Navy threadThread for all naval, maritime, ship, submarine & water craft discussion, seas, oceans, lakes, rivers & other bodies of water. Soviet & American shipping alike is welcome, as are civilian vessels. Video & images encouraged. Ekranoplanes & other marine aircraft also count.
Russian / USSR Naval sites:
https://flot.com/ https://war-book.ru/nashe-vremya/flot-ww3/ https://вооружение.рф/armaments/sredstva-voenno-morskogo-flota/ US / Western Navy sites (consume with copious amounts of table salt):
https://www.naval-technology.com/ https://www.navysite.de/index.htm https://www.navyrecognition.com/ P.S. Be civil on this Polynesian raft-roping forum.
>>405Same way ordinary homes are built but slightly more complex
<designYou design the ships dimensions, mass, what it’ll fire, what resources it’ll use etc
You prepare a site for construction of the ship
<preparationYou mine the resources for the ship
You put those resources into moulds that will fill the dimensions of the ship
<framing and construction(this is happening on said site)You structure the ship using beams and rods made out of the moulds
You attach the moulds together to the beams overtime until all the dimensions are filled with the needed resources like steel glass etc
You then get the rest of the moulds to construct the final equipment the ship needs like pipes, wires, ac, generators, cannons, telescopes, radio ware etc
And that’s about it
>>405>How are battleships made? in a shipyard, with industrial workers and tools
>what would a country need for it to have domestic ship construction?access to building materials, the necessary tools and labour pool, specialized port towns help make this more efficient
>what does a nation need these days to be a naval power?productive ports, fuel
>>411you also need a good munitions industry to go with it btw
the collective expertise in large metalworking that both require could be flexible for either, too, which is why the soviets loved them especially compared to other war industries
>>405>How are battleships made?The term battleship refers to a specific type of warship with large caliber guns and thick armor. Battleships became obsolete in WWII and have not been produced since then. The generic term for a military combat ship is warship, not battleship.
Production of warships and civilian ships are similar. Both require the construction of a hull, out of steel. Today, hulls are often manufactured in large segments and welded together. Modern warships since the 1990s will have hull shapes optimized to reduce their radar signature giving them some degree of "stealth". This stealth is not invisibility but it reduces the range at which a ship could be detected by radar.
After hull assembly, the propulsion of the ship is installed into the hull. Civilian ships and slower warships typically use large diesel engines. Warships that require higher speeds will use gas turbine engines. In the past, steam turbines and reciprocating steam engines which burned oil or coal were common in both civilian and military ships. The ship engines transfer mechanical energy through shafts and gearboxes to turn the propellers of the ship, much like how a car engine transfers power through the gearbox and driveshaft to the car wheels. Electrical generation is an important part of modern ships, especially warships since radar require huge quantities of power. Ships have smaller dedicated engines for electrical generation, separate form the main propulsion engines. In recent years, a concept called "integrated electric propulsion" or IEP is being developed in warships were the main engine generates electricity only. This electricity is used to both propel the ship and also provide onboard power for all other subsystems.
After the propulsion is installed the other subsystems of a ship are installed. Subsystems include wiring to deliver power to all electronic components of the ship, heating and cooling for crew and cargo, living accommodations for crew (food cooking areas, bathrooms, sleeping areas). In addition to the above subsystems war ships will also carry weapons, radars, and other sensors/communication systems. The primary weapons today are not guns (cannons) but missiles. To launch missiles, modern warships have large vertical tubes installed in the deck of the ship, these are called Vertical Launch System or VLS. They are mechanically simpler and can launch missiles faster than older missile launching systems used in the cold war. Missiles armament include missiles for attacking land targets, other ships, aircraft, and submarines.
The biggest threat to ships are aircraft and submarines. Modern warships carry radar to find and shoot down aircraft and missiles, though it is not known just how effective these systems are. Sonar is used to find submarines or intercept torpedoes. Defeating underwater threats is even more difficult than defeating aerial threats so these anti-submarine weapons are probably less effective than anti-air weapons.
>what would a country need for it to have domestic ship construction?Countries need shipyards which must have sufficient space to fit many ships under construction and large cranes to move heavy equipment onto the ship (including hull modules). They also need skilled labor such as welders and technicians who can install all subsystems of the ship.
>what does a nation need these days to be a naval power?It's very difficult to be a naval power. Only US, Russia, China, UK, and Japan could be considered naval powers. The US is still the standard for naval power despite its decline. It has both a large number of ships and many high quality ships. China is probably second to the US is all respects except for submarines. Russia is weaker than both the US and China in surface ships but excels in submarines. The UK and Japan are declining powers but still possess a small number of high quality surface warships and submarines. They will likely become less relevant in the coming decades. Maintaining a navy is an unproductive endeavor and requires a large industrial base capable of producing ship hulls as well as the weapon systems that go into warships. Only countries with large and high tech economies can do so. Some countries with large economies but without technical ability to produce all ship components can rely on importing components. India is one example and it may overcome UK and Japan in terms of naval power despite relying on imported parts.
>>414thanks for the great response.
how important are warships at this point? what is the real focus of naval warfare these days if as
>>417 points out that they are growing obsolete. do you agree with them? are submarines more important at this point?
Well explicitly battleships aren't made anymore, they existed from the mid-19th century until 1946, with the last one being built and launched being the HMS Vanguard in 1946, although she was a crappy 1930s treaty design using 1910s guns so most people consider the Iowa class from 1944 the last battleships, and even further still you have the Sovetsky Soyuz class by the Soviets which were partly completed after WW2, but kinda just sat as empty hulls and were scrapped in 1949.
As to how they were made, it was a very general process that has existed since ships have existed.
First the keel is laid; the keel is the central vertical beam that runs the entire length of the ship. This bears the entire weight of the ship and has to be reinforced, back with wooden ships usually this would be made from a single giant tree, so you can imagine how stuff like the 1st rate ships of the Napoleonic era used giant trees and Britain actually went to war with Denmark when they threatened to cut off their supply of tall trees from the Baltics that they made their ships' keels and masts out of.
So once the keel is laid then you have to lay the skeleton or frame structure, AKA the ribs, these are horizontal beams that frame the bottom of the ship and are also reinforced. These differ slightly from commercial ship beams in that all ships have their keels and beams reinforced as most of the time the biggest force pushing against it it the sea itself.
This is where Battleships start to differ, commercial ships just use structural steel for the rest of the construction, as in they slap steel in the shape they want and call it a day. Battleships do the same thing for the initial hull, but then begin bracing it and compartmentalizing the interior so as to limit damage, flooding and fires. Then once the initial hull is complete comes the armor. Now Battleships aren't armored how you normally think; their entire hull isn't covered in armor. Instead the 'modern' armor scheme of battleships came as a result of early ironclads being too heavy to armour everywhere and so they developed a system called the central battery; that is all the guns, engines and important bits were shoved into the centre of the ship and only that part was properly armored. This concept gave way eventually to the idea of the citadel; the most heavily armoured part of the ship. The citadel is usually the main belt, which is what most people quote as the armour thickness of a ship, but that is a horizontal strip of armour running along the side in the middle, beyond that at the bow and stern are the extended belts, same thing with the deck; the centre is heavily armoured while the ends are called the extended deck and are a lot less armoured. After WW1 it was realized that armouring the extended belt and decks was useless, as the armour had to be the same as the main belt and deck or it was just deadweight, so once again they reverted to the central battery idea and everything was shoved into close as the centre as possible and the rest wasn't armoured. This is called the 'All or Nothing' scheme and is considered the most efficient way to armour a warship. This is important, as armouring a ship means that you're slapping armoured steel along only strips of the ship, the rest is just structural.
Traditionally, armour is best applied as one single piece, it's more efficient this way. If you compress multiple layers it's actually less effective, this is the opposite of how it usually works as space armour usually helps, but naval munitions are generally so large that they have special fusing caps that make it so they can punch through the top layer and then explode so they pierce the lower layer, whereas it can't do that with a single thick strip. So for this special armour foundries are needed, it is incredibly specialized and only certain countries could do it at their height; Britain developed the ability and the US came fairly close to doing it the same but never quite. Germany before WW1 was able to do it, but by the time of WW2 they'd lost it so the Bismarck was armoured with the layered armour which is why it's incredibly overweight for its capabilities. The Soviets also lost this ability as they never saw the need for heavy ship industry and focused on other aspects of industrialization, so the Sovetsky Soyuz was going to be armoured with the layered armour and was also incredibly overweight, but again they were never completed partially because of this fact and also because by the time their hulls were launched the Soviets were getting early missile cruisers.
Once the armour is applied and the structure is complete the hull is launched. This is considered the 'launch' date, as in the day it's off the slipway despite being nowhere close to finished. It's just an empty hull. The fitting out takes place with the hull dragged alongside the dock. Then piece by piece they load the machinery on board, this includes the engines(not the shafts, the shafts are constructed as part of the hull), the guns are lowered into the barbettes, because yes that's right the turrets are actually free sliding things that pop into the hole and historically fall out of ships when they sink upside down because while they have clips to keep them on the tracks that run around the inner ring of the barbette, these are meant to stop them from falling down from their own blasts and damaging the inner ring and not falling up from gravity being upside down.
After that it's the conning tower, more equipment being loaded in and it's just about done besides sea trials, and of course loading more stuff on the ship including ammo, supplies etc, which usually makes the ship's actual tonnage increase by around 20-30% so an empty battleship at no load might be at 36 000 tons, but loaded will be at 42 000. This has been used historically to sneak around naval limitations on ship size, the pocket battleships of Germany were not allowed to be bigger than 10 000 tons, so the Germans provided evidence that they were 10 000 but failed to mention that was unloaded, fully loaded they were 15 000 tons, so when the British fought the Graf Spee in 1939 they were surprised at how much better it was than what its specifications otherwise would have suggested. The Italians also did this by hiding most of their Battleship's tonnage under the water with bulbous bows and were found out when one of their ships had to go into drydock at a British port before WW2 and the British realized "Hey why is your ship so much larger under the waterline than on your blueprints".
Guns are also a factor, as large rifled barrels are hard to make as is the ammunition, because if you have a new calibre of gun you have to have a whole factory dedicated to making just that shell, so if only one ship uses that calibre then that's a waste of a factory, which is why often you'll see navies use slightly smaller guns than they can build simply for logistical reasons. The only times a country has ever done this was the British with HMS Agincourt because it was a ship built for South America but was taken once WW1 started, and the US with the Richelieu's 15 inch guns, they simply had enough factories to just pay one a lot of money to build these 15 inch shells for the Free French.
>>1022What
>>1023 said
>>1024Number of reasons. Battleship hulls don't make good carrier hulls, they're too heavily armoured and don't have the right streamlining. It's a little known fact that a ship's hull shape depends on its designed speed, kind of like an aeroplane but with water, and carriers are actually designed to go really fast since they often need to outpace the wind for their planes to take off. Now the concept of carrier conversions comes from the 1920s conversions after the Washington Naval Treaty, but all of those were actually battlecruisers; the Lexingtons the Amagi and Akagi etc, which were designed to go fast and had less armour than battleships. Battlecruisers are essentially Battleships with armour stripped off to go really fast, and then slowly evolved into fast battleships and every battleship after 1930 was a fast battleship so they just became battleships. Other reasons include inferior steel, realizing that the age of big ships was over after WW2 and a shift to cruisers and submarines and a lot of the hulls were damaged during the German invasion and so in the end the cost/benefit factor just made the Soviets cut their losses and used the scrapped hulls to build the first missile cruisers in the world which on their own made practically all-gun ships obsolete.
Have you guys ever heard of the Littoral Combat Ships? Of course not, cause they're useless hunks of junk designed when the US decided they needed a wet F-35.
In all seriousness though, the LCSs are not only a failure in engineering of the individual ships and classes but also in initial concept. The LCS came about as a response to a need for small, fast, CHEAP ships to perform non-combat duties such as ASW and minesweeping. Almost every country in the 80s-90s had their fleet of support vessels nearing the end of their lifespan and so were busily working on next-generation replacements.
In both the East and West the form of this next generation of ships took two forms: Hydrofoils based on the design of the HMCS Bras d'Or which had perfected the design of hydrofoils as far as stability was concerned, and ground-effect vehicles. Ground effect vehicles are basically hovercrafts, OR Ekranoplans. The Ekranonplans planned to take over support roles were ironically larger versions of the Luna class since the weird thing about GEVs is that the bigger they are, the easier they are to control and are cheaper to maintain, so bigger=better in every way.
So while the rest of the world was designing their next generation on cutting-edge technology that had been proven in the last generation, what did the US do? They out-sourced their shipbuilding programme to a fucking aircraft designer; Lockheed-Martin. Lockheed did exactly what every US military contractor does and essentially created this concept of a Littoral Combat Ship to be a shallow water frigate with a streamlined hull. As many of you are going to point out, that's just a regular frigate. Because that's exactly what it was. The LCS was just a rebranded frigate meant for shallow water operations in the Gulf near the Middle East, with special gimmicks such as modular combat systems, 2 engine types to propel the ships at 70 knots, and a low radar silhouette. The latter is absolute BS btw, since "low radar silhouette" has been disproven by the Zumwalt fiasco.
Anyways, the first class of the series, the Independents failed every single one of the mentioned requirements. The 2 different engine types, a gasoline AND diesel turbines, failed miserably because they forgot each engine type had different torque and as a result broke the ship's gearbox, so instead of 70 knots the top speed was a whopping 5 knots… you walk faster than that. The system modules? Turned out they built the ship BEFORE the modules, and the modules turned out to be too big. OK but surely it's cheaper because of its small size right? Nope. Despite being a small frigate, the LCSs cost more to operate than the Allen Burke Destroyers. And they couldn't even perform ANY role.
OK but that's just the first class right? Surely it got better since there's been 3+ classes since 2002? Wrong. The follow up to the Independents was the Freedom Class(The US can't go 5 minutes without naming something after their ego), while these were better, that's not exactly a high bar. The best thing about the Freedoms was that there weren't total failures in that it mostly worked. However their ability was extremely scaled back, now they were just semi-hydrofoil frigates with some more automation. It worked fine as a frigate, except that's all it did. Even its automation didn't work as advertized, so for all intents and purposes it was just a more expensive regular frigate with a nifty semi-hydrofoil design that didn't actually work as a proper hydrofoil and more existed simply to wow Pentagon staff into thinking it was a new design. The Freedoms have since been cancelled for going 50% over budget and not offering any real advantages.
So where does that leave the LCSs today? Well I shit you not, but they've decided to bring back the Independents, because Lockheed promises they've fixed the gearbox issues, while all the other issues still remain. What that means is that they're scrapping all the old Independents, 9 in total and the newest being less than a year old, and building another 9 in the next 2 years to replace them…. instead of just fixing the old ones. While it is expensive to gut a ship's powerplant it's nowhere near the cost of building an entire new ship, so it's all just about that contract money surprise surprise.
Even if the LCSs did work perfectly, their concept of "Shallow Water Support Ships" is utterly stupid. The US has had a fixation for shallow water operations since the first Gulf War, even making their current generation of SSNs, the Virginia Class, designed for shallow water operations(Even though that goes against the entire concept of submarines and coastal submarines were deemed stupid over a century ago), yet since the Gulf War there's been no need whatsover for shallow water ships, and considering most of the ocean is deep water, making it so that ships are tied only to 5% of its entirety severely limits the strategic positioning of your fleets. Plus, if you build the shallow water ships, you're just going to have to build deep water equivalents for your main battlegroups, so you're doubling the cost of your ships overall when you could have just built half the number of ships but that do both. Which is exactly what the Ekranoplans and Hydrofoils from the 80s were supposed to do, since a large part of support ships is that they have to be flexible which LCSs are inherently not.
But it's the US, how could you ever expect them to design something proper? And the largest argument out there for the LCSs is that they provide building experience for the naval engineers, yet they're on 2 and a half classes now and STILL having the same issues, I don't know what lessons they're learning but they don't seem to be related to ship building.
TL;DR: US Built stupid ship that is stupid.
>>1969I don't get what you're saying, why aren't shallow water craft useful?
I guess the real question with all these things is the cost to me. The US spends so much money on military and the amount of actual things they have is small. More ships for less money would be way better. Especially fighting low tech enemies like the war on terror. They say they made the LCS to combat Somali pirates in speed boats, so why don't they just fight the pirates in speedboats themselves? Just bring more speedboats than the enemy and they should be fine. Cost of a dozen speedboats has to be way less I'm sure.
>>1975Because shallow water operations are very limited. Unless the US wants to go back to the 1880s style of navy where they have 5 battleships with a range of 50km so they don't have to go beyond spitting range of the US coast it's absolutely useless in terms of naval projection. The only place the US ever estimated they would use shallow water vessels would be in the Gulf for their (then) future Second Gulf War so they could just sit off the shore and bombard Iraq. It's useless in any other scenario, even the Med or Black Sea is deeper with heavier seas than is wanted with the Virginia and LCSs.
Imagine if the USSR built the Kirovs but were only meant for the Caspian Sea, that's how fucking stupid LCSs are. Or well I guess the Moskva fits that bill and look how it ended up…
Also yeah you do want more small cheap ships for support roles, but the LCSs don't fit that. The reason why hydrofoils and Ekranoplans were the go-to for the projected replacements back in the day was because they could go really fast on really cheap engines; they both reduced water friction on a semi-large vessel, meaning the powerplant doesn't have to be as big, which is usually the most expensive part of a ship, so if the US had built those it would have been a lot cheaper than fielding even the older fleet support vessels that they had in service. Instead what they built was overhyped conventional ships that act and look as if some Silicon Valley startup built them as a "wow that's cool" thing while not actually innovating in any way shape or form.
Even the name Littoral Combat Ship is stupid, just say frigate or corvette and be done with it, but no Lockheed wanted to make it look like the reinvented the wheel and could copyright the term. The LCSs are truly the F-35 of the sea.
>>1976Yee
>>1981This is a very one sided understanding of the class. The current use of this ship class isn't the same as its actual capabilities.
>budget KirovOk and?
>ran into problems with the hull form That got solved.
>>1982Because they expected the same out of the Atlants as a Kirov and even gave it the Flotilla leader designation despite being on the light side for a cruiser. It's essentially wanting the same for less, which put extreme pressure on how the ship actually handles. The hull form wasn't really ever fixed, they managed to make it stop flexing in heavy seas but not to the point of making it function as intented; that's why the P-500 tubes are above deck on the superstructure similar to Soviet patrol boats and escorts instead of imbedded in the hull which is the standard for Soviet cruisers since the hull was under enough stress already. The Atlants are the result of trying to pack a Kirov into a hull half the size, that's cheaper too rather than tempering expectations and making it a proper cheaper alternative.
Ironically I think it falls victim to the Battlecruiser curse. Battlecruisers were originally meant to only hunt cruisers, but because they had capital grade guns they got shoved into the capital ship role, the Atlants are the same. They're light cruisers, but because they're pocket Kirov's they're now flagships and Flotilla leaders, and this effected the class during the design process too. It's a class that given even a refit would perform well in another role, so saying that's just because of how they're used is a misnomer, since while technically true the ship's design and equipment is also at fault since it was rushed to fulfill its current role as a flagship for some of the smaller fleets. It's not an inherently bad design like the LCSs, just asking too much out of too small of a ship and that's stressing parts of the ship out way beyond the limit.
>>1983>they expected the same out of the Atlants as a Kirov Not really, it's meant to have similar fire-power on a smaller scale, but only as supplement to the Kirovs. The reason they're overstressed is because the Kirovs got mothballed and so did like half the Soviet fleet. If Russia could raise the Ukrainian ship of the same class (and the Moskva) they'd be able to more efficiently do this, so it's more a lingering fault of the Russian government from the 90s.
>gave it the Flotilla leader designation Yes in areas not having Kirov's to lead and act as fleet centres, because they have the armament and defenses capable of doing so.
>that's why the P-500 tubes are above deck <vertical launch tubes? What's that?The hull is fine and the P-500 tubes are fine
>It's not an inherently bad design like the LCSs, just asking too much out of too small of a ship and that's stressing parts of the ship out way beyond the limit.I'd argue that its fine as it had been and the Moskva is just a case of bad luck and sabotagae.
>>1985Similar firepower on a smaller scale is exactly the problem, the Kirov's weren't as big as they were just for kicks, on ships space is a big premium, and trying to fit that much firepower in a ship half the size means you're going to have to cut corners, which again is fine but the with the Atlants they couldn't compromise. That's what's causing them to be overstressed, I'm not talking about wear-and-tear kind of stressed I am talking about the actual hull of the ship not being the right size to accommodate the missiles, FCS, communication systems for a Flotilla leader etc. Which once again would have been fine if not for the fact that late into their design period they had to tack on all the FCS and communication equipment. It can be a cruise missile cruiser or a command ship for a ship its size, not both. That's not an issue with how Russia operates them since they came out of the yard like this due to a runaway design process. And no, the P-500 tubes are NOT fine like that. On cruiser hulls and above missile tubes are meant to be uniform with the hull, this is because during fighting the superstructure is considered non-primary (That's part of the reason why the Moskva was lost because the superstructure burned to the hull, which for ships is 100% OK but the untrained crew thought the ship was sunk along with modifications in the 2000s that made her even more top heavy for such a light ship but anyways the sinking is largely secondary to the issues I have with it), so the launch tubes not being part of that for cruisers is important. Patrol boats, destroyers etc can have it since they're not meant to be at the centre of fire anyways and need every ounce of weight savings they can get, the P-500s being as they are is a sign of compromise due to construction constraints. Which is not the good kind of compromise in terms of capability but more a compromise in terms of its stability and integrity. It's one of the few Soviet designs that fell down this hole, the only other one I can name off the top of my head was the Udaloy II and that was a Russian modification of the Udaloy.
>>1969What gets me about the LCS is that other nations (some of them at least) just use corvettes or even fast missile and gunboats for littoral/shallow water operations. Most of coastal Europe has some kind of indigenous corvette design that they make to whatever specifications they need including LO in some cases. Those boats don't take years to iron out problems with.
I know the USN does not have the same sort of "need" or "tradition", but its not some super-secret, overly specialist knowledge thing. Chalk it up as another "easy elsewhere, exceedingly difficult in the US for no reason at all".
>>1998The LCS is American exceptionalism at it's finest; they made a light attack craft but not like the others, no no no this one was designed to be special. Because it's a complete utter failure.
They tried to make a revolutionary craft using conventional methods without any real innovation and failed even along those lines, it's impressive even.
>>2003It still doesn't change the fact tit lacks the capabilities for the role it's being pressed into, and the modernizations actually hurt the class somewhat because while modern electronics are a lot smaller, they decided rather than save on that weight, they'd use the savings to put more stuff in. Not good. Also that only tackles one of the many facets of the issue at hand, so while all the problems could be fixed in a good refit and it's not flawed as a concept like the LCS, the commication systems were only one out of five or six problems that needed to be rectified. And I don't think that I'm overstating them at all, any ship which even goes slightly over its tonnage in terms of capability is a serious hazard and a failure to curb expectations during the design process. It's dangerous and easily avoidable.
>>2005While that is true, designing SSNs entirely for that purpose is a stupid idea. See the thing that makes SSNs better than diesel is their endurance and speed, which is completely lost in shallow waters, hence why stuff like the 205s, Tangos, and Kilos exist. Designing your entire line of mainline SSNs specifically for coastal operations with blue water navy is idea. The option for shallow water operations? Perfectly fine. Designing them ONLY for shallow water operations and limiting their deep water capability to boot? Came about only as a weird fixation with the Gulf War and now producing such vessels is incredibly lucrative for the contractors and that's why they intend to keep building them up to 2070 despite no apparent need for them in future conflicts and that a life-span until 2070 does not line up at all with technologal advancement and generally ships do not last 70 fucking years let alone submarines.
>>2007>any ship which even goes slightly over its tonnage in terms of capability is a serious hazard and a failure to curb expectations during the design process. It's dangerous and easily avoidable. The USSR planned these ships out carefully, I'm fairly sure that they took into account these issues and avoided or made compromises to execute an optimal design.
I suggest you look at the design process for the ships - their main issues are almost negligible due to the various innovations taken to supplement problems, thus the P-500 tubes got built in such a fashion rather than vertical launch tubes that could technically have been done on the same platform. The Russian Navy´s post Soviet scrapping of most ships is the cause for the problems. The class could lead the Black/Mediterranean fleets because it's a much smaller marine environment than the other Fleets contend. In any other areas it had been an intended supplement and backup for the Kirov-class capable of leading the fleet if the main ship had been disabled but not being the main leading force for Blue-Water operations.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0_%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%B0_1164#%D0%9E%D0%B1%D1%89%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%B0_%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%B0 >>2008 (me)
>>2007The only major problems I can recall for the design of the Atlant is the hull lengthening and bow, but it's not a major operation issue. The draft is fairly decent and the raised bow had been a response to issues of frontal swamping for Blue Water operations. The hull-length made up for the increased tonnage and relatively slight imbalance in front-back heaviness of the design. The rather unique power-plant made up for the hull length and increased tonnage allowing it to have good maneuverability and high speeds, something that internalizing the P-500s could compromise as they'd force the width to increase and worsen hydrodynamics of the ship.
http://www.and-kin2008.narod.ru/drawingpr1164.html >>2008>>2009The fact that the P-500s being internalized would have compromised the stability and speed is proof that it was too small for its firepower and role, I don't understand why you're acting like that's a good reasoning for it. Decrease the number, decrease the speed and therefore the size of the powerplant, compromises have to be made, but instead the Soviets here wanted their cake and to eat it to. The firepower of a Kirov on a frame half the size with none of the drawbacks is bad enough as is, but then asking it to be cheaper is just nonsense. I mean the Kirovs themselves compromised by using the subsonic P-700s because space WAS an issue but they considered external tubes as too much of a hazard, and that's why they spent so much time on the nuclear powerplant in order to squeeze it down as much as possible to make room and compromising on P-700s.
And while you can blame a lot on the Russians it's still a fact that the Atlants came out of the yards with a command suite, the Russians didn't stick those on later. I see your image mentions them as insurance against the potential failure of the Kirovs which isn't something I've thought of before but it would explain a lot. Would explain the command suite despite being second line ships and why it takes up so much space. I'm guessing the image is from Modern Naval Combat or something other from the weird NATO perspective. I'm getting most of my info out of the 1984 and 85 version of Jane's.
>>2010>the P-500s being internalized would have compromised the stability and speed <proofNo it isn't, they literally just used the deck for a better purpose than it had been used for, it's not a dreadnought battleship, it's a light rocket cruiser meant to hit heavy and and fast. It's rocket tubes being on the deck don't matter.
>Kirovs themselves compromised by using the subsonic P-700s That got replaced using supersonic missiles once made available.
>considered external tubes as too much of a hazard Because if you look at the design of said tubes they are far different to the Slava configuration and ARE an obvious hazard, the Slave embedded them into the deck in a reclined position. The initial Kirov plans that got discarded had them mounted over th deck on hinges similar to to the Moskva-clas Heli-carrier but rather than for 4 tubes, it had been for single tubes, 4 on each side, fully exposed and tall. There is a marked difference in this.
>Janes 1984-85That explains it, you're using information that's out of date and/or based on the speculations that they had at the time.
My image is sourced from Modern Naval Combat by Chris and David Miller, but my information is largely from Russian naval sources.
>>2012you literally said
>>2009>something that internalizing the P-500s could compromise as they'd force the width to increase and worsen hydrodynamics of the ship. Also the Kirovs haven't actually been equipped with any other missiles in place of the P-700s, only now is Russia planning on replacing them with the 3M22 and that's only because they're ASMs being retrofitted for naval usage, on the Kirovs they're going to be used with Sabots(Quite clever actually) to fit in the tubes of the P-700s. But that's also besides the point since I was trying to point out that the Kirovs were designed with the P-500s or more specifically the intended specifications of the P-500's prototype requirements but scaled back during the design process as a compromise to allow considerations for other parts of the ship. And also to simplify logistics with the 3rd generation SSGNs that ended up becoming the Oscars.
Also the Atlant's tubes in a reclined position is a known hazard as it wasn't novel at the time, it was standard on both missile patrol boats, SSGN and smaller destroyers like the Sarychs, all of which used it due to weight saving and that they weren't going to be the focus of fire, and this was known as for the 3rd gen SSGNs after the Papa they wanted to make all cruise missile launch tubes imbedded but decided against it due to the absurd cost the Papa was already racking up although they did test with a couple with the Echo II testbeds for the P-500 but ultimately due to time and price constraints decided against it for the Oscars. Anyways the point is the external P-500s is a sign of refusal to compromise on firepower despite growing concerns on this placement at the time, and while it's a compromise, it's done at the expense of other departments of the ship rather than the firepower, which is what they should have done. Heck scaling back to the P-700s might have done the trick and also kept the firepower of a Kirov although I guess at that point the Kirov's hadn't switched to the P-700s on the drawing board.
Also actually I believe you have it mixed up, Modern Naval Combat is known for being a bit of a NATO shill, almost everything in it writes from the NATO perspective on such stuff even post-1991. Whereas Jane's is while I wouldn't say more accurate it definitely is a lot more direct from the source because of the weird context of Jane's in being a weird mutually agreed intel sharing phamphlet so that countries could spy on each other. The history of Jane's is weird.
>>2013>they'd force the width to increase and worsen hydrodynamics of the shipYes, as in make it slower due to drag, not unstable, if anything it'd have made it MORE stable due to the increased horizontal draft.
>he Atlant's tubes in a reclined position is a known hazardHow?
>it wasn't novel at the time And? It got used repeatedly for a reason. If it had been such a hazard the USSR'd not have used them, the costs would outweigh the benefits.
>it was standard on both missile patrol boatsNo, those are different configurations as they had not been embedded into the deck and sat on mounts on the deck.
>SSGN Not the same thing even remotely. The impact of water pressure at vertical angles is important in regards to missile launch and unless you're looking to create a system similar to Ballistic Missiles as is on Ohio class SSGNs, it's better to have the missiles angled slightly to aid in launch.
>ultimately due to time and price constraints decided against it for the OscarsEXCEPT THE OSCARS DO HAVE EMBEDDED LAUNCH TUBES. And the Charlie class literally took the launch systems from the Papa class, just downgraded and simplified to cut costs. The Papa class's cost is due to the automation, experimental nuclear reactors and titanium hull among other reasons, not the cruise missile systems.
>it's done at the expense of other departments of the ship rather than the firepower, which is what they should have doneThe Slava is not intended to be as complex as the Kirov and cutting back its firepower makes it pointless, it's not meant to have high-command capabilities, just act as a back up in case something happens. It is a problem today due to the Russian Navy pushing it into a leadership role even though it isn't meant to be, I never denied that, but that's not a ship design problem, that's a post-Soviet doctrine and corruption problem.
>Jane's is while I wouldn't say more accurate it definitely is a lot more direct from the source because of the weird context of Jane's in being a weird mutually agreed intel sharing phamphlet so that countries could spy on each other. Except a lot of times countries lied about their capabilities in Janes
>Modern Naval Combat is known for being a bit of a NATO shill True, but that's not my primary source, and their infographics are accurate and confirmed by Russian ones.
>>1969>Independents>Allen BurkeAre you using speech to text?
I thought the real goal of the LCS was muh Chyna?
>Cookie-Cutter Sharks sabotaged US Navy submarinesBased Comrade Shark!
https://archive.ph/2zJAR https://archive.ph/0kaiKBut seriously, did this happen to Soviet submarines?
>>3202>Nuclear submarines will never be fastPapa class and Alpha class say hello
>reasons <what is super-cavitation <what is stealth Life isn't a videogame anon.
>>3203I can understand supercavitation but stealth
Yeah I’m calling bs. Also submarine engines that take advantage of that phenomena are purely experimental partly because it’s difficult as shit to use but mostly because naval craft particularly submerged naval craft is rarely used since only countries with actually competent armies have them, and rarely will they go to war with each other
>>3204And your ignoring reality
I stated the physics of a submarine prevent it at moving at speeds past walking speeds for the overwhelming majority of submarines. Sure stealth has its utilities but it doesn’t make it move faster in any aspect it merely prevents the submarine from being detected by most radars
>>3205>your ignoring reality This coming from an grammatical illiterate
>the physics of a submarine prevent it at moving at speeds past walking speeds Even in WW2 the average underwater speed of a submarine had been 10 knots (18 km/hr). That is double walking speed (A walking speed of 3 to 4 miles per hour is typical for most people - 5km/h for metric).
Modern submarines using tear-drop hulls average 30 knots at cruising speed and most can go up to 35knots. The Papa class and Alpha class both shot up to 40+ knots and they never attempted to go faster despite the potential ability to, for perspective that's as fast as a car on a highway going roughly 60mph.
>stealth has its utilities but it doesn’t make it move faster in any aspect it merely prevents the submarine from being detected by most radars1) It's SONAR
2) The point is that submarines aren't supposed to be fast or be transported quickly, they already move fast enough to cross an Ocean in a day and they don't need to, they're not passenger craft, they're military machines tracking and hunting other ships.
>>3207The Soviets developed a super-cavitation torpedo in 1977 that can go 200nots 370 km/h 230mph and is basically a underwater rocket.
>The high speed is made possible by supercavitation, whereby a gas bubble surrounding the torpedo is created by outward deflection of water by its specially-shaped nose cone and the expansion of gases from its engine and the gas generator in the nose. This minimizes water contact with the torpedo, significantly reducing drag.
>The torpedo steers using four fins that skim the inner surface of the supercavitation gas bubble. To change direction, the fin(s) on the inside of the desired turn are extended, and the opposing fins are retracted.In principle this could be scaled up for an entire submarine
>>3209>mph We use km/h
Fucking cocksucking fucking faggot
Also the fastest speed a submarine has reached is 88km/h which was built over 70 dumb fuck years ago
>>3207What
>>3208 said. You talk about nuclear submarines like they're based on WW2 era conventional hulls that slow down underwater due to their hull design being optimized for the upper hull being above the water whereas the modern teardrop shape is optimized for high speeds entirely under the water without accounting for air friction, and yes to a submarine air has more drag than water does as weird as it sounds.
>>3204>>3206Stealth is not nearly as much as a factor as you think it is, its mostly propigated by the US because that's literally the only thing their subs did better than their Soviet counterparts… until the Soviets built the Akula and Victor IIIs which had rafter machinery basically making US subs redundant. Anyways, it's mostly useless because stealth only matters when your enemy is using passive sonar, AKA hiding and masking your sound signature, and the assumption is always to make it masked by masking it with environmental sounds however it can only ever get so quiet. The Soviets once again figured out the answer and masked it by simply changing the resonance and harmonics of their subs' engines on the fly, so if they're detected American subs check their database of Soviet sub sounds and realize it's actually a local trawler. Yes that thing from Red October sounding like a whale is a real thing and wasn't some experimental device but really just the engineer of any given sub hitting the engine slightly to change its pitch. As to why it only matters with passive sonar, that's cause you physically cannot hide from active sonar. Passive sonar is when you hear a ship's propellers whereas active is the pinging and works kinda like underwater radar. Anyways, you cannot hide from it since it WILL bounce off your hull since it physically exists. You can dampen it with rubber padding, you can misdirect it with thermal layers, or even try hiding on the bottom of the ocean but in general once your enemy turns on the pings, it's a game of cat and mouse.
And that's why stealth is trumped by speed. See speed is fucking life, since according to soviet simulations in the 1980s, all sub combat falls into 2 catagories: launching an attack from out of range or the game of cat and mouse. So positioning in both is key, both to get into an attack position and to dodge sweeps and attacks. Now you might say well speed doesn't mean you can dodge torpedoes but yes it fucking does. The Papa and Alfa class scared NATO so much because they could literally outrun and go deeper than any of their deeprunning torpedoes and in the UK at least caused a crash programme to develop the Tigerfish torpedo. And even if a torpedo catches up to you, a weird quirck of how water physics work is that the faster you go, the better you turn since you get more water moving over the control surfaces, meaning more drag meaning your drift better, so you want to go fast in order to turn fast to get under or over a torpedo since that's how submarine tactics work when dodging torpedoes(Launch a decoy, torp goes for decoy does a 90 degree turn to come back around and catch you but you've move above its search circle in a 3D plane). Also check
>>1223 as to why they don't do supercavitating submarines, it's not because the reactors can't handle it(The Soviets literally design liquid metal reactors to work on deep running subs because of the reason OP stated), but because of the human factor. The Papa and Alfa only went 47 and 45 knots respectively because their crews were too afraid to go any faster lest they DO actually supercavitate which is a very very slippery slope since once you start supercavitating it's hard to not go even faster and they didn't want to be fucking squished since that did almost happen on the Papa class's speed trial.
>>3210>Muh km/hI literally used that earlier you illiterate single-minded, moron. And Knots are used by all navies.
>Fucking cocksucking fucking faggotYeah, we know you are, and?
>the fastest speed a submarine has reached is 88km/hAnd you cretin? You're literally proving the point.
>was built over 70 Again, you're making yourself look stupider, technology has advanced since then, making it EASIER for engineers to make submarines EXCEEDING that speed, you cretin.
>>3211>Stealth is not nearly as much as a factor as you think it isYes it is, the Soviet submarines after the November class had comparable quietness to American ones through the decades. Those that detect the enemy first and remain undetected have the first-strike advantage. It' proven given that the Kilo class "black hole" are a major risk to the American navy including other submarines, and numerous tests using comparable DE boats have proven the viability of DE boats ambushing noisier, bigger targets like nuke boats.
>stealth only matters when your enemy is using passive sonarWhich is most of the time during military sub patrols, you don't reveal your position unless necessary, even in Cat/Mouse games. Obviously speed is also important but neither can be neglected anon.
> >>3214No it's not, yes passive sonar is what is used 99% of the time but it's an incredibly complicated system that involves matching sound signatures and profiles with limited range, thermal variation, sound quality and and the screws of the ships with the sonar. The loudest Soviet sub was around 150 db, the loudest US sub was around 115 db. A humpback whale is 80 db. The Papa class was 125 db, Alfa 120, Oscar 115, Los Angeles 115, Viktor III 110, Akula 105 db. And yes you're right after the November Soviet subs did get a lot quieter but was never the main priority since positioning was the key above all else. They didn't want to get close to NATO battlegroups, they wanted to speed into range of a force, launch their payloads and get out. Even Soviet SSNs were designed specifically out position NATO SSNs, that meant running deeper, faster and a heavier payload. Stealth with passive sonar only matters if you're trying to sneak up and listen in on someone, but to the Soviets they didn't want to do that. NATO did, because they wanted to tail and follow Soviet subs. And like I said, the Soviets just flipped the table and outranshumanistATO weapons, they could approach full speed at an enemy and there wasn't jack shit they could do to them, they were essentially untouchable. In fact Soviet subs buzzed US subs all the time, often coming close to them, racing ahead, waiting for the US sub to catch up, then racing off again taking them on a wild goose chase. And you have completely avoided active sonar, it's not like radar where its use is coveted, is an enemy wants to protect something you bet your ass they're probably blasting active the whole time. US carrier groups ALWAYS have active on, which again is why the Soviets prefer outranging and outpositioning. And if they wanted to be stealthy, Soviet subs had something called a creep motor which was a little deployable electric screw that floated 50m above the main sub that propelled it at 2 knots and had a noise rating of 20 db. That's what they used when they wanted to be stealthy, diesel boats like the Whiskey and Kilo can't use it as they don't have the energy output for it, but a nuclear sub can.
>>3215>diesel boats like the Whiskey and Kilo can't use it as they don't have the energy output for itbecause that's essentially the default of their electric motors.
You make an interesting post but you aren't really arguing against me, you don't have to begin every post as "No" and then proceed to post facts that I never even argued against.
A couple months ago Western Press released a little talked about article about how the HMS Swiftsure of the Swiftsure class submarine "secretly" photographed the bottom of a Soviet Carrier and was "undetected". This is both laughable and not true as discussed in the topwar.ru article I've linked below.
It boils down to simple statements: A) it's virtually impossible to avoid detection from the reported position the British submariners claimed.
B) The photographed screw is not of a Kiev Class Heavy Aircraft Carrying Cruiser, moreover it is not rotating, does not have motion blur and lacks cavitation bubbles, indicating a still screw, meaning the photograph is of a ship not moving or not moving at full speed. Overall, the propeller-steering mechanisms, the stem and the "Orion" SONAR bulge do not look like that on the Kiev.
This leads to
C) The most economic fuel speed for a carrier group of the Kiev class was 18 Knots. The Swiftsure would have to maintain 12 Knots or less to avoid tripping acoustics, so it could not have been able to just come up and move with the group "undetected"
The Swiftsure could not keep up silent creeping fast enough to come up and do these photographs, as aircraft carriers are deceptively fast ships and so the photographs are bullshit. The only way for a Swiftsure to take a photograph of the Kiev would be to lie in wait in the path of the carrier (something they can't know for sure) and keep silent, letting the ships pass overhead. HOWEVER to take multiple photographs it needs to move with the group. You can hide from ONE Anti-Submarine Ship in the SONAR/acoustic "shadow" of the other ships, but at 18 Knots the rest of the ships WILL hear the submarine. An ASW formation is 360 degrees by 180 degrees of sensors and the ships are constantly scanning.
An example of one of the articles:
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/how-a-british-submarine-spent-hours-under-a-russian-aircraft-carrier The debunk:
https://topwar.ru/214375-najti-sovetskij-avianosec-podlodka-hms-swiftsure-i-krejser-kiev.html In 1977, from April 14 to April 22, a detachment of ships as part of the TAVKR "Kiev", BOD "Admiral Nakhimov", "Marshal Timoshenko", "Admiral Isakov", "Smyshlenny" took part in the command-staff exercises "North-77" and exercises for air defense of the fleet "Relay-77" under the leadership of the Civil Code of the Navy. During these exercises, a detachment of ships and the tanker "Genrikh Hasanov" made a trip to the Lofoten Islands in difficult weather conditions. In April, The Norwegian Sea has water temperature +4.1 Celcius, air temperature -5.0 Celcius. Often stormy weather. Under such conditions, the Norwegian current along the coast at a depth of 50-100m with a salinity of 35 bends the beam of the Hydro Acoustic System* down.
*Example of a Soviet ГАК
http://bastion-opk.ru/sonar-mgk-335-platina/>>3409I meant that Azure Lane is more of an anime thing.
As for models get whichever you like better, or think is cooler. As for model brands, IDK, not really a model guy.
https://minipark.by/product/sovetskij-linkor-marat/ sells a lot of ships.
Just wanted to make a post about Submarine sensing equipment
Systems like SONAR are not the only method of detection and navigation they possess (hell even SONAR isn't that simple either as like RADAR, it has various types with different capabilities_ systems such as SOKS arrays provide alternative means of detection and tracking.
You won't find much information on this in English webpages, but Russian ones have a neat list
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Обнаружение_подводных_лодок?useskin=vector https://dzen.ru/a/YRnCQ9Pw3yVk-3Gq SOKS specific information
>>3521what
>>3523 said. you'd be better off using the other side of the spectrum, like some kind of longwave radar that has a chance of penetrating a few 100 m
r/NonCredibleDefense posted pic rel and is laughing about it… do they not realize that they've just admitted that Ukraine has no navy anymore? Do they not realize that Russia isn't planning to use these drones for Ukraine, but against future opponents (NATO)? Why are they like this (other than being reddit)? Is it the Copium?
Onto the subject of ships vs drones in general. The question becomes
is surface naval warfare heading back to THICC belt and bulge armor and protection belts? Or does it go straight into the trash bin? To this there are several answers so far other than up-armoring or phasing out warships. But first let me address why up-armoring would be unlikely
Bulge Armor (pic 2) Also known as Torpedo Blisters, were essentially thick layers of bulging armor with extra bulkheads under the waterline of ships-of-the-line and some other large warships; Battleships, Battlecruisers, Heavy Cruisers, some Aircraft Carriers etc. This was done because the older Torpedo Belts and Bulkheads were insufficient against newer, larger torpedoes. These were later phased out with the aircraft carrier making battleships easy targets and later the advent of cruise missiles completely negated the entire point of heavy armor. Torpedoes also developed acoustic tracking heads and attacked from below, detonating on or under the ships keel and breaking its back, bypassing the bulge entirely. Making an all around thick hull of a ship was more costly and massive than it would be worth - even compared to the enormous Nuclear Aircraft Carriers that were being deployed at the time - so that idea wasn't even floated. Of course against semi-submersible and surface drones this bulge plating would be sufficient. The problem of bulge armor, is that unless it was able to be spectacularly modular, it would be hard to replace and fix after each impact, and it still is damage directly to the hull. Thus it makes it far too costly a solution. Moreover, no matter how sleek external bulges were made, they still created drag in the water, degrading the hydrodynamic performance of the ships increasing fuel consumption and so on.
Link Rel concerning torpedo damage:
https://archive.ph/C5LHi https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torpedo_bulkhead?useskin=vector https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torpedo_belt?useskin=vectorhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-torpedo_bulge?useskin=vector The idea of phasing out ships entirely is unlikely, although automation will make future ships far smaller and with smaller crew compliments, as Soviet Submarines like the Akula Class and Alpha Class prove. However drone ships are not going to replace manned ships for a long time if ever, because of a variety of reasons, ranging from the risks of jamming transmissions making a ship helpless, to the possibility of rogue AI and the problems of one or even a set of people controlling a ship's functions from afar, which is much harder than it may seem. Mankind has been sailing the seas for millennia and will not likely stop soon, militarily or otherwise.
P 1/?
>>3677 First, some more information on the effectiveness and capabilities of Kamikaze sea-drones.
-
https://topwar.ru/218369-napadenie-na-ivan-hurs-i-amerikanskie-uchenija-vyzov-tysjacheletija-2002-kak-primer-buduschih-ugroz-k-kotorym-poka-esche-ne-gotov-ni-odin-flot-mira.html -
https://topwar.ru/216250-pri-zatjagivanii-svo-unichtozhenie-ukrainskimi-morskimi-dronami-korablej-chernomorskogo-flota-vmf-rf-jeto-vsego-lish-vopros-vremeni.html Now onto the other ideas I've seen or had.
CIWS systems are very effective, but low-down targets are hard to spot, so improving Look-Down capability would be useful against small sea drones.
A more radical idea floated around by some Russians was a proposal for a set up that resembled
Torpedo Nets from the late 19th, early 20th century. But rather than wire nets, the idea would be to use armored plates, like spaced armor on the Panzer IVs, which could be raised or dropped as needed. Against semi-submersible drones and surface drones this would be effective, however the added weight and (when dropped) drag would slow the ships speed, increase fuel consumption and make it a larger RADAR target. In the long-term maintaining the booms would be a hassle as well, given the strain on the joints lifting heavy armor up and down as well as possible explosion impacts. That's not taking into account the impact on balance in the water and the potential of capsizing in a storm.
(pic 1)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torpedo_net?useskin=vector Finally a possibility is also found in the ground-effect and hydroplaning. A large, heavily armed
Ekranoplan like the Lun would be immune to such marine drones and has the distinct advantage of being extremely fast and relatively hard to spot on RADAR due to its wave-hugging tendencies. Making such Ekranoplans is made even easier by modern technology able to create lighter building materials like composites for non-critical areas, compacter technology such as sights and RADAR, requiring less space, and newer weaponry. This appears to be a potential angle the Russian Navy is looking into reviving (pic 2).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lun-class_ekranoplan?useskin=vector http://www.hisutton.com/Russian-Navy-Ekranoplan-WIG.html Alternatively
Hydrofoil ships such as the could work as well, with such classes of ships used in anti-ship, anti-submarine and anti-mine roles in several Navies over the decades, particularly the USSR and Russia still operates a few classes of hydrofoil ships like the Muravey-class patrol boat. The hull being lifted over the water makes a tougher and less vulnerable target to hit. However Russia has not announced plans for new hydrofoil ships so its unlikely, even though the HMCS Bras d'Or (FHE 400) and USS Plainview proved that they can be made quite large and remain fast. The Soviet Sarancha class Hydrofoil was a good example of that, but it never left the prototype stage unfortunately. (pic 3)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydrofoil?useskin=vector https://www.autoevolution.com/news/this-ex-us-navy-hydrofoil-flew-across-the-water-now-it-rots-in-an-oregon-mudflat-171369.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMCS_Bras_d%27Or_(FHE_400)?useskin=vector https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Малые_ракетные_корабли_проекта_1240?useskin=vector https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41048/the-soviet-era-hurricane-high-speed-missile-boat-had-absolutely-gargantuan-hydrofoils https://en.topwar.ru/184260-korabl-s-gigantskimi-podvodnymi-kryljami-mrk-proekta-1240-uragan.html Also, for close to shore roles, a
Hovercraft could work since it can essentially glide over many mines, barely has any water displacement and is very fast, making it a difficult target for marine drones as well. The Zubr class LCAC is the largest made so far and has proven to be an able platform capable of carrying several tanks and hundreds of troops while armed with MLRS launchers and CIWS autocannons. Making it more offensively armed wouldn't be a big problem. (pic 4)
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Судно_на_воздушной_подушке?useskin=vector Hover Craft (As a side note, the Russian designation is more accurate)
https://warspot.ru/2131-bystrye-dorogie-nevostrebovannye Nuclear giant hovercraft projects.
http://www.barque.ru/shipbuilding/1974/first_hovercraft https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Малые_десантные_корабли_на_воздушной_подушке_проекта_12322?useskin=vector https://www.seaships.ru/svp.htm Object 760, Soviet Hover tank
https://novate.ru/blogs/240519/50471/Finally although a bit of a failure with Littoral Combat Ships, the Trimaran ship hull set up would make for a a ship more resistant to hull damage below the waterline, as there are essentially redundant hulls to provide buoyancy. Throw in decent belt armor and bulkheads and you have a decently resistant ship without needing exorbitant amounts of armor. (pic 5)
https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/trimaran/ These options prioritizing speed and maneuverability over armor would also make for harder targets by potential future sea-drones utilizing mounted remote weapon systems like ATGMs and machineguns instead of suicide attacks. As well as fully submersible kamikaze drones (discount torpedoes).
http://www.hisutton.com/Ukraine-Marichka-AUV.html P2/2
>Western News claims that a Chinese Nuclear Submarine has had an accident >China denies it all>BBC: British intelligence could track down a sunken Chinese Navy submarine through a PLA officer's Apple Watch Fucking comedy
A Submarine must do pic rel to communicate at depth. Is remote connection of an Apple Watch possible through non-existent cell phone towers in the Yellow Sea, through the water column and the metal hull of the submarine? No, obviously not.
Yes, the watch could start searching for a network, and the RTR satellite(s) saw these network search requests from the watch, so you can determine where these requests are coming from (although theoretically the watch itself should first “see” some network, and after that trying to establish contact with this network). When the boat is underwater (and the clock is inside the boat) it is unlikely that the signals from the clock will reach anywhere.
This isn't the first time such nonsense has been written either
https://трымава.рф/?p=3532 The Catalina PB-Y may make a modernized comeback.
It's one of my favorite non-soviet flying boats
https://topwar.ru/223513-gidrosamolet-pby-catalina-projdet-modernizaciju-i-vernetsja-v-seriju.htmlReposting this with an expansion because people seem to be nonces that have no idea what a cruise-missile strike does to a ship. I very much recommend reading the links.
The idea that the Neptun could reach Snake Island is not impossible - 270km from shore, for a 280km range missile -though at the limits of its range. However a pair of subsonic cruise missile not being shot-down by a cruiser that mounts a massive amount of Air Defense is ridiculous. The Neptun is based on the Kh-35 which is itself meant to be an extremely light anti-ship missile meant for smaller, lightly defended ships with limited air-defense capability. This is reflected in the 150kg warhead and subsonic flight speed. It is NOT meant to target larger warships because of associated air-defense capabilities of those ships.
https://archive.ph/DqNrP https://archive.ph/t4Q79 https://archive.ph/fjlHI The relatively intact status of the ship also indicates this: The Neptun is subsonic, but still a fast and a large missile that upon theoretical impact would cause much more damage, even just from kinetic force alone, let alone an explosive warhead. The explosions from US naval tests of the Tomahawk and Harpoon cruise missiles absolutely devastated the ships they were hitting, ships that were without fuel or ammunition in the magazine.
See
https://www.quora.com/Why-have-big-battleships-e-g-USS-Iowa-and-the-Bismarck-become-obsolete-in-modern-navies/answer/Chuck-GarenThe ship is likely going to be raised after the war and if not for a storm, could have reached dry-dock.
https://archive.ph/oFh1o The current theory is that of diversion/sabotage causing the explosion or fire, however for now the investigation into it has not been published.
https://archive.ph/64wDe>>4133>However a pair of subsonic cruise missile not being shot-down by a cruiser that mounts a massive amount of Air Defense is ridiculous. The Neptun is based on the Kh-35 which is itself meant to be an extremely light anti-ship missile meant for smaller, lightly defended ships with limited air-defense capability. This is reflected in the 150kg warhead and subsonic flight speed. It is NOT meant to target larger warships because of associated air-defense capabilities of those ships. Ukraine managed to send two storm shadow cruise missiles across Crimea and sunk a Russian navy vessel two kilometers from a S-400 air defence system. This is even more ridiculous than missing two sea skimming cruise missiles.
>The current theory is that of diversion/sabotage causing the explosion or fire, however for now the investigation into it has not been published. Wow, I have no idea why Ru MoD thinks such lies are less embarrassing than just admitting the obvious, that it was sunk by cruise missiles. And only westerners believe that shit. Whenever MoD sources let loose such a lie, they get clowned to hell on telegram.
>>4134>Ukraine managed to send two storm shadow cruise missiles across Crimea and sunk a Russian navy vessel two kilometers from a S-400 air defence system. If you are referring to the recent hitting of the Novacherkassk, it wasn't sunk, it was damaged while docked, at night. The Su-24s that launched the missiles were both shot down. Moreover the strike involved using NATO surveillance coordination for extreme-terrain hugging, which let the missiles hide behind the hills of Crimea and lets the Ukrainians know exactly where Russian air defense is stationed in Crimea. The Storm Shadows are also supplemented with MALD decoys and are themselves stealthy cruise missiles. This is not only completely different than a strike over the open ocean and on a moving ship, but also involved NATO guidance. So no, it is not more ridiculous, especially as an air defense monitoring an entire peninsula with highly varied terrain and a stealthy cruise missile paired with decoys, is incomparable to a centralized air defense system for one singular ship, attacked during daytime.
>Ru MoD thinks such lies <It's a lie but even if its not its so embarrassing lolOk NAFO, cope harder
>it was sunk by cruise missiles Ah yes cruise missiles that left no holes and no wreckage even though even a puny Exocet can cause immense hull damage (see USS Stark photograph related), two equivalent missiles hitting a cruiser is going to be visible, yet not a single photo of the Moskva shows evidence of a cruise missile impact. Westoid coolaid has melted your brain.
>Whenever MoD sources let loose such a lie, they get clowned to hell on telegram. <Le online armchair warriors are totally laughing at them and that matters because the Russian government totally cares about the opinion of a couple thousand retards talking out of their assLMAO that loss at Maryinka must really be bothering you lot.
Russia's military has placed the K-3 Leninskiy Komsomol as a wholesale terrestrial exhibit in Kronshtdat's Naval Museum as of the 26th of December 2023. The K-3 was the first Soviet Nuclear Submarine and first SSN проект 627(А) «Кит», NATO reporting name November, and served in the Soviet Navy from August 9th of 1957 until its fall in 1991, far longer than the first US SSN the USS Nautilus which only served from 1954 to 1980. Unlike the Nautilus the November was designed from the start with the tear-drop nose that is now ubiquitous on submarines today. Overall as a first generation SSN, the November Class, contrary to Western Media's presentation was very successful and competitive with Contemporary US SSNs. The main competitors of Project 627(A) were the first US submarine projects: “Nautilus”, “ Skate", "Skipjack". Compared to the previously built Nautilus and Skate (1955-1958), Project 627 had a number of undeniable advantages in speed, armament, diving depth, and compared to the Skipjack class boats built simultaneously, Project 627 boats were larger, were not inferior in speed, were still better armed, superior in size, but had higher noise. Submarine crew sizes were similar despite the size difference due to the focus on automation in even the early November Class, something that the USA only began to use more often in later submarines.
https://topwar.ru/233218-v-muzee-voenno-morskoj-slavy-v-kronshtadte-otkrylas-jekspozicija-pervoj-sovetskoj-apl-k-3-leninskij-komsomol.html https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/15427709>>4135>If you are referring to the recent hitting of the Novacherkassk, it wasn't sunk, it was damaged while docked, at night. The Su-24s that launched the missiles were both shot down. Moreover the strike involved using NATO surveillance coordination for extreme-terrain hugging, which let the missiles hide behind the hills of Crimea and lets the Ukrainians know exactly where Russian air defense is stationed in Crimea.Evidence?
inb4 MoD said so
>>4138>Makes baseless assertion<gets explained why they're wrong>P-proofs?<From the guy that provided no proof for their own claims, just hearsay and Western narratives based on no fact. LMAO it's /k/ope hours again, go back.
>inb4 MoD said soThe Russian MoD has been far more candid than any Ukrainian or Western media or government service, while they may not openly display losses, they do not go out of their way to deny actual ones, only fictional numbers and statements made by Western propagandists.
Regardless; NATO surveillance being used to target Crimea has been noted several times, Global Hawk drones and various AWACs and reconnaissance aircraft like them fly over the Black Sea just within international airspace, during the same time as Ukrainian attacks. Satellites are also usually positioned in those areas, HIMARS rockets including ATACMS are literally GPS guided. NATO and the USA are actively supporting Ukrainian war efforts and haven't hidden their intentions at all.
There was no such thing regarding the Moskva, no aerial surveillance capable of transmitting target coordinates - NATO or Ukrainian - was flying near it, precisely because it's got a hell of an air-defense and any surveillance aircraft would be tracked by air defense systems gone on alert.
As for the Crimea strike, this is very obvious to anyone that knows how and why terrain-hugging aircraft and cruise missiles do what they do, and the relevance to RADAR. The F-111 was literally built for this and was highly successful because of it, able to evade the RADAR of SA 2 and SA-3 SAMs because of it, forcing the North Vietnamese to use Anti-Aircraft Artillery and machine guns to fend it off.
>>4141>The Russian MoD has been far more candid than any Ukrainian or Western media or government service, while they may not openly display losses, they do not go out of their way to deny actual ones, only fictional numbers and statements made by Western propagandists.
no
>>3645Same as any breaching armaments I suppose - carbine assault rifles, shot-guns and pistols for small-arms, and maybe an axe and breaching charges for breaking down doors and such. Also tear-gas grenade launchers to smoke out defensive positions. Hypothetically speaking of course.
TL;DR: The the same equipment requirements as for Naval Special Forces ops around the world.
Returning to the topic of the Sea Drone threat to warships:
Ukraine finally sank its first ship using their drone boats. On the night of January 31st of 2024, Ukrainian drone boats launched a mass attack on the Project 1241.1 Molniya (NATO designation Tarantul-III Class) Guided Missile Corvette "Ivanovets". This was part of a recent mass assault on the Black Sea Fleet and its bases by Ukrainian drones and cruise missiles, guided by NATO reconnaissance aircraft flying over Romanian and International Waters, preventing them from being valid targets to shoot down. Most of the attacks have been successfully countered with most missiles and drones being shot down.
Unfortunately it is inevitable that some incoming may get through, especially with NATO's assistance. The Ivanovets was caught alone several kilometers out from Donuzlav naval base by 9 unmanned boats and sank by three impacts after a prolonged night battle wherein it managed to destroy several attacking boats before being hit. The crew evacuated after the third impact and later the Moskit anti-ship missiles it carried detonated, sinking the ship.
The Black Sea Fleet has been tangling with this drone threat for the past 2 years and this is the first actual resulting loss. Prior drone attacks have mostly failed, with dozens being destroyed or disabled without reaching their targets, and the few that have hit ships only damaged them. While unfortunate, this sinking is a minor casualty in the overall war, as Ukraine has no navy to speak of and the sinking of this ship does not reverse or stop its territorial losses.
Details on the Ship:
https://www.kchf.ru/eng/ship/warfarecorvettes/ivanovets.htmhttps://podolyaka.ru/protivnik-opublikoval-kadry-gibeli-raketnogo-katera-ivanovets-proekta-12411-molniya-chernomorskogo-flota-na-reyde-ozera-donuzlav-v-krymu/https://southfront.press/ukrainian-naval-drones-destroyed-russian-missile-corvette-ivanovets/>>4421>Unfortunately it is inevitable that some incoming may get through, especially with NATO's assistance. The Ivanovets was caught alone several kilometers out from Donuzlav naval base The Ivanovets was sunk in a former lake that is connected by a 400 meter wide channel to the sea. There are few if any waterways in Crimea that are more defensible than that.
The main reason why Ukrainian drones don't sink more of the Black Sea fleet is that most vessels are restricted to the harbors or moved out of range from Crimea long ago.
>>4424Thanks for proving that all you've done is read the introductory paragraphs of Western MSM. It was not sunk in the lake, it was sunk several kilometers off the coast of said naval base, which you can see in the pic I posted. It was alone on patrol outside the harbor, not as part of a group, which means that it was not, in fact, easily defensible. This is not like an aerial threat, where-in SAMs can cover huge swathes of the sky from long range. A small marine target requires close ranges to be detected and fired-upon, which is why most anti-ship cruise missiles fly low over the water to avoid detection before striking their targets. No matter if the ship detected them and immediately sent transmissions as to the situation, there is no possibility for another ship or aircraft to respond in time to assist in defense.
>The main reason why Ukrainian drones don't sink more of the Black Sea fleet is that most vessels are restricted to the harbors or moved out of range from CrimeaCouch /k/ope nonsense with no proofs.
>>4488>don't know the whereabouts and no footage of a 112 meter vessel easily in sight range fron the coastSunk
Southfront of course used the least informative videos, but the first one shows a tug boat to the right of the smoke column from ammo that cooked off within the Kunikov wreckage.
There is much more hard evidence for the sinking of the Caesar Kunikov than there is for the Moskva. And the Moskva even looked better on the last images taken.
>>4489>112 meters is somehow supposed to mean something AT SEA. >Southfront of course used the least informative videos >of courseAh its this faggot again. Go back.
> from ammo that cooked off I said this in the Ukraine thread, I'll say it again, WHAT FUCKING AMMO COOK-OFF? IT IS A LANDING SHIP, IT DOESN'T HAVE A MAGAZINE TO COOK-OFF AND CERTAINLY NOT IN THE AREA WHERE IT WAS IMPACTED ON THE DRONE FOOTAGE.
>There is hard evidence for the sinking of the Caesar Kunikov Where? A ship partially capsized =/= sunk, otherwise by that metric I've sunk a few boats in my youth too. The Ivanovets DID have proof it sank, we see a massive explosion and the ship clearly sinking under the waves.
>>4492 1) Proof of ban? I don't remember such an announcement.
2) Landing ships are not used to transport ammunition or general cargo, they're LANDING ships, they transport troops and vehicles.
3) The Novocherkassk is yet another example of why I don't believe Western Media, I haven't seen a single proof of it destroyed. The photos of it supposedly being destroyed at dock are literally incomprehensible, because there's no clearly visible wreckage of a SHIP, just some fire damage to the land, and inb4 "le ebic storm shadows destroyed it that badly" 3 of those missiles directly hit a corvette in dry dock and the damage was mostly in regards to the superstructure and RADAR and whatnot. the hull was barely damaged in spite of 3 direct impacts, and the Buyan corvettes are MUCH smaller than a large landing ship.
>>4501LOL I meant to greentext something else in
>>4498 but accidentally copied my initial search result. I found photos after opening Google Images.
https://archive.is/oZAtS >>4600Another ship was sank last week, Sergei Kotov a Project 22160 patrol ship named after a Soviet Admiral and war veteran. It sank trying to limp to port after being hit by multiple drones in a large drone swarm, many of which it destroyed. It's close position the Kerch strait and bridge has led some to theorize it was hit while defending the bridge, which is a credible reason*. The ship previously defeated 3 drone attacks prior to this.
*Reasons for credence
1) Ukraine has attacked the bridge and damaged it before, with the Truck Bomb
2) Russia has used marine drones to blow up Ukrainian bridges early on in the conflict
3) The recent leaked talks of the Bundeswehr using Taurus missiles to hit the bridge not long after this sinking, and the repeated attempts with Storm Shadow cruise missiles in recent times
https://southfront.press/patrol-ship-sergey-kotov-of-russian-black-sea-fleet-lost-last-battle-against-ukrainian-unmanned-boats/ >>4135If there isn't proof that Storm Shadows are quickly losing what effectiveness they had, the recent failure of the massive assault is proof enough. Only 2 missiles made it through the SAMs in spite of several NATO recon aircraft guiding them and NATO forces helping program the missiles and GPS guidance as well. Those 2 missiles failed to hit any ships.
Nine aircraft (presumably Su-24M and Su-27) took off from Starokonstantinov, two MiG-29 from the Uman airfield and another Su-27 from Mirgorod. After reaching the line in Zatoka , Novaya Odessa and Snigirevka, Storm Shadow/SCALP, ADM-160 and Neptune missiles were launched.
https://southfront.press/satellite-imagery-confirmed-storm-shadow-missiles-missed-targets-in-sevastopol-crimea/ I think Electronic Warfare had a part in this as its been reported that GPS guided munitions like Excalibur and Himars missiles have been losing effectiveness.
>>4129https://topwar.ru/237013-pressa-ssha-v-hode-ukrainskogo-konflikta-boepripasy-s-gps-navedeniem-okazalis-ne-tak-jeffektivny.html I stated this before but Ukraine's lack of a functional navy, especially after Russian forces captured the few patrol boats it had back in 2022, means Russia can't exactly demonstrate the same anti-shipping results that Ukraine has. However Ukraine has become more desperate in stalling the Russian advance and thrown its remaining brown-water navy into the fray. Moreover Belgium the Netherlands and Scandinavia are going to send patrol boats, gunboats and mine-trawlers to Ukraine as well, providing more targets.
https://topwar.ru/238577-niderlandy-i-belgija-planirujut-popolnit-ukrainskij-flot-esche-tremja-korabljami-protivominnoj-oborony.html As a result Russia's drones have started to strike back with both Lancet and FPV aerial drones, and with boat-drones.
https://southfront.press/russian-unmanned-boat-attacked-suspicious-ukrainian-steamer-in-kherson-region/ https://topwar.ru/238512-kadry-porazhenija-ukrainskogo-patrulnogo-katera-v-rajone-nikolaeva-dronom-kamikadze-lancet-pojavilis-v-seti.html https://southfront.press/in-video-russian-lancet-destroyed-ukrainian-armored-gunboat-in-mykolaiv-region/ https://southfront.press/in-video-russian-lancet-uav-struck-patrol-boat-probably-from-us-in-rear-mykolaiv-region/The US Navy never learns
>US financiers say that creating a new landing ship could cost three times more than originally thought
>All-adjusted for 2024 inflation, early estimates indicate that the 18-ship LSM program will cost between $6,2 billion and $7,8 billion, or $340 million to $430 million per ship. That's three times more than the US Navy's $2,6 billion estimate, or $150 million per ship.
>A financial report released April 11 noted the program would cost between $11,9 billion and $15 billion in 2024 dollars if the service ultimately procures the 35 ships required by the Marine Corps.
>The report identifies challenges in projecting the cost of the program, given remaining questions about what the entire project will look like and how the program will be used. In addition, there are inconsistencies between the way the US Navy and Marine Corps talk about the future of this program.
>The number of ships the U.S. will ultimately buy has not yet been determined, as the Marine Service has discussed purchasing 18 units while the Marines insist it needs 35 units.
>Experts have prepared cost estimates based on the hybrid military-commercial ship design that Navy and Marine Corps leaders have said they will pursue. If the landing ships are initially built according to all the announced standards, then this will increase the cost of the entire project to 3 billion for 18 ships, and to 6 billion for 35 ships, respectively.
>In turn, the use of simplified qualities and functionality of civil shipbuilding will reduce the entire project budget by 10 billion in the maximum version of 35 ships.
>For the record, the Navy originally planned to begin procurement in fiscal year 2023, but for budgetary reasons this was pushed back to 2025. The vessels will have a draft of 3,6 meters, will be able to travel about 6500 kilometers at a speed of 14 knots, and will approach the coastline to load and unload vehicles and supplies. The number of crew members of such ships is 70 sailors, the landing force is up to 50 military personnel.
>>4837>>4833How well this will work is questionable considering the extreme problems the US Navy is having over the past decade. Already the Littoral Combat Ships have been having members retired despite not serving nearly the usual time naval ships do because of inherent defects, the LCU Utility 1700* line is delayed and stuck in the docks and
>>4811 we can see that finance gauging is not the strong-suit of the MIC (Military Industrial Complex). The US Navy has diminished carrier capability despite its struggle to maintain and produce new carriers of different types
>>3861 . The F-35's pricey, complicated and unready nature (
>>3151 ) also impacts the carriers, as they lack proper mission readiness required if a large scale conflict breaks out, as is the current fear of an Iran-Israel war
https://topwar.ru/237020-desantnye-katera-ostajutsja-na-stapeljah-vms-ssha-rastorgli-kontrakt-na-postrojku-lcu-utility-1700.html https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2022/05/10/the-littoral-combat-ships-latest-problem-class-wide-structural-defects-leading-to-hull-cracks/ >>4853It's truly the floating F-35.
Maybe it's for the best that the US has kept the same service rifle for half a century, I can't imagine what kind of hilarious abomination they would come up with from trying to redesign it
>>4854>Maybe it's for the best that the US has kept the same service rifle for half a century, I can't imagine what kind of hilarious abomination they would come up with from trying to redesign itThe funny part is that the first M-16 was an absolute garbage fire to the point that troops preferred heavy M-14 or picked up AK-47s over it. I remember writing an essay in school about it years back. The AR-15 and M4 still has trouble shaking off that reputation, even in spite of all the problems being long since fixed and it actually being a good rifle now.
Also the US Army has been trying to replace the M4 for decades at this point, its just all attempts failed and looked like Starship Troopers parodies.
>>4856 >>4859 >>4857 >>4858As OP This belongs in the AR thread.
That being said: the Marines' replacement is just a modern H&K, not significantly different. The XM-8 and others looked cool, but it has severe overheating issues when firing and it doesn't appear to be very modular, meaning any jamming or need to clean the weapon is going to be problematic. Electronic sights are also pretty temperamental at the moment.
The Russian Navy is slowly modernizing its fleet of Oscar and Oscar II class submarines into the Project-949AM standard. The modernization replaces some electronics, overhauls the structure and most importantly re-arms the submarine with newer cruise missiles such as the hypersonic Zirkon. Most importantly it also raises the number of such missiles carried to 72 per vessel, meaning that a single Oscar-III (presumed new NATO name) would be powerful enough to rain hell on an entire Carrier Taskforce and now, also have the capability to singlehandedly launch a massive barrage on a land target, all while under-water, which means that counter-measures will have a much harder time taking it out and countering the suddenly appearing missiles, as their lack of time in the air (by comparison to surface or air-launched versions) means they're on RADAR for much less.
So far one has been completed, another is in the process and the plan is to make at least 6 of these, with the possibility of decommissioned ones also being put back into service. Pic rel is the Oscar-II which is already a formidable SSGN in its own right.
https://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-769.html https://ria.ru/20220111/podlodki-1767257506.html https://topwar.ru/240753-the-national-interest-rossijskie-apl-proekta-949a-antej-do-sih-por-pugajut-vms-ssha.html https://www.alternathistory.ru/proekt-949am-samaya-vooruzhyonnaya-submarina-rossii/As I spoke of in
>>4814 helicopters are effective anti-drone weapons, and Russia has used them against the marine drones of Ukraine.
Footage of an attack by a Russian Ka-29 helicopter on Ukraine’s new missile naval drones in the area of the northwestern coast of the Crimean Peninsula has been published. The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense "Group 13" used in this attack for the first time a new modification of naval drones equipped with two air-to-air missiles, presumably R-73 or R-60. This design made naval drones more dangerous weapons, but at the same time made them easier to destroy, since missiles on drones are easy to detonate. Five unmanned boats of the Ukrainian army were reportedly destroyed. According to Ukrainian media reports, a Russian boat was destroyed; this has not been officially confirmed by Russian media. The video shows an alleged attack by a Ukrainian naval drone. Russian military sources report only 2 damaged vessels.
https://southfront.press/russian-military-responded-to-ukrainian-media-attack-on-crimea/ https://www.airwar.ru/enc/sh/ka29.html>>4952Several of the drones involved in this and some more recent attacks washed up ashore Crimea. Mi-35Ms with 23mm cannons and Mi-8s have joined the Ka-29s in anti-drone operations, destroying dozens of Unmanned suicide boat drones.
https://topwar.ru/242572-opublikovany-fotografii-unichtozhennyh-v-chernom-more-bezjekipazhnyh-katerov-vsu.html https://southfront.press/in-video-russian-boats-helicopters-take-out-ukrainian-naval-drones-in-black-sea/ Video related is operations of the Mi-35M
>Footage of an attack by a Russian Mi-35M helicopter on a Ukrainian maritime drone MAGURA V5 has been published. The Mi-35M helicopter fires at the drone from an NPPU-23 installation with a GSh-23L double-barreled aviacannon of 23 mm caliber. The GSh-23L air cannon is liquid-cooled, which allows it to fire in long bursts without high-speed air flow blowing over the gun; the GSh-23L's rate of fire is 3,400 rounds per minute. Reportedly, a total of 15 maritime drones were destroyed in the Black Sea, but only one was shown on video. >>4952In following the mounting of missiles on drones, a larger unmanned boat series called Sea Baby have had MLRS systems mounted on them.
https://topwar.ru/242886-primenjaemye-sbu-bezjekipazhnye-katera-sea-baby-osnastili-reaktivnymi-sistemami-zalpovogo-ognja.html One such unit was used to barrage the Russian EW fortified positions on the Kinburn Spit located in the Dnepr-Buk Estuary.
>>5103They've actually begun production without a design plan. Usually, you have a 80-90% complete design plan adjustable to modification for any changes made down the line. The shipyard is literally constructing ships without a blueprint. They are laying down keels already and they have no idea how this thing is supposed to look. They don't even have a 3D model or a mock up. Its been a decade since the program begun and its still in the elementary design phase butc fuck it we have to keep to schedule so we're gonna build it anyway.
The original design was to basically build a FREMM with some modifications to carry US Navy weapons and equipment. This works fine since the contractor already builds FREMMs and its a proven design but nooo Uncle Sam had to have a bright idea: we want to redesign the hull and throw in a brand new hybrid propulsion system that's not only never been tested before but we have no intention of building this system to test it before actually constructing the ship. That's right they are going ahead with an unproven power plant that has never been proven before even in lab studies or controlled tests. Its LCS 2.0 but bigger.
>>5132It's as bad as the Zumwalt tbh. The LCS and Zumwalt should have been a lesson… clearly it was not learned. As a side note I don't think people realize just how MASSIVE the Zumwalt is (pic rel) yet how poorly designed and armed it is. 2 "special" artillery cannons as its primary armament and missiles that are in such low quantity as to be easily overwhelmed by any serious attack. The main ammunition is all this precision guided stuff that has been proven to be unreliable in Ukraine due to jamming.
>>4945They're so ineffective tha there are plans to remove the 155mm guns and replace them with Hypersonic missiles, hypersonic missiles that the US military does not have at the moment, with the few models it has being barely in testing and do not perform consistently.
https://topwar.ru/244343-zamvolt-bez-pushek-i-na-veslah.html As posts
>>5147 >>5132 >>5103 >>1969 demonstrate, the US Navy ship-building for the future is disorganized, the only ships I can think of being constructed properly in these past few years was the recent Gerald R. Ford Class Nuclear Aircraft Carriers. Everything else has been a mess. Russia has had a similar problem, but that was primarily due to the dissolution of the USSR fucking up its industry and other socio-economic aspects in general. The depiction of e.g. "rusting Soviet-era hulks", has some basis in fact, but conceals as much as it reveals. Russia's famously "old" submarine fleet, for example, isn't older than the US submarine fleet and ships in general have expected service lifespans of 35-40 years, with many US Naval ships easily being older than some of Russia's. The real problem for the Russian Navy has not just been the retention and poor-maintenance to date of late-Soviet-era ships, but the low rate of production of new vessels to replace them, with the largest warships produced since the USSR being the 6,600t Ivan Gren landing ship and the 5,400t Gorshkov class frigates. And that's an entirely different discussion.
The USN is just an example of Capitalism in decay: - The USS Bonhomme Richard was scuttled because repairing it after the fire damage in San Diego would have cost a little over 3 billion dollars and take 3 years. Meanwhile, the cost of replacing the ship outright in 2020 (when it was decided to be decommissioned) was 4 billion, so rather than repair a damaged but seaworthy ship that exists, the Navy is opting to replace it in the future for an extra 1 billion dollars, even as costs go up, with the cost of a replacement for the Wasp-Class light carrier rising to over 4.1 billion dollars as of 2023. Considering that constructing a new ship of the class takes 3-4 years, it the Navy's decision was idiotic, but in part due to a lack of repair facilities.
- The larger USS John C. Stennis and George Washington have had their RCOH delayed heavily, with the two carriers only expected to come back into service at the end of 2026 and 2027 respectively.
https://topwar.ru/244574-kapitalnyj-remont-avianosca-vms-ssha-dzhon-k-stennis-otlozhen-na-zavershenie-rabot-potrebuetsja-bolee-5-let.html https://www.sycamoreinstitute.org/post/sinking-the-navy-s-sunk-cost-fallacy https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/17/us-navy-ships-shipbuilding-fleet-china-naval-race-pacific/ Of course it doesn't help that the US Navy relies on Japanese steel and ship-building even as said steel has been substandard for literal decades
https://www.quora.com/Can-the-United-States-build-a-new-carrier-group-every-five-years-for-the-next-fifty-years/answer/CaiLei-2 https://topwar.ru/243123-na-rodine-sroki-rabot-prevyshajut-gody-vms-ssha-peredajut-kompetencii-remonta-korablej-japonskim-verfjam.html So in other words the famous shipyards of the US Navy have rotted into incompetence and impotence.
https://news.usni.org/2019/05/31/fitzgerald-co-destroyer-repairs-at-risk-from-poor-shipyard-fire-safety The same is applicable to European ships. As seen in the Ukraine posts about economic production failures this is also a problem of the over-all military from tanks and artillery, to missiles and ships (
>>4991 >>4897 >>4823 >>4824 >>4693 ).
The UK's aircraft carriers have had numerous problems, ranging from smoking engines and rust, to fires and breakdowns.
https://news.usni.org/2024/02/05/u-k-carrier-hms-queen-elizabeth-sidelined-european-carriers-head-for-pacific https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/royal-navys-aircraft-carrier-nightmare-just-wont-end-209971 The same applies to their Nuclear submarines
>>4646 due to budget cuts reducing maintenance and causing corrosion issues that haven't been solved since they were reported.
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/nov/16/submarine-corrosion-cost-cutting-mod-memo https://topwar.ru/245326-jeto-pozor-britanskij-admiral-raskritikoval-sostojanie-jadernoj-infrastruktury-soedinennogo-korolevstva.html Not to mention the lack of safety for the Trident missiles:
https://wikileaks.org/trident-safety/ https://www.navylookout.com/a-credible-deterrent-trident-missile-fails-during-test-launch-from-hms-vanguard/ And other smaller ships have had issues with internals because British drydocks are fucked, such as the Type 45s whose engines literally die in the heat of equatorial regions of the Ocean.
https://topwar.ru/231942-problemy-sudoremonta-v-anglii.html https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/jan/21/royal-navy-warships-crashed-into-each-other-due-to-faulty-rewiring-say-sources Danish, German and Italian Warships have had numerous missile launch problems, and these were known in advance but not resolved because it wasn't seen as an important issue
https://www.politico.eu/article/danish-defense-chief-dismissed-after-warship-malfunctions-in-red-sea-battle/ https://www.businessinsider.com/missile-misfire-damages-deck-of-a-german-navy-frigate-sachsen-2018-6 https://www.twz.com/sea/danish-frigate-suffered-radar-combat-system-gun-problems-during-red-sea-ops-reports >the German Navy’s Sachsen class frigate Hessen mistakenly fired two SM-2 missiles at a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone. The Reaper survived the incident only because those missiles failed to function >the (Danish) warship was unable to fire its ESSM air defense missiles for a half-hour period, while “up to half” of the rounds fired from the (Italian) twin 76mm guns detonated too early and close to the ship. The most recent German warships are also poorly armed and extremely pricey while failing their trials.
https://archive.ph/6Qnxr Canada's Arctic patrol ships are a joke, both in design and in actual execution. Based on civilian Coast Guard vessels They have no CIWS, no military grade SONAR and RADAR, a terrible top speed for ships of their size and class, yet are supposed to be PATROL ships.
https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/latest-breakdown-on-new-arctic-ship-blamed-on-failed-diesel-generators https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/royal-canadian-navys-new-arctic-ships-have-a-severe-flooding-problem-say-sailors https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/leaks-ineffective-anchors-mechanical-breakdowns-among-ongoing-problems-facing-new-arctic-patrol-ships https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-navy-critical-state-1.7044267 https://nationalpost.com/opinion/our-navy-sinks-toward-impotenceWhy the U.S. Can’t Build Icebreaking Ships
https://www.construction-physics.com/p/why-the-us-cant-build-icebreaking
>Because polar bodies of water are often covered in ice, accessing these regions by ship requires specially designed ships which can break up the ice and create a path for other ships to follow. The need for icebreaking vessels will remain even as climate change reduces the extent of sea ice: paradoxically, as new polar routes become accessible and sea ice becomes more mobile, the demand for icebreakers is likely to increase. Russia has an aging fleet of more than 40 icebreakers, with several under construction. China has somewhere between 5 and 7 icebreakers (depending on exactly how you define “icebreaker”), with more under construction.1
>The U.S., on the other hand, has allowed its icebreaking capabilities to wither. The Coast Guard has handled all U.S. icebreaking since 1966, and estimates that it needs 8-9 polar icebreakers (4-5 heavy and 4-5 medium) to fulfill its needs. But it currently has only two: the heavy icebreaker Polar Star, and the medium icebreaker Healy. The U.S. hasn’t built a heavy icebreaker since 1976. In fact, no existing U.S. shipyard has built a heavy polar icebreaker since before 1970. A 2017 National Academies report stated that “The nation is ill-equipped to protect its interests and maintain leadership in these regions and has fallen behind other Arctic nations, which have mobilized to expand their access to ice-covered regions.”Unique IPs: 66