>>2717921>baitNo, its called an epistemological discourse (or perhaps even a demonstration). If the claim is that we come to "know" without the means of our senses (such is the case you have made) then it portrays knowledge as something insensible, or derived from the mind alone. I contrast "knowledge" (that is, of apprehending "things") from "belief" (that is, supposing to knowledge of things, yet having necessary ignorance) to prove that the view of knowledge as deriving from sensation alone is insufficient. Proof of this is in the necessary terms of empirical knowledge needing sensation to "verify" claims, which thus makes all empirical claims "beliefs" rather than knowledge, for to know is to not believe (for belief is necessarily a form of ignorance, as I have said).
In developing the means of the discussion, I invoke a form of insensible knowledge, such as (1+1=2). This is known, not believed, and so is verified by its own terms. If what is "known" does not belong to experience, but only belongs to the mind, and what is purported as knowledge by experience is necessarily ignorance, then we conclude that knowledge cannot belong to the body, and so all knowledge necessarily belongs to the mind.
The relevance of this epistemology is to demonstrate ontology, for if we return to earlier arguments, the materialist appears to only believe in "stuff", and cannot purport to believe in "things". If we then accept the epistemological argument that knowledge is only the knowledge of things, then the materialist abandons knowledge, for he denies the existence of distinction. This then explains why the materialist is most often an empiricist, for both make knowledge an impossibility. Of course, the materialist falls into inherent contradiction for all these efforts, by claiming no knowledge, except the knowledge that all no-things are made of stuff. The contradiction is in that he concludes this by his mind, and so comes to knowledge, from its abstract negation.
Of course, one can remain a materialist (but only by denying the validity of rational argumentation, and many materialists are shamelessly irrational, as we've seen). The materialist suffers greater problems however, since he is not just in a crisis of ontology and epistemology, but also of ethics. If the materialist adopts Marxism for exam
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