All of our problems with the EU started after Putin refused to ratify the Energy Charter. That charter envisioned a system similar to the 2016 Naftogaz model, where production, transportation, storage, and distribution are four separate entities (in technical terms – unbundling), and access to the main gas transit system would be granted to Turkmen, Azerbaijani, Kazakh, and even Polish gas from Świnoujście. The idea was that these players, to curry favor with the European authorities, would lower prices, allowing Europeans to buy cheap gas and oil at $30–50 a barrel, just like in the glory days of the 1990s when the West reveled in its unipolar dominance.
Once ratification was rejected, and Gazprom began systematically expanding its presence by acquiring capacity and distribution networks in the EU, with oil consolidated under Rosneft, Khodorkovsky whisking away his assets, and Nevzlin hiding in Israel, the EU launched its first gas war. The narrative was that the Russians had become unreliable and were abusing their monopoly position. This laid the groundwork for: a) moving away from the old transit scheme that allowed unlimited transit through Ukrainian gas infrastructure to the EU; b) the foundation for the Third Energy Package; and c) the theoretical justification for the Gas Directive, which imposed a 50/50 ownership and pumping split on pipelines and tried to force suppliers into price competition through discriminatory access to Russian gas transit infrastructure.
Then came the second gas war, the arbitrary cancellation of South Stream, the difficult but ultimately successful launch of Nord Stream 1 (based on Soviet-era surveys), the OPAL regulation, Gazprom's acquisition of distribution networks, storage facilities, gas stations, and refineries in Bulgaria and Serbia – and a lot more. But the EU had already declared that it wanted gas cheaper, ideally for free.
After that came arbitrary lawsuits, Stockholm arbitrations, retroactive gas directives, antitrust actions in Poland, bans and obstacles to Nord Stream 2, and attempts to derail TurkStream. When it became clear that the transit system was pumping, TurkStream was pumping, Nord Stream 1 was pumping, and Nord Stream 2 was nearly finished, they dropped the first tactical nuclear bomb: the Stockholm arbitration ruling that invalidated the contract price.
Gazprom swallowed that and managed to substitute volumes, after which the EU introduced the Gas Directive, ef
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