>>2725875>a presupposition is just a kind of propositionI simply disagree, so we must abandon this issue. You see that a valid presupposition is true in the terms which it constitutes, but in my opinion, you fail to see how what is proposed is different from what is presupposed.
>you have to have propositions to formulate the law of identity.Okay, so what are the primary propositions of logic?
>it's an absolute fact within an intentionally constructed practice of constrained signification.Yes, which denotes the content of thinking, which as something bound to necessity, is a logical structure. Thus as I have written, the laws of thought are logical.
>reason's practical and historical apprehension of natureReason is not an object of history, it is the subject. If not, then the meaning of history is absolved.
>you haven't provided a definitionBut this is the same trouble in Theaetetus; to provide a theory for how we come to know (epistemology), we find that we must already know so as to come to know. This is why the rational subject is a knowing being, which begins in self-identity. If you deny your own identity, then from whence doth thou speaketh?
>the epistemic subject is genuinely a blank slate prior to the perceptual act of knowledge creation we call learningKant disproves this by seeing how the form of empirical knowledge is formed from the pure intuitions of space and time (in the understanding). Phenomena (i.e. perception) is constituted by these, which do not exist in things themselves, but in how things appear to us. To perceive thus, is to have content for what is formal. Proof of this is in how thinking itself is perceptual, as you put it, and so is conditioned by an internal space and time, which as I have said, links necessity to causation, and so logic to the realm of intelligence.
>you only know what you rememberWe also come to know by Reason alone, hence I can know that all bachelors are unmarried, despite never having a memory of all bachelors and married people.
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