you're doing this out of nowhere without even noticing that this thread is part of a series.
>>2190679ive already told you three times i dont have a problem with the links its the posting the full text of cockshotts blog and screenshots from old threads out of context and claiming 'neutrality' without posting the rebuttals, now ive provided the rebuttals and you are crying that your attempted anti-communist echo chamber has been btfo. i know you want to make the thread about me instead but its not gonna work
>>2190680> the thread is about /political economy/you are never going to understand Marx's critique of political economy if you dont understand his dialectical method
>>2190726so let me get this straight, you start off bitching at OP for having cockshott links, but you won't admit that's the case
you then start spamming debatebro posts from dead threads out of context
then you claim the REAL post you were responding to was one that said
>I do not have strong opinions one way or another on this. Just thought I'd share.this is insane behavior. nobody else does this. just talk to people like a normal person instead of copypasting huge walls of text from 5 year old bunkerchan threads. you could have just given the links and said "read this if you're interested" instead of filling up the whole thread like this and then claiming everyone but you is derailing
>>2190725sounds to me like someone pretending to be naive while presenting only one side of the argument and framing the thread in a way to exclude Marx's actual ideas.
>spam dead thread links and walls of tex>out of context in an insane gish gallopYeah just keep saying this over and over while not addressing the argument its extremely convincing.
>instead of simply responding to the people who asked you questions?maybe ask a question about the actual topic instead of about me? maybe address the content of the thread instead of your obsession with my posting style?
>>2190731a lot of "scarcity" is artificial scarcity, planned obsolescence, crises of overproduction, etc.
we are capable of producing more than everyone needs, especially if we stopped making shit nobody needs, and then throwing it in the garbage. hence planning.
>>2190728I'm pretty obviously accusing them of samefagging considering they posted multiple times and bumped their own thread and are continuing a bad faith discussion from last thread. Even if they aren't the same poster they are giving arguments for the same position that doesn't actually address Marx's thought.
You could be right though maybe they actually are completely ignorant about the topic in the same way you seem to be when I directly tell you that they are framing the thread in a way to exclude Marx's actual ideas and you still seem to be confused about how this is well poisoning.
>>2190741>I'm pretty obviously accusing them of samefaggingthat wasn't really obvious and this is the first time you said it. In fact you refused to get the point for several posts in a row, instead opting to spam old posts you didn't even write from dead threads that had an entirely different context to respond to a "debate" someone wasn't even trying to have with you (except you interpreted that way because you decided to be a mind reader and assumed that the "i don't have a strong opinion either way" was secret coded evil intentions)
it's pretty fucking weird dude, ngl
>>2190746you are still talking about me instead of the content of the thread. since you apparently care so much a lot of those old posts actually are me and are in exactly the same context as the debate on whether marxists should 'waste time on hegel' or if marx had a dialectical method. i saved them because this topic comes up often because people on this site are obsessed with watching youtube videos and refuse to read and i got tired of writing out the same rebuttal to a settled debate that is now half a decade old
>>2190747for the fifth time, im not talking about the links in the OP im talking about posting the debunked screenshot of an old leftypol thread regarding cockshott and hypercomputation and the full text spamming of his blog.
>>2190752> im not talking about the links in the OP im talking about posting the debunked screenshot of an old leftypol thread regarding cockshott and hypercomputation and the full text spamming of his blog.that post literally said "here's some things that made me think" and the other images in the same post weren't even anti-dialectics. you wanted a debate someone wasn't trying to have
compare the length of the short article that was posted (and written for general consumption) to the huge out of context textdumps that link to dead posts and don't even mention turing, etc.
>In a letter to his friend Ludwig Kugelmann about a reviewer of Capital vol. 1 (which had been published the previous year), Marx wrote in July 1868: Considering 'Centralblatt', that man makes the biggest possible concession when he admits that if you think of value as anything at all, my conclusions are correct. The poor chap won't see that if there were indeed no chapter on 'value' in my book, the analysis of the really existing relations that I provide would contain the proof and evidence of the real value relation … Every child knows that any nation that stopped working – I don't want to say for a year, but for a couple of weeks – would perish miserably (verrecken) … Science is all about developing just how the law of value prevails…
>This is indeed no mistake in the systematic architecture and method of Capital, but exactly what Marx is trying to analyse: how value emerges as the dominant form in which the specific character of labour in the capitalist mode of production manifests itself. For Marx, value is not something that emerges when two commodity owners meet and exchange their respective commodities, but the socially necessary form in which labour in capitalist societies expresses itself. Value as socially necessary labour time emerges prior to exchange, even if in exchange it is concretely realised in particular prices…
>What Marx sets out to do with value form analysis is to answer the riddle of money: why do all products of labour in societies where the capitalist mode of production prevails necessarily express themselves in money form, a very specific commodity? Money, according to Marx, exerts a particular “magic” which consists in the strange fact that commodities find their own value form, 'in its finished shape, in the body of a commodity existing outside and alongside them.'4 In other words, what exactly makes all other commodities – the world of commodities – relate themselves to money as their general equivalent? The key to the riddle of money Marx sees in the fact that gold and silver 'as soon as they emerge from the bowels of the earth' become 'the immediate incarnation of all human labour.'5 Consequentially, and even before Marx traces the developed form of value in money back to their logical nucleus in the simple value expression 'x commodity A = y commodity B', his inquiry centers around the condition of possibility for commodities, their production. Although every single commodity is the product of a specific kind of concrete and useful labour (tailoring, weaving, software-programming or tea picking), in the exchange of commodities, the concrete use-values of the commodities and therefore the concrete and useful labour that was necessary to produce to commodities, are abstracted from. However, what makes exchange possible is the feature that such different kinds of labour have in common: to be products of the expenditure of abstract-homogeneous human labour in a certain amount of average socially necessary labour time.6 This Marx calls 'value' – not 'exchange value' which only indicates the ratio by which different kinds of commodities are exchanged, but does not explain the condition of possibility of exchange. So the common feature of commodities to be not products of any kind of specific labour, but to be products of homogeneous human labour brings the value form and therefore also theondition for the commodities' exchangeability about. The money form as the fully developed form in which value exists – the foremost 'bearer of value' – only masks its social character as the “reified form” of human labour, or as Marx puts it, it has a 'phantom-like objectivity' as 'social substance'7. Discovering this relation allows Marx to scientifically criticise the historically specific mode of production of capitalist sociation (Vergesellschaftung) which expresses itself in abstract homogeneous human labour: a society in which the division of labour and its private character prevail (privat-arbeitsteilige Produktion), and which necessarily leads to forms of commodity exchange. Methodically, this level of abstraction is required to be able to criticise how the law of value prevails, as Marx tells Kugelmann in his letter: in its forms of commodification and exchange…
>What could Kuruma possibly mean by this? To put his counterargument in the wider setting of the methodological structure of Capital, Kuruma strongly emphasizes the method of the first three chapters. According to Marx's claim that 'the difficulty lies not in comprehending that money is a commodity, but how, why and through what a commodity becomes money'45, Kuruma sees a division at work in the systematic structure of the first two chapters: value form analysis in Section 3 of the first chapter of Capital, 'The Commodity', looks at the how (ika ni shite) of money, section 4, 'The Fetish Character of the Commodity and its Secret' examines the why (naze ni) of money, and in the second chapter on 'The Exchange Process', Marx looks at the through what (nani ni yotte) of money.46 The exchange process as a social process that first puts commodities into practical relation is however strongly related to value form analysis. But whereas value form analysis, as Kuruma says, 'answers the question how gold as a specific commodity can become the general equivalent, so that its natural form counts as value in the whole world of commodities'47, the question is here not through what this takes place. The 'practical side' of money is shown in the exchange process. However, to Kuruma the differentiation between the function of value form analysis and the practical act of putting commodities into relation is vital for clarifying the overall basic intention of Marx's value theory. This is how Kuruma arrives at the conclusion that, although in the theory of the exchange process the necessity of the mediating 'nature' of money is practically reproduced, the mediation of the two different commodities has already taken place: through abstraction from the specific form of labour that was necessary to produce different use-values. Money is the magical substance in which this abstraction gains 'phantom-like objectivity' (gespenstige Gegenständlichkeit)48. Kuruma therefore maintains that the confrontation of commodities and their owners for the purpose of exchange in a general social, and not only coincidental manner, is only possible on the basis of the general equivalent of money, so that money is not generated by exchange. General social exchange is only possible if money as a reified product of abstraction already exists.
>…only the social deed endues the gold commodity with these properties (the through what of money). Uno's interpretation that sees not the logic of value, but the individual acts of the commodity owners as the driving force behind the genesis of money, overlooks this fine methodological nuance, which is in turn crucial to understand the autonomous, independent forms that commodity productionand exchange generate…
>…Like the other circulation theorists in the debate, a Kuruma informs us, Uno maintained that Marx has declared his 'theoretical bankruptcy' (rironteki hasan), since value form analysis could not solve the contradiction between use-value and value. That is why Marx was allegedly forced to use the stopgap of introducing the practice of commodity owners within the theory of value…
>It is in no way true that Marx maintains that a 'theoretically unsolvable problem' is solved through a particular kind of action (commodity exchange). Quite to the contrary: commodity owners act according to theory. 'The laws of commodity nature act upon the natural instinct of the commodity owners.' It is a matter of fact that the contradiction of use-value and value must be confronted, before money is there to solve it. But that is just why the commodity owners unwillingly act according to what theory has already demonstrated (riron ga kakusureba kakunaru to oshieru toori ni kōdō shite): by generating money indispensable for exchange. Why does Marx also claim that they 'have acted before thinking'? This is a cunning way to say that money like all other relation in commodity production emerges spontaneously, not as a 'product of reflection' or as a 'discovery' like the bourgeois economists declare…
>By the exchangeability of two completely different products of labour, the labour manifested in the commodity that is in the equivalent form becomes the incarnation or materialisation of value for the commodity that is in the relative form of value. It its completely developed and reified form, this labour becomes money. Money does not 'leave a trace'56 of its own genesis – therein consists its magic. However, if we want to understand the magical character of money and value as the concealment of the social character of labour in capitalist societies, we have to take a short look at how exactly a commodity becomes money, in other words: we have to recapitulate the emergence of value abstraction as a fetish…
>From here, the final deduction of the money form (Form IV), money's logical genesis, can be completed: a commodity becomes money because all other commodities represent their value in it as a general and homogeneous expression of value. The only advancement from Form III to Form IV consists 'in that the form of direct and general exchangeability, in other words the general equivalent form, has now by social custom irrevocably become entwined with the specific bodily form of the commodity of gold.'69 Gold therefore, just like any other commodity which functions as value-body, is the reification of human labour reduced to its abstract and general character. It is a purely social relation which only manifests itself in solid materiality and therefore gains 'phantom-like objectivity' as an abstraction from social relations. Money consequentially has a conspicuously paradoxical ontological status: it is society's own unconscious, but nevertheless consciously performed self-concealment…
>If we summarize the above, we can say that in the capitalist mode of production, commodities are produced for no other reason than to represent value. Consequentially, value assumes the active and structuring role of the exchange process. It is not the meaningful organization of social life meeting the demands of the people that regulates the social process, but a law inscribed into the rationality of exchange which, as an 'automatic subject'82, dominates the social relations between people.
>>2190975ok so you're just making stuff up now after textdumping and spamming the thread. really hostile weird person. I thought you
weren't complaining about the OP. firs you complain about the OP, then you say, no, you're complaining about this other post. Now you're complaining about OP again.
>>2191054careful anon, he'll say we're the same person for having the same opinion and textdump more random posts from 5 years ago that don't even say why Turing is wrong about the nature of information, or why Hegel is somehow able to get two kilos of theorems out of one kilo of axioms.
>>2190731The biggest hurdle in conversations about that IMHO is the lack of precision.
>Theres no way to have a post currency economy without post scarcity right?I suppose by post currency you mean a system without prices and consumers having budgets of tokens to spend. (I spell it out because in Marxist language not every distribution system with these rules is referred to as using money/currency.)
But no, there are other rationing methods, usually much more clumsy to use. For example, people can fill out forms ranking consumer items and then some algo figures out how to assign the stuff (for example: people do turns taking one item each according to their best-ranked thing that's still available). I just loathe that ranking concept. When I get groceries, do I have a ranking of all the stuff in my head? Not really, some parts of my shopping list may be short rankings (if I can't get pizza A, I look for pizza type B), but my shopping list is not one big ranking.
>How would you distribute post scarcity goods?Better say consumer items or products, or some marxister-than-you debate-bros will accuse you of wanting a market. People don't seem to actually agree on a definition for post scarcity. Some people seem to mean that if it is
very easy to meet demand and metering usage is quite a big hassle in comparison to the other costs of producing, so it looks like we shouldn't bother metering it, then it's post scarcity. (That term
metering usage is a bit ambiguous. I mean specifically linking the usage to particular individuals, not just measuring how many units of something are taken in total.)
If we sum up how many units of something are wanted among all people wishing for one or several units of it, and that sum is not above what is in stock, then we have post scarcity
for now regarding that particular thing. But people may not be aware of that, because the wish data is not collected; or it is collected, but distribution is decided by a lousy algorithm that is vulnerable to exaggeration strategy and so people exaggerate how many units they want and then it looks like what's in stock is way below below the amount people want.
There is an algorithm for getting people to not exaggerate their wish amounts:
https://pastebin.com/bPyr7Vau(Please ignore the word
budget in the comment description. The programmer thought about parceling out a shared budget within a group of people living together, but this can be used for other things than money. We have had some incredibly stupid debates about this: "IT SAYS BUDGET RIGHT THERE!! YoU aRE doInG cApitali$m!!") The way it works_ If you want e. g. 5 units (and you would rather get 4 than 3, and rather get 3 than 2 and so on), you just ask for that. Asking for a higher amount does not increase the likelihood that you get at least 5.
The algorithm's result is the same as walking in a circle among people with a sack full of cookies, stopping at each person and asking them if they want
one more cookie. They compare their wish amount with the amount they already got, and if their wish amount is higher, they ask for one more cookie. You walk around in the circle of people until either nobody wants a cookie anymore or you got no cookies to share anymore.
The algorithm is only strategy-free on the individual level though. For example, if two people live together and Alice wants 3 cookies and Bob wants 7, Alice can help Bob by asking for more cookies than the amount she wants. The algorithm can be modified so that the optimal strategy for households of people automatically happens if they register as living together, so then then the algorithm is also strategy-free on that level: When the virtual Santa Cookie with the cookie sack stops at a virtual person and asks if they want one more cookie, that person looks not just at their own wish list and how many cookies they already have, but also what the situation for the sum of wishes in the household is in relation to the already received cookies. (Likewise the algorithm could be modified to take care of strategy issues for groups of groups of people, and groups of groups of groups etc.)
>>2190438>>2190572>>2190757>>2191061The quote "Hegel is somehow able to get two kilos of theorems out of one kilo of axioms" humorously captures the prolific and expansive nature of Hegel's philosophical system. The metaphor uses weight (kilos) to suggest that Hegel generates a significant volume of conclusions ("theorems") from a modest set of foundational principles ("axioms"). This highlights his method's productivity, deriving extensive insights from basic ideas.
Hegel's works, like
Phenomenology of Spirit and
Science of Logic, aim to construct a comprehensive system explaining reality, history, and consciousness. The quote may acknowledge his ability to weave a vast, interconnected worldview from core principles. The "somehow" hints at ambiguity—admiration for Hegel’s generative logic or skepticism about its rigor.
The quote encapsulates Hegel’s unique approach: transforming foundational axioms into a rich, evolving system through dialectics. Whether seen as a testament to his intellectual fecundity or a critique of his complexity, it underscores the remarkable scope of his philosophical project.
Hegelian Logic vs. Formal Logic: A Category Error?The incompatibility between Hegel’s dialectical method and the formal logic underpinning modern computing (Boole, Shannon, Turing). Chaitin and Turing’s insights—that
“you cannot get more out of a logical system than you put into its axioms”—apply to
formal systems with strict rules of inference. Hegel’s project, however, is not a formal logical system but a
philosophical framework for understanding contradiction, change, and totality.
Marxism’s strength lies in its analysis of
social relations (exploitation, alienation), not technical logic. The infrastructure of the internet (Shannon’s circuits, Turing’s machines) is a product of capitalist innovation, but Marxists critique the social use of technology, not its material basis.
Engaging with Hegel is less about formal logic and more about grappling with concepts like
totality, contradiction, and historical process. For example, dialectics is often invoked to analyze nonlinear social change (e.g., revolutions).
The use of Markov chains, cybernetics, or process algebra for understanding complex systems is well-founded. These methods are undeniably powerful for describing change, but they do not inherently address the
normative or historical questions central to Marxism (e.g., "Why does exploitation persist?"). Dialectics attempts to bridge description and critique.
Dismissing Hegel entirely risks losing insights into
nonlinear causality and
systemic contradictions—concepts that resonate in fields like ecology or complexity theory. The challenge is to reconcile dialectical intuition with materialist rigor.
>Socially necessary labor time determines the magnitude of the (intrinsic) value of the commodity. Exchange value is the means by which this value is expressed through its relation to other commodities.
>value is not exchange value or use-value
>Marx’s argument about intrinsic value is often referred to as ‘the 3rd-thing argument’ because Marx is arguing that in addition to commodities having a use-value and an exchange value that they also have a 3rd thing, value.
>Despite the clear distinction between value and exchange value it is quite common in the literature to see instances of the two concepts being confused and/or conflated. To make matters more confusing Marx himself did not make the distinction clearly in his writings prior to the publication of vol. 1 of Capital. He also often asks us to assume, for the purpose simplifying an argument, that commodities sell at their values, in other words, that commodities have exchange-values that are quantitatively equal to their values…
>Marx’s distinction between value and exchange value also allows us to theorize unequal exchange. What happens if commodity A worth 1 hour of labor exchanges for commodity B worth 2 hours of labor? Obviously the owner of commodity A wins out! We have two different sums of value, 1 hour and 2 hours. The exchange value of A is 2 hours and the exchange value of B is 1 hour. The exchange values are different than the values. When A trades for more than its value the owner of A receives a greater sum of value in exchange. The opposite happens for the seller of B who receives a lesser sum of value. We could not theorize unequal exchange without a concept of intrinsic value. For Bailey an exchange ratio is just an exchange ratio and it cannot be more or less equal or unequal because there is no intrinsic value being measured in the exchange process.
>This distinction comes in handy later when we discuss deviations of price from value. Price after all is just the exchange value that a commodity has when it exchanges with money. Just as a commodity is a sum of value, so is money. [Footnote on money commodity and MELT] If a commodity’s price is greater than its value then the seller receives a greater sum of value in exchange than she parts with. Sometimes critics of Marx point to price-value divergences as if such divergences prove that value is being created by something other than the labor that created the commodity. But, as we have seen from the simple example of unequal exchange in the previous paragraph, labor has created the value of A and B. Whatever social forces have caused the exchange to be unequal (monopoly, imbalance in supply and demand, dishonesty, etc.) are not creating value. They are merely causing an unequal exchange to take place. This unequal exchange is still an exchange of two sums of value value created by labor. Such a distinction would not be possible with Bailey’s notion of relative value. But with Marx’s clear division between value and exchange value we can easily theorize how an exchange value can be different from a commodity’s intrinsic value while still holding to the idea that labor is the sole source of value…
>Marx’s theory of value is a theory about production relations. Value expresses the relation between the worker and her product. It also expresses the relation between the worker’s labor and all of the other labors in society since it is the socially necessary labor time that determines the value of the commodity.
>How then does exchange fit into this theory? How do the relations of buyers and sellers fit into the picture? Exchange is a process whereby sellers attempt to ‘realize’ the values of commodities. Sometimes they realize more or less value than that embodied in the commodity. But, as demonstrated in our discussion of unequal exchange, no new value is being created in exchange. Value is just being moved around, reapportioned. This reapportioning of value is not unimportant. When commodities sell above their value this attracts investment into that line of production, reapportioning labor. When commodities sell below their value this triggers outflows of labor and capital and a disciplining of labor in that industry.
>These fluctuations in price are an important part of the way production is disciplined and organized. Producers do not always know the socially necessary labor time or the market demand for their commodities. They discover these things after production has taken place. They then use these discoveries to alter future production plans.
>The term “realize” is quite apt. When we realize an idea we are discovering something that already exists. When we realize the value of a commodity we are not creating anything. We are not changing anything. We are merely allowing something that already exists to come to fruition, to take the form of exchange-value. Not only is the individual commodity value realized in exchange but the entire spectrum of production relations is realized in exchange. Exchange finishes the work of production.https://kapitalism101.wordpress.com/2014/04/28/intrinsic-value/ >>2191989its funny bc the whole point is to generate the whole universe from one axiom
for hegel its that the real is rational and the rational is real
which for marx is that being determines consciousness
and for lenin its that atoms exist even when you close your eyes
its a response to kant's claim that the thing-in-itself is unknowable
what thats supposed to mean is that reality is intelligible
that it has a rational structure capable of being understood
whether hegel was a secret materialist is another topic
but assuming he was an idealist
the point of the marxist turn in historical and dialectical materialism
is to condition your concepts
its not just checking for personal or ideological biases
for most people what you see is what you get
you see an object call it A and A exists
but objects dont just exist independently
you have to make sure that what you think you see
and the concept you give to name it actually correspond
and because many objects humans encounter have a particular human use
and humans are social creatures
and language is socially constructed
you have to investigate the historical development of an object
to correctly understand it
and then once you have grounded your concept in social history
then begins the empirical analysis
which brings us to marx's study of money and the commodity fetish
money is just another commodity
and sure its special because its the universal commodity
but it could be anything silver, gold, salt etc
people see money and can hold money so money must exist
but marx says this is not the case
money is actually a real abstraction of social labor
and what we think we can see and hold that we call money is just a phantom
because money as capital is really private control of collective human action
and thats why dogecoin or monopoly bucks can be money
because what is commodified is not the physical token
its labor
thats why we get a labor theory of value
the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas
so when people talk about bourgeois consciousness
its not a statement about just thinking about things the wrong way
its about whether or not those things actually exist
whether the conceptual abstraction that you name and presume to exist
has justified material content
so when someone says vulgar materialist or a positivist
or a subjective idealist or physical reductionist or a mechanical materialist
or that you are doing scientism
and that something is ahistorical or undialectical
thats what they mean
that terms are being assumed as given
without proper investigation
money as price is a contentless abstraction
how many hours you have to work to afford something is real
the point isn't just to describe the world but to change it
and to change it you first have to not just correctly describe it
but understand how it changes
you can't begin to have a foundational critique of capitalism
if you dont have a correct understanding of money
and if you think modern money as capital under generalized commodity production
is just the same thing as a primitive universal commodity like seashells
then you have no basis for changing political economy
because money is just a thing that exists
eternal static and unchanging with no social or historical development
but if you identify it correctly as social labor
you identify the revolutionary subject in a conscious agent
in the proletariat
>>2192137I'm sure none of those three guys actually believed profit rates to be practically equal so the question really is how strong the economy's pull towards an equalized profit rate looked in their minds.
I don't believe your claim that Marx assumed no such pull. I'm at loss how you otherwise explain the belief in price ratios at equalized profit rates as the centers of gravity for the actual price ratios. (I don't have that belief myself, I'm saying Marx did, see Capital III).
>>2194015
>its exactly how it works
not according to godel
>hegel invented metaphysics?
he completed it lol. if you are aware you are doing metaphysics you could at least be transparent about what school of thought you subscribe to. i dont know all the popular names like antirealism and all that either but then i could at least look up what you believe. because it sounds like someone who studied stem and has been around marxists trying to say they dont have a metaphysics and then describing positivistic empiricism but using dialectical materialst verbage. like empiricists think the mind is a blank slate at birth and rely on self evident axioms, but then you seem to say axioms are self evident because we are born into an embedded history which is more then self evidence.
>self-evident
i agree but thats a pretty subjective justification and a lot of people might not agree. im fine with it if you want to get one kilo of axioms out of no kilos but it upsets some people and they will accuse you of mysticism.
>the non-A cannot exist without A, but what is the content on not-A?
everything else. just like you cant find the area under a curve without assuming an infinity. its like an infinite series that converges to a finite sum. identity is defined through difference
>this is why negativity is always abstract, and so has no affirmative content to self-relate.
are you aware that this is deleuzes position(transcendental empiricism) which is also dialectical? affirmation of affirmation instead of negation of negation? rather then an overcoming of hegel its just another inversion like stirner. or are you just clarifying what hegel thinks and agreeing with him?
descartes was a dualist. for hegel there is no object-subject distinction. instead substance is subject, so you are the universe experiencing itself. instead of logic(human thought) describing reality and so the mind(human thought) conforms to it, which is what marx critiques vulgar materialism for, if thought is a part of reality, and thought is rational, reality is rational. hes not an "ideasist" in that ideas are primary to matter hes an "idealist" in that concepts are ideal because they correspond to the real, like an annoying christian who says cancer is gods plan but without the perfect benevolence part. very similar to you saying "theres no reason why anything has to exist, but things do." but still saying any particular thing has to exist is different then saying existence has to exist. every thing is necessarily contingent, so everything is contingently necessary. as long as we are here to experience it thats how things are. its how he overcomes kant who is also a dualist thinking that phenomena and noumena are separate categories and imposing a gap and limit to knowledge.
>>2195916Commodities have to have a use value (be the product of a particular type of labor that serves some need or want in society) and a value (be a product of general, human labor apart of society’s social division of labor)
If no one buys your commodity, it means society has determined your particular type of labor and labor product is not useful and thus the socially necessary amount of labor time spent to make your commodity (how value is measured) was in fact, not needed. And useless.
This can be for numerous reasons, maybe other competitors have a kick on the market, maybe your current labor product is outdated and society has advanced to a new commodity with different methods of labor, etc
Regardless this is reflected in the marketplace with you not having a buyer, no one willing to exchange their money for something that they see as having no value, whether it be in its ability to satisfy a want or desire or means to create something else, much less hoard for the purpose of acquiring money.
>>2196191NTA, jumping in>If no one buys your commodity, it means society has determined your particular type of labor and labor product is not useful in a society overflooded with worthless commodities some actual useful ones are missed because they didn't have an advertising budget.
>This can be for numerous reasons, maybe other competitors have a kick on the market, maybe your current labor product is outdated and society has advanced to a new commodity with different methods of labor, etcpeople are low info and will buy bad, cheap, defective products because they are better advertised. People don't have perfect information and aren't always rational actors. Senile people get scammed into buying useless shit all the time. I've had to stop my own grandparents multiple times and other times I didn't stop them in time…
These ideas have a general application of course, but there is so much insanity going on that it seems like there are a lot of exceptions.
>>2196197I mean yes all of that is true, I’m speaking in generalities not specific manifestations due to decaying de-industrialized American finance capital epoch
And yeah buyers not having an encyclopedia of all goods/ expected to be “informed conscious” buyers with everything at their fingertips and not heavily at a disadvantage due to the social relations between the capitalist and worker is something he touches on
Im not disagreeing with you, just that those specificities don’t discount what I said
>>2196219yeah that makes sense, thanks for replying, got nothing to add
>>2196222understood
>>2196221lol I haven't seen this one since 2019ish
>>2195138
At the fundamental hardware level, traditional computers rely on binary logic which is rooted in formal logic because of how transistors work. At the core of traditional computing hardware, formal logic is the dominant framework but there are emerging areas like quantum computing that use different principles like superposition and entanglement that aren’t strictly formal logic-based. quantum computing isn’t just an extension of formal logic, it's a fundamentally different approach to how information is processed. Quantum computing is definitely more than just marketing buzz. It’s a real, developing field of research. we’re still in the early stages of making it scalable and reliable for broad use. These phenomena don’t follow the rigid, true-or-false logic of classical computing but instead work with probabilities and quantum states that are more complex and less intuitive. quantum logic is more dialectical than formal in some ways. Traditional formal logic, like Boolean logic, is based on rigid, binary principles (true/false, 0/1). In contrast, quantum logic reflects the probabilistic and often non-intuitive nature of quantum mechanics, where states can exist in superposition, and outcomes aren't determined until measured. dialectics often deals with contradictions, change, and interconnections, which somewhat aligns with quantum behavior where a particle can be in multiple states at once (superposition), and measuring one part of a system can affect the whole (entanglement). Quantum logic doesn’t follow the strict, binary principles of formal logic but instead embraces uncertainty, potentiality, and relationships between particles. So, in a way, it’s closer to a dialectical approach than classical formal logic.
>>2196191>Commodities have to have a use value>If no one buys your commodity, it means society has determined your particular type of labor>you not having a buyerRead the question again:
1. "sellable commodities"
2. "not offering them for sale yet"
The situation the question considers is: Things are made that can be sold, but right now they are in storage and not yet offered on the market. They will be sold. The question is about our concept of value if we are following Marx: Should we say the value is already produced at the point in time before the selling? (I'm inclined to say yes.)
>>2196261Value in itself is a social relation, right, its reflects the SNLT that went into a product compared to another, but it’s only realized in the exchange sphere
You have produced *potential* value, but you haven’t realized that value until your commodity (which is a use-value to buyer, but the buyer, it’s only a source of potential value)
Also “sellable” implies that a money commodity has been established and exchange of commodities has reached a degree that some commodity has become the universal equivalent (money), the commodity through which all other commodity’s can express their magnitude of value based on a fixed unit.
Just the fact you said your “million commodities of X” produced is “sellable” that implies you have already thought of a notional amount of the money commodity (say gold) that you could theoretically acquire with that commodity in your given society’s marketplace
But your commodity isn’t gold “yet”, just because you give your commodity a money-name (price) you are only equating the labor time spent making one to the labor time spent making another just expressed in gold.
You still have to actually go to the marketplace and find someone with the money commodity, in which your commodity will express its value *relative* to the money commodity by saying a certain quantity of your commodity X has the same amount of labor time that this real, definite quantity of gold.
The underlying processes that determine value are their regardless, but because labor is organized privately (without regard to whether or not your commodity is actually useful or Society can absorb it) but the product of labor are in a directly social form (a commodity that was produced for the purpose of selling), the only way you can “realize” this value or be confirmed that the labor products of your own private labor (your corporation, etc) is by gaining something that is recognized as being the universal emobidement of all labor power (the money commodity)
>>2196374*sorry to the seller, your commodity is not a use value, the seller only sees it as a source of potential value (hence why the seller has produced those commodities for the sole purpose of exchange, and given it a notional money-name that the seller hopes to realize in the market)
I produced 5 pair of pants that I think (based on the current tailoring industry, other pants makers in my economy, the expense to acquire the fabric to make the pants, etc) that I can get 100 gold coins for these pants.
I have produced potential value, but I have no way of knowing if those 5 pants will all be sold, or only some, or if I can even get 20 gold coins for a pair of pants. The only way is buy bringing my goods to the market, and if the seller is willing to exchange 20 gold coin for a pair of jeans, my labor has been recognized as created a product that is useful for society, while also being the product of general, simple labor power that confirms this amount of labor within the entire totality of the social division of labor, was in fact necessary.
If you can only sell 2 pants but still have 3 left. That means the total amount of SNLT that went into making all 5 of those pants was wasted. And such, society wasted that total amount of time. Maybe society already has enough jeans in the economy, maybe it only needed your labor time towards 2 jeans, etc regardless
>>2196414Yes, but again value itself is a social relation determined by humans, if you store your commodities before somewhere, you are assuming these commodities are worth a notional amount of money, and can be exchanged for a *real* amount of money at the point of the sale
You have no way of showing to society that your labor was expended productively, which is the point.
The commodity that acts as the universal equivalent (money, in this case gold) is the social signifier that you have expended a certain amount of labor time (and made some sort of sale) that was equivalent to the real amount of money you are holding.
Basically “value” is determined by society, so in the most technical terms sure, given that you reside in a society where commodity production has become so generalized and widespread that the very act of producing commodities that don’t serve an immediate use or need, but for the purpose of exchange, is reflected in the social relations to our labor well before you even made your commodities.
Idk if I’m making sense. But your commodities store are useless, so yeah you can say narrowly you produced value, but again it’s a social relation. If you were to try and directly exchange your millions of commodity X for a different commodity, in most cases you would get rejected.
Why? Because your commodity isn’t in a form that has been recognized by society as being the universal equivalent of all forms of labor power, nor in a form that is ready to be circulated without exchanging itself for another commodity (the money commodity serves both these roles)
Now on the other hand, you can say “why do consumers buy a bunch of junk that objectively has no value?”
This is where commodity fetishism comes in, the process by which value is realized (the market-place) presents itself as a rational system of free actors and free markets, individuals coming of their own volition to exchange for products of their own labor
This obscures the fact that this “free market” exists on the basis of the social division of labor having workers (who don’t own the means of production, must sell their labor power) take the products of private labor, to the market in order to both “realize” value (their private labor products are exchanged for a labor product in a socially valid form, money) and also gain a commodity (money) which is necessary to buy other commodities like food, clothes, etc
This is a self-reproducing cycle, with your value being realized and such your spot within the social division of labor, but on the surface it looks like individual buyers with free will just going to the market place
It doesn’t show workers *have* to go to the market, or else how will they get money for their products? The capitalist *has* to put their commodities in a form that is socially recognized because they are producing a bunch of use values that aren’t necessarily useful to himself or lots of people, but they need ti acquire money (and by extension capital) that will allow them to satisfy their own wants and needs but also accumulate more capital.
>>2196459*are not useless. Fuck I hate the spelling
TDLR: yes in layman’s terms, but marx (and society) isn’t going to recognize your commodities as value until you bring it to the marketplace. That is the point Marx makes in capital about value being a social relation
>>2196459Commodity fetishism obscures the relations that go into realizing value and how commodities are produced.
You make a sell/purchase by exchanging your commodity for money. Or you have money and can now acquire any commodity in the world, given you have the right quantity.
But it’s not the commodities themselves that give them value, it’s the fact that a certain amount of labor time went into making the commodity that makes it equivalent to another commodity.
This is commodity fetishism, societies think value comes from commodities themselves because that is what the surface level look at the free market shows you, but in reality it is the labor time that went into it, and such the further people become removed from the production process, the more and more alienated they become to how real human labor power (and a real human, with real skills, thoughts, etc) were used to make this product.
Such you have billionaires with massive amounts of commodities, and where does capitalism say it comes from? It is due to the hard work and wit of the capitalist, he has a bunch of wealth, obviously he must have done something good to deserve this.
Not, wow, a bunch of labor time was expended to produce that many commodties, what was the productive process like, what are the conditions of the workers, how was labor organized in such a way that so many commodities are produced in Y time, what is the impact of the environment, etc
All of that is ignored
That is why the first sentence of capital, marx starts with “The Wealth of all societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, the COMMODITY “appears” to be the elementary form of the wealth.
He says “appears” as it’s only a surface level observation that does not take into account the totality of how commodities appear in circulation
>>2190874>a society in which the division of labour and its private character prevailI find this phrasing very unclear. (So what if Marx also put it like that. Fidelity to Marx does not absolve you). If there is
any division of labor, labor has a social character.
People might have all sorts of ideas about individual responsibility having a big role, that's capitalist ideology ("pull up yourself by your own bootstraps"—every tried that
literally?) and people are held responsible for all sorts of things as individuals that they cannot control as individuals, that's legal fiction. People are dependent on each other as a matter of fact, and on quite a big scale.
I understand saying that in capitalism effort is verified in sales, that it counts when it leads to sales. But why say that's the moment labor
becomes social? (Aren't you just replicating capitalist ideology in that.)
>In his Vol. 3 transformation procedure Marx holds that total value equals total price. (Despite the fact that prices and values diverge, the coherence and relevance of value theory is maintained by the equality of total value and total price, and total surplus value and total profit.) Bohm Bawerk, Marx’s famous Austrian detractor, argued that this assertion proved nothing. “… it is perfectly true that the total price paid for the entire national produce coincides exactly with with the total amount of value or labor incorporated in it. But this tautological declaration denotes no increase or true knowledge, neither does it serve as a special test of the correctness of the alleged law that commodities exchange in proportion to the labor embodied in them. For in this manner one might as well, or rather as unjustly, verify any other law one pleased- the law, for instance, that commodities exchange according to the measure of their specific gravity.” (Bohm Bawerk, “Karl Marx and the Close of His System” p 36 of the 1975 Sweezy edition) He goes on to give an example where individual commodities do not exchange at their specific weights but total weight equals total price, thereby apparently showing the tautological uselessness of Marx’s first equality.
>Like much of Bohm-Bawerk’s critique, his reading of Marx here is inaccurate and simplistic. Yet his critique is a good jumping off point for clarifying what Marx is actually arguing. Marx’s theory of value does not require that goods trade in exact proportion to the labor time embodied in them. Neither does his theory require that prices fluctuate around a ‘center of gravity’ that is embodied labor times. Rather Marx argues that prices and values systematically deviate and that this poses no problem for any aspect of his theory of capitalism.
>Marx’s claim that total price equals total value is not supposed to “serve as a special test of the correctness” of his value theory. Rather it is a logical conclusion of his observation in Volume 1 of Capital that value cannot be created in exchange. This observation flies in the face of everything that is sacred to the Austrian school. As Bohm-Bawerk writes, “Where equality and exact equilibrium obtain, no change is likely to occur to the disturb the balance. When, therefore, in the case of exchange, the matter terminates with a change of ownership of the commodities, it points rather to the existence of some inequality or preponderance which produces the alteration.” (ibid p. 68) In other words, people exchange things because of a subjective difference in their estimation of the value of goods. Exchange happens because of an inequality in subjective estimations in value. This leads to the bizarre notion of “subjective profit” which, more than anything else, makes it obvious that the entire idea of marginal utility comes from an attempt to impose the objective rational of the capitalist investor upon the the subjectivity of individual consumers.
>Two points should be made in response to Bohm-Bawerk. First, despite the impressions that could be had from a naive reading of the first chapter of Vol. 1 of Capital, Marx does not believe that every exchange involves an equality of labor times. The very concept of socially necessary labor time (SNLT) implies inequalities in exchange between the social value of a commodity and the individual value (between the labor time considered socially necessary for its production and the labor time actually spent on its production.) The gap between social and private labor is the mechanism whereby value regulates private labor for social purposes. (2) Rather, Marx is claiming that value cannot be created in exchange. While there can always be inequalities in exchange, these cannot be the source of profit because no aggregate addition to the total value of society can be created just by moving commodities from one person’s hands to another’s.
>Now Marx does often ask his readers to assume, for sake of argument, that value and price are identical for individual commodities. Why?…because this makes it easier for him to show that profit must come from the exploitation of wage labor, rather than from an inequality in exchange. If value can’t be created in exchange we must look to production and the exploitation of wage labor to explain profit. But this type of profit is different than the super-profit that comes from selling below the SNLT. Thus it makes sense to assume the sale of commodities at their SNLT in order to look at the source of profit proper, rather than super-profit. Sometimes people, like Bohm-Bawerk, claim that Marx holds price and value equal for the first two volumes of Capital, later dropping it for the 3rd volume. But the concept of SNLT, which entails sale above and below SNLT, occurs at the beginning of Vol. 1![…]
>[…]If value can’t be created in exchange then this puts us quite far along in our path to understand the value price relation. The exchange process is one of measuring the value of commodities against each other. If a commodity is exchanged above or below its value then value is transfered from one person to another. This can be a source of profit for one person but it cannot increase the total amount of profit in society. Though Marx doesn’t use the term, sometimes one hears the words “super profit” used to describe this profit arising from unequal exchanges.
>If profit can’t come from exchange then we must look to production for it. There is one commodity that can produce more value than it costs to buy. This is labor power. Labor power is the only commodity whose cost of production (the cost of the means of subsistence) differs from the value it transfers to the final product. The amount of value created by the worker in production cannot be determined by looking at the wage. It can only be determined by looking at the total amount of work that has been done. This is the source of profit proper.
>Marx’s theory of SNLT contains both types of profit, profit proper and super-profit. All capitalists in an industry exploit labor and thus make profit. But they also compete to outsell each other in the market by introducing new production techniques which allow them to produce under the SNLT. This allows them to appropriate value through exchange, hence making an additional super-profit on top of the profit proper.
>The source of this super-profit is the surplus value created by workers in other firms. It works like this. All capitalists in an industry must at least cover their costs of production or else they will go out of business. So let’s assume all firms are at least making enough to cover costs. Now if the SNLT corresponds to the modal (not average) level of productivity in an industry this means there will probably be firms operating above, at, and below the SNLT. Firms operating above the SNLT will lose business and make less profit. Firms operating below the SNLT will get more business and realize more profit. The more efficient firms carve out a larger space for themselves in the market, squeezing out less efficient firms. They cut into the profits of competitors. Less efficient firms are not able to realize all of the surplus value they have created while more efficient firms realize more profit than just the surplus value their workers created.
>If value can be transferred in exchange, and if this transfer of value comes through redistributing surplus value created in production, then we already have the tools needed to understand Marx’s theory of Prices of Production. Sometimes we are told the notion of prices of production involves some modification of Marx’s value theory. I do not believe this to be the case. All of the tools we need to understand prices of production are already present in the notion of SNLT, and all of these points flow logically from the observation that value can’t be created in exchange[…]https://kapitalism101.wordpress.com/2012/04/05/value-cant-be-created-in-exchange/ >>2198685of course it's less efficient! they're shipping unassembled parts all over the fucking globe to wherever they can be assembled the cheapest! of course that's a giant fucking waste of time and money and resources! it's unfathomably wasteful that you would design an appliance in the USA, order the parts from china, have them shipped to mexico to be assembled, and then have the finished product shipped back to the USA to be sold!
yet, even when accounting for all this inefficiency and waste, if the labor can be ruthlessly exploited to the degree that it DOES yield a greater profit, even if it's only a fraction of a percent of margin, they'll do it. every extra dollar spent on wasteful logistics and wasteful shipping and wasteful supply chains is made up by extracting that amount of surplus value from ever more poorly paid laborers; where else would it come from?
>>2193952
>computers operate on formal logic. i already explained how basic code operates syllogistically. the way we think is also logical, which is why you literally cannot reason illogically, but just present incomplete logic. logic just describes reality then and so the mind conforms to it.
Every single development in the history of computing has tried to humanize it despite it being pure formal logic in its most basic form. Assembly assigns human words to pieces of machine code. Procedural programming organizes it into tasks it has to perform, as computing power is worthless if you can't give it instructions to what you want to do, not just perform calculations for the sake of it. Object-oriented programming first has you create abstract models of your program (based on, again, what you want the program to do) and break it up into separate parts accordingly. During every single step of this development code evolved from ones and zeros towards something that resembles plain English, the kind that two very bad ESL speakers would converse in. Don't get me started on AI. When it writes code, it mimicks code written by actual humans. It is non-determentistic. Not in the strict sense of course, but for all intents and purposes it is. It doesn't look for a one or a zero, meaning a 100% true or a false result. It generates a probable answer. And it is the only thing that can interact with a lot of things outside the world of computing. Face recognition, self-driving vehicles, LAWS, etc. The development of graphical interfaces representing the functioning of programs with pretty symbols is also absolutely necessary for most use cases of computing.
Computers never make mistakes, but humans do and they are the ones giving them instructions. The same can be said for formal logic.
>>2198685For all their talk of efficiency, capitalists are actually inefficient. The way capitalist exploitation works is that it undervalues human labour, treating it as nothing but a cost instead of what it really is, an end to itself, human activity. Capital can not create value from thin air, only labour can, so for capital to persist, it must appropriate a part of labour to itself. This also means that it doesn't just undervalue labour, it has to keep it undervalued. Automatization would allow humans to produce more while working less, but for capital, it is a disaster. The amount humans work is mostly fixed, therefore employing more machinery on the long term would only increase upkeep costs relative to human labour, a part of which capital always appropriates. As long as human labour exists, profit will probably still exist too in some form, but capital will always try to fight against this natural process. This is why China is socialist. The state and state-owned companies aren't obligated to make profit. Their goal is to fulfill party directives. This means that they are able to invest where capital wouldn't because it doesn't find it profitable. What private capital does exists is forced compete against itself, further increasing the organic composition of capital and weakening it in the long run.
>>2197941>>If I [dont sell anything] have I not already produced value?>no. if i spend a 100 hours painting a picture, do i create value? muh mud pies.That post
>>2195916 you reply to here is very, very, short. What's so hard about parsing it? It is explicitly said in the post: SELLABLE. Maybe that somehow went past you, but there are also posts after it explaining the question again. Don't bother replying before having read those.
And this reply:
>marx in chapter 2 of capital vol. 1 says that divisions of labour can exist without exchange (value) existing.got nothing to do with the question in
>>2197088 either. It was about phrasing
becoming social within the context of capitalist society.
>This monotonousness and abstract universality are maintained to be the Absolute. This formalism insists that to be dissatisfied therewith argues an incapacity to grasp the standpoint of the Absolute, and keep a firm hold on it. If it was once the case that the bare possibility of thinking of something in some other fashion was sufficient to refute a given idea, and the naked possibility, the bare general thought, possessed and passed for the entire substantive value of actual knowledge; similarly we find here all the value ascribed to the general idea in this bare form without concrete realisation; and we see here, too, the style and method of speculative contemplation identified with dissipating and, resolving what is determinate and distinct, or rather with hurling it down, without more ado and without any justification, into the abyss of vacuity. To consider any specific fact as it is in the Absolute, consists here in nothing else than saying about it that, while it is now doubtless spoken of as something specific, yet in the Absolute, in the abstract identity A = A, there is no such thing at all, for everything is there all one. To pit this single assertion, that “in the Absolute all is one”, against the organised whole of determinate and complete knowledge, or of knowledge which at least aims at and demands complete development – to give out its Absolute as the night in which, as we say, all cows are black – that is the very naïveté of emptiness of knowledge.
>The formalism which has been deprecated and despised by recent philosophy, and which has arisen once more in philosophy itself, will not disappear from science, even though its inadequacy is known and felt, till the knowledge of absolute reality has become quite clear as to what its own true nature consists in. Having in mind that the general idea of what is to be done, if it precedes the attempt to carry it out, facilitates the comprehension of this process, it is worth while to indicate here some rough idea of it, with the hope at the same time that this will give us the opportunity to set aside certain forms whose habitual presence is a hindrance in the way of speculative knowledge.https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm
>Only one word more concerning the desire to teach the world what it ought to be. For such a purpose philosophy at least always comes too late. Philosophy, as the thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its formative process, and made itself ready. History thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva, takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.
>But it is time to close this preface. As a preface it is its place to speak only externally and subjectively of the standpoint of the work which it introduces. A philosophical account of the essential content needs a scientific and objective treatment. So, too, criticisms, other than those which proceed from such a treatment, must be viewed by the author as unreflective convictions. Such subjective criticisms must be for him a matter of indifference.https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/preface.htm >>2200171>>2200171>The assumption that the commodities of the various spheres of production are sold at their value merely implies, of course, that their value is the centre of gravity around which their prices fluctuate, and their continual rises and drops tend to equalise. There is also the market-value — of which later — to be distinguished from the individual value of particular commodities produced by different producers. The individual value of some of these commodities will be below their market-value (that is, less labour time is required for their production than expressed is the market value) while that of others will exceed the market-value. On the one hand, market-value is to be viewed as the average value of commodities produced in a single sphere, and, on the other, as the individual value of the commodities produced under average conditions of their respective sphere and forming the bulk of the products of that sphere. It is only in extraordinary combinations that commodities produced under the worst, or the most favourable, conditions regulate the market-value, which, in turn, forms the centre of fluctuation for market-prices. The latter, however, are the same for commodities of the same kind. If the ordinary demand is satisfied by the supply of commodities of average value, hence of a value midway between the two extremes, then the commodities whose individual value is below the market-value realise an extra surplus-value, or surplus-profit, while those, whose individual value exceeds the market-value, are unable to realise a portion of the surplus-value contained in them. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch10.htm
>excess profit arises from the lowering of the price of the product, in agriculture the relative size of rent is determined not only by the relative raising of the price (raising the price of the product of fertile land above its value) but by selling the cheaper product at the cost of the dearer. This is, however, as I have already demonstrated (Proudhon)[2], merely the law of competition, which does not emanate from the “soil” but from “capitalist production’’ itself.https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/subject/tsv/tsv-v2.pdf
>which presupposes priceswhich presupposes labor. you have to consider labor historically not just in capitalism. first there was labor, then there was money, then there was generalized social labor, then there was
labor precedes price
>where does marx ever invoke the concept of unequal exchange?he doesn't and neither does the author. you have to read what people actually say not just assume what you think they said
>>2200167
>>there are also posts after it explaining the question again
>those blog posts from people who have no reference to the primary sources?
What primary sources would you need for getting told that you misread a question. There is no point about repeating over and over that usefulness is necessary for value to exist. The question was not about stuff that can't be sold so answering with muh mudpies was not relevant to it. And what primary source would other posts need that just paraphrase the question. Neither that post nor the posts rephrasing it made any claims about what Marx said. It was only a question about when value comes into existence.
Now to the part of your post that actually answers the question:
>value is a retroactive category. it is determined *after* sale.
>here's a direct quote to enlighten you…
Again comes the statement that usefulness is necessary for value. Nobody claims otherwise.
>To become a commodity a product must be transferred to another, whom it will serve as a use value, by means of an exchange
Hmmmm. Read the sentences right before it:
>Whoever directly satisfies his wants with the produce of his own labour, creates, indeed, use values, but not commodities. In order to produce the latter, he must not only produce use values, but use values for others, social use values. (And not only for others, without more. The mediaeval peasant produced quit-rent-corn for his feudal lord and tithe-corn for his parson. But neither the quit-rent-corn nor the tithe-corn became commodities by reason of the fact that they had been produced for others. To become a commodity a product must be transferred to another, whom it will serve as a use value, by means of an exchange.)
I don't actually think that the quoted passage unambiguously establishes that value comes into existence at the moment of sale or that commodities become commodities at the moment of sale.
>>2200676 (me)
>I don't actually think that the quoted passage unambiguously establishes that value comes into existence at the moment of sale or that commodities become commodities at the moment of sale.I don't mean that as an
either-or.
>>2200717
>marx never postulated a theory of unequal exchange which creates "super profits".
right he just talks about how individual commodities sell above or below their actual value in exchanges that are not perfectly equal and how this is the mechanism by which capitalists appropriate extra surplus-value.
this comes from the fact that some capitalists pay less for wages because they invest in technology as capital which can create more of a given commodity in the same amount of time with less labor input. this lowers the average value for commodities of that type, so other capitalists have to invest more time than is socially necessary, because they dont yet have the same technology. both of them sell at the average but the one who spent more time is getting less then was put in while the one who spent less time is getting more than they put in.
youve got two capitalists producing the same commodity. they employ laborers at $10/hr for 10 hours and make 10 commodities each. so you get 100 commodities for $100. one of the capitalists invests in a new machine where one laborer can make 10 commodities in an hour. so he fires 9 of them and keeps one. after a day both capitalists have 100 commodities but for one it only costs him $10 while the other is paying $100. the first capitalist gets 100 commodities for $10 and the second 100 for $100. before the average was $1 now its $0.55. but the second capitalist is still paying $1 meaning they are losing out on every one they make, while the other one is only paying $0.10 making extra profit on every sale, as long as they are still selling at the old price. to stay profitable he has to pay the worker less, which will make them want less hours, if he says no they can go work for a competitor that has the technology, or he can get the upgrades too. labor still makes the same thing, which is equal to its value, but there are less workers. the individual commodities are sold not equal to their actual values, but to the social average of all values for that given commodity. when all the different capitalists implement the new tech, the average goes down and the value too, as well as the price after a lag. then they can lower wages and there is no competitor to go work for. but this decreases the ratio of value:profit which means they have to make more to get the same return at the lower rate, leading to overproduction, underconsumption, and crises.
>>2201407criticizing political economy does not put marx outside of political economy. he spent 20 years reading poltiical economy, studying political economy, and trying to figure out how scientific socialism and political economy would interpenetrate
>deboooonknot everyone here is trying to do that
>>2202621
>"This is vulgarised still more by those who pass from the general determination of value over to the realisation of the value of a specific commodity. Every commodity can realise its value only in the process of circulation, and whether it realises its value, or to what extent it does so, depends on prevailing market conditions."
It says the commodity realises its value. Can this be intended to mean exactly the same as the value becomes real in exchange… but if so saying to what extent it does so seems rather strange. Sounds like some substance that is already there as a potential before the sale that becomes "activated" in the sale. A couple paragraphs earlier he is talking about producing a quantity that is too high.
>"What competition does not show, however, is the determination of value, which dominates the movement of production; and the values that lie beneath the prices of production and that determine them in the last instance. [vol. 3, ch. 12]"
According to Marx, competition does not approximate value ratios in prices as well as it approximates the ratios of prices of production. His reasoning: Capitalists flee from industries with low profits and seek industries with high profits, leveling the profit rates between industries as a tendency. Price ratios close to values would scare away capitalists from investing in high-capital industries, lowering the competition there, thus making the prices in these industries systematically higher relative to industries with low capital investment compared to value ratios.
>"To become a commodity a product must be transferred to another
As was shown earlier ITT the quote is in the big-picture context of corn becoming a commodity historically, not a zoomed-in view of an item sitting on the shelf and then getting sold.
>it is clear to conclude thus that a commodity's value has a prior determination (its price), but it cannot realise this value if it is not exchanged for.
But exchange value isn't value.
>hopefully this puts the "debate" to rest.
Good luck with that :P
>>2202789
>marx's preliminary comments,
>>"To become a commodity a product must be transferred to another, whom it will serve as a use value, by means of an exchange…"
Again: When you look at the quote (it's an addition by Engels btw.) in its context, you will see that the statement is in reference to the historical change of the social embedding of the production of an agricultural product, from feudalism to capitalism. Not the change of an item going from shelf to customer.
>>But exchange value isn't value.
>it is the form of appearance of value: the "value form", translated into exchange-ratios, or prices. yet prices can exist without values also, which is why its easier to look at the cost of production. also, i am generalising the logic of value, by showing how a price-form designates the worth of a potential commodity, without itself being achieved. when we see prices, we see what a product *could* be worth if we bought it. this determination is the orientation of value in society…
An individual can set the price of something he owns at whatever level if he isn't particularly bothered by not being able to sell it. Since that individual can choose arbitrarily, staring at that individual's price-setting antics regarding said item is not something I would call "generalising the logic of value".
>The purpose of this chapter is to explore the theoretical and empirical properties of what Ricardo and Smith called natural prices, and what Marx called prices of production. Classical and Marxian theories of competition argue two things about such prices. First, that the mobility of capital between sectors will ensure that they will act as centres of gravity of actual market prices, over some time period that may be specific to each sector. Second, that these regulating prices are themselves dominated by the underlying structure of production, as summarized in the quantities of total (direct and indirect) labour time involved in the production of the corresponding commodities. It is this double relation, in which prices of production act as the mediating link between market prices and labour values, that we will analyze here.
>At a theoretical level, it has long been argued that the behavior of individual prices in the face of a changing wage share (and hence changing profit rate) can be quite complex. Yet, as well shall see, at an empirical level their behavior is quite regular. Moreover these empirical regularities can be strongly linked to the underlying structure of labour values through a linear ‘transformation’ that is strikingly reminiscent of Marxs own procedure.
>In what follows we will first formalize a Marxian model of prices of production with a corresponding Marxian ‘standard commodity’ to serve as the clarifying numeraire. We will show that this price system is theoretically capable of ‘Marx-reswitching’ (that is, of reversals in the direction of deviations between prices and labour values). We will then develop a powerful natural approximation to the full price system, and show that this approximation is the ‘vertically integrated' version of Marx’s own solution to the transformation problem…
>…In our empirical analysis we compared market prices, labour values and standard prices of production calculated from US input-output tables for 1947, 1958, 1963 and 1972 using data initially developed by Ochoa (1984) and subsequently refined and extended by others (Appendix 15.2). Across input-output years we found that on average labour values deviate from market prices by only 9.2 per cent, and that prices of production (calculated at observed rates of profit) deviate from market prices by only 8.2 per cent (Table 15.1 and Figures 15.2-3)
>Prices of production can of course be calculated at all possible rates of profit, r, from zero to the maximum rate of profit, R. The theoretical literature has tended to emphasize the potential complexity of individual price movements as r varies. Such literature is generally cast in terms of pure circulating capital models with an arbitrary numeraire. But our empirical results, based on a general fixed capital model of prices of production with the standard commodity as the numeraire, uniformly show that standard prices of prices of production are virtually linear as the rate of profit changes (Figure 15.4). Since standard prices of production equal labour values when I = 0, this implies that price-value deviations are themselves essentially linear functions of the rate of profit. For this reason, the linear price approximation developed in this chapter performs extremely well over all ranges of r and over all input-output years, deviating on average from full prices of production by only 2 per cent (Figures 15.6-7) and from market prices by only 8.7 per cent (as opposed to 8.2 per cent for full prices of production relative to market prices)…
>…The puzzle of the linearity of standard prices of production with respect to the rate of profit is certainly not resolved. But its existence emphasizes the powerful inner connection between observed relative prices and the structure of production. Even without any mediation, labour values capture about 91 per cent of the structure of observed market prices. This alone makes it clear that it is technical change that drives the movements of relative prices over time, as Ricardo so cogently argued. Moving to the vertically integrated version of Marx’s approximation of prices of production allows us to retain this critical insight, while at the same time accounting for the price-of-production-induced transfers of value that he emphasized. On the whole these results seem to provide powerful support for the classical and Marxian emphasis on the structural determinants of relative prices in the modern world.
>>2204451
Value (as a social relation determined by abstract labor and expressed through generalized commodity exchange) did not exist prior to capitalism. Value, for Marx, is a historically specific category that emerges only when labor is systematically organized for market exchange, commodities dominate social production, and labor is reduced to abstract labor (quantified as socially necessary labor time).
Value as a social relation rooted in abstract labor, commodity production, and profit-driven exchange—is specific to capitalism. Before capitalism, societies had use-values, labor, and sporadic exchange, but not value in Marx’s sense. Recognizing this distinction is key to understanding capitalism’s exploitative core and its historical contingency.
For Marx, commodities are not transhistorical. They emerge under capitalism as products of labor subordinated to exchange-value, governed by abstract labor and profit. While trade and goods existed in prior societies, the commodity-form as a dominant social relation is unique to capitalism. Marx explicitly rejects the notion that commodities are transhistorical. For Marx, the commodity-form—as a product of labor that embodies both use-value and exchange-value—is specific to capitalist society and arises under particular historical conditions.
>>2203786
>it is the mediated exchange which constitutes the act of commodification
For Marx, a commodity is defined by its production for exchange within capitalist social relations. The intention to sell (embedded in the system) establishes its commodity status, while the act of selling realizes its value. The distinction highlights capitalism’s inherent tension between production for profit and the uncertainty of market validation.
Marx’s analysis focuses on systemic logic, not individual acts of exchange. If a commodity remains unsold, it represents a failure of realization (a crisis of overproduction), but it does not retroactively lose its commodity status. Unsold commodities still embody the social relations of capitalism (production for profit) and reflect the contradictions of the system.
A product becomes a commodity the moment it is produced for the market, regardless of whether it is ultimately sold. Its status as a commodity arises from its role in capitalist social relations, where labor is generalized as abstract labor. Thus, the intention (production for exchange) defines it as a commodity, while the sale actualizes its value.
Marx emphasizes that a commodity is produced for exchange, not for the direct use of the producer. This intention is embedded in the social relations of capitalism, where production is organized for market exchange and profit. A commodity is defined by its social purpose within capitalist production relations, not strictly by whether it is successfully sold.
>>2204451>>lets read this one more time,>"To become a commodity a product must be transferred to another, whom it will serve as a use value, by means of an exchange"Let's read it again, with context, and in the German original this time, because we like to suffer:
<Der mittelalterliche Bauer producirte das Zinskorn für den Feudalherrn, das Zehntkorn für den Pfaffen. Aber weder Zinskorn noch Zehntkorn wurden dadurch Waare, dass sie für andre producirt waren. Um Waare zu werden, muss das Produkt dem andern, dem es als Gebrauchswerth dient, durch den Austausch übertragen werden.As you can see, "a product" is not the right translation, it's "
the product". And the product refers here to the farmer's product in different historical-economical contexts and certainly not one unit of some item.
>>2204456>Value (as a social relation determined by abstract labor and expressed through generalized commodity exchange) did not exist prior to capitalism. Value, for Marx, is a historically specific category that emerges only when labor is systematically organized for market exchange, commodities dominate social production, and labor is reduced to abstract labor (quantified as socially necessary labor time).Overstating it. Value becomes dominant in society with capitalism. It doesn't just go from off to TADAAH VALUE DOMINATES. Here is Marx stating in Capital's preface the value-form is very old:
<The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it allhttps://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p1.htmAnd that means value predates capitalism. Capitalism is like a pandemic, value is like the virus making the pandemic. The virus of value can persist through small circulation for centuries before capitalism breaks out.
>I’ve been reading ‘Marx’s Theory of Money: Modern Appraisals’ after there was some debate on here about the role of commodity money in Marx’s value theory. @__gio and @StoryPegasus rightly pointed out there are many places where Marx insists on the necessity of commodity money, however I am inclined to agree with @criticofpolecon and @ygzgzot that it isn’t essential to the logic of his value theory when further developed.
>Chris Arthur in his chapter of the book (as well as in The Spectre of Capital and elsewhere) argues that money acts as the measure of value not because it shares a property of value common to commodities as a product of labour but because in fulfilling the function of universal equivalent it imposes a standard by which each commodity becomes quantitatively measurable against each other and therefore creates the space in which value can exist and be measured at all. Geert Reuten in his chapter ‘Money as a Constituent of Value’, similarly argues that abstract labour is immeasurable ex-ante since it is only money which establishes the actual homogeneity of commodities and so makes the reduction of commodities into values actual.
>On the other hand, in §3 of ch.1 of Capital, Marx is very clear that the reduction of private labour to abstract social labour in exchange only occurs because the labour power that produces commodities is equated to the labour power that produces the money commodity. In his chapter in the book, Claus Germer makes the same point, that money must be the product of labour in order for the private labour time expended in other commodities’ production to be equalized and reduced to a common substance of social labour. As such as if you reduce the money-form to a pure value-form and say that money doesn’t need to be a product of labour, it seemingly threatens to undermine labour as the condition of the value-relation.
>A second argument Chris Arthur puts forward for the redundancy of commodity money rests on his systematic dialectic method. He argues that commodity money is initially assumed because it provides the minimal sufficient conditions for developing the money-form of value from the simple category of the commodity, and does not require appeal to the more complex concrete categories of capital and credit which have yet to be developed. A similar point is also made by Graziani, that while commodity money is adequate to the circulation process of commodities, it is not to the production phase where the purchase of labour-power by capitalists depends on credit money.
>This argument is taken up by Bellofiore in his chapter who, while arguing that commodity-money is a necessity to Capital, also argues that it is necessary to go beyond it in order to develop a theory of the monetary circuit. And so the logic of Marx’s argument points beyond it. @__gio has pointed out that however that Marx also says repeatedly e.g. in Ch.32 and 36 of Vol.3 that credit money can only express value if it is ultimately backed by commodity-money. I think it’s true that there is an unmistakable connection between fiat and credit money and gold since as Bellofiore, Kliman and Freeman note, people turn to gold as a money of last resort in times of crises, hence why Shaikh argues for the existence of Kondratiev ‘gold waves’.
>However, this is not the same as saying that credit money ‘cannot break free’ of commodity money. It just entails that the development of inconvertible fiat currency systems depends on a (potentially revokable) extension of trust and confidence in the monetary system. While Marx thinks credit money depends on commodity-money then, I think Arthur and Graziani are right that credit-financed production in fact represents a kind of supersession of the necessity of commodity-money. However, I believe the supersession does not only occur with the emergence of credit and capital but earlier in the development of the money-form itself.
>Marx is of course correct the money-form of value can only develop out of the commodity-form. It can only evolve from initially being equated with other commodities as a product of labour and particular equivalent alongside others, to eventually becoming a universal equivalent excluded from them as the direct embodiment of social labour or value itself. Once the money-commodity reaches this stage however, its ability to function as the representation of social labour or value is no longer necessarily dependent on it itself being a product of labour or having intrinsic value. Similarly, while it is true that it is only through the emergence of commodity money that private labours are first equalized as social labour and transformed into values, once money becomes the embodied representation of social labour time its ability to validate commodities’ private labour as socially neccessary no longer depends on being the product of private labour itself. All that it requires is that it continues to be acknowledged in its functional role as the representation of social labour time or value. Fred Mosely agrees on this point. He argues against Germer that commodity money is historically contingent, and that fiat money may function as the measure of value even if it contains no labour simply because it is the only means by which social labour can be represented.
>This raises the question though if money as a universal equivalent becomes completely unmoored from labour, how can it claim to represent social labour time or value? In A Spirit of Trust Robert Brandom discusses how pre-modern theories of representation generally assumed that a representation required a resemblance or shared property between the representing and what it represents, whereas in the Early Modern Period, it came to be understood that representation only requires a global isomorphism between the system of representings and the system of representeds, and the subjunctive sensitivity of the representing system to changes in what is represented. In the same way, money does not necessarily need to have intrinsic value in order to represent value, there only needs to be some clear subjunctive sensitivity of money prices to values. The only question is how that sensitivity can be grounded in a fiat money economy. This same question can be phrased in terms of the MELT. As Moseley asks, if commodity-money is no longer essential, what determines the amount of social labour that is represented by a given unit of money?
>Moseley’s own approach to this question is to provide an ex-ante determination of the MELT for fiat money, which he elaborates in the introduction to the book and more fully in his paper ‘The Determination of the MELT in the Case of Non-Commodity”. Under commodity money, Moseley argues, such an ex-ante definition is unproblematic since the MELT can be defined as equal to the inverse of the value of the gold commodity, and the price of each commodity as the product of the SNLT required to produce it and the MELT. To extend this approach to fiat economies, Moseley argues the MELT is equal to the inverse of the value of gold times the ratio of paper money in circulation to the quantity of gold money that *would* be required if commodities were to sell at gold prices. This allows him to retain an ex-ante definition of MELT for fiat currency, and so explain the determination of money value added by labour time, in a way that doesn’t depend on the value of gold (though at the expense of adopting the quantity theory of money).
>Bellofiore points out however that Moseley’s ex-ante determination of MELT relies on the implicit assumption that SNLT is a purely technical magnitude determined ex-ante in production: Rodriguez-Herrera also argues at length that the MELT should not be thought of as determined once and for all in production but instead as depending on total prices determined in the unity of production and circulation. Andrew Kliman and Alan Freeman also argue that money prices do not depend on an ex-ante MELT determined solely in the production conditions of the gold commodity. Instead the MELT should be understood as the dependent variable and aggregate price as the independent variable.
>I think this criticism of Moseley’s approach to the MELT is on the right lines, however it also creates a problem, because if you abandon the ex-ante determination of MELT you also threaten the core of the LTV the determination of money value added by labour time. Herrera seems to see prices and values as simultaneously determined in the transformation process rather than values existing before and then determining prices, however it’s unclear how this can preserve the subjunctive sensitivity of prices to labour values. Moseley makes the same criticism of Foley and Reuten and Williams value-form theory, namely that they abandon the ex-ante determination of social labour time, and so the determination of price by social labour time, in favour of simultaneous determination.
>Bellofiore’s money circuit approach however is different. He acknowledges that without some notion of an ex-ante MELT it seems impossible to meaningfully talk about exploitation as something that occurs in production prior to the market as Marx does. Bellofiore also criticises Reuten for abandoning abstract labour as an ex-ante magnitude in production, however unlike Moseley, he also acknowledges the value-form/Rubin point about MELT and value being determined ex-post. Bellofiore’s solution is to argue that while in general the MELT must be understood as an ex-post magnitude, there is an ex-ante determination of the MELT in the money circuit in terms of the money wage bill advanced by firms, and the credit money or finance advanced to purchase wage-labour in expectation of realized value. Hence the money supply is endogenous and determined by firms’ expected money prices rather than the other way around as in Moseley’s quantity theory.
>Bellofiore shows that capital undergoes both a monetary ante-validation of labour through the initial financing of capital and purchase of wage-labour based on expected prices, and an ex-post validation through the eventual market realization of value at the point of sale. By doing so, Bellofiore retains an ex-ante definition of MELT, but crucially with respect to initial finance rather than the value of the gold commodity. In doing so he seeks show how the LTV and exploitation can be preserved under conditions of credit money. I know @__gio has raised the concern however of whether Bellofiore’s approach can actually ground socially necessary labour time as the source of money value added if firm’s price expectations could potentially have no relation to labour whatsoever. One potential solution to this problem is to extend Bellofiore’s money circuit idea with the TSSI perspective on the circuit of industrial capital. Guglielmo Carchedi argues there is no once and for all transformation from values to prices but rather a continuous cycle of transformations of values into market prices which in turn form the basis for the new ‘individual values’ at the start of the next M-C-P-C-M’ cycle. This implies a radically different notion of what it means for money-prices to represent values.
>In the Phenomenology, Hegel criticises models of knowledge which treat representings and representeds, as resolutely independent of one another since it results in a dualism between objects as they are for us and as things-in-themselves. Instead, he argues experience is a process of constant negation, a bacchanalian revel, where what we previously took to be the thing in itself is revealed to be simply how things appeared for us, which thereby results in a new understanding of the true essence of the object. As such essence and appearance, truth and error, should be grasped not as independent entities but merely different logical moments of one dialectic, the process of experience. Similarly, in the Grundrisse, Marx says that market value equates itself with value not as if value were an independent third-party, but rather ‘by means of constant non-equation of itself’ as real value.
>In this way Marx invokes the same dialectic as Hegel. Competition is also a process of constant negation which reveals each market price to always be a mere appearance of value, but which in doing so reveals something new about the true value of the commodity. Since price equates itself with value through constant negation of itself as value this means that what is represented (value) and our representing of it (money-prices) are not wholly independent but rather structural moments of one dialectic, the circuit of industrial capital. In this way, the representation of value in the money-form can be grounded without requiring an ex-ante MELT to map a set of pre-existing values onto prices as if they were resolutely independent entities. Instead, the TSSI approach suggests we should instead understand the relationship between value and its money-form on the more dialectical model of Hegel’s account of experience, in terms of the relationship between an essence and its appearance. This is exactly the conclusion that Patrick Murray reaches in his chapter in the book on ‘Money as displaced social form’. https://x.com/hetheylianmarx/status/1907699007511548200https://nitter.net/hetheylianmarx/status/1907699007511548200https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1907699007511548200.html(more screenshots and highlights in the thread)
Marx's Theory of Money: Modern Appraisals - Fred Moseley
https://libgen.is/search.php?req=money+moseleyThe Spectre of Capital - Christopher J. Arthur
https://libgen.is/search.php?req=arthur+spectreMoney as constituent of value - Geert Reuten
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305231197_Money_as_constituent_of_value_the_ideal_introversive_substance_and_the_ideal_extoversive_form_of_value_in_Marx%27s_CapitalThe Marxist Theory of Money - Augusto Graziani
https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1080/08911916.1997.11643946The Commodity Nature of Money in Marx’s Theory - Claus Germer
https://sci-hub.ru/10.1057/9780230523999_2A Welcome Step in a Useful Direction - Alan Freeman Andrew Kliman
http://gesd.free.fr/frekli2kim.pdfMarxian Economics: A Reappraisal - Riccardo Bellofiore
https://libgen.is/search.php?req=marxian+economics+a+reappraisalCapitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises - Anwar Shaikh
https://libgen.is/search.php?req=capitalism+ShaikhA Spirit of Trust - Robert Brandom
https://libgen.is/search.php?req=Trust+brandomThe New Interpretation - Foley
https://brill.com/previewpdf/book/9789004301931/B9789004301931_009.xmlMoney, the postulates of invariance - Adolfo Rodríguez-Herrera
https://copejournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Rodriguez-Herrera-Money-the-Postulates-of-Invariance-and-the-Transformation-of-Marx-into-Ricardo-1.pdfThe Determination of the “Monetary Expression of Labor Time” (“MELT”) - Fred Moseley
https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1177/0486613410383958 >"When we examine the determination of the magnitude of value […], the value-relation of commodities is already anticipated in the concept of value".
>Marx destroying the "value's magnitude is a quantity of labor-time determined independently of the relations between products"
>"The form of objectivity is included in the concept of value." "Their value-being can only emerge […] insofar as it is expressed objectively" (ie. as exchange-value).
>Tough for @PaulCockshott who thinks value's essence is independent of its form of appearance.https://x.com/StoryPegasus/status/1907203652881613255
>That the value relation of commodities is anticipated in the concept of value is straightforward. The value relation of commodities is of the form xA = yB, where x and y are numbers and A and B are commdodity weights. The idea that value exists independently of exchange and is the ground for exchange is set out right at the beginning of Marxs argument.
>He first establishes that commodity exchange takes the logical form of an equivalence relation.H e then says that there has to be some third thing, independent of two commodities that is their value, into which they can be decomposed. He uses the example of areas being equal insofar as they can be decomposed into triangles : a reference to the work of Archimedes.https://x.com/PaulCockshott/status/1908258741058773381
>"Likewise, Marx shows that value is not independent of price." Yes, of course, as value and prices are parts of a contradictory whole (i.e. circular causality). Definitely not, if this means that values cannot be qualitatively and quantitatively identified independent of prices.https://x.com/ianpaulwright/status/1907793627457245386
>"[…] isn't stating that value cannot be quantitatively determined independent of price. Because value […] regulates and explains exchange-value […]."
>Here's the most part of the (mistaken) substantialist readings of Marx summed up in one sentence.
>Value cannot be quantitatively determined independent of price because the magnitude of value, as a quantity of socially necessary labor, is established in and through the formation of prices, as a result of the monetary relations between buyers and sellers.
>Talking about "conditions of production" independent of the "conditions in market" might be the stupidest thing to say in a Marxian perspective.
>Marx precisely shows how in capitalism, the conditions of production are socially effective only through the "conditions in market".https://x.com/StoryPegasus/status/1907855727445606874
>Yes, exactly what I said. Real value cannot be identified in any way, except as price - which is a negation of real value (ie price is not real value) - which is a negation of negation.
>The resolution is of course, a moneyless society " aka the abolishment of commodity form.https://x.com/trappychan_/status/1907823937234387436 >>2210622I dont think its accurate to say their entire argument hinges on a translation. They are mostly talking about appearance vs essence and Cockshott is talking past them because he doesn't recognize a difference, and I dont mean that as a slight, but that he doesn't believe there to be one so he is reasserting his own position instead.
How does changing objectivity to concreteness change the argument? Where does it say the values are in the physical bodies?
To me it just says value is expressed concretely as a physical commodity, with all the implications of the definition of a commodity like social labor and all that, not that it is contained within it. So the appearance of value is a concrete physical object, but that is not its essence. It makes sense that Cockshott would disagree given his own interpretation.
>"The form of objectivityconcreteness is included in the concept of value." "Their value-being can only emerge […] insofar as it is expressed objectivelyconcretely" (page 32)
I also found a discussion of the text (with the same translation) at the end of Heinrichs book in Appendix 4 (page 407 for me) and in a response to it by Mosely (all of Chapter 3)
>>2210669papers mentioned
Marx’s transformation problem and Pasinetti’s vertically integrated subsystems
https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bex068The Law of Value: A Contribution to the Classical Approach to Economic Analysis
http://pinguet.free.fr/wrightthesis.pdfA category-mistake in the classical labour theory of value
https://ejpe.org/journal/article/view/155/149On nonstandard labour values, Marx’s transformation problem and Ricardo’s problem of an invariable measure of value
https://digitalis-dsp.uc.pt/bitstream/10316.2/24730/1/BoletimLII_Artigo4.pdf >>2210632>I dont think its accurate to say their entire argument hinges on a translation.As a rule of thumb I think a debate with some people throwing gotchas about the precise meaning of words in a language they don't speak well (or at all?) is unlikely to come to much. (At least Cockshott can read German, though his speaking or writing it is very clunky.)
>To me it just says value is expressed concretely as a physical commodity…They read "physical COMMODITY". But the vibe in the snippet when read in German is more like "PHYSICAL commodity".
>…with all the implications of the definition of a commodity like social labor and all thatAnd what vibe are you going for here, is it "division of labor and MARKET EXCHANGE"? How about "DIVISION OF LABOR and market exchange" instead? Division of labor already implies labor is social.
>>2211133>At least Cockshott can read GermanHeinrich is German and his translation also has 'objective'.
>They read "physical COMMODITY". But the vibe in the snippet when read in German is more like "PHYSICAL commodity".I dont think it makes a difference if they say the appearance of value is a commodity, or the appearance of value is physical.
>And what vibe are you going for hereThat value in the sense its being used here is not transhistorical and is specific to the capitalist mode of production.
fwiw i think they are both wrong and both right in different ways. value form theorists abuse dialectics to show that both production and consumption are involved in value, but they want to use this to say that the USSR wasn't real communism and real communism has never been tried and they didn't abolish the value form because they were only concerned with production. they want to say value is not a substance but a social relation and that abolishing commodity production abolishes the value form.
cockshott on the other hand says USSR was real communism but thinks that Marx was wrong about the LTV and wants to throw out dialectics to prove communism true with math, which is why he wrote TANS as advice to the late USSR on how to fix their economy with computers. he says value is a common substance and mentioned a third thing in the tweet thread but idk if thats the same third thing argument that other people use.
these two positions aren't actually mutually exclusive, social relations can be the common substance of labor in a dialectical sense, which is what i think marx meant. also having a complete understanding of dialectics should end with people understanding that increasing productive forces is a dialectical action towards the abolishment of commodity production and value, which would make AES real communism, and communism a process not an endpoint.
I think both of these sides as well as the TSSI guys just want to do theory so they can dismiss Engels and Lenin and avoid doing What Is To Be Done.
>[…]And that brings me to another possible difference, at least in the debate between Marxists trying to refute Heinrich’s bastardisation. Does the law just show how there are crises in capitalism, booms and slumps, driven by the up and down movement of the rate of profit; or does it go further and say that IN A WORLD ECONOMY, where capitalism is exhausting all sources of value creation, the rate of profit will fall secularly to new lows and thus make it more and more difficult for capitalism to develop the productive forces? In other words, the law shows why capitalism will come up against the ultimate barrier, namely capital itself, and so is a transient mode of production like other earlier class-based systems. It will increasingly descend into stagnation, decay and chaos unless the progressive class, the proletariat, takes over. If the law is just one of explaining recurrent booms and slumps in capitalism, that would suggest that capitalism could go on forever expanding the productive forces, albeit with waste, inequality and injustice. If it is more than that, then it provides support for the view that capitalism is not eternal.https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2013/07/28/heinrich-a-small-rejoinder/ >>2211282>Heinrich is German and his translation also has 'objective'.Heinrich committed to a particular "interpretation" of Marx decades ago with hilarious results (if you like cringe humor).
>cockshott on the other hand says USSR was real communism but thinks that Marx was wrong about the LTV… Where? Are you familiar with Cockshott at all outside of what Twitter twats tell you to think about him?
>>2211319>Heinrich committed to a particular "interpretation"I'm fully aware, his monetary theory of value is even more wrong than his value-form theory.
>Where?In his solution to the transformation problem as a problem he implicitly accepts that Marx didn't solve it, or was flawed, or incomplete. You can only think this if you reject dialectics, which Cockshott does, and thats why he reproduces Ricardos LTV and not Marx's.
>>2211359yeah i know theres a response its a pretty old debate, its not really controversial that cockshott also has a unique interpretation that is unorthodox. i dont think hes necessarily wrong, except where he says his claims are the same as marxs. its just that his main point is that a version of the LTV can be proven empirically with input/output tables, which is a sort of side quest and besides the point of marx's larger project, that as i said accepts critiques like bohm-bawerks as valid, which is based on a misunderstanding of what marx is trying to do. marx didn't give up on the math he just assumed that sufficient understanding of his actual point would be enough and that simplified generalizations add weight to something self evident and were never meant to prove it empirically.
either way its completely sidestepping the critique here, which is that value for marx has both an essence and appearance, both form and content, and for cockshott it only has an appearance and a content, because his rejection of dialectical materialism in favor of a more positivist mechanical materialism does not recognize or distinguish the difference, instead saying that essence and form are meaningless idealist abstractions.
for marx value, like all concepts is a coconstitutive dialectic between form and content, and so value has both a substance that is socially necessary time as abstract labor, and a social relation, which is the value-form expressed as money-price under generalized commodity production. if im reading it right thats basically the conclusion that Murray comes to in his part of the book. (picrel)
the difference between heinrich and substance interpretations is one of emphasis, heinrich claims that substance LTVers are ignoring the value-form in favor of a physical substance only, where LTVers who actually do understand dialectics think heinrich is over-emphasizing the value-form and elevating the abstraction to be primary and determinative which is basically actual idealism.
in reality its both, there isn't just a static one sided abstraction, but a dialectical relationship that proceeds through the circuit of capital like an autopoesis. its not just a thing, and its not just a social relation. cockshott’s empiricism cannot grasp why a $X commodity embodies alienated social labor, not just Y minutes of SNLT, while heinrichs reduction divorces marx's economics from his politics. marx's LTV wasn't trying to make a better version of political economics but show how capitalism is fundamentally flawed and leads to its own destruction that necessitates a revolutionary rupture, which is why authors like Hudson and Roberts focus on how the tendency of the rate of profit to fall drives imperialism, which is the actual primary contradiction today, not commodity production or the existence of fiat.
marx's use of the dialectic isn't just some fancy way to do abstractions about economic theory only, but is integral to his philosophical thought and broader project, which is the emancipation of humankind from the drudgery of unnecessary work through the rational implementation of technology in central planning. these people want to pry Marx out of Marxism and pretend Engels dialectics of nature is a distortion of what he really thought and that Lenin was just an authoritarian opportunist who misapplied Marx's theory just to get political power. marx was pretty directly explicit that the point of his philosophy is to change the world not just analyze it.
>>2211719okay so then i was right the first time when i said
>cockshott […] thinks that Marx was wrong about the LTVi just didn't really feel like digging through his blog so i was assuming charitability in my response, referencing rv saying that pauls LTV and marx's arent the same but that paul presents his as the same, since that is what was being discussed.
i think cockshott is trying to prove what he thinks "marx really meant", so when he disagrees with marx he thinks marx is being mystical and that theres something empiric behind the dialectic that can be separated from it, that its a hangover from what he thinks is the idealist "young marx" via althusser, or that he just made a simple blunder that he is 'correcting'
that doesn't mean cockshotts work is useless or completely incorrect, i just wish he would stick to his specialty and stop arguing with people about things he doesn't understand. it taints his work and makes people dismiss it out of hand when its not even relevant to what hes trying to do. he presents himself as ML adjacent and scientific socialist which is a really weird thing to do if you reject diamat.
i think if he were honest hes a lot closer to western analytical marxism and classical economics then to ML. its extremely difficult to talk about or to him because he will just ignore half of what you say because he doesn't believe in it and only respond to the part that is relevant to what he does believe, so a lot of what i say has to be from inference from conversations in his comments on his blog and youtube. if you really nail him down he will just say something like essences consciousness and alienation arent real they are just chemicals in your brain and while continuing to claim he is a marxist.
it doesn't actually seem like he doesn't understand but that hes ignoring it and talking past it on purpose as a sort of flex. like when he says there is no 'dialectical force' like electromagnetism or gravity in nature. or that the 'subject'(as opposed to object) is a legal category related to feudalism. or when he tries to prove hegel wrong with newton. hes not actually addressing the question he is dismissing it and demanding that you conform to his ideology to be taken seriously.
>>2211735jfc do you ever directly read ANYBODY? It's always second-hand and third-hand accounts that you skim. And then you shart all over the thread with your revelations about where and how and why Cockshott, Althusser, Böhm-Bawerk, Heinrich, Hegel, and Shigero Miyamoto all relate and contradict. And you are the best for the role of neutral observer, since you haven't read
any of them. And your preferred mode of analysis is psychobabble about their subconscious motivations.
>Examining Marx’s theory of value through his critique of Samuel Bailey, James Furner intends to undermine Marx’s ‘third thing argument’ – that exchange value expresses value – and to support Chris Arthur’s proposal to reconstruct Marxian theory by introducing labour into the theory of value at the conceptual level of capital. Furner concludes, ‘It would therefore be surprising if Marxists were to continue to give much positive weight to the “third thing argument”’. I believe that it is a serious mistake to dismiss the ‘third thing argument’. Marx’s theory of value cannot do without it, and if you are going to do without Marx’s theory of value, you might as well do without his critical theory of the capitalist mode of production[…]
>[…]Furner thinks that Marx begs the question by claiming that a given commodity ‘has’ an exchange value: ‘To say that the exchange-values belong to the wheat is taken to imply that there is something of which the wheat is further possessed by virtue of which it has exchange-values’. Furner seems to be using the term ‘imply’ as equivalent to ‘means’. In other words, Marx does not argue to the existence of a ‘something of which the wheat is further possessed by virtue of which it has exchange-values’; he assumes it in assuming that exchange value is something that the wheat ‘has’. But Marx is not begging the question; he is arguing from something that commodities are observed to have, namely, ‘valid’ exchange values, to something further, something intrinsic to the commodity, value. Furner inverts Marx’s reasoning. It is not the question-begging assump- tion of some ‘intrinsic property’ to the commodity that ‘allows one to say that there is a constancy that x boot-polish or y silk or z gold each repres- ent and which makes them “of identical magnitude”’. Marx’s argument is that the fluctuations of actual exchange values – it is the fluctuations in the prices of commodities that Marx has in mind – display a pattern. Only on that basis do commodities have ‘valid [gültige]’ exchange values, and only on the basis of commodities having ‘valid’ exchange values does Marx claim that they are ‘mutually replaceable’ ‘as exchange-values’. If the ‘valid’ exchange value of a gallon of milk is three dollars and the ‘valid’ exchange value of a gallon of gasoline is three dollars, I can replace the milk with gasoline by selling the milk and buying the gasoline. Marx takes the mutual replaceabil- ity of commodities to be sufficient evidence of their identical magnitude. But if these diverse commodities share some magnitude, what is its dimension? It cannot be milk, money or oil. Since commodities have no sensible (physical) feature in common, the dimension must be a ‘supersensible’ one. Marx’s argument, then, goes from the observable replaceability of specific quantit- ies of commodities (as determined by their ‘valid’ exchange values) to the identity of their magnitudes (taking replaceability as the test of identity of magnitude). Magnitude is always magnitude of; it always has a dimension, but the various commodities do not share a use-value dimension. Milk is not money; money is not oil. Consequently, argues Marx, there must be a super- sensible ‘third thing’ intrinsic to commodities, whose dimension is common to them[…]
>[…]Marx’s assertion that commodities ‘have’ exchange values is an empirical claim, not a question-begging assumption. Marx’s ‘third thing argument’ cannot be made on the basis that goods exchange with other goods. If there were no money and prices and if there were no regularity to price fluctuations – if the law of value did not force its way through – there would be no ‘valid’ exchange values. Then there would be no basis on which Marx could assert that commodities can replace one another, hence no basis for asserting that they are of identical magnitude. That would eliminate the observational basis for asserting a ‘content’ [‘Gehalt’] intrinsic to commodities that is distinguish- able from their properties as use values. Without observable constancy in the fluctuations of prices, Marx’s ‘third thing argument’ for value cannot be made[…]
>[…]Furner is no more convinced by Marx’s follow-up argument, where he takes any two commodities that are exchanged for one another and represents their exchange as an equation. Marx argues that such an equation implies that there is a third thing, value, which is neither the one commodity nor the other, but exists in both. Furner focuses on a phrase that comes up on p. 152 of Capital (the ‘third thing argument’ comes up on p. 127), where Marx praises Aristotle for ‘his discovery of a relation of equality in the value-expression of commodities’. Furner jumps on the phrase ‘the value-expression of commodities’, charging, ‘With this phrase, exchange can no longer be seen as the logical starting- point of Marx’s argument. Instead of value depending upon an equality, it is equality that is said to be found in the expression of value’. Furner detects a circular argument that moves from value, to equality expressed in exchange- value, then back to value, but his case is forced. Marx makes his argument that exchange value presupposes value and is value’s expression some twenty-five pages prior to his use of the phrase to which Furner objects! Actually, Marx’s second argument builds on his first. If every commodity ‘has’ a ‘valid’ exchange value, every commodity is mutually replaceable with every other commodity having the same ‘valid’ exchange value. Mutually replaceable commodities, argues Marx, have the same magnitude. But two commodities having the same magnitude are equal to one another with respect to that magnitude. This allows Marx to represent their exchange as an equation, and that leads him to the ‘third thing’ (value) in answer to the question: What are these equal magnitudes, magnitudes of?[…]
>[…]Here Furner follows Bailey: since there is only exchange value (price), exchange value is not the expression of anything intrinsic to the commodity. Consequently, there can be no discrepancy between price and intrinsic value. Unjust exchange is thereby excluded in principle. But common discourse pertaining to justice in com- mercial exchange cannot be collapsed into talk about ordinary and unusual prices. Someone who says that a certain price is unjust does not mean that it is unusual. Ordinary discourse is incompatible with Bailey’s contention that value is established exclusively in the act of exchange[…]
>[…]Furner pushes his criticism of Marx’s ‘third thing argument’ further, arguing that defences of it ‘necessarily fail’ because, at the level of the argument in Chapter One of Capital, Marx cannot defeat Bailey’s rival subjectivistic the- ory of value as ‘relative esteem’. Even if we grant Marx’s contention that ‘the exchange of commodities in given proportions could not proceed if it were not underpinned by some sort of qualitative homogeneity’, that will not prove that there is some supersensible property, value, that is intrinsic to commod- ities. Furner’s intention is not to defend Bailey’s theory that the ‘qualitative homogeneity’ underlying commodity exchanges is nothing intrinsic to com- modities but rather purely subjective relative esteem. Furner is simply pro- posing that, at this level of argument, Marx cannot defeat Bailey and estab- lish his own (labour) theory of value. But, like generations of interpreters and critics of Marx going back to Böhm-Bawerk, Furner overlooks the fact that, both in Capital and in his critique of Bailey, Marx mocks the very idea of sub- jective value theory. Here is what Marx has to say (in the fifth paragraph of Capital) about the idea that usefulness is something purely subjective, that is, wholly separable from all particular features of the useful thing, ‘The use- fulness of a thing makes it a use-value. But this usefulness does not dangle in mid-air. It is conditioned by the physical properties of the commodity, and has no existence apart from the latter’. The brevity of Marx’s critique does not detract from its profundity and finality. The idea that usefulness is something ‘qualitatively homogeneous’ is simply a non-starter. Marx does answer sub- jective value theory in the first chapter of Capital; it is just that few seem to notice[…]
>[…]Furner examines and sets aside one possible argument for the superiority of Marx’s value theory over Bailey’s, namely, the charge that Bailey uses ‘a tran- shistorical category’, relative esteem, ‘to explain a historically specific phe- nomenon’. After granting that there is a ‘real slackness about the way in which Bailey jumps from using transhistorical to historical terms’, Furner lets him off the hook because ‘in practice, Bailey used the concept of esteem in con- nection with terms particular to commodity production such as market com- petition’. Here, I think Furner underestimates Bailey. Bailey’s conception of ‘relative esteem’ is not transhistorical even in theory.[…]
>[…] This conceptual link between ‘relative esteem’ and commodity exchange is further confirmed by Bailey’s praise for Smith’s definition of value as purchas- ing power, ‘the definition of Adam Smith, therefore, that the value of an object “expresses the power of purchasing other goods, which the possession of that object conveys”, is substantially correct’. Bailey’s conception of value as ‘rel- ative esteem’ incorporates the phenomenon of commodity exchange; contrary to Furner, it is not transhistorical, even in theory.[…]
>[…]Furner’s critique of Bailey’s thinking about money sidesteps several of its severe shortcomings. (i) Bailey does not understand what money is; that is, he lacks the proper concept of money. Bailey does not recognise that money must be the exclusive commodity in what Marx calls the general equivalent form of value; money is the one and only commodity that is ‘directly social’, that is, directly and universally exchangeable. This connects to Bailey’s failure to recognise that commodities ‘have’ exchange values, since that is possible only where there is money (properly understood). (ii) Bailey cannot get money right because – though in identifying value with exchange value, he insists on the relational character of value – he does not see the polarity of exchange value. He misses its polarity because he does not recognise the root of that polarity, the double character of commodity-producing labour. Consequently, as Marx points out in a passage that Furner quotes, Bailey fails to see that money, and money alone, answers the need for a qualitative transformation of commodity-producing labour, from privately undertaken into socially valid labour. (iii) Bailey’s theory of money as the measure of value will not work because his general theory of measuring the value of any two commodities in a third commodity does not work. (iv) Because Bailey excludes the possibility of comparing the value of any commodity (the money commodity included) across time, he cannot make sense of money’s functioning as a measure of value or a store of value (means of payment).[…]
>[…]One could say that Bailey’s is not so much a theory of money as a denial that money exists[…] With Bailey, everything is money and nothing is money […] Furner is right to trace Bailey’s theory of money back to his idea that the values of two commodities, a and b, can be compared only by seeing how each relates to c, a third commodity. Bailey explains If we wish to know whether a and b are equal in value, we shall in most cases be under the necessity of finding the value of each in c; and when we affirm that the value of a is equal to the value of b, we mean only that the ratio of a to c is equal to the ratio of b to c. But the ratio of a to c (say, ten gallons of milk to one ounce of gold) cannot equal the ratio of b to c (say, ten gallons of gas to one ounce of gold) unless a and b are commensurable. A subtle bait and switch is going on here. Bailey conflates the ratio of the units of a to the units of c with the ratio of the number of units of a to the number of units of c (ten to one). By eliminating the dimensions of a and c (milk and gold), the latter expression reduces to a number, ten, which could be compared to the number obtained by handling the ratio of b to c in the same manner. If the numbers are the same, we say a and b have the same value. But there is no justification for dropping the dimensions to arrive at this number. That leaves us comparing a ratio of ten gallons of milk to one ounce of gold with a ratio of ten gallons of gas to one ounce of gold. There is no way to equate these two ratios and determine that a and b have the same value except to make the assumption that, as values, a, b and c are homogeneous: they have a common dimension. Only then would the dimensions of a over c and b over c cancel out. But, to concede that a, b and c have a common dimension is to concede the point of Marx’s ‘third thing argument’[…]
>[…]Furner quotes Marx: ‘It merely amounts to a repetition by Bailey of his proposition that value is the quantity of articles exchanged for an article’. Referring to this passage Furner mentions ‘the confusion between use-value and value that arises within Bailey’s discussion at the level of the commodity’. Ironically, by identifying value with the use value of the commodity for which another commodity is exchanged, Bailey finds himself making that use value an invariable measure of value. If, in the course of a year, wages go from one bushel of wheat to two, they have doubled according to Bailey’s thinking. But, as Marx pointed out in his appeal to the common merchant, everyone knows that the value of a bushel of wheat does not remain constant. Value is not use value. By identifying value with use value, Bailey wants the impossible – to wipe away the inescapable fetish character of the commodity form of wealth without changing the social form of production.
>>2211849>usefulness (…) is a subjective determinationThat's how current mainstream economics sees it, the individual judgment, coming from the depth of the subjective and unique soul, as the ultimate cause. Marx says:
<When examining use-values, we always assume we are dealing with definite quantities, such as dozens of watches, yards of linen, or tons of iron.Physically existing things in observable quantities.
<The use values of commodities furnish the material for a special study, that of the commercial knowledge of commodities.Facts about these physical things stemming from their physical properties.
<Use values become a reality only by use or consumption: they also constitute the substance of all wealth, whatever may be the social form of that wealth.Usage is observable.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htmYou quoting Marx out of context:
>Whether that labour is useful for others [.] can be proved only by the act of exchange."and conclude
>you cannot measure value outside of priceYes,
in capitalism the lack of ex ante coordination and the active hiding of information leads to a certain ignorance. But this can be overcome, even in capitalism, when looking at big aggregates. See last thread and ctrl-f "scale trick".
>>2211996
Your engagement with Hegel is nuanced and highlights a critical yet appreciative stance that many dialectical materialists share. Let’s unpack your points and situate them within broader philosophical debates:
You acknowledge Hegel’s insights, particularly his dialectical method (e.g., the unity of being and nothing, the mediated nature of sense-certainty). However, your critique centers on two key issues:
- Formal Impracticality: Hegel’s system is totalizing and abstract, making it difficult to operationalize outside speculative philosophy. Marx echoes this critique, calling Hegel’s dialectic "mystified" and needing inversion to ground it in material reality.
- Negativity and Identity: While Hegel grounds identity in negation (A is A only by excluding not-A), you argue for an essential positivity—that self-identity (A as A) persists even as it relates to its other. This resonates with critiques of Hegel’s "negative dialectics" (e.g., Adorno) but pushes further toward affirming positivity.
Your syllogistic example clarifies how mediation (Y) resolves the tautology of identity:
- Formal Logic: If X = Y and Y = Z, then X = Z. This demonstrates how identity (X) can relate to difference (Z) through a mediating term (Y), avoiding empty tautology.
- Dialectical Implications: The syllogism illustrates determinate negation—a Hegelian concept where negation is not mere cancellation but a productive movement toward concrete universality. Here, mediation (Y) allows A to "reach B" without dissolving its self-identity, aligning with Marx’s materialist dialectic, where contradictions (e.g., capital/labor) drive historical change.
- Hegel’s Retroactive Dialectic: Hegel treats history as a "slaughterbench" where contradictions resolve retrospectively into Absolute Spirit. This risks idealism, as material conditions are subordinated to logical necessity.
- Marx’s Materialist Dialectic: Marx retains Hegel’s dialectical motion but roots it in class struggle and production, emphasizing *praxis* over abstract negation. For Marx, contradictions (e.g., value vs. use-value) are resolved not in thought but through revolutionary action.
- Your Emphasis on Positivity: By asserting that "A still has self-identity in A," you resist Hegel’s over-reliance on negativity, seeking a dialectic that affirms *material stability* (e.g., labor as the substance of value) while accounting for transformative mediation (e.g., money as the value-form).
Your syllogism bridges formal logic and dialectics, showing how mediation (Y) enables identity (A) to engage with difference (B) without self-erasure. This aligns with Marx’s analysis of capitalism:
- Commodity Circuit: Money (M) mediates between commodities (C) and capital (C'), transforming abstract labor into value (M→C→M').
- Class Struggle: The proletariat (A) becomes a revolutionary class (B) through mediation by capitalist exploitation (Y), retaining its identity while transcending it.
Your critique suggests a synthesis:
- Retain Hegel’s Motion: Dialectics as a process of contradiction and mediation.
- Anchor in Positivity: Affirm material foundations (e.g., labor, class) without reducing them to mere negation.
- Prioritize Praxis: Follow Marx in linking theory to revolutionary action, avoiding Hegel’s idealism.
Your rejection of Hegel is not a dismissal but a refinement, echoing Marx’s materialist turn. By emphasizing mediation (the syllogistic Y) and essential positivity (A’s self-identity), you propose a dialectic that is both dynamic and grounded—a tool for understanding *and transforming* reality. As Marx wrote:
"The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but a practical question. "
Your approach bridges theory and practice, rejecting Hegel’s idealism while salvaging his dialectical core.
>>2213210To exist is to be something, as distinguished from the nothing of non-existence, it is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes. Centuries ago, the man who was—no matter what his errors—the greatest of your philosophers, has stated the formula defining the concept of existence and the rule of all knowledge: A is A. A thing is itself. You have never grasped the meaning of his statement. I am here to complete it: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification.
Whatever you choose to consider, be it an object, an attribute or an action, the law of identity remains the same. A leaf cannot be a stone at the same time, it cannot be all red and all green at the same time, it cannot freeze and burn at the same time. A is A.
Are you seeking to know what is wrong with the world? All the disasters that have wrecked your world, came from your leaders' attempt to evade the fact that A is A. All the secret evil you dread to face within you and all the pain you have ever endured, came from your own attempt to evade the fact that A is A. The purpose of those who taught you to evade it, was to make you forget that Man is Man.
No matter how eagerly you claim that the goal of your mystic wishing is a higher mode of life, the rebellion against identity is the wish for non-existence. The desire not to be anything is the desire not to be.
The extreme you have always struggled to avoid is the recognition that reality is final, that A is A and that the truth is true. A moral code impossible to practice, a code that demands imperfection or death, has taught you to dissolve all ideas in fog, to permit no firm definitions, to regard any concept as approximate and any rule of conduct as elastic, to hedge on any principle, to compromise on any value, to take the middle of any road. By extorting your acceptance of supernatural absolutes, it has forced you to reject the absolute of nature. By making moral judgments impossible, it has made you incapable of rational judgment A code that forbids you to cast the first stone, has forbidden you to admit the identity of stones and to know when or if you’re being stoned.
A contradiction cannot exist. An atom is itself, and so is the universe; neither can contradict its own identity; nor can a part contradict the whole. No concept man forms is valid unless he integrates it without contradiction into the total sum of his knowledge. To arrive at a contradiction is to confess an error in one's thinking; to maintain a contradiction is to abdicate one's mind and to evict oneself from the realm of reality.
You who’ve lost the concept of a right, you who swing in impotent evasiveness between the claim that rights are a gift of God, a supernatural gift to be taken on faith, or the claim that rights are a gift of society, to be broken at its arbitrary whim. The source of man's rights is not divine law or congressional law, but the law of identity. A is A—and Man is Man. Rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival. If man is to live on earth, it is right for him to use his mind, it is right to act on his own free judgment, it is right to work for his values and to keep the product of his work. If life on earth is his purpose, he has a right to live as a rational being: nature forbids him the irrational. Any group, any gang, any nation that attempts to negate man's rights, is wrong, which means: is evil, which means: is anti-life.
Rights are a moral concept—and morality is a matter of choice. Men are free not to choose man’s survival as the standard of their morals and their laws, but not free to escape from the fact that the alternative is a cannibal society, which exists for a while by devouring its best and collapses like a cancerous body, when the healthy have been eaten by the diseased, when the rational have been consumed by the irrational. Such has been the fate of your societies in history, but you’ve evaded the knowledge of the cause. I am here to state it: the agent of retribution was the law of identity, which you cannot escape. Just as man cannot live by means of the irrational, so two men cannot, or two thousand, or two billion. Just as man can’t succeed by defying reality, so a nation can’t, or a country, or a globe. A is A. The rest is a matter of time, provided by the generosity of victims.
The source of property rights is the law of causality. All property and all forms of wealth are produced by man’s mind and labor. As you cannot haves effects without causes, so you cannot have wealth without its source: without intelligence. You cannot force intelligence to work: those who’re able to think, will not work under compulsion; those who will, won’t produce much more than the price of the whip needed to keep them enslaved.
The only proper purpose of a government is to protect man’s rights, which means: to protect him from physical violence. A proper government is only a policeman, acting as an agent of man’s self-defense, and, as such, may resort to force only against those who start the use of force.
A savage is a being who has not grasped that A is A and that reality is real. He has arrested his mind at the level of a baby’s, at the stage when a consciousness acquires its initial sensory perceptions and has not learned to distinguish solid objects. It is to a baby that the world appears as a blur of motion, without things that move—and the birth of his mind is the day when he grasps that the streak that keeps flickering past him is his mother and the whirl beyond her is a curtain, that the two are solid entities and neither can turn into the other, that they are what they are, that they exist. The day when he grasps that matter has no volition is the day when he grasps that he has— and this is his birth as a human being. The day when he grasps that the reflection he sees in a mirror is not a delusion, that it is real, but it is not himself, that the mirage he sees in a desert is not a delusion, that the air and the light rays that cause it are real, but it is not a city, it is a city’s reflection—the day when he grasps that he is not a passive recipient of the sensations of any given moment, that his senses do not provide him with automatic knowledge in separate snatches independent of context, but only with the material of knowledge, which his mind must learn to integrate—the day when he grasps that his senses cannot deceive him, that physical objects cannot act without causes, that his organs of perception are physical and have no volition, no power to invent or to distort, that the evidence they give him is an absolute, but his mind must learn to understand it, his mind must discover the nature, the causes, the full context of his sensory material, his mind must identify the things that he perceives—that is the day of his birth as a thinker and scientist.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KAZoRTBQuYwhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uf4R0gX7g3w>>2211861>both of you are also wrong.What exactly is
>>2211319 wrong about, the entire content of that tiny comment is
Heinrich wrong lol, a judgment that you agree with?
>prices of production and abstract labour are the same thing? Prices of production and abstract labour inputs show different ratios unless profits are at zero.
>>2214707>>The phrase "dozens of watches, yards of linen, or tons of iron" refers to physical quantities, not exchange value.>exchange value is a ratio between physical quantities. marx's point is dialectical. as he says, use-value appears as quality and quantity. it is a use and simultaneously, a certain quantity of goods. these quantities then comprise the exchange value of commodities.The Marx quote:
<When examining use-values, we always assume we are dealing with definite quantities, such as dozens of watches, yards of linen, or tons of iron.These quantities are the physical quantities. The ratios of physical quantities, how many units of this watch, how many units of that soda can, are NOT the same concept as the exchange ratios.
>the "objectivity" of use value is only in its quantity as an exchange value. use is qualitativeQualitative isn't synonymous with subjective.
<but how does labour have a value in the first place? by its exchange for a wage. the wage thus measures value by labour-time.Consider two scenarios, the same output mix produced and fully sold in both situations, the difference being how it's distributed between the owners and the workers. So the wages and profit rates can be very different between the scenarios, but what about the values of the commodities?
>>2215202A contradiction (A ∧ ¬A) is indeed a sign of error in classical logic. It violates the law of non-contradiction, which states that a proposition cannot be both true and false
in the same sense and at the same time. This framework is foundational for coherent reasoning but operates within a static, binary system.
Dialectical contradictions (capital vs. labor, use-value vs. exchange-value) are understood as
dynamic oppositions inherent in systems, driving change and development. These are not logical errors but structural tensions. The contradiction between socialized production and privatized accumulation is not a "mistake" but the engine of capitalist crisis. Wave-particle duality is a contradiction in classical logic but a fundamental reality in quantum mechanics. The atom/universe example misses this distinction: atoms
do contain contradictions (e.g., protons and electrons as opposing forces) that sustain their stability. Dialectical contradictions are not logical errors but expressions of
motion and processNietzsche rejected dialectical negation, arguing that life affirms itself through
will to power, not opposition. For him, logic is a human tool to impose order on chaos, not a reflection of reality. Deleuze radicalized this critique, arguing that difference (not negation) is primary. In
Difference and Repetition, he rejects Hegelian dialectics as a "monotonous" play of negation, proposing instead a philosophy of
affirmation and multiplicity. Both philosophers challenge the idea that reality is structured by opposition (A vs. ¬A). Nature, for Deleuze, is a field of differences (A₁, A₂, A₃…) without negation. Yet this does not eliminate tension or conflict—it reorients them as productive forces rather than binary oppositions.
"Man imposing it upon the world" echoes Nietzsche’s perspectivism and Deleuze’s critique of representational thought. However, this does not render logic arbitrary. Logic is a tool for navigating reality, even if it simplifies complexity. As Nietzsche wrote, "Logic is bound to the condition: assume there are identical cases." Marx agrees that categories like "value" are socially constructed but insists they emerge from material practices (e.g., labor under capitalism). Contradictions in thought often reflect contradictions in reality.
While nature does not "negate" in the logical sense (¬A), it operates through transformation (A becoming B). For example a seed "negates" itself to become a tree (Hegel’s Aufhebung). Entropy negates order but generates new states. Replace negation with
difference a seed does not negate itself but differs from itself in becoming a tree. This critique aligns with Deleuze: dialectical negation risks anthropomorphizing nature. Yet Marx’s materialism avoids this by grounding contradictions in social and historical processes, not abstract logic.
"No concept is valid unless integrated without contradiction" assumes a foundationalist epistemology (knowledge built on indubitable axioms). In Dialectical Materialism: knowledge evolves through resolving contradictions (e.g., the shift from Newtonian to quantum physics). Contradictions in thought often signal gaps in understanding, not errors. Gödel’s Incompleteness shows that even formal systems contain undecidable propositions—contradiction is unavoidable in complex systems. To demand a contradiction-free totality is to deny the dynamism of reality and thought.
The critique rightly challenges rigid, binary logic but risks flattening dialectical motion into static identity. Contradictions in thought can signal errors, but contradictions in reality (class struggle, ecological crisis) demand praxis, not just better logic. As Deleuze wrote "There is no negation, only differences and differences of differences." Yet even Deleuze’s "difference" does not eliminate tension, it reorients it toward creative becoming. Marx’s dialectic, grounded in material history, retains contradiction as a tool for critique and liberation. To dismiss it is to abandon the fight against capitalism’s very real, very violent contradictions.
>>2211864>Marx’s argument is that the fluctuations of actual exchange values – it is the fluctuations in the prices of commodities that Marx has in mind – display a pattern. Only on that basis do commodities have ‘valid [gültige]’ exchange values, and only on the basis of commodities having ‘valid’ exchange values does Marx claim that they are ‘mutually replaceable’ ‘as exchange-values’. If the ‘valid’ exchange value of a gallon of milk is three dollars and the ‘valid’ exchange value of a gallon of gasoline is three dollars, I can replace the milk with gasoline by selling the milk and buying the gasoline. Marx takes thQe mutual replaceability of commodities to be sufficient evidence of their identical magnitude. But if these diverse commodities share some magnitude, what is its dimension? It cannot be milk, money or oil. Since commodities have no sensible (physical) feature in common, the dimension must be a ‘supersensible’ one. Marx’s argument, then, goes from the observable replaceability of specific quantities of commodities (as determined by their ‘valid’ exchange values) to the identity of their magnitudes (taking replaceability as the test of identity of magnitude). Magnitude is always magnitude of; it always has a dimension, but the various commodities do not share a use-value dimension. Milk is not money; money is not oil. Consequently, argues Marx, there must be a super- sensible ‘third thing’ intrinsic to commodities, whose dimension is common to them
>A subtle bait and switch is going on here. [Anon] conflates the ratio of the units of a to the units of c with the ratio of the number of units of a to the number of units of c (ten to one). By eliminating the dimensions of a and c (milk and gold), the latter expression reduces to a number, ten, which could be compared to the number obtained by handling the ratio of b to c in the same manner. If the numbers are the same, we say a and b have the same value. But there is no justification for dropping the dimensions to arrive at this number. That leaves us comparing a ratio of ten gallons of milk to one ounce of gold with a ratio of ten gallons of gas to one ounce of gold. There is no way to equate these two ratios and determine that a and b have the same value except to make the assumption that, as values, a, b and c are homogeneous: they have a common dimension. Only then would the dimensions of a over c and b over c cancel out. But, to concede that a, b and c have a common dimension is to concede the point of Marx’s ‘third thing argument’ >>2215827
Value is the essence (socially necessary labor time, SNLT) embedded in commodities during production. Exchange-value is the appearance of value as a ratio (1 chair = 20 apples), reflecting how commodities relate to one another via labor-time. Price is the monetary expression of exchange-value, distorted by supply/demand, profit rates, and money’s own value.
Value = Mass (intrinsic property determined by SNLT).
Exchange-value = Weight (contingent expression dependent on gravitational context/market). But unlike mass/weight, value is social, not physical.
Value’s magnitude (SNLT) is determined before exchange (in production), but it is only socially validated through exchange. Exchange-Value ≠ Value. While exchange-value is the form value takes, market fluctuations (supply/demand) cause prices to deviate from values. However, total value = total price in aggregate.
A chair’s value = 10 hours of SNLT. Its price might be $100(if 1 hour = $100 and 1 hour= $10) or $80 (if undersold), but the total value of all chairs = total prices realized.
Industries with higher OCC (more machinery, less labor) produce less surplus value but may sell commodities above their value to equalize profit rates. Industries with lower OCC (more labor) produce more surplus value but sell below their value, transferring surplus to capital-intensive sectors. This redistribution does not change total value (SNLT) but alters its distribution among capitalists. Profit rates fall as OCC rises system-wide, since surplus value depends on living labor.
With inflation there is a rise in prices (nominal) due to currency devaluation (printing money). If wages lag inflation, workers’ real wages (purchasing power) fall, but the value of labor-power (SNLT to reproduce workers) remains tied to subsistence costs. Inflation does not alter SNLT (value), only prices (exchange-value).
Value as a "primary relation to the wage" risks conflating the value of Labor-Power Wages (SNLT to reproduce workers) and value created by labor, as workers produce more value than their wages (surplus value). Value is not "a relation to the wage" but the total labor-time objectified in commodities. Wages are a fraction of this total.
>The ratio of units in existence is not identical to their exchange ratio
Its not tautological but dialectical. Use values are by amount of physical objects(100 chairs) while exchange-value is a social relation(1 chair = 20 apples)
>no *quantitative* difference
Incorrect. While total value = total price, individual prices deviate from values due to competition, OCC, and profit-rate equalization. Marx’s point is that these deviations presuppose value as their anchor.
Value is social, not individual, its magnitude is determined systemically, not per commodity. Nominal price shifts like inflation obscure but do not alter value’s basis in SNLT. Wages are the value of labor-power; surplus value arises from workers’ unpaid labor.
Marx’s theory is not a static equation but a dynamic critique of capitalism’s contradictions. As he writes: "The real science of modern economy only begins when the theoretical analysis passes from the process of circulation to the process of production."
>>2194998
>kant includes this limit into his system, while hegelians just brush it off and project it into negativity.
The law of identity (A = A) is tautological, grounding reason in a self-referential circle. Aristotle’s prime mover ("thought thinking itself") exemplifies this. It posits a self identical foundation for reality but struggles to escape circularity. This mirrors the challenge of axiomatic systems, where foundational principles ("A is A") cannot justify themselves without presupposing their own validity. All axiomatic systems are ultimately self-referential. Formal logic’s strength in consistency is also its limitation as the inability to ground itself.
You argue that ontological claims collapse into equivalence because being and nothing share an identity as Hegel shows. To declare "everything is X" is as arbitrary as "everything is Y," since the infinite (as "absolute negativity") undermines totalizing claims.
However, this aligns with Hegel’s own critique of traditional metaphysics. Hegel’s Science of Logic begins with the identity of pure being and nothing, revealing that static ontological categories are empty without movement (becoming). For Hegel, the infinite is not a static totality but a process—a dynamic interplay of finite and infinite. The "bad infinite" (an endless series) is rejected in favor of the "true infinite," which is immanent within the finite. Ontology fails because it cannot speak of "everything" without reducing it to a tautology (A = A). We can only discuss particulars (A, B, C…) via the law of identity.
Kant limits reason to phenomena (appearances), declaring noumena (things-in-themselves) unknowable. This preserves rationality but confines it to human subjectivity. For Hegel, limits are not barriers but moments to be sublated in a higher unity. Kant’s "thing-in-itself" is reimagined in Hegel as a determinate negation. We know the world not by transcending limits but by working through contradictions.
You suggest Hegelians dismiss tautological limits by invoking negativity, but Hegel’s negativity is not an evasion, it is a methodological tool to resolve contradictions. Static Identity (A = A) leads to tautology and paralysis. Dialectical Negation (A → ¬A → A') transforms contradictions into developmental stages.
Pure being is empty (A = A). Its negation (¬A) is equally empty. The synthesis (A')—being and nothing in motion—resolves the paradox. Negativity here is not a dismissal of limits but a way to think through them.
>absolute negativity — zero,"
Hegel would agree that traditional conceptions of the infinite (as a "finished totality") are flawed, but his "true infinite" is immanent not beyond the finite but realized through finite particulars and also relational the infinite is the totality of relations between finite beings(capital and labor in Marx).
You conclude that we can only speak of particulars (via the law of identity), not "everything", but Hegel would counter that particulars only gain meaning through their relations to the whole. Like how a commodity (particular) is unintelligible without its role in capitalism (totality).
Your critique exposes the fragility of axiomatic reason and ontology, but Hegel’s dialectic offers a way forward by embracing contradiction we move beyond static identity to dynamic becoming by reject "Bad" totality the infinite is not a fixed "everything" but the process of relationality. And as Marx suggests ground theory in practice, this means analyzing capitalism’s contradictions in order to transform them. To speak of particulars and the whole, we need not axioms alone but dialectics, a logic that thinks through limits rather than naturalizing them. As Hegel says:
<The truth is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development.
>we cannot speak of difference until identity, and thus, prices occur before values, since values are themselves measured as prices
For Marx, value (determined by socially necessary labor time, SNLT) is the essence of capitalist social relations, while price is its appearance in the market. This mirrors Hegel’s dialectic of essence/appearance. Value is the social substance of commodities, rooted in the exploitation of labor. Price is the monetary expression of value, distorted by market dynamics.
Value is ontologically prior to price. Even though we observe prices first, they are expressions of an underlying value structure. Marx’s method moves from the abstract (value) to the concrete (price), uncovering the hidden social relations behind surface phenomena.
>prices occur before values
This is a conflation of epistemological and ontological orders. Epistemologically we encounter prices first (they are visible in markets). Ontologically Value (SNLT) is the foundation that anchors prices. Without value, prices would have no coherent basis. A chair’s price ($100) fluctuates daily, but its value (10 hours of SNLT) is determined in production. The price is a form of value, not its measure. Prices express value but do not define it. Value is measured in labor-time, not money.
<The price-form, however, is not only compatible with the possibility of a quantitative incongruity between magnitude of value and price, i.e., between the former and its expression in money, but it may also conceal a qualitative inconsistency.
>we cannot speak of difference until identity
>implying price (as identity) precedes value (as difference).
For Marx, identity (price) and difference (value) are dialectically intertwined. Prices are identical to value in aggregate (total price = total value) but differ in individual cases. Value is the essence refracted through price. To understand price deviations (differences), we must first grasp value (identity as SNLT). Temperature (essence) vs. thermometer readings (appearance). Readings vary (difference), but they reflect an underlying reality (identity as molecular motion).
>values are themselves measured as prices
but this conflates measure and expression SNLT (labor-hours) is the measure of value. Money as price is the expression of value. Money conceals value’s social basis (labor exploitation) by naturalizing price as a "property" of commodities. Prices are not the measure of value but its representation, contingent on money’s own value.
<[Money] is the measure of value inasmuch as it is the socially recognised incarnation of human labour
Marx’s project is not to explain prices (a task for bourgeois economics) but to expose capitalism’s exploitative core. Value reveals the class struggle inherent in production (workers vs. capitalists). Price obscures this struggle by reducing social relations to market transactions. A $10 chair’s price hides the unpaid surplus labor extracted from workers. Value theory demystifies this.
By prioritizing price over value, you are naturalizing capitalism, accepting market appearances (prices) as self-evident, rather than critiquing their social basis, and ignoring exploitation, failing to see how value underpins profit, rent, and interest.
<The vulgar economist has not the faintest idea that the actual everyday exchange relations can not be directly identical with the magnitudes of value. The essence of bourgeois society consists precisely in this, that a priori there is no conscious social regulation of production. The rational and naturally necessary asserts itself only as a blindly working average. And then the vulgar economist thinks he has made a great discovery when, as against the revelation of the inner interconnection, he proudly claims that in appearance things look different. In fact, he boasts that he holds fast to appearance, and takes it for the ultimate. Why, then, have any science at all?
Is there actually anyone besides
>>2218604 who does not understand what the comment
>>2218198 says?
And does
>>2218604 understand his own reply? Probably not.
Weeeeelllllll my dear No. 2218604, what are you getting at here, or rather, what are your words getting at here, though you seem to be unaware of it. Getting at this: Industries with
higher organic composition output stuff with
lower value. At the last second you quickly shift your mind to value = price. Phew! That was close, you almost learned something.
>>2218606
Yes Marx didn't invent anything new. Capitalism is just fine the problem is monopolies and regulatory capture, aka crony capitalism. Marxists think everything is capitalism but really capitalism is free markets, as soon as the market isn't free you dont have true capitalism anymore you have authoritarian statism. Exploitation is a result of monopolies, if workers were able to freely compete on the market they wouldn't be exploited. Socialists think the problem is the solution. Actual free competition between equals in the market would naturally balance wages and profits.
Intellectual freedom cannot exist without political freedom; political freedom cannot exist without economic freedom; a free mind and a free market are corollaries.
The free market represents the social application of an objective theory of values. Since values are to be discovered by man's mind, men must be free to discover them—to think, to study, to translate their knowledge into physical form, to offer their products for trade, to judge them, and to choose, be it material goods or ideas, a loaf of bread or a philosophical treatise. Since values are established contextually, every man must judge for himself, in the context of his own knowledge, goals, and interests. Since values are determined by the nature of reality, it is reality that serves as men's ultimate arbiter: if a man's judgment is right, the rewards are his; if it is wrong, he is his only victim.
Now observe that a free market does not level men down to some common denominator—that the intellectual criteria of the majority do not rule a free market or a free society—and that the exceptional men, the innovators, the intellectual giants, are not held down by the majority. In fact, it is the members of this exceptional minority who lift the whole of a free society to the level of their own achievements, while rising further and ever further.
A free market is a continuous process that cannot be held still, an upward process that demands the best (the most rational) of every man and rewards him accordingly. While the majority have barely assimilated the value of the automobile, the creative minority introduces the airplane. The majority learn by demonstration, the minority is free to demonstrate. The "philosophically objective" value of a new product serves as the teacher for those who are willing to exercise their rational faculty, each to the extent of his ability. Those who are unwilling remain unrewarded—as well as those who aspire to more than their ability produces. The stagnant, the irrational, the subjectivist have no power to stop their betters .
In a free economy, where no man or group of men can use physical coercion against anyone, economic power can be achieved only by voluntary means: by the voluntary choice and agreement of all those who participate in the process of production and trade. In a free market, all prices, wages, and profits are determined—not by the arbitrary whim of the rich or of the poor, not by anyone's "greed" or by anyone's need—but by the law of supply and demand. The mechanism of a free market reflects and sums up all the economic choices and decisions made by all the participants. Men trade their goods or services by mutual consent to mutual advantage, according to their own independent, uncoerced judgment. A man can grow rich only if he is able to offer better values—better products or services, at a lower price—than others are able to offer.
Wealth, in a free market, is achieved by a free, general, "democratic" vote—by the sales and the purchases of every individual who takes part in the economic life of the country. Whenever you buy one product rather than another, you are voting for the success of some manufacturer. And, in this type of voting, every man votes only on those matters which he is qualified to judge: on his own preferences, interests, and needs. No one has the power to decide for others or to substitute his judgment for theirs; no one has the power to appoint himself "the voice of the public" and to leave the public voiceless and disfranchised.
>>2219587>Yes Marx didn't invent anything new. Capitalism is just fine the problem is monopolies and regulatory capture, aka crony capitalismThis Teddy Roosevelt Trust Busting bullshit does nothing to get to the source of the problem. It just plays whack a mole. Pop the monopoly. But capitalism is competition. Competition has winners. Winners eat losers. Mergers and Acquisitions. When a monopoly emerges, and the "reward" for "winning" the "competition" is to get broken up into smaller firms, the "crony" capitalists complain, they say "We won fair and square and now the government is breaking us up. This is literally communism!" Of course it's not literally Communism. It's quite the opposite. Communism views monopoly as natural. vertical and horizontal integration of the productive forces is more efficient than decentralized market anarchy. From the chaos of decentralized, tribal, rural, backward, traditional unproductive history emerges the order of centralized, civilizational, urban, forward, progressive, productive future. Monopoly Capitalism socializes the production process by enclosing the rural commons and forcing the people into factories and large workplaces. But it does not socialize the means of production. It does not socialize the wealth created by labor. It privatizes those things. So Capital becomes a historically backwards ball and chain on the very productive forces it unleashes. We need socialism because Capital is self limiting and has outlived its historical purpose. The Teddy Roosevelts of the world fetishize the early stage of capital: Petty bourgeois competition. They look at monopoly capital and say "not real capitalism" and seek to RETVRN to the unproductive, provincial roots. Socialism says "Yes, have a monopoly, but nationalize it under a proletarian class dictatorship."
>>2219587you are an actual idiot, but in the interest of potentially relieving you of your condition i will address some of your 'points'
1. monopolies and regulatory capture are inevitable under capitalism. since the capitalist class is the ruling class under capitalism, they will inevitably erode any regulations or institutions that are an obstacle to their class interests. The only way to enforce regulations and anti-trust laws in a way that is not easily undone is to dominate the capitalist class with a dictatorship of the proletariat - see the chinese CPC's management of their capitalist class for example.
2. marxists do not think 'everything is capitalism' - we define capitalism as the type of organization of society in which the capitalist class, those who own and operate (via hired labor) the means of production for personal profit, are the ruling class (i.e. their ideas and ideology predominate, their people or agents fill government positions, they control media infrastructure, etc.). this is a very explicit and technical definition, it is not vague.
4. capitalism is not 'free markets', capitalism is the class dictatorship of the capitalist class, as mentioned above. 'free markets' are a myth, any market is regulated via class dictatorship, whether that class is the proletariat or the capitalists.
5. 'authoritarian' is a meaningless buzzword. every government operates with the assumption that they have the authority to govern, and almost all of them assume a 'popular mandate' justifying their rule. this word is applied to whomever the speaker dislikes, regardless of electoral status of the target.
6. 'statism' is another meaningless buzzword. your corporate security squads are identical to cops. your buddies with AK47's in the back of a deuce and a half truck patrolling the commune after the anarchist revolution are identical to cops. every culture has a hierarchy of some kind, the key is ensuring that this hierarchy is transparent, accountable, and justified.
7. 'exploitation is a result of monopolies' - this belies your lack of understanding of the origin of monopolies and the competing class interests of capital and labor. in a class dictatorship of the capitalist class over the laborer class (the condition marxists call capitalism), the government is operated in the interests of the capitalist class. this inevitably leads to monopoly and deregulation, as discussed previously. There is no stable capitalism that will not tend to develop into oligarchy. in actuality exploitation is due to class dictatorship by the capitalist class, under capitalism the labor class has no recourse or power to negotiate their labor price or to organize for their class interests - these activities are suppressed by the capitalist class and their class dominance of society. exploitation is inherent to capitalism, the existence of the capitalist class requires that laborers are not paid the full value of their labor, with a portion of the value they produced kept as profit by their employer.
8. 'if workers were able to freely compete on the market they wouldn't be exploited' - again, exploitation occurs under capitalism because the capitalist class must pay labor less than the value of their work to make a profit.
9. 'Actual free competition between equals in the market would naturally balance wages and profits' - again, no matter how much competition you have, the capitalist class cannot make a profit if they pay labor the full value of their labor value.
10. 'intellectual freedom cannot exist without political freedom; political freedom cannot exist without economic freedom;' - this is an idealistic non sequitur. what 'intellectual freedom' is had in a society where the media is bought by the rich and promotes only the class interests and ideologies of the capitalist class? what 'political freedom' exists in a system where media access, and therefore votes, can be bought by the highest bidder? what 'economic freedom' exists under a system that serves only the owning class?
'The free market represents the social application of an objective theory of values…' - this is pure bandwagon fallacy thinking. popularity, even when abstracted into a market as in stocks, is no basis or arbiter of truth. if you need an example of this obvious concept, consider that in many places in history you would be considered insane to say that the earth revolved around the sun rather than vice versa.
>>2220068
>>In the big picture, on the micro level value isn't price.
>the whole is just the sum of its parts.
The position by Marx is that while value parts price parts form the same aggregate picture, the price parts attached to things are not proportionate to the value parts attached to the same things.
>>Now remember that Marx says the aggregate profit comes from employing labor, and only from that.
>no, general rates of profit are factored from organic composition, which includes both, variable and constant capital.
Aggregate profit refers not to somewhat aggregated profits summed within this or that industry, it refers to profits in total. The general rate of profit, no plural, is the usual rate of profit. You are not using the terms like Marx. You follow different definitions that you are not making explicit and then you wonder why everybody else is driving on the wrong side of the road, so to speak.
>>How does it happen that an individual capitalist makes a solid profit if he has absolutely massive outlays for machinery and barely employs labor?
>because he sells more commodities than his competition
That's a capitalist making temporarily higher profits than his colleagues within an industry because of a technological innovation. But what you have been asked is to consider the differences between capitalists in totally different types of business that have different organic composition as the norm:
>>Capitalists have outlays for machinery, renting space, and so on. These outlays have different proportions in different industries.
>>2218606
You misunderstand. There is no need to be hostile. Marx’s distinction between value and price is not about temporal priority but structural necessity. Value is the social substance of capitalism, rooted in the exploitation of labor during production. Price is the form through which value appears, mediated by competition, profit rates, and money. Marx does not deny that value is a social construct, but he grounds it in capitalist social relations, it has objective social reality under capitalism
>you do realise that labour-power as a commodity is itself only given a value based on market transaction? we live in a market society.
A capitalist market society. Money only becomes capital under capitalism.
>you do realise that market societies have existed milennia before capitalism?
Exchange existed in pre-capitalist markets, but value did not exist and did not dominate production. Commodities were incidental, not systemic. Generalized commodity production subordinates labor to value relations. In pre-capitalist markets goods were exchanged, but production was not organized around value. Surplus took forms like tribute or rent, not profit. With Capitalism labor becomes a commodity, and production is subordinated to value accumulation. Value’s dominance is historically unique.
Marx’s critique is not about markets but about capitalist social relations, where value structures society. Value becomes the universal equivalent. Smith’s "labor as the first price" conflates labor-commanded (value as what labor can purchase) with Marx’s labor-embodied (value as labor objectified in production). Marx critiques this conflation, arguing that capitalism’s uniqueness lies in reducing labor to an abstract, quantifiable input. Markets existed for millennia, but Marx’s value theory is specific to capitalism. Smith treats labor as the "natural" measure of value, where Marx distinguishes concrete vs. abstract labor, grounding value in exploitation. Marx’s value theory explains how prices are anchored by SNLT, even as prices fluctuate. This is a materialist analysis of capitalism’s laws of motion rather than a static idealist abstraction, not a fetish.
>>2219757
SNLT is not measured by wages but by the social average of labor-time required to produce a commodity under prevailing conditions. Wages reflect the value of labor-power (the cost of reproducing workers), not the value workers create. A factory producing shirts with advanced machinery requires 1 hour of labor per shirt (SNLT = 1 hour). A less efficient factory takes 2 hours per shirt. Its labor is socially unnecessary, so its shirts sell at the SNLT price (1 hour’s value). Wages are determined by class struggle and reproduction costs, not SNLT itself. Even if wages rise, SNLT remains tied to productivity.
Marx’s LTV is not an economic model but a critique of political economy, exposing how capitalism alienates labor and generates crises. His historical materialism and economic analysis are inseparable. To dismiss value as "retroactive Hegelianism" ignores its material force: workers are still exploited, and capital still accumulates through surplus value extraction.
>>2220771
>prices have priority
You can't have prices without value, therefore, value has priority.
>now, you are saying two different things.
I'm not. You are conflating value, as Marx is using it with what Smith erroneously thought of as a transhistorical category, which is exactly Marx's critique of him. If value does not dominate production that is the same as it not existing, since the concept of value that Marx is using is historically specific to a mode of production called capitalism, which is defined as the dominance of value in controlling social reproduction. Capitalism is unique for organizing society around the accumulation of value. Incidental instances of wage labor in pre-capitalist societies did not have labor as a commodity systemically shaping the whole economy. It did not have abstract labor as a generalized commodity to be bought and sold. Wage labor was always specific and concrete, and the wage directly related to its product. It did not have a division of labor into simple repeatable processes that could be generalized in the same way it can under capitalism.
With Capitalism we have a systemic shaping of the economy by value as concrete labor becomes abstract labor. Abstract labor/SNLT/value/exploitation act together to discipline and conform labor which has no other choice but to offer their lives as a commodity on the market. This process is historically specific to Capitalism. If are not intentionally conflating Smiths value with Marx's so you can equate it to price you maybe should start calling it something else value' or term X.
Going all the way back to your original misunderstanding, in insisting that Marx thought money had to be a commodity. His entire point is that Capitalism transforms money into not a commodity but a fetish. It is already in Marx that money has begun to separate from its identity as a commodity and into a representation for value as abstract labor measured by SNLT directly, not by equivalence to the labor required to create the money.
>yet their values differ based on labour-time
No they dont, for the same reason mudpies aren't valuable. Extra time spent is socially unnecessary. You keep going back and forth between specific and general at your leisure according to how it benefits your argument rather then putting what Marx said in its actual context, mixing Marx and Smith together and not being clear when you are telling Marx or Smiths version. SNLT isn't individual time but the social average.
>listen to yourself
>chair made in 1 hour vs 10 hours has just as much labour "embodied" in it
You have it exactly backwards.
<"All labour of a higher or more complicated character than average labour is expenditure of labour-power of a more costly kind, labour-power whose production has cost more time and labour, and which therefore has a higher value, than unskilled or simple labour-power. This power being higher-value, its consumption is labour of a higher class, labour that creates in equal times proportionally higher values than unskilled labour does. [capital vol. 1, ch. 7]"
Why do you think this is about wages? Hes talking about the labor it takes to educate specialists. Their wages are higher because their is more labor needed to reproduce labor of that type, which is why it is a higher class. Its a multiple of SNLT not a "different standard". This is the mistake Smith himself makes when he thinks of labor. He conceives of an idealist labor in the abstract
>so we need hegel to understand smith
We aren't trying to understand Smith, we are clarifying your distortions of Marx. Marx very clearly did not agree with Smith and most of his work was entirely different focus. If you want to have a conversation with yourself you can start a blog you do not need to reply.
Value for Marx, is a historically specific social relation under capitalism, determined by abstract labor (labor homogenized into socially necessary labor time [SNLT]). Value exists only when production is organized around generalized commodity exchange for profit. Price is the monetary expression of value. Value’s existence under capitalism is inseparable from its dominance over production. To say "value did not dominate" in pre-capitalist societies is to say it did not exist in Marx’s sense. Under capitalism, money is not "just a commodity" but a social hieroglyph that masks the exploitation of abstract labor. SNLT ≠ Individual Labor. If a worker takes 10 hours to produce a chair when SNLT is 1 hour, only 1 hour counts as value. The extra 9 hours are socially unnecessary, rendering them valueless (like mudpies). Marx’s reference to "higher-value" labor (specialists) refers to the SNLT required to reproduce skilled labor-power (training/education). Skilled labor is complex labor, which counts as a multiple of simple labor. Training a doctor takes 10 years (socially necessary labor for their labor-power). Their 1 hour of work may equate to 5 hours of simple labor, creating more value.
Wages reflect the SNLT required to reproduce workers (food, housing, training). Workers labor longer than needed to reproduce their wages. This unpaid labor is the source of surplus value as profit. Surplus Value = Value Created (SNLT) − Value of Labor-Power (Wages). Smith treats labor as a transhistorical measure of value (labor-commanded). His "natural price" conflates value with market equilibrium. For Marx Value is a capitalist-specific social relation. His critique exposes how capitalism transforms labor into abstract, exploitable value. Smith naturalizes capitalism, Marx historicizes it. Marx’s value is not a transhistorical "law" but a social relation born of capitalism’s unique organization of production. Abstract labor, SNLT, and money’s fetishistic role are inseparable from capitalism’s logic of exploitation. To retroject value into pre-capitalist societies as Smith does is to misread Marx and obscure capitalism’s historically contingent violence, an attempt to seperate politics from economy in political economy.
>>2220767>>the price parts attached to things are not proportionate to the value parts attached to the same things.>so the values of commodities [c+v+s] does not equate to their price of production?Only in the aggregate, not the individual commodities: Profits…
<are not distributed in proportion to the surplus-value produced in each special sphere of production, but rather in proportion to the mass of capital employed in each sphere, so that equal masses of capital, whatever their composition, receive equal aliquot shares of the total surplus-value produced by the total social capital.So…
<how is this equalization of profits into a general rate of profit brought about:
<Let us first assume that all commodities in the different branches of production are sold at their real values. What would then be the outcome? According to the foregoing, very different rates of profit would then reign in the various spheres of production. It is prima facie two entirely different matters whether commodities are sold at their values (i.e., exchanged in proportion to the value contained in them at prices corresponding to their value), or whether they are sold at such prices that their sale yields equal profits for equal masses of the capital advanced for their respective production.<(…)<The whole difficulty arises from the fact that commodities are not exchanged simply as commodities, but as products of capitals, which claim participation in the total amount of surplus-value, proportional to their magnitude, or equal if they are of equal magnitude. And this claim is to be satisfied by the total price for commodities produced by a given capital in a certain space of time. This total price is, however, only the sum of the prices of the individual commodities produced by this capital.After a lot of elaboration Marx gets to this:
<Now, if the commodities are sold at their values, then, as we have shown, very different rates of profit arise in the various spheres of production, depending on the different organic composition of the masses of capital invested in them. But capital withdraws from a sphere with a low rate of profit and invades others, which yield a higher profit. Through this incessant outflow and influx, or, briefly, through its distribution among the various spheres, which depends on how the rate of profit falls here and rises there, it creates such a ratio of supply to demand that the average profit in the various spheres of production becomes the same, and values are, therefore, converted into prices of production.Marx chapter 10 of Volume III.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch10.htm>>2220825>You can't have prices without value, therefore, value has priority.lets read this:
<"Objects that in themselves are no commodities, such as conscience, honour, &c., are capable of being offered for sale by their holders, and of thus acquiring, through their price, the form of commodities. Hence an object may have a price without having value. [vol. 1, ch. 3]"so a price can exist without a value, yet a value cannot exist without price. this gives price social precdence in exchange, and if your claim is truly that value didnt exist before capitalism, then you inherently forfeit the argument, since prices precede capitalism, and therefore precede values.
>the concept of value that Marx is using is historically specific to a mode of production called capitalismlets read this:
<"the great thinker who was the first to analyse [.] the form of value. I mean Aristotle […] The brilliancy of Aristotle’s genius is shown by this alone, that he discovered, in the expression of the value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality. [vol. 1, ch. 1]"when marx says that "in truth", aristotle failed to "discover" what the essential relation of equality was, this is implying that value existed between commodities in exchange, even if unknown to people. this is why he says this in the 1867 preface,
<"The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it all"what does a "value-form" imply to you? a "form of value", obviously. now, remember marx's distinction between commodity exchange [C-M-C] and capital circulation [M-C-M']. when we exchange commodities we are tranferring a fixed value to one another. this is the relation of pre-capitalist exchange. what differs in capitalism is the mass production of surplus value, where over-production dominates commerce;
<"In the pre-capitalist stages of society commerce ruled industry. In modern society the reverse is true. [vol. 3, ch. 20]"to marx, value is simply the common unit held between commodities in exchange, and exchange is transhistorical. this is why the value-form stretches all the way back to barter, where commodities first emerge. how can value have a form, without value?
>Marx thought money had to be a commoditywell, lets go over this again, and tell me where there's a flaw in my argument:
(1) how does marx conceive of money? it is the most developed value-form. what is a value-form? the commodity in mutual exchange with another, by which it attains its equivalent value, or as marx clarifies:
<"the value of commodities has a purely social reality […] value can only manifest itself in the social relation of commodity to commodity [vol. 1, ch. 1]"this means that value cannot be directly self-related, but can only be known by another. marx relates this to a hegelian dialectic of essence and appearance.
(2) to marx, there are 4 value-forms:
- the elementary value-form (A)
- the expanded value-form (B)
- the general value-form (C)
- the money-form (D)
(a) the elementary form expresses value by a ratio [X:Y], where the inferior [X] and superior [Y] variables form the relative and equivalent forms of value [quality:quantity].
(b) the expanded form develops, where the ratio of exchange now reveals an inherent equality in the magnitude of value. in this, we only have particular equivalent forms, and so value is not yet universalised.
(c) the general form then generalises value, by no longer being a particular equivalent, but a universal equivalent, which sublates the elementary form. the elementary equivalent, is now universal.
(d) the money-form naturally develops out of the general form, but entails no fundamental difference. money then stamps values with prices to equate them.
(3) in all this, the movement from commodities to money is plain to see, so money to marx is a commodity:
<"The simple commodity form is therefore the germ of the money form [vol. 1, ch. 1]"marx likewise calls money the "universal commodity" in chapter 2, and the "equivalent commodity par excellence" in chapter 3. marx's comments on paper money in chapter 3 are also illuminating, where he sees that paper money only has value if it represents gold or silver, the same way in chapter 2, he exclaims that money is not merely a "symbol of value". in a footnote, he also rails against fiat (by decree) currency, since in its employment, money is no longer seen as a commodity;
<"Lawyers started long before economists the idea that money is a mere symbol, and that the value of the precious metals is purely maginary. This they did in the sycophantic service of the crowned heads, supporting the right of the latter to debase the coinage, during the whole of the middle ages, by the traditions of the Roman Empire and the conceptions of money to be found in the Pandects. […] it was a maxim of the Roman Law that the value of money was fixed by decree of the emperor. It was expressly forbidden to treat money as a commodity [.] some good work on this question has been done by G. F. Pagnini […] the second part of his work Pagnini directs his polemics especially against the lawyers. [ch. 2, footnote 11]"so in one place, marx sees that fixing the quantity of currency preserves its value, yet in another, sees that it debases value. this is marx's internal contradiction, since he conceives of money as a commodity.
>representation for value as abstract labor measured by SNLT directlySNLT cannot be measured directly, which is why it needs a value form.
>Extra time spent is socially unnecessarythis is entirely relative to the society in consideration. different societies, like different industries, have different values. you can easily discern this from the wage.
>why do you think this is about wages? [.] Their wages are higher because their is more labor needed to reproduce labor of that type which is why it is a higher class.ah, so in the end, it is about wages…
>Its a multiple of SNLT not a "different standard"what do you think "standard" means? marx for example sees that prices assort values by a "standard of price" relative to the money-form. with gold, the standard is different from silver, but both are still scaled at proportion. they entail different standards of price based on the different quantities relative to the same unit. wages scale labour at different powers, so wages standardise labour according to its worth.
>This unpaid labor is the source of surplus value as profit.yes, an inference logically deducible; not subject to esoteric doctrine or jargon.
>Smith naturalizes capitalismno, he generalises the logic of value as an a priori basis for exchange, taken from aristotle's original insight. was aristotle equally "bourgeois" by assuming a syllogistic equality inherent to exchange? marx ultimately follows up by affirming this insight, as i quote above. aristotle is right, he says, but just underdeveloped. so in the end, marx is equally "naturalising" capitalist relations by a retroactivity. will you now criticise marx, or retreat into hypocrisy?
>>2221839well, we must begin by first principles. what is price? the exchange-ratio between goods [X:Y]. what is value? the unit which is proportioned by exchange. both include each other's concept thus. it shows then that prices must express a common measure, by which they relate; this, smith and marx both locate in labour. so labour acts as its own price, as smith says. this "first price" purchases whatever may be exchanged for it, and this is the primal relation by which goods exchange. yet, exchange is not always an exchange of commodities, as marx affirms, in the same way that a division of labour does not necessarily entail its commoditisation. price then, as an elementary expression of exchange, entails a standard measure; a measure which is labour, yet not "value" as such. value, as per marx's understanding, is only given in commodity exchange, where value is abstracted as an end in itself of exchange. this is why to marx, use-value goes to the buyer, but value goes to the seller. value then in this elementary form, implies a mode of accumulation. without this mode of private accumulation, value cannot sustain itself (as marx writes in "critique of the gotha programme", value will be abolished in the "co-operative society", yet payment will still resemble the creation of values. here, we can say that there may be prices, but no values. prices precede and proceed values, historically and socially, since a value can only be abstracted from price in the first place). can prices then exist without value? yes, where exchange may suffice without its mode of private accumulation, the same way david graeber and michael hudson write about forgiving debts. if this is not possible however, then we idly ontologise value as a logistical fact, and not a social construct. once we have price systems, prices may gain an inequality however, which allows valueless items to gain a price; this is already presented in rent. the difference between smith and marx overall then, is that marx treats price as modally developed in the money-form, while smith treats it primitively in labour. the fact that prices can exist independently of value, yet value cannot exist apart from price, also shows a theoretical priority, and speculatively, a post-capitalist posterity.
>>2221863if price is not expressing value in pre-capitalist relations, what is it expressing? what is the relation of equality found in these modes of commodity exchange which is not grounded in labour, despite marx saying as such?
<"What is that equal something, that common substance, which admits of the value of the beds being expressed by a house? […] human labour. [vol. 1, ch. 1]"this, marx judges, from aristotle's own time. now, to give further lessons in logic, when you begin with false premises, such as "value did not exist before capitalism", you reach false conclusions, by running into contradictions. ultimately, you contradict marx's own statements, which leads to a new branch; either you are wrong, or marx is wrong. which is it?
>>2221934thx. as far as i see, a book can only restate what has already been said. i am not inventing new concepts, just explaining old ones. i have thought about writing summaries of older books to give them accessibility, like engels did for capital. marx in the 1872 preface also saw the reformatting of his work to be helpful in its accessibility (which is why telling people to simply "read marx" is unhelpful by marx's own standards). i would wish to be a teacher, to help advance the struggle for knowledge, but when you have prideful and ignorant students, the task is impossible.
>>2222106so your idea is that commodities did not exist before capitalism? despite capital circulation only being a development of an original commodity exchange..? marx sees that money (as a development from simple commodities), has existed for over 2,000 years, and equally says this of barter;
<"It therefore follows that the elementary value form is also the primitive form under which a product of labour appears historically as a commodity"and concludes the section with this:
<"The simple commodity form is therefore the germ of the money form. [vol. 1, ch. 1]"so commodities predate money, since money itself is only an advanced form of a commodity, which serves as a universal equivalent.
>>2222119you are the expert here so you shouldnt be intimidated by my simple questions:
- did commodities exist before capitalism?
answer: [yes/no]
- if [no], then why does marx attribute money as the most developed value-form (commodity)?
- if [yes], did value also exist?
answer: [yes/no]
- if [no], what equated commodities in their exchange relations? marx says labour (value).
- if [yes], then value predates capitalism
see the beauty of logic?
>>2222130its like you forget everything but the post you are immediately responding to
>>2221863
>then value predates capitalismnot according to marx. if you think that then say so. no need to involve anyone else
>>2222133>>2222133>not according to marxyes, according to marx:
<"the great thinker who was the first to analyse [.] the form of value. I mean Aristotle. […] What is that equal something, that common substance, which admits of the value of the beds being expressed by a house? […] human labour […] The brilliancy of Aristotle’s genius is shown by this alone, that he discovered, in the expression of the value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality. [vol. 1, ch. 1]"and as i rhetorically ask, how can you have a "form of value" without value? values are expressed between commodities, and commodity exchange is milennia old. you are still too cowardly to face the facts.
>>2222138>commodity exchange is milennia oldits not. a commodity is a product made
for exchange. you cant make something
for exchange without the prerequisite generalized commodity exchange market, which doesn't exist until capitalism. you also need industrialization and mass production where commodities are the same, not artisan workers handmaking somewhat similar products for direct use, which are not commodities.
>>2221934>Hello again extremely patient adam smith anon. have you considered writing a book? regards, your mostly silent admirerWhy yes I am working on it, it will be called Value is Stored in the Balls. You know I am sometimes worried that I will alienate people with just how intelligent I am, which is also the reason why I have been deleting some of my own posts in this thread.
But you know I am just a humble explainer of Marx. And Marx needs an explainer, because as this thread shows, few people understand that Marx thought that values are quantitatively equal to their corresponding exchange values. He just made the two terms for vibe reasons: If you want your text to give economy vibes, you say exchange value; and for philosophy vibes, just say value. That's all there is to it. Idiots got confused because Marx explicitly said they can diverge quantitatively. Why did he do that, I don't know, perhaps he was being ironic.
But it is certain they are quantitatively the same, as certain as time being only measurable by wages (see Archive of Thread #1 mentioned in the OP for more awesome insights on that!). That's why humanity could only start doing astronomy as a real science when the Moon finally got a job. (I was recently talking with my mother about this, since the Moon will soon retire and my mother has just the right size and proportions.)
>>2222138>>2222104>>2221541You are (again) conflating value (as a historically specific social relation) with exchange ratios (which existed long before capitalism). Let’s clarify Marx’s distinction and Aristotle’s insight to resolve this. Marx praises Aristotle for recognizing that exchange requires a "common substance" to equate disparate commodities (e.g., beds and houses). However, Aristotle could not identify this substance as abstract labor because in ancient Greece, labor was not generalized as a commodity. Human labor performed by slaves was seen as unequal and unworthy of being the basis for equivalence. There was no Abstract Labor, exchange ratios (prices) in antiquity reflected concrete labor (specific skills, status) or social hierarchies, not a universal measure of labor-time.
<However, Aristotle himself was unable to extract this fact, that, in the form of commodity-values, all labour is expressed as equal human labour and therefore as labour of equal quality, by inspection from the form of value because Greek society was foundedon the labour of slaves, hence had as its natural basis the inequality of men and of their labour-powers.
Aristotle glimpsed the form of value (exchange equivalence) but could not grasp its substance (abstract labor) due to his society’s historical constraints. Pre capitalist exchange had prices without value. Exchange ratio is not value. Prices of equivalence (1 bed = 5 goats) existed in pre-capitalist societies, but they did not express value (socially necessary labor time). Instead, they reflected concrete labor(a bed’s craftsmanship vs. a goat’s utility), social hierarchies (tribute, religious significance), scarcity, or power relations(fuedal dues). There is no systemic abstraction of labor. Labor was not homogenized into a universal measure (Value as SNLT). A blacksmith’s labor and a farmer’s labor remained distinct, tied to their specific use-values. A medieval lord might demand 10 bushels of wheat as rent. This "price" reflects feudal obligation, not value (SNLT).
Capitalism is unique in that value has social dominance. Value is not merely a technical measure of labor but a social relation that dominates production under capitalism. Abstract Labor is stripped of its qualitative differences and reduced to interchangeable units of time. Under generalized commodity production goods are produced for exchange, not use, and labor-power itself becomes a commodity. Money becomes a universal equivalent, value crystallizes in money, which mediates all social relations, superceding its identiy as a simple commodity, and becoming a fetish that stands in for Value as Abstract Labor measured by SNLT. Even paper or digital money still retains its role as a mediator of social production. Money's power is not derived from its material properties, but from its social relations, and its appearence as gold or paper or crypto serves as a mask for exploitation. The form of money evolves with society, but its function remains root in Value. Money’s detachment from gold only reinforces the illusion that value is independent of labor, masking capitalism’s exploitative core. Pre-capitalist prices are arbitraty ratios reflecting concrete labor. Capitalist prices are anchroed by SNLT, reflecting the systemic exploitation of Abstract Labor.
The conflation of prices with value fails because it treats prices as exchange ratios as transhistorcial existing in all societies with trade, but Value is a capitalist specific social relation where labor is commodified and abstracted. Value’s "universality" applies
only to capitalism, where it becomes the dominant social logic. Pre-capitalist societies had exchange but lacked value’s systemic role.
Aristotle identified the formal necessity of equivalence in exchange but could not identify abstract labor as its substance. Marx reveals that abstract labor (SNLT) is the social substance of equivalence under capitalism, tied to the commodification of labor-power. This does not refute Marx isntead but confirms his core insight, that value (as SNLT and abstract labor) is not transhistorical. While exchange ratios (prices) predate capitalism, they expressed concrete labor, power, or tradition,
not value. Aristotle’s genius lay in intuiting the
form of value, but only under capitalism does its
substance (abstract labor) fully emerge.
<The secret of the expression of value, namely the equality and equivalence of all kinds of labour because and in so far as they are human labour in general, could not be deciphered until the concept of human equality had already acquired the permanence of a fixed popular opinion. This however becomes possible only in a society where the commodity-form is the universal form of the product of labour, hence the dominant social relation is the relation between men as possessors of commodities. To equate pre-capitalist prices with value is to mistake the shadow (exchange ratios) for the substance (exploitative social relations). Marx’s value theory remains a revolutionary critique of capitalism, not a ledger of ancient trade.
>>2223471rent free.
>>2223184>a commodity is a product made for exchangeyes; marx sees this as developing between primitive communities from barter:
<"The direct barter of products attains the elementary form of the relative expression of value in one respect, but not in another […] The first step made by an object of utility towards acquiring exchange-value is when it forms a non-use-value for its owner […] But such a state of reciprocal independence has no existence in a primitive society based on property in common […] The exchange of commodities, therefore, first begins on the boundaries of such communities […] So soon, however, as products once become commodities in the external relations of a community, they also, by reaction, become so in its internal intercourse […] From that moment the distinction becomes firmly established between the utility of an object for the purposes of consumption, and its utility for the purposes of exchange. Its use-value becomes distinguished from its exchange-value. Custom stamps them as values with definite magnitudes. [vol. 1, ch. 2]"so value is present, even in primitive society, by means of commodity exchange.
>>2223764what you want to say but cant, is that the value of commodities assumed a different standard back then, than it does today, but this would admit that value indeed, did exist, by the exchange of commodities, but since you will not even admit that commodities existed before capitalism, you block yourself into a dead-end, based on false assumptions of marx's own work. nevertheless, marx gives us the source of aristotle's own equation:
<"Compared with the beds, the house does represent something equal to them, in so far as it represents what is really equal, both in the beds and the house. And that is – human labour. […] The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality. [vol. 1, ch. 1]"so stop your conjecture already, and at least admit to yourself that you have been mistaken.
>prices precede valueso even in your meandering you once more concede this point to me
>Money becomes a universal equivalentmoney existed over 2,000 years ago, so the equivalence of the value of commodities also prevailed in antiquity, hence aristotle's syllogism of value gaining its theoretical possibility.
>Even paper or digital money still retains its role as a mediator of social production.yes, because money's value is not measured by its production costs, but its scarcity. money is not a commodity. it is only treated as a commodity in regressive times of monopoly, like in gold standards.
>To equate pre-capitalist prices with value…<"The exchange of commodities, therefore, first begins on the boundaries of such [primitive] communities […] Custom stamps them as values with definite magnitudes. [vol. 1, ch. 2]any thoughts? or just more evasion?
>>2222138>yes, according to marxThis is my first time hearing this. Could you give us some academics historians biographers economists or anyone else who endorse this interpretation of Marx? Maybe a reading list? At least until you finish your book.
>how can you have a "form of value" without valueUsually this is taken to mean that Aristotle identified the "form" of value, meaning its "appearance", as opposed to its "content", meaning its "essence". Its not supposed to be something like an earlier "type" of value.
Lets say there is a painting of a train. Its "form" might be oil on canvas, but its "content" is the image of the train. Its "appearance" is that it has specific a texture and colors, maybe a style or technique, and its "essence" is that it depicts a train. So what Marx is taken to be saying something like Aristotle had access to oils and canvas, but steam engines hadn't been invented yet so he couldn't understand trains.
Aristotle identifies labor as something that has value, but his abstraction of labor is idealist. Its only with capitalism that labor becomes abstracted by the material relations of society itself that Abstract Labor becomes a concrete reality rather than an idealist abstraction that only exists in the economists mind.
Aristotle recognizes the logical necessity of a common measure for exchange of two objects to occur, and his time this actually is their subjective Use-Values, they directly fulfill a need. However they are not actually equivalent, they are different objects. But in Capitalism the common measure is abstracted as Value, in the form of Money, whose content is Value, which is Abstract Labor as Socially Necessary Labor Time. The exchange actually becomes equivalent.
Value appearing as money controls social production, which was not the case in Aristotle's time, where people directly controlling other people controlled social reproduction and money was merely accounting and facilitating the existing hierarchy. Under Capitalism even the Capitalists are not free, they are also enslaved to seek profit and accumulate surplus-value in the form of money.
Its the same for Commodities, the Appearance of products for trade precedes Capitalism in the form of goods for trade, but the Content of these goods is their Use-Value. Its only in Capitalism that Commodities come into their true Essence and their Content becomes Value.
>>2224061>could you give me someone besides marx to validate marx?why are secondary sources necessary?
>the "form" of value, meaning its "appearance"as marx understands the value-form, it proceeds by a dialectical relation between two commodities. the ratio [X:Y] provides an inverse relation, between the relative (qualitative) and equivalent (quantitative) form. value then, is an inseparable expression of this relation;
<"the value of commodities has a purely social reality […] value can only manifest itself in the social relation of commodity to commodity [capital vol. 1, ch. 1]"the appearance of value is represented concretely by another commodity, which is why to marx, money as a commodity relates its own value to all others;
<"These objects, gold and silver, just as they come out of the bowels of the earth, are forthwith the direct incarnation of all human labour [capital vol. 1, ch. 2]"value thus expresses itself by its cosubstantial "form" and "matter", or abstract and concrete aspects.
>form and contentif we recontextualise marx's division, between its "natural" and "value" form, we can see how this relates to an aristotelian "form" and "matter". form and matter are self-including concepts (which is why value must relate itself to both, concrete and abstract, or why commodities must possess a use-value to be realised, as we can read earlier). this is to show why value can only be given from its price, which is measured by another commodity (money). for there to be a "form of value" means that value is given its mode of appearance, whereby it is able to realise its essence.
>Aristotle identifies labor as something that has valuearistotle is not even considering labour; thats marx's point. aristotle only sees an inherent equality, but cannot identify its common substance, which marx says is human labour. is marx an idealist then?
>[in aristotle's time] this actually is their subjective Use-Valuesmarx says its human labour:
<"Compared with the beds, the house does represent something equal to them, in so far as it represents what is really equal, both in the beds and the house. And that is – human labour. […] The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality. [vol. 1, ch. 1]"are you wrong, or is marx wrong?
>implying commodities and values didnt exist before capitalismlets read once more:
<"The exchange of commodities, therefore, first begins on the boundaries of such [primitive] communities […] So soon, however, as products once become commodities in the external relations of a community, they also, by reaction, become so in its internal intercourse […] From that moment the distinction becomes firmly established between the utility of an object for the purposes of consumption, and its utility for the purposes of exchange. Its use-value becomes distinguished from its exchange-value. Custom stamps them as values with definite magnitudes. [vol. 1, ch. 2]"you should have already got the gist with my rhetorical question: how can you have a "form of value" without value? think.
>>2224108>why are secondary sources necessary?If no one else has ever thought this is what Marx meant then your interpretation doesn't hold much weight. Why would we believe some random anonymous post who isn't a Marxist and is politically motivated to distort his writing? If other people have written about this we could get a better understanding of your position, since your convoluted explanation is not very clear.
>the ratio [X:Y] provides an inverse relation, between the relative (qualitative) and equivalent (quantitative) form.This ratio reveals that value is not inherent but a social relation between commodities mediated by labor. The "form of value" (money) is the necessary mode through which value’s "essence" (abstract labor) becomes socially legible. You are again(still) conflating exchange-value and use-value with Value proper.
>marx understands the value-form, it proceeds by a dialectical relation between two commodities>value then, is an inseparable expression of this relation> appearance of value is represented concretely by another commodityCorrect, which is why value is historically specific to Capitalism. The mode of production in which Commodities are fully realized.
>value thus expresses itself by its cosubstantial "form" and "matter", or abstract and concrete aspects.Values concrete aspect is its social abstraction by Capitalist relations.
>if we recontextualise marx's division, between its "natural" and "value" form, we can see how this relates to an aristotelian "form" and "matter"Or we could just go with what Marx said. He was a dialectical materialist, not an Aristotelian. The form of value and its content develop through history. For Aristotle the Form is its essence and its Matter is its appearance, and these abstractions are static and ahistorical without real content. This is backwards and idealist.
>aristotle is not even considering labourHe thought labor was necessary, and contributed to a products use-value, but that it was not sufficient, because use-values are determined by subjective need.
>is marx an idealist then?No, because Marx did not believe that Value was present in Aristotle's time. Value under capitalism has a material reality. Becoming is not reducible to being and nothing, but emerges dialectically from them and contains both, in the same way Value is not reducable to exchange-value and use-value. This dialectical move does not happen in Marx's head, but plays out in history consolidating itself with the rise of Capitalism.
>how can you have a "form of value" without value? You just ignored the post explaining it to you. Should I just repeat myself like you do? You know Marx is using dialectics and you disagree that dialectics are valid. Changing Marx to be using formal logic doesn't make your interpretation more correct, it makes it entirely separate and different from what Marx is saying.
If you want to present an alternative theory of value you don't need to involve Marx. If you want to talk about Smiths LTV that's fine, but pretending that it is also Marx's is disingenuous. Marx's entire project hinges on the historical specificity of his concept of Value as Abstract Labor measured by SNLT under Capitalism, so he is obviously not saying value is transhistorical. Interpreting him to be saying something he is not does not refute this, you have to actually analyze him on his own grounds, like he does with Smith, an immanent critique. The road to overcoming Marx, if possible, is not going to be through dishonestly recontextualizing him, you have to engage with what he actually thought. At its core the argument you are making is a strawman and is not convincing at all.
You are smart enough to know this is not what he is saying which means you are arguing in bad faith. There is no point in continuing this conversation if you are just going to disregard everything that proves you wrong to simply repeat the same talking points ad nauseam.
>>2226233>politically motivated to distort his writingim literally quoting marx directly.
>value is not inherent but a social relation between commoditiesit is what determines the exchange ratio of commodities, and is therefore, inherent. how else do you compare magnitudes?
>conflating exchange-value and use-value with Valuelets read marx:
<"nothing can have value, without being an object of utility […] value can only manifest itself in the social relation of commodity to commodity [capital vol. 1, ch. 1]"there can be no value outside of its use and exchange-value. what exactly is this fetish called "value" that youre clutching to, which exists outside of these relations?
>Correct, which is why value is historically specific to Capitalism.i noticed you never commented on this:
<"The exchange of commodities, therefore, first begins on the boundaries of such [primitive] communities […] Custom stamps them as values with definite magnitudes. [vol. 1, ch. 2]any reason why?
>He was a dialectical materialist, not an Aristotelianmarx literally attributes the theory of value to aristotle. in marx's division of the commodity, he is expressly relating it to form and matter, which is why he says,
<"The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition."hence, matter and form. essence and appearance are only derivations of this original concept, which still apply.
>No, because Marx did not believe that Value was present in Aristotle's timeinterpret this statement for me:
<"Compared with the beds, the house does represent something equal to them […] human labour. […] The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality. [vol. 1, ch. 1]"to marx, the products are equated by their common substance of labour;
<"Therefore, the common substance that manifests itself in the exchange value of commodities, whenever they are exchanged, is their value. [vol. 1, ch. 1]"its over, bro.
<From the Commodity to Capital: Hegel’s Dialectic in Marx’s Capital - Jairus Banaji
>[…]There are countless references to problems of scientific method scattered across the pages of Marx’s later work. To draw some of these together here in a form that recapitulates their underlying conceptions: firstly, there is a methodological reference that is basic to any understanding of the architecture of Capital, namely, the distinction Marx repeatedly draws between ‘capital in general’ and ‘many capitals’ (cf. Rosdolsky, 1968, Volume I, p. 61 ff.). The former refers to the ‘inner nature of capital’, to its ‘essential character’ (Grundrisse, p. 414), and is also called ‘the simple concept of capital’ (ibid.); by contrast, ‘many capitals or competition of capitals, entails a study of capital ‘in its reality’ (Grundrisse, p. 684 note), or in its ‘concrete’ aspects as they appear reflected on the surface of society, in the ‘actual movement’ of capitals (Capital, III, p. 25). So in the first place the investigation of capitalist economy is broadly stratified into two levels which contrapose the ‘essential character’ of capital to its ‘concrete’ or ‘actual’ superficial movements. But secondly, the investigation itself is a movement from one level to the other, from essence to concreteness. In the Preface to the first edition (1867) of Capital I, Marx writes that in the analysis of ‘economic forms’, i.e. of social phenomena as such, the ‘power of abstraction’ must replace a directly experimental, hence empirical, relation to the object. In what does the power of abstraction consist, however? About this the passage in question leaves no room for doubt. It consists in our ability to identify a point of departure for the movement from one level to the other, and a point of departure which will be simultaneously the foundation of that movement. For Marx here introduces the notion of a ‘cell-form’ (Capital, I, p. 90), which he identifies with Hegel’s ‘in itself (An-sich, or essence) in the first edition form of Chapter One (cf. Zeleny, 1973, p. 78, n. 8, for the passage). The movement from the cell-form to the concrete is logically continuous, so that, in approaching the concrete forms in which capital appears on the surface of society, we do not abandon the sphere of essential relations as if we were moving across into new territory; rather, we now investigate those very relations in ‘their’ forms of appearance, i.e. in the forms determined within their own logical movement, as part of this movement.
>These intermediate levels of the logical process, which connect abstract and concrete, are as essential as essence in its abstract and simple cell-form. Marx’s constant reference to these intermediate levels or ‘terms’ or ‘stages’, or to the ‘connecting links’ (Theories, 3, p. 453, 2, p. 174, Capital, I, p. 421), implies a logic of derivation (of ‘deduction’ in the broad sense) which is distinct from the pure deductive method of axiomatic systems (on this see Zeleny, 1973, p. 75 ff., p. 141 ff.). The concrete is derived by stages, from the abstract. Where this process of dialectical-logical derivation collapses, as it does in Classical Economy, Marx refers to ‘forced abstractions’, to the direct subordination of the concrete to the abstract (Theories, 1, p. 89, p. 92; 2, p. 164 f., p. 437; 3, p. 87).
>Thirdly, in the famous introduction of 1857 (Grundrisse, p. 100 ff.), the movement of essence from abstract to concrete is also described as a journey from the simple to the combined. The movement of derivation of forms within a framework defined by its logical continuity is thus also a process of ‘combination’, of the ‘concentration’ of many ‘determinations’ into a ‘rich totality’ which reproduces the concreteness of reality no longer simply as something that impinges confusedly on perception but as something rationally comprehended. These ‘determinations’ are only the forms derived in the movement of essence as the form-determinations of essence (cf. Rubin, 1972, p. 37 ff.).
>Finally, the entire process by which the concrete is reproduced in thought as something rationally comprehended is described in places by Marx as the ‘dialectical development’ of the ‘concept’ of capital, and all moments within this movement which are derivable as essential determinations, including, of course, the forms of appearance, no matter how illusory they may be, count as moments (forms, relations) ‘corresponding to their concept’ (e.g. Capital, III, p. 141). (This is why, despite its illusory and deceptive character, Marx can call the wage-form ‘one of the essential mediating forms of capitalist relations of production’, Results, p. 1064.)
>It is obvious that the methodological references express a consistent and internally unified conception which it is impossible to grasp without reference to the dialectic, that is, to what can now be formally defined as a specific, non-classical logical type of scientific thought, a form of scientific reasoning and proof distinct from generalising inductivism, deductive-axiomatic methods, or any combination of these supposedly characteristic of a ‘scientific method in general’, e.g. Della Volpe’s hypothetico-deductive method.
>The point can also be put in these terms: it is impossible to grasp Marx’s conception of scientific method outside the framework of Hegel’s Logic. This is not to claim that, like Lassalle, he simply ‘applied an abstract ready-made system of logic’ (Selected Correspondence, p. 123) to the phenomena of capitalist economy. The claim is a different one: the method that Marx followed was a method ‘which Hegel discovered’ (Selected Correspondence, p. 121). It was Hegel who first enunciated the conception of a point of departure which is simultaneously the foundation of the movement which it initiates (Science of Logic, p. 71). For Hegel this was only conceivable because the principle that forms the beginning is not something ‘dead’, something fixed and static, but something ‘self-moving’ (Hegel, 1966, p. 104). Hegel’s great announcement in the ‘Preface’ to the Phenomenology is the conception of ‘substance’ as ‘subject’, or the conception of a ‘self-developing, self-evolving substance’, where the term ‘substance’ can be taken in its classical, Cartesian sense to mean ‘that which requires only itself for its existence’.
>As the ‘process that engenders its own moments and runs through them’ (Hegel, 1966, p. 108) this substance-subject is what Hegel calls das Wesen, essence. Essence cannot be said to be something ‘before or in its movement’, and this movement ‘has no substrate on which it runs its course’ (Science of Logic, p. 448). Rather, essence is the movement through which it ‘posits itself, ‘reflects itself into itself, as the totalising unity of ‘essence and form’ (Science of Logic, p. 449). Conversely,
<‘the question cannot therefore be asked, how form is added to essence, for it is only the reflection of essence into essence itself …’ (Science of Logic, p. 449-50)
>Moreover, if form is immanent, or
<‘if form is taken as equal to essence, then it is a misunderstanding to suppose that cognition can be satisfied with the ‘in itself or with essence, that it can dispense with form, that the basic principle from which we start (Grundsatz) renders superfluous the realisation of essence or the development of form. Precisely because form is as essential to essence as essence to itself, essence must not be grasped and expressed merely as essence … but as form also, and with the entire wealth of developed form. Only then is it grasped and expressed as something real.’ (Hegel, 1966, p. 50)
>In this decisive passage Hegel says essence must realise itself, or ‘work itself out’, and this it can only do through the ‘activity of form’ (Science of Logic, p. 453). Only as this self-totalising unity of itself and form does it become something ‘real’ (wirkliches). Otherwise, as immediate substance, substance not mediated through its self-movement, essence remains something abstract and so one-sided and incomplete. It remains something basically untrue, for, as Hegel goes on to say, in the passage cited above, ‘the truth is totality’ (Hegel, 1966, p. 50), a fusion of essence and form, universal and particular, or the universal drawing out of itself the wealth of particularity.
>It is interesting that in a terminology that is almost indistinguishable from Hegel’s, Marx articulates an identical conception as early as his Dissertation. For Hegel’s argument can be summarised in his own words as follows: ‘Appearance is itself essential to essence’ (Hegel, 1970, p. 21). Now in the Dissertation Marx argues that although they shared the same general principles (Atomist), Democritus and Epicurus evolved diametrically opposed conceptions of knowledge and attitudes towards it. Democritus maintained that ‘sensuous appearance does not belong to the Atoms themselves. It is not objective appearance but subjective semblance (Schein). The true principles are the atom and the void …’ (Marx, 1975, p. 39). So for Democritus ‘the principle does not enter into the appearance, remains without reality and existence’, and the real world, the world he perceives, is then ‘torn away from the principle, left in its own independent reality’ (Marx, 1975, p. 40). In Hegel’s terms, for Democritus the Atom is devoid of form, has no form of appearance, so that the world of appearances (Erscheinungen) necessarily degenerates into a world of pure illusion (Schein). ‘The Atom remains for Democritus a pure and abstract category, a hypothesis’ (Marx, 1975, p. 73.). Or, ‘in Democritus there is no realisation of the principle itself (Marx, 1975, p. 56 ff.). On the other hand, if Democritus transforms the world we perceive into pure illusion, Epicurus regards it as ‘objective appearance’.
<‘Epicurus was the first to grasp appearance as appearance that is, as alienation of the essence’ (Marx, 1975, p. 64).
<‘In Epicurus the consequence of the principle itself will be presented’ (id. p. 56).
>Or for Epicurus the Atom is not a simply abstract and hypothetical determination, it is something ‘active’, a principle that ‘realises itself’.
>The conception of Democritus is dominated by the following contradiction: what is true, the principle, remains devoid of any form of appearance, hence something purely abstract and hypothetical; on the other hand, the world of appearances, divorced from any principle, is left as an independent reality. It is not difficult to see that in the critique which Marx developed many years later, classical and vulgar economy emerged as the transfigured expressions of the poles of this contradiction. So Marx would write,
<‘By classical political economy I mean all the economists who … have investigated the real internal relations of bourgeois economy as opposed to the vulgar economists who only flounder around within their forms of appearance’ (Capital, I, p. 174.).
<‘Vulgar economy feels especially at home in the alienated external appearances of economic relations’ (Capital, III, p. 796.),
>whereas classical economy, which investigates those relations themselves, seeks to grasp them ‘in opposition to their different forms of appearance’. Classical economy says, the appearances are pure semblance (Schein), only the principles are true. So
<‘it is not interested in evolving the different forms through their inner genesis (die verschiednen Formen genetisch zu entwickeln) but tries to reduce them to their unity by the analytic method’ (Theories, 3, p. 500.)
>Again, classical economy ‘holds instinctively to the law’, ‘it tries to rescue the law from the contradictions of appearance’, from ‘experience based on immediate appearance’, while vulgar economy relies here ‘as elsewhere on the mere semblance as against the law of appearance (gegen das Gesetz der Erscheinung)’ (Capital, I, p. 421 f.), that is, as against the notion of appearances as ‘essential’ (Science of Logic, p. 500 ff.).
>In short, as in the atomism of Democritus, so in bourgeois economy essence and appearance fall apart. It follows that classical economy which ‘holds to the law’, the principle or essence or inner relations, comprehends this only abstractly as a principle that remains ‘without reality and existence’, as an essence without form, as dead substance or hypothesis. In Hegel’s terms, its ‘principle’, the Ricardian labour theory of value, forms an Abstract Identity incapable of passing over into a Concrete Totality, hence into something true. Ricardo
<‘abstracts from what he considers to be accidental’,
>or the appearances are of no concern to him, his is an essence that can dispose of form.
<‘Another method would be to present the real process in which both what is to Ricardo a merely accidental movement, but what is constant and real, and its law, the average relation, appear as equally essential’. (GKP p. 803.)
<‘Beginnings are always difficult in all sciences. The understanding of the first chapter, especially the section that contains the analysis of commodities, will therefore present the greatest difficulty.’ (Capital, I, p. 89.)
>No section of Capital gave Marx as much trouble as its beginning. Why could he not just begin with Part Two, the transformation of money into capital (as Althusser asks the French readers of Capital to do)? Quite clearly because the whole understanding of what capital is, of its relation to social labour, depends crucially on the exposition of the theory of value. (The sense in which ‘value’ is used here and throughout this essay will be clarified in the next section.) As Marx says about capital, ‘In the concept of value its secret is betrayed’ (Grundrisse, p. 776).
>This method is Marx’s own, the conception of Epicurus in Antiquity or of Hegel in the modern world.
>It follows that the ‘abstraction of value’ cannot by itself ‘reflect nature … truly and completely’. As the abstract universal, it is something simple and undeveloped, this form of simplicity is its one-sidedness, it remains a principle that has still to ‘realise itself, to become ‘active’. And this it can only do by ‘entering into appearance’, determining itself in appearance or in the whole ‘wealth of developed form’. For to trace the movement through which the principle (essence) enters into appearance and acquires reality and existence, is precisely to ‘evolve the different forms through their inner genesis’, it is to develop conceptually the movement which Marx calls ‘the real process of acquiring shape’ (Theories, 3, p. 500, der wirkliche Gestaltungsprozess).[…]
>>2227745
>[…]It would be good to summarise the general argument of the section in advance for the sake of simplicity. The total structure (Gesamtaufbau) of Capital is best understood in terms of an image that Marx himself uses at one point. Namely, if it is seen as an ‘expanding curve’ or spiral-movement composed of specific cycles of abstraction. Each cycle of abstraction, and thus the curve as a whole, begins and ends with the Sphere of Circulation (the realm of appearances), which is finally, at the end of the entire movement, itself determined specifically as the Sphere of the Competition of Capitals. The first specific cycle in Capital, the one which initiates the entire movement of the curve, starts with Circulation as the immediate, abstract appearance of the total process of capital, that is, it starts with ‘Simple Circulation’. As an immediate appearance of this process, as its Schein, Simple Circulation presupposes this process, which is capital in its totality. The first cycle then moves dialectically from Simple Circulation, or what Marx calls the individual commodity, to capital. This movement will be called the ‘dialectical-logical derivation of the concept of capital’. Methodologically, it is itself decomposable into specific phases: an initial phase of Analysis which takes us from the individual commodity to the concept of value, and a subsequent phase of Synthesis which, starting from value, derives the concept of capital through the process Hegel called ‘the development of form’. Capital then emerges through this movement as ‘nothing else but a value-form of the organisation of productive forces’ (Ilyenkov, 1977, p. 85). In the return to the Sphere of Circulation which concludes cycle 1, initiates cycle 2, the individual commodity from which we started is now ‘posited’, that is, established dialectically, as a form of appearance (Erscheinungsform) of capital, and Circulation is posited as both presupposition and result of the Immediate Process of Production. The dialectical status of the Sphere of Circulation thus shifts from being the immediate appearance of a process ‘behind it’ (Schein) to being the posited form of appearance (Erscheinung) of this process. (Cf. for example, Grundrisse, p. 358, Theories 3, p. 112, Results p. 949 ff.)
>In the Grundrisse Marx sketches a series of short anticipatory drafts of the plan of his work as a whole. They are, of course more in the nature of notes which he will revise from time to time. In one of these he writes,
<‘In the first section, where exchange-values, money, prices are looked at, commodities always appear as already present … We know that they (commodities) express aspects of social production, but the latter itself is the presupposition. However, they are not posited in this character …’ (Grundrisse, p. 227, Nicolaus’)
>Here Marx says that at the beginning of the entire movement of investigation the commodity already presupposes social production (capital) of which it is only an ‘aspect’, or determination, but it is not yet posited as such an aspect. That is, it has still to be established dialectically or dialectico-logically as a determination of the total process of capital. Secondly, this world of commodities that confronts us on the surface of bourgeois society ‘points beyond itself towards the economic relations which are posited as relations of production. The internal structure of production therefore forms the second section …’ (ibid.). In his original draft of the 1859 Critique, reprinted in the German edition of the Grundrisse, Marx returns to this idea and develops it more explicitly:
<‘An analysis of the specific form of the division of labour, of the conditions of production which are its basis, or of the economic relations into which those conditions resolve, would show that the whole system of bourgeois production is presupposed before exchange-value appears as the simple point of departure on the surface.’ (GKP, p. 907.)
>As the form which confronts us immediately on the surface of society, the commodity as such is our point of departure. But this simple commodity, the point of departure, already presupposes a specific form of the social division of labour, it presupposes the bourgeois mode of production in its totality. On the other hand, at the beginning itself, the commodity has still to be posited as only an ‘aspect’ or form of appearance of the total process of capital.
>Because capital in its totality is the presupposition, when he starts Chapter One of Capital Marx must explicitly refer to this presupposition. And that is exactly what he does. He says,
<‘The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an immense collection of commodities; the individual commodity appears as its elementary form.’ (Capital, I, p. 125.)
>So the very first sentence of Capital makes it quite clear that capital is presupposed.
>One consequence of this is obvious. The conceptual regime of Part One, Volume One is not some ‘abstract pre-capitalist society’ of ‘simple commodity producers’, it is the Sphere of Simple Circulation, or the circulation of commodities as such, and we start with this as the process that is ‘immediately present on the surface of bourgeois society’. (Grundrisse, p. 255), we start with it as a reflected sphere of the total process of capital which, however, has still to be determined as reflected, i.e. still to be posited. When we examine the simple commodity, or the commodity as such, we only examine capital in its most superficial or immediate aspect. As Marx says,
<‘We proceed from the commodity as capitalist production in its simplest form.’ (Results, p. 1060.)
>Indeed, capital ‘must form the starting-point as well as the finishing point’ (Grundrisse, p. 107), but as the starting-point capital is taken in its ‘immediate being’ or as it appears immediately on the surface of society.
>It is, therefore, difficult to understand how anything except the most shallow and hasty reading of Marx’s Capital could have led to the kind of view proposed by Anon and so many other expounders of Marx. The ‘abstract pre-capitalist society’ that Marx is supposed to have started with is not a fiction that Marx consciously uses in the tradition of certain medieval conceptions of science, but a fiction that ‘mythodologists’ unconsciously tend to elaborate.[…]
>[…]Marx begins therefore with ‘exchange-value’, taking this as the only basis on which he can begin to penetrate the social properties of the commodity.
>These properties then appear initially as a sort of ‘content’ ‘hidden within’ their ‘form of appearance’, exchange-value. Insofar as Marx, both in Section 1 and later, calls this ‘content’ ‘value’ (cf. Capital, I, p. 139: ‘We started from exchange-value … in order to track down the value that lay hidden within it’), it is easy to fall into the illusion of supposing that value is something actually contained in the individual commodity. For example, it is easy to suppose that Marx means by value (as quite clearly he did at one stage) ‘the labour objectified in a commodity’, and then from there to proceed to the more general identification of labour with value which II Rubin quite correctly polemicised against (Rubin, 1972, p. 111 ff.). But Marx also makes it clear in Chapter One that this is not how he understands the matter. If value appears initially to be a ‘content’ concealed within its form of appearance, exchange-value, then this false appearance is plainly contradicted when he writes,
>‘Political economy has indeed analysed value and its magnitude … and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms. But it has never once asked the question why this content has assumed that particular form, that is to say, why labour is represented in value (warum sich also die Arbeit im Wert … darstellt).’ (Capital, I, p. 173-74.)
>In this lucid sentence Marx calls value the social form as such..Let us look at this a bit more closely.
>Outside of the purely vulgar and quite incorrect Ricardian understanding of Marx’s theory of value, which identifies value with the labour objectified in commodities, the usual mode of presentation of the theory in the Marxist literature is the one apparently started by F. Petry and typified in the expository accounts of Rubin, Sweezy and others. In this mode of presentation, the crucial architectural distinction within Marx’s value theory is its separation of ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ aspects in the problem of value. For example, Sweezy writes,
<‘The great originality of Marx’s value theory lies in its recognition of these two elements of the problem.’ (Sweezy in Howard and King, 1976, p. 141 f.)
>What is the ‘qualitative aspect’ of the problem of value, however? No sooner do we pose this question, than it becomes evident that the qualitative/quantitative distinction is not enough to render a proper account of Marx’s concept of value. Indeed, in the very passages where Marx himself refers to this distinction explicitly, he also says,
<‘Ricardo’s mistake is that he is concerned only with the magnitude of value … But the labour embodied in (commodities) must be represented (dargestellt) as social labour … this qualitative aspect of the matter which is contained in the representation of exchange-value as money (in der Darstellung des Tauschwertes als Geld) is not elaborated by Ricardo …’ (Theories, 3, p. 131).
>Again, some pages later,
<‘This necessity of representing individual labour as general labour is equivalent to the necessity of representing a commodity as money.’ (Theories, 3, p. 136)
>In passages such as these Marx isolates two dimensions of the value-process, (a) the representation of the commodity as money, and (b) the representation of (private) individual labour as social labour. The relation between these two dimensions can be described as follows: in the social process of exchange a surface relation, exchange-value, becomes the form of appearance of an inner relation, the relation which connects individual labour to the total social labour. (This connection is, in any case, what we might call a ‘material law of society’. Cf. Selected Correspondence, p. 239, p. 251, Theories, 1, p. 44.) The surface-relation is simultaneously a ‘relation among things’ and the inner relation a ‘relation among persons’.
>When we look at Marx’s final presentation of Chapter One, the ‘substance of value’ and ‘magnitude of value’ aspects are taken together, investigated without any specific formal separation, in both of the first two Sections. This is so because, although separable as qualitative and quantitative aspects respectively, they belong to the same dimension of the value-process, the dimension of its inner content as a process within which individual labour is connected to and becomes part of total social labour. On the other hand, this ‘content’ is logically inseparable from its specific ‘form’; or to put the same thing differently, it only becomes something real through its form, which is the representation of the commodity as money. In its ‘immediate being’ the commodity is only a use-value, a point which Marx repeatedly makes in the Critique. Its immediate being is thus the commodity’s relation of self-repulsion, or its ‘negative’ relation to itself as a commodity (cf. Science of Logic, p. 168: ‘The negative relation of the one to itself is repulsion’.) The commodity can posit itself as a commodity-value, a product of social labour, only in a form in which it negates itself in its immediate being, hence only in a mediated form. This form is money. Only through the representation of the commodity as money, or, expressed more concretely, through the individual act of exchange, the transformation of the commodity into money, is individual labour posited as social labour. The concept of value in Marx is constructed as the indestructible unity of these two dimensions, so that logically it is impossible to understand Marx’s theory of value except as his theory of money (cf. Backhaus, 1975).4 This is the aspect developed explicitly in Section 3, the ‘form of value’. In Section 3, moreover, or in this return to the level of appearances, the contradictory determinations of the commodity, which appeared initially as mutually indifferent, become reabsorbed as a unity (money). In Marx’s words,
<‘Use-value or the body of the commodity here plays a new role. It becomes … the form of appearance of its own opposite. Instead of splitting apart, the contradictory determinations of the commodity here enter into a relation of mutual reflection’ (cited Berger, 1974, p. 102, Zeleny, 1973, p. 78).’
>The sequence of Marx’s presentation is thus: A(1) → B → A(2).
>In Section 1 ‘exchange-value’ figures as pure surface appearance (Schein), hence as a quantitative relation of commodities. But already within this section Marx accomplishes a transition to dimension B, whose two aspects (socially-necessary labour, and abstract labour) he then investigates, in this and the following section, without formal separation. Finally, in Section 3, Marx ‘returns’ to exchange-value, to dimension A, to deal with it no longer as the immediate illusory appearance of the exchange-process but as objective appearance, or form, Erscheinung.
>In short, value is not labour and ‘to develop the concept of capital it is necessary to begin not with labour but with value’ (Grundrisse, p. 259), that is, with the twofold process by which individual labour becomes total labour through the reified appearance-form of the individual act of exchange (transformation of the commodity into money). Regarded as this twofold process of representation, the concept of value can then be formally defined as the abstract and reified form of social labour, and the term ‘commodity-form of the product of labour’ can be taken as its concrete-historical synonym. It is value, the commodity-form, in this definition, just outlined here, that composes the ‘self developing substance’ of Marx’s entire investigation in Capital. As Marx says, value is
<‘the social form as such; its further development is therefore a further development of the social process that brings the commodity out onto the surface of society.’ (GKP p. 931)
>Or value
<‘contains the whole secret … of all the bourgeois forms of the product of labour’. (Selected Correspondence, p. 228)
>The money-form of value (or money) is ‘the first form in which value’, social labour in abstract form ‘proceeds to the character of capital’ (Grundrisse, p. 259). So as the abstract-reified form of social labour, value ‘determines itself first as money, then as capital. In its money-form value obtains its sole form of appearance, and through this the moment of actuality. In its capital-form it posits itself as ‘living substance’, as a substance become ‘dominant subject’ (Capital, I, p. 255 f.), or posits itself as that totalising process which Hegel calls ‘essence’. Or, in the concept of value the analysis of the commodity arrives through its own movement at a basis for the dialectical-logical definition of capital.
>At the moment of dialectical-logical derivation, this definintion is only the most simple or abstract definition of capital. ‘If we speak here of capital, that is still merely a word (ein Name)’, Marx says.
< ‘The only aspect in which capital is here posited as distinct from (…) value and from money is that of (…) value which preserves and perpetuates itself in and through circulation.’ (Grundrisse, p. 262)[…]
>Thus in its most simple and essential definition capital is a form of value where value itself is grasped as a form of social labour. From this it follows that when capital seeks to overcome or to subordinate the commodity-form of its own relations of production, to regulate the ‘market’ according to the combination of its individual wills (cf. Sohn-Rethel, 1975, p. 41 ff.), then it merely seeks to overcome or to subordinate itself as a form of value, or itself in its most essential definition. And this is impossible except as the contradiction which capital becomes[…]https://libcom.org/article/commodity-capital-hegels-dialectic-marxs-capital-jairus-banajihttps://libgen.is/search.php?req=Representation+of+Labour+in+Capitalism >>2224108>as marx understands the value-form, it proceeds by a dialectical relation between two commodities. the ratio [X:Y] provides an inverse relation, between the relative (qualitative) and equivalent (quantitative) form.Where I am from "ratio" refers to the relationship between
two quantities which expresses their sizes relative to each other.
>>2226580im currently re-reading capital vol. 1 to simplify things for you, so i should hopefully have a key to marx's thought later today.
>>2228013well, marx otherwise states it as an equation: [X = Y]
but an equation bound by two poles of value; its "relative" [X] and "equivalent" [Y] form, which are magnitude (value) and substance (use), realised by the value-relation. marx thinks that if we can compare substance, then we can compare magnitude, so both must include each other's concept. this makes a bit more sense in hegel's logic, where "being", is given its concept in the dialectic: [quality-quantity-measure]. in the commodity form, its two factors are united in measure. this is why commodities possess value. so yes, its not a purely quantitative relation, but to marx, it still acts as a means of proportion. the substance and magnitude of each are mutually compared, so both acquire a means of commensurability. so value is the unity of substance and magnitude.
in the hegelian dialectic of "essence", or "nature" [essence-appearance-actuality], the value-form [exchange-value] gives expression to this, where magnitude [X] is given concrete appearance by [Y]. this is also why prices denote a relation of relative, to equivalent value: [X:Y]. the actuality of value then is in exchange, where determined values are realised;
<"Therefore, the common substance that manifests itself in the exchange value of commodities, whenever they are exchanged, is their value. [vol. 1, ch. 1]"this socialises the commodity, between its buyer and seller, who receive use-value, and value, respectively. this separation between production, consumption and accumulation then lay the groundwork for all modes of production.
>>2227745>>2227746now, barring the passive-aggressive nature of these verbose expositions, i would like to finally put this all to rest. in these posts, in the first place, the "single" commodity represents the "dormancy" or immanence of capital, as the "cell-form" of its mature development. this, by totalisation, connects the simple commodity to the fully realised mode of capital. this is treated by marx, as the movement of simple reproduction [C-M-C] to capital circulation [M-C-M'], and why he says,
<"In the pre-capitalist stages of society commerce ruled industry. In modern society the reverse is true. [vol. 3, ch. 20]"this then signifies a pre-capitalist mode of commodity-exchange and value-relation. and so, i have found a definite source in engels' "supplement" for capital vol. 3, which resolves any and all disputes;
<"In a word: the Marxian law of value holds generally, as far as economic laws are valid at all, for the whole period of simple commodity production – that is, up to the time when the latter suffers a modification through the appearance of the capitalist form of production […] Thus, the Marxian law of value has general economic validity for a period lasting from the beginning of exchange, which transforms products into commodities, down to the 15th century of the present era. But the exchange of commodities dates from a time before all written history – which in Egypt goes back to at least 2500 B.C., and perhaps 5000 B.C., and in Babylon to 4000 B.C., perhaps to 6000 B.C.; thus, the law of value has prevailed during a period of from five to seven thousand years."so commodity exchange and value has existed for thousands of years, but this should be obvious, if we understand money as the "form of value". so then, the "riddle" of value is finally (re-)solved…
<"The exchange of commodities, therefore, first begins on the boundaries of such [primitive] communities […] Custom stamps them as values with definite magnitudes. [vol. 1, ch. 2] >>2226580>>2228617to get a properly professional summary, i will need more time, i have decided. so please be patient.
>>2227745>>2227746another reference to this bourgeois immanence:
<"The mode of production in which the product takes the form of a commodity, or is produced directly for exchange, is the most general and most embryonic form of bourgeois production. It therefore makes its appearance at an early date in history, though not in the same predominating and characteristic manner as now-a-days. [vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4]"this he relates to bourgeois production, in the sense of the commodity having a fetish inherent to it, but more easily recognised in earlier times [due to the visibility of the production process];
<"Hence its Fetish character is comparatively easy to be seen through. But when we come to more concrete forms, even this appearance of simplicity vanishes."people today are most beguiled by the concept of value, and so are never able to articulate the cause of crises correctly. marx's ultimate criticism of classical political economy comes by the way of the fetishism also;
<"Political Economy has indeed analysed, however incompletely, value and its magnitude, and has discovered what lies beneath these forms. But it has never once asked the question why labour is represented by the value of its product and labour time by the magnitude of that value."in the footnotes to this passage, marx's criticism for ricardo is that he correctly discerns the values of a commodity, but never connects these forms of value to their unity as a "value", proper. this is why marx's "value theory" is based on the unity of opposites; not simply, opposites. this spectre of "value" is also why i call marx a metaphysician, which as per his 1873 preface, was apparently a charge given against him by the positivists (comtists). so history repeats itself i suppose. lol.
new potential insights into political economy
https://mronline.org/2025/04/12/the-state-of-capitalism-in-flux-economy-society-and-hegemony-under-todays-interregnum/
>While classical imperialism featured internationalization of commodity and money capital under amalgamating industrial and banking monopolies, the finance capital envisioned by Rudolf Hilferding has been dismantled. Today, the authors assert, “giant financialization enterprises together with transformed financial institutions drive contemporary imperialism.”25 This manifests in the “qualitative transformation of the internationalization of productive capital together with the enormous revival of loanable capital flows,” world money’s dominance, and a capitalist periphery with elites commanding global circuits of capital via international transactions.26 And though the classical theorists correctly emphasized the state’s role, they overlooked world money, an essential feature for understanding hegemony.27
>Productive capital internationalization has created complex global value chains (GVCs) dependent on profit-friendly conditions, with governance asymmetries favoring core firms over peripheral enterprises. Financialization deepens this dominance by enabling multinationals to exert control through financial mechanisms.28 Financial liberalization draws peripheral economies into global finance on terms dictated by core countries, creating “subordinate financialization” that heightens peripheral vulnerabilities. This dynamic is reinforced by the dollar’s status as primary reserve currency, compelling peripheral states to accumulate dollar reserves and remain tethered to the core-dominated financial architecture. Controversially, L and C argue that today’s imperialist rivalry no longer seeks territorial exclusivity but instead focuses on shaping rules for investing, producing, trading, and monetary transfers. While structuralist and dependency theories remain “reliable” guides to peripheral subordination, L and C argue that they require updating to account for global capitalism’s new modalities.>>2228706Engels is defending the idea that the law of value (labor-time regulation of exchange) predates capitalism, applying to ancient and medieval commodity exchange. This differs subtly from Marx’s focus on value as a
historically specific social relation under capitalism. Engels’ interpretation broadens the scope of the law of value, while Marx’s analysis ties it more tightly to capitalist social structures. Engels is saying that value (as labor-time determination) existed in pre-capitalist exchange but operated in a "purer" form, with prices approximating values. Marx’s emphasis is that value as a social abstraction (shaping production and class relations) is specific to capitalism. Pre-capitalist exchange was incidental, labor-time calculation lacked the systemic role it gains under capitalism.
The capitalist mode of production (post-15th century) introduces profit-driven production, wage labor, and competition, which transform how value operates. Prices no longer directly align with labor values but instead orbit "prices of production" (costs + average profit). However, Engels maintains that the law of value remains foundational, even as its expression changes.
If you actually know your Hegel you know hes saying that value as it is fully conceptualized under capitalism retroactively gives us a more true understanding of historic modes of production in a way that would be impossible for them at the time because it did not yet exist. Pre-capitalist producers did not organize production around abstract labor-time or market imperatives. Value, as a
social abstraction, did not yet mediate their social relations. Its "law-like" regularity is only visible
after capitalism creates the conditions for its universalization.
Pre-capitalist exchange (simple commodity production) was not governed by value as a systemic logic but by localized, contingent practices. Labor-time proportionality in exchange was incidental, not a structural necessity. Capitalism’s value form allows us to "decode" earlier exchanges through its categories — but this is an analytical reconstruction, not a historical reality.
In other words, Engels’ claim that the law of value "held" for 5,000 years is
descriptive (observing empirical patterns), whereas Marx’s account is
explanatory, revealing capitalism’s unique social ontology that retroactively defines the past.
Engels mocks Loria for dismissing the idea that pre-capitalist exchanges could reflect labor-time value. But from a Hegelian-Marxist perspective, Anons’s error is deeper: he fails to grasp that value is not a transhistorical "fact" but a
social form whose full conceptualization is only possible after capitalism. Pre-capitalist societies could not comprehend their own exchanges through the category of value, because value as a universal social mediation did not yet exist.
Capitalism, by universalizing value, allows us to retroactively analyze earlier societies through this lens — but this does not mean value "existed" in the same way prior to capitalism. The difference hinges on whether "value" is understood as a descriptive empirical pattern (Engels) or a historically specific social relation (Marx) and is not necessarily a disagreement but simply different uses of the same word.
The apparent tension between Marx and Engels on the question of "value" can indeed be resolved by recognizing that they are
using the term in distinct but overlapping ways, shaped by their differing emphases (theoretical vs. historical) and the dialectical method itself.
For Marx, value is not merely a quantitative measure but a
qualitative social relation specific to capitalism. In this framework, value is a historically specific abstraction that structures society, making labor-time the hidden regulator of production and social life. Pre-capitalist societies lacked this systemic logic.
Engels uses "value" more descriptively, applying it to pre-capitalist societies where exchange ratios approximated labor-time proportions over time. His focus is on the empirical regularity of exchange, not the systemic social role of value. Engels’ empirical claim and Marx’s theoretical claim (value as a capitalist social form) are thus compatible and even complimentary when understood as two perspectives. Engels observing that labor-time ratios empirically influenced exchange in history, and Marx arguing that value as a social logic only becomes dominant under capitalism.
Engels introduces the concept of "simple commodity production" to bridge pre-capitalist exchange and capitalism. Here, goods are exchanged, but production is not yet subordinated to profit or wage labor. Engels argues that the law of value "holds" here because exchange reflects labor-time.
Marx, however, treats "simple commodity production" as a theoretical abstraction, not a historical stage. For Marx, generalized commodity production (and thus value as a social form) requires capitalism. Pre-capitalist exchange was too marginal and embedded in non-market social relations (kinship, feudalism) to generate value as a systemic logic.
This is not a contradiction but a difference in analytical focus. Engels uses "simple commodity production" to historicize the law of value. Marx uses it to theorize capitalism’s origins. Engels’ critique hinges on this distinction. Anon conflates; value as a transhistorical empirical pattern (Engels’ usage) with Value as a capitalist social form (Marx’s usage).
Anon misses that Engels is describing a
descriptive regularity (labor-time influencing exchange), not a
social logic. Similarly Engels’ frustration is with Loria’s failure to recognize that the same term "value" can operate at different levels of analysis. Ancient Babylonian traders might have exchanged goods in rough proportion to labor-time, but they did not organize production around abstract labor or market imperatives. Value, as a social abstraction, was absent. These different meanings of value refer to is as an idealist abstract universal that becomes a material concrete universal with the emergence of capitalism as a mode of production. That is how this attempt to reduce Marx's theory of value to Smith's fails.
>>2228617In recognizing Hegel's influence and the dialectical logic of Marx's work you have to acknowledge either that Smith was a covert Hegelian and that Marx was the only one to correctly interpret him, or that Marx's critique of political economy was more than just a record of Smith's work.
Also the section preceding your quote:
<Starting with this determination of value by labor-time, the whole of commodity production developed, and with it, the multifarious relations in which the various aspects of the law of value assert themselves, as described in the first part of Vol. I of Capital; that is, in particular, the conditions under which labor alone is value-creating. These are conditions which assert themselves without entering the consciousness of the participants and can themselves be abstracted from daily practice only through laborious, theoretical investigation; which act, therefore, like natural laws, as Marx proved to follow necessarily from the nature of commodity production. The most important and most incisive advance was the transition to metallic money, the consequence of which, however, was that the determination of value by labor-time was no longer visible upon the surface of commodity exchange. From the practical point of view, money became the decisive measure of value, all the more as the commodities entering trade became more varied, the more they came from distant countries, and the less, therefore, the labor-time necessary for their production could be checked. Money itself usually came first from foreign parts; even when precious metals were obtained within the country, the peasant and artisan were partly unable to estimate approximately the labor employed therein, and partly their own consciousness of the value-measuring property of labor had been fairly well dimmed by the habit of reckoning with money; in the popular mind, money began to represent absolute value.https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/supp.htmSo Engels also thinks money is a measure of value and not a commodity. I guess Marx's law of value holds under fiat too.
>>2231877machine error.
>>2231766>Engels is defending the idea that the law of value predates capitalismright, so value and commodities existed before capitalism, which was the entire idiotic dispute.
>Prices no longer directly align with labor values but instead orbit "prices of production" (costs + average profit)right, so [C-M-C] moves to [M-C-M'] as i have already explained. value moves to surplus value as its new orientation. Value [Q/P] -> surplus value [V/C].
>If you actually know your Hegel you know […] capitalism retroactively gives us a more true understanding of historyoh, so projecting capitalist categories onto the past is valid? yet its not okay when smith does it, as you say:
>>2220825>Smith naturalizes capitalism, Marx historicizes it […] To retroject value into pre-capitalist societies as Smith does is to misread Marxpure hypocrisy, like how you accused aristotle of things marx was actually doing.
>Value, as a social abstraction, did not yet mediate their social relationto marx, value is inherently abstracted in the very act of exchange. he also thinks value determines itself, even without our knowledge of it:
<"But the exchange of commodities is evidently an act characterised by a total abstraction from use value […] whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it. [vol. 1, ch. 1, sec.1-4]">Pre-capitalist societies could not comprehend their own exchangesthats fine to marx, since exchange equates labour by itself
>but this does not mean value "existed" in the same way prior to capitalism.[C-M-C] -> [M-C-M']
>historically specific social relationyes, which marx locates at an "early date in history", the same as engels;
<"It (commodity production) therefore makes its appearance at an early date in history [vol. 1, ch. 1]and
<"The exchange of commodities, therefore, first begins on the boundaries of such [primitive] communities [vol. 1, ch. 2]"these quotes youre too cowardly to confront.
>That is how this attempt to reduce Marx's theory of value to Smith's fails.yet you will never be able to explain why smith is incorrect. marx and engels even both attribute the concept of surplus value to smith.
>So Engels also thinks money is a measure of value and not a commodity.where does he say that money isnt a commodity? more hallucination. but lets read marx:
<"It thus serves as a universal measure of value. And only by virtue of this function does gold, the equivalent commodity par excellence, become money. [vol. 1, ch. 3]"money to marx is the universal commodity.
>>2232395>its not okay when smith does it>as Smith doesSo Smith
was a Hegelian, or Marx and Smiths conception of Value are different?
>>2233442No it's like saying that criticizing religion is part of the subject of religious studies. Every field of study has critics who are well versed in it. Every field of study has meta-analysis and criticism.
You know how you came to this thread to bitch about this thread, and now you are inside the thread you're bitching about? It's kinda like that.
>>2233362no, smith saw the law of value as transhistorical (i.e barter), like marx and engels - the inference that projecting value onto the past is the hegelian magic which marx is performing, is incorrect. value to marx was only unconscious (as per the case of aristotle) yet it was still the thing which determined exchange. only in capitalism does it come into full knowledge, and so our view of history is given character by seeing what was always there. it is retro-spection, not retro-activity. the difference then would be that smith sees an intentionality in exchange, while marx sees contingency within a larger frame of necessity (i.e. substance). marx is superior to smith in this way; that he sees the inherent obscuration of value in its many different forms (while smith seems to take his discovery for granted). their perspectives of the magnitude of value (that is, what determines exchange rates) are nominally equal though, which is why marx only ever cites an incompleteness in smith and ricardo, never an incorrectness. they were all wrong about money though, whilst still preserving a rational kernel, as i cite in relation to "paper money", where both smith and marx see it only as valuable in proportion to the gold which it represents. thus, the quantity of the circulating medium, not its substance, is what relates it to its value. in marxist terms, today we have no universal equivalent commodity, and therefore we have no money, which means, we have no capitalism [M-C-M']. this is the limit of marx's theory, and why "value form theorists" like michael heinrich attempt to revise marx's idea of what can constitute as money, without proper justification. so smith and marx were both wrong, but only marx was precisely wrong, in this case.
>>2234019>marx is superior to smith in this way; that he sees the inherent obscuration of value in its many different forms (while smith seems to take his discovery for granted).Oh, so Marx
is different then Smith. I guess now we know why you deleted your post history.
>>2234087so you have conceded (by dishonourable means) the previous points, that value and commodity exchange preceded capitalism, and now you return to a more original ignorance? why? just admit that everything you say is false, since that is the ultimate result of your efforts.
in the first case, you mindlessly accuse me of revising marx, when i am literally just describing his ideas - you even admit this, defeating yourself within the same sentence. next, you say money doesnt have to be a commodity, when that is marx's exact definition;
<"The simple commodity form is therefore the germ of the money form. [vol. 1, ch. 1]"<"It thus serves as a universal measure of value. And only by virtue of this function does gold, the equivalent commodity par excellence, become money […] values can be measured by one and the same special commodity [.] money [vol. 1, ch. 3]"yet you will not respond to this directly, just like you avoid my previous quotations.
moreover, you say that i insist on money having physical backing, when this is actually marx's position:
<"paper money can spring up only from the proportion in which that paper money represents gold [.] the issue of paper money must not exceed in amount the gold [.] which would actually circulate if not replaced by symbols. [vol. 1, ch. 3]"you accuse others of the faults you find in marx, but once marx's errors are revealed, you censor it from your mind. as i ask then, who is wrong here? you or marx?
>>2234129>Finally, some one may ask why gold is capable of being replaced by tokens that have no value? But, as we have already seen, it is capable of being so replaced only in so far as it functions exclusively as coin, or as the circulating medium, and as nothing else. Now, money has other functions besides this one, and the isolated function of serving as the mere circulating medium is not necessarily the only one attached to gold coin, although this is the case with those abraded coins that continue to circulate. Each piece of money is a mere coin, or means of circulation, only so long as it actually circulates. But this is just the case with that minimum mass of gold, which is capable of being replaced by paper money. That mass remains constantly within the sphere of circulation, continually functions as a circulating medium, and exists exclusively for that purpose. Its movement therefore represents nothing but the continued alternation of the inverse phases of the metamorphosis C—M—C, phases in which commodities confront their value-forms, only to disappear again immediately. The independent existence of the exchange-value of a commodity is here a transient apparition, by means of which the commodity is immediately replaced by another commodity. Hence, in this process which continually makes money pass from hand to hand, the mere symbolical existence of money suffices. Its functional existence absorbs, so to say, its material existence. Being a transient and objective reflex of the prices of commodities, it serves only as a symbol of itself, and is therefore capable of being replaced by a token. One thing is, however, requisite; this token must have an objective social validity of its own, and this the paper symbol acquires by its forced currency. This compulsory action of the State can take effect only within that inner sphere of circulation which is coterminous with the territories of the community, but it is also only within that sphere that money completely responds to its function of being the circulating medium, or becomes coin.https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch03.htm >>2234149yes, as i have already explained. insofar as a symbol of value *represents* a real value, it has validity to marx. paper money as the circulating medium is not a substitute of gold, it is its representative. we can read this paragraph immediately before the one you posted:
<"Paper money is a token representing gold or money. The relation between it and the values of commodities is this, that the latter are ideally expressed in the same quantities of gold that are symbolically represented by the paper. Only in so far as paper money represents gold, which like all other commodities has value, is it a symbol of value."it is a "symbol" of value, not a value of its own. now, you are frustrated because you know that marx is being short-sighted. if paper money is treated as valuable then its function remains the same, no matter what it "represents". smith makes the same error, and so both are lost to a mercantile illusion in the end. yes, gold serves as a store of value and can act as money, but in itself, it is not money. money is simply the circulating medium, or means of payment. smith and marx reproduce the same issue as schiff does in vidrel. speaking of "real money" is always a trap since it reveals its absurdity. marx also speaks derisively of fiat (by decree) currency here:
<"Lawyers started long before economists the idea that money is a mere symbol, and that the value of the precious metals is purely imaginary. This they did in the sycophantic service of the crowned heads, supporting the right of the latter to debase the coinage, during the whole of the middle ages, by the traditions of the Roman Empire and the conceptions of money to be found in the Pandects […] it was a maxim of the Roman Law that the value of money was fixed by decree of the emperor. It was expressly forbidden to treat money as a commodity […] Some good work on this question has been done by G. F. Pagnini [.] In the second part of his work Pagnini directs his polemics especially against the lawyers [vol. 1, ch. 2, footnote 11]"this is adjoined to a further polemic against locke's derision of the precious metals. marx's orientation then is expressly a commodity-money theory, and in particular, the gold standard. now, in volume 3, he makes more sophisticated comments regarding credit-money and fictitious capital, but its not enough to see through the dialectical delusion. the value of gold is based on scarcity. once we realise this, we can then see paper money's value based on scarcity (as smith and marx only see from one side).
>>2234019Anon rightly points out that Smith’s labor theory of value suffers from anachronism, projecting capitalist categories (like explicit exchange-value) onto pre-capitalist barter. Marx, however, isn’t doing "Hegelian magic" by retrojecting value; he’s engaging in retro-spective analysis. For Marx, value (as SNLT) only becomes a socially dominant force under capitalism.
Pre-capitalist exchanges (Aristotle’s bed-for-house) involved labor, but labor wasn’t yet abstracted into a universal measure. Capitalism, for Marx, is the first system where value becomes the organizing principle of society, not because it was always there, but because it’s only now fully legible.
So, when Marx looks back, he's not saying value existed in the same way in the past, but that capitalism reveals the latent potential of value that was always there in a different form. Marx's use of retrospection is about understanding the development of social relations, not imposing modern categories onto the past. This shows that value existed unconsciously in antiquity, not as a governing social law, but as a latent possibility.
Marx traces the historical emergence of value as a social form, showing how capitalism retroactively illuminates its earlier, incomplete manifestations. He does not impose capitalist categories onto the past; he explains how the past unfolded into capitalism.
Smith's error is anachronism because he assumes that past societies had the same understanding of value as capitalist ones. Marx avoids this by showing how value's form evolves with modes of production. Marx isn't projecting; he's explaining how past economic interactions can be understood through the lens of capitalism's development. This retrospection is dialectical, while Smith’s transhistorical projection
Smith’s error is assuming intentionality, that people in barter societies consciously traded "labor for labor." Marx, by contrast, sees contingency: value emerges unintentionally from the collision of decentralized commodity producers. This is why Marx’s value is "unconscious" until capitalism, not because it didn’t exist, but because it wasn’t yet the social logic.
Smith treats value (labor-time as the measure of exchange) as an eternal feature of human societies, even in barter. His famous deer/beaver exchange in Wealth of Nations assumes pre-capitalist actors consciously traded based on labor inputs. This is in error, Smith assumes people in non-capitalist societies understood exchange through the same capitalist logic of "labor cost." This naturalizes capitalism as "human nature." Smith conflates labor (a material activity) with value (a social relation). He cannot explain why labor takes the form of value under capitalism or how pre-capitalist societies organized production differently.
By treating value as a universal law, Smith erases the specificity of capitalist exploitation. His barter myth justifies capitalism as the "natural" endpoint of human exchange, masking its violent historical origins.
For Marx Value’s dominance under capitalism is contingent on historical processes (primitive accumulation, proletarianization). There is no teleology, capitalism is not inevitable, but once established, its value logic becomes necessary. For Smith Value is a natural necessity, inherent to all human societies. This obscures capitalism’s novelty and the role of class struggle in shaping economic systems.
Anon nails a key problem: both Smith and Marx anchor money to a commodity (gold). Marx’s "universal equivalent" requires a commodity-money to ground value in SNLT. But today’s fiat systems (no gold link) seem to break Marx’s formula M-C-M’, if there’s no commodity-money, is capitalism even capitalism?
Here’s where I’d push back: Money is a social relation first, a commodity second. Marx’s point about fetishism is that we fixate on money’s form (paper, digits) and miss its social function: mediating class relations. When you exchange money for a commodity, you’re not swapping paper for a widget, you’re accessing a share of society’s total labor-time. Fiat money works because the state enforces its validity as a claim on social labor, not because it’s backed by gold.
Money doesn’t need intrinsic value; it needs social validity. The Fed’s dollars or the ECB’s euros are universal equivalents because we (and the global market) treat them as such. The "substance" of money isn’t gold, it’s the collective labor of the working class, which remains exploited under capitalism. Profit (M-C-M’) still flows from surplus value, even if money is dematerialized.
Anon claims Marx was "precisely wrong" on money because fiat systems lack a commodity anchor. But this misses Marx’s deeper insight: capitalism is defined by exploitation (surplus value extraction), not money’s materiality. The shift to fiat didn’t abolish capitalism, it intensified financialization and abstract domination.
Yes, Marx’s 19th-century examples are dated, but his logic holds. M-C-M’ persists, Capitalists still chase profit (M’) by exploiting labor, regardless of whether money is gold or digits. Fiat money as a "fictitious" universal equivalent. It’s a socially constructed veil, but the veil still conceals the same exploitation.
The limit isn’t Marx’s theory, it’s our ability to see value relations in dematerialized money. When Amazon pays workers in digital dollars, the labor theory of value isn’t negated; it’s obscured by new forms of fetishism.
Anon argues both were wrong on money, but Marx was "precisely wrong." I’d flip this: Smith’s error is foundational, while Marx’s is situational. Smith naturalizes capitalism by treating value as transhistorical; Marx historicizes it, exposing its contingency. Smith’s barter myth justifies capitalism as "human nature"; Marx’s value theory destabilizes it as a recent, fragile system. By naturalizing money as a commodity, he missed its role in mediating class relations.
As for money, Smith’s commodity-money is just as flawed as Marx’s, but Marx gives us tools to critique fiat systems. When the OP says "we have no capitalism [without commodity-money]," I’d ask: Do billionaires, wage labor, and crises of overproduction suddenly vanish because money isn’t gold? Capitalism adapts, Marx’s core insights don’t depend on gold, only on the social relations gold once symbolized.
Marx’s "precise wrongness" on money is like Darwin’s "precise wrongness" on genetics, he lacked modern data, but his framework survives adaptation. The task isn’t to discard Marx over money’s materiality but to wield his critique against capitalism’s ever mystifying forms.
Marx’s retro-spection is valid because it is critical, not descriptive. He does not impose value onto the past; he shows how capitalism emerged from contradictions within earlier systems. Smith, by contrast, projects capitalist categories backward, mistaking a historically specific social form for a natural law.
>>2234202You do realize hes talking about the development of money through history? Paper money isn't fiat, its legal tender, or banknotes, when he says it must be backed by gold he is defining it, not stating a law that his theory of value depends on. Hes describing how even when it was backed by gold we can see the emergence of its true form as it becomes debased, which is fully realized under capitalism where the commodity-money becomes completely detached from its materiality and serves only as a symbol, but only is so far as it circulates, meaning that total labor is proportional to total circulating supply, and that fiat that is held doesn't contribute to this total because it doesn't circulate.
His point is that even when paper is nominally tied to gold, its actual function in circulation exposes its already symbolic nature. The gold standard’s collapse in the only confirms his analysis, money’s value is upheld by social relations, not metal. Thats why you cant just rely on short quotes in isolation but have to understand the whole text together within its context. You like to take a declaration from the first chapter to claim he is wrong because the concept later develops, without noticing that the development is the entire point. Marx is not contradicting himself, he is showing how capitalism is inherently contradictory.
>>2234756>value only becomes a socially dominant force under capitalism.i already explained: [C-M-C] -> [M-C-M']
>Pre-capitalist exchanges involved labor, but labor wasn’t yet abstracted into a universal measureyes it was. thats marx's point. what equated the value of commodities was labour, but it was unconscious. thats why aristotle misses what was already present.
>not because it was always therereally? interpret this statement for me:
<"Compared with the beds, the house does represent something equal to them [.] human labour. There was, however, an important fact which prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to attribute value to commodities, is merely a mode of expressing all labour as equal human labour, and consequently as labour of equal quality […] The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality."the case is closed. its over.
>Marx traces the historical emergence of valueyes, of which he places at an "early date in history";
<"The mode of production in which the product takes the form of a commodity, or is produced directly for exchange, is the most general and most embryonic form of bourgeois production. It therefore makes its appearance at an early date in history, though not in the same predominating and characteristic manner as now-a-days">This is why Marx’s value is "unconscious" until capitalism, not because it didn’t existoh so it did exist after all? good to know
>Smith treats value as an eternal feature of human societies, even in bartermarx makes the exact same point, except that marx sees how it was simply unknown. value still mediated trade, just without our knowledge. my critique of smith is an historical, not theoretical one.
>This naturalizes capitalism as "human nature".[C-M-C]/[M-C-M']
>He cannot explain why labor takes the form of value under capitalismyouve never read smith while marx has, and marx agrees with smith.
>By treating value as a universal lawsuch as marx does.
>Smith erases the specificity of capitalist exploitationnot in the slightest. smith is the discoverer of surplus value you fucking moron.
>His barter myth justifies capitalismsmith was a critic of capitalism; thats why he saw profits as entirely ruinous of a nation. you are just making shit up.
>Fiatit still doesnt "measure" value (by embodying that very social labour). it is a unit of account which standardises prices.
>The Fed’s dollars or the ECB’s euros are universal equivalentsno, just stop using these retarded marxian terms. fiat is not a relation of universal equivalence - which again, is supposed to equate values to the money-commodity.
>The shift to fiat didn’t abolish capitalismit abolished marx's value form nonsense
>The limit isn’t Marx’s theoryhow about this. just admit that marx was wrong.
>the labor theory of value isn’t negatedmarx didnt invent the LTV in case you forgot
>Smith’s error is foundational, while Marx’s is situational.not at all, since smith could easily accept fiat while marx couldnt, since smith grounds the measure of value in labour itself, while marx assumes that it must take the form of a commodity to be expressed.
>Marx’s core insightsand what are they, that arent borrowed from previous thinkers?
>Marx’s retro-spection is valid because it is critical, not descriptive.it is descriptive. you even admit that value existed in pre-capitalist forms. stop coping.
>>2235209i said that marx never re-invented the wheel, and so his conclusions ultimately submit to the classical school's findings.
>>2234861the question wasnt about value's prevalence, but its existence. now, the retard who said pre-capitalist commodity exchange didnt exist is scurrying into new territories of deflection, like the rat he is.
>>2234775>You do realize hes talking about the development of money through history?nowhere does he imply this.
>Paper money isn't fiatyes exactly, and he trashes fiat in the quote i already provided
>under capitalism where the commodity-money becomes completely detached from its materiality and serves only as a symbollets read this again since you seem confused:
<"Only in so far as paper money represents gold, which like all other commodities has value, is it a symbol of value."paper money must represent gold/silver
>total labor is proportional to total circulating supplyyes, to marx, as embodied in gold/silver
<"These objects, gold and silver, just as they come out of the bowels of the earth, are forthwith the direct incarnation of all human labour. [vol. 1, ch. 2]">money’s value is upheld by social relations, not metaldo you even know what marx's theory of value is? to marx, gold money has value because it is embodied human labour. fiat has no labour in it, so is valueless. thats the be-all and end-all of it.
>contextyou have provided no sources for your claims. youre literally making things up.
>>2235333lets read this again since you seem confused:
>Paper money isn't fiat, its legal tender, or banknotes, when he says it must be backed by gold he is defining itThat does not mean "to Marx" that paper money has to be backed by gold because of his preference, but because that is the definition of what paper money is, which is one of several types of money he talks about.
>Hes describing how even when it was backed by gold we can see the emergence of its true form as it becomes debasedThis is where he implies that hes walking us through the historical development of money, first he talks about coins, then their debasing, then becoming paper. Hes describing how once money is established as a universal equivalent it becomes fetishized and seperated from its materiality.
<Throughout this work, I assume, for the sake of simplicity, gold as the money-commodity.
<The price or money-form of commodities is, therefore, a purely ideal or mental form.
<it is ideally made perceptible by their equality with gold, a relation that, so to say, exists only in their own heads.
<It is not money that renders commodities commensurable. Just the contrary. It is because all commodities, as values, are realised human labour, and therefore commensurablePerhaps you think that Marx is describing here a trade of one thing for another, commodity for commodity, say linen for gold. But then we have the second part, where the gold is traded for something else, because Marx is talking about circulation, not isolated individual trades. It is not C->M, but C->M->C that he is talking about, where money only facilitates the exchange for another commodity. Money does not need to be a commodity, it is assumed to be one, gold in particular, for simplicity.
<Because money is the metamorphosed shape of all other commodities, the result of their general alienation, for this reason it is alienable itself without restriction or condition. It reads all prices backwards, and thus, so to say, depicts itself in the bodies of all other commodities, which offer to it the material for the realisation of its own use-value. >>2235412>Hes describing how once money is established as a universal equivalent it becomes fetishized and seperated from its materiality. and what is a universal equivalent? the absolute commodity, which to marx, has a value, because it is embodied human labour. paper money to marx acts as a value because it represents an existing value, not because it is itself valuable. it isnt "separated" from its materiality; it is only mediated by symbols.
>It is not C->M, but C->M->C[C-M-C] is a two-sided relation: [C-M] + [M-C]
thats why in exchange, one person gets a
the commodity and the other person gets money
>Money does not need to be a commodity>the realisation of its own use-valueyes, use-value as the SUBSTANCE OF VALUE, OR EMBODIED LABOUR!!!
fucking idiot. this is your problem. you dont understand marx's value-form, so you dont understand marx's theory of money.
<"It thus serves as a universal measure of value. And only by virtue of this function does gold, the equivalent commodity par excellence, become money. [.] it is because all commodities, as values, are realised human labour, and therefore commensurable, that their values can be measured by one and the same special commodity, and the latter be converted into the common measure of their values, i.e., into money. Money as a measure of value, is the phenomenal form that must of necessity be assumed by that measure of value which is immanent in commodities, labour-time" >>2235447The "absolute" commodity is money, not paper money or gold money, but money. Paper money acts as value because it represents value, as snlt, the fact that paper money is backed by gold is a historical product of the properties of gold that made it into an ideal universal commodity, not just a universal equivalent.
>use-value as the SUBSTANCE OF VALUEThe use value of money is to facilitate exchange.
Marx doesn't say that the labor supply is limited by the gold supply. If there are more paper notes in circulation than gold then the labor supply is equally relative to the quantity of notes as it is to gold, and if there is no gold then naturally its in proportion to the circulating supply of the resulting fiat currency. Money acts as a social force to regulate and distribute labor, because that is what it represents, it doesn't have to actually be the product of labor to serve as a representative in exchange.
>It thus serves as a universal measure of value. And only by virtue of this function does gold, the equivalent commodity par excellence, become money.What serves?
<moneyNot gold, and what is this function?
<to supply commodities with the material for the expression of their values, or to represent their values as magnitudes of the same denomination, qualitatively equal, and quantitatively comparable.and what are values a measure of?
<labour-time >>2235513you must also be uneducated
>>2235503>The "absolute" commodity is moneyright, so to marx, money is a commodity. thanks for finally agreeing.
>the fact that paper money is backed by gold is a historical productyes. to marx, the universal equivalent can be any commodity, but in chapter 2 sees that it is the most adequate form in the same way as smith, that as a store of value, it can also be divided into units and is durable.
>The use value of money is to facilitate exchange. to marx, money as a two-fold use value;
<"The use-value of the money-commodity becomes two-fold. In addition to its special use-value as a commodity (gold, for instance, serving to stop teeth, to form the raw material of articles of luxury, &c.), it acquires a formal use-value, originating in its specific social function [vol. 1, ch. 2]">Marx doesn't say that the labor supply is limited by the gold supply.why should he? he sees the limits of labour in overproduction caused by automation. as we can see from the great depression however, the lack of gold caused severe unemployment. this is the true macro analysis, approached by keynes, which still holds today.
>If there are more paper notes in circulation than goldyet marx says that paper currency must not exceed the gold supply.
>the labor supply is equally relative to the quantity of notes as it is to gold, and if there is no gold then naturally its in proportion to the circulating supply of the resulting fiat currency. yes precisely. fiat occurs when you realise that paper money retains value without a commodity backing it, since it is not money which measures values, but the opposite; values measure money.
>it doesn't have to actually be the product of labor to serve as a representative in exchange. yes i agree. marx disagrees.
>labour-timeyes, which to marx, must operate by its essence and appearance in the value form (exchange value)
<"exchange value is the only form in which the value of commodities can manifest itself or be expressed [vol. 1, ch. 1]"<"Money as a measure of value, is the phenomenal form that must of necessity be assumed by that measure of value which is immanent in commodities, labour-time [vol. 1, ch. 3]" >>2235537>yet marx says that paper currency must not exceed the gold supply.He is talking about the state making a law, and again this is specifically about paper money, that being a promissory bank note specifically for gold as a legal construct, and not money in general as all types of tokens that regulate exchange.
<The State puts in circulation bits of paper on which their various denominations, say £1, £5, &c., are printed. In so far as they actually take the place of gold to the same amount, their movement is subject to the laws that regulate the currency of money itself. A law peculiar to the circulation of paper money can spring up only from the proportion in which that paper money represents gold. Such a law exists; stated simply, it is as follows: the issue of paper money must not exceed in amount the gold (or silver as the case may be) which would actually circulate if not replaced by symbols. Now the quantity of gold which the circulation can absorb, constantly fluctuates about a given level. Still, the mass of the circulating medium in a given country never sinks below a certain minimum easily ascertained by actual experience. The fact that this minimum mass continually undergoes changes in its constituent parts, or that the pieces of gold of which it consists are being constantly replaced by fresh ones, causes of course no change either in its amount or in the continuity of its circulation. It can therefore be replaced by paper symbols. If, on the other hand, all the conduits of circulation were to-day filled with paper money to the full extent of their capacity for absorbing money, they might to-morrow be overflowing in consequence of a fluctuation in the circulation of commodities. There would no longer be any standard. If the paper money exceed its proper limit, which is the amount in gold coins of the like denomination that can actually be current, it would, apart from the danger of falling into general disrepute, represent only that quantity of gold, which, in accordance with the laws of the circulation of commodities, is required, and is alone capable of being represented by paper. If the quantity of paper money issued be double what it ought to be, then, as a matter of fact, £1 would be the money-name not of 1/4 of an ounce, but of 1/8 of an ounce of gold. The effect would be the same as if an alteration had taken place in the function of gold as a standard of prices. Those values that were previously expressed by the price of £1 would now be expressed by the price of £2. Paper money is a token representing gold or money. The relation between it and the values of commodities is this, that the latter are ideally expressed in the same quantities of gold that are symbolically represented by the paper. Only in so far as paper money represents gold, which like all other commodities has value, is it a symbol of value.
>>>2235537>to marx, money as a two-fold use value;Correct.
<The currency of money is the constant and monotonous repetition of the same process. The commodity is always in the hands of the seller; the money, as a means of purchase, always in the hands of the buyer. And money serves as a means of purchase by realising the price of the commodity. This realisation transfers the commodity from the seller to the buyer and removes the money from the hands of the buyer into those of the seller, where it again goes through the same process with another commodity. That this one-sided character of the money’s motion arises out of the two-sided character of the commodity’s motion, is a circumstance that is veiled over. The very nature of the circulation of commodities begets the opposite appearance. The first metamorphosis of a commodity is visibly, not only the money’s movement, but also that of the commodity itself; in the second metamorphosis, on the contrary, the movement appears to us as the movement of the money alone. In the first phase of its circulation the commodity changes place with the money. Thereupon the commodity, under its aspect of a useful object, falls out of circulation into consumption. [27] In its stead we have its value-shape — the money. It then goes through the second phase of its circulation, not under its own natural shape, but under the shape of money. The continuity of the movement is therefore kept up by the money alone, and the same movement that as regards the commodity consists of two processes of an antithetical character, is, when considered as the movement of the money, always one and the same process, a continued change of places with ever fresh commodities. Hence the result brought about by the circulation of commodities, namely, the replacing of one commodity by another, takes the appearance of having been effected not by means of the change of form of the commodities but rather by the money acting as a medium of circulation, by an action that circulates commodities, to all appearance motionless in themselves, and transfers them from hands in which they are non-use-values, to hands in which they are use-values; and that in a direction constantly opposed to the direction of the money. The latter is continually withdrawing commodities from circulation and stepping into their places, and in thus way continually moving further and further from its starting-point. Hence although the movement of the money is merely the expression of the circulation of commodities', yet the contrary appears to be the actual fact, and the circulation of commodities seems to be the result of the movement of the money.
>right, so to marx, money is a commodity. thanks for finally agreeing.Yes, money becomes a commodity, hes not saying money-commodity is a commodity, but money as an abstract ideal that governs exchange represented by a fetishized token becomes a commodity independent of its material object because of what it socially represents. The development of money into the absolute commodity is itself the development of capitalism, there are historically contingent particulars like gold, that develop into paper and then absolute money, which is capital itself, a fetishized commodity representing labor power that is in constant circulation and governs the distribution of socially necessary labor time by its private ownership.
>>2235565>not money in general as all types of tokens that regulate exchange.yes, as all types of tokens. you even quote it:
<"if the quantity of paper money issued be double what it ought to be, then, as a matter of fact, £1 would be the money-name not of 1/4 of an ounce, but of 1/8 of an ounce of gold […] Paper money is a token representing gold or money."so to marx, its gold all the way down.
>Yes, money becomes a commodityits the opposite for marx,
<"The simple commodity form is therefore the germ of the money form [vol. 1, ch. 1]"to marx, we begin with simple commodities which then create the universal equivalent commodity;
<"The particular commodity, with whose bodily form the equivalent form is thus socially identified, now becomes the money commodity, or serves as money. It becomes the special social function of that commodity, and consequently its social monopoly, to play within the world of commodities the part of the universal equivalent [vol. 1, ch. 1]">hes not saying money-commodity is a commodityyou dont see how youre contradicting terms?
>The development of money into the absolute commoditytheyre the same thing to marx. stop with this mindless apologia.
>>2235701>contextthe paper money that marx discusses is not promissory notes, or bills of exchange, but inconvertible notes, so who has the context wrong?
<"We allude here only to inconvertible paper money issued by the State and having compulsory circulation [vol. 1, ch. 3]">Almost like somebody who pokes around for what looks useful at the moment without ever reading several pages in one gointerpret this statement for me,
<"Paper money is a token representing gold or money […] Only in so far as paper money represents gold, which like all other commodities has value, is it a symbol of value [vol. 1, ch. 3]"if i was wrong, i could be proven wrong.
yet i am right, so i can only be proven right.
>>2236922what? so you think marx was actually talking about a gold-backed fiat currency in 19th century england? 🤣
stop humiliating yourself. marx already discussed "fiat" (by decree) currency here:
<"Lawyers started long before economists the idea that money is a mere symbol, and that the value of the precious metals is purely maginary. This they did in the sycophantic service of the crowned heads, supporting the right of the latter to debase the coinage, during the whole of the middle ages, by the traditions of the Roman Empire and the conceptions of money to be found in the Pandects. […] it was a maxim of the Roman Law that the value of money was fixed by decree of the emperor. It was expressly forbidden to treat money as a commodity [.] some good work on this question has been done by G. F. Pagnini […] the second part of his work Pagnini directs his polemics especially against the lawyers. [ch. 2, footnote 11]"his disapproval is that when you fix the supply of currency in this way, you de-commodify it and therefore "debase" its value. this footnote is in the context of dismissing locke, who imagined precious metals to only possess an illusory value, to marx's scorn.
>>2236936>gold-backed fiat currency???
>his disapproval where are you reading disapproval? and what is it a footnote of?
<The fact that money can, in certain functions, be replaced by mere symbols of itself, gave rise to that other mistaken notion, that it is itself a mere symbol. Nevertheless under this error lurked a presentiment that the money-form of an object is not an inseparable part of that object, but is simply the form under which certain social relations manifest themselves. In this sense every commodity is a symbol, since, in so far as it is value, it is only the material envelope of the human labour spent upon it.He is saying that money is still a commodity, even when it is a mere symbol, even when its declared illegal for it to be a commodity, because it actually represents commodified labor. I don't know how you are not getting this. Even when it is backed by gold the limit to production is labor, not gold. A "unit" of gold, a pound an ounce a gram, is arbitrary. If the supply decreases their is inflation which suppresses wages relative to it until the ratio of total supply to total labor evens out, and the same if it increases. They aren't going out and mining gold one-to-one with the entire rest of the economy because the emperor declared minimum wage to be a gram. Debase isn't a moral category here hes talking about the ratio going down. How does fiat break Marx's theory if he already accounted for it? What fucking nonsense are you even arguing?
>>2236944>???are you dumb? you were equating inconvertible money with fiat, to imply that marx's discussion of paper money was about fiat, when its the opposite.
>where are you reading disapproval?he is writing against the "lawyers" who suppotted fiat, very obviously. thats why he concludes by pointing to pagnini's polemics *against* the lawyers. you have the reading comprehension of a retard, just like when you accuse others of what i quote marx doing.
>He is saying that money is still a commodity, even when it is a mere symbolwait, so you are finally admitting that to marx, money must be a commodity? its about time, eh?
>Even when it is backed by gold the limit to production is labor, not goldand where does labour attain its value to marx? by its relation to the money commodity. what labour value does fiat have?
>If the supply decreases their is inflationthere*
>Debase isn't a moral category here hes talking about the ratio going downyes, which he views disfavourably. thats why he says that paper money "ought" not to extend its limited supply;
<"if the quantity of paper money issued be double what it ought to be, then, as a matter of fact, £1 would be the money-name not of 1/4 of an ounce, but of 1/8 of an ounce of gold [vol. 1, ch. 3]">How does fiat break Marx's theory if he already accounted for it?fiat is not representing any universal equivalent, so it has no value, according to marx
>What fucking nonsense are you even arguing?very simply, that marx has a commodity theory of money. something you have been forced to implicitly accept. now, i ask you, what is the commodity which fiat is supposed to represent as "paper money"? it does not represent any fixed commodity, thats why it has a "floating exchange rate". basic economics.
>>2236960>money must be a commodityOf course it is, it is commodified labor. That doesn't mean the symbol has to be a commodity.
>and where does labour attain its value to marx? by its relation to the money commodity. Wrong, abstract labor is value.
>marx has a commodity theory of moneyIn the sense that money represents commodified labor, not that money is itself a commodity representing itself.
These "critiques" aren't even of Marx at this point. You are just making shit up thats not even possible to get out of the text without deliberate misinterpretation.
>>2236966>Of course it isoh, "of course" it is? then why have you been battling me all this time you babbling fool?
>That doesn't mean the symbol has to be a commodity.to marx, it must still *represent* the universal equivalent commodity to have a value
>abstract labor is value.yes, which must be embodied in a commodity… abstract labour is the substance of value (use-value), which must be compared by its magnitude by the value-form (exchange-value). money to marx, is simply the highest value form, from which a commodity relates its own value to the universal equivalent. this is basic stuff, man.
>In the sense that money represents commodified labouryes… which to marx, is embodied in the money commodity!
>You are just making shit upyou mean that im citing sources directly? you are frustrated now because you know im right. you have already capitulated to every other point ive made, so theres no point fighting the truth.
>>2236983>you are frustratedI'm frustrated because I don't know how you could possibly still not understand what Marx is saying but you clearly don't even though all the tools have been provided.
Do you actually think that Marx's point is that if it takes 1 hour to mine 1 gram of gold that a worker in a factory earns 1 gram of gold per hour?
>>2236991>I'm frustrated because I don't know how you could possibly still not understandwhat exactly dont i understand?
>Do you actually think that Marx's point is that if it takes 1 hour to mine 1 gram of gold that a worker in a factory earns 1 gram of gold per hour?well it all depends on the labour power of that society, so its a relative question, not counting the distribution between wages and profits. marx sees that value must equate itself to commodities either way however. ask your question more clearly.
>>2237001Its a yes or no question. Does Marx say that value must equate itself to other commodities by equating to an equivalent amount of gold?
>>2236983>to have a valueIs it having a value the same thing as it representing a value? Does Marx say the value of the money-commodity and that thing it is representing have to be equivalent in value?
Your dispute with Marx is becoming increasingly incoherent.
>>2237020>Does Marx say that value must equate itself to other commoditiesyes
>by equating to an equivalent amount of gold?gold to marx is the money commodity, so its the same difference
>Is it having a value the same thing as it representing a value?no. gold has a value. paper money is a symbol of that value. i misspoke in assigning paper money a value.
>Does Marx say the value of the money-commodity and that thing it is representing have to be equivalent in value?its proportional to what it represents;
<"if the quantity of paper money issued be double what it ought to be, then, as a matter of fact, £1 would be the money-name not of 1/4 of an ounce, but of 1/8 of an ounce of gold [vol. 1, ch. 3]">Your dispute with Marx is becoming increasingly incoherent.how so?
>>2237039>so its the same differenceTo an equivalent amount of gold measured in SNLT?
>i misspoke in assigning paper money a value.Thats not what I'm asking. Is gold having a value the same thing as it representing a value. Is a measure of gold by weight, X grams having a value of X hours, the same as it representing a value? Can it represent a different value or do they have to be the same?
>its proportional to what it representsSo, what is the function of the value of gold, as money, and is it the same as the value that the gold represents?
Marx's answer is that the value of gold is trivial, and what matters is what it represents, which are not the same thing.
>how so?You are doing a super convoluted triple backflip twist to say that Marx thinks value = price.
>>2237041>To an equivalent amount of gold measured in SNLT?yes. that is marx's basic value form:
[xA = yB]
>Is gold having a value the same thing as it representing a valueto marx, its value is embodied in its material qualities; it can only compare this value to other commodities.
>So, what is the function of the value of gold, as moneyto be the measure of value;
<"It thus serves as a universal measure of value. And only by virtue of this function does gold, the equivalent commodity par excellence, become money [vol. 1, ch. 3]">Marx's answer is that the value of gold is trivialso you dont believe in the LTV, then?
>and what matters is what it representsso you are saying that the value of gold measures another commodity's magnitude? the value of gold is not trivial then, its the central factor of consideration.
>value = pricethis is not related at all to what we are discussing. stay on topic.
>>2237053>so you are saying that the value of gold measures another commodity's magnitude? <what matters is what it representsThis is what I mean by deliberate.
>to be the measure of value>>2235503We talked about this yesterday. The value of gold is not its function, its function is to
<serve as a universal measure of valueotherwise, lacking the virtue of this function it ceases to be money, and returns to being just gold. Its value is incidental and not part of the equation.
>>2237066how can gold represent another commodity's value if its own value is "trivial"?
>The value of gold is not its function, its function is to serve as a universal measure of valueand how do you think it measures values?
>Its value is incidental and not part of the equation.… ever hear the term "universal equivalent"? what do you think is being given equation, exactly?
>>2236983>>2237039In Marx's theory, gold's value comes from SNLT, which not arbitrary, but the ratio of total gold to total labor is arbitrary with respect to gold, from the perspective of production, depending on how much gold a given nation has or mines, where as labor is constant for the same population. And with its denomination also being arbitrary, it is the ratio that is arbitrary, not the value. That is the proportion of total gold to total labor being equal, the portion of gold for a given wage is arbitrary, because what money represents under capitalism is abstract labor, not gold. If one hour of mining gold produces one gram, employers are not paying a factory worker one gram of gold per hour. When paper money is unmoored from a commodity, Marx says the value of the paper becomes pure illusion, what remains is the portion of total abstract labor a given denomination represents, its value measured in socially necessary labor time, and its price in a portion of money, be that gold or paper.
Marx traces money’s evolution as a social relation, not merely a technical tool. Money emerges as commodity-money from the need to express value through a universal equivalent. Gold becomes money because its production requires socially necessary labor time (SNLT), grounding value in material labor. Paper money initially represents gold (banknotes convertible to gold). Marx calls this a "token" or "symbol" of the money-commodity. With Inconvertible Paper/Fiat completely unmoored from gold, paper money becomes a "pure sign" of value, sustained by state power and social convention. Marx critiques this as a "nominalist illusion," yet acknowledges its necessity under capitalism.
Gold’s Value is not its monetary role, while gold’s value is tied to SNLT (labor to mine it), its monetary function (denominations, exchange ratios) is socially determined conventions, not inherent to gold’s value. When paper loses its commodity anchor, its value becomes a social fiction, but this fiction still mediates capitalist relations.
The total gold-to-labor ratio in a society is relative. Gold’s Quantity depends on mining output, imperial plunder, or central bank reserves, factors unrelated to the total labor-time of the population. The specific denomination is set by the state ($35/oz. in Bretton Woods), but this does not alter gold’s value (it's SNLT). If 1 hour of labor mines 1 gram of gold, a factory worker’s wage might be $20/hour, not 1 gram of gold. Money abstracts labor into a universal equivalent, masking the qualitative difference between specific concrete labor (mining) and abstract social labor.
When money becomes fiat (unmoored from gold), it does not refute Marx but instead his critique sharpens. Fiat’s value appears self-referential, but it ultimately represents a claim on total social labor. A dollar or euro represents a claim on a portion of society’s aggregate labor-time, even without a tangible commodity anchor. Inflation causes crisis, if fiat is overissued, if expands faster than real labor output, its purchasing power collapses, exposing the contradiction between symbolic value and material production.
Fiat money does not abolish the labor theory of value. Instead, it intensifies capitalism’s fetishism, value appears to spring from money itself (interest, speculation), obscuring its origin in exploited labor. SNLT remains the anchor of value, even as monetary forms evolve. Capitalism’s contradictions reflect the disconnect between symbolic money and material labor.
Value, as abstract labor, measured by SNLT, is objective, rooted in production). Exchange-Value as monetary expression, is arbitrary, and is shaped by social and political power. Money must both represent labor-time and function as an autonomous force. Gold historically bridged this gap; fiat severs it, relying on state violence (legal tender laws) to sustain the illusion.
Under the gold standard, gold’s value is naturalized, obscuring its origin in labor. The arbitrary denomination reinforces this mystification. With fiat money, the illusion deepens, value appears to emerge from the state or financial systems, not labor, but the system still depends on labor exploitation to generate real value. Both systems fetishize the form of money (gold/paper) while masking the substance (abstract labor).
Marx’s theory holds because labor is still exploited, Surplus value is extracted whether wages are paid in gold or digits. Reccuring financial collapses and crisis remind us that "fictitious capital" depends on real value production. The shift from gold to fiat does not abolish labor’s role, it heightens capitalism’s dependence on abstraction and power to sustain exploitation and value illusions like the fetish of money.
Whether gold-backed or fiat, money functions as a social hieroglyphic, representing labor-time while concealing exploitation. The "illusion" of fiat money’s value is a symptom of capitalism’s ability to adapt its domination mechanisms, not a refutation of labor’s role as the substance of value.
We can see confirmation of Marx's observations in recent history, with the increased fetishization of finance and speculation. Under neoliberalism, capitalism’s focus has shifted from producing goods to accumulating abstract claims on value (stocks, derivatives, cryptocurrencies).
These "fictitious capitals" (Marx’s term) are divorced from material production but dominate economic policy. In the 2008 crisis mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps financial instruments with no material basis nearly collapsed the global economy. With quantitative easing central banks "create" money digitally to prop up markets, reinforcing the illusion that value springs from financial systems, not labor. This mirrors Marx’s critique of money as a "social hieroglyphic," but intensified: value is now doubly abstracted, hidden behind algorithms and speculative bubbles.
Imperialism justifies domination through idealist rhetoric ("spreading democracy," "free markets," "development") while materially extracting value while pretending to create and spread it. Loans from imperialist institutions (IMF, World Bank) trap nations in cycles of austerity, privatizing public goods and redirecting labor/value to foreign creditors. Global South nations are forced to prioritize export commodities (oil, minerals) for imperialist markets, while their labor and ecosystems are exploited. Here, material exploitation (of labor, land, resources) is obscured by the fetishized language of "free trade" and "economic growth," which naturalizes inequality as a neutral outcome of market logic.
States prioritize financialization and militarism over productive investment. Public services are slashed to service debt, privileging abstract fiscal metrics over human needs. Military-industrial complexes profit from destruction, treating war as a "growth sector" while displacing millions. These policies reflect a mystified idealism where "the market" is deified as an infallible force, even as it immiserates populations and destabilizes the planet. Its not misinformed politicians or bad economic choices but the natural logic of capital exactly as Marx described it.
>>2237072Gold, as a commodity, has both a use-value in its physical properties (like being used in electronics or jewelry), and its exchange-value is determined by the socially necessary labor time (SNLT) required to produce it. But when gold becomes money, its role changes. It becomes the universal equivalent, representing the value of all other commodities.
Gold's value is initially necessary for it to serve as money. However, once gold is established as money, its symbolic role can take precedence, and it does. In practice, the symbolic representation (money) becomes detached from the underlying value (gold's SNLT). In modern economies, the symbolic function of money (even if originally based on gold) has overshadowed the material basis. This aligns with Marx's discussion of how money evolves and how capitalist systems can create forms of money that obscure the labor theory of value. In Marx's time, the gold standard was prevalent, so his analysis was based on that, but his analysis does not rely on it.
The primacy of the representational aspect of money over its material basis is a key aspect of Marx's critique of commodity fetishism. The value of gold as a commodity (SNLT) is real, but its role as money gives it a symbolic power that transcends its material value. This duality is important in understanding how capitalist economies function and how value is perceived socially. Marx would agree that, in practice, the symbolic role dominates under capitalism, but its historical material basis was necessary in the foundation for money’s social power.
This is not a contradiction in Marx, but a contradiction in capitalism. Capitalism’s value system appears self-sustaining, but the system’s stability is borrowed from the material world. Crises expose the fragility of the symbolic edifice, but underlying that is not the labor embedded in gold. The symbolic (money) cannot exist without the material (labor), but the labor here is not the labor in money, but the total socially necessary abstract labor. Gold’s value is the repressed foundation of a system that must deny its own basis to survive.
Gold's historic role is to provide a stable measure, even if market prices deviate. Marx's critique of abandoning the gold standard is not that its logically impossible, but that it is both irrational from the perspective of a capitalist wishing to maintain capitalist social relations and necessitated by the logic of Capital itself, as capital prioritizes the efficiency of profit over all else, all that is solid melts into air.
Gold’s position as money arises from its social function, not its physical properties alone. Gold’s value (SNLT) anchors it in the real world of production but this only works because society collectively agrees to use gold as the universal equivalent, masking the labor relations behind exchange. This duality allows gold to objectify abstract labor, transforming the qualitative diversity of concrete labor into a quantitative hierarchy. Gold’s symbolic power as money obscures this foundation, making value appear as a natural property of gold itself.
Marx’s genius was to show that value is a social relation, not a property of things, and money is the alienated expression of this relation. If producing a chair takes 10 hours and an ounce of gold takes 20 hours, the chair would be worth half an ounce of gold, but in reality a chair can also be worth a quarter or eighth an ounce of gold if notes are overissued. This shows that the exchange ratio of chairs for money is arbitrary, but the ratio between the portion of total social labor to create a chair, and total social labor to create all gold in circulation is constant. Money serves as a measure by its portion of total represented labor time not the labor embedded in gold directly.
In practice, the amount of gold (or money) a chair can command can change even if the SNLT for both doesn't change. This seems contradictory, but the key here is the difference between value and price. Price can deviate from value due to market factors like supply and demand. So even though the intrinsic value (SNLT) of the chair and gold are fixed, their prices in terms of each other can vary. Overissuing money like printing more paper notes affects the exchange ratio, which Marx attributes to changes in the value of money itself rather than the value of the underlying commodities.
Money's role as a measure of value isn't about the labor embedded in money itself but about the portion of total social labor it represents. So, if the total money supply increases, each unit represents a smaller slice of the total labor pie. This aligns with Marx's idea that money is a social relation, representing a claim on society's labor. While the exchange ratio (price) can become arbitrary, the underlying value (SNLT) of commodities remains tied to labor. Money's value is as a social construct representing a fraction of the total labor, rather than being directly anchored to a specific commodity's labor time. Money measures value not by its own SNLT (gold’s labor-time) but by its proportion to total social labor time.
Marx’s framework holds clearly, gold’s SNLT anchors value, and deviations reflect monetary policy decisions, not flaws in labor theory. In the C-M-C circuit, the first exchange (C-M) converts the commodity's value into a price (money), and then the second exchange (M-C) uses that money to acquire another commodity. It's the commodity's value being measured, not the money's value. With fiat money, the C-M-C process still involves measuring the commodity's value in terms of money (price), but since fiat isn't understood to be a commodity, the value measurement is more abstract. Fiat money still functions as a representation of social labor, even if it's not directly tied to a particular commodity's SNLT.
Price is the monetary expression of value isn't the same as value (SNLT), and in the exchange process, we're dealing with prices, not direct values. So even though Marx says value is determined by SNLT, the actual exchanges use prices, which can deviate. But Marx's theory is about the underlying value determining prices in the aggregate, even if individual prices vary, not about individual values. The process isn't about equating the value of money itself but using money as a measure for the commodity's value. So in the first exchange, the commodity's value is translated into a price, which is a quantity of money, but that doesn't mean we're measuring the money's value. Instead, money's role is to express the commodity's value. The measurement is about the portion of total social labor represented by the money, rather than the labor in the money itself. Value measurement works when money itself isn't a commodity, because prices represent a claim on total social labor rather than a direct equivalence.
Marx's asserts that money has value but this isn't necessary for its function, just a result of its historical development. Marx does argue that money originated as a commodity with intrinsic value (like gold) because it needed to be a universal equivalent grounded in socially necessary labor time (SNLT). However, once established, the form of money can evolve into symbols (paper, digital) that represent value without having intrinsic value themselves. Even though fiat money isn't a commodity, it's still fetishized as having inherent value, masking the underlying social relations of labor. While Marx argues that money must originate as a commodity with intrinsic value (gold or silver), he also acknowledges that, historically, money evolves into a symbolic form (paper or fiat) that no longer requires intrinsic value to function.
Early money (cattle, grain, metals) arose because societies needed a material basis for equivalence in exchange. Gold became dominant due to its durability, divisibility, and the labor required to mine it. Marx traces how money evolves from a commodity to a token or symbol (coins, paper notes, fiat). This shift is driven by capitalism’s need for flexibility and abstraction. Coins lose metal content over time but retain their face value, revealing that money’s social function (as a medium of exchange) can outlive its material substance. Governments issue paper money, initially backed by gold but eventually unmoored (fiat). Marx calls this a "forced loan" from the public, enforced by legal tender laws. Paper money has no intrinsic value, yet it functions as money because society collectively accepts it. This "illusion" relies on capitalism’s existing value relations (exploitation of labor) to sustain itself.
Marx insists that money’s commodity origins are important, because they explain why money retains its social power even as it becomes symbolic. Capitalist ideology naturalizes money’s symbolic forms, making it seem as if value arises from money itself. This fetishism is only possible because money originated as a commodity with labor-value, but that doesn't mean money must stay a commodity. When fiat systems collapse (hyperinflation, bank runs), the repressed truth resurfaces: value ultimately depends on real production (labor) and social trust, not abstract symbols.
Marx’s theory transcends the materiality of money. Whether money is gold or fiat, it is fundamentally a social relation. Fiat money embodies capitalism’s central contradiction that Marx discovered, value must be rooted in labor, but it is increasingly represented by abstract symbols. Marx’s theory is not undermined by fiat money, it is vindicated. Money’s commodity origins are a historical necessity, but its symbolic forms are a social necessity under capitalism. The tension between these poles defines capitalism’s unstable evolution.
Commodities are produced, sold for money, and money buys new commodities. This process depends on the totality of social labor and the continuity of circulation. Fixating on gold’s materiality ignores how money’s role is sustained by social relations. Gold’s importance dissolves when we recognize that money’s essence is not its material form but its function as a social claim on labor. This claim persists whether money is gold, paper, or digital. Marx’s target is not gold itself but the capitalist ideology that naturalizes money as a "thing" (gold, dollars) rather than a social relation. The belief that "gold = wealth" distracts from the reality that wealth derives from labor, not hoarding metal. Marx calls this "the religion of everyday life." Marx’s analysis of gold is not a defense of its necessity but a critique of capitalist mystification. The solution is not to return to a gold standard but to abolish the religion of money, to abolish capital as such.
"The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men."Marx's point, throughout this entire section, is that money is always already an abstract symbol of congealed abstract labor measured by SNLT and that the SNLT is proportional to the quantity of total money, not the value of that money. Precisely the opposite of what you claim, which can only be true if you conflate value and price and fetishize money as an object independent of its social relations, and treat individual exchanges isolated from circulation, which is exactly what Marx is critiquing.
>>2237968>In Marx's theory, gold's value comes from SNLT, which not arbitrary, but the ratio of total gold to total labor is arbitrary with respect to goldmarx sees that debasement occurs where you expand the money supply beyond its prior means; such that £1 can be worth less than what it was yesterday. so to say, there is inflation. we have already discussed this trend with reference to lowering the purchasing power of labour. so its not an "arbitrary" rate, but a proportional rate.
>where as labor is constant for the same populationnot at all. labour power is always changing.
>And with its denomination also being arbitrary, it is the ratio that is arbitrary, not the valuenothing is "arbitrary"; it is proportional.
>what money represents under capitalism is abstract labor, not goldto marx, gold and silver are the vessels of this abstract labour
>When paper money is unmoored from a commodity, Marx says the value of the paper becomes pure illusionhow do you still not get it? paper money to marx is not in any way separated from a commodity, but directly represents it
>Paper money initially represents gold (banknotes convertible to gold)marx is talking about inconvertible money
>With Inconvertible Paper/Fiat why are you being retarded again? fiat is not "paper money". paper money represents a commodity; fiat is a currency fixed in its value by the state. thats why the romans issued debased silver coins at the same rate as "real" coins.
>Marx critiques this as a "nominalist illusion"source?
>Gold’s Value is not its monetary role [.] its monetary function (denominations, exchange ratios) is socially determined conventions, not inherent to gold’s valuedo you know what an exchange ratio entails to marx? the comparison of its magnitude of value. this is inherent to its value.
>When paper loses its commodity anchor, its value becomes a social fiction, but this fiction still mediates capitalist relations.yes, because marx was wrong about money having to be a commodity
>Money abstracts labor into a universal equivalentyoure so dense. a universal equivalent IS a commodity within the general value form.
>Fiat’s value appears self-referential, but it ultimately represents a claim on total social laboryes because it represents markets, not individual commodities, like marx's idea.
>Fiat money does not abolish the labor theory of valuei never said it did. it only abolishes marx's theory of value.
>Exchange-Value as monetary expression, is arbitraryso you dont believe in the LTV then?
>Gold historically bridged this gap; fiat severs it, relying on state violencesuch an ahistorical, nonsensical comment. gold is a metal drenched in blood.
>to sustain the illusion.what illusion? £1 is worth £1. this is reality.
>Under the gold standard, gold’s value is naturalized, obscuring its origin in laborgold has only ever been valued based on its scarcity, not its production costs
>Marx’s theory holds because labor is still exploitedmarx did not invent the LTV.
>In the 2008 crisis […] no material basis nearly collapsed the global economy.it wasnt about any lack of "material basis", it was about enforcing debt. what happened in 2008 is that a bunch of bankers stole people's money and evicted thousands of people (just like in the great depression). it wasnt a crisis of labour or production, but of debt. if you nationalised banks, these crises would not have to happen.
>imperialismits called debt slavery. its what all empires have done since the roman "tributes"; we just call them "taxes" today.
>States prioritize financialization and militarism over productive investmentthis is the general law of state power, which is not confined to capitalism. lenin says very directly that imperialism is a transhistorical phenomenon.
>>2238056>Gold, as a commodity, has both a use-value in its physical propertiesto marx, a commodities' use-value is an expression of its substance of value, which is then given quantity in exchange-value.
>[gold] becomes the universal equivalent, representing the value of all other commodities.yes, according from its own value.
>However, once gold is established as money, its symbolic role can take precedencea symbol of value *must* represent gold
>the symbolic representation (money) becomes detached from the underlying valuethe gold itself is the money; a symbol of value cannot be "detached" from a value
>In modern economies, the symbolic function of money has overshadowed the material basis.theres nothing "immaterial" about fiat.
>[marx's] analysis does not rely on [gold]he only speaks of gold - and critiques fiat
>The value of gold is real, but its role as money gives it a symbolic powerif you double the supply of paper money, you halve the value of gold, remember?
>Gold's historic role is to provide a stable measure, even if market prices deviatethis is right-wing propaganda. the historic role of gold was to serve as a natural monopoly to enslave populations. this is what defined the mercantile period of protection and hoarding. this is why silver gained the reputation of "the people's money"; gold is hoarded, silver is traded.
>Gold only works because society agrees to use gold as the universal equivalentthere is no "agreement"; there's a forced policy.
>Marx’s genius was to show that value is a social relation, not a property of thingsthe device he employs in the fetishism of commodities is to show how the fetishism is "real"; it really does express value by its exchange. man is subordinated to the commodity, as a self-expressing entity.
>This shows that the exchange ratio of chairs for money is arbitraryso exchange value (SNLT) is "arbitrary"?
>Money serves as a measure [.] not the labor embedded in gold directly.to marx, it is precisely measured in the gold directly. look at picrel.
>Money's role as a measure of value isn't about the labor embedded in money itselfyes it is; thats what allows it to "measure" values.
>While the exchange ratio (price) can become arbitrary, the underlying value (SNLT) of commodities remains tied to labor. explain to me the difference between exchange rates and exchange value.
>Money measures value not by its own [value] but by its proportion to total social labor time.so.. you mean, its value?
>It's the commodity's value being measured, not the money's valueand HOW is this value measured?
>With fiat money, the C-M-C process still involves measuring the commodity's valuethere is no "measuring" since there is no common substance.
>the value measurement is more abstractso how does £1 relate to £1 worth of goods?
>Price is the monetary expression of value isn't the same as value (SNLT)the difference is that you can verify prices
>in the exchange process, we're dealing with prices, not direct valuesso exchange value is all bullshit then?
>But Marx's theory is about the underlying value determining prices in the aggregateyou mean smith's concept of "natural price" conceived 91 years prior?
>Marx's asserts that money has value but this isn't necessary for its functionwhere, exactly, does marx say money doesnt require a value?
>the form of money can evolve into symbolswhich to marx, only represent gold/silver
>historically, money evolves into a symbolic form (paper or fiat)fiat and paper money existed milennia ago
>Early money (cattle, grain, metals) arosehasnt the barter myth been debunked? in any case, the original money according to graeber is credit-money based in the circulation of debts via IOUs, ritually forgiven at the end of each cycle. this is why money was never a commodity, even though commodities can briefly serve as money. again, smith and marx are wrong.
>Gold became dominant due to its durability, divisibility, and the labor required to mine it.this is all bullshit as ive explained. it gains use because of its scarcity, which naturally leads to monopoly.
>Marx traces how money evolves from a commodity to a token or symbol (coins, paper notes, fiat)you keep sneaking fiat into marx's analysis, where he nowhere implies its legitimacy. he criticises it directly, even.
>Coins lose metal content over time but retain their face valueonly when money is de-commodified
>Paper money has no intrinsic valueto marx, it must represent an intrinsic value
>money’s commodity origins are importantfirst, the barter myth is false. second, to marx, money is always a commodity.
>Capitalist ideology naturalizes money’s symbolic formsto marx, money does possess an intrinsic value in relation to other commodities. remember aristotle?
>but that doesn't mean money must stay a commoditymoney was never a commodity, as ive already explained. it just gets treated as a commodity by despotic regimes.
>Marx’s theory transcends the materiality of moneyno it doesnt, anywhere. again, provide a source.
>capitalism’s central contradiction that Marx discovered, value must be rooted in labormarx never "discovered" anything.
>Marx’s theory is not undermined by fiat moneyyes it is, because we have no universal equivalent, and therefore, no money, to marx. also, you do realise that smith conceived of paper money in the identical way that marx did, and thats why i criticise them both? marx was just taking notes.
>Marx’s target is not gold itself but the capitalist ideology that naturalizes money as a "thing"gold money has existed for milennia, and to marx, has transacted an equivalent value in all that time.
>Marx’s analysis of gold is not a defense of its necessity yes it is. it is marx's "universal commodity"
>but a critique of capitalist mystification.gold money has existed for milennia:
>The solution is not to return to a gold standardwho the fuck suggested that?
>but to abolish the religion of moneyhow? by working for big government instead of big business? lol
>money is always already a symbol of SNLTyes by being *embodied* in a *commodity*
…. all this yapping. stop wasting everyone's time, please.
New(reprinted, free) Book!
Unequal Exchange and the Prospects of Socialism<A searing indictment of global capitalism—and a blueprint for revolutionary solidarity from inside the imperial core.
>Originally published underground in 1986 and long unavailable in print, Unequal Exchange and the Prospects of Socialism is one of the clearest, most uncompromising anti-imperialist texts of the late 20th century. Written by the Communist Working Group (CWG) in Denmark, the book offers a sharp and accessible analysis of how global capitalism extracts value from the Global South through unequal exchange, and how that extraction shapes class complicity within the imperial core.
>This new edition from Iskra Books restores the original text—complete with Arghiri Emmanuel’s introduction—alongside a new prologue and epilogue by longtime anti-imperialist organizer and CWG member Torkil Lauesen, and a fresh preface by Henry Hakamäki and Nemanja Lukic. Together, these excellent additions situate the text in its historical moment while clarifying its relevance to the contradictions of global capitalism today.
>Far more than a critique, this book is a call to action, challenging revolutionaries in the Global North to confront their material position in the imperial order—and to take seriously the kind of politics demanded by real solidarity. Unapologetically internationalist and rooted in material analysis, Unequal Exchange and the Prospects of Socialism remains essential reading for anyone serious about dismantling empire from within.https://www.iskrabooks.org/unequal-exchangehttps://www.iskrabooks.org/_files/ugd/ec1faf_b615b36f535e4866a4a6b8c6a21fa516.pdf>>2235588>you dont see how youre contradicting terms?they clearly are not saying that money-commodity is not a commodity, but that marx does not explicitly say its a commodity because its in the name so he doesn't need to. hes talking about 3 different things and how they develop into eachother. first there is money-commodity, which can be wheat or salt or iron or cattle, then there is the ideal money-commodity which historically was gold because of its properties, then with the transition to paper money we can see the beginning of the value it represents becoming detached from what it is represented by as the gold supply fluctuates from day to day, and finally when dramatic changes in the gold supply lead to the exchange ratio changing. the constant through all of these is the underlying snlt, not the token that represents it. first money is abstract, as a money-commodity, wheat for salt, that is directly proportional to the labor it represents, then this is negated with gold, its debasement, and printing of more dollars than gold in stock, but traded as gold for gold, and finally it becomes concrete, representing the abstract labor that controls society instead of particular labors, like gold mining, in this stage its labor for labor. money as a social relation becomes more real inversely proportional to its representation becoming more abstract. money becoming fiat is the confirmation of its symbolic nature already exposed in the gold stage. you can deny dialectics are valid, or you can critique marx on his dialectics, but you cant reinterpret marx as an empiricist and critique him on those grounds, because then you are not critiquing marx
>>2238230>do you know what an exchange ratio entails to marx? the comparison of its magnitude of value. this is inherent to its value.You are confusing exchange value and value. This is because you haven't read Capital Volume III.
>>2238232>>once gold is established as money, its symbolic role can take precedence>a symbol of value *must* represent gold>>the symbolic representation (money) becomes detached from the underlying value>the gold itself is the money; a symbol of value cannot be "detached" from a value>(…)>>Marx’s analysis of gold is not a defense of its necessity >yes it is. it is marx's "universal commodity"
<Throughout this work, I assume, for the sake of simplicity, gold as the money-commodity. t. Marx. Hey would you look at that, this was already pointed out here:
>>2235412 >>2238230>its not an "arbitrary" rate, but a proportional rate.Its both, its in proportion to an arbitrary amount of gold.
>not at all. labour power is always changing.Not for "the same population". Read more carefully. The population can be assumed constant because there is not a direct correlation between population and gold, instead available gold to be mined is dependent on geography, which is arbitrary.
>marx is talking about inconvertible moneyHe talks about all three.
>fiat is not "paper money"Inconvertable paper is fiat, convertable paper is bank notes, and he talks about both.
>source?Thats the point of his discussion, that Money only appears to have value itself, but the value behind the fetish of Money is labor, that the value is not inherent to Money but a social symbol. The historical transition to gold being the basis for this observation, that it once directly corresponded to labor, and then that correspondence became abstracted to a ratio as it was necessary to continue its role in regulating exchange, which then becomes purely an abstract ratio disconnected from the materiality of the symbol but still relative to the labor supply.
>a symbol of value *must* represent goldNo, a convertible gold bank note must represent gold, by definition.
>he only speaks of gold - and critiques fiatSo he also speaks of fiat, unless you think he critiques it without saying it.
>the device he employs in the fetishism of commodities is to show how the fetishism is "real"No, that is commodity fetishism. His point is to show the real basis behind the fetish, to show that the fetish does not contain value itself but acts as a mediator to compare other values by proportion in relation to its circulating supply.
>so exchange value is all bullshit then?Exchange value also isn't price. Exchange value is the ratio, price is a quantity.
>and HOW is this value measured?The price is a quantity, which is a portion of the total supply, and the aggregate price of all commodities of a type is also a portion of total supply, and that ratio is its exchange value, and that portion is equal to the portion of total labor, which is its value.
>lenin says very directly that imperialism is a transhistorical phenomenon.This is even more egregious and deliberate than your misreading of Marx. What Lenin says very directly at the same time as mentioning historical imperialism is that:
>“general” disquisitions on imperialism, which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental difference between socio-economic formations, inevitably turn into the most vapid banality or bragging, like the comparison: “Greater Rome and Greater Britain.” Even the capitalist colonial policy of previous stages of capitalism is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital.When Marxists use the word Imperialism, its short hand for Capitalist Imperialism. Lenin is clearly talking about Capitalist Imperialism, which is specifically monopoly finance capital, which is not transhistorical, he called the paper "The Highest Stage of Capitalism" for a reason, and its not because the Imperialism he is talking about always existed. When I talk about Imperialism and the IMF and World Bank you can be sure I am also not talking about something transhistorical.
Even though Marx did not talk about Imperialism, its relationship to Marx's theory is the same as the discussion around fiat. Marx did not give us an isolated and static analysis of disparate facts as they existed in his time but a scientific model of how the economy changes through history with the tools to critique past and future economic systems. Lenins critique of Imperialism is about the specific appearance of monopoly capitalism, but the tools to see its emergence were already present in Marx.
Monopoly capitalism as financial Imperialism logically and naturally follows from Marx's observation that Capitalist competition consolidates into monopoly resulting in a tendency of the rate of profit to fall as new technology is introduced to the supply chain increasing the composition of organic capital leading to stagnation, turning capitalism from a progressive force that creates new productive forces into a regressive force that lives off rent and necessitates expansion into new territorial markets through wars of conquest. So, the same as the move to fiat, we can say that this was already accounted for by Marx. None of this is transhistorical, both Marx and Lenin were dialectical and historical materialists, nothing they discuss is ever transhistorical, its always historically contingent, all phenomena are shaped by their historical and material conditions. Marxism is not a fixed static dogma but a method of analysis. Since you are already concerned with rent maybe modern studies of Imperialism would be of interest to you and can clarify your misconceptions of Marx. I would recommend actually reading Lenin, but I know you would rather stick with your vapid banality. Sad to see that your declaration that you can be convinced rationally was just bait for you to generate a medium where you can continue to spread false ideas.
>>2239113>You are confusing exchange value and valueexplain the difference to me, since you are the expert who imagines they have read capital vol. 3 without even reading vol. 1 🤣
i already explained the difference between precapitalist and capitalist exchange:
[C-M-C] -> [M-C-M']
does this then negate the law of value?
>Throughout this work, I assume, for the sake of simplicity, gold as the money-commodity.yes, and? to marx, money is still a commodity, so where is the rebuttal? lol
>>2239024>they (you) are not saying what they (you) are saying🤣 sure…
>first there is money-commodity, which can be wheat or salt or iron or cattle>then there is the ideal money-commodity>then with the transition to paper moneyagain, gold is an imperfect form of money, and paper money and fiat existed milennia ago. marx speaks about fiat currency negatively.
>becoming detached from what it is representedlets go over this one more time:
<"Paper money is a token representing gold or money […] Only in so far as paper money represents gold, which like all other commodities has value, is it a symbol of value […] if the quantity of paper money issued be double what it ought to be, then, as a matter of fact, £1 would be the money-name not of 1/4 of an ounce, but of 1/8 of an ounce of gold [vol. 1, ch. 3]"there is no "detachment".
>money becoming fiatwhich marx expressly criticises as the debasement of money, remember?
>you cant reinterpret marx as an empiricist and critique him on those groundsi never claimed marx was an empiricist you mongoloid. he fails because of his dialectics. and the most pathetic thing is that youre self-fagging this post in third person. get a life.
>>2239388>The population can be assumed constantits not about the size of a population, but their labour-power. 100 people can be more productive than 1000 people. its a relative factor, so money supply must also be relative.
>He talks about all three. in reference to "paper money" he is very specific:
<"We allude here only to inconvertible paper money issued by the State and having compulsory circulation [vol. 1, ch. 3]">Inconvertable paper is fiatno. "fiat" was based on silver coins in the roman empire. the form of fiat doesnt matter as long as its supply is managed by the state. "fiat" means "by decree".
>Money only appears to have value itselfmoney to marx is GOLD. are you saying that according to the LTV, gold lacks value?
>abstract ratio disconnected from the materiality of the symbolone more time. follow along:
<"Only in so far as paper money represents gold, which like all other commodities has value, is it a symbol of value [vol. 1, ch. 3]">No, a convertible gold bank note must represent gold, by definition.marx is speaking of INCONVERTIBLE notes!
>So he also speaks of fiatyes, as i have shown many, many times!
<"Lawyers started long before economists the idea that money is a mere symbol, and that the value of the precious metals is purely maginary. This they did in the sycophantic service of the crowned heads, supporting the right of the latter to debase the coinage, during the whole of the middle ages, by the traditions of the Roman Empire and the conceptions of money to be found in the Pandects. […] it was a maxim of the Roman Law that the value of money was fixed by decree of the emperor. It was expressly forbidden to treat money as a commodity [.] some good work on this question has been done by G. F. Pagnini […] the second part of his work Pagnini directs his polemics especially against the lawyers. [ch. 2, footnote 11]"this is his criticism of fiat currency.
>that is commodity fetishismyes, which to marx is a real relation of value by commodity exchange, where private labours gain public intercourse.
>Exchange value is the ratio, price is a quantity. you are really waffling here. explain the difference to me.
>This is even more egregious and deliberate than your misreading of Marxwhat have i misread in marx?
>imperialism quoteyou craftily missed the beginning of that passage, didnt you?
<"Colonial policy and imperialism existed before the latest stage of capitalism, and even before capitalism. Rome, founded on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and practised imperialism [imperialism, ch. 6]"yet lenin qualifies between the different forms of imperialism:
<"Even the capitalist colonial policy of previous stages of capitalism is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital. [imperialism, ch. 6]"so where am i wrong? imperialism, as a trend, is a transhistorical phenomenon.
>When Marxists use the word Imperialism, its short hand for Capitalist Imperialismyoure even wrong here - lenin is qualifying the difference between,
<"the capitalist colonial policy of previous stages of capitalism"and,
<"the colonial policy of finance capital"so you mean "finance capitalism".
>marx gave us "a scientific model"🤣🤣🤣 i'll bite. what is "scientific" in marx's work?
>capitalism from a progressive force that creates new productive forces into a regressive force that lives off rentcapitalism was never "progressive" you dogmatic dingbat. what is "progressive" about the rape of the earth and its people?
>nothing they discuss is ever transhistorical🤣🤣 so marx and engels never discuss the law of value existing in the past?
>your misconceptions of Marxwhat misconceptions do i have of marx?
>you can continue to spread false ideas.what false ideas? you make accusations but never back them up, because youre thrice, a coward, a liar, and illiterate.
>>2239563>>You are confusing exchange value and value. This is because you haven't read Capital Volume III.You
>explain the difference to me, since you are the expert who imagines they have read capital vol. 3 without even reading vol. 1 🤣What an odd response (very Muskesque). Why don't you directly answer that you have read the third Volume? Do you think that exchange value and value are the same magnitude for Marx in the third Volume? Why not directly say it?
Marx:
<Throughout this work, I assume, for the sake of simplicity, gold as the money-commodity.You:
<yes, and? to marx, money is still a commodity, so where is the rebuttal? Earlier ITT:
>>Marx’s analysis of gold is not a defense of its necessity You:
>yes it is. it is marx's "universal commodity"^Moving the goalposts.
>>2239568>you are really waffling here. explain the difference to me.you cant be serious. real marx understanding hours
>which marx expressly criticises as the debasement>this is his criticism of fiat currencywhat exactly do you think critique means lmao
>>2240784and here is for hiring a technician to ibstall a mining rig and for a mcdonalds worker.
Anyways i think take away is the more labor intensive the commodity is the less profitable it is. Makes sense.
>>2240788>the more labor intensive the commodity is the less profitable it ismarx's point is opposite, since only "living labour" can create value.
>>2240176calling it "imperialism" is theoretical baggage by lenin, since he happily cosigns it as "finance capitalism" or "monopoly capitalism" anyway (which are more acceptable terms). i only brought up lenin to show how the system of monopoly (rents) is a trend we see throughout history (which lenin also agrees with) - you dont need "historical materialism" to see the way that power works (history repeats itself and so on); the same way that fiat and paper money are old monetary orders, and not historically "progressive" of a capitalist development. this is part of the issue of the progressive vision in general - it doesnt see how "communism", or whatever you should call it, is always an immanence in every age, like how engels saw the early christians as proto-communist. this is why many anarchists (following foucault) naturally became historical nihilists of a sort - a bit like rousseau and his notion of noble savagery. likewise, baudrillard wished to escape value exchange (which he saw marx inevitably reproducing) by returning to symbolic exchange (or what in anthropology is called "gift economies"). kojin karatani and david graeber walk the finest line in this regard, by inverting marx's materialism for a superstructural primacy.
>>2240743>you cant be seriousoh, so you literally cant explain the difference between price and exchange value to me? nice talking to you 🤣
>>2240472>Why don't you directly answer that you have read the third Volume?you never asked me, you accused me - should i be defensive? i ask you to educate me instead, yet you decline, why? (we all know why…)
>Do you think that exchange value and value are the same magnitude for Marx in the third Volume?marx's formula for the value of a commodity in vol. 3 is:
>C = c + v + s (the same as smith's)which are all elements of labour-time, calculated in the price of production. profit is made by selling a commodity at its value, which is thrice, c + v + s.
marx does not presuppose surplus value in pre-capitalist exchange (except in usurer's capital). we might say then that pre-capitalist exchange is:
>C = c + vsurplus is present in capital:
>C = c + v + s[C-M-C] -> [M-C-M']
so as i have stated many times, capitalist exchange is oriented around the cost of production: cost-price (k) + profit (s). this doesnt disrupt the law of value however, since surplus is just surplus labour time.
>>2240472>>2240924[C = c + v] is yet still an incomplete sum however.
calculation of value in vol. 1, ch. 1: [Q/P] = [SNLT]
in pre-capitalist exchange then, we have living and dead labour, but not constant and variable capitals. marx says that SNLT, or the magnitude of abstract labour power, is an inverse relation between labour's quantity (labour-time) and productivity. the calculation of this is as follows: [Q/P], which directly resembles capital's value composition: [v/c].
the more proper sum of pre-capitalist value:
>C = SNLT [Q/P]<C = labour + means of productionsurplus then becomes determined from this original fraction, but in the form of capital: [Q/P] -> [v/c]. the cost-price [k] of these capitals are: [c + v], which generate surplus [s] to give us the value of the capitalist commodity: [c + v + s]. surplus then is added from an original calculation of value: [Q/P].
>>2242034the formula: [C = c + v + s]
begins in the first chapter of vol. 3 and continues throughout the rest of the work. it is previously developed from vol. 1 and vol. 2 though
>Do you mean value or price?[C = c + v + s] is its cost of production [i.e. value]
surplus here is a relative factor based on organic composition however, which marx sees equalising across industries, and therefore creating the trend of a falling rate of profit [on the macro scale].
the market price of a commodity is always determined by supply and demand though, which as smith says, orient around the cost of production.
>Marx does not change what value is between the volumes.value gains new conditions from between its pre-capitalist and capitalist character though. this is the movement from value to surplus value:
[C-M-C] -> [M-C-M'].
now, this is not to say there was never surplus production, but that it had not attained its general form as surplus value, due to the captivity of labour. this is why workers are literally just wage-slaves (as well as debt slaves). my own historical view is that its slavery all the way down; there is not really a qualitative shift. marx in looking at the early forebodings of primitive accumulation and industrialisation also shows us that exile was even outlawed, and you were forced to work in factories at the threat of execution. honestly, it would be great if we could all choose to not work, and exist as nomads, fleeing to new lands, like the pilgrims, but the state will always oppress those who do not participate in the system (or if youre a dissident, they will literally freeze your assets and not allow you to access them - the bank of england even did this to venezuala, who wanted their gold in england's treasuries, but were denied). the erection of nation states doesnt just keep people out, it keeps people in, like the walls of a factory, plantation, prison or school.
>>2242880read again:
>>2242452 (You)
<"[C = c + v + s] is its cost of production [i.e. value]"this is what smith designates as the "natural price" of commodities, which regulates market prices.
we may also read this:
<"The value of every commodity produced in the capitalist way is represented in the formula: C = c + v + s [capital vol. 3, ch. 1]" >>2243837It literally says this is not what value is, but how value
represents itself in capitalism. Here is another snippet from Volume 3 supporting this:
<The various forms of capital, as evolved in this book, thus approach step by step the form which they assume on the surface of society, in the action of different capitals upon one another, in competition, and in the ordinary consciousness of the agents of production themselves.Literally the sentence before what you quote. This is why people don't believe you have read the book as a whole or even a chapter.
>>2243926youre literally making no point.
if [C = c + v + s] is not an acceptable formula for the value of capitalist commodities, what is?
>>2244020read this:
>>2240981[C = c + v] is yet still an incomplete sum however.
calculation of value in vol. 1, ch. 1: [Q/P] = [SNLT]
in pre-capitalist exchange then, we have living and dead labour, but not constant and variable capitals. marx says that SNLT, or the magnitude of abstract labour power, is an inverse relation between labour's quantity (labour-time) and productivity. the calculation of this is as follows: [Q/P], which directly resembles capital's value composition: [v/c].
the more proper sum of pre-capitalist value:
>C = SNLT [Q/P]<C = labour + means of productionsurplus then becomes determined from this original fraction, but in the form of capital: [Q/P] -> [v/c]. the cost-price [k] of these capitals are: [c + v], which generate surplus [s] to give us the value of the capitalist commodity: [c + v + s]. surplus then is added from an original calculation of value: [Q/P].
[C-M-C] -> [M-C-M']
>>2244076Q = quantity (labour-time)
P = productivity (amount of goods created)
SNLT is determined from this fraction [Q/P]
value decreases per commodity created, thus.
<"The value of a commodity, therefore, varies directly as the quantity, and inversely as the productiveness, of the labour incorporated in it [vol. 1, ch. 1]".>>2244079yes.
cost-price = [c + v] [k]
cost of production = [c + v + s] [C]
>>2244082>yes.Earlier you said:
>there is no *quantitative* differencebetween exchange value ratios and value ratios. You deleted that post, but it still shows up in a reply quoting you.
What is the reason why you are deleting your own posts. Have you changed your opinion.
>>2244084>exchange value ratios and value ratiosthere is no quantitative difference… an exchange value is literally just the magnitude of value compared between two commodities.
>You deleted that posti never deleted my posts. the mods wiped all of my posts of this website for some reason. years worth of content are gone, without any official explanation.
seems that my first post after this purge was this:
>>2221538so take anything i say after this as my opinion
i did notice this post however:
>>2242235which is more recent and i think is addressed to me. so im not in control of the shit management this site has always had.
>>2244079>the capitalist cost-price of the commodity differs in quantity from its value>>2244082 (you)
yes.
>>2244097 (also you, somehow)
>there is no quantitative difference… an exchange value is literally just the magnitude of value compared between two commodities.Can you make a decision and commit.
>>2244109the cost-price [k] is the cost of capital [c+v]
the production cost [C] is value [c+v+s]
>>2244133yes, since each of these variables are already values in themselves.
constant capital = fixed labour
variable capital = necessary labour
surplus = surplus labour
>>2244159You are saying ratios of c+v+
s are equal to S
NLT ratios.
>>2244097>and i think is addressed to me. if the blog talking about mmt and smith and fiat isn't you then you wont mind me posting it
>the mods wiped all of my posts of this website for some reason. so you are evading a 5-week ban? is that why the IP count goes up every time you post? or did you appeal? i wonder what you posted to upset them
>>2244276the only blog i would have linked is lord keynes' blog "social democracy in the 21st century", and one david harvey article on marx's "value theory".
>or did you appeal?why would i appeal to a bunch of low lives, as if i was in trouble? the "appeal" section is just free real estate to call the jannies transhumanists and mods faggots.
>>2244317>Deleted post # >>2215827 >>2214846 >>2213812 wvobbly Created a new 5-week ban on all boards for xxxx (# 78344 78345 78347 ) with reason: pol Deleted all posts by IP address: xxxxhttps://leftypol.org/log.php?page=5&board=leftypolthose are missing posts quoted itt
but
>systemhidden2 days/leftypol/User at xxxx deleted his own post >>2240976https://leftypol.org/log.php?page=1&board=leftypolwas self
i never got to see what post he got banned for so i left the thread open incase things got deleted again. he made the post then quickly deleted it and reposted with different formatting and additions but without the image, so i thought to myself he will probably delete and repost a third time with the image again, but nope
Should we regard land as simply a type of Capital or should we treat it as a separate component, a la Smith (i.e. land, labor, and capital)? Unlike most forms of capital, there is a finite amount of land, and accumulating it is necessarily zero-sum. Yes, man-made islands exist and we can newly exploit previously fallow or "virgin" lands, but realistically even that has major limits.
Isn't one of the major contradictions of capitalism in the present that it treats land acquisition as a process that can continue indefinitely, in the same way as building up capital like more advanced factories? Nature has finite resources but we produce and consume as if there is no need to sustain the process. Capital on the other hand is sustained by reinvestment and growth, which seems like an important difference. If land functioned like capital (as it seems capitalism tends to assume) this would not be an issue, but clearly it is.
Isn't the continuation of a landlord/rentier class evidence that land has a different relationship to the economy than capital does? Capital needs workers to operate, rusting away if left unused. Land on the other hand increases in "value" (really price) over time because the supply is fixed but demand keeps rising as a capitalist economy develops. Thus a landowner doesn't have to engage in value creation the way a capitalist does in order to make money. Intellectual property seems to be taking on a similar form as well, moving technically advanced industries away from value production towards rent-seeking. It seems that the slimmer the profit margins get (as the rate of profit falls), the backup plan is to focus more on services and information, which function more like land. Information and services aren't finite the way land is, but they can't be readily produced individually the way most commodities can be. Instead you have the passkey to use a product or access to proprietary servers to operate your products.
>>2244623i'll have a look.
>>2244980>profit is temporary. debt is forever.i completely agree. power is parasitic. the labour of prey is the food of predators.
>>2244888marx in capital vol. 3 isolates land from capital, and so like smith, sees its revenues come out of a separate economic category. capital produces profit, while land produces rents. this indeed is a prior form of accumulation, which we can see throughout history. rents are also tied to interest/usury, as an unproductive form of extraction.
>land increases in price over timethis was smith's perspective too; that the prosperity of a country can be tracked proportionally by the rise in wages and rents, but conversely from profits - since profits can only rise where wages are cut.
>intellectual propertythe origins of IP are interesting. we can see with the KJV bible (1611) for example, the exclusive "copy rights" given to certain publishers of the work to create a monopoly - adolf hitler actually did something similar with mein kampf, where he had the third reich print his book and so he collected profits from this monopoly.
>rents substitute for profitsyes, and we must remember the fate of debt economies; it always ends in slavery.
>>2245073this one:
https://davidharvey.org/2018/03/marxs-refusal-of-the-labour-theory-of-value-by-david-harvey/paul cockshott also did a response to the article (vidrel), claiming that marx and ricardo shared the same theory of value, which is why they come to the same conclusions.
as i can interpret from capital vol. 1, chapter 1, footnotes 32 and 33, marx's unique criticism of the classical school is that it doesnt yet have a concept of abstract labour (value substance). marx earlier in chapter 1 sees that the two-fold character of labour is his own creation, so that is his theoretical advance.
>the default when all other economic theories fail is marxism.
Do we really have to wait for everything else to fail? Why is that? It seems to me that class society is in a constant state of failure, from the perspective of the working class, and in a constant state of success, from the perspective of the ruling class. Bourgeois economic theories "fail" to describe reality but "succeed" in justifying exploitation. In that sense they are more like religious doctrines than scientific theories. Bourgeois economists, in the rare instance that they don't entirely dismiss the scientific merits of Marx, complain about how he "politicizes" things which is unscientific, but economics is political by default, and the attempt to ignore the real material interests of the people involved is an inherent protection of the status quo. Bourgeois "indifference" in science sweeps class society under the rug. Can a study really be "unbiased" when it receives funding from a specific private organization run by specific people with specific class interests?
>its not that marxist economic theories are wrong perse its that theyre counterintuitive.
What do you think is "counterintuitive" about them?
>look at trump. Why did he fail? he put up tarrifs without putting in sone gas if you know what i mean. Subsidies.
Not sure what this has to do with the previous parts of your post. Trump is a bourgeois leader doing protectionism. But addressing the merits of this statement on its own: subsidies only stimulate and incentivize certain economic activity. They do not guarantee that activity will happen. Factories, reindustrialization, etc. take years, if not decades. If the US wishes to reindustrialize they'll need a lot more than mere economic policies like tariffs and subsidies. Even the very act of building factories will require a lot of imported materials. In my opinion the tariffs are a pump and dump scheme. Trump and his billionaire cabinet crashed the economy with the tariff announcement, bought up the crashed stocks at a low price, then sold after the recovery when some of the tariffs were "cancelled." If it were really about reindustrialization, the actions (not policies, actions) necessary to do that needed to happen decades ago. But decades ago deindustrialization was the official practice, not reindustrialization. So this will take decades and the tariffs would only have been helpful at a much later and more developed stage of reindustrialization.
>We coukd have had automated factories…
Automation is constant capital, which requires labor to have been performed in the past. That labor not only didn't happen, it was prevented, through neoliberalism.
>>2195842if you make a million commodities depending on the total size of commodify production you have significantly skewed resources from other industries to make 'uselessthing' and have therefore affected the value of other things.
No one would do this though (its unprofitable) so its not a useful exercise.
>>2198685The capitalists are using more labor (less efficient) to produce the commodities when offshoring. This increases the price of those commodities and restores profitability. The low wages = low prices has always been a bourgeois cope that is only true depending on circumstances of production as a whole - plenty of historical counterexamples like Japan in the 60s-80s and America in the 60s-80s and Britain in the 19th century.
Over time through deindustrialization the labor productivity of certain industries drops to below that of the now industrialized third world which means bringing them back has the same effect. Not a huge fan of Cockshott but he does talk about this, a fairly large bit of wage disparity between countries can be explained in the differences of the total labor productivity between those countries - for instance many third world countries rely on feudalism for agriculture which drags the productivity of all other industries down with it.
>>2244888Treating land as a separate thing is more of a Proudhon and Georgist idea. Both are much more aligned with the neoclassical idea of scarcity = value. Which is of course a tautology as Marx points out.
> Isn't the continuation of a landlord/rentier class evidence that land has a different relationship to the economy than capital doesYou should re-read Capital if this is your understanding. Marx is very smart to start with the elementary commodity and work his way up to credit and rent which are fetishized objects of social labor 'endowed with a life of their own'
>>2245065> marx in capital vol. 3 isolates land from capital and so like smith, sees its revenues come out of a separate economic category.completely wrong. The heading of the Section on Land rent is literally " Transformation of Surplus-Profit into Ground-Rent"
Does no one read the book?
>>2239429They are talking about different things. The exchange of wages for labor or commodity for commodity are equal, with respect to value, but exchange between nations are often is structurally unequal, with respect to resources exchanged, even if the individual things traded are of equal value, because of differences in productivity that are reinforced and exacerbated by dependency. You cant just look at a single trade in isolation with respect to its values being equal while ignoring the structural relationship that makes productivity different or you are naturalizing those differences, divorcing them from the economic reality.
Saying that exchange is equal doesn't explain why some countries are developed and others are exploited, or how those countries can become developed and break their dependency, it approaches nearly the same thing as liberals implying less productive countries just choose to be lazy, and is ultimately just arguing over the definition of words without addressing the actual issue. The unequal exchange thesis is not that rich countries become rich by selling things for more then their value, but they they get rich by not allowing other countries to develop through coercion and war that perpetuates the differences in productivity.
It would be the same for actually claiming that the exchange of wages for labor is unequal, not with respect to the values being exchanged, but from the perspective of the worker who must "voluntarily" accept a minimum wage job from a property owner because he has not productive property of his own. The inequality is structural not in the things being exchanged. But from within the logic of capital the structural inequality is assumed to be temporary, legal and just, in the same way that surplus value is the property of the capitalist even though the worker produces it, and it is in this sense that Marx says that it is equal, not theft, and that the worker is paid the full value of their labor, but not the value of the product of that labor, etc.
Its a difference in scope of analysis, so the same word referring to different things is perfectly normal. It also makes sense when we consider what Mao called primary and secondary contradictions. In a relationship between an colony nation and its colonizer, the primary contradiction is between the nation and its exploiter, and supersedes class antagonisms, because any nation, communist or otherwise, cant develop with a vampire on its back. Marx's focus was mostly about intranational capitalism, not international capitalism, so in the age of imperialism we would have to extend his analysis. Unequal exchange theory is one extension of that analysis towards the conflict between imperial core and periphery developing nations.
On top of that there is also monopoly rents, which in the form of technological patents are mostly held in imperial core countries, and is something Cockshott himself uses to explain price disparities in industries like petroleum. So there are also actual exchanges that are unequal in value. First a country exports a raw resource, then the importing country creates a finished good that adds an order of magnitude more value to the end product, and then that product is sold back to the exporting country. Wages in the exporting country are low, and so the product is relatively expensive, and this results in a net drain over repeated cycles through time. And then there is a monopoly tax on top of every transaction, and a dollar tax on top of that for anything has to be transformed transported using oil bought in dollars. This results in systemic under"valuing" of the prices in the third world compared to the first world, not its value, in the same way that migrant workers within a country can be paid below the value of the reproduction of their labor resulting in superexploitation because of their legal status and resulting lack of recourse. Or like building a factory in a slum to get cheap workers. Wages in low income countries can be systemically undervalued towards their local SNLT, while high income countries systemically overvalued towards their local SNLT, under/over being with respect to the global average SNLT. Its the same thing as individual prices not always being equal to average value but scaled up internationally and becoming a sort of arbitrage opportunity for imperialist stakeholders who then maintain these differences by deciding international trade policy.
This highlights why unequal exchange theory is important. Marx's point is that exploitation of individuals happens in production, with the appropriation of surplus value, not in exchange because things are not systemically sold for more then they are worth when buyers and sellers meet on equal terms. But if exchange between countries, not individuals, is actually unequal this gives backing to Mao's theory of principle contradictions. The inequality isn't in the exchange itself but in the broader economic structures that force them into unfavorable terms. Which explains why national liberation is a prerequisite for communist revolution, as you cant have communist self determination without national self determination, just like you cant have international communism without nations in the first place. If we wanted to be orthodox and defer to Marx's specific terminology we would call it "uneven development" but the trots already took that name and we cant go back and time and tell the author to change their title.
>>2247456>completely wrongreally? my claim is that marx's perspective is the same as smith's. lets read:
<"The analysis of landed property in its various historical forms is beyond the scope of this work. We shall be concerned with it only in so far as a portion of the surplus-value produced by capital falls to the share of the landowner […] One of the big contributions of Adam Smith was to have shown that ground-rent for capital invested in the production of such agricultural products as flax and dye-stuffs, and in independent cattle-raising, etc., is determined by the ground-rent obtained from capital invested in the production of the principal article of subsistence. in fact, no further progress has been made in this regard since then. Any limitations or additions would belong in an independent study of landed property, not here […] Here, then, we have all three classes – wage-labourers, industrial capitalists, and landowners constituting together, and in their mutual opposition, the framework of modern society. [capital vol. 3, ch. 37]"if only you read the first page down from part 6. i shall rhetorically ask you your own question: Does no one read the book?
NEW! liberal interviews liberal and paywalls the marxist part
Steve Keen: The Myths of “Basic Economics” | 1Dime Radio
In this episode of 1Dime Radio, I am joined by economist @ProfSteveKeen to discuss the many myths of “Basic Economics” (Neo-Classical Economics), the end of Neoliberalism, the Trade Wars, Trump Tariffs, and MMT (Modern Monetary Theory.
In The Backroom, Steve Keen talks about what Karl Marx got wrong, and what he got right, as well as his predictions for human civilization.
00:00 The Backroom Preview
02:27 Steve Keen on Neoclassical ECONomics
11:28 Why Economists Didn’t Predict The 2008 Crash
15:22 Modern Monetary Theory Proven Through Mathematical Models
42:27 Trump Tariffs and The End of Globalization
50:20 Reindustrialization, AI, and Automation
01:05:20 The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism
01:13:14 Why Social Democracy Failed
01:24:41 What Marx got Wrong (and what he got Right)
Thoughts on Silvio Gesell?
Keynes said of him
>I believe that the future will learn more from the spirit of Gesell than from that of Marx. The preface to The Natural Economic Order will indicate to the reader, if he will refer to it, the moral quality of Gesell. The answer to Marxism is, I think, to be found along the lines of this preface.https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/keynes/general-theory/ch23.htmI'm not anti-Marxist I just found this interesting>>2247456>Treating land as a separate thing is more of a Proudhon and Georgist idea.But Smith did this too? What do you mean "more of a [blank] idea" exactly? There are common ideas between theorists who disagree. The relationship between ideas in economic theory isn't like ingredients in a stew soaking together, but pieces in a machine where the function of an idea works on another idea so that they all fit together into a functional structure.
>Both are much more aligned with the neoclassical idea of scarcity = value.Scarcity is related to price, which is why real estate is such a huge speculative market now. From the kind of perspective you seem to be implying, land would have no value. Proudhon and George would oppose ownership of land a priori, and in Marx's terms there's no labor content that went into the land itself, though there may be features
on the land (buildings, farms, etc) that contain dead labor and therefore value. But generally speaking the value of the features added to a piece of real estate are very small compared to the price of the land itself on current markets.
>Which is of course a tautology as Marx points out."Scarcity = value" is not true, let alone a tautology. Did you mean fallacy or something else?
>You should re-read Capital if this is your understanding.But as this anon points out
>>2245065<marx in capital vol. 3 isolates land from capital, and so like smith, sees its revenues come out of a separate economic category. capital produces profit, while land produces rents. this indeed is a prior form of accumulation, which we can see throughout history. rents are also tied to interest/usury, as an unproductive form of extraction. >Marx had plans to investigate foreign trade more closely in a fourth volume of Capital, but never had the opportunity to write it.9 Emmanuel picked up this loose end and put forward his thesis, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade. At the time of publication, it was criticized for focusing on circulation—international trade—rather than the sphere of production, where the exploitation of labor is assumed to take place. However, this perception is wrong, both regarding the theory of unequal exchange and the Marxist theory of exploitation in general.
>The core of the theory of unequal exchange is the Marxist concept of value.10 It assumes the existence of a global value of labor on one side, and, on the other side, a historical capitalism, which has polarized the world-system into a center and periphery with a correspondingly high- and low-wage level. This difference in the price of labor entails a value transfer, hidden in the price structure when commodities are exchanged between the center and periphery of the world-system. The central point is not the exchange itself, but the difference between the global value of labor and the different prices of labor power.
>The concept of value unifies the production and the circulation spheres, which are both necessary in capitalist accumulation. Marx was very clear about the relationship between production and circulation in the valorization of capital: “Capital cannot…arise from circulation, and it is equally impossible for it to arise apart from circulation. It must have its origin both in circulation and not in circulation.”11 To be certain, the labor power in the sphere of production is a precondition for surplus value, but the goods have to be sold on the market to turn the surplus value into profit: the accumulation of capital.
>At the center of Emmanuel’s work is the fundamental contradiction in capitalism between the imperative to expand accumulation—to produce more and more commodities—on one side, and on the other side, the inability of the market to absorb the production and hence realize the profit for continued accumulation. The “historical” solution to this contradiction became the development of “unequal exchange.” Through the imperialism of trade, value was transferred from the superexploited proletariat in the periphery of the world system to the center—expanding the power of consumption, hence balancing the expanded accumulation. This “historical solution” was not a cunning plan by capitalism but one generated by the class struggle of the proletariat in Northwestern Europe and North America[…]
>In June 1970, Emmanuel wrote in Monthly Review:
>The most bitter fruits of my work on “L’échange inégale” was the negative conclusion arrived at regarding the international solidarity of the working class…loyalty to the nation transcends internal conflict of interest, on the one hand, while on the other, it grows stronger in the consequence of international antagonism. National integration has been made possible in the big industrial countries at the cost of international disintegration of the proletariat…. As I said in my book, when the relative importance of the exploitation which the working class suffers through belonging to the “proletariat” continually decreases as compared with that which it benefits through belonging to a privileged nation, a moment comes when the aim of increasing the national income in absolute term takes precedence over that of improving each section’s share relative to that of the others. This is what the workers of the advanced countries have well understood, becoming, over the last half-century, increasingly “social democratized”—either by supporting the social democratic parties already in being or by “social-democratizing” the Communist Parties themselves.
>Why return to a theory of imperialism from the 1970s? The answer is simple: Because the past fifty years have made Emmanuel’s work more relevant than ever.
>Neoliberal globalization changed the economy of the world-system profoundly in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The development of productive forces—computers, mobile phones, the Internet, the standard container, and new logistic systems—all made possible the control and management of production globally. The distance between place of production and market became less relevant. Industrial production was outsourced on a massive scale from the Global North to low-wage countries in the Global South in search of higher profit. A new international division of labor was created. It was no longer just raw materials and tropical agricultural products from the third world competing against industrial products from the North. In the 1950s, industrial goods made up only 15 percent of the exports of all so-called third world countries combined. By 2009, the number had risen to 70 percent.15 This was the result of all kinds of industrial production, from high-tech electronics and cars to washing machines and designer clothes organized in global production chains stretching from the Global North to the South and back again. The financing and control of the whole process and research and development remained in the Global North. The production process was outsourced to the Global South. The main markets for consumption were still located in the Global North, where branding, sales, and service took place. Often, the subcomponents of an electronic device or a car were produced in different countries in the Global South, where conditions for profit were optimal, before assembly. Hence the value-transfer did not only take place in the international trade between countries but also through the price formation of the product within a company’s various departments.16
>The low level of wages in the South creates not just a higher global rate of profit than would otherwise be obtained; it also affects the price of goods produced in the South. In mainstream economics, the formation of the market prices for a smartphone, for example, through the production chain, could be described as a “smiling curve” for so-called value added. “Value” added in mainstream theory is simply equivalent to the added cost of production in each step of the production chain in conventional price terms. The “value” added is high in the first part of the chain, with highly paid research and development, design, and financial management located in the North, whereas the curve falls in the middle, with low-wage labor in the South producing the physical product. “Value” added rises again toward the end of the curve with branding, marketing, and sales taking place in the North despite wages for retail workers being among the lowest in those countries. In the logic of the “smiling curve,” the main part of the value of the product is added in the North, while labor in the South, which manufactures the goods, contributes only a minimal portion. In Marxist terms, by contrast, value is the sum of socially necessary labor time that has gone into producing a commodity. Thus, if one were to draw the curve for the Marxist concept of value added, in a production chain for a smartphone, it would take more or less the opposite form of the “smile curve”—a kind of “sour smiley.”17
>In total, the global labor force engaged in capitalist production increased by 61 percent between 1980 and 2011. Three-quarters of this workforce live in the Global South. China and India alone account for 40 percent of the world’s labor force.18 This means there has been an expansion of capitalism of historic magnitude, and a shift in the balance between Global North and South. In 1980, the number of industrial workers in the South and North was about equal. In 2010, there were 541 million industrial workers in the Global South, while only 145 million remained in the Global North.19 The center of gravity for global industrial production thus no longer lies in the North but in the South. Despite this change, the wage level remains low in the South. The consumption power able to absorb the production to realize profit and continued accumulation is mainly located in the Global North. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, the core countries have become dependent on production in the periphery, and the periphery dependent on consumption in the center. These can be referred to as “producer economies” and “consumer economies,” connected via global chains of production.
>A recent study by Jason Hickel, Morena Hanbury Lemos, and Felix Barbour has quantified the size of unequal exchange:
>Researchers have argued that wealthy nations rely on a large net appropriation of labour and resources from the rest of the world through unequal exchange in international trade and global commodity chains. Here we assess this empirically by measuring flows of embodied labour in the world economy from 1995–2021, accounting for skill levels, sectors and wages. We find that, in 2021, the economies of the global North net-appropriated 826 billion hours of embodied labour from the global South, across all skill levels and sectors. The wage value of this net-appropriated labour was equivalent to €16.9 trillion in Northern prices, accounting for skill level. This appropriation roughly doubles the labour that is available for Northern consumption but drains the South of productive capacity that could be used instead for local human needs and development. Unequal exchange is understood to be driven in part by systematic wage inequalities. We find Southern wages are 87–95% lower than Northern wages for work of equal skill. While Southern workers contribute 90% of the labour that powers the world economy, they receive only 21% of global income.20[…]
>>2266535>Neoliberalism gave capitalism forty golden years, but beneath the surface resistance has been brewing. With the decline of U.S. hegemony, the rise of China, and the development of a multipolar world-system, the world is undergoing a profound change not seen in the past hundred years.
>Today, this polarized world-system has reached a turning point. In the first three decades of neoliberal globalization, the transfer of value by unequal exchange had been steadily growing. However, the rise of China as the world’s leading industrial power has broken this dynamic for the first time in two hundred years. Keeping its national project intact, China changed from being a spring of value transfer to a competitor to the Global North on the world market. The value transfer of unequal exchange from South to North has begun to decline for the first time in the past 150 years. The rising wage levels in China are a main factor contributing to this decline: “Between 1978 and 2018, on average, one hour of work in the United States was exchanged for almost forty hours of Chinese work. However, from the middle of the 1990s…we observed a very marked decrease in unequal exchange, without it completely disappearing. In 2018, 6.4 hours of Chinese labour were still exchanged for 1 hour of U.S. labour.”27
>The center no longer has the advantage of a monopoly on high-tech industrial production, and it is losing the grip of global finance and trade. To uphold its hegemony, the United States is splitting and eroding the former neoliberal world market via trade wars, sanctions, and blockades, killing the goose that laid the goldeuyghs.
>The value transfer of unequal exchange is a pillar upholding the current capitalist world system. It contributes to the development of the current two major contradictions in the world. The contradiction between declining U.S. hegemony versus the rise of China and the emergence of a multipolar world system, and the contradiction between the capitalist mode of production versus the earth’s ecological systems. The economic and ecological unequal exchange are implicit in international trade and the global production chains.
>In the wave of anti-imperialism in the 1970s, the third world demanded a “new economic world order,” which came to nothing. National liberation and the ambition to create socialism were not enough to cut the pipelines of imperialist value transfer. The newborn revolutionary states did not have the power to change the polarizing dynamic caused by unequal exchange. They could not simply increase wages and prices for the raw materials and agricultural products they supplied to the world market. No matter their aspirations, the economies of the newly independent countries were determined by the dominant capitalist world market.
>Today the nations of the Global South are beginning to construct a new economic world order, creating alternative trade patterns and financial institutions, and using their own currencies instead of U.S. dollars. The decline of U.S. hegemony and the rise of a multipolar world-system opens up “a window of opportunity”—creating a space for progressive states and movements countering imperialist exploitation by unequal exchange. The United States is still a forceful power, but the South is on the offensive. While the transformative power of the third world in the 1960s and ’70s was based on “revolutionary spirit”—attempted ideological dominance over economic development—the current transformative power of the Global South is based on its economic strength.
>Countering unequal exchange can offer the basis for a global coalition creating a new international order. The rule of imperialism and effect of unequal exchange has, however, divided the working class along hierarchical lines of nationality and citizenship, race and ethnicity, and gender. As Marx noted: “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.”28 Hence, the main drivers of the struggle will be found in the Global South. They have the immediate material interest in getting rid of unequal exchange.
>In the 1980s, Samir Amin advised the countries in the third world to delink from the imperialist economic system, in order to stop the value transfer of unequal exchange.29 However, as Amin pointed out, delinking does not mean isolation—autarky—but the reorientation and subordination of international economic relations to the social and environmental needs of the toiling masses. It requires a mutually complementary and reinforcing process, between the class struggle in each country for the benefit of the working class on one side, and the establishment of external global political conditions that make the restoration of national popular sovereignty possible, on the other side. Building an anti-imperialist front on the state level, balancing U.S. hegemony in the world-system, is an integral and fundamental part of the national liberation project. Putting an end to unequal exchange cannot be pursued in isolation and separately by individual countries. The driving force will be states trying to build socialism and social and national liberation movements in the Global South.
>In order to reduce the value transfer, they must regain their economic sovereignty, which has been eroded by neoliberal globalization. They need to redirect their trade-pattern from South-North to South-South. There might still be wage differences, but much less than the North-South difference. They need to develop their productive forces in order to free themselves from dependency on Western technology. They need to develop their own financial and banking system to avoid the dependency of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as the U.S. weaponization of the financial system through sanctions and blockades. They need to adopt new means of international payment to reduce the power of the dollar in global markets.
>One example of such measures is BRICS. The cooperation between Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which was enlarged in 2023 with new countries, now comprising 46 percent of the world’s population and 36 percent of the world economy, counterbalancing the G7 (the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and Japan), with only 10 percent of the world’s population and 30 percent of the world economy.
>BRICS+ is not an anticapitalist organization. The emerging multipolar world system consists of a complex of contradictory currents—between hegemonism and counter-hegemonism, conservative and progressive, capitalist and socialist forces. We have to keep in mind Marx’s words: that no social order disappears before all the productive forces for which there is space have been developed. We are reaching this point. Then—as Marx continues—comes the period of social revolution.30[…]
>The majority of the working class in the imperialist North still identifies themselves with the national interest of the imperialist national state, believing that it will defend the “imperial mode of living.” This is reflected in the broad popular support for the NATO alliance.
>The crises of neoliberal globalization in the past decade have led to the development of populist right-wing movements and even fascism in the Northern lower-middle class and the more privileged element of the working class. It is not unusual that a class formation losing its privileged position moves to the right. In the coming decades, with deepening economic and political crisis, it will be an important task to convince the working class that their long-term interest is to join the anti-imperialist struggle, to put an end to global capitalism. The struggle against fascism may as in the 1930s be of paramount importance.
>The bourgeoisification of sections of the working class and its support of imperialism is a historical development, and as such, it opens up the possibility of change in the position and attitude of the working class and maintains a future possibility of the class as gravediggers of capitalism.
>Since October 2023, the war on Gaza has created a new generation of anti-imperialists in the Global North, not seen since the protests against the Vietnam War. The mobilization of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle is also a schooling in organization and of how the system works: about the power instruments of the state, about the media, and about imperialism in general. Anti-imperialists in the North are still a minority, but an important minority. In the solidarity movement with Palestine, we see local people standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Palestinians in the diaspora. Refugees and migrant workers can be an anti-imperialist Trojan Horse within the Global North. Because of their position in production and service, they are not powerless, and their affiliation with family and hope for the economic development of their homeland in the Global South may be stronger than their loyalty to a state that barely tolerates their stay.https://monthlyreview.org/2025/03/01/arghiri-emmanuel-and-unequal-exchange-past-present-and-future-relevance/ >>2190402He goes into this topic way more in this interview. He thinks early 19th century Germany had a bias against atomism due to its absolutist political culture, and that people like Marx were forced to use a German idealist mode of expression or mode of presentation, to appear unlike the "crude" British and French materialists, hence all the Hegelian language in Marx, but at the same time, Marx's academic origins were in studying the Greek materialists of antiquity, Lucretius, Democritus, Archimedes, etc. Cockshott contends that Marx was a mechanical materialist and not a dialectical materialist. He contends that this is revealed through his more Newtonian language (Capitalist laws of motion) and how he uses the idea of laws of conservation from physics and applies it to economic exchange in order to prove that profit does not arrive in exchange, but in exploitation, and similarly his separation of labor from labor-power is similar to the separation of work done from horsepower in mechanics. He cites Marx attending physics lectures and living in England for most of his life as proof that Marx's exposition in Capital is thoroughly of a mechanical materialist and not dialectical materialist character, and that the debates in the 1920s Soviet union mistakenly attributed Dietzgen to Marx leading to dialectical materialism becoming a state doctrine in the USSR by mistake.
>>2269647marx explicitly writes that he is a pupil of hegel. this is the difference between the early and late marx;
<"The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago […] But just as I was working at the first volume of Das Kapital, it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Ἐπίγονοι [Epigones — Büchner, Dühring and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel […] as s a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker [capital vol. 1, 1873 afterword]">labour-powermarx cites the origin of this term in "value, price and profit", as originating from thomas hobbes:
<"One of the oldest economists and most original philosophers of England — Thomas Hobbes — has already, in his Leviathan, instinctively hit upon this point overlooked by all his successors. He says: “the value or worth of a man is, as in all other things, his price: that is so much as would be given for the use of his power.” Proceeding from this basis, we shall be able to determine the value of labour as that of all other commodities [part vii - labour power]"cockshott is full of shit
<THE LABOR THEORY OF VALUE AND ITS CRITICS
>Since a given commodity is exchange able for a multitude of other commodities, it cannot be the case that its exchange value derives from the circumstances of each individual exchange. Exchange value, therefore,cannot be the "accidental" result of particular circumstances, but must express some inherent property of the commodity itself. Since this inherent property is expressed by exchangeability, i.e., by equality with another commodity, it must be something which all commodities have in common. Marx further argues that this inherent property of commodities cannot be derived from their use value:
>This common element cannot be a geometrical, physical, chemical or other natural property of commodities. Such properties come into consideration only to the extent that they make the commodities useful, i.e., turn them into use values. But clearly, the exchange relation of commodities is characterized precisely by its abstraction from their use values. (Marx, 1977, p. 127.)
>Therefore, Marx asserts, the commonquality expressed in the exchange is the fact that both commodities are the products of human labor: "If then we disregard the use value of commodities, only one property remains, that of being products of labor" (Marx, 1977, p. 128).
>However, labors which produce different use values are themselves different. The "common something" responsible for the value is therefore not the individual concrete labors, but the so-called "abstract labor" embodied in the commodities. The abstraction Marx refers to here is the social reduction of all labor to the expenditure of "human brain, muscles, nerves," etc. Quantitatively, value is determined by the time required by labor of "average skill and intensity" to produce a commodity under the average conditions of production (the socially necessary labor time). The concepts of "average skill," "average intensity," and "socially necessary" imply the comparison of numerous production processes and therefore underline the fact that the content of value is something social. Thus, abstract labor cannot be located as atechnological input in the production processas concrete labor can. "So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange value either in a pearl or a diamond" (Marx,1977,p. 177).
>Marx's discussion of the fetish-like character of the commodity at the end of the first chapter remphasizes the social quality of value. In a generalized exchange system producers may appear separated and autonomous, but through exchange, the different production processes are linked and, in fact, reduced to the common denominator of "abstract" labor. Thus, relations between people take the form of relations between things[…]
>Since the publication of Capital, numerous criticisms have been raised agains tthe labor theory of value. Probably the most influential and comprehensive critical analysis of Marx's views was that of Böhm-Bawerk published in 1896 (Böhm-Bawerk, 1975). Böhm-Bawerk argued that the entire structure of Marx's work was unsound since the claims of Volume I contradicted those of Volume III, in addition to the fact that the claims concerningthe LTV in Volume I were themselves unfounded. Böhm-Bawerk's arguments have been restated in numerous contexts and reappear in the articles from the Value Symposium as well as other recent critical commentaries(e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 1981). In addition to these traditional criticisms, a more recent anti-LTV argumentation has arisen from the neo-Ricardian school. Steedman's recent work best summarizes this line of reasoning. Below we have tried to develop a non-exhaustive list of six influential points of controversy concerning the adequacy of the labor theory of value from both of these sources. Then, in the section which follows, we attempt to reply to these criticisms:
>1. Many goods which are not products of labor have exchange values (Böhm-Bawerk,1975,p. 70).>2. The idea that a common third substance is necessary for two distinct commodities to exchange in stable proportions is wrong (Böhm-Bawerk, 1975, p. 71; Carling, 1985-85, p. 409; Bowles and Gintis, 1981, p. 5; Krause, 1982).>3. Marx arbitrarily concludes that the common substance which allows commodities to exchange is abstract labor. He doesn't give any reason why we should choose labor over utility or a physical quality (Carling, 1984-85, p. 413; Böhm-Bawerk, 1975, p. 75; Bowles and Gintis, 1981,p. 5).>4. The theory of the origin of surplus value in exploited labor is arbitrary since any commodity can formally be shown to be the source of surplus value (Bowles and Gintis, 1981, p. 19; Roemer, 1981, p. 204).>5. Labor power is not a commodity because it is not produced by abstract labor(Bowlesand Gintis, 1981,p. 8). >6. The LTV is redundant since one must derive both values and prices from data concerning the economy's input-output structure and distribution(Steedman, 1977, p. 48; Bandyopadhyay,1984-85, p. 435). In the following section we wish to address each of these claims[…]
>To understand the difference between a price of production model and the labor theory of value we might return to Marx's originating question. If x commodity A = y commodity B, what is the communality which allows these two commodities to exchange in stable proportions? This question is in fact a social one, and therefore cannot be answered at the level of a mathematical model which only depends on the technological production coefficients. If we triedt o reply that both have equal prices since they are both made up of a cost price plus an average rate of profit we still have the problem that cost price embodies the concept of price as well.Thus, in posing his question, Marx is asking "what is a price?" His answer is that the social reason why these two commodities exchange in given proportions is that they present equal amounts of abstract labor. The reduction of concrete to abstract labor pre-supposes certain relations of production, disjunctive ownerso f the means of production, etc. Prices are therefore forms of value, which are redistributed in the competitive process. The weaknessof the neo-Ricardian criticism is that their price model alternative, although quite useful at one level, cannot adequately embody the social content of the LTV. Besides their inability to explainw hat a price is,the neo-Ricardians confront further problems when they attempt to analyze economic phenomena without a labor theory of value. Below we propose a similar list of criticisms of neo-Ricardians as was posed for the labor theory of value.
>1. The neo-Ricardian price model is an ex post accounting which might apply to any society with an equalized rate of return. The neoRicardian price model might, therefore, conceivably apply to a socialist society, even though such a society would be socially and economically quite different.>2. Neo-Ricardian theory is forced to take economic data as given and is unable to build the laws whichg overn income distribution and uses of the surplus product. >3. The neo-Ricardiansa rgue that all that is needed for economic analysisis a concept of use value and a concept of price. We would argue that without a concept of value, the neo-Ricardians can calculate profits but they cannot have a theory of exploitation. A theory of exploitation in price terms requires the assumption that labor alone creates all of the output or use values. This view is subject to their own criticism of labor as a privileged input. A third concept between that of use value and price is necessary, namely, the concept of value,to establish exploitation. Although all of the factors of production contribute to produce the use value, only labor is responsible for its social evaluation as value.>4. The neo-Ricardians prefer to establish profit technologically, and then explain income distribution by class struggle, but how then is a theory of classes established without a theory of exploitation?https://sci-hub.ru/https://www.jstor.org/stable/40402976 >>2269647https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/defending-materialism-9781350447349/https://libgen.is/search.php?req=Defending+Materialism
<Defending Materialism: The Uneasy History of the Atom in Science and Philosophy>Katerina Kolozova (Author) , William Paul Cockshott (Author) , Greg Michaelson (Author)
>Nobody doubted that atoms were real once atomic energy was developed, but in the early 20th-century and before their existence was widely doubted. Defending Materialism follows the political and theoretical background of this intense philosophical controversy, defending atomistic and mechanical materialism against idealist paradigms. These accounts range from the explicit idealism criticised by Lenin and Einstein to the implicit Hegelian idealism that influenced Soviet dialectical materialism.
>Following several key threads, the authors trace how the idea of atoms has changed over the centuries, how ideology has influenced both sides of the idealism/materialism divide, and how the nature of time in physics, biology and human society can give a fresh view of historical materialism. Starting from the origins of materialism in ancient Greek thought and moving through its revival in Isaac Newton and Charles Darwin gives a full picture of the links between the Marxist tradition and the 'coarse materiality' to which the worlds of science and philosophy have found themselves both subscribed and averse.
>Table of Contents>1. Introduction>2. Philologico-philosophical Examination of the Conceptual Material proffered by Greek Antiquity and the Trans-millennial Exchanges it has Foregrounded>3. Classical Atomism>4. Dialectics, Materialism, Change From Epicurus to Marx via Aristotle>5. Historical and Mechanical Materialists>6. Idealist Reprise and Responses>7. Logic and Materialism>8. Logic and Dialectical Materialism>9. The Crisis in Logic and the Apotheosis of Anti-formalism>10. Language, Automata and Meaning>11. Dialectical and Stochastic Materialisms>Appendix: How the Ptolemaic Method Works >>2271135>>2271386(following up on my own reply)
making SNLT public would also jeopardize the illusion of competition. I repeat, SNLT local to a firm is often called "key performance indicators" because it's used for performance evaluation, quality control, and discipline of labor by the managerial-supervisory middle strata who serve as the insulation between the executives/shareholders and the workers. These statistics must be kept local to a firm and its own internal standards. If nominally "competing" companies started sharing KPI statistics in order to better discipline workers and have an idea of how behind or ahead of the market they are in terms of SNLT, it would have the negative consequence of admitting surplus value publicly, which the capitalist class cannot do under any circumstances, because it amounts to a confession of the correctness of Marx's analysis.
>>2272089>if an employee is expected to produce 100 of a commodity in a single shiftwhat job is this exactly? most workers in the west dont produce, but rather, distribute commodities.
>wages are lower than overall production costsa part cannot be greater than its whole. you are thinking that the capitalist is selling "above" a commodity's value, again. this is not how smith or marx imagine things according to the LTV. if the working day was lowered to its minimal amount, there could be no profit, so that gives you a clue.
>exploitationwhich occurs via "surplus labour", or an extended workday.
>>2272133it actually adds real value to the commodity.
but this is why the focus purely on what is "productive" vs "unproductive" can actually be an impediment to understanding the system, not useful.
>>2272106>most workers in the west dont produce, but rather, distribute commodities.Change in location is a use-value that can be sold as a commodity that is instantly consumed.
>you are thinking that the capitalist is selling "above" a commodity's valueHow do you read that into it.
>if the working day was lowered to its minimal amount, there could be no profitThe other post was made from that very point of view.
>>2272146>Change in location is a use-value>that can be sold as a commodity>that is instantly consumed.pure nonsense. implying that value increases by incriments of use-values is marginal utility theory, not the LTV. the LTV, formulated in smith, ricardo and smith, defines exchange ratios as contrary to use-values, such as in "the paradox of value".
>How do you read that into it.because you are saying that SNLT is derived from a worker's subsistence alone rather than the entire production process.
>The other post was made from that very point of view.what other post?
>>2272174lets read what you quote:
<"The useful effect can be consumed only during this process of production. It does not exist as a utility different from this process […] the exchange-value of this useful effect is determined, like that of any other commodity, by the value of the elements of production…"and a bit further on from what you quote:
<"it is the process of production itself that is paid for and consumed, not a product separate and distinct from it."what is paid for in transportation thus is its costs of transportation itself, not the utility attached to it.
>>2272176>what is paid for in transportation thus is its costs of transportation itself, not the utility attached to it.What on earth are you trying to convey with this. People pay other people for useful effects, not for costs. That pay and costs correlate comes from competition. In the passage quoted Marx makes clear to me that
1. change in location is a use-value
2. that can be sold as a commodity
3. that is instantly consumed
There is no point in you repeating that you don't believe this and me repeating yet again this is what Marx says. So let's leave it at that. Another anon might look at
>>2209050 and say how he sees it.
>>2272188>What on earth are you trying to convey with this. its quite obvious
>People pay other people for useful effects, not for costsyes, in markets, which determine prices by supply and demand. marx is speaking of "value" however, which is based in the cost of production of commodities, which, like smith's "natural price", is the equilibrium.
>There is no point in you repeating that you don't believe thisi already went over the quote. lets read:
<"it is the process of production itself that is paid for and consumed, not a product separate and distinct from it."what does this imply to you?
>>2272195<"it is the process of production itself that is paid for and consumed, not a product separate and distinct from it.">what does this imply to you?This implies to me that you can't maintain your attention span over three consecutive sentences:
<This useful effect also entertains the very same relations to consumption that other commodities do. If it is consumed individually its value disappears during its consumption; if it is consumed productively so as to constitute by itself a stage in the production of the commodities being transported…This is right before the bit you quoted.
>>2272243>so whats contrary to my position in these quotations?These quotations are entirely in line with:
Change in location is a use-value that can be sold as a commodity that is instantly consumed.Which you called nonsense and then you babbled on about marginal utility theory.
>>2272261okay, so clearly we're talking past each other. lets return to the original claim. mine was that many workers dont produce commodities directly, but distribute them, to which you respond with:
>>2272146<Change in location is a use-value that can be sold as a commodity that is instantly consumed.to which i respond:
>>2272176<what is paid for in transportation thus is its costs [as opposed to its use-value]supporting my claim with this quote:
<"it is the process of production itself that is paid for and consumed, not a product separate and distinct from it."https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1885-c2/ch01.htmever since, we have talked past each other, so lets return to marx's quote:
<"what the transportation industry sells is change of location. The useful effect is inseparably connected with the process of transportation, i.e., the productive process of the transport industry […] locomotion, constitutes the process of production effected by these means"already, we see that there can be no use-value without its manner of productivity. thus, he says,
<"The useful effect can be consumed only during this process of production. It does not exist as a utility different from this process, a use-thing which does not function as an article of commerce, does not circulate as a commodity, until after it has been produced."and as he stipulates,
<"But the exchange-value of this useful effect is determined, like that of any other commodity, by the value of the elements of production. This useful effect also entertains the very same relations to consumption that other commodities do."and here is my justification;
<"If it is consumed individually its value disappears during its consumption"which is to say that, in itself, transport has no value, without its productive context…
<"if it is consumed productively so as to constitute by itself a stage in the production of the commodities being transported, its value is transferred as an additional value to the commodity itself […] it is the process of production itself that is paid for and consumed, not a product separate and distinct from it."thus, value is added to commodities in transportation based in production costs, not by its usefulness.
your original claim then:
<Change in location is a use-value that can be sold as a commodity that is instantly consumed.marx's point is that the "useful effect" acts as it does in a commodity, yet, only achieves a value in its connection to the larger productive process. otherwise,
<"if it is consumed individually its value disappears during its consumption"so then, transportation in itself is useful, but not valuable. it attains a value when its cost is included in a larger manner of production (i.e. distribution)
>>2272276>many workers dont produce commodities directly, but distribute themBecause of something called
division of labor, many workers considered as individuals do not do more than a few changes to something. When do you ever buy the result of changes by only worker X in a super market. Work in distribution is not distinct in that regard from most other labor.
>value is added to commodities in transportation based in production costs, not by its usefulness.This is not specific to transportation.
<Change in location is a use-value that can be sold as a commodity that is instantly consumed.You are quoting this twice in this post. How about admitting that this is true.
>marx's point is that the "useful effect" acts as it does in a commodityA commodity is something that is
sold. Marx says "…what the transportation industry
sells is change of location…" Marx does not classify change in location as something that merely is commodity-like, but that
is a
commodity, as seen by the snippet "…the exchange-value of this useful effect is determined, like that of
any other commodity…". Why would he say that and not
as with a commodity.
>it attains a value when its cost is included in a larger manner of productionMarx is very explicit about transport service being a commodity that can be consumed individually or in production and that it is a commodity in both cases.
>>2272298>Work in distribution is not distinct in that regard from most other labor.it is in the larger context. pay attention. the discourse began by my saying that to measure SNLT by how many commodities are produced by workers is silly, since most workers do not directly produce commodities, but rather, transform them by distribution.
>You are quoting this twice in this post. How about admitting that this is true.what is sold is not the usefulness of travel, but the process of production itself. what is passed on to the consumer to marx is this production cost
<"it is the process of production itself that is paid for and consumed, not a product separate and distinct from it.">change of location is a commoditywhat is sold in rail transport is locomotion;
<"what the transportation industry sells is change of location. The useful effect is inseparably connected with the process of transportation, i.e., the productive process of the transport industry […] locomotion, constitutes the process of production effected by these means">Marx is very explicit about transport service being a commodity that can be consumed individually or in production and that it is a commodity in both cases.if it is sold individually, transport loses its value, remember?
<"if it is consumed individually its value disappears during its consumption" >>2272363youre making no point. what you really want to say is that you dont believe in the LTV, so just say it. marx's theory of surplus value is no different from smith's, so dont deflect either. the "row" is only due to misinterpreting value as price; exemplified here:
>>2272188<People pay other people for useful effects, not for costs.this sentiment contradicts the LTV, since it presumes use-value to be a characteristic of production, rather than consumption. smith deals with this in his "paradox of value" (the distinction between use-value and exchange-value, between necessary and unnecessary commodities), which is later reproduced in the first chapter of both ricardo and marx's seminal works in economics. where it concerns the specific context of the dispute, marx directly contradicts it:
<"it is the process of production itself that is paid for and consumed, not a product separate and distinct from it."the usefulness of transport is immaterial to its cost.
>>2272332>to measure SNLT by how many commodities are produced by workers is sillyYou can measure SNLT in the big picture from that, though it less reliable when you zoom in.
>what is sold is not the usefulness of travel, but the process of production itself.Are you ESL or (worse) American? Again: There are two cases, transport can be sold to the individual being moved around, and transport can be sold to become part in a production process. Transport can be a commodity in either case.
>if it is sold individually, transport loses its valueIt is a commodity either way.
>>2272379<People pay other people for useful effects, not for costs.>this sentiment contradicts the LTV, since it presumes use-value to be a characteristic of production, rather than consumption.A mighty attempt to read between the lines by the guy who can't keep in his head more than one line at a time. Literally the next line:
That pay and costs correlate comes from competition. What's the sentiment.
>>2272401>Transport can be a commodity in either casethat wasnt the dispute. the dispute was treating the usefulness of transport as a commodity of its own. what is paid for in transport is the cost itself; the productive process.
>That pay and costs correlate comes from competitionexplain what this means, because its terribly worded
>>2272412>>Transport can be a commodity in either case>that wasnt the dispute.You are constantly splitting off one case from the other.
>the dispute was treating the usefulness of transport as a commodity of its own.A commodity has a use-value. If transport can be a commodity in either case, it must have a use-value in either case.
>what is paid for in transport is the cost itself;People pay for something when it appears useful for them to do so. Saying this isn't marginalist analysis.
>the productive processAre you trying yet again to split off one case from the other.
>>That pay and costs correlate comes from competition>explain what this means, because its terribly wordedBut just a moment ago you were so certain what that post meant and it was something about use-value in production and against the LTV.
>>2272433>You are constantly splitting off one case from the other.here is my original reply:
>>2272169<pure nonsense. implying that value increases by incriments of use-values is marginal utility theory, not the LTV.i dont deny transport being a commodity, but that it does not accrue a value based on usefulness. you then double-down and say this:
>>2272188<People pay other people for useful effects, not for costs.which contradicts marx's statement:
<"it is the process of production itself that is paid for and consumed"its all quite clear.
>If transport can be a commodity in either case, it must have a use-value in either case.yes, but this isnt its source of value.
>wont explain his own wordsquite humiliating. explain to me what this means:
>That pay and costs correlate comes from competition >>2272452>that value increases by incriments of use-values is marginal utility theoryAnd where does anyone ever say that? You (and only you) say it is "implied", that is: you are hallucinating.
>i dont deny transport being a commodity, but that it does not accrue a value based on usefulness.I suppose you meant: …but that it does
not accrue a value based on usefulness. And you know what's interesting? I never claimed otherwise. You misread a statement about payment (people pay for useful effects) as a statement about value, then you accused me of mixing up value and pay.
>you then double-downThe only thing I double-down (and quadruple-down) on is that you lack reading comprehension and you try to make up for that by psychoanalyzing your interlocutors. You called this statement:
Change in location is a use-value that can be sold as a commodity that is instantly consumed.nonsense.
So what of these extremely fucking banal things you disagree with.
1. change in location is a use-value
2. that can be sold as a commodity
3. that is instantly consumed
Number 1 you agree with I suppose, the
useful effect sold it's right there in the Holy Scripture; Number 2 you admit here, so is it number 3? When you think consumption, you think it's always something that a human does, and not something that can happen in production or what? If so, that's too bad, because Marx does talk about using resources in production as productive consumption, you are even quoting it.
>explain to me what this means:>>That pay and costs correlate comes from competitionYou explain how you read that as an assertion of subjective experience constituting value.
>>2272504 (me)
You know what, I give up. I just looked at the time and reading between the lines of my posts, I realized my subconscious commitment to the mudpie theory of value, and that can't be right. I hand the debate victory over to whoever makes the next post.
>>2272504>And where does anyone ever say that? <Change in location is a use-value that can be sold as a commodity that is instantly consumed […] People pay other people for useful effects, not for costsyour position privileges the utility of a thing as possessing a value; thats why you say the change of location is a use-value, which afterwards, assumes the form of a commodity, when marx reverses this:
<"a use-thing which does not function as an article of commerce, does not circulate as a commodity, until after it has been produced.">then you accused me of mixing up value and pay.>value and paywtf does this mean? no wonder youre embarrassed to explain yourself. you mean value and "price", surely?
>1. change in location is a use-value>2. that can be sold as a commodity>3. that is instantly consumeda use-value is a commercial fact of things, which occurs after production. you inaccurately situate it as something preexistent. thats why you begin with a use-value, then say it *becomes* a commodity.
>You explain how you read that as an assertion of subjective experience constituting value.i never quoted that directly. i quoted this:
<Change in location is a use-value that can be sold as a commodity that is instantly consumed.in my original reply. you are the one who brought up this quote:
<that pay and costs correlate comes from competitionhere:
>>2272401now you refuse to explain it
>>2272519>You know what, I give up.im glad you realised your error
>I hand the debate victory over to whoever makes the next post.i win ☝️🤓
>>2190532>Cockshott rejects the LTVHe doesn't, he actually gave empirical evidence for price being 95%+ correlated to labor content, and advocates for an economic system where labor time is used as the metric for cost
>Cockshott defends the bourgeois position that the USSR failed because it was not sufficiently demoratic rather than being overthrown in a coup.His argument is that the political system based on bourgeois electoralism, copied from the existing liberal states, tended to over-represent well-off strata of society. This, coupled with the fact that the USSR's economic system hadn't replaced money, meant that there was political pressure for liberalization.
>bla bla bla gays and trans and shitnot class politics, not economic analysis. GTFO
>>2272680>He doesn'tRicardian LTV is not Marx's LTV.
>not class politicsCorrect. Cockshott divides the working class based on identity.
>>2272698yes just hyperfocus on identity dont address the multitude of problems with dickblast "analysis". the biggest issue by far is also his most famous work, "proving" LTV with input-output, which is an implicit acceptance that marx did not "solve" the transformation "problem", which in turn reveals a lack of understanding about what marx was actually trying to do that is a result of not understanding dialectics.
what cockshott ends up doing is reproducing an bourgeois accounting theory of the economy which is precisely what marx was critiquing and entirely misses the point by trying to turn an immanent critique of social relations into an empiric measurement of prices. marx doesn't concern himself with proving established facts about value that were already present in classical economy, he is just the first to expose the logical conclusions of what was already widely accepted reality that economist priests only turned away from after marx pointed out what it actually means for society to be organized that way.
cockshotts mistaken views on identity and nationalism are downstream from his rejection of dialectics and are an affirmation that he has missed the mark. china hasn't replaced money either yet they do not experience the same pressure for liberalization. if that really is his argument he is wrong about that too
was keynes pro or anti-capitalist?
>keynes on "new liberalism" ("neo" liberalism):
<the actual alternative to Marx's communism […] The abuses of this epoch in the realms of Government are Fascism on the one side and Bolshevism on the other. Socialism offers no middle course, because it also is sprung from the presuppositions of the Era of abundance, just as much as laissez-faire individualism […] The transition from economic anarchy to a regime which deliberately aims at controlling and directing economic forces in the interests of social justice and social stability […] the true destiny of New Liberalism is to seek their solution. [am i a liberal, 1935]"
>keynes on communism:
<"How can I accept a doctrine which sets up as its bible, above and beyond criticism, an obsolete economic textbook which I know to be not only scientifically erroneous but without interest or application for the modern world? How can I adopt a creed which, preferring the mud to the fish, exalts the boorish proletariat above the bourgeois and the intelligentsia who, with whatever faults, are the quality in life and surely carry the seeds of all human advancement? Even if we need a religion, how can we find it in the turbid rubbish of the Red bookshops? It is hard for an educated, decent, intelligent son of Western Europe to find his ideals here, unless he has first suffered some strange and horrid process of conversion which has changed all his values. [a short view of russia, 1925]"
>keynes commenting upon "das kapital":
<"My feelings about Das Kapital are the same as my feelings about the Koran. I know that it is historically important and I know that many people, not all of whom are idiots, find it a sort of Rock of Ages and containing inspiration. Yet when I look into it, it is to me inexplicable that it can have this effect. Its dreary, out-of-date, academic controversialising seems so extraordinarily unsuitable as material for the purpose. But then, as I have said, I feel just the same about the Koran. How could either of these books carry fire and sword round half the world? It beats me. Clearly there is some defect in my understanding. Do you believe both Das Kapital and the Koran? Or only Das Kapital? But whatever the sociological value of the latter, I am sure that its contemporary economic value (apart from occasional but inconstructive and discontinuous flashes of insight) is nil. Will you promise to read it again, if I do? [letter to george bernard shaw, 2 december 1934]"
>the famous anticapitalist quote:
<"Capitalism is the extraordinary belief that the nastiest of men for the nastiest of motives will somehow work for the benefit of all."
this cannot be sourced from keynes directly, either. it is originally cited from [Christianity and human relations in industry, g. schuster, 1951], 5 years after keynes' death (and repeated ever since). so keynes cannot be said to quite be an anticapitalist, as opposed to popular belief. however, he writes:
<"We shall do more things for ourselves than is usual with the rich to-day, only too glad to have small duties and tasks and routines. But beyond this, we shall endeavour to spread the bread thin on the butter—to make what work there is still to be done to be as widely shared as possible. Three-hour shifts or a fifteen-hour week may put off the problem for a great while. For three hours a day is quite enough to satisfy the old Adam in most of us! [economic possibilities for our grandchildren, 1930]"
so he was rather hopeful as to what capitalist society would afford us. more people "share" labour today, and likewise, work longer - his predictions were entirely reversed. if he could see our future, would he have changed his mind on the priority of ownership, or is the capitalist project simply incomplete?
>>2272697>Ricardian LTV is not Marx's LTV.well, lets compare. ricardo opens his "principles" with this:
<"The value of a commodity, or the quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends on the relative quantity of labour which is necessary for its production, and not on the greater or less compensation which is paid for that labour."here, ricardo signifies the [exchange] value of a commodity as a quantity, relative to the labour [socially] "necessary" for its production. ricardo also says this:
<"Utility then is not the measure of exchangeable value, al-though it is absolutely essential to it. If a commodity were in no way useful,—in other words, if it could in no way con-tribute to our gratification,—it would be destitute of exchange-able value, however scarce it might be, or whatever quantity of labour might be necessary to procure it. [principles, ch. 1]"which is identical to a statement made by marx,
<"Lastly nothing can have value, without being an object of utility. If the thing is useless, so is the labour contained in it; the labour does not count as labour, and therefore creates no value [capital vol. 1, ch. 1]"here, both conceive of value, not as an inert matter, but a social substance expressed in commodities. this is due, as ricardo cites smith for, the twofold nature of value's terms:
<"It has been observed by Adam Smith, that the word Value has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of pur-chasing other goods which the possession of that object con-veys. The one may be called value in use; the other value in exchange [principles, ch. 1]"marx however develops from this by inciting his unique dichotomy in the nature of labour itself,
<"At first sight a commodity presented itself to us as a complex of two things – use value and exchange value. Later on, we saw also that labour, too, possesses the same two-fold nature; for, so far as it finds expression in value, it does not possess the same characteristics that belong to it as a creator of use values. I was the first to point out and to examine critically this two-fold nature of the labour contained in commodities. As this point is the pivot on which a clear comprehension of political economy turns, we must go more into detail. [capital vol. 1, ch. 1]"this is marx's advancement from political economy, for which he comments upon later:
<"For the rest, in respect to the phenomenal form, “value and price of labour,” or “wages,” as contrasted with the essential relation manifested therein, viz., the value and price of labour-power, the same difference holds that holds in respect to all phenomena and their hidden substratum. The former appear directly and spontaneously as current modes of thought; the latter must first be discovered by science. Classical Political Economy nearly touches the true relation of things, without, however, consciously formulating it. This it cannot, so long as it sticks in its bourgeois skin. [capital vol. 1, ch. 19]"according from marx's two-fold division of labour itself comes his analysis, which allows him to unify the divisions of value in the commodity itself;
<"As regards value in general, it is the weak point of the classical school of Political Economy that it nowhere expressly and with full consciousness, distinguishes between labour, as it appears in the value of a product, and the same labour, as it appears in the use value of that product. [capital vol. 1, ch. 1, footnote 32]"<"It is one of the chief failings of classical economy that it has never succeeded, by means of its analysis of commodities, and, in particular, of their value, in discovering that form under which value becomes exchange value. [capital vol. 1, ch. 1, footnote 33]"marx's theoretical issue then, is that "labour" to the classical school is not abstracted enough (into "labour power"), and so attaches itself to particular phenomena. practically speaking, however, there does not seem to be much, if any, dispute. for this reason, cockshott can derive an empirical analysis. in particular, he sees an identical approach to ricardo and marx's perspective of profit rate equalisation.
my blood is boiling at the amateurish dishonesty in this video. here are the assertions:
- adam smith thought commodities exchanged based on use-value, and therefore he couldnt resolve the "paradox of value"
- adam smith had no concept of abstract labour (which is to say, "labour", as such)
- smith had no concept of social labour
- marx discovered labour-time as a unit of measure
yet if we read wealth of nations, what do we find?
<"after the division of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very small part of these with which a man’s own labour can supply him. The far greater part of them he must derive from the labour of other people, and he must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that labour which he can command, or which he can afford to purchase. The value of any commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it, and who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or command. Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities […] That money or those goods indeed save us this toil. They contain the value of a certain quantity of labour which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity. Labour was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command."
this is quoted from the opening of wealth of nations, book 1, chapter 5, which all at once, disputes the claims made by the video. in these passages, smith sees the social character of labour, by abstracting from its division. he further sees that the rate by which commodities exchange is based in labour time. he even finishes this off with a statement,
<"Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power."
which recalls marx's theory of "labouring power":
<"One of the oldest economists and most original philosophers of England — Thomas Hobbes — has already, in his Leviathan, instinctively hit upon this point overlooked by all his successors. He says: “the value or worth of a man is, as in all other things, his price: that is so much as would be given for the use of his power.” Proceeding from this basis, we shall be able to determine the value of labour as that of all other commodities [part vii - labour power]"
this is why you can never trust a claim without a proper source.
>>2273167>what cockshott ends up doing is reproducing an bourgeois accounting theory of the economy which is precisely what marx was critiquingInput-output analysis is 20th century and later and associated with names like Leontief. Marx wasn't a time traveler so unsurprisingly he wasn't criticizing those guys. A precursor to this is stuff like department 1 and department 2, which has its origin in… Marx.
>and entirely misses the point by trying to turn an immanent critique of social relations into an empiric measurement of prices.Cockshott claims something about the world we live in. Your argument is that you don't care about it being true because you think Marx didn't care about it.
>>2273512>another one of his famous misunderstandings. marx does not say that profit rates equalize he says they trend towards equalizationCockshott knows that. For example:
https://paulcockshott.wordpress.com/2020/05/11/equalisation-of-rate-of-profit-or-equalisation-of-rate-of-surplus-value/<Both Ricardo and Marx later go on to modify their presentation to take into account an assumed tendency for profit rates to equalise.His point is more subtle: The tendency assumption in the rhetoric does not carry over to the more formal modelling, which uses the single profit rate, which is much easier to work with. This simplistic modelling than in turn affects the thinking.
>>2274420>Cockshott claims something about the world we live in.Lots of people make claims, even correct ones, about the world we live in. That doesn't make them relevant to changing that world.
>>2274420>His point is more subtleHis point is almost entirely trivial. Every time I take the time to read Cockshott I'm waiting the whole time for him to make a point and when you get to the end you realize that was it and he didn't really do anything. Hilariously he claims that profit rates dont equalize because if they did it would lead to crisis which contradicts his model when if you just take a look outside you can see the crisis. He accuses Marx of importing unjustified assumptions and then pretends like capital investors are rational actors. Here he says they cant because they would have negative surplus value and run at a loss. Yet in real life we have businesses whos entire model is to run at a loss to capture market share. Elsewhere he uses the example of railroads, saying that an industrialist cannot simply liquidate physical rail stock to invest elsewhere, but in real life that is exactly what finance does in advanced countries, selling of infrastructure at a loss to export labor abroad. He uses these archaic examples because they fit his idealism, not because its how capitalism works. He says it can't work that way because it is a contradiction, but that is exactly Marx's point, capitalism is contradictory, and the chase for profit does result in crisis.
Marx does not say, as Cockshott claims, that there is a single profit rate, but that there is an average rate of profit, and that some industries are above or below that rate. The 'mistake' is not in assuming profit rates equalize that then generates the transformation problem, its that classical economics assumes an equilibrium profit rate can exist, like they also think of 'equilibrium prices'. Marx's point in both cases is that there is no equilibrium, and the 'problem' comes from assuming that he is just repeating classics and thinks there is an equilibrium. Its mistaking his average profit rate called 'generalized' for a single profit rate, which is not what he is saying. The reason the transformation problem is not a problem is because he does solve it, by saying that all profit rates together make an average and some are above or below by a factor of T, not because he was wrong to assume there is one rate of profit, which he does not.
Most people dont even recognize that the problem is about profit rates and think that it is about deriving price from value, which emerges from the same exact mistake, thinking that Marx subscribes to a LTV where individual prices always exactly equal individual values, when he in fact says that value is defined as an average from which prices
must deviate. His point here is that labor is the ultimate source of profit because total labor = total value so the deviations from the average cancel out in the whole, and that profit is not derived from selling things above or below their value. So critics in both cases are using an exception to a rule Marx doesn't hold to say he is wrong, but this 'exception' is actually proof of what Marx is really saying, that individual prices and profit rates as a rule always deviate from the average. Cockshott essentially says that because markets are never at equilibrium Marx was wrong, but that is exactly Marx's point!
>>2274449>His point is almost entirely trivial.Yet you misunderstood his point.
>Hilariously he claims that profit rates dont equalize because if they did it would lead to crisis which contradicts his model when if you just take a look outside you can see the crisis.First he observes that they don't equalize. Then he models what would happen with equal profit rates. And what happens in the model is not a recession, but collapse. So no, you don't see that when you look out of the window.
>he uses the example of railroads, saying that an industrialist cannot simply liquidate physical rail stock to invest elsewhere, but in real life that is exactly what finance doesYou failed to parse what he said. His point is exactly that there is loss, that the money invested into building physical infrastructure is not like magical clay that can be transformed back without loss and shaped again into whatever.
>Marx does not say, as Cockshott claims, that there is a single profit rateCockshott does not claim that about Marx (you can verify this by reading to the end of the post you are replying to here).
>>2274480>First he observes that they don't equalize.And Marx never claimed they did. Its entirely besides the point but Cockshott thinks its worth making a post about because he does not understand Marx.
>Cockshott does not claim that about Marx>>2274420>His point is more subtle: The tendency assumption in the rhetoric does not carry over to the more formal modelling, which uses the single profit rate, which is much easier to work with. This simplistic modelling than in turn affects the thinking.and from the blog
<This matches how Ricardo initially presents value at the start of the first chapter of his Principles.
<Both Ricardo and Marx later go on to modify their presentation to take into account an assumed tendency for profit rates to equalise.
<It is interesting that Marx and the classicals were willing to allow for some things to be tendential: movement of profit rates over time, tendencies of prices to oscillate around labour values or natural prices. When it comes to profit rates across industries, instead of a tendential treatment the examples given in the Principles and Capital 3 assume a single uniform profit rate. >>2274487and the very next sentance
<This assumption carried over first to the critics of Marx like Boehm Bawerk and then to Sraffian school. The whole debate from Ricardo to Steadman was conditioned on the assumption of profit rate equalisation.which is exactly what I accused him of in the first place, taking Ricardo for Marx and then critiquing Marx on that basis, which is an admission that he thinks Bawerks critique is valid. And what Cockshott ends up doing is reproducing Marx's actual position but from an isolated static perspective that undermines his point. The same way he does when he agrees with the critique that labor is arbitrary and it could just as easily be calories. He even notices that Marx is making a political point and not an empiric one and then dismisses it out of hand. As if proving that labor relies on energy from the sun proves humans exploit the sun, because of course he rejects the subjective experience of it as a 'legal category', one of his special personal definitions and refuses to engage with philosophy that says otherwise. He does not recognize that the tendency of the rate of profit to fall results in rising class consciousness, which he also rejects as chemicals in the brain, from the resulting increase in contradictions and crisis, the point of this dialectical analysis being that the universal subjectivity of human experience is objective, not that prices approximately correlate to values in input-output tables.
>>2274053yes 👍 fabulous video
one note of criticism i give however, is that they imply marx saw the "symbolic" nature of money, when marx's argument is precisely contrary to this;
<"The fact that money can, in certain functions, be replaced by mere symbols of itself, gave rise to that other mistaken notion, that it is itself a mere symbol." [capital vol. 1, ch. 2]this is why MMT is contrary to marxism in its chartalist anthropology (which i agree with). i went to the comments of the video and was immediately hit with reactionary nonsense however (picrel). if we read david graeber's "debt" book, for example, he understands that all societies are based on credit (debt) relations, and so money, when treated as a commodity, fixes debt in matter. for example, to have £10 is to be owed £10, and so to be able to pass on debt to others by the medium of exchange. this negative worldview is much more proficient than the positive worldview of "storing" value in metal. all that gold represents thus, is debt (which is why money is the opposite of "wealth", as per smith's criticism of the mercantilists - you cant eat gold).
in the words of j.m. keynes:
<"Owe your banker £1,000 and you are at his mercy; owe him £1 million and the position is reversed."who then, is the rich man, really?
>>2274535keynes was a liberal; a social democrat at most.
here is the source for your cited article:
https://mises.org/mises-wire/keynes-called-himself-socialist-he-was-rightit first cites another article, "keynes and the reds":
https://mises.org/free-market/keynes-and-redsin which it proposes keynes' alleged support for fascism, based on the 1936 german preface for his "general theory";
<"The theory of aggregated production, which is the point of the following book, nevertheless can be much easier adapted to the conditions of a totalitarian state than the theory of production and distribution of a given production put forth under conditions of free competition and a large degree of laissez-faire […] Although I have, after all, worked it out with a view to the conditions prevailing in the Anglo-Saxon countries where a large degree of laissez-faire still prevails, nevertheless it remains applicable to situations in which state management is more pronounced."some defenses of these comments come from various keynesians, such as harold l. wattel,
<"What Keynes says is that his macroeconomic theory of output as a whole is more easily adapted to a totalitarian state than is classical microeconomic theory of the production and distribution of a given output produced under conditions of free competition and a large measure of laissez-faire. The distinction is an important one. Keynes is comparing the usefulness of micro and macro theory in a totalitarian state" [the policy consequences of john maynard keynes]what we can assume then, is that keynes' macroeconomics have a larger picture in view, than microeconomic transactions. these accusations may be contraposed with mises' blatant support of fascism;
<"It cannot be denied that Fascism and similar movements aiming at the establishment of dictatorships are full of the best intentions and that their intervention has, for the moment, saved European civilization. The merit that Fascism has thereby won for itself will live on eternally in history." [Liberalism: A Socio-Economic Exposition, 1927] the indicting claim of keynes' socialism comes from his review of a book by fabian socialists beatrice and sidney webb, called "soviet communism", published in 1936. his review is as follows,
<"The result is impressive. The Russian innovators have passed, not only from the revolutionary stage, but also from the doctrinaire stage. There is little or nothing left which bears any special relation to Marx and Marxism as distinguished from other systems of socialism. They are engaged in the vast administrative task of making a completely new set of social and economic institutions work smoothly and successfully over a territory so extensive that it covers one-sixth of the land surface of the world. Methods are still changing rapidly in response to experience. The largest scale empiricism and experimentalism which has ever been attempted by disinterested administrators is in operation […] it leaves me with a strong desire and hope that we in this country may discover how to combine an unlimited readiness to experiment with changes in political and economic methods and institutions, whilst preserving traditionalism and a sort of careful conservatism, thrifty of everything which has human experience behind it, in every branch of feeling and of action.”here, keynes praises the USSR precisely for its movement away from marxism, and toward the "empirical" task of administration. keynes is divorcing economics from politics, noting the objective progress the USSR has experienced, in spite of its doctrines. this is only a scientific consideration then.
concerning the article cited in your meme, we can begin. the article first cites close friends of keynes, declaring him a liberal:
<"Keynes was a lifelong liberal [.] He was not a socialist" - [robert skidelsky]<"He was a classical liberal in his politics, being as attached to individual freedom as the most ardent libertarian, who throughout his life repudiated socialism" - [roger backhouse and bradley bateman]this seems like true enough opinions, but the article continues,
>Keynes was highly enthusiastic about socialism in Russia from the very beginning. He celebrated the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 […] Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks took power on November 7, 1917. Keynes happily announced, “The only course open to me is to be buoyantly bolshevik.”keynes even spoke at the soviet politburo in 1925, which was attended by trotsky,
<"Even the more progressive economist, Mr. Keynes told us only the other day that the salvaging of the English economy lies in Malthusianism! For England, too, the road of overcoming the contradictions between city and country leads through socialism.”there is clear disapproval.
keynes once more appeals to the "ideal" nature of the USSR beneath its "russian" and "jewish" "beastliness",
<"perhaps, it is the fruit of some beastliness in the Russian nature—or in the Russian and Jewish natures when, as now, they are allied together […] beneath the cruelty and stupidity of New Russia some speck of the ideal may lie hid" [november 11, 1925, the new republic magazine]https://newrepublic.com/article/87511/communism-soviet-russia-religionhere, keynes is incredibly weary, yet optimistic about the soviet "experiment".
the rest of the article is incidental connections which keynes had to socialists of different sorts. an interesting anecdote concerns bretton woods;
<"In July 1944 Keynes went to the Bretton Woods Conference to design the postwar world monetary system. His American counterpart was the US Treasury official Harry Dexter White. Keynes and White are the two individuals most responsible for the postwar monetary system that emerged. Today it is well known that White was a Soviet spy. And while collaborating with White in 1944 at Bretton Woods, Keynes was vice-president of the SCR. This means that the postwar monetary system was designed by two men with connections to the socialist government of the USSR. Of course, the Keynes-White monetary system devolved into the current world monetary system.this all seems quite clear, but let us see what keynes spoke of socialism directly:
<"I criticise doctrinaire State Socialism […] because it misses the significance of what is actually happening; because it is, in fact, little better than a dusty survival of a plan to meet the problems of fifty years ago, based on a misunderstanding of what some one said a hundredyears ago. Nineteenth-century State Socialism sprang from Bentham, free competition etc., and is on some respects a clearer, in some respects a more muddled, version of just the same philosophy as underlies nineteenth-century individualism. Both equally laid all their stress on freedom, the one negatively to avoid limitations on existing freedom, the other positively to destroy natural or acquired monopolies. They are different reactions to the same intellectual atmosphere. […] We must aim at separating those services which are technically social from those which are technically individual. […] The important thing for Government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all." [the end of laissez-faire, 1926]keynes sounds like a typical social democrat, not a socialist, as such. further,
<"the actual alternative to Marx's communism […] The abuses of this epoch in the realms of Government are Fascism on the one side and Bolshevism on the other. Socialism offers no middle course […] I suggest, nevertheless, that the true destiny of New Liberalism is to seek their solution." [am i a liberal?, 1925]here, keynes criticises fascism, bolshevism and socialism, together. he instead proposes "new (neo) liberalism". he continues,
<"The Labour Party contains three elements. There are the TradeUnionists, once the oppressed, now the tyrants, whose selfish and sectional pretensions need to be bravely opposed. There are the advocates of the methods of violence and sudden change, by an abuse of language called Communists,who are committed by their creed to produce evil that good may come [.] There are the Socialists, who believe that the economic foundations of modern society are evil, yet might be good.The company and conversation of this third element, whom I have called Socialists, many Liberals to-day would not find uncongenial. But we cannot march with them until we know along what path, and towards what goal, they mean to move. I do not believe that their historic creed of State Socialism, and its newer gloss of Guild Socialism, now interest them much more than they interest us. These doctrines no longer inspire anyone. […] But the progressive Liberal has this great advantage. He can work out his policies without having to do lip-service to Trade-Unionist tyrannies, to the beauties of the class war, or to doctrinaire State Socialism - in none of which he believes." [liberalism and labour, 1926]
keynes clearly shows contempt for political socialism, in any marxist variant, and sees himself as a "progressive liberal".
of course, we have keynes' thoughts on marx and his work,
<"Gesell's main book is written in cool, scientific language […] The purpose of the book as a whole may be described as the establishment of an anti-Marxian socialism, a reaction against laissez-faire built on theoretical foundations totally unlike those of Marx in being based on a repudiation instead of on an acceptance of the classical hypotheses, and on an unfettering of competition instead of its abolition. I believe that the future will learn more from the spirit of Gesell than from that of Marx. The preface to The Natural Economic Order will indicate to the reader, if he will refer to it, the moral quality of Gesell. The answer to Marxism is, I think, to be found along the lines of this preface." [keynes' general theory, 1936]if we look at gesell's work, "the natural economic order", we may read this,
<"How is it that Marx and his theory are spoken of by every newspaper in the world? […] Marx can never damage capital." [part i, distribution]gesell instead prefers proudhon's "market socialism" of cooperative ownership, since he sees its practical validity. i have also advocated for mutualism in this thread.
returning to keynes, he also discredits marx's "das kapital":
<"My feelings about Das Kapital are the same as my feelings about the Koran. I know that it is historically important and I know that many people, not all of whom are idiots, find it a sort of Rock of Ages and containing inspiration. Yet when I look into it, it is to me inexplicable that it can have this effect. Its dreary, out-of-date, academic controversialising seems so extraordinarily unsuitable as material for the purpose." [letter to george bernard shaw, 2 december 1934]"from all this, we can conclude that keynes, as per his self-identification, was a liberal, even if also a statist. he never praised socialism as such, but only what it sought represent in contradistinction to the free market. at best, you could call him a "social democrat" or "progressive". his central concern was monetary reform, not revolutionising property relations. he wanted to fix markets, not abolish them.
>>2274588>If Keynes lived until the 1980s he would radicalize fast. yes i agree. thats why i conclude my original post with a rhetorical question, in light of keynes' failed optimism:
>>2273656>if he could see our future, would he have changed his mind(?)
>Witnessing the neoliberal counter attack would have made it irrefutably clear to him that the communists were correctthis is incredibly presumptuous. just because some right wing intellectuals were incorrect doesnt vindicate the failed soviet experiment.
>>2274588>His era and century was one in which social democrats were experimenting with state policy for the first time ever so there was some material cause for optimism.Wrong but that's a hilarious way to put it. Bourgeois ideologist Keynes operated in the epoch of most aggravated crises of latest stage of capitalism (WW1 and 2.) Keynes was perhaps the monopolist bourgeoisie's most faithful lackey. Keynes is utterly imperialist and bourgeois. Keynes Thought is the rationale of all capitalist States.
>Witnessing the neoliberal counter attack would have made it irrefutably clear to him that the communists were correct and there is no way to solidify such gains without a violent revolution.I cannot fathom thinking one of imperialism's greatest thinkers (who blamed the great depression on account of not lowering wages enough) is a socialist. Read what proletarian political economy textbook say about Keynes.
In the period of the general crisis of capitalism, when the market problem has assumed unprecedented acuteness, economic crises have become both more frequent and more profound, and permanent mass unemployment is a regular feature of life, sundry theories have appeared which suggest that it is possible to secure “full employment” and to eliminate anarchy of production and crises while preserving the capitalist system. The theory of the British economist J.M. KEYNES (1883-1946) which he set forth in his book A General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) became widespread among bourgeois economists.
Concealing the true causes of permanent mass unemployment and crises under capitalism, Keynes tries to show that these “flaws” of bourgeois society arise not from the nature of capitalism but from the psychology of individuals. According to Keynes, unemployment results from insufficient demand for articles of personal and productive use. The inadequacy of consumer demand is caused by the inherent tendency which people have to save part of their income, and the inadequacy of demand for articles of productive use is due to the capitalists’ loss of interest in investing their capital in the various branches of the economy because of the general fall in the “profitability of capital”. In order to increase employment, Keynes declares, it is necessary to increase the investment of capital, and to this end the State must, on the one hand, ensure a growth in the profitability of capital by reducing the real wages of the workers through inflation and reduction of the bank rate, and, on the other hand, carry out large-scale capital investment at public expense. The extension of consumer demand, according to Keynes, may come from a further growth in the parasitic consumption and extravagance of the ruling classes and an increase in expenditure for war purposes and other unproductive outlays by the State.
Keynes’ theory is unsound. The inadequacy of consumer demand is due not to any mythical “inclination of people to save” but to the impoverishment of the working people. The measures proposed by Keynes allegedly in the interests of securing full employment — inflation, increase in unproductive, expenditure on preparing and carrying on wars — lead in reality to a further reduction in the standard of living of the working people, to shrinkage of the market and increase in unemployment. The theory of Keynes in one variety or another is widely made use of nowadays by bourgeois economists and also by right-wing Socialists in a number of capitalist countries.
>>2274610>who blamed the great depression on account of not lowering wages enoughstopped reading there
keynes supported trade unions going on strike during the great depression
he did not support a reduction in wages of workers during the depression he supported the exact opposite
you know nothing but smear him anyways so I will not participate in a further discussion
as for imperialism he proposed post-WW2 monetary structure would have afforded far more leeway to decolonizing and newly independent states. the IMF was pushed by White and the Americans coercing him, although the IMF has attempted to revise their own history to mislead people.
>>2274606The Soviet defeat was a psychological one not an economic one. This is why I do not agree with reductionist materialist narratives for every event. Objectively speaking the Soviet Union even despite "stagnation" was operating fine and could have continued operating for another 5 centuries in the exact same way. There was no existential economic pressure. That came only after Gorbachev began to deliberately sabotage and wreck the system in order to generate an artificial wave of support for capitalism. The videos of empty markets in the 90s that westoids cite only happened after Gorbachev took power and pushed through his "restructuring".
The party members eventually became tired of living under a constant state of emergency and conflict and believed that by junking the Soviet ideology and switching to capitalism they would be welcomed by the West and become a "normal" country that could resolve disputes in a much friendlier/less costly way. They did not understand that the Soviet ideology rather than being a constant source of insecurity was in fact their greatest shield against Western imperialism and they bought into the lie that all the West wanted was for them to switch systems. This is why their inheritors and successors like Putin constantly complain about Western malfeasance - as far as they're concerned, they did everything the West asked for and are still being threatened and browbeaten. Eventually Russia will switch back. There is a constant growing wave of support for socialism from the youth. The newer generations are sick of capitalism and Russia will once again lead the vanguard.
>>2274614>The Soviet defeat was a psychological one not an economic one.or just a cynical, political fleecing? the piracy of russia after the USSR points to the coup d'etat which took place. this is the materialist analysis. the leadership was corrupt and chose to line their own pockets over the benefit of the people.
>putinhe is one of the criminals to blame.
>>2274610>[keynes] blamed the great depression on account of not lowering wages enoughhe actually says otherwise:
<"Moreover, the contention that the unemployment which characterises a depression is due to a refusal by labour to accept a reduction of money-wages is not clearly supported by the facts. It is not very plausible to assert that unemployment in the United States in 1932 was due either to labour obstinately refusing to accept a reduction of money-wages or to its obstinately demanding a real wage beyond what the productivity of the economic machine was capable of furnishing." [general theory, chapter 2]>these “flaws” of bourgeois society arise not from the nature of capitalism but from the psychology of individuals.keynes is a "macroeconomist", so is not particularly concerned with the psychology of individuals. keynes also appropriates marx's theories of crisis and adapts them into "boom-bust" cycles, which proceed as a natural consequence of free markets, or what keynes terms "the marginal efficiency of capital", which expires itself.
>aggregate loss in demand causes unemploymentobviously. this is why keynes wished to stimulate demand by liquidity;
<"The quantity of money determines the supply of liquid resources, and hence the rate of interest, and in conjunction with other factors [.] the inducement to invest, which in turn fixes the equilibrium level of incomes, output and employment and [.] the price-level as a whole through the influences of supply and demand thus established." [general theory, french preface]basically: more money = more demand
>unproductive excesswell, keynes wanted a reduction in the working day, along with full employment. he wanted efficiency, not anarchy:
<"We shall do more things for ourselves than is usual with the rich to-day, only too glad to have small duties and tasks and routines. But beyond this, we shall endeavour to spread the bread thin on the butter—to make what work there is still to be done to be as widely shared as possible. Three-hour shifts or a fifteen-hour week may put off the problem for a great while. For three hours a day is quite enough to satisfy the old Adam in most of us! [economic possibilities for our grandchildren, 1930]"what youre citing seems like hit-piece more than a solid refutation. also, where's the sauce for all this?
>>2274634here's the source for the quote, which solidifies keynes' anticommunism:
<"How can I accept a doctrine which sets up as its bible, above and beyond criticism, an obsolete economic textbook which I know to be not only scientifically erroneous but without interest or application for the modern world? How can I adopt a creed which, preferring the mud to the fish, exalts the boorish proletariat above the bourgeois and the intelligentsia who, with whatever faults, are the quality in life and surely carry the seeds of all human advancement? Even if we need a religion, how can we find it in the turbid rubbish of the Red bookshops? It is hard for an educated, decent, intelligent son of Western Europe to find his ideals here, unless he has first suffered some strange and horrid process of conversion which has changed all his values. [a short view of russia, 1925]" >>2274612>keynes supported trade unions going on strike during the great depression he did not support a reduction in wages of workers during the depression he supported the exact oppositewrong
>you know nothing but smear him anyways so I will not participate in a further discussion as for imperialism he proposed post-WW2 monetary structure would have afforded far more leeway to decolonizing and newly independent states. the IMF was pushed by White and the Americans coercing him, although the IMF has attempted to revise their own history to mislead people.you say we know nothing then inform us that keynes designed the imperialist system that always fails. the keynesian system is bourgeois. Proletarian dictatorship has no keynesians.
>>2274623>he actually says otherwise:<"Moreover, the contention that the unemployment which characterises a depression is due to a refusal by labour to accept a reduction of money-wages is not clearly supported by the facts. It is not very plausible to assert that unemployment in the United States in 1932 was due either to labour obstinately refusing to accept a reduction of money-wages or to its obstinately demanding a real wage beyond what the productivity of the economic machine was capable of furnishing." [general theory, chapter 2]You fail to grasp the essence of keynesian economics. You equate money-wage with real wage. Keynes actually says this about reducing real wage to achieve capitalist notion of "full employment":
>Now ordinary experience tells us, beyond doubt, that a situation where labour stipulates (within limits) for a money-wage rather than a real wage, so far from being a mere possibility, is the normal case. Whilst workers will usually resist a reduction of money-wages, it is not their practice to withdraw their labour whenever there is a rise in the price of wage-goods. It is sometimes said that it would be illogical for labour to resist a reduction of money-wages but not to resist a reduction of real wages. For reasons given below (section III), this might not be so illogical as it appears at first; and, as we shall see later, fortunately so. But, whether logical or illogical, experience shows that this is how labour in fact behaves.>keynes is a "macroeconomist", so is not particularly concerned with the psychology of individuals.Wrong. He devotes chapters of his seminal work to the psychology of consumption. See picrel
>keynes also appropriates marx's theories of crisis and adapts them into "boom-bust" cycles, which proceed as a natural consequence of free markets, or what keynes terms "the marginal efficiency of capital", which expires itself.Wrong. Keynes presents bourgeois theories of crisis.
>keynes wanted full employment. he wanted efficiency, not anarchyWrong. Keynes was bourgeois economist who wrote these delusions during great depression. What you say keynes wants is exactly what any bourgeois wants during the great depression.
>>2274487You say Cockshott says Marx assumes profit rates equalize, the reply you get is that C does not say that about M assuming it in his rhetoric, but that the simple formal examples by Marx have equal profit rates and these models mislead. You now quote at length statements showing you wrong, but you don't seem to recognize it.
>>2274495>taking Ricardo for MarxHe merely says that Ricardo's presented examples have equal profit rates in common with the presented examples by Marx.
>he agrees with the critique that labor is arbitrary and it could just as easily be calories.Cockshott is known for claiming that labor time is different, that labor time gives better price correlations than energy inputs, and that labor-time calculation should be used widely in a socialist economy.
>>2274664>You equate money-wage with real wage.no i dont. included in the quote is the implied difference:
<"It is not very plausible to assert that unemployment in the United States in 1932 was due either to labour obstinately refusing to accept a reduction of money-wages or to its obstinately demanding a real wage beyond what the productivity of the economic machine was capable of furnishing. [general theory, chapter 2]"yet neither are deemed as responsible for unemployment to keynes.
>Keynes actually says this about reducing real wage to achieve capitalist notion of "full employment"… "It is sometimes said that it would be illogical for labour to resist a reduction of money-wages but not to resist a reduction of real wages. For reasons given below (section III), this might not be so illogical as it appears at first; and, as we shall see later, fortunately so"well, lets give the context:
<"When money-wages are rising, that is to say, it will be found that real wages are falling; and when money-wages are falling, real wages are rising. This is because, in the short period, falling money-wages and rising real wages are each, for independent reasons, likely to accompany decreasing employment; labour being readier to accept wage-cuts when employment is falling off, yet real wages inevitably rising in the same circumstances on account of the increasing marginal return to a given capital equipment when output is diminished." [general theory, ch. 2, sec. 2]here then, real wages are tied to the marginal utility of labour, which, like marginal efficiency of capital investment, diminishes its returns over time (tracked by declining aggregate demand). fuller employment then means a greater diminishment of returns, or a "marginal disutility of labour". we might say in other terms, that with high capital investment, wages increase, and then stagnate; this is part of the business cycle's general movement. on the specific issue of lowering real wages while preserving money-wages, he says:
<"it is fortunate that the workers, though unconsciously, are instinctively more reasonable economists than the classical school, inasmuch as they resist reductions of money-wages, which are seldom or never of an all-round character, even though the existing real equivalent of these wages exceeds the marginal disutility of the existing employment; whereas they do not resist reductions of real wages, which are associated with increases in aggregate employment and leave relative money-wages unchanged [general theory, chapter 2, section 3]"and concludes this in section 5,
<"in general, an increase in employment can only occur to the accompaniment of a decline in the rate of real wages"this only counts as a logistical fact. and he further qualifies it with an earlier notion,
<"is not necessarily due to labour's demanding a larger quantity of wage-goods; and a willingness on the part of labour to accept lower money-wages is not necessarily a remedy for unemployment"so keynes is not saying that lowering real wages raises employment, but the reverse, that raising employment lowers real wages. we see high unemployment in the poorest countries, with no means of bargaining power - so the market does not solve these issues itself.
>He devotes chapters of his seminal work to the psychology of consumption. See picrel [chapter 9 and 12]in chapter 9 he begins with this,
<"Since, however, the analysis of these factors raises no point of novelty, it may be sufficient if we give a catalogue of the more important, without enlarging on them at any length."he is not dedicating much time to it. he identifies 8 subjective factors, which he then concludes the chapter revoking in their importance:
<"Thus, after all, the actual rates of aggregate saving and spending do not depend on Precaution, Foresight, Calculation, Improvement, Independence, Enterprise, Pride or Avarice. Virtue and vice play no part. It all depends on how far the rate of interest is favourable to investment, after taking account of the marginal efficiency of capital. [general theory, ch. 9, sec. 2]"chapter 12 is a digression, as he states,
<"There is, however, not much to be said about the state of confidence a priori. Our conclusions must mainly depend upon the actual observation of markets and business psychology. This is the reason why the ensuing digression is on a different level of abstraction from most of this book." [general theory, ch. 12, sec. 2]>Keynes presents bourgeois theories of crisis.marx's crisis theory of "overproduction" is converted into theories of underconsumption by keynes, formulated as a decline in aggregate demand. its the same difference, in effect, which is why both attribute unemployment to this cause. labour loses its purchase because it is outcompeted by capital.
>Keynes was bourgeois economist who wrote these delusions during great depressionwhat delusions? you want to hate keynes simply because he wasnt a communist. you are the worst type of defender of faith; dogmatic and ignorant. you can rationally, or irrationally disagree with keynes.
>>2274701Keynes teaches us that strikes, unemployment, and crises are "inefficient" and cutting money-wages is wrong. Keynes concludes that capitalists are better off cutting real wages instead of money-wages to avoid strikes, using that money to achieve "full-employment."
>>2274733The delusions about british 15 hour work week in his lifetime. Rational proletarians recognize keynesian doctrine as late stage capitalist cope and categorically repudiate keynesian doctrine on every ontological, epistomological, and praxiological level.
>>2275226>The delusions about british 15 hour work week in his lifetime.it was actually intended for his "granchildren's" lifetime. we can see this from the very title of the article;
<"economic possibilities for our grandchildren" [1930]>Rational proletarians recognize keynesian doctrine as late stage capitalist copeyet, this "cope" has objectively extended the lifetime of "late capitalism". but elsewise, in the words of j.m. keynes,
<"in the long run, we are all dead" [tract on monetary reform, 1923]keynes did not expect the current state of affairs to last forever.
>>2275396where it concerns the facts of the matter i have already addressed this:
>>2274733<"in general, an increase in employment can only occur to the accompaniment of a decline in the rate of real wages [general theory, chapter 2, section 5]"this is not keynes' unique remark however, but his submission to a classical postulation concerning labour. it therefore only appears as a logistical fact, in the same manner with which smith and ricardo see the inherent antagonism between wages and profits. at the same time however, according from the LTV, more wealth is able to be produced for less value over time, so fuller employment may simultaneously bring fuller wealth. more labour = cheaper goods.
the other anon's remarks seem to have him assuming that unemployment is a virtue. who benefits from unemployment?
Archived the Paul Cockshott AMA
https://archive.is/53xswThe link should be working in a few minutes
>>2276579keynes understands that what allows real wages to be higher for employed workers, relative to the unemployed is the marginal productivity/utility of labour (or the rate of diminishing returns on something). when you increase the quantity of labour without meaningful division, you lower its quality and so lower its aggregate demand (think of how at a certain level of growth, a company suddenly becomes unprofitable). in marxist terms, labour-power is conserved for the most skilled labourers (based on distribution of wages), so increasing the workforce debases its standard unit to a lower degree (lowers wages by proportion). think for example how global markets create "brain drains" on localities. the unskilled have the least demand. practically speaking, most people are unskilled (including myself), so it becomes burdensome for the skilled to train up the population. now, this fall in real wages only concerns an average, so its not as if everyone magically becomes poorer because more people work; its just that there is less to go around individually, but collectively, there would be more wealth if more people worked; thats just intuitive. thats why the only options we have as a society is, as per the ricardian adage, to make everyone "equally poor", or malthusianism (depopulation).
>bargainingwell, keynes praises bargaining for money-wages, but the price and value of labour are different variables. you cant print off money and suddenly create value, for example.
>>2276579>>2277228here is another description of marginal productivity.
there is an absolute limit to productive capability which then limits the capacity of real wages, per worker.
<"[the first classical postulation] - The wage is equal to the marginal product of labour […] In emphasising our point of departure from the classical system, we must not overlook an important point of agreement. For we shall maintain the first postulate as heretofore […] the marginal product in the wage-good industries (which governs real wages) necessarily diminishes as employment is increased. So long, indeed, as this proposition holds, any means of increasing employment must lead at the same time to a diminution of the marginal product and hence of the rate of wages measured in terms of this product." [general theory, chapter 2, section 1-5]a good example might be a group project in school. one person does the work while rest do nothing. the aims to productivity are then limited by overemployment. this is why its preferable to divide labour into different tasks, as smith saw. marx also sees how the division of labour increases productivity, but then curiously decries its "alienating" qualities. the facts of the matter is that we are a species which specialises. nerds and jocks will exist together.
>>2279800yes. money can be said to be a token representing a national economy's debt. debt is created by governments by "deficit spending", or issuing more money than it receives in revenues (taxes). the increase of national debt has a positive trend with inflation therefore, which, in relative terms, allows economies to grow. the opposite of inflation is deflation, or recession, which if unchecked, leads to depression, or a severe lack of activity in an economy. the great depression for example came about from the crisis of banks being fleeced of their fractional reserves of gold. this meant that there was no gold to issue credit on, so the money supply was limited, leading to a lack of activity. keynes sought stimulation as a remedy, in line with roosevelt's "new deal".
when foreign countries hold "debt" then, it just means that they possess a certain amount of currency of that nation, not that they "owe" the nation anything (in fact, the relationship is often reversed, as we might read from picrel). if all national debt was cleared (as we see in your video), there would be no money left (public money counts as a "liable" asset, which is why it is taxed). this is why conservatives who try to "balance the budget" by setting high interest rates on central banks limit public spending (the rate for the federal reserve and bank of england is around 4.25%). people might think its reasonable to eliminate debt, but in this case, it is simply class warfare. the common aim of MMT-inclined thinkers then is in pursuing the abolishment of interest rates (by nationalising banking), to liberate spending. this is part of the post-keynesian strategy toward full employment.
>>2279894>Money isn't valueaccording to marx, money as the "absolute commodity" embraces the entire world of commodities to become the universal form of value:
<"These objects, gold and silver, just as they come out of the bowels of the earth, are forthwith the direct incarnation of all human labour. Hence the magic of money." [capital vol. 1, chapter 2]>Want to solve employment? Nationalize production.sure, im just explaining the keynesian position.
according to engels this text (1845):
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/condition-working-class/ch06.htm>The southern facile character of the Irishman, his crudity, which places him but little above the savage, his contempt for all humane enjoyments, in which his very crudeness makes him incapable of sharing, his filth and poverty, all favour drunkenness. The temptation is great, he cannot resist it, and so when he has money he gets rid of it down his throat. What else should he do? How can society blame him when it places him in a position in which he almost of necessity becomes a drunkard; when it leaves him to himself, to his savagery? With such a competitor the English working-man has to struggle, with a competitor upon the lowest plane possible in a civilised country, who for this very reason requires less wages than any other. Nothing else is therefore possible than that, as Carlyle says, the wages of English working-man should be forced down further and further in every branch in which the Irish compete with him. And these branches are many. All such as demand little or no skill are open to the Irish. For work which requires long training or regular, pertinacious application, the dissolute, unsteady, drunken Irishman is on too low a plane.he is saying that immigration lowers the wages of a national working class by a general decline of the standards of living.
marx also wrote this in a letter (1870):
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1870/letters/70_04_09.htm>Ireland is the bulwark of the English landed aristocracy. The exploitation of that country is not only one of the main sources of their material wealth; it is their greatest moral strength. They, in fact, represent the domination over Ireland. Ireland is therefore the cardinal means by which the English aristocracy maintain their domination in England itself … But the English bourgeoisie has also much more important interests in the present economy of Ireland. Owing to the constantly increasing concentration of leaseholds, Ireland constantly sends her own surplus to the English labour market, and thus forces down wages and lowers the material and moral position of the English working class. And most important of all! Every industrial and commercial centre in England now possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life.offering similar sentiments. to marx and engels then, there seems to be a ruling class interest in immigration, which leads to antagonisms in the working class. are there any contrary theoretical notions to this, or is this the consensus?
here is an interesting excerpt from keynes' "tract on monetary reform", in a section subtitled "inflation as a form of taxation":
<"A government can live for a long time [.] by printing paper money […] Let us suppose that there are in circulation 9,000,000 currency notes, and that they have altogether a value equivalent to 36,000,000 gold dollars. Suppose that the Government prints a further 3,000,000 notes, so that the amount of currency is now 12,000,000 [.] In the first state of affairs, therefore, each note = $4, and in the second state of affairs each note = $3. Consequently the 9,000,000 notes originally held by the public are now worth $27,000,000 instead of $36,000,000 [.] Thus by the process of printing the additional notes the Government has transferred from the public to itself an amount of resources equal to $9,000,000, just as successfully as if it had raised this sum in taxation. On whom has the tax fallen? Clearly on the holders of the original 9,000,000 notes, whose notes are now worth 25 per cent less than they were before [.] No wonder its superficial advantages have attracted Ministers of Finance [.] What is there to prevent the Government from repeating this process over and over again?" [tract on monetary reform, chapter 2, section 1]
this is congruous to my earlier comments that inflation largely represents the lowering of the value of the wage, where capitalist losses are subsidised from this redistribution.
>>2289480>this is congruous to my earlier comments that inflation largely represents the lowering of the value of the wageok
>where capitalist losses are subsidised from this redistribution.how does it say that?
<On whom has the tax fallen? Clearly on the holders of the original 9,000,000 noteswouldn't the holders be capitalists? isn't this just MMT?
>>2289957>how does it say that?are you aware that large capitalist firms are subsidised from their losses by bailouts from the state? at the same rate that capital is supported, wages are lowered in their purchasing power. this means that wages are redistributed as profits. a simple deduction.
>wouldn't the holders be capitalists?in keynes' example, the currency holders are the general population.
>isn't this just MMT?MMT is more of an anthropological and historical theory as to the nature of money, which aligns with the keynesian postulation of "chartalism", or the notion that a central authority legitimises the medium of exchange by special powers. this is different from a commodity theory of money, which is part of the classical hypothesis, such as in smith or marx. the theory of money's value then comes from the view that it must create demand by limiting its supply through taxation. this is a "negative" view of money (which in fiat is equally regarded as "debt"). as per the keynesian truism; "If you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem. But if you owe a million, it has." MMT theorists may then have political application of these ideas, but thats a separate issue.
>>2290197>are you aware that large capitalist firms are subsidised from their losses by bailouts from the state?well yeah but where does the text say that? was it also like that in keynes' time?
>MMT is more of an anthropological and historical theory as to the nature of money>this is a "negative" view of moneyso then MMT is keynesian?
>>2290225>I thought the point of MMT was to print money to tax capitalists indirectly.Wrong. The point of Keynesianism and MMT is to print money, give it to capitalists, and drive down real wages by inflation so they can hire more labor to offset the crises of capital.
>That inflation devalues savings which is largely owned by capitalistsDevaluing savings means making investment possible by driving down real wages. The inflation compels the worker to work for lower real wages which makes investment possible or more profitable.
>the printed money can be allocated by the state towards the public.The printed money goes to capitalists, not the public.
>well yeah but where does the text say that?it says that inflation acts as taxation - which today, is used to fund capitalists.
>so then MMT is keynesian?its "post-keynesian", originating in the thought of people like hymen minsky and warren moseler - who has reported that he has never read adam smith or karl marx. he's not an economist, but a financial adviser. MMT has more academic grounding in economic historians like l. randall wray, and some political thinkers of MMT include michael hudson and david graeber.
>was it also like that in keynes' time?well keynes directly cites the sinister attitude of the state keeping itself alive.
>>2290225>inflation devalues savings which is largely owned by capitalistsonly cash savings. capital assets rise in value during inflation.
>then the printed money can be allocated by the state towards the public. Isn't that what Keynes claimed to advocate?well, it all depends. keynes approaches the classical theory of say's law ("supply creates its own demand"), and reverses this to be keynes' law of effective demand ("demand creates its own supply"). the strategy for keynes is in raising aggregate demand (AD) in the economy, thus. this is the mechanism which enables prosperity to keynes. AD may be raised in diverting savings into investment, as he writes here:
<"If we are to continue to draw the voluntary savings of the community into “investments,” we must make it a prime object of deliberate State policy that the standard of value, in terms of which they are expressed, should be kept stable; adjusting in other ways (calculated to touch all forms of wealth equally and not concentrated on the relatively helpless “investors”) the redistribution of the national wealth, if, in course of time, the laws of inheritance and the rate of accumulation have drained too great a proportion of the income of the active classes into the spending control of the inactive." [tract on monetary reform, ch. 1, sct. 1]saving counts as economic inactivity (this is also why investing in capital assets is the best form of "saving"). keynes is also more direct on economic equality and redistribution here:
<"The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes. The bearing of the foregoing theory on the first of these is obvious. But there are also two important respects in which it is relevant to the second. Since the end of the nineteenth century significant progress towards the removal of very great disparities of wealth and income has been achieved through the instrument of direct taxation — income tax and surtax and death duties — especially in Great Britain. Many people would wish to see this process carried much further, but they are deterred by two considerations; partly by the fear of making skilful evasions too much worth while and also of diminishing unduly the motive towards risk-taking, but mainly, I think, by the belief that the growth of capital depends upon the strength of the motive towards individual saving and that for a large proportion of this growth we are dependent on the savings of the rich out of their superfluity. Our argument does not affect the first of these considerations. But it may considerably modify our attitude towards the second. For we have seen that, up to the point where full employment prevails, the growth of capital depends not at all on a low propensity to consume but is, on the contrary, held back by it; and only in conditions of full employment is a low propensity to consume conducive to the growth of capital. Moreover, experience suggests that in existing conditions saving by institutions and through sinking funds is more than adequate, and that measures for the redistribution of incomes in a way likely to raise the propensity to consume may prove positively favourable to the growth of capital." [general theory, ch. 24, sct. 1]keynes sees then that redistribution can only be a positive force, for both capital and labour, via circulation. this concedes to smith's own analysis, that the higher the wages, the wealthier a nation,
<"But the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with the prosperity and fall with the declension of the society. On the contrary, it is naturally low in rich and high in poor countries, and it is always highest in the countries which are going fastest to ruin. The interest of this third order, therefore, has not the same connection with the general interest of the society as that of the other two." [wealth of nations, ch. 11, sct. 3]keynes also cites market anarchist silvio gesell as the theorist who supersedes marx:
<"I believe that the future will learn more from the spirit of Gesell than from that of Marx. The preface to The Natural Economic Order will indicate to the reader, if he will refer to it, the moral quality of Gesell. The answer to Marxism is, I think, to be found along the lines of this preface." [general theory, ch. 23, sct. 6]so that gives you an impression of his thought on the matter.
>>2290306>keynes also cites market anarchist silvio gesellThe "Market Anarchist" in question:
>In April 1919, Gesell received a call from Ernst Niekisch from the revolutionary government of Bavarian Soviet Republic to come to Munich. This offered him a seat in the so-called Socialization Commission and he was appointed shortly, on suggestion of Erich Müchsam and Gustav Landauer, as the "People's Representative for Finance" (German: Volksbeauftragte für Finanzen) situated in Munich. Gesell worked with law Professor Karl Polenske [de] from the University of Greifswald and the Swiss physician and mathematician Theophil Friedrich Christen. He wrote a law for the creation of Freigeld (Free Money), a currency system he had developed. However, his term lasted for only seven days.>After the violent end of Soviet Republic, Gesell was arrested. There he shared a cell with the poet Gustav Gräser, whose writing on revolution he funded. After several months in prison, he was acquitted on July 1919 in a high treason trial for his self-defense speech in front of a Munich court martial.[1] He claimed that he didn't have anything to do with the political decisions of the Republic and was just trying to offer a plan to restructure the economy.[10] The legal costs of the process were paid by the state treasury. However, he, Gräser, and others was deported from Bavaria. Immediately after his discharge, Gesell and his supporters resumed their activism for his revolutionary ideas Keynes chads stay winning. A true Keynesian always ends up working for the bolsheviks.
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